VDA DE AVILES v CA

VDA DE AVILES v CA November 21, 1996

ISSUE/HELD: WON a complaint for quieting of title is not the proper remedy but rather it should be a case for ejectment - YES

FACTS: Petitioners: Anastacia Vda. De Aviles et. al. Respondents: Court of Appeals and Camilo Aviles

The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.

Eduardo Aviles’ family has been in actual possession of a parcel of land described as a fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential land, situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan since 1957. This property is his share in the estate of his deceased parents. The respective areas allotted to them had been agreed upon and were measured before the execution of the agreement. Because he had several children to support, Eduardo asked for a bigger share and Camilo agreed to have a smaller area. Eduardo mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank and Phil. National Bank branch in Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo, in the presence of the boundary owners (defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin) pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and nobody objected. The real estate mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold at public auction, but it was redeemed by plaintiff’s mother and the land was subsequently transferred and declared in her name. In 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles moved the earthen dikes and constructed a bamboo fence on the northern portion of Eduardo’s property, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion. Petitioners filed this special civil action for quieting of title TC: dismissed the complaint CA: affirmed TC decision, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead.

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To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. In this case, the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant which constitutes a cloud thereon. Documents (those executed by private respondent and his brothers, as well as the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia of the subject property in a foreclosure sale) in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties’ failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties. Petition DENIED and decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

ONO VS VICENTE LIM The subject of controversy is Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-9969-(O-20449), over which the contending parties in this action for quieting of title, initiated by respondent Vicente N. Lim (Lim) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City, assert exclusive ownership, to the exclusion of the other. In its decision dated July 30, 1996,[1] the RTC favored Lim, and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim (Luisa), Lim’s deceased mother and predecessor-in-interest. On appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC on January 28, 2002.[2] It later denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration through the resolution dated June 17, 2002.[3] Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari. Antecedents On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging that said OCT had been lost during World War II by his mother, Luisa;[4] that Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had been sold in 1937 to Luisaby Spouses Diego Oño and Estefania Apas (Spouses Oño), the lot’s registered owners; and that although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being registered, Antonio Oño (Antonio), the only legitimate heir of Spouses Oño, had executed on April 23, 1961 in favor of Luisa a notarized document denominated as confirmation of sale,[5]which was duly filed in the Provincial Assessor’s Office of Cebu. Zosimo Oño and petitioner Teofisto Oño (Oños) opposed Lim’s petition, contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oño. On account of the Oños’ opposition, and upon order of the RTC, Lim converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of title,[6] averring additionally that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter alia, that the Oños be ordered to surrender the reconstituted owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said OCT be cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in the name of Luisa in lieu of said OCT.

In their answer,[7] the Oños claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, Spouses Oño, never sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that the confirmation of sale purportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not being authentic. RTC Ruling On July 30, 1996, after trial, the RTC rendered its decision,[8] viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered quieting plaintiff's title to Lot No. 943 of the Balamban (Cebu) Cadastre, and directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu — (1) To register the aforestated April 23, 1961 Confirmation of Sale of Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre by Antonio Oño in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim; 2) To cancel the original certificate of title covering the said Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre; and, (3) To issue in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim, a new duplicate certificate of title No. RO9969 (O-20449) of the Register of Deeds of Cebu, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate of title, and shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original certificate, and shall be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 109, Presidential Decree No. 1529. Without special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.[9] The RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful possession of the land since 1937; that their possession had never been disturbed by the Oños, except on two occasions in 1993 when the Oños seized the harvested copra from the Lims’ caretaker; that the Lims had since declared the lot in their name for taxation purposes, and had paid the taxes corresponding to the lot; that the signature of Antonio on the confirmation of sale was genuine, thereby giving more weight to the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the document and affirmatively testified that Antonio and Luisa had both appeared before him to acknowledge the instrument as true than to the testimony of the expert witness who attested that Antonio’s signature was a forgery. CA Ruling On appeal, the Oños maintained that the confirmation of sale was spurious; that the property, being a titled one, could not be acquired by the Lims through prescription;

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that their (the Oños) action to claim the property could not be barred by laches; and that the action instituted by the Lims constituted a collateral attack against their registered title.

1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title; 2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse possession;

The CA affirmed the RTC, however, and found that Spouses Oño had sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that such sale had been confirmed by their son Antonio. The CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that the Lims’ undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on their own title. Nonetheless, the CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicate certificate of title in the name of Luisa, considering that the owner’s duplicate was still intact in the possession of the Oños.

3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Oño in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost during World War II; 4. Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and 5. Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was genuine. Ruling of the Court

The decree of the CA decision was as follows: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from is CORRECTED as follows: (1) Within five (5) days from finality of the decision, defendants-appellants are directed to present the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969 (O-20449) to the Register of Deeds who shall thereupon register the ―Confirmation of Sale‖ of Lot No. 943, Balamban Cadastre, Cebu, executed on April 23, 1961 by Antonio Oño in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim, and issue a new transfer certificate of title to and in the name of the latter upon cancellation of the outstanding original and owner's duplicate certificate of title. (2) In the event defendants-appellants neglect or refuse to present the owner's copy of the title to the Register of Deeds as herein directed, the said title, by force of this decision, shall be deemed annulled, and the Register of Deeds shall make a memorandum of such fact in the record and in the new transfer certificate of title to be issued to Luisa NarviosLim. (3) Defendants-appellants shall pay the costs. SO ORDERED.[10] The CA denied the Oños’ motion for reconsideration[11] on June 17, 2002.[12] Hence, this appeal. Issues The petitioners raise the following issues:

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The petition has no merit. A. Action for cancellation of title s not an attack on the title The petitioners contend that this action for quieting of title should be disallowed because it constituted a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz: Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.– A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The petitioners’ contention is not well taken. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.[13]The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[14] Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.[15] Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an

action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.[16] In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.[17]

Lim’s complaint pertinently alleged:

18. If indeed, the genuine original of the Owner's Duplicate of the Reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-9699 (O-20449) for Lot 943, Balamban Cadastre xxx is in Defendant's (Oño’s) possession, then VNL submits the following PROPOSITIONS:

The assertion is unwarranted. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.[19] However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest. Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the property by virtue of sale; that from the time Luisa had acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over its possession in the concept of an owner, and had performed her obligation by paying real property taxes on the property, as evidenced by tax declarations issued in her name;[20]and that in view of the delivery of the property, coupled with Luisa’s actual occupation of it, all that remained to be done was the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her name. C.Forgery, being a question of fact, could not be dealt with now

xxx 18.2. Therefore, the Original of Owner’s Duplicate Certificate (which Respondents [Defendants Oños] claim in their Opposition is in their possession) must be surrendered to VNL upon order of this Court, after the Court shall have determined VNL's mother's acquisition of the attributes of ownership over said Lot 943, in this action, in accordance with Section 107, P.D. 1529, Property Registration Decree xxx xxx [t]hat OCT 20449 be cancelled and new title for Lot 943 be issued directly in favor of LUISA NARVIOS, to complete her title to said Lot;[18] The averments readily show that the action was neither a direct nor a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), for Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the name of the petitioners’ predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lim’s mother, and resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), or challenge the judgment by which the title of the lot involved had been decreed. In other words, the action sought the removal of a cloud from Lim’s title, and the confirmation of Lim’s ownership over the disputed property as the successor-in-interest of Luisa. B Prescription was not relevant The petitioners assert that the lot, being titled in the name of their predecessors-ininterest, could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

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The petitioners submit that Lim’s evidence did not preponderantly show that the ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and that both the trial and the appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonio’s signature on the confirmation of sale was a forgery. Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties. The Court cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence, because the Court is not a trier of facts.[21] Although this rule admits of certain exceptions, viz: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record,[22] it does not appear now that any of the exceptions is present herein. We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the appeal for that reason.

It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion arrived at by the RTC that the signature of Antonio had not been simulated or forged. The CA ruled that the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the confirmation of sale to the effect that Antonio and Luisa had appeared before him prevailed over that of the petitioners’ expert witness. The concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness of Antonio’s signature now binds the Court.[23] In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence.Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of the truth.[24] It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff. He established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior right and title to the property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other than their copy of the reconstituted certificate of title. Such proof was not enough, because the registration of a piece of land under the Torrens system did not create or vest title, such registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to be reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.[25] WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision dated January 28, 2002 is affirmed. The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. NEY VS SPS QUIJANO On appeal is the June 29, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. CV. 86047, setting aside the August 25, 2005 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 45. Petitioners Manuel P. Ney and Romulo P. Ney (petitioners) are the registered owners of a residential lot located at 1648 Main Street, Paco Manila, with an area of 120 square

