Torts Case Digests Midterm

G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997 DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents. Facts: The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest terms is the type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide for the untimely death of said Lydia Umali on the day following her surgical operation. Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother, Lydia, to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. While the petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision finding the accused Dra. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC and the Court of Appeals affirmed the MTCC in toto and further directed petitioner to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death. Issue: Won petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide? Held: No. This Court finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the

fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence. Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. It is significant to state at this  juncture that that the autopsy autopsy conducted conducted by Dr. Arizala Arizala on the body body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the hemorrhage. This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. No. L-21291, March 28, 1969 FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns. In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased “in his eagerness ea gerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation. The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40. ISSUE: WON the lower court’s decision is erroneous HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed. NO. The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual] determination is best left to the trial  judge why had the advantage advantage of hearing hearing the parties parties testify testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand.”  But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown,

therefore, that MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.

TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award ofdamages.

Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United States v. Barias. Cooley’ formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: “Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be:

ISSUE:

 “The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.”  There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: ”   “Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”  To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action of Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on MRC had not arisen. Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.

Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the respondents. Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.

FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR NO. 52732, AUG 29, 1988 FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was situatedadjacent to the residence of the Mables.Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and Mable’s residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in Cruz’s shop.Cruz’s emp loyees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, buttheir efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables’ house. Both the shopand the house were razed to the ground.The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and thecontents thereof.The Mables filed an action for damages against the Cruz’s.The

W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. HELD: YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. The CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the Mables’. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. L12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.] The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon. It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioneror its employees was not merely presumed.Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residenceof the Mables as required by a city ordinance: - that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a litcigarette - that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and - that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. Defendant's negligence,therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect tothe spread thereof to the neighboring houses. In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.] REPUBLIC VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION 21 SCRA 279 FACTS: In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig River by two tugboats when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960. The Republic of the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damage caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000. Defendant Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure, that plaintiff has no capacity to sue, and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. ISSUE: Was the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge caused by fortuitous event or force majeure?

RULING: Yes. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it was undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing will not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule The appellant strongly stressed the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L1892; that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected' that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event. These very precautions, however, completely destroyed the appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It was, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as was commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening was not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998 FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel. ISSUES: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?; (2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage? HELD: (1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the

vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas)258 SCRA 334 DAVIDE; July 5, 1996 FACTS- Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patientsometime before September 21,1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, alongwith other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas andsuccessfully delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began tosuffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, soshe consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines.However, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examiningher, Dr Kho suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery.- When Dr. Kho opened theabdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovariesand consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedlyfound was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in CebuCity for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the pieceof rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record,and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court, however, regarded these documentaryevidence as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared themare deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated- There was also doubts as to thewhereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it wassent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw itaway as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two differentversions served only to weaken their claim against

Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled infavor of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision.

W/N defendant is guilty of negligence. HELD:

ISSUES Procedural:WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive:WON Dr. Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural:YES - While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review oncertiorari , there are exceptions, among which are when the factual findings of the trial court andthe appellate court conflict, when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidenceon record, or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive- The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Kho’s testimony. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony, which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. The CA was correct insaying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Kho’s testimony anddid not consider it with other portions of Dr. Kho’s testimony. Also, the phrase relied upon bythe trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondentVillegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination bya pathologist. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based onother than first hand knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court. YES, UNDER THE RULE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR, DR. BATIQUIN IS LIABLE. Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttablepresumption or inference thatdefendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that theinstrumentality causinginjury was in defendant's exclusive control,and that the accident was one whichordinary does not happen inabsence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule ofevidence wherebynegligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from themere factthat the accident happened provided the character of the accidentandcircumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in theabsence of negligenceit would not have occurred and that thing whichcaused injury is shown to havebeen under the management and controlof the alleged wrongdoer. Under thisdoctrine the happening of aninjury permits an inference of negligence whereplaintiff producessubstantial evidence that the injury was caused by an agencyorinstrumentality under the exclusive control and management ofdefendant, and thatthe occurrence was such that in the ordinarycourse of things would not happen ifreasonable care had been used. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiarto the law ofnegligence which recognizes that prima facie negligencemay be established withoutdirect proof and furnishes a substitute forspecific proof of negligence. The doctrineis not a rule ofsubstantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mereproceduralconvenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts andcircumstances of aparticular case, is not intended to and does not S.D. MARTINEZ v. BUSKIRK, GR No. L-5691, Dec 27, 1910 FACTS: The plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. The cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage and for the purpose of delivery the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon to unload the forage; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding. ISSUE:

In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other for five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers. It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not. Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. (CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949) In the afternoon of May 5, 1946while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were loading grass,an electric transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power andDevelopment Co., Inc., alongside the road suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and seriousmultiple burns from skull to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and causing intense pain andwounds that were not completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year afterthe incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show anyspecific act of negligence. The appellate court, in overruling this defense, held: “While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of non-contractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff toestablish that the proximate cause of injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does notoccur as if he having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he had observed due diligence and care. This rule is known by the nameof res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case atbar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every night to be on the highway, and the electricwire was under the sole control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electricwires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subject to unusual strainand stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision, just as barrels do notordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure passers-by, unless someone is negligent (which isadmittedly not present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock “if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove.”  RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA, respondents No. L-44748.

August 29, 1986

Facts: Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) due to the telegram sent through its Manila Office to the former, reading as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER 115 PM SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him wounded his feelings, caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators, that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person reading the same would logically think that they refer to Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P40, 000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the company was negligent and failed to take precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident, and the fact that a copy of the telegram is filed among other telegrams and open to public is sufficient publication; however reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00 Issue: Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee. Ruling: Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code, as well as on respondent’s breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. By adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent, there is a clear breach of contract; for upon payment of the fixed rate, the company undertakes to transmit the message accurately. In contracts, the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of the employer (master). This is the master and servant rule. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their clientele’s interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury. The judgment of the CA is affirmed. RAKES V. AG & P, 7 PHIL 359 FACTS: Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While transporting iron rails from a barge to the company’s yard using a railroad hand car, Rakes broke his leg when the hand car toppled over and the rails fell on him. It appears that the hand car fell due to a sagging portion of the track that gave with the weight of the rails. Atlantic knew of the weak state of the rail but did nothing to repair it. When Rakes filed an action for damages, Atlantic’s defense was that Rakes’ injuries were caused by his own negligence in walking alongside the car, instead of in front or behind it, as the laborers were told to do. ISSUES: 1. Whether Rakes was negligent. 2. Whether Atlantic is liable to Rakes.

HELD: 1. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders of his superiors when he walked alongside the car instead of in front or behind it. 2. Atlantic is liable to Rakes. The negligence of Rakes will not totally bar him from recovering anything from Atlantic, although the liability of the latter will be mitigated as a result of Rakes’ contributory negligence. This is because although Rakes contributed with his own negligence, the primary cause of the accident was still the weak rails which Atlantic refused to repair. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemedequivalent for his own imprudence. We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation.