Zach WeinerSmith Polystate v7
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Zach WeinerSmith Polystate v7...
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POLYSTATE A Tought Experiment Exper iment in Distributed Government
By Zach Weinersmith
This is not a copyright page. This is a Creative Commons Page. Zach Weinersmith, 2013. Some Rights Reserved. Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ Weinersmith, Zach Polystate: A Thought Experiment in Distributed Government Book designed by Michael David Johnson
CONTENTS FOREWARD BOOK1 erms and Conditions What is a Geostate? Approximate Anthrostates Why the Polystate Requires Modern and Future echnology Potential Benefits o a Polystate
BOOK 2 Caveats and Backpedaling Crime and Punishment Children in a Polystate Commerce Co-Existence with Geostates Discriminatory Systems Healthcare Privacy and Censorship Public Property and/or Private Property ax Evasion/Manipulation Ungoverned People War
BOOK 3 Bureaucracy Explosion Constrains on Social Security via Age Sorting De-Integration o Society Ethical Co-Existence Mob Rule Sacred Locations Saety/Weapon Carrying
Startup Costs ransition
EPILOGUE
FOREWORD In this book, I wish to explain a concept o governance I call “anthrostate.” In simple terms, an anthrostate is a virtual state whose laws apply only to individuals, not to geographic areas. I am not a proponent o this idea or a detractor. I’m just a nerd with a thought experiment and a lot o time on his hands. Much o science fiction has to do with the act that what is possible ofen becomes typical. In this way, science fiction ofen smooths the introduction o new technologies by exploring their meaning, ethics, sanguine visions, and dystopian possibilities in advance o their existence. Speculative science fiction has in this way both entertained and aided civilization. H.G. Wells’ Te World Set Free did not prevent nuclear war (nor did it accurately predict the nature o such weapons), but it nevertheless helped develop an ethical stance toward the dark days to come. Indeed, through the influence it had on Leo Szilard, Wells’ book helped both to create and subdue atomic warare. George Orwell’s 1984 has not entirely prevented the rise o powerul state surveillance apparatuses, but it has given us an understanding o their danger and a our-numeral code by which to signiy our worst ears. Wells was writing in the age o the rise o science in warare. Orwell was writing in the age o the rise o psychology in warare and governance. It seems to me we are now in an era o discretization o experience. Tanks to advances in computing and manuacturing, variety and personalization o experience are everywhere. In a certain sense, the greatest o modern luxuries is choice — one’s options or ood, entertainment, field o endeavor, and even mate choice seem to grow year by year. As 3D printing becomes more commonplace, it may be the case that almost every aspect o lie is personalized in the same way Internet search and social media are today.1 In other words, the trend o history is toward more individual choice and personalization o lie experience. Clever sofware and cheap computing has made this trend exponential. Perhaps then it is only a matter o time beore 1 Te author is well aware that he is, by and large, talking about the wealthiest portion o living humans. However, as global affluence increases and the Internet becomes completely ubiquitous, this paragraph should hold true or more and more people.
people begin to wonder why they can’t personalize their government too. Tat is the subject o “Polystate.” I hope you will think o this book as a sort o “poli sci fi” work exploring a conception o government, largely in the abstract. For all that it may get wrong, it is educated speculation, and it is made in the recognition that anthrostates may well be a possibility in the near uture and are thereore worth considering in the present.
BOOK 1 Te Anthrostate
Chapter 1: Terms and Conditions
Beore I go orward, I wish to introduce three terms I have made up. My riends know I have a proound loathing or jargon. However, just as the Second Law o Termodynamics technically permits occasional decrease in systemic entropy, now and then jargon can be used to increase clarity. I hope this is one o those rare times. Te three words I wish to introduce are “anthrostate,” “geostate,” and “polystate.” Te first word is the major concept in this book. I define it thus: A set o laws and institutions that govern the behavior o individuals, but which do not govern a behavior within geographic borders. For example, suppose you subscribed to a ascist anthrostate. Tat would mean the rules o that ascist state apply to you, but may not apply to your neighbors. Perhaps your neighbors are citizens o a syndicalist geostate or a social democracy. Tis is opposed to the typical notion o statehood, which is the application o laws over the individuals who claim citizenship within a geographic area. In order to set the typical notion o statehood in juxtaposition to the anthrostate, the second term I introduce is “geostate.” When I say “geostate,” you should think o a typical nation, such as France, Japan, or Mexico. Te third term I wish to introduce is “polystate.” Te polystate is simply the collection o anthrostates in a hypothetical human society. I believe that in any system o anthrostates it will be necessary to have certain overarching laws, which will be embodied in the polystate.
Chapter 2: What is a Geostate?
I you stop and think about it, a geostate is a strange entity. What exactly is an American? Is an American someone who lives inside a region bounded by certain latitudinal meridians? Is an American someone who obeys most o the laws o a certain geographic region, whether or not she is inside that region currently? Is an American someone who subscribes to a civic religion or speaks with a certain accent, or has a certain cultural vocabulary? Te strange thing is that an American is all o those things. So, the geostate called America is a superposition o many institutions — legal, cultur-
al, geographic, and so orth. Why should it be thus? Why should we suppose that a person who likes hot dogs, is amiliar with a two-party electoral system, and believes Abraham Lincoln was a great man is necessarily someone who should live in a temperate climate in the Western hemisphere? Many cultural qualities o a society may be determined by arbitrary acts o geography. For example, it should not surprise us to learn that rules o social engagement differ between polar and equatorial societies. Tis is not to deny that history and culture and the choices o individuals matter, but rather to assert that many o the “essential” qualities o nationhood are not, in the long run, meaningul ones. More importantly, laws o nations change drastically over time. Te structure o the modern Japanese state would not be recognizable to a medieval Japanese person. Slavery is considered antithetical to Americanness, yet it existed or nearly the first century o that nation. A Russian man who lived rom 1900 to 2000 would have seen his state go rom a monarchy to hopeul communism to a dictatorship to a nominal democracy, and yet might well consider himsel “Russian” all the time. In a sense, the experience o the state recapitulates the experience o the individual. I am not the person I was at age 10 — a act I deduce rom the lack o Star Wars posters on my wall. I am not the person I was at 20. In act, I suspect I would not get along with those people particularly well. Te state is not so different — America is America because it hasn’t stopped being America. Te laws have changed dramatically, as has the religious makeup, the ethnic makeup, the population size, the urban-rural distribution, the geographic borders, and the cultural hallmarks. Tat is, a geostate continues to be itsel only so long as there is not a discrete moment at which the people governed by it choose or it to change, usually at great cost o blood, treasure, and order. All this is to say simply that geostates are not entities pre-ordained by the human condition. Tey should not be taken as inevitable. We should especially consider the extent to which technology influences the meaning o geography. As technology changes, the meaning o locality changes. Seasonal produce is now year-round. Dispersed amilies can now see each other regularly. Even economic externalities may in time be rendered harmless by technology. As Gordon ullock wrote in “What Should Government Do,” externalities that tend to be geographic in area such as pollution may simply
be mitigated by new developments.1 Indeed, development o society per se may help minimize such costs by limiting locality. In the year 1800, a New Yorker might have little desire to be taxed or a road in San Francisco. Te price o that road is a cost to him with no direct benefit. Te more interconnected society becomes, especially in terms o transportation speed and globalized commerce, the more palpable the effect o a crumbling Caliornia road becomes to a New Yorker, or perhaps even a Londoner or Parisian. Another externality cited by ullock is the natural monopoly. A natural monopoly is, in short, when a service or good is provided most efficiently by a single provider. ullock’s claim is that a natural monopoly will (naturally) be run in an inefficient manner. I this is the case, government intervention may well be warranted. However, what i we consider the government o a geostate as having a natural monopoly over coercion? Does this produce an efficient outcome? Laws applied to diverse people necessarily contain ineficiencies. Tis is not necessarily a problem. Consider or example the case o drunk-driving laws. It may be the case that there are certain individuals who drive perectly well at an illegal level o blood alcohol content. Te law is unair toward them compared with individuals who are more typical in their alcohol impairment.2 Nevertheless, we consider it a good law because this externality is small when compared to the benefit. But, suppose we reversed the situation. Suppose the blood alcohol limit were set below a level where 95% o people could drive saely. In that case, the law might or might not be efficient, depending on the danger posed by the weak-livered 5%. 1 o give a counterpoint, Enrico Moretti has convincingly argued in Te New Geography o Jobs that locality has persisted in importance even in the age o the Internet because o the value o shared inormation between local networks o experts. It will remain to be seen i this effect persists as the Internet matures. I admit, as a cartoonist, I have been very surprised by the number o cartoonists who live and work in Brooklyn, Portland, and San Francisco, even though their incomes are not geographically determined. Considering the cost-o-living difference between Brooklyn and, say, Birmingham, this location choice is something like cutting one’s disposable income by two-thirds. Moretti might suggest this has to do with these networks, though no doubt status and personal predilection are very important. Nevertheless, to the extent that ace-to-ace meetups remain important, technology may eventually overcome location. Tere is no reason in principle that the time taken by the trip rom Los Angeles to Paris could not be reduced to the time o a car commute in 2013 rom the suburbs to the city. 2 Note, this is true even though the hyper-tolerant individuals receive a positive externality, as they are protected rom other people’s drunk driving. Afer all, both groups are protected, but only the hypo-tolerant individuals are protected rom themselves.
I the cost o bargaining and lawmaking were not very high, the optimum outcome might be a law that that applies slightly differently to each person. Tis is only easible with technology, but more on that later. Setting aside the normative question o whether it is desirable to have one law apply differently to individuals, a DUI law that scaled with tolerance and driving ability might be most efficient or all people. Changing the laws (be they written down or just understood) under which you operate has always been difficult. In the modern world, you basically have two options — change location or change the laws in your geostate. Te ormer is difficult, and the latter is practically impossible or most people. It is not possible in a more or less uncorrupt geostate that I should have a different set o taxes and services than my neighbor 3. Tis is true even i each o us would voluntarily choose different systems. I cannot, or example, say “Well, this year I wish to pay less in taxes, so please don’t have the police protect me.” In the geostate, I exist in the same set o laws as other ull-fledged citizens. Tis is not inevitably the case, but it is certainly convenient. A massive bureaucracy would be required to have many overlapping varieties o law. As we shall see, this is a potential problem in a polystate, but it is not insurmountable.
Chapter 3: Approximate Anthrostates
Any system in which ree association is allowed will possess something akin to anthrostates. For example, i you are a citizen o Mexico, you abide by Mexican law. I you are a Mexican citizen, you are likely also to be Catholic. Tus, you obey a certain set o rules in addition to the geostate rules. I you decide you dislike 3
It is air to note that a rich person may effectively buy himsel a different set o tax laws and services, but at least nominally the same tax system applies to every citizen, whose ortunes may wax and wane. It could also be noted that most Western or Westernized states nowadays have progressive tax systems and welare systems that apply differently to different people. Although this is true, the same set o laws still applies to everyone. Tat is, a millionaire who goes broke is entitled to welare, just as a poor person who becomes rich is still obligated to pay more.
the rules o Catholicism, you are ree to switch to a different set o rules, or no rules at all, so long as you still obey geostate law. However, your obeisance to the local church is not a matter o legal obligation. I you break your vow not to play video games during lent, there may be some social comeuppance, but the church has no legal ability to orceully coerce you to obey. Similarly, an individual in a geostate may belong to many types o organizations. For example, i you are the leader o a Boy Scout troop, you are obligated to go to the woods, wear shorts, and sport a yellow neckerchie. However, these rules are not made binding with orce. Tey are no more laws, and thereore no more anthrostatist, than the rule that i you don’t do your share o housework your spouse will make you aware o your deficiency. It might also be argued that conederated systems (i.e., those in which internal states are granted a great amount o autonomy) are a sort o anthrostate. At this moment on 6/10/2013, I am sitting outside a library in uscaloosa, Alabama. I have no doubt that i I were to begin selling marijuana to passersby, I would quickly be arrested and jailed. I I were in Washington or Colorado, the use o the same substance would, within certain limits, cause me no trouble. In that sense, it could be argued that conederated systems offer something like a polystate. However, they are necessarily geostates because they cast their laws geographically. And, all o the states within a larger nation must obey a large set o ederal laws, and must subordinate much o their ability to use orce on citizens. o the extent that these internal states can use orce, that orce is circumscribed by the ederal state. It could also be argued that a polystate o anthrostates is not different in a meaningul way rom a minarchic 4 or anarchic5 geostate. However, in both philosophical and practical terms, it would be quite different. For example, a minarchic geostate would still claim national boundaries. I a ascistic geostate were to invade a minarchy, the minarchy would find itsel in a state o war. In a polystate, the ascist and minarchist anthrostates inside it would be coextensive, and the very idea o “invasion” would be nonsensical. o give another example — in a geostate o minimal laws, suppose Alice picks the pocket o Betsy. In a minarchy with a public court system, Betsy may seek legal remedy. In a minarchy with no public court system, we may suppose Alice would have to use private means to achieve arbitration. On the other hand, in a polystate, the picked pocket would be an issue between 4 I use this term to mean a minimal state that has property rights. 5 Unless otherwise modified, by “anarchy” I mean a complete lack o state, including a lack o property rights.
Alice’s and Betsy’s states that would have to be mutually arbitrated. I they were under the same anthrostate, anthrostate law (or lack thereo) would abide. I they were under different anthrostates in a single polystate, legal action would have to proceed in a manner somewhat akin to what geostates do with international police matters. It may be noted that international police matters are not highly developed, but it is conceivable this would change in a polystate. Te bureaucratic issues will be discussed more later. It might also be argued that a polystate is in some way a orm o syndicalism6. However, anthrostates, being diverse entities, are not syndicates. Even i they were, many (i not most) would allow non-syndicalist behavior, such as money and private property. Simply stated — although there are modern systems that approximate a polystate, there are undamental ways in which they differ, which lead to the probability that the construction o polystate society would be different rom geostate society.
