Thomas Aquinas Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics 1 Books 1 to 5

November 21, 2017 | Author: Viator | Category: Truth, Epistemology, Science, Philosophical Science

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I struggled with Aristotle's Ethics at University and wish someone had told me at that time that there was a comment...

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THOMAS AQUINAS COMME NT A RY ON T HE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS of ARISTOTLE BILINGUAL EDITION

volume 1 BOOKS 1 – 5

translated by C. I. Litzinger, O.P.

Reprinted from http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Ethics.htm

BOOK I THE GOOD FOR MAN

LECTURE 1 Subject Matter and End of Moral Philosophy: Diversity of Ends Chapter 1 PRELIMINARY NOTIONS I. FIRST ARISTOTLE SHOWS WHAT HE INTENDS TO DO. — 1 to 7 A. He presents in advance certain things necessary to explain his intention. 1. HE SHOWS HOW IT IS NECESSARY TO START WITH THE END. a. He states... that all human things are ordered to an end. i. He states his intention. — 8 πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ·

All arts and all teaching, and similarly every act and every choice seem to have the attainment of some good as their object. —

ii. He explains his purpose. — 9-10 διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται.

For this reason it has correctly been proclaimed that good is what all desire.

b. He shows that there can be a number of ends. — 12-13 διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.

Now a certain diversity of ends is apparent, for some are operations while others are works outside the operations.

c. He makes a comparison among ends. — 14

ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα.

If the ends are works then the works are better than the operations.

2. HE COMPARES HABITS AND ACTS WITH THE END. a. He shows that different things are ordered to different ends. — 15

πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος.

Since there are many operations and arts and sciences there must also be different ends for each of them. Thus the end of medical art is health; of shipbuilding, navigation; of strategy, victory; of domestic economy, riches. b. He arranges the order of habits among themselves. — 16

ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας·

In all such skills a subordination of one to another is found. For instance, the art of bridle-making is subordinated to the art of riding as also are the arts which make riding equipment. The art of riding in turn, and all military operations, come under strategy. In a similar way other arts are subordinated to still others.

c. He lays down the order of ends. — 17 ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται.

It follows then that in all these, architectonic ends are more desirable than the ends subordinated to them. The reason is that men seek the latter for the sake of the former.

d. He shows that it makes no difference whether the end is a product or an operation. — 18 διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν

It does not matter whether the ends are operations themselves or something other

πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

than the operations as in the skills mentioned above.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Sicut philosophus dicit in principio metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem. Nam etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis. Invenitur autem duplex ordo in rebus. Unus quidem partium alicuius totius seu alicuius multitudinis adinvicem, sicut partes domus ad invicem ordinantur; alius autem est ordo rerum in finem. Et hic ordo est principalior, quam primus. Nam, ut philosophus dicit in XI metaphysicae, ordo partium exercitus adinvicem, est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur. Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae; tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo.

1. As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics (Bk. 1, Ch. 2, 982 a 18; St. Th. 2, 41-42), it is the business of the wise man to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the most powerful perfection of reason whose characteristic is to know order. Even if the sensitive powers know some things absolutely, nevertheless to know the order of one thing to another is exclusively the work of intellect or reason. Now a twofold order is found in things. One kind is that of parts of a totality, that is, a group, among themselves, as the parts of a house are mutually ordered to each other. The second order is that of things to an end. This order is of greater importance than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics (Bk. XII, Ch. 10, 1075 a 15; St. Th. Bk. XII, Lect. 12, 2629-2631), the order of the parts of an army among themselves exists because of the order of the whole army to the commander. Now order is related to reason in a fourfold way. There is one order that reason does not establish but only beholds, such is the order of things in nature. There is a second order that reason establishes in its own act of consideration, for example, when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of concept as well, because words express the meanings of the concepts. There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in the operations of the will. There is a fourth order that reason in planning establishes in the external things which it causes, such as a chest and a house.

Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae. Nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones; ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam, pertinet ad artes mechanicas.

2. Because the operation of reason is perfected by habit, according to the different modes of order that reason considers in particular, a differentiation of sciences arises. The function of natural philosophy is to consider the order of things that human reason considers but does not establish—understand that with natural philosophy here we also include metaphysics. The order that reason makes in its own act of consideration pertains to rational philosophy (logic), which properly considers the order of the parts of verbal expression with one another and the order of principles to one another and to their conclusions. The order of voluntary actions pertains to the consideration of moral philosophy. The order that reason in planning establishes in external things arranged by human reason pertains to the mechanical arts.

Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae adinvicem et ad finem.

Accordingly it is proper to moral philosophy, to which our attention is at present directed, to consider human operations insofar as they are ordered one another and to an end.

Dico autem operationes humanas, quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis. Nam si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur, quae non subiacent voluntati et rationi, non dicuntur proprie humanae, sed naturales, sicut patet de operationibus animae vegetabilis, quae nullo modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut igitur subiectum

3. I am talking about human operations, those springing from man’s will following the order of reason. But if some operations are found in man that are not subject to the will and reason, they are not properly called human but natural, as, clearly appears in operations of the vegetative soul. These in no way fall under the consideration of moral philosophy. As the subject of natural philosophy is motion, or mobile being, so the subject of moral philosophy is human action ordered to an end, or even man, as he is an

philosophiae naturalis est motus, vel res mobilis, ita etiam subiectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem, vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem.

agent voluntarily acting for an end.

Sciendum est autem, quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; consequens est, quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicuius multitudinis, per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum. Quo quidem auxilio indiget ad duo. Primo quidem ad ea quae sunt vitae necessaria, sine quibus praesens vita transigi non potest: et ad hoc auxiliatur homini domestica multitudo, cuius est pars. Nam quilibet homo a parentibus habet generationem et nutrimentum et disciplinam et similiter etiam singuli, qui sunt partes domesticae familiae, seinvicem iuvant ad necessaria vitae. Alio modo iuvatur homo a multitudine, cuius est pars, ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et bene vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt ad vitam: et sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis, cuius ipse est pars, non solum quantum ad corporalia, prout scilicet in civitate sunt multa artificia, ad quae una domus sufficere non potest, sed etiam quantum ad moralia; inquantum scilicet per publicam potestatem

4. It must be understood that, because man is by nature a social animal, needing many things to live which he cannot get for himself if alone, he naturally is a part of a group that furnishes him help to live well. He needs this help for two reasons. First, to have what is necessary for life, without which he cannot live the present life; an for this, man is helped by the domestic group of which he is a part. For every man is indebted to his parents for his generation and his nourishment and instruction. Likewise individuals, who are members of the family, help one another to procure the necessities of life. In another way, man receives help from the group of which he is a part, to have a perfect sufficiency for life; namely, that man may not only live but live well, having everything sufficient for living; and in this way man is helped by the civic group, of which he is a member, not only in regard to bodily needs—as certainly in the state there are many crafts which a single household cannot provide—but also in regard to right conduct, inasmuch as public authority restrains with fear of punishment delinquent young men whom paternal admonition is not able to correct.

coercentur insolentes iuvenes metu poenae, quos paterna monitio corrigere non valet.

