What is that—Philosophy_

MARTIN HEIDEGGER WHAT IS THAT — PHILOSOPHY? Translated and annotated by Eva T.H. Brann St. Johns College Annapolis, Maryland, 1991 Corrections, suggestions, and conversations are welcome. It is not necessary to read the footnotes in order to follow Heidegger’s meaning; they are for those students who become fascinated by his wordplay. Of course, the easiest way is to learn German. Very little Greek is presupposed. Since Heidegger’s versions of the Greek passages are devised to serve his philosophical purpose, straightforward translations are added in the text and are marked by square brackets.

2 QU’EST-CE QUE LA PHILOSOPHIE? 1 WHAT IS THAT — PHILOSOPHY? 2 1 Lecture given in Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, August 1955, as an introduction to a conversation. Bilingual text (German and English): Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy?. Translated with an Introduction by William Kluback and jean T. Wilde (New Haven: College and University Press, no date). 2 The question in German is “Was ist das - - die Philosophie?,” which introduces into the question “What is philosophy?” a motion of pointing and distancing as in ‘What have we here?”

3 With this question we touch on a theme that is very wide, that is to say, extensive. Because the theme is wide, it remains indeterminate. 3 Because it is indeterminate, we can treat the theme from the most disparate points of view. In so doing, we shall always hit upon something correct. But because in the treatment of this wide-ranging theme all possible opinions whatsoever run askew of each other, we run the danger that our conversation will lack the proper collectedness. 4

Therefore we must try to determine the question more exactly. In this way we give the conversation a firm direction. The conversation is thereby started on a way. I say: on a way. Thus we admit that this way is surely not the only way. It must, in fact, remain open whether the way which I should like to indicate in what follows is in truth a way that allows us to pose the question and to answer it. 3 Indeterminate: unbestimmt. The first sentence introduces the principal wordplay of the lecture. Bestimmen ordinarily means “to determine”; however, stimmen, transitively, means “to tune” but also “to put in a mood.” Hence unbestimmt might be read as “untuned,” or “moodless,” though the normal word would be ungestimmt. Taken intransitively, stimmen means “to be correct,” “to be in adjustment.” See Notes 47-49, 57, 60-62. 4 Collectedness: Sammlung; means “collection, gathering,” and also “concentration, composure of mind.”

4 Let us, for example, assume that we might find a way to determine the question more exactly; then right away there arises a grave objection to the theme of our conversation. When we ask “What is that — philosophy?,” we are speaking about philosophy. By asking in this mode we evidently maintain a position above, and that means outside of, philosophy. But the aim of our question is to enter into philosophy, to dwell in it, to conduct ourselves according to its mode, that is, to “philosophize.” The way of our conversations must, therefore, not only have a dear direction, but this direction must at the same time offer us the guarantee that we are moving within philosophy and not outside and round about it. The way of our conversations must, therefore, be of a kind and have a direction such that that of which philosophy treats concerns us ourselves, touches us (nous touche), and touches us in our very nature. 5 But does not philosophy thereby become a matter of affectedness, of affects and feelings? “It is with beautiful feelings that bad literature is made.” “C’est avec les beaux sentiments que l’on fait la mauvaise 5 Nature: Wesen; the usual German word for “essence.” Gewesen is the past participle of the verb “to be.”

5

litterature.” 6 This mot of André Gide is valid not only of literature; it is even more valid for philosophy. Feelings, even the most beautiful feelings, do not belong in philosophy. Feelings, people say, are something irrational. Philosophy, on the other hand, is not only something rational but is the true and proper administratrix of ratio. When we assert this we have, unawares, decided something about what philosophy is. We have already hurried ahead of our question with an answer. Everyone considers the declaration that philosophy is a matter of ratio correct. Perhaps this assertion is nevertheless a premature and precipitous answer to the question, “What is that — philosophy?” For we can immediately counter this answer with a new question: What is that — ratio, reason? Where and by whom was it decided what ratio is? Has ratio constituted herself the mistress of philosophy? If the answer is “yes,” by what right? If “no,” whence does she receive her charge and her role? If what counts as ratio was first established by philosophy and only by philosophy and within the course of its history, then it is not well-considered to proclaim philosophy in advance as a matter of ratio. As soon, however, as we cast doubt on the characterization of philosophy as a rational attitude, it also becomes dubitable in the same way whether philosophy belongs in the domain of the irrational. For whoever wishes to determine philosophy as irrational thereby takes the rational as the measure of its delimitation, and in such a way 6 André Gide, Dostoievsky (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1923), p. 247.

6 that he again assumes as self-evident what ratio is. If, on the other hand, we point to the possibility that that on which philosophy bears concerns us humans in our nature and touches 7 us, then it might be that this affectedness has nothing at all to do with what people ordinarily call affects and feelings, in short, the irrational. From what has been said, we infer immediately only this one thing: A higher care is required when we dare to begin a conversation under the title, “What is that —philosophy?” The first thing is for us to get the question going along a dearly directed way, so that we do not flounder around in arbitrary or accidental conceptions of philosophy. But how are we to find a way on which we can determine our question in a reliable manner?

The way to which I would now like to point lies immediately before us. And only because it is the nearest at hand is it difficult to find. But even when we have found it, we nevertheless still move clumsily along it. We ask, “What is that — philosophy?” We have uttered the word 7 Touches: be-rührt; might be rendered ‘be-stirs.” Here, as often below, Heidegger puts in a hyphen to draw attention both to the prefix and to the basic verb.