Chapter 4: Why the Polystate Requires Modern and Future Technology
Right now you can’t buy a paperback book in any size you like. It is orders o magnitude cheaper, both at the level o the printer and distributor, to give everyone the size o book. Companies that are being very generous (or, more likely, squeezing money rom collectors) will sometimes print as many as a hal-dozen varieties, but rarely more. I books in physical orm persist into the uture, it is possible this situation will change thanks to developments in robotics and manuacturing. As robotics and additive manuacturing de velop, we can expect to see inexpensive ubiquitous customizability in all aspects o lie, rom simple products to the size and shape o our homes to the genetics o our children. It is conceivable that governments could go much the same way. In the past and in the present, the idea o tailoring the experience o every individual to his taxes, healthcare laws, social services, and so on would be unthinkable. Government bureaucracy is large enough without having to provide this massive service. But suppose that in at some point, computer AI is good 6 I use syndicalism to reer to the system outlined in the book Anarcho-Syndicalism: Teory and Practice by Rudolph Rocker. A rough sketch o the idea is “the replacement o the state and o state economic systems by trade union cooperatives.”
enough that “computer assistants” actually assist the user in a meaningul way? Suppose that more and more delivery o goods and services can be done on the spot by individuals, thanks to better technology. In this case, it is possible that government could be extremely tailored to the individual. Tis would open up the possibility o a polystate in the real world. It seems to me the two great barriers to a polystate are distance and bureaucratic complexity. Much o the solution to distance has already been achieved. With the creation o the Internet, you can instantly file your taxes whether you’re living at home, afloat on the ocean, or in space. One suspects the taxman would do a better job o locating you in space than the man with the check rom Social Security, and yet the provision o services too has been greatly simplified in the age o the Internet. In the Victorian era, bicycles were spoken o as “annihilating distance.” People and data now travel quite a bit aster and, as noted earlier, have not yet reached theoretical maxima. Speed is the exchange rate between distance and time, and the exchange rate is getting more and more avorable. Te bureaucratic complexity problem is more proound and probably awaits more developments in technological areas o computing, printing, and rapid delivery o goods. Better AI and higher computer speeds would be needed or many things in a polystate. Tere are many examples o why this should be but let us consider one that is emblematic: I there are ar more states, and those states are coextensive, legal arbitrations would be complex. In act, the number o possible inter-anthrostate dealings rises exponentially with the addition o each new anthrostate. For a polystate to unction efficiently, the legal complexity o inter-anthrostate arbitration would have to be extremely streamlined. Even mildly improved AI would greatly acilitate this. Commerce too would be very complex, and or similar reasons. I people o various systems are commingled in an environment where many governments may have many orms o tariff or embargoes and such, it would be necessary to have a system by which to readily calculate transactions. A polystate would likely increase the complexity o business and legal transaction. In a world with only 200 or so geostates, most commerce is not interstate and even i it were, geometry tells us that the number o possible
two-state transactions is given by n(n-1)/2.7 Consider then the situation o 10,000 anthrostates! It may turn out that, or a variety o reasons, the interactions would be less complex in practice. I can imagine a ew ways in which there might be a second term in the equation that would lower the total. For example, many systems could agree to common rules or a range o common legal matters. Much like many different devices can use the same charger, there could be some standardization between many legal systems. It’s even conceivable that there could be a taxonomy o anthrostate types so that although 1,000,000 interactions are possible, only 10 or 20 interaction types happen in practice. Additionally, a polystate rule could be made simply to limit the number o states to a manageable amount. But, it seems likely that whatever rules were put in place, the result would be too burdensome to exist without a large bureaucracy or some sort o computational way to arbitrate these many interactions. Advanced printing might also simpliy bureaucracy. Consider a world in which medical diagnosis can be done by computer and in which drugs can be printed. Tese two technologies would make the provision o almost any state healthcare system very simple. I the materials o which the drugs are made could be transported rapidly, no human beings would be required at all. Te citizenry would have only to decide how much money to invest in the healthcare system. Tis is, o course, science fiction. However, some or all o it may be available in the next 50 years, and the provision o major services at a distance would eliminate the need or an incredible amount o bureaucracy. In his 1860 essay, “Panarchie,” which is the closest notion I’ve ound to the polystate idea, Paul Emile de Puydt brings up some o the issues contained in this book. In his notion, people go to a local register and sign up or a type o government. Many o the major problems he cites could potentially be navigated with more modern computing technology. For example, he proposes that the existence o only 10-20 government options would make or difficulty. But, in my opinion, it is likely (and grows more likely as population increases) that although there might be 10-20 major governments, 7 Tat is, or 200 anthrostates, there are 19,900 possible interactions. o a good approximation, i you square the number o anthrostates, you get the number o possible interactions. Tus, the number o interactions becomes unwieldy very quickly. Tat said, as my computer scientist riend, Dr. Alex Roederer, notes, “the act that this is quadratic means to me the growth in complexity is manageable.”
there would also be many different varieties with small variations. Te history o religion is proo that the interpretation o seemingly small acts can be the difference between unity and schism. It seems to me that what we have here is a problem o databasing technology and the meaning o locality. Te first problem might be solved already. Locality has not yet become meaningless — indeed, in the age o the Internet, locality may have ironically become more important thanks to the extra inormation generated by dense population — but i the speed o travel were ever increased by an order o magnitude, this might change. I should probably take care and not say too much more on the topic o uture technology. As the saying goes, “Predict the uture? It’s hard enough predicting the past.” One need only look at any prognostication older than 50 years to see that predictions tend to only be right or the same reason that a thousand arrows shot will result in a ew bullseyes. Tat said, I do think it tenable to state that technology will increase choice and abundance to the point where a polystate is an economic and clerical possibility. But, we probably aren’t there yet.
Chapter 5: Potential Benefits of a Polystate
Here, I will only attempt to lay out some obvious benefits to the idea o the polystate. As you read, you may find yoursel noting that some o these benefits are double-edged (and that the other edge may have fire and poison on it), but I will attempt to address those problems later in the book. Te most obvious benefit to living in a system o anthrostates is the level o choice. I you are a child born in a geostate that is ascistic, you will grow up in ascism with no choice but to stay or take great risk to escape. Tis is the mere result o physical reality. Borders can be guarded, governments tend to have better weapons than civilians, and most people are not willing to engage in any behavior that carries even a small risk o death. In a polystate o anthrostates, change o government would be available readily. I you were born into a ascist anthrostate and dislike the elements o that government, you would be ree to leave once you reach an appropriate age. It should be noted that the reverse o this scenario is also true, distasteul though it might seem at first glance. I you are born in a social democracy,
but decide you would rather be the property o a charismatic law-giver, you would be ree to join the hypothetical cult-ascism anthrostate. Perhaps you find your personality more suited to a radical orm o government than the airly narrow spectrum o governments available today. Indeed, one o the benefits o ree non-geographic choice is that geostate orms that have historically been problematic might prove possible as anthrostates. In many nominally Communist 8 geostates, collective arming has been imposed with the apparently inevitable result that those arms work less efficiently. It may be that the ailure o collectivization has not got to do with the individual so much as the aggregate. I 95% o people work poorly in a collectivized environment, any random collectivized arm will perorm poorly. But it may be the case that 5% o people would excel in such an environment. By allowing individuals ree, available, inexpensive choice o government, generally unpopular orms o existence might prove to be benign or even beneficial to the unusual individuals who choose them. A related benefit might be to reduce internal bureaucratic complexity by creating homogenized groups. Tis would be at the expense o the creation o complex external bureaucracies, but it is worth noting. Consider a nation made entirely o clones o me compared to a nation made o random indi viduals. Most people take it or granted that it would be undesirable to have a centralized government decide what sort o bread everyone gets. Tere are several reasons or this. One is that there would probably be a high bargaining cost (either in a bureaucracy or in a voting system) devoted to determining what bread would be allotted in what amount. Perhaps more importantly, a central board is likely to not know that I preer sourdough to wheat. As Bertrand Russell wrote in Te Proposed Roads to Freedom9, “On every matter that arises, [the people in the Official Caste] know ar more than the general public about all the definite acts involved; the one thing they do not know is ‘where the shoe pinches.’ “ Te central planning board poses two large costs — one at the level o bureaucracy and/or bargaining, and another at the level o the ill-served consumer. 8 I say “nominally” here because it is open to debate whether a true Communist society has ever existed. 9 It would perhaps be more prudent to cite something Hayek said here, but I wish to make it clear that the polystate idea is not to my mind aligned with any particular political ideology. Te cited book by Russell advocates Guild Socialism.
However, in the hypothetical state where everyone is a Zach Weinersmith clone, the shoe pinches in the same place on every oot. Tis reduces both the bargaining cost (due to easily achieved consensus) and the externality o painul ootwear. Tis example is o course absurd, but one can easily imagine the spectrum. I people are highly assortative in their choice o government, internal costs o organization may be substantially reduced. Te second major benefit, which is the natural offspring o this ree choice, is that citizens have a great deal o recourse against their government. In America, it has become a cliche that, prior to the potential election o a president o a certain party, wealthy celebrities threaten to emigrate. Celebrities are not typically a good group to look to or data, but they are relevant here in that they presumably have the means to leave the country readily, much more so than the typical American. When the election happens, ew leave. Tere are several reasons why this might be the case, but I suspect the main reason is that it’s difficult to leave one’s country, even i one has the means. In addition to bureaucratic inertia, one must leave behind a world o riends and relatives, o people with similar cultural heritage, and o people with the same accent and language(s). One’s options or a nation to flee to are also limited in their diversity. Te wealthiest countries (on a per capita basis) have many differences, but almost without exception they are representative governments with mixed economies. Tus, change o geostate does not necessarily imply a great change in experience o governance. In a polystate, where change o anthrostate is available on a regular basis, leaving a country would be a simple affair. Tereore, punishing one’s leaders is a simple affair. Consequently, leaders o a government would have more need to please their constituents. In a geostate, once you are the prime minister o a nation o about 100,000,000 people, you are very likely to end your term as the prime minister o a nation o about 100,000,000 people. Tat is, your “customer” base cannot change significantly. Tis is true even under low-quality and generally disliked governance. For example, the population o North Korea has increased every year since the end o the Korean War. One suspects this is despite the airly tepid immigration numbers. In act, it may surprise the reader to learn that the ratio o North Koreans to South Koreans has actually increased over time. Tere are perectly scrutable sociological reasons or this, which I will not go into here, but or our purposes the salient act is that Kim Jong-un has more citizens in his country than his
ather had. It is hard to imagine he would have this larger population i any o his citizens could have reely switched to any other government. Indeed, i the polystate system were in any way reflective (as it might well be) o the rise and all o social networks, it is conceivable that an anthrostate might experience the loss o the majority o its citizens in a matter o years i it made enough serious missteps. It could be argued that there may be a difference between good governance and governance which pleases one’s constituency. Tis is to some extent a normative or even aesthetic question. But, regardless o the philosophy o good government, there is an extent to which good governance must have to do with what voluntary citizens decide is good. I most o the people are happy most o the time, as time goes on we might consider the governance to be reasonably “good” regardless o philosophical considerations. I an anthrostate is run by corrupt buffoons, but its voluntary citizens are happy with their perormance, what business is it to an outsider to critique? I citizens are given ree choice o government and ready ability to switch, it is likely that the various available governments will conorm to the wants o the people. A counterargument might be “What i most o the people like the government, but the government is racist?” Tat is air enough, but at least in an anthrostate, those who do not support racism in government could leave the racists to their own devices. Whether this would make the average human lie better is a hard question to answer. Te issue o distasteul governments is discussed in more depth later. Another great benefit o the polystate would be the difficulty in warmaking. I conceive two reasons or this difficulty. Te first problem would be the aorementioned availability o options. In democratic geostates, citizens rarely can stomach a war or more than a ew years. However, wars can be maintained in the ace o public opposition so long as the part o government that prosecutes wars does not have a change o opinions and/or occupants. I every war presented the possibility o a massive loss o citizenry, and thereore wealth and prestige, even a modern-day Napoleon would be reluctant to fight.10 A less obvious reason or the difficulty o anthrostatic war would be the 10 It should be noted that this effect could create problems. Removing all pacifists rom a society no doubt would change the nature o that society immeasurably, while equally and oppositely affecting those systems to which the emigrants flee. Such effects are hard to predict, so I will leave them to the reader’s imagination.
semi-random geographic distribution o citizens. In geostatic war, the nature o fighting is generally “this is my side and that’s your side, pal.” Polystates contain no recognized borders. Tus, in order to prosecute war, two actions in a polystate would either have to fight door-to-door, careul not to injure members o powerul third parties, or they would have to agree to combat at a certain place and time at a suitable location. Clausewitz wrote that the goal o war was to disarm the enemy’s ability to make war. Tis is no doubt easier to accomplish against a centralized oe than a distributed one, as the modern experience o guerilla deense shows. I both attacker and deender are distributed, the difficulty grows larger still. Perhaps more importantly, Oscar Wilde wrote “As long as war is regarded as wicked, it will always have its ascination. When it is looked upon as vulgar, it will cease to be popular.” Tat is to say, war has always been hell, but historically many pretty girls have been attracted to a man who just got back rom hell. o the extent that war in a polystate would be more piecemeal, more absurd, more local to one’s own interest, and more likely to produce civilian casualties, war might be made more vulgar than ever. One last polystate benefit worth noting, though a bit speculative, is the ease o territorial expansion. I you were to look at an animation o nations o the world rom the dawn o humanity, it would look like a ew springs o parti-colored liquid, branching out and filling the world, orming a heterogenous mixture in perpetual swirl, which suddenly settles into a more or less rigid state right around 1945. Most modern people have greatly benefitted rom the act that territorial disputes, with a ew small and requently very stupid exceptions, have stopped. But, it may be the case that in the next ew centuries, humanity sends colonists to other worlds. For any student o history, this may be a source o concern. A Moon reaty was proposed in 1979, but has not been ratified by any nation with the ability to reach the moon. Currently, this is a non-issue. Suppose helium-3 becomes a valuable uel — how many claimants then will assert mineral rights to the moon? Te only likely resolution to conflicting claims between geostates would be military in nature — either through direct action or the threat o it. In a polystate system, humanity would be more or less homogenized and thereore capable o a sort o amoebic expansion. erritorial claims would have to be settled at the level o individual property owners. Although this might still avor wealthy or technologically advanced anthrostates, anyone
in another anthrostate would be able to join those societies. Although territorial expansion would not be a simple matter, it might be less likely to result in great wars.