Sciendum

est

autem, quod hoc

5. It must be known moreover that the whole

totum, quod est civilis multitudo, vel domestica familia habet solam ordinis

which the political group or the family constitutes has only a unity of order, for it is not

unitatem, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum; et ideo pars

something absolutely one. A part of this whole, therefore, can have an operation that is not the

huius totius potest habere operationem, quae non est operatio

operation of the whole, as a soldier in an army has an activity that does not belong to the whole

totius, sicut miles in exercitu habet operationem quae non est totius

army. However, this whole does have an operation that is not proper to its parts but to

exercitus. Habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem,

the whole—for example, an assault of the entire army. Likewise the movement of a boat is a

quae non est propria alicuius partium, sed totius, puta conflictus

combined operation of the crew rowing the boat. There is also a kind of whole that has not only a

totius exercitus. Et tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium

unity of order but of composition, or of conjunction, or even of continuity, and according

navem. Est autem aliud totum quod habet unitatem non solum ordine, sed

to this unity a thing is one absolutely; and therefore there is no operation of the part that

compositione, aut colligatione, vel etiam continuitate, secundum quam

does not belong to the whole. For in things all of one piece the motion of the whole and of the part

unitatem est aliquid unum simpliciter; et ideo nulla est operatio

is the same. Similarly in composites and in conjoined things, the operation of a part is

partis, quae non sit totius. In continuis enim idem est motus totius

principally that of the whole. For this reason it is necessary that such a consideration of both the

et partis; et similiter in compositis, vel colligatis, operatio partis

whole and its parts should belong to the same science. It does not, however, pertain to the same

principaliter est totius; et ideo oportet, quod ad eamdem scientiam

science to consider the whole, which has solely the unity of order, and the parts of this whole.

pertineat consideratio talis totius et partis eius. Non autem ad eamdem scientiam pertinet considerare totum quod habet solam ordinis unitatem, et partes ipsius. Et inde est, quod moralis philosophia in tres partes dividitur. Quarum

6. Thus it is that moral philosophy is divided into three parts. The first of these, which is called

prima considerat operationes unius hominis ordinatas ad finem, quae

individual (monastic) ethics, considers an individual’s operations as ordered to an end. The

vocatur monastica. Secunda autem considerat operationes multitudinis

second, called domestic ethics, considers the operations of the domestic group. The third,

domesticae, quae vocatur oeconomica. Tertia autem considerat

called political science, considers the operations of the civic group.

operationes multitudinis civilis, quae vocatur politica.

Incipiens igitur Aristoteles tradere

7. Thus Aristotle as he begins the treatment of

moralem philosophiam a prima sui parte in hoc libro, qui dicitur

moral philosophy in the first part of this book called Ethics, or morals, first gives an

Ethicorum, idest Moralium, praemittit prooemium, in quo tria

introduction in which he does three things. First [1] he shows what he intends to do. Second

facit. Primo enim ostendit de quo est intentio. Secundo modum tractandi,

[Lect. 3, II], at “Our study will be etc.” (B.1094 b 13), he determines the manner of treatment.

ibi, dicetur autem utique sufficienter et cetera. Tertio qualis debeat esse

Third [III] in the same lecture, at “Now every man etc.” (B.1094 b 29), he explains what

auditor huius scientiae, ibi: unusquisque autem bene iudicat et

manner of person the student of this science ought to be. In regard to the initial point he does

cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo praemittit quaedam, quae sunt

two things. First [A] he presents in advance certain things necessary to explain his intention.

necessaria ad propositum ostendendum. Secundo manifestat

Second [Lect. 2, B], at “If our actions etc.” (B.1094 a 19), he manifests his intention. In

propositum, ibi, si utique est aliquis finis et cetera. Circa primum duo

regard to the first he does two things. Initially [1] he shows how it is necessary to start with

facit. Primo necessitatem

proponit secundo

the end. Then [2], at “Since there are many etc.,” he compares habits and acts with the end. On the

habitudinem humanorum actuum ad finem, ibi: multis autem

first point he does three things. He states initially [1, a] that all human beings are ordered

operationibus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit,

to an end. Next [1, b], at “Now a certain diversity etc.,” he shows that there can be a number of

quod omnia humana ordinantur ad finem; secundo ostendit diversitatem

ends. Last [ 1, c], at “If the ends are works etc.,” he makes a comparison among ends. In regard to

finium, ibi, differentia vero finium etc.; tertio ponit comparationem

the first point he does two things. He states his intention [i]; and then, at “For this reason etc.”

finium adinvicem, ibi, quorum autem sunt fines et cetera. Circa primum

[ii], he explains his purpose.

enim finis;

duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, ideo enunciaverunt et cetera.

bene

Circa primum, considerandum est, quod duo sunt principia humanorum

8. In regard to the first we should consider that there are two principles of human acts, namely,

actuum, scilicet intellectus seu ratio, et appetitus, quae sunt principia

the intellect or reason and the appetite, which are active principles as explained in the third book De

moventia, ut dicitur in tertio de anima. In intellectu autem vel ratione

Anima (Ch. XI, 434 a5a22; St. Th. Lect. 16, 840-846). The intellect or reason considers both

consideratur speculativum et practicum. In appetitu autem

the speculative and the practical. The rational appetite is concerned with choice and execution.

rationali consideratur electio et executio. Omnia autem ista

Now all these are ordered to some good as to their end, for truth is the end of speculation.

ordinantur ad aliquod bonum sicut in finem; nam verum est finis speculationis. Quantum ergo ad intellectum speculativum ponit doctrinam per

Therefore, in the speculative intellect he includes teaching by which science is conveyed from

quam transfunditur scientia a magistro in discipulum. Quantum

teacher to student, while in the practical intellect he locates art which is right reason applied to

vero ad intellectum practicum ponit artem, quae est recta ratio

things to be made, as is stated in the sixth book of this work (1153). He indicates that the act of

factibilium, ut habetur in VI huius; quantum vero ad actum intellectus

the appetitive intellect is choice, and that execution is “actus.” He does not mention

appetitivi ponitur electio. Quantum vero ad executionem ponitur actus.

prudence, which is in the practical reason together with art, because choice is properly

Non facit autem mentionem de prudentia, quae est in ratione

directed by prudence. He says therefore that each of these faculties obviously seeks some good as

practica sicut et ars, quia per prudentiam proprie dirigitur electio.

an end.

Dicit ergo quod singulum horum manifeste appetit quoddam bonum tamquam finem.

Deinde

cum

dicit:

ideo

bene

9. Then [ii], at “For this reason,” he manifests

enuntiaverunt etc., manifestat propositum per diffinitionem boni.

his intention by the effect of good. In regard to this we should bear in mind that good is

Circa quod considerandum est, quod bonum numeratur inter prima: adeo

enumerated among the primary entities to such a degree—according to the Platonists—that good

quod secundum Platonicos, bonum est prius ente. Sed secundum rei

is prior to being. But, in reality, good is convertible with being. Now primary things

veritatem bonum convertitur. Prima

ente non

cannot be understood by anything anterior to them, but by something consequent, as causes

possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut

are understood through their proper effects. But since good properly is the moving principle of the

causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum

appetite, good is described as movement of the appetite, just as motive power is usually

appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet

manifested through motion. For this reason he says that the philosophers have rightly declared

manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene

that good is what all desire.

cum autem

enunciaverunt, bonum esse id quod

omnia appetunt. Nec est instantia de quibusdam, qui appetunt malum. Quia non appetunt

10. There is no problem from the fact that some men desire evil. For they desire evil only under

malum nisi sub ratione boni, in quantum scilicet aestimant illud esse

the aspect of good, that is, insofar as they think it good. Hence their intention primarily aims at

bonum, et sic intentio eorum per se fertur ad bonum, sed per accidens

the good and only incidentally touches on the evil.