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meters more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 122489.[3] A three (3) door apartment was constructed on the subject lot – one for Manuel, the other for Romulo; and the last one for their sister Mina N. Quijano and her husband Celso Quijano (respondents). On October 8, 1999, respondents filed with the RTC of Manila a suit for reconveyance, partition and damages against petitioners. They averred that they are co-owners of the subject property having paid part of its purchase price; that Celso’s name was inadvertently omitted as one of the buyers in the execution of the deed of sale. Consequently, TCT No. 122489 covering the subject property was issued only in the names of Manuel and Romulo. To obtain a separate certificate of title, they requested from petitioners the segregation of the portion allotted to them, but the latter refused. They later discovered that the entire property was mortgaged with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, prompting them to execute and register their adverse claim with the Register of Deeds; and to file the instant complaint.[4] Petitioners, in their answer,[5] denied respondents’ allegation of co-ownership. They averred that Celso Quijano was not a vendee of the subject lot; thus, his name did not appear on the title. They asserted that respondents cannot validly maintain an action against them because the latter possessed the property by mere tolerance; and even assuming that respondents had a valid cause of action, the same had already been barred by prescription and/or laches. Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision[6] dismissing the complaint. It rejected respondents’ claim of co-ownership, and declared their documentary and testimonial evidence unreliable. The RTC sustained petitioners’ assertion that respondents possessed part of the property through mere tolerance; and that their cause of action, if any, already prescribed. The RTC thus ruled that respondents can no longer demand the segregation or reconveyance of the claimed portion of the property. Finally, the RTC granted petitioners’ counterclaim and ordered the reimbursement of the expenses they incurred in defending the case. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, DISMISSED.

premises

considered,

the

[respondents’]

Complaint

is

hereby

On the other hand, finding merit in the [petitioners’] Counterclaim, the [respondents] are hereby ordered to pay the [petitioners]: a)

The reduced amount of P50,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and

b)

The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[7] From the aforesaid Decision, respondents went to the CA. They faulted the RTC for dismissing their complaint and insisted that they are co-owners of the subject lot; and that their share was erroneously included in petitioners’ title. Respondents also took exception to the trial court’s declaration that their action was already barred by prescription and laches. Citing Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, respondents asserted that their right to institute an action for reconveyance is imprescriptible because they are in possession of the claimed portion of the property.[8] On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision,[9] reversing the RTC. The CA found sufficient evidence to support respondents’ claim that they are indeed co-owners of the property; and were excluded by petitioners in the deed of sale and certificate of title. The CA considered respondents’ complaint as one for quieting of title which is imprescriptible; and granted to respondents the reliefs that they prayed for.

respondents averred and prayed for in their complaint was for petitioners to surrender their certificate of title, and for the partition of the subject property. Petitioners assert that the CA ruled on an issue not raised in the pleadings; and substituted the respondents’ action with an entirely new action for quieting of title. The argument is specious. The allegations in respondents’ complaint read in part: 2) That [respondents] are co-owners of one-third (1/3) portion pro indiviso of the residential lot where their residential house was constructed known as 1648 Main Street, Paco, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 122489; x x x 3) That in their agreement with the lot owner, the name of the [respondent] Celso P. Quijano appears as one (1) of the Second Party [sic] who purchased the lot at the purchase price ofP50,000.00 with P40,000.00 as down payment and the balance of P10,000.00 shall be paid on or before July 14, 1976, wherein the [respondent] Celso P. Quijano have (sic) paid the sum of P5,000.00 on the same due date of July 14, 1976;

The CA disposed, thus: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated August 25, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 45, Manila is hereby SET ASIDE. In its stead, a NEW ONE IS ENTERED, declaring [respondents], spouses Celso and Mina Quijano, as coowners of the subject lot to the extent of one-third (1/3) thereof which corresponds to that portion where their house stands. Accordingly, [petitioners] are hereby ordered: 1) to partition the subject lot into three (3) equal portions of forty square meters (40 sq.m.) each, specifically allotting to [respondents] the portion where their house stands; 2) to reconvey to [respondents] the clean title to their portion of the subject lot; 3) to surrender the owner’s copy of TCT No. 122489 to the Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of [respondents’] share thereon; and 4) to pay [respondents] attorney’s fees and the costs of suit in the reasonable amount of P50,000.00. SO ORDERED.[10] Undaunted, petitioners took the present recourse. They ascribe reversible error to the CA for treating respondents’ action as one for quieting of title. They claim that nowhere in the complaint does it state that respondents seek to quiet their title to the property. All that

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4) That when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the Vendor, the name of the [respondent] Celso P. Quijano, marr[ie]d to Mina Ney Quijano was omitted and the purchase price appeared to be only P20,000.00 and not P50,000.00 as appearing in their Agreement, thus when the Absolute Deed of Sale was presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila, only the names of Manuel P. Ney and Romulo P. Ney appeared as the registered owners in the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title No.122489; 5) That Celso Quijano, however, was able to secure a Certification from the Vend[o]r Luz J. Lim the true and correct selling price agreed upon is P50,000.00 and the Vendees were Manuel P. Ney, Romulo P. Ney and [respondent] Celso Quijano and that the amount of P20,000.00 put in the Deed of Sale was at the instance of the Vendor with the consent of the Vendees; 6) That sometime in March 1991, [respondents] requested from the [petitioners] to segregate their Title to the one-third (1/3) portion of the lot [sic] where their house was constructed with an area of about forty (40) square meters more or less and [petitioners] agreed and executed a Deed of Reconveyance, but when [respondent] Celso P. Quijano presented the document to the Register of Deeds of Manila it [sic] was rejected because he can not present the Owner’s copy; xxxx 8) That from the records of the Register of Deeds of Manila, [respondent] Celso P. Quijano discovered that the whole property was mortgaged with [sic] the Metropolitan

Bank & Trust Company, thus [respondents] were constrained to execute and register their adverse claim that they are co-owners of one-third (1/3) portion of the lot and their residential house therein;

Undoubtedly, respondents did not only seek the partition of the property and the delivery of the title, but also the reconveyance of their share which was inadvertently included in petitioners’ TCT.

9) That after the registration of the [respondent’s] adverse claim, the Register of Deeds through Expedito A. Javier notified the [petitioners] to surrender the Owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 122489 in order that a Memorandum be made thereon for the Notice of Adverse Claim, but the request of the Register of Deeds was not honored by the [petitioners];

An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.[11] Indeed, reconveyance is an action distinct from an action for quieting of title, which is filed whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title for purposes of removing such cloud or to quiet title. [12] However, we find nothing erroneous in the CA’s ruling treating respondents’ action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title.

xxxx 12) That by reason of the[petitioners’] refusal to surrender the Owner’s copy of the Title to the Register of Deeds of Manila for partition and reconveyance, [respondents] were constrained to engage the services of counsel to protect their interest at an agreed amount of P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. These allegations make out a case for reconveyance. That reconveyance was one of the reliefs sought was made abundantly clear by respondents in their prayer, viz.:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing judgment be rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioners] ordering the latter as follows: a) To surrender the Owner’s copy of TCT No. 122489 to the Court or if refused that an Order be issued ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue to the [respondents] their co-owner’s copy if [sic] the Title; b) Ordering the partition of the lot into equal shares of forty (40) square meters more or less and the lot where the [respondents’] residential house is constructed known as 1648 Main Street, Paco Manila be awarded and be reconveyed to the [respondents] as their share; c) Ordering the [petitioners] to settle their obligations to [sic] the mortgagee bank, if any, and to reconvey to the [respondents] clean Title over their property.

In Mendizabel v. Apao,[13] we treated a similar action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title, explaining, thus: The Court has ruled that the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. The ruling was reiterated in Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.,[14] viz.: An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

d) Ordering [petitioners] jointly and severally to pay [respondents] moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 and the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and costs.

Indubitably, the characterization by the CA of respondents’ action as in the nature of an action for quieting of title cannot be considered a reversible error.

[Respondents] further pray for such other reliefs and remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.

Petitioners next fault the CA for sustaining respondents’ claim of co-ownership. They denied that Celso Quijano is a co-owner of the property. Unfortunately for petitioners, the records speak otherwise.

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The Deed of Reconveyance[15] executed by Manuel and Romulo explicitly states that:

G.R. No. 161122

[W]e acknowledge and recognized the rights, interests and participation of Celso P. Quijano, Filipino, of legal age, married to Mina P. Ney and resident of 1648 Main Street, Paco, Manila, as a co-owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of the said lot wherein his residential house is now constructed at the above-stated address, having paid the corresponding amount over the said 1/3 portion of the property for the acquisition costs but whose name does not appear in the Deed of Sale executed in our favor, thus resulting in the non-conclusion (sic) of his name in the above-stated Transfer Certificate of Title when issued as a co-owner.

DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, HON. AUGUSTINE VESTIL, as Presiding Judge of RTC-CEBU, Br. 56, MANDAUE CITY, SPS. FELIX NG AND NENITA NG, and SPS. MARTIN T. NG AND AZUCENA S. NG AND AGRIPINA R. GOCONG, Respondents.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises WE, MANUEL P. NEY and ROMULO P. NEY, do hereby transfer and convey unto said Spouses Celso P. Quijano and MINA P. NEY their one-third (1/3) portion share of the aforedescribed (sic) parcel of land where their residential house is now situated at their above-given address with an area of forty (40) square meters more or less by virtue of this Deed of Reconveyance.