BOOK 2 A Hypothetical Polystate and its Consequences
Chapter 1: Caveats and Backpedaling
Now that you’ve got the general idea (I hope), you may be wondering how it would work in particular. o that end, Book 2 will be a thought experiment in a hypothetical polystate. I am not a macroeconomist, so my ability to make speculative predictions about complex systems is limited. Te notion o a polystate is in many practical aspects so different rom historical systems that how it would work in practice is probably impossible to predict. So, here I wish only to attempt to find ways in which systems could work. o that end, the chapters that ollow will each address a particular issue that may have general application. No section is definitive or exhaustive. Rather, it is my hope that individually they may serve as topics or thought and discussion, and as a whole they will help make the complexities o this thought experiment more visceral or the reader. Anyone who has ever designed a rule or children knows that human beings do not behave the way the lawgiver would like them to behave — they behave pragmatically according to their values and incentives. Tereore, I have done my best to find ways in which pragmatic sel-interested people would behave in this imaginary system. Statement of Hypothetical Polystate:
Te hypothetical polystate I am laying out will have a minimal set o rules. Tis is partially done or simplicity but also done because a more minimal polystate will more prominently display the differences between a polystate system and the geostate system. It is conceivable that other systems could work. A polystate with no rules is possible, but perhaps problematic. Many polystates with lots o rules are also possible, but are less useul or the purpose o this book. I am not trying to design the best polystate or even a good polystate. I merely want to design a polystate that will serve as a good substrate or discussion. With that in mind, here are the rules or my polystate, which I will call WS-1, or Weinersmith 1. Each rule will be stated and then elaborated.
1) No anthrostate may assert law as a geostate.
Rule one states simply that within the polystate, there can be no geostates. Tat is, no state can claim territory. Tis is important because it seems likely that i the assertion o geostate power were allowed, the most powerul anthrostates would claim land, and very quickly the world would be geostates.
2) Individuals select their government once a year on their birthday. Rule two is simply the protocol or change o government. Te choice o one year intervals may beg or some explanation. Here it is: Conceivably, a more elegant polystate rule would be “Individuals select government any time.” Te problem with that has to do with issues such as tax collection. Tere will be more on this later, but it merits brie discussion here. I a society wishes to collect, or example, income tax, any individual who wanted to avoid tax could simply switch systems. It is conceivable that multiple systems could ally to prevent this, but it’s also conceivable “tax ha ven” anthrostates would develop. Tis would still happen under the “one year” rule, but I believe that requiring polystate citizens to choose governments one year at a time would allow a number o measures that would mitigate the problem. wo years might be better, or 6 months might be better, and I ully recognize that 365 days is entirely arbitrary. It might also be asked why the changeover is a year rom birth, as opposed to January 1 or everyone. I believe overlapping changes o regime would be good or stability. Having everyone change government at the same second would be, in a very real sense, a global revolution. As I said beore, it’s above my pay grade to determine the specific results o such a complex system, but it may be prudent to assume that anything o that magnitude in such a small time could be a source o danger and political intrigue. Randomly staggering the changeover time allows or the global revolution to be more fluid. Te possibility o coercive governments looms large here. Tis is also true or geostates, so an anthrostate isn’t necessarily worse. Additionally, the anthrostate might very well be better i there were powerul governments known to protect their new citizens. Tat is, suppose you were in a government that threatened you and your amily, you could potentially declare all o the threatened people to be reugees o some other government. In that condition, the carrying out o the threat might pose an international danger to the coercive region.
Tis could also provide a backdoor to constant switching. However, that too could be resolved at the inter-anthrostate level. I a reugee comes to your anthrostate or reasons o asylum, it’s a much different matter rom a reugee coming or tax eevasion. vasion.
3) Any government violating rule 1 shall have its government status revoked. Its members will have 24 hours to decide a new government. Tis rule simply simply deals with the punishment or behaving like a geostate. Rule 3 serves ser ves two purposes: (1) ( 1) It creates a simple simple system or reassignment. reassignment. (2) It hopeully makes the idea o orming a geostate taboo and distasteul in the long run. Te question as to how rule three could be enorced is a hard one. I it were a cultural norm that geostate ormation were taboo, there would be no need or additional law. However, i that were not the case, there would have to be some additional law or use o orce against the violators. It may seem like a stretch to assume that geostate ormation would become a taboo. However, in a purely polystate environment, the ormation o a geostate would pose a substantial economic loss to all other members. It’d be something akin to a single nation claiming the entirety o the moon today. today. In addition, it is entirely possible that t hat in a significantly Heterogeneous Heterogene ous polystate, the claimed geostate would violate the private property rights o many individuals. So, it is not inconceivable that geostate ormation would be considered unjust. *** Tese are the only rules or the t he WS-1 anthrostates. anthrostates. I have some concern that the minimal nature o the above rules will be seen as a sort o backdoor to minarchy. minarchy. It is decidedly not. A polystate is not simply a minimal state built on ree association. In all states, geo or anthro, the power o orce and coercion is vested in some authority. Tis is generally the defining difference between a ree association and state authority. Your local chess club may demand you pay monthly dues, but they cannot compel that payment without invoking some state authority. Even a ree association with the implements o orce (e.g., guns, explosives, etc.) cannot use that orce on ellow citizens without the author-
ity o the geostate. In WS-1, power o orce would be distributed among many overlapping groups. Tat is, unlike the ree associations inside a minarchy, in the polystate each ree association would be granted g ranted the power o orce to use as it sees fit. Tis is the essence (and perhaps the paradox) o the polystate — coercive ree association. In the polystate, power o coercion would be distributed, but it would not be absent. It is in act conceivable that within a real polystate, the aggregate individual1 would experience less reedom ree dom than the aggregate individual in a system o geostates. It seems to me probable that in a polystate, the selection selec tion o anthrostates would ollow a sort o bell curve o population on the axis between minarchy and monarchy. Now then with all that in mind, I will try to suggest how WS-1 might work in a number o circumstances. Beore you dive in, let me offer this disclaimer: Government necessarily touches on just about every aspect o lie. Some people may find the bare mention o several topics to ollow to be offensive. I can’t ask or you not to be affronted, but I do request that you go into the ollowing discussions with an open mind; my goal here is in some sense to undermine many assumptions assumptions o political order, order, and so s o necessarily I will have to violate a ew taboos. Unless explicitly stated, nothing below is meant to endorse any particular system o ethics, justice, or governance. governance.
Chapter 2: Crime and Punishment
First, let’s deal with the problem o crime. Several potential hurdles or the polystate present themselves — (1) the bureaucracy needed or these many overlapping systems, (2) different understandings as to what constitutes crime (3) crimes having to do with sel-expression, such as public indecency, pornography, orbidden inormation, etc. Te bureaucracy issue has been and will be discussed in the context o several other issues, so I don’t wish to belabor it too much here. It seems to me that this issue is in essence similar to the issues o international law 1
By “aggregate individual” I mean something like “the average person.” Tat is, in a polystate where 9/10 o people are social democrats, 1/20 are monarchists, and 1/20 are libertarians, the aggregate individual is a social democrat. o o put it another way — i there were some metric by which you could score the prominence o a state in the lie o the individual, the aggregate individual would have the average score.
among geostates, only it is likely to present itsel more ofen. In addition, whereas modern international law is sometimes made arbitrary by the exigencies o powerul nations, “international” law among anthrostates would have to be enorced at least with as much justness as a typical geostate. In other words, some system o rapid and generally agreeable arbitration would be necessary. Tis would be especially important or petty crimes. For most Western states, murder trials are already quite complicated, complicated, as befits their gravity. gravity. No doubt the same would be true within a polystate. Tat is, i inter-anthrostate inter-anthrostate murder trials were drawn-out affairs, they would at least be no worse than the current state o things. However, However, the case cas e o smaller crimes, such as grafiti or example, could be problematic. I, in an ideal system, the care o due process scales with severity se verity o crime, petty crime cr ime should be arbitrated quickly. ly. Petty crime between whole nations could pose a problem. Now and then, in the modern geostate system, an American will commit a small crime in Singapore, such as spitting out gum on a sidewalk. o an American, this is at worst poor taste, but is certainly not a crime. In Singapore, the crime is worthy o corporal punishment. Because o the disparity, an action whose resolution is swif in either country (or better or worse) becomes a matter o great discussion. For a unctioning polystate, polystate, this could not be b e the case. It seems to me there would be several possible solutions to this problem. One possibility would be that the larger anthrostates either make their criminal codes similar to one another or come to some agreement about the most common occurrences. Te main problem here is that it would create an onerous burden on smaller states or all small criminal proceedings. Another possibility would be the creation o some kind o non-national court system with the express purpose o squaring the laws o various anthrostates with one another. Getting to the issue o different sets o laws, it is unortunately inevitable that various groups understand the notion o justice in various ways. Indeed, in a polystate, some might recognize no such thing as justice. It may be an unavoidable flaw in the idea o WS-1 that it cannot deal readily with legal matters between nations with very different legal rameworks. I one society has a constitution and another another has a capricious dictator, dictator, no modern moder n Solomon would be able to create justice between two parties. In general, i one society uses legal precedence as a guide, while another uses the whims o an autocrat, there is little hope that law is predictable or the citizens in
either society. It may be that a more realistic polystate would have to have some sort o higher judiciary built in. Te one possible deense I can think o is this: Suppose we consider the worst possible scenario — a democracy overlaps with a group o insane ascists. Te dictator o the ascists tells his people that i they attack the democrats, they will ace no punishment rom him, and he will deend them in arbitration. It seems to me that the only resolution to this sort o thing is some sort o war between anthrostates. And, whereas it is likely that liberal democracies will be larger and more affluent, those nations will likely win. Tus, over time, justice (in the sense o equal application o law or the citizens o a state) should prevail. Tis does not obviate the possibility o something like a Nazi government, in which a modern, large, technologically advanced nation is also a ascist dictatorship. However, it is not clear that a polystate would handle this situation worse than geostates do now. In addition, the difficulty o maintaining consensus over a long war is high. Tere will be more on this in the chapter on war. Crimes having to do with sel-expression would also present difficulty. A geostate or nudists is not a problem or either the nudists within or the non-nudists without. A nudist anthrostate may well be a problem or the Muslim theocracy next door. Tis too would be difficult to resolve. Tere are several similar issues which may carry greater gravity than seeing a naked lady walking down the street — public consensual violence, public display o censored inormation, public drug use, and so orth. It is conceivable some o these issues could be ameliorated by the use o private property law, but this presents its own problems, to be discussed later. Tere may not be a perect resolution to this issue at the moment. However, as I mentioned earlier, a polystate cannot unction in practice without technology. Crimes o sel-expression may be resolvable through some technological system not yet available. For example, suppose system A orbids men to see naked women, while system B orbids its members to wear clothes. Conceivably, in a technologically advanced polystate, the onus o sheltering one’s eyes could be put on system A. For example, the system A people could have an advanced sofware-based set o blinders that would obscure the offending body parts. As I am not a theologian, I can’t speak to the ethical difference between real and virtual niqab. But, it does seem to me that i the eyes o the viewer and the ree expression o the viewee can be protected, in principle the problem can be resolved. I would have some
concern over the idea o entire generations raised without the ability to see offensive material, but that is a problem o the strange intersection o ethics and technology in any system, polystate, geostate, or otherwise. *** As noted above, the resolution o crime may be problematic, at least in my airly minimal polystate conception. Tat said, i it could be worked out, there might be great benefits. In a system where each individual selects a government, rates o violence might be lower. o give just one example, in the USA, drug offenders are significantly more likely than other criminals to have committed their crimes in pursuit o money. Tat is, there is a large number o crimes that are not committed or passion or otherwise in a state o madness. In a polystate system, it is very likely that there would be anthrostates that allow ree markets or drugs that are illegal in other anthrostates. Tis would both lower the price o illegal drugs (mitigating the need or violent crime in anthrostates that disallow usage) and provide rameworks that cater to the needs and desires o their users. It might then be noted that in a polystate, prohibition is essentially impossible without draconian enorcement laws and panoptic surveillance. Tat is, even i your anthrostate disallows marijuana, your neighbor who lives in the Rastaarian anthrostate has got you covered in case o emergency. I can only say in deense o the difficulty o prohibition o substances and inormation that it seems to me to be a eature and not a flaw o the system. Tose citizens who wish not to be exposed to such inormation are at liberty to do their best to avoid it.
Chapter 3: Children in a Polystate
It seems to me that there are two major questions regarding children within a polystate. Te first is what government a child exists under, and the second is whether an anthrostate can have laws regarding children that are anathema to members o other anthrostates. Although the laws o WS-1 do not explicitly deal with children, it is likely that every anthrostate would have rules regarding children. Suppose Marie is a member o a social democracy. She has just given birth to a daughter,
Irene. Her anthrostate has rules that say what she can do to that child and what she cannot do. Tose rules state the child’s age o consent, and the procedure or that child’s emancipation. As these conditions are built-in aspects o human lie (perhaps even animal lie), it is likely that all anthrostates would have provisions regarding them. o the extent that they will differ, they are no different than geostates. Where an anthrostate has problems (e.g., age o consent’s arbitrariness), so too does a geostate have problems. Let’s start with custody issues. o get at the general idea, I will start with a simple and thereore somewhat absurd example. It might be asked, “What i another state lays claim to my child?” Tat is, what i there is some state o madmen who declare a law that “All children born belong to us.” Let’s call this state Kidnappocracy. Assuming the unlikely notion that Kidnappocracy is able to attract membership, the result would be a competing claim between the parents o the child and the Kidnappocrats. I think it can be airly said that this is also similar to the condition o geostates. Tat is, in the modern world, suppose there was a geostate called Kidnapistan. Kidnapistan may claim rights to my child. However, I and the orce o my government would back my claim to the child and not recognize the need or arbitration in the matter. Additionally, should Kidnapistan attempt to take my child, my government would respond with orce to protect its citizens. It is likely then that the major difference would be that in a geostate system, Kidnapistan would be blocked by a border, whereas in a polystate the Kidnappocrats would be overlapping with everyone else. I think it can reasonably be supposed that communities would make effort to keep out Kidnappocrats either by the use o trespassing law, embargo o sales to Kidnappocrats, or even declaration o war. Te above situation is purposeully somewhat absurd. Te point I wish to make is that a dispute over claims o a child would be a matter between governments, arbitrated in much the same way as such claims are made now. We can also consider a less extreme but more complex case — competing claims to custody between typical anthrostates. For example, suppose one person belongs to a Catholic theocracy in which divorce is illegal, and another belongs to a secular government in which divorce is allowed. Custody arbitration would be doubly complex because beyond the normal questions regarding divorce, at the end o the proceeding, one government would recognize the divorce and one would not! We can imagine similar situations or a system o patrilineal claim disputing against a system o matrilineal claim.