cadit supra malum. Quod autem dicit appetunt, non est

quod omnia intelligendum

11. The saying “... what all desire” is to be understood not only of those who knowingly seek

solum de habentibus cognitionem, quae apprehendunt bonum, sed etiam

good but also of beings lacking knowledge. These things by a natural desire tend to good, not as

de rebus carentibus cognitione, quae naturali appetitu tendunt in bonum,

knowing the good, but because they are moved to it by something cognitive, that is, under the

non quasi cognoscant bonum, sed quia ab aliquo cognoscente moventur

direction of the divine intellect in the way an arrow speeds towards a target by the aim of the

ad bonum, scilicet ex ordinatione divini intellectus: ad modum quo

archer. This very tendency to good is the desiring of good. Hence, he says, all beings desire

sagitta tendit ad signum ex directione sagittantis. Ipsum autem

good insofar as they tend to good. But there is not one good to which all tend; this will be

tendere in bonum, est appetere bonum, unde et actum dixit appetere

explained later (58-59; 108-109). Therefore he does not single out here a particular good but

bonum in quantum tendit in bonum. Non autem est unum bonum in quod

rather discusses good in general. However, because nothing is good except insofar as it is a

omnia tendunt, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo non describitur hic aliquod unum

likeness and participation of the highest good, the highest good itself is in some way desired in

bonum, sed bonum communiter sumptum. Quia autem nihil est

every particular good. Thus it can be said that the true good is what all desire.

bonum, nisi inquantum est quaedam similitudo et participatio summi boni, ipsum summum bonum quodammodo appetitur in quolibet bono et sic potest dici quod unum bonum est, quod omnia appetunt. Deinde cum dicit: differentia vero quaedam etc., ostendit differentiam

12. Then [i, b], at “Now a certain diversity,” he indicates that there is a diversity of ends. In this

finium. Circa quod considerandum est, quod finale bonum in quod tendit

we must keep in mind that the final good, to which the inclination of each thing tends, is its

appetitus uniuscuiusque est ultima perfectio eius. Prima autem perfectio

ultimate perfection. Now the first perfection is possessed after the manner of a form, but the

se habet per modum formae. Secunda autem per modum operationis. Et

second perfection by way of an operation. Consequently, there must be this diversity of

ideo oportet hanc esse differentiam finium quod quidam fines sint ipsae

ends: some are operations and others are the objects achieved, that is, the products which exist

operationes, quidam vero sint ipsa opera, id est opera quaedam praeter

apart from the operations.

operationes. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod duplex est operatio, ut

13. For evidence of this we must consider that activity is of two kinds, as noted in the ninth

dicitur in IX metaphysicae: una quae manet in ipso operante, sicut videre,

book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 8, 1050 a 23; St. Th. lect. 8, 1862-1865). One, which remains in

velle et intelligere: et huiusmodi operatio proprie dicitur actio; alia

the agent himself, as seeing, wishing and understanding, is an operation of the type

autem est operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam, quae proprie

properly called “action.” The other is an operation passing over into external matter and

dicitur factio; et haec est duplex: quandoque enim aliquis exteriorem

is properly called “making.” Sometimes a person accepts external matter only for use, as a horse

materiam assumit solum ad usum, sicut equum ad equitandum, et

for riding and a zither for playing, and at other times he takes external matter to change it into

cytharam ad cytharizandum. Quandoque autem assumit materiam

some other form, as when a carpenter constructs a house or a bed. Accordingly, the first and

exteriorem ut mutet eam in aliquam formam, sicut cum artifex facit

second of these operations do not have any product which is their term, but each of them is

lectum aut domum. Prima igitur et secunda harum operationum non

an end. The first, however, is more excellent than the second, inasmuch as it remains in the agent

habent aliquid operatum quod sit finis, sed utraque earum est finis;

himself. But the third operation is a kind of generation whose term is a thing produced. So,

prima tamen nobilior est quam secunda: inquantum manet in ipso

in operations of the third type, the things done are the ends.

operante. Tertia vero operatio est sicut generatio quaedam, cuius finis est res generata. operationibus tertii operata sunt fines.

Et ideo in generis ipsa

Deinde cum dicit: quorum autem sunt fines etc., ponit tertium; dicens, quod in quibuscumque operata, quae

14. Then [ i, c ], at “If the ends,” he presents the third type, saying that whenever the products which are extrinsic to the activities are ends, the

sunt praeter operationes, sunt fines, oportet quod in his operata sint meliora operationibus: sicut res generata est melior generatione.

things produced necessarily are better than the operations that brought them to be, as the thing generated is better than the generative action. The end is more important than the means—in

Nam finis est potior his quae sunt ad

fact, the means have goodness from their

finem. Nam ea quae sunt in finem habent rationem boni ex ordine in finem.

relation to the end.

Deinde cum dicit: multis autem operationibus etc., agit de comparatione habituum et actuum ad finem. Et circa hoc quatuor facit.

15. Then [2], at “Since there are many operations,” he compares habits and acts with the end. In this matter he does four things. First [2, a] he shows that different things are ordered

Primo manifestat, quod diversa ordinantur ad diversos fines. Et dicit, quod cum multae sint operationes, et artes et doctrinae, necesse est quod

to different ends. He says that, since there are many operations and arts and sciences, there must be different ends for each of them, for the ends and the means are proportional. This he

earum sint diversi fines. Quia fines, et ea quae sunt ad finem sunt proportionalia. Quod quidem manifestat per hoc, quod artis

shows by saying that the end of medical art is health; of shipbuilding, navigation; of strategy, victory; and of domestic economy or managing a household, riches. He accepts this last example

medicinalis finis est sanitas, navifactivae vero navigatio, militaris autem victoria, oeconomicae vero, idest dispensativae domus, divitiae,

on the opinion of the majority of men, for he himself proves in the first book of the Politics (Ch. 3-4, 1253 b 12-1254 a; St. Th. Lect. 2, 4651; Ch. 9-11, 1256 b 40-1259 a 36; St. Th. Lect.

quod quidem dicit secundum multorum opinionem. Ipse autem probat in primo politicae, quod divitiae non sunt finis oeconomicae,

7-9, 71-100) that riches are not the end of domestic economy but the instruments thereof.

sed instrumenta. Secundo ibi: quaecumque autem sunt talium etc., ponit ordinem habituum

16. Second [2, b], at “In all such skills,” he arranges the order of habits among themselves.

adinvicem. Contingit enim unum habitum operativum, quem vocat virtutem, sub alio esse. Sicut ars quae facit frena est sub arte

It happens that one operative habit, which he calls virtue (skill), is subordinated to another, as the art of bridle-making is subordinated to the art of riding because the rider tells the bridle-

equitandi, quia ille qui debet equitare praecipit artifici qualiter faciat frenum. Et sic est architector, idest principalis artifex respectu ipsius. Et

maker how he should make the bridle. In this way the rider is the designer, that is, the chief producer of the thing itself. The same arguments hold for the other arts making additional

eadem ratio est de aliis artibus, quae faciunt alia instrumenta necessaria ad equitandum, puta sellas, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Equestris autem

equipment needed for riding, such as saddles or the like. The equestrian art is again subordinated to the military, for in ancient times the army included not only mounted soldiers but everyone

ulterius ordinatur sub militari. Milites enim dicebantur antiquitus

who fought for victory. Hence under military science there is not only the equestrian but every

non solum equites, sed quicumque pugnatores ad vincendum. Unde sub militari continetur non solum

art or skill ordered to the prosecution of wararchery, ballistics and everything else of this kind. In this same way other arts are

equestris, sed omnis ars vel virtus ordinata ad bellicam operationem, sicut sagittaria, fundibularia vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi. Et per

subordinated to still others.

eundem modum aliae artes sub aliis. Tertio ibi: in omnibus utique etc., proponit ordinem finium secundum

17, Third [2, c], at “It follows then,” he lays down the order of ends according to the order of

ordinem habituum. Et dicit quod in omnibus artibus vel virtutibus hoc communiter est verum, quod fines architectonicarum sunt simpliciter

habits. He says that in all arts or skills it is commonly true that the architectonic ends are absolutely more desirable to everyone than are the ends of the arts or skills that are

quoad omnes magis desiderabiles, quam fines artium vel virtutum, quae sunt sub principalibus. Quod probat per hoc, quod homines persequuntur,

subordinated to the chief ends. He proves this from the fact that men follow or seek the ends of the inferior arts or skills for the sake of the ends of the superior. The text, however, is suspensive,

id est quaerunt, illa, id est fines inferiorum artium vel virtutum gratia horum, idest propter fines superiorum. Litera autem suspensiva

and should be read as follows: In all such skills a subordination of one to another is found... in all these the architectonic ends etc.

