Updates and Pointers in Pafr (Bar 2017)

UPDATES AND POINTERS IN PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS FOR BAR EXAM 2017 (PROF. ELMER T. RABUYA) 1) The doctrine of processual presumption is also known as the doctrine of presumedidentity approach in International Law [Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)]. 2) All matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted. [Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)] 3) In Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem [744 SCRA 516 (2014)], a Dutch national, after divorcing his Filipino spouse, failed to support their child for several years. When charged with violation of R.A. No. 9262 for refusing and/or failing to give support to the child, he pleaded the law of the Netherlands to advance his position that he is not obliged to support his son. The Court held that even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, said foreign law cannot be applied in the Philippines because it is contrary to a sound and established policy of the forum and that, additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Thus notwithstanding his national law, his obligation to support his child is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto. 4) The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 of the NCC is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under this article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business [Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp., 734 SCRA 238 (2014)]. In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or

interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. [Id.] 5) In Republic vs. Albios [707 SCRA 584 (2013)], where a citizen of the Philippines got married to an American citizen solely for the purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of a sum of money, it was alleged that the marriage was void because it was one made in jest and consent was therefore lacking. In declaring the marriage to be valid, the Court ruled that that there is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. While the avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life, the possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 6) No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar unless the applicants present a Certificate of Compliance issued for free by the local Family Planning Office certifying that they had duly received adequate instructions and information on responsible parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition [Sec. 15, R.A. No. 10354, The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)]. 7) In Republic v. Dayot [550 SCRA 435 (2008)], the Supreme Court ruled that the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. In De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro [G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 162], the Court further clarified that the falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license, the Court explained in Dayot, is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. In Santiago v. People [G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015], the Court held that the falsity of an affidavit of cohabitation CANNOT be used as a defense in the crime of bigamy, for it will be the height of absurdity for the Court to allow the accused to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction. 8) In Ronulo v. People [728 SCRA 675 (2014)], a solemnizing officer from the Aglipayan Church was charged with violation of Article 352 of the RPC for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony because he solemnized the marriage knowing fully well that the parties did not have marriage license. The accused contended that he merely conducted a “blessing” and that in order for a marriage ceremony to exist, the law require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. In holding that the accused indeed performed a marriage ceremony, the Court ruled that the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony:

first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife. Both requirements were present in this case. 9) Three Important Legal Premises On Divorce : First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction. [Bayot vs. CA, G.R. No. 155635, Nov. 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472] 10) The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact [Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266; Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013)]. 11) The registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. The Court explained that while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect [Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266]. 12) Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code while the alien spouse can claim no right under said provision. The Court explained that the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Thus, if the Filipino spouse invokes the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the action is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. [Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266] 13) The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code is also applicable to a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Court explained that the principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the

foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. [Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013)] 14) In the case of San Luis v. San Luis [514 SCRA 294 (2007)], the Court held that there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code because there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to apply the rule embodied in said law to absolute divorces obtained by the foreign spouse prior to the effecivity of the Family Code, as exemplified by the cases of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera and Quita v. Court of Appeals. 15) In Garcia-Quiason v. Belen [G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013, 702 SCRA 707], the Court allowed a marriage to be declared void ab initio for being bigamous in a Petition for Letters of Administration filed by a compulsory heir. The Court, citing Niñal, ruled that any interested party may attack a void marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. [Note: Here, the marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Civil Code, hence, not covered by the Rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10SC] 16) In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental [G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638], the Court ruled that the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Since the cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of the second marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn the child’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171of the Family Code, respectively, it was held that the petition should be filed in a Family Court. NOTE: The case of Braza must be distinguished from the case of Republic vs. Olaybar [G.R. No. 189538, Feb. 10, 2014, 715 SCRA 605], involving a case of identity theft. In Olaybar, the respondent found out that someone stole her identity in contracting marriage to a Korean national. Upon such discovery, she immediately filed a petition for cancellation of entries in the marriage contract filed with the NSO, specifically the entries in the wife portion thereof. The Republic opposed the petition which it claimed to be actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the name of the respondent in the wife portion thereof, the Court held that the respondent did not seek the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of. 17) In void marriages, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation, are governed by Article 147 or 148, as the case may be. Exception: If the marriage is declared void by reason of non-compliance with Article 40 of the FC, the applicable property regime is absolute community, conjugal partnership, or complete separation, as the case may be. [Art. 43(2), in relation to Art. 50, FC; Valdez v. RTC, Br. 102, QC; and Diño v. Diño, 640 SCRA 178 (2011)]

