Torts Case Digest 4.18.17

SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957 Facts: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of Balintawak Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed by the school’s supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and other students boarded the jeep that was going to take them to the parade. Dante then drove the jeep, while the driver sat by his side. They have not gone too far when the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi. Issue: Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally liable with his son Dante Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous act? Held: Yes. Under Art 1903, of the Spanish Civil Code paragraph 1, and 5 which provides: the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. xxx Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. But the provision applies only to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Dante was then a student of Balintawak Elem School and as part of his extra-curricular activity; he attended the parade upon instruction of City school’s supervisor. It was in connection with the parade that the accident took place Clear that neither the head of the school nor the city supervisor could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades Civil liability of father (in case of death or incapacity, the mother) for any damages caused by minor children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way they could relieve themselves of liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

Maria Teresa Cuadra vs Alfonso Monfort G.R. No. L-24101 Sept. 30, 1970

Facts: Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadra’s eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monfort’s dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s fees. Issue: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180. Held: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states “that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

Benigno Gutierrez v CA G.R. No. L-31611 November 29, 1976

Facts: The workers of petitioner Gutierrez, under the supervision of co-petitioner Balisalisa whom he had engaged as project engineer of the construction job, started digging up Severino Street, at first by manual labor and later by means of a crane to speed up the excavation. The earth and mud dug up were scooped by the crane and dumped against the exterior side of the adobe stone fence of the A. Mabini Elementary School along the street. When the pile of earth and mud reached the height of the fence, the crane's steel scooper was used to press them down. Because of heavy stress thus placed on the fence, a portion of it gave way and collapsed on March 21, 1964 between 2:30 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Respondents' daughter Edna was then playing with other children inside the school grounds. When the adobe wall collapsed, she was hit and pinned down by the falling debris of the adobe stone wall and was buried underneath the piled up earth and mud which caved in. While she was rushed to the hospital, it was in vain for she died moments after the tragic mishap. Issue: Whether or not the contractor and project engineer are NOT jointly and severally liable for the gross negligence of their crane operators as there is no employee and employer relationship between them. Held:

No. Respondent court correctly held that the defense of alleged non-existence of employer-employee relationship was never raised in the lower court and could not be raised or entertained for the first time on appeal. Court correctly quoted with approval the basis of the trial court's award for moral and exemplary damages: "(T)hus, the negligence of the defendants has been clearly established by the evidence. Indeed, no evidence is necessary to show that the defendants were negligent in the performance of their obligation. They ought to have known that it was not the right thing to do — to pile up the big volume of earth excavated against the wall, which was fragile, being made only of adobe stones held together by weak mortar and without reinforcements. The collapse, therefore, of the said wall could reasonably be expected by any person of ordinary prudence, if not intelligence. The danger not only to the wall but also to anybody on the other side of the wall, being a school ground, could have been anticipated by the defendants herein and yet they failed to take the necessary precautions to avoid the same, For this omission on their part, they should be held responsible for moral and exemplary damages. This is more so with respect to the contractor, Benigno C. Gutierrez, in order that other contractors similarly situated should be more careful in the performance of their contracts. It is a matter of public knowledge that there are important public works projects of the government that have been awarded to contractors, who are not reliable, if not irresponsible. To cite only a few, like the Nagtahan Bridge and the underpass and overpass complex near the City Hall, which had been awarded to the same contractor, but who abandoned the same. Unless something is done to prevent repetition of these acts of negligence on the part of the contractors, public welfare will suffer".