est, et sic legenda: quaecumque sunt talium sub una quadam virtute (...) in omnibus utique architectonicarum fines et cetera. Quarto ostendit non differre quantum ad ordinem finium, utrum finis sit opus vel operatio. Et dicit

18. Fourth [2, d], at “It does not matter,” he shows that it makes no difference in the order of ends, whether the end is a product or an activity.

quod nihil differt, quantum ad ordinem pertinet, quod fines earum sint operationes, aut aliquod operatum praeter operationes, sicut

He says that it makes no difference in what pertains to this order that these ends be activities or some product other than the activities, as is evident from the explanation given above (16).

apparet in praedictis doctrinis. Nam frenifactivae finis est operatum frenum; equestris vero, quae est principalior, finis est operatio scilicet

The end of bridle-making is a finished bridle; but the end of horsemanship, which is of greater importance, is an operation, that is, riding. The contrary is true in medicine and gymnastics, for

equitatio; e converso autem se habet in medicinali, et in exercitativa. Nam medicinalis finis est aliquod operatum, idest sanitas.

the end of medicine is something produced, namely, health. But of gymnastics which is comprised under it, the end is an activity, which is exercise.

Exercitativae vero, quae sub ea continetur, finis est operatio idest exercitium.

LECTURE 2 The Supreme End of Human Affairs; Political Science Chapter 2 B. The philosopher now begins to show what the principal purpose of this science is. 1. HE SHOWS... THERE IS SOME SUPREME END OF HUMAN AFFAIRS. — 19-22 εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν

If our actions have an end that we wish for

πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα πρόεισι

itself and if we wish other things for that end, and not each thing on account of another (for this would involve us in an infinite process making our desire useless and in vain) then

γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ

obviously that will be not only a good end but a supreme end.

τὸ ἄριστον. 2. HE SHOWS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW THIS END. a. He shows that it is necessary for man to know such an end. — 23 ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ

A knowledge of it, therefore, will be a great

γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ

help in human living, for like archers keeping their eye on the target, we will more likely attain our objective.

b. He manifests what man should know about it. — 24 δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε

This being the case, we must try to determine

περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ

the general characteristics of this end and to which of the sciences or skills its study

δυνάμεων.

pertains.

3.

HE SHOWS TO WHICH SCIENCE THIS KNOWLEDGE

BELONGS. a. He gives a reason in proof of his statement. — 25 δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται·

It seems undoubtedly to belong to the most truly architectonic science. This, to all appearances, is political science.

b. He proves something that he had previously assumed. i. He proves that (political science) is most truly architectonic. x. He ascribes to political science... the things belonging to an architectonic science. — 26-28 τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν

Now such a science ordains which studies are

ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει· ὁρῶμεν δὲ

to be followed in a state, and who are to pursue them and to what extent. Hence we see the noblest of the operative arts, for example, strategy, domestic economy, and rhetoric fall

καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικήν·

under political science.

y. From this he draws the conclusion he intended. — 29 χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς

Political Science in fact makes use of other

λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων

practical sciences, even legislating what is to be done and what is not to be done. Its end, therefore, embraces the ends of the other practical sciences. For these reasons, then,

ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν.

this end will be the good of man.

ii. (He proves) that it is most important. — 30-31

εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ

Even though the good be the same for one

καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ

man and for the whole state, it seems much better and more perfect to procure and preserve the good of the whole state. It is admirable, indeed, to preserve the good of an

καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα.

individual but it is better still and more divine to do this for a nation and for cities. With such a good as the object of our inquiry we may call our study political science.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Si itaque est aliquis finis operabilium et cetera. Praemissis his quae sunt necessaria ad propositum ostendendum, hic accedit philosophus ad manifestandum

19. After having stated premises on which his proposition must rest, the Philosopher now begins to manifest it, that is, to show what the principal purpose of this science is

propositum, scilicet ad ostendendum ad quid principaliter respiciat huius scientiae intentio. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit ex praemissis, esse aliquem finem

[B]. To achieve this he does three things. First [1 ] he shows from what he has already said, that there is some supreme end of human affairs. Second [2], at “A

optimum in rebus humanis. Secundo ostendit, quod necessarium est habere cognitionem de ipso, ibi, igitur ad vitam et cetera. Tertio ostendit ad quam scientiam

knowledge of it etc.,” he shows that it is necessary to know this end. Third [3], at “It seems undoubtedly,” he shows to which science this knowledge belongs. He gives

pertineat eius cognitio ibi. Videbitur autem utique principalissimae et cetera. Circa primum utitur triplici ratione. Quarum principalis talis est. Quicumque

three proofs for the first statement. The principal one is this. Whenever an end is such that we wish other things because of it, and we wish it for itself and not because of

finis est talis quod alia volumus propter illum et ipsum volumus propter se ipsum et non aliquid aliud, iste finis non solum est bonus, sed etiam est optimus, et hoc

something else, then that end is not only a good end but a supreme one. This is obvious from the fact that an end for the sake of which other ends are sought is of greater

apparet ex hoc quod semper finis cuius gratia alii fines quaeruntur est principalior, ut ex supra dictis patet; sed necesse est esse aliquem talem finem.

importance than they, as is evident from his earlier remarks (16). But it is necessary that there be some such end of human affairs. Therefore, human life or activity has

Ergo in rebus humanis est aliquis finis bonus et optimus.

some good end which is supreme.

Minorem probat secunda ratione ducente

20. He proves the minor premise by an

ad impossibile, quae talis est. Manifestum est ex praemissis quod unus finis propter

argument leading to an impossible conclusion. Thus, it is evident from the

alium desideratur. Aut ergo est devenire ad aliquem finem, qui non desideratur propter alium, aut non. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si autem non est invenire

premises (16) that one end is desired on account of another. Now, either we arrive at some end which is not desired on account of another, or we do not. If we do, the

aliquem talem finem, consequens est quod omnis finis desideretur propter alium finem. Et sic oportet procedere in infinitum. Sed hoc est impossibile, quod

proposition is proved. If, however, we do not find some such end, it follows that every end will be desired on account of another end. In this case we must proceed to infinity. But it

procedatur in finibus in infinitum: ergo necesse est esse aliquem finem qui non sit propter alium finem desideratus.

is impossible in ends to proceed to infinity. Therefore, there must be some end that is not desired on account of another.

Quod autem sit impossibile in finibus procedere in infinitum, probat tertia ratione quae est etiam ducens ad impossibile, hoc modo. Si procedatur in

21. That it is impossible in ends to proceed to infinity is proved also by an argument having an impossible resolution. If we should proceed to infinity in our desire for

infinitum in desiderio finium, ut scilicet semper unus finis desideretur propter alium in infinitum, nunquam erit devenire ad hoc quod homo consequatur fines

ends so that one end should always be desired on account of another to infinity, we will never arrive at the point where a man may attain the ends desired. But a man

desideratos. Sed frustra et vane aliquis desiderat id quod non potest assequi; ergo desiderium finis esset frustra et vanum. Sed hoc desiderium est naturale: dictum

desires fruitlessly what consequently, the end he useless and vain. But this for it was said above (9)

enim est supra quod bonum est, quod naturaliter omnia desiderant; ergo sequetur quod naturale desiderium sit

what all beings naturally desire. Hence it follows that a natural desire would be useless and vain. But this is impossible. The

inane et vacuum. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia naturale desiderium nihil aliud est quam inclinatio inhaerens rebus ex ordinatione primi moventis, quae non

reason is that a natural desire is nothing else but an inclination belonging to things by the disposition of the First Mover, and this cannot be frustrated. Therefore, it is

potest esse supervacua; ergo impossibile est quod in finibus procedatur in infinitum.

impossible that we should proceed to an infinity of ends.