Complexity aside, I suspect this too is more or less the same as the geostate system. It is already the case that divorce procedure can be arbitrated between dual citizens. A polystate system would be no different, except that it would probably have more intra-government cases to deal with. Tat said, one suspects that in a polystate there would be an onus on parents to agree on a system together, or at the very least to select an anthrostate or the child. Tat is, noting that divorce and custody would be complex in a polystate is merely to note that divorce and custody questions would exist in a polystate. Tere is an extent to which it might be ar more complex in the polystate. However, this may only seem to be the case because o its rarity. It is conceivable that in a polystate system, the marriage rules could be worked out in greater detail and rigor than they are today. Te second question I raised was about the level o control over one’s child. Suppose, or example, one anthrostate sets age o consent at 14, and another sets age o consent at 18. Ten, suppose a member o each group has sex with the other, and that each member is at the age o consent o the other government. Tat is, suppose an 18-year-old rom a government with 14 as age o consent has sex with a 14-year-old rom a government that sets age o consent at 18. Te result is that the 18-year-old has not violated his/her own anthrostate’s law, but HAS violated law in the other anthrostate. Likewise, the 14-year-old has violated his/her own anthrostate’s law, but HAS NO violated the other anthrostate. o understand how this mess might unravel, let us consider the equivalent geostate cases. In one case, we can imagine an 18-year-old American emale (age o consent 18) goes to Papua New Guinea (age o male consent, 14) and has sex with the 14-year-old boy. In that case, distasteul though it may be, neither the American nor the New Guinean has violated the law o the land in which the act was committed. In the second case, we can imagine a 14-year-old New Guinean goes to America and has sex with an 18-year-old emale. In that case, equally distasteul, the American has violated law and is at risk o punishment. Te 14-year-old would be a victim in America and would o course receive no punishment o a legal nature. Te polystate would be similar, with important differences. In order to understand them, we must understand the purposes o consent law. It seems to me that the main purpose o consent law is to protect those who are con-
sidered unable to offer consent. Tat is, to state the obvious, consent laws do not exist to protect 40-year-olds rom 14-year-olds. Tereore, we can say that in our two hypothetical anthrostates, no person considered by his government to require protection would have gone unprotected. In that sense, one could argue that no wrong was committed, at least rom a legal perspective. Again, it may seem distasteul to an American reader, but the alternative view is that consent is constantly violated in Papua New Guinea. Te reader may well consider this true, but I suspect the reader does not believe that the United States would be, or example, within its rights to invade another country in order to increase the age o consent. In addition, it should perhaps be considered that there is a difference between individuals raised in societies with different ages o consent. Presumably, age o consent is selected to reflect biological act. But the opposite may in some way be at work. In the United States, the age o 18 is etishized, even though it has no biological meaning. But or an arbitrary choice, the age vested with so much sexual intrigue could have been 17 or 24 or 19.25. Within reason, the age selected by society may in some way determine the preparedness o the individual to give consent at that age. It might be elucidatory to consider a system with no age basis at all. Imagine a technocratic society in which individuals are given psychological exams to determine their ability to give consent. Tis ramework would put orward some situations which almost all modern people would find abhorrent: (a) a very young individual being able to consent to sex, and (b) an older individual o sound mind being unable to give consent. Once again, it’s worth first considering how things would play out in a similar situation in geostates. In modern-day Yemen, age o consent is determined by puberty 2. On this basis, it is conceivable that a child as young as nine could be considered to be capable o consent. Although I suspect every single Westerner reading this finds the idea repulsive, they may not find it to be grounds or legal or military action against Yemen. In act, in all likelihood, I suspect ew readers were aware. More importantly, they probably would not demand imprisonment or death or a Westerner who becomes a Yemeni citizen and makes use o those consent laws. Although that Westerner would likely be shunned by society, and perhaps even banned rom return, the act that such is possible has apparently not stopped the largely 2 Te law is a bit more complicated, but the simplified case will suffice or this discussion.
peaceul coexistence o Yemen and the rest o the world. 3 In act, the major Yemeni conflicts since unification in 1990 have been internal ones. Tat said, we can consider instances where differences might lead to conflict. It may in act be a virtue o the polystate that it makes repugnant behavior more local and thereore subject to scrutiny. Let us suppose that government A finds the consent laws o government B so revolting that they cannot stand idly by. In that case, it is likely that government A would either take military action against government B, or simply seize the children o government B by orce. What would be the result o this? I suspect that i government B were engaging in repugnant practices, it would have ew allies in its struggle. I it were engaging in more or less agreeable practices, it would have many allies in its struggle. It is o course possible that a good government should be beaten by a wicked government, but this would hardly be a problem unique to the polystate. Indeed, it should be noted that the historical tendency o humanity has been to increase age o consent over time. In order or us to declare a polystate system equivalent or superior to a geostate system, we must only find the polystate no worse than the system o geostates. It may well be the case that in the polystate, age o consent would have risen aster, since the commingling o many people could produce a general progression toward the mean. A judgmental neighbor may well have a more proound effect than a judgmental oreign government. Tus, by and large, the case o anthro and geostates would be similar, and the anthrostates would have the arguable benefit o more locally conronting citizens with the behavior o others. I there is an ideal age o consent (or system or consent determination), it could spread more rapidly in a polystate. I there is no ideal age o consent, and in act age o consent is more a matter o local culture, the polystate would allow or more individual choice. Tat said, the overlapping o these legal systems might result in more conflict, especially when anthrostates are first established. Te major ineriority o anthrostates here would be to make arbitration more complicated. It is likely that a polystate system would result in more interstate legal matters. Tis is discussed in more detail in other chapters.
3
American drone strikes notwithstanding.
Chapter 4: Commerce
Commerce, like legal arbitration, would likely pose difficulty or a polystate or similar reasons. It seems to me that there are two major areas that would pose the greatest potential difficulty — the running o businesses and the use o currency. Suppose there exists a business called Bob’s Bakery. Bob’s Bakery wishes to have three employees. As Bob is looking through applicants, he finds three good ones. wo (A and B) are rom minarchic governments, and the third ( C ) is rom a highly socialized government. A and B are willing to work or 5 dollars an hour. C’s government reuses to allow its people to work or less than 10 dollars an hour. Does this pose a dilemma? It seems to me that it shouldn’t. Tere are a number o ways situations like this could be resolved, and given the nature o the polystate, it is likely that many different techniques would be employed. Let’s consider a ew. One possible solution would be or Bob to simply employ all three. Although this might pose a problem or the morale o A and B, there would certainly be no legal difficulty. Te morale question would have to do with the nature o governments. For example, suppose A’s government tops off her wage to $15 so long as she’s working. She might not care what Bob pays. Another solution would be or C’s government (the highly socialized one) to insist only that employers in its system pay a certain minimum wage. Tat is, workers are not obligated to demand a certain wage or their labor. Tat would ree (or oblige, depending on your perspective) the citizens o C’s government to take lower-wage jobs. Tis might well pose a social dilemma by putting a “race to the bottom” on wages. In other words, it might well be the case that the lowest possible wage would effectively be set by those anthrostates which have no minimum wage. In act, the situation could conceivably be even more dire. Suppose there existed a ascistic state, whose leader insists that his workers only ever charge $1 an hour or labor. By this means, the powerul ascist might keep his citizens in check, undercut other economies, and still accrue some wealth. Tis is possible, but it must be hoped that in a voluntary state, very ew people would be willing to live in this condition. In the first place, it would be degrading to the desire or autonomy most humans possess. In the second, pragmatically there could perhaps even be competition among ascisms. Tat is, your fascism orces you to work or the Dear Leader at a rate o $1/
hour, while my fascism orces me to work or Te Fuhrer at $1.50/hour plus medical. So, conceivably there would not be so much a race to the bottom as a race to equilibrium. Indeed, there are many current geostates or states in conederated geostates which lack minimum wage, but which nevertheless have workers who are, on average, paid as well as in comparable states. And, in those states which do have minimum wage, it is rarely more than a small percentage o working people who earn only that much. In addition, more socialized systems may produce higher-quality employees than non-socialized systems. Tat is, i the government o C expends a great deal o its citizens’ money on its citizens’ education and health, or example, and those expenditures result in an economically higher-quality citizen, it is to be expected that Bob’s Bakery should want to pay C more money than A or B. C may very well have more training or aptitude by virtue o the superiority o his system. Tus, it may even be the case that, rather than a race to the bottom or a race to equilibrium, there would be many races to many equilibria. Let us consider a more extreme case that may generate complexity. Suppose there exists a store called Karl’s Knishes. Karl is a member o a communal government that does not recognize private property. He is thus only the manager o the business, not the owner. Into that store walks Adam, who as it happens is a member o a government whose economy is laissez-aire capitalist. Karl’s government expressly orbids selling o goods to Adam’s government. Tis presents two problems or Karl — first, he must veriy the governments o all buyers beore he can sell; second, he may be seriously limited in his selection o buyers. Te selection problem is a problem or the business alone, so it is not o interest. Te issue o determining the anthrostatic origin o all customers is a bit harder. But, I don’t believe it would be any harder than many issues that are already easily handled in modern geostates. For example, i I wish to buy a new computer, I will be obligated to provide some orm o identification, unless I pay in cash. Short o getting a large wad o bills and going to a computer store with a sack o cash, I have to show inormation about my state o origin. So, the ID problem would pose no new issues or what I assume would be the typical anthrostate. Admittedly, this could be problematic or ultra-minarchic systems. Suppose, or example, in WS-1 60% o governments require sellers to identiy buyers’ governments beore selling. Tis would put a great onus on min-
imal systems to yet still have some orm o identification, even though it goes against their principles. In other words, no anthrostate is necessarily an island, and the capacity to have one’s own anthrostate have a very high degree o autonomy might exist in tension with the capacity or someone else’s anthrostate to provide a strong central government. How this would play out in reality is hard to predict. However, it should be noted that even a system o minimal government could still avail itsel o internal or external third-party verification services. Indeed, political libertarians ofen note the capacity o non-governmental organizations to take the place o regulatory systems. Much like the hypothetical socialized government earlier, a minarchist system in a polystate would be obligated to put its ramework where its mouth is, so to speak. Tus, it seems to me that the major issues or inter-anthrostate commerce would be the management o legal codes and the potential or the laws (or lack thereo) o one anthrostate to bind the laws (or lack thereo) o another anthrostate. Te ormer issue could potentially be aided by technology, much o which already exists. Te latter would be a act o the matter in the system, hopeully mitigated in some ways suggested in this book. In addition, it is not clear that the issue o interplay between governments would be completely different rom that o a conederated geostate. Tere are locations in the United States where by standing just so, one hal o your body will be worthy o $6.25/hour while the other will be worthy o $7.00/hour. Tis, like many things political, is technically absurd but pragmatically unraught. Te existence o separate governments or humans necessarily results in some absurdities. We are not individually so different as the different governments we have tried. But, it is not clear that these absurdities are always a problem, nor is it clear that a polystate will produce more o them than a collection o geostates. Te matter o the use o currency is, I think, a much simpler problem to resolve. It is merely a matter o technology and inrastructure, in essence the same as the aorementioned problem o bureaucracy. In the unlikely event that each o 10,000 anthrostates decided to have its own currency, all transactions could be handled through a simple currency market, with the arguable downside that physical money would probably be extremely cumbersome or consumers and businesses. Tis sort o general currency market might well have some benefits. For example, hyperinflation is a notoriously hard phenomenon to stop once it
begins. In a system o overlapping states, it might be much easier to simply jump ship to a stable currency. Provided that the hyperinflation isn’t systemic, this would be o great use to small anthrostates. In addition, individuals could choose various anthrostates based on their macroeconomic views. Tis may be a good end unto itsel, but it also means that there could be more experimentation to see what works well in monetary and fiscal policy. In reality, I suspect in a polystate there would be a rapid convergence on a small number o reserve currencies that would be used or simplicity and perceived stability. It’s even possible that currencies used by many states could acquire a sort o independence rom their anthrostate o origin. Tis would provide the added benefit o stability in a system where government sizes might regularly change. In the modern world, the dollar is the reserve currency because people perceive the US as very stable. I every system were somewhat unstable4, it would be useul to have the dollar still available afer a system schisms. It might be suggested that the need or currency per se imposes limits on the orms o anthrostate available. Suppose a group wishes to live in a society that doesn’t use money at all. I will admit, outside o a universe in which energy is essentially ree, it is hard or me to imagine a truly money-ree society. At the very least, nominally moneyless societies still engage in barter and social exchange. However, supposing it is possible, I think we must first note that a potential moneyless anthrostate wouldn’t be in a substantially dierent position rom a potential moneyless geostate. A money-ree geostate would only be able to acquire trade goods through barter. Just so, members o money-ree anthrostates would be obliged to use resources rather than cash i they wished to trade with other anthrostates. It is likely that a moneyless anthrostate citizen would be surrounded by money-using citizens, and this act might be said to constrain one’s ability to truly exist in a moneyless society. Te status o that citizen is not really different rom the status o any geostate that tries its hand at moneylessness. So, i there are constraints to moneylessness, they aren’t limited to the polystate ramework. Additionally, it is conceivable that with a more complex market system, barter could simply be rolled into transactions such that it becomes indistinguishable rom money. Tough this might be difficult at the individual level (“Ma’am, how many bushels o corn would it cost or 3 cappuccinos?”), it might work perectly well at the level o society. Many proposed money4 Suppose, or example, the USA had been an anthrostate at the height o the Vietnam War.
less societies sensibly make property communal. For example, some flavors o anarcho-syndicalism propose that trade syndicates determine how much o their goods go to the people in society. We can imagine a collectivized arming anthrostate might exchange corn or metal, then distribute it accordingly. So, although barter might be inefficient at the level o individual purchases, moneyless anthrostates could get around this by bartering at the level o anthrostates and then distributing to citizens.
Chapter 5: Co-Existence with Geostates
Could a polystate co-exist alongside a geostate? In principle, it’s clear that this is possible. In practice, there might be some complications. For example, what is the status o a traveler rom a geostate into an anthrostate? Is immigration possible? What about illegal immigration? How would polystate-geostate war work? Unlike a geostate, a polystate cannot on principle have a standing army or border guards. But, by virtue o its many anthrostates, it may in act have many standing armies and many border guards. Te number o particular possibilities or this kind o interaction is too large to go through thoroughly. So, I want to consider a ew particular cases that should give the reader a sense o how geostate-polystate interactions might occur. First, let us look at the status o a traveler rom geo to anthro. Te geostater would be something like a person today traveling abroad, with the exception that he would not abide by the rules o two countries. Other than the minimal rules o WS-1, the traveler would be abiding only by the laws o his geostate. Tat is to say, assuming she was not in violation o the three laws o the polystate, she would be more or less the same as a member o an anthrostate modeled on and connected to her home geostate. I do not see why this would pose a problem. Te polystate is already the overlapping o many governments. Te addition o a geostate government to the mix wouldn’t necessarily pose a problem. One interesting result would be that the border between polystate and geostate would be more like a diode than an insulator. Whereas a geostater might readily enter the polystate, the reverse would not necessarily be true. In addition, the geostater will maintain her own laws in the polystate, while the polystater would become like a geostater abroad in a oreign geostate.
