Tuason v LTA.docx

J.M. TUASON and CO., INC., petitioner-appellee, vs THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondentsappellants. Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for petitioner-appellee. Office of the Solicitor General and M. B. Pablo for respondents appellants. GR L-21064 | FEB 18 1970 | EN BANC | J.Fernando NATURE: Special civil action for prohibition to nullify a legislative legislative act directing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, Quezon Quezon City QUICK FACTS: RA 2616 is a legislative act expropriating the Tatalon Estates, Estates, the constitutionality of which is being assailed by the owners, herein petitioners. CFI QC held the legislative act of expropriating Tatalon Estate Estate as invalid. Responedents thus appealed to SC. SC reversed CFI QC and held in favor of the respondent. FACTS: - Guido v. Rural Progress (1949) - SC, in passing upon the scope of the power of the President conferred by statute "to acquire private lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants" had occasion to delineate the contours of the above constitutional provision, reconciling the undoubtedly broad grant of constitutional authority authority to Congress with the right of property that might be adversely affected by its exercise. - Republic v. Baylosis - later case - tilted the balance in favor of property. This is the case cited by CFI QC to rule for Tuason - Aug 3, 1959 - RA 2616, which took effect w/o executive approval, provided "The expropriation of the Tatalon Estate Estate in Quezon City jointly owned by the J. M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, et al., is hereby authorized." - Nov 15, 1960, respondent Land Tenure Administration (LTA) was directed directed by the then Executive Secretary to institute the proceeding for the expropriation of  the Tatalon Estate. - Nov 17, 1960 - petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in CFI QC a special action for prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondents respondents praying that the above act be declared unconstitutional, seeking in the meanwhile meanwhile a preliminary injunction to restrain respondents from instituting such expropriation proceeding, to be made permanent after trial. - Nov 18, 1960 - Preliminary injunction granted. - January 10, 1963 - After trial, CFI held that RA 2616 as amended by RA 3453 is unconstitutional and granting the writ of prohibition prohibition prayed for. ISSUE: PROCEDURAL: 1.a WON the special proceeding proceeding for prohibition is "actually a suit against the State, which is not allowed without its consent;" and assuming that the suit could proceed 1.b.) WON the Executive Secretary, as the real party in interest, interest, ought to have been impleaded. SUBSTANTIVE: 2. WON RA 2616 as amended is unconstitutional. HELD: 1.a. No, 1.b. No. 2. No; WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of Jan 10, 1963 holding that RA. 2616 as a mended by RA 3453 is unconstitutional is reversed. The writ of prohibition suit is denied, and the preliminary injunction injunction issued by the lower court set aside. With costs against petitioner. RATIO: PROCEDURAL 1.a. That the government is the adverse party and that therefore must must consent to its being sued certainly is far from persuasive. - Angara v. Electoral Commission - power of judicial review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from the relevant provisions of the Constitution. This may be may be exercised when the party adversely affected by either a legislative or executive act, or a municipal ordinance for that matter, files the appropriate suit to test its validity. - Special civil action of prohibition - relied upon to restrain the the enforcement of what what is alleged to be an unconstitutional statute. - Constitution is the supreme law,binding on all government agencies agencies and failure to observe the limitations found therein therein furnishes a sufficient ground for a declartion of the nullity of the governmental measure challenged. 1.b. For the purpose of thus obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, nullity, it is enough if the respondents or defendants named be the government officials who would give operation and effect to official action allegedly allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality. unconstitutionality. As it cannot be denied that in the then Land Tenure Administration as well as the Solicitor General were called upon to enforce the statute now assailed, it would appear clear that the existence on the Executive Secretary being made a party lacks support in law. SUBSTANTIVE 2. For the purpose of deciding the question of validity, a further inquiry into the the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize the expropriation of  lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals is indicated, if for no other purpose than to attain a greater degree of clarity. - The question is then of constitutional construction. The primary task task is one of ascertaining and thereafter assuring the realization of the purpose of the framers framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution: a.) Look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning - It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. - They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails - the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. - Thus there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum and this is one of them. - It does not admit of doubt that the congressional power thus conferred is far from limited. limited. Power of expropriation rests solely to the legislative. - the judiciary in the discharge of its task to enforce constitutional commands and prohibitions prohibitions is denied the prerogative of curtailing its well-nigh all-embracing sweep. b.) two of the extrinsic aids to construction along with the contemporaneous contemporaneous understanding and the consideration of the consequences that flow from the interpretation under consideration - reference to the historical basis of this provision as reflected in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Convention, yields additional light on the matter. Guido xxx - J. Tuason cited 1935 Constitutional convention convention delegate Miguel Cuaderno's Cuaderno's speech about large estates and trusts trusts in perpetuity.