Et sic necesse est esse aliquem ultimum finem propter quem omnia alia

12. It follows that there must be some ultimate end on account of which all other

desiderantur et ipse non desideratur propter alia. Et ita necesse est esse aliquem optimum finem rerum humanarum.

things are desired, while this end itself is not desired on account of anything else. So there must be some supreme end of human affairs.

Deinde cum dicit: igitur ad vitam etc.,

23. Then [2], at “A knowledge of it,” he

he cannot get; desires would be desire is natural, that the good is

ostendit quod huius finis cognitio, est homini necessaria. Et circa hoc duo facit.

shows that the knowledge of this end is necessary for man. He proves this in two

Primo ostendit, quod necessarium est homini cognoscere talem finem. Secundo ostendit quid de eo cognoscere oporteat, ibi, si autem sic, tentandum est, et cetera.

steps. First [2, a] he shows that it is necessary for man to know such an end. Second [2, b], at “This being the case etc.,” he manifests what man should know about

Concludit ergo primo ex dictis, quod ex quo est aliquis optimus finis rerum humanarum, cognitio eius, habet magnum incrementum ad vitam, idest

it. He concludes then from what has been said (19-22), that it is necessary for man to know that there is a supreme end of human affairs because this has great importance for

multum auxilium confert ad totam vitam humanam. Quod quidem apparet tali ratione. Nihil quod in alterum dirigitur potest homo recte assequi nisi cognoscat

life, that is, it is of great help in all phases of human living. This conclusion is apparent for the following reasons. Nothing that is directed to another can be immediately

illud ad quod dirigendum est. Et hoc apparet per exemplum sagittatoris, qui directe emittit sagittam, attendens ad signum ad quod eam dirigit. Sed tota

attained by man unless he knows that other to which it is to he directed. An obvious indication of this is found in the example of the archer who shoots straight because he

humana vita oportet quod ordinetur in ultimum et optimum finem humanae vitae; ergo ad rectitudinem humanae vitae necesse est habere cognitionem de ultimo

keeps his eye on the target at which he is aiming. Now man’s whole life ought to be ordered to the supreme and ultimate end of human life. It is necessary, therefore, to

et optimo fine humanae vitae. Et huius ratio est, quia semper ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumenda est ab ipso fine, ut etiam in secundo physicorum probatur.

have a knowledge of this end of human life. The explanation is that the reason for the means must always be found in the end itself, as also is proved in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 9, 199 b 34-200 b 10; St. Th. Lect. 15, 184-188).

Deinde cum dicit: si autem sic etc.,

24. Then [2, b], at “This being the case,” he

ostendit quid circa istum finem sit cognoscendum. Et dicit quod ex quo sic est, quod cognitio optimi finis necessaria est ad vitam humanam: oportet accipere

shows what ought to be known about that end. He states that inasmuch as the knowledge of the supreme end is necessary for human life, we must determine what, is

quis sit iste optimus finis et ad quam scientiam speculativam vel practicam pertineat eius consideratio. Per disciplinas enim intelligit scientias speculativas, per

the supreme end, and to which speculative or practical science its study belongs. By sciences he understands the speculative sciences, and by skills the practical sciences

virtutes autem scientias practicas, quia sunt aliquarum operationum principia. Dicit autem quod tentandum est de his determinare ad insinuandum

since there are principles of some operations. According to him we must make this attempt, in order to suggest the difficulty there is in grasping the ultimate end of

difficultatem, quae est

human life, as in considering all ultimate

in

accipiendo

ultimum finem in humana vita sicut et in considerando omnes causas altissimas. Dicit autem quod oportet illud accipere figuraliter, id est verisimiliter, quia talis

causes. He says then that we should understand it in its general outlines, that is, with only the evidence of probability because such a manner of understanding is largely

modus accipiendi convenit rebus humanis, ut infra dicetur. Horum autem duorum, primum quidem pertinet ad tractatum huius scientiae, quia talis consideratio est

what is available in human things, as he will explain later on (131-134). Now the first of these two belongs to the treatise on this science because such a consideration is

circa rem de qua haec scientia considerat. Sed secundum pertinet ad prooemium: in quo manifestatur intentio huius doctrinae.

about the matter of this science. But the second belongs to the introduction, where its purpose is explained.

Et ideo statim consequenter cum dicit:

25. Therefore when immediately after this

videbitur autem utique etc., ostendit ad quam scientiam pertineat huius finis consideratio. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationem ad propositum

material he says “It seems undoubtedly” [3], he shows to which science the consideration of this end should belong. In regard to this he does two things. First [3, a] he gives a

ostendendum. Secundo probat quiddam quod supposuerat, ibi: quas enim esse est debitum et cetera. Primo ergo ponit rationem ad propositum, quae talis est.

reason in proof of his statement. Second [3, b], at “Now such a science etc.,” he proves something which he had previously presumed. First then, he states the reason

Optimus finis pertinet ad principalissimam scientiam, et maxime architectonicam. Et hoc patet ex his, quae supra praemissa sunt. Dictum est enim quod sub scientia

for his proposal, which is this: the supreme end belongs to the most important and most truly architectonic science. This is clear from what was said above, for it was pointed

vel arte quae est de fine continentur illae quae sunt circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et sic oportet quod ultimus finis pertineat ad scientiam principalissimam, tamquam de

out (16, 20) that the sciences or arts treating of the means to the end are contained under the science or art treating of the end. So it is necessary that the

principalissimo fine existentem, et maxime architectonicae, tamquam praecipienti aliis quid oporteat facere. Sed civilis scientia videtur esse talis, scilicet

ultimate end should belong to the most important science concerned with the primary and most important end and to the truly architectonic science as directing the

principalissima, et maxime architectonica. Ergo ad eam pertinet considerare optimum finem.

others in what they should do. But political science appears to be such, namely, the most important and the most truly architectonic. Therefore, it belongs to it to consider the supreme end.

Deinde cum dicit: quas enim esse etc.,

26. Then [3, b], at “Now such a science’ “ he

probat quod supposuerat; scilicet quod

proves what he had taken for granted: that

civilis sit talis. Et primo probat quod sit maxime architectonica. Secundo quod sit

political science is such a science. First [b, i] he proves that it is most truly architectonic,

principalissima, ibi: si enim et idem est uni et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo attribuit politicae, sive civili, ea quae pertinent ad scientiam architectonicam.

and next [b, ii], at “For even though the good etc.,” that it is most important. He handles the first statement in two ways. First [i, x] he ascribes to political science or

Secundo ex his concludit propositum, ibi, utente autem hac et cetera. Duo autem pertinent ad scientiam architectonicam, quorum unum est, quod ipsa praecipit

politics the things which belong to an architectonic science. Second [i, y] from this he draws the conclusion he intended, at “Political science etc.” There are two

scientiae vel arti quae est sub ipsa quid debeat operari, sicut equestris praecipit frenifactivae. Aliud autem est, quod utitur ea ad suum finem. Primum autem horum

characteristics of architectonic knowledge. One is that it dictates what is to be done by the art or science subject to it, as the equestrian art dictates the manner of bridle-

convenit politicae, vel civili, tam respectu speculativarum scientiarum, quam respectu practicarum; aliter tamen et aliter. Nam practicae scientiae praecipit

making. The other is that it uses it for its own ends. Now the first of these is applicable to politics or political science both in regard to speculative and in regard to practical

politica, et quantum ad usum eius ut scilicet operetur vel non operetur, et quantum ad determinationem actus. Praecipit enim fabro non solum quod

sciences-in different ways, however. Political science dictates to a practical science both in the matter of its activity, that is, whether or not it should operate, and in regard to the

utatur sua arte, sed etiam quod sic utatur, tales cultellos faciens. Utrumque enim est ordinatum ad finem humanae vitae.

objects to which its operation is to be directed. It dictates to the smith not only that he use his skill but also that he use it in such a fashion as to make knives of a particular kind. Both (characteristics of architectonic knowledge) are ordered to the end of human living.

