Yigael Yadin the Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Discovery 1963

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CORRIGENDA

Y. Yadin: The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands

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p.48 (fig.) read "to fight" instead of " to light". pp. 79 and 206 (bottom) read "1307-1275" instead of " 1310-1280" . p. 126 read " Ein Gedi" instead of " Ei Gedi". read "see page 125" instead of "see page 124". pp. 130, 136, 150, 173 read " T elloh" instead of " Lagash" . p. 154 read " Tehutihorep" instead of "Tehutitcp". " (cf 169)" to be omitted. p. 159 read "{zoth century B.C.)" instead of "(c. 1900 B.C.)". p. 168 read " left" instead of " above" and " above" instead of "left" . Same correction in index, p. 473, No . 168. p. 174 read "at Ginossar" instead of " of Ginossar". read " above and left" instead of "ab ove". read "spear head" instead of 'javelin head". p. 180 read "The Palestine Archaeological Museum" instead of " T he Rockefeller Museum". Same correction in index, p. 474, No. 180. p. 187 read " The Ugariti c hunt ing charioteer (above)" instead of " The Canaan ite hunting charioteer" . p. 191 read "1'69 ms." instead of " 1'47 ms." p. 195 read "from a tomb at Thebes" instead of "from a tomb ofIamanezeh, Sheikh Abd el-Gurnah". p. 197 (bottom) read" 14th century" instead of" 17th cent ury" . p. 224 read "The city of Hattussas" instead of "The city ofBoghazkoy", p. 229 read "on page 347" instead of " in the oppo site illustration". p. 237 read "pages 103 ff." instead of " following page I07" . p. 354, the words "National Museum, Athens" refer to the Warriors' Vase. p. 397, Nos. 13 and 14 read: "xiii" instead of "viii". p. 473, No. 168 read " The Palestine Archaeological Museum " instead of " Dept. of Antiquiti es, Archaeological Museum, Jerusalem." p. 473, No. 172 read "Virolleaud" instead of " Viroelleaud".

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Where Rockefeller Museum is mentioned read Palestine Archaeological Museum.

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CONTENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

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The Art of Wa1are Mobility The Chariot Cavalry Firepower: Personal Weapons The Bow The Composite Bow The Arrow The Qllillt'r The Slin< !? The[aveiin and the Spear The Sword The Mace and the Axe Security: Personal Protection The Shield Armor The Helmet

1 1 4 4 5 6

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7 8 9 9 10 10 II

13 13 15 15

Fort~fied

Cities ill Attack and Defense Attack and Penetration FortUlcatiolls and Defense The Cit)' Walls The Gate 'T he Inlier Citadel r..Vater Suppl» dllrin,!? Siexe

Archaeological Sources Ilutstrated Monuments Finds at Ex cavations Written Documents

Chronology and Terminology Relative Chrollolog)' Absolute Chronology Archaeological Terms and Periods

16 r6 18

19 21

23 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 29

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II. THE FORTIFICATIONS OF JERICHO-

The Most Ancient Fortifications in the World (7000 B.C.)

Plate

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III. THE PERIOD BEFORE ABRAHAM (400o-2IOOB.C.)

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Personal Protection The Shield Armor The Helmet

48 48

Mobility The Chariot Weapons: Short-range and Hand-toHand Fighting The Mace The A xe Egypt The Sword The Spear and the[aveliu \ Weapons: Long-range The Bow ,~

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37 37 40 40 41

43 44

45 46 46

Methods of Wariarc Battle in Open Terrain Battle 0/1 FortUled Cities Conclusions Plates

49 49 49 49 50 57 u6

IV. THE PERIOD OF THE PATRIARCHS (2100-1570 B.C.) Methods of Wiltjare Weapons: Short- aud Medium-range 59 Battle 011 Fortified Cities The Axe 59 60 Battle in Gpen Terrain: The Sword 61 The Duel The Spear and thejm'din Standard Combat 62 vVeapons: LOllg-rallge Communications and ltltelligmce 62 The BOl/! The Chariot 64 The S!illg 64 Personal Protection plates 64 The Shield 65 Fortificatiolls V. THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT, THE EXODUS, MOSES, AND JOSHUA (1570-1200 B.C.) vVeapoflS: Short- ami Mcdinm-ranoe The Axe The Sword The Spear

77 78 80

T¥eapoflS: Lony-ranye The Bow

80 80

Personal Protection

The Shield Arlllor The Helmet

83 83 84 85

M,)bility The Chariot

86 86

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Methods of Assault 011 Fortified Cities 90 90 The Fort!ficatiolls Water SlIpply under Siege 95

Attack and Defense Stratagems Battle in Open Terrain The Battle of Megiddo The Battle of Kadesh The March The Surprise Attack The Countcrattacl: Tactics Illtelligence Ambush and Night Fightitlg Standard Formations Army Oroaniratioi: Chariot Units 1'vlilitary Administration Plates

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69 71 73 73 74

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76 96 99 100 100 103 1°3 1°4 105 108 IIO IIO III II2 113 II3 182

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VI. THE PERIOD OF THE JUDGES AND THE UNITED MONARCHY (1200-920 B.C.) The Philistines: Land and Napal Battles The Land Battle The Naval Battle The Egyptiall Army

248 249 251 253

Wars ill the Bible dllring the Period of thejudges The Conquest of Bethel The Exploits of Eliud Deborah and Siscra

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253 253 254 255

Gideon and the Three Hundred Abimclech and the Tower of Sheehan The Concubine ill Gibeah and the Oroauiration ofthe TribalArmy Saul the Warrior-Killg Dapid and Goliath

256 260 262 26 3 265

Dauid and Solomon The Conquest ofJeri/salem The Battles '~f David The Army of David and SOIOIllOIl The Chariot and the Cavalrv The Fortifications Plates

VII. THE KINGDOMS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH (920-586 B.C.) The Troops and their Weapons 293 Iltjalltry 294 The Archers 295 The Slingmell 296 The Cavalry 297 The Chariot Corps 297 Battle in Open Terrain 302 The Battle of Samaria 3°4 The Battle of the Wilderness ,tj Tekoa 310 josiah and the Battle of Meoiddo 311

Fortified Cities in Attack andDciense The Breach-the Batteriuo-Ratn Other Devices Sealillg the Walls Penetration beneath the vValls Siege, Ruse, and Psychological Warfare Water and Food Supply The Walls The Gate Dejensive Warfare Plates

267 267 27° 275 284 287 331 291 313 314 316 316 317 318 32° 322 323 325 375

ABBREVIATIONS OF PERIODICALS

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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SOURCES FOR ILLUSTRATIONS

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SUBJECT INDEX OF PLATES

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PREF A CE

PREFACE

This boo k-which is a first attempt to discuss all the facets of the art of warfa re. its impl ements. techni ques and strategy in all Biblical lands-requires a few explanatory word s as to its structure and meth od of presentation to the reader. Altho ugh the book discusses a variety of subjects, each of whi ch is in a sense independent , it is the interweaving of the vario us themes that makes the harmonious wh ole at which I have aimed, The boo k covets all lands o f the Bible-from Anarolia to Egypt and from Palestine to Mesopo tamia- a part of the world conta ining nations and countries that had been fighting each other over long periods of history . O nly a complete analysis from both the military and archaeological point of view will enable US to com prehend the development ofwarfare in all its aspects: weapo ns, fortifi cations. army organization. and tactics. The book is. in fact. compos ed of thr ee parts: the text accom panied by line dr awin gs. the color plates. and explanatory capti ons. T his arran gement is necessitated by the fact that the princip al sources for the subj ect are pictorial in character, consisting o f thou sand s of carved and painted monuments. together with other rem ains of an archaeological character, which must first be set in their pro per histo rical and geogr aphi cal settin g through archaeological and chron ological analysis before it is possible for one to draw military conclusions. T he objec t of the text is to defme the historical and archaeological backg rou nd. to describe the various elements in the art of war and weave them into a single pattern w hich wi ll make evident their mu tual relationshi p and their conn exion wi th the different warring nations. Th e accompanyin g line draw ings sho uld at this point assist the reader to visualize the subject withou t undue reference to the color plates. T he subjects are discussed here within their archaeological period. and in each period the ind ividual aspects are dealt with separ ately. This seemed to me preferable to discussing any one element (e.g., the bow ) from its very begum ing to the end of the period discussed in the book. The latter may perhaps be a suitable method for a book whi ch aims merely at presenti ng a bod y of data for reference purp oses. but . in my opinion, it is unsuitable for a book whose aim it is to emp hasize the inter-relationship amon g the many elements which compose the art of warfa re. this being the only satisfactory way to grasp the development o f this art o r science. The plates are put at the end of each part . according to the archaeological period s. In this kind of book , w hich is based to a large extent on archaeologi cal fmds. it is imperative. I believe. to present visually to the reader the many sources in as clear and faithfu l a manner as possible. T he cho ice of suitable subjects o ut of thousands of documents, the collection of colored and other pictures. and the

