Title 2 Persons Criminally Liable For Felonies

 

BOOK ONE GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE DATE OF ENFORCEMENT AND  APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE, AND REGARDING THE OFFENSES,

4.  Accessories  Accessories   are not liable for light felonies, felonies , even if they are committed against persons or property. (Art. 16) committed

THE PERSONS LIABLE AND THE PENALTIES

In all crimes there are always two parties, namely namely:: the active subject (the criminal) Art. Art. 16 16 of tthe he Cod Code e enum enumer erat ate e s the the ac acti tive ve subjects of the crime.

TITLE 2: PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECT 

Article 16. Wh Who o ar are e cr crim imin inal ally ly li liab able le..  - The The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals.

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2. Accomplices.

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3. Accessories.

the passive subject (the injured party).

 ACTIVE SUBJECT 

3. Accessories.

Only natu Only natural ral pers persons ons   ca can n be the the acti active ve subj subjec ectt of cr crim ime e beca becaus use e of the the high highly ly pe pers rson onal al na natu ture re of the the cr crim imin inal al responsibility Only Only nat natur ural al p per erso sons ns bec becau ause se he he al alon ong g by his his act act ca can n set in motion a cause of by his inaction make possible the completion of a modification of the external world. Only Only nat natur ural al p per erso sons ns can can act act w wit ith hm mal alic ice. e.

1. Principals 2. Accomplices.

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--------------------------------------------------------PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE THEORIES: Th The e tr treb eble le divi divisi sion on of per perso sons ns cr crim imin inal ally ly liliab able le fo forr an offense rests offense  rests upon the very nature of their participation

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1. Principals.

2. Accomplices.

The fo The foll llow owin ing g ar are e cr crim imin inal ally ly li liab able le fo forr li ligh ghtt felonies:

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in the commission of the crime When a cri crim me is c com omm mitt itted by by m ma any, without being eq equa uall lly y sh shar ared ed by al alll, a diff differ eren entt de degr gree ee of   responsibility  responsibi lity is  is imposed upon each and every one of them. In that case, they are criminally liab iable either as principals, accomplices, or accessories accessories..

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Rules relative to light felonies: 1. Light felonies  felonies  a arre  punishabl  punishable e only only   whe when n they have been consummated.. (Art. 7) consummated 2. But whe when n  light felonies  felonies  are co comm mmitt itted ed aga against inst pers persons ons or   property,, they  property they are are  punishab  punishable le   ev even en if they they are only in the the attempted or frustrated stage frustrated stage of execution. execution. (Art. 7) 3. Only Only  principa  principals ls and accomplices  accomplices  are liable for light felonies. (Art. 16)

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Ju Juri ridi dica call pe pers rson onss ca cann nnot ot commi committ cr crim imes es with with will willfu full purpose or malicious intent. Pe Pena nalt ltie iess consi consist stin ing g in im impr pris ison onme ment nt or depri depriva vati tion on of liberty can only be executed on natural persons EX EXCE CEPT PTIO ION: N: Jurid Juridic ical al per perso sons ns,, ho howe weve ver, r, are crimi crimina nalllly y liable under certain special laws. Offi Office cers rs,, no nott the the co corp rpor orat atio ion, n, are cr crim imin inal ally ly liable. - General Rule: a director or other officer  of a corpo corporatio ration n is crimi criminally nally liable for for his his acts acts thou though gh in his his of offi fici cial al ca capac pacity ity,, if he parti particip cipate ated d in the unlawful act either directly or as an aider, aid er, abe abettor ttor or accessor accessory y, but is not liable cr im imina inally for the corporate acts performed by other  officers or agents thereof. - It is a settled rule that since a corporation can only act through its officers and agents, the president the president or  manager   ca can n be be   he held criminally liable for the violation of a law by the entity The pre pressid ide ent a an nd ge general  ral  manager of a corporation  violated the Motor Vehicle  Law was he held ld crimi criminal nally  ly  liab liable le for for the off ffe ense  imputable to the   corporation.

 

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-  However, if the law provides a penalty for the cor corpo porat ration ion,, it may be  punished   ev  punished even en thoug though h the the crime crime was perpetrated through its agents. agents.

PASSIVE SUBJECT  - Passive Subject (Injured Party) The p as assive s ub ubject o f a c ririme is the holder holder of the injured right:  right:  the man, the the jur juris isttic person rson,, an and the state. - RULE: While a corporation or partnership cannot be the active  subjet, it can be be a passive sub subject ject of a crime - RULE: The dead and the animals have no rights that may be injured. REASON: Corpse or animal cannot be passive subject. As such, the dead and animals have no rights that may be injured. Exception: Article 353, the crime of defa defama mati tion on ma may y be co comm mmit itte ted d if the imputation tends to blacken the memory of  one who is dead.

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PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION

PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION

 th  the ek kilille lerr p pai aid d tto od do o the the act act

Ac com ommo monn-la law w wif wife ew who ho induced the killing of another  common law wife of her  husband by giving money to the killer 

Principals.   Article 17. Principals. considered principals:

The

following

are EXAMPLE:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of  the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. -------------------------------------------------------- Article 17. — Principals

Where the two accused each inflicted a serious wound which contributed to the death of the victim, they are co-principals (People vs. Cagod, No. L-36016, Jan. 18, 1978, 81 SCRA 110, 118) REQUISITES:: For two or more principals [BY DIRECT REQUISITES PARTICIPATION] 1. That they participated in the criminal resolution; MEA EAN NING ING: w wh hen th they were in re in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. -

- RULE: Single Single ind indivi ividua duall commi committi tting ng a cri crime me is alw alway ayss a

pri princi ncipal pal by direct direct par partic ticipa ipatio tion n (take (take direct direct par partt in the execution of the act) Principals under Article 17

Co-Conspirator   -

criminal liability is limited to his own acts

(His) responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators

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--------------------------------------------------------PAR 1: THOSE WHO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ACT.”

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 (PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION.) - RULE: The principal by direct participation personal participation personally ly takes part  in the execution of the act constituting the crime. one who shoots at and kills another: personall lly y executes the act of killing another [principal by direct   participation  participa tion in the crime crime of homicide] one one who bur urn ns the hou ousse of an ano othe ther” pe pers rson ona alllly y ex execu ecute tess the the act of bur burnin ning g the the ho house use of an anoth other. er. [principal by direct participation in the crime of arson] - RULE [NOT A PRINCIPAL by direct participation]: One who only orders orde rs or indu induces ces another to commit a crime is not a principal by direct participation, participation, bec ecau ausse he do doe es not pers perso onally ally ex exe ecut ute e the the act constituting the crime. - RULE INSTEAD: It is is the  the one personally committing the crime in obedience to obedience  to that order or because of the inducement, who is the principal by direct participation.

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It is is we wellll-settled tth hat a person may be convicted for  the criminal criminal act of anoth another er where, between them, there has been conspiracy conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. (People vs. Talla, G.R. No. 44414, Jan. 18,1990,181 SCRA 133,148, citing People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664; People vs. Serrano, L-45382, May 13,1985, 136 SCRA 899) A cons conspir piracy acy ex exist istss w whe hen n two two or m more ore pe perso rsons ns co come me to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, par. 2) Th The e consp conspira iracy cy cont contem empl plat ated ed in th the e fir first st requ requis isit ite e is not a felony, but felony, but only a manner of incurrin incurring g criminal liability. Cons Conspi pira racy cy must must be esta establ blis ishe hed d by po posi siti tive ve an and d conclusive evidence. RULE: When there is no conspiracy conspiracy   ea each ch of of th the e of offe fend nder erss is liab liable le onl only y fo forr the the act performed by him. RULE: Conspiracy is implied when implied when the accused had a com omm mon pur urpo pose se and and wer ere e un unit ite ed in its its execution. RULE: In multiple rape, each rapist is equally liable for the other rapes.  rapes.   In a long line of cases, it has been held that in multiple rape, each defendant is resp respon onsi sibl ble e no nott on only ly for for th the e rape rape pe pers rson onal ally ly committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because each of them cooperated in the commi commissi ssion on of the the rape rape pe perpe rpetra trated ted by the the others oth ers,, by acts acts wit witho hout ut whi which ch it wou would ld not have been acc accompl omplishe ished. d. (Peo (People ple vs. Fern Fernande andez, z, G.R. No. 62116, March 22, 1990, 183 SCRA 511, 517-518) RULE: ULE: Parti Participa cipation tion in anot another' her'ss criminal criminal reso resolutio lution n mustt either mus either preced precede e or be co coeta etane neous ous wit with h the criminal act. RULE: RUL E: There could be no conspiracy to commit an offense through negligence. RULE: ULE: In ca cases ses of cri crimin minal al ne neglig gligen ence ce or cri crime mess

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of the very strongest very strongest kind of temptation t o commit the crime. (U.S. vs. Indanan, supra)

punishabl punish able e by spe speci cial al law law,, allow allowing ing or fai failin ling g to prevent an act to be performed by another, makes one a co-principal. RULE: It is not enough that a person participated in the assault made by another in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime committed. He must also participate in the criminal resolution of the other. The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose. (People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 74048, Nov. 14, 1990, 191 SCRA 377, 385) 2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. (Peopl (Pe ople e vs. Ong Chiat Chiat Lay, Lay, 60 Phi Phil. l. 788, 788, 790; People People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 45-46) RULE: The principals by direct participation  participation  must be at the scene of the crime, crime, personally  personally taking part in its execution. This This is th the e reas reason on w wh hy Dalmac lmacio io Ti Tim mbo bol, l, who merely conspired with his co-accused to kill the decea decease sed d bu butt left left the place place

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REQUISITES for how a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement  1. 1. That  That the inducement be made directly with the intention of  procuring the commissi commission on of the crime; -

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before his co-accused began shooting the shooting the deceased, was acquitted of the charge of  mu murd rder er.. (Pe (Peopl ople e vs. Tim Timbol bol,, G.R. G.R. Nos. Nos. L47471-73, August 4,1944) RULE: The acts of each offender must directly tend to the same end. RULE: One serving as guard  pu purs rsua uant nt to the the conspiracy is a principal by direct participation. RULE: When the second requisite is lacking, there is only conspiracy.

