Well Integrity Management Manual

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EP WELL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT MANUAL

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EP Well Integrity Management Manual COMPANY STANDARD

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DOCUMENT HISTORY Custodian

Davie Stewart - T&OE Global Lead Well Services

Approved by

John Rusz – T&OE Global Lead Production Technology

Document type

Business Control Documents – Company Standard

Distribution

Regional Chiefs Production Technology, Well Engineering & Well Services Available as download copy for all staff

Date

Issue

Reason for change

October 2006

0

First issue

This document will be maintained live on the SIEP intranet site. The Web-based document will be the controlled version and revision announcements will be published on the web. Copies or extracts of this manual, which have been downloaded from the website, are uncontrolled copies and cannot be guaranteed to be the latest version.

FOREWORD The purpose of the Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM) is to describe how Shell EP manages the integrity of its wells during the design and construction phases and then safeguards that integrity during the operational phase, through to Well Abandonment. Establishing and maintaining well integrity throughout the well lifecycle prevents the occurrence of HSE incidents, production loss and costly remedial activities. Well Integrity is therefore fundamental to maintaining a safe working environment, to extracting maximum business value from an Asset and to upholding Company reputation. It is a prerequisite to achieving lasting business success, a continued ‘license to operate’ and positive and constructive relations with stakeholders and customers. It is therefore imperative to demonstrate to regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders that the integrity of wells is being effectively managed and that a system, allowing continuous improvement, is embedded in the organization, the work processes, and practices. The WIMM is the formal manual for wells in support of the EP Technical Integrity Objectives (draft Standard), under the Technical Integrity Framework (TIF). The WIMM spans several EPBM processes, namely EP63 (Design, Drill, Service & Abandon Wells), EP72 (Maintain and Assure Facilities Integrity) and EP73 (Execute Well & Reservoir Surveillance). The WIMM is supported by T&OE Minimum Standards on Technical Integrity and Technical Authorities, and the Global Processes on Integrity Assurance (GP 16) and Operations Readiness and Assurance (GP12). The WIMM is developed to provide Operating Units (OU) and Service Companies (SC) with the guidance to develop and implement an effective Well Integrity Management System using proven practices and processes. The document focuses on the principles and the fundamental building blocks for managing Well Integrity and will distinguish between mandatory (“shall”) requirements and recommendations/best practices (“should”). John Rusz Global Discipline Leader Production Technology Process Owner of Lifecycle Well Integrity Management

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CONTENTS 1.

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

INTRODUCTION 1.1. Purpose 1.2. Principles & Objectives of WIMM 1.3. Definition of Well Integrity 1.4. Overview and Scope 1.5. Relationship of WIMM to TIF (Technical Integrity Framework) 1.6. Relationship of WIMM to EPBM 1.7. Well Boundaries ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1. Well Integrity Lifecycle RACI Chart 2.2. Activities and Responsibilities WELL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROCESS DESCRIPTION 3.1. Well Integrity Management Map 3.2. Process Deliverables DATA MANAGEMENT 4.1. Principles 4.2. Monitoring and Tracking 4.3. Well Status Traffic Lights WELL FAILURE MODEL (WFM) WELL INTEGRITY ASSURANCE 6.1. SCE Definition 6.2. SCE Performance Standards 6.3. Well Barriers 6.4. Leak Criteria 6.5. Corrosion Management 6.6. Wellhead and Xmas Trees ANNULUS PRESSURE MANAGEMENT 7.1. Principles 7.2. Types of annular pressures 7.3. Calculation of MAASP 7.4. Setting of MAWOP (Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating Pressure) 7.5. Special provision for the ‘A’ Annulus MAWOP 7.6. ‘A’ Annulus MINAP (gaslifted wells) 7.7. Management and Control 7.8. Revisiting MAWOP values PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 8.1. Key Performance Indicators 8.2. Performance Improvement

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Introduction

1.1. Purpose The purpose of the Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM) is to describe how Shell EP manages the integrity of its wells during the design and construction phases and then safeguards that integrity during the operational phase, until the Well Abandonment has been completed. The WIMM is developed to provide Operating Units (OU) with the means to implement an effective local Well Integrity Management System (WIMS) using proven practices and processes. The document focuses on the principles and the fundamental building blocks for managing Well Integrity and will distinguish between mandatory requirements and recommendations/best practices.

1.2. Principles & Objectives of WIMM This Manual describes what activities shall be done to manage WI throughout the well lifecycle. Local Well Integrity Management Systems (at Region and/or OU level) shall assure that those activities are done. 1.2.1. Well Integrity Principles The following principles shall be followed by all staff and contractors involved in any way in managing well integrity: All EP assets must clearly demonstrate WI status at all times and all assets shall set WI targets consistent with the requirements of these principles. Whenever a conflict exists between completing repair to safety critical equipment and other non-integrity related work, the safety critical work will always take priority. Deviations from Company Standards shall be approved by absolute exception. Deviations shall not be approved to allow continued production unless it can be clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that the risks are tolerable. The complexity of the required intervention shall never be a reason for delaying the beginning (planning) of safety critical work. Consistent with EP priorities, resources must immediately be made available to begin remedial work. Likewise complexity, and therefore the time possible to complete work, shall not alone be a reason to continue production pending repair. All Asset leaders are expected to continually and consistently promote and demonstrate these principles to their teams. All parties with WI responsibilities shall fully understand their responsibilities and shall be given training opportunities to maintain the required competency levels. If they have any doubts regarding WI issues they should immediately raise them with their supervisor.

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1.2.2. Objectives The WIMM aims to provide a clear understanding of the expectations of Well Integrity Management within Shell EP. This will enable local well integrity management systems to be consistently implemented and rigorously followed. The WIMM document itself is aimed at all parties involved in WI, including the Asset Management, Production Operations, Maintenance, Production Technology, Well Engineering and Well Services. The WIMM document is intended to: Give clear guidance in creation of a local WI Management System. Outline the expectations of lifecycle management of well integrity. It describes the process, organisation and tools safeguarding and demonstrating the integrity of the wells throughout their lifecycle including when permanently abandoned. Combine good practices into one integrated approach to WI management. Identify the roles and responsibilities of the personnel that are accountable for delivering the necessary well integrity assurance.