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners never denied the due execution of the Deed of Reconveyance. In fact they admitted that the signatures appearing therein are theirs.[16] The CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for declaring respondents as co-owners of the subject property because it merely confirmed and enforced the Deed of Reconveyance voluntarily executed by petitioners in favor of respondents. As aptly pronounced by the CA: T]he Deed of Reconveyance, duly signed by [petitioners] themselves, put to rest the focal issue between the parties. There is no denying that it outweighs the evidence relied upon by [petitioners] despite the fact that they have the transfer certificate of title over the entire subject lot. It is settled that it is not the certificate of title that vests ownership. It merely evidences such title. x x x[17] In a number of cases, the Court has ordered reconveyance of property to the true owner or to one with a better right, where the property had been erroneously or fraudulently titled in another person's name. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.[18] Thus, the CA acted correctly in rendering the challenged decision. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86047 is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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September 24, 2012

DECISION

A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not hind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall he adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. 1 Hence, such person cannot bring an action for the annulment of the judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, except if he has been a successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem the judgment in which is binding against him. Antecedents The petitioner acquired a parcel of land with an area of 65,100 square meters situated in San Roque, Lilo-an, Metro Cebu known as lot 7531-part (the property) through a deed of absolute sale executed on July 28, 1994 between the petitioner, as vendee, and Agripina R. Goc-ong (a respondent herein), Porferio Goc-ong, Diosdado Goc-ong, Crisostomo Goc-ong, Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-ong and Avelino Goc-ong (collectively, the Goc-ongs), as vendors.2 The petitioner later on discovered the joint affidavit executed on June 19, 1990 by the Goc-ongs, whereby the Goc-ongs declared that they were the owners of the property, and that they were mortgaging the property to Felix Ng, married to Nenita N. Ng, and Martin T. Ng, married to Azucena S. Ng (collectively, the Ngs) to secure their obligation amounting to P 648,000.00, subject to the condition that should they not pay the stipulated 36monthly installments, the Ngs would automatically become the owners of the property.3 With the Goc-ongs apparently failing to pay their obligation to the Ngs as stipulated, the latter brought on January 16, 1997 a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money, or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure of mortgage in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, in Mandaue City (RTC) only against respondent Agripina R. Goc-ong.4 The action was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2838.

With Agripina R. Goc-ong being declared in default for failing to file her answer in Civil Case No. MAN-2838,5 the RTC rendered its Decision on October 16, 1997, disposing: In the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1) Declaring herein Plaintiffs the owners of lot 7531-part, situated at San Roque, Liloan, Cebu containing an area of Sixty Five Thousand One Hundred (65,100) square meters and assessed for P 22,240.00 and

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE ASSAILED THE DEED OF SALE AND QUESTIONED THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS OR SOUGHT THE QUIETING OF TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

2) Directing Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of P 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and

The decisive query is whether the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was a proper recourse for the petitioner to set aside the decision rendered in Civil Case No. MAN-2838.

3) P 10,000.00 as litigation expenses.

Ruling

SO ORDERED.6

We deny the petition for review.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

I.

In 2001, the petitioner commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) an action for the annulment of the October 16, 1997 decision of the RTC.

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.8 Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions.9 The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 110 of Rule 47 of theRules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.11 A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

On June 19, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment, viz: We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, considering that nowhere therein is there an allegation on why "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.["]7 The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the outright dismissal, but the CA denied its motion for reconsideration on October 24, 2003 on the basis that petitioner did not show why it had not availed itself of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies as provided in Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Issues Hence, the petitioner ascribes to the CA the following errors, to wit: I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO EXPLAIN WHY IT DID NOT AVAIL OF THE OTHER REMEDIES ENUMERATED UNDER SECTION 1 RULE 47 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE.

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The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.12 As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land.13 As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.14

II. We uphold the CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s action for annulment of judgment based on the foregoing considerations. It is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the commencement of the action in court.15 Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly so provides, to wit: Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders .—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: xxxx (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; xxx. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. The operation of this principle was illustrated in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,16 where the Court declared that a person not impleaded and given the opportunity to take part in the proceedings was not bound by the decision declaring as null and void the title from which his title to the property had been derived. We said there that the effect of a judgment could not be extended to non-parties by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them, for no man should be prejudiced by any proceeding to which he was a stranger. In the same manner, a writ of execution could be issued only against a party, not against a person who did not have his day in court.17 Accordingly, the petitioner’s resort to annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was unnecessary if, after all, the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. MAN-2838 did not prejudice it. Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 47 extends the remedy of annulment only to a party in whose favor the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition for relief from judgment are no longer available through no fault of said party. As such, the petitioner, being a non-party in Civil Case No. MAN-2838, could not bring the action for annulment of judgment due to unavailability to it of the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, or setting the judgment aside through a petition for relief.

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The petitioner probably brought the action for annulment upon its honest belief that the action was its remaining recourse from a perceived commission of extrinsic fraud against it. It is worthwhile for the petitioner to ponder, however, that permitting it despite its being a non-party in Civil Case No. MAN-2838 to avail itself of the remedy of annulment of judgment would not help it in any substantial way. Although Rule 47 would initially grant relief to it from the effects of the annulled judgment, the decision of the CA would not really and finally determine the rights of the petitioner in the property as against the competing rights of the original parties. To be borne in mind is that the annulment of judgment is an equitable relief not because a party-litigant thereby gains another opportunity to reopen the already-final judgment but because a party-litigant is enabled to be discharged from the burden of being bound by a judgment that was an absolute nullity to begin with.18 We agree with the CA’s suggestion that the petitioner’s proper recourse was either an action for quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property. It is timely for the Court to remind that the petitioner will be better off if it should go to the courts to obtain relief through the proper recourse; otherwise, it would waste its own time and effort, aside from thereby unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. The petitioner may vindicate its rights in the property through an action for quieting of title, a common law remedy designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In the action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the plaintiff and the other claimants, not only to put things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to the immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.19 The other proper remedy the CA suggested was an action for reconveyance of property.1âwphi1 According to Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong,20 the remedy belongs to the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, and such landowner demands the reconveyance of the property in the proper court of justice. If the property has meanwhile passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the landowner may seek damages. In either situation, the landowner respects the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review provided the oneyear period from the land coming under the operation of the Torrens System of land registration already passed.

WHEREFORE the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 19, 2001; andDIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. LUCAS Associate Justice

P.

BERSAMIN

WE CONCUR: G.R. No. L-38745 August 6, 1975 LUCIA TAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO VALDEHUEZA, defendants-appellants. Alaric P. Acosta for plaintiff-appellee. Lorenzo P. de Guzman for defendants-appellants.

3. That the parcel of land described in the first cause of action was the subject matter of the public auction sale held on May 6, 1955 at the Capitol Building in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, wherein the plaintiff was the highest bidder and as such a Certificate of Sale was executed by MR. VICENTE D. ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff in favor of LUCIA TAN the herein plaintiff. Due to the failure of defendant Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the period of one year as being provided by law, MR. VICENTE D. ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff executed an ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE in favor of the plaintiff LUCIA TAN. A copy of the NOTICE OF SHERIFFS SALE is hereby marked as 'Annex A', the CERTIFICATE OF SALE is marked as 'Annex B' and the ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE is hereby marked as Annex C and all of which are made as integral parts of this stipulation of facts. 4. That the party-plaintiff is the same plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2002; that the parties defendants Arador, Rediculo and Pacita, all Valdehueza were the same partiesdefendants in the same said Civil Case No. 2002; the complaint in Civil Case No. 2002 to be marked as Exhibit 1; the answer as Exhibit 2 and the order dated May 22, 1963 as Exhibit 3, and said exhibits are made integral part of this stipulation.

CASTRO, J.: This appeal was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as involving questions purely of law. The decision a quo was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental (Branch I) in an action instituted by the plaintiff-appellee Lucia Tan against the defendants-appellants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza (docketed as civil case 2574) for (a) declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of the parcel of land described in the first cause of action of the complaint, and (b) consolidation of ownership of two portions of another parcel of (unregistered) land described in the second cause of action of the complaint, purportedly sold to the plaintiff in two separate deeds of pacto de retro. After the issues were joined, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts: 1. That parties admit the legal capacity of plaintiff to sue; that defendants herein, Arador, Rediculo, Pacita, Concepcion and Rosario, all surnamed Valdehueza, are brothers and sisters; that the answer filed by Arador and Rediculo stand as the answer of Pacita, Concepcion and Rosario. 2. That the parties admit the identity of the land in the first cause of action.

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5. That defendants ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO VALDEHUEZA have executed two documents of DEED OF PACTO DE RETRO SALE in favor of the plaintiff herein, LUCIA TAN of two portions of a parcel of land which is described in the second cause of action with the total amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00), Philippine Currency, copies of said documents are marked as 'Annex D' and Annex E', respectively and made as integral parts of this stipulation of facts. 6. That from the execution of the Deed of Sale with right to repurchase mentioned in the second cause of action, defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza remained in the possession of the land; that land taxes to the said land were paid by the same said defendants. Civil case 2002 referred to in stipulation of fact no. 4 was a complaint for injunction filed by Tan on July 24, 1957 against the Valdehuezas, to enjoin them "from entering the abovedescribed parcel of land and gathering the nuts therein ...." This complaint and the counterclaim were subsequently dismissed for failure of the parties "to seek for the immediate trial thereof, thus evincing lack of interest on their part to proceed with the case. 1 The Deed of Pacto de Retro referred to in stipulation of fact no. 5 as "Annex D" (dated August 5, 1955) was not registered in the Registry of Deeds, while the Deed of Pacto de Retro referred to as "Annex E" (dated March 15, 1955) was registered.

