Vicarious Liability of the State

Vicarious liability of the State E. Merritt vs Government Of The Philippine Islands G.R. No. L-11154

March 21, 1916

Facts: E. Merritt was riding on a motorcycle travelling at ten to twelve miles per hour when he collided with the General Hospital ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly before reaching the center of the street and without sounding its whistle or horn in violation of the Motor Vehicle Act. The plaintiff suffered from fractures to the skull, material injury to the grey matter and brain and a broken right leg as a result of the collision. He was mentally and physically impaired such that he lost his efficiency in constructing wooden buildings, which was his occupation. Act No. 2457 was enacted specifically to authorize E.Merritt to bring suit against the Government “in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision.” The court found the chauffeur of the ambulance solely negligent and awarded plaintiff a total P14,741. Issue: Whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting from the collision committed by the agent or employee of the Government RULING: The SC increased the total damages awarded to plaintiff to P18,075 since he was incapacitated for a period of six months and not only for the time he remained confined in the hospital. The general rule is that the Government cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. In accordance with Act No.2457, the plaintiff was authorized to bring action against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision and to determine the amount of the damages, if any. However, Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized. According to the Civil Code Article 1903 (now Art 2180): “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”

The responsibility of the state is limited to cases wherein it acts through a special agent; a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. Therefore, the State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 (now Article 2180); and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent for which the State is made liable.

Inocencio Rosete vs.The Auditor General G.R. No. L-1120 (August 31, 1948) Facts: Inocencio Rosete and others filed a claim against the Government for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claimants, which were destroyed by fire from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration, ECA, an office or agency of the Government. The fire was initiated by the reckless ignition of a cigarette-lighter by a certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio near a five-gallon drum where gasoline was drained and stored in contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila. The Insular Auditor denied or dismissed the claim of Rosete and others in the amount of P35,376. Issue: Whether the government is liable for the damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code (now Article 2180) Ruling: The pertinent provision reads as follows: ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. The state is liable in the scene when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. The court citing Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands held that the state is not liable for damages suffered by private individuals by government employees in the discharge of their responsibilities unless such act was committed by a special agent, “duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or

charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.” Since the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents and there is no negligence imputable to a special agent, the government is not liable for the damages resulting from the negligence complained of. Act No. 327, authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with the Insular Auditor, does not make any and all claims against the Government allowable or the Government responsible for such claims.

Mendoza vs. De Leon, et al. G.R. No. L-9596

February 11, 1916

Facts: Marcos Mendoza was the highest bidder for the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege in the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, and was duly awarded the privilege under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission. After a little more than a year, the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan, through a resolution, awarded the franchise for the same ferry to another person, forcibly ejecting Mendoza therefrom. The council claimed that the ferry Mendoza was operating was not the one leased to him. Mendoza instituted an action for damages against the individual members of the Municipal Council. Issue: Whether the individual members of the Municipal Council are liable to Mendoza for forcibly ejecting him from the leased ferry Ruling: A municipality has a two-fold character of powers, namely governmental and proprietary. With respect to liability, numerous cases elucidate that the municipality is liable for the acts of its officers and agents in the exercise of proprietary or corporate powers, but it is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the performance of its governmental functions. Officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties are not liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless they have acted willfully and maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury. In so far as its governmental functions are concerned, a municipality is also not liable, unless expressly made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as they perform their duties honestly and in good faith. But a municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration

of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Mendoza had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry; and there is no evidence that there was justifiable reason for his eviction. The contention that Mendoza was operating a ferry that was not leased to him is untenable since it was the vice-president himself who personally placed him in possession thereof, a fact know to the council members. It cannot be said that the councilors acted honestly for the interests of the municipality. Therefore, they are jointly and severally liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.

Fontanilla vs. Maliaman G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989 FACTS: Francisco Fontanilla, son of the spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, died as a result of an accident when a pickup owned and operated by the National Irrigation Administration, a government agency, driven by Hugo Garcia (a regular employee of said agency) bumped the bicycle he was riding. The deceased was thrown 50 meters from the point of impact, while his companion, who survived the incident, was thrown a bit further away. Nevertheless, the NIA employees did not stop to assist the victims and instead sped away. The trial court directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against the NIA Ruling: The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

The National Irrigation Administration is a government corporation and exercises proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. As a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it is liable as an ordinary employer for the acts of its

employees. As such, the NIA becomes answerable for damages caused by its employees upon the existence of negligence of supervision on its part.

applies because its subject-matter is more particular. RA 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

At the time the accident took place, the employees and the driver did not assist the victims and instead sped off even though there were dent marks indicating they were aware they hit something or someone. The strength of the impact also indicated that they were driving at a high speed at the time the collision occurred.