It might be asked what would happen in the case o an international incident. For example, suppose a citizen o hypothetical geostate Bombsylvania enters WS-1 and detonates a bomb inside a city. Many WS-1 members are killed as a result. Suppose or now that the bomber is a citizen o Bombsyl vania, but not a state actor. Tat is, he is a terrorist. What must be and what would be the response o WS-1? I believe that WS-1 per se would not have a response, as its own rules do not permit this. However, when the bomb went off, it took away blood and treasure rom individual anthrostates. Tereore, those anthrostates — i it is in their interest — would likely seek redress rom the state o Bombsylvania. Anthrostates, much like individual people, could act separately or as a group. I think it is likely that both situations would arise. Tat is, the hypothetical international incident would not be terribly different rom the result o a bomber attacking a crowded metropolitan city, which is likely to contain tourists rom many geostates. In act, it could well be the case that such events would be more unlikely in a polystate. Acts o terror, even by insane people, are politically motivated. I you are a terrorist wishing to make a violent political statement, it might be much easier against a geostate. Afer all, a bomb in a geostate probably kills and terrorizes only the members o that state. A bomb in a polystate may kill and terrorize the members o many different groups, neutralizing or even going counter to the intended political result. Te more random and overlapping the anthrostates, the more difficult precision bomb strikes would become. I it turns out that ideologies tend to be reflected geographically, even in the absence o ormal geostates, it would mitigate the anti-terror value o overlapping governments. It is not clear how geography and ideology would turn out in a polystate, especially i we are talking about a world o extreme rapid transit. However, it’s worth noting that in the modern geostate world, cities are the typical targets o terrorists. Cities are also where the most di versity (in terms o ethnicity, place o birth, religion, etc.) is ound. So, it’s possible the best terrorist targets (in terms o population) would be the worst terrorist targets (in terms o heterogeneity o anthrostates). I our hypothetical terrorists were opposed to polystates per se, having a variety o anthrostates would afford no protection. Let us suppose now that the bomber was in act a paid state actor. Tat is, a member o Bombsylvania was employed by his state to blow up a WS-1
city. Would the polystate be in exceptional danger by virtue o its complexity? Very possibly. Perhaps a more direct question would be whether coalition armies perorm better or worse in the prosecution o war. What would likely happen in a polystate under attack is that many o the anthrostates would be compelled onto a war ooting. In a sense, it could be said that the response would be akin to the response o the US and EU in the case o China in vading Europe. A host o treaties would come into effect as the nations o the West organized or war. Large economically powerul geostates would take the lead in the organization and prosecution o the war, with smaller states less obligated. Tat is to say, it seems possible that the response o the polystate would be more or less the same as the response o a geostate alliance to the attack o one o its members. Tat said, I suspect that all things being equal (population, wealth, technology, etc.), you’d be better off placing your wager on a geostate victory. Combined allied orces probably do not unction as well as orces o a single large state. I you could ask Generals Montgomery and Patton i the overall prosecution o World War II was made more efficient by the existence o his counterpart, you would at least find them to be in agreement on the answer. In addition, the required level o organization within a polystate coalition would probably be higher due to the great number o anthrostates, possibly with great variation in command structure. Tis might well simply waste resources in a way a geostate would not. Politics and war are not happy bedellows. Friendly fire within an army is tragic; riendly fire between allies is an incident. With this in mind, a polystate’s best hope might be to have all things NO be equal. It is a matter o historical act that different governments produce different results in terms o wealth, human capital, and technology. It is not always the most militarized (in terms o percent GDP spent on war) or most organized society that has the most money or the best machinery. In due time, the variety o the polystates might economically and technologically make up or the organizational problems it poses. Whether this is the case is too complex to determine without experiment. Let’s consider a different incitement to war — territorial dispute. Suppose a geostate claims a corner o WS-1. As WS-1 does not claim any territory, and by definition its anthrostates cannot claim territory, how could the members o the polystate respond?
Much like the bombing hypothetical, although the action o territorial claim does not affect the territory o any nation (since no anthrostate claims any geography), it does affect the private property o individuals 5 who are members o anthrostates. On this basis, the response would be much the same as the bombing situation. Let us consider one more case o interest — illegal immigration. One o the interesting results o a polystate is that illegal immigration is not really possible. An individual within the territory o the polystate would have only to find an anthrostate to accept him. Having accomplished this, he would be allowed to switch to any other system at the appropriate time. Potential issues arising once membership is attained will be explored later. But, whereas the polystate doesn’t have a border so much as a diode, the idea o an illegal border crossing is moot. In addition, some o the concerns having to do with illegal immigration (cost, culture, etc.) might be ameliorated by the nature o the polystate. In the case o cost, only those nations wishing to bear the cost they perceive o immigration would be willing to accept the immigrant. Tus, or example, no individual would be made to unwillingly pay or the healthcare o an immigrant. Concerns o culture or race issues6 could also be helped by the polystate. Consider or example an influx o redheads rom a neighboring geostate. Tere might well be WS-1 anthrostate members who don’t wish their race corrupted by the pernicious blood o a thousand gingers. Although by WS-1 law, these anti-redhead states could not ban red-haired members rom claiming membership, they could make lie or redheads unbearable enough that none would wish to join. Tat is, those anthrostates wishing to maintain some sel-perception o cultural or racial homogeneity would be able to do so. It is my suspicion that they would do so to the detriment o their ability to maintain high or high-quality citizenship, but nevertheless those people would perhaps be pacified. A trickier issue would be the nature o border surveillance. One o the major modern concerns over “open borders” is whether terrorists can easily 5 Tis is true even or states (in act, especially or states) that disallow private property. Community-owned buildings, or example, might be part o the territorial dispute. 6 Just to be perectly clear — the author personally doesn’t see these as serious issues. However, many people do, and the author is (he’s told) allible. Also, note that the author is a redhead, which inormation will shortly be useul.
enter the country. Whether this is a real or imagined issue 7 is beside the point. Does the polystate prevent the policing o borders? Not necessarily. Although polystate citizens can’t really restrict the movement o people, it is conceivable that certain anthrostates might orm alliances to monitor people who enter the polystate rom other geostates. I those entering claim no geostate origin or anthrostate selection, they would not have a legal right to not be surveilled. I they are geostate citizens, the nature o the geostate might determine what sort o surveillance they are subjected to. I they join an anthrostate, they are subject to the laws o that anthrostate, which has a vested interest in protecting itsel rom terrorism and rom international incidents involving its citizens. Tus, although the polystate might not have the ability to police its borders as heavily as a geostate, such caution is by no means prohibited. Although geostate-polystate interactions would be odd, they would not be unimaginably so. Many instances o geostate-polystate interactions would be akin to, i not identical to, interactions between a geostate and an alliance o other geostates. Te case o immigrants to a polystate as opposed to a geostate would be somewhat different, but it is not clear whether on the whole the difference is good or bad.
Chapter 6: Discriminatory Systems
For the purpose o this chapter, by “discriminatory systems” I mean essentially this: anthrostates which either disallow certain members or distasteul8 reasons (gender, race, orientation, etc.) or systems which create internal citizenship classes or distasteul reasons. It is a act that in a polystate such ugly systems would exist. However, I do not think the existence o ugliness makes the overall system bad any more than the existence o Hustler magazine makes reedom o the press bad. Any time reedom is allowed it will be abused. Tis is not a flaw in reedom (else police states might be more desirable) but a flaw in humanity. It must always be borne in mind that the polystate is at its core voluntary. Tis act makes or very different results or oppressed individuals. Tus, sit7 One notes the requency with which so-called terrorists are in the victimized country legally. 8 I will reuse this word regularly. I you think it not sufficiently strong, let me add “repulsive,” “repugnant” and “antisocial” to its meaning.
uations that seem at first to be horrible, may be less so. Tis is a rather taboo topic, but I believe it really poses no problem or a polystate beyond those problems that exist in all geostates. So, to start off, I want to give several scenarios and how they might not be so bad as they first seem. As discussed earlier, one o the problems o geostates is that they are sticky. It is hard, or reasons financial, cultural, emotional, perhaps even metaphysical, to leave one’s homeland. It is also at times illegal to leave one nation or illegal to enter another. And, all that is assuming there is a riendly nation nearby. In a polystate, the situation is much less dire. I you find yoursel a redhead in an anthrostate suddenly overtaken by an anti-ginger action, at most you will have to wait one year to switch. Presumably, in this situation, there would be anthrostates that would provide sanctuary in the interim. It is conceivable that i a system changed rapidly enough, our oppressed redheads might find themselves in a more dire situation. But, at the very least, this seems no worse than it is with geostates, and would be significantly harder to do rom the perspective o the anti-ginger government. Suppose another system: A technocracy. In this system, castes are created based on some IQ metric. By this means, there are quite literally first, second, third, and ourth-class citizens. Is this a problem? Clearly, we would consider it a problem in a geostate. In addition to the difficulty o finding agreed-upon metrics, most modern societies agree that at least in principle “equality o opportunity” is desirable. A caste system o any kind may stand in the way o that. However, it seems to me that the existence o these caste societies would pose no serious problem in a polystate. Personally, I am dubious that such a system would work well, but in that case it’d be my right not to join such a society. Indeed, i you were to meet someone o the lowest rank in such a society who hadn’t yet switched out, you could assume that he had no problem being a bottom-rung caste member. Although you might find his lie an unhappy one, it is at least voluntary. Voluntary unhappiness seems to me to be a reasonably good descriptor o most people, so I don’t see it as a particular problem or the polystate. Let’s suppose an even uglier system. Suppose there was a system that allowed slavery. Te WS-1 rules would not prohibit this development. Is that a problem? I believe it is not, or two main reasons. Te first reason is that there can never be true slavery in WS-1, in that the
so-called slaves would be there by consent. Tey would have to recognize the system and declare themselves a part o it. Tat is, i there were slavery, it would have to be non-coercive to some extent. 9 Tus, whatever “slavery” existed in WS-1 would not be slavery in the usual sense o the word. In the history o American slavery, stories abound o supposedly “well-behaved” slaves who would suddenly run away, to the surprise o their masters. It is not a surprise to anyone now. I people were willing to become criminals, pursued by the state, subject to vigilante justice in order to escape slavery, how much more likely would they be to escape i they could do so with the click o a button? Even i people were willing to enter into these contracts, WS-1 effectively limits ormally legal slavery engagements to 1 year.10 In addition, it seems to me very likely that i there nevertheless were slave anthrostates, most governments would consider slaves to be reugees, much as modern geostates do. Tat is, the easy availability o “migration” in the polystate would constrain the possibility o slavery. Between the voluntary nature o the system and the overlapping o societies, hyper-discriminatory systems would be hard to enorce on those who dislike them. It could well be noted that this is all fine and good or adults, but might pose a problem or children. Tese leads me to the second reason I believe allowing “slavery” systems is acceptable. I there really were anthrostates that exercised orms o slavery that were o questionable consent, it is likely that other anthrostates and organizations would stop it by orce. Tat is, the existence o a polystate by no means obliges you to ignore that your neighbor is behaving heinously. In act, in a polystate, such behavior would be harder to ignore than it is or current geostates. Overlapping anthrostates would have to countenance horrible acts in a way separate geostates ofen do not. Te sufferer on television simply does not provoke the emotional response o the sufferer next door. Similar arguments could be made regarding, or example, a system that explicitly finds women inerior. One suspects such a system would, it goes without saying, have trouble attracting many women. Many polls o modern geostates that ask men and women about anti-woman laws regularly 9 I’m told that in BDSM culture, such relationships already exist and are highly ormalized. Although I would personally never desire to participate in such a system, whereas it is entirely consensual it seems to be no business o mine. Tat said, no doubt there are many who believe such systems are necessarily criminal. Issues such as these are discussed in the chapter on crime and punishment. 10 Tis is not to say it is an optimal system. A great deal o lasting harm can be done in a year (or a day or that matter), but it is still superior to slavery on a permanent basis.
find that men and women hold divergent opinions 11. Tat is, i the choice o home “country” were wide open, sexist societies would have a lot o trouble holding on to women. Nevertheless, it would likely be the case that societies that affront the Western liberal mindset would exist. Tat such societies are (especially in their extreme orm) distasteul, I take or granted. But, most would agree that so long as the women involved are behaving voluntarily, nothing unjust is occurring. Much like with the consent rules or children, it might be noted that indi viduals could be “brainwashed” into living in distasteul societies. Tis may well be true, but it’s certainly no worse than in geostate situations. In act, it might be better — at least in a polystate, it would be readily possible to see how other people live. One other possibility that might be noted is a situation in which some group is not accepted by any anthrostate. Tat, is, suppose that redheads are so generally despised that no group will accept them. I think this situation somewhat unlikely, but I do believe the polystate system would handle it better than a geostate. In the first place, a Red-Headed League could be ormed in which redheads abide their own rules. But, more importantly, any system which cleansed itsel o redheads would be at risk o losing a airly large portion o its population, both o redheads and ginger-sympathizers. Tat is, governments that can very easily lose their citizens might be less inclined to alienate even small groups. It might be argued that this assumes governments behave rationally. Indeed, the Nazi government’s alienation o many o the greatest scientists in history provides evidence that some societies are perectly capable o acting against their economic sel-interest. Tat said, in the case o those great scientists, the nature o the polystate would have at least made it easier or them to escape, and would make the creation o a centralized persecution apparatus much more difficult. Tus, I think that although the polystate system would allow discriminatory systems, this would be ameliorated by the voluntary nature o the system, and by the economic and social disincentivization against discrimination. In addition, i someone chooses to persist as a low-caste citizen in a society, despite having the requent option to leave, it at least seems to me that the ethics o the system cannot be assailed on either utilitarian or consent-based ethical grounds. 11 http://www.peworum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-women-in-society.aspx#views
Chapter 7: Healthcare
Healthcare is a airly specific issue, but it has great political importance in our time. So, perhaps it merits its own brie discussion. In particular, healthcare is a good way to explore a potentially serious ree rider problem. No doubt, in a polystate, there would be many different levels o social saety net. Suppose you have one anthrostate that provides a high level o completely socialized healthcare and another anthrostate that is a minimal government. Assuming hyper-rational actors, the most prudent choice in lie might be to stay in the minimal government (or at least, in a lower taxing government) until you start to eel sick. On average, in WS-1, you’ll only have to wait 6 months beore switching anthrostates. Since most diseases don’t kill you that quickly, you’d be best paying low taxes until sick, then switching and soaking up healthcare rewards once you’re ill. By this means, it might be argued that governmental provision o healthcare would be prohibitively expensive. My speculation is that there are a ew ways this issue could be solved. First, people o conscience might exist. I don’t wish to have this book be too science-fictional, but it is possible such individuals walk the Earth. I they do exist, you might simply expect them to pay into a system and take their air share out later. Tere is no welare state that does not assume some shenanigans will occur — the question is the size o the cost. I the vast majority o people are airly honest, or too busy to invest the effort it would take to cheat, the ew who attempt to game the system may not matter much. Second, anthrostates could enact laws insisting that benefits only go to long-term citizens, or to citizens who’ve paid in a certain amount. Tird, there could very well arise “soup kitchen” anthrostates that organize around the principle o helping the poor. For example, it is conceivable that there could be a Christian or Fabian anthrostate that structures itsel such that all people are given welare no matter what their condition, or at what cost to well-off citizens. I think this proposition is both probable and very interesting in its potential consequences as time grows large. In a polystate system, citizen loyalty would be a very prized commodity. For this reason, in the long term, a state that does the most to help the tired, poor, huddled masses might well rise to prominence.