7 “philosophy” often enough before. If, however, we now use the word “philosophy” no longer like a worn-out title, if instead we hear the word “philosophy” from its origin, then it sounds thus: philosophia [philosophia]. The word “philosophy” is now speaking Greek. The Greek word, as a Greek word, is a way. On the one hand this way lies before us, for the word has a long time since been fore-told us. 8 On the other hand, it already lies behind us, for we have ever and always heard and said this word. Accordingly, the Greek word philosophia is a way along which we are underway. Yet we know this way only very indistinctly, although we possess and can broadcast much historical knowledge about Greek philosophy. The word philosophia tells us that philosophy is something which is first of all determinative of the existence of the Greeks. But not only that - - philosophia also determines the innermost basic feature of Occidental-European history. The often-heard expression, “Occidental-European philosophy,” is in truth a tautology. Why? Because “philosophy” is in its nature Greek —Greek, in this instance, means that philosophy is in the origin of its nature of such a 8 Fore-told us: uns...vorausgesprochen; could, be “pre-dicted for us.” The dictionary word vorausgesagt means “prophesied, told in advance.”

8 kind that it first laid claim to the Greeks, 9 and to them alone, in order to unfold itself However, the originally Greek nature of philosophy is, in the era of its modem European dominance, guided and dominated by conceptions of Christianity. The domination of these conceptions is mediated by the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, one cannot say that philosophy thereby becomes Christian, that is, becomes a matter of belief in revelation and the authority of the Church. The

proposition that philosophy is in its nature Greek says nothing but that the Occident and Europe, and they alone, are in the innermost course of their history originally “philosophical.” This is attested by the rise and domination of the sciences. It is because they stem from the innermost Occidental-European course of history, that is, the philosophical course, that they are today able to put their specific imprint upon the history of mankind over the whole earth. Let us consider for a moment what it means that an epoch in the history of mankind is characterized as the “atomic age.”. The atomic energy discovered and liberated by 9 Laid claim to: in Anspruch genommen hat; might be rendered by “bespoke,” an old verb that would preserve the sense of ‘being spoken for,” ‘being possessively addressed,” that becomes important later in the lecture. See Notes 20, 34, 35, 37, 39, 42, 44. The Greeks: das Griechentum; literally “Greekdom.”

9 the sciences is represented as the force which is to determine the course of history. To be sure, there never would have been any sciences if philosophy had not gone before and in advance. But philosophy is: philosophia. This Greek word involves our conversation in a historical tradition. Because this tradition remains unique in kind, it is also univocal in meaning. This tradition, which is named by the Greek name philosophia, while it in turn names the historical word philosophia for us, makes accessible to us the direction of a way on which we ask, “What is that — philosophy?.” The tradition does not deliver us to the coercion of what is past and irrevocable. Delivering, délivrer, is a liberation, namely for the freedom of conversation with what has been. 10 When we truly hear the word and think upon what we have heard, the name “philosophy” calls us into the history of the Greek descent 11 of philosophy. The word philosophia appears, as it were, on the birth certificate of our own history —we may even say, on the birth certificate of the contemporary world-historical epoch, which calls itself the atomic age. That is why we can ask the question, ‘What is that — philosophy?,” only if we involve ourselves in a conversation with the thinking of the Greeks. 10 Tradition: “Überlieferung”; literally “delivering-over.” Traditio in Latin means both “delivery” and ‘betrayal” (related to traditio). What has been: dem Gewesenen; allusion to Wesen, see Note 5. 11 Descent—Herkunft; literally “whence-coming.”

10 But not only what is in question -- philosophy -- is Greek according to its descent, but also the way, how we question; the way in which we still question today is Greek. We ask, ‘What is that...”? In Greek we hear this as ti estin [ti estin]. The question what something might be remains, however, equivocal. We can ask, ‘What is that over there in the distance?” We receive the answer, “a tree.” The answer consists in the fact that we give its name to a thing which we do not recognize exactly. We can, however, ask further, “What is that which we name ‘tree’?” With the question we have now posed we are already near to the Greek ti estin. It is that form of questioning which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle developed. They ask, for example, “What is this — the Beautiful? What is this —Knowledge? What is this — Nature? What is this —Motion?” But now we must observe the fact that in the questions just mentioned not only is a more exact delimitation sought of that which nature, motion, or beauty is, but that at the same time an interpretation is given of what the “what” means, in what sense the ti is to be understood. People call what the “what” means the quid est, to quid, the quiddity, the whatness. However, the quiddity is determined differently in the different epochs of philosophy. Thus, for example, the philosophy of Plato is a peculiar interpretation of what the ti means. It means, in 11 fact, the idea [ideal. That we mean the “idea” when we ask about the ti and the quid is by no means self-evident. Aristotle gives a different interpretation of the ti than does Plato. Another interpretation of the ti is given by Kant, yet another by Hegel. What is asked for each time, using the ti, the quid, the “what” as a due, is to be newly determined every time. In every case this holds: When we ask, in reference to philosophy, ‘What is that?,” then we are asking an originally Greek question. Let us note well: The theme of our question —”philosophy” — as well as the manner in which we ask “What is that ... ?” both remain Greek according to their descent. We ourselves belong within this line of descent, even when we do not so much as mention the word “philosophy.” We are expressly called

back into this descent, re-claimed for it and through it, as soon as we not only pronounce the words of the question, ‘What is philosophy?,” but are intent upon its intention. 12 (The question, ‘What is philosophy?,” is not a question that a kind of cognition directs towards itself [philosophy of philosophy]. The question is, moreover, not a question of historical research, one that is interested in figuring out how what people call “philosophy” began and 12 Intent upon its intention: ihrem Sinne nachsinnen.