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

There was evident negligence on the part of NIA when its supervisor within the group allowed the driver to travel at a high speed.

Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.

Even assuming that the incident took place in a national highway, it is not necessary for liability to attach that the defective roads or streets belongs to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What Article 2189 requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.

City of Manila vs. Teotico G.R. No. L-23052 (January 29, 1968) Facts: Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole when he attempted to board a jeepney at a "loading and unloading" zone. As a result of the fall, Teotico’s eyeglasses broke and its shards pierced his left eyelid, impairing his vision. Aside from the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, he also suffered from several contusions to his body and an allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. His medical expenses amounted to P1,400.00. As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The City of Manila and its officers contended that every time a report that a cover of a manhole is missing, the Office of the City Engineer immediately had it replaced and that they were attentive thereto. The trial court rendered a decision in favour of the City of Manila but the Court of Appeals sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages amounting to P6,750.00. Issue: Whether the City of Manila is liable for payment of damages to Teotico Held: Between RA 409, the Charter of Manila, exempting the City from liability, and the Civil Code, the Civil Code

Republic Act No. 917 provides that the construction, maintenance and improvement of national, provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers.

Liability of employees Araneta vs. De Joya G.R. No. L-25172 (May 24, 1974) Facts: Antonio de Joya was the general manager of the Ace Advertising. He proposed that an employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in television. Although the board of directors failed to act on the proposal, Taylor was still sent to the US, with the assurance that Taylor’s expenses would be defrayed by parties other than the company. Taylor received his salaries while abroad through checks and vouchers signed by Luis Araneta (vice-president), Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) or de Joya. The total costs of Taylor’s travel and study expenses was P 5,043.20. Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court for the recovery of the total amount disbursed to Taylor since the travel and expenses were made without its knowledge, authority or ratification. A third-party complaint was filed by de Joya against Vicente Araneta, Luis Araneta and Taylor.

Both Aranetas disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks covering part of the travel expenses and payroll in good faith since they were approved by de Joya. The trial court ruled that de Joya was liable for the amount disbursed by the company but dismissed the third party complaint, while the Court of Appeals held that according to the facts of the case, the two Aranetas were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant. Issue: Whether Luis Araneta is solidarily liable with de Joya and Vicente Araneta for payment of the erroneously disbursed funds. Ruling: Luis Araneta is guilty of a quasi-delict. His allegations of good faith were not substantiated and established. In fact, as vice-president of the company, Luis Araneta remained passive concerning the unauthorized disbursement of corporate funds and approved three of the payroll checks for Taylor’s salary. Luis Araneta evidently neglected to perform his duties as an officer of the firm.

evidently primarily liable for his reckless driving resulting to the damage caused to Lanuzo under Article 2176 of 2 the Civil Code Sy Bon Ping, as employer, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which explicitly provides: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Sy Bon Ping failed to disprove the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee (Article 2180) and is primary and solidarily liable with Mendoza. Nevertheless, Sy Bon Ping may demand reimbursement from Mendoza for whatever amount he will have to pay the offended party 3 to satisfy the claim for damages .

Malipol vs. Tan G.R. No. L-27730 January 21, 1974

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Applying Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, it is proper that the other joint tortfeasors be made solidarily liable and shoulder their proportional responsibility.

Engineers/Architect- Nature of liability Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980 Facts: Salvador Mendoza, driver of Sy Bon Ping, recklessly and negligently rammed the residential house and store or Felix Lanuzo. The total damage to his property was P13,000 and he was deprived of his monthly income from the store of P300. In a complaint for damages instituted by Lanuzo independently from the criminal action, the trial court ruled that Sy Bon Ping and Mendoza were jointly and severally liable to pay Lanuzo P 13,000.00 as damages and P 300.00, representing Lanuzo’s monthly income, until the entire P 13,000.00 has been paid in full. Issue: Whether Sy Bon Ping, as employer, and Mendoza, as employee are solidarily liable for payment of damages to Lanuzo Held: Plaintiff predicated his claim for damages on quasidelict, which may proceed independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case. Salvador Mendoza is 1

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary

Facts: Pantaleon Malijan was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante when he was hit by a gasoline tanker, got thrown to the ground and was ran over by the tanker’s right wheel that got detached. Although he was brought to the hospital, Malijan died that night from "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident." The gasoline tanker at that time was driven by Ernesto Labsan and was used and owned by Lily Lim Tan for her gasoline business. The mother and minor siblings of Malijan filed a complaint for damages against Tan and Labsan. The trial court ruled that Labsan was primarily liable to pay the damages, and in case he would not be able to do so, Tan would be subsidiarily liable. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ruling Labsan as primarily liable for damages, and Tan as subsidiarily liable. Held: The court ruled that the trial court correctly denied the motion to set aside order of default and for new trial; however, the trial court erred in holding Tan subsidiarily liable.