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs Phil-American Forwarders G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975

Facts:

Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit alleged that on 24 November 1962, Fernando Pineda drove recklessly the freight truck owned by his employer Philippine-American Forwarders along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. It bumped the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by Felix Pangalangan. As a result of the accident, Pangalangan was injured and the damaged bus cannot be used for seventy-nine (79) days, causing loss of income amounting to PhP8,665.81 to Philippine Rabbit. Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan as plaintiffs, filed a case for damages against the defendants Philippine-American Forwarders, its manager Archimedes Balingit and the driver Fernando Pineda for damages and lost income sustained by Philippine Rabbit and the injuries sustained by Pangalangan. Balingit stated in defense that he is not Pineda’s employer and he asked for the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ case as they had no cause of action against him. The CFI Tarlac held only PAFI and Pineda liable for damages and injuries sustained and dismissed Balingit’s liability. As a result, Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the trial court was right in dismissing the liability of PAFI manager Archimedes Balingit to the damage sustained by them? Held: The trial court’s decision on appeal is AFFIRMED and costs against plaintiff-appellants. The Supreme Court held that based on the allegations of the complaint of appellants Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan, Balingit has no liability based on tort or quasi-delict as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. in connection with the vehicular accident because he may be regarded as an employee of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. The Supreme Court interpreted the term “manager” (directores, Spanish) is used in the sense of employer, as it may be gathered from the article’s context. The Supreme Court disregarded the appellant’s argument raised on appeal that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil be used against PAFI, Archimedes Balingit and his wife. Since that issue was not raised in the trial court below, it cannot be raised also on appeal. The case has to be decided based on allegations stated in the pleadings (complaint) of the appellants, where it was assumed that Balingit and his wife has a separate legal personality from that of PhilippineAmerican Forwarders, Inc.

ERNESTO PLEYTO vs MARIA D. LOMBOY G.R. No. 148737 June 16, 2004

Facts: Ricardo Lomoboy died while his daughter herein respondent Carmela Lomboy, suffered injuires requiring hospitalization, as a result of the head-n-collision between the bus owned by petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. , driven by petitioner Ernesto Pleyto, and the car where Ricardo and Carmela, among others, were passengers. Hence, the heirs of the late Ricardo Lomboy, herein respondents, filed an action for damages against petitioners. After due trial, the RTC of Dagupan City rendered judgment in favor of the respondents and ordered the petitioners to pay the respondents civil indemnity, loss of earning capacity, actual and moral damages. Issue: Whether or not Pleyto is negligent and thus making PRBL Bus liable. Held: Yes. Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations when he overtook the tricycle despite the presence of an oncoming car in the other lane. Article 2185 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, petitioners failed to present any convincing proof rebutting such presumption. A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. PRBL liable for Pleytos negligence pursuant to Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

YHT Realty Corporation vs The Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126780 February 17, 2005 Facts: Peaches McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he is here in thePhilippines and would rent a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box could only be openedthrough the use of 2 keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining inthe possession of the management of the hotel.McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box – 2 envelopes containingUS Dollars, one envelope containing Australian Dollars, Letters, credit cards, bankbooks and acheckbook.On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip, McLoughlin took some items from thesafety box which includes the ff: envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), theother envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and hiscredit cards. The other items were left in the deposit box. Upon arrival, he found out that a fewdollars were missing and the jewelry he bought was likewise missing.Eventually, he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened the safetydeposit box with the key assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was stayingand confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLouglin’s key and was able to open thesafety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlinthat Tan stole the key assigned to McLouglin while the latter was asleep.McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss hesuffered. Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safetydeposit box entitled “Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box”. Issue: Whether or not the “Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box” admittedly executed by privaterespondent is null and void. Held: Yes, it is null and void. Art. 2003[1] is controlling. This is an expression of public policy that the hotel business like common carriers are imbued with public interest. This responsibility cannot be waived away by any contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature. The CA (former case) even ruled before that hotelkeepers are liable even though the effects are not delivered to them or their employees, but it is enough that the effects are within the hotel or inn. Pars. 2 and 4 of the undertaking manifestly contravene Art. 2003 of the NCC. Meanwhile, the defense that Art. 2002 exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of the guest, family or visitors falls because the hotel is guilty of negligence as well. This provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss.