12 developed. The question is a historical, that is, a fate-ful 13 question. Moreover, it is not “one,” it is rather the historical question of our Occidental-European existence.) When we involve ourselves in the whole and original meaning of the question, “What is that -philosophy?,” our questioning has found through its historical descent a direction into a historical future. We have found a way. The question itself is a way. It leads from the existence of the Greeks toward us, if not, indeed, beyond us. We are — if we persist with the question —underway on a clearly directed way. Nevertheless, we still have no guarantee that we are immediately enabled to go on this way in the right way. We cannot even make out instantly at which point on this way we are standing today. People have been accustomed for a long time to characterize the question what something might be as a question about its nature or essence. 14 The question concerning the nature always comes awake at those times when that about whose nature the question is raised has become obscured and confused, and when, at the same time, 13 Not a question of historical research: keine historische Frage; historical: geschichtliche; fate-ful: geschick- liche. (The latter adjective, from Geschick, destiny, is not a dictionary word.) Heidegger opposes the two German words for “historical”: historisch and geschichtlich; the former has a more academic flavor. 14 Nature or essence: Wesen; see Note 5. Heidegger uses Wesen throughout.

13 the relationship of human beings to what is being questioned has begun to waver or has even been shaken.

The question of our conversation concerns the nature of philosophy. If this question arises out of a dire need 15 and is not to remain a mere sham-question for the purpose of making conversation, philosophy as philosophy must have become questionable. Is that the case? And if the answer is yes, in what respect has philosophy become questionable for us? Obviously we can state that only if we have already gained an insight into philosophy. But for that it is necessary that we should know beforehand what that is — philosophy. Thus we are being chased around in a circle in a curious way. Philosophy itself seems to be this circle. Supposing that we cannot immediately get free of the loop of this circle, we are still permitted to look upon the circle. Where should we turn to look? The Greek word philosophia indicates the direction. Here a fundamental observation is required. When we listen now and later to the words of Greek speech, we enter into a distinctive domain. For it will slowly dawn upon our reflection that Greek speech is no mere language like the 15 Dire need: Not.

14 European languages 16 with which we are acquainted. Greek speech, and it alone, is logos [logos]. We shall have to deal with this in more depth in our conversations. For a beginning, let it be sufficient to indicate that in Greek speech what is said in it is in a remarkable way simultaneously what the saying names. When we hear a Greek word with a Greek ear we follow its legein [legein], its immediate laying-down. 17 What it lays down is what lies before us. 18 Through the word heard in Greek we are immediately with the matter lying before us, not in the first instance with a mere verbal meaning. The Greek word philosophia goes back to the word pilosophos [Philosophos]. This word is originally an adjective like philarguros, loving silver, like philotimos, loving honor. The word philosophos was presumably coined by Heraclitus. This signifies that for Heraclitus there is as yet no philosophia. 16 Speech, language: Sprache, which is used throughout, means both “human speech” and the “common tongue”; the latter use permits the plural. 17 Laying-down: das Darlegen; etymological reminder of the connection of legein to legen, laying, lying. Dar- legen means literally “laying- or putting-there” (as in Da-sein, ‘being there” or “existence”); the ordinary meaning is “explanation.” 18 What lies before us: Das Vorliegende; usually “what is present or presented.”

15 An aner philosophos [aner philosophos] is not a “philosophical” man. The Greek adjective philosophos says something completely different from the adjective philosophical, philosophique. An aner philosophos is he hos philei to sophon [hos philei to sophon], who loves the sophon; 19 philein [philein], to love, signifies here, in Heraclitus’s sense, homologein [homologein], to speak as the Logos speaks, that is, to speak in accordance with the Logos. This speaking in accordance is in accord 20 with the sophon. Accord is harmonia [harmonia]. This fact, that one nature fits itself to the other reciprocally, that both from their origin submissively fit each other because they are ordered and fitted to each other” -- this “ The sophon: Heidegger does not translate this word in this lecture but glosses it below as “the beings in Being.” Its normal meaning is “the wise [thing].” 20 To speak: sprechen. To speak in accordance with: entsprechen; see Note 38. Accord: Einklang, unison; see Note 21, die Fuge. 21 Fits itself to the other reciprocally: dem anderen wechselweise sich fügt. Submissively fit each other: sich beide einander fügen. Ordered and fitted to each other: sie zueinander verfügt sind. Fügen (transitive) means “to fit”, sich fügen (reflexive) means “to come about”; with the dative it means “to submit,” or “to ad-just (to someone or something).” Die Fügung means “fate’ or “ordinance.”

16 harmonia is the distinctive feature of philein, of “loving,” thought in the Heraclitean sense. The aner philosophos loves the sophon. What this word says for Heraclitus is hard to translate. But we can elucidate it according to Heraclitus’s own interpretation. Accordingly, to sophon says this: Hen Panta [Hen Panta], “All (is) One.” “All” here means Panta ta onta [panta ta onta], the whole, the totality of beings. 22 Hen, one, means the unit, the unique, the all-uniting. But it is in Being 23 that all beings are united. The sophon says: All that is, is in Being. More pointedly: Being is beings. Here “is” speaks transitively and says something like “collects.” Being collects beings in so far

Elsewhere die Fuge is Heidegger’s rendition of harmonia, “accord”; der Fug, “joint” or “fit,” is his translation for dike [dike], “judgment” (Introduction into Metaphysics, IV 3). Neither is a dictionary usage. (Der Unfug means “mischief.”) 22 Beings: Das Seiende; a collective noun formed from the present participle of the verb “to be,” seiend. It is properly rendered as “all that is in being”—”beings” for short. Both versions will be used in the text. 23 Being: Das Sein; substantive formed from the infinitive (rather than the participle, as in English) of the verb “to be;” here rendered, as is usual, by “Being,” capitalized.