arran gement o f this abun dant material on plates. by their geographical provenance. their archaeological periods. and their relation to the various clements of war, has necessitated con siderable effo rts. which often surpassed anythi ng I had anticipated when I first started the book. N everth eless. I believe this to have been wo rth w hile since the pictur es will not on ly aid the reader to understand many things that are Impossible to describe in mere w ords. but will enable him to read critically and come to his own conclusions, Moreover. much of the material publi shed her e is scattered in scor es of m useums and hundreds of publ ications (some of them qu ite rare). I have made a special point of presenting mate rial from these so urces (such as the rare publications o f Layard. Botta, and Flandin ) and at the same time tr ying to show them in conjunction wi th their places of discovery. I have made it a rule to pr esent . wheneve r possible, the pictu res of the obj ects themselves. together with the monuments describing them. I have sometim es preferred a certain monument to others. not because of its absolute impo rtance, but on the basis of its relative artistic value or its rarity . As fot rhe w ritten documents-Egy pti'an. Arcadian, etc.-whICh I have incorp orated in to the text. I have of co urse used translations and . unless other wise indicated, I have mostly follo wed those in Pritchard' s book (see bibliograph y). Th ese translations do not pre tend to be literal; their purp ose is. in gcneral. to give a clear unders tan din g of the cont ents of the documents. As f or the .explanatory captions. I tho ught it best not to include too many descriptive details o f the monuments and finds in the text prope r. lesr it distract the reader from the main poin ts and hinder him fro m seeing the wo od for the trees. On the other hand . it is frequ ently these fine differences in details which make it possible to follow clearly the essential interrelationship between the van ous aspects of warfare and the development of the science as a whole . Tha t is why I have paid particular attention to the captions of the more complex mo numents which embody several subj ects sim ultaneo usly. Th e reader who wishes to explore mor e thoroughly the w hole subject. or thato f a particular chapter, has but to tu rn to the last pages for the very extensive bibliography ou every fmd and monu ment depicted in the book. I have no t spared det ails there. since I wished to provi de the reader wi th ample op port uni ty for studymg and comparmg varrous opi nions in regard to the obj ects. Onl y seldom have I touched on actual batt les. the reason bcing that here. , more than on any oth er topic. the sources are very scant aud are subject to speculations and interpretations so ex tremely divergent that it is imp ossible to present the pro blem satisfactorily from a scien tific viewpoint. 'Mo reover. the details of the battles depend mainly on our knowledgc of the to po graphic al factors which determ ined the tactical and strategical moves. In most of the famo us battles this element is com pletely lacking, and often scholars canno t even IdentifY with certainty the places named. Any change in iden tification of a sitea matter which is of prim ary im portance to our understauding of a particular h.ltlle-alters. in fact. our grasp of the who le situation . Schematic maps. so o ften bra.ught forth to explain the battles in Biblical lands. may be useful to exp lain a war as a wh ole and the lines of the " grand strategy" . but 110t mo re than that. and

PREFACE

PREFA CE

arc th erefor e liable to mislead the reade r who is no t fam iliar with the top ographical pro blem s. N evert heless, w e have eno ugh details abou t som e battl es, and th e most impo rt ant of those are discussed here. Even this, however, is not done JUSt for their own sake , bu t in o rde r to illustrate the pr inciples, techn iques, and im plemenrs of wa rfare wh ich are the subjec t of this book . In a few instances I have described Biblical battles, b nt on ly w here I th ought the data w ere sufficient to clarify their main problems and , perhaps, to stim ulate other scholar s to give the matt er more th ought. I have no illusion s th at I have succeeded in exhausting the subje ct. This may be possible in the future, when prim ary and basic work on the subj ects discussed wi ll have been don e separat ely for each perio d and each co wu ry . I hope I may succeed in ro using scholars in vari ous fields to dev ot e the ir abi lities and ene rgies to fur ther research , and thus prepare the w ay for still other scholars to complete the job . M y debt to pr evious research on every subject mention ed in this boo k can be realized fro m the lon g bibliograph y at the end. w hich can also serve as a guide to readers w ho may wish to del ve mor e deep ly into the subjec t. It gives m e great pleasure to acknowledge m y gratitude to all those who helped me to bring th is bo ok into being. First and fo rem ost I want to thank Mr. Y. Makavi, the general mana ger of the Int ernati on al P ublishing Co mpan y. who urged me a number of years ago to put into writing some of the data I had been collectin g. and has spared no effort in help ing me to acquire ph ot ographs and publis h the bo ok in its present elabor ate format. I am deep ly ind eb ted to his daring and able

reconstruction of the Lachish siege; to Miss T. Kish for her co lor recons tru ction of several d rawings; to Mr. P. Bar-Ade n for th e ph otograph of an axe from the Judean D esert; to M r. B. Roth enb erg for a ph ot ograph of Ein Q adi>. and to M essrs. S. Smila n, D. Ussishkin , \ V. M armot , Co lonel M . Mi chael . Lieutenant Colonel A. Perr y, and M ajor A. Ar an, for their help in procuring colo red ph otographs du ring thei r travels. I also thank th e O rient al Photographic Company for prepa ring several colored photo gra phs fro m vario us sources, and cop ies of all th e ph otographs for the purpose of the layo ut. I am deepl y ind ebt ed to Lord M arks. wh o kindl y put at m y disposal the ph oto graphi c labo ratori es of Marks and Spencers and the services of its chief, Mr. Bayn ton , w ho, together with his assistant s, w ork ed tirel essly to ph otograph many obj ects from th e Br itish Mu seum . To my good friend Mr. L. Shalit I am grateful for help , as usual, in m or e w ays than one. Mr . Zi m and Mr. Bengum kindl y help ed in man y phases of the wo rk of pre par ing the layour . I shou ld also like to express my deep appreciatio n to Clic hes Schwitte r AG. Z lirich, who wi th mu ch patience prepar ed the illustrations, as well as to J arr old & Sons. N orwich . England. for their high standard of pr inting. I thank m ost heartily my friend Mr. Pearlman for his painstakin g translat ion of the m anuscript fro m the Heb rew . I am gra teful to M r. H . Ravi v of th e scient ific staff of the View s of the Bi blical World for his help in selecting the pictu res and prep aring the index of sour ces, and to Mrs . I. Pomerantz for mu ch help in edit ing the bibli ography and index of

execution .

so urces.

I am particularly thankful to the many museums and their dire ctors w ho have permitted me to check their collections and som etimes em ploy special photo. graphers for my purposes. Amongst them I would like to thank Professor A. Parrot and the Lou vre; Dr. D. R. Barnett and the British Museum ; Dr . W . C. Hayes and the Metro politan Museum of Art; Professor P. D elo ugaz and D r. W . Boy d of the Orienta l Insti tu te, U niversity of Ch icago (especially for permission to use the magnificent colored dr aw ings from Medinet Habu); to the museums of Florence and Bologna; to the University Museu m , U niversity of Pennsylvania (and particularly to M r. A. R. Schulman w ho kind ly allow ed me to stud y his m anuscri pt on th e organiza tion of the Egyptian army) ; to the Hittite M useum in Ankara; to the Arch aeologi cal M useum in Istanb ul; to Miss W. Needler and the Ro yal O ntario Museum; the Prin ce of Wales Museum in Bombay ; to the Ashm olean Museum, O xford ; to the Archaeologica l Institu te, London U niversity. and particularly to Dr. K. Kenyon ; and also to the Museum of the De partment of Antiquities. gove rnment of Israel. and th e M useum of th e H ebr ew U niversity .

I w ish to th ank McGr aw-Hill ed itori al staff for m uch help , and particu larly Mr . D. SCOtt. Lastly. I wish to thank my wi fe. wh o not on ly took upon herself the exten sive co rrespondence w ith museums and indiv iduals, but also gave me th e benefit of her advice througho ut.