On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the annexes, the trial court rendered judgment, as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff: 1. Declaring Lucia Tan the absolute owner of the property described in the first cause of action of the amended complaint; and ordering the herein defendants not to encroach and molest her in the exercise of her proprietary rights; and, from which property they must be dispossessed; 2. Ordering the defendants, Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiff, Lucia Tan, on Annex 'E' the amount of P1,200, with legal interest of 6% as of August 15, 1966, within 90 days to be deposited with the Office of the Court within 90 days from the date of service of this decision, and that in default of such payment the property shall be sold in accordance with the Rules of Court for the release of the mortgage debt, plus costs; 3. And as regards the land covered by deed of pacto de retro annex 'D', the herein defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P300 with legal interest of 6% from August 15, 1966, the said land serving as guaranty of the said amount of payment; 4. Sentencing the defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza to pay jointly and severally to the herein plaintiff Lucia Tan the amount of 1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and . 5. To pay the costs of the proceedings. The Valdehuezas appealed, assigning the following errors: That the lower court erred in failing to adjudge on the first cause of action that there exists res judicata; and That the lower court erred in making a finding on the second cause of action that the transactions between the parties were simple loan, instead, it should be declared as equitable mortgage. We affirm in part and modify in part. 1. Relying on Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that a dismissal for failure to prosecute "shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits," the Valdehuezas submit that the dismissal of civil case 2002 operated, upon the principle of res judicata, as a bar to the first cause of action in civil case 2574. We rule that this contention is untenable as the causes of action in the two cases are not identical. Case

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2002 was for injunction against the entry into and the gathering of nuts from the land, while case 2574 seeks to "remove any doubt or cloud of the plaintiff's ownership ..." (Amended complaint, Rec. on App., p. 27), with a prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession. Applying the test of absence of inconsistency between prior and subsequent judgments, 2 we hold that the failure of Tan, in case 2002, to secure an injunction against the Valdehuezas to prevent them from entering the land and gathering nuts is not inconsistent with her being adjudged, in case 2574, as owner of the land with right to recover possession thereof. Case 2002 involved only the possession of the land and the fruits thereof, while case 2574 involves ownership of the land, with possession as a mere attribute of ownership. The judgment in the first case could not and did not encompass the judgment in the second, although the second judgment would encompass the first. Moreover, the new Civil Code provides that suitors in actions to quiet title "need not be in possession of said property. 3 2. The trial court treated the registered deed of pacto de retro as an equitable mortgage but considered the unregistered deed of pacto de retro "as a mere case of simple loan, secured by the property thus sold underpacto de retro," on the ground that no suit lies to foreclose an unregistered mortgage. It would appear that the trial judge had not updated himself on law and jurisprudence; he cited, in support of his ruling, article 1875 of the old Civil Code and decisions of this Court circa 1910 and 1912. Under article 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration was a necessary requisite for the validity of a mortgage even as between the parties, but under article 2125 of the new Civil Code (in effect since August 30,1950), this is no longer so. 4 If the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nonetheless binding between the parties. (Article 2125, 2nd sentence). The Valdehuezas having remained in possession of the land and the realty taxes having been paid by them, the contracts which purported to be pacto de retro transactions are presumed to be equitable mortgages, 5 whether registered or not, there being no third parties involved. 3. The Valdehuezas claim that their answer to the complaint of the plaintiff affirmed that they remained in possession of the land and gave the proceeds of the harvest to the plaintiff; it is thus argued that they would suffer double prejudice if they are to pay legal interest on the amounts stated in the pacto de retro contracts, as the lower court has directed, and that therefore the court should have ordered evidence to be adduced on the harvest.

The record does not support this claim. Nowhere in the original and the amended complaints is an allegation of delivery to the plaintiff of the harvest from the land involved in the second cause of action. Hence, the defendants' answer had none to affirm.

PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

AND

HOUSING

G.R. No. 167391

Petitioner, In submitting their stipulation of facts, the parties prayed "for its approval and maybe made the basis of the decision of this Honorable Court. " (emphasis supplied) This, the court did. It cannot therefore be faulted for not receiving evidence on who profited from the harvest.

Present:

4. The imposition of legal interest on the amounts subject of the equitable mortgages, P1,200 and P300, respectively, is without legal basis, for, "No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." (Article 1956, new Civil Code) Furthermore, the plaintiff did not pray for such interest; her thesis was a consolidation of ownership, which was properly rejected, the contracts being equitable mortgages.

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, - versus BRION, BERSAMIN,

With the definitive resolution of the rights of the parties as discussed above, we find it needless to pass upon the plaintiffs petition for receivership. Should the circumstances so warrant, she may address the said petition to the court a quo.

VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified, as follows: (a) the amounts of P1,200 and P300 mentioned in Annexes E and D shall bear interest at six percent per annum from the finality of this decision; and (b) the parcel of land covered by Annex D shall be treated in the same manner as that covered by Annex E, should the defendants fail to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P300 within 90 days from the finality of this decision. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

MAXIMO BONIFACIO, CEFERINO R. BONIFACIO, Promulgated: APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B. CAINA, CRISPINA B.PASCUAL, ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA, TERESITA S. DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO AND ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in their capacity as the surviving heirs of the late June 8, 2011 ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE BONIFACIO,

Teehankee, J., is on leave. Martin, J., took no part.

Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the Decision[2] dated January 31, 2005 and Resolution[3] dated March 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 62211. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Complaint[4] for Quieting of Title and Damages filed by Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-Ville) and denied its Motion for Reconsideration.[5] The factual antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows.

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Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation is the registered owner of three parcels of land designated as Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 of the subdivision plan Psd-113-006209, located in Caloocan City, having a total area of 8,694 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 270921,[6] 270922[7] and 270923.[8] Prior to their subdivision, the lots were collectively designated as Lot 1-G of the subdivision plan Psd-2731 registered in the name of Phil-Ville under TCT No. T148220.[9] Said parcels of land form part of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994[10] registered on May 3, 1917 in the name of Isabel Gil de Sola as the judicial administratrix of the estate of Gonzalo Tuason and thirty-one (31) others. Phil-Ville acquired the lots by purchase from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. on July 24, 1984. Earlier, on September 27, 1961, a group composed of Eleuteria Rivera, Bartolome P. Rivera, Josefa R. Aquino, Gregorio R. Aquino, Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancio R. Angeles, Felipe R. Angeles Fidela R. Angeles and Rosauro R. Aquino, claiming to be the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, a co-owner to the extent of 1-189/1000% of the properties covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994 of the Hacienda Maysilo, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 4557. They prayed for the substitution of their names on OCT No. 994 in place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. Said petition was granted by the CFI in an Order[11] dated May 25, 1962. Afterwards, the alleged heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a petition for the partition of the properties covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the CFI of Rizal, Branch 12, Caloocan City. On December 29, 1965, the CFI granted the petition and appointed three commissioners to determine the most equitable division of the properties.[12] Said commissioners, however, failed to submit a recommendation. Thirty-one (31) years later, on May 22, 1996, Eleuteria Rivera filed a Supplemental Motion[13] in Civil Case No. C-424, for the partition and segregation of portions of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, of Caloocan City, through Judge Jaime D. Discaya, to whom the case was transferred, granted said motion. In an Order[14] dated September 9, 1996, Judge Discaya directed the segregation of portions of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 and ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to issue to Eleuteria Rivera new certificates of title over them. Three days later, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, Yolanda O. Alfonso, issued to Eleuteria Rivera TCT No. C-314537[15] covering a portion of Lot 23 with an area of 14,391.54 square meters. On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued another Order directing the acting Branch Clerk to issue a Certificate of Finality of the Order dated September 9, 1996.

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Thereafter, one Rosauro R. Aquino filed a petition for certiorari contesting said Order of December 12, 1996 and impugning the partial partition and adjudication to Eleuteria Rivera of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43034 at the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of possession[16] was issued in Eleuteria Rivera’s favor on December 26, 1996 upon the Order[17] of Judge Discaya issued on the same date. Accordingly, Sheriff Cesar L. Cruz served a Notice to Vacate[18] dated January 2, 1997 upon Phil-Ville, requiring it to vacate Lots 23-A and 28. Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc., which occupied Lot 28-A-2, was also served a copy of the notice. Aggrieved, Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43009, before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision[19] dated February 19, 1997, the appellate court set aside and declared as void the Order and Writ of Possession dated December 26, 1996 and the Notice to Vacate dated January 2, 1997. The appellate court explained that a party who has not been impleaded in a case cannot be bound by a writ of possession issued in connection therewith. Subsequently, on February 22, 1997, Eleuteria Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio died at the age of 96.[20] On April 23, 1997, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 137 creating a special committee to investigate the circumstances surrounding the issuance of OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles. On April 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034 granting Rosauro R. Aquino’s petition and setting aside the RTC’s Order of September 9, 1996, which granted Eleuteria Rivera’s prayer for partition and adjudicated in her favor portions of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate. The appellate court likewise set aside the Order and the Writ of Possession dated December 26, 1996. Nonetheless, on June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against the surviving heirs of Eleuteria Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio (namely Maximo R. Bonifacio, Ceferino R. Bonifacio, Apolonia B. Tan, Benita B. Caina, Crispina B. Pascual, Rosalia B. de Gracia, Teresita S. Doronia, Christina B. Goco, Arsenio C. Bonifacio, Carmen B. Bernardino and Danilo C. Bonifacio) and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-507 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 122. On October 7, 1997, then Senator Marcelo B. Fernan filed P.S. Resolution No. 1032 directing the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement to conduct a thorough investigation, in aid of legislation, of the irregularities surrounding the titling of the properties in the Maysilo Estate.