1.3. Definition of Well Integrity Well Integrity in design & construction is achieved when: Functional performance standards (e.g. to isolate pressure) and operating parameters (e.g. pressures, stresses, fluid/corrosion properties) have been quantified and conditions modeled, Significant functional failure modes have been considered and have the potential to require a redesign. (e.g. corrosion induced tubing leak resulting in improved tubing metallurgy), The operating envelope has been updated prior to the well handover, to reflect the changes made and lessons learned during construction (e.g excessive casing wear or sub-optimal cementation), Operating and maintenance requirements have been specified. Well integrity in operation is achieved when: Under specified operating conditions, there is no intolerable risk of failure endangering the safety of personnel, environment or asset value.

1.4. Overview and Scope Establishing and maintaining well integrity throughout the well life cycle prevents the occurrence of HSE incidents, production loss and costly remedial activities. The early detection of problems may lead to the avoidance of injuries to people (some potentially lethal) and costly remedial work, while problems left undetected have the potential to escalate and ultimately lead to uncontrolled situations (even blowouts). Well Integrity is therefore fundamental to maintaining a safe working environment, to extracting maximum business value from an Asset and to upholding Company reputation. It is a prerequisite to achieving lasting business success, a continued ‘license to operate’ and positive and constructive relations with stakeholders and customers. It is therefore imperative to demonstrate to regulators, shareholders and other EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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stakeholders that the integrity of wells is being effectively managed and that a system, allowing continuous improvement, is embedded in the organization, the work processes, and practices. The activities described under this Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM) apply to all exploration, appraisal and development wells designed, constructed and operated by Shell EP Companies. The WIMM spans all activities that directly affect well integrity (WI) from the early stages of design through to well abandonment, including conceptual and detailed well design, well construction / handover, well production operations and well intervention/ repair under Well Services. Production Technology is the process owner for Well Integrity Management throughout the entire well lifecycle. Carrying out Well Integrity activities is a line responsibility that resides within the Wells and Production organizations. Depending on the lifecycle phase, each organization has a distinct role: Wells - for establishing Well Integrity through design, procurement, construction, and commissioning (i.e., definition and application of design specifications, performance standards, and verification). Production - for safeguarding Well Integrity (i.e., application and verification of good operating and maintenance practices, Performance Standards, Management of Change and Deviation Control processes). During all phases there is a crucial supporting role for the Technical Authority (TA) to risk assess both deviations and Management of Change.

1.5. Relationship of WIMM to TIF (Technical Integrity Framework) The Technical Integrity Framework (TIF) document provides the over-riding guidance about general asset integrity policies within the Group. Technical Integrity Framework The TIF describes the following elements of a comprehensive asset integrity system that are generic to all assets and hence not repeated within this WIMM document Structure of the asset integrity management system. Policy / Commitment Statement Minimum Standards for Technical Integrity Processes and Procedures Integrity Audits Management of Deviation and Change Control Conflict Resolution Risk Assessment There are also specific mandatory documents that must be applied to local Technical Integrity Management Systems.

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These are: Global Process 9 for Well Delivery

http://sww-toe.shell.com/process9/

Global Process 16 for Integrity Assurance

http://sww-toe.shell.com/process16/

In addition, there are Minimum Standards that shall be complied with, these are: Wells Minimum Standard

http://sww.shell.com/ep/toe/minimum_standards/wells.ht ml

Technical Integrity Minimum Standard

http://sww.shell.com/ep/toe/minimum_standards/integrity .html

The WIMM document fits within the global TI document structure (and hierarchy) as indicated below, under the Operational Excellence document structure. The specific purpose of each document is as follow: Global Technical Integrity Framework (TIF)

Provide direction and guidance for Technical Integrity Management of Physical Assets in Shell EP.

Global Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM)

Describes what activities shall be done to manage Well Integrity.

Well Integrity Guideline (WIG)

Supports the Global Well Integrity Management Standard. Contains the procedures, monitoring and reporting tools that are deemed necessary to meet the expectations set forth in the Global WIMM document.

Local Well Integrity Management System (WIMS)

Assures that the activities described in the Global WIMM are done locally.

Well Integrity Assurance Procedures (WIAP)

Local adaptation of the WIG. Supports the local Management System. Describes local practices and procedures.

Global EP documents

Business Unit Adaptation Documents

Global TI Framework (TIF)

Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM)

Well Integrity Management System (WIMS)

Well Integrity Guideline (WIG)

Well Integrity Assurance Procedures (WIAP)

Figure 1, Global TI Document Structure EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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1.6. Relationship of WIMM to EPBM The Well Integrity Management Standard spans several EPBM processes, namely EP.63 – Design, Construct, Modify, Service & Abandon Wells EP.72 – Maintain & assure Facilities Integrity EP.73 – Execute Well & Reservoir Surveillance

EPBM v 4 Alignment of T&OE Global Processes T&OE GP-04 Geophysical Acquisition and processing Upgrade Portfolio

T&OE GP-01 HC Resource Volume Management

ASS Manage Assets

business plan

asset reference plans

EP.03 Manage EP Business Management System

EP.52 Execute Appraisal Activities

EP.62 Acquire and Process Geophysical Data EP.63 Design, Drill & Modify Well(s)

EP.65 Execute Operations Readiness and Assurance Activities

ACT Manage Activities

(Set-up-Operate-Wind up)

T&OE GP-17 Logistics Management

OpCos

Management of an opportunity /project

EP.05 Govern Non Operated Ventures

ORP Opportunity Realisation Process

JVs

T&OE GP-25 Manage Company & JVs Technology Development

EP.15 Manage Finance Processes

EP.16 Manage Information

EP.21 Manage and Deploy Technology

EP.22 Manage Legal Processes

EP.23 Manage Application Portfolio & OPF Integration

EP.24 Provide IT Solutions and Services VAR

T&OE GP-11 Wells Software Portfolio Management

EP.30

EP.63 Abandon Well(s)

T&OE GP-12 Operational Readiness and Assurance

EP.64 Decommission Facilities

EP.71 Produce Hydrocarbons

T&OE GP-16 Integrity Assurance

EP.72 Maintain & Assure Facilities Integrity

T&OE GP-08 Well and Reservoir Surveillance

EP.73 Execute Well & Reservoir Surveillance

T&OE GP-13 Production Forecasting

Opportunity/project plans

EP.14 Manage Logistics

Benchmarking

EP.63 Service Well(s)