- Digest of the speech: Narrated about the exploitation of tenants such as the family of Jose Rizal. He argued that large estates are evil and disrupts domestic tranquility. Thus it bcame the duty of the drafters of the Constitution to prohibit the ownership of large estates and make it the duty of the government to break up existing large estates, and to provide for their acquisition by purchase or through expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has been provided in the Constitutions of Mexico and Jugoslavia. - This is not to say that such an appeal to history as disclosed by what could be accepted as the pronouncement that did influence the delegates to vote for such a grant of power could be utilized to restrict the scope thereof, considering the language employed. For what could be expropriated are "lands," not "landed estates." - J. Laurel: "historical discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive" - the social and economic conditions are not static. To identify the text of a written constitution with the circumstances that inspired its inclusion may render it incapable of being responsive to future needs. - It could thus be said of our Constitution as of the US Constitution, to borrow from C.J. Marshall's pronouncement in M'Culloch v. Maryland - it is "intended to endure for ages to come and consequently, to be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs." 3. The text of the constitutional provision in question, its historical background as noted in pronouncements in the Constitutional Convention and the inexonerable need for the Constitution to have the capacity for growth and ever be adaptable to changing social and economic conditions all argue against its restrictive construction. - J.B.L. Reyes, in the Baylosis case - "The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution can not be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis. Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable number of individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem before taking remedial action." - As to the role of the courts in the appraisal of the congressional implementation of such a power, he had this to say: "The Constitution considered the small individual land tenure to be so important to the maintenance of peace and order and to the promotion of progress and the general welfare that it not only provided for the expropriation and subdivision of lands but also opened the way for the limitation of private landholdings (Art. XIII, section 3). It is not for this Court to judge the worth of these and other social and economic policies expressed by the Constitution; our duty is to conform to such policies and not to block their realization." - This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. This is merely to emphasize that the philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its "nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions" although not extending as far as the "destruction or annihilation" of the rights to property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be enjoyed by the property owner. 4. There need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is without limit. As in the case of the more general provision on eminent domain, there is the explicit requirement of the payment of just compensation. 5. The failure to meet the exacting standard of due process would likewise constitute a valid objection to the exercise of this congressional power - it is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. 6. It is primarily the equal protection guaranty though that petitioner's case is made to rest - those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. . - It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. - We start of course with the presumption of validity, the doubts being resolved in favor of the challenged enactment. As this is the first statute of its kind assailed, SC did not stop inquiry there. The occasion that called for such legislation, if known, goes far in meeting any serious constitutional objection raised. - SC turned to the Explanatory Note of the bill, which was enacted into the challenged statute. It started with the declaration that it provides for the "expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, and for the sale at cost of the lots therein to their present bona fide occupants, authorizing therefor the appropriation of ten million pesos." Then it continued: "The Tatalon Estate has an area of more than ninety six hectares and the lots therein are at present occupied by no less than one thousand five hundred heads of families, most of whom are veterans of World War II. It is the earnest desire of this group of patriotic and loyal citizens to purchase the lots at a minimum cost." Why there was such a need for expropriation was next taken up: "The population of Quezon City has considerably increased. This increase in population is posing a serious housing problem to city residents. This bill will not only solve the problem but will also implement the land-for-the-landless program of the present Administration." - Thus there is a vital point which should have great weight in the decision of this case. - Moreover, there is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its disposal to follow a system of priorities. It could thus determine what lands would first be the subject of expropriation. This it did under the challenged legislative act. 7. In the course of the expropriation proceedings, there undoubtedly would be a judicial determination as to the party entitled to the just compensation. As of  now then, such a question would appear at the very least to be premature. SEPARATE OPINIONS: BARREDO, Con