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PAR 2: THOSE WHO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ACT.”  (PRINCIPALS BY INDUCEMENT)

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- Those who directly induce others to commit the act are called "principals "principa ls by inducement" or "principals” by induction," from the Spanish "autores por induction." Th The e word word "indu "induce ceme ment nt"" co comp mpri rise ses, s, in the the opin opinio ion n of Viada and the Supreme Court of Spain , price, promise of reward, command, and pacto. (People pacto.  (People vs. Gensola, No. L-24491, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 483, 490) - RULE: The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal by direct participation committed the act induced. - RULE: To constitute inducemen inducement, t, -

EXAMPLE:  Wh When en the the accu accuse sed, d, blin blinde ded d by the the grudge gru dge which which she she bor bore e ag again ainst st the the dec decea eased sed,, caused her co-accused thru promise of pecuniary gain to shoot the victims with a gun which she had furnishe furn ished d the latt latter, er,   it is clea clearr that that she had the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244) RULE [NOT INDUCEMENT]: A thoughtless expression wit witho hout ut inten intentio tion n to pro produc duce e the result result is no nott an inducement to commit a crime. RU RULE LE:: [NOT [NOT IND INDUC UCEM EMEN ENT] T]:: im impr prud uden entt advi advice ce,, no nott constituting sufficient inducement. inducement. In a decision b y t h he e S up upreme Cour t of of Spain rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, it was held held that that " a per person son who advis advised ed a married woman whose husband was very

there there must must exist exist on the the part part of of the the indu inducer cer the the m most ost positive resolution and the the most most p pers ersist istent ent effort effort to sec secure ure the com commis missio sion n of the crime, together wi with tth he  presentation  presentation   to the person induced

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 stingy and treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob him, him , was not guilty of the crim ime e of robbery by indu induce cem ment, for for the rea reason son that an imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not   sufficient."   (Cite (Cited d in the case of U.S. U.S. vs. Indanan, supra) Th The e pers perso on who who gav gave the the adv advice ice di did d no nott hav ave e the inte inten ntion ion to pr pro ocur ure e the commission of the crime. "Kill him and we will bury him" as an imprudentt utterance said in the excitement  impruden of the hour or in the heat of anger, and not, rather, in the nature of a command that had to be obeyed, does not make the utterer a principal by inducement. (People

vs. Aga Agapin pinay, ay, G.R. G.R. No. No. 77 77776 776,, June June 27, 1990, 186 SCRA 812, 821) RULE [INDUCEMENT  [INDUCEMENT ]: ]: MAY EXIST IN : Th The e indu induce cem men entt and and th the e com commi miss ssio ion n of a crime crime where whereby by the the induce inducerr be becom comes es a principal, to the same extent and effect as if he had physically committed the crime, may exist in acts of command, sometimess of advice, or sometime agreement for a consideration, or  through an influence so effective that it alone determines the commission of the crime. RU RULE LE [INDUCEMENT ]: ] : Th The e word wordss of ad advi vice ce or the the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. Thus, a person who  persuaded an inexperienced boy of tender age to steal certain certa in jewe jewels ls   of his his gra grand ndmo mothe therr was foun found d gu guililty ty of thef theftt by indu induce ceme ment nt..

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(Vi (Viad ada, a, cited cited in U.S. U.S. vs. Indan Indanan, an, supra supra)) Minors Min ors under under 15 ye years ars of age are ea easil sily y susc suscep epti tibl ble e to the the sugg sugges esti tion onss of the the induce inducer, r, becaus because e usuall usually y the they y ha have ve no disce discernm rnment ent or judgm judgment ent of their their own own.. When   induce When induced d to commi committ a cri crime, me, the influence of the inducer is the determining cause of the commission of the crime. 2. Tha Thatt such induc inducemen ementt be the determini determining ng cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203; People vs. Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil. 609) -

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[ind [induc ucem emen entt be the the det deter ermi mini ning ng c cau ause se]] that is, without is, without such inducement the crime would not have been committed. committed. (Decision  (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, cited in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra). RULE: Inducement exists if the command or advice is advice is of such a nature that, that, without its concurrence, concurrence , the crime would not have materialized. (People materialized. (People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 74048, Nov. 14,1990,191 SCRA 377, 385) RULE RUL E [NO [NO IN INDUC DUCEME EMENT] NT] Thus Thus,, if the  principal by direct participation participation   had personal had  personal reason to reason to commit the crime so that he would commit it  just  just the same -

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even if no i nd nducement   was was ma made de by another, this th is seco second nd requ requis isit ite ed doe oess not not ex exis ist. t. RULE [NOT INDUCEMENT]: Thus, the price given to the principal by direct participa parti cipation tion after   the comm commissio ission n of the crime, without pr prior pr promise  to give a price or  reward, co coul uld d not not be an in indu duce ceme ment nt.. RULE [NOT INDUCEMENT]: If the the  person who actually committed the crime had a rre eason o off hi his o ow wn  to commit the crime, it c can anno nott be sai said d that that the the iind nduc ucem emen ent  t   was -

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influential in producing the criminal act. In such case, the case, the one charged with having induced the commission of the crime is not  criminally liable. [IN [INDUC DUCEM EMENT ENT]] For the the uttera utteranc nces es of an ac accu cuse sed d to make make hi him m a prin princi cipa pall by inducement, it is necessary that the words be of suc such h nat nature ure and uttere uttered d in such such manner man ner as to becom become e the the det determ ermini ining ng cause of the crime, and that the induce induceme ment nt precis precisely ely was inten intended ded to serve such purpose. pe

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In the these se c cas ases es,, th ther ere e is no cons conspi pira racy cy,, not not ev even en a unity of criminal purpose and intention. RULE: Only the one using force or causing fear   fear   is cr crim imin inal ally ly liable liable.. Th The e mater ateria iall ex exec ecut utor or is no nott criminally liable because of Art. 12, pars. 5 and 6.

(2) by directly inducing another to commit a crime. There are two ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime. a. By giving giving price,  price, or offering reward offering reward or  or promise. Both  the the one giving the price price or offer offering ing  reward or promise and promise and the one committing the cri crime me   in co cons nsid ider erat atio ion n ther thereo eoff are  principalss  — the former, by inducem  principal inducement; ent; and the latter, by direct participa participation. tion.   There is collective criminal responsibility. A wife,  w wh ho induce induced d the killi killing ng of the mistress of mistress  of her husband by giving money to the killer, is a principa a principall by inductio induction. n. Th The e kill kille er is a p pri rin ncip ipal al b by y dire direc ct participation. (People vs. Lao, No. -

L-10473, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 42) b. By using words of words of command. Both th the e person who used the words of  command and the person who committed the the cr crim ime, e, be bec cause ause of the the word wordss of command, are command,  are equally liable. There is also collective criminal responsibility. responsibility.   (U.S. vs. Gamao, 23 Phil. 81) With respect to command,  command,   it must be the moving cause of the offense. RULE:  it must appear that the inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way way as to be beco come me the the de dete term rmin inin ing g caus use e of the the crim rime and and that that such uch inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result. (People vs. Castillo,

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Two ways of becoming principal by induction. (1) by directly forcing another to commit a crime two two ways ways of direc directly tly for forcin cing g anot another her to com commit mit a crime.

a. By us usin ing g irr irres esis isti tibl ble e ffor orce ce.. b. By By cau causi sing ng u un nco cont ntro rollllab able le ffea ear. r.

No. 19238, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 721, 723724) [INDUCEM [IND UCEMENT] ENT] In othe otherr words, words, the inciting wordss must have grea word greatt dominanc dominance e and influence over the person who acts; acts ; they ou ough ghtt to be direct   and and as efficacious efficacious   or   powerful   as physical  powerful physical or moral coercion or  violence itself.  itself.  (People vs. Canial, Nos. L31042-43, Aug. 18,1972, 46 SCRA 634, 651) [INDUCEM [IND UCEMENT] ENT] Word Wordss of co comm mman and d of a father father may indu induce ce his son to com commi mitt a crime. [NOT INDUCEMENT] [IMPRUDENT   UTTERANCE]: UTTERAN CE]: "Kill him and we will bury him" as an im impr prude udent nt uttera utterance nce said said in the excitemen excit ementt of the hour   or in the heat of anger, and not, rather, in the nature of a command that had to be obeyed, does no nott ma make ke the the ut utte tere rerr a pri rinc ncip ipal al by induce inducemen ment. t. (Peo (People ple vs. Agap Agapinay, inay, G.R. No. 77776, June 27, 1990, 1990, 186 SCRA 812, 821)

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[NOT INDUCEMENT] If the crime committed is not contemplated in the order given , the induce induceme ment nt is no nott mat materi erial al an and d not the determining cause thereof.

REQUISITES TO BE PRINCIPAL: using words of command In order that a person using words of command may be held liable as principal under paragraph No. 2 of Art. 17, the following five requisites must all be present:

(5) The materia materiall ex execu ecutor tor of the the crime crime has no pers personal onal  reason to commit commit the crime. If the the prin rincipa pall by dire direct ct part partiicipa cipati tio on has a pe pers rson onal al reas reason on to co comm mmit it the the cr crim ime, e, the the supposed supp osed words of induceme inducement nt can cannot not be the determining cause.

- RULE: One who planned the crime committed by another is a  principall by induce  principa inducement. ment. -

Th The e perso persons ns who who plan planne ned d the cr crim ime e co comm mmit itte ted d by otherr persons othe persons are guilty as auth authors ors by indu inducem cement ent.. (People vs. Asaad, 55 Phil. 697 [Syllabus])

(1) That the one uttering the words of command must have the intention the  intention of procuring the commission of the crime.

(2) That the one who made the command must have an ascendancy or influence over the person who person  who acted. -

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A was a po poor or,, ignor ignoran antt fis fishe herm rman an,, dep depen ende dent nt upon his uncle B. On the other hand, B was a man of great influence in the community. B was the local political leader of his party. In the meeting wher where e the the pl plan an to mur urde derr the the prie priest st was was di disc scus usse sed, d, B was was the the prim prime e mo move verr and and the the dominant figure. B selected A who was present in the meeting to commit the crime and directed him to do it. The influence exercised by B over A was so great and powerful that the latter could not resist it. (U.S. vs. Gamao, 23 Phil. 81) RU RULE LE:: Asce Ascend ndan ancy cy or infl influe uen nce as to a amo moun untt to moral coercion  coercion  is not necess necessary ary when there there is conspiracy.

(3) That the words used must be so direct , so efficacious efficacious,, so  powerful as to amount to physical  powerful as to  physical or moral coercion. -

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(a) Efficacious Efficacious — One who makes the accused believe that the person to be killed was the one believe that who had stolen the property of the accused, is guilty as principal by inducement. Note: I t w wo ould s ee eem th that  the material executor had a reason to kill the victim, but it was furnished by the inductor who made mad e him believe that the dece deceased ased had stolen his property. (b) Powerful — The influence exercised by B over  A was so great and powerful that the latter could not resist it. (U.S. vs. Gamao, 23 Phil. 81)

(4) The words of com comma mand nd must be uttered prior to the commission of the crime. Thus Thus,, when th the comm ommiss issio ion n of the crim rime ha hass already alrea dy been comm commence enced d whe when n the words of inducement are uttered, this requisite is lacking. In a d dec ecis isio ion n of the the S Sup upre reme me C Cou ourt rt of of Sp Spai ain, n, c cit ited ed in People vs. Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil. 609, it was held that a that  a father who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in a combat with another, "Hi "Hitt him him," ," was was not res respon ponsib sible le for the injur injuries ies inflicted after such advice was given.

- RULE: Principal by inducement in falsification. In this this ca case se,, the the em empl ploy oyee ee was was no nott crimi rimina nalllly y liab liable le,, because he had no knowledge of the falsity of the facts supplied by the accused. While While itit is tru true e that that it w was as tthe he em emplo ployee yee of the the off office ice of the treasurer who performed the overt act of writing the fal false se facts facts on the the res reside idenc nce e cer certif tifica icate te of the accused, it was, however, the accused who induced him to do so by supplying him with those facts. The accu accuse sed d was was a pr prin inci cipa pall by indu induce ceme ment nt.. Th The e employee was a mere innocent innocent agent of the accused in the performance of the act constituting the crime. (People vs. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 919)

pr prin inci cipa pall by by ind induc ucem emen entt

of offe fend nder er who who mad made e pro propo posa sall to commit a felony.

In the first, the inducement inducement involves any crime;

in the second second,, the proposal to be punishable must  invo vollve only nly tr tre eason son or   rebellion.

In the first, the principal by inducement

in the the seco second nd,, the the me mere re proposal to commit a felony

becomes liable only when

is pun punish ishab able le in tre treaso ason n or  rebellion.

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the crime is The e pe pers rson on to whom whom the the co comm mmit itte ted d by the the Th proposal osal is made  should not   principal by direct  prop commit the crime;  crime;    participation;  participati on; othe otherw rwis ise, e, the the pr prop opon onen entt be beco come mess a pr prin inci cipa pall by inducement. In both, there is an inducement to commit a crime.

Effects of acquittal of principal by direct   participation upon the liability of principal by inducement. (1) Conspiracy Conspiracy is  is NEGATED by the acquittal of co-defendant.