Marcelo Macalinao, Et Al., vs. Eddie Medecielo Ong G.R. No. 146635 December 14, 2005

Facts: April 1992: Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and 2 other truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinery to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan While delivering, the Genetron’s Isuzu Elf truck driven by Ong bumped the front portion of a private jeepney. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment then to Philippine Orthopedic Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to Philippine General Hospital due to financial considerations. His body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down. He filed against Ong and Sebastian. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was instituted but was not ensued. November 7 1992: Macalinao died and was substituted by his parents. RTC: Ong negligent and Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong thus ordering them jointly liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinao’s death. Issue: Whether or not Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. Held: Yes. Photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney rather than the other way around. Based on the angle at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established. While not constituting direct proof of Ong’s negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Res ipsa loquitur Recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. Permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part based on the theory that defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES HUANG G.R. No. 172122 June 22, 2007

Facts: Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi truck, with petitioner del Rosario as driver. Respondents Richard and Carmen Huang are parents of respondent Stephen Huang, who owned a Sedan. The two vehicles got into an accident as they were traversing a highway. The Sedan was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the latter swerved to its left and slammed in the front right side of the car. As a consequence, the car was wrecked and Stephen Huang incurred massive injuries and became paralyzed. The parents of Stephen faulted Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. The RTC found the petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages. The CA affirmed, hence this appeal. Issue: Wheter or not Mercury Drug is liable as employer of Del Rosario. Held: Yes Mercury Drug is liable. Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario, as the employer of the latter. In order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of the employee in the performance of his duties. Mercury failed in both respects. In selecting employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to supervision, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish such, concrete proof, such as documentary evidence must be submitted by him. In the case at bar, it was shown that Del Rosario didn't take driving tests and psychological exams when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In addition, Mercury didn't present Del Rosario's NBI and police clearances. Next, the last seminar attended by the driver occurred a long 12 years before the accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury didn't have a backup driver for long trips. When the accident happened Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than 13 hours. As to negligence with regard to supervision over its employees, Mercury didn't impose any sanction on Del Rosario when the latter reported to the former about the incident. Hence, Mercury didn't exercise due diligence.

E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS G.R. No. 11154 March 21, 1916 Facts: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south turned unexpectedly and struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff was taken to the General Hospital on the very same day as he was so severely injured. The trial court ordered the Government of the Philippine Islands to pay damages. The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the Government of the Philippine Islands is not liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur. Issue: Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands may be held liable for the act done by the chauffeur. Held: The Government of the Philippine Islands is not liable. The substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees can be found in paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code, which reads: "The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable." The state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO G.R. No. L-20322 May 29, 1968

Facts: In April 1960, a certain Ildefenso Ortiz sued the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which was under the Department of Public Works because ISU, without the consent of Ortiz, encroached upon his land by allegedly inducing the Handong Irrigation Assoc. to do so. The basis of the suit was that ISU, though created by the government, is engaged in private business (selling of irrigation pumps/construction materials in installment) and being such has opened itself to suit thereby waiving immunity from suit. Judge Palacio of CFI Camarines Sur ruled in favor of Ortiz so did the Court of Appeals. The CA also ordered the issuance of the order of garnishment against the deposit/trust funds in ISU’s account in the PNB (such fund were generated from the installment payments ISU received). Issue: Whether or not such deposits may be garnished. Held: No. ISU’s activity of selling irrigation pumps is not intended to earn profit or financial gain. It is actually just to replenish the funds used in purchasing said irrigation pumps (the original funds were from FTA from US). The CA ruled that ISU, by selling irrigation pumps is engaged in private business, hence it waived its immunity from suit and had also ordered the garnishment of ISU’s deposits in PNB. But then again, as based in Merritt vs Insular Government, the waiver of said immunity does not make the government liable. This would only lead to a disbursement of fund without any proper appropriation as required by law. There is also no showing that the ISU’s alleged inducement of Handong is authorized by the State hence the government cannot be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs SPOUSES FONTANILLA G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 198