This separate opinion is intended only to clarify two statements in main opinion of J. Fernando that appear to be qu ite inconsistent with each other for him. - It is said therein that "it (the language of the constitutional provision herein involved) does not admit of doubt that the congressional power thus conferred is far  from limited", (p. 422 * ) and that it has a "well-nigh all embracing sweep". (p. 423 * ) but at page 431 * it is also said that "there need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power to expropriate is without limit". - Anyhow, he would like to state categorically that he considers the power granted to Congress by the Constitution to "authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals" to be unlimited by any other provision of said Constitution. - Just compensation is in reality a part of the power granted rather than a limitation thereto, just as just compensation is of the essence in any exercise of the power of eminent domain, as otherwise, it would be plain commandeering. - Withal, he holds that the power o f eminent domain, in general, is an inherent power of any government, as, otherwise, it w ould be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the government to adequately respond to the demands of public n eed and interest. - He then lifted excerpts from the ConCon w hich made his opinion lengthy. TEEHANKEE, J, Con and Dis - Concurs in the re sult of the main opinion, insofar as it reverses the decision of the lower Court which g ranted petitioner-appellees petition for a writ of prohibition and permanently enjoined respondents-appellees from instituting the proceedings for the expropriation of the "Tatalon Estate" as specifically authorized by RA 2616. - Dissents on the extent that the main opinion tends to prematurely judge petitioner's objections and defenses. I do not believe that all the relevant facts and circumstances are properly and adequately before the Court to enable it to rule on them now. - He listed some Principal issues which should properly be resolved in the expropriation proceedings yet to be instituted. 1. What remains of the "Tatalon Estate" that may be subjected to expropriation proceedings has to be threshed out. 2. Whether there remain "bona fide" occupants on the property, who are the express beneficiaries of Republic Act 2616 or whether such occupants are merely illegal squatters and occupants as found by the lower court in its decision and asserted by petitioner is one o f sharp conflict. 3. All these factual questions should first be determined, before the vital issues of necessity of the taking and whether it is for the public use, may be resolved. 4. The leading Guido case that clearly involved agrarian discontent and with the pertinent facts yet to be established - it is in pari materia with the case at bar. The peculiar facts and circumstances governing the ca se at bar is necessary b efore judgement. 5. Neither do I agree with the observation that the constitutional power of Congress for the expropriation of lands is we ll-nigh all embracing and forecloses the courts from inquiring into the necessity for the taking of the property. It is noted that this is the first case where Congress has singled out a particular property for  condemnation under the constitutional power conferred upon it - Does this square with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution? Is the explanatory note of the bill later enacted as Repub lic Act 2616, without any evidence as to a hearing with the affected parties having been given the opportunity to be heard, and citing merely the p opulation increase of Quezon City and the land-for-the-landless program sufficient compliance with these basic co nstitutional guarantees? Rather, does not the need for a more serious scrutiny as to the p ower of Congress to single out a particular piece of property for expropriation, acknowledged in the main opinion, call for judicial scrutiny, with all the facts in, as to the need for the expropriation for full opportunity to dispute the legislative appraisal of the matter? And who should bear the burden of demonstrating that the equal protection guarantee had been observed, the State or the owner whose property has been singled out? 6. Guido case - "the size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use", and  Arellano Law College case - that where such limitations and conditions governing the need of taking property for public use are not present, "the National Government may not confer upon its instrumentalities authority (to expropriate) which it itself may not exercise." - This would indicate precisely that where Cong ress itself directly exercised the power to expropriate and singles out a specific property under the Act, rather than have the Executive agencies institute the corresponding expropriation proceeding under the general laws it has enacted in pursuance of its constitutional power, the question of its appraisal of the necessity and of the validity of its exercise of the au thority to expropriate the specific property is not foreclosed from judicial scrutiny. 7. The main opinion acknowledges that existing contractual rights that have been acquired by vendor and purchasers of subdivided lots of the property sha ll be accorded the appropriate constitutional protection of non-impairment, at the expropriation proceedings. Importantly related to this unassailable dictum are questions not founded on primacy of property rights con cepts or personal predilections or private notions of p olicy. These concern the fact that the Tatalon Estate has been subdivided into lots for sale to the public, with priority after the passage of RA 2616 to the occupants (and such purchasers may have been theretofore landless themselves), and the Court's reason in dismissing the action for condemnation in the analogous Urban Estates. Inc. case that "the people on whose behalf this action has been instituted could acquire the remaining lots by direct purchase from the defendant like those (dir ect) purchasers." - In view of the cardinal principle of eminent domain that just compensation of the market value of the land must be pa id as well as of the constitutional limitation that the land be conveyed at cost to the individuals concerned, respondents may well consider that the o bjectives of the Act may be accomplished more expeditiously by a direct purchase of the available unsold lots for resale at cost to the remaining bona fide occupants in ac cordance with the Act's provisions or  by extending financial assistance to enable them to purchase directly the unsold lots from petitioner.