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(2) One One ca cann nnot ot be held guilt guilty y of having having instig instigate ated d the the commission commiss ion of a crime crime without without first bein being g show shown n that the crime has been actually committed by another. (People vs. Ong Chiat, 60 Phil. 788, 790) EXCEPTION: EXCEPTIO N: But if the one charged charged as prin principal cipal by direc directt participation is acquitted because he acted without criminal intent or malice,  malice,   -

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his ac acquittal iiss not a ground for the acquittal of the  principall by inducement.  principa inducement. (See People vs. Po Giok To, supra) The reason for the rule is that in exempting circumstances, such as when the act is not voluntary bec because ause of la lack ck of inte intent nt on the the part part of the the accused, acc used, there is a crime committed, only that the accused is not a criminal. In int inten enti tion onal al felo feloni nies es,, the the ac actt of a pe pers rson on do does es not not make him criminal unless his mind be criminal.

- RULE: Possessor of recently stolen property is a principal. It is cle clear ar fr from om S Sec ecti tion on 5(j 5(j), ), Ru Rule le 13 131, 1, of the the R Rul ules es of of Court, that the possessor of a recently stolen article is considered a principal, not merely as an accessory or  an accomplice, [BURD [BU RDEN EN OF PROOF] PROOF] un unles lesss he proves proves in a  satisfactory manner   that he is but an accessory or an accomplice thereto and that another person, from whom the article came, is the one who stole it from the owner thereof. (People vs. Javier, No. L-36509, Feb. 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 186, 190)

---------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------PAR 3: "Those who cooperate in the commission of  the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished."   (PRINCIPALS BY Indispensable Cooperation.) - Meaning of the term "cooperate."  means to desire or wish in common common a thin thing. g. But that commo com mon n wil willl or pur purpos pose e does not nece necessar ssarily ily mean  previous understand understanding, ing, for it can be expl explaine ained d  or  inferred from the the circumstances of each case. (People case.  (People vs. Apelgido, 56 Phil. 571, 576)

REQUISITES PRINCIPALS BY Indispensable Cooperation 1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that resolution,  that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or conspiracy or un unit ity y of of c crim rimin inal al pu purp rpos ose ea and nd inte intent ntio ion n immediately   befo immediately before re the commis commission sion of the crime charged; - RULE: there mu must st be conspirac conspiracy. y. - RULE: concurrence concurrence with  with the principal by direct participation in the the pur urpo posse of the la latt tte er is  sufficient,  sufficient,   bec because ause the cooperation is indispensable  indispensable  to the the accomplishment  accomplishment    of the commission of commission  of the offense. - RULE: May there be cooperation by acts of negligence? One One wh who, o, b by y a act ctss of n neg egli lige genc nce, e, co coop oper erat ates es in  in the co comm mmis issi sion on of est estaf afa a thro throug ugh h falsif alsifica icatio tion n or  malversa malv ersation tion throu through gh fals falsific ificatio ation n , with withou outt whic which h negligen negli gentt acts the commission of the crime could not have been accomplished accomplished,,  is a co-principal. -

-

But But the on one e wh who o coope coopera rate ted d in th the e co comm mmis issi sion on of  the crime was held guilty of the same crime through  reckless imprudence. imprudence. (Sa (Sams mson on v vs. s. C Cour ourtt of Appe Appeals als,, 10 103 3 Ph Phil il.. 27 277, 7, 2 28282-283 283;; People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294, 1295 [Unrep.])

7  

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2. Cooperation Cooperation   in the comm ommiss issio ion n of the offe ffense by  performing another another act,  act, without  which  which it would not have been accomplished.. accomplished - RULE: The cooperation must be indispensa indispensable, ble, that is, without which whic h the comm commissio ission n of the crime would not hav have e bee been n accomplished. - RULE [ONLY AN ACC ACCOMPL OMPLICE] ICE]:: If the the   cooperat cooperation ion is not  indispensable,, the offender is only an accomplice. indispensable - "by another act," which me means th that it it  should not be the act of one who could be classified classified   as as   prin princi cipa pall by direct   participation  participa tion.. - RULE [MU [MUST ST BE DIFF DIFFEREN ERENTT ACT]: The act  of   of the principal by indispensable cooperation should cooperation should be different  from  from the act  of  of the principal by direct participa participation. tion. it wil willl be note noted d th that at the the c coo oope pera rati tion on o off th the e othe other  r  accused acc used consis consisted ted in perfo performin rming g an act whic which h is differ differen entt fro from m the act of ex execu ecutio tion n of the the crime crime committed by the other accused. R, an an empl employ oyee ee of of a bank bank,, had had th the e duty duty to to ex exam amin ine e the account of the drawer of a check, to determine whet whethe herr or no nott the the draw drawer er of the the ch chec eck k ha had d suff suffic icie ient nt ba bala lanc nce e to hi hiss cred credit it to requ requir ire e the the pa paym yment ent of the the ch chec eck, k, an and d to indors indorse e upo upon n the ch check eck,, if it was entit entitled led to paym paymen ent, t, the the words words "Corrie "Co rrient nte, e, P.O. P.O. Lucian Luciano o de los Reyes. Reyes."" After After the check was marked in this manner, it would pass to the cashier of the bank who, in reliance upon the indorsement, would pay or order the same to be paid. R, in connivance with B, and knowing that the latter had no sufficient funds in the bank, indorsed upon a check drawn by B the words "Corriente, P.O. Luciano de los Reyes." The cashier, relying upon the indorsem indo rsement ent,, ordered ordered the paym payment ent of the che check, ck, thus enabling B to draw the amount of the check. In this this ca case se,, R was was a prin princi cipa pall by indi indisp spen ensa sabl ble e cooperation. (U.S. vs. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 484)

- To be liable as principals, the principals, the offender must fall under any of the three concepts defined in Article 17. - Collective criminal responsibility. Th Ther ere e is co collllec ecti tive ve crimi rimina nall resp respon onsi sibi bilility ty when when the offenders are criminally are criminally liable in liable in the same the  same manner manner and to the same the same extent . The  penalty  penalty to  to be imposed must be the  same for all. -

-

Princi Principa pals ls by direct direct parti partici cipat pation ion   have collect collective ive criminal r esponsibility esponsibility.. Princi Principa pall by induct induction ion   have have collec collectiv tive e crimi criminal nal responsibility. except   that who directly forced another to commit a crime Principal by indispensable cooperation has h as collective crimin cri minal al res respon ponsib sibilit ility y wit with h the pri princi ncipal pal by direct direct participation.

- Individual criminal responsibility. In the absence of pr pre evio vious cons onspira iracy cy,, un unit ity y of of c crim rimin inal al pu purp rpos ose ea and nd inte intent ntio ion n im imme medi diat atel ely y befor before e the comm commis issi sion on of th the e crime, OR com comm mun unit ity y of cri crimi min nal d des esig ign, n, the cri crimin minal al rres espon ponsib sibilit ility ya aris rising ing fro from m diff differe erent nt actss direct act directed ed ag again ainst st on one e and the the same same person is - individual and not collective, collective, and and eac each h of th the par parttici icipa pant ntss is liable is liable only for  the the act act com omm mitt tted ed by him im..   (U.S (U.S.. vs vs.. Magcomot,, 13 Phil. 386, 390; U.S. vs. Abiog, 37 Magcomot Phil. 137,139-140) RULE: Where there is no pretension that there was any conspi con spirac racy y betwe between en the the acc accuse used d no norr co conce ncerte rted d acti action on pu purs rsua uant nt to a co comm mmon on CTim CTimin inal al de desi sign gn be betw twee een n them them,, ea each ch is resp respon onsi sibl ble e on only ly for for the the consequences consequen ces of his own acts (Araneta, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, Appe als, G.R. No. 43527 43527,, July 3,1990, 3,1990, 187 SCRA 123, 133) EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY -

- Liability of conspirators who took turns in raping a girl. [For own acts, and for all the acts of others] Four persons each took turns in having sexual intercourse with a girl by force. It was held that each of them them is resp respon onsi sibl ble, e, no nott on only ly for for the the ac actt of rape rape committ com mitted ed personal personally ly by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because while one of them was having sexual intercourse with the girl, the others were hol old ding ing her er,, so that hat each each one of the hem m co coop oper erat ated ed in the the co cons nsum umma mati tion on of the the rape rape committed committe d by the others by acts without which it could not hav have e been accomplishe accomplished. d. Four sentenc sentences es were imposed on each accused. (People vs. Villa, 81 Phil. 193, 197; People vs. Alfaro, 91 Phil. 404, 408-409; People vs. Fernandez, Fernandez, G.R. No. 62116, 62116, Marc March h 22, 1990, 183 SCRA 511, 517)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY ARTICLE 17

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-

-

The dece deceased ased was the one who assaulted assaulted   a group of three individuals with a knife,  knife,  and in in th the cou course rse of an incom incomple plete te sel selffde defe fens nse, e, two of them caus caused ed less seri serious ous physical injuries upon the assailant, whil while e th the e thi third rd inf inflilict cted ed tthe he fata fatall woun wound. d. In this case, the party who inflicted the fatal wound would be the only one responsible as  principal for for the crime of hom homicide; icide; the other two would be held liable only for  less serious physical injuries. (Dec. Sup. Ct. of Sp Spai ain, n, Ju June ne 2, 18 1874 74,, 11 Jr Jr.. Crim Crim.. 11 11-1 -14; 4; 1 Viad Viada, a, Cod. Cod. Pe Pen. n.,, 34 3422-34 343; 3; Pe Peop ople le vs vs.. Martinez, 42 Phil. 85, 89; People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 44-45)

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8  

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Article 18. Accomplices.  - Accomplices are those 18. Accomplices. persons person s who who,, not being inc includ luded ed in Art Articl icle e 17, coop co oper erat ate e in th the e ex exec ecut utio ion n of th the e of offe fens nse e by previous or simultaneous acts. ---------------------------------------------------------

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THREE criminal responsibility - Quasi-collective criminal responsibility. responsibility. - Collective criminal responsibility. - Individual criminal r esponsibility esponsibility..

-------------------------------------------------------- Accomplices

- Quasi-coll Quasi-collective ective criminal responsibility responsibility.. -

-

Betwee Between n colle collect ctive ive crim crimina inall respon responsib sibili ility ty and and in indiv dividu idual al criminal responsibility, ther there e is th the e so so-c -cal alle led d qu quas asii-co coll llec ecti tive ve criminal responsibility. RULE:  some of the offenders in the crime are principals and the others are accomplices.

