TITLE 2 & TITLE 3 - Criminal Law II Case Digests (The Revised Penal Code)

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ARTICLE 152 Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority People vs. Sion 277 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 109617, August 11, 1997 FACTS:  On 21 January 1992, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First Judicial Region, in Dagupan City,

Pangasinan, against appellants Sion and Disu and Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and four (4) unidentified persons (designated as John, Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime of murder committed as follows: That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, the abovenamed accused, armed with stones and a bladed weapon conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hurl with stones, attack and stab Fernando Abaoag inflicting upon him the following injuries: — stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth betw een 10-11 inches, mid axillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe

of the lung — stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2, inch in depth — stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular area, left — contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow which caused his instant death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. Only Sion and Disu were arrested. They were both found guilty of the crime of murder by the trial court thus sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Sion filed an appeal to the Supreme Court and in his appeal he stated that he is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires that "the offender voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority. As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, appellant Sion "presented" himself to Kagawad Modesto Lagman who, in turn, "escorted and surrendered" him to the police in the poblacion. His admission that he surrendered because he was already suspected as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not make his surrender "forced by circumstances" as ruled by the trial court. However, the appellee contends that there was no voluntary

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surrender because appellant Sion surrendered to a mere barangay "Kagawad" or Sangguniang Barangay member, and not to the police authorities, implying that the former is not a person in authority. ISSUE: Whether or not a Kagawad is a person in authority HELD: Yes. Section 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which expressly provides, in part, that "for purposes of the Revised

Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions . . . ." This law expands the definition of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong Barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong Tagapayapa are now considered not merely as agents of, but as persons, in authority. The Court thereby declared Sion as guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. RATIO: The Local Government Code of 1991 that Kagawads or Sangguniang Barangay members are persons in authority in their  jurisdictions. This law expands the definition of a person in authority under Article 152 o f the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong Barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority.

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ARTICLE 147 Illegal Associations People vs. Ferrer 48 SCRA 382, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972 FACTS: On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent

Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. "That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the  jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People’s Army, the military arm of the said Communist Par ty of the Philippines. Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws. ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder 2) Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is vague and embraces more than one subject 3) Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act denies the equal protection of the laws

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HELD:

1) No. it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 2) No. What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in the title of the Act Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads: "And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means, for the purpose of placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and domination of any lien power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code." The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates that the subject-matter is subversion in general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies. The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow or technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. 3) The Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country. ---

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ARTICLE 148 Direct Assaults ARTICLE 152 Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority People vs. Carpizo 80 Phil. 234, G.R. No. L-1424, February 17, 1948 FACTS: On or about the 29th day of April, 1946, in the municipality of Jolo, Province of Sulu, the said accused being the husband of

Mrs. Martina Carpizo, the creditor of provincial voucher No. A-2250, which voucher is on pre-audit in the possession of Eutiquio de la Victoria, clerk, duly appointed in the office of the Provincial Auditor of Sulu, and while the said Eutiquio de la Victoria was in the point of writing on the typewriter the tentative suspension of said voucher No. A-2250, for being defective attacked the said Eutiquio de la Victoria and took hold of his neck with his left hand and at the same time inflicted upon him a fistic blow on his left cheek which produced a contusion thereon and scratches on the left arm, which injuries have required and will require medical attendance for a period of four days and have incapacitated and incapacitate him in the customary performance of his official duties as such clerk for the same period of time. He was charged with assault upon an agent of authority with slight physical injuries but later on filed a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts alleged in the said information do not constitute the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or not a clerk is a person in authority HELD: No. A mere clerk in the provincial auditor's office is not a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. A person in

authority, in the words of article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, is "any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission;" while an agent of a person in authority is one who, by direct provisions of law, or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, or who comes to the aid of a person in authority. Even if, it be possible that this particular clerk might be clothed with functions that bring him under the above definition of an agent of a person in authority, still such functions must be clearly shown in the information. Merely to say that a clerk is an agent of a person in authority is a conclusion of the law. Therefore the offense is of slight physical injuries, formerly a mere misdemeanor, and punishable with arresto menor . The order of the lower court granting the motion to quash is affirmed.