Chapter 8: Privacy and Censorship
Let us take or granted that WS-1 will have an Internet. I think there are two questions that might arise — (1) is it possible or all members to be secure with their inormation? and (2) with ree societies overlapping with controlled societies, is a controlled society possible? Te first question is, o course, a question or geostates as well. As I write this chapter, the United States may be about to enter a diplomatic argument with the EU over whether the American NSA wiretapped European offices. Tat said, the issues o the polystate may be somewhat different. For example, suppose I wish to send a message to Sally. Te message is routed through property owned by Adol (or example, a mail truck or an email ser ver). Sally and I are staunch libertarians who think the message is inviolable. Adol is a totalitarian who eels it is the duty o his state to open the message. In this situation, how is the mail treated? In a geostate system, you must simply accept that i your mail goes through a questionable geostate, questionable things may happen to it. In a polystate o significant complexity, it is conceivable that there would be no efficient way to route messages without at some point dealing with these problematic anthrostates. In act, or this to be true, we need not assume totalitarian states run by people named Adol. Many nominally liberal Western nations not only practice surveillance o citizens, but keep secret the level o surveillance. It is likely that a similar situation would exist in a polystate. One possible result would be that the polystate would produce anthrostates that are more liberal and transparent. A conceit o this book is that a polystate system puts more onus on the state to obey the will o its citizens. It’s possible, i perhaps a bit naive, to suppose that the various anthrostates would be more transparent with citizens i those citizens can easily immigrate. I you are British, you must accept the compromise between liberty and security that your representatives (who admittedly embody the will o the people to some extent) have struck. In a polystate, it might be the case that some percentage o citizens agree to be scrutinized harder or reasons o security, while others wish none at all, and most wish to be in the middle. In such a situation, it’s conceivable that mail transmission could be achieved by inter-anthrostate agreements. Tat is, liberty-minded countries
could make an effort to work together to provide message transmission ser vices. Tose less concerned with these issues could willingly orego these rights. By this means, my letter to Sally would not ever have to all into the hands o an Adol. In addition, non-state mail-carriers could develop to suit these needs by privacy guarantees. Tese carriers could be much like UPS, FedEx, Ontrac, and others, with the addition that they wouldn’t exist inside geostates, and thereore wouldn’t be subject to any single government. Tis ramework’s virtues may raise a problem or those who are security-minded: I a government can only wiretap the people who accede to wiretapping, it won’t do much good against terrorism in the polystate at large. It would be very tempting or a security-minded anthrostate to cast a broader net. Tose concerned most with liberty might be willing to accept a larger death toll rom terrorism than those most concerned with security. However, a terrorist’s bomb doesn’t ask or one’s political affiliations. I’m not entirely sure how this problem could be resolved. Tat said, the speculation I’ve expressed throughout this book is that the majority o anthrostates (by membership) would be liberal republics. Given the recent history o such republics, I consider it likely that the vast majority o anthrostates would allow some sort o snooping on mail. It could be argued that potential terrorists would necessarily not be part o the major governments, but then this is a problem or geostates as well. And, not incidentally, many o the most inamous terrorists were members o some large geostate at the time o their most heinous crimes. o take the argument rom the other side, this ramework may cause problems or the liberty-minded. Afer all, it’s never onesel who needs sur veilling. It’s always the other person. I the major anthrostates are anything like today’s geostates, they will be interested in spying on oreign governments. By this means, perhaps everyone will be surveilled. By virtue o the act that a polystate setup makes it ar harder to cordon off geography, it may be that nobody who chooses to interace with the rest o the world is sae rom snooping. It is not entirely clear to me that, in practice, this would end up substantially different rom modern geostates. However, it is almost certainly the case that there is an extent to which the level o surveillance over a citizen is tied to that citizen’s geostate o residence. In a polystate, the overlapping o systems might result in a more surveilled society than any that exists in the world today. Tis may be unresolvable. Te only deense I can think o here is this: I
we accept that we are in a panopticon, the remaining issue is how the panopticon uses its data. Tat is, assuming I didn’t mind a camera in my home12, the issue becomes how widespread the video eed becomes. In a polystate, there is a market or governments. So, between two surveillance states, I may well pick the one that’s more responsible with its data. Tat said, recent events lead me to be more convinced that privacy violations are not a highly researched issue or most people. I the citizens o the biggest anthrostates don’t in general care about privacy issues, then the market o governments won’t result in more privacy. Te second issue I raised was whether the nature o the polystate constrains the existence o more policed states. Tat is, i the Chinese and American Internet overlap, what use is it or China to censor material? o answer this, one must consider why those censorship laws exist. Tere is no law orcing me to eat candy bars. Tere doesn’t need to be. Censorship laws exist because people want to see things that other people do not wish them to see. I you are a citizen o China and wish to see images o iananmen during the student protests, your best options are to do something illegal or to emigrate. In a polystate system, you would probably have better choices — you could switch to an uncensored system entirely, or you could even switch to a version o your China-style system that has less censorship. Tat is, i the censorship laws o the China-style system were unpopular, people would just leave. Te residual group o people still in the system would necessarily be people who eel that they should be restricted in their media options. So, although the overlapping o societies might restrict the ability to censor inormation, it would not necessarily constrain censorship. It would only constrain voluntary membership in censored-media societies, and the range o behaviors o those members in a generally uncensored society.
Chapter 9: Public Property and/or Private Property
I believe public property might pose a difficulty or polystates. At the very least, the system would have to be substantially different rom the geostate system. I am not certain it would be different in a desirable way, but here I will speculate as to how it might work. First, let me deal with the trivial case o whether an anthrostate could, 12
Tis seems more a danger to society than to mysel.
within itsel, have a system o public property. Tis would o course be possible. In common usage, “public” property means something more like “property o the state.” o a good approximation, public land can be thought o as private property o the nation, public property within the nation. So too would it work in WS-1. Anthrostates having public property would be the same as corporate entities owning property in modern-day geostates. Tere might well be some practical differences in how this works (or example, McDonald’s doesn’t have an army, so ar as I know), but the system per se poses no contradictions. A more difficult case would be public parks. Most people believe that it is good to have wildlie preserves. We rightully believe that i Yosemite were auctioned off, much i not most o it would go to people who would not preserve it in its pristine orm. It might be argued that i people really wanted wildlie preserves they’d be willing to pony up the money. However, a well-developed sense o ethics and a well-developed stock portolio are not always tightly correlated. Suppose we assume that the existence o state-owned wildlie preserves is an intrinsic good. I so, I think we have to assume that this is one way in which a polystate system contains an intrinsic bad quality. Although I think it is very likely that wildlie preserves would exist in a polystate (I am certain there would be many anthrostates devoted to environmentalism), it is likely they would not be able to buy as much property as might be desirable. Tere is a reasonably good economic deense o this — that public lands may cost more than they benefit the public, especially when the aggregate citizen (mysel included, i I’m being honest) would ofen rather go to Disney World than to Yosemite. Considering what benefit might be had to the lower and middle classes by opening up cheap land, it could be argued that the preservation o certain beautiul ecosystems is not a good economic move purely in dollar terms. Perhaps this is so, but then again, i a majority o people thought the works o Monet would make good kindling, the paintings would still merit protection. Microeconomics-style analysis is unsuited to this task, in my opinion, largely because there is probably not a good way to determine a value or dollar figure or natural areas on which individuals place literally infinite value. Still, I will say this in deense o the way WS-1 might handle wildlie preserves — it is perhaps good to make citizens at some point put their money where their mouths are. It may be that part o why I don’t believe the auc-
tioning o Yosemite would end well is because citizens do not expect, based on their lie experiences, to have to lay out personal money to preserve certain lands. In addition, we shouldn’t necessarily think o the simple case o the auctioning o Yosemite. I only 3-5% o societies were pro-environmental, they might well make it the business o a century to acquire as much land as possible. By this means, it’s conceivable that over a long time scale, the polystate might even have more public land than a typical geostate does today. Unortunately, this is an “as time goes to infinity” solution to a problem that is in many cases short-term. Tere might be more wildlie preserves as time goes to infinity, but there might be a lot less wildlie, too. Another difficulty might be roads. Tese, however, I think could be handled amicably. It may surprise the reader to learn that private highways exist in many countries, rom the USA to France to Japan. In a polystate, an anthrostate could act as a corporation to accomplish roadbuilding, or corporations within and between anthrostates could create highways. Te polystate might, however, pose a ew complications. For example, i one anthrostate has drivers always on the right side o the road and another has drivers always on the lef, there would be an increase in accidents. I think it likely that this would not long be a problem. USB cords work in thousands o devices without a governmental authority insisting on it. But, even i we suppose an extreme case — say, an anthrostate theocracy that insists that the only ethical way to drive is on the lef side o the road — it is likely that other anthrostates or private owners would not link roads with those people. Other potential differences, such as speed limits or road construction standards, could also be resolved amicably by similar means. o the extent that roads would have differences, that inormation could be made public. And, as someone who has taken long road trips in the American Southwest, I can say that on I-10 alone there is considerable quality variation in highways within a single country. Dr. Roederer tells me I-95 provides sizeable variation even within the state o Virginia. In addition, non-standardization might open the option or a bit more variety in roads. In the modern world, roads are standardized based on the width o two cart-pulling animals established millennia ago. In the uture as cars become more autonomous, multiple road widths, or technology-embedded roads, might become the norm. In that case, there may be a benefit to a lack o top-down standardization. One other problem might be tolls. In a polystate, a person driving long
distance might encounter toll roads taking many different currencies. Te answer to this problem has already been discussed in the larger chapter on currency . It might be asked at this point what the nature o private property is without an overarching state regulating it. Tat is, suppose Alice and Bob both claim the same land and are rom different anthrostates. How is this to be resolved? I believe this question has to some extent been answered in other sections by the notion that an anthrostate will have the orce to deend the property rights o its constituents. Te general problem o complex arbitration has already been mentioned. However, one additional question worth noting is the potential abuse o property within the anthrostate in order to generate geostates. Tat is, suppose anthrostate A claims a thin ring o land that is 100 miles in radius and then disallows movement through the ring as “trespassing.” Tis would cause serious problems or the other citizens trapped inside the ring, and restrict resource usage by anthrostates outside the ring. How is this to be resolved? One possibility would be to simply add a polystate rule against enclosure; a good rule might be something like “no property o one anthrostate can be used to impede the motion o other anthrostates.” Tis rule would require some interpretation, but could be workable. Another possibility would be that, in practice, it would simply not be desirable to orm these sorts o rings. In a polystate, trapping o one anthrostate’s citizens would likely be an inducement to war or diplomatic sanction. Assuming a decent amount o overlap o anthrostate populations, the ring maneuver is something like the terrorist’s bomb discussed earlier. Tat is, it is not an advisable action at the level o a government because the victims o the action may be rom many anthrostates. Encircling a large area o land might very well entrap dozens i not hundreds o citizens o different countries. It’d be something akin to trying to take over the UN. It is also possible that in a polystate there would be normative opposition to internal geostates, which an encirclement might be seen to represent. Te impedance o movement in a large region would be something like casting law over geography rather than over people. In a long-term polystate, this might well become a taboo. Tat is, the culture that would develop in a
polystate might render this problem moot.13 One other actor worth noting is that the ability to switch governments yearly might make the whole idea o encirclement pointless — or at least rather silly. I I find mysel encircled by anthrostate A on November 1, I have only to wait 60 days to join anthrostate A. At that point, I proceed across the circle and out into the wide world, and 365 days later I can switch anew. 425 days is a long time to wait, but it is practically an instant in bureaucratic time. Tis necessarily ails i anthrostate A doesn’t, or example, allow citizens to leave their homes. It’s not clear to me why anyone would join such a state, but supposing a ew do it is still unlikely they would be able to impose their odd rules against a powerul state. In that case, our encircled citizen could escape by joining a large state (perhaps a large belligerent state), which would quickly secure his reedom by some means. Lastly, on the note o public property, it’s probably worth discussing the ultimate in public properties — air and sea. In more abstract terms, what I want to get at are externalities and common goods. For externalities, in particular I want to talk about airborne pollution. Tere are many externalities, but the logic o how pollution-limiting might work should apply generally. So, let’s consider two cases where airborne pollution might be a problem — one extreme, the other more likely. Te extreme case would be a rogue government. Let’s imagine a government created by evil Ebenezer Scrooge types, called PU (Polluters United). PU has 1 citizen, who exists to allow PU to exist, but contains the private property and operations o 10,000 corporations. PU emits hal o the carbon dioxide in the entire polystate. Tey won’t change because they aren’t compelled to internally, and who in the world would start a war with them over externalities? In addition, despite having 1 citizen, PU commands a great deal o financial power with which it can hire security. Tis is, I think, a worst-case scenario that might occur to many readers. I would say first o all that such a group should be airly easy to embargo, i there is political will on the part o other nations. In the case o a rogue government as extreme as PU, I think such an embargo is likely. Tat is, although the polystate permits coal plants, it would be within the power o 13 Tis may be wishul thinking, but I elt I should mention it since my original idea or this book was a work o fiction in which the above maneuver is the setting. Tat is, a group in a worldwide polystate attempts a geostate. Te plot (perhaps someone who’s better at long stories can take it up) was that a rogue group cleverly homogenized the population o an area and then declared a geostate.
the various anthrostates to economically isolate them and the people who work with them. Te reader might well note that this assumes many governments will behave ethically, and that assuming a large group will behave ethically is not very prudent. However, I don’t believe the above depends on ethical behavior. Rather, the embargo would result rom the polluted air being undesirable. In a polystate, it’s entirely possible that the PU actories would be somewhat distributed among the citizens o other nations. Tat is, as in WS-1, people would be conronted with the behavior o other nations. Only a concern or its people’s interest, or the regard o their constituency, would be needed to impel a politician to cut ties with PU. Let’s consider the more likely and potentially more problematic case o a large powerul anthrostate unwilling to agree to an externality-limiting arrangement. For example, suppose there is an anthrostate that contains 10% o the polystate population, and which reuses to sign a CFC-limiting accord. I they produce enough CFCs, the arrangement will be moot even i every single other anthrostate signs on. I don’t know that there’s a good solution to this, however the situation is very similar to the geostate situation. Consider the response o the US and Canada to the Kyoto Protocol. In act, it’s conceivable that in the particular case o the Kyoto Protocol, in which (i you believe the surveys) the majority o North Americans wanted the agreement ratified, the polystate system would’ve done more to limit emissions by giving citizens more choices. One more case to consider is that o simpler externalities. Suppose, or example, PU also dumps mercury into a lake that is partially the property o non-PU people or entities. In that case, what you have is essentially a crime perpetrated by one anthrostate upon another, which could be resolved as discussed previously in the chapter on crime. Te last area I want to consider on the topic o public property is common resources. Let’s consider the example o whaling rights. In the modern geostate system, whaling rights are airly strictly constrained, with most nations voluntarily limiting the number and type o whales their citizens can hunt, i not banning whaling altogether. Te situation might be a bit different or a polystate in that a polystate can’t make a geographic ban, as or example exists currently on Southern Ocean whaling. However, I believe in practice it would end up about the same. One way this might work would be to claim the whales as property o an anthrostate
or common property o a number o anthrostates. Tat is, i three quarters o all polystate citizens want a moratorium on hunting these species, their nations could simply assert ownership o the whales. I a pro-whaling anthrostate were to kill such an animal, it would be an international crime. In other words, i many powerul anthrostates wish to protect common resources, they could simply become the protectors o those resources by demonstrating that the violation o those resources would result in an international incident, which could result in serious sanctions o some sort.