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Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 3 Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim

The action was based on quasi-delict and not to demand civil liability arising from a crime, since the complaint makes no mention of a crime. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. Therefore, the employer, Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court, without prejudice to the right to demand reimbursement from damages from Ernesto Labsan for whatever she would have to pay the relatives of the deceased.

Viluan vs. CA G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 (April 29, 1966) Facts: The bus owned by Francisca Viluan, and driven by Hermenigildo Aquino raced with the overtaking bus driven by Gregorio Hufana and owned by Patricio Hufana. Aquino lost control of the bus, hitting a post and crashing into a tree, after which it burst into flames wherein seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured. In the complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages filed by the heirs of those who perished in the incident and Carolina Sabado, an injured passenger, Vilaun and Aquino filed third party complaints against Gregorio Hufana and his employer, Patricio Hufana, contending that the incident was their fault. The lower court found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both the two drivers and their employers jointly and severally liable for damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of concurrent negligence on the part of the two buses but held that only Vilaun is liable because Aquino, as driver, cannot be made jointly and severally liable in a contract of carriage. It ruled that the Hufana’s cannot be made liable since the plaintiffs did not amend their complaints in the main action so as to assert a claim against them. Issue: Whether Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should be made equally liable although they were third-party defendants and not principal defendants Held: The fact that the respondents were not sued as principal defendants but were brought into the cases as third party defendants should not preclude a finding of their liability. Section 5 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, precluding a judgment in favor of a plaintiff and against a third party

defendant where the plaintiff has not amended his complaint to assert a claim against a third party defendant, applies only to cases where the third party defendant is brought in on an allegation of liability to the defendants. It does not apply where a third-party defendant is impleaded on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiffs, in which case no amendment of the plaintiffs complaint is necessary. In this case the third-party complaints filed by Viluan and Aquino charged Gregorio and Patrcio Hufana with direct liability to the plaintiffs. Amendment of the complaint is not necessary and is merely a matter of form since the liability of the Hufana’s as third-party defendant was already asserted in the third-party complaint. Regardless whether the injury is quasi-delict or breach of contract of carriage, in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.

Torts with Independent Civil Actions (Violation of Civil and Political rights) Lim vs. Ponce De Leon G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975 Facts: Jikil Taha sold a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL" to Alberto Timbangcaya but a year later Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal that Taha forcibly took the motor launch. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed an information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha and instructed Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch, which was already sold to Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon informed Maddela that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Lim filed a complaint for damages against Fiscal de Leon and Maddela. Lim contended that there was a violation of his constitutional rights when the motor launch was seized without a search warrant. As defense, de Leon and Maddela contended that the motor launch was the corpus delicti in an ongoing investigation and filed a counterclaim for malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by Lim and Taha.

The trial court upheld the validity of the seizure of the motor launch and ordered Taha and Lim to pay for damages. Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of Jakil Taha and Delfin Lim was violated, and if so, whether they are entitled to damages Held: The taking of the motor launch was ruled to be in violation of the constitutional right of the parties against unreasonable searches and seizure as provided in the Bill of Rights since it was effected without a search warrant, the authority of which lies with a magistrate or judge and not a fiscal. With respect to damages, Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha were entitled to damages under Article 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code for the violation of their constitutional right. Good faith is not a defense against liability under Article 32 of the NCC. To be liable it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that the act was attended with bad faith or malice. Therefore, Fiscal de Leon was liable to pay damages to Delfin Lim for violating his constitutional right; but Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he acted upon the order of his superior officer believing that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch.

Aberca vs. Ver G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988 Facts: The intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), were ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT). The plaintiffs complained that in the execution of such order, the TFM raided several places using “defectively issued judicial warrants” and arrested the plaintiffs without warrant, confiscated personal property, interrogated plaintiffs without council and employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence. The plaintiffs filed an action for damages, which was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that (1) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, (2) the defendants were performing their official duties and (3)the complaint states no cause of action. Issue: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, and if so, who should be made liable

Held: The contention that respondents are covered by state immunity for acts done in the performance of their official duties was not accepted by the court because plaintiffs may have been ordered to conduct pre-emptive strikes against the communist terrorists but this did not amount to “a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint”. In carrying out their task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards should still have been observed by respondents. The plaintiff’s cause of action were not barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was explicitly recognized in PD No. 1755: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasidelict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. Even if the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspended petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it did not extend to suspend their right to demand damages for injuries suffered through the confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. As to who should be made liable for damages, the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. Article 32 speaks of “an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another”. Thus, the person directly causing damage and the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

