Williams-Michael-Problems-of-Knowledge

Preface

The title of this book is an allusion to A. ]. Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge, first published in 1956. I studied with Ayer back in the 1960s, so the allusion is in part a gesture of respect towards a teacher of whom I retain fond memories. But that is not its sole point. I also regard Ayer' s book as a model of a certain kind of philosophical writing. Ayer's book is meant to appeal to a wide range of readers. It offers a general account of the aims and methods of philosophical theorizing about human knowledge, designed to be accessible to the beginning undergraduate or curi­ ous non-specialist. At the same time, it is not a textbook. On the contrary, Ayer always discusses problems in a way that allows him to develop his own distinctive line, with the result that his arguments are interesting to specialists as well as beginners. This is what I have tried to do too. For those acquainted with my work, this book combines the Sellarsian themes of Groundless Belief with the diagnostic ideas and contextualist approach to knowledge developed in Unnatural Doubts. Does it still make sense to attempt what Ayer attempted? Some philo­ sophers will argue that, since Ayer' s day, philosophy has become too technic­ ally developed for serious philosophical ideas to be made accessible to the average reader. While I do not deny the value of technical work, I am not so pessimistic. I think that philosophical ideas are important, so that they ought to circulate outside narrowly professional circles; and I think that they can be made to do so, if not in full rigorous detail, then at least not in hopelessly garbled form. Anyway, for good or ill, I have tried to follow Ayer's lead. Whether I have succeeded is for others to judge. Baltimore MD November

2000

Contents

Acknowledgments xi Introduction: The Very Idea of a Theory of Knowledge 1.

The Standard Analysis 13

2.

Knowledge Without Evidence 28

3.

Two Ideals 38

4.

Unstable Knowledge 48

5.

Agrippa's Trilemma 58

6.

Experience and Real ity 69

7.

Foundations 81

8.

The Problem of the Basis 94

9.

Reduction and Inference 105

10.

Coherence 117

11.

The Myth of the System 128

12.

Realism and Truth 138

13.

Evidence and Entitlement 146

14.

Knowledge in Context 159

15.

Seeing and Knowing 173

16.

Scepticism and Epistemic Priority 186

17.

Induction 201

18.

Projection and Conjecture 211

19.

Relativism 220

20.

Objectivity and Progress 230 Conclusion: Epistemology After Scepticism? 241 Works Cited 256 Index 261

Acknowledgements

I am sure that I owe intellectual debts to more people than I can remember. But the following have influenced me greatly, either through their writings, personal discussion, or both: Laurence BonJour, Robert Brandom, Stewart Cohen, Fred Dretske, Robert Fogelin, Paul Horwich, Hilary Kornblith, John McDowell, David Lewis, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Ernest Sosa, Barry Stroud, and Timothy Williamson. I owe special thanks to Ernest Sosa, John Skorupski, and Meredith Williams, who read complete drafts of the manu­ script. Their comments forced me to make substantial changes and (I hope) improvements. The influence of the late Wilfrid Sellars, together with that of Quine, Davidson, and Wittgenstein, is obvious throughout. Sellars's great essay,