Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Gammad

November 23, 2017 | Author: JakeDanduan | Category: Damages, Negligence, Punitive Damages, Common Law, Crime & Justice
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VICTORY LINER, INC. vs. GAMMAD G.R. No. 159636 | November 25, 2004 FACTS: Marie Grace Gammad was a passenger of petitioner’s bus when it fell on a ravine, which resulted to her death. Hence, heirs of the deceased Marie Grace filed a case for damages against Victory Liner, Inc. for breach of contract of carriage. Rosalito Gammad, husband of deceased, completed his testimony and was scheduled for cross-examination. However, counsel of peritioner failed to appear even after a reschedule, and thus the court deemed the petitioner to have waived cross-examination. The petitioner’s counsel also failed to appear at the presentation of evidence. The court already deemed the case submitted for resolution when it received belatedly the telegram of petitioner’s counsel requesting for postponement. ISSUE: (1) Is the petitioner bound by the negligence of the counsel? (2) Is the petitioner liable for breach of contract of carriage? (3) Is the award of damages proper? RULING: (1) Yes. As a general rule, client is bound by negligence of counsel. Any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client. However, exceptions have been recognized by the court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, and accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence. The exceptions, however, are not present in this case. Petitioners claim that it was denied due process lacks basis. Petitioner too is not entirely blameless. (2) Petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of contract of carriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.

In the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proximate cause of Marie Grace’s death was the negligence of petitioner. Hence, the courts below correctly ruled that petitioner was guilty of breach of contract of carriage. (3) Nevertheless, the award of damages should be modified. Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206, holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2) indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral damages. In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to indemnity for the death of Marie Grace which under current jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.00. The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased’s earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Here, the award of compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity was based only on the testimony of respondent Rosalito. No other evidence was presented. The award is clearly erroneous because the deceased’s earnings does not fall within the exceptions. However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be awarded to respondents. Under Article 2224, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with exemplary damages because they are based on different jural foundations. These damages are different in nature and require separate determination. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of contractual obligations and, as in this case, when the act of breach of contract itself constitutes the tort that results in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a

passenger results from a breach of carriage. On the other hand, exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of example or correction for the public good may be recovered in contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Respondents in the instant case should be awarded moral damages to compensate for the grief caused by the death of the deceased resulting from the petitioner’s breach of contract of carriage. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the extraordinary diligence required for common carriers, it is presumed to have acted recklessly. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is proper. Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award respondents the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. For actual damages, only substantiated and proven expenses or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized. Hence, actual damages should be further reduced to P78,160.00, which was the amount supported by official receipts. Pursuant to Article 2208, attorney’s fees may also be recovered in the case at bar where exemplary damages are awarded. The Court finds the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged against petitioner reasonable. Finally, when an obligation, regardless of its source (i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts) is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, subject to the following rules: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.

Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169, Civil Code. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. In the instant case, petitioner should also be held liable for payment of interest as damages for breach of contract of carriage. Considering that the amounts payable by petitioner has been determined with certainty only in the instant petition, the interest due shall be computed upon the finality of this decision at the rate of 12% per annum until satisfaction. NOTE: Legal interest rate is now fixed at 6%.

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