Jerusalem. May I also record my thanks to Miss A. Pesin of the edit or ial staff of Horizon~ w ho allowed me to use a colo r tr anspar ency of the Tutankhamun chest ; to Mr. J. Per rot for a ph ot ograph of a gate at Bogh azko y and Yazilikaya; to Mr. E. Erick son for permissi on to reproduce an ivory pan el from his co llection; to D r. E. Boro wsk y for permis sion to reprod uce a sickle sword of his; to Mr. A. Sorrell and D r. R. D . Barne tt for permission to reproduce the draw ing of the

Yigael Yadin Jerusalem

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INTRODUCTION

THE AR T OF WARFARE War is the attempt by one nati on to impose its will on ano ther by force. This breakd own in hum an association has been a recurring feature in the history of man since the very beginning . Human conflict finds expr ession in the first pages of the Bible. Hardly has man begun life on earth wh en, as the Biblical narrative records wi th unadorned simp licity , "Cain rose up against his br oth er Abel and killed him." The chain reaction to this event has continued right up to the zoth century. A study of human history canno t therefore be complete without a study of the military events of the past and of the m eans conceived by nations to secure their own military aims and thwart those of their enemies. Moreover, in ancient times, as today, men devoted IDtlch of their technical genius to perfecting weapons and devices for destruction and defense; W eapons of war thus serve as an enlightening . index of the standards of technical development reached by nations duri ng different periods in history. Since war always involves at least two sides, the development of the art of warfare of one nation can only be fully evaluated in the light of the art of warfare conducted by its enemy, in attack and defense. As an object of military study, a single land or nation is too limiting and confming-and can be misleading. The smallest unit of such a study is a region or a group of peoples who battled each other at some period or another in their history . One must examin e the.reciproc al effects ofsuch encounters, which enabled each side to gain kn owledge of the weapons and fortifi cations of the other, to copy them and improve upon them. And these effects are often evident in the relics laid bare by the spade of the archaeologist. But-and here is an example of how a limit ed study can mislead- these ancient weapons may be and have often been found far from their land of origin, carried there as w ar booty by a victor or left behind by a powerful nation waging war beyond its ow n frontiers. Such wa r material, found in archaeological excavations, sheds much light on the art of warf;l rc' of a parti cular period and in a particular region , but not necessarily of the : ~~~

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I N T R O D U CTI ON

THE ART O F WARFARE

nat ion in w hose land it was discovered. Th e study of warfare mu st clearly cover both rivals. There is a reciprocal impact on nations who com e into conflict with each oth er. Th ere are similar reciprocal influences, inevitable and consistent, which the different weapons, fortifications, tactics, and military organizations make upon each other. The progressive developments in each branch and instrument of war during successive periods in history become clear only when examine d in the context of enem y opposition at the time. New tactics int roduced by one side prompted new counter- tactics by the other. Th esein tum produced furth er tactical innovations by the first. W eapons developm ent followed the same process. T he appearance of the composite bow, for example, with its increased power of penetr ation, led to the inventio n of the coat of mail for defense. Thi s ill turn provided a further challenge for a weapon to defeat armor. And so the process conti nued, leading to advances in both offensive and defensive battle devices. Similarly, the various types of city fortifications can be und erstood only in the light of standard patt erns of attack on cities prevalent dur ing the different periods, and in particular of the use of the battering-ram. The study of military development .is in large measure the study of the unending process of reaction of each element in warfare to its counterpart. But all elements must be considered as an int egrated wh ole, and the relationship of each to the o ther properly examined. The development of weapons must be stu died against the background of the development of tactics, army structure, and the systems of fortifications. To stud y each element in isolation w ould be superficial and sterile, and as unreward ing as the study of military developments of a single nation witho ut reference to those of its neighb ors. Bur account must also be taken of a hum an featur e which has affected the rate of military development amo ng different peoples-inertia, or conservatism. There are countless examples thr ough out history, right up to the present time, in which military innovations, pro ved in batt le, have been spum ed by other armies who have pre~erred to adhere to traditional patterns, and have been finally int rodu ced only alter long delay. There is often a considerable time-lag between the appearance of an improved weapon in one country and its adop tion by another. .M oreover, even when some technical imp roveme nt gradually becom es accepted in the military scheme of things, it suffers for a time by being considered in the obsolete terms of patterns prevalent before its int rodu ction. Th ese compl ex factors must alwavs be borne in mind when we com e to study the monuments left behind by the na~ions' of antiquity. Th ese monuments relate mo stly to warfare, since wa r was a regular part of the lives of these people. Military action may be classified in several ways. But none is compl etely satisfactory . Th e most general classification, for exam ple, is by the character of the operations, either offensive or defensive. Bur in every operation there is usually a concern both with offense and defense. Even an army initiating an assault must be organized to defend itself against surpr ise or count erattack. This is also true of the individ ual soldier, who must be arm ed with bo th offensive and defensive 2

weapons.

Military action may be classified accord ing to forms of warfare-battle in open terrain and battle on a fortified ciry. Bur here, too, each side must be armed and or ganized in a manner suited to both types of warfare. For ir may have to move from the city to the plain, or from the plain to the city . durin g the course' of the fighting. An army mau led in an open battl efield may seek to retreat behind a fortified base- as did the Canaanites w hen beaten by Thutmose III in the celebrated battle near Megiddo. And an army that may be expected to sit behind rhe defensive walls of its city may break out and attack the enemy in the open plain- as happened with the counterattack of the King of Samaria on the armies of Aram w ho sough t to besiege him. And there is yer a further classification. A military action can be analyzed in the light of strategy and tactics. Basically, strategy is the art of war. Tactics is the art of battle, concerned with the mov ement and operation of fighting units on the battlefield. But however military action may be classified and defined, in the final analysis the art of warfare is to seek to achieve suprema cy over the enemy in three fields: mobiliry, firepow er, security. To put it anoth er way, it is the ability to mo ve troops to engage and inju re the enemy without serious inju ry to oneself. The principles of warfare discussed in the following chap ters, as they emerge from the military record of ancient peoples, reflect the attempt of each warring faction to achieve this triple supremacy over the enemy , or the action taken after its successfulachievem ent. Th ese principles, often regard ed as the basis of strategy and tactics, may be broken down into surprise; mainten ance ofaim, economy. and concent ration of force; coordination of arms; securi ty, mob ility, and the offensive spirit. Incidentally, surprise is generally accepted as the most impo rtant of these factors. Surpri se is, in fact, the ability to move one's forces to engage the enemy at a time, place, and under cond itions which he does not expect, for which he is unprepared, and to which he canno t, therefore, react by the most etfective application of his own forces and weapons. These principles are illustrated in cameo for m at any boxing match, in which the conten ders arc even unar med. The constant movement of the body has a single pu rpose: to put the box er in the most advantageous position fro m wh ich he can both arrack and at the same time evade the blows of his opponent . Th e predominant role of one fist is to attack-firepowe r; of the other , to parr y-securiry. T o gain this advantageous position, the boxer has to know where his opp onent is-or is likely to be at a given mo ment-and to seck ou t his weak spots. In this he is served by his senses-sight, sound, and touch. His eyes, ears, and hands provi de him with the intelligence which, in battle, is provided by recon naissance units on patrol or at forward observation posts. Th e action of his fists and other parts of his body is directed by his brain, thro ugh the medium of nerves and muscles. T heir counterpart in warfa re is the military comm ander and his staff, as the brain ; their Ilcrves-the commun ications network; their muscles-trained and disciplined troops.

Mobility, firepower, and security , as the three basic elements in the art of

3

T HE ART OF W AR F AR E

w arfare, are appro priate head ings under w hic h the na ture of ancient warfare and the weapollS used in antiquity ma y be examined. The three gr oups we shall be conside rin g are therefor e : Means w hose purpose was to ofier mo bility , such as cha riot s, cavalry. and the capacity of the foo t soldier to m ove far and fast. 2 . Means of firepowe r , na mel y weapons w hose pur po se w as ro hit the enemy at various ranges . 3. Mean s of security, namely prot ectiv e devices such as the helmet, shield , and arm or , whose purpose was to parry or blunt the effecti veness of the enemy's 1.

we apo ns. Porri ficarion s are a subje ct in themsel ves. For , though they may be classed as a security device ag ainst the designs o f an enemy , their struc tu re must be such as to offer their own tr oops mo bili ty and freedo m of actio n in add itio n to secu rity bo th fo r so ldiers and civi lians. Befor e pr oceeding to a descripti on and analysis of these m eans of w arfare, it is perh aps wo rt h und erl ining that in th e final resort it is not wea po ns alone wh ich determine the issue in hattie, but oft en , particul arly where both sides are evenl y matched, the spirit of the commander in the direction of his for ces and the spirit o f th e tro op s in the handling of th eir weapons . These have been the decisive factors in fateful war s through out histo ry .