Chapter 10: Tax Evasion/Manipulation
In WS-1, I stipulate a one-year changeover period under most circumstances. Tis is a relatively short time period, which might impose some problems or the collection o taxes. Specifically, three problems occur to me — (1) ax evasion by changing anthrostates beore collection can occur, (2) Anthrostatic tax havens, and (3) difficulty o collection o sales tax. In the first case, let’s imagine Bob who hates paying taxes. Bob, however, does not wish to live under a low-tax anthrostate, as he enjoys getting state services. So, Bob comes up with a bright idea — skip paying taxes this year, then beore he gets in legal trouble, switch to a similar anthrostate to which he does not owe taxes. I think the solution or the Bob problem here is pretty easy. Anthrostates could simply create laws that limit people’s ability to game the system. For example, services could be made contingent on previous payments. Tis might hurt poor people who are ofen the object o government services, so the contingency could be tied to income. Tat is, everyone gets the same service in exchange or a certain percent o income. Similar anthrostates could also gather together to enorce each other’s tax rules. Based on his behavior, Bob may only wish to live in certain types o anthrostates. Tose anthrostates could simply agree that tax cheats will be punished within a multi-anthrostate system. Let’s now suppose Bob has exhausted most o the anthrostates he likes, so he comes up with a new scheme. He’ll use as many services as he can, then at the end o the year he’ll switch to a minarchist state with low or no taxes, and which will not punish Bob or back taxes he owes to another country. In this situation, Bob may well “win,” but he does so at a very high price. He must
spend the rest o his days in a government he dislikes, and which perhaps his riends don’t esteem highly, all in exchange or a ew years o discounted government services. Simply put — assuming people care what system they exist in, the price o cheating could be easily made high enough to limit bad behavior. It’s conceivable that this effect could benefit the polystate overall. Consider that people who consistently cheat could get washed out o systems that are hurt most by cheating, into systems which are hurt least by cheating. It may be the case that ew citizens want to live in a libertarian paradise, but it is also the case that there is probably not much money to be made in derauding a minimal government. Let’s consider the second problem I raised — tax havens. For example, suppose our tax cheat Bob sets up an independent state — Bobtopia. He has his riend, Lawless Frank, be the only citizen o Bobtopia. Although Bob is a member o a social democracy, he has his income routed into an account in Bobtopia. Bobtopia has no taxes, but has its currency pegged to the social democracy o which Bob is a citizen. Tus, Bob gets the services o his anthrostate, but because he has no income, he pays no taxes. Depending on how heavy his taxes are, he might be able to offer a substantial bonus to Lawless Frank. Tis situation is more or less isomorphic to the modern geostate world, at least or wealthy people who can offshore their accounts in the Cayman Islands. In addition, at least in this hypothetical, Bob’s money is probably not very sae in Bobtopia, as Boptopia has no resources with which to make Bob whole i his money is stolen. Let’s then consider the more likely case o a proessional tax haven anthrostate. Suppose Bob creates an anthrostate called BobCorp. BobCorp has only one citizen — Bob. BobCorp employs hundreds o digital security experts and only deals in digital money. BobCorp has a small ee or holding onto money, but otherwise has no taxes. How are regular anthrostates to protect themselves? I believe once again this is similar to geostates. Tere will probably always be small states willing to act as tax havens or wealthy individuals in return or a small ee. Te potential downside o the polystate is that, due to its overlapping state nature, it might be easy or everyone to have a tax haven. Currently, tax havens are the province o the rich who have enough money and wherewithal to get them. But, imagine i BobCorp had an AM on ev-
ery block. Why wouldn’t everyone use it? Tis may pose a problem in the orm o a constraint on taxes in anthrostates, but I don’t believe so. In act, it would at least have the silver lining o making tax evasion rather democratic. Tat is, i everyone can avoid taxes very easily, including people who are not politically connected, anthrostates would be orced to conront the issue. Tis could be done in ways mentioned earlier, such as embargo laws. It could also be accomplished by having all taxes occur at the point o service. At the moment, this would probably mean a flat tax, but it is conceivable in a sufficiently advanced (and financially surveilled) society, progressive or regressive tax schemes could be accomplished at the point o service. Anthrostates could also come up with more rigorous accounting methods requiring their citizens to turn over all o their banking records, and taxing their overall income and wealth, rather than merely that wealth contained in their own system. It is worth noting that not all human beings are Bob. Although I don’t like what taxes do to my bank account, I do like many o the services they und. It is entirely possible that in a polystate, due to my ree choice o governments I would be happy about the majority o the uses o my tax dollars. Tis might make me unlikely to cheat on my taxes, even i it were a ready possibility. Lastly, let’s consider consumption and sales taxes. Tat is, let’s consider taxes at the point o sale. Suppose or example that Bob creates a right-libertarian anthrostate called Bob’s Gulch, which has a flat consumption tax on all goods. In Bob’s Gulch, Bob creates a chain o stores called Bob-Mart. He believes his right-libertarian anthrostate will result in his having the lowest prices. Meanwhile, Alice lives in Inc-A, which is a state that has no taxes other than a very high income tax on individuals. She opens a chain called Alkea. Because Inc-A has no consumption tax, whereas Bob’s Gulch does, Alkea is consistently able to charge lower prices at the point o sale, even though Alkea is in a more taxed anthrostate. In other words, the polystate might create a system in which the ability to have a point-o-service tax is constrained by the nature o competition. Tis constraint is potentially bad because it doesn’t clearly benefit anyone, and at the same time it limits anthrostate variety. In practice I believe it wouldn’t pose a problem, at least in the long term. Why? Because in the long-term, the citizens o Inc-A get really really
screwed. Tey pay a high income tax to make up or the lack o a sales tax. Te citizens o Bob’s Gulch pay no income tax, and then get Alkea products without paying a sales tax. In a sense, the question o consumption tax might become very similar to the question o tariffs in geostates. When a nation raises a tariff on a good, it is essentially protecting one group o people (those who work with the good or in related areas) at the expense o another group (everyone else). For example, i China wishes to sell cheap tires to Americans, a high tariff on tires protects tire people, but removes the benefit to everyone else o cheap tires. In the case o Inc-A, their corporations might get a benefit at the point o sale, but that benefit would be to the detriment o their citizens. Similarly, Bob’s Gulch has a system that benefits their citizens, but potentially harms their corporations. Tereore, it seems to me that at equilibrium you’d expect most states to employ a number o kinds o taxes to limit these sorts o problems. In addition, it should be noted that sales tax is not the only actor in the mind o a consumer. For example, many people would not want to buy ood rom a company in an anthrostate with ew or no ood saety standards. It is probable that discussions on the relation o consumption behavior and consumption tax cannot be reduced merely to the sticker price. Just as I trust oyota more than Ford to make a quality car, I might trust the ood made by companies in an eco-democracy over the ood made by companies in a ascism.
Chapter 11: Ungoverned People
Te polystate allows or the existence o entirely ungoverned people. I do not believe this poses any problem beyond normal orms o lawless behavior. First, it should be noted that very ew people wish to live a lawless existence. As I write, there are a number o nations (or at least, war zones with agreed-upon borders) that effectively have no law. One suspects the immigration rate is rather low. Tat said, the polystate system might be a bit more amenable to lawless individuals than a lawless geostate. For example, i you exist in no anthrostate, you may still be able to use the money, services, and protection o some anthrostates around you. But, you probably would also be barred rom
many opportunities or commerce or employment. Especially when you consider that a polystate would probably contain a variety o ultra-minimal governments, the option to be utterly lawless would not be very appealing to many people. In act, even i you were a sociopath bent on murder and with no regard or law or common decency, it seems unlikely you’d want to be lawless. I lawlessness is the exception to the rule, it is probable that such people would be held in suspicion. Suppose, or example, anthrostate NoMu has only one law (no murder) and yet a person still chooses to not exist in any anthrostate. Additionally, having no government effectively means you have no legal protection. As discussed previously, crimes between anthrostates would require (at least) two parties to arbitration. I a person rom anthrostate A commits a crime against a lawless individual, who is to say that anthrostate A cannot orce the lawless individual to obey the law o anthrostate A? Te lawless individual has no protection against any system. It should be considered that because the polystate permits all orms o government, anthrostate A could be a government that allows corporal punishment or execution or minor crimes. In a certain sense, lawless individuals already exist in geostates. In a number o voluntary 14 victimless crimes (e.g., prostitution, drug dealing, loan sharking) in many Western geostates, a class o lawless individuals are created. Tat is, a loan shark can’t call the police to get his money back. He can rely on social codes, or simply on the ear he instills in clients, but he cannot bring the power o the state against people who break agreements with him. At least in the matter o his business, the loan shark is lawless, as is the prostitute whose client won’t pay and the dealer who was shot while dealing. It may be debated whether these lawless individuals pose a serious problem to society as a whole. However, they do exist, and so this may be a case where in some sense the geo and anthro systems are the same. In addition, or reasons stated above, total lawlessness might well be less common in a polystate system.
14 I say “voluntary” with the understanding that almost nothing is purely voluntary, in the sense that social and economic circumstances can compel individuals to behavior they find undesirable. I mean voluntary only in the sense that both parties to a transaction can walk away rom it i they desire, regardless o the damage that doing so may entail.
Chapter 12: War
In many o the previous chapters, I’ve tried to argue that some phenomenon would be more or less the same between geostates and anthrostates. I think war is one area where the difference would be very large. Because this dierence is very large, speculation about how war might work in a polystate is probably unwise. For that reason, although war is a very large area or discussion, I will try to limit mysel to some observations on why war should be very different in a polystate, as opposed to how it would be different. Te most apparent way war would be different is that — at least at the outset o a war — it wouldn’t be clear who held what territory. Te closest geostate analogy might be a civil war. But, even in the case o civil war, actions are ofen regional, and spheres o influence are established quickly. However, this is only possible when there is a small number o non-overlapping actions. In a polystate, it is possible that over any radius the size o a small city, there will be dozens i not hundreds o anthrostates. Tis complicates matters. Suppose Anthrostate A1 goes to war with Anthrostate B2, and that (or simplicity) neither has any allies or sympathizers. Let us also suppose, as Clausewitz does, that the end o war is the disarmament o the enemy. It seems to me there are our ways the war can be accomplished: (1) Selection o a pre-determined fighting area, (2) Street-to-street fighting with care taken not to harm non-warring anthrostates, or (3) “Peaceul” evacuation o non-warring anthrostates, ollowed by fighting in a more traditional manner. (4) Fighting heedless o the consequences. Te first case would be simple enough, though it doesn’t seem likely. Or, i not unlikely, it at least presents an absurd situation in which parties to the war agree to fight en masse, then either use state property or rented property rom another state to execute the battle. Te second case (fighting street to street) is possible, but would be risky geopolitically in a way that typical geostate war is not. War in this sense would have to be something more like large-scale targeted assassination than what we usually think o as war. Even that might be dangerous, as a stray bullet or uncontrolled conflagration might represent an international incident. In this situation, almost all conventional weapons would have too high o a collateral damage risk to be useul. Most explosives would be too dangerous, as would automatic weapons. Innocent victims are a part o all
war, but in the case o the polystate, innocent victims might represent an entirely new action entering a war in progress. Whether a new action would enter a war would be very much subject to the belligerence o the harmed nation, the level o collateral damage done, and the clarity available to determine who is at ault. It may be the case that accidentally killing a citizen o a major government would not result in all-out war. However, as the last hundred years demonstrate amply, the difference between total war and total peace is not binary. On that basis, it seems to me that case three (evacuation o non-combatants) is a bit more likely. I B2 went to war with A1, B2 would perhaps do its best to find the highest concentrations o A1’s citizens and/or leaders. Especially i B2 was in the stronger political position in the polystate, B2 might be able to urge an evacuation o an area. More realistically, i a state o war seems to exist over a geographical area, those who can evacuate will evacuate. I so, any war lasting long enough might automatically result in a clear field o battle. Case our, in which the two actions do not heed the higher risk o collateral damage, may unortunately be the most likely. I a nation eels existentially threatened, or i its citizens have a particular view o conflict, they may not care or any o the reasoning pointed out above. I someone is coming to kill my amily, the optimum location and population dynamic or combat will not be high on my list o concerns. I the typical nature o combat is that the ear o collateral damage to third parties is not a serious one, then polystate war would probably be different, but no less prevalent than geostate war. With all that said, as I noted earlier, war in the polystate seems to me to be very complicated, and so ar I’m only talking about the case o two actions. In a polystate, which would contain many similar states, two-party war is perhaps unlikely. It is also entirely possible that in a state o total war, anthrostates might declare temporary geostates or the duration. In this situation, the determining actor might simply be the polystate culture and its attitude toward this sort o behavior. It’s entirely possible that once war commenced, it’d be prosecuted much like war always has been. Although it is difficult to say how war might be prosecuted, some o the political aspects might be interesting to discuss. Te political difficulty o war is discussed in the first book as a potential upside to a polystate, so I won’t belabor it much here. Te gist is this: I an anthrostate makes war, it
risks rapidly alienating a large segment o its population, especially i the war is generally perceived as unjust. In a system where it is easy to leave, it would be very hard to make war without the will o the people. I can think o two important counters to this somewhat rosy notion — first, that people are subject to propaganda, and second, that in the long term, warlike individuals might sort into certain anthrostates that might thus become very dangerous. Te case o propaganda is obvious enough, though propaganda is ofen hard to maintain in the long run. In his memoirs, Siegried Knappe recalled that even in highly propagandized Nazi Germany, soldiers quickly learned to differentiate victory rom deeat because newsreels used the term “heroic” whenever there was a loss. And in any case, the avoidance o war weariness is difficult even in times o general military success. Tat said, it should be noted that the possibility o mass deection during war might perversely result in leaders trying to prosecute wars very quickly and aggressively, which might make things worse in the short term o warmaking. Te case o personality sorting is more interesting, but perhaps difficult to predict. It could be imagined that any time a nation goes to war, there could be people eager to join and fight. On this basis, and on the basis o the reputations achieved by anthrostates, over time highly warlike nations might emerge. Tis is entirely possible, though it may be the case that warlike nations do not persist or long in a modern world. Modern warare is more and more determined by technology and economics. I North Korea is any example, a permanent war culture may not be conducive to good science or the generation o prosperity. In addition, even i there were these warrior states, they would still be subject to the constraints above. In summary, it seems to me that although war in a polystate is hard to understand or speculate about, the nature o the system probably presents some inertia against large-scale fighting.
