Yu v. Yu

G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006 ERIC JONATHAN YU vs. CAROLINE T. YU FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Yu unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child Bianca. Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The petition included a prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of petitioner’s visiting rights "subject only to the final and executory judgment of the CA. ISSUE: Is WHC available to determine the custodial rights of parents over their children? HELD: No. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provides that the issue on the custody of the spouse’s common children is deemed pleaded in the declaration of nullity case. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of by either spouse. Pursuant to the aforementioned provisions, it is the court who shall determine the custody of the common children in the case for declaration of nullity Canlas v. NHA

G.R. No. 182795

June 5, 2008

FACTS: The petitioners, settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, filed and sought for the issuance of a "Writ of Amparo" on the premise that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter as embodied in our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. With the claim that land titles were fraudulent and spurious, they expressed willingness to help the government to unearth the so called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, and by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the "Writ of Amparo, the petitioners request that the unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of fraudulent and spurious titles, which are now in the hands of the private respondents. The petition was actually made to seek the reversal of the Court's dismissal of previous petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, considering that no motion for reconsideration can be filed for the second or third time in the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Is the Writ of Amparo available against a threatened demolition of a dwelling? HELD :"The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof." The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights stated in the quoted description of "The Writ of Amparo". Their claim of their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. Thus, the petition has no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. The petition is DISMISSED. G.R. No. 183711 June 22, 2010 EDITA T. BURGOS vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 1 FACTS: On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision in the consolidated petitions for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas 2 3 4 Corpus, for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her son Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, who was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four men and by a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, 5 Quezon City, on April 28, 2007. This CA decision dismissed the petitioner’s petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioner’s motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: Did the PNP and AFP exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires in the investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos? RULING: Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the

disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation among them the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. Based on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring should be undertaken. While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDG’s investigation particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason, we resolve to refer the present case to the CHR as the Court’s directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all 25 persons within the Philippines. G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 ROXAS vs. ARROYO. 1 FACTS: At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari assailing the 2 Decision dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. ISSUE: Are “enforced disappearances defined and penalized in our jurisdiction?, If not, is there legal and/or constitutional basis for the writ of amparo? Is the petitioner entitled to the writs prayed for? RULING: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty 106 or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo 118 proceeding. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property 119 rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 120 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights. Rodriguez vs Arroyo GR 191805 FACTS: Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. 193160).[1][1] Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals. Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.Sometime September of 2009, petitioner was forcibly taken by a group of military men and was brought to a military camp where he was interrogated with lots beatings and other forms of torture.

ISSUE: What is a writ of amparo? What is the writ of habeas data? Can the doctrine of command responsibility be used in amparo and habeas cases? The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action. Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ ofhabeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification. Nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. It further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010 MERALCO vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By 3 Memorandum dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security." ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under of the writ of habeas data where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein RULINGS: Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. 16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due 17 process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary Roquero vs UP Chancellor, GR 181851, March 9, 2010 FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 1 seeking to set aside the Decision dated 22 March 2007, and the 2 Resolution dated 1 February 2008, of the Court of the Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 entitled, "Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero v. The Chancellor of the University of the Philippine-Manila (UP Manila), et al.," a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which sought to reverse and set aside the Orders 3 4 dated 8 June 2004 and 9 November 2004 of the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of UP-Manila, chaired by Atty. Zaldy B. Docena with Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara as members ISSUE: Who can invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases? In what cases can this right be invoked? What factors are considered and balanced in determining that the right to speed trial was violated? Was the right to speedy disposition of case violated? RULING: The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a 12 relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. COCOFED vs Republic GR 177857-58 FACTS: Cast against a similar backdrop, these consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assail and seek to annul certain issuances of the Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case No. 0033A entitled, “Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., Defendants, COCOFED, et al., BALLARES, et al., Class Action Movants,” and Civil Case No. 0033-F entitled, “Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., Defendants.” Civil Case (CC) Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F are the results of the splitting into eight (8) amended complaints of CC No. 0033 entitled, “Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,” a suit for recovery of ill-gotten wealth commenced by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), against Ferdinand E. Marcos and several individuals, among them, Ma. Clara Lobregat (Lobregat) and petitioner Danilo S. Ursua (Ursua). Lobregat and Ursua occupied, at one time or another, directorial or top management positions in either the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) or the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), or [1] both. Each of the eight (8) subdivided complaints correspondingly impleaded as defendants only the alleged participants in the transaction/s subject of the suit, or who are averred as owner/s of the assets involved. ISSUE: Is the right to speedy trial under Section 14, Art III the same or different from the right to speedy trial under Section 14, Art III? Was the right to speedy disposition of case violated?

RULING: It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accused’s right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution, obtains regardless of the nature of the case. In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In the instant case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for [97] the first time on appeal. The sporting idea forbidding one from pulling surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case cannot be dismissed for the alleged violation of petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of the case pimentel v comelec 157870 FACTS: In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for reelection in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the qualifications of Senators. HELD: Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Agustin vs. CA Facts: In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,

with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.[6] Issue: Is DNA compulsory testing a form of unreasonable search? Ruling: No, In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

Ong vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: This Petition for Certiorari,[1] dated December 13, 1996 seeks the nullification of the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated August 18, 1994[2] and October 22, 1996.[3] The first assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss the petition for forfeiture filed against them, while the second questioned Resolution denied their motion for reconsideration. Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit[4] on February 4, 1992, claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. Issue: Is the respondent in forfeiture proceeding entitled of due process? 29

Ruling: NO, In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379 are civil in nature and not penal or criminal in character, as they do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. Moreover, the procedure outlined in the law is that provided for in a civil action RA 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor," expressly affords a respondent public officer or employee the right to a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigation in criminal cases, but is silent as to whether the same right is enjoyed by a co-respondent who is not a public officer or employee. Lejano vs People GR 176389 FACTS: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. On August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al, The Court granted the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI pursuannt to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. ISSUE: Were the accused denied of due process by prosecution’s failure to produce the semen specimen for DNA testing? RULING: NO, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the 9 ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be overtaken by the

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decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test. For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime Quarto vs Ombudsman GR 169042 FACTS: Before the Court is a petition [1] for certiorari and mandamus filed by Erdito Quarto (petitioner) [2] assailing the Ombudsman’s January 7, 2004 and November 4, [3] 2004 resolutions which granted Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A. Gayya (collectively, respondents) immunity from prosecution, resulting in the respondents’ exclusion from the criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify the immunity granted to the respondents, and to compel the Ombudsman to include them as accused in the informations for estafa through [4] falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3(e), [5] Republic Act (RA) No. 3019. ISSUE: How is the state interest in criminal prosecution satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional right against selfincrimination? Who has the power to grant immunity from prosecution and to implement the same? Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of an individual’s constitutional right against self[51] incrimination (considered the fount from which all statutes granting [52] immunity emanate ) and the legitimate governmental interest in [53] securing testimony. By voluntarily offering to give information on the commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a person opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself had participated in the criminal act. To secure his testimony without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given [54] immunity from prosecution. In this manner, the state interest is satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional right against self-incrimination. While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function. The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.