Sed scientiae speculativae praecipit civilis

27. But political science dictates to a

solum quantum ad usum, non autem quantum ad determinationem operis; ordinat enim politica, quod aliqui doceant vel addiscant geometriam. Huiusmodi

speculative science only as to activity, but not concerning the specification of its proper activity. Political science orders that some teach or learn geometry, and actions of this

enim actus inquantum sunt voluntarii pertinent ad materiam moralem et sunt ordinabiles ad finem humanae vitae. Non autem praecipit politicus geometrae quid

kind insofar as they are voluntary belong to the matter of ethics and can be ordered to the goal of human living. But the political ruler does not dictate to geometry what

de triangulo concludat, hoc enim non subiacet humanae voluntati, nec est ordinabile humanae vitae, sed dependet ex ipsa rerum ratione. Et ideo dicit, quod

conclusions it should draw about a triangle, for this is not subject to the human will nor can it be ordered to human living but it depends on the very nature of things.

politica praeordinat quas disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, scilicet tam practicarum quam speculativarum, et quis quam debeat addiscere, et usque ad quod

Therefore, he says that political science ordains which sciences, both practical and speculative, should be studied in a state, who should study them, and for how long.

tempus. Alia autem proprietas scientiae architectonicae, scilicet uti inferioribus

28. The other characteristic of an architectonic science, the use of subordinate

scientiis, pertinet ad politicam, solum respectu practicarum scientiarum; unde subdit quod pretiosissimas, idest nobilissimas virtutum idest artium

sciences, belongs to political science only in reference to the practical sciences. Hence he adds that we see the most highly esteemed, the noblest skills, i.e., the operative arts, fall

operativarum videmus esse sub politica, scilicet militarem, et oeconomicam et rhetoricam, quibus omnibus utitur politica ad suum finem, scilicet ad bonum

under political science-for example strategy, domestic economy, and rhetoric. Political science uses such skills for its own end, that is, for the common good of the state.

commune civitatis. Deinde cum dicit: utente autem hac etc., ex praemissis duobus concludit propositum. Et dicit quod, cum politica, quae practica est, utatur reliquis practicis disciplinis, sicut secundo dictum est, et cum ipsa legemponat quid oporteat

29. Then [i, y], at “Political science in fact,” he draws a conclusion from two premises. He says that since political science uses the other practical sciences, as already noted (28), and since it legislates what is to be done and what omitted, as previously stated

operari et a quibus abstinere, ut primo dictum est, consequens est quod finis huius tamquam architectonicae complectitur, idest sub se continet fines aliarum scientiarum practicarum. Unde concludit quod hic, scilicet finis politicae, est humanum bonum, id est optimum in rebus humanis.

(27), it follows that the end of this science as architectonic embraces or contains under itself the ends of other practical sciences. Hence, he concludes, the end of political science is the good of man, that is, the supreme end of human things.

Deinde cum dicit: si enim et idem est etc., ostendit quod politica sit principalissima, ex ipsa ratione proprii finis. Manifestum

30. Then [b, ii], at “For even though the good be the same,” he shows that political science is the most important science from

est enim quod unaquaeque causa tanto potior est quanto ad plura effectus eius se extendit. Unde et bonum, quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est quanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo, si idem est bonum uni homini et toti civitati: multo videtur maius et perfectius

the very nature of its special end. It is evident that insofar as a cause is prior and more powerful it extends to more effects. Hence, insofar as the good, which has the nature of a final cause, is more powerful, it extends to more effects. So, even though the good be the same objective for one man and

suscipere, id est procurare, et salvare, id est conservare, illud quod est bonum totius civitatis, quam id quod est bonum unius hominis. Pertinet quidem enim ad amorem qui debet esse inter homines quod homo quaerat et conservet bonum etiam uni soli homini, sed multo melius est et divinius quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti et

for the whole state, it seems much better and more perfect to attain, that is, to procure and preserve the good of the whole state than the good of any one man. Certainly it is a part of that love which should exist among men that a man preserve the good even of a single human being. But it is much better and more divine

civitatibus. Vel aliter: amabile quidem est quod hoc exhibeatur uni soli civitati, sed multo divinius est, quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti, in qua multae civitates continentur. Dicit autem hoc esse divinius, eo quod magis pertinet ad Dei similitudinem, qui est universalis causa omnium bonorum. Hoc autem bonum,

that this be done for a whole people and for states. It is even sometimes desirable that this be done for one state only, but it is much more divine that it be done for a whole people that includes many states. This is said to be more divine because it shows greater likeness to God who is the ultimate cause of all good. But this good common to

scilicet quod est commune uni vel civitatibus pluribus, intendit methodus quaedam, id est ars, quae vocatur civilis. Unde ad ipsam maxime pertinet considerare ultimum finem humanae vitae: tamquam ad principalissimam.

one or to several states is the object of our inquiry, that is, of the particular skill called political science. Hence to it, as the most important science, belongs in a most special way the consideration of the ultimate end of human life.

Sciendum est autem, quod politicam dicit esse principalissimam, non simpliciter, sed in genere activarum scientiarum, quae sunt circa res humanas, quarum ultimum finem politica considerat. Nam ultimum

31. But we should note that he says political science is the most important, not simply, but in that division of practical sciences which are concerned with human things, the ultimate end of which political science

finem totius universi considerat scientia divina, quae est respectu omnium principalissima. Dicit autem ad politicam pertinere considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae; de quo tamen in hoc libro determinat, quia doctrina huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae.

considers. The ultimate end of the whole universe is considered in theology which is the most important without qualification. He says that it belongs to political science to treat the ultimate end of human life. This however he discusses here since the matter of this book covers the fundamental notions of political science.

LECTURE 3 Qualities of the Student and Teacher Chapter 3

II. HE NOW DETERMINES THE METHOD PROPER TO THIS SCIENCE. a. On the part of the teacher. — 32-35 λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην

Our study will be adequately treated if it is investigated according to the nature of the

διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει

subject matter. The same certitude should not be sought in all discussions just as the same exactness should not be expected in all the productions of art. Now good and just deeds, with which political science is concerned, are differently and mistakenly judged to such a degree that none of them seems to be good and just by nature but

δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς

merely by disposition of law. Because of bad judgment, many have been harmed even by good things: some men have lost their lives by reason of riches, others by reason of physical courage. It is desirable therefore when treating of these variable subjects and when arguing from them as premises, to bring out roughly the outlines

ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

of the truth, and to conclude about those things which occur in the majority of cases.

b. On the part of the student. — 36 τὸν

αὐτὸν

δὴ

καὶ

In this same spirit the student ought to

ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι

take whatever is taught, for it is proper to an educated man to look for as much certitude in each study as the nature of the subject admits. It approximates the same thing to allow a mathematician to use rhetorical arguments and to demand conclusive demonstrations from a rhetorician.

καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀπαιτεῖν.