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RATIO: A mere clerk in the provincial auditor’s office is not a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority as provided  in

Article 152 of the revised Penal Code. ---

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ARTICLE 125 Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities Ilagan vs. Enrile 139 SCRA 349, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985 FACTS: On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a

Mission Order issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a signed Mission Order. This petition for habeas corpus  was then filed by the three arrested lawyers on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases. However, the respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985 and that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that Courts lack the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. Respondents further reiterated that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its  jurisdiction to hear the case, and that the detained attorneys attorneys "were arrested not on the basis of their 'lawyering' but for for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP" ... "even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites and using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with demands for the armed overthrow of t he government." As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.

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But petitioners submit that because of the absence of a preliminary investigation, the Information for Rebellion filed against the detained attorneys is void and the Court below could not have acquired jurisdiction over them, and consequently, they are entitled to release. On the other hand, respondents contend that a preliminary preliminary investigation was unnecessary since since the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests were valid HELD: If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been

conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides: SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person. However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in t his Rule.

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Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is lawful. SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful .—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an off ense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final  judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs [al and [b] hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (Rule 113) Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in  flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the provi nce of the trial Court. The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate Court. This petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by t he Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court. ---

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ARTICLE 129 Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained, and Abuse in the Service of those Illegally Obtained Prudente vs. Dayrit 180 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989 FACTS: On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western

Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, an application for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT WARRANT NO. 87-14, fo r VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled “People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant.” In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a “Deposition of Witness” dated 31 October 1987. When asked if he knew that said property is subject of the offense of violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or inten ded to be used as the means of committing an offense, he responded that “as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days, we gathered information from verified sources that the holder of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not students who were not supposed to p ossess firearms, explosives and ammunition.” On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14, the pertinent portions of which read as follows: It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witne ss FLORENIO C. ANGELES that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are subject of the above offense or intended to be used as the means of committing the said offense. You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit: a. M16 Armalites with ammunition;

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b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; c. explosives and hand grenades; and d. assorted weapons with ammunitions. And bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant ’s lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure were valid? HELD: For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant, and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense, and the  judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. The “probable cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined “as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to b e searched.” This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and n ot based on mere hearsay. Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but b ased on hearsay evidence. In his applicat ion for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the

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other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons. While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant. What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. The petition was granted and Search Warrant No. 87-14 was annulled and set aside. ---

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ARTICLE 157 Evasion of Service of Sentence Parulan vs. Director of Prisons 22 SCRA 638, G.R. No. L-28519, February 17, 1968 FACTS: The petitioner was confined in the state penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which,

however, was commuted to twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the military barracks of Fort Bonifacio situated at Makati, Rizal, under the cust ody of the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. P etitioner was recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the imposable penalty prescribed by law on August 3, 1966. He then filed for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged. ISSUE: Whether or not he Court of First Instance of Manila is with jurisdiction to try and decid e the case and to impose the sentence

upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he was charged, evasion of service of sentence? HELD: Rule 110, section 14, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and

tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place. In transitory or continuing offenses some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has  jurisdiction to try the case. There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation, and abduction, may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another, and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. To this latter class may also

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be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service or sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for as long as he continues committing the crime, he may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion; for, under section 6(c) thereof one of the instances when a person may be validly arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime evading the service of his sentence. ---

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ARTICLE 125 Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities Sayo and Mostero vs. Chief of Police 80 Phil. 859, G.R. No. L-2128, May 12, 1948 FACTS: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin

Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them information with the proper courts  justice. ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty 2) Whether or not the city fiscal is a judicial authority HELD: When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted by law, the officer or person making the arrest should without

unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or  judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108. In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender o r take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the corresponding investigation and file, if proper, the necessary information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. For the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of

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surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration. The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. The surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judge and the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. If the city fiscal does not file the information within the period of six hours prescribed by law and the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not be responsible for violation of said article 125, because he is not the one who has arrested and illegally detained the person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the arresting officer to hold and not release the prisoner after the expiration of said period. In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of  justice. ---