EP.74 Market and Trade Hydrocarbons

EP.13 Manage Supply Chain

T&OE GP-18 Global Information Management

T&O GP-09 Well Delivery

EP.64 Design, Construct, Modify Facilities

Regional

EP.04 Manage Legal Entity

asset management

EP.61 Develop/ Update Integrated Reservoir Model

process management systems

Manage EP Global Business

EP.80 Manage Abandonment

EP.51 Execute Exploration Activities

PRO Manage Process

business controls

Abandon

EP.60 Plan Hydrocarbon Development

IAP Integrated Activity Planning

T&OE GP- 03 Integrated Activity Planning

Produce

EP.42 Develop Exploration Business

integrated activity plans

EP.02 Manage Reputation

Develop

EP.41 Develop New Business

hc resource maturation plans

EP.01

T&OE GP-07 Integrated Reservoir Modelling

EP.40 Manage Growth Strategy and Plan

HRVM Manage Hydrocarbon Resource Volumes

T&OE GP-02 Manage Asset Reference EP Business Plan Planning

Explore

T&OE GP-05 HC Development Planning

EP.31

Opportunity Framing

T&OE GP-21 Benchmarking of Project Performance

EP.32

Value Assurance Reviews (VARs)

T&OE GP-22 Benchmarking of Operational Performance

EP.17 Provide HSSE Support EP.25 Provide Laboratory Services PERT

EP.33

Project Assurance

T&OE GP-19 Opportunity Framing

EP.18 Manage Geomatics

EP.20 Provide Human Resources

EP.19 Provide Staff Services

T&OE GP-14 Production System Optimisation

EP.30 to 36 Facilitative processes

EP.34

Practices Worth Replicating

Support Processes

EP.35

Risk & Opportunity Management

T&OE GP-24 Project Execution Reviews

EP.36

Realise the Limit

T&OE GP -15 HC Production Information Management

Facilitative Processes

T&OE GP-23 Practices Worth Replicating

T&O GPE-20 Risk Management

Figure 2, EPBM v 4 Alignment of Global Processes

1.7. Well Boundaries The local Well Integrity Management System shall define the well boundaries that specifically impact on the responsibilities for managing WI (e.g. upstream or downstream of the choke flange; upstream or downstream of X-mass tree in subsea wells).

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Organisation and Responsibilities

2.1. Well Integrity Lifecycle RACI Chart

Production Technology

WI Technical Authority

AR

C

R

I

2

Well Functional Specifications

WDP 7 to 9

AR

C

R

I

3

Detailed Well Design

WDP 11

C

AR

R

C

I

4

Construct / service well

WDP 15 & 16

C

AR

R

C

I

5

Calculate and set annulus MAASPs

AR

I

6

Prepare Handover Documents

7

Sign-off Handover document

8

Calculate MAWOP

9

Monitor Well & Annuli

AR

Production

WDP 3 to 6

Well Services

Well Engineering

Well Charter

Activity

Subsea

Development

1

WIMM Step No

WDP Step No

The local Well Integrity Management System shall provide clarity over accountability and responsibilities for each activity falling under lifecycle well integrity management. The RACI chart below provides a high level overview of the WIMM steps, and their alignment with the Well Delivery Process (WDP) steps and across disciplines.

i

R WDP 18

C

AR

R

I

I

C

R

R

A

C

I C

I

I R

WDP 19

C

AR

AR

C

10

Manage Annulus Pressure

R

C

AR

C

11

Carry-out Well maintenance (preventative & corrective)

R

R

AR

C

C

12

Carry out annulus investigation

C

R

A

C

13

Carry out MAASP / MAWOP re-calculation

R

C

A

C

14

Carry out Technical Review

C

C

AR

C

15

Monitor Asset Compliance with WIMM requirements

C

C

A

16

Review, maintain and update process

17

Well Abandonment

WDP 7 to 18

C

I

I

I

I

I

AR

C

R

R

A

C

C

Table 1, Well Integrity Lifecycle RACI Chart RACI Legend Code

Title

What the title means

R

Responsible

Responsible party, i.e., does it or gets it done. Controls the quality of the deliverable or task.

A

Accountable

Is accountable for the activity to take place. May formally accept or reject the deliverable. Should be consulted by Responsible party for guidance.

C

Consult

Contributing party, i.e., must be involved in the creation of the deliverable or execution of the task.

I

Inform

Informed party. Receives copy of the deliverable or completion notification for the task.

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2.2. Activities and Responsibilities The activities listed in the RACI chart (table 1) are described in the sections below. 2.2.1. Activities breakdown WIMM Step 1. Well Charter The Well Charter should provide clarity of purpose for the well objectives and deliverables, and in addition identify the well functionalities that may be desirable from a Production perspective, with due regard to life-cycle well integrity management. WIMM Step 2. Well Functional Specifications The purpose of the Well Functional Specifications is to capture a comprehensive set of data and requirements to enable Wells to proceed with the detailed well design. It also summarizes the long-term objectives of the well (e.g. a producer, injector or observation well) and provides input to the detailed well design process with key hydrocarbon characteristics and selected Critical Success Factors. Its compilation should be a joint effort of the Development, Production Technology and Wells organisations. WIMM Step 3. Detailed Well Design Detailed well design work is performed by Well Engineering in consultation with Production Technology and in compliance with the Shell Group guidelines. Subsea wells will also involve participation of the Subsea Engineering group. Well Integrity issues that will be addressed include (but are not limited to): Structural capacity of surface casing (and where applicable the conductor) to support all axial loads imparted by suspended internal casing & tubing strings, wellheads, BOP loads and operational loads, etc Structural capacity to withstand dynamic loading, torque and bending moments Compliance with Shell’s Casing & Tubing Design Guide. Casing & Tubing thread selection, including integrity envelope, qualification testing, etc Determination of life cycle erosion and corrosion Metallurgy of completion (production casing, tubing, etc) Life cycle integrity of well bore seals (liner hanger, wellhead, Xmas tree, packer operating envelope, etc) Zonal isolation capacity of cement Life cycle Barrier Philosophy compliance Capacity to plug and abandon the well in accordance with Group Guidelines. WIMM Step 4. Construct / Service well Well Engineering is the ultimate accountable party during the well construction activities, and the authority with regards to WI assurance during this phase. EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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Subsea wells will involve Subsea Engineering during construction. Well servicing activities are to be seen as a pause in the operate phase of the well, during which the well is handed over to Well Services for a specific operation. During that operation, Well Services is the ultimate accountable party, and the authority for well integrity assurance. Consultation is however required with Production Technology who oversees lifecycle aspects of the well. WIMM Step 5. Calculate and set annulus MAASPs The MAASPs constitute the core of the integrity envelope and are set at the time of handover. For more details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7. WIMM Step 6. Prepare Handover Documents The handover of wells to the Asset should be formalised through a process that outlines the expectations for information to be handed over together with the physical well asset. Wells organization is responsible for collating that information. WIMM Step 7. Sign-off Handover Document The local Well Integrity Management System should provide clarity of expectations regarding the sign-off of the handover document for both the Development / Wells and Asset / Production organizations. WIMM Step 8. Calculate MAWOP The MAWOPs are calculated by Production Technology (derived from the MAASP) and constitute the core of the operating envelope for the well. For more details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7. WIMM Step 9. Monitor well and annuli The well status condition (in particular the annulus pressure and annulus fluid levels) is monitored by Production Operations. For subsea wells, this activity will involve Subsea Surveillance. The local well integrity management system shall outline a requirement for this data to be reviewed at regular intervals. This is for confirmation that integrity remains intact, is safeguarded and that the well can continue in operation. For more details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7. WIMM Step 10. Manage Annulus Pressure Production Operations is accountable for the management of annular pressure. For subsea wells, this activity will involve Subsea Surveillance. For more details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7. WIMM Step 11.Carry-out well maintenance (preventative and corrective) The Asset (Production Operations) has accountability for preventative and corrective well maintenance to be carried out (this excludes well intervention for which WS is accountable – Ref. Step 4). The responsibility is shared with Well Services and with Subsea Surveillance for subsea wells. The local well integrity management system should provide clarity over what tasks are to be carried out by each organisation.