Facts: Hugo Garcia, a driver of the National Irrigation Administration, while driving at a high speed along the Marikina National Road of San Jose City, bumped the son of the spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla., which caused the death of the spouses’ son. The driver did not even stop to check what the pick-up bumped into and just went on travelling at a high speed until they reached their destination. The spouses Fontanilla filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the National Irrigation Administration, as Garcia’s employer. NIA was ordered to pay the Fontanillas, the amounts of 12,000 for the death of the victim; 3,389 for hospitalization and burial expenses; 30,000 as moral damages; 8,000 as exemplary damages, and atty’s fees of 20% of the total award. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. The Sol-Gen maintains that on the strength of Presidential Decree No. 552 (which amended certain provisions of RA Aact 3601, the law creating the NIA) and the case of Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers’ Union, et al. “the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent. Issue: Whether or not NIA, a government agency, may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners. Held: Yes, NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. In this case, the Court primarily considered the fact that NIA is exercising proprietary functions. Next to that, it considered the fact that NIA had been vested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the Government and that it has capacity to sue and be sued in court. Art. 2176 thus provides: Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to

whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable. The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ). In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.) Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601 Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing nongovernmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision. It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group. Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT vs FULGENCIO DACARA G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005

Facts: Dacara Jr.’s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr., his son who was likewise on board the car, sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Fulgencio Dacara in behalf of his minor children filed a complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon before RTC. He prayed for damages. The LGU contended that the fault is with the driver, since the LGU have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU is liable.The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. Issue: Whether or not the Quezon City Government is liable for damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr. Held: YES. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction. They argue that the driver, Fulgencio Dacara Jr., of respondent's car was overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident. The Court found petitioner, Quezon City, negligent. "Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident. Negligence of QC is the proximate cause Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.15 Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.16 Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable.

Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when not designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal. Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners' negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 121920 August 9, 2005 Facts: Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections”, between the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks System Construction (KC, for short), the former engaged the services of the latter to install water service connections. The agreement provides: The CONTRACTOR agrees to install water service connections, transfer location of tapping to the nearest main, undertake separation of service connection, change rusted connections, within the service area of the MWSS specified in each job order covered by this Contract, from the water main up to the installation of the verticals. Tapping of the service pipe connection and mounting of water meter shall be undertaken exclusively or solely by the MWSS; That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project Engineer Ernesto Battad, Jr. to conduct the digging operations in the specified place. The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled the excavated portion of the road with the same gravel and stone excavated from the area. At that time, only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires. Meanwhile, between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. With her on board the car and seated on the right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured. Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal officials.

Issue: Whether or not the municipality is liable. Held: Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof. It is argued, however, that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government Code, petitioner has control or supervision only over municipal and not national roads, like Santolan Road. Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other similar structures; erecting of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for persons suffering from them. Doubtless, the term "regulate" found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory. The [petitioner] cannot validly shirk from its obligation to maintain and insure the safe condition of the road merely because the permit for the excavation may have

been issued by a government entity or unit other than the Appellant San Juan or that the excavation may have been done by a contractor under contract with a public entity like the Appellee MWSS. It is the duty of the municipal authorities to exercise an active vigilance over the streets; to see that they are kept in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. They cannot fold their arms and shut their eyes and say they have no notice. (Todd versus City of Troy, 61 New York 506). (Words in bracket supplied).

Mercado vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 87584 May 30, 1960 Facts: Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. A ‘pitogo’ (an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedicto’s, so when Augusto attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the ‘pitogo’. Augusto resented his remark and pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the fight. After successive blows to Manuel, Jr., Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor. Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado, Augusto’s father. Issue: Whether or not the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the father? Held: NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY. Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code: “Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.