Book 3 Potentially Insoluble Objections to a Polystate
In writing Book 2, I purposeully put mysel in the position o a skeptical apologist. Tat is, I start with the conclusion that a polystate could work, then try to explain why, while keeping an eye out or the limits and biases o my imagination. However, by and large, the discussions in Book 2 do not treat normative questions. I have tried to stick largely to trying to understand what might happen and not to judge what should happen. In doing so, I came up with a number o issues that are insoluble, usually because they have an ethical character. Tat is, i you consider it immoral to co-exist in the same polystate as a ascist dictator, WS-1 won’t do or you no matter how well I speculate about the economics o it.1 “Polystate” was written mostly because I think it’s an interesting thought experiment. At the same time, it also seems to me that it is a system that, in some orm, will be tried at some point. As inormation technology improves, individuals more and more expect customized experiences. When I go to a website now, I get inormation tailored to my interests. I I want a soda, I can go to Amazon and select rom thousands o options. As 3D printers and programmable matter become more common, almost all ob jects may be subject to the whims o individuals. I think it is only a matter o time beore people begin asking or customizability in the rameworks o their governments. I it is something that’ll be tried in the uture, it’s something we should think about now. I it contains insoluble problems, it’s probably good to locate those problems and figure out how they might be ameliorated, avoided, or at least reckoned with. Many o the topics to ollow have been treated in some orm, or have been touched upon in general by discussion o other areas. For that reason, and because the problems are generally normative and thereore above my pay grade2, I am going to list them here with only limited discussion.
1 Having worked in the movie industry or some years, I can say that you probably already exist in a nation with ascist dictators o a sort, but you may take comort knowing that at least they aren’t legally recognized as such. 2 Spoiler Alert: this book does not solve the gun rights debate.
Bureaucracy Explosion
As I have discussed in some previous sections, a number o the workings o a polystate could potentially result in a great need or more officials whose job is only to navigate the complexities that result rom a society with many overlapping governments. I a polystate necessarily requires more such individuals, the conversion o a geostate to a polystate system could at least in this sense be thought o as an economic loss. It’s conceivable these problems could be ameliorated by better technology, which could take the place o many somewhat mindless duties that nevertheless currently require humans. It’s also possible to imagine a way polystates could limit internal anthrostate bureaucracy by making governments more accountable to citizens. It could also be the case that a prousion o small governments would require ewer internal employees than a large body with the equivalent number o citizens. But, this is hard to speculate on well. As C. Northcote Parkinson said, “...it is maniest that there need be little or no relationship between the work to be done and the size o the staff to which it may be assigned.” Nevertheless, the need or an expanded amount o bureaucracy, as I believe is likely to exist in a polystate, would cost money directly and create the potential or indirect loss through corruption and rent seeking. I so, the polystate might still be worth it i the afforded reedoms were valued enough by citizens. In addition, it is possible that in the long term, the need or bureaucracy would lessen i over time citizens coalesced around a small number o governments or government types.
Constraints on Social Security via Age Sorting
Tis may seem specific, but I think it’s important. In many Western economies, it pays to be old. Tis hasn’t yet induced anyone to manuacture pro-aging creams or to bring comb-overs into high ashion, but it may well induce some ire among the young. Social security systems work on the premise that young people pay in while young and receive payment back when they get older. But what i people age sort their anthrostates? A rational short-term-thinking young person might preer a more libertarian society on the basis that she probably doesn’t need health insurance.
Anthrostates could insist that one must pay in what one gets out or one must pay in or a time period beore taking out, but it is entirely unlikely these policies will make an 18-year-old think rationally about lie 50 years rom now. It may also be the case that elderly people are attracted specifically to systems that cater to their needs by providing high social security and healthcare. Te elder-centric system might not persist or long without going bankrupt. In other words, i the young have differential preerences o a certain kind, in the long term, social security might not be possible. Tat said, the above assumes that people will behave ultra-rationally (at least in the short term) and will not act charitably toward their elders. I people are not ultra-rational, as is widely believed outside o economics, they may simply not tend to care to switch out o their parents’ systems. It may also be the case that charitableness isn’t necessary or young people to exist in these systems. Suppose, or example, that in the first 50 years o a polystate the more minimal societies prove to be less stable. Tat might result in many young people gravitating toward more standard systems. In addition, i the modern world is any guide, young people on average tend to avor expanding the welare state in a way that probably costs them in the short and medium term. Tat is, what is not economically rational may still be socially ashionable. Tese questions all have to do with one’s view o human nature and o responsibility to ellow citizens. Social security might well be constrained by the tendency (or lack thereo) or people to behave generously toward strangers when uncoerced. For those who believe social security is necessary to an ethical state, this constraint may pose an insoluble problem. Tis problem o age-assorting o social security states in specific might well be extended to any notion o uture planning by any anthrostate in general.
De-Integration of Society
One o the good and bad things about a large nation is that you are in the same ship o state as a lot o people who are nothing like you. Tis may mean society isn’t what you want it to be, but it also may mean you are compelled to learn how other people think. It is probably the case that the availability o infinite splintering o gov-
ernments would lead a polystate to in some sense be more ractured than a geostate. For example, different economic systems, different public property systems, and different healthcare systems might lead to groups o people who live near each other but can essentially ignore each other’s existence. Tis is, o course, already the case to some extent in every geostate, but the polystate might splinter even urther. It is not clear to me what the effect o this would be or whether it is desirable or not. Te polystate would at least have the saving grace o limiting regional disparities based on manmade borders.
Ethical Co-Existence
Is it ethical in general to live next door to a person whose society allows vivisection o animals? Tis would be the sort o question you might have to ask yoursel in a polystate. Mind you, at this moment unethical things are happening in pretty much every country on the planet, and I don’t think most o us eel we’re either directly responsible or personally tainted by them. However, it seems to me there’s something viscerally different between knowing North Korea starves its citizens and knowing that the amily next door beats their children. I pay taxes to neither3, and I approve o neither, and yet proximity and direct awareness make a great deal o difference to me. A related example to which the reader may be less sympathetic (this is an eBook, afer all) is ethically tech-ree or ethically tech-low societies. Tere could very well be a paleolithic style anthrostate, in which members are prohibited rom using tools created in the last 10,000 years. Even i members were capable o this, they would find it very hard to avoid at least interacting with technology. I may live like a caveman, but my technocratic neighbor can surveil me rom his arduino quadcopter, which rather ruins the experience. Tere is probably no way to resolve this, other than perhaps in some version o the private property nature reserves mentioned earlier. However, one wonders how well a paleolithic society that does not engage with other societies would be able to hold onto its property in the long term. I suspect that in a polystate there would still be broad norms. And, as 3 Or, at least, i by some means my tax dollars help the abusive parents next door, those dollars don’t support the violence per se, and in any case money is not nearly the majority o my concern.
discussed earlier, the overlapping o societies might speed the homogenization o norms. But it would also mean that an individual at any point in time would live in the same “state” as another individual committing unethical acts. It is not clear that this would be acceptable, regardless o any benefits gotten in the trade-off.
Mob Rule
One o the pros o the polystate I’ve suggested is that it makes government more beholden to citizens, as the citizens are readily able to leave government. However, this could result in an odd sort o mob rule in which leaders are so beholden to citizens (and their perception o citizens, and their perception o citizens’ perception o them, and so on) that the wise or educated have no ability to exercise discretion or prudence. By analogy, imagine the difficulty o raising a child i that child were able to leave you or some other parent quickly and or any reason. You might be tempted to dole out the candy a bit more regularly. It may be noted though that the citizens o a state are not children and government is not a parent. I suspect the extent to which this is seen as a problem depends on one’s view o democracy and o loyalty to one’s nation. One man’s mob rule is another man’s polity. And, i a society is indeed a mob rule in all the ways that those words signiy, it will soon find itsel without a mob to do the ruling.
Sacred Locations
Are locations and nations inseparable? Civilization, as we think o it, is not much older than 10,000 years, and all modern geostates are much younger. And yet, almost all nations, religions, ethnicities, and creeds, however young, tie their history to important locations. Suppose there were a strip o land claimed by group A to be the origin place o their messiah and claimed by group B to be their ancestral homeland. Let us also suppose these two groups hate each other. Both have a metaphysical attachment to this particular location. As such, it’s possible that neither party would be amenable to a polystate system on the mere basis that it would mean, in a sense, that one’s own party doesn’t have a geograph-
ic right to that location. Imagine how a devout Muslim might eel knowing that the Kaaba was in some sense private property that could be lost. Or, imagine that same Muslim being unable to restrict the movement o infidels in the area o the Kaaba. In other words, in the case where individuals consider ethnicity/religion/ culture and a part o the planet to be linked inseparably, the polystate’s allowance or ree movement o citizens may pose a dilemma. I should admit, I’m somewhat dubious o the ties between location and nation. One wonders whether ewer wars would have been ought i Jerusalem were a mental state and not a city. Tat said, it cannot be denied that to many i not most people, the love o a location and its history cannot be disentangled rom the idea o nationhood. Tis may pose a problem or the polystate, especially in the short term. People may eel a personal kinship with locality and be uncomortable with the idea that their part o the world no longer has a defined boundary. In the case o sacred locations, the right or the individual to visit may not be nearly as important as the right or a state to control. Tis would not be impossible to do via private property, but it would be more difficult in a polystate, especially i the claimed sacred area is large.
Safety/Weapon Carrying
I anyone in the polystate is in a society that permits the carrying o guns, nobody in any anthrostate is “ree” to live in a gunless society. Tis is true or all weapons, but guns are a good embodiment o the issue. In a polystate, the near-certain existence o anthrostates permitting concealed weapons means that everyone exists in a state that permits concealed weapons. Short o some very impressive technological developments, the potential added danger o weapons is probably unavoidable without urther constraints being placed on the entire polystate. Tis danger is certainly unavoidable in WS-1.
Startup Costs
It may be the case that the cost o starting certain orms o anthrostate would be prohibitive, even i they would be good in the long run. Most new states, i they were at all modern, would have some airly large upront costs in
terms o computing and location purchases. In the modern world, most very large projects which don’t have a clear economic benefit (e.g., large works o art, outer-space travel, particle colliders, etc.) are accomplished by governments because it is hard to get the needed capital rom private individuals and groups. I the creation o a new system were a very expensive undertaking, it might require similar investment. However, it is unlikely that one government will use its taxpayers’ money to create a competitor government. We can easily conceive o low-cost systems, or ways to implement expensive systems piecemeal, but the upront cost might limit some not-yet-imagined government ormats.
Transition
Even i all the above difficulties were dealt with, the issue o transition rom geostate to polystate may be unethical, as it would probably result in violence, and given the history o revolutions, might well result in ailure. Tat is, even i a polystate seems desirable compared to your geostate, the process o change might represent too high a cost or the change itsel to be desirable. It is probably the case that a polystate would limit the concentration o power, and thereore it is probable there would be resistance. Te only way around bloodshed I can imagine would be the creation o new territory, either by artificial means or by the colonization o other celestial bodies. For the moment, these both seem to be distant possibilities.
EPILOGUE For the purpose o simplicity, I have centered this book around a minimal polystate, and so most o the arguments herein are crafed or that setting. However, most i not all o the bad things (and good) mentioned above could be marginalized by having a more extensive polystate. Te options are infinite and are thereore useless to argue over here, but some interesting ideas to spark your imagination might be these — illegalization o war, illegalization o private property, illegalization o guns, guaranteed income, changeover time o 10 years, instant changeover, limiting number o states to 100 overall, yearly constitutional congresses, common currency, and common judiciary. By expanding the rules, you will necessarily restrict variety. However, when it comes to danger, prejudice, and censorship, to name just a ew issues, variety is not necessarily desirable. One particularly interesting possibility is the creation o a polystate-style tax code. For example, suppose each year you are told “you must pay x dollars in taxes,” and then are given a set o options or where the money goes (perhaps with non-discretionary payments to things like military and inrastructure). It would be interesting to see how the public chooses differently rom its representatives. I don’t know precisely what the results would be o such a system, but I suspect it may at some point be tried. And that is the note I would like to close on. I reely admit, i tomorrow a polystate were set up somewhere, I would not join. I would excitedly read about it, and would love to visit, but I’d like to see it actually work or oh... 50 years or so beore I join the party. Tat said, part o why I wrote this book is that I think the idea, i workable, would have many good consequences. A reading o the last ew centuries shows us that idealized government orms typically ail in practice, regardless o theories o their good and bad qualities. As Burke wrote, “Tey who destroy everything certainly will remove some grievance. Tey who make everything new have a chance that they may establish something beneficial.” It is probably the case that, much like a surgeon operating on a poorly researched animal, any change is likely to do bad, and any great change may kill the patient. And yet, most o the governments the readers exist in are the products, at some level, o philosophers and economists who proposed
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