Training for the Tournament Player-Mark Dvoretsky & Artur Yusupov
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Trainin g for the Tournament Player
Training for the Tournament Player Mark Dvoretsky and Artur Yusupov
Translated by Malcolm Gesthuysen
B. T.Batsford Ltd,
London
First published in Germany by Thomas Bayer Verlags GmbH 1991
©
Thomas Bayer Verlags GmbH 1991
First English language edition
©
1993
English Translation B. T. Batsford Ltd
Reprinted ISBN
1993
1993
0 7134 7238 3
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, by any means, without prior permission of the publisher.
Typeset by John Nunn GM and printed in Great Britain by Redwood Books, Trowbridge, Wilts for the publishers, B. T. Batsford Ltd,
4
Fitzhardinge Street, London WlH OAH
A BATSFORD CHESS BOOK
Adviser: R.D.Keene GM, aBE Technical Editor: Graham Burgess
Contents Preface - A School for Future Champions (Viktor Glaunan) Introduction (Artur Yusupov)
7 11
1 A Chess player's Strengths and Weaknesses (Mark Dvoretsky) Exercises The Route to the Top (Mark Dvoretsky) How to Play as Black (Artur Yusupov) 2 Analysing Your Own Games (Artur Yusupov) Exercises The Annotator's Doubts (Mark Dvoretsky) 3 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games and Those of Other Players (Artur Yusupov and Mark Dvoretsky) The ' S uperfluous' Piece (Mark Dvoretsky) Exercises 4 Studying the Classics (Mikhail Shereshevsky) . Finding New Ideas (Mark Dvoretsky) Exercises 5 Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan in the Middlegame (Alexei Kosikov) Exercises Regarding a Certain Article (Mark Dvoretsky) 6 A Feel for the King (Grigory Kaidanov) Additional Examples (Artur Yusupov and Mark Dvoretsky) Exercises Assessment and Analysis (Mark Dvoretsky) 7 The Thoughts and Advice of Great Players 8 Creative Discoveries And Instructive Errors (Artur Yusupov) Solutions to Analytical Exercsies
13 38 39 42 45 65 66 73 98 1 02 1 03 1 12 1 20 121 1 43 1 44 1 54 158 159 1 60 1 67 1 72 1 82
Preface
-
A School for Future Champions
Viktor Glatman
It is bardly necessary to explain what tremendous benefit a young chess player can derive from creative asso ciation witb leading grandmasters and trainers, or to say just how es sential it is for young people to re ceive advice and assistance. Many years ago, World Champion Mikhail Botvinnik became head of tbe first All-Union Youtb School, and many pupils of tbis school have become outstanding chessplayers. Otber schools for producing grandmasters have since appeared, tbough tbey have not all been successful. Artur Yusupov was once a pupil at Botvinnik's school, and Mark Dvor etsky worked tbere, helping Botvin nik and at tbe same time training Artur. Several years have passed Yusupov has become one of tbe world's strongest grandmasters and has competed many times in World Championship Candidates matches. Dvoretsky is now a famous trainer who numbers several World Junior Champions amongst his pupils and who has helped Yusupov, Dolmatov, Alexandria and Dreev to prepare for Candidates matches. The Dvoretsky-Yusupov chess School, which offers botb personal
tuition and correspondence courses, was founded at tbe end of 1 989. The combination of a top-class grand master and a trainer of enormous ex perience at once made it possible to give chess lessons at a new, much higher level tban had previously been attempted. Dvoretsky and Yusupov offered me, a chess master, tbe opportunity to become Director of tbe school, to concern myself witb tbe organisa tional problems associated witb its activities. I shall briefly describe tbe stu dents and teachers at tbe school, and also how our work is planned. There are two sessions every year, each lasting for 10 to 15 days. We are involved in teaching young chess players who have already achieved a recognised qualification (no lower tban Candidate Master). Our pupils include Diana Darchiya from Batumi, already a winner of two World Championships for girls, and Alyosha Alexandrov, who has twice won tbe Men's Championship of Byelorussia. We invite 1 2 to 15 pu pils to each session, and as a rule tbey are accompanied by tbeir trainers. Yusupov and Dvoretsky (initially
8 Preface assisted by Grandmaster Kaidanov, who worked at the school full-time) take charge not only of the children but also of their trainers. And highly qualified specialists give lessons to gether with us. Masters Mikhail Shereshevsky, Alexei Kosikov, Mik hail Pukshansky and Vladimir Vulf son are essentially fellow members of our teaching staff. Each day begins with physical ex ercises, in which not only the chil dren but also Grandmaster Yusupov and many masters take part. This is an excellent example for the pupils, much more effective than any talk on the benefits of taking part in sporting activities. Incidentally, we engage in various sports throughout the day football, basketball, swimming and table-tennis all enter into our pro gramme . To manage our physical and psychological preparation we have the services of a professional sports psychologist. After breakfast the students gather for a general lecture. The lec tures are recorded on tape and then printed out using a word-processor. In the second half of the day, lessons are given on a more individual basis. Usually the children are split into small groups, taking account of their age, playing-strength and, occasion ally, their opening repertoires or their particular weaknesses (in order, for example, to improve their end game technique or to sharpen their combinational vision). We also give individual consultations to strong
masters or even grandmasters who have expressed a wish to attend our school. Considerable importance is at tached to the analysis of the games played by our students. The children carefully annotate their own games, and then the teachers examine what they have written. These games, and the results of solving competitions held at the school (consisting of spe cially selected exercises), combined with individual observations made by the teachers, enable us to give our pupils a 'diagnosis', to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of their play. On the basis of this diagnosis we determine their homework: - a programme for working on their game still further. Of course, given such intensive work:, it is essential to offer adequate opportunities for relaxation. We pro vide the teachers and pupils of the school with comfortable hotel rooms and we give them food which is both tasty and varied. We also find time for entertainment, watching videos, etc. All the sessions at our school are thematic. The first session was con cerned with general problems of chess training. The second was de voted to matters relating to master ing opening theory and forming an opening repertoire. At the third ses sion we shall be studying the endgame and ways to improve one's playing technique; plans for future sessions have already been drawn up. Apart from what he or she learns
Preface 9 at our lectures and seminars, each of our students also receives a solid 'package' of additional material for independent study - previously pub lished articles connected with the theme of the session. This book has brought together the lectures and also some additional material from the fIrst session. By
studying this material you will get an idea of the way we work and, I hope, discover a considerable number of useful and interesting ideas. Perhaps you would like to attend our school some day? This is not out of the question, since we intend to extend our activities, to make our school in ternational.
Introduction Artur Yusupov What enables a chessplayer to be successful? In response to this ques tion two essential factors are usually singled out: talent and hard work. But it is not sufficient just to be tal ented and hard-working. Physical condition, competitive character and the ability to concentrate during play are also very important. No less im portant is the ability to choose cor rectly the direction that such work should take and to be able to reach the required standard. Needless to say, this task is far from easy. During the first session of the new Dvoret sky-Yusupov chess school we en deavoured to help our pupils to master the art of studying chess on one's own. Of course, in order to be able to choose a direction leading to self improvement it is necessary to have a critical understanding of one's game. The authors are totally con vinced that the serious study of one's own games is an essential require ment for any chessplayer who Wishes to improve. Therefore the theme 'analysing one's own games' oCCupies a central place. This book contains specific recommendations on how such analysis should be car ried out.
Without a broad knowledge of the history of chess, without an aware ness of the creative legacy be queathed by the great players of the past, one can scarcely hope to achieve good results. So we have also attempted to show the reader various ways of making use of our rich chess heritage. Of course, themes such as 'ana lysing one's own games' or 'study ing the classics' are virtually inexhaustible. Seen from different viewpoints, the first theme is consid ered in Chapters 1 , 2, 3, 5 and 8; the second theme is reflected in Chap ters 3 and 4. Chapter 6 is devoted to original manoeuvres with the king, but the more general concept 'non standard manoeuvres' is to be found in Chapter 5, in some of Chapter 8 and in many other parts of this book. It is necessary to say a few words about the way the book is structured. At the start of each chapter there is a lecture which was given during the first session of our school. Each of these lectures carries the main weight of argument of the chapter. Exercises to be solved on one's own then follow, together with some ad ditional material. These supple ments, which are connected with the
12
Introduction
lectures by virtue of their subject matter, have been taken from articles which the authors have had publish ed in the Soviet chess press (in the magazines Shakhmaty v SSSR and 64), and in some cases include addi tional or revised material prepared specially for this book. The quite separate Chapter 7 con sists of advice given by leading grandmasters on how to improve one's chess. Of course, work at our school is not confined merely to the reading of lectures. A great deal of attention is given to analysing games together, to individual consultations, and also to setting particular tasks to be worked through at home. The reader can get some idea of the form such home work can take from Chapter 8. It was the authors' intention to compile a book containing material that the reader will find both interest-
ing and useful. The methods pro posed in it will, we hope, play a key role in helping the reader to improve his or her game. Of course, even the best methods will not be very effec tive if they are adopted mechanically rather than creatively. But for the se rious, thoughtful player this book may be just the right stimulus for creative growth. Our work is continuing. Our school has already had its second session, the main theme of which was the opening: general opening principles, ways of studying opening theory, how to form an opening rep ertoire, the connection of the open ing with the middlegame, and so on. Plans for forthcoming sessions in clude endgame technique, middle game strategy, practical playing methods ... We intend to share the re sults of this work with our readers in due course.
1
A Chessplayer's Strengths and Weaknesses Mark Dvoretsky
Long, long ago, before Steinitz, it was considered that a chessplayer wins or loses a game solely by virtue of his ingenuity. Morphy was a gen ius, and so he beat everyone; his op ponents were less talented, and therefore they lost to him. Steinitz recognised and demonstrated that chess has an objective basis. The events which occur on the board are subject to certain basic laws, to posi tional principles. If a chessplayer is guided by them then he will be suc cessful. Today it is quite evident that the truth is to be found not somewhere in between, so to speak, but in a combi nation of both these aspects, the sub jective and the objective. (Those of you with a serious interest in phi losophy will probably recall the con cept of 'synthesis' from Hegel's famous triad.) Yes, of course, a game is conducted on the basis of objec tive positional laws, but a decisive influence on its result is exerted by a chessplayer's personal qualities - his talent, character, state of health, and, finally, his degree of preparation, his ability to apply his knowledge, to act OVer the board in a competent, pro fessional manner, to make optimal
decisions accurately in the most di verse situations. Chess mastery comprises an enor mous number of the most varied components; in some of these a player may be very strong, while in others - frankly weak. Behind the moves he makes lie his merits and deficiencies, his strong and weak sides. It is these which have a deci sive influence on the outcome of a game or an entire competition, and frequently on the fate of a player's chess career. Many players have been unable to reveal their talent fully because of obvious problems in certain areas. Take, for example, Grandmaster Kupreichik. He is an exceptionally dangerous player when attacking, he plays boldly and with great inven tiveness. But in matters of technique, in the endgame, he is quite frankly weak. Consequently he has not suc ceeded in attaining a general level of play corresponding to his talent. On one occasion, when playing Ku preichik in the First League of the USSR Championship, I went into an endgame a pawn down, but after ten moves or so it was I who had an extra pawn. In the qualifying tournament
14 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses for the 1989 World Cup, Kupreichik had a completely winning position against young Gata Kamsky, with two extra pawns, but gradually - by no means because of any outright blunder - he also lost this game. Many chessplayers have become totally 'bogged down' in the study of openings, occupying themselves only with processing information and acquiring new opening know ledge. I am sure this is not the best way to develop a chessplayer's po tential - at any rate, not where young players are concerned. It is much more important to set in motion a training programme to improve one's game. The main task of the trainers at our school is to give each of their pu pils a 'diagnosis', in order to help them to understand their own style, to determine their strengths and weaknesses, and to suggest how they can eliminate their shortcomings and develop the strong sides of their game. In order to convince you of the correctness of the direction which our school is going to take, of the im portance of what we are going to do, I am devoting this entire chapter to examples of the decisive influence on play (and results) of deficiencies which certain players either did not wish to, or could not, rid themselves of. By spending all their time on studying openings, some players be lieve that their games will never get as far as an ending, and that, if an
endgame does arise, they will some how manage to cope over the board with the problems they will have to face. The outcome of my game with Kupreichik shows the total naivety of such hopes. Of course, the open ing is a very important phase of the game, but the endgame is no less im portant, and it too should be studied seriously. Weakness in the endgame may show itself in two main forms: igno rance of endgame theory and weak ness of endgame technique. Let us begin by examining the first of these.
Euwe-Hromadka Piestany 1 922
•••• �•••• • ••• · . . ., • • ••• • • • • z. • • • ••• =
What plan would you have played as Black? You will not succeed in calculating the correct answer - you either know it or you don't. This is a fact of endgame theory, which one simply has to keep in one's head (in order to prove it I would need about half an hour). If the defending king is in a light squared corner with a dark-squared
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 1 5 bishop ( or in a dark-squared corner witb a light-squared bishop), it is im possible to mate it with king and rook. Moreover, a rook's pawn is also sometimes insufficient to win if it is too far advanced (on h3 or b4). If White can maintain his bishop on tbe h2-b8 diagonal Black is un able to strengthen his position. The only winning chance is to place tbe king on h3 and tben to give check witb the rook on g2, forcing the reply � 1. If Black could tben succeed in getting his king out from h3 while still cutting tbe white king off from tbe g-file and therefore from his pawn, he would win. But it can only get out (and witb some difficulty) by making use of the square b4 - that is, if his pawn has not yet crossed into tbe opponent's half of the board. (In order to convince yourself of this, I recommend that you consult a book on tbe endgame.) So, the conclusion: if the pawn has crossed into tbe opponent's half of the board, and White's bishop is able to occupy the h2-b8 diagonal, the position is drawn; if it has not, the position is winning. Without knowledge of this fact you are al most sure to miss the win, which is j ust what happened in this game. t ... h4? !
2 i.d4
2 '" l:le2 ! wins.
3 i.e5 4 �n
�h3?? 1lg2+
Now there is nothing more to be done, and the players agreed a draw.
If Black had played 1 ... ..t>h3 at once, he would also have won. Many players have repeated the same mistake. For example, in a master game Novotelnov-Telpugov, Moscow 1 95 1 , the following posi tion arose: White: ..t>g3, �d6, pawn on b4; Black: ..t>g6, l:le4, pawn on h5 . Telpugov played just as Hrom adka had: 1 ... h4+ n A remarkable example of igno rance of theory struck me not long ago while I was browsing through the Dutch magazine New in Chess.
Coull-Stanciu Thessaloniki Women 's 01. 1 988
•• •• !•••• • • •• • ./j. • •• • •• · .�. . •• • • •••• The Scottish player, playing White on top board, found the only way (apart from losing on time) to lose the game immediately - she simply resigned ! ! Quite amazing ! Endings of this type are probably studied in the first class of any chess school, but the education of the top player in the Scottish Women's Olympiad team was clearly deficient.
1 6 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses This, of course, is an extreme case, an anecdote, but I could give similar examples - although not quite so glaring - from the games of many chessplayers. I remember, for example, how a terrible blunder in a rook ending which is known to be theoretically drawn led to Kochiev's defeat in a game against Smyslov at a Zonal tournament (Lvov 1978) and so put an end to his hopes of reach ing the Interzonal. I also recall a famous comedy of errors in an ele mentary rook ending from a game Capablanca-Menchik (Hastings 1 929/30). It is amusing that 45 years later precisely the same ending arose in a game which decided the fate of the USSR Schools Team Champion ship.
Pekker-Yermolinsky Alma-A ta 1974
•••• �••• • • • •• •••• •• • • . . ., .� , • .� Z . ,,�. . ". For his team to become champi ons, it was sufficient for the Musco vite playing White to get a draw. The position is totally drawn. The sim plest thing was for White to bide his
time: 1 lIbl or 1 h3. But 1 !laS is entirely playable, as is any other re treat of the rook along the a-file ... ex cept one, which is precisely what Pekker chose.
1 :a3??
2 f2, and the exchange takes place in slightly better circum stances for White. First, he doesn't now have to capture on b6, opening the a-file for the black rook; and sec ond, the white king will move closer to the centre. These minor points do not perhaps affect the overall assess ment of the position, but neverthe less in the endgame every minor point like this should be evaluated, one should seek out the most precise way to accomplish one's plans. If Black were now to decide to ex change bishops, he would need to think how to do this more accurately. However, as it turned out, my op ponent had quite different plans.
12
•••
h5? !
Black has decided to go onto the attack! What is his idea? Probably he
18 A Chessplayer 's Srrengths and Weaknesses intends to play ... b4, ... /l)h5 and ... /l)f4. In the middlegame such a plan would be quite good, but for the endgame this is a very peculiar strat egy. All right, for the time being I shall just complete my development.
13 :dl 14 /l)d2
h4 h3?
But why should Black play this? Indeed, the pawn on h3 will in all probability tum out to be a weakness.
15 g3
b5?
It appears that Black has forgotten that pawns are unable to move back wards. Now I also have an object of attack on the queenside - the pawn on b5, which I shall strike at immedi ately by playing a2-a4.
16 i.n From this square the bishop keeps both of Black's vulnerable pawns in its sights.
16 ... 17 �f2
i.b6 g5
Finally the idea (albeit a reckless one) behind my opponent's preced ing moves has become comprehensi ble. He wishes after 1 8 ... g4 either to weaken the pawn on e4 or, having brought his knight to g4, to attack the pawn on h2, which he has 'fixed' with the advance ... h5-h4-h3. And if 1 8 g4 then he had probably intended to sacrifice the bishop on g4. Inventive, ingenious, but totally impracticable. It's just not on to play the endgame like this!
18 a4 19 i.xb6!
g4 axb6
20 21 22 23 24
axb5 %bal /l)xf3 ! �e3 bxc6
:xal gxfJ /l)xe4+ /l)d6
I had calculated this whole vari ation when playing 1 9 i.xb6. It is clear that White has a winning posi tion, and I subsequently converted my advantage into victory. What remains to be said? It was all quite clear. The outcome of the game was already determined, since play was far too one-sided. You probably got the impression that Black was very weak, not even a first-category player (first-category players would be offended - they would say not even they play end ings like that!). No, I repeat, this was a talented master, who at other stages of the game would act quite differently. I just managed to get at his weak spot. Now, just think to yourself, is it conceivable that you could ever become a strong player by giving your opponents such enor mous odds in any aspect of the game? It is very important to rid oneself not only of pure chess weaknesses but also of deficiencies of a psycho logical nature, relating to one's per sonality. A person who is unsure of himself often suffers setbacks be cause of his own indecisiveness; the self-confident player, on the other hand, may fail as a result of underes timating his opponent's possibilities. The slow-witted player with poorly
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 1 9 developed intuition will always suf fer from time-trouble. The list could be extended - one comes across the most varied human, personal defi ciencies, and they all influence our results to no less an extent than our pure chess weaknesses. Let us examine an example where one such deficiency is displayed and diagnosed.
Fedorov-Shammrai Moscow 1 973
5 W
This being the case, he should play 1 Ite3 before it is too late, con senting to an equal pawn ending. Candidate Master Fedorov, play ing White, supposed that he stood better and played a move which is amazingly nonsensical.
1 Ilg6? Sometimes in such cases a stand ard phrase is employed by annota tors: 'White increases his pressure'. But here it is not clear what this pres sure is, or how it could be increased. Perhaps Fedorov had g2-g4-g5 in mind.
1 ... The threat is 2 ...�f5, winning the pawn on f4. In the event of 2 g4 White's rook would be imprisoned. As we can see, Black's reply under lined the absurdity of the move 1 l:tg6?, but probably it was even bet ter not to pay it any attention and to play 1 ... d4.
2 Ilg3 3 �e2!?
It is White's turn to move. How do you assess the position? What move would you suggest? With a static assessment you may find White's position quite accept able. But let us try to look at it dy namically, taking the likely prospects into account. I should prefer to play Black. Why? He bas a clear plan: to play ... dS-d4, put his king on dS and then push on with ... c5-c4. White appears to stand very well, with pressure against g7, but exactly how he should continue is unclear.
d4
A move based on sound princi ples. White transfers his king to the area of the board where the battle will take place - the queenside. (In the event of 1 ... d4! 2 l:tg3 �d6 Black would not have permitted this transfer.) The drawback of the move 3 'it>e2 is the loss of the pawn on f4 after 3 ... 'it>f5+. But this sacrifice is entirely justified from a positional point of view. In return the white king becomes active - it gets through to c4 and attacks the pawn oneS.
20 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses I would be fully justified in prais ing the player of the white pieces ... if, after the game, it had not turned out that he had not in fact sacrificed the pawn, but simply blundered it away. Here, you will understand, quite a different picture arises. This episode shows, incidentally, why we ask our pupils to send us only games that have been thor oughly annotated. Sometimes one can make a good move even though the idea behind it may be totally in correct. It is important for trainers not only to see the actual moves played but also to know what ideas lay behind them, what the pupil was thinking of, and how he or she as sessed the position. Only then can a trainer form an objective opinion of the way his pupil plays. So, White blundered the pawn, but he blundered well.
3 4 �d3 5 �c4
'iti'f5+ �xf4 �e5 (6)
Should White opt for sharp play, or would this be dangerous? It isn't necessary to calculate the variations right through to a conclusion - con fine yourselves merely to a general impression. Of course, without any calcula tion at all it is clear that capturing on c5, giving the opponent a passed pawn on d4, would be terrible - this is simply not playable. But what should White play? I think 6 lId3, in tending 7 l:td2 with the threat 8 �c5. It would be useful to force the black rook back to c7. Then it would make sense to exchange the most ac tive black pawn on d4 with the move c2-c3. In some lines b3-b4 is possi ble. If 6 .. . e4 then 7 �d2 �e3 8 l:id3+ and Black cannot play 8 . . . �e2? because of 9 �xc5. Probably it is best for Black to re ply 6 ... f5 7 lld2l:r.c7, intending 8 ... g5 and becoming active on the king side, where he has an extra pawn. But White's pieces are active, so he would still have quite good chances of a draw.
6 �xc5?? 7 �b5
Is it possible to capture the pawn on c5? (Black will reply 6 . .. l:1c7+).
llc7+
More prudent was 7 �b4, keep ing the king a little nearer the d pawn. If Black had continued as in the game, this might have helped White. But, all the same, his decision to play 6 �c5 was fundamentally incorrect. This is best proved by a move which was not noticed by either player. What move? Well, 7 ... g5!. Having removed the g-pawn from
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 21 attack, Black will now quietly gob ble up the pawn on c2. Clearly, with the king on b4 it would not have helped to play S c3 because of S ... dxc3 9 lhc3 8.5+.
