Waley 1954 - 'Combined Operations' in Sicily, A.D. 1060-78 (1).pdf

'Combined Operations' in Sicily, A.D. 1060-78 Author(s): D. P. Waley Source: Papers of the British School at Rome, Vol. 22 (1954), pp. 118-125 Published by: British School at Rome Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40310517 . Accessed: 07/11/2014 15:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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'COMBINED OPERATIONS' IN SICILY, a.d. 1060-78 1 A recently published inthe ofnavalpowerandtradein theMediterranean history 2 of thatvitalbut little-explored earlymedievalperiod providesa reminder changein the balanceof maritimepowerwhichprecededthe Crusadesand of the movement whichwonbackfortheChristians of theWest,Sardinia,Sicily,andMalta,threatened theshoresofAfricaand Albania,and wasbotha rehearsal and an essential preliminary forthegreatDrangnachOstenwhichwas to follow. Littleis knownof theshipping usedin theseoperations or of thetacticsemployed, but an attempthas beenmadeto the sources for the Norman in the earlystagesof naval investigate scanty operations theirconquestof southern not because someof theseoperaand Italy Sicily, merely in theirimmediate tionswereimportant results,but also as an exampleof thenaval in southernEurope. The techniqueof the Latin Christianmilitarycommanders derives from it their additional interest the affords ofVikingsfinding subject spectacle after in It as decades farmers and sea-legsagain many cavalrymen Normandy. also offers one explanation forthe conquestof the considerable areaof southern Italyand a small and and once the eclecticism demonstrates force, Sicilyby comparatively again the of Normans. adaptability theirpositionon themainlandof By 1060 theNormanshad begunto consolidate southern Over of in 1059 and had culminated warfare Italy. fortyyears brigandage in Pope NicholasII's investiture of RobertGuiscardde Hautevilleas Duke ofApulia, Calabria,andSicily,andofRichardofAversaas PrinceofCapua. 1060sawGuiscard's he began conquestof Reggio,and althoughhis positionin Apuliawas stillinsecure, for the of invasion preparations Sicily. The operations withwhichthispaperis concerned extendfromthefirst raidon the of Messina from the Calabrian in 1060 the of thesiege mainland to abandonment port of Naplesin 1078. Up to 1076 thereappearsto be no reference of to theconstruction the but a the of fleet to that which sailed in Normans, shipsby description Trapani 3 thatnewshipshad beenbuiltfortheexpedition, and a fleetwas ceryear suggests tainlybuiltin theApulianportsfortheAlbanianlandingof 1081. AftertheNormans setup as ship-builders in theSoutha newsituation arose,andthislaterperiodhasbeen studiedby Cohnin hisbookon theNorman-Sicilian fleet.4 Withintheperiod1060-78 therewerefoursetsof operations Norman involving naval and militaryforces.The firstof thesecomprisedthe threelandingsin the of Messinain theyears1060-61, whichled up to thecaptureof that neighbourhood The of theselandingswas a reconnaissance first to the walls of Messina,the city. 1 This readto the paperis based on a communication CambridgeHistoricalSocietyin November1951.I am muchindebtedto Mr.T. C. Lethbridge forgivingmethe ofhis knowledgeof nauticalmatters. benefit 2 A. R. Naval Power and Trade in theMediterLewis, 5oo-iioo (Princeton, ranean^ N.J., 195 1). 8 G. Malaterra, [De Rebus GestisRogeriiCalabriaeet

SiciliaeComitis, ed. E. PontieriinRerumItalicarum Scriptores , n.s.,v, 1],p. 58. 4 W. derNormannisch-Si^ilischen Cohn,Die Geschichte Flotte(Breslau,1910).This book is uselessfortheperiod before1076,becauseCohn startsfromtheunsupported thatthe Normansmustfromthe starthave assumption builtall theshipstheyused.

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'COMBINED OPERATIONS' IN SICILY, a.d. 1060-78

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an assaulton Messina),and seconda raidin thenorth-eastern tip of Sicily(including attackon thecity. Sincethecaptureof a bridgehead thethirda directand successful theportandcityofMessina,wasthevitalstagein theeventual on theisland,including the of Sicily,and since theseoperations most nearlyresembled of whole conquest in the be at somelengthlater modern will considered 'combined sense, they operations' in thispaper. involvedco-operation betweenthe Normanarmyand fleet The otheroperations of troops,but not 'assault in sieges,as well as navalbattles,and the transportation most of and the tookplacebetween1068 first series The these, important, landings'. baseon theItalianmainand 107 1 andled up to thecaptureofBari,thelastByzantine encircledBari by sea and land, linkingthe ships land.5 The Normanscompletely someshipswereable nearesttheshoreto theland by meansof bridges;nevertheless, intoBaribyByzantine andgrainwassmuggled to breakoutandaskforreinforcements, fleetcompelledthegarrison Byzantine ships,but in 107 1 thedefeatof a big relieving in whichnineof thetwenty to submit.Apartfromthisdecisivesea-battle, Byzantine in one of vesselstakingpartweresunk,therewereseveralminornavalengagements, losttwelveships.6The secondofthegreatcombined whichtheByzantines siegeoperawasbegunas soonas thesiegeofBarihadbeentriumphantly tions,thatagainstPalermo, from concluded.Againa majorcity,whichhad alreadybeenassaultedunsuccessfully a this time within means of a from land and thelandalone,wascaptured sea, siege by in whichtheNormanfleet fewmonths.7At Palermotherewasonenavalengagement, MoslemfleetfromAfrica.In general, howthearrivalofa relieving failedto prevent the to have been main seems and starvation maintained the was ever, siege successfully, a from the land after the assaulted when was causeofthedefenders' city poorshowing a at the Normans had Thus Christmas within months. four some 1071 siegelasting of the two the months few capitals majorpowersopposingthem, captured provincial to The lastoperations andin eachcasesea powerhadplayeda bigpartin thevictory.8 9 in of Salerno in of and the are be considered 1076 Naples 1077-78; sieges amphibious the was with forces of naval in undertaken conjunction theformer, Amalfi, successful, thelatterseemsto havebeenabandoned. and natureof is theprovenance The majorproblempresented by theseoperations of the Normansthemselves the shipsused by the Normans.The possibility having builttheseshipscan be discounted.Thereis no reasonto supposethatthe Norman withthem,norarethereanyhaltsin theiroperations in Italyhad shipwrights knights further.More whichcan be explainedby the needto build shipsbeforeproceeding their own ships that built the Normans source not a suggests single conclusively, 6 The mainsourcesforthesiegeofBariare Malaterra, (readingaltosforalii). StoriadeiNormanni, 7 The mainsourcesforthesiegeof Palermoare Malapp. 48-51: Aimé[of Montecassino, la Storiaa1* inFontiper ed. V. De Bartholomaeis Italia],pp. terra,pp. 52-3: Aimé,pp. 275-82:andWilliamofApulia, 248-55; Williamof Apulia [Gesta RobertiWiscardiin pp.8269-72. The Normanshadalso capturedCataniaon theirway Mon. Germ.Hist.,SS., ix],pp. 263-8; and Lupus Protospatarius,[ed. L. A. Muratori,RerumItaL Script.,v], to Palermo,buttheonlyweaponemployedseemsto have beentreachery (F. Chalandon[Histoirede la Domination • £t .. •_ • J «1_• _ ^1_* • r£t enItalie\i, 206). in TjuupusT">_._ me passage uescruuugmis Normande rruiuspacanus 9 battleis obscure,but makessenseif it is read as multi Malaterra,pp. 58-9: Aimé,pp. 349, 354-^» 36