In a Decision[22] dated March 24, 2000, the Caloocan RTC ordered the quieting of Phil-Ville’s titles over Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, declaring as valid TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in Phil-Ville’s name. The fallo of said Decision reads: WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Ordering the quieting of title of the plaintiff over Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, all the subd. plan Psd-1-13-006209, being a portion of Lot 1-G, Psd-2731, LRC Rec. No. 4429, situated in Kalookan City, as owner thereof in fee simple and with full faith and credit; 2. Declaring Transfer Ce[r]tificates of Title Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in the name of Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation over the foregoing parcels of land issued by the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, as valid and effective; 3. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-314537 over Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate situated in Maysilo, Kalookan City, in the name of Eleuteria Rivera, issued by the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, as null and void and with no force and effect; 4. Ordering the private defendants to surrender to the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, thru this Court, the Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera; 5. Directing the public defendant, Register of Deeds of Kalookan City to cancel both Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera on file with the Register of Deeds for Kalookan City, and the Owner’s Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-314537 being required to be surrendered by the private defendants; and 6. Ordering the private defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[23] In upholding Phil-Ville’s titles, the trial court adopted the conclusion in Senate Committee Report No. 1031[24] dated May 25, 1998 that there is only one OCT No. 994, registered on May 3, 1917, and that OCT No. 994, purportedly registered on April 19, 1917 (from which Eleuteria Rivera’s title originated) does not exist. The trial court also found that it was physically impossible for respondents to be the heirs of Eleuteria Rivera’s grandmother, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of OCT No. 994, because Maria de la Concepcion was born sometime in 1903, later than Eleuteria Rivera who was born in 1901.[25] Lastly, the RTC pointed out that contrary to the contentions of Rivera’s heirs, there is no overlapping of titles inasmuch as Lot 23 lies far from Lot 23-A, where Phil-Ville’s lands are located.

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On April 13, 2000, Atty. K.V. Faylona, on behalf of respondents, addressed a letter[26] to the Branch Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City RTC requesting the complete address of Phil-Ville and its counsel. Supposedly, respondents’ counsels of record, Attys. Nicomedes Tolentino and Jerry D. Bañares, had abandoned the defense but still kept the records of the case. Thus, the Notice of Appeal[27] on behalf of respondents was filed by Atty. Faylona while two of the heirs, Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino, filed a separate Notice of Appeal[28] through their own counsel. The appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66547. On April 17, 2000, respondents withdrew their appeal and instead filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[29] which was docketed as G.R. No. 142640. In a Resolution[30] dated September 25, 2000, the Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits since the case does not involve pure questions of law. Respondents moved for reconsideration of the Resolution, but the Court denied their motion. Thus, respondents’ petition was transferred to the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62211. Meanwhile, on October 17, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[31] in CAG.R. CV No. 66547, dismissing the appeal as regards Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino. Yet, along with Danilo and Carmen, respondents moved for reconsideration on the contention that they are not bound by the judgment since they had withdrawn their appeal therein. The Court of Appeals denied said motion in a Resolution dated June 7, 2004. Danilo, Carmen and respondents elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 163397. Said petition, however, was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated September 8, 2004 for being filed out of time. Subsequently, on January 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211, setting aside the RTC judgment and dismissing PhilVille’s complaint. The appellate court held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear PhilVille’s complaint as it effectively seeks to annul the Order dated May 25, 1962 of the CFI in LRC No. 4557, which directed the substitution of the late Eleuteria Rivera and her coheirs in place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as registered owners on OCT No. 994. The appellate court likewise affirmed the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 citing the Supreme Court Decisions in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals[32] and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals[33] as precedents. Phil-Ville sought reconsideration[34] of the decision, but the Court of Appeals denied its motion in the assailed Resolution dated March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that: I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF RESPONDENTS MAXIMO BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-G.R SP NO. 62211 BECAUSE OF THE EARLIER DISMISSAL OF THEIR APPEAL IN CA-G.R NO. 66547. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY RESPONDENTS MAXIMO BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-G.R. NO. SP 62211 WHICH DOES NOT RAISE PURE QUESTION[S] OF LAW OR ISSUE[S] OF JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE THE PROPER REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THEM IS ORDINARY APPEAL WHICH, AS STATED, HAD ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 66547. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON THE COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE FILED BY PETITIONER PHIL-VILLE IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-507, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IN FAILING TO DECLARE RESPONDENTS MAXIMO [BONIFACIO], ET AL. ALREADY IN ESTOPPEL TO RAISE THE SAID ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.[35] Condensed, petitioner puts in issue the following: (1) whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of respondents’ petition; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the trial court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. C-507. Pertinently, however, the genuine issue in this case is whether TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over petitioner’s titles over portions of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate. Petitioner argues mainly that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in resolving respondents’ petition for review since it had dismissed their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547 for failure to file brief. Petitioner also points out that respondents’ petition is defective because Maximo Bonifacio alone signed its verification and certification of nonforum shopping without proof that he was authorized to sign for the other respondents. It contends that the ruling in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals will not invalidate its titles because it is not a party to any of said cases. As well, petitioner invokes the finding in the joint investigation by the Senate and the Department of Justice (DOJ) that there is only one OCT No. 994, that is, the one registered on May 3,

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1917. It maintains that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear its action since it is one for quieting of title and not for annulment of the CFI Order dated May 25, 1962. Conversely, respondents rely on MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that upheld the titles emanating from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. Therefore, they insist that petitioner has no cause of action to seek the nullification of their title which is a derivative of said OCT. Respondents reiterate that since they had withdrawn their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547, the Court of Appeals decision therein applies only to Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino. Lastly, they believe that petitioner’s action is one for annulment of judgment, which is foreign to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner argues in its first two assignments of errors that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining respondents’ petition. However, said contention deserves scant consideration since the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211, properly assumed jurisdiction over respondents’ case after the same was referred to it by this Court through our Resolution dated September 25, 2000. The issue raised by respondents, as petitioners in G.R. No. 142640, was purely a question of fact that is beyond the power of this Court to resolve. Essentially, respondents asked the Court to determine the ownership of the lots purportedly covered by petitioner’s titles. Neither do we find merit in petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547 is binding on respondents. The appellate court itself recognized the withdrawal of appeal filed by respondents, thus: … However, defendants Maximo R. Bonifacio, et al. withdrew their appeal so that the only appellants herein are defendants-appellants Danilo R. Bonifacio, et al.[36] So did the trial court err in taking cognizance of petitioner’s action for quieting of title contrary to respondents’ assertion that it is actually one for annulment of the CFI Order dated May 25, 1962? To this query, we rule in the negative. The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief.[37] In its complaint, petitioner alleges: 27. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera, although apparently valid and effective, are in truth and in fact invalid and ineffective[;] 27.1. An examination of Decree No. 36455 issued on April 19, 1917 in LRC Case No. 4429 and also of OCT No. 994 which was issued … pursuant thereto will show that

Lot 23 covered by the said TCT No. C-3145[3]7 of the late Eleuteria Rivera is not one of the 34 parcels of land covered by said Decree No. 36455 and OCT 994; 27.2. That, as hereinbefore stated, the same TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera is a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917. The fact, however, is that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued … pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in LRC Case No. 4429 and said OCT 994 was registered with the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. The Office of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City or of Malabon or of Pasig City has no record of any OCT No. 994 that was allegedly registered on April 19, 1917; 27.3. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera could not cover Lot 23-A or any portion/s thereof because, as hereinbefore recited, the whole of Lot 23-A had been totally disposed of as early as July 24, 1923 and she and/or any of her alleged predecessors-in-interest is not among those named in the memorandum of encumbrances of OCT No. 994 as vendees or vendors of said Lot 23-A;[38] Ultimately, petitioner submits that a cloud exists over its titles because TCT No. C314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera purports to cover the same parcels of land covered by petitioner’s TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. It points out that what appears to be a valid and effective TCT No. C-314537 is, in truth, invalid because it covers Lot 23 which is not among those described in the OCT No. 994 on file with the Register of Deeds of Rizal and registered on May 3, 1917. Petitioner notes that the OCT No. 994 allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 and from which TCT No. C-314537 was derived, is not found in the records of the Register of Deeds. In other words, the action seeks the removal of a cloud from Phil-Ville’s title and/or the confirmation of its ownership over the disputed properties as the successor-in-interest of N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.[39] In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property

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subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite itsprima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.[40] As regards the first requisite, we find that petitioner was able to establish its title over the real properties subject of this action. Petitioner submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[41] by which it acquired the subject property from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc., as well as copies of OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and all the derivative titles leading to the issuance of TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in petitioner’s name as follows: Title No. 8004 8059 8160 8164 8321 8734 12946 28315 39163 43559 18767 57541