MOBILITY

The Chariot

4

The chariot in battle is basically a mobile firing platform. It is not, primarily, a means of tr ansport fro m a distant base to the battl efield. Its principal purpose is to serv e as a mo vabl e platform within th e battlefield, from w hic h rel ati vel y lim ited firepower can be rush ed to and brought to bear on decisive spots in the midst of th e fi ghting. A secondary and by no means negligibl e purpose is its sho ck valu e as it cha rges into the en emy ranks : To fultil its major function, the chari ot mu st o ffer speed and m aneuverabiliry as well as stabiliry for the firing of weapons. These needs ar e contradictory. For speed and ma neuverability are best pr ovided by a small and light chariot. But a stable firing platform demands a heavier vehi cle, capable of supporting and providing o perational space for at least one w eap on-carrying soldie r in addition to the dri ver. The riva l claims of these tw o co nsiderations exercised the minds of m ilitar y planner s throug ho ut the gener atio ns. Different soluti o ns we re devised at differ ent times. And these arc reflected in the va riety of ancient ba ttle cha riot s. At tim es speed was sacrificed to stab ility . At o ther rim es stabili ty gave wa y to speed. Event ually the chari o t becam e a finely balan ced wa r instrumen t, serving both need s equally effectively . In its com plete form, it w as a co m plex vehicle, co mprising the followin g carefull y design ed pa rts ; body , whe els, axle, chariot pol e, yoke,

and fittin gs for wea pollS such as qui vers, bo w cases, an d sheaths and stands for axes and spears. T o give it strength and ligh tness, the chariot was bu ilt largel y of woodspecial kind s for each par t-str ips of leather , and vario us metals. It was not an instru m ent com mo n to th e equip ment of all armies. It co uld be fashioned only by nations co mm anding rich reso ur ces and advanced techniques. T echniq ue w as im po rtant . For, as we shall see later, the turning-point in the devel opment of the chariot came with the lighter body, the introduction of the light, spoked wheel, and the techni cal knowledge which en abled the axle to be set farth er to the rear . For only with the rear axle co uld the chariot be co mp letel y m ane uve ra ble even on sharp turns. But this requi red lightness. Fo r a rea r axle on a heav y ch ariot, ma de heavier by the w eight of the militar y team , w o uld have been 100 grcat a strain on th e draft anim als. It was the co m bina tion of the rear axle plu s the design of a light bod y and light w heels, as w ell as po werful and swift dr aft ani m als, whic h brought about the perfect chariot : stab le, fast, and highly man eu verable. Like the ch ariot, the prim ary purpose of the cavalry hor se was also to serve as a mobile firing platform, though here. too , the panic and co nfusion induced in the ene m y by a cavalry cha r ge wa s not without impor tance. T he advan tage of the horse over the chario t was its ability to m ov e ove r almost any gr o und, whereas a wheeled vehicl e was lim ited to co mpa ratively level and unbrok en terrain . Against this, the hor se o ffered a poor and unstable fir in g platform . In a chario t, th ere was the driver, con cern ed solely with cont rollin g th e hors es, and a fighting soldier , free for operariona l acrion. In th e cavalry , rid er and soldi er were one. If his weapon were the bow, requiring two hands to o perate, his contro l of the hor se in action was co rr espond in gly reduc ed . E ven if arm ed w ith a spear . w hic h need ed only one hand and left the o ther free for the reins , he lacked a third to ho ld a shield. T he eflcctivencss of the mounted ho rse in battl e in earliest times wa s th us limi ted. O nly with the ve ry late introduction of im prov ed sadd les. stirr up s, and spurs, making it possible to control the horse with thigh, kn ee, and ankle, w as the cavalrymanfree to fight with both hands. Small w onder tha t th e cav alry made its serio us ap pearance on the battlefield only some 1, 500 year s after the chari ot .

An Egyptian chariot T hese fortifications ofthe upper 14th-13th-eenrurr city are the most powerful of the.entire complex.And though similar to those of the low er city , their plan and th e quality of their co nstruction are mo re ad vanced. Here, too (225, bo ttom) , they are bui lt on a very high and wide ramp art. T hey comprise two wails: the ma in, w all. and , at a distance of 8' 5 meters, an outer wall. TJ#s o uter wall is also built on ' a rampart, and is 1 m eter thick. It is srren grhened rectangular bastions, built ~; at a distanc e of 30 ineters from each other and set ex:d:cly between the towers on > ,. the main w all. Th is mai n w all, like the w all of the lower city. is a do uble-casemate ., , stru cture, its o uter skin 1·6 m eters thick, its inn er skin 1 ' 4 me ters, and the space betw een them I ' 5 Ine.ren , gi\~n g it II ov eral l thi ckness of m ore than 4 meters. ' Irs f(lnnidabj~' qUJliri:' apm from th e (litter wa ll, deAved fr om the considerable ' number ;' f to wers (no t bastions ) built into it. T bet w ere 8 m eters wid e and " protr uded outward som e 5'.5 meters. Its low er section, tOO, was fIlled with earth ' and stones between t he skins. And it w as upo n this flat!.llurf2ce tha t the upper waH ·

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str ucture of brick was built, mos t prob ab ly with casemates. ,T he casema tes were (0 0 narrow to serv e as storeho uses or dwel ling-chamb ers. Th ey wer e used as paSS:l geways for the troo ps at the low em brasures which were cut into them , as illustrated on the wall rd iefs (sec fig ure on r1iis page). Thro ugh these emb rasures. the ,k f,'nd ers co uld engage those of the enemy who had succeeded in breachin g the outer wall and had rcached th e area w hich wa s "d ead ground " to the soldiets 011 top of the m ain wa ll. Th e top of the rampart, parti cularly in the tegion of the gates, was cove red with Idtge po lygo nal stones. M ost im pressive were the tw o m ain city gates themsclves-i-rh e southeastern King', Gate (~4) and the southwestern Lions' Gate (225. rop), Bot h w ere similar in plan. T hey fonned a " gate cita del" between the main and outer wal ls which comprised two lon g towers, and en trance to the city was th rough the passage between the rowers, Thi s passage had tw o gatew ays, a douh ll' d oo r at each, an o uter one near the o uter wal l and an inne r on e near the main \\".,11. Th e j amb s of each gateway we re hu ge va ulted stone pillars. T he o uter da m s .rpparenrly o pened inward and the inner doors ou twa rd. The gate w as r".Khnl by an o bliq ue sloping path or ram p w hich ex posed hostile users to fir e {rolll the tow ers and bastions of the mai n an d ou ter wa lls. In fron t of the gate wa s 3 leveled open " sq uare." The Lions ' Gate gets its name from the lion car ved in hig h relief on each of '. West Gal'

4 B,'ghazkdy (sw io,,)

15 7 0 -1 2 00 B . C .

T HE PE RIO D O F THE SOJ O UR N IN E GYPT

II

Plan (Jf lho! gates of B,'ghazkciy. ~1 b ..)f>e:

The Kittg' j Gate

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the postern andthe walls

the two jam bs of its· outer gatewa y- "the keepers of m e gate." The Ki ng's G.Jte; ~ is SO called toda y. because of the figure of the warriozor deity, whi ch was carved '!.'" on the inner left jamb-from the point of view of J,meon e inside looking out. 4T his relief (222, to p) is now in the Hittite Mu seum inAnkara and is ther efore not seen in the phot og raph on page 224. . Far the most int erestin g feature of the sou thern wall is th e fortification arr an gem ents in th e m iddle of the area betw een the Lions' Gate and the Kin g's Gate. T his is know n tod ay as Yerkapu - the Earth Gate (225, bottom ). ln the main wall between these tw o city gates is a ~mall o pening for the use of pedestr ians called the Sph inx Gate, because of the figures of a sphinx which decor ated its j amb s. T he ram part at this point is q uite h igh- about I I meters. T o gain access to the Sph inx Gate fro m o utside, tw o rows of steps we re cut in rhe ramp art Some distance to its righr and to its left. At the to p of each stairway, a small"wicket gate had been cut in the o uter wa ll w hich gave entry 10 the space between the main and o uter walls throu gh which th e Sphinx Gate could be reached. , At the foot of the rampart in front of the SphinxGate and midway between th e tw o stairw ays, a postern had been constr ucted int o the rampart leadin g right th ro ugh int o the city. Its length w as 80 meters- the width of the ram part at this section-s -reaching , at its other end, a point J J m eters immediately beneath th e Sph inx Gate. T his w as the Earth Postern , or Gate, and its purpose is believed to have been both to save the inha bitants fro m the steep clim b up the tampart , and, in attack , to ena ble so rties to be carried o ut against the enemy in certain cond ition s o f battle. T his postern apparently had do o rs at both ends w hich cou ld be closed duting siege. T o co m plete the picture of the Boghazkoy forti fications, it should be added th at the lo w er city also had a nu m ber o f innet defensive w alls w hich created a kind of citadel wit hin a citadel. It is possible th at these inner walls we re the boundaries of earlier cities and became " inner" only wi th the gro wt h and ex pansion of th e settlement . But in the city's final phase, they certai nly add ed stren gth to the system of fort iti cati ons. T he upp er city, too , was strengthened by several independent citadels, built on roc k cliffs, w hich for m ed a cha in of fort ification s wi thin the city itself. ( Now here, neither in Boghazkoy nor in an y other' city in Syria , Pale stine, or'