τρόπον

ἀποδείξεις

III. HE SHOWS WHAT SORT OF PERSON THE STUDENT ... OUGHT TO BE.

a. Who is an incompetent student. i. He introduces certain things necessary to explain his proposition. — 37 ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος,

Now every man is a good judge of the things he knows. Accordingly, then, one educated in a particular subject judges well what belongs to that subject. But the man

ἁπλῶς δ' ὁ πεπαιδευμένος.

who is well educated in all subjects can judge well about all.

περὶ

πᾶν

ii. He proves his statement. — 38 διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον

In keeping with this a young man is not a good student of political science, for he is inexperienced in the ways of life that are

πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων·

the starting point and subject matter of this science.

b. Who is an unprofitable student. — 39-40

ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος

Furthermore, because he is strongly influenced by his emotions, he will study political science without result and uselessly, for the end of this science is not knowledge but human action. Nor does it matter whether the student be immature

νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν·

in age or immature in character, for the deficiency is not due to time but to a life lived according to the passions and to the pursuit of each object of passion. Such men gain no profit from their knowledge; and the same is true of the incontinent.

c. He explains the characteristics of the ideal student. — 41-42 τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις

But it will certainly be very useful to have a

ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροιμιάσθω ταῦτα.

knowledge of moral matters for those who desire and act according to the dictates of reason. To sum up what has been treated in the introduction: we have discussed the student, the method of demonstrating and the purpose of our science.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Dicetur autem utique sufficienter et

32. After the Philosopher has shown what

cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid sit bonum, quod principaliter intenditur in hac scientia, hic determinat modum huic scientiae convenientem. Et primo ex parte doctoris; secundo ex parte auditoris, ibi: eodem utique modo et cetera. Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Modus manifestandi veritatem

is the good principally intended in this science, he now [II] determines the method proper to this science. He does this first on the part of the teacher [II, a]; and then, at “in the same spirit etc.,” on the part of the student [II, b]. In regard to the first he lays down this reason. The method of manifesting truth in any science ought to be

in qualibet scientia, debet esse conveniens ei quod subiicitur sicut materia in illa scientia. Quod quidem manifestat ex hoc, quod certitudo non potest inveniri, nec est requirenda similiter in omnibus sermonibus, quibus de aliqua re ratiocinamur. Sicut etiam neque in conditis, id est his quae fiunt per artem,

suitable to the subject matter of that science. He shows this from the fact that certitude cannot be found, nor should it be sought, in the same degree in all discussions where we reason about anything. Likewise, the same method is not used in all products made by art; but each workman works with the material in a way suited to that

non est similis modus operandi in omnibus; sed unusquisque artifex operatur ex materia, secundum modum ei convenientem aliter quidem ex cera aliter ex luto, aliter ex ferro. Materia autem moralis talis est, quod non est ei conveniens perfecta certitudo. Et hoc manifestat per duo genera rerum quae

material, in one way with the soil, in another with clay, in still another with metal. Now the matter of moral study is of such a nature that perfect certitude is not suitable to it. He shows this from two classes of things which seem to belong to the material with which moral study is concerned.

videntur ad materiam moralem pertinere. Primo namque et materiam moralem

principaliter ad pertinent opera

33. In the matter of morals the first and foremost place is held by virtuous works.

virtuosa, quae vocat hic iusta, de quibus principaliter intendit civilis scientia. Circa quae non habetur certa sententia hominum, sed magna differentia est in hoc

They are called just and are the chief concern of political science. Regarding them there are no agreed opinions, but rather a decided difference is found in what men

quod homines de his iudicant. Et in hoc

judge about them. In this matter a variety

multiplex error contingit. Nam quaedam sunt quae a quibusdam reputantur iusta et honesta, a quibusdam autem iniusta et inhonesta, secundum differentiam temporum et locorum et personarum. Aliquid enim reputatur vitiosum uno tempore aut in una regione, quod in alio tempore aut in alia regione non reputatur

of errors occur, for certain actions, considered just and good by some, are looked upon as unjust and bad by others according to different times and places and persons. Now a deed is considered vicious at one time and in one country, but at a different time and in a different country it is not considered to be so. Because of this

vitiosum. Et ex ista differentia contingit quosdam opinari quod nihil esset naturaliter iustum vel honestum, sed solum secundum legispositionem; de qua quidem opinione ipse plenius aget in V huius.

disagreement, it happens that some are of the opinion that no action is just or good by nature but only by disposition of law. We shall treat more fully of this opinion in the second book of this work (245-254).

Secundo autem ad materiam moralem pertinent bona exteriora, quibus homo utitur ad finem, et circa ista etiam bona contingit invenire praedictum errorem, quia non semper eodem modo se habent in

34. Second, external goods that are used purposively by men have a moral consideration. In regard to them it happens that we find the mistake just mentioned inasmuch as these material goods are not

omnibus. Quidam enim per ea iuvantur, quibusdam vero ex ipsis proveniunt detrimenta. Multi enim homines occasione suarum divitiarum perierunt, utpote a latronibus interfecti. Quidam vero occasione suae fortitudinis corporalis, ex cuius fiducia incaute se periculis exposuerunt. Et sic manifestum est, quod

always used in the same way by everyone. Some men are helped by them, while others indeed are harmed by them. Many are ruined by having riches—for instance, those who are murdered by robbers. Some by reason of their physical courage on which they rely have carelessly exposed themselves to dangers. Thus it is evident that moral

materia moralis est varia et deformis, non habens omnimodam certitudinem.

matters are variable and divergent, not having the same certitude each time.

Et quia secundum artem demonstrativae scientiae, oportet principia esse conformia

35. Because, in the art of demonstrative science, principles must conform to

conclusionibus, amabile est et optabile, de talibus, idest tam variabilibus, tractatum facientes, et ex similibus procedentes ostendere veritatem, primo quidem grosse idest applicando universalia principia et simplicia ad singularia et composita, in quibus est actus. Necessarium est enim in qualibet operativa scientia ut procedatur

conclusions, it is desirable and preferable when treating subjects so variable, and when proceeding from premises likewise variable, to bring out the truth first in a rough outline by applying universal principles to singulars and by proceeding from the simple (universal) to the complex (particular) where acts are concerned. For

modo compositivo, e contrario autem in scientia speculativa necesse est ut procedatur modo resolutivo, resolvendo

it is necessary in every practical science to proceed in a composite (i.e., deductive) manner. On the contrary in speculative

composita in principia simplicia. Deinde oportet ostendere veritatem figuraliter, idest verisimiliter; et hoc est procedere ex propriis principiis huius scientiae. Nam scientia moralis est de actibus voluntariis: voluntatis autem motivum est, non solum bonum, sed apparens bonum. Tertio oportet ut cum dicturi simus de his quae

science, it is necessary to proceed in an analytical manner by breaking down the complex into elementary principles. Second, we should bring out the outlines of the truth, that is, an approximation to the truth. This is to proceed from the proper principles of this science. Moral science treats the acts of the will, and the thing

ut frequentius accidunt, idest de actibus voluntariis, quos voluntas non ex necessitate producit, sed forte inclinata magis ad unum quam ad aliud, ut etiam ex talibus procedamus, ut principia sint conclusionibus conformia.

moving the will is not only the good but even fictitious good. Third, we must speak of events as they happen in the majority of cases, that is, of voluntary acts that proceed from the will, inclined perhaps to one alternative rather than another but never operating under compulsion. In these, too, we must proceed in such a way that principles are conformable to conclusions.