17 as they are what is in being. Being is the collection —Logos 24 All beings are in Being. To hear such things sounds trivial to our ear, if not indeed insulting. For no one needs to care about the fact that beings belong in Being. All the world knows that beings are that which is. What else is there left for beings but this: to be? And yet, just this, that beings remain collected in Being, that in the shining-forth of Being beings show up 25 — it was that which first struck the Greeks with wonder, 26 them first and them alone. Beings in Being — that became for the Greeks what is the most wonderful. However, even the Greeks had to rescue and protect the wondrousness of this most wonderful thing — against 24 Collection: Versammlung: logos; shifts the etymological allusion of Note 17 from “laying-down” to “picking-up,” “gathering.” Such opposite movements are etymologically common. Freud mentions Latin altus, which means both “high” and “deep,” and several others (General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Eleventh Lecture). Recall also Collectedness: Sammlung, Note 4. 25 Shining-forth: Scheinen. Show up: erscheinen; usually, “appear.” 26 Wonder: Erstaunen; really “astonishment, amazement.” However, “wonder” is not only what we are used to but is the only term that yields an intransitive verb, “to wonder”; see Note 51.

18 seizure by the Sophistic mind, which had ready to bring to market an explanation for everything, an explanation that everyone could understand right away. The rescue of what is most wonderful, beings in Being, happened because a few set off on the way in the direction of this which is most wonderful, that is,

the sophon. Thus they became such as strove for the sophon and who, through their own striving, awakened and kept awake among others the longing for the sophon. “Loving the sophon,” that accord with the sophon previously mentioned, that harmonia, thus became an orexis [orexis], a striving after the sophon. The sophon — the beings in Being — now becomes the object of a particular search. Because the philein is no longer an original accord with the sophon but rather a particular striving after the sophon, philein to sophon becomes “philosophia.” Its striving is determined by Eros. 27 This striving search for the sophon, for the Hen Panta, for the beings in Being, now becomes a question: What is that which is in being insofar as it is?” Only now does thinking become “philosophy.” Heraclitus, and Parmenides were not yet “philosophers.” Why not? Because they were the greater thinkers. Here “greater” does not signify the evaluation of a performance, but points to another dimension 27 Den Eros: Heidegger uses the definite article and so invokes the god and his particular passion. Orexis, usually “appetite,” is rendered by Heidegger as “striving.”

19 of thinking. Heraclitus, and Parmenides were “greater” in the sense that they were still in harmony with the Logos, that is, with the Hen Panta. The step 28 toward “philosophy,” prepared for by the Sophists, was first carried out by Socrates and Plato. Almost two centuries after Heraclitus, Aristotle then characterized this step in the following sentence: kai de kai to panlai te kai nun kai aei zetoumenon kai aei aporoumenon, ti to on; [“And, indeed, that which has been searched after of old and also now and ever, and ever left in doubt is: What is being?”] (Metaphysics, Z1, 1028b2ff.). In translation this says: “And so then (that which was asked after) once, and also now and ever, that whence (philosophy) has set out on its way and to which it ever and again fails to find access, is this: What is that which is in being? (ti to on).” Philosophy searches for what beings are insofar as they are. Philosophy is underway toward the Being of beings, that is, to beings with respect to Being. Aristotle elucidates this by adding in the sentence quoted an elucidation to the question, ti to on?, “What is that which is in being?,” namely: touto esti tis he ousia; [“that is, what is ousia?”]. Spoken in translation: “This (namely, ti to on) means: What is the Beingness 29 of beings?” The Being of

28 Step: Schritt; avoids Fortschritt, meaning “progress.’ 29 Beingness: ousia: Seiendheit; in all three languages the “abstract” substantive is formed from a participle, in Greek from the feminine form.

20 beings rests on Beingness. But this, ousia, is determined by Plato as idea [idea], by Aristotle as energeia [energeia]. At the moment, it is not yet necessary to discuss more exactly what Aristotle means by energeia, and in what respect ousia may be determined by energeia. What is important now is only that we note how Aristotle delimits the nature of philosophy. In the first book of the Metaphysics (A2, 982b9ff.) he says as follows: Philosophy is episteme ton proton archon kai aition theoretike [theoretical knowledge of the first principles and causes]. People like to translate episteme [episteme] as “science.” This is misleading, because we an too easily allow the modem conception of “science” to slip in. The translation of episteme by “science” is mistaken even if we understand “science” in the philosophical sense intended by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The word episteme derives from the participle epistamenos [epistamenos]. That is what a human being is called when he is competent and adroit in something (competence in the sense of appartenance). Philosophy is episteme tis, a kind of competence, namely, theoretike [theoretike], which is capable of theorein [theorein], that is, capable of looking out for something and of taking and holding in its view what it is on the lookout for. Philosophy, therefore, is episteme theoretike. But what is it that it holds in view? Aristotle says what it is when he names the protai archai kai aitiai [protai archai kai aitiai]. People translate this as “the first grounds and causes,” namely, of beings. The 21 first grounds and causes thus constitute the Being of beings. After two-and-a-half millennia it would seem to be about time to follow out in thought what the Being of beings has to do with such matters as “ground” and “cause.” In what sense is Being thought such that the likes of “ground” and “cause” are suitable for setting their stamp on and taking over the being-in- Being of beings? 30