18) A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, if the marriage is covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. However, the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy [Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 646 SCRA 753 (2011)]. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “ a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. [Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013)] 19) In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te [G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193], the Court revisited the Molina guidelines and put into question the applicability of said time-tested guidelines. However, in the subsequent cases of Ting v. Velez-Ting [G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.], Suazo v. Suazo [G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 514] and Agraviador v. Agraviador [G.R. 170729, Dec. 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519], the Court laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, it was clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. The Court also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. In the more recent case of Kalaw v. Fernandez [745 SCRA 512 (2015)], however, the Court, in granting the petition for declaration of nullity of a marriage based on Article 36, relied heavily on the teachings of Ngo Te. 20) In Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes [628 SCRA 461 (2010)], the Court emphasized that a recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability because recommendations for therapy are, in general, given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. As such, a recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable. 21) The Court applied Article 40 retroactively to cases where the second marriage took place prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and prior to the promulgation of the Wiegel case. In Jarillo v. People [G.R. No. 164435, Sep. 29, 2009; and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 24], the second marriage was celebrated on November 26, 1979; while in Montañez v. Cipriano [684 SCRA 315 (2012)], the second marriage took place on January 24, 1983. In both cases, the Court applied Article 40 retroactively in a criminal action for bigamy holding that said provision, being a rule of procedure, may be applied retroactively. 22) In Santos v. Santos [737 SCRA 637 (2014)], the Court ruled that a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith by the spouse present (who knew that the alleged absentee

spouse is alive), even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead, and does not validly terminate the first marriage. Hence, the subsequent marriage is void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Additionally, the Court ruled that if the presumptively dead spouse has not really been absent and the judicial declaration of presumptive death was obtained by reason of extrinsic fraud, the proper remedy available to the presumptively dead spouse is not the filing of an affidavit of reappearance but an action to annul the judgment declaring him/her presumptively dead. The Court reasoned out that if the presumptively dead spouse is to be limited to the filing of an affidavit of reappearance as his/her remedy, such remedy is not sufficient because: (1) it carries with it an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead; (2) if the subsequent marriage is terminated by mere recording of the affidavit of reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate; (3) the property relations of the spouse in the subsequent marriage will be the same as in valid marriages; and (4) a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. 23) In the case of Garcia v. Drilon [, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352], the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 (VAWCI), emphasizing that it does not violate the equal protection clause under the Constitution. In the cases of Garcia v. Drilon and Tua vs. Mangrobang [G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 428 (2014)], the Supreme Court also sustained the constitutionality of Section 15 of R.A. 9262. According to the Court, the grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process. 24) If the other spouse objects to the exercise of any profession, occupation, business or activity of the other and the court finds that such objection is proper, the resulting liability shall be borne by the following: (a) If benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection, the resulting obligation is chargeable to the absolute community or the conjugal partnership; (b) If benefit has accrued to the family after the objection, such obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. [Art. 73, FC; as amended by R.A. No. 10572] 25) In Hapitan vs. Sps. Lagradilla [G.R. No. 170004, January 13, 2016, 780 SCRA 288], the RTC declared the sale of conjugal property (house and lot) of the spouses null and void, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the husband entered into an amicable settlement with the other parties recognizing the validity of the sale previously declared void in the court’s decision. Since the husband made the amicable settlement over the wife’s objection, the latter questioned the validity of said settlement. The Court declared the amicable settlement void. The Court explained that by agreeing to the validity of the sale, the husband disposed of or waived his and the wife's rights over the house and lot and such disposal or waiver by the husband is not allowed by law. Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void. Further, under Article 89 of the Family Code, no