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out wbar they looked like , we must have recourse to the illustrated monuments of the peri od. Fortunately there are man y Egyptian reliefs which depict cities whicb .. were attacked or co nquered by the pharaohs of the XIXth Dynasty . Incidenta lly, . Seri I and Rarneses II fo ught much in Canaan, In these battl es, nuny cities certainly suriered destruction. an occurrence which is substantiated by archae ological excavations. A s a result, the fortifications of cities of the J j th cent ur y we re greatly weakened. Where a city had been cap tur ed, no new fort ifications we re constr ucted. The earlier ones w ere either rep aired . often in a slapdash manne r, or reJl1 ained un tou ched, in ruin. T his may exp lain w hy the tr ibes of Israel, und er the leader ship of Joshua, were able to conque r some of th ese cities. Th e pharaoh s never conq uered Hat tussas. And so there is no Egyptian relief wh ich illustrates its fort ifications. But reliefs show ing o ther cities tell us much abo u t the upp er struc tures of their fortificatio ns and arc also instructive, by inference. abo ut cities like H artussas. Most of the reliefs depict the captured cities in the stand ard for m , present ing them as twa-stor y stru ctur es (228, 230, 2]2) . In the m ain, the intention is assured ly to show an elevation vie w of the high inner citadel , or acropolis, and the main w all. Sometimes the ar tist m anages to depict also the out er wall (229) , as in th e Harrussas fortific ation s. The reliefs suggest tha t the gates in Canaan were not vaulted, as in Hattussas, but were rectangu lar. One can discern. in some of the reliefs, the embrasures and win dows ill the wall (229). T his testifies to an uppe r structure of casemates. The bal coni es on the tow ers and bastions, w ho se vital fun ction we have discussed earlier. are sho w n w ith the utmost clarity in all the reliefs. And this is also tru e o f the batrlcmen ts on th e outer wall, the main w all, and the bu ildin gs of the acro po lis.

A special type of fortification of this period were the ",igJols. T hese were sm all citadels built to guard such im portant military objectives as wells and communications. They, roo . appear on some reliefs. A migdol of this rype w as discove red in 1960 in Israel, not far hom Ashdod. It is squ are in plan . with rectangular bastions, and bas two sto ries-just as dep icted in the reliefi (sec figure on page 97). A wo rd abou t the for tified tem ples inside the city . Th ese arc the places to wh ich th e citizens w ou ld flee afier their w all had been breached, as described in the Hible in the slOry of the tower of Shcche rn du n n g th e period of th e J udges (which we deal with later). T he principal str en gth of these tem ple forrificarions lay in the thickness of their w alls, the tw o tow ers at the entrance, and certainly the roof wi th its balconies and battleme nts. In rhe plann ing of fortification s, one of the tou ghest pro blem s that dema nded Water Supply solution was th e guatan tee of a teg ular supp ly of w ater ill tim e o f siege. In the under Siege peno d un der review, ingenious devices we re introd uced to m eet this need , stagger ing in th e scale and qu ality of their skilled engine ering. T he most interesting and form ida ble of all that have come ro light so far are those discove red at Megiddo. T he well which supp lied water to the city was in a natu ral cave at the

95

15 7 0 - 1 2 0 0B . C .

western foot of tbe teU-outside the bou ndaries of the 'city fortifi cations. The sole methods of secur ing water from this source during siege were to pu mp it from the we ll int o the city , or to devise som e appro ach system w hich wo uld give the inhabitants access withou t having to venture beyond the walls. T he stratagem conceived by the planners of the Megi ddo forti fications was at once sim ple and RJ:glJt: The submissioJJ a stro ke of genius. Within the city compound, at a p(>int not far from the well, • of a Syrian city as depicted they sunk • vertical sbah to the same depth as the\o;ell-30 meters. The first 011 Egyptianrcliifof 8 meters were fairly easy going, for they were diggini through the dust and ashes Ramcses II of earlier ruined settlements. But the next 22 meters had to be cut through solidv rock , From the base of this shaft, they cut a ho rizon tal tunnel right through to the well-a distance of 67 meters, T he tunnel had an average height of 3' 5 me ters. T he floor of the tunn el was engineered with a slight gradient sloping down toward the city , so that th ere was a gravity flow of water fro m the well int o the city. O n com pletion of the engineerin g job, the well was sealed from the outside by a thick wall. T he labor involved in this! excava tion and tunnel ing project m ust have been enormo us. Bur it was vital forthe defense of the city. O n occasion, these stratagems were apparently not unk no wn to the enemy. And so from tim e to time, as the archaeological diggings show , the outside wall sealing the well was breached or torn down , and another wall built in its place later with the repair of the for tifications. T hese installations were until very recent ly ascribed to the Late Bronze period. But our ~xcav ations at Megiddo in 1960 showed that the whole ente rprise sho uld actually be attri bute d to the reigns o f Solom on or Ahab in the Israelite period. O n the o th~r hand , installations similar in basic patterns to rhat of Megi ddo, but of inferior stat.dard, we re also discovered in other Palestinian cities w hich belong to the Late Bron ze perio d .

Attack and Dei euse

T he conquest of fortified cities posed a grim problem in this period, too, for the attacking arm y. O f the fIve meth ods of capturing a fortifi ed city mentioned in o ur Introduct ion , we can, wi th the help of illust rated m onum ent s and w ritten docum en ts, follow the use of only a few of rhem . One of the ' most remarkable ~ featu res of the m.ny detailed Egyptian reliefs and of the written documents of this period is th at in no t one ofthem isthere a single sign of or reference to the batteringram, Some sch olars, it is true, have sought to recogn ize barrermg-ramsin the four

cover- ten ts dep icted in th e relief port rayin g the conquest of Deper (z2.9}. But the , derails of the reliefdo not sup po rt th is thesis, If these tent s we re indeed int ended as battering-ram s, th e artist wou ld surely have given pro minence to the most im po rtant element of this weapon- the met al-headed beam. And th is does not appear at all. It is tar more pr oba ble that these tents represent the camp of Pharaoh an d his sons; set up near the city , as in the relief mowing the Ba ttle of Kades h (236-2 37). T he absence of the battering- ram in th e E gyp tian armies of the New Kin gdom , w hen it was already in use in Canaan and Anatolia in the first half of the second millennium , and indeed also in Egypt, may have several explanations: the ' ' considerable distance betw een the military bases in Egypt and the battleg rounds in Canaan; whi ch no doubt proved a tough adm inistrative and technical obstacle . for the movement of this heavy instrument; the con servatism of th e ancient Egyptians; and, m ore parti cularly , th e firmness of the forrificaeions at the end of the previous and the beginning of th is period. Th ese fortificatio ns w ere built especially to withstand the batterin g-ram. And they succeeded in blunt ing its etl,:ctiveness, for it was not as yet a perfect instr um ent , Thi s is a good exam ple of one aspect of the chain reaction pr oduced by offensive and defensive devices. Proficient counrer-measures, as w e can see, render obsolete, at least tem porari ly , the weapon or a part icular m odel of th e weapon against w hich they we re devised . The most usual method of attack on a city was penetration abo," th e walls, usingscaling-ladden. T his system is well illustrated in th e reliefs (228, 229). Under heavy coveting fire from the archers, the assault tro ops would rush to scale the walls and try to reach th e top. T he Egyptian shield , wi th the sho ulder- m ap attached to its inner surface, was part icularl y suited to th is task. For the attacking soldier could hang it over his back (228), and this left his hands free for the climb and the fig hting. A'second meth od, which paralleled the first, was penetr ation through the city gates. The assault troops would sto rm the gate, th eir backs prot ected by shields, .' and, armed with axes (228). the y would tr y and tear down the bolts and hing es. · Both opera tions dem and m uch coura ge. And thus does one of the prou d soldiers of Thurm ose III deliver hims elf: " His Majesty sent fort h every valian t man of his army, to breach the new wall whi ch Kadesh had made. I wa s the one w ho breached it, being the first of every valiant man." Against such forms of attack, the defend ers respond ed with several measures. L ( Th ey posted archers on the wall to give co unter-fire to the enemy 's bo ws (229) , while other !roops arm ed with spears attacked the assaulting so ldiers scaling the ladders. 1\ number of the defenders hu rled stones upon the enemy below . Some of the stones were large and heavy, requiring the lise of bath hands (229, top righr). If at the beginning or dur ing th e barrie some of the defendin g units fightin g outside the wall fou nd th em selves compelled to fall back to rhe city, they we re hauled up by their com rades at the top of the wall w ith rop e or with strips made of A .Higll0! guardillg a lI,dl ill rhe clothing. This is sur ely the rep resentation by the artist of the two figures han gin g desert bcrwetlJ Egypt and Palc~,t it1 e . to a tope on th e wall in the relief sho w n on page 229. End orsement of this as depicted 011 a r('li~f ~r SNi, I