But now let us attend to something else. The sentence of Aristotle quoted above tells us whither that which since Plato has been called “philosophy” is underway. The sentence gives us information about what that is —philosophy. Philosophy is a kind of competence that qualifies one to hold beings in view, namely with a view to what they are insofar as they are what is in being. The question which is to give our conversation its fruitful unrest and movement and is to show the conversation the direction of its way, the question, “What is philosophy?,” has already been answered by Aristotle. Therefore our conversation is no longer necessary. It is at an end before it has begun. People will reply right away that 30 The being-in-Being of beings. das seiend-Sein des Seienden; meaning the nature, that is, the Being (das Sein) of what is (des Seienden) insofar as it is in the state of being (seiend).

22 Aristotle’s assertion about what philosophy is can in no way be the only answer to our question. In the most favorable case, it is one answer among many others. With the help of the Aristotelian characterization of philosophy one can, to be sure, present and interpret thought before Aristotle and Plato, as well as philosophy after the time of Aristotle. However, it will be easily pointed out that philosophy itself and the mode in which it represents its own nature has changed in manifold ways in the subsequent two millennia. Who would deny this? We ought not, however, to ignore the fact that philosophy from Aristotle to Nietzsche has remained the same, precisely on the basis of these transformations and through them and throughout them. For the transformations are the surety for a kinship in sameness. 31 In saying this we are by no means claiming that the Aristotelian definition of philosophy is absolutely valid. For already within the history of Greek thought it is only one particular interpretation of Greek thought and of the task assigned to it. The Aristotelian characterization of philosophy can in no case be translated back to the thought of Heraclitus, and Parmenides; on the contrary, the Aristotelian definition of philosophy is, indeed, a free consequence of early thought and of its conclusion. I say “a free consequence,” because there is no way to make perspicuous the claim that the several philosophies and the

31 Transformations: Verwandlungen; kinship: Verwandschaft.

23 epochs of philosophy emerge from one another in the sense in which a dialectic process has necessity. What is the result of what has been said for our attempt to treat the question, “What is that — philosophy?,” in a conversation? First of all this one point.- We must not rely only on Aristotle’s definition. From this we infer the second point: We must make present to ourselves the earlier and the later definitions of philosophy. And then? Then we will expose that which is common to all definitions by a comparative abstraction. And then? Then we will arrive at an empty formula which fits every kind of philosophy. And then? Then we will be as far removed as possible from an answer to our question. Why has it come to this? Because in the proceeding just mentioned we are only collecting the available definitions historically and resolving them into a general formula. All of this can, indeed, be carried out with great erudition and with the help of correct formulations. In so doing we do not need in the least to involve ourselves in philosophy, so as to follow the nature of philosophy in thought. 32 In this way we acquire manifold, thorough, and even useful items of knowledge about how people have represented philosophy in the course of history. But along 32 Follow ... in thought: nach- denken; usually nachdenken is used with über and means “to think about (something).” Heidegger puts in the hyphen to emphasize the literal meaning of nach, “after”: Our thinking should follow the lead of the emerging nature of philosophy.

24 this way we never reach a genuine, that is, a legitimate, answer to the question, “What is that — philosophy?” The answer can only be a philosophizing response, a response that, as a re-sponse, 33 philosophizes in itself. But how are we to understand this proposition? In what respect can a response, just insofar as it is a re-sponse, philosophize? I shall now try to clarify this provisionally by a few pointers. What is meant will disquiet our conversation over and over. It will even be the touchstone of whether our conversation is permitted to become truly philosophical. This is by no means within our power.

When is the answer to the question, “What is that — philosophy?,” a philosophizing one? When are we philosophizing? Evidently only when we enter into a conversation with the philosophers. This implies that we talk through with them what they are talking about. 34 This talking-through-with-one-another of that which, as one and the same, ever and again, peculiarly concerns the philosophers, is speaking, legein [legein], in the sense of dialegesthai [dialegesthai], speaking as dialogue. Whether and when dialogue is necessarily dialectic, we leave open. 33 Answer, re-sponse: Antwort, literally “counter-word,” as Heidegger brings out by writing Ant-wort; see Note 38. 34 Talk through: durchsprechen, literally “follow through in speech.” In what follows Sagen is rendered either as “saying’ or “telling.”

25 It is one thing to establish and to describe the opinions of philosophers. It is an entirely different thing to talk through with them what they are saying, and that means, that of which they are telling. Assume, then, that the philosophers are addresseed 35 by the Being of beings so that they tell what beings are insofar as they are, then our conversation with philosophers must also be addressed by the Being of beings. We ourselves, must, through our thinking, go half-way 36 to meet philosophy on its way. Our speaking must cor-respond 37 to that which addresses the philosophers. If we succeed in this cor-responding we re-spond in a genuine sense to the question: “What is that -- philosophy?” The German word antworten really means as much as ent- sprechen. 38 The answer to our question is not exhausted by an assertion that replies to the question by stating what people are to imagine 35 Addressed: angesprochen. 36 Go half-way: entgegenkoinmen, “to go to meet,” but also “to oblige.” 37 Cor-respond: ent-sprechen. 38 Ant- worten: “to answer,” literally, “to counter in words.” Entsprechen: “to correspond,” literally “to confront in speech.” These appear to be defensible etymologies, since ant and ent are the same. In an earlier context ent-sprechen was translated as “to speak in accordance with”; see Note 20.