waiver of rights, interests, shares, and effects of the conjugal partnership of gains during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. Clearly, the wife did not consent to the husband’s disposing or waiving their rights over the house and lot through the Amicable Settlement. 26) In Flores v. Sps. Lindo [G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011], the RTC denied the creditor the right to judicially foreclose the mortgage on the ground that the mortgage of the conjugal property was made without the consent of the husband. In said case, the wife signed the promissory and note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of her husband, on October 31, 1995; but the Special Power of Attorney was executed by the husband only on November 5, 1995. When the case reached the Supreme Court, it was held that while the mortgage is void it is considered as a continuing offer and the subsequent execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract. 27) In Heirs of Patricio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola vs. Servacio [657 SCRA 10 (2011)], it was held that the disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code (which is the counterpart provision of Article 103 in the regime of conjugal partnership of gains) is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. Instead, the sale is valid insofar as the ideal share of the selling co-owner/co-heir in the property is concerned but without affecting the ideal shares of the other co-owners. 28) If the spouses got married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code without a marriage settlement, in which case the property relation is that of conjugal partnership under the Civil Code, may it be argued that pursuant to the transitory provisions of the Family Code such property relation was changed to absolute community when the Family Code took effect in 1988 considering that no vested or acquired rights are impaired? In Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. [G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 414], both the RTC and the CA took the position that such property relation was changed to absolute community upon the effectivity of the Family Code considering that no vested or acquired rights are impaired. The Supreme Court did not, however, agree as it ruled that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements. 29) In conjugal partnership, when the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse [Valdez, Jr. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 55 (2004); citing PNB vs. CA, 153 SCRA 435 (1987); see also Ruiz vs. CA, 449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003); Dela Pena vs. Avila, 665 SCRA 553 (2012)].  When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired, the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved [Lim vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 713 SCRA 555 (2014)]. Under Philippine law and jurisprudence, if the property is registered in the name of one of the spouses, with a description that he or she “is

married to” the other spouse, the same is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner [Orient Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014); Calalang-Parulan vs. CalalangGarcia, 725 SCRA 402 (2014) ; Dela Pena vs. Avila, 665 SCRA 553 (2012)]. Note that in numerous cases where the Court held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties [Orient Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)]. 30) But even if the property was acquired during the marriage, the presumption in favor of conjugality cannot be applied with respect to private lands if one of the spouses is an alien for this will be in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits aliens from acquiring private lands in the Philippines [Matthews vs. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584 , June 22, 2009]. 31) Article 122 of the Family Code allows payment of criminal indemnities even prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, so long as the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 have been covered. The Court explained that such is not altogether unfair since Article 122 of the Family Code states that “at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such (offending) spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.” [Dewara vs. Lamela, 647 SCRA 483 (2011), and Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., 687 SCRA 414 (2012)] 32) In the cases of Bautista v. Silva [G.R. No. 157434, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 334], Ravina v. Villa Abrille [604 SCRA 120 (2009)], and Aggabao v. Parulan, [Aggabao vs. Parulan, G.R. No.165803, Sep. 1, 2010], the Court erected a standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse. 33) If the subsequent marriage is void by reason of non-compliance with Article 40 (but the prior marriage is indeed void ab initio), the property relations of the parties to the subsequent marriage may either absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage [Diño vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178 (2011)]. As such, Sec. 19(1) of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, which requires the liquidation, partition and distribution of properties prior to the issuance of decree of nullity of the marriage applies only to a void marriage under Article 40 of the Family Code when said rule mentions of “decree of absolute nullity” and not to a marriage declared void by reason of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In the latter case, since the applicable property regime is that provided in Article 147 of the Family Code, the declaration of nullity can already be made even without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties because it is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in