- Collective criminal responsibility. responsibility. Th Ther ere e is co collllec ecti tive ve crim crimin inal al res respo pons nsib ibililit ity y when when the offenders are criminally are criminally liable in liable in the same the same manner and to the same the same extent . The  penalty  penalty to  to be imposed must be the  same for all. Princi Principa pals ls by di direc rectt partic participa ipatio tion n  have collect collective ive criminal responsibility. Princi Principa pall by induc inductio tion n  ha have ve collec collectiv tive e crimi crimina nall responsibility. except   that who directly forced another to commit a crime Principal by indispensable cooperation has h as collective cri crimin minal al res respon ponsib sibili ility ty wit with h the the princ principa ipall by dir direct ect participation. - Individual criminal responsibility. In the absence of prev previo ious us co con nspira pirac cy, un unit ity y of of c cri rimi mina nall purp purpos ose ea and nd inte intent ntio ion n im imme medi diat atel ely y befor before e the co comm mmis issi sion on of the the crime, OR c com omm mun unit ity y of of cr crim imin inal al d des esig ign, n, the cri crimi mina nall resp respons onsibi ibilit lity ya aris rising ing fro from md diff iffere erent nt actss direct act directed ed agains againstt one and the sam same e person is

-

-

the other two would be held liable only for  less serious physical injuries. (Dec. Sup. Ct. of Sp Spai ain, n, Ju June ne 2, 18 1874 74,, 11 Jr Jr.. Crim Crim.. 11 11-1 -14; 4; 1 Viad Viada, a, Cod. Cod. Pe Pen. n.,, 34 3422-34 343; 3; Pe Peop ople le vs vs.. Martinez, 42 Phil. 85, 89; People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 44-45)

(541-562) =cipati 21 pages - RULE: RULE: [ACC [ACCOM OMPLI PLICE CE]] parti particip ation on   of an acco accomp mplilice ce  presupposes  presuppos es the commissi commission on of the crime crime   by the principal by direct participation. - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] cooperates by cooperates by previous acts or simultaneous acts in the ex execu ecutio tion no off the the offe offense nse by the the p prin rincip cipal. al. - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] "Not being included in Article 17."  participation  participati on or cooperation cooperation   of the accomplice is not any one of those mentioned in Article 17 direct p pa articip ipa ation by inducement indi indisp spen ensa sabl ble e co coop oper erat atio ion n  RULE: [cannot be held as PRINCIPAL] : [THUS ACCOMPLICE] When there is is no conspiracy conspiracy between or among the defendants but   they they were anim animate ated d by one and the  same purpose to accomplis accomplish h  the crimin criminal al objective, thos those e who who co coop oper erat ate ed by prev previo ious us or sim simulta ultane neou ouss acts bu butt can canno nott b be eh hel eld d liab liable le as pr prin inci cipa pals ls are ac accomplices. - In case of doubt as to whether principal or accomplice. In case of doubt,  doubt,  the the pa part rtic icip ipat atio ion n of the the of offe fend nder er will be cons consider idered ed that of an accomp accomplice lice rather than that of a principal.

- individual and not collective, collective, and and e eac ach h of of the the parti artici cipa pant ntss is is liable only for  the the act co com mmitted tted by him him.  (U.S (U.S.. vs vs.. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386, 390; U.S. vs. Abiog, 37 Phil. 137,139-140) RULE: Where there is no pretension that there was any co consp nspira iracy cy bet betwe ween en the the acc accuse used d nor co conce ncerte rted d ac acti tion on pu purs rsua uant nt to a co comm mmon on CTim CTimin inal al desi design gn betw betwee een n them them,, ea each ch is resp respon onsi sibl ble e on only ly for for the the consequences consequen ces of his own acts (Araneta, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, Appe als, G.R. No. 43527, July 3,1990, 187 SCRA 123, 133) EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY The dece deceased ased was the one who assaulted assaulted   a group of three individuals with a knife,  knife,  and in the cou course rse of an incomp incomplet lete e sel selff-

In the the cas case e of a app ppel ella lant ntss Carlo Carloss and and Pa Pasc scua uall Clemente, Clement e, while they joined their brother in the pursuit of the fleeing Matnog, Matnog , and in the attack  on  on him as he fell, yet the pr o ossecution eyewitness was unable to assert positively that the two managed to hit  the fallen man. There being no showing of conspiracy conspiracy,,   and and the the ex exte tent nt of of th thei eirr parti partici cipa pati tion on iin n th the e homicide being uncertain, they should be given the benefit of the doubt , and consequently, consequently, they are declared to be mere accomplices accomplices in the crime.  crime.  (People vs. Clemente, G.R. No. L23463, Sept. 28,1967, 21 SCRA 261, 270-271) - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] When the participation of an accused is

de defe fens nse, e, two of th the em caus caused ed less serious serious physical injuries upon the assailant, whil while e th the e thir third d in infl flic icte ted d th the e fata fatall wo woun und. d. In this case, the party who inflicted the fatal wound would be the only one responsible as  principal for for the crime of homicide; homicide;

not disclosed, he is only an accomplice. A pers person on w who ho a ass ssis ists ts on one e who who com commi mits ts the the c cri rime me o off arson and and who knows the latter's purpose, purpose , but whose  participation  participati on in the arson is not disclosed, may not be considered as a principal,

-

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10  

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because his acts are neither direct nor   absolutely absol utely necessary necessary for the commiss commission ion of the offense, no norr do they they in indu duce ce the the sai said dc com ommi miss ssio ion. n. (2 Viad Viada, a, p pp. p. 369 369-37 -370, 0, cite cited d in People People vs. Ubi Ubina, na, 97 P Phil hil.. 515, 533) - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] In criminal cases, the participation of the accused must be established established by the prosecution prosecution [BURDEN] -

homicide or murd homicide murder  er   is of a mi mino nor  r  character,   character, may properly be held liable as accomplice. accomplice.

by positive and competent evidence. evidence. It cannot be presumed.

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] It cannot be presumed. - RULE: [ACCOMPL [ACCOMPLICE] ICE] do does es not not hav have ep pre revi viou ouss a agr gree eeme ment nt with with tthe he pri princ ncip ipal al by by di dire rect ct p par arti tici cipa pati tion on.. do does es no nott h hav ave e un unde ders rsta tand ndin ing g with with tthe he pri princ ncip ipal al by by di dire rect ct p par arti tici cipa pati tion on.. is not in conspir ac acy with with tthe he pri princ ncip ipal al by by di dire rect ct p par arti tici cipa pati tion on..

-  RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [ACCOMPLICE] An accomplice participates to a certain point in the common criminal design. (People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571, 576) BUT: do does es not not hav have ep pre revi viou ouss a agr gree eeme ment nt do does es no nott h hav ave e un unders dersta tand ndin ing g. is not in conspir ac acy -  EXC EXCEP EPTI TIO ON RUL RULE: E: [CO [CO-CO -CONS NSPIR PIRAT ATOR OR]] [co [consi nside dered red as  ACCOMPLICE]  ACCOMPL ICE] [ROLE IS MINOR CARACTER ONLY] In some exceptional  situations, having co comm mmun unit ity y of de desi sign gn with with the the  principall  does  principa does not prevent prevent a mal malef efact actor or from being  regarded as an accomplice accomplice   if his role in role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of speaking, of a minor  character . (People vs. Nierra, 76 O.G. 6600, No. 37, Sept. 15,1980) The ruling in People vs. Nierra failed to distinguis disti nguish h between between "com "communi munity ty of desig design" n" and "participation in the criminal resolution" of two or more offenders - [PA PART RTIC ICIP IPA ATIO TION IN THE CRI CRIMINA INAL RESOLUTION] If a malefactor  entered  entered with the others others into an agr agreeme eement  nt  concer con cernin ning g the the com commis missio sion n of a felony and the decision to commit it, - [PA PART RTIC ICIP IPA ATIO TION IN THE CRI CRIMINA INAL RESOLUTIO RESO LUTION] N] the mal malefact efactor or and the the othe others rs part partic icip ipat ated ed in the the criminal resolution. - Such agreeme agreement nt an and d dec decision ision may b be e inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. - [Community of design] If there was no  such agreement agreement and decision decision,, but, knowing the criminal design of the ot othe hers rs,, the the ma male lefa fact ctor or merel erely y concurred in their criminal purpose, there is only community of design. - [Communi [Community ty of design] The malefactor, whose role in the perpetration of the

accomplice

conspirator  

they know and agree with the criminal design. come to know abo come about ut it after  the principals have reached the decision,  decision,  and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution.

know the criminal know criminal inte intentio ntion n because the they y the thems mselv elves es ha have ve dec decide ided d  up upon on such such course of action.

Accomplices merely concur  Con Accomplices Conspira spirators tors decide decide that a in it. crime should be committed; Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be co comm mmit itte ted; d; they they mer erel ely y assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment acco accom mplic plices es ar are e mere merely ly instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.

Conspirators Conspira tors are the authors authors of a crime;

(People vs. de Vera, G.R. No. 128966, 18 August 1999)

-  RULE: [NOT AN ACCOMPLICE]: NO knowledge/cognizance  knowledge/cognizance   of the PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTTICIPATION’s intention to commit any crime: ca can nnot ex exis istt with ithout prev revious ious cogn ogniz iza ance nce of the the criminal act intended to be executed by the principal by direct participation (U.S. vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526, 528; People Peop le vs. Cajand Cajandab, ab, No. L-295 L-29598, 98, July 26, 1973, 52 SCRA 161, 166) The sentry sentry improp improperl erly y permi permitte tted d cert certain ain co conv nvict ictss to go out of jail, accompanied by the corporal of the guards. The convicts convicts committed committed robbery. Was the sentry an accomplice in the crime of robbery committed by the convicts? No. When the sentry permitted the convicts to go at large, the sentry had no knowledge of their  intention to commit any crime. (U.S. vs. Bello, supra) [OPPOSITELY] But [OPPOSITELY]  But the driver of a taxicab who, knowing that his co-accused were going to make a hold-up, permitted them to use the taxicab driven by him in going to a store where his said co-accused staged the hold-up, and waited for them until after the hold-up, is an accomplice in the crime of robbery. (People vs. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12)

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- EX EXCE CEPT PTIO ION N RU RULE LE:: [NOT [NOT CO CONS NSID IDER ERED ED ACCO ACCOMP MPLI LICE CE]] [A PRINC PRINCIPA IPAL] L] WHEN Concurrence Concurrence with the crim criminal inal purpose purpose  of another may make one a co-principal. Even Even if on only ly one one of of th the e offen offender derss or origi iginat nated ed tthe he crim crimin inal al design and the the ot othe herr mer erel ely y co conc ncur urre red d wit with h hi him m in his his crim crimin inal al purpos pur pose, e, but befor before e the ac actua tuall com commis missio sion n of the the crime both of them agreed and decided to commit it, the other is not merely an accomplice. He is also a

- RULE RULE [NOT [NOT AN AC ACCO COMP MPLI LICE CE]: ]: [NO [NO EVIDEN EVIDENCE CE OF AWARENESS] [NO EVIDENCE OF ABETTING] -

Although Serapio got the car carbine bine from Sulp Sulpicio icio,, the latter

can cannot

be

co con nsider idered ed

a

princi incip pal

by

indispensable indispensa ble cooperation or an accomplice. -

principal,, because principal because having agreed agreed and decided to co comm mmit it a felony felony with anothe another, r, he become becomess a coconspirator.

[NO [NO EVID EVIDEN ENCE CE O OF F KNOW KNOWLE LEDG DGE] E] TThe here re is is no evidence at all that that  Sulpicio was aware Serapio would use the rifle to kill Casiano. Presumably, Presumably, he gave the carbine to Se Sera rapi pio o for for him him to shoo shoott Rafa Rafael el on only ly as pe perr thei their  r  agreement. (People vs. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-20911, October 30,1967,21 SCRA 569, 586-587)

-

[NO [NO EVID EVIDEN ENCE CE O OF F ABET ABETTIN TING] G] N Neit either her is ther there e co concr ncrete ete proof that Sulpicio abetted the shooting of Casiano.