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WIMM Step 12. Carry-out annulus investigation Production Technology is accountable for this activity, as custodian of the well integrity envelope. Consultation is required with the Technical Authority. The local well integrity management system should provide clarity over the appropriate triggers for annulus investigation. WIMM Step 13. Carry-out MAASP/MAWOP recalculation Production Technology is accountable for this activity, as custodian of the well integrity envelope. Those changes must be administered through the MOC process. For more details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7. WIMM Step 14. Carry-out technical review Production Technology is accountable for technical reviews, as custodian of the well integrity envelope. This entails assessing whether or not identified anomalies are acceptable, require repair or require a change to the well’s allowable pressure operating envelope. Any change to the well’s operating envelope must be done through the MOC process. WIMM Step 15. Monitor Asset Compliance with WIMM requirements The Well Integrity Technical Authority is accountable for monitoring Assets compliance with the WIMM requirements as part of the Well Integrity Assurance process. This activity is supported by the generation and reporting of well integrity KPI’s for each Asset. WIMM Step 16. Review, maintain and update process The Well Integrity Technical Authority provides lifecycle oversight of the well integrity process. As such, he is the custodian of the local well integrity management system and is accountable for its review and update. WIMM Step 17. Well Abandonment Wells will be abandoned with due consideration given to the lifetime integrity requirement to provide permanent barriers in the well. Such permanent barriers will prevent cross flow between formations and prevent flow to surface. Consideration shall also be given to the long-term consequence of any materials (wellheads, drill cuttings, etc) left on or above the seabed (offshore wells), in addition to the potential for degradation of any material used in the abandonment process. 2.2.2. Responsibilities for WIMM process execution Proper execution of the well integrity management process (i.e. day to day) entails the co-ordination of a number of well integrity activities at Asset level, including the reporting of integrity issues. Those responsibilities may be filled from a number of disciplines or positions, but could also be consolidated into one position. The local well integrity management system shall provide clarity as to how the responsibilities for process execution are allocated. That includes carrying out the following generic tasks.

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Create / gain approval for OU specific Well failure Model (WFM) with TA support Create / gain approval for safety critical tasks associated with WIT & SIT for agreed local well types Develop / schedule & maintain SAP / Maintenance Management System (MMS) tasks (e.g. eWIMS checklists). Implement / operate database (e.g. eWIMS) for all wells assigned to a particular asset area - collate and validate well integrity data in database and MMS (e.g. SAP) Co-ordinate / lead Technical Reviews / QRAs etc associated with well changes / failures specifically highlighted with the potential to impact well integrity Create annulus investigation programmes and review results Analyse well integrity test results, ensure WFM action codes are correctly assigned and follow up on mitigating action with responsible parties Ensure effective well operating envelope data handover between Well Engineering and Operations Create / input to WI part of well proposals where intervention for repair is required Manage process for scheduled changes in MMS of WIT / SIT Creation and management of budgets for WI maintenance as required by owner Report KPI’s as required 2.2.3. Specific Role of the Technical Authority Each Region/OU shall have a Well Integrity Technical Authority, in line with the Technical Authorities framework. The responsibilities of the Well Integrity TA include: Provide technical decisions in determining how to manage wells whose integrity has been compromised Document and manage the process by which well integrity is defined and safeguarded over the well lifecycle Develop well integrity policies and guidelines Oversee the Well Handover Process. Provide the assurance role for barrier check The local well integrity management system shall identify corresponding job descriptions to meet the role description given above.

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Well Integrity Management Process Description

3.1. Well Integrity Management Map The Appendix 1 maps the relationships between key Local and Global processes, controls and documents. The relationships are explained in more detail in the subsequent chapters.

3.2. Process Deliverables This section describes what each WI lifecycle phase has been designed to deliver

DESIGN It has to be ensured that WI risks have been taken into account whilst designing the well to ensure the delivered well has integrity throughout its anticipated lifecycle.

CONSTRUCT It has to be ensured that the well has been constructed as per functional specifications and design intent and that variations from design intent have been verified to maintain integrity assurance.

OPERATE It has to be ensured that the well is operated within its defined operating envelope and that any variances are dealt with in line with the Performance Standard / WFM.

MAINTAIN It has to be ensured that all assurance tasks (preventative) are carried out within defined frequencies and that any failures (corrective) are dealt with in line with WFM requirements.

SUSPEND It has to be ensured that all assurance tasks are still conducted in accordance with WFM codes and definitions (which may include decreased testing / monitoring frequencies)

ABANDON It has to be ensured that the well has been abandoned as per design intent, and that there is confirmation through post abandonment assurance task to provide integrity assurance.