7 8 l:lxg7 9 :xa7?
l:lxc2 d3
More stubborn was 9 l1d7, at tempting to hold back the passed pawn at least temporarily. But Fe dorov is sure that 'all is quiet on the Western front', that he will manage to stop the pawn, and that, while Black wins a rook for it, he will ad vance his queenside pawns.
9
...
'iPe6!
Now the rook is unable to reach the d-file.
10 :a6+
'iPd7
Here White resigned, in view of lllta7+ l1c7. (With the white king on b4 Black would not have had this variation: in the event of an ex change of rooks the king would have managed to restrain the pawn.) What would you say about the player who had White? Are we being too critical of him? Then I shall show you another of his games.
Fedorov-Dvoretsky Moscow 1 972 (7): What do you consider White should do now? Black's intentions are clear. If he can succeed in playing ... hS and ... :'g8, and then doubling (or even tripling) his major pieces along the
g-file, a menacing attack will develop on the kingside. White is obliged to divert his opponent, to get his own game going rather more quickly. It is essential to play c4-cS. At once, or after preparation? At once, of course - there is no point in postponing it. If Black replies ... dxc5, then after .t.xc5 the rook has no move (after ... 1117 White has the fork lLld6). If Black could manage to play ... hS, the rook would get the excellent square gS. But Fedorov did not fear a king side attack at all, and so be decided that he had no need to hurry.
29 b4? Probably White wished to take on c5 with the pawn, to get a lovely pawn centre. But frrst he will have to defend the pawn on d5. Such a plan would be good if the position were quiet, but here, with White threat ened by an attack, it is too slow.
29 30 'iPhl 31 11id2?
'iPh8 :g8
Consistent; having defended the pawn on d5 , White prepares to play
22 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses c4-c5. But he is not paying the slightest attention to his opponent's possibilities - he simply doesn't even think about them. Retribution is not long in coming.
31 32 gxt3 33 fxe4
gxt3 .i.xe4
'ib3 Mate is forced, so White resigned. Ridiculous, wasn't it? Injust three moves an excellent position col lapsed completely. Is it still not clear what one should say about the player who had White? Does he simply play badly? Well, I could show you how he beat Belyavsky in superb p0sitional style, and he has played other good games. No, I am not showing you the games of a weak player, I am simply demonstrating his most vulnerable side. So what is this exactly? Fedorov played the endgame badly against Shamrai, but it is not simply that he is weak in the endgame - this is not really the point. Remember: with the move I llg6 he tried to play for a win, not re alising that he in any case stood no better and not noticing his oppo nent's plan to strengthen his posi tion. Then he blundered away the pawn on f4. Mter that, fearlessly and recklessly, he captured the pawn on c5 and, finally, allowed his oppo nent's passed pawn to queen. All his mistakes, just like those he made in his game against me, had, as you see, a common thread running through them.
It is quite evident that Fedorov is totally sure of himself and his ideas. He couldn't care less about his oppo nent - for Fedorov the opponent sim ply doesn't exist. So the diagnosis here is over-confidence, overestima tion of oneself, of one's resources, and underestimation of the oppo nent's possibilities. At that time Fedorov was a stu dent at the Moscow Institute of Physical Training, where I was teaching. He was a really strong young sportsman, very determined, with a presence over the board like that of a World Champion. In such children self-confidence (an excel lent quality!) often becomes exces sive. He was quite a strong candidate master, but he simply could not achieve the master norm. His main weakness was a constant hindrance. I explained to Fedorov the main reason for his lack of success. I rec ommended that he work on this as pect of his game, that he study the games of players who always pre vent counterplay from their oppo nents in advance - primarily the games of Petrosian. I selected a se ries of exercises on this theme, and the work Fedorov did soon helped him to become a master. In the first half of this chapter we investigated some examples of the destructive effect of certain very marked weaknesses on particular players. But now let us examine how all a chess player's weaknesses work together with his strengths to
A
Chesspiayer 's Srrengths and Weaknesses 23
f()11Jl a complex which completely determines his characteristic chess style. In 1980 I assisted Nana Alexan dria in her Candidates quarter-final O1lltch against Lena Akbmy lovskaya. As usual, I put together a creative profile of her opponent, giv ing information about the strong and weak sides of her game. Of course, I could also see Alexandria's own merits and deficiencies, as she and I were then working actively on elimi nating the latter. After an exceptionally hard and tenacious struggle, Nana emerged victorious. When the match was over, the thought came to me to dem onstrate to Nana (and also to myself) to what extent her weaknesses and strengths, as well as those of her op ponent, had determined her play and the course and final outcome of the struggle. I wrote down the main chess qualities of both players and gave each of them a code. The symbol 'Ll' stands for Akhmylovskaya's main strength her good positional understanding. Lena has a subtle feeling for the in terconnection of her pieces, she is gOOd at finding good squares for them, as well as manoeuvring and strengthening her position. 'U' is Akbmylovskaya's main weakness. She has a poor grasp of tactics and fears a tactical game; she aVOids lines which make play sharper, as she feels unsure of herself in complicated, muddled positions.
'L3' signifies Akhmylovskaya's lack of confidence in the technique of converting an advantage into vic tory. It is probably not so obvious to you that this deficiency is closely connected with the previous one, be ing to a certain extent a consequence of it. When converting an advantage, a moment is sure to come when one has to cease gradually improving one's position and proceed to take firm action. It is important not to al low such a moment to pass by. One should make great efforts, calculate variations accurately and find the strongest continuation - at times the only correct continuation. For the player who prefers to act according to general considerations, who does not like to calculate variations, this moment often proves to be a stum bling-block. He or she continues playing by intuition in situations where it is necessary to solve spe cific problems; as a result, his or her advantage diminishes. Of course this deficiency is not peculiar to Akbmylovskaya alone. Some time later I noticed that Andrei Sokolov also suffered from it. At a particular moment during the 1 986 Candidates Final, Yusupov, realising that my diagnosis of his opponent was totally correct, threw up his arms in bewilderment: 'Just how does he intend to win even one game if I don't leave anything exposed? You know, he is quite unable to solve a single problem of the slightest complexity.' Regrettably, at the end
24 A Chesspklyer 's Strengths and Weaknesses of the match Yusupov began leaving himself exposed... Nana Alexandria's main strength, which I designate as 'Nt ' , is her bril liant imagination, her creative inven tiveness. 'N2' signifies inadequate posi tional understanding, as a result of her limited experience of chess at that time. We gave this problem a great deal of attention, and, by the time of her World Championship match against Chiburdanidze, Nana had managed to raise the level of her positional play. But even then this weakness was still noticeable, being responsible for frequent failures to assess a position correctly and for bad positional blunders. 'N3' symbolises irrational use of time, time-trouble. Alexandria had formerly been an inveterate sufferer from time-trouble. After special training her bouts of time-trouble be came less severe, but there was no complete cure. 'N4' stands for excessive emotion over the board. Alexandria is a per son of moods, her emotions get the better of her during play. She finds it hard to change the course of a game which is turning out badly. She fre quently commits a whole series of errors, and as a result an excellent position can very quickly turn into a hopeless one. 'NS' signifies an inadequate sense of danger. As you can see, the list of Alexan dria's shortcomings turned out to be
longer than her rival's. This is not surprising - I wished to demonstrate graphically to Nana all her weak nesses, in order to prompt her to de vote herself seriously to eliminating them. I annotated all the games of this Candidates match, noting how the qualities of both players that I have singled out manifested themselves during play. Wherever I detected one or other of the characteristics de scribed, I noted down the corre sponding code. The resulting picture turned out to be rather interesting in any case it made an impression on Nana. From this viewpoint we shall now investigate two games chosen almost at random.
Akhmylovskaya-A1exandria 6th match game, Kislovodsk 1980 t d4
2 3 4 S
8 B
c4 tDt3 tDc3
'i'b3 (8)
dS c6 tDfti e6
A
Chesspiayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 25
The score at this point was level: 2112-2112. We had managed to guess that Akhmylovskaya would choose 5 .,, 3 . She is a positional player and doesn 't like playing main-line open ings in which a sharp struggle devel ops (e.g. the Meran Variation or the Botvinnik System) (L2) . This meant that it was very likely that she would choose a quiet plan of development. For Black in reply there is quite a good plan in the spirit of the Meran Variation: 5 . . . dxc4 6 li'xc4 b5, and then ... lLlbd7, ... ..ib7 and, at some point, ... c6-c5 , perbaps after com pleting development with ... ..ie7 and .. , 0-0. But during preparation I found in the 27th volume of Infor mator a game Farago-Nogueiras which had recently been played (Kecskemet 1 979). This game had continued 5 . . . dxc4 6 ii'xc4 b6 (Black wishes to answer 7 e4 with 7 ... ..ia6 and, having exchanged on fl , to deprive his opponent of the right to castle kingside). There followed 7 g3 ..ie7 8 ..ig2 0-0 9 0-0 b5 ! 1 0 ilb 3 (better is 1 0 ii'd3) 10 ... b4. After the knight retreats, Black plays 1 1 ... -*.a6, attacking e2, then . . . ..ib5 and, maybe, ... a7-aS-a4 with a very ac tive position. I liked Nogueiras's plan. But the thought occurred to me tbat it could be implemented still more accurately, by playing ... b7-b5 in one go. First we play 5 ... ..ie7 (generally sJ>eaking, this is the principal theo retical move). If 6 g3· then 6 ... dxc4 7 W'xc4 0-0 8 ..ig2 b5 and Black has
saved a whole tempo. Probably 6 ..tg5 is stronger. I did not wish to continue further according to the book with 6 . 0-0 7 e3, since then a rather passive position arises which does not suit Alexandria's style. But it is possible to play in the same fash ion as Nogueiras. S ..ie7 6 ..igS dxc4 .
.
7 ii'xc4
b6
In the event of 8 g3 it turns out that, in comparison with the game Farago-Nogueiras, Black has played the move ... ..te7, which is clearly more useful than White's move ..tg5 . Generally speaking, a kingside fianchetto together with a bishop on g5 looks a bit odd. So White is prac tically forced to play 8 e4, when B lack will implement his idea in volving an exchange on f1 . Just how good this plan is, is an other question. Yusupov and I later analysed this system and came to the conclusion that White still has the better chances.
8 e4 9 1ib3 10 ,Uxfl
i.a6 i.xfl
A good alternative was 10 'itxfl , followed by g3 and �g2.
10 1 1 0-0-0 •.•
0-0 lLlbd7
White has developed her pieces harmoniously and has gained more space. Her position is certainly to be preferred. But, considering the fact that the players have castled on opposite sides, a sharp increase in
26
A
Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses
tension is to be expected. This was precisely the sort of advantageous turn of events, uncomfortable for her opponent, that Alexandria had to aim for. For this reason the outcome of the opening suited us perfectly. This is perhaps a typical example of taking the strengths and weak nesses of the players into account in one's choice of opening variation. In the end our calculation paid off, al though we had to endure quite a few unpleasant moments. Despite the fact that the position which has now arisen had been on our board at home when we were preparing for this game, Alexandria spent around 35 minutes on her pre ceding moves - moves which we had already planned. This is quite a long time - and she could well find her self short of time later on. As you can see, from the very start of this game weakness (N3) showed itself - irra tional use of time.
12 lLleS Apparently the prophylactic 1 2 �b 1 should have been preferred.
12 13 .txf6! (9) •••
lLlxe5
At home, having given the vari ations a cursory examination, we had satisfied ourselves that after 13 dxe5 lLld7 Black has an excellent po sition. Akhmylovskaya assessed the position correctly (Ll) and played more forcefully.
13
•••
lLld7
A natural reply, but after this White retains somewhat better
chances, in connection with her spa tial advantage. Let us consider what else Black could have played. Of course, it is bad to play 13 . . . �xf6? 1 4 dxe5 �g5+ 1 5 f4; whilst if 13 . . . lLld3+ 141hd3 �xf6, roughly the same poSition arises as in the game, but Black is left with a bishop instead of a knight, which is hardly to her advantage. White continues with f4, e5 and lLle4, with the better chances. Chessplayers are not accustomed to changing the pattern of play abruptly except in cases of extreme need, and so certain moves some times quite simply fall outside our field of vision. It dido't occur to any one to consider the idea 1 3 ... gxf6 ! ? This looks very strange, but al l the same, let us examine what happens after 14 dxe5 'Wic7. Tempting is 1 5 exf6 .txf6 1 6 f4, intending e5 and lLle4. Just what Black has achieved is not clear - one cannot see for what reason the king side has been weakened. This is true , but we have not taken an
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 27 intennediate check into considera tion, and this changes our assess ment of the position: 15 ... 'iWf4+! 16 �bl .i.xf6. Look now: Black has a strong bishop on f6, and the queen on f4 is rather beguiling for White: does it intend to capture on h2 or on e4 (after an exchange on c3)? Most probably Black will simply play in the centre with ... l:UidS. I would pre fer Black's position. In turn White can try to improve on this variation with 16 .:d2 (in stead of 16 �bl) 16 ... .i.xf6 17 g3 'iWf3 (otherwise 18 f4) 18l2JdS (after 16 �bl this move would not be pos sible) 18 ... 'iWxb3 19l2Jxf6+ �g7 20 ti)bS+ 'it>h6 21 axb3 with the better ending for White. But in this case Black has another intennediate move in reserve: 16 ... :Cd8! 17 lIfdl (17l2Jd5 cxdS 18 fxe7ltdc8+) 17 ... 'iWxf6 (White cannot now play f2-f4), or even 17 ... I:txd2 18 I:txd2 :d8. In playing 13 ... gxf6 14 dxeS 'iWc7 it is also essential to reckon with a positional pawn sacrifice: 15 f4 fxeS 16 fS!. But here too Black has sufficient counter-chances. She may, for example, play 16 ... exfS. If 17 l:lxfs then 17 ... 'it>h8 or 17 ... �g7 followed by 18 ... f6. White's knight and queen are too far away from the kingside, so it will not be possible for her to create an attack there rap idly, but Black will immediately be gin operations in the centre with ... l:UidS. And she still has an extra pawn.
If 17 exfS then 17 ... :Cd8 18l2Je4 l:tdS!. Again there is no positional bind - White has a handsome knight on e4, but Black has not only an ex tra pawn but also strong outposts in the centre. The conclusion: 13 ... gxf6! is an excellent move - it would have guar anteed Black entirely adequate counterplay. (For this reason White should have preferred 12 �bl, keep ing l2JeS as a threat.) But can one re proach Nana? I am sure that a decision such as this would have overtaxed many male grandmasters.
14 j,xe7 15 f4 (10)
'fIxe7
Let us consider how Black can get her game going. It seems to me that two plans are possible. The first is to try to get control of certain squares in the centre for her pieces by playing 17-fS. It is cer tainly better to prepare this move, by first removing the king from the a2g8 diagonal with 15 ... 'it>h8. The other plan is to play on the queenside: ... bS, ... l2Jb6, and then
28 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses ... ttJc4 or ... as-a4. In the event of e4eS the black knight will be able to occupy the square dS . I don't know which of these plans is stronger, but Black should have chosen one of them. Unfortunately Nana played rather routinely, and not too successfully (N2).
15
...
llad8? !
Why this? If Black is going to at tack on the queenside, the rook may be needed there. If, however, Black plays ... 17-fS, then it is possible that she will need to defend the pawn on e6 with this rook.
she is a purely positional player and sharp attacking moves are not her style (L2).
17 a4
This looks a bit risky, as it weak ens the flank where the white king is situated. Nevertheless, if one forgets about the possibility of 17 g4! Akhmylovskaya's decision is well founded positionally. She prevents Black from developing an initiative on the queenside with ... bS and . .. ttJb6.
17 18 �bl (11)
�h8
16 e5 Akhmylovskaya acts logically and consistently. She wishes to play ttJe4 and occupy the strong square d6 with her knight. In addition, Black has to take into account the threat of an attack on the kingside with f4-fS. Therefore her reply is practically forced.
16
.•.
f5
What should White play? You haven't forgotten that the players have castled on opposite sides, have you? Well then, 17 g4! is the first move that should come into your head! If 17 . . . fxg4 then 18 fS - the pawn on e6 is attacked and the knight gets the square e4. The reply 17 ... g6 can even be ignored - it is clear that inserting the moves 17 g4 g6 is good for White. Neither player noticed the thrust 17 g4!. Alexandria - by virtue of the fact that she has little sense of danger (N5); and Akhmylovskaya - since
Now what would you play as Black? One reasonable plan is 18 ... a6, preparing 19 . . . bS. Another possible line is 18 . . . ttJb8, intending to transfer the knight via a6 to the weakened square b4. If the knight is not allowed to reach b4 it will head for dS via c7. After 18 ... ttJb8 19 1Wc4 it is pos sible, after defending the pawn on e6, to prepare ... 1ifb7, but one may also recall the first plan: 19 . . . a6 and then, with gain of tempo, 20 . . bS. .
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 29
18 ...
ltb8?
But this move is bad. The knight gets stuck on the unfortunate square d7. Again Alexandria is found want ing when it comes to strategy (N2) .
19 ltc1
as
On the immediate 19 ... bS Black evidently did not like the reply 20 as . Akbmylovskaya has outplayed ber opponent, which is not surpris ing we have already noted her su periority over Alexandria in a positional struggle. But now trou bles begin for Akbmylovskaya. She needs to exploit her advan tage in the most accurate manner, but she rarely manages to do this (1..3) . Now White should have played 20 lM1!. The knight heads for d6 via c4. By attacking the pawn on c6 at the same time, White deters her op ponent from playing ... b6-bS, which is very important. After 20 ... ID"c8 21 ltJe3 the threat is 22 lLlc4, and 21 ... bS is hardly possible in view of 22 axbS, when the rook on c8 is hang ing . Also bad is 20 ... cS, because of 21 dS. -
20 ltc2? 21 lLlcii
ltb7
Now this i s not s o strong, since Black can defend the c6 square com fortably.
21 22 lLle3 23 axb5
lLlb8 b5
Here White had the interesting move 23 ncS!? By exploiting the fact that it is hard for the knight to move away from the defence of the
pawn on c6, White attacks bS and cuts the black queen off from the b4 square.
23
•••
':'xb5
Although Black 's queenside pawns have been weakened, her pieces are gradually coming into play and the position is becoming much sharper.
24 iVc3 25 :dl (12)
iVa7
Stronger was 2S lLlc4.
What does White intend to do? Most probably she wishes to transfer her knight to d6. The rook will have to retreat somewhere from bS, al though it will remain on the open file, and then the second black rook will be passive. Therefore a continu ation which suggests itself is 2S ... l:id8! 26 lLlc4 l:tddS. Now 27 lLld6 is not so dangerous - the king's rook has broken through into the centre, it attacks the pawn on d4 and supports the undermining thrust ... cS. Regret tably Alexandria missed this oppor tunity (N2).
30 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses
25 26 ltJc4 27 ltJd6
a4? ! ltJa6
It is not easy to assess the conse quences of 27 ltJa5 ! ? c5 . Akhmy lovskaya is not usually tempted by flank diversions - she prefers to play in the centre.
27 ...
':b6
Probably correct. In the event of the sharper 27 ... llb3 the following variation could have occurred: 2S \Wxc6 ltJM 29 \WcS \Wb s 30 ltJf7+! �gS 31 \Wxe6, threatening the cele brated 'smothered' mate (3 1 ... ltJxc2 32 ltJh6+ 'it>hS 33 \WgS+ ! .l:i.xgS 34 ltJf7 mate).
28 'i'a5
h6
Black could have brought her last piece to the queenside: 2S ... .l:i.aS, but she preferred to play more cun ningly. As we have just seen, Black needs an escape-hole, but at the same time she provokes her opponent to take the pawn on a4, after which lines are opened up for an attack on the queenside.
29 'i'xa4?! Akhmylovskaya has become greedy. After 29 �d3, followed by 1:la3, Black's position would have re mained unpleasant.
29
•••
':a8
How suddenly the situation has changed ! For her pawn Black has a dangerous attack along the open a and b-files (imagine a Benko Gambit with the white king on the queen side!). The threat is 30 ... \Wb S, and then Black's knight will come to M ...
We can see that as soon as a tense calculating game took the place of quiet manoeuvring, Alexandria out played Akhmylovskaya. This is not surprising , considering Nl and L2.
30 ltc3 31 ltJc4
'i'b8 ':b5
Worth considering was 3 1 ... llb4.
32 ':a3 33 'i'c2
ltJc7 ltJd5
White has successfully brought her rook to her defence, and the posi tion is now rather unclear. She should now have simply defended the pawn with 34 g3. The prelimi nary exchange of rooks undertaken by Akhmylovskaya is a mistake.
34 ':xa8? 35 g3 (13)
'i'xa8
Around this point the 35 minutes wasted by Nana in the opening be gan to tell. In time-trouble (N3) Al exandria missed a comparatively straightforward route to victory. But can you see what she should have played?
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 31 1be winning continuation was 35 c5 ! 36 dxc5 lbb4 37 'tWb3 'iWe4+. eautiful geometry: the attack down tbe file is reinforced by the unex pected appearance of the queen on tbe apparently overcrowded diago
B
nal b I -a8.
35 ... 36 :d3
'iWa6
Now the game could bave ended
in a draw after 36 . . . lbb4 37 l:ta3
lLlxc2 38 lha6 lb xd4, with a rougbly equal ending. But in a time scramble Alexandria plays for a win .
36 37 lba3 38 lbc4 39 lba3??
l:lb4 'tib6 'tWb5
A terrible oversigbt. After 29 b3 the position would bave remained unclear.
39 ... 40 'iWxb2
':'xb2+ ! 'i'xd3+
Black bas won back the pawn and now bas a big positional advan tage. Alexandria's superiority in a sbarp game was wbat counted in the
end.
Here Akbmylovskaya sealed ber move. I sball not sbow you the end of this game now - you will find it in the supplement to Cbapter 6 of this
book.
Now let us examine the ninth game, wbicb proved to be the last game of the matcb. Alexandria was two points ahead of ber rival and bad White. Akhmylovskaya needed to win two games in a row.
Alexandria-Akhmylovskaya 9th match game, Kislovodsk 1980 1 d4 2 .tg5
lbffi d5
Even in a situation wbere a draw is tantamount to defeat, Akbmy lovskaya cbooses the most quiet sys tem of development. On the one band this is correct - you need to play your 'own ' positions , to adopt systems corresponding to your own tastes and style of play. On the other band, it can only be regretted that ber style is not sufficiently universal and does not (by virtue of L2) permit sbarper plans of development to be adopted, even at sucb an important time.