- RULE RULE [NOT AN ACCO ACCOMP MPLI LICE CE]] No knowledge knowledge of the criminal design of design of the principal — not an accomplice. -

(People (Peo ple vs. De la Cerna, Cerna, G.R. No. L-20911, October  October  30,1967,21 SCRA 569, 586-587)

Th Ther ere e is no pro proof of that that th they ey purs pursue ued d Cosme Cosme beca becaus use e they had accepted accepted a cha challeng llenge e com coming ing from him. Apparen App arently, tly, their intentio intention n was only to prevent prevent him from taking from his house a weapon with which to ca carr rry y ou outt

an at atta tack ck.. They They were were,,

ther theref efor ore, e, just just

advancin adva ncing g a legitimat legitimate e defe defense nse by preve preventin nting g an illegitimate aggression. Sixto's act of holding Cosme's neck from behind is no proof of intention to kill. At that

- RULE RULE [AN ACCO ACCOMP MPLI LICE CE]: ]: [IF THERE IS EVIDEN EVIDENCE CE OF

time he did not know yet what his brother's intention

AWARENESS] [IF THERE IS EVIDENCE OF ABETTING]

was. It was not shown that Sixto knew that his brother 

-

was armed. (People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664)

Sulpici icio m iig ght have b ee een lia liable if after the  shooting   of Rafael  shooting Rafael,, Ser Serap apio io ret return urned ed the the carbin car bine e to him but upo upon n see seeing ing Casia Casiano no flee fleein ing, g, im imme media diatel tely y asked asked again again for the ca carb rbin ine e and Sulpic Sulpicio io volunt voluntari arily ly ga gave ve it to

- RULE RULE [NOT AN ACCOMP ACCOMPLIC LICE] E]  simultaneou  simultaneousness sness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of

him. -

 reasonably

two or more individuals.  individuals. (People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664) -

from taking from his house a weapon with which to ca carr rry y ou outt

an at atta tack ck.. They They were were,,

ther theref efor ore, e, just just

advancin adva ncing g a legitimat legitimate e defe defense nse by preve preventin nting g an illegitimate aggression. Sixto's act of holding Cosme's neck from behind is no proof of intention to kill. At that

appare apparent nt

[EVI [EVIDE DENC NCE E

OF

AWARENESS] to AWARENESS]  to Sulpicio and Sulpicio and the latter's giving

Th Ther ere e is no pro proof of that that th they ey purs pursue ued d Cosme Cosme beca becaus use e they had accepted accepted a cha challeng llenge e com coming ing from him. Apparently, Apparen tly, their intentio intention n was only to prevent prevent him

Serapio's cri crimi minal nal intent intention ion the then n wou would ld be

back of the rifle would constitute his assent thereto [EVIDENCE OF ABETTING]. -

Bu Butt such such w was as n not ot tthe he c cas ase. e. S Sul ulpi pici cio, o, tthe here refo fore re,, must be acquitted for the killing of Casiano Cabizares. (People vs. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-20911, L-209 11, October October 30,1967, 30,1967,21 21 SCRA 569, 586587)

time he did not know yet what his brother's intention was. It was not shown that Sixto knew that his brother  was armed. (People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664)

- RULE [ACCOMPLICE]: Common purpose is enough,

- RU RULE: LE: [ACC [ACCOM OMPLI PLICE] CE] [RELA [RELATIO TION N BET BETWEE WEEN N AC ACTS TS]: ]: CAN CAN BE PUNISHED FOR A DIFFERENT CRIME. An acc accom ompli plice ce may may be lliab iable le ffor or a cri crime me differ differen entt from from that which the principal committed.

ev even en if th the e cr crim ime e ac actu tual ally ly comm commit itte ted d is ju just st a natural/probable consequence of that purposes. -

The The comm commun unit ity y of desi design gn n nee eed d not not be tto o co comm mmit it the the crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a common com mon purpose to commit commit a parti particular cular crime and that the crime crime actually actually commi committed tted was a natural natural or   probable  probabl e consequence of the intended intended crim crime. e.

accomplice

principal

An accom accompli plice ce is one who who does   not  take does  take a direct part in the commission of the act,

An accom accompli plice ce is one who who take take a dire direct ct pa part rt in the the commission of the act,

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who does not force or induce who does others to commit it,

who force or induce others to commit it,

161, 166)

or who does not cooperate cooperate in the the co comm mmis issi sion on of the the crime by another act without whic which h it woul would d no nott ha have ve been accomplished,

or who who co coop oper erat ate e in the the commiss com mission ion of the crime by another act without which it would not have been accomplished,

- RULE: [ AT  AT LEAST THE THE KNOWLEDG KNOWLEDGE E OF THE CRIMINAL DESIGN]

-

Ho How w an acc accom ompl plic ice e ac acqu quir ires es k kno nowl wled edge ge o off th the e criminal design of the principal. [HEAR?] [HEA R?] When the prin principa cipall info informs rms or 

yet cooperates in the the indi indisp spen ensa sabl ble e = with withou outt execution of the act whic which h it woul would d no nott ha have ve by previous or   been accomplished, simultaneous actions. necessary but not indispensable In both, there is community of criminal design. As to the the ac acts ts perf perfor orme med, d, there is no clear-cut distinction between the acts of the accomplice and those of the the pr prin inci cipa pall by dire direct ct participation. participat ion. That is why, why, in ca case se of do doub ubt, t, it shal shalll be reso resolv lved ed in favo favorr of le less sser  er  responsib resp onsibility, ility, that is, that that of mere accomplice. between the princ between principals ipals and the accomplices, there is no conspiracy.

Between or among principals liable for the same offense, there there mus mustt be con conspi spirac racy; y; (People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571, 575)

REQUISITES “ACCOMPLICE” 1. That there be  be  community of design; design ; that that is, knowing knowing   the criminal design criminal design of the principa principall by direc directt part participa icipation tion,, he concurs with concurs  with the latter in his purpose; - RULE: Note that before there could be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation. - RULE: Principal by direct participation authors. Accomplice merely concurs. ca cann nnot ot exis existt with withou outt prev previo ious us co cogn gniz izan ance ce of the cr crim imin inal al ac actt in inte tend nded ed to be ex exec ecut uted ed by the the principal by direct participation (U.S. vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526, 528; People vs. Cajandab, No. L-29598, July 26, 1973, 52 SCRA 161, 166)

tel tells ls the acc accomp ompli lice ce   of the for former mer's 's criminal purpose. Thus us,, w wh hen the mas maste terr to told his his servant that he would abduct (abduction with consent) a girl un unde derr 18 ye year arss of age age and and instig instigate ated d his said said ser serva vant nt to indu induce ce the the girl girl to leav leave e he her  r  ho home me for imm immora orall pur purpos poses, es, and the servant assisted in the commission of the crime by so induci inducing ng the the girl, girl, the the mas master  ter  was was the the pr prin inci cipa pall by dire direct ct participat parti cipation ion and the servant servant was an accomplic accomplice. e. (U.S (U.S.. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil. 231, 236) [SAW?] When the accomplice saw  saw  the criminal acts of the principal. There i s no no s h ho owing t h ha at t he he attac ttack k was agre agree ed upo pon n be betw twee een n the the two two accu accuse sed d before bef orehan hand. d. No motiv motive e for it was was show shown n othe otherr than than the the pr prov ovoc ocat atio ion n give given n by the the deceas dec eased; ed; an and d such such mo motiv tive e was was tr true ue on only ly inso insofa farr as the the other accused was concerned. Th The e circum circumsta stanc nces es indic indicate ate that if the accused embraced the deceased deceased and rend rendered ered him helpless, it was to stop him fro from m fur furth ther er hittin hitting g the the oth other  er  accused with his fists. However, even after the first knife thrust had been delivered, he did not try to stop the other accused, ei eith ther er by word word or ov over ertt act. act. Instead, the accused continued to hold the deceas dec eased, ed, even even for forced ced him down on the bamboo bed with the other accused still pressing the attack. If the initial intent of the the accu accuse sed d was was fr free ee fr from om guilt,, it beca guilt became me tainted tainted after  after  he saw saw the the fi firs rstt knif knife e thru thrust st delivered. (People vs. Manans Man ansala, ala, No. L-235 L-23514, 14, Feb. 17,1970, 31 SCRA 401, 405)

- RULE: [NO [NO PARTICIPATION IN PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL RESOLUTION] - RULE: The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly knowingl y or intentionally rendered (U.S. vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526, 528; People vs. Cajandab, No. L-29598, July 26, 1973, 52 SCRA

2. That he  he  coo cooper perate atess in the exe execut cution ion of the offense by  previous or simultaneo simultaneous us acts acts,, with the intention the intention of supplying material mate rial or mora morall aid aid   in the the execution execution   of the crime in an

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efficacious way; - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS] cooperation of a n a cc ccomplice is only necessary, not indispensable. - EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT ACCOMPLICE] : IF CONSPIRACY, even if is only necessary necessary cooperat cooperation ion and not indispe indispensab nsable le =  principal by consipiracy consipiracy How owe ever er,, if the there is cons onspira pirac cy betw etween een two or  among several persons, even if the cooperation of one offender is only necessary, the latter is also a principal by conspiracy. In Conspiracy, the nature of the cooperatio ion n becomes immaterial.

not indispensable. One who who acte acted d as a loo look-out -out o orr guard guard an and als also assisted in taking the stolen articles in the crime of robb robber ery y with with ho homi mici cide de,, ab abse sent nt a co cons nspi pira racy cy.. (People vs. Parcon, Nos. L-39121-22, Dec. 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 425, 434, 435)

- EXAMPLES EXAMPLES OF COOPERA COOPERATION TION OF AN ACC ACCOMP OMPLICE LICE:: only necessary, not indispensable. indispensable. [PRE [PREVI VIOU OUS S ACT] ACT] The ex exam ampl ple e of coo coope pera rati tion on by previous act is the lending of a dagger or pistol to the murderer, knowing the latter's criminal purpose. [PREV [PREVIOU IOUS S ACT] ACT] In the crime crime of rrape ape,, the the ph pharm armaci acist st who, who, kno knowin wing g the the crimin criminal al pur purpos pose e of an anoth other, er, fur furnis nishes hes him the drug with which which he wil willl put his vict victim im to sl slee eep p in orde orderr to rape rape her, is also also an

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [MATERIAL OR MORAL AID]: BUT: Th The e acco accomp mplilice ce m mer erel ely y suppl supplie iess the pri princ ncip ipal al wi with th material mate rial or mora morall aid aid   with without out conspira conspiracy cy with the latter. [STA [STAYE YED D WITH WITH TTHE HE C CRI RIMI MINA NALS LS W WIT ITH H KNOW KNOWLE LEDG DGE E OF TH THE E CRIM CRIME, E, EV EVEN EN JU JUST ST MORA MORALL SU SUPP PPOR ORT, T, AN ACCOMPLICE] Where the evidence does not prove that appellant appellant con conspire spired d with the male malefacto factors, rs, he cannot be considered as a principal. However, in going with them them,, knowing knowing the their ir crim criminal inal intention, intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill the vict vi ctim im,, the the ap appe pellllan antt ef effe fect ctiv ivel ely y supp supplilied ed the the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomp accomplice lice.. (Peo (People ple vs. Balili Balili,, No. L14044, 140 44, Aug. Aug. 5,1966 5,1966,17 ,17 SC SCRA RA 89 892,8 2,898; 98; Peo People ple vs vs.. Doctolero Doct olero,, G.R. No. 3438 34386, 6, Feb. 7,1991,19 7,1991,19 3 SCRA 632, 645)

accomplice in the crime. (U.S. vs. Flores, 25 Phil. 595, 597-598) [SIMU IMULT LTA ANEO EOU US AC ACT] : TTh he defendant who held one of the hands of the victim and tried to take away the latter's latter's revolver, revolver,   whil while e hi hiss co co-d -def efen enda dant nt was was attacking him, is an accomplice, for he cooperated in the execution of the crime by simultaneous acts [E [EVE VEN? N?]] with withou outt an any y pr prev evio ious us agre agreem emen entt or  understa und erstandin nding g with his co-defen co-defendant dant..  (Peo (People ple vs. Escarro, 89 Phil. 520, 524) The three persons who actually detained the offended offe nded woman were prin principal cipalss in the crime of illegal detention and the three other accused who held the victim's companion, in order to prevent the latter from rendering any help to the victim, were accomplices,

