Why It Is Better Never To Come Into Existence - David Benatar

 

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Why It Is Better Never to Come into Existence Author(s): David Benatar Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 345-355 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009904 Accessed: 03-07-2018 21:11 UTC   JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].   Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms

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 American Philosophical Quarterly  Volume 34, Number 3, July 1997

 WHY IT ISINTO BETTER NEVER TO  COME EXISTENCE  David Benatar  I

 years of frailty. We all face death.1 We  infrequently contemplate the harms that

 A here is a common assumption in the await any new-born child: pain, disappoint?  literature about future possible people that,  ment, anxiety, grief and death. For any  all things being equal, one does no wrong given child we cannot predict what form  by bringing into existence people whose  these harms will take or how severe they  lives will be good on balance. This as? will be, but we can be sure that at least  sumption rests on another, namely that  some of them will occur. (Only the prema?  being brought into existence (with decent  turely deceased are spared some but not  life prospects) is a benefit (even though  the last.) None of this befalls the non?  not being born is not a harm). All this is  existent. Only existers suffer harm.  assumed without argument. I wish to ar?  Of course I have not told the whole story.

 gue that the underlying assumption is Not only bad things but also good things

 erroneous. Being brought into existence is happen only to those who exist. Pleasures,  not a benefit but always a harm. Many joys, and satisfaction can be had only by

 people will find this deeply unsettling  claim to be counter-intuitive and will wish  existers. Thus, thepleasures cheerfulof will say, we  must weigh up the life against  to dismiss it. For this reason, I propose the evils. As long as the former outweigh  not only to defend the claim, but also to the latter, the life li fe is worth living. Coming  suggest why people might be resistant to it.  into being with such a life is, on this view,

 II

 a benefit.  How ever, this conclusion does not fol?

 As a matter of empirical fact, bad things  low. This is because there is a crucial  happen to all of us. No life is without hard? difference between harms and benefits  ship. It is easy to think of the millions who which m akes the advantages of existence

-existence2 nce2 hollow but the disad?  live a life of poverty or of those who live over non -existe  much of their lives with some disability. vantages real. Consider pains and pleasures  Some of us are lucky enough to be spared as exemplars of h arms an d benefits. It iiss  these fates, but most of us who do none? uncontroversial to say that:

 theless suffer ill-health at some stage  1) the presence of pain is bad  during our lives. Often the suffering is ex?  and that

 cruciating, even if it is only in our final  days. Some are condemned by nature to  2) the presence of pleasure is good.

 3 4 5

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 346 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

 However, such a symmetrical evaluation  However, even of those who do think  does not apply to the absence of pain and  that we have positive duties only a few  pleasure, for:  also think that amongst these is a duty  3) the absence of pain is good, even if that  good is not enjoyed by anyone,

 whereas  4) the absence of pleasure is not bad un less  there is somebody somebody for w hom this ab?  sence is a deprivation.

 M y view about tthe he asymmetry between  3) and 4) is widely widely shared. A num ber of  reasons can be advanced to support this.  First, this view is the best explanation for  the commonly held view that while there  is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people

 into existence, there is no duty to bring  happy people into being. In other word s,  the reason why w e think that there is a duty  not to bring suffering people into existence existence  is that the presence of this suffering w ould

 to bring happy peop le into existence. For  this reason, my ex planation is preferable  to the alternative.

 A second suppor supportt for my cla claim im about the

 asymm etry between 3) and 4) is tthat, hat,

 wher eas it seems strange to give as a rea?  son for having a child that the child one  has will thereby be benefited, sometimes  we do avoid bringing a child into exist?

 ence b ecause of the potential child's child's  interests. If If having children w ere done for

 the purpose of thereby benefiting those

 children, then there would be greater moral

 reason for at least many people to have

 m ore children. In contrast to this, our con?

 cern for the welfare of p otential chil children dren

 who would suffer is taken to be a sound

 ing). In contrast to this, we think that there

 basis for deciding not to h ave the child. If  absent pleasures were bad irrespective of  whether they w ere bad for anybody, then  having children for their own sakes would  not seem odd. A nd if it were not the case

 is no duty to bring happ y people into ex?

 that absent pains are good even where they

 istence because, while their pleasure would

 are not good for anybody , then we could

 be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence  of the suffering is good (even though there

 is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffer?

 be good, its absence would not be b ad

 (given that there would be nobody who  would be dep rived of it).  It might b e objected that there is an al?

 ternative explanation for the view about our

 procreational duties, one that does not ap?

 peal to my claim claim about the asym metry

 between 3) and 4). It might be suggested

 that the reason why w e have a duty to avoid

 bringing suffering people into being, but  not a duty to bring hap py people into ex?  istence, is that we have negative duties to

 not say that it would be good to avoid  bringing suffering children into existence.

 Finally, support for my claim can be

 drawn from a related asymm asymm etry, this time time

 in our retrospective judgments. Bringing  people into existence as w ell as faili failing ng to  bring people into existence can be regr et?  ted. However, only bringing people into  existence can be regretted for the sake of  the person whose existence was contingent  on our decision. One migh t grieve about  not having had children, but not because

 avoid harm, but no corresponding positive  duties to bring about happiness. Judgm ents  about our p rocreational duties are thus like  judgmen ts about all ot other her duties. Now for  those who deny that w e have any positive  duties, this would indeed be an alternative

 explanation to the one I have provided.

 the children which one could have had have

 been deprived of existence. Remorse about  not having children is remorse for ourselves,

 sorrow about having missed child-bearing  and child-rearing experiences. However, we  do regret having brou ght into existence a  child with an unhapp y life, and we regret

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 WHY IS IT BETTER NEVER TO COME INTO EXISTENCE / 347  it for the child's sake, even if also for our

 and one (B) in w hich X nev er exists. This, already ady m entioned entioned,,  own sakes. The reason why we do not la?  along with the views alre  ment our failure to bring somebody into  can be represented diagramaticall diagramatically: y:

 existence is because absent pleasures are  not bad.  I realize that the judgm judgm ents that underlie  this asymmetry are not universally shared.

 For exam ple, positive util utilitaria itarians ns ? w ho

 are interested not only in minim izing izing pain

 but also in maxim izing pleasure ? would  tend to lamen t the absence of additional  possible pleasure pleasure even if there were no?  body deprived of that pleas pleasure. ure. On their  view there is a duty to bring people into  existence if that would increase utility.  Usually this would be manifest as a duty  to bring happy people into existence. How?  ever, under certain circumstances the duty

 could be to bring a suffering person in to  being if that w ould lead to a net increase  of happiness, by ben efiting others. This  is not to say that all positive utilitarians  must reject the view about the asymmetry  of 3) and 4). Positive utilitarians who are  sympathetic to the asymm etry could draw

 a distinction between (i) promoting the

 happiness of people (that exist, or will ex?

 ist independently of one's choices) and

 (ii)) increasing happiness by m aking  (ii

 people. They could then, consistent with  positive utiliarianism, judge only (i) to be  a requirement of m orality. This is tthe he pref?  erable version of positive utilitarianism. If

 one took (ii) also to be a requirement of

 Scenario A

 Scenario B

 (X exists)

 (X never exists)

 3  3))

 1 Presence of Pain

 Absence of Pain

 (Bad)