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Data Management

4.1. Principles It is important that the information used to assess the status of well integrity be collected and interpreted correctly to reduce the risk of loss of integrity. Operational guidelines and this WIMM document address the data required and the interpretation that is necessary. Achieving well integrity requires integrity at all stages, starting with data acquisition. This requires all measurement gauges shall be calibrated and of appropriate type, scale and accuracy for the measurement required, as a basic pre-requisite. Data shall be collected, whether electronically or manually, in a consistent manner. Whilst manual data gathering systems based, for example, on electronic files and spreadsheets, can be acceptable, they become less effective as the volume of data grows and may also suffer from security problems. Where practical, it is preferred to use dedicated software such as the eWIMS tool that has been developed by SIEP specifically for the lifecycle management of well integrity data.

4.2. Monitoring and Tracking It is recommended to implement a tool (preferably eWIMS) with the functionality to manage well integrity data throughout the well lifecycle, while interfacing other data management tools for: Maintenance scheduling – SAP or other MMS Deviation management - FSR Well mechanical status - DIMS / EDM / OpenWells Production data – EPROMS / Energy Components Working together, as illustrated in the diagram below, the tools provide reporting capabilities and trend analysis during monitoring. The eWIMS software tool (and the associated checklists / processes, and user guide) is recommended by SIEP to allow Shell Global Regions to manage (either manually or automatically) the WI process using a common system of tools throughout the well lifecycle (Design, Construct, Operate, Intervene & Abandon). eWIMS also enables the retrieval of statistical well integrity data, such as the number of wells with overdue integrity monitoring or testing activities and the number of wells operating under dispensation etc. Where eWIMS is not used, an alternative WI Management tool should mirror the same capability (utilizing similar processes, forms and checklists).

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SAP

Maint scheduling

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SCE Status/Deviations

Automatic Update

eWIMS

Testing & Maintenance Results

EDM OpenWells

Well Integrity Management System

Logic Loop

Construction Data

PI / EC

Production Data

WFM

Well Failure Severity Action Code Required

Figure 2, eWIMS and interfaces

4.3. Well Status Traffic Lights The well integrity tracking tool uses three colours to annotate all wells. Satisfactory (Green)

All monitoring and testing requirements have been fulfilled within test criteria.

Unsatisfactory (Amber)

Failures have occurred where time based Actions are required.

Immediate (Red)

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Action Failures have occurred that require immediate action, or scheduled WIT or SIT testing has not been carried out.

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Well Failure Model (WFM)

The Well Failure Model (WFM) is a risk-based matrix that has been developed to clearly define cause and effects of failure types in wells on one single matrix. Its purpose is to demonstrate that all of the possible well failure modes have been identified and that each one has a suitable strategy in place for both monitoring and preventative maintenance, such that well technical integrity is safeguarded. The WFM should be at the centre of the local well integrity management system as it clearly defines the ‘rules’ (the rules are codes and definitions) to be followed and the key cause and effect criteria for programming of the tracking tool (e.g. eWIMS or equivalent). WFM creation and approval required input from the local experts in the PT, Operations and Well Engineering / Services communities. The following describes each part of the model: Well Types The naming convention and the number of well types are derived from agreeing the minimum number of well types that will allow appropriate testing requirements and resultant actions upon discovery of an integrity issue. Well Failure Modes & Codes Local decisions must be made on the level of failure mode detail to be used. Descriptions of reasoning are covered as cell notes on the spreadsheet that can be seen when viewing the model electronically. Monitoring and Maintenance Frequencies Assurance task frequencies should be based on “Best Engineering Experience and Practices” and be refined to reflect experience and failure rate data. Those frequencies must be aligned with regulatory requirements wherever applicable. Action Codes These are set globally to ensure consistency of meaning and cannot therefore be changed locally. They are placed in ascending order of importance and risk - e.g. a failure type 1 can be planned as low priority, whereas a 9 or 10 must be dealt with immediately. Guidance Notes Guidance notes provide a more detailed explanation to allow the user to plan the correct course of action and are based on the local Well Integrity Management System and applicable legislation. For an example of Well Failure model, refer to Appendix 2.

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Well Integrity Assurance

6.1. SCE Definition Safety Critical Elements (Reference DEP 80.80.00.15 EPE) are integrity barriers, including equipment, hardware, and related control systems, of which the failure could lead to a Major Accident or Event or mitigate the consequences of a Major Accident or Event. The Appendix 3 captures the elements defined as safety critical for wells.

6.2. SCE Performance Standards Performance Standards (PS) describe the minimum functional specification for a SCE. A Performance Standard is a statement, which can be expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of the performance required of a system, item of equipment, person or procedure, and which is used as the basis for managing the hazard (e.g. planning, measuring, control or audit) through the life cycle of the installation. The PS for wells in an OU is owned and developed by the Technical Authority. Performance Standards for wells follow up actions from failures that have been defined in the local WFM. 6.2.1. PS Assurance Task (WIT, SIT) Two tasks have been designed to provide assurance that a SCE operates as defined in the Performance Standard. The Testing Matrix in the local WFM is used to define what activities form part of these tasks split by well type. The frequency of testing should be set by well type which takes account of design and location / associated risks. Testing frequency shall be based on Reliability Based Inspection RBI principles where data is available or otherwise defined by local legislation. Where neither exist, frequencies shall be set based on best practices. Tests shall be scheduled using the local maintenance management system and results captured in eWIMS or the locally developed tracking tool. The two preventative Performance Standard assurance tasks are:Well Integrity Test (WIT) – assesses the performance of the well surface components (including the SSSV and maintainable items). Sub-Surface Integrity Test (SIT) – assesses the performance of annular well components and maintainable items. Test failure results shall be applied to local WFM codes and definitions (this application is an automatic step for eWIMS users).

6.3. Well Barriers 6.3.1. General Well barriers are envelopes of one or several dependent physical elements preventing fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation, into another formation EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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or to surface (as such they are not to be confused with the ‘Safety Risk Barriers’ – see Appendix 5). The following guidance for well barriers is consistent with EP2002-1500 (Pressure Control Manual for Drilling and Workover Operations): Two independent and tested barriers shall be available during all well activities to prevent an uncontrolled outflow from the borehole or well to the external environment (i.e. at surface or seabed); Note: One barrier may be acceptable in the case where the reservoir cannot produce to the environment without prior pressure boosting. One well barrier shall be in place during all well activities where a pressure differential exists that may cause an uncontrolled crossflow in the wellbore between permeable zones (i.e. subsurface or below seabed); If a well barrier fails then activities in the well shall be directed solely towards restoring the barrier. For Producing wells, the concept of the two barriers will generally be applied in reference to Hydrocarbon zones, i.e. 2 barriers between hydrocarbon (HC) zone and surface. During that “operation” phase of the well, annular pressures have to be monitored and controlled such that these barriers are not endangered as a result of annular pressures (see also section 7) 6.3.2. Well barrier schematics It is recommended that well barrier schematics are developed for all operational wells as a practical method to demonstrate and illustrate the presence of the defined primary and secondary well barriers in the well. See Appendix 4 for an example of well barrier schematic.