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [IF WOULD INFLICTED DID NOT CAUSE DEATH] Th The e woun wounds ds infl inflic icte ted d by an ac acco comp mplilice ce in cr crim imes es against again st perso persons ns  should not have caused the death of victim. 1. Pe Peop ople le vs. vs. Azc Azcon ona, a, 59 59 Phil. Phil. 58 580, 0, b bec ecau ause se the wounds inflicted by the accused did not materially contribute to the death of the deceased. 2. Peo Peopl ple ev vs. s. Tam Tamay ayo, o, 56 Phi Phil. l. 587 587,, b bec ecau ause se the wound inflicted by the accused was no nott of a cha hara ract cter er that that woul would d ha have ve resulted in the death of the deceased. 3. Peo Peopl ple e vs. vs. Cort Cortes es,, 55 Ph Philil.. 14 143, 3, b bec ecau ause se the the accused who were armed with clubs

-

-

-

-

[E [EVEN VEN?] ?] ther there e bein being g no cons conspira piracy cy amon among g them them.. (People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775, 784)

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS] : Th The e coo coope pera rati tion on of an ac acco comp mplilice ce is not due to a conspiracy. - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS] : When When the the act actss o off tthe he ac accu cuse sed d are are not indispensable in the killing, they are merely accomplices. EX EXAM AMPL PLE: E: TThe he a act ct o off one, one, b blo lock ckin ing g peop people le com comin ing g to the the ai aid d of the the vict victim im whil while e bein being g assa assaile iled d is undoubtedly one of help and cooperation to the assailants. But, it is not indispensable to the stabbing of the victim. Hence, he is merely an accomplice. (People vs. Resayaga, No. L-49536, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 426, 432; People vs. Anin Anin,, No. L-39046 L-39046,, June 30,1975,64 SCRA 729, 736 [hitting the victim's compani com panion on with a piece piece of wood wood,, app apparen arently tly to dissuade him from going to the succor of the victim]) - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS]: being a look-out is

-

merely struck the victim, victim , as he fell by the fatal blow made by the principal, without causing the victim serious injuries. 4. Peo Peopl ple e vs. vs. Anto Antoni nio, o, 7 73 3 Phil Phil.. 42 421, 1, ssto toni ning ng the victim alre already ady mortally wounded by other accused, the stoning not being the cause of death.

-RULE -RULE:: [ACC [ACCOM OMPLI PLICE] CE] [be [bein ing g pr prese esent nt and and giving giving mo moral ral  support, you are an acco accomplice.] mplice.] -

Be Bein ing g pr pre esent and giv giving ing mor ora al sup uppo port rt when when a cr crim ime e is be bein ing g co comm mmit itte ted d will will ma make ke a pe pers rson on resp respon onsi sibl ble e on only ly as acco accomp mplic lice e in the the cr crim ime e committed.

- RULE RULE:: [AC [ACCOMP COMPLICE LICE]] [MAT [MATERIA ERIALL OR MORA MORALL AID] AID]:: must be external acts [prosecution must prove by evidence] The moral aid may be through advice, encouragement o orr agreement.

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or ma mate teri rial al,, — thro throug ugh he ext xter erna nall act acts. s. Such Such an an inte intent, nt, co conc ncurri urring ng wit with h some some ove overt rt a act, ct, must must be spec specif ific ical ally ly show shown n by the the ev evid iden ence ce of the the prosecution.

- RULE RULE:: [NO [NOTT AN ACCOMPL ACCOMPLICE]: ICE]: “MATER “MATERIAL/ IAL/MORA MORALL AID” AID”  should not be the determining determining cause, But the the advi advic ce, enc encou ourrage agement or agree greem ment shou should ld no nott be the the dete determ rmin inin ing g caus cause e of the the commission of the crime by the principal by direct partic par ticipa ipatio tion; n; oth otherw erwise ise,, the the on one e who who gav gave e the the advice or encouragement or the one who entered in into to the the agre agreem emen entt woul would d be a prin princi cipa pall by inducement. 3. That That there there be a  relation between the acts done done   by by   the  principal   an  principal and d those those attribut attributed ed to the pers person on ch charg arged ed as accomplice.. (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49) accomplice

Articl e 19.  Accessories.  Accessories.   - Accessories are those Article who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, cri me, and wit withou houtt hav having ing par partic ticipa ipated ted the therei rein, n, eith ei ther er as pr prin inci cipa pals ls or ac acco comp mplic lices, es, ta take ke pa part rt subs su bseq eque uent nt to it its s co comm mmiss issio ion n in an any y of th the e following manners: -------------------------------------------------------- Accessories

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [ACCOMPLICE] [RELATION BETWEEN ACTS]: not enough to have an identical criminal design. It is not enough that a person entertains an identical criminal design as that of the principal. There must be a relation between the It is not enough that a person entertains an identical criminal design as that of the principal. There must be a relation between the   the - RULE RULE:: [AC [ACCOMP COMPLICE LICE]] [RELATIO [RELATION N BETW BETWEEN EEN ACTS]: CAN BE PUNISHED FOR A DIFFERENT CRIME. An acc accom ompl plic ice e may may be lia liabl ble e fo forr a cri crime me d dif iffe fere rent nt from that which the principal committed.

---------------------------------------------------------

-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: SHOULD NOT BE IN CONSPIRACY WITH THE PRINCIPAL A cons conspi pire red d wi with th o oth ther erss to stea steall cer certa tain in g goo oods ds in tthe he custom cus tomho house use.. A agr agreed eed to pa pay, y, as in fact he paid them, a substantial sum of money upon delivery of the stolen stole n good goodss in his ware warehous house e from the wagons on which whi ch his his coc cocons onspir pirato ators rs loaded loaded the the goo goods ds at the the customhouse.. It was held that A was guilty of the crime customhouse of theft as a principal and not merely as an accessory. (U.S. vs. Tan Tiap Co., 35 Phil. 611) - RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSOR ACCESSORY]: Y]: One who kept silen silentt with regard to the crime he witnessed is not an accessory. A pers person on wh who saw the co com mmiss ission ion of a cr crim ime e, say say murder, by another whom he knew, kept silent with rega regard rd to it, and and did did no nott repo report rt it to any any of the authorities is not liable even as an accessory. (U.S. vs. Caballeros, 4 Phil. 350; U.S. vs. Callapag, 21 Phil. 262) - RULE: [ACCESSORY] [principal not yet apprehended] [principal  remain at large]: If the principal is still at large, as long as there is a crime committed, the accessory may be convicted convicted.. Ap Appr pre ehe hens nsio ion n and and co conv nvic icti tion on of the the pr prin inci cipa pall is no nott necessary for the accessory to be held criminally liable. Ev Even en if the the pri prin ncipa cipall is still still un unkn know own n or at larg large, e, the the access acc essory ory may be he held ld res respon ponsib sible le provid provided ed the the requisites prescribed by law for the existence of the crime are present and that someone committed it. Th Thus us,, a pe pers rson on,, knowi knowing ng th the e ill illeg egal al sour source ce of a thing thing that that is stol stolen en,, be bene nefi fits ts th ther eref efro rom, m, is gu guililty ty as an accessory after the fact, even if the author of the theft has not been discovered. when the principal is not yet apprehended, the accessory may be prosecuted and convicted. It ma may be ask asked w wh hethe ther or not not app appella ellant nt may be legally convicted as accessory after  the fact of the crime of qualified theft, when up to no now w the princip principal al has no nott yet bee been n pr pro osec secut ute ed fo forr fa faililur ure e to id iden enttify ify and and apprehend him. We believe that the answer   should be in the affirmative. affirmative.   The cri crime me of qual qualif ifie ied d thef theftt ha hass be been en prove roved; d; the the nonprosecution nonprosecutio n of the principal for the reason

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that that his ide identit tity has not as yet been disco discover vered, ed, cannot cannot ser serve ve as bas basis is to fre free e appellant from the liability incurred by him as an ac acce cess ssor ory y afte afterr the the fact fact.. (Peo (Peopl ple e vs vs.. Ramos, C.A., 62 O.G. 6862) - RULE: RULE: [ACC [ACCESS ESSOR ORY Y ONLY ONLY WHEN] WHEN]:: Acces Accessor sories ies'' lia liabil bility ity is  subordinate  subordina te and subsequent. subsequent. Principal must also be tried tried first  The The arrai arraign gnme ment nt,, tria triall and co conv nvic icti tion on of an acce access ssor ory y after the fact without the principal of the crime having first been tried and convic convicted ted in the separat separate e case filed and pending at the time of the arraignment, trial and decision of the case against the accessory, is not properr and violates the legal system of proc prope procedura edurall orderliness. - EXCEPTIO EXCEPTION N RULE RULE:: [NOT [NOT AN ACC ACCESSO ESSORY] RY] [IN EXEMPTIN EXEMPTING?]: G?]: conviction of accessory possible, even if principal is acquitted [because a crime is still committed in this case] Convi Convicti ction on of of an acc access essory ory is po possi ssible ble not notwit withs hstan tandin ding g the acquittal of the principal, if the crime was in fact committed, but the principal was not held criminally liable, liabl e, beca because use of an exe exempti mpting ng circ circumst umstanc ance e (Art (Art.. 12), suc uch h as insani sanitty or minorit rity. In exemp exemptin ting g circumst circ umstance ances, s, there is a crime crime committed committed.. Hence, Hence, there is a basis for convicting the accessory. Thu huss, if a mino inor, ei eig ght ye year arss ol old, d, st stol ole e a rin ring wort orth P500.00 and B, knowing that it has been stolen, buys it for P200.00, B is liable as accessory in the crime of theft, even if the principal (the minor) is exempt from criminal liability. (See U.S. vs. Villaluz, 32 Phil. 376) - RULE: [NOT [NOT AN ACCES ACCESSOR SORY]: Y]: If the PRINC PRINCIPAL IPAL is acqui acquitted tted because there was NO CRIME committed. Coro Corollllar ary y to this this is Uni Unite ted d Sta State tess vs. M Men endo doza za,, supra supra,, where it was held in an arson case that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the ac acces cessor sory y where where it was show shown n that that no crime crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory. - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: participation of the accessory in all cases always takes place after the commission of the crime. - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: it is not necessary that there be a princip principal al duly convicted For one to be found guilty and punished as an accessory, it is not necessary that there be a principal duly convicted (Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, Tomo I, pages 515-516, Octava Edicion). Neither the letter nor  the the spi spirit rit of the the law requires requires that the the princ principa ipall be co conv nvic icte ted d befo before re on one e ma may y be pu puni nish shed ed as an accessory.  As long as the corpus del delicti icti is proved and proved and the accessory's participation as such shown,  shown,   he can can be be held held crim crimin inal ally ly resp respon onsi sibl ble e an and d me mete ted d out the corresponding penalty. (Inovero vs. Coronel, C.A., 65 O.G. 3160) - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: there can be an accessory even after the  principal was convicted RE REQ QUISIT ISITE E 1: pres resent enting ing one oneself self to serve rve ou outt the the sentence in lieu of the real culprit.

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REQUISITE 2: But the crime committed by the real culprit  must be:  be:  treason, parricide, murder, or an att attem empt pt to to ta take ke the the lif life e of tthe he P Pre resi side dent nt,, tha that he is kno known to be ha hab bitua itualllly y gu guililty ty o off some other crime, RE REQU QUIS ISIT ITE E 3: beca becaus use e this this is poss possib ible le on only ly wh when en th the e accessory is a private individual.