_

THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT

interpretation is to be found in this description of the siege of Megiddo by Thurmose III which talks of the retreat of the enemy after their failure outside the city: "They abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and silver, so thar someone might draw them up into this town by hoisting on their garments. Now the people had shut rhis town against them, but they let down garments to hoist them up into this town." Attack by breaching the gate and scaling rhe wall involved the assault units in very heavy casualries, and could be undertaken mostly against cities whose fortification system was not of a high standard or whose troops were not the besr. Ofren the invading army resorted to siege or infiltration stratagems. And indeed we hear at the very beginning of this period of one of the most prolonged sieges carried out at this time. The Egyptian documents record that PharaohAhmose, founder of the XVIIIth Dynasty, in hi. campaign against the' Hyksos armies. laid siege for three consecutive years to Sharuhen, a fortified city in southern Palestine (also mentioned in Joshua 19: 6). Thutrnosc III tried to follow up his celebrated success on the battlefield near Megiddo by taking the city by storm. But his soldiers, instead of pursuing the retreating troops who were retiring to entrench themselves behind their city walls, tarried on the field of batrle to collect war booty. And when they reached the city, they were repelled. Thutmose was therefore forced to put Megiddo under siege for seven months, as recorded in one of the documents. The siege operation, though less dangerous than breaching, was nevertheless very difficult and complicated. For the besieging army had to encamp for a long period in the open, set up encampments all round the city, and maintain vigilant defense against sorties and raids by the troops under siege. There is a detailed description in one of the Egyptian docnments of how these encampments were established: "Orders were issued to the commander of the troops to provide for their division and to inform each man of his place. Theymeasured this city, which W~S' corralled with a moat, and enclosed with fresh timbers of ali their pleasant trees, while His Majesty himself was in a fortress east of this.. town being watchful, .•. ' People were appointed as sentries at the enclosure of His Majesty, and they were told: 'Be steadfast! Be vigilant, be vigilant! ...'" In these siege operations. they would cut down the trees in the area, as we see from the above document, with which to build their encampments or forts. This, too, is depicted in the Egyptian reliefs (346). A faithful description of this custom appears in the Bible-Deuteronomy 20: 19-20: "When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it .to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of them. and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man's life) to employ them iri the siege: Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalr destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt build bulwarks against the city that maketh war with thee, until it be subdued."

1570-1200 B.C.

We have seen that the conquest of a fortified city was a very difficult opera- Strataocms rion. It is not therefore to be wondered that side by side with the above methods of warfare, the attacking army continuously sought means of entering the city by cLUllling and stratagem. For all the solidity and strengrh of a city's fortifications, rhcv had their weak spots. And since the defenses were all designed to meet attack from the outside, oace me enemy had succeeded in penetrating one of the weak points and entering the city, the rest of the fortifications were rendered valueless. There were of course exceptions, as at Boghazkov, which had inner citadels and wails. And this lessenedthe danger. Bur, in general, penetration of the fortifications at one point was likely to cause a total collapse of the city's defenses. There are many stories of celebrated stratagems whereby cities were entered and captured. Many have about them the ring oflegend. Bur their very composition makes it evident that such devices were used. One of the most famous dc'scriptions of a stratagem of this nature is undoubtedly that contained in the story of rhc Trojan Horse, in the Bartle of Troy.

J AHA. But there is a legendary Egyptian tale. which predates the Trojan bartle by several hundred years, which relates, in the style of Ali Baba, how the city ofJalfa was captured by the forces of Thutrnose Ill. The Commandet of the bc'sieging army, That, notified the Governor of Jaffa that he had decided to surrender and that it was his intention to give himself up. together with his wife and children: "And he [That 1had the 200 baskets brought which he had made. and he had soldiers get down into them. And their arms were filled with bonds and fetters. and they were sealed up with seals. And they were given their sandals, as well as their carrying poles and staves. And they had every good soldier carrying them, totahng 500 men. And they were told: 'When you enter the city, you are to let alit your companions and lay hold on all the people who are in the city and put them in bonds immediately.' And they went out to tell the .charioteer of the Eucmv ofJafra: 'Thus speaks your lord: "Go and tell your mistress [i.e., the wife of the prince ofJalfa 1: 'Rejoice. for Seth the god has given us That, along with his \\'Ifc' and his children I' See the vanguard of their tribute. You shall tell her about these 200 baskets [which were filled with men with fetters and bonds ].''' Then he went ahead of them to bring the good news to his mistress, saying: 'We have captured That.' And they opened the locks of the city before the soldiers. And rhcy entered the city and let alit their companions. And they laid hold on the city, small and great, and put them in bonds and fetters immediately. So the mighty arm of Pharaoh-life. prosperity, health-captured rhe city." 200

JE~ICIlO. The Biblical story of Joshua's conquest of Jericho apparently describes another kind of stratagem whose military implications, however. have been obscure. Its highlights, apart from the collapse of the walls. are to be found in joshua 6: 3. 16.20:

"And ye shall compass the city, all ye men of war, and go round about the city once. Thus shalt thou do six days .... And it came to pass at the seventh time,

99

THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT

1570- 1200B.C.

when the priests blew with their trumpets, Joshua said unto the people, 'Shout' for the Lord hath given you the city .. .' so that the people went up into the city. every man straight before him, and they took the city." It seems to me that this stratagem is explicable in the light of a later one which is described in a Roman book of military ruses composed by Frontinus: "When Dominus Calvinus was besieging Lueria, a town of the Lugerians protected not only by its location and siegeworks but also by the superiority of its defenders, he instituted the practice of marching frequently around the walls with all his forces, and then marching back to camp. When the townspeople had been induced by this routine to believe that the Roman commander did this for the putpose of drill, and consequently took no precautions against his efforts, he transformed this practice of parading into a sudden attack, and gaining possession of the walls, forced the inhabitants to surrender." A I. A simpler stratagem, and one easier to understand, is that described in the Biblical story of the capture of the city of Ai. Its main purpose was to draw the city's inhabitants away from the fortifications, and then enter. The plan is presented simply and clearly in Joshua 8: 3-8:

" ... and Joshua chose out thirty thousand mighty men of valor, and sent them away by night. And he commanded them, saying, 'Behold, ye shall lie in wait againsr the city, even behind the city: go not very far from the city, but be ye all ready: And I, and all the people that are with me, will approach unto the city: and it shall come to pass, when they come out against us, as at the first, that we will flee before them, (For they will come out after us.) till we have drawn them from the city; for they will say. "They flee before us, as at the first": therefore we will flee before them, Then ye shall rise up from the ambush and seize upon the city: for the Lord your God will deliver it into your hand. And it shall be, when ye have taken the city, that ye shall set the city on fire... .' "

100

Battle ill Cpcn Terrain

Before discussing the organization and services of the army in this period, it may be found useful to describe two of the most celebrated battles that took place at this time, which are depicted and described in detail in the Egyptian monuments.

The Battle of Meoiddo

The first is the battle of Thutmose III which led to the capture of Megiddo at the beginning of the r yth century. This is, in fact, the earliest battle in human history of which a detailed account exists. And it is the first of a series of battles fought near Megiddo (244-245), each ofwhich was decisive, each determining the fate of Palestine, The strategic .importance of Megiddo lies in its position commanding the exit ' from Wadi Au. the narrow defile which links the coastal plain of Palestine with rhe Valley ofjezreel through the hills south of the Carmel Mountains. This was the route of the famous Via Maris, the great trunk road which served as the main communications line between Egypt and the important empires of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia.in the uorrh.t Whocver controlled Megiddo controlled this communications route, and, consequently, important areas of the Fertile Crescent.