6.4. Leak Criteria There shall be no leaks to the environment from the wellhead, tree, valve and instrument connections as confirmed by visual Inspection. 6.4.1. Industry standard for leaks within the well system - API leak rate The petroleum industry has only one leak rate defined in API Recommended Practice 14B Design, Installation, Repair and Operation of Subsurface Safety Valve Systems, 5 th Edition, October 2005 (ISO10417 of 2004), the maximum leak rate for SCSSSV’s. It is a function of manageable risk for safety and environment in the event of an uncontrolled outflow of hydrocarbon well effluents. This leak rate has been the basis for API RP90 (Annular Casing Pressure Management for Offshore Wells).

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6.4.2. Application of API Recommended Practice 14B (5 th Edition:2005) The leak rate of any component of the well i.e. SCSSSV, tree valves or tubing or shall not exceed the API RP14 B specified leak rate of 0.43m 3 / min (15scf / min) gas or 400 cm 3 / min (13.5 oz / min). An exception may be made for water injection wells in the case where it has been determined that there is no potential for hydrocarbon flowback. No leaks are allowed on internal seals like P seals, hanger neck seals, control lines or wellhead feed-through conduits. No leak is allowed from the production casing unless the next casing is capable of sustaining closed-in wellhead pressure. This next casing then should not be allowed to leak 6.4.3. Leak rates and Well Failure Model: The local WFM shall provide a guideline on allowable leak rates based on API RP14B, local wells standards and any legislative requirements. Pressure build-up rather then flow maybe measured, where this makes it easier to assess whether a leak is allowable or not. This trigger pressure should be specified in the WFM and eWIMS or equivalent. For further detail about leak criteria and calculation methods, refer to the document below. Well Integrity Guide

6.5. Corrosion Management 6.5.1. Production String Corrosion can be managed by: Fail to produce philosophy (i.e. repair when tubing has failed), with option to monitor corrosion rate (i.e. predict failure). Maintain condition with inhibitor injection, control corrosion and monitor corrosion rate or inhibitor availability (i.e. predict failure). Select material in design stage suitable for operating envelope of well conditions (Reference DEP 39.01.10.11 - General for material selection). The Operating Philosophy, supporting any of these cases, should specify how the integrity of tubing is to be managed. Tubing or Casing that is identified to have excessive wall loss shall be highlighted as an integrity threat. The appropriate controls, mitigations and remediation should then be implemented 6.5.2. Conductors and Casing In offshore wells and onshore locations where conductor and external casing corrosion is an identified significant risk, particularly for long-life wells, the well should be EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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protected with an appropriately designed method of corrosion prevention. Methods that are commonly used are; cathodic protection, epoxy coatings, pre-cemented casings and grouting-off conductors, inhibitor treatment. This type of failure has not been addressed in the Wells Failure Model but Local Companies shall have Standards and Procedures in alignment with casing design guidelines to ensure that surface casings and conductors are adequately designed, existing wells are monitored, and remedial action are taken if necessary to prevent collapse. Well Integrity Guide

6.6. Wellhead and Xmas Trees 6.6.1. Design and Materials Wellhead and Xmas Tree design and material selection shall comply with Surface and Subsea Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment Global Functional Specification EP2006-5283. 6.6.2. Maintain All well safety critical components can only be replaced / repaired with original equipment manufacturer (OEM) components or components that are manufactured by others to same standard supported by OEM’s QA / QC process. In event that components are obsolete / no longer patented alternatives shall be subject to an approved QA / QC process equivalent to OEM standard or better. Reference Appendix 6 – Use of spare parts based on Shell EP Well Services Position Paper for Wellheads and Xmas Trees – Use of OEM Spare Parts

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Annulus Pressure Management

7.1. Principles The principle of Annulus Pressure Management revolves around the fact that a well is in effect made up of pressure vessels (completion and inner annuli) within other pressure vessels (outer annuli) and that each pressure vessel must be managed within operational limits. A small positive pressure should generally be maintained in each annulus with a small DP between annulus strings in order to provide ongoing assurance of annular integrity as any pressure drop or rise or equalization between annuli is then obvious to the extent that investigation action can be requested. EP Annular Pressure management is consistent with the principles that the industry standard API RP90 is built upon.

7.2. Types of annular pressures 7.2.1. Thermal Pressure (TP) Wells with fluid filled enclosed annuli will exhibit thermal pressure changes during warm-up and cool down periods. It is important to recognize this fact and to monitor annulus pressure closely during start up of new wells. Pressure should not be bled off in this instance unless MAWOP is breached (see section 7.4). It is vital to monitor annulus pressure closely during initial start up of new wells as pressure can build up rapidly and result in over-pressurised annuli. 7.2.2. Applied Pressure (AP) Pressure may be applied on an annulus for various purposes, including gaslift, compensating for bullheading loads or to assist in annulus monitoring. This pressure may also come from pressure containment tests as part of preventative SIT activities. Care must be taken to ensure this pressure is bled down after testing to a suitable value to ensure that thermal pressure does not result in MAWOP being breached. 7.2.3. Sustained Casing Pressure (SCP) This pressure comes from a pressure source such as reservoir, adjacent annulus etc and shall be investigated using the eWIMS (or equivalent local WI tool) internal process whenever suspected or where observed pressure cannot be proven to be either AP or TP.