- RULE: [ACCESS [ACCESSORY]: ORY]: Heavy penalties for accessories in robbery and theft. PR PRES ESID IDEN ENTI TIAL AL DECR DECREE EE NO NO.. 1612 1612 ANTIANTI-FE FENC NCIN ING G LAW OF 1979 In oth other er c crim rimes es punish punishabl able e by the Re Revis vised ed Pen Penal al Code Code,, the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed up upon on the the acce access ssor orie iess to the the co com mmi miss ssio ion n of a consummated consummat ed felony. (Art. 53, Revised Penal Code)

IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 19. “having knowledge” -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: [ACCESSORY]: Must have knowledge of the commission of the crime An accessory must have knowledge of the co comm mmis issi sion on of the the crim rime, and and ha havi ving ng that that know knowle ledg dge, e, he took took pa part rt subs subseq eque uent nt to its its commission. In the absence of positive proof, direct or   circum circumst stant antial ial,, of his knowl knowledg edge e that that the goods goods were of illegal origin or fraudulently acquired by the vendors at the time of the transaction, a customer  who who purc purcha hase sess such such go good odss ca cann nnot ot be he held ld crimin criminall ally y res respon ponsib sible le as acces accessor sory. y. (Peopl (People e vs. Labrador, C.A., 36 O.G. 166). Th Thus us,, if A buy buyss a stol stolen en p pro rope pert rty, y, not not k kno nowi wing ng ttha hatt it was stolen, he is not liable. -RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: IF THIEF IS ALREADY CONVICTED, when possession of stolen property is discovered. - The legal princ principle iple that unex unexplain plained ed possessi possession on of stol stolen en articles is sufficient evidence to convict one of theft is not applicable where the principal or author of the robbery has already been convicted and where there is no proof that the alleged accessory knew of the commission of the crime and that he profited himself by its proceeds. -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: it is not necessary that he should have acquired the property knowing it was stolen. Knowledge may be after. Knowle Kno wledge dge of the the co comm mmiss ission ion of crime crime may may be acquired acqu ired subseque subsequent nt to the acquisiti acquisition on of stol stolen en property. Facts: The robbers took and carried away carabaos belonging to another. These animals were found in the posses possessio sion n of A who who acqui acquired red them them wit witho hout ut knowing that they had been illegally taken. When the owners of the carabaos informed A that they wer ere e ille illeg gally ally depr priv ived ed of the their anim animal alss, A demanded the payment of one-half of what he had paid for them. The owners promised to come back 

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with the money. When the owners came back, A informed them that he had returned the animals to the persons from whom he had bought them.  them.   Held: To declare the accused guilty as accessory, it is not necessary that he should have acquired the property, prop erty, know knowing ing at that time that it had been stol ole en. It is suff suffic icie ient nt that that af afte terr ac acqu quir irin ing g that  that  kn know owle ledg dge, e, he co conc ncea eale led d or disp dispos osed ed of the the  property, thereby thereby depriving depriving the owner the thereof. reof.

been committed.

-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Knowledge of the commission of crime may be established by circumstantial evidence. When When a pers person on kne knew w that that h his is coco-ac accu cuse sed d ha had d no legitimat legit imate e business; business; that some of the goods were taken to him as early as 5:00 to 6:00 o'clock in the morning; and that said co-accused was neither a barber bar ber nor the the owner owner of a sar sari-s i-sari ari store such as would induce in him a rational belief that the latter's posses pos sessio sion n of said said goods goods (amon (among g them them barber barber's 's utensils uten sils)) was legitimate; legitimate; the conclus conclusion ion is that he had knowledge of their illegal source. (People vs. Dalena, CA-G.R. Nos. 11387-R and 11388-R, Oct. 25, 1954) “commission

of the crime”

- The crime co comm mmitt itted ed by the the princ principa ipall mus mustt be prove proved d beyond reasonable doubt. - The crime must actually be adjudged committed by the principal, if someone will be adjudged as an accessory: Thus, Thus, where where it is is do doubt ubtful ful wheth whether er a woman woman killed killed he her  r  husband maliciously, as it is possible that she might have acted in self-defense, the fact that their servant  took part in the burial of the deceased in a secluded  place would  place  would not make the servant an accessory in parric par ricide ide,, an offe offense nse whic which h was not conclusi conclusively vely  proven.   (See  proven. (See People People vs. Pardito Pardito,, G.R. No. L-3234, March 1,1952 [Unrep.])

“without having g parti participate cipated d there therein, in, eithe eitherr as without havin principals or accomplices” - If they they are already adjudged as principal or accomplice, they cannot anymore be adjudged as accessory A atta attack cked ed and and fat fatal ally ly wou wound nded ed B. B. Seei Seeing ng B ffal alll to the ground as a result of the fatal blow made by A, C and D hit B with a piece of wood each was carryi car rying ng.. When When B died, died, A, C, and D bur buried ied the corpse corp se to prevent prevent the authoriti authorities es from disc discoveri overing ng the crime. Can Can A be he held ld llia iabl ble e as an an a acc cces esso sory ry? ? No No,, be beca caus use e he already participated as principal. Are C and D accessories? accessorie s? No, because they already participated as accomplices. accomplices. “take

part subsequent to its commission ”

-RULE: [ACCESSORY] The accessory takes part after the crime has been committed. Not ote e that that p par ara agr gra aphs phs Nos Nos. 1, 2 and and 3 of Art. Art. 19 19, which describe the different acts of the accessory, refer to those acts performed after the crime had

1. By pr prof ofit itin ing g th them emse selv lves es or as assi sist stin ing g th the e offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, cri me, or the eff effect ects s or ins instru trumen ments ts the thereo reof, f, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the th e ac acce cess ssor ory y ac acts ts wi with th ab abus use e of hi his s pu publ blic ic functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. -------------------------------------------------------- Specific acts of accessories. accessories. takes part in three ways: (a) by profiting by profiting from  from the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing concealing   the body, effect effectss or instruments instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting assisting in  in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crim crime, e, pro provid vided ed he acts acts wit with h ab abuse use of his public public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

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(a) by  profiting  profiting   from the effects of the crime; - EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: In light felonies Th The e cr crim ime e comm commit itte ted d by th the e pri prin nci cipa pall un unde derr this this paragraph may be any crime, provided it is not a light felony.  

a. By profiting themselves by the effects of the crime. -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: [ACCESSORY]: shared in the fruits/effects fruits/effects of the crime In mur murde der, r, o one ne who who ssha hare red d in tthe he rew rewar ard d gi give ven n for  for  the commission of the crime (U.S. vs. Empainado, 9 Phil. 613) profited by the effects of the crime. -RULE: [ACC -RULE: [ACCESSO ESSORY]: RY]: received received any property property from another, another, and used it [with knowledge of the crime] A pers person on who who rec recei eive ved d an any y pr prop oper erty ty ffro rom m an anot othe her, r, an and d used used it, knowing knowing that the the sam same e ha had d be been en stolen, is guilty of the crime of theft as an accessory. (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463, 467) -RULE: -RUL E: [NOT ACCESSORY]: ACCESSORY]: when profit is in the nature of a reward and not fruits or effects of the crime. But one one wh who o rece receiv ived ed ff*2 *20 00 fro from th the e ow own ner of a st stol olen en jeep jeep,, as a rewa reward rd for for lo loca cati ting ng it in the the possession of someone who had bought it, is not an accessory, because the amount of P200 was in the nature of a reward and not fruits or effects of the crime. (People vs. Yatco, C.A., 51 O.G. 260) -RULE: [NOT ACCESSORY, INSTEAD INSTEAD A PRINCIPAL for theft]: when the person person take take the propert property y wit withou houtt the conse consent nt of the  principal..  principal In prof profiti iting ng b by y the the effec effects ts o off th the e crime crime,, the the ac acce cesso ssory ry must receive receive the property property from the prin principal cipal.. He shou should ld no nott take take it with withou outt the the co cons nsen entt of the the principal. If he took it without the consent of the principal, he is not an accessory but a principal in the the cri crime me of theft theft.. Theft Theft may be com commit mitted ted by taking taki ng with inte intent nt to gain, personal personal property from one who stole it, without the latter's consent.

-RULE: [NOT ACCESSORY] [PROFITING PUNISHED AS PRINCIPAL  ART 307 RPC] When is profiting by the effects of the crime pu puni nish shed ed as the the ac actt of pr prin inci cipa pal, l, and and no nott the the ac actt of accessory? When a person know knowingl ingly y acqu acquired ired or recei received ved  property   taken by the brigands. (Art. 307, Revised  property Penal Code)

 same for the thief to whom he gives the proceeds of the the sale sale,, is gu guilt ilty y of the the cr crim ime e of thef theft, t, as an accessory. (U.S. vs. Galanco, 11 Phil. 575) -RULE: [ACCES -RULE: [ACCESSOR SORY]: Y]: Run Runners ners or Courier Courierss in obta obtainin ining g the  ransom money money In kidnapping for ransom, those who act acted ed as  runners or couriers couriers   in obtaining the ransom money (People vs. Magsino, G.R. No. L-3649, Jan. 29, 1954) assisted the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime. -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Takes part in cattle rustling One One who tak takes es pa part rt in catt cattle le ru rust stlilin ng by pr prof ofit itin ing g himself by its effects with knowledge of the crime is only an accessory after the fact. (Taer vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85204, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA 598, 604-605) Cattle rustling  rustling  is the takin taking g aw away ay by any means means,, metho me thod d or schem scheme, e, wit withou houtt the co conse nsent nt of the owner/ own er/rai raiser ser,, of an any y of the ab above ove-me -ment ntion ioned ed animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether  commit com mitted ted wit with h or wit withou houtt violen violence ce again against st or  intimidation of any person or force upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser. PD 533 -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: SHOULD NOT BE IN CONSPIRACY WITH THE PRINCIPAL A cons conspir pired ed wit with h other otherss to to st steal eal ce certa rtain in good goodss in the the customhouse. A agreed to pay, as in fact he paid them, a substantial sum of money upon delivery of the stolen goods in his warehouse from the wagons on which his coconspirators loaded the goods at the customhouse. It was held that A was guilty of the crime of theft as a principal and not merely as an accessory. (U.S. vs. Tan Tiap Co., 35 Phil. 611)

(b) by concealing concealing   th the body, effects or  instruments   of the crime in order to instruments  prevent its its discovery discovery;; and - EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: In light felonies Th The e crime crime co com mmi mitt tted ed by th the e prin principa cipall un unde derr this this paragraph may be any crime, provided it is not a light felony.