3 4 5 6 7
.txf6 e3 lbd2 .id3 _f3
exf6 .te6 c6 f5
This is often a useful move in sucb positions , but in this case I think White sbould not bave burried to play it. More sound was 7 lbe2, followed by c4 and lb c3 (or lbf4). Only then, if need be, sbould White play 'iWf3 .
7 ... 8 lbe2
g6 lbd7
Now on 9 c4 the reply 9 . . . �b4 would be unpleasant, so Alexandria first castles.
9 0-0
.td6
Stronger was 9 . . . lb f6 and 10 . . . lbe4. This line would bave sbown up the negative aspect of the early 'i'f3 .
32 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses
10 c4 11 ttJf4 12 cxdS
ttJft) 0-0 cxdS? !
I would have preferred to capture on dS with a piece, probably with the bishop. Akbmylovskaya wishes to invade on e4 with her knight, but in itself this square is not really so im portant. A much more significant factor is that the light-squared bishop remains shut in by its own pawns . Now let us recall what White's last five moves were: ttJe2, 0-0, c4, ttJf4, cxdS . They are all , with the ex ception of the last, obvious, almost indisputable, and could have even been played in a blitz game. How much time should have been allotted to them? Probably about ten min utes, more or less . But how long do you think Alexandria spent over them? 30 minutes? No, rather more more than an hour! This, of course, is totally impracticable, and it greatly reduces her chances of success in this game. Certainly problems lie ahead, and rather more complicated problems than those which were solved during the last five moves, but now White will probably not have enough time for them. Here not only Nana's 'time-trouble disease' (N3) showed itself, but also her height ened emotional state (N4). The fact that this is the decisive game influ ences her - it makes her agitated, compels her to re-examine her deci sions , and consequently reduces the quality of her play.
13 ttJb3?! (14)
The knight has nothing to do on b3. Unfortunately Alexandria some times deploys her pieces rather poorly (N2). Better was 1 3 'iVe2, va cating the f3 square for the knight or a pawn in case it becomes necessary to chase the black knight away from the e4 square. However, White 's position is still very solid. Black stands quite well, but, don 't forget, she needs to win. Akbmylovskaya begins active op erations. But sharp play is not one of her strengths, and for this reason each of her next few moves turns out not to be the best.
13 14 ttJhS .••
gS? ! ttJe4?!
Better was 14 . . . g4 15 ttJxf6+ 'iVxf6 and then . .. f5-f4.
15 'i'e2
g4? !
Why concede the f4 square? 16 ttJf4 'iVgS (15) Let us now consider how White should continue. I have an unexpected suggestion:
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 33
17 f3?! 15 W
Also playable, though by no means the most reliable plan. In principle, when your opponent has two bishops it is more sound not to open up the game but, on the con trary, to keep it closed.
17 18 lbt3 19 llaO
let us examine 1 7 �xe4. We shall as sume 17 ... fxe4 1 8 g3. White has a splendid knight on f4; an exchange on f4 will leave Black with a hope lessly bad bishop. (You should un derstand that if there were a black pawn on g7 I would not be suggest ing this variation.) White has some useful moves for example: ltJcs , %lcI , 1Wbs . But what about Black? Perhaps ... h7-hS h4, to prepare to attack down the h file. But, in the first place, this is not so dangerous - after ... h4xg3 White can always reply f2xg3, retaining a defence along the second rank. Be sides, it is clear that White will man age to develop active operations far sooner than Black. I think that after an exchange on e4 B lack would have had to give up any thoughts of playing for a win even before she had really got started, and that her position would have offered no prospects at all. Inci dentally, there was no need to hurry Wi th this exchange - the preliminary 1 7 g 3 is certainly no worse.
gxf3 �h8 llg8
Black has some pressure on the kingside. If your opponent is prepar ing an attack, it is necessary to seek a way to change the pattern of play, to make the transition to the sort of static situation which favours you. Here too let us examine 20 �xe4. I realise that it is a shame to undouble the black pawns, but on the other hand it is good for White to simplify the position. Let us assume 20 . . . fxe4 (20 . . . dxe4 is n o better) 2 1 %lg3 fle7 (or 2 1 ... fih4) 22 J:lxg8+ J:lxg8 23 'iiih 1 . Although the position is not as quiet as that arising after 17 �xe4, here too Black's attack has few pros pects of success. White has a mag nificent knight on f4, which is holding her entire position together. She only needs to transfer the knight from b3 to some decent square - to c3, for example (perhaps t2Jc5-a4c3). Unfortunately, as became clear after the game, exchanging on e4 didn't even enter Alexandria's head. Routine thinking prevented it: Black has doubled pawns, so why undou ble them? In general , Nana's in adequate positional arsenal (N2)
34 A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses was shown up in this phase of the game.
20 �hl?
'i'e7!
An excellent prophylactic move. Now in the event of .i.xe4 White will not also be able to exchange rooks with the move l:lg3. But, all the same, White's position remains solid, and as yet nothing terrible has occurred. It is evident that the time has come for White to move her poorly-placed knight away from b3.
21 lLlc1
llg4 (1 6)
16 W
suddenly threatens to come into play via b5. If 24 a4 then 24 ... b5 ! . Alexandria decided not to capture on d5 because of a rather strange variation, which did credit to her imagination (Nl) (I suspect, inci. dentally, that it never even entered Akhmylovskaya's head): 24 lLlxdS 'ii'h 4 (threatening ... lLlg3+) 25 l:lh3 .i.c6 ! ! 26 l:lxh4 :txh4. Black only has a rook for her queen, but all her pieces are participating in the attack and it is hard for White to parry a multitude of threats hanging over her, Whilst finding this spectacular idea for her opponent, with the move she played Nana overlooked another simpler idea. However, the position has now become very much sharper and it is very hard to advise anything good for White.
24 lLltl 25 llxf4
llxf4! .txf4 (1 7)
22 .i.c2? It is tempting to put the knight on d3, but Black has a strong reply, which was underestimated by Alex andria. Her poor sense of danger (NS) showed here. More sound was 22 'i'd! and 23 lLlce2. From e2 the knight would support its colleague on f4 and take control of the square g3, and in some lines could go to c3.
22 23 lLlcd3 •••
llagS .i.d7!
An excellent move - the bishop
Question: How should White cap ture on e4? During the last few moves the situation has changed dramatically:
A Chessplayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 35 it haS become unpleasant for White, al though still by no means hopeless. Here it is very important to keep one's composure, to find one 's way caImly through the problems which have arisen. But, as I have already noted, Alexandria is excessively emotional - a change in the nature of the conflict has a powerful effect on her frame of mind. She is in no con dition to stop, to take hold of herself, to calculate variations calmly, and for this reason she usually makes one mistake after another (N4). The solution to the problem we now face requires not just accurate calculation but also a correct assess ment of the position. I think the right move is 26 tDxe4. On 26 ... .ixe3 White has at least 27 tDxc5 or 27 tDf6, so that the only reply to be feared is 26 . . . .ixh2. But then 27 'itxh2 fxe4 28 'iih5 , attacking the pawns on f7 and d5, or 27 . . . .h4+ 28 'ii;lg 1 fxe4 29 ZUf7. In both cases White maintains counterplay. It is much weaker to capture on e4 with the bishop.
26 .txe4?
.tb8?
As soon as it is a question of con crete calculation, Akbmylovskaya makes a mistake (L2, L3). Probably in reply to 26 tDxe4 she had planned to retreat the bishop, to try to make Use of ' the advantage of the two bishops' , and now she does not wish to deviate from her intended plan. B ut capturing on e4 with either pawn WOuld have guaranteed her a big ad Vantage.
a) 26 ... fxe4 27 exf4 e3 ! (Black cannot allow a blockade of pawns on the dark squares). The bishop sud · denly gets excellent prospects; for example: . . . .ig4, or . . . .if5-e4, or . . . a6 an d . . . .ib5 . And the passed pawn is extremely dangerous. b) 26 '" dxe4 27 exf4 'iib4! . The threat is ... .ib5 , whilst the pawn on d4 is attacked, and it is rather awk ward for White to defend it, since the white knight is badly-placed. I don't really know which of these two captures is stronger, but at any rate they are both better than the move Akhmylovskaya played.
27 .to
'iih4 ?
Yet another mistake Lena sim ply overlooks her opponent's reply, which is the only move. It was nec essary to play 27 . . . l:!e8, giving White a problem with the pawn on e3. -
28 tDh3 29 .d2 30 ..txd5?
':'e8
'ike7
The white knight now gets stuck on h3 for some time. Of course , stronger was 30 tDf4 .xe3 3 1 'ilxe3 lhe3 32 tDxdS with a rather bette r endgame for White. Again Alexan dria revealed inadequate under standing of the position (N2) , coupled with a tendency to produce a series of errors (N4). Nana rejected 30 tDf4 because of the reply 30 . . . .ic6, after which it is not possible to capture on dS . Not a very serious reason ! It was simplest to play more solidly: 3 1 g 3 ! .xe3 32
36 A Chesspiayer 's Strengths and Weaknesses 'ii'x e3 l:txe3 and now either 33 i.xdS or the cold-blooded 33 �g2. It is not necessary to hurry to regain the pawn - everything is securely block aded, the mobility of the bishops is
played i. f3. Now it will not be easy to attack the pawn on d4. Again her habit of making moves 'on general grounds prevented Lena from utilis ing the advantages of her position
limited, and so White stands at any rate no worse.
(LJ).
30 31 'ii'xe3 •••
'ii'xe3 Doxe3
Threatening 32 ... l:te2.
32 i.o (18)
18 B
•
33 �gl
34 Dodl ? ! 35 g3?
Black's position is to be preferred - she has two bishops, and White's knight is out of play for the time be ing . If only Black's kingside pawns were not so weak. . . White clearly wishes to bring her king towards the centre. In the mean time Black should develop some sort of activity. I suggest 32 ... a5 ! ? , with the idea of playing . . . i.a7 . It is ad vantageous for Black to lure the pawn to dS and then to centralise her bishop on d4.
32 ...
b6? !
Why this? White doesn 't wish to capture on b7 - indeed, she only j ust
�g7
If Alexandria had now played 34 � she would have obtained an ex cellent position. She would only have had to play g2-g3 and then put her knight on f4. But Nana was al ready in time-trouble (N3), and in such cases emotions and feelings frequently misguided feelings - take the place of logic and calculation. Alexandria saw that in the event of 34 � l:td3 two pawns are attacked at once, but she failed to realise that after 3S l:tdl l:txd l 36 i.xd l Black cannot capture on h2.
DoeS
Why is this planned move by White a mistake? It was necessary for White to ask herself what Black wishes to do, why the rook had moved away: simply in order to avoid the loss of a tempo after �,
or because of some other idea? Of course, it is heading for c8. It should not have been allowed to reach the open c-file, so White should have played 3S l:tc l .
35 36 D.d2 37 a3 38 lDf4
DocS i.d6 i.e7 i.g5
I fail to see the point of this move,
39 �tl
�t8
A
40 h4
Chessplayer IS Strengths and Weaknesses 3 7
.b6 (1 9)
42
...
i.e8
We were mainly reckoning on 42 ... .td7 43 a4 .txf4 44 gxf4 Ilc3 . White's defence here is not as easy as it may seem at flfSt sight. Prob ably best is 45 'Ote2 ! .tc8 ! ? (45 . . . 1lh 3 46 1lc2; 45 ... b5 4 6 axb5 .txb5+ 47 .tc4) 46 .tc4 %lh3 47 dS lhh4 48 'ite3 .td7 ! 49 .te2 ! , but not 49 d6? 1lh6 ! , and not 49 'Otd4? 'Ote7 ! .
43 a4 44 �e2
Here the game was adjourned. White has a solid position, but all the same it is rather passive. Despite her disconnected kingside pawns, Black retains the initiative, thanks to her two bishops and control of the open c-file. What is the best move for White? Her bishop is now shooting into thin air, so it would be quite good to transfer it to b3, covering the light squares on the queenside and prepar ing to exchange rooks on c2. After 41 .td l ! the game would have soon ended in a draw. Regrettably Alexan dria sealed a less accurate move (N2,
NS).
41 .tdS?
i.a4!
The bishop will not now be able to reach b3, and Black intends to acti vate her pieces by playing l:1c l and J.c2-e4.
42 b3
During analysis we had decided that this move was essential. But
now Black gets the excellent square c3 to invade on with her rook.
i.g7 :'c7!
An excellent prophylactic move. Akhmylovskaya takes away the im portant square c4 from the enemy bishop. It would be bad to play 45 .tc4 now, in view of 45 ... .txa4 (with a rook on c8, capturing on a4 would not be playable because of the intermediate move .ta6) . Black in tends, having put her king on d6, to drive the white bishop away from the centre and then to transfer her own bishop to e6.
4S l:.d3
l:.c2?
Akbmylovskaya wrongly departs from her plan. The move 45 ... 'ite7 ! would have preserved Black's ad vantage, whereas the rook incursion is easily parried.
46 �e3 Having defended the pawn on d4, White wishes to offer an exchange of rooks: 47 1lc3. The minor-piece end ing is drawn, and if Black does not exchange, the incursion of the white rook on c8 or c7 will be unpleasant.
46 47 h2 1Wf5 , when quite unexpect edly Black creates dangerous threats with just a few pieces. Karpov plays more forcefully.
40 f4 41 'i'h5
1We6
Again a good move. White pre vents the black pieces from becom ing active.
41 ... 42 �xh3
38 �g3 ! There aren 't many pieces left on the board. Karpov decides logically that the king has to take part in offen
1We7+ 1Wn
I try my last chance. The final lit tIe problem: what should White play?
43 W !
sive operations, and so he uses it to attack the knight on h4. This is the
Th e threat o f 4 3 . . . :g3+ 44 ..t>h4 l:th3+ is repelled. Black no longer
only winning continuation , and al though I saw it, I decided to take the risk, recognising that only with com plications was I able to obtain any
has any hope.
1Wd7+ 43 ... 44 f5 Black resigned
practical chances.
38 39 �xh4
fxg4
An excellent positional game by White . The prophylactic spirit
54 Analysing Your Own Games pervading all of Wbite's play is very characteristic of Karpov's style. It is clear that I lost this game with the move 30 . . . tbf5? But the stra tegic battle was evidently lost rather earlier, when Karpov frustrated the transfer of my knight to c4. In order to understand the events that oc curred in this game we need some penetrating analysis. At first Black played logically; all his actions were dictated by concrete considerations. But after 23 h3 (32) my reply 23 ... h6 was clearly not obligatory.
in fact possible to play 24 . . . tbaS , an d now 25 1ib 1 i s not dangerous. Black has combated his opponent's prophylaxis by, as it were, giving him a taste of his own medicine. I also found another interesting possibility: 23 ... l:la4 ! ? Black has to reckon with 24 a3, of course. He may sacrifice a pawn: 24 ... tbaS 25 ':xb4 l:.bxb4 26 l:.xb4 l:.xb4 27 axb4 tbc4. The knight is stronger than the pas sive bishop, which could give Black some compensation, but it seems to me that White still retains the advan tage. For example: 28 �h2 1i'a4 29 1i'f5 . I don 't like this. But it is not obligatory to sacrifice a pawn. It is possible to maintain the equilibrium simply by creating an escape-square with 24 ... h6! . But what if White plays 24 1i'c2 !? (instead of 24 a3)? Then Black has 24 ... l:.a6. How can Black answer 25 l:.c l ? Can you see? That's right 25 . . . l:.xa2 ! . After 26 l:.xa2 b3 27 1ib2 bxa2 28 1i'xa2 White maintains his pressure along the c-file, so Black still has some problems. I thought about the following plan: 28 ... tbdS 29 1i'a7 lk8, and then ... tbe6 and even . . . g6. On the whole Black gets an acceptable position. But this is not all . I still had doubts: you see, the move 23 . . . h6 doesn't look so bad. I couldn't be lieve that my position had to become difficult just because of this move. So let us look a little more closely at what subsequently occurred. After 23 ... h6 24 :c 1 ! l:.b6 25 -
I looked at this position a little more closely and discovered that, firstly, the move 23 ... l:.b6 ! deserves consideration. It is not clear whether or not the move . . . h6 is necessary, but . . . l:.b6 is certainly a useful move, as it renders harmless White's active move 24 l:.c 1 . Let me remind you: in the game there followed 23 ... h6 24 l:.c 1 !, and it turned out that on 24 . . . tbaS White had the tactical idea 25 1ib 1 . But after 23 ... l:.b6 24 l:.c l it is
Analysing Your Own Games 55 '11> 1 I played 25 ... nab8. This move is generally in keeping with Black's plan , since it prepares ... ttJas but, all the same, it is a shame to move the rook away from the open file. What other possibilities does Black have? ,
The pawn on b4 could also have been protected from the other side: 25 ... 1la4! . Now on 26 ltc5 (as in the game) it is possible to play 26 . . . �a5, an d this represents an enor mous achievement for Black, solv ing all his problems. If 26 llbc2, again preventing the move . . ttJas B lack renews the threat by playing 26 ... na7. This means that 26 llbc2 also gives White nothing. That leaves 26 Wc2 still to be con sidered, but here too Black has 26 . . . l:ta7 2 7 Wc5 :as 2 8 Wc2 na7. White ei ther has to consent to a draw or al low the knight to come to c4. When I discovered this I immedi ately felt better. My assessment made during the game had after all been more or less correct (I had con.
,
sidered that the position was roughly equal). But my perception of the po sition proved to be insufficiently as tute. Although I had wished to place my knight on c4, clearly this wish had simply not been strong enough to become a burning desire to be ac complished at any cost. By under standing the essence of a position, by getting hold of the thread of a game, it is possible to unravel any situation. Such an understanding can be very important in helping a player to find the only correct solutions over the board. Let us sum up. What benefit can we derive from the game just exam ined? Well, for one thing, valuable opening information. Afterwards, having made use of my analysis, I was able to use this variation to draw with Black whenever this suited me - in a manner of speaking I defended this variation. It is very useful to reflect on Kar pov 's actions. His play makes a pow erful impression. Above all, his way of taking decisions, his prophylactic approach. With every move he makes, he takes his opponent's plans into account and combats them. Also instructive is the very accu rate way he set about converting his advantage into victory. Perhaps at one point Karpov could have played with greater precision. But when the need arose he was not afraid to play 38 �g3 ! and 39 xh4. Here he did not avoid the calculation of concrete variations, because the position de-
56 Analysing Your Own Games manded it. Situations occur in which one needs to calculate variations, to create complications - when this is in fact the only way to win. Once again I shall return to the idea of a central theme. This whole game essentially contained just one idea, the battIe revolved around a single manoeuvre. This does some times happen. For example, you re alise that your main task is to exchange light-squared bishops, and you try to accomplish this exchange, and your opponent prevents it. In an notating the ninth game of his World Championship match with Botvin nik in 1 960, Tal recalls a conversa tion he had with his opponent concerning a complicated position which arose in the middlegame. Botvinnik said that for a long time he was not sure how it should be as sessed, but that he had eventually come to understand the essence of the position: it was necessary to ex change rooks but to keep the queens on. This assessment had seemed too abstract to Tal, but later, when exam ining complicated variations that he had calculated in the course of the game, he realised that Botvinnik was absolutely right, and that the idea he had expressed came into effect in many variations. I wish to examine one more game. It was played in a Candidates match when the scores were level at 2112-2112, and to some extent it de cided the fate of the match. We shall pay most attention to the features I
spoke about before we analysed the Karpov game.
Timman-Yusupov 6th game, Candidates match, 1ilburg 1986 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d4 c4 ltJc3 ltJa i.g5 .ixfti 'tib3
d5 e6 ltJfti i.e7 h6 .ixfti
I had not expected this move, which had previously been encoun tered in a Kasparov-Karpov match, and I replied with the same move that Karpov had chosen.
7 8 0-0-0 ...
c6
Kasparov had continued with the quieter 8 e3 . Timman's choice is evi dence that he is in the mood for a fight. Here I considered various con tinuations, even the most risky - for example, 8 ... b5 , and also 8 ... 'ifb6 9 'ii'c2 dxc4 lO ltJe4 - but I didn't par ticularly like any of them. I played quite logically and in accordance with my tastes.
8 9 'i'xc4
dxc4 b5
White has a choice - where should he retreat the queen: to b3 or d37 Each move has its drawbacks. On lO 'i'd3 Black will reply, say, lO . . ltJd7 1 1 e4 'i'a5 , with the threat of 12 . . . b4 (the pawn on a2 will be hanging). .
Analysing Your Own Games 57 demonstrates the greater will to win. The move 10 ... a5 is very good psy chologically - Black indicates that he is not afraid of his opponent and that he is aiming to complicate the game as much as possible. I think that it is also quite good objectively.
10 1t'b3 (34)
1 1 e4
All according to theory: in re sponse to a flank operation White plays in the centre.
1 1 ... 12 'i'c2
A pawn structure has arisen which is typical of many variations of the Queen 's Gambit or the Slav Defence. Black's standard plan is to prepare ... c6-c5 by playing ... liJd7, ... .ib7 and . . . a6. There is also a more risky plan, which is the one I chose. I think there was one thing that I sensed correctly during the game: Black should not rush to castle, since as a result of the move . . . h7-h6 the position of the black king would prove to be vulnerable. White could begin a pawn storm: b4, g4 and g5 , and in this situation he might be first to break through.
10
...
a4
�7 (35) I also considered 1 2 . . . �6!7. If 1 3 e5 .te7 14 iFe4, attacking the pawns on c6 and b5 , Black has the defence 14 . . . iFc7 ! . But all the same I decided to bring my knight towards the centre .
a5
Of course this is an impudent plan, but I didn 't choose it casually. A match has particular features of its OWn - the fight for the initiative, for the psychological advantage. Fre quently the winner is not the one Who play s better chess but the one Who is in fighting mood, the one who
Timman had a choice. The con tinuation 1 3 e5 .ie7 1 4 �e4 .tb7 15 �b 1 seemed to me to be logical, most justified positionally. Of course, also in this case Black would retain counter-chances after 15 ... b4. The plan then would be to sacrifice the pawn on b3 in order to open lines.
58 Analysing Your Own Games Timman played a sharper vari ation. He apparently considered that Black's flank development had to be refuted by an immediate break through in the centre.
13 d5 The drawback of this move is that a diagonal is opened up for the bishop on f6, which now begins to play at full strength.