7.3. Calculation of MAASP MAASP is the absolute maximum pressure for a given annulus that shall not be exceeded at any time, since it represents the integrity limit for that annulus. The initial MAASP is calculated at the time of the well handover. The Production Technologist of the Asset is the custodian of the MAASP, and accountable for keeping it updated to reflect possible changes during the well life. These later updates of the EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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MAASP may require the involvement of Well Engineering, and shall be controlled under the Management of Change (MOC) process. Further guidance is given in the MAASP calculation guide, part of the WIG. Well Integrity Guide

7.4. Setting of MAWOP (Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating Pressure) As defined in API-RP90 (draft-K), the Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating Pressure (MAWOP) is a measure of how much pressure can be safely applied to an annulus on a sustained basis. The MAWOP is measured relative to the ambient pressure at the wellhead for any particular annulus. It establishes a safety margin when considering the ultimate integrity limit for a given annulus, as indicated by the MAASP. The setting of the MAWOP is based on the following rationale: It is necessary to maintain a sizable margin between the MAWOP and the MAASP, in order to allow for reaction time (i.e. assessment of the situation then intervention) in the event that the MAWOP would be exceeded. Since the MAWOP may be applied to the annulus on a sustained basis, it is important to assure that a possible leak to the next outer annulus would not compromise the integrity of that next annulus. Further guidance for the setting of the MAWOP is given in the Well Integrity Guide (WIG). Note: It is recommended as a best practice to take formation strength tests at casing shoes (Reference Casing and Tubing Design Guide - Appendix 8). In those cases where the formation strength test was not taken and as a result there is uncertainty in the value (and in the impact on the MAASP), the MAWOP may be set by defaulting to the API-RP90 calculations.

7.5. Special provision for the ‘A’ Annulus MAWOP The setting of the MAWOP for the ‘A’ annulus is solely based on the MAASP of the ‘A’ annulus itself, and does not take into account the MAASP of the next outer annulus (‘B’ annulus), based on the provision that the production casing is confirmed to be leak tight. Should the production casing develop a leak (confirmed communication between the A and B annuli), then the A annulus MAWOP should be adjusted to account for the MAASP of the B annulus.

7.6. ‘A’ Annulus MINAP (gaslifted wells) Because gaslifted wells do not have a liquid column inside the ‘A’ annulus, the risk may exist that the production casing collapses with insufficient applied pressure on the ‘A’ annulus. It is therefore worth considering the effect of the artificial lift being partially or completely bled off (with or without an annular safety valve). This may generate high burst loads on the tubing during a production shut-in case, or high collapse loads on the production casing. Such cases result in the setting of a Minimum Annular Pressure (MINAP) for the ‘A’ annulus of those wells. EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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Further guidance on calculating the ‘A’ annulus MINAP is given in the MAASP calculation guide, part of the WIG. Well Integrity Guide

7.7. Management and Control The management and control of annular pressures is schematically represented in flow diagrams contained in the document below. In these flow diagrams, clear differentiation has been made between start-up and late-life conditions and also between the ‘A’ annulus and the outer annuli. Well Integrity Guide 7.7.1. Monitoring All annulus pressures of producing, injecting and observation wells are to be observed and recorded at regular intervals. For wells where there are no pressure transmitters connected to the DCS or DACA system installed, the minimum frequency shall be set in the local WFM. Critical wells should be equipped with remote monitoring. 7.7.2. Reporting Field Production Operations is responsible for monitoring of annuli, data collection and registration. All recorded pressures (incl. bleed-off data) are to be stored in a database (e.g. eWIMS). Wherever applicable, the reporting of Annuli Pressures and bleed-off data should comply with local regulatory requirements. 7.7.3. Reaching High Pressure Alarm (HPA) values Timely alarm in case of pressure build-up should ensure that pressures are bled-off in time. The HPA should be set at the MAWOP or lower. When the annulus pressure reaches the HPA, an assessment should be made as to whether the pressure is thermally induced or sustained from a leak or influx. The pressure is then to be bled down to below the MAWOP. It is not advisable to bleed down the pressure to zero. The rationale for this is to limit bleed-offs to a minimum and comes from the fact that bleeding-off annular pressures may exacerbate the problem (i.e. increasing influx of low-density fluids into the annulus from the formation and subsequent gravity inversion of fluids). In the event of sustained annular pressure, operating the well at less than 50% of MAWOP is considered good practice (i.e. in the lower half pressure band but above zero – see figure 3). 7.7.4. Preventing MAASP values from being breached Field Production Operations is responsible to ensure that the MAASP is not breached. The local Well Integrity Assurance Procedure (WIAP) should include guidance to Operations staff for responding to situations where timely intervention to bleed down the annulus at HPA level was not possible and as a consequence, the MAASP value is close to being reached. In such case the Operations staff should bleed down and EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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control the pressure in accordance with the WIAP, until an assessment has been done to determine the next course of action. 7.7.5. Problem well identification The local WIMS should include criteria to identify and report wells that are required to be blown down frequently, in order to avoid an annular pressure higher than the HPA. This report should include a description of the possible cause, seriousness, history and anticipated problem resolution. The purpose of this reporting is to carry out a risk assessment. The outcome of the risk assessment could be the development of specific annular pressure management procedures for those wells (i.e. through the MOC process). The following diagram outlines the relationship between MAASP, MAWOP, trigger (HPA) and working pressures:

Annulus Triggers & Working Pressure MAASP MAWOP 50% of MAWOP

Trigger

Watch Out !

Working Pressures Watch Out !

Zero Figure 3, Annular Triggers & Working Pressures

7.8. Revisiting MAWOP values Frequent HPA alarms, in particular when cold wells are started up, can be a reason to revisit the original MAWOP settings. No standard procedure can be given as each well has to be evaluated individually on its own merit. Issues to be considered in this context include: Age of the well and well history Casing / liner (material type, connection type, corrosion, wear etc.) Height of cement column

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Changes to MAASP and MAWOP settings need to be correctly and systematically documented through the MOC process. 7.8.1. Cases of thermal pressure effects In such cases, the MAASP and MAWOP may be increased by focusing the assessment on those barriers whose load is not compensated on the other side. For example, if the ‘B’ annulus of a subsea well is sealed-off, the same thermal effects that induce pressure on the ‘A’ annulus may also induce pressure on the ‘B’ annulus. As a consequence, this effect should be taken into account when re-establishing the ‘A’ annulus MAASP. 7.8.2. Other Annular Pressure cases In cases where the annular pressure increases are not caused by thermal effects, then a formal investigation and a resultant plan of action are required. Refer to the flow diagrams in the WIG for further guidance. Well Integrity Guide

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Performance Management

8.1. Key Performance Indicators Each OU shall track WI performance (KPIs etc) on an Asset basis and prepare reports and trends. The KPIs shall be based on adherence to WFM assurance tasks and repair limit requirements. The following minimum tracking of KPIs shall be reported: Preventative Maintenance (PM) and Corrective Maintenance (CM) compliance shall be the main measures tracked, (i.e. carrying out the required assurance tasks and follow-up repairs within the schedule defined). In addition, the numbers of Deviations shall be tracked to ensure that instances of operation outside the Standards are highlighted, managed effectively and areas for improvement are identified. Local OUs should define their own additional KPIs by making optimum use of the tracking and reporting capabilities of their Well Integrity tool (e.g. eWIMS), through data mining / download facilities. FSR will provide the ability to track “Red” items greater than a 7-day timeline as an overriding measure of WI.