Ylarde vs Aquino G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988 Facts: June 11 1951: Juanito Chan, son of Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala, drove and operated a motor vehicle (a truck) along Rizal Ave Ext, Manila in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing to hit Nicolas Paras, 65 yo, and ran over his head, crushing it, resulting to his instantaneous death; facs revealed that the truck was registered in the name of Lim Koo. At the initial stage of the criminal trial, Petitioner, Estanislawa Canlas (widow of Nicolas, representing also 5 minor children), made a reservation to file a separate civil action. TC: Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity. CA: modified, 1yr not less than 4 yrs of imprisonment, indemnity also affirmed.In the civil action, same facts were alleged. Defendants disclaimed liability by establishing that Juanito is married and is no longer a minor living in the company of his parents, and that he is also not an employee of Lim Koo. Thus, Neither Juanito’s parents can be made liable under vicarious liability (2180 of the NCC) nor the owner of vehicle be the subsidiary liable under 103 of the RPC. Civil action: dismissed, since petitioner already tried to execute the indemnity adjudged in the crim action and Juanito already served subsidiary imprisonment by virtue of his inability to pay indemnity. Petitioner insists on the liability of parents and truck owner. MR denied, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not Respondents can be made liable over the civil liability of Juanito? Held: NO. 2180 par 5 of the NCC (primary liab-vicarious liab) only applies if the offender is a MINOR LIVING in the COMPANY of his PARENTS. In this case, Juanito was already married and lives independently from his parents. 103 of the RPC (subsidiary liab) only attaches if EER between the owner and offender is established and that the act happened while he was discharging his duties (as employee). In this case, no evidence was presented to establish such relationship.

Salvosa vs.IAC G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

Facts: Petitioner Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution and an institution of arts and trade. Petitioner Benjamin Salvosa is the President and Chairman of the Board of BCF. The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary and orders from the AFP. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Court. The heirs of Castro sued for damages. TC sentenced Abon, Salvosa and BCF, jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Castro. CA affirmed with modification in the amount of damages. Issue: Whether or not Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages under Article 218012 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Abon. Held: No. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Castro. Logically, therefore, Salvosa and BCF cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Rationale behind Art. 2180: So long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student].

Amadoras vs. CA GR No. L47745 April 15, 1988 Facts: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports). Issue: Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable. Held: No. The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

REYNALDO PASCO vs COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R. No. L-54357 April 25, 1988

Facts: On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life. On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether the provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is equally applicable to academic institutions. Held: No. Article 2180 states,” teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” There’s no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable.

St. Mary’s Academy vs Carpitanos G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002 Facts: The case is about St. Mary’s liability for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment. Sherwin Capistranos was part of the campaigning group. On the day of the incident, Sherwin rode a Mitsubishi Jeep owned by Vicencio Villanueva. It was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. James Daniel was driving the car recklessly so it turned turtle. Actually it was the detachment of the steering that caused it. Sherwin Capistranos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case claiming damages for their son Sherwin Carpitanos against James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City. St. Mary’s Academy was ordered to pay the complainants for damages. In case of the insolvency of St. Mary’s Academy, James Daniel and Guada Daniel were also ordered to pay Capistrano. Daniel is only subsidiarily liable. James Daniel was a minor during the commission of the tort and was under the special parental authority of James Daniel II. He was adjudged to have subsidiary liability with his parents. Issue: Whether the St. Mary’s should be liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Capistranos. Whether the Capistranos are entitled to the award of moral damages. Held:

No to both issues. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: 1. The school, its administrators and teachers. 2. the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody. In this case, there was no finding that the act or omission considered negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of the petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the Jeep. There was no evidence that the petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the Jeep of respondent Vicencio Villanueva. IT was Ched Villanueva who had custody, control and possession of the Jeep. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. St. Mary’s cannot be held liable for moral damages. Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. In this case the cause was not attributable to St. Mary’s Academy.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC vs Tagorio G.R. No. 150920 November 25, 2005

Facts: During the school year 1990-1991, Timothy Tagorio was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). Between 1-2pm of March 5, 1991, Timothy entered the boy’s CR at the 3rd floor of the school to answer the call of nature. However, he found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no helped arrived, he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down 3 stories. He was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. Sps. Basilio and Herminia Tagorio, parents of Timothy, filed an action under Art. 2176 of CC against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors (Sps. Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso, Luningning Salvador), and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao. In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. It further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, wellbeing and convenience of its students. Court a quo found in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners CLC and Sps. Limon to pay respondents jointly and severally actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fee. The trial court disregarded the corporate fiction of CLC and held the Spouses Limon personally liable because they were the ones who actually managed the affairs of the CLC. CA affirmed the decision in toto. MR denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the argument of petitioner that it exercised the due diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of employees is decisive in this case. Held:

No. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained, hence, the defense of such due diligence is not applicable.

JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008

Facts: Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he sustained.6 Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him. Saludaga thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint7 against Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance. On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Issue: Whether or not Saludaga may claim damages from FEU for breach of student-school contract for a safe learning environment. Whether FEU’s liability is based on quasi-delict or on contract. Held: Yes. FEU’s liability is based on contract, not quasi-delict. Quasi-delict – vicarious liability between Galaxy Agency and security guard Rosete Quasi-delict – but SC held that there is no vicarious liability between FEU and Rosete Quasi-delict – damage to FEU due to the negligence of Galaxy Agency in supplying FEU with an unqualified guard (Imperial, the president of Galaxy is solidarily liable with the agency) It is undisputed that Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law student in FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On Saludaga's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the instant case when Saludaga was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that FEU failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students. In order to avoid liability, however, FEU alleged that the shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee; and that they complied with their obligation to

ensure a safe learning environment for their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy. After a thorough review of the records, the SC found that FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university was offered. FEU also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. Consequently, FEU's defense of force majeure must fail. In order for force majeure to be considered, FEU must show that no negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation - whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages.

St. Francis High School vs. CA G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991

Facts: Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. Thereupon, the Castillo spouses filed a complaint against the St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. The TC found in favor of the Castillo spouses and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz. On the other hand, the TC dismissed. the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. Defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. Issue: Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the school officials which will warrant the award of damages to the Castillo spouses; Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar; Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. Held: No. There was no negligence attributable to the school officials which will warrant the award of damages to the Castillo spouses. The school officials are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them. Consequently, they are not liable for damages. No. Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar. Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were

holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extracurricular activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. No. The award of exemplary and moral damages is improper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.

PSBA vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

Facts: Carlitos Bautista was a third year commerce student in PSBA. In Aug 30, 1985, he was stabbed while on the 2nd floor of the school, causing his death. It was established that the assailants were not students of PSBA. The parents of Carlitos filed a damage suit against PSBA and its school authorities for the death of their child. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. RTC dismissed the MTD. CA affirmed. The CA ratiocinated as follows: Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of progress. Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; hence, the ruling in the Palisoc case that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. Issue: Whether or not PSBA and its school authorities are vicariously liable for the death of Carlitos Bautista inside its premises. Held: NO, THEY ARE NOT LIABLE. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

Soliman vs. Tuazon G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992 Facts: Petitioner Soliman Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against respondents Republic Central Colleges, R.L. Security Agency, and Solomon, a security guard at Republic. The complaint alleges that one morning, while Soliman was in the premises of Republic, as he was still a regular enrolled student, Solomon with intent to kill attacked and shot him in the abdomen. It is further alleged that such wound would have caused his death, were it not for timely medical assistance, and because of this he may not be able to attend his regular classes and perform his usual work from three to four months. Republic Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Soliman had no action against it. It averred that it should be free from liability because it was not the employer of the security guard. Moreover, Article 2180 (7th paragraph) did not apply, since such holds teachers and heads responsible only for damages caused by their pupils and students/apprentices. The MTD was granted by the judge. Hence this instant petition. Issue: Whether or not Republic Central Colleges may be held liable for damages. Held: REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2180 (AS AN EMPLOYER). HOWEVER, IT MAY BE LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT. Petition GRANTED. Order REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Case REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. Under Article 2180 of the NCC, employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Also, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. There is no basis to hold Republic liable under Article 2180. The employer of security guard Solomon was R.L. Security Agency Inc. Where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer. Solomon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic. Hence, the provision with liable for damages. Nevertheless, Republic may be held liable on the basis of an implied contract between it and Soliman, because of its obligation to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and place. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.