13 14 exd5 ...
cxd5 a3
Black's idea is logical - to open the game up on the queenside, where the enemy king is situated. But in such a sharp situation one should not rely on superficial feelings - it is necessary to back up such feelings with calculation. The correct move was 14 ... O-O ! (significant for the theory of this variation). Now that the position on the queens ide and in the centre has been opened up, Black should think about the safety of his king and only then continue his of fensive. If, say, 15 dxe6 fxe6 1 6 ltJxb5 (I was worried about this during the game), then Black has the promising reply 1 6 . . . a3. On 17 ltJxa3 an ex change sacrifice is possible: 17 . . . .l:Ixa3 I S bxa3 WaS. By then playing . . . ltJc5 and ... .i.b7, Black will de velop a terrific attack. It would ap pear that such a turn of events would favour Black. In the event of 16 We4 B lack can choose between 1 6 . . . waS , 1 6 . . . .i.xc3 an d 1 6 ... a3 ! ? Probably stronger was 1 6 .i.xb5 .
Then there could follow 1 6 ... a3 17 �c4 (this looks logical) 1 7 ... axb2+ I S b l (a typical defensive method - hiding the king behind one of the opponent's pawns; it would of course be dangerous to capture on b2). This is a very complicated posi. tion, and it is practically impossible to analyse it thoroughly. I shall show you here one possible variation that I analysed, and really just as an illus · tration: I S ... Wb6 ( 1 S ... WaS ! ?) 19 liJe4 .i.e7 20 ltJd4 ltJc5 2 1 ltJxc5 (more accurate is 2 1 !the l ) 2 1 . .. �xc5 22 We4 .i.xd4 23 WxaS .i.b7 24 1Wa3 .i.e4+ 25 .i.d3 .l:IaS 26 We7 Wa6 and Black wins. It would probably be possible to devote an entire chapter - possibly more than one - to the analysis of this position (and also, incidentally, to others which arose later in this game). But the conclusion is clear: 14 . . . O-O ! would have led to very complicated play, with chances for both sides. But after the move in the game White could have obtained an advantage.
15 dxe6 16 bl
axb2+ fxe6 (36)
I considered sacrificing a piece with 1 6 ... 0-0 1 7 exd7 waS , hoping for I S dxcSW? .l:IfxcS, but unfortu nately this can be refuted by 1 8 Wb3 ! . For example, I S ... .i.xc3 19 dxcSW, or I S . . . .i.b7 19 liJd4 b4 20 ltJcb5 ; it is also impossible to believe in the fairy tale I S . . . .i.xd7 19 .l:Ixd7 .l:IfcS (or 19 ... .l:IacS) .
17 We4!
Analysing Your Own Games 59
17 36 W
White had a wide choice of tempt ing continuations, and TImman was able to find the strongest among them. 17 �xbS would have led to an already familiar position, resulting after 14 ... 0-0. In the event of 17 /t)xbS 0-0 1 8 ttJc7 Black cannot play 18 ... �bn 19 ttJxa8 'tWxa8 20 �xd7 .ic6 (20 ... �c8 2 1 �c4 �e4 22 AdJ) 2 1 lta7 ! (not 21 �6? 'i'xa2+ !). But I had seen a worthy re sponse: 1 8 ... l:la7 ! 19 ttJxe6? lha2 ! . It looks tempting to play 17 'i'g6+. Bad in reply is 1 7 . . . h8 19 l:.h5 , win ning). But Black compels the rook to move to h5, where it is not placed particularly well .
16 17 lIbS .••
a6!
There was no point in going for simplification with 17 �f4 �d6 ! '
17 18 i.f4 •••
i.d7 'i'c8
A cool-headed and correct move. In the event of 18 ... �d6 19 �xd6 'iWxd6 White would have obtained a big advantage by playing simply 20 'iWxb7 �c6 2 1 'iWb6. Much weaker was the tempting 20 i.g6? After 20 . . . 'iWe7 2 1 �xt7+ 'iWxt7 22 'iWxt7+ 'ifi>xn 23 lhd7+ 'ifi>g6 24 l:.h3 l:.hdS 25 l:1g3+ xh7 33 IDl3+ 'i'h6 34 'i'17+) and here the simplest is 32 'i'h5+ �g7 33 :g3+ �6 34 ID"3+ �e7 35 'iWe5+, winning the queen. In such cases it is necessary to choose the move you like best and calculate it through to a conclusion. �xh7 29 �g7 30 1i'xe4+ 31 J.xe5+ This is the [mal blow, and a beau tiful one. One has to admire Zukertort's aesthetic sense. �xf8 31 ... 32 J.g7+ A very nice move. �g8 32 ... 33 'ilxe7 Black resigned
Part II Mark Dvoretsky You have just seen a remarkable classical game and singled out sev eral situations which were interest ing from a strategic point of view. The positional sketches which one could make are, so to speak, of a pure chess nature (they are all associated with the problem of exchanging pieces). It is very important to mas ter typical methods of positional play. The arsenal of any strong player includes an enormous number of such methods, both the generally familiar and also the more subtle, those encountered more rarely. But positional sketches do not have to relate only to pure chess themes. Chess is played by a human being, a person who thinks, searches and struggles. Some things may turn out well for a chess player, he may discover something interesting, but sometimes he makes mistakes, he may fail. And this failure may not be due just to a lack of basic chess knowledge - it is frequently the re sult of character defects, errors made in considering moves, in the way a poSition is approached, or in the tak ing of decisions. Being able to ana lyse one's thinking, to cultivate rational thought-processes, to estab lish the causes for errors made and, conversely, to note one 's creative successes - all these abilities are clearly no less important than the
82 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games ... mastering of the finer points of chess itself. The examples I wish to show you are associated with the analysis of one's own actions. This is not pure chess analysis but analysis relating, as it were, to the psychology of chess. The examples have all been taken from games Sergei Dolmatov played during the period 1 977-80. At that time he needed to improve his positional play, so he put together some positional sketches, noting not only the pure chess incidents but also psychological aspects of decision making and ways of thinking about moves. I recently took another look at Seryosha Dolmatov's notebook, and it was very interesting to recall the work he did to improve his game. I should add that Sergei was already quite a strong player. In 1 978 he be came World Junior Champion, and a year later he won the First League of the US SR Championship. But, even for a player of Dolmatov's standard, the use of positional sketches proved to be productive, it helped to im prove his skills. Needless to say, there were certain weaknesses in his game which he wanted to rid himself of. I shall now show you some exam ples of his analysis of his own games. At the end of 1 977 Dolmatov failed to win the European Junior Championship - he shared Ist-3ed place, finishing second on tie-break. This toumament showed up some of
his weaknesses - in particular, a lack of self-confidence and a certain pas sivity in his play. We had previously done a great deal of work on tech nique and strategy. Sergei became fascinated by positional play and started avoiding risk, preferring to play by technique alone. After the European Championship we studied ideas for activating his game and for consolidating his fighting qualities. The work we did was successful, and Sergei started playing with far more aggression and inventiveness. He soon won the World Junior Champi onship with assured play. But, when analysing his games even from this successful tournament, he found traces of his old illness. The game with which we are go ing to begin was played at the start of the championship. The first sketch which Sergei drew was associated with a poSition which arose immedi ately after the opening.
Kchakpur-Dolmatov World Junior Ch., Graz 1978 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
e4 tLla c3 exd5 d4 .td3 0-0 'i'e2 cxd4 lldl tLlc3
c5 e6 d5 'i'xd5 tLlfti .te7 0-0 cxd4 tLlc6 tLlb4 'i'd6
The Technique o/ Working on Your Own Games
12 .tbl (55)
...
.
•
83
. . . .ta6 and had therefore decided b6 could be refuted, one that 1 2 could assess this episode as a tactical blunder. But in fact he saw every thing and took fright nonetheless, and so quite a different picture arises. One should only be afraid of things that are more real. If you see a good idea and it works - why should you have anything to fear? Mistakes made in deliberating over moves rarely occur by chance; they give cause for reflection, since there is usually some reason behind them. For instance, lack of confi dence in your own powers - when you do not actually fear any concrete threats but are simply excessively cautious in any circumstances. This is a serious weakness, as it a terrible hindrance when playing chess. Suc cess comes most often to aggressive players with confidence in their own ability. Sometimes cautious play is a con sequence of a corresponding attitude to a particular game. For example, it may be important that you do not lose; by virtue of your tournament position a draw may suit you en tirely, and you decide to play rather more safely than usual. Such an atti tude of mind has a corrective influ ence on your actions throughout the game. At some point you may need to play more actively, but as your at titude is one of solidity and safety, you place restrictions on yourself. If your tournament position de mands that you get a draw, then '"
12 .td7 A nOlmal developing move. But was 12 ... b6 not stronger, attempting to place the bishop more actively and take control of the long diagonal? What could Black have been worried about here? Of course, 1 3 �, when he might inadvertently lose a rook. Should we fear this move or not? What about the counter 1 3 . . . .ta6 1 . Any exchanges favour Black, so we should not be afraid. Dolmatov sketched a diagram and wrote that, instead of 1 2 .. .td7, it was better to develop the bishop on the long diagonal (this is for the mo ment a pure chess assessment). He commented on what happened as follows : I knew that the strongest move in this position was 1 2 ... b6, but during the game I suddenly became afraid of 1 3 .tJe4, even though I saw the re ply 1 3 . . . .ta6 ! - that is to say, I was afraid of ghosts.' Rather interesting. If Sergei had not found the intermediate move
' "
84 The Technique o/ Working on Your Own Games ... straightforward playing for a draw is a serious mistake. You will nearly al ways lose in such cases - assuming, of course, that you have a clever and experienced opponent. There is nothing worse than playing for a draw from the very fIrst move. If it is important that you avoid defeat, you should in no circumstances think about a draw - you should play nor mally and actively. You are only enti tled to think about the desired outcome at certain rare moments for example, if your opponent offers a draw or if the opportunity arises to force a position that is dead-drawn in other words, only once or twice in the course of a game. Of course, a cautious attitude does not necessarily reduce the quality of your play. Thanks to such an attitude you can sometimes render harmless your opponent's hidden intentions, which in other circumstances you might well have overlooked. That is to say, a cautious frame of mind may help you, but it may also let you down, and sometimes both the one and the other occur in the course of a single game. We shall now look at just such a case. At the start of the World Champi onship, when his game with the Ira nian player Kchakpur was played, Sergei had not yet warmed up. He was not quite sure of himself, being excessively diffident and cautious. Let us examine a position which arose in the middlegame of that en counter (56).
It is Black to move. How does he stand? Very well, of course. At any rate, we in Russia play chess better than they do in Iran, and so it is not surprising that Dolmatov had out played his opponent. Here he again sketched a diagram, placed an exclamation mark after his move 22 . . . l:td7 ! , and provided the following comment: 'Here I puzzled out my oppo nent's plan and played the strongest move. The tempting 22 . . 'ifb6 was weaker, because of 23 'tieS ! 'tixb2? 24 g4 ! , when White wins. Previously I would have overlooked a move like 24 g4, since I have always been afraid of moving the pawns in front of my king precipitously.' We see the result: in this instance a cautious approach to the game made Sergei pay careful attention to his opponent's possibilities and helped him to discover a hidden trap. Note the last phrase in Dolma tov 's commentary - it is connected with his pleasure at seeing the result of the work he had done. Previously .
The Technique o/ Working on Your Own Games ... 85 moves such as 24 g4 were not in his chess repertoire, he would find them only with some difficulty. We had devoted a great deal of time to active, dynamic play, to unusual decisions, and now Seryosha felt that he was capable of finding such ideas for himself. Look at a third episode from the same game (57) .
Dolmatov's note t o his move 2 5 ... 'i'b5?: 'Again I saw the strongest con tinuation: 25 ... lbe4 26 'ii'e3 'ii'xb2 27 .i.xe6 'ii'xf2+ 28 'ii'x f2 l£lxf2, but did not notice that at the end of this variation I would have an extra pawn - for some reason it had seemed to me that the pawns on each side would be equal.' At first glance a pure error in cal culation has been made, but I think this was no accident. When a player is in a mood for a cautious game he does not wish to take sharp deci Sions, to make the situation more complicated, to play combinations.
Subconsciously he looks not for confmnation of the idea he has found but for its refutation, in order that he may continue with his quiet manoeuvring. And so he easily per suades himself, with real or some times - as in this case - illusory arguments. The illusions arise, as a rule, only on one side of the argu ment. Conversely, a player in highly ag gressive mood usually gets illusions of the precisely opposite nature. These three positional sketches (more correctly in this case - psy chological sketches) associated with episodes from a single game were placed together, since they have something in common - they show us various consequences of a chess player's particular psychological state. To the same sheet I added a de scription of another episode from one of Sergei 's games from the same World Junior Championship.
Yusupov-Dolmatov World Junior Ch., OraZ 1978
86 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games ... I don' t remember whose tum it was to move. This game was played in the middle of the tournament and Yusupov was at this stage half a point behind Dolmatov. In the first half of the game White had a big ad vantage. Dolmatov defended stub bornly and was able to repel his opponent's attack. Again I shall quote his commentary. ' In this position I took my most unfortunate decision of the whole tournament: I offered a draw, even though Black had good winning chances. Considering my oppo nent's lack of time, these chances could well have been turned into a full point. Having conducted an ex hausting defence in the fIrst half of the game, I was unable to adjust my thoughts and start playing for a win. I realised that my position was not worse, but the fact that it was better somehow never even entered my head.' First let us consider the pure chess assessment of this situation. Dol matov is absolutely right. In a mid dlegame with opposite-coloured bishops the player with the advan tage is usually the one with the in itiative, the one who is attacking. It is clear that Black's position is the more active. His bishop exerts pres sure against the square 12, while White's bishop is biting on its own pawn at d5 . A blockaded pawn on a square of the same colour as the bishop restricts its activity consider ably and therefore constitutes a very
serious positional defect in a middle game with opposite-coloured bish ops. Now the psychological aspect. The transition from an inferior posi tion to a superior one frequently proves to be difficult for both play ers. The player who had the advan tage sometimes does not quite grasp the fact that the situation has changed, he does not sense the dan ger. Instead of contenting himself with equality before it is too late and agreeing a draw at some point, he continues playing for a win through ' inertia' and so makes his position worse. On the other hand, the player who for a long time had been con ducting a difficult defence quite often continues defending even when he has real winning chances. This is a typical psychological mis take, and it is a very good idea to learn to notice such errors in your own games. If you can be as honest as Dolmatov and analyse your play as frankly as he did, then in all prob ability you will avoid repeating the same errors in future. On the whole, Dolmatov played superbly in the 1978 World Junior Championship, finishing fIrst with a very high score of 101h points out of 1 3 and winning several beautiful games. But, as you see, even in his best tournaments a chessplayer can not avoid some difficult moments, suffering losses of confidence and totally overlooking certain moves ; it is very important to be able to
The Technique of Working on Your Own Games . . . 87 SUlVive such moments, suffering as little damage as possible. Chess is played by all kinds of people, with different mentalities, characters and temperaments. Dol matov is a highly emotional person; excessive emotion often over whelms him and prevents him from assessing a situation objectively. He often suffers from considerable fluc tuations of mood. I have demon strated examples in which he was unsure of himself, where he had un j ustified doubts about something or feared something. But now I shall acquaint you with some examples where the exact opposite was the case. Immediately following the 1 978 World Championship, Sergei and I took part in a tournament in Kutaisi, where we shared first place.
Estrin-Dolmatov Kutaisi 1978
White has just captured Black's knight: 17 .i.xg6. What would you
recapture with on g6? Dolmatov chose 17 ... fxg6? ! ' 'Stronger was th e natural 1 7 . . . hxg6; for example: 1 8 0-0-0 liJf5 19 1Wxd8 lifxd8 with advantage to Black in the endgame.' [In fact, the position favours Black only because of the bad knight on a3; with a more normal white knight such an assess ment would hardly be correct.] ' But I wanted to play a more complicated game, and so I convinced myself that in the middlegame too I would at any rate have no less an advantage. In ac tual fact, Black has nothing in the middlegame. Moreover, he has to play accurately in order not to get an inferior position. Earlier I would have played 1 7 ... hxg6 almost with out thinking, since I had the better endgame, and this has always suited me. But here I was playing for maxi mum gain, which in principle is the correct approach, but in this particu lar case I did not establish correctly how this maximum could be achieved.' To my mind, this is a very good and interesting piece of reasoning. Sergei considers how a game should be contested, how to play for a win, what risk one may permit oneself, and what one may not permit. By an alysing his play from such a view point, a chessplayer increases his chances of avoiding similar errors in future - although, of course, there cannot be any full guarantee. For example, soon afterwards at the European Jooior Championship,
88 The Technique o/ Working on Your Own Games ... Seryosha made a similar mistake. True, the situation was rather spe cial, as he was seriously worried about the outcome of the tourna ment. At first, Dolmatov had led confidently, but then the Dutch player, van der Wiel, started winning game after game, and by the tenth round he caught Sergei up. The gen eral feeling was that the Dutchman could continue his series of wins still further.
Dolmatov-Petursson European Junior Ch., Groningen 1 978/79
Chances are roughly equal. White's trumps are the isolated en emy pawns on the queenside. But in return for this weakness B lack's pieces are active, he has the open d file, and he can attack the pawn at e5 . In principle, this is just the sort of position Dolmatov likes: a strategic struggle, and chances to develop pressure against the weak black pawns. He wanted to play for a win,
but he couldn 't see how. It was possi ble to play accurately with 25 Z!e4, with a roughly level ending , but in this case he would have had no real winning chances. Here is the note to the move chosen by White, 25 'iti>n ? 'A totally senseless move. I wanted to win at all costs, but play ing like this could only lead to de feat. One should not violate one's position ! I have convinced myself of this yet again.' The motive underlying the move with the king was purely emotional. If it is necessary to retreat the rook anyway and to go into an ending, the king should be brought closer to the centre - with the king on e2 in the endgame it will be possible to play for a win. But this was just a feeling, and it would have disappeared after some thought. Try moving the rook away - White will get hit immedi ately by . . . lIdl + or . . . Z!d2. The idea of transposing to an endgame with the king on f1 is just not practicable. And otherwise there is no justifica tion for moving the king. Petursson is a good positional player, but he defends better than he attacks. If he were a better attacking player he would surely have found 25 . , . a4! . In the event of 26 ':c 1 Z!d2 White would have a difficult ending. Relatively the best way out of this position would have been for White to admit his mistake: 26 �g 1 !? But first, it is not easy to decide on this, and second, after 26 ... a3 the white pawn on a2 would become a weakness
The Technique of Working on Your Own Games . . . 89 onto which Black would be able to fasten. But Black played a less forceful move, after which White was given a breathing-space. 25 i.f8? ! 26 f4 Dolmatov defends the pawn on eS and wishes to bring his bishop into play. Now in the event of 26 ... a4 White may calmly take the pawn with the rook, as after 27 . . . :ct l + White has 2 8 i.e ! . 26 i.b4 27 i.el The simple move 27 \Wf3 ! would have led to equality. Instead of this, White commits another serious posi tional error, and again in the same vein: he wishes to simplify the posi tion and then begin to put pressure on the weak: pawns. But with this plan Sergei again underestimates the danger to his king. i.xel 27 a4! 28 �xel What can White do now? The pawn on b3 is attacked, and he can not take on a4 with the rook, in view of 29 ... \WcS ! with the fatal threats 30 ... \Wc 1 + and 30 ... \Wg l+. The po sition would be completely normal if White's king were on, say, h2, but here it is stuck in the centre. 29 b4 a3? Again Petursson plays an inaccu rate attacking move. From a posi tional point of view the move he played was entirely sound - it is use ful to get a dangerous pawn on a3, to ...
...
...
split the opposing pawns, fixing the weakness on a2. But at the same time White, by playing 30 'iii>f2 , gets the chance to remove his king from the danger-zone. Black still retained the initiative, but Dolmatov succeeded after stubborn defence and agonising analysis of the adjourned position (described in my book Iskusstvo Analiza published by Batsford as Secrets of Chess Training) in saving this game. Had Petursson played rather more precisely with 29 ... \Wb6 ! , and only after 30 'iPfl then 30 . . . a3, the white king would have remained in the centre and Dolmatov would have had a much tougher time than in the game. We have spoken about lack of confidence in one's own powers and, conversely, overestimation of one's own possibilities and underestima tion of one's opponent's resources. But, of course, a chessplayer may also be hampered by inadequacies of a totally different nature. For exam ple, weak: combinational vision. (You have already encountered an instance of this in the first chapter of this book, when you solved the exer cises from Botvinnik's games. Botvinnik himself stressed that he always suffered from this weak ness .) Some years ago Dolmatov was not happy with his ability to calcu late variations. After the Premier League of the 1 979 USSR Cham pionship he made ' sketches ' on this -
90 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games '" theme, taken from five of his games. I shall now show you one of them.
Belyavsky-Dolmatov USSR Ch., Minsk 1979
This position is of course in Black's favour. He stands remark ably well in the centre and has con trol of the dark squares. Which move looks the most natural? Advance the pawn to h3? A possi ble continuation, and this is what Dolmatov chose. But poSitionally it is questionable, as it weakens Black's control of the dark squares. Play . . . ttJh5 and then ... ttJf4 ? Not bad, since f4 is an entirely appropri ate square for the knight. However, the nicest move is 22 . . . ttJd5 ! . Th e knight i s heading for f4, but at the same time it also eyes sev eral other squares, and no-one knows which it will actually occupy. Perhaps c3 . But if White replies 23 'iff3, the knight will come to b4, and what will White then do about his bishop on c2? It is clear that the mUlti-purpose
move 22 ... ttJd5 ! would have most clearly underlined Black's advan tage. Dolmatov writes: 'Black was di verted by the calculation of a com plicated combination, beginning with 22 ... h3? ! 23 g3 �g4, and did not notice the simple move 22 . . . tiJd5 , which would have given him a clear advantage. Again undisci plined calculation let me down.' What did Sergei mean by undisci plined calculation? Which principle of calculating variations was vio lated? Of course, the principle of ' candidate moves' , which requires that one frrst determine all the prom ising continuations and only then get more absorbed in the calculation of any of them. By following this prin ciple Dolmatov would surely have seen the move 22 ... ttJd5 ! . Then he would possibly have re jected the combination, particularly since its consequences are totally un clear, and would have preferred a simple and secure way to preserve his advantage. 22 h3?! 23 g3 .tg4 24 t3 Now try to find the idea behind Black's combination. It is far from obvious. 24 ... 'i'c5+ 25 'I'll White could still have played 25 ttJe3. His position would be ex tremely perilous, but I cannot see any refutation. Look for one at your
The Technique a/ Working on Your Own Games ... 91 leisure, perhaps one can be found. Of course, the move chosen by Be lyavsky was more natural. 25 'i'c3 (62) •••
Now let us calculate variations; try to understand what Dolmatov had in mind and guess what he was unable to see. This is a rather diffi cult task. Capturing the bishop clearly loses at once, because of 26 ... lL'lxg4 27 'iWe2 'ilcS+. Which candidate moves for White can you see? Sergei calculated the following main variation: 26 lL'le3 �xf3 ! 27 'ilxf3 lL'ldS ! 28 exdS lhe3 29 'iVt2 �f3 30 'iVe2 'iVcS+ and 3 1 .. !tt2 , winning. A very interesting and beautiful conception ! When Dolmatov showed me this game I immediately asked him: ' But what if White plays 29 dxc6 (instead of 29 'iVt2), or, better still, takes on c6 a move later? ' He had no answer Sergei had simply overlooked his opponent's counter-punch. I have not examined what would happen in
this case, since it is possible that this would be the start of a whole new tree of complicated variations. Alas, this is not yet all. Dolmatov writes: ' Black overlooked the strong reply 26 eS , which, fortunately for him, does not actually lead to his de feat. In sharp positions of this type any oversight can cost the game: Belyavsky played his move after considerable thought. 26 e5 i.xf3 The only reply. If 27 exf6 then simply 27 . . . �xd 1 . 2 7 ':'xd8 ':'xd8 28 exf6 'iVxal 29 'i'xt3 (63) Let us now pause for a moment, think what possibilities Black has, and identify which are better and which worse.