the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. [Id.] 34) In Article 148, the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property [Adriano v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 474, cited in Saguid vs. CA, 403 SCRA 678 (2003)]. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title [Ventura, Jr. vs. Abuda, 708 SCRA 640 (2013)]. The words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner and such words do not prove co-ownership under Article 148 [Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702 (2013)]. 35) If the increase in value of a family home is by reason of an involuntary improvement, like the conversion into a residential area or the establishment of roads and other facilities, the one establishing the family home should not be punished by making his home liable to creditors [Eulegio v. Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103 (2015)]. Hence, the family home still enjoys protection from execution, force sale or attachment. If the value of the family home exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by the one establishing the family home, then Article 160 will apply. To warrant, therefore, the execution sale of the family home under Article 160, the following facts are required to be established: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. [Id.] 36) It is the rule that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, register, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of such third person [Perla v. Baring, 685 SCRA 101 (2012); Salas v. Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560 (2013)]. The foregoing rule does not, however, apply when there is a showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, as when he was the one who went to the Local Civil Registry and gave all the data about his child’s birth, or who caused the registration the child’s birth certificate [Arado v. Alcoran, 762 SCRA 37],or who supplied the information himself about child’s birth, including his paternity [Ilano v. CA, 230 SCRA 242 (1994)]. 37) For a public or private instrument to be considered competent evidence of paternity or filiation, the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a statement of admission of paternity or filiation; (2) It must be signed by the parent concerned [Salas v. Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560 (2013); Nepomuceno v. Lopez, 616 SCRA 145 (2010)] and (3) The admission must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative [Cenido v. Apacionado, 318 SCRA 688 (1999)]; otherwise, such recognition is ineffectual [Rivero v. CA, 458 SCRA 714]. 38) In the case of Dela Cruz v. Gracia [594 SCRA 648 (2009); reiterated in Aguilar v. Siasat, 748 SCRA 555 (2015)], the Court adopted the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument

wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: a) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. 39) In Perla v. Baring [685 SCRA 101 (2012)], the child offered the following testimony to prove his illegitimate filiation with the putative father: (1) that during their first encounter in 1994, the child called the alleged father as “Papa” and kissed his hand while the alleged father hugged him and promised to support him; and (2) that his alleged Aunt treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place. The Court ruled that such acts cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). The Court held that except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of the alleged father treating the child as his son. Neither may paternity be deduced from how the alleged father’s sister treated the child because in the mind of the Court, such actuations could have been done due to charity or some other reason. 40) In Grande v. Antonio [716 SCRA 698 (2014), the Court clarified that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255, gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. Hence, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. In the same case, the Court declared void the provision of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255, Office of Civil Registrar General (OCRG) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004, issued by the National Statistics Office-Office of the Civil Registrar General, which makes it mandatory on the part of illegitimate children to use the surname of their father upon recognition. 41) The Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption applies only to surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children as mentioned in R.A. No. 9523. Any of the following adoption proceedings in court does not require a Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption: (1) adoption of an illegitimate child by any of his/her biological parent; (2) adoption of a child by his/her step-parent; or (3) adoption of a child by a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity. [Sec. 4, IRR of R.A. No. 9523] 42) One of the exceptions to the rule of joint adoption by the spouses is when one spouse seeks to adopt his or her own illegitimate son/daughter. However, the law requires the spouse seeking to adopt his/her illegitimate child to first obtain the consent of his/her spouse. This requirement is mandatory according to the case of Castro v. Gregorio [738 SCRA 415 (2014)]. According to the Court, in all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified

through personal service of summons and it is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service; otherwise, the court does not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings and the decision of the court is null and void. 43) Under the Foster Care Act of 2012 (Sec. 17, R.A. No. 10165), in case adoption of the foster child by the designated foster parents, the trial custody period may be partially waived to the extent of the period equivalent to the period in which the foster child has been under the foster care of the foster parents; provided, that a harmonious relationship exists between the foster child, the foster parents, and, where applicable, the foster family. 44) When the adopter dies during the time that the adopted is still a minor or incapacitated, the parental authority of the biological parent is deemed to have been restored. Considering that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by adoption, there shall be no one left to care for minor adopted child if the adopter passed away, hence, the parental authority of the biological parent should be deemed to have been restored, applying by analogy the provisions of Section 20 of the DAA. [Bartolome v. SSS, 740 SCRA 78 (2014)] 45) Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent [Obiter Dictum in In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Naty Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 (2005)]. Also, the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of the adopted child pursuant to Article 190(2) of the Family Code [Obiter Dictum in Bartolome v. SSS, 740 SCRA 78 (2014)]. 46) The law says that the adoption decree “shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed” and that this rule “shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee [Sec. 13, DAA].” Hence, for purposes that are beneficial to the interest of the adopted child, the latter acquires the rights that are being enjoyed by legitimate children as of the date of the filing of the petition for adoption and not only at the time of the issuance of the adoption decree. However, no retroactive effect may be given to the granting of the petition for adoption for the purpose of imposing a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child [Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518 (1992)]. It must be emphasized that the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents may arise if the adopted child is not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort is committed. [Id.] 47) In the case of Castro v. Gregorio [738 SCRA 415 (2014)], the Court suggested that the remedy of annulment of judgment could be resorted to if the adoption was found to have been obtained fraudulently, which action must be brought within four years from discovery of the fraud. 48) In Lim v. Lim [604 SCRA 691 (2009)], the grandparents theorized that their liability