26

by the concept “philosophy.” The answer is not a retorting assertion West pas une réponse); the answer is rather that correspondence (la correspondance) which cor-responds to the Being of beings. Yet, right away we should like to know what in fact constitutes the characteristic feature of a response in the sense of correspondence. However, first everything depends on our attaining a correspondence, before we establish the theory about it. The answer to the question, “What is that —philosophy?,” consists in our corresponding to that toward which philosophy is underway. And that is -- the Being of beings. In such a correspondence we listen from the very beginning to that which philosophy has already bespoken for us, 39 philosophy, that is, philosophia understood in the Greek sense. That is why we attain correspondence, meaning an answer to our question, only thus — that we remain in conversation with that whither the tradition of philosophy delivers us, that is, for what it liberates us. We find the answer to the question, what philosophy might be, not through historical information about the definitions of philosophy but through the conversation with that which has 39 Bespoken for us: uns zugesprochen hat; literally “has spoken toward us;” ordinarily means “has imparted, awarded, or assigned us”; see Note 9.

27 delivered itself to us 40 as the Being of beings. This way to the answer for our question is not a break with history, not a repudiation of history, but an appropriation and a transformation of what the tradition has delivered. Such an appropriation of history is what is meant by the title of “destruction.” The meaning of this word has been dearly circumscribed in Being and Time (§ 6). 41 Destruction does not mean destroying but dismantling, demolishing, setting-aside —namely merely historical information about the history of philosophy. Destruction means: opening our ear, freeing ourselves for what addresses us in the tradition as the Being of beings. By listening to this spoken appeal 42 we reach correspondence. 40 Delivers: ausliefert, also means “to surrender as in betrayal”; see Note 10. Liberates: befreit; the German verb liefern is related to the Latin verb liberare, “to free.” Has delivered itself to us: sich uns überliefert hat, “has handed itself down to us in the tradition”; again, see Note 10. 41 Being and Time, p. 22: .’We understand this task [of loosening-up the petrified tradition and of dissolving the cover-up it has effected through time] as the destruction — executed by using the question of Being as a clue — of the traditional

inventory of ancient ontology down to the original experiences in which were achieved the first, and henceforth the guiding, determinations of Being.” 42 Spoken appeal: Zuspruch, literally “speaking-to,” usually means “encouragement, consolation.” Heidegger is playing with the meaning of zusprechen, the verb of Note 39.

28 But even while we are saying this, a hesitation has already announced itself It says: Do we really first have to make an effort to enter into a correspondence with the Being of beings? Are we -- human beings — not always and already in such a correspondence, and, what is more, not only de facto, but by reason of our nature? Does not this correspondence constitute the fundamental trait of our nature? So it is in truth. But if that is how it is, we can no longer say that we first have to attain this correspondence. And yet we are right to say so. For, although we do remain always and everywhere in correspondence to the Being of beings, we nevertheless rarely attend to the spoken appeal of Being. The correspondence to the Being of beings does, to be sure, always remain our abode. But only from time to time does it become a self-unfolding attitude expressly adopted by us. Only when this happens do we properly correspond to the concerns of that philosophy which is on the way toward the Being of beings. This correspondence to the Being of beings is philosophy; but it is philosophy only if and when the correspondence is expressly realized, so that it unfolds itself and consolidates this unfolding. This correspondence occurs in different ways, depending on how the spoken appeal of Being speaks, depending on whether it is heard or unheard, and depending on whether what is heard is told or 29 is passed over in silence. 43 Our conversation can offer opportunities to follow this further in thought. Now I shall only try to say a foreword to the conversation. I should like to double back from what has been presented so far to what we touched upon in connection with André Gide’s mot about “fine feelings.” Philosophia is the expressly realized correspondence which speaks insofar as it attends to the spoken appeal of the Being of beings. The correspondence listens to the voice 44 of the spoken appeal. What announces itself appealingly to us as the voice of Being at-tunes 45 our cor-respondence. “Correspondence” then means: being at-tuned, être disposé, namely by the Being of beings. Dis-posé here means literally: en-countered, en

43 Heard; unheard: gehört, überhört; the latter means “ignored.” Passed over in silence: geschwiegen; odd usage, just misses verschwiegen: “concealed, discreet.” . 44 Cor-respondence: Das Ent-sprechen. Voice: Stimme; “voice,” “musical part,” “tune,” also “vote; the grandest of the stimm-words. 45 Announces itself appealingly to us: sich ... uns zuspricht; not a normal usage. At-tunes: be-stimmt, normally “determines.” See Notes 3, 47-49, 57, 60, 62.