63 B
.
Well, let's assume 29 . . . 'i'xf6. How should we assess the position? Black stands worse - do you agree? If the rook were active it could be stronger than the two minor pieces, but here the rook has no squares to
92 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games ... invade on. The white king quickly comes closer to the centre, after which the rook will apparently not break through anywhere. And White, of course, will soon surround the pawn on h3 and gobble it up. There is the thrust 29 ... .:d2. But where does this lead? To the counter 30 �h7+ ! can you see? Perpetual check is the result. But this is still better than the unfavourable ending after 29 ... 1Wxf6? Are there any other continuations? Again I quote Dolmatov 's words: ' Here the telling factors were bad calculation and a poor assessment of the position. Black has three possi bilities: a) 29 . . . 1Wxf6? The most unsuc cessful move, and the one which was played in the game. The endgame fa vours White. b) 29 ... :d2? ! . I simply did not see this move. It would have led to a draw after 30 �h7+ �h7 3 1 'iWfS+, with perpetual check. c) 29 . . . gxf6 ! . Black has an ad vantage in the middlegame, since his king can hide safely on the squares f8 and e7, whereas the white king is in a worse position. In the event of the pawn on a2 being exchanged for the pawn on h3 (for instance, after 30 1Wg4+ f8 3 1 1Wxh3 1Wxa2) , Black will soon exchange queens and get a winning endgame. It is interesting that the move 29 . . . gxf6! didn't even occur to me or my opponent.' Dolmatov and I discovered the possibility 29 ... gxf6 when we ana-
lysed this game. I fear that Sergei somewhat exaggerates its strength: after 30 1Wg4+ f8 White has the unpleasant check 31 'iWb4+. But ba sically everything he said was cor rect. It is quite shocking to overlook resources such as 29 . . . l:{d2 and 29 . . . gxf6. Every cloud has a silver lining . Having reached a difficult ending, Sergei started to defend stubbornly, and when at one point his opponent's concentration faltered he played a fantastic combination and created a genuine masterpiece. The ending of this game can be found in my book mentioned above. We have seen that at that time Dolmatov felt unsure of himself in sharp struggles, he calculated vari ations poorly and overlooked moves both for himself and his opponent. But those of you who are already fa miliar with Secrets of Chess Train ing will have discovered a great many examples of the complete op poSite, games in which Sergei dem onstrated supreme skill in calculating the most complicated variations. The matter is quite straightfor ward: Dolmatov realised that with poor calculating technique he could never hope to achieve great success. He did some serious training and solved an enormous number of stud ies and practical positions from my card-index of exercises. We also made use of other training methods for example, the playing-out of
The Technique of Working on Your Own Games . . . 93 specially selected positions . I think that in some situations he is now ca pable of out-calculating even Kas parov. Don 't get the idea that Sergei was at that time simply a learner who had only just begun to play chess. No, he was already a strong player - he had demonstrated interesting, profound ideas and won some remarkable games. But however soundly a chessplayer plays he always has weaknesses which he should work on. As you see , the starting-point in Dolmatov's work to improve his game was the analysis of his errors, accomplished with the aid of the method which we have convention ally called 'positional sketches ' . Up until now I have mainly been demonstrating negative examples Sergei's failures. Now I shall show you one of his best games from that period, a game which any strong player would be pleased to number among his achievements. It was played in the European Junior Championship of 1 978/79. In that Championship Dolmatov played many very fine games; I annotated some of them in the tournament book, but I didn 't annotate his en counter with the Englishman, Plas kett. I can still recall that at one point in this game Doimatov played a very deep, very subtle positional move which established his advantage. But the game is quoted in the tournament book without any annotations, and it is not so easy to grasp what the idea
behind the move was - why he needed to play precisely this move and no other. Sergei of course no longer remembers what he calcu lated at the time. But not long ago I came across Dolmatov's notebook of positional sketches and found in it a deScription of this episode. Thanks to the notebook, this magnificent ex ample has been preserved, and I can now show it to you.
Dolmatov-Plaskett European Junior Ch., Groningen 1978(79 1 e4 eS 2 lLlt3 d6 3 d4 exd4 4 lLlxd4 lLlfli 5 lLlc3 a6 6 f4 e6 7 i.e2 i.e7 8 0-0 0-0 9 a4 lLle6 10 i.e3 ike7 1 1 �hl One of the standard positions of the Scheveningen Variation has arisen. Here Black most often plays 1 1 . . . lIe8. The continuation chosen by Plaskett is less successful. 11 lLlxd4 12 'i'xd4 i.d7 The Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings mainly considers 12 . . . e5 . Instead of this , B lack allows his position to become cramped, hop ing subsequently to counter-attack White's centre. •••
94 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games ...
13 eS It is not so easy to choose between two natural moves: 1 4 .i.d3 and 14 .i.f3. They are both entirely play able, but the latter appears to be somewhat stronger. 14 .i.d3 .tc6 (64)
16 g6 17 as A standard way to suppress Black's play on the queens ide. 17 1tJg7 IS 'i'e2 A good regrouping manoeuvre: the bishop should be placed in front of the queen on the g l -a7 diagonal. IS :d7 'ti'bs 19 .i.b6 20 'i'e3 .tdS 'i'aS 21 .ta7 22 .tb6 In order to avoid tactical tricks like 22 . . . .i.xg2+ 23 'i&>xg2 b6+, or the immediate 22 ... b6 (22 . . . b5), Dolmatov retreats his bishop. 22 .txb6 Perhaps 22 . . . 'Wbs was better. 23 'i'xb6 'i'bs 24 .te4 B lack has a strong bishop on c6, cementing his queenside together and exerting pressure on g2; White is ready to exchange it off. 24 :c8 2S :ad l 1tJe8 (65) •••
•••
•••
IS .ttl! It was tempting to play 15 ltJe4, but Black would have replied 1 5 .. . lidS ! and after 1 6 'iWc3 then 1 6 . . . licS ! . The opposition of the queen and the enemy rook would cause White real discomfort. In due course Nana Alexandria, the Kiev Grand master Platonov and I analysed the position which has arisen and ascer tained that White has nothing. Dolmatov's move is stronger - he vacates a convenient retreat square for the queen in advance. :dS IS ... 16 'i'e3 White has slightly more space, and so his position is clearly to be preferred. Subsequently he will strive to hold on to his spatial advan tage and then increase it.
65 W
The Technique of Working on Your Own Games . . . 95 This is the position which has prompted me to show you this game. White has a superb position, but how can he maintain his initiative? Although Sergei was not then a grandmaster, he played a truly grandmasterly move. I shall now at tempt to reproduce the logic behind his reasoning . First let us examine whether it is possible to break through immedi ately, for example: 26 f5 . Alas, we have nothing definite, our opponent has a normal position, and so we won't be able to take him by storm. Which question is it useful to ask oneself in such a situation? 'What does my opponent wish to do? ' - this is the key question, which will al ways help you to approach a position correctly. Mentally we should give our opponent the move and fmd out how he would make use of it. Let's think what Black wishes to do. Does he intend, for instance, to capture on e5 ? Let's see: 26 . . . dxe5 27 l:ixd7 .i.xd7 28 i.xb7 and the rook and the pawn on a6 are both at tacked. This surely favours White, and that means that we should not fear the capture on e5 . But what about 26 . . dS ? This also does not frighten us: the bishop retreats to d3. If 27 . . . d4 then White has at least 28 liJe4. And otherwise White will transfer his knight to d4 and retain a marked advantage. Not bad would be 26 . . . 'irc7 !? White certainly has to take this move into account. .
What else is there? Let's examine 26 ... .i.xe4 27 liJxe4 dS . Where will the knight go? It stands poorly on c3, Black will successfully unravel his pieces and get play on the c-file. Pos sible are . . . l:ide7, ... l:ic6 and ... l:tc4. The move 28 liJc5 is also not danger0us. Black has the restrained reply 28 . . . '!J.e7 followed by . . . :'c6, but also not bad is 28 ... ]ide7 29 b4 l':tc6 30 'irxb7 'irxb7 3 1 liJxb7 l:lb8. This gives us some useful infor mation: we already know what to ex pect from Black. Most probably 26 . . . .i.xe4 and 27 . . . dS , but perhaps 26 . . . 'ilic7. Now we need to see how we can combat these plans. What can we think up so as not to allow our oppo nent to free himself from the bind? Dolmatov found a brilliant solution. 26 'ib4! ! A baffling queen retreat - you won't understand the point of it straightaway. I really like moves such as this. Let's try to puzzle it out. What has White planned in reply to his opponent's main idea? It turns out that on 26 . . . i.xe4 27 liJxe4 dS Dolmatov had prepared a move of awesome power: 28 c4 ! ! . By sub sequently capturing on dS White will obtain a clear advantage. And if 28 . . . lhc4 then 2 9 'irxc4 dxc4 3 0 :'xd7 with a totally winning position - the black pieces have no useful moves. So, the point behind Dolmatov's discovery is now clear - he has man aged to prevent his opponent's idea involving an exchange on e4. As often happens with profound moves,
96 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games ... the move 26 'iWb4 turns out to be multi-faceted: new merits can be dis covered in it; it turns out to be very opportune not j ust in those variations for the sake of which it was played. In order to convince ourselves of this, let us examine the situation which has now arisen. Let us assume that after 26 .. . �xe4 27 �xe4 Black will play 27 . . . l:lxc2. We can capture on d6 with ad vantage. It is pleasant to note that the move . . . 1:k6 will now be played without gain of time - just as Black will no longer gain a tempo by at tacking the queen with 26 ... iic7. If26 . . . d5 then 27 �d3 (intending �c3-e2-d4). Here the situation has not changed in comparison with our preliminary estimations. But after 26 . . . dxe5 27 llxd7 �xd7 the situation has changed. We had intended to take on b7 with the bishop, but now this is not possible because of the pin. And cap turing with the queen is not so clear. But this is nothing terrible - for now we shall simply play 28 fxe5 , since after 28 .. , iixe5 we have the deci sive thrust 29 iie7 ! . C an you believe that the move 26 'iWb4 wins the game? Hardly - in fact it is not even easy to say what Black is actually threatened with. He will surely find a defence. Let us try 26 . . . llcd8, creating the threat of capturing on e5 . Dolmatov considered this move, and he wrote that he had intended to reply 27 �xc6 bxc6 28 iib6 ! . A good plan.
In the event of an exchange on b6, the passed pawn will be supported by the knight on a4. The black pawn cannot remain on d6 forever - it will either move to d5 or be exchanged on e5, and in either case the white knight will get the excellent square c5 . But I am not sure how to assess the position arising after 28 . . . ltb7 29 'iWxa6 (or 29 'iWxc6) 29 . . . lhb2. It seems to me that Black has every right to reckon on eqUality. It is not impossible that other ac ceptable possibilities may be found for Black. But this does not affect the essence of the matter. In practice, moves such as 26 'iWb4 ! ! more often than not change the course of a game and sometimes even decide its out come. If you can succeed in pene trating the mysteries of a position, in frustrating your opponent's plans, in setting him serious problems, then it is entirely probable that he will not manage to guess your intentions in time, that he will not readj ust his thoughts in order to frod new ideas and lay new plans. Psychologically this is a very difficult task. Plaskett was unable to cope with this task. He probably realised what awaited him in the event of an ex change on e4, but he did not notice one other powerful idea associated with the move 26 'iWb4. 26 ... 'iWe7?! This looks very natural - Black activates his queen and defends the rook on d7. B ut also in this case
The Technique of Working on Your Own Games ... 97 Dolmatov had prepared an excellent positional reply. 'i'xc6 27 i..xc6 27 . . . bxc6 would have been met by the same reply. 28 ttJa4! This is the point: having retreated the queen White has vacated the b6 square for his knight. It is finally time to say something about the piece whose fate has been the leitmotif of White's entire strat egy - the black knight, now re stricted by the white pawn on e5 . What future does it have? Can it emerge via g7 on f5 ? But if there are no queens on the board, White will meet this plan by playing g4. The other route for the knight is via c7 to d5 . If White can succeed in putting a pawn on c4 this route will also be barred and the knight on e8 will be shut out of the game forever. And then it will be time to recall Tarrasch: 'If one of your pieces stands badly, your whole game is bad.' Now it is clear what Dolmatov was aiming for. It is not merely a question of the fork which Black is now threatened with, nor of the knight coming in at b6 (this is not the best square on the board). The main point is that White has secured the move c2-c4! , limiting the mobility of the enemy knight and, at the same time, Black's major pieces on the c file. The ending of this game demon strates the complete triumph of White's plan.
28 ttJc7 A primitive trap: 29 ttJb6? ttJdS , an d the exchange o f knights immedi ately alleviates Black's position. Of course, Dolmatov cannot possibly go wrong here, he knows very well that his main aim must be to restrict the black knight. 29 c4 dxeS 30 ttJb6 Ilxd l 31 :'xd l 1le8 32 fxeS The black pieces have no space in which to manoeuvre. In passing , White has taken control of the open d-file. We now see the sort of domi nation so loved by Petrosian and Karpov. The rest of the game is not really a fight - it is simply a massaere. 32 q;g7 33 'i'd6! The simplest and most precise so lution. The black queen defends the queenside, and after it is exchanged White's rook will invade on the sev enth rank. 33 Ilb8 34 'i'xc6 bxc6 ttJe8 35 ltd7 If 35 . . . ttJa8 then, of course, 36 c5 , with a totally hopeless rook end ing for Black. 36 g4! An accurate positional decision. This move provides an 'escape-hole' and a direct path towards the centre for the king, and also gains space on the kingside. 36 g5 (66) •••
•••
•••
98 The Technique a/ Working on Your Own Games ... And now the [mal subtlety. This position can probably be won as White pleases, but in no circum stances should you adopt such an at titude when seeking to convert an advantage. It is necessary to find the most 'pure ' , the most accurate path to victory.
Now the point of the move 37 b4!
can be understood.
39 cxb5 40 cxb5 axb5 41 a6 b4 42 a7 Black resigned
A superb strategic victory ! I hope you are convinced how useful it can be to make positional sketches - relating both to pure chess episodes and to psychological as pects of the game - when analysing your own games or when studying games of other players.
The ' Superfluous Piece ' White can, of course, bring his king to the centre or set about attack ing the enemy pawns on the queen side. But Dolmatov again asked himself what Black could undertake in this position. What do you think B lack wishes to do? Most probably he will try to free his knight by play ing . . . �g6 and ... f6. It would be quite a good idea to prevent this. 37 b4! �g6 38 l:.e7 The f-pawn cannot now advance, and White intends to bring his king to the centre. But should White have allowed the black rook to have the d file? 38 l:.d8 39 b5!
Mark Dvoretsky From Nimwwitsch's writing we know that pieces which are able to cover a strategically important square, making it possible to oc cupy that square, are usually well placed. In the fight for a given square players most often try to exchange these pieces off. But sometimes a to tally different strategy is adopted: if the square cannot be won back by means of exchanges, then one may. . . forget about exchanges altogether (after all, only one of the opponent's pieces will be able to occupy the ' important high ground' , and the others will turn out to be, so to speak,
The Technique of Working on Your Own Games ... 99 superfluous). I should like to show you some examples of this theme. In my own games the following opening variation was encountered several times: lDtli 1 c4 g6 2 lDc3 ..tg7 3 g3 0-0 4 ..tg2 d6 5 e3 e5 6 lDge2 lDc6 7 0-0 ..too 8 d3 'i'd7 (67) 9 lDd5
67 W
Black wishes to reduce the pres sure on his queenside by exchanging light-squared bishops with 10 . . . ..th3. I n s o doing h e takes into ac count that White cannot play 1 1 i..x h3 'i'xh3 1 2 lDxc77, because of 1 2 ... lDg4. In the game Ubilava-Dvoretsky, Batumi 1 969, there followed: 10 l:tbl i..b 3 1 1 l2Jec3 i.. x g2 12 �g2 (better is 1 2 lDxf6+) 12 . . . lDh5 . And here it turned out that there are two white knights competing for just one square (dS), and this is one too many.
After 1 3 b4 f5 14 b5 lDd8 my oppo nent had to reckon with both 15 ... c6 and 15 . . . f4. Ubilava decided to re treat: 1 5 lDe2 c6 16 bxc6 bxc6 1 7 1Wa4 �h8 1 8 f3 lDe6 1 9 lDdc3 :n , but as a result Black gained a marked advantage . Five years later, in the game Dvoretsky-Savon, Odessa 1 974, White played 10 l2Jec3 at once. Black is faced with a problem: which of two reasonable positional ideas (familiar to us from the previous game) should he carry out fust: the exchange of light-squared bishops or the retreat of the knight, followed by ... c7-c6. The choice was unfortu nate: 1 0 ... i..h 3? ! l l lDxf6+ ! i..xf6 1 2 00 ..td8. White has exchanged off his 'su perfluous ' knight, at the same time driving back Black's bishop to a bad position. There followed: 1 3 i..d2 ..txg2 14 Wxg2 f5 1 5 'i'b3. Black has come up against serious difficul ties. Analysis showed that he should have avoided the exchange of knights: 10 . . . lDe8 ! , intending sub sequently to play . . . i..e6-h3 or . . . lDc6-d8, followed by . . . c6, after which he has no worries . This con clusion was confirmed in two games: a) Gufeld-Dvoretsky, Borzhomi 1 975 : 1 1 f4 i..h 3 1 2 i.. xh3 'i'xh3 1 3 f5 (a totally harmless ploy) 1 3 . . . gxfS 1 4 b4 f4 (probably stronger still was the simple 1 4 ... �h8) 1 5 gxf4 f5 1 6 b5 �h8 ! 1 7 �h l lDd8 with an ex cellent game for Black.
100 The Technique of Working on Your Own Games . . . b ) Dvoretsky-Vadasz, Wijk aan Zee 1 975: 1 1 1ia4 �3 ( 1 1 . . . ttJdS !?) 1 2 .i.d2 .i.xg2 1 3 �g2 f5 1 4 :ae l (It is a mistake to play 14 b4? , because of 1 4 ... f4! , when the unfortunate position of the white knight on c3 is very significant. More accurate, however, was 14 f4, since after the move in the game Black could have replied 14 . . . gS !) 14 . . . !tf7 IS f4. Now Black could have equalised with IS . . . ttJdS ! . For example: 1 6 1ixd7 ':xd7 1 7 e4 c6 1S ttJe3 exf4 1 9 gxf4 fxe4 20 dxe4 ttJe6 2 1 fS ttJcS, or 1 6 1ia3 ttJe6 1 7 b4 gS . Instead o f this he played I S ... exf4? 1 6 gxf4 ttJd8 , which turned out to be a mistake: 1 7 1ixd7 .lhd7 1 8 e4 c6 (or 18 . . . fxe4 19 ':xe4 !) 1 9 exfS ! cxdS 20 ':xeS+ fS 25 c6 it will be White who has an ex tra piece.
21 22 i.xfS •••
gxfS
With a great many threats: i.xh7+; i.xd7; l1xd7 etc, all based on the terrific power of the bishop on b2 - White's main attacking piece. Why has this piece become so im portant? Because it has no opponent. B lack's bishop should have been on g7, but it has got stuck on b4. 22 ... ttJeS
23 'i'xf6 The harvest begins - Black is forced to give back what he has grabbed. Question: If 23 ... fxg2 then what should White play? 24 f4 perhaps? No, this move is very bad, because of 24 . . . i. xc5+. You suggest 24 l:1d7? The reply 24 ... liJf3+ is unpleasant. Remember the bishop on b2, and you will easily frod the solution. Of course - 24 l:1d3 ! . The threat of 24 . . . liJf3+ i s repelled, an d B lack i s now unable to parry the fatal 25 l:1g3+.
128 Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan . . . 23 .txcS On 23 . . . 'ile7 the simplest was 24 'ilh6 f6 25 i.xe5 fxe5 26 l:Ml7 . 24 :d7 'ilxd7 My opponent was in time-trouble. He was just about to play 24 ... 'ilc6, but at the last moment he took his hand away. What a shame ! I had in tended to play 25 i.xh7+ ! �h7 26 ':xf7+. Again the variations are based on the power of the dark squared bishop. I very much wanted the game to end in this way, but, alas, not everything happens as we should wish. Our opponent also has a brain, and he tries to hinder our plans. 25 i.xd7 Black cannot capture on d7, White already has a lead in material, and after another five or six moves he won without difficulty. This game illustrates very well Tarrasch's famous aphorism: 'If one of your pieces stands badly, your whole game is bad.' The bishop is a long-range piece, so it would appear that it is not difficult to deploy it suc cessfully. But, as you see, this is not always possible. The following game was played in the Semi-Final of the USSR Trade Union Championship. This time I was playing Black. ...