“"Body

of the crime”

- Same as "corpus delicti." 

b. Assisting the offender to profit by the effects of  the crime. -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: [ACCESSORY]: Someone who sells sells the stolen property property for the thief. A pers person on who who rrec ecei eive vess any any pro prope pert rty y fr from om a ano noth ther er,, which whic h he knows to have been stolen, stolen , and sells and  sells the

-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: [ACCESSORY]: Assist in the burial of the victim. hiding the body. Th Thos ose e who who as asssist ist in th the e bu buri rial al of of th the e vic victim tim of a homicide to prevent the discovery of the crime incur  the responsibilities of accessories. accessories. (U.S. vs. Leal, 1 Phil. 118) In hom homici icide de or m murd urder, er, it is is n nec ecess essary ary to prov prove e that that a

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particular person is the victim. The victim must be properly prop erly identif identified. ied. Thus, if the body of the victim ca cann nnot ot be fou found nd,, the crime crime ca cann nnot ot be pro proved ved.. Hence, the concealing of the body of the victim is in effect concealing the crime itself. -RULE: [ACCESSO [ACCESSORY]: RY]: Planting false evidence on the victim Fu Furn rnis ishi hing ng the the m mea eans ns to to ma make ke it it appe appear ar th that at th the e deceased was armed, by placing a weapon in his hand when already dead, and that it was necessary to kill kill him him on ac acco coun untt of hi hiss resi resist stan ance ce to the the constab con stabulary ulary men; or making making it appe appear ar that the deceased who had been arrested ran away. (U.S. vs. Cuison, 20 Phil. 433; People vs. Saladino, G.R. No. L-11893, May 23, 1958) -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Mere act of carrying the body (which is to be concealed) The The mere mere a act ct of of a pers person on o off ca carr rryi ying ng tthe he cad cadav aver er o off one unlawfully killed, when it was buried to prevent the discovery of the crime, is sufficient to make him responsible as an accessory under paragraph 2 of Art. 19. (People vs. Galleto, 78 Phil. 820) -RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: Act of carrying but there was no attempt to hide the body of the crime.(no knowledge of the crime either in this case) With respect to appellant A.R., he sh shou ould ld be ac acqui quitte tted. d. Accor Accordin ding g to his af affid fidavi avitt — the the on only ly evidence against him —  he   he was merely ordered to board the the jee eep pney, ey, no nott know owin ing g, no nott ev eve en  suspecting,, the reason or purpose  suspecting purpose of the ride ride.. He did not take take pa part rt in the killing killing,, neit neither her did he profit by it, nor try to conceal the same from the authorities. It is true that he helped his companions in removing the two dead bodies from the jeepney and throwing them into the ditch; but there was no attempt to bury or hide said bodies, not even cover them with grass or bushes. In ffac act, t, the the evid eviden entt de desig sign n and and plan plan of tthe he c culp ulprit ritss as unfolded during the trial was not to hide the bodies, but to but  to just leave them on the roadside so as to make it appear that the two victims were killed by Huks in an encounter with the Government forces.  forces.  (People vs. De la Cruz, 100 Phil. 624, 633) “"Concealing/Destroying

effects or instruments ”

effect of the crime

instrument of the crime

The stolen property

The pistol or knife

is guilty of the same crime as accessory. The ladder is an instrument of the crime. -RULE: ULE: [AC [ACCESSO SOR RY] Y]:: rece receiv ivin ing g stol stolen en pr prop oper erty ty and and concealing concealin g that it is a stolen property A pers person on who who re rece ceiv ived ed per perso sona nall prope propert rty y know knowin ing g that that it ha had d be been en stol stolen en,, for for the the purp purpos ose e of concealing the same, as in fact he concealed it, is guilty of the crime of theft as an accessory. (U.S. vs. Villaluz, 32 Phil. 376) - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: concealing a crime/murder weapon He is guilty of the crime of homicide as an accessory, under paragraph No. 2 of Art. 19, who received a pistol or a knife, knowing that it had been used in killing the deceased, and concealed it

“"To

prevent its discovery."”

- its  = CRIME Th The e pron pronou oun n "its "its"" refe refers rs to to th the e wo word rd "cri "crime me." ." In the the c cas ase e of U U.S .S.. vs. vs. Vi Villa llaluz luz,, 32 Ph Philil.. 37 376, 6, 38 380, 0, the the Supreme Court stated: "Such facts also show that her  concealment of said articles was for the purpose of  preventing   and  preventing and de defe feat atin ing g the the disc discov over ery y of the the crime."  - RULE: RULE: [ACC [ACCESS ESSOR ORY]: Y]: Receiv Rec eives es stolen stolen pro proper perty ty for the the purposes of concealing In the the sam same mann anner th that at a pe pers rso on who rec receiv eives stolen property for the purpose of concealing the same, is likewise guilty of the crime of theft as an accessory acce ssory after the fact." fact." (U.S (U.S.. vs. Villaluz, 32 Phil Phil.. 376)

(c) by assisting assisting   in the escape or  conc co ncea ealm lmen entt of th the e pr prin inci cipa pall of th the e crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of tr trea easo son, n, pa parr rric icid ide, e, mu murd rder er,, or an atte at temp mptt to ta take ke th the e lilife fe of the the Ch Chie ieff Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime

-RULE: [AC -RULE: [ACCESS CESSORY ORY]: ]: act of Conc Conceali ealing ng or dest destroyi roying ng the effects or instruments of the crime to prevent its discovery.

Two classes of accessories are contemplated in  paragraph 3 of Article 19.

-RULE: [ACCESSO [ACCESSORY]: RY]: destroying an instrument of the crime A pers person on who who des destr troy oyed ed the the llad adde derr whic which hh he e knew knew had been used by another in climbing the wall of the house where the latter had committed robbery,

- EXCEPTION RULE: [for paragraph 3 of Article 19 ONLY] [NOT   AN ACCESSOR ACCESSORY]: Y]: Even if there is a crime, if failed to convict principa principal: l: Th The e accu accuse sed d cann cannot ot be be held held lia liabl ble e as a acc cces esso sory ry under und er pa parag ragrap raph h 3 of Art Art.. 19, if the princip principal al

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charged with murder died before trial, because had he been alive he might have been found guilty only of homicide.

Public officers

who harbor, conceal or assist in the

escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public functions.

-

(e) that the principal  principal is  is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Thus, if a person was previously punished three three tim times es for less less ser seriou iouss physi physical cal injuriess and now commits estafa, injurie the the one one who who hel helps ps in his his e esc scap ape e iiss lia liabl ble e as an accessory although the accessory is a private individual. -

Requisites : Requisites: (1) The accessory The accessory is a public officer. (2) He harbors, He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the  principal.  principa l. (3) The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions. (4) The crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony.

- RULE: [ACCESSORY]: A mayor who refused to prosecute offender is accessory. Abus Abusin ing g his his pu publ blic ic of offi fice ce,, the the president  president of the town of Cabia Cabiao o ref refuse used d to pr prose osecut cute e the cri crime me of  homicide homicid e an a nd th thus us made made it po poss ssib ible le for for the the  principal offender offender to escape. escape.   He re refu fuse sed d to m mak ake e an iinv nves esti tiga gati tion on o off th the e se serio rious us occurrenc occur rence, e, of whic which h com complain plaintt was made to him. The municipal president was found guilty as accessory. (U.S. vs. Yacat, 1 Phil. 443) - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: PUBLIC OFFICER IS NOT LIABLE FOR BEING AN ACCESSORY TO A RELATIVE. a pub publilic c offi office cerr who, who, wit with h evid eviden entt abus abuse e of his his office,   furnis office, furnished hed the means means of esc escap ape e to his brother   who who ha had d co comm mmit itte ted d mu murd rder er IS NO NOTT criminally liable as accessory Su Suc ch a publ public ic o off ffic icer er d doe oess not not incu incurr any any cr crim imin ina al liliab abililit ity y. Tie Ties of blo loo od or  relationship constitutes a more powerful incentive than the call of duty. RE REM MINDER: ONLY EXEMPTION IS PROFITING: Furthermore, Article Furthermore,  Article 20 does not grant the benefits of exemption only to accessories who profited or  helped help ed the offender offender profit by the effe effects cts of the crime.   This is the only case where the accessory crime. who is rel relate ated d to the the off offen ender der incurs incurs crimi criminal nal liability.

Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape escap e of the the author author of the the crime crime — guilty guilty of tre treaso ason, n, parricide parri cide,, murder, murder, or an attempt attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Requisites: (1) The accessory is a is a private person. (2) He harbors, conceals or assists in assists in the escape of the author of the crime. (3) The crime committed by the principal is either: (a) treason, (b) parricide, (c) murder, (d) an atte attemp mptt ag again ainst st the the life life o off the the Presi Presiden dent, t, or or

principal

RU RULE LE:: [ACC [ACCES ESSO SORY RY]: ]: acces accessor sory y mu must st have knowledge of the principal being habitually guilty But th the a c cc cessory m us ust h av ave know knowle ledg dge e of the the pr prin inci cipa pall being habitually guilty of some other crime, because the law says "or is known to be habitually guilty of some other  crime."

accomplice

accessory does not take direct part or   co coop oper erat ate e in, in, or  induce, the commission of the crime. does not cooper coo perate ate in the commission of the of offe fens nse e by acts acts either prior thereto or sim simult ultaneo aneous us therewith. pa part rtic icip ipat atio ion n

of

the the acce access ssor ory y in all all ca case sess alwa always ys take takess plac place e after  the commission of  the crime.

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• __ 

- RULE RULE:: [AC [ACCESSO CESSORY RY EXEM EXEMPT PT FRO FROM M LIAB LIABILITY ILITY]: ]: Only accessories under paragra under  paragraphs phs 2 and 3 of Article 19 19 are  are exempt  from  from criminal liability if they are related to the principals. “with

the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.” -

Paragraph 1 of Article 19, 19, covers the accessories who take part subsequent to the commission of the crime in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting  profiting by  by the effects of the crime. 2. By assisting assisting   offender to profit  by   by the effects of the crime.

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Arti ticl cle e 20 20..  Accessories who are exempt from Ar criminal crimi nal liabil liability. ity.   - The pen penalt alties ies pre prescr scribe ibed d for  accessori access ories es sha shall ll not be imp impose osed d upo upon n tho those se who wh o ar are e su such ch wi with th re resp spec ectt to th thei eirr sp spou ouses ses,, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adop ad opte ted d br brot othe hers rs an and d si sist ster ers, s, or re rela lati tives ves by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exce ex cept ptio ion n of ac acce cess ssor orie ies s fa fall llin ing g wi with thin in th the e provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. -------------------------------------------------------- Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability - RULE: [ACCESSORY [ACCESSORY but EXEMPT FROM FROM LIABILITY]: LIABILITY]: An accessory is exempt from criminal liability, when the principal is his

-

spouses, ascen end dants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relative ves s by affinity within the same degrees

- RULE: RULE: [ACCESS [ACCESSORY ORY NOT EXEMPT EXEMPT FROM FROM LIAB LIABILITY ILITY]: ]: EXCLUSIV EXCLUSIVE E LIST? Nephew not incuded A neph nephew ew,, wh who o had had wi witn tnes esse sed d th the e ki killllin ing g by hi hiss un uncl cle e of the deceased, helped in burying the dead body. Is the nephew nephew crimi criminall nally y liable liable as an accesso accessory? ry? Yes, because the relationship of uncle and nephew is not included in Art. 20. In the the cas case e of U.S U.S.. vs vs.. Insi Insier erto to,, 15 Ph Philil.. 35 358, 8, it w was as h hel eld d that the relationship between uncle and niece does not come within any of the degrees of relationship of spouse, or ascendant, ascendant, descendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree.

- RU RULE: LE: [ACC [ACCESS ESSOR ORY Y EXE EXEMPT MPT FR FROM OM LIABI LIABILIT LITY]: Y]: PRO PROFIT FITIN ING G mentioned mentione d in Para 1 is the only exce exceptio ption, n, which whichever ever is the case, there must be profit to not be exempted. Pa Para ragr grap aph h 2 of Arti Articl cle e 19 re requ quire iress that that tthe he purp purpos ose e of the concealme concealment nt is to prev prevent ent the discovery discovery of the crime cri me.. On the othe otherr hand, hand, paragr paragraph aph 1 says, says, "by profiting themselves by the effects of the crime." Does paragraph 1 mean that the accessory should actually profit from the effects of the crime? That seems to be the meaning. But suppose a husband conceals the property stolen by his wife in order to profit from it later, -

-

is he liable as accessory? It woul would d se seem em that that h he e may may be be h held eld liable liable as a acce ccesso ssory, ry, because his said act is prompted not by affection but by a detestable greed. In that case, his purpose in concealing the stolen property is not to prevent the discovery of the crime. IF he he di did d not not prof profit it by by the the ef effe fect ctss of th the e cr crim ime. e. TThe he reward received by him was not the effect of the crime of parricide.

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