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This explains why the King of Kadesh on the Orontes, in the north, moved southward with all his allies to Megiddo in an effort to bar the northward advance ofThutmose II1.The defeat of the King of Kadesh in this battle at Megiddo, far as he was from his main bases, apparently served as a "classic lesson" to the later northern kings. For in the second battle, this time at Kadesh, some 200 years later, against Rameses II, the Hittites apparently tried the opposite strategy, seeking to draw the Egyptian forces as far northward as possible so that they would be far from their bases, and this time they would suffer defeat. When we analyze these two battles, we shall do well to bear in mind these two basic and diametrically opposed strategic approaches of the northern king,-offensive strategy and defensive tactics in the Battle ofMegiddo, and defensive strategy and offensive tactics in the Battle of Kadesh. These two approaches have in fact always been the two basic Joctrines of warfare of the nations up to present times. Their application, when there has been a failure to learn the lessons of the Megiddo and Kadesh battles, has brought defeat in the most decisive campaigns. Perhaps the most interesting recent parallel of the alternate use of these two doctrines occurred in the Second World War, in the series of battles between the Allied Powers and the Germans in the North African Campaign. But we must return to Megiddo. In the spring of the year 14.68 B.C., Thutmose III set out from Egypt at the head of his armies to campaign against the nations of Syria and Canaan who had fortified themselves in the neighborhood of Megiddo under the leadership of the King of Kadesh. Nine days later, he and his forces reached their base in Gaza, having covered some 26 kilometers a dav.-Prom here he advanced northward to the city of Yehem in the northern Sharon. He now took counsel to decide how he' would advance on Megiddo, for he had the choice of three routes: the direct route through the defile of Aruna (Iron, Wadi Ara); the northern route through Dlcfti, which would bring him out north of Megiddo; or the southern route. !clding to Ta'anach, a few kilometers south of Megiddo. The report of this council of war, as transmitted by the royal scribes and recorded on the walls of the temples, is most instructive, and points to the practice of the army staff conference before the' commander made his decision. It is worth quoting. The Pharaoh first briefs his commanders on the latest intelligence on the enemy. as elucidated from spies; gives them his appreciation of enemy strength; and informs them of the enemy decision to make a stand at Megiddo, or, in his words:

"For he says-so ir is reported-I shall wait here at Megiddo [to ftght against the Pharaoh]." The report records that the conference continued with the commanders expressing their objections to an advance on Megiddo by the shortest and most direct route. This is what they say: "What is it like to go on this road which becomes so narrow? It is reported th.ir the foe is there, waiting on the outside, while they arc becoming more numerous, will not horse have to go after horse, and the arlllY and the people SImilarly? Will rhe vanguard of us be fighting while the rear guard is waiting here

101

THE PE RIOD O F TH E SO JOURN I N EGY PT

f

1 5 7 0 - I 200 B . C .

1

Beto re the assault, and with his forces assembled. Thurm ose divi ded th em into the southern flank . between rhe Q ina brook an d the exit fro m W adi Ara; th e n orthern Bank. northwest of M-·"'· ·'fi·}.f; ; " .""J . •'.,,,:

~ ~t~,F~;~~;i~::~;~ .

The tIlolmd of Kadesh-« Tell Ncb; .\find-sllrrounded by rivets and ",ater canols

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T o link the follow ing description w ith th e prev ious, we go bac k a little in our next qu ot ati on and start it just befor e the story of the dece ption:

"When His M ajesty appeared like the rising of Re, he assumed the ado rnment s of his father M ontu . When the king pr oceeded northward , and His Majesty had arrived at the localit y so uth of the city of Shabtu na, there came two shan! • [Bed o uin] to speak to His Maj esty as fo llows : 'O ur brethren, who belong to the gr eatest of the famil ies w ith the w retched foe of Harri, have made us co me to H is Maj esty to say : " W e wi ll be subject s of Pharao h, , . and w e w ill flee fr om the w retched foe of H au i w ho is in the land of Aleppo, on the north ot T un ip. H e fears because of Pharaoh to co m e north w ard ;" N ow these Shasu spoke these words w hich they spoke to His Majes ty falsely, for the w retched foe of H arti made them to co me to spy whe re His Maj esty was, in ord er to cause the arm y of H is Majesty no t to draw up for fighting him . to battle w irh the wretched foe of Hatti." Bu t or rhe tim e, Rameses did no t perceive that they had co me o n a mission of deceit. He sw allo wed their sto ry. and advanced to the neighborhoo d o f Kadesh, fully con vinc ed that the H itt ite coalition fo rces were far to the north , near Aleppo . He set up his cam p (depicted in reliefs on pages 236-23 7-see detailed descripti on in the captions and figur es in the text) ro the west of Kadesh. And on ly then did he ' discover his gr im plight . as a result of the captute of tw o H itrire recon naissance scouts;

106

r,

-'." . :~.?' /f.'t'1f.r- ~:~- : :. -.: o-~

" T hen , as His Maj esty sat up on a thr on e of gold, there arrived a sco ut who was in the follow ing of His Majesty, and he bro ught tw o sco uts of the wretched

Ramcses W lt/ I'

Il ea l

depicted at tilt'

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CIl lIIJ'iJf cJ

whit ril e

Kadcsh as ,, that it consisted of not more than four or five pl.tOOllS-200 at 250 men. Between the comp.ny and the division (really a. brigadej there w as certainly the battalion wh ose total strength was not fixed but was com posed of several companies , four or five. At all events, both the written docum ents and the reliefs clearly indicate that these divisions not only marched together, arranged in a specially organi zed pattern but that.they also fough t under the o rganization of the deep phalanx. made up of straight ranks in close order. A poetic description of an arm y on the march in close forma tion appears in one of the documents of Ugarit:

1

" T hey march in thousands serried and in myriads massed. After two, two march, after three all of them ."

The reliefsof the Bartle ofK.adesh clearly portr.y the assault of ihe Na'arun

I II Auacl:

II2

unit in phalanx formation, with a phalanx of ten ranks, line abreast, and the ten men in each section for ming a file, one behind the oth er, one in each rank. Th e Hittite infantry behind the city of Kadesh are depicted in the same w.y. But they are shown before .rhe action , while their phalanx are still organized for the rnarch.: So they are depicted as a column, and the ten-man section is converted from a file into a .line-abr east rank, From the reliefs, it is easy to gather how the phalanx . transformeclits pattern of organization for the march into its o rganization fot attack. It can be best ex plained by • diagram . '

I5 70 -I200B . C .

Th e allied arm y under the Hi ttite King at Kadesh had 2,500 chariots. We have Chariot Units no breakdown of this figure whi ch would enable us to determine the size of the chariot unit of each king . But since we know that this allied force comprised the men of very many kings, we can assume that each unit was not larger than 300 chariots, and many were very m uch smaller. The docu ments of Tell el-Amarna make frequent mention of units of 50 . chariots. 30. and even 10. Similarly. we know of 100- and jo-chariot units in . Anatolia, The documents of Nuzi mention units of 50 chariots under the command ofa "Captain of Fifry." And this is true also of Egypt. All this suggests that the basic unit consisted of 10, and several such units wou ld make up a squadro n of 30 or 50 chariots. Presumably the largest tactic. I unit consisted of 150. These we re usually attached to infantry divisions of expeditionary forces. It may be recorded that in this period , chario t units were still the only mobile forma tions in the armies of the lands of the Bible, for the cavalry regiment did not make its ap pearanccuntilthe end of the second millennium. In this period, we know of the horseman being used only for isolated communications functio ns, such as messengers (221). Let us add. as a piquant item, the followi ng extract from a letter by the King of Byblos: "The messenger of the king of Aceo is more heeded than my messenger, because a horse was given to him ." The employment of such large armies and their operation at such distances from "their main bases naturally called for ramified milit ary administration. And, indeed, the numerous written docum ents from Nuz i, Ugari t, Anarolia, and Egypt clearly indicate the existence in this period of well-developed quarterma ster and adj utan t services which maintai ned detailed records of the army form ations. their equipment , the sums of money paid to them. and so on. W e also learn from these records and from the illustrated mon uments that detailed lists were prepare d of captured booty, categorized according to type. The problem ofsupply to expediti onary forces was not easy. And the military scribes and qwutermasrers under went special exercises to make them profi cient in determining the battle rations requ ited by the various arm y corps. Here, fot example, is a test question on the subject which appears furth er down in the Anastasi Papyrus I which we quoted earlier in connexion with the 5.00Q-strong Egyp tian expeditionary force:

lHi!irary A dmin istration

"There is brou ght thee a peace offering before thee; bread, cattle, and wine. T he numbe r of men is too great for thee. W hereas the provisions arc too small for them . . . . Th ou receive them . place them in camp . T he troops are ready and prepared. Make them quickly int o portions, that of each man at his hand . . . . Midday is com e. the camp is hot. Time to start ! Don' t let the troop commander be angry ! Much marching isahead of us. What bread have we at all!, . .. So thou art an experienced scribe. if thou canst approac h to give the provisions." . This document. too. shows that an expeditionary force did not bring with it all the supplies it wo uld need, but got much of its food from the produce of the