MHP Garments vs. CA G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994 Facts: MHP Garments, Inc. had the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. When MHP Garments received information that Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority, Larry de Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, together with

members of the police constabulary, went to the stores of Cruz, Lugatiman, and Gonzales at the Marikina Public Market and seized these items. The seizure caused a commotion to the embarrassment of Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales. MHP Garments instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the vendors. The Provincial fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales instituteed an action for sums of money and damages against MHP Garments and de Guzman. MHP Garments contend that they should not be made liable for damages since they did not commit the act of seizure. Issue: Whether MHP Garments and de Guzman should be held liable for the seizure of the goods in question although it was the Police constabulary who effected the seizure Held: The seizure was conducted without a warrant in evident violation of the constitutional right of the vendors. The facts of the case did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of the vendors’ goods. There was sufficient time for de Guzman in behalf of MHP Garments to secure a warrant from the time of receipt of the information and the raid of the stores. Although the Philippine Constabulary conducted the raid, their omission as party to the complaint does not exculpate MHP Garments and de Guzman from liability. The company was indirectly involved in transgressing the rights of Cuz, Lugatiman and Gonzales. It was MHP Garments who instigated the raid and the raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee, Larry de Guzman, who apparently assented to the conduct of the raid and is as liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. The corporation is also liable to the same extent as the officers when it received the goods for safekeeping and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.

Independent Civil Action (Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries) Marcia et al. vs.CA G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983 Facts: A passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc.,driven by its employee, Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap.

An information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against the driver while an action for damages was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, and the heirs of Clemente Marcia against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje. The trial court initially convicted Paje of the offense charged, but on appeal, Paje was acquitted after it was found that he was not speeding and was diligent, but the collision, nevertheless, took place and was a fortuitous event. It further ruled that criminal negligence was wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence. The court dismissed the civil case against Paje and Victory Liner ruling that they could not be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident. Issue: Whether the acquittal in the criminal case would result in the dismissal in the civil case Held: The judgment of acquittal included a declaration that the fact from which civil liability may arise did not exist. In acquitting Paje, the court ruled that the event was an accident and that Paje was without fault, and it is only proper that the civil case be dismissed. Furthermore, the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, which provides: ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Therefore, it was only proper that the court dismiss the civil case against Paje and Victory Liner since Paje was acquitted of the fact from which the civil case arose.

Madeja v. Caro 211 Phil 469 (December 21, 1983) Facts: Dra. Eva Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madejo after an appendectomy. The widow of Madejo filed a criminal

complaint and reserved her right to claim for a separate action for damages. The judge dismissed the civil case because of Rule 111 3(a) but the petitioner appealed to the SC by using Rule 111 Section 2 ROC in relation to Article 33 of the NCC, which states: Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The Court found the case impressed with merit. Issues: (1) Whether or not the civil case can carry on independently of the criminal case. (2) Whether or not physical injuries of Article 33 encompass other bodily injury in its definition Held: (1)Yes. Rule 111 Section 2 creates an exception to the rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation. (2)Yes. The Code Commission discussed that the term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries by consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide but also any other bodily injury including battery based on the American Law.

Arafiles v. Phil. Journalists GR No 135306 (2003) Facts: In 1987, Emelita Despuig, working as a grant-inaid scholar at a Manila university and as an office worker at a government office in Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a government agency director, last March 15, but afraid to lose her job – and of being harmed – she chose to keep her ordeal to herself.

On the second night, she was almost raped again by the same man, Catalino Arafiles. However, the bellboy and the security guard noticed something suspicious as Emelita was fighting back while they were checking in the Flamingo Hotel, thus the bellboy followed them to their room. Arafiles rushed to leave as soon as he paid money to the bellboy and the security guard not to report the same. Emelita reported the same information to the police and she was interviewed by Romy Morales, a journalist of People’s Journal Tonight. During the following day, the news was part of the headlines in the said newspaper. After a year of publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages arising from the said publication against the journalist and its employer. Arafiles alleged that on account of the “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item” prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan, Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal, Jr. as president of Philippine Journalists, Inc., and published by respondent Philippine Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) was injured; he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to the position of Deputy Administrator of PAGASA. The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Arafiles granting him awards for damages. 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal damages; 2.) P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; 3.) P1,000.000.00, as moral damages; 4.) P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and 5.) Costs of suit. . CA reversed RTC’s decision. MR from CA made by Arafiles was denied. Hence they elevated it to the SC. Issue: Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended with malice, hence, must free respondents of liability for damages. Held: Yes. There was no malice in the article. Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. Arafiles brands the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” of a patently embellished and salacious narration of fabricated facts involving rape and attempted rape incidents. For, so petitioner argues, the police blotter which was the sole basis for the news item plainly shows that there was only one count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.