Agzamov-Kosikov Orenburg 1972 1 e4
2 d4 3 ltJd2
e6 d5 �c6
More common is 3 . . . �f6 or 3 . .. c5 . But I consider the move 3 ... �6 to be quite playable. Before long I think this move will be adopted more and more often, because the vari ations with 3 ... �f6 have been worked out in great depth, and so in this line it is becoming difficult to find new opening ideas. 4 �gf3 �ffi �d7 5 e5 6 i.b5 The main continuations are 6 �b3 and 6 i.e2. But this move is also playable. a6 6 A questionable decision. Worth considering was 6 . . . Jie7 or 6 . . . as. 7 i.xc6 bxc6 •••
8 c4
I cannot recommend this move. Stronger is 8 �b3 , in order to play �aS, and if Black replies 8 . . . c5 then one possible line is 9 JigS i.e7 10 � , forcing 10 . . . �b8 . White's po sition is to be preferred. Two years later Lerner played this line as White against me. Although the game ended in a draw, Black nevertheless experienced certain difficulties. [Opening Note: After 8 �b3 Black may reply 8 . . . as 9 i.g5 i.e7 10 i.xe7 'ilxe7. Now after 1 1 'ild2 a4? 1 2 �aS l:a6 13 c4 c5 14 cxdS exdS 15 0-0 White has the advan tage, Timoshchenko-Panchenko, Kishinev 1975. However, in the game Khalifman-Monin, Leningrad 1 985 , Black succeeded in equalising by playing 1 1 . . . Yib4 ! 1 2 0-0 ( 1 2 c3
Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan... 1 29 'I1>S) 1 2 ... 'ii'xd2 13 �bxd2 cS 14 c4 c6 IS �b3 cxd4 (Dvoretsky).] The ftrst question on this game: How should Black react to the move 8 c4 (88)?
You suggest beginning active op erations in the centre with the move 8 ... f6? But such activity usually fa vours the side that is better devel oped, which can hardly be Black in this case. Basically the same applies to 8 . . . cS . Moves such a s ... f6 or ... cS should be played very cautiously. Look at the position a little more carefully and you will see that White has outstripped his opponent in de velopment and is already ready to castle. Therefore any increase in the sharpness of play in the centre would be very dangerous for Black. What can we say about 8 . . . as , with the idea of ... �a6 ? I shall share with you an observation which is tnJe of such positions. The bishop on a6 is well-placed only if White has not castled. If White can castle and bring his rook to e l , the bishop on a6
will prove to be out of play. This position should not be solved by ploughing through variations me chanically. Let us try to understand its essence - this will help in plan ning a reliable strategic line. What characterises the position? White has given up his bishop, and now Black has two bishops against bishop and knight. What do you know about the strategy of playing with two bishops? It is necessary to open up the diagonals for the bish ops - this is clear, this is the basic principle. But there is also another consideration which is very impor tant for all such positions. When playing with two bishops against bishop and knight, you must demon strate the strength of the bishop that has no counterpart. If you can prove that the light-squared bishop here is a real piece, and not j ust an extra, you will indeed be able to exploit the power of the two bishops. In the game Black captured on c4. 8 ... dxc4 This move has already been sug gested. But it was not played in order to follow it up with ... as . Black plans to bring his bishop out at b7 and then to play . . . c6-cS at some point, taking control of the long diagonal. Probably White should simply have played 9 �xc4. I do not know how I would have responded. Most probably 9 . . . �b6, but maybe 9 ... as nonetheless, in order not to allow the knight onto the square as . But White chose . . .
130 Assessing a Position and C}wosing a Plan ...
9 it'a4 . . .having underestimated Black's reply. ttJb6! 9 ... By giving up the pawn on c6, B lack opens up diagonals for his light-squared bishop, and the pawn on c4 may still come in useful.
10 it'xc6+ 1 1 'i'e4
i.d7 i.b5
exchanging the knight on c3 for my own knight. As before, 14 0-0 is not playable, in view of 14 . . . c3. ttJ xc3 14 ttJc3
15 bxc3 (89) In chess, as in life, there are some things which one has to do first, and some which may be postponed until later. So let us establish which is the best move for B lack to start with.
The bishop is already becoming active. White cannot play 12 0-0 be cause of 12 . . . c3. But White needs to castle, and so his next move is forced.
12 ttJbl
it'd5
The exchange of queens - 13 "iWxdS ttJ xdS 1 4 ttJc3 - gives Black an excellent position after either 14 . . . ttJxc3 1 5 bxc3, or 14 ... ttJb4.
13 it'e3 The queen on dS is very powerful. Imagine what a powerful battery will be set up when the bishop comes to c6. Of course, it is desirable to main tain the queen on a central square, and this means that it is necessary to take steps to combat ttJc3 . You suggest exchanging the dark squared bishop for the knight on c3? You know, this idea isn 't particularly good, because the white bishop will come out to a3. I shall be strong on the light squares of course, but my opponent will get counterplay on the dark squares.
13
••.
ttJa4
Moves to the edge of the board can be quite good if they are associ ated with a logical idea - in this case,
The assessment of this position is clear: Black has the advantage. White will have nothing with which to oppose the light-squared bishop when it comes to c6. The bishop is very strong, much stronger than the knight. What other characteristics of this position can we note? Two bishops? I don't really un derstand what the advantage of hav ing two bishops is if the bishop which has no counterpart is not dominant. If in this position B lack'S light-squared bishop can be shown to be strong, then yes, I can see the advantage of the two bishops. If the bishop is passive, there is no advan tage at all.
Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan... 131 Let us remove the dark-squared bishops from the board. Of course this favours White, since the bishop on c1 is bad. But nevertheless Black's position would still be excellent, be cause his bishop is very dangerous. So here, I would assert, there is no advantage of the two bishops: here we have the advantage of one bishop - the light-squared bishop - over a knight. Although the presence of Black's second bishop of course un derlines the strength of his position. Let us note one other feature of this pOSition which is not unimpor tant: the open b-file. This will surely be significant, whichever side con trols it. When taking a decision it is useful to note the candidate moves ftrst. You suggest the move 15 . . . c5? But what is the point? You wish to get rid of the doubled pawn. But in what re spect is my pawn on c7 inferior to the pawn on c3? I don 't see it. And here White gets the chance to occupy the d4 square with his knight, or even with the bishop. I seriously considered three can didate moves: the developing move 1 5 . . . i.e7, occupying the diagonal with 1 5 . . . i.c6, and, ftnally, 15 . . . l1b8 , placing the rook on th e open file. Which of them is most accurate? On 1 5 . . . i.e7 White can reply 16 �bl . It doesn' t look bad to play 1 5 . . . �b8 1 6 JIb l ltb6, an d after the bishop moves away the exchange on b6 will improve Black's pawn struc ture. But in the game Black played. . .
15 ...
i.c6!
Now on 1 6 �b l extremely un pleasant is 1 6 ... 'ii'e4, when the rook has no satisfactory square on the b file (if 1 7 'ub2 then 1 7 . . . i.a3). After. ..
16 0-0
%lb8
. . . (but not 16 ... i.e7 17 �b l 'ile4 1 8 i.d2) Black has in passing gained control of the open file. You might say that all this is just trivial detail. But such tiny details can affect the assessment of a posi tion, make the subsequent struggle easier, make the opponent's oper ations more difftcult, and quite often influence the outcome of a game.
17 %leI
At any rate, White defends against . . . 'ii'e4. You know, the reason for his position being so difftcult is that it is very hard to recommend anything; there is no obvious plan of action. If 17 a4 (intending i.a3) then 1 7 . . . l:lb3 ( an illustration o f how timely Black's last two moves were). How ever, also after the exchange of dark squared bishops, Black's possession of the b-file, together with the weak ness of the squares b2 and b3, would have become the decisive factor. [Apparently this is where White missed his last chance to organise a stubborn defence. He should have chosen 17 'iWg5 ! , in order to create some pressure against his oppo nent's kingside and, by defending the pawn on g2, to allow his knight on f3 to move (Dolmatov).]
17 ...
i.e7
132 Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan... A useful developing move. A move like this is very unpleasant for one's opponent - indeed, it is not clear what the threat is or what he should play in reply.
18 h4 (90) If Black castles then this pawn is ready to advance further in the trans parent hope of creating some sort of attack. Now answer the next ques tion: How would you continue to strengthen Black's initiative?
You like the move 1 8 . . . cj;d7? But what will you do next? Double rooks, leaving your kiogside to the mercy of fate? Somehow this doesn't look too good, does it? The move . . . cj;d7 i s very committal; you are com mitting yourself to hardly ever being in a position to open up the game. In particular, with your king on d7 you will not want to wage war. Of course it was possible simply to castle and then attempt to invade down the b-file, although it is still unclear precisely how. But after 19 hS should Black allow the pawn to
reach h6, or meet it with 19 . . . h6? In the latter case it is necessary to reckon with the transfer of white pieces to the kingside: .f4, 1Ii'g 4, l:le3, ttJe l , ltg3. We don't wish to al low our opponent any counterplay. The idea 1 8 ... gS is very interest ing - one should not immediately give it a hostile reception. But this move of course is again very com mittal. After 1 9 hxgS do you wish, by playing 1 9 ... l:.g8, to create the threat of recapturing on gS? White will reply 20 fl , in order in the event of a piece sacrifice to run away with the king via the square e2. What about preparing the move ... g7-gS with 18 . . . l:t.g8 ? But again, if I reply 19 cj;f1 , what then? After another preparatory move, 1 8 ... h6, White will probably try to blockade the kingside: 19 hS . You suggest 1 8 . . . i.a8? What for? Again, are we going to play ... cS? Let us assume 1 9 1Ii'e2 cS 20 i.e3. Then %!eb l and tiJe l , and White somehow untangles himself. I don' t see the point of B lack playing like this. Play 1 8 ... 1Ii'aS , with the idea of ... i.a3? Illogical. You liked the advan tage of the two bishops, and we de cided that White has a bad bishop , so why exchange it off! And it is a great shame to destroy the powerful bat tery (1WdS and i.c6). I think that Black's strategy should be con nected with exploiting the power of this battery. 18 ... h5!
Assessing a Position and Clwosing a Pkm... 133 This is the correct decision, though it is also a committal move, as it weakens the g5 square. It is im portant that White should not man age to play 'it'f4, 'it'g3 and �g5. But we wish to increase the pressure on the g2 square. If it were our move we would decide the fate of the game by bringing the rook into the attack with .. , IDl6 ! , and then ... .l:lg6 and, at some point, ... .l::tg 4.
19 'ife2
The only defence. What now? Let us continue our strategy - we shall attempt to clear the long diagonal, not baulking at sacrificing a pawn.
19 20 �xg5 21 bxg5
g5! �xg5 h4
you will undouble our pawns.' But what else can White do? He has to take - otherwise his rook on a l will suffer.
23 :'xb6 24 ttJel 25 'i'D
cxb6 h3
Black has launched an attack, but this certainly does not mean that he should automatically decline to ex change queens. Retreating the queen to d7 or b5 would now have turned out to be a blunder. White would have replied 26 "f6 and then g6, when it is unclear who is attacking whom.
25 bxg2 26 'i'xd5 .txd5 27 ttJxg2 (91)
If Black now plays . . . h3 the game will be over. But White still has a de fensive resource.
22 llebl
l:.b6
It would be a pity to concede the open file with the move 22 . . . l:.dS . But if an exchange has to come then it is best for it to take place on the b6 square. (Incidentally, if we had ear lier played . . . c7-c5, the move . . . .l::tb6 would not have been possible. This shows that leaving the pawn on c7 has its advantages). Any exchange in a game of chess is, as it were, a trade. You offer your wares and the other player offers his, and each side seeks to derive some benefit from the deal. Here it is as if we are saying to our opponent: 'You wish to exchange rooks. All right, you can take on b6, and in so doing
It was all so glorious, we did everything so correctly - but now we have reached an endgame in which we are a pawn down. Was something not quite right? No, we made no mis take in our assessment, and the next move proves this convincingly. 27 ... :'h3!
134 Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan... Everything is quite in order! White's position is bad. In fact I shall say more - it is completely hopeless.
b5 28 l:.c1 White resigned Why? The knight can't move, the king can 't move, if 29 f4 then 29 . . . J:lg3 3 0 Ilc2 b 4 and a mass exchange on g2 decides the game. That only leaves nc2-c l -c2, but then Black plays ... �d7-c6, ... as and . . . b4 etc. Why did Black win? Which piece was the real hero? Clearly this was the light-squared bishop, which had no opponent. I played this game when I was still a Candidate master, but I am still proud of it even today. Indeed, most often the bishop on c8 in the French Defence turns out to be 'bad' and is only a source of worry for Black. But here it became the star player. Such instances stick in one's memory for a long time. The following game was played at the international chess festival in Kiev in 1 989. I had White, and my opponent was a Candidate master from Tbilisi. Running ahead for a moment, I shall say that although, re grettably, I did not manage to win this game, from a creative point of view I was happy with it.
Kosikov-Khoperiya Kiev 1 989 1 e4
c5
The Sicilian Defence sometimes turns into a French.
2 lDtJ 3 c3 4 e5
e6 d5
If Black wishes to avoid the French Defence he can play 4 ... d4, which leads to a very complicated game.
4 5 d4 6 a3 7 i.f4
lDc6 lDge7 c4 'W'b6
I am not going to enter into a theo retical discussion here, since we are really interested in the middlegame. Note only that Black's last move is usually made when White's bishop is on cl . But here it can hardly be considered good, since the bishop has already come out to f4 and White will not shut it in by developing his knight to d2. Preferable was 7 ... ilc7.
8 'i'c2 9 lDbd2
i.d7
Here 10 i.xc4 is not a threat, in view of the intermediate 1 0 . lDg6, but in principle such an idea has to be taken into consideration. ..
9 10 i.e2
lDaS f5? (92)
Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan... 135 To my mind this is a serious strategical error. The pawn on eS cramps Black, and so he should have retained the possibility of undermin ing the centre with . . . t7-f6. In the french Defence there are variations in which Black plays ... t7-fS and then puts pressure on the d4 square. But here, after Black has deprived him self of counterplay in the centre by playing ... cS-c4 and . . . t7-fS , his position becomes difficult strategi cally. This is a typical French position: White is clearly stronger on the kingside, whereas Black is trying to develop an initiative on the queen side.
1 1 h4 A natural move in such positions, and considerably stronger than 1 1 0-0. The h-pawn will need to be ad vanced in any event, to ram the op ponent's defence on the kingside. But is it necessary to castle? That is another question. The following plan is entirely playable: the rook comes into play via h3, and the king is evacuated from the centre by playing � 1 and 'it>g 1 .
11 12 h5 •••
:c8 h6
I do not like this move, but Black feared (and not without reason) 1 3 h6 g 6 1 4 �gS , followed by �f6 and lLlgs .
1 3 tLJh4 White's moves up to now have been very natural and have not de manded any great effort. Besides
taking control of the g6 square, the main idea behind his last move is to play g2-g4. Black hurries to distract his opponent from his attack by de veloping activity on the other side of the board.
13 ... 14 tLJxb3
tLJb3 'ii'xb3
The question here is: will you ex change queens or not? Do you wish to play IS Wxb3 or IS �d l ? Or do you prefer retreating the queen? You are right if you preferred the latter. Why exchange when White has excel lent prospects of a kingside attack! Although, I should note, also after an exchange on b3 White's position would have been slightly better.
15 'ii'd2
�a4
Now it is no use playing 1 6 �dl WbS , as an exchange of bishops is clearly to Black's advantage. White should also not play 1 6 llcl . What sort of job is this for the rook: to guard the empty square c2? In re sponse Black will immediately at tack the b2 square: 1 6 . . . llc6 and . . . llb6.
16 g4!
Now it was possible to exchange queens with 1 6 ... Wc2, but this leads to an extremely difficult endgame: 1 7 Wxc2 �xc2 1 8 d2 �a4 19 gxfS . White gets too many positional advantages: a defended passed pawn, a weak square on g6, and the open g-file.
16 ...
:c6!
A good reply. The rook is heading for b6, and after an exchange on fS it
136 Assessing a Position and Choosing a Plan ... will not only restrain the advance of the e-pawn but also defend the g6 square, which is very important.
17 gxfS
exfS (93)
Here I used up rather a long time around 25 minutes. But the position merited it, as it is far from easy. It is necessary to take both . . . l:tb6 and . . . 'iWc2 into serious consideration. What would you have played in White's place? The evaluation of the exchange of bishops after 18 �dl 'iWb5 is the same - it rather favours Black. If 1 8 .i.f3 then 1 8 ... ':b6 19 lbg6 lbxg6 20 hxg6, and now Black has at least 20 .. , �c6. It is not advisable to block the g6 square and the g-file with a pawn. The immediate 18 lbg6 has the same drawback. A variation which suggests itself is 18 .i.d 1 'iWb5 19 .i.f3 %1b6 20 :'b 1 . Let u s assume the queen goes back to b3. What should White do now? Let us approach this position philosophically, establish what we can do, what we wish to do and what
we don't wish to do. We have no ob jection to attacking. To do this it is necessary to keep the queens on the board. We must keep our hold on the square b2. If it were to fall, our oppo nent would develop a serious initia tive on the queenside, and our attack on the kings ide might come too late. We do not wish to permit the ex change of light-squared bishops. Therefore it doesn 't suit us to defend the b2 square by means of .i.d l , �xa4, .l:tc 1 an d !k2. The bishop on a4 must be allowed to live. Its fate will influence the outcome of the game. This bishop may be menac ing , but it might also turn out to be very bad. Black's pieces - the queen, the rook and the bishop on a4 - are pres surising our position. But they are tied down to the queenside, and if an attack were to break out in another area of the board they may prove to be out of play and not manage to reach the battlefield in time.
18 O-O!
A move which at first sight doesn't look particularly significant, but it is very effective. Now after 18 . . . %1b6 19 %1ab l Black cannot play 19 ... 'iWc2 in view of 20 .i.d l ! .
1 8 ... 19 'l'el !
'i'c2
Th e threat i s 20 .i.d 1 . Bad for Black would be 1 9 ... 'iWxb2 20 %lbl and then 2 1 %1xb7. After 1 9 . . . 1We4 20 lbg2 the queen will fall into a trap (2 1 .:c l and 22 f3). Here my oppo nent astonished me by offering a
Assessing a Position and Choosing a PkJn.. . 137 draw. I asked him to play a move, and he couldn 't find anything better than retreating his queen. 'i'b3 19 ...
28 29 30 31
'i6'g3 1i'xf4
'i6'h2
'i6'xd2
.ie7 .ig5 .ixd2 �e7 (94)
20 :dl
By transferring the rook to h2 Wc6) 32 '" d3 33 lhc7 l:Ie2. Previously there had been no need to examine all tbese possibilities, since tbe plan chosen by Alekhine in tbe game had seemed sufficient to win. But now we have to take tbem much more seriously, since tbe de fensive resource pointed out by Goldin - 33 iif3 ! - casts doubt on
tbe correctness of Black's attack (this is the only rational point in his whole article). At the end of his article Goldin writes: 'Despite the changes made to our assessment of tbe course of events by the present analysis, done almost 60 years later, this was a cap tivating struggle, in the course of which botb players took decisions which were impressive by virtue of tbeir depth and beauty.' I fear that if one agrees with tbe 'changes made' , this little panegyric looks rather like a sneer. You see, in the short interval between tbe 1 0th and 1 4tb moves Goldin ostensibly points out two mistakes by White and four by Black. Fortunately, tbese great play ers of the past did not play quite so badly - in most cases it was not tbey but tbeir critic who was at fault. Overall, though, I think tbe game we have examined could not be called a masterpiece.
6
A Feel for the K i ng Grigory Kaidanov
The arsenal of any strong chess player includes an enormous number of the most varied methods and evaluations, rangiDg from the gener ally familiar to the non-standard. It is very important to be able to identify in material being studied something general, something capable of en riching your game. Even grandmas ters and masters occasionally come across ideas with which they were previously unfamiliar. In 1 9 8 1 I had a conversation with Grandmaster Yuri Razuvaev about the new wave in Soviet chess - in the USSR Championship which had j ust ended, Psakhis, Yusupov and Dol matov had played brilliantly. When speaking about Psakhis, Yuri ob served that 'he has a subtle feel for the king.' To be honest, this remark seemed to me rather abstract at the time, but soon afterwards I came across the following game:
Psakhis-Hebden Chicago 1 983 (1 07) : White has an extra pawn, but turning it into victory doesn't look easy. 35 Itdl With the idea of l:1d 1 -d3-f3. 35 ... l..a7
36 b4 'ike7 37 Itd3 g6 If 37 ... i.b6 then 38 'iih5 l:1fS 39 ':13, intending 'ikg6 ! and g4-g5 with a winning attack. 38 'ikg4 rJ;g7 39 1t13 itt'S 40 h5 g5 41 'ikr5 'ike7 Now Black is completely tied down. He cannot move his queen, his rook or his king, because of the weakness of the squares 17 and f6. That only leaves moves with the bishop. It seems that it is also hard for White to strengthen his position, but. . . 42 rJ;g2 i.b6 43 rJ;fi l..a 7 44 rJ;e2 i.b6 45 rJ;d3 i.a7 46 rJ;e4 'ike7+ 47 rJ;b3 'ike7
A Feelfor The King 1 55
48 g4! 49 �c4
i.b6 i.a7 (l08)
61 b6 i.d4 62 i.a4 d5 Or 62 . . . i.e3 63 'It>c6 i.c5 64 b7 winning. 63 cxd5 exd5 64 exd5 e4 65 �c6! �c8 66 d6 e3 67 i.b5 i.f6 68 i.a6+ �b8 69 �d7 Black resigned Perhaps the study of this example helped me in the following game:
50 �b5!! The white king heads straight into oncoming fIre from the enemy's ma jor pieces. But what does he hope to achieve? 'i'e8+ 50 ... Not 50 ... l:r.bS+ 5 1 'It>a6 ! ! �b6+ 52 'It>a5 winning. 'i'd8 51 i.c6 'i'e7 52 �c4! 53 'i'd7 Only now does White's plan be come clear. The king did not advance so far j ust to frighten his opponent but in order after an exchange of queens to secure the advance of his pawns. 'i'e6+ 53 . . fxe6 54 'i'xe6 �xt8 55 %lxt8 �e7 56 �b5 i.x12 57 �a6 �d8 58 c4 i.el 59 �b7 i.12 60 b5 .