I

13

THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT

land through which it passed and from supplies and equipment provided by the various enthralled local governots. From the narrative of the Battle of Megiddo by Thunnose Hl, we learn that a good part of the food for his men and fodder for his beasts came from the local produce. The' letters of Tell el-Amarna contain a many notifications to the Egyptian Pharaoh from the kings of Canaan, assuring him that they have prepared all the requisite supplies for his expeditionary army, as requested in prior orders by the military scribes. Those supplies which accompaniedan army were carried by pack ass and ox-drawn wagons, The wagons bore the-collapsible parts of camps. as at Kadesh, and sometimes.even boats needed for ferrying troops across a river, as we see from the document of Thutmose Ill:

PLATES VOLUME ONE

"When my Majesty crossed over to the marches of Asia, I had many ships of cedar built on the mountain of God's land [the Middle East], near the Lady of Byblos. They were placed on chariots with cattle drawing them. They journeyed in front of my Majesty, in order to cross that great river which lies between this foreign country and Naharin." Thc military panorama of this lively period of history is one of formidable fortifications encircling the key cities of the Middle East; of large, well-trained armies, equipped with chariots and supply and engineering services, moving between Egypt and Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Canaan; of ferocious battles waged between mighty empires, involving high tactical skill and ingenious stratagems. These military campaigns eventually drained the energy and resources of most of these kingdoms and led to their downfall. And this opened the way to new nations, like the Tribes of Israel from the east and the Sea Peoples from the west andnorth, who conquered and settled large areas of Palestine over which the mighty nations of earlier ages had fought for so long.

"\ 1

II4

The bow. Two types emerge in the fourth millennium-sThe Nimrod-like M esopotamian king (,) in Mesopotamia, depicted on the c. comm emorative stele on page (upper left) holds an almo st semicircula r single-arc wC3pon in the lower a single-arc form; hunti ng scene. In contrast, the Egypti.tn bow forms on both the cylinder SC'.JI (page in Egypt, a doublemiddle) and me celebrated Hunt ers' Slate Palette (lower left, and enlarged fragm eD(, convex weapon upper righ() show a do uble-convex instru3000 B.C.

II 8

I I !I.

ment in usc at the same orne. Huntin g figu res on the palette also exhibit long spe.us, maces, boom erangs, double-headed axes, and the fork -h eaded arrow . Another instance of the l.rsr is show n in the fragme ntary Egypt ian carving at the lower right, in which J forkheaded arrow has pierced a warri or's body . Page fI R: Up per left, granite stele from W arka, LICe Proto-L iterate. Baghdad Museum. U Ll({ Om.

lI 8

Hunters" Slue Palette (including: C3H

of the upper righ t fragm enc). Late Pr eDyn.rsric. British M useum . M iddle, cylinder SCJ I fro m Hicrakonpolis, Pre- Dynastic. Th e Petr ie Colle ction. Page 1 19 . top ; O riginal upper fragmt"nt of Hunt ers' Slate Palette. Lou vre. Bon om : Slate fragme nt fro m Lower Egypr. Pre-Dynastic. Mct~opolltan Museum of Art.

1 19

The macekey weapon for hand-to-hand fighting until the appearance of the helmet The maceheads shown here, all from the period between 3500 and 2500 B.C., embrace a variety of materials and shapes. The round copper examples (upper left) art from excavations near Beer-sheba. Below them arc two Mesopotamian limestone mace-heads, borh poar...hapcd and fiured. Tho porphyry. diskshaped example (above) and the magnificent ceremonial macehead of King Scorpion (right) arc both Egyptian.

r.n

Above left: Marchcads from Abu Mat.ir, Chalcolirhic. I Jcpartutenr of Antiquities, r.rc1lJ.n)I\)~iClI Museum. Jerusalem. Below lett: Macchc.ids from Tdl Agn,b. E,nly Dynastic. Museum of the OriC11u} Institute, Chi('agn. Above: E;ypti.1ll macehcad. Pre1);;11:15U':' Hrmsh l'v1USCUllL Richt: Kllltt Scorpion Ill.lCdK'.1J from Hicr rkonpolis. Late Prc-Dvn.istic. Ashmolean Museum, 0:-;:-

ford.

TlO

T HE PER IO D B EF O RE A B R A H A M

( 4000-2 100 B . C . )

King N arrn er subdues Southern Palestine l eft: H en..-, on the reverse side of the Palette o f King Na rmer , the King wears (he cro wn o f U ppe r Egypt. Below him , ( W O ene mies lice from stron ghol ds that are depicted in minia cure-c-one, J. rectangular bastioned cirv, w hich may repr esent settlem ents west of 'jor dau : the other, a kite-shaped encl osure, possibly symbolizing territ ory cast ofJ ordan. T he drawings represent Tran s-j ordan ien kite- shaped enclosures similar to that sho wn on the palette . Far left: Palett e of King N arm er. Left. abo ve : Plan of a kite-shaped desert enclosure. Below :

Stone .~rqtfito from the Cairn of H.lIli'. Safaitic period. Trans-jordan .

The mace in action The famous slate palette on page 12 4 shows the King stri kin g his ene my w ith a mace. Its ha ndle is bound wi th cor d, prob ably to prevent slipping. A similarly bound mace (c. 1 9 00 H.C. ) appe,us in use on an ivory plaque from AbyJ m (up per righ t) comm em o rating the victo ry o f King \V cdymu over the Semites, and inscribed " First rime of smiting o f the East." T he middle illustrati on nf .3cylinder sr ,ll from the samc' P'..riod sho w) a bound captive bl·j ll ~ struck wi th J. mao- . Two fine E ~)' pti.ln m . ncher.Is [horh Co ~,)OO R.C.). enc· of brccci.r rock and rhc other of .rl duvcr, OOl J IH c m cJ w uh 'i a p.:n (~ md f tlulI n , .' ppl..·.u bclo v,.

12 4

Righ t. {dP t o bottom : Plaque from Abvd cs . lsr Dyna sty. British Mu seum . Ivo ry cylinder seal {rom Hicr akonpolis, Isr Dynas ty. Briti sh Museum. Early Dvnasric macehccds. British Mu~um. .

r u u 1'1, 1< 10 11 BEf OR E A B R A H A M ( 4000 - 2 100 II . C . )

T his socketed axehcad, fou nd in a cave in the j udean desert in Israel berw eeu Ei C edi and Massada in 1901, is par t of J. discovery th at mak es revo lutionary imp act on accepted ideas of the technical level and ethn ic character of -c-an d contacts betwe en- the lands of the Bible Juring this early period. T he more than 4 50 copper objects fou nd belong to the end of the C halcolitbic and the beginn ing of the

of socketed piercing axes su~gests the moun raino us regions to the north and east of Mesop otarnia-c-the area whi ch g.:we birth to, or W.:lS domin ant in, the laun chin g of Surnerian culture. On the o ther hand , both the shape and quantity of the m aceheads found indicate close contact with Egypt , Palestine, and Syria.

Th e axcheads, like this one , reveal the high technical ..randards that the period achieved . Th ey are certainly not inferior to the Sumerian socketed 4Xe-S of the: first half of the third m illenn ium (see page:: I ] 7) which , pri or to the 196 1 judean discover y. were considered as a standard of perfection for contemporary metal-w ork.

Since access to the cave in which the cache was located wa s very difficult, it is presumed that the objects were brou gh t there by local resident s w ho were for ced [Q Hee befor e an invadin g force. The possibility is tha t this outside force w as an Egyptlan arm y. for at the en d of the four th millennium , and the begin ning of the third, the Egypt ians began to und erta ke widespread military action (see page 124) in the southern regions o f Palestine and T rans-j ordan and even beyond .

Th e exact origin of the obj ecrs-e-w hich ineludes man y cult instru m ents-in the Jude an find is unknown . The pres