30 lightened, 46 and thus placed in its relations to that which is. Beings as such attune speaking in such a way that telling attunes itself (accorder) to the Being of beings. Correspondence is necessarily and always tuned, not just accidentally and occasionally. It is in a tuning. 47 And only on the basis of this tuning (disposition) does the telling of correspondence obtain its precision, its at-tunement. 48 As something tuned and attuned, correspondence is essentially in a mood. 49 Through it our attitude is adjusted 50 sometimes in this, sometimes in that way. Mood 46 En-countered: auseinander-gesetzt, literally “set asunder.” Die Auseinandersetzung means an “explanation,” an “argumentative confrontation,” and a “coming-to-terms.” En-lightened: gelichtet; from a verb used for making a space that lets in the light, such as a clearing in a forest; see Being and Time, p. 133. 47 Attunes itself to: sich...abstimmt auf; tuned: gestimmtes; tuning: Gestimmtheit, not a dictionary word. ‘To be thus or so gestimint” means “to be in this or that mood”; see Note 49. 48 At-tunement: Bestimmtheit, “determinateness,” also “definiteness”; see Note 3, 45. 49 Mood: Stimmung; means both “emotional disposition” and “musical tuning”; compare the English word “mood” with (musical) “mode,” which is used below. 50 Adjusted: gefügt; see Note 21.

31 thus understood is not a music of accidentally emerging feelings which only accompany the correspondence. When we characterize philosophy as tuned correspondence, we by no means want to surrender thinking to the accidental variations and vacillations of our emotional conditions. It is rather only a matter of pointing out that all precision of telling is grounded in a disposition of correspondence, of correspondence I say, — of correspondance, in heeding the spoken appeal.

Above all, however, the reference to the essential tuning of correspondence is not a modem invention. The Greek thinkers, Plato and Aristotle, had already drawn attention to the fact that philosophy and philosophizing belong to that dimension of human beings which we call mood (in the sense of tuning and at-tunement). Plato says (Theaetetus, 155 d): mala gar philosophou touto to pathos, to thaumazein. ou gar alle arche philosophias e aute. “For surely this pathos [pathos] especially belongs to the philosopher -wondering. 51 For there is no other Ruling Whence 52 of philosophy than this.” 51 Wondering: to thaumazein: das Erstaunen; really “astonishment,” ‘amazement”; see Note 26 , Here “wondering” rather than “wonder” is used because of the Greek infinitive. 52 Ruling Whence: Heidegger’s rendering of arche, “beginning, source, origin, rule.”

32 Wonder, as pathos, is the arche [arche] of philosophy. We must understand the Greek word arche in its full sense. It names that whence something goes out. But this “from whence” is not left behind in the going out; the arche rather becomes what the verb archein [archein] says: that which rules. The pathos of wonder thus does not simply stand at the beginning of philosophy as, for example, the washing of hands precedes the surgeon’s operation. Wonder supports and rules philosophy through and through. Aristotle says the same (Metaphysics A 2, 982 b 12 ff): dia gar to thaumazein hoi anthropoi kai nun kai to proton erxanto philosophein. “For through wondering human beings have now and from the first gained entrance to the ruling issue 53 of philosophizing” (to that whence philosophizing goes forth and which thoroughgoingly determines the going of philosophizing 54). Our thinking would be very superficial and, above all, very un-Greek, if we were to suppose that Plato and Aristotle were merely observing here that wonder is the original cause of philosophizing. Were this their opinion, it would mean that once, at some time or other, human beings wondered 53 Ruling issue: beherrschender Ausgang; Heidegger’s German rendering of arche, meaning both “issue (origin)” and “issue (upshot, exit).” 54 Goes forth: ausgeht. Going: Gang. Thoroughgoingly: durchgängig. . .

33

about what is in being -- that it is and what it is. Driven by this wonder, they began to philosophize. As soon as philosophy was a going concern, wonder became superfluous as an impetus, so that it disappeared. It could disappear since it was only an impetus. But wonder is arche — it pervasively rules every step of philosophy. Wonder is pathos. We usually translate pathos by passion, an access of feeling. But pathos is connected with paschein [paschein] to suffer, submit, bear up, wear out, letting oneself be borne by, letting oneself be modi-fied by. 55 It is risky, as always in such cases, for us to translate pathos with mood, by which we mean tuning and at-tunement. But we must risk this translation because it alone protects us from conceiving pathos psychologically, in a contemporarily modem sense. Only if we understand pathos as tuning (dis- position) can we also characterize thaumazein [thaumazein], wondering, more closely. In wondering we hold ourselves in (être en arrêt). We step back, as it were, from that which is in being, from its being thus and not otherwise. And wonder is not exhausted in this withdrawal from the Being of beings, but, as a withdrawal and a holding-in, it is at the same time swept away and, as it were, captivated by that from which it withdraws. Thus, wonder is the dis-position in which and for which the Being of beings opens itself. Wonder is the 55 Wear out: austragen; also means “to carry a child to term.” Modi-fied: be-stimmt; see Note 49.

34 mood within which the Greek philosophers were granted the correspondence to the Being of beings. Of a very different sort is that mood which attuned thinking to asking in a new way the traditional question, what being might indeed be insofar as it is, and thus to begin a new time for philosophy. In his Meditations Descartes does not ask only and first, ti to on — what is that which is in being, insofar as it is? Descartes asks: What are those beings which are genuine beings in the sense of the ens certum? In the meanwhile, the nature of certitudo has changed for Descartes. For in the Middle Ages certitudo does not signify certainty of knowing 56 but the firm delimitation of a being in respect to that which it is. Certitudo here is still synonymous with essentia. Descartes, on the other hand, takes the measure of that which genuinely is in another way. For him to doubt becomes that mode 57 in which the tuning resonates to the ens certum, that which is in the certainty of knowing. Certitudo becomes that fixation of the ens qua ens

56 Certainty of knowing: Gewissheit; literally “being in the knowing state,” but ordinarily just “certainty.” Heidegger has the literal meaning in mind. 57 Mode: Stimmung; could be “mood”; see Note 49.