Kishnev-Kaidanov Odessa 1 987
White went for a combination ' . 1 4 tiJxf7? �xf7 15 i.xf6 �xf6! The refutation ! After 16 'i'xd7 .l:t.dS the white queen is trapped. 16 'i'13+ �e7 17 %lfd l i.xb5 18 i.xe6 �xe6! 19 'i'd5+ �tlj 20 'i'13+ �e7 •
156 A Feelfor the King
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
ltd5 .td7 .te6 'i'e4+ cj;t7 ltcdl .te7 ltd7+ �e8 1i't3+ 1i'c5 ltxb7 ltd8 1i'e4 White resigned
' Wh y did m y opponent not notice the move 1 5 . . . 'it>xf6? ' , I began to wonder, and I came to a simple conclusion: while acknowledging and understanding the role of the king in the endgame, we frequently do not even consider active moves with the king in the middlegame. Let us recall the history of chess: Steinitz tried to demonstrate that the king is also a strong piece in the middlegame. But in the gambit he had thought up ( 1 e4 e5 2 f4 exf4 3 lDc3 1i'h4+ 4 'iti>e2) the 'active position ' of the white king was hardly justified - quite often it ended up simply getting mated. An understanding of when it is necessary to activate the king - and also of when this would be untimely - is surely the 'feel for the king ' , which Razuvaev had mentioned. Although one may also interpret this concept more broadly, by also including in it the ability to sense the right moment for an attack on the enemy king, or, by foreseeing one 's opponent's intentions, to secure the position of one's own king at the right time, etc. Now let us examine the following game:
Andersson-Tempone Buenos Aires 1979 1 c4 lDm 2 lDt3 g6 3 lDc3 d5 4 cxd5 lDxd5 5 e4 lDxc3 6 dxc3 1i'xdl + 7 �xdl c5? After this move White stands better. 8 .te3 b6 9 a4 lDc6 10 .tb5 .td7 1 1 �c2 .tg7 12 lthdl a6? ! 13 .tc4 .tg4 14 h3 .txt3 15 gxt3 0-0 16 f4 lta7 17 e5 as 18 ltd2 e6 19 :ad 1 ltc8 (1 10)
20 �b3! 21 .tb5! 22 .txc6
.trs ltcc7 ltxc6
A Feelfor rhe King 157
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
�e7 �c4 ltd7 ltcc7 ':xc7 ltxc7 �b5 ':c8 �f8 ltd7 �e8 �b6 �d8+ ':b7 c4 �b5 �c5 Black resigned
This game, in which the white king quite disdainfully took the route b3-c4-b5 into his opponent's half of the board, gave me a lot of en joyment. I called this technique ' the king's march ' , and I selected a few more examples on the same theme. Here is one of them.
Geller-Hort Skopje 1968
A typical Caro-Kann endgame. 27 'i'f4! 'i'd7 28 b3! Intending �c2. 28 ... �d8
29 �c2 �e8 'i'c7 30 'i'e4 Black is extremely cramped, and White begins a pawn offensive on the kingside. 31 f4 �e7 32 g4 �h4 33 f5 �g3 34 fxe6 fxe6 35 'i'g6+ e 36 'i'xe6 �xe5 Having studied the previous ex ample, it is not too difficult to find the manoeuvre which now followed. �g3 37 �d3! 38 �e4 � 39 �f5 �g3 40 �d2 i.h2 41 i.c3 'i't7+ And Black resigned: after 42 'ii'xti+ c:in.f7 43 �e4 and 44 'ittdS White wins the bishop ending. Remember the game Psakhis Hebden; here we have the same sce nario: the march of the king with the major pieces still on the board, then an exchange of queens, and the re sulting endgame turns out to be win ning, thanks to the better position of the king. After studying all these examples it was a pleasure to play the follow ing game: Kijk-Kaidanov Norilsk 1 987 (1 1 2) : 21 22 lta4
�e7 lthb8
1 58 A Feel/or the King tuitive 'feel for the king' and also to master a particular technique the king 's march. -
Additional Examp les Korchnoi-Yusupov Lone Pine 1 981 (annotated by Artor Yusupov) �! 23 i.c4 :a7 24 em 25 :el .th6 26 �e2 �e5 ct>f4 27 �f1 28 �e2 :e7! White's next move loses quickly, but his position was already difficult: he cannot play 29 .txa6, because of 29 ... d5 followed by 30 . . . l1a7, and meanwhile Black threatens 29 . . . d5 and 30 ... f5. 29 �f1? �xf3 30 .txa6 d5 31 exd5 :xel+ 32 �xel :e8+ 33 �f1 :e2 :xt2+ 34 :al :g2+ 35 �gl .tel 36 �hl White resigned There is no defence against 37 . . . �g3 an d 3S ... l'nl 2 mate. This episode is yet further evi dence that no conscientious work is ever in vain ! The examples we have j ust exam ined will help you to develop an in-
With my last move, 32 . . . lkS as? ! , I was hoping to force White to reduce the annoying pressure on the pawn at b5 and to defend against the threat of 33 . . . !ta l by playing 33 l:ldl . But Korchnoi's brilliant reply shattered my illusions. 33 �f1 ! ! :al? It would have been better to ac knowledge my mistake and play 33 . . . IlbS, but also in this case White would still have had a big advantage. 34 �e2!! I t turns out that th e white king on e2 is completely safe. White intends to activate all his forces by playing .th4. 34 ... �g7
A Feelfor the King 159 If 34 ... lbb6 then simply 35 :xb5 'i'c 1 36 'i'e8+ b6 g5 50 h3 (50 h4 gxh4 is just as good) 50 . . . g4 5 1 h4 h5 52 'li>a5 ! b2. Again we shall work through all the knight moves. The move 44 . . . lDh7-g6-h5 . The sub sequent examination of variations is' as they say, a matter of technique. c;Ph7! ! 41 ... Besides the objective streng th of this move it is also good for the rea son that it must have come as a sur prise to White.
42 ttJbl After 42 ttJc2 c;Pg6 there do not appear to be any reasonable continu ations (43 ttJb4 'iWd l+ 44 c;Pa2 'iWa4+).
42
•••
�g6!
The threat is ... ct>g6-h5-g4-h3. On 43 'iWb8 there follows 43 ... 'iWxd4+ 44 'it>a2 ttJb4+ ! with a deci sive attack.
43 'i'd2
'i'xd2
Black consents to the exchange of queens, since her king will infiltrate the enemy position. 44 ttJxd2 �h5 (1 22)
45 ttJc4 White gets no chances after either 45 ttJb3 ct>g4 46 ttJc5 ttJc7, or 45 c;Pb2 'it>g4 46 'it>b3 h3 47 �
A Feelfor the King 165 �2 48 �c5 �xg3 49 �xc6 h5 50 �d6 lL'lxf4 5 1 dS exdS 52 e6 lL'lxe6. The main variation of the analysis runs as follows : 45 h3 g5 46 fxg5 hxg5 47 �b2 g4 (47 ... f4? 48 gxf4 gxf4 49 lL'lf3) 48 hxg4+ (48 h4 f4) 48 .. . �g4 49 �c2 ! ? (also hopeless is 49 lL'lfl �f3 with the threats 50 . . . 'itf2 an d 50 ... � 2 5 1 lLlh2 �f2, and 49 �b3 leads to the main variation) 49 ... �g3 50 �d3 �g2 ! (but not 50 .. .f4? 5 1 �e4; also inaccurate is 50 . . . 'itf2 5 1 lL'lb3 f4 52 �) 5 1 �c4 (on 5 1 lL'lb3 or 5 1 �e2 decisive is 5 1 . . . f4) 5 1 ... 'it>f2! (less correct i s 5 1 ... f4 52 �c5 f3 53 �c6 f2 54 �d6 since it is not good to play 54 . . . lL'lf4? 55 dS !) 52 �c5 (52 �d3 lL'lf4+ 53 �c4 �e2) 52 . . . �e2 with an easy win, since White is unable even to sacri fice her knight for the f-pawn. The position in the last diagram looks totally hopeless for White. Was it really necessary to analyse it in such detail? But, you see, we al ready know how difficult it can sometimes be to convert even a very big advantage, we know how much care and accuracy it requires. In or der to be sure of your assessment of a poSition and to avoid complications during the adjournment session, the analysis of forced variations should be continued as far as possible, until they lead to completely clear (or, on the contrary, to totally unclear) situ ations. By selecting and working through the most accurate and sound routes to our goal, we are basically training
ourselves to acquire a skill which is exceptionally important for every chessplayer - the technique of con verting an advantage into Victory. A thoughtful attitude to taking deci sions even in totally winning posi tions, seeking to restrict the opponent's counterplay as much as possible, paying constant attention to ' trivial points' and 'details ' - all these qualities distinguish players who are renowned for their supreme technique - players such as Fischer, Karpov, Petrosian and Andersson.
45 46 lL'laS 47 �b2
�g4 lL'le7
After 47 lL'lb7 possible are both 47 . . . g5 and 47 ... �h3 48 lLld8 �h2 49 lL'lxe6 �xg3 50 lL'lxg7 �g4.
47 48 49 50 51
�c3 �c4 �c5 �d6
�h3 �xh2 �xg3 h5
On 5 1 lL'lxc6 the simplest is 5 1 . . . lL'lxc6 52 �c6 h 4 53 dS h 3 , an d the black pawn queens with check.
51
•••
lLld5
5 1 ... h4 would also win easily.
52 �xe6 h4 53 lL'lxc6 lL'lxf4+ 54 �xf5 h3 White resigned The positional considerations on which the move 4 1 . . . �h7 ! is based are elementary. The king must take an active part in the endgame; if one of our pieces is placed badly then it
1 66 A Feelfor the King is urgently necessary to improve its position. We know all this very well. So why was it that a whole group of experienced chessplayers was un able for such a long time to discover the solution to this position? Clearly we were all obsessed with 'material' - the capture of the pawn on d4 after 4 1 . . . lDc3 looked too attractive. Al though this plan turned out to be a mistake in this instance, generally speaking there is nothing criminal about winning material, so long as this does not involve making posi tional concessions and only incurs minimal loss of time - most often such tactics are entirely reasonable. And this is also the case here: if in the initial position the king had stood on h7, the move 41 . . . lDc3 would certainly not have merited criticism. In any position various principles operate simultaneously, and the rec ommendations which follow from them are sometimes contradictory. Quite often one succeeds in making the right choice intuitively, by rely ing on a feeling for the position. But a solution can by no means always be 'guessed' - sometimes one has to immerse oneself in calculation and
get involved in the lengthy process of ploughing through variations. Different players may arrive at the same conclusion in various ways, depending on their characteristic ways of thinking, their own perSonal algorithms for searching for the right move. We found the solution to this posi tion, 41 ... 'it>h7 ! ! (as well as the best formation for the white pieces in re ply to 41 . . . lDc3? - 42 'iWb3 ! and 43 lDc2 !), after lengthy concrete analy sis. Possibly a player with a subtle positional sense could have guessed the correct line far more quickly and thereby spared himself a lot of analy sis. One should not (as is sometimes done) establish any sort of priority of the concrete over the general, of analysis over assessment, of logic over intuition - or, indeed, the con verse. A chessplayer must develop in himself both these contrasting ways of thinking, he must master different methods of approaching a position and learn to combine them correctly, in accordance with his abilities, tastes and style of play.
7
The Thoughts and Advi ce of Great Players
(On working at chess, studying one 's own games and the games of other players, and overcoming deficiencies in one 's play) Wilhelm Steinitz The advice which we offer on the subject is, in the first place, that a learner should seek as much as pos sible to play on even terms with su perior players. One thing that we would espe cially urge upon the chess student is that regularity of study and practice very much facilitates making rapid progress . The player by fits and starts will scarcely ever improve, and it is much better to devote to chess one hour per day for six con secutive days than six hours one day in the week. In order to strengthen the powers of chess perception and memory, a good habit to cultivate is that of playing over from recollec tion one's own games, or more espe cially selected and well-annotated published games played by masters. The Modern Chess Instructor
Siegbert Tarrasch I was well aware that my defeat was due not to a lack of playing-strength but to the fact that I did not make suf-
ficient use of it. Underestimation of my opponents and overestimation of my own prowess were to blame for my failure. I supposed that in order to win it was quite enough for me to sit down at the board and play moves; my opponents would surely be completely overcome and lose, simply because they were playing against Dr Tarrasch. So I moved my pieces carelessly, without any pro found reflection, quite unshakeable in my belief that in the end the right side - namely mine - must come out on top . . . I was justly punished, but this was a salutary lesson. I realised that it is not enough to be a good chessplayer - one also has to play well. . . . I need hardly add that I have never played, as they say, 'for a draw ' , except of course in positions which were unfavourable for me and in which best play on my part could at most lead to a draw. I consider the expressions 'playing for a win' and 'playing for a draw ' to be totally in appropriate. I regard every position as a problem requiring the best move to be found, and I try to solve this
1 68 The Thoughts and Advice of Great Players problem. If I find the strongest move, one which offers winning chances, then it would go totally against the grain for me to prefer a weaker move leading only to a draw. And as for the routine chopping-off of pieces followed by a quick draw, I have always considered this to be de testable and absurd. Three Hundred Chess Games
Emanuel Lasker One may err, but one must not de ceive oneself. He who bravely fol lows his judgment may lose, but even his loss profits him, provided he seeks to discover the reasons for it; and he grows to be a master, an artist. But he who no longer ventures to back his opinion loses the quality of a fighter and approaches his fall. .. .Education in chess has to be an education in independent thinking and j udging. Chess must not be memorised, simply because it is not important enough ... Memory is too valuable to be stocked with trifles. Of my fifty-seven years I have ap plied at least thirty to forgetting most of what I had learned or read, and since I succeeded in this I have ac quired a certain ease and cheer which I should never again like to be without. You should keep in mind no names, nor numbers, nor isolated in cidents, not even results, but only methods. The method is plastic. It is applicable in every situation.
He who wants to educate himsel f in chess must evade what is dead in chess - artificial theories, Supported by few instances and unheld by an excess of human wit; the habit of playing with inferior opponents; the custom of avoiding difficult tasks; the weakness of uncritically taking over variations or rules discovered by others; the vanity which is self sufficient; the incapacity for admit ting mistakes; in brief, everything that leads to standstill or to anarchy. Chess Manual
Jose Raul C apablanca It would be a grave mistake to study the opening without keeping in mind the subsequent middlegame and ending. In the same way it would be wrong to study the middlegame without considering the endgame. This reasoning clearly proves that in order to improve your game you must study the endgame before any thing else; for, whereas the endings can be studied and mastered by themselves, the middlegame and the opening must be studied in relation to the endgame. Capablanca 's Last Chess Lectures
Alexander Alekhine I was driven to become a chess mas ter firstly by a quest for truth and sec ondly by a desire to compete. When still a small boy I sensed that I had a gift for chess. Even then I felt an
The Thoughts and Advice of Great Players 1 69 inner aspiration, an irresistible at traction to the game. It was through chess that I fonned my character. More than anything else, chess teaches you to be objective. In chess you can only make yourself a great master by becoming aware of your mistakes and deficiencies. And pre cisely the same applies in life . . . .One trait more than any other determines one's strength at chess : unshakeable concentration, which has to cut a player off completely from the outside world.
Aron Nimzowitsch The simultaneous investigation of positions of different types gives rise only to muddled thoughts, whereas the thorough study of a single type cannot fail to raise the level of one's positional knowledge. If you, esteemed reader, set about studying as intensively as possible positions of a particular type - a cen tral me against a stonn on the flank, say - it would not surprise me in the least if, as a result, you also come to display clearer judgement in the sphere of the endgame. The process of studying a standard position has as its aim not only analysis of the particular standard position but also an improvement in one's overall po sitional flair. I believe in the radioactive power of this method: the whole chess or ganism is, so to speak, woken up and waits joyously to be rejuvenated. It
does not merely strengthen one's po sitional sense; perhaps the most typi cal improvement is that the player who previously chased after ghosts (for example, by constantly dream ing of mating attacks) suddenly be gins to face up seriously to the reality of chess . . . . Combinational talent plus hard work can make the impossible possi ble, and therefore we advise yet again: 'Tacticians, try little by little to acquire an understanding of the most important positional motifs, of strategy ! And those among you who do not like combinations, try to love them, study them, since only a mix ture of combinational and positional play will bring you the successes, joys and thrills in which chess is so abundant! ' How I Became a Grandmaster
Mikhail Botvinnik For a long time I have advised our masters who systematically get into time-trouble that there is a way of combating this shortcoming. Unfor tunately it seems that they have not taken advantage of my advice, even though it is very simple. One should play training-games and pay atten tion primarily to the clock, not to the quality of play or the result of the game, and continue these exercises until the skill of managing one's time prudently has been cultivated, so that one has time to calculate all necessary variations. By adopting
1 70 The Thoughts and Advice o/Great Players this method I think that ninety per cent of those who suffer from 'time trouble disease' would be com pletely cured, with the exception of course of those who are 'incurably ill ' . Other deficiencies should also be cured in this way. During special training-games one should pay most attention to the particular deficiency, until such time as it disappears . . . Supposing that a master i s weak in the endgame, he has only to fol low the example of Chekhover, who not long ago worked very hard on the endgame, particularly on studies, and achieved notable success . Dur ing training-games he should aim for the endgame, which will also help him to acquire suitable experience. With the same method it is possible to rectify deficiencies in the middle game, although here the matter is rather more complicated . .. . Home analysis has its particular features: the master has no time con straint and he can move the pieces around. Despite these differences, analysis and practical play also have a lot in common. It is well-known that virtually all outstanding chess players have also been magnificent analysts. The conclusion is obvious: any one wishing to become an outstand ing chess player must also perfect his skills in chess analysis ... Needless to say, the notes to games which are written 'as one goes' , during a period of one or two
hours, can in no way be considered to be analysis . Such 'analysis' has only a negative effect, since it can tum into a bad habit. On my methods/or preparing/or competitions
Gary Kasparov I am an adherent of the investigative school of chess to which Botvinnik belongs. It was from Botvinnik that I learnt how to study chess properly, to find new ideas and to work con stantly at perfecting them. It is a sci entific approach, based on a profound analysis of our heritage from the past, the search for new opening variations and methods of play in the middlegame, and the de velopment of fundamentally new strategic plans. All chess players study old games - rather like they learn the words of a foreign lan guage. But, having acquired some sort of vocabulary, you need to learn how to use it, in order to realise your creative potential. Particularly if you aim to become World Champion. . . .For me, brought up on the scien tific methods of Botvinnik, the abil ity to concentrate is the basis for everything else. This would appear to be a simple matter. But what about when you are in a crisis situation? Few people realise that the ability to focus one's thoughts during the deci sive moments of a game is just about the most important qUality a chess player can possess.
The Thoughts and Advice of Great Players 171 . . .To play creatively without being afraid of taking chances and to pos sess a polished chess style in no way releases you from the need for per sistent hard work. On the contrary, you must constantly perfect your playing, deepen and widen your opening repertoire, refine your tech niques, and analyse complicated endgames. Chess, after all, is not just an accumulation of acquired knowl edge; chess is dynamic, and any ap parently defmitive conclusion may in actual fact be just an interim one. The truth has to be proved every time. Even my own annotations to
games are not unshakeable as far as I am concerned. I like to keep updat ing them, making them more pre cise: many ideas come to be reassessed, including, of course, one's own ideas. I willingly go over my own mistakes again and analyse them. Botvinnik wrote in 1 980: 'When a chessplayer annotates one of his games, he frequently tries to conceal his own inaccuracies and omissions. Kasparov does not do this. He searches for the truth and tries to be objective.' Das endlose Duell
8
Creat ive Discoveri es and Instruct ive Errors Artur Yusupov
In Chapter One Mark Dvoretsky showed how the strong and weak sides of a chessplayer's game can in fluence the result of an encounter. In order for a player to improve it is im portant to determine these qualities correctly - to make, as it were, a 'di agnosis ' . At our school we attach particular importance to this aspect of our work. The students rust annotate their games themselves. Then analysis of their most substantial games and ex tracts from games, conducted jointly with the teachers, enables us to re veal their merits and deficiencies more accurately, to examine and, in a number of cases to review, their as sessments of particular situations. Taken in conjunction with the results of various solving competitions and the participation of our pupils in les sons and lectures, as well as thematic training-games, this procedure en ables us to put together quite a full creative profile of our young players. In this chapter I should like to give you some idea of how such work is carried out, to show you some striking examples - creative discoveries or instructive errors taken from pupil 's games.
Pessimists and Optimists In order to acquaint ourselves better with the play of our pupils we organ ised a thematic match between two teams: the 'optimists' and the 'pessi mists ' . We included among the opti mists those students who were sure of their own powers, who love sharp play, love to attack; the team of pes simists consisted of those who, in ac cordance with their milder nature, are more inclined towards a posi tional style of play. The following game is taken from this match; as for the team which each student was representing, I think you will be able to guess this quite easily for your self.
Zvyagintsev(13 years old) Alexandrov(l6) Daugavpils 1 990 1 2 3 4 5 6
d4 c4 tDc3
f3 a3 cxdS? !
tDf6
e6 ..tb4 dS ..te7
Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors 1 73 A more testing continuation is 6 e4.
6
•••
12 .i.f4 13 lDxh4
exdS!
.i.h4+ 1t'xh4+ (1 23)
Weaker is 6 . . . lDxdS ? ! because of 7 e4 lDxc3 S bxc3, when White has a strong centre.
7 e4
dxe4!?
In the game Gelfand-Spassky, Li nares 1990, Black sacrificed a pawn after 7 ... cS S dxc5 .i.xc5 9 eS , but he was unable to prove the correctness of his plan.
S fxe4
lDc6?!
In his notes Vadim Zvyagintsev examines more promising possibili ties: S ... cS 9 dS (9 .i.bS+ .i.d7 10 eS 00 is slightly better for Black) 9 .. . .i.d6 10 lDf3 lDg4 (I think that 10 . . lDbd7 is also quite good), and S . . . 0-0 9 lDf3 cS 10 dS lDg4 1 1 eS t? lDxeS !? 1 2 lDxeS .i.h4+ 1 3 g3 nes with unclear chances. .
9 lDa 10 i.e3
.ig4
White now enjoys a slight advan tage.
10 ...
i.hS?!
Black launches an attack without having completed his development. More solid and stronger was 10 . . . 0-0. After th e risky 1 0 . . . .i.xf3? 1 1 gxt3 lDhS Zvyagintsev had foreseen 1 2 f4 ! ( 1 2 1t'd2 lDa5 ! is unclear) 12 . . . .i.h4+ 1 3 �d2 ! ! , with advantage to White, and if 1 3 . . . lDxd4? then 14 �c l winning.
1 1 .i.c4
lDg4?!
Continuing in the same adventur ous manner. Better was 1 1 . . . 0-0, with only a slight disadvantage.
14 i.g3? A serious error. White wanted to play safe, but as a result he has handed his opponent the initiative. Correct was 14 g3 ! 1t'dS ( 14 . . . 1t'h3?? IS .i.f1 wins for White) I S lDdS with a clearly better position.