Registration Date July 24, 1923 September 3, 1923 October 24, 1923 November 6, 1923 February 26, 1924 September 11, 1924 November 21, 1927 July 16, 1935 November 18, 1939 July 26, 1941 June 16, 1950 March 13, 1958

Holder Vedasto Galino -ditto-dittoJuan Cruz Sanchez -dittoEmilio Sanchez -dittoEastern Syndicate Mining Co., Inc. Royal Lawrence Rutter Mapua Institute of Technology Sofia Nepomuceno Leona N. de Jesus, Pacifico Nepomuceno, Sofia Nepomuceno, Soledad Nepomuceno de Jesus 81679 December 15, 1960 Pacifico Nepomuceno, Sofia N. Jugo, Soledad N. de Jesus (81680) 17745 December 15, 1960 Pacifico Nepomuceno & Co. C-13794 April 21, 1978 Pacifico Nepomuceno & Co. Inc. C-14603 May 16, 1978 N. de La Merced & Sons, Inc. T-148220 April 22, 1987 Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp.[42] Petitioner likewise presented the Proyecto de particion de la Hacienda de Maysilo[43] to prove that Lot 23-A, of which petitioner’s Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 form part, is among the 34 lots covered by OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. It produced tax receipts accompanied by a Certification[44] dated September 15, 1997 issued by the City Treasurer of Caloocan stating that Phil-Ville has been religiously paying realty taxes on the lots. Its documentary evidence also includes a Plan[45] prepared by the Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division showing that Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate is remotely situated from Lot 23 portion of the Maysilo Estate. Petitioner ties these pieces of evidence to the finding in the DOJ Committee Report[46] dated August 28, 1997 and Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998 that, indeed, there is only one OCT No. 994, that is, the one registered on May 3, 1917.

On the other hand, respondents have not adduced competent evidence to establish their title to the contested property or to dispute petitioner’s claim over the same. It must be noted that the RTC Order dated September 9, 1996 in Civil Case No. C-424, which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera had long been set aside by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034. Clearly, respondents’ claim anchored primarily on TCT No. C-314537 lacks legal basis. Rather, they rely simply on the Court’s pronouncement in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 and all titles emanating from it are void. The Supreme Court sustained said decisions in the case of Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation[47] promulgated on November 29, 2005. In said case, the Court declared void the titles of the Manotoks and Aranetas which were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 consistent with its ruling in MWSS andGonzaga. The Court disregarded the DOJ and Senate reports on the alleged anomalies surrounding the titling of the Maysilo Estate. However, on motion for reconsideration, the Court issued a Resolution[48] dated December 14, 2007 which created a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the consolidated cases on remand. The Special Division was tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to the Court a report on its findings as well as recommend conclusions within three months from the finality of said Resolution. However, to guide the proceedings before the Special Division, the Court laid the following definitive conclusions: … First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect. Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles. Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS [and] Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994

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dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.[49] (Emphasis supplied.) Eventually, on March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution[50] reversing its Decision of November 29, 2005 and declaring certain titles in the names of Araneta and Manotok valid. In the course of discussing the flaws of Jose Dimson’s title based on his alleged 25% share in the hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera, Eleuteria Rivera’s co-petitioner in LRC No. 4557, the Court noted: … However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496). It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born only on [1903]. This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Rivera’s alleged grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.[51] The same is true in this case. The Death Certificate[52] of Eleuteria Rivera reveals that she was 96 years old when she died on February 22, 1997. That means that she must have been born in 1901. That makes Rivera two years older than her alleged grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal who was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible for Eleuteria Rivera to be an heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. Moreover, the Partition Plan of the Maysilo Estate shows that Lot 23-A was awarded, not to Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, but to Isabel Tuason, Esperanza Tuason, Trinidad Jurado, Juan O’ Farrell and Angel O’ Farrell.[53] What Vidal received as her share were Lot 6 and portions of Lots 10 and 17, all subject to the usufructuary right of her mother Mercedes Delgado. This was not at all disputed by respondents. On the other hand, Vedasto Galino, who was the holder of TCT No. 8004 registered on July 24, 1923 and to whom petitioner traces its titles, was among the successful petitioners in Civil Case No. 391 entitled Rosario Negrao, et al. v. Concepcion Vidal, et al., who sought the issuance of bills of sale in favor of the actual occupants of certain portions of the Maysilo Estate. Be that as it may, the second requisite in an action for quieting of title requires that the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

the plan and are marked on the ground by Old Ps. cyl. conc. mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true;[54] (Emphasis supplied).

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

A parcel of land (Lot No. 1-G of the subdivision plan Psd-2731, being a portion of Lot 23A, Maysilo Estate, GLRO Rec. No. 4429), situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. Bounded on the North., by Calle A. Samson; on the East., by properties of Gregoria de Jesus, Arcadio de Jesus and Felix de Jesus; on the South., by properties of Lucas Bustamante and Patricio Galauran; and on the West., by property of Patricio Galauran; and Lot No. 1-E of the subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked ―1‖ on plan, being N.69 deg. 27’E., 1600.19 m. from BLLM No. 1, Mp. of Caloocan, more or less, thence S. 21 deg. 25’E., 44.78 m. to point 2; thence S. 14 deg. 57’E., 37.24 m. to point 3; thence S. 81 deg. 11’W., 20.28 m. to point 4; thence S. 86 deg. 06’W., 15.45 m. to point 5; thence N. 67 deg. 20’W., 15.91 m. to point 6; thence N. 35 deg. 19’W., 37.56 m. to point 7; thence N. 27 deg. 11’W., 12.17 m. to point 8; thence N. 19 deg. 26’W., 23.32 m. to point 9; thence N. 13 deg. 08’W., 28.25 m. to point 10; thence S. 78 deg. 45’W., 13.00 m. to point 11; thence N. 0 deg. 56’E., 48.92 m. to point 12; thence N. 89 deg. 13’E., 53.13 m. to point 13; thence S. 21 deg. 24’E., 67.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (8,694) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground points 1,2,3 and 13 by Old PLS conc. mons. point 4,6,7,8 and 9 by Old PLS stone mons.; points 5 to 10 and old stakes points 11 and 12 by PLS conc. mons. bearings true, declination 1 deg. 08’E., date of the original survey, Sept. 8-27, Oct. 4-21 and Nov. 17-18, 1911 and that of the subdivision survey, Oct. 14 and 15, 1927.[55](Emphasis supplied).

Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. The fourth element is not present in the case at bar. While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera is an instrument that appeared to be valid but was subsequently shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same parcels of land that are described in petitioner’s titles. Foremost, Rivera’s title embraces a land measuring 14,391.54 square meters while petitioner’s lands has an aggregate area of only 8,694 square meters. On the one hand, it may be argued that petitioner’s land could be subsumed within Rivera’s 14,391.54-square meter property. Yet, a comparison of the technical descriptions of the parties’ titles negates an overlapping of their boundaries. The technical description of respondents’ TCT No. C-314537 reads: A parcel of land (Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate) situated in Maysilo, Caloocan, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2 by Blk. 2; on the SW., along line 2-3 by Jacinto Street, along lines 3-4-5 by Blk. 4; along line 5-6 by Bustan St., and San Diego St., on the S., along lines 6-7-8 by Blk. 13, all of Caloocan Cadastre; on the NE., along line 8-9 by Caloocan Cadastre; and on the N., along line 9-1 by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. Beginning at a point marked ―1‖ on plan, being S. 28 deg. 30’E., 530.50 m. from MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre; thence S. 07 deg. 20’W., 34.00 m. to point 2; S. 17 deg. 10’E., 12.00 m. to point 3; (0/illegible) S. 15 deg. 31’E., 31.00 m. to point 4; S. 27 deg. 23’E., 22.50 m. to point 5; S. 38 deg. 41’E., 43.20 m. to point 6; S. 71 deg. 35’E., 10.60 m. to point 7; N. 84 deg. 30’E., 38.80 m. to point 8; N. 11 deg. 40’W., 131.20 m. to point 9; N. 89 deg. 10’W., 55.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY ONE SQUARE METERS AND FIFTY FOUR SQUARE DECIMETERS (14,391.54). more or less. All points referred to are indicated on

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On the other hand, the technical description of petitioner’s lands before they were subdivided under TCT No. T-148220 is as follows:

Such disparity in location is more vividly illustrated in the Plan prepared by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division, showing the relative positions of Lots 23 and 23-A. As it appears on the Plan, the land covered by respondents’ TCT No. C-314537 lies far west of petitioner’s lands under TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. Strictly speaking, therefore, the existence of TCT No. C-314537 is not prejudicial to petitioner’s titles insofar as it pertains to a different land. Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding quasi in rem.[56] In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named a defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgment therein is binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.[57]

Yet, petitioner was well aware that the lots encompassed by its titles are not the same as that covered by respondents’ title. In its complaint, Phil-Ville alleges: 27.4. That Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate, as described in said TCT No. C314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera when plotted using its tie line to MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre is outside Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate. This must be so because Lot 23 is not [a] portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo Estate….[58] This brings petitioner’s action within the purview of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on Declaratory Relief. Section 1 of Rule 63 provides:

Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate that respondents’ TCT No. C314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over its title, it has nevertheless successfully established its ownership over the subject properties and the validity of its titles which entitles it to declaratory relief. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31, 2005 and Resolution dated March 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 24, 2000 of the Caloocan RTC in Civil Case No. C-507 is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.-Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis supplied). An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title after it was served a notice to vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the subject properties. Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant thereto. And although petitioner’s complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages, all that petitioner prayed for, is for the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that of respondents’. This is consistent with the nature of the relief in an action for declaratory relief where the judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay damages or to perform any act.[59]

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SO ORDERED. SPS HIPOLITO VS CINCO Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts[1] by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] are the May 19, 2006 Decision[3] and August 15, 2006 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 which dismissed petitioners’ Petition for Review and denied their Motion for Reconsideration respectively. Said assailed CA Decision which affirmed the February 28, 2005 Resolution[5] of the Office of the President (OP), in O.P. Case No. 04-F-262, states, viz: In fine, we hold that public respondent Office of the President, in affirming the resolution of the Secretary of the DPWH which sustained the resolution and the demolition order of the OBO, committed no grave abuse of discretion, the same being supported by evidence and having been issued in accordance with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated February 28, 2005 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, issued through the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs in O.P. Case No. 04-F-262, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.[6] Petitioners beseech this Court to reverse and set aside said Decision and consequently, to alter a string of consistent Resolutions issued by the OP in the said O.P. Case No. F262, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in NBC

Case No. 17-03-I-MLA,[7] and the Office of the Building Official (OBO) of the City of Manila in NBC Case No. NG-2002-06.[8]

on October 7, 2002. A report on the ocular inspection conducted was thereafter submitted through a Memorandum[14] dated October 8, 2002, which states:

Factual Antecedents

x x x The subject structure is a 3-storey at the rear portion and Two (2)[-] storey at the front made up of wooden materials with G.I. sheet roofings.

Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (petitioners) allege that on June 15, 1989, Edeltrudis Hipolito y Mariano (Edeltrudis)[9] entered into an agreement[10] with Francisco Villena[11] (now deceased) to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building without securing a building permit. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis. In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena, all residing in the property, were informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976. On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, Teresita Cinco and Dr. Carlota Balde Cinco (respondents) filed with the OBO a verified request[12] for structural inspection of an old structure located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila. Acting on the request, Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. Rico (Engr. Rico) conducted an initial inspection. In his memorandum Engr. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden materials were found in the premises and recommended that the matter be referred to the Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate action and disposition. Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement pursuant to the National Building Code (NBC) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the verified request of the respondents was referred to the Committee for Hearing/ Investigation. With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, three hearings were subsequently held from August 12, 2002 to September 20, 2002 for purposes of resolving the focal issue of ―the structural stability, architectural presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the subject buildings are still safe for continued occupancy.‖[13] On September 20, 2002, Victoria Villena, wife and heir of Francisco Villena and owner of one of the two buildings, filed a counter manifestation questioning respondents’ personality to file the petition for condemnation, and refuting the technical evaluation reports of Engr. Rico and respondents’ commissioned engineer. Whereupon, the Committee was constrained to schedule an ocular inspection of the subject buildings

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II.

Findings:

1. Corrugated G.I. sheet roofings and its accessories incurred extensive deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering. 2.

Ceiling boards [bulging] attributed to water leaks from defective roofing.

3.

Exterior and interior wooden boards deteriorated.

4.

Doors/windows including its jambs deteriorated/[dilapidated].

5.

No provisions of firewall on the sides abutting private lot.

6.

Rafters, purlins, and girts deteriorated due to neglect of maintenance.

7. Vibrations were felt on the wooden flooring when exerting wt. An indication that its support suffered [material] fatigue due to wear and tear and termite infestation. 8. Wooden columns incurred deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering and termite infestation. 9.

Open wiring installation/fire hazard.

10. With notices of condemned installation No. 2K3-62042 EPM issued by OIC, City Electrical Division, DEPW. 11.

Inadequate water supply and drainage system.

12.

Outmoded T & G due to neglect of maintenance.

13.

Inadequate sanitary/plumbing installation.

III. RECOMMENDATION: From the foregoing, the subject buildings [appear] to have incurred extensive deterioration/[dilapidation] [attributed] mainly to long weather exposure, poor maintenance and termite infestation on its architectural and structural components by 60-80% which constitutes an Architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as fire and electrical hazard thereby endangering the life, safety, health and welfare [of] the general public

specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly recommended that the subject building be declared dangerous and ruinous in pursuance of Sec. 214 and 215 and Rules VII and Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1096. Ruling of the Office of the Building Official In a Resolution[15] dated March 26, 2003, the OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and recommended their demolition, to wit: xxxx On the basis of the ocular inspection report submitted by the Committee on Buildings and the findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW which form part of this resolution, it appearing that the subject structures incurred an extensive degree of [dilapidation]/deterioration by 60-80% attributed mainly to long weather exposure, termite infestation and neglect of maintenance on its architectural and structural component which constitute architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as electrical hazards thereby endangering the life, health property and welfare of the general public particularly the tenants thereat [sic]. Such sorry condition of said structures exist to the extent that remedial/ rehabilitation which is no longer practical and economical as it would entail/ necessitate a total overdone thereof [sic]. WHEREFORE, premises considered the Committee on Buildings and in consonance with the findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW the subject buildings are hereby found and declared Dangerous and Ruinous and strongly recommending the issuance of the corresponding Demolition Order in pursuance of Section[s] 214 and 215 of the National Building Code and Rule VII and VIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations further directing the tenants/ occupants thereat to vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to pave the way for its peaceful and orderly [d]emolition activity. SO ORDERED. A Demolition Order[16] addressed to the respondents was accordingly issued on even date with petitioners and their tenants duly furnished with a copy thereof. Petitioners thus appealed[17] to the DPWH. Ruling of the Department of Public Works and Highways In their appeal, petitioners prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the OBO and for the setting aside of the Demolition Order on the ground that same were anomalously issued. They likewise contended that respondents’ petition for condemnation was actually

22

an attempt to circumvent their rights as builders in good faith. Petitioners prayed for a separate inspection of the two buildings by an impartial body. Thus, another ocular inspection was conducted by the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH to determine the actual physical condition of the subject buildings. The Inspectorate Team reported thus: There are two (2) Buildings/Structures subject of this appeal. For proper identification of the two (2) Storey Residential Building located at front No. 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, is designated as Building I while the Three (3) Storey Residential Building located at the rear portion is designated as [B]uilding 2. Building 1 Building I is pre-war vintage (t)wo (2)[-](s)torey structure generally made of wooden materials. Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and its accessories are extensively corroded and deteriorated due to long existence, weather exposure and improper maintenance. Gutters and [down spouts] are already missing. Interior and exterior wooden board partitions are deteriorated by about eighty percent (80%). Roof eaves and media agues are deteriorated and some wooden members are ready to collapse. Doors and windows including [their] jambs are deteriorated by about eighty percent (80%). Wooden stair[s] leading to second floor is rotten and deteriorated due to long existence and termite infestation. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration can be felt when walking on it. Plywood ceiling boards are deteriorated by about eighty percent (80%). The wooden roof framing parts such as rafters, purlins, and girts are rotten. Majority of the wooden posts are termite infested and deteriorated. The wooden beams and floor joists are noted to have incurred deterioration. Vibration is felt at the second floor wooden flooring when walked upon, an indication that its wooden structural supports show signs of material fatigue due to wear and tear and termite infestation. Structural components of the structure were observed to have deteriorated by about seventy five percent (75%). Sanitary/Plumbing fixtures and systems within the building are noted outmoded, inadequate and not properly maintained. Inadequate water supply and drainage system within the building is noted. The comfort room is useable and functioning but is not properly ventilated and unsanitary. The electrical wiring insulation shows sign of brittleness due to excessive exposure to ambient heat, moisture and time element. Excessive octopus connections and dangling of wires/extensions [sic] cords are observed. Some switches and convenience outlets are detached and defective. Junction/pullboxes are not properly covered thus exposing electrical wiring connections. Some electrical wiring installations

are attached to deteriorated parts of the building. The electrical wiring installations are already old, not properly maintained and inadequate to conform to the rules and regulations of the Philippine Electrical Code (PEC). Building 2 Building 2 is a three (3)[-](s)torey structure located at the back of the Building I, and the usage is purely for residential purposes. The building is constructed [out] of wooden materials, corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and plain G.I. sheets for its accessories. The said building was constructed sometime in 1989, however, the construction is not in accordance with the standard and the requirements of the National Building Code (PD 1096). Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets are corroded and deterioration is about seventy percent (70%). [Down spouts] and gutters are no longer in place. Interior and exterior wooden board sidings have incurred about sixty percent (60%) deterioration. Some rooms have no proper ventilation due to excessive partitioning. Eaves [have] no ceiling. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration is felt when walked upon due to undersized wooden framing. Substandard ceiling height. Plywood ceiling boards are bulging. No fire resistive wall provided between the two buildings.

been built by Ediltrudis Villena on the subject property in the hearing/investigation of the case was within the bounds of the duties and responsibilities of the OBO. In the said proceedings, the Building Official shall not delve on issues affecting contract involving the property or of the building subject of the case or of lessee-lessor relationship, since those are matters within the competence of the court to pass upon. Appellants’ allegation that inspection of the premises was done without their participation and [that they were] not given the chance to engage the services of an engineer deserves scant consideration. Records revealed that appellants who actively participated in the proceedings of the case were duly furnished with copies of appellees’ petition for condemnation and the technical evaluation report of their (appellees) commissioned engineer, and were enjoined to submit their counter technical report. They however failed to comply. Appellants who at the same time are residents of the building subject of the proceedings could have easily participated or hire[d] an engineer to represent them in the inspection conducted by the Committee on Buildings on the premises as they were duly notified about it and of which they signified their conformity during the hearing on September 20, 2002. x x x[20] Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal[21] with the OP.