to give support to their legitimate grandchildren is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. The Court held that neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. Under the law, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. 49) When a child (foster child) is placed under foster care of foster parents pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 10165, the latter shall have the rights, duties and liabilities of persons exercising substitute parental authority, as may be provided under the Family Code over the children under their foster care (Sec. 6, RA No. 10165). Foster care is defined as the provision of planned temporary substitute parental care to a child by a foster parent [Sec. 3[f], RA No. 10165). However, they only have the rights of a person with special parental authority to discipline the foster children as defined under Family Code, insofar as it prohibits the infliction of corporal punishment upon the child. The infliction of corporal punishment by the Foster Parents shall be ground for revocation of the Foster Family Care License and termination of Foster Placement Authority [Sec. 8, R.A. No. 10165 and Rule 8, Part III, IRR of R.A. No. 10165]. 50) However, if the child is under the age of seven, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. Hence, the law provides that “no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” This is the so-called “tender-age presumption [Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, 461 SCRA 450, 476 (2005); Gamboa-Hirsch v. CA, G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007].” In the case of Dacasin v. Dacasin [611 SCRA 657 (2010)], the Court held that this statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code is mandatory and any agreement to the contrary is void. In this case, the Court declared void a compromise agreement providing for joint custody of a child below seven years of age. The Court in Dacasin recognized, however, the validity of an agreement providing for joint custody if the children are already over seven years of age considering the fact that the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. 51) In Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. [721 SCRA 146 (2014)], the Court declared unconstitutional Section 7 of R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they, among others, allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s. The Court reasoned that it is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution, as the State cannot replace the child’s natural mother and father when it comes to providing the child’s needs and comfort. Thus, to say that their consent is no longer relevant is anti-family. Section 23(a)(2)(ii) of the RH Law was likewise declared

unconstitutional because it effectively limits the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," and denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." According to the Court, the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority for to deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family. 52) The law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family. Thus the common-law wife does not have the right to make funeral arrangements over the objection of the legal wife [Valino vs. Adriano, 723 SCRA 1 (2014)] or the deceased’s brothers and sisters [Tomas Eugenio, Sr. vs. Velez, 263 Phil. 1149 (1990)]. The wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not, however, absolute, as said wishes are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. Thus, if the husband was cohabiting with another woman at the time of his death and expressly wished that he be buried in the family mausoleum of the paramour against the wishes of his legitimate family, said wish cannot prevail over the right and duty of the loved ones under Article 305 of the Civil Code to make the proper arrangements [Valino vs. Adriano, 723 SCRA 1 (2014)]. 53) In Grande v. Antonio [G.R. No. 206248, Oct. 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 698], the Court clarified that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255, gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. Hence, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. 54) While Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father, said provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, specifically Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code [Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648]. 55) If the admission of paternity is made in a private handwritten instrument which was not signed by the father, may the illegitimate child be allowed to make use of the father’s surname on the basis of such instrument? In Dela Cruz v. Gracia [G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648], the Court allowed the child to use the father’s surname on the basis of such private handwritten instrument considering that there are other evidence to prove paternity and filiation. In the same case, the Court adopted the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: (a) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there