14 ... 15 lDdS
1t'gS 0-0-0
After the game it emerged that Al exandrov had not examined the obvi ous IS . . . lDf2. Admittedly, 16 1t'd2 1t'xd2+ 17 �d2 lDxh l IS lDxc7+ d7 19 l:lxh l l:IacS 20 dS would have led to a confused position. The move he played is quite good, but unfortunately his opponent's (forced) reply came as a complete surprise to Black. It is clear that finding 'candi date moves ' , the ability to see vari ous resources (especially for one's opponent), is this young player's weakness (and, incidentally, the main reason for his failure in this game). He will need to do some hard work on this aspect of his play.
1 74 Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors
16 'i'd !
1i'g6?
An unfortunate move, allowing White to complete his development. Black should have continued 1 6 . . . 'iWxc l + ! 1 7 nxcl l:the8 with a slight advantage.
:d7 17 'i'f4 18 O-O!? lbxd4 19 Ld (124)
'iii>e 8 24 nxe7+ (also possible i s 24 llc6 winning) 24 ... d8 2 3 l:td l +
This element of chess strategy is one of the most difficult. But look how skilfully a young player was able to employ it.
Baklan(1 1 )-Zilberstein Kiev 1 989
Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors 1 75 The correct plan in this position is to push b2-b3 and then play on the queenside. But before starting to carry out this plan, White first dis rupts the coordination of his oppo nent's pieces with an operation on the opposite wing.
20 21 22 23
1i'g5! h4 h5 1i'g3
� g6 Ilhg8 h6 �t8
If 23 ... �7 then 24 .i.h7 lTh8 25 ifxg7.
24 b3! 25 bxc4
1i'c6 dxc4?
Better was 25 . . . 1i'xc4, but then too after 26 l:lb4 'fIc7 27 ntb 1 White has the advantage.
26 27 28 29
1i'e3 Ilb4 Iltbl 1la4
1td7 Ilc7 1i'a6
Also good was 29 .i.e4 b6 30 dS .
29 30 lla5 •.•
1i'c6
Preparing to play d4-dS . But also possible was the immediate 30 dS ! ? 'fIcS 3 1 d6 l:lc6 3 2 1i'xcs l:lxc5 33 .i.e4 bS 34 :as.
30 3 1 d5 32 d6 33 .i.e4
1i'd7 b6 1lc6 1i'c8
And now a beautiful finish.
34 Ilxb6+ 35 1i'xb6+ 36 1la8+
axb6 1i'b7
Simpler was 36 1i'xc6.
36 37 .i.xc6
�xa8 1i'xc6
38 1i'xc6+ �b8 39 d7 Black resigned
Steinitz ' s Principle The development of an initiative is a very difficult topic, and not only for young players. During individual lessons in our school we try to con centrate our pupils' attention on their missed opportunities, and we at tempt to investigate the reasons for their mistakes.
Kiryakov(IS)-Sakaev Simjeropol l 990 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
d4 c4 �c3 1i'c2 dxcS �t3 e3 .i.d2!? i.d3 0-0-0
�f6 e6 .i.b4 c5 i.xcS 1i'b6 1i'c7 0-0 �h8?! .i.e7 (1 26)
1 76 Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors White has a clear lead in develop ment, but here he played the inert . . .
1 1 h3 ? . . . allowing his opponent to initiate counterplay after...
1 1 ...
liJa6!
Commenting upon this game, Pe tya Kiryakov pointed out the follow ing possibilities: 1 1 e4, 1 1 liJe4 ! ? an d I I g4 ! ? But after 1 1 g4 liJxg4 he only considered 12 �dg l liJxf2 1 3 i.xh7. Petya wrote i n his notes : 'This attack is probably incorrect, and I also do not like such attacks.' In fact White has some tempting possibilities for developing an initia tive. After 1 1 g4 liJxg4 strong was 12 liJb5 ! and then 1 3 i.c3 with danger ous threats. Also interesting is 1 1 liJb5 'iWd8 1 2 i.c3 a6 1 3 i.xf6 i.xf6 14 liJd6. Remember Wilhelm Ste initz 's famous principle: 'The side with the advantage must attack when threatened with the loss of this advantage.'
12 13 14 15 16
liJb5 g4 g5 1i'xd3 e4
A Spectacular Storm Maxim Boguslavsky loves to attack. In the following example his accu rate and inventive operations al lowed him to mate the enemy king after his opponent failed to make use of all his defensive resources.
Boguslavsky(14)-Matsionis Tallinn 1990
1i'b6 liJc5 liJxd3+ liJe8
Better was 16 i.c3 ! ? a6 1 7 liJbd4, with the idea of playing b4-h5 and g6. The position obliges White to play for an attack.
16 17 i.e3 18 liJc3
initiative (although the game ended in a draw). We advised this young player to turn his attention to the slight passiv ity of his style and recommended that he study the games of Timman and other dynamic players.
a6! 'i'a5 b5!
Having exploited his opponent's indecisiveness, Black, as Steinitz would have predicted, has seized the
24 i.n ! White would have had little to gain from 24 1i'xb7+ 'iWxb7 25 :txb7 .l:ih l + , with an unclear ending. With his subtle move in the game, the young Muscovite repels the threat of an exchange of rooks and maintains
Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors 1 77 the full force of all his options.
24 ...
'i'xa5?
Boguslavsky(14)-Shakhbaz Moscow 1989
Black can no longer stand the ten sion. He should have replied in the same fashion: 24 ... 'i!td8 ! 25 'tWxb7 'tWxaS ! (also worth considering was 25 . . . iLc8 !?) 26 l:.b5 ! ? l:lh l + ! (but not 26 ... 'tWxc3? 27 'i'xd7+ ! !) 27 h7 23 'tWg3, obtaining excellent at tacking prospects.
22
•••
1lf8!
Black defends the vulnerable square 17 and prepares to occupy the important square f4 with his knight.
23 :ad l 24 'i'd3?
�5
A bad move, leading to the loss of White's initiative. Correct was 24 'tWg3 :!ad8 25 l:.d4 ! 'tWf6 26 h4, when 26 . . . lLlf4? is bad in view of 27 iLt7+ ! .
24 25 26 27 28
.th7+ 'i'g3 ltd7 lLlxd7
lLlr4 �h8 �xh7 'i'xd7!? :r5
And now Black, having sacrificed his queen, began an attack.
1 78 Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors
Which Move is More Accurate? Obseevich(12)-Emelin(13) Beltsy 1 989
White has an appreciable posi tional advantage, mainly by virtue of his better pawn structure and more active pieces. The different pros pects of the bishops should be par ticularly noted: the light-squared bishop can come out to h3 and in crease the pressure against Black's position. Now an attack against the pawn on b6 suggests itself. This can be done in two ways: 2 1 'i'd4 or 2 1 'i'e3. In such situations the method of comparison comes to one's aid. In both cases it is bad to defend the pawn with the queen, because of 22 i.h3. The advantage of 2 1 1We3 ! con sists in the fact that after the primi tive defence 2 1 ... .l::lb7 White has the tactical refutation 22 ltJxd6 ! i.xd6 23 i.xb7 1Wxb7 24 .l::lxd6 l:txd6 25
'i'xe5, emerging with an extra pawn. The obvious disadvantage of the move is that it allows . . . d6-dS . Of course, at such moments one should immerse oneself in the posi tion and calculate variations. After 2 1 'i'e3 dS 22 1Wf4 Black has several possible continuations: a) 22 ... dxe4 23 .l::lxdS+ 1WxdS 24 'i'xe5 with a clear advantage; b) 22 . . . ltJg6 23 1Wf7+ �h7 24 ltJf6+ i.xf6 25 'i'xa7 and White wins the exchange; c) 22 ... ltJc6 23 cxdS exdS 24 llxd5 ! I1xd5 25 'i'f7+ �h8 26 1WxdS with a clear advantage; d) 22 . . . ltJxc4 23 bxc4 dxe4. This position should be assessed in White's favour. He has real attacking chances, and the presence of oppo site-coloured bishops merely inten sities his attacking possibilities. Simplest is 24 1Wxe4 followed by 'i'g6 and �e4, but one could also try 24 1hd8+ 1WxdS 25 1Wf7+ ! ? �hS 26 \i'g6, with the threat 27 �xe4. In the game White played with less finesse and allowed his oppo nent to organise a defence.
21 22 23 24
'i'd4 'lPhl cxb5 %tel
1:b7 b5 %txb5 'i'b8!?
The start of active counterplay. Also possible was 24 . . . 1Wd7 25 i.h3 �hS with slightly better chances for White.
25 i.h3 26 i.xe6+ 27 ltJc3
d5 'lPh8 %tb4
Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors 1 79
28 'i'tl (130)
As so often happens, following the loss of material an initiative takes hold. But the natural continuation 28 . . . d4 led after 29 tiJdS l:tf8 30 'i'g2 l:!.b7 3 1 tiJxe7 l:!.xe7 32 l:txfS+ 'iix fS 33 l:tc8 to a lost endgame for Black. He should not have allowed the knight to come to d5 and could have prevented this with 28 ... !':!b6! ! , when i t i s dangerous to play 29 iLxdS because of 29 . . . iLg5 fol lowed by . . . tiJg4.
Sacrificing the Queen in Defence Gasymov-Kiryakov(l5) Simjeropol 1 990 (131) : White had played this game very inventively and built up a dangerous attack. But he has already sacrificed two pawns. In such cases the opponent can frequently succeed in 'buying his way out of trouble ' by
returning the extra material for the sake of some positional advantage. White intends, by playing f2-f4, to include his dark-squared bishop in the attack. It was possible to prevent this by playing 29 ... tiJa4 ! . After 30 J:!g8+ 'i'xg8 3 1 iLxg8 llxg8 Black has the advantage. The game continued somewhat differently: 29 ... tiJf7?
30 ':g3!
':e7!
It was bad to play 30 ... 'ikh6+? 3 1 'iixh6 tiJxh6 3 2 f4 tiJa4 3 3 fxe5 tiJxb2 34 ltxb2 fxe5 35 !':!xb7, with a decisive advantage for White.
31 32 33 34 35
f4
':eg2 dxe6 fxeS 'i'f4
':ae8 ':xe6 ':xe6 tiJxe5! ? tiJbd7
Now White was tempted into 'winning ' the queen with 36 l:tg8+??, which led to a difficult end ing that he eventually lost. B ut after 36 'ikh4 ! , with the veiled idea iLc 1 h6, h e would have maintained a menacing attack.
1 80 Creative Discoveries and Instructive Errors
Forestalling the Opponent ' s Possibilities
Pashanov-Sitnik(8) Sochi 1989
Paying attention to the opponent's threats is an essential quality for any chessplayer. It can rescue you from many situations, particularly when you are defending.
Makariev(14)-Khristov Kishinev 1 990 This example shows just how im portant it is to be vigilant. Black has a big advantage, but after the care less ...
22
.•.
tLlf8??
. . .the game lasted just one more move:
23 llxf8+ !
White threatens to play 44 .i.c4+ , after which the black king will be made to feel extremely uncomfort able. In the game there followed the error. . .
43
•••
. . . which after...
44 i.c4+ 45 llb6+ 46 llg6+
... since mate is unavoidable. When analysing this game, Maxim Sitnik found the correct solu tion: it was necessary for Black to di vert his opponent's pieces from the attack and to complete his develop ment; therefore 22 . . . c2 ! , and only after 23 "xc2 then 23 . . tLlf8. .
fxeS? c2 'iti>f7 4 d2 i.d7 5 e2 i.e6 6 'iti>e l i.c4 7 'iti>d2 e7 8 'iti>e2 i.e6 9 fl f5 10 e2 fxe4 1 1 fxe4 f6 12 el (of course, not 12 �? i.g4+ 13 'iti>xg3 i.e2). A draw was soon agreed. It was possible to destroy the for tress that White had constructed. The very frrst move, 1 . . . g3?, was a mis take. The plan for storming the for tress, as is so often the case in such situations, is based on zugzwang.
1 2 3 4 5 6
gxt3 �b2 �c2 �d2 �e2
gxf3! i.e6 i.d7 �f7 i.g4!
Hopeless is 6 fxg4 bxg4 7 'iti>e2 fS 8 exfS 'iti>f6 or 8 . . . e4.
6 7 �t2
fS! � (135)
This is it - the zugzwang position which Black needed to find. As be fore, 8 fxg4 hxg4 is bad. If 8 'iti>g2 then 8 . . . fxe4 9 fxe4 i.e2. Finally, on 8 e2 decisive is 8 . . . fxe4 9 dxe4 d3+ 10 xd3 i.xf3 followed by 1 1 ... i.xe4 (analysis by Dvoretsky).
Mieses-Spielmann 1 1) 3rd match game, Regensburg 1910 In the game, after 1 7 . . . d5? ! White decided to accept all the material sacrificed by his opponent:
18 exdS 1 9 exdS
i.xdS! ! 'i'xdS
In commenting upon the situ ation which has arisen, Spielmann wrote: ' Now it is possible to assess the results of the sacrifice: Black is a piece down (the doubled pawn can hardly be considered !), but, thanks to the two open files in the centre, he has far overtaken his opponent in de velopment; the threats to the bishop on d3 and the pawn on g2 prevent White from castling, and in addition White has to lose another tempo, un less by playing 20 i.xh7+ and 2 1 0-0 he contents himself with complete eqUality. It is most unlikely that White will not attempt to refute the sacrifice; consequently Black can reckon on obtaining a strong attack against the opposing king stuck in the centre of the board. These were roughly the considerations by which I was guided when I resolved to play the sacrifice. Only complete faith in
1 86 Solutions to Analytical Exercises the strength of my position and the indisputable laws of development prompted me to make this sacrifice, since even today I am unaware of any similar 'example' of breaking through in this way. I supposed that, despite his extra piece, it would be very difficult for White to defend against my superior forces, albeit in a very limited area of the board, and that this would at least lead to White's losing several pawns. The course of the game shows - at least from a practical point of view - that my assumptions were entirely cor rect.'
20 'i'g3 21 .te2 22 lDc3
l:.fe8+ l:.bd8
Or 22 fl nxe2 ! 23 �xe2 'iVc4+ ! 24 �el :e8+. 22 ... 'i'd2 + lDds 23 �f1 ' Stronger than ... 'iVxb2. In such positions pawns should be taken only in passing, so to speak. All one's thoughts should be concen trated on the attack.' (Spielmann). 24 2S 26 27 28
l:.el 'i'a
g3 'i'fS 'i'xh3?
lDxf4 l:.d4 lDh3 'i'xb2
The main variation according to Spielmann was 28 lDd l ! 'iVd2! 29 'iVxh3 I1de4 30 lDf2 ! nxe2 3 1 nxe2 'i'xe2+ 32 �g2 hS ! , and an unclear position arises, with chances for both sides.
28 ...
'i'xc3
29 30 31 32 33
'i'rs 'iVa
l:.de4! 'i'd2
l:.gl l:.4e6 l:.g2 l:.f6 .to l:.xel+ White resigned
We see that, objectively, the piece sacrifice did not promise Black any advantage. Moreover, it is not hard to prove that it should have led to an inferior position. In reply to 1 7 . . . dS let us examine 1 8 eS ! lDe4 ( 1 8 . . . dxc4 1 9 .ic2) 1 9 'iVxd8 l:.fxd8. Spielmann considered that the posi tion favours Black because of White's backward development. This is not so - the assessment of this position is determined mainly by the defects in Black's pawn structure. We shall continue 20 b3 fS 2 1 cxdS .ixdS 22 lDe3 .ie6 23 .ixe4 fxe4 24 1:lc 1 , and it becomes clear that Black will have quite a hard struggle for a draw. Instead of his spectacular - but objectively not entirely correct breakthrough, Spielmann could have proceeded to put pressure on the en emy centre according to plan with 17 . . . %le8 ! 1 8 0-0 .id7. For example: 19 lL)c3 (not 1 9 eS dxeS 20 fxeS nxeS 2 1 nxf6 'i'xf6 22 'i'xh7+ fS) 1 9 . . . nxb2 2 0 e S .ic6 ! 2 1 0 0 .ixdS 22 cxdS dxeS 23 fxeS 'iVxdS and Black wins . White can defend by means of 19 ne l .ic6 20 00 (but not 20 . , . nxb2? in view of 2 1 eS), but also in this case Black obviously retains a satisfactory position.
Solutions to Analytical Exercises 187
12)
Teichmann-Anonymous Zurich 1921 1 lbh6!
�xh6
No good is 1 . . . l:lxh6? 2 .*.xf7+, or 1 ... bxc4? 2 l:1b8+ ! '
2 'i'g5 3 'i'd8+! ! 4 h6
game, White increases the pressure on his opponent's poSition consider ably and obtains a big advantage.
�rT �xd8
In colUlection with the threat of 5 h7+ it looks like Black has to resign (and according to some sources, this is just what he did). But in fact it is a bit too early to resign. True, 4 . . . 'i'f8 is unsatisfactory, because of 5 h7+ d6 ! . How should this posi tion be assessed? Probably Black has the advantage after 8 .*.xe6 �xe6, or 8 'ii'f8+ q;c7 9 'ii'x d8+ b7. But Candidate Master V.Nikonov estab lished that this pOSition is actually drawn after 8 !lg7 ! 'i'xd2 ! (8 . . . �b7? 9 .*.xe6 �xe6 10 'ii'xe6+ ! ! ; 8 . . . .*.b7? 9 'ii'xd8 ! l:lxdS 1 0 'ii'xd8; 8 . . . bxc4? 9 'ii'xd8) 9 'ii'f8+ Q;c7 10 'ii'xd8+ Q;b7 when White cannot avoid perpetual check.
14)
Simagin-Bondarevsky SZczawno Zdroj 1 950
Here the right square for the light squared bishop is c4, from where it will create dangerous threats against the enemy king. 1 .tn ! . In the game there followed: 1 . . . 'ii'a7 2 .tc4 .uxc4 3 bxc4 'ii'c5 4 �6 ! .*.c8 5 �xh7+ Q;e7 6 e5 ! , and White soon won.
15)
Gligoric-Speelman Lucerne 1 982
The bishop on a3 is shooting into thin air and should really be on g5 . Then the pawn on h5 will become vulnerable.
1 .tel Imprecise would be 1 O-O? ! , in view of I . . . g5 ! 2 hxg5 h4 with coun terplay. There followed:
1 2 f3 ! •••
�g4
2 l:lb l f5 ! ?
2 3 cxd4 4 lZ.bl
�xd4 'i'xd4
4 .tb2? 'i'b4+.
13)
Korchnoi-Penrose Palma de Mallorca 1 969 1 h4!
And then 2 .*.h3. Having brought his light-squared bishop into the
4 5 .te3 6 � 7 W
�e5 �3+ 'i'e5 lZ.d7
7 . . . f5 8 .tg5, with the idea of 9 exf5 .
1 88 Solutions to Analytical Exercises
S 9
�gl
:bdS
4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
�t1 And Black did not have sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece.
1 6) Romanishin-Yusupov Minsk 1979 (variationfrom the game) Black must play for mate:
1 ... 2 a7
�e4!
2 �f7 � 3 lteS .l1a2.
2 ...
�t3 ! !
3 ':'bS 4 aS1i'+
':'e2! �xg3
But not 2 . . . .:az ? 3 �c6 � 4 ':'eS ! .
With inevitable mate. It would have been a mistake to play 3 ... l!d2? (instead of 3 . . . l:te2!), in view of 4 %lb3 ! ltxdS 5 %lbS :d2 6 M+ ! �g3 7 lW+ ! �f3 S aS1i'+.
17)
Dolmatov-Shamkovich Amsterdam 1979
IS)
2 �xd5! !
Gorchakov-Dvoretsky Moscow 1 974
1 ...
3 4 5 6
�b6
�xd5
d5 Black resigned
�b6!
Now on 2 �b3 Black has 2 . . . �b5 . I f 2 a4 then not 2 ... as? (in view of 3 �b3 or 3 bxaS+), but 2 . . . �6 ! 3 lhd4 lhd4 4 �xd4 aS ! ' The game continued as follows: 2 g4 �e3
1 ':'b7
1 ...
b3
f5+ �xf6 g5 g4 g3 �b6 �g5 �h6 �5 �e7 ':'b6 ':'b8
White threatens to attack the pawn on d4 by playing �b3.
I %lc7? �b6; I %laS? �e7 2 nes �f5 or 2 ... %ld7. I . . . �6 2 �xd5 �d4+ 3 �4 �6 4 �e5 .
�xd5 gxf6+ i..c4 f5 i..e6 �t3! ':17+ ':'g7+ ':'g4 ':'xgJ �e4
.:.xd4 �xd4 �gJ �c4+
':'xd4 �xg4+ h5 �c7
Having retained three pawns for his piece, Black subsequently ob tained a draw.
2 . . . 1lxdS 3 �xdS �xd5 4 �e4.
3 �e4!
19)
Now it is bad to play 3 ... llb6 4 �xd5, and if 3 . . . �f6+ then 4 �5 ! is decisive. The game went:
3 ...
�7
Matheu-Dolmatov Groningen 1978/79
Having played 1 ... f4?, Black missed a win. The game ended as
Solutions to Analytical Exercises 1 89 follows : 2 'iff8 �d5 3 liJf3 ! with a draw, in view of 3 . . . �xf3 4 'ift7+ 'iti>g4 5 'ifd7+. Unconvincing is 1 ... c3? 2 bxc3 dxc3 3 liJb 1 . In the event of 1 . . . 'ifd5 it is not good to play 2 dxc4? bxc4 3 liJxc4 .i.b5 4 b3 axb3 5 cxb3 d3. But White has the simple 2 �e2 'ife6+ 3 �d l , or 2 . . . 'ife5+ 3 'iti>f1 (but not 3 �d l ? c3). However, Black could have won the game by bringing his king into the attack.
1 2
�g4! 'iff8
2 dxc4 �h3 3 'iti>g l �g2! 4 liJf1 'ife2.
2
'i'e6
Intending 3 ... �h3. There could have followed:
3
'iti>gl
el!
Not so convincing is 3 . . . 'iti>h3 4 liJfl b4 5 dxc4 ! b3 6 cxb3 �g2 7 'ifc5 ! , or 4 . . . �g2 5 'ifg7 b4 6 axb4! c3 7 bxc3 a3 8 cxd4 �xfl 9 'itxfl a2 10 'ifa7 ! .
dxc3 f4! gxf4 �h5 With the threat of 8 ... 'i'g6+. 4 5 6 7
bxel tLln gxf4 'i'g7+
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