35 which results from the indubitability of the cogito (ergo) sum 58 for the human ego. Because of this, the ego becomes the distinctive sub- jectum, and thus the nature of the human being enters, for the first time, the realm of subjectivity in the sense of the Ego. From the tuning to this certainty Descartes’s telling derives the mode of “perceiving clearly and distinctly.” 59 The mode of doubt is the positive accord 60 with certainty. Henceforth, certainty becomes the standard measure of the form of truth. The mood of confidence in the absolute certainty of a cognition that is always obtainable remains the pathos, and thus the arche, of modern philosophy. In what does the telos [telos], the fulfillment of modern philosophy, consist, if we may speak of such? Is this end determined by another mood? Where must we look for the fulfillment of modem philosophy? In Hegel, or only in 58 Ens certum: certain being. Ens qua ens: being as being. Cogito (ergo) sum: I think (therefore) I am. The sentence itself occurs, for example, in the Discourse on Method, Part IV, and in the Reply to Objections IL ‘Thirdly.” For the argument, see Meditation II. 59 Sub- jectum: (thing) placed beneath; that which supports all attributes. Ego: Egoität. Perceiving clearly and distinctly: clare et distincte percipere. 60 Accord: Zustimmung, “attunement-to,” ordinarily “agreement”

36 the late philosophy of Schelling? And how about Marx and Nietzsche? Are they already stepping out of the course of modern philosophy? If not, how can we determine their station? It looks as though we were only posing questions for historical research. But in truth we are considering the coming nature of philosophy. We are trying to hear the voice 61 of Being. Into what kind of mood 62 does this voice put today’s thinking? The question can scarcely be answered unequivocally.

Presumably a fundamental mood prevails. It is, however, still hidden from us. This would be a sign that today’s thinking has not yet found its unequivocal way. What we meet with is only this: manifold moods of thinking. Doubt and despair 63 on the one hand, blind obsession by untested principles on the other, stand in confrontation. Fear and anxiety are mixed with hope and confidence. Often and widely it looks as though thinking in the mode of rationalizing representation and calculation were completely free of any mood. But even the coldness of calculation, even the prosaic sobriety of planning, are marks of tuning. Not only that — even reason, which keeps itself free of any influence of the passions, is, as reason, tuned to 61 Voice: Stimme; could be “tune”; see Note 44. 62 Mood: Stimmung, could be “tuning”; see Note 49. 63 Doubt and despair: Zweifel and Verzweiflung.

37 confidence in the logico-mathematical perspicuity of its principles and rules. The correspondence, expressly adopted and selfunfolding, which corresponds to the spoken appeal of the Being of beings, is philosophy. What that is -- philosophy — we come to recognize and know only when we experience how, in what way, philosophy is. It is in the mode of a correspondence which attunes itself to the voice of the Being of beings. This cor-respondence is a speaking. 64 It is in the service of speech. What this means is difficult for us today to understand, for our current conception of speech has undergone strange transformations. Consequently, speech appears as an instrument of expression. Accordingly, people consider it more correct to say: Speech is in the service of thinking, instead of. Thinking, as cor-respondence, is in the service of speech. Above all, the current conception of language is as far removed as possible from the Greek experience of speech. To the Greeks the nature of speech reveals itself as logos. But what do logos and legein mean? Only today, through the manifold interpretations of the logos, are we slowly beginning to see through to its original Greek nature. However, neither can we ever again return to this nature of speech, nor can we simply take it over. Instead, we 64 Cor-respondence: Ent-sprechen; speaking: sprechen.

38 had better enter into a conversation with the Greek experience of speech as logos. Why? Because without a sufficient reflection on speech we can never genuinely know what philosophy is as a marked cor-respondence, what philosophy is as a remarkable 65 mode of telling. But because poetry, when we compare it with thinking, is in the service of speech in an entirely different and remarkable way, our conversation, which thinks in the wake of philosophy, 66 is necessarily led to discuss the relationship between thinking and poetry. 67 Between both, thinking and poetry, there operates a secret kinship, because both expend and squander themselves in the service of speech. But between both there also exists an abyss, for they “dwell on the most sundered mountains.” 68 Now one might require with good justification that our conversation should restrict itself to the question concerning philosophy. This restriction would be possible and even necessary only if it should turn out in the 65 Marked: gekennzeichnete; remarkable: ausgezeichnete. 66 Thinks in the wake of philosophy: der Philosophie nachdenkt; see Note 32. 67 Thinking: Denken; poetry: Dichten. 68 Friedrich Hölderlin, “Patmos.”

39 conversation that philosophy is not that which it is now interpreted to be: a correspondence that casts in speech the spoken appeal of the Being of beings. In other words: Our conversation does not set itself the task of developing a fixed program. But it would wish to make the effort to prepare all who are participating in it for a collectedness in which we are addressed by what we call the Being of beings. As we name it we are thinking of what Aristotle has already said “The being-in-Being comes to shine in manifold ways.” 69 [Being is spoken of in many ways. To on legetai pollachos.]

To on legetai pollachos. 69 The being-in-Being: Das seiend- Sein; as in Note 30. Heidegger here cites Being and Time, § 7B. His reference is to the section on “Me Concept of the Logos,” where legein, “speaking,” defined by Aristotle as apophainesthai, “declaring,” is explicated as phainesthai, “making appear, showing forth, letting shine out.”