8.2. Performance Improvement Each OU shall have a mechanism where continuous improvement can be demonstrated. eWIMS can provide this requirement. Continued improvement of WI performance requires constant feedback from the operational phase of the well lifecycle back to the well design phase. Across the Group, the sharing of best practice is recommended and will assist OUs to gain benefit from operating experiences.

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Well Integrity Lifecycle Map

Microsoft Word Document

Appendix 2 -

Example Well Failure Model

Microsoft Excel Worksheet

Appendix 3 -

Safety Critical Elements

Microsoft Excel Worksheet

Appendix 4 -

Example Well Barrier Schematic

Microsoft Excel Worksheet

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Safety Risk Barriers & SCE Groups

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Wellheads and Xmas Trees – Use of OEM Spare Parts

A Well Services Position Paper has been prepared to provide a clear understanding of Shell Well Services position with respect to the use of the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturers') spare parts. F1 -

F2 -

This need is driven by five (5) main concerns: 1.

Use of non-OEM spare parts does not conform with Well Services' policy of compliance with ISO 10423.

2.

OEMs are not prepared to fully warrant their equipment if non OEM spare parts are included, or if remanufacture is undertaken without full OEM involvement.

3.

The potential for negative impact on Shell's reputation in equipment failure attributed to non-OEM design or workmanship.

4.

Common standards of equipment integrity and performance will be assured by the use of OEM spare parts.

5.

Divergence between the latest editions of API Specification 6A and ISO 10423 in respect of remanufacture has weakened the internationally agreed technical structure for life cycle integrity of Wellheads, Christmas Trees and ancillary equipment.

The following Procurement Strategy should be implemented in order to ensure the proper application of ISO 10423. The various spare parts that could be supplied have been grouped into four (4) category Types 1, 2, 3 & 4. The definitions of these Types, the associated procurement strategy recommendations and the associated justifications are as follows: Type 1 Parts: Definition:

OEM owns design and controls manufacturing methods.

Examples:

Valve Blocks, Gate Valves & Custom Flanges.

Recommendation: Purchase from OEM - without exception. Justification:

ISO 10423 Section 5.2.2 Metallic Requirements & impact on OEM Type Approval.

Type 2 Parts: Definition:

OEM owns specification - detailed design & manufacturing by others.

Examples:

'O' Rings, Soft Seals, Small Bore Valves, & Injection Stingers.

Recommendation:

Purchase from OEM - unless written agreement with OEM that should Shell procure from the OEM's supplier, then the OEM will provide the latest design.

Justification:

ISO 10423 Section 5.2.2 Metallic Requirements & impact on OEM Type Approval.

Type 3 Parts: Definition: EP200610207566 Custodian ECCN

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Examples:

Standard API Flanges, ANSI Fasteners & BX Gaskets

Recommendation:

Purchase from OEM unless OEM provides controlled Bills of Materials, Assembly Drawings & Maintenance Procedures and there are independent Quality checks to confirm that OEM's standards are met.

Justification:

ISO 10423

Type 4 Parts: Definition:

OEM sets acceptance criteria based on knowledge of design.

Examples:

Re-manufacture, re-work, welds, repairs.

Recommendation:

Purchase from OEM – unless: (i) Written agreement with OEM that should Shell procure then the OEM will provide the latest design, specification and acceptance criteria and, (ii) Company undertaking work can provide a full equipment warranty.

Justification:

F3 -

ISO 10423 Annex J & impact on OEM Type Approval

The Supplier shall provide at Company well site, all necessary spares and replacement parts within 30 days of any failure of their equipment. Where Supplier cannot provide and manage all necessary replacement parts as detailed within Global Scope of Work, Supplier shall provide Company all necessary technical information to enable Company to contract to 3rd Party to manufacture and assure replacement parts.

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Abbreviations and definitions

TIF: WIMM eWIMS SAP: FSR: WFM EDM/Open Wells: Eproms / Energy component: PACER / Cirrus: MAASP: MAWOP:

SCE: PS: WIT: SIT: MMS HPA MOC

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Technical Integrity Framework Global Well Integrity Management Manual. Group approved WI software tool to manage lifecycle well integrity. Commonly used maintenance management (and accounting) tool that schedules routine assurance tasks and mitigating actions. Facility Status Report software tool. Reports SCE status through a traffic light system and manages deviations from WI standards in the WFM Well Failure Model. Risk-based matrix spreadsheet that has been developed to clearly define cause and effects of failure types in wells. Used to store well status diagrams and provide data to be used by WFM to determine the well risk profile. Uploads production information, including annuli pressures to eWIMS Provides corrosion data that might affect the as built Operating Envelope Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure. Is the actual annulus pressure integrity limit based on the as built well Maximum Allowable Well Operating Pressure. Is the set annulus operating pressure limit that can be applied on a sustainable basis. The MAWOP is always lower then the MAASP. Safety Critical Elements Performance Standards describe the minimum functional specification for SCEs and are used as the basis of verification throughout the lifecycle of the well. Well Integrity Test Sub-surface Integrity Tests Maintenance Management System High Pressure Alarm Management Of Change process

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Reference

Title Safety Critical Element DEP EPBM Version 4 Technical Integrity Framework (TIF) Well Integrity Guide (WIG) Global Deviation Process Global MOC process Pressure Control Manual for Drilling and Workover Operations General for material selection Surface and Subsea Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment Global Functional Specification Design, Installation, Repair and Operation of Subsurface Safety Valve Systems, 5th Edition, October 2005 Testing of Thread Compound for Rotary Shouldered Connections Annular Casing Pressure Management for Offshore Wells

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Document no 80.80.00.15 EPE EP200509205865

EP2002-1500 DEP 39.01.10.11 EP2006-5283 API-14B / ISO10417 of 2004 API 7A API RP90

For Servicing the well activities, Well Services is the accountable party during WIMM step 4.

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