should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and (b) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. 56) A married woman may retain her maiden name after marriage. The use of the word “may” in Article 370 of the Civil Code indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. [Remo vs. The Hon. Sec. of Foreign Affairs, 614 SCRA 281 (2010); see also In re Josephine P. Uy-Timosa, Bar Matter No. 1625, July 18, 2006] 57) Upon termination of the marriage, either by reason of death of the husband, or divorce, or annulment of the marriage, the woman is not required to seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of the former husband’s surname is optional and not obligatory for her. [Yasin v. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court, 311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)] 58) In Vitangcol v. People, Vitangcol contracted a first marriage in 1987 and another marriage in 1994. The second wife filed a criminal complaint for bigamy. Vitangcol presented as evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argued that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. The Court held that persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage. [Vitangcol v. People, 780 SCRA 598 (2016)] 59) In Vitangcol, the accused presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states: “After a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.” The Court then ruled that “the appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case.” The Court adds, “We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that

it could not have been issued.” In Kho v. Republic, 791 SCRA 604 (2016), however, among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972." The RTC granted the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of such marriage, which decision, however, was reversed by the CA. The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage. On appeal to the SC, it was held that based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. The Court adds: “Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.” 60) In Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar [783 SCRA 242 (2016), the driver-employee of Caravan accidentally hit a pedestrian, who eventually died. The aunt of the victim who raised her since she was nine years old, Abejar, filed for damages against the driver and Caravan. Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring the suit because she is not a real party in interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She is also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased." According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for damages. The Court ruled that Abejar is a real-party-in-interest because she was the victim’s actual custodian and therefore exercising substitute parental authority, citing Articles 216 and 233 of the Family Code, considering that the victim has no living parents, grandparents nor brothers and sisters. The Court likewise ruled that even if the victim was already 18 years old when she died, Abejar continued to support and care for her even after she turned 18. Except for the legal technicality of the victim’s emancipation, her relationship with Abejar remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to Abejar by the victim’s death was no different because of her emancipation. In addition, the Court also ruled that anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor. 61) Note: In Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, the Court harmonizes the requirements of Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the so-called registered-owner rule and prior conflicting rulings. Recall that these rules appear to

be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle. In Caravan, it was held that the appropriate approach in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, is that the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, it is now up to defendant to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it has no employment relationship with the driver; second, that the driver acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driveremployee. 62) In Republic v. Sarenogon, Jr. [783 SCRA 615 (2016)], the Court reiterated the rule that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge a trial court’s declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). 63) Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: 1) That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; 2) That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3) That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead; and, 4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. [Republic v. Sarenogon, Jr., 783 SCRA 615 (2016), citing Republic v. Cantor, 712 SCRA 1 (2013)] Mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead. [Id]. The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a caseto-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that

his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). [Id.] 64) Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. [Republic v. Tampus, 787 SCRA 563 (2016)] The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. [Id.] The "wellfounded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead. [Id.] 65) In Republic v. Romero II, 785 SCRA 164 (2016), it was held that the fact that the husband married his wife not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Albios [707 SCRA 584 (2013)], the Court held that: “Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.”

66) Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. [Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1 (2016)] Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted. [Id.] 67) On the contention that Poe-Llamanzares committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, the Court ruled that the law allows Poe to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, Poe was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee. The Court explained: “One of the effects of adoption is to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee. Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) and which certificate shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue. That law also requires that [a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." Hence, she can state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents. [Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1 (2016)] 68) Anastacio and Flora got married during the effectivity of the Civil Code without any marriage settlement. In 1968, Flora died. In 1978, Anastacio sold his interest in the land which was acquired during the marriage to the Spouses Molina, who registered the sale several years after the death of Anastacio. Is the sale valid? The Court ruled that while Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." The Court noted that upon the death of Flora in 1968, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; while Anastacio, on the other hand, owned one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest. Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for

Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This result conforms with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest). The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. [Domingo v. Molina, 791 SCRA 47 (2016)] 69) While the rule is that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, it was held that such issue may be resolved in an action for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages since it was necessary for the purpose of determining the legal rights of the respondents to the subject property and the question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial. [Calimag v. Heirs of Silvestra N. Macapaz, 791 SCRA 620 (2016)]