As to the Structural, Sanitary/Plumbing and Electrical aspects, Building 2 has the same findings as in Building I. From the foregoing, it appears that the subject building attained a degree of dilapidation that repair works are no longer practical and economical to undertake. Therefore, it is recommended that the Demolition Order issued by the OBO, Manila be sustained.[18] On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a Resolution[19] dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and the issuance of the Demolition Order. In the same Resolution, the Secretary of the DPWH opined: In condemnation proceedings of dangerous and ruinous building pursuant to the National Building Code (NBC) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the authority of the Building Official is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building sought to be condemned and abated, and depending on the degree of its deterioration and dilapidation, to issue appropriate order, taking into consideration the welfare and safety not only of its occupants, but the public in general as well. Corollary thereto, said official is mandated under the Code, even in the absence of a petitioner or complainant, to motu propio initiate condemnation proceedings of reported dangerous and ruinous buildings. The inclusion thereof of the 3-storey building which appellant claims to have

23

Ruling of the Office of the President Before the OP, the petitioners asserted that the findings of the DPWH Inspectorate Team is erroneous and that they are builders in good faith. However, the OP found no reversible error to justify the reversal or modification of the DPWH Resolution, and thus resolved to dismiss the appeal in a Resolution[22] dated February 28, 2005. The OP likewise subsequently denied with finality Reconsideration[23] in an Order[24] dated April 25, 2005.

petitioners’

Motion

for

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review[25] with the CA. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Before the CA, petitioners again raised the issues they advanced before the administrative bodies, particularly the issue regarding the ownership of the lot vis-à-vis their right as builders in good faith. However, the CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the OP Resolution without addressing the issue of ownership. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] but same was denied in a Resolution[27] dated August 15, 2006 for being a mere rehash or repetition of the issues raised in the petition.

Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issues Petitioners raise the following issues: A. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES SUSTAINING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL OF MANILA. B. WHETHER X X X THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT OBSERVING THE CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS/DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE HEARING AND IN THE CONTENTS OF THE INSPECTION REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE INSPECTION TEAM INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OBO. C. WHETHER X X X [THE] OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL (OBO) OF MANILA OVERSTEPPED THE BOUNDS OF ITS AUTHORITY IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 482 AND ARTICLES 694 TO 707 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 215 OF THE BUILDING CODE P.D. 1096 IN THIS CASE.

At the outset, ―[i]t bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari [under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court], the scope of this Court’s judicial review of decisions of the [CA] is generally confined only to errors of law, and questions of fact are not entertained.‖[29] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.[30] More so, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh evidence pertaining to factual issues which have not been subject of any proper proceedings below. ―Well-entrenched and settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court adequately and on time need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.‖[31] The determination of who owns the subject property, the authenticity of the evidence of both parties, and whether petitioners are builders in good faith are questions of fact, the resolution of which requires the examination of evidence that should be ventilated in a separate action brought before a proper forum. As correctly stated by the Secretary of the DPWH in its Resolution,[32] the administrative agencies’ jurisdiction in this case is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building sought to be condemned and the issuance of the appropriate order relative thereto. Issues affecting contract involving the property or of the buildings subject of the case are not within their competence to rule upon. Lest this Court becomes a court of first instance instead of a court of last resort, we decline to act on matters that have not run the proper legal course. Nevertheless, we note that petitioners’ purported right to occupy the property has already ended two years ago when the 20-year period of the lease agreement expired in year 2009. There being no provision in the contract, tacit or otherwise, for renewal or extension of the lease, petitioners no longer have basis to keep hold of Building 2. Hence, the determination of whether petitioners are builders in good faith is no longer necessary.

D. WHETHER X X X THE PETITIONER[S] OR THEIR PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST [ARE]/IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE 3[-]STOREY APARTMENT BUILDING LOCATED AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE PROPERTY AND REFERRED TO AS BLDG. 2.

As to the other issues, suffice it to say that they boil down to the question of whether the issuance of the OBO Resolution and Demolition Order was proper, and whether the CA erred when it affirmed the Resolutions of the OP and the Secretary of the DPWH, which in turn, likewise affirmed the said OBO Resolution. A Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation and demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.

E.

Our Ruling

―[I]t is unquestionable that the Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation and demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.‖[33] This authority emanates from Sections 214 and 215 of the National Building Code (Presidential Decree [P.D.] No. 1096) which provides:

The petition lacks merit.

Section 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures

WHETHER X X X THE ACTION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE IS PROPER IN THIS CASE.[28]

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Dangerous buildings are those which are herein declared as such or are structurally unsafe or not provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in relation to existing use, constitute a hazard to safety or health or public welfare because of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment; or which otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or the community to an intolerable degree. Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. There is, therefore, no question as to the authority of the OBO to render the challenged issuances. Here, the Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned Demolition Order in view of his finding that the disputed structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the purview of P.D. No. 1096, in relation to its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which the resolution and demolition order were issued is evident. As found by the CA, the records show that the OBO issued the resolution and Demolition Order only after ocular inspections and hearings were conducted. Notably, the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH came up with the same conclusion as the OBO when it conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises, that is both Buildings 1 and 2 had structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%.[34] What is more, contrary to the position of the petitioners that the provisions of the Civil Code on abatement of nuisances should have been applied in their case, the fact that the buildings in question could also constitute nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official from issuing the assailed Demolition Order. As provided by P.D. No. 1096, the authority of the Building Official to order the repair, vacation or demolition, as the case may be, is without prejudice to further action that may be undertaken under the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.[35] The position taken by petitioners that the OBO is duty-bound to first order the repair of ruinous and dangerous buildings is erroneous. Petitioners, in their Memorandum,[36] quoted Section 215 of the National Building Code, thus:

danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.[37] A careful reading of the provision shows that it does not require the OBO to take actions in the same order or sequence that Section 215 enumerates them. Instead, it authorizes the Building Official to order either the repair, vacation, or demolition of the building depending on the circumstances presented before it, particularly on the degree of danger to life, health and safety. In the case at bench, the OBO, based on its assessment of the buildings, deemed it necessary to recommend and order the demolition of the said buildings, having found them dilapidated and deteriorated by up to 80%. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the resolution issued by the Office of the President Petitioners find error in the CA’s reliance on the report of the OBO in affirming the resolution of the OP. Petitioners contend that the initiation of the proceedings in the OBO was calculated to oust them from the property and to circumvent their rights as builders in good faith thereby making the findings and issuances of the OBO unreliable. Petitioners thus beseech this Court to ascertain facts that have already been determined by the administrative agencies involved and thereafter reviewed and affirmed by the CA. We find the contention without merit. The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly received, on reported dangerous and ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the life, health and well-being of the inhabitants, and the general public. Hence, the OBO, based on its findings, can still act on the matter pursuant to such mandate, notwithstanding petitioners’ claim that respondents initiated the proceedings to circumvent their rights under the law as builders in good faith. Otherwise stated, respondents’ motive in initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the challenged OBO Resolution and Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or structure is dangerous and ruinous.

Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings

Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the manner that officials of the OBO performed their duties and in coming up with its Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was affirmed by the CA when it resolved the petition before it.

When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of

We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the findings of fact of the OBO and the other administrative bodies. As correctly stated by the CA in its Decision:

25

comes into its hands, putting together every piece of the puzzle to come up with the whole picture of the controversy brought before it. That is no easy task. The powers granted by law, particularly the National Building Code to the Building Official regarding demolition of buildings are executive and administrative in nature. It is a wellrecognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion and findings of fact. The established exception to the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. None of these obtains in the case at bar. (Citations omitted.)[38]

―By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts.‖[39] Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.[40] It is not the task of the appellate court to once again weigh the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment regarding sufficiency of evidence.[41]

Similarly, this Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling reasons to do so. This Court, in numerous occasions, has cited exceptions to the general rule that it is not a trier of facts. None of the said exceptions is present in this case. The conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved after thoroughly conducting their ocular inspections and hearings and considering all pieces of evidence presented before them, which finding was affirmed by the CA, must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.

We take this opportunity to inform petitioners that the appellate court cannot be expected to actually perform the inspection itself for purposes of validating the findings of the administrative bodies. Reliance on findings of fact of the lower courts or, in this case, administrative bodies, does not mean that the appellate court does not conduct its own review. In fact, the appellate court painstakingly studies every piece of document that

26

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.