Deinde cum dicit: eodem utique modo etc., ostendit quod auditorem oportet acceptare

36. Then [II, b], at “In this same spirit,” he shows that the student must accept this

in moralibus praedictum modum determinandi. Et dicit, quod debitum est, quod unusquisque recipiat unumquodque (eorum) quae sibi ab alio dicuntur eodem modo, id est secundum quod convenit materiae. Quia ad hominem disciplinatum, idest bene instructum, pertinet, ut tantum certitudinem quaerat in unaquaque

limitation in moral matters. He says that it is proper that each one should take whatever is said to him by another in the same spirit, that is, as the matter warrants. The reason is that a learned or wellinstructed man should look for as much certitude in any matter as the nature of the subject admits. There cannot he as much

materia, quantum natura rei patitur. Non enim potest esse tanta certitudo in materia variabili et contingenti, sicut in materia necessaria, semper eodem modo se habente. Et ideo auditor bene disciplinatus nec debet maiorem certitudinem requirere, nec minori esse contentus, quam sit conveniens rei de qua

certainty in variable and contingent matter as in necessary matter which is always the same. Therefore, the educated man ought not to look for greater, nor be satisfied with less, certitude than is appropriate to the subject under discussion. It seems an equal fault to allow a mathematician to use rhetorical arguments and to demand from a

agitur. Propinquum enim peccatum esse videtur, si aliquis auditor acceptet aliquem mathematicum persuasionibus rhetoricis utentem, et si expetat a rhetorico

rhetorician conclusive demonstrations such as a mathematician should give. But mistakes happen because the method appropriate to the matter is not considered.

demonstrationes certas, quales debet proferre mathematicus. Utrumque enim contingit ex hoc, quod non consideratur modus materiae conveniens. Nam mathematica est circa materiam, in qua

Mathematics is concerned with matter in which perfect certitude is found. Rhetoric, however, deals with political matter where a variety of views occurs.

invenitur omnimoda certitudo. Rhetorica autem negotiatur circa materiam civilem, in qua multiplex variatio accidit. Deinde cum dicit unusquisque autem iudicat bene etc., ostendit qualis debeat esse auditor huius scientiae. Et primo ostendit quis sit insufficiens auditor. Secundo quis sit inutilis, ibi, amplius autem passionum et cetera. Tertio ostendit quis sit auditor conveniens, ibi, secundum rationem autem et cetera. Circa

37. Then [III], at “Now every man,” he shows what sort of person the student of this science ought to be. First [III, a] he shows who is an incompetent student; and second [III, b], at “Furthermore etc.,” who is an unprofitable student. Third [III, c], at “But it will certainly etc.,” he explains the characteristics of the ideal student. In

primum duo facit. Primo praemittit quaedam quae sunt necessaria ad propositum ostendendum. Et dicit, quod unusquisque non potest habere bonum iudicium nisi de his quae cognoscit. Et sic ille qui est instructus circa unum quodlibet genus bene potest iudicare de his quae pertinent ad illud genus. Sed ille qui est

respect to the first lie does two things. First [a, i] he introduces certain things necessary to explain his proposition. He states that each man can judge well only the things he knows. Thus a man educated in one particular subject can judge well what belongs to that subject. But the man who is well educated in all subjects can judge well

bene instructus circa omnia, potest simpliciter bene iudicare de omnibus.

about all, without restriction to a particular subject.

Secundo ibi: idcirco politicae etc., concludit propositum, scilicet quod iuvenis non est conveniens auditor politicae et totius moralis scientiae, quae sub politica comprehenditur; quia sicut dictum est,

38. Second [a, ii], at “In keeping with this,” he proves his statement, namely, that a young man is not a good student of political science nor of any part of moral science comprised under political science, because as

nullus potest bene iudicare nisi ea quae novit. Omnis autem auditor oportet quod bene iudicet de his quae audit, ut scilicet bene dicta recipiat, non autem ea quae male dicuntur. Ergo oportet, quod nullus sit auditor conveniens nisi habeat aliquam notitiam eorum quae debet audire. Sed

was said (37) a man can judge well only the things he knows. Now every student should make good judgments about what he studies, so that he may accept what is true but not what is false. Therefore, no one can be a good student unless he has some knowledge of what he ought to study. But a

iuvenis non habet notitiam eorum quae pertinent ad scientiam moralem, quae maxime cognoscuntur per experientiam.

young man does not have a knowledge of things belonging to moral science, which are known mostly by experience. A young

Iuvenis autem est inexpertus operationum humanae vitae propter temporis brevitatem, et tamen rationes moralis scientiae procedunt ex his quae pertinent ad actus humanae vitae, et etiam sunt de his; sicut si dicatur quod liberalis minora sibi reservat, et maiora aliis tribuit, hoc

man is inexperienced in the ways of life because of the very brevity of his life, while the principles of moral science proceed from what pertains to and also treats of the actions of human life. For instance, if it be said that the generous man keeps the cheaper things for himself and makes a

iuvenis propter inexperientiam forte non iudicabit esse verum, et idem est in aliis civilibus. Unde manifestum est, quod iuvenis non est conveniens auditor politicae.

present of the more expensive to others, a young man will perhaps judge this not to be true because of inexperience. It is the same with other social dealings. Hence it is evident that a young man is not a good student of political science.

Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem passionum etc., ostendit quis sit inutilis auditor huius scientiae. Ubi considerandum est, quod scientia moralis docet homines sequi rationem, et discedere

39. Then [III, b], at “Furthermore,” he shows who is an unprofitable student of this science. Here we must consider that moral science teaches men to follow reason and to refrain from the things to which the

ab his in quae passiones animae inclinant, quae sunt concupiscentia, ira et similia. In quae quidem aliqui tendunt dupliciter. Uno modo ex electione: puta cum aliquis hoc proponit, ut concupiscentiae suae satisfaciat. Et hos vocat sectatores passionum; alio modo cum aliquis proponit quidem a noxiis delectationibus abstinere,

passions incline, such as concupiscence, anger, and the like. Toward these, men are inclined in two ways. In one way by choice, for instance, when a man of set purpose intends to satisfy his concupiscence. Such a one he calls a slave of his emotions. In another way, when a man resolves to abstain from harmful pleasures but is

vincitur tamen interdum impetu passionis, ut contra suum propositum, impetum passionis sequatur. Et talis vocatur incontinens.

sometimes overcome by the urge of passion, so that contrary to his resolution he follows the promptings of passion. A man of this type is said to be incontinent.

Dicit ergo, quod ille qui est sectator passionum, inaniter, idest sine aliqua efficacia audiet hanc scientiam, et inutiliter, idest absque consecutione debiti finis. Finis enim huius scientiae non est sola cognitio, ad quam forte pervenire possent passionum sectatores. Sed finis

40. He affirms then that the one who is ruled by the emotions will study this science in vain, that is, without any result and uselessly without attaining its proper end. The end of this science is not knowledge alone, which those enslaved to passion can perhaps gain. But the end of this science, as

huius scientiae est actus humanus, sicut et omnium scientiarum practicarum. Ad actus autem virtuosos non perveniunt, qui passiones sectantur. Et sic nihil differt

of all practical sciences, is human action. Now those who follow the emotions do not attain virtuous acts. So in regard to this it makes no difference whether the student of

quantum ad hoc quod arceantur ab auditu

this science is immature in age or immature

huius scientiae iuvenis aetate vel iuvenis moribus, scilicet passionum sectator, quia, sicut iuvenis aetate deficit a fine huius scientiae, qui est cognitio, ita ille qui est iuvenis moribus deficit a fine, qui est actio: non enim est defectus eius propter tempus, sed propter hoc quod vivit secundum passiones, et sequitur singula,

in character, that is, a slave of the emotions. The reason is that, as the person immature in age fails to achieve the end of this science that is knowledge, so the immature in character fails to achieve the end that is action-His deficiency is not due to time but to the fact that he lives according to his emotions, seeking everything to which the

ad quae passiones inclinant. Talibus autem fit inutilis cognitio huius scientiae; sicut etiam incontinentibus, qui non sequuntur scientiam, quam de moralibus habent.

emotions incline. Now, for such men the knowledge of this science is useless; the same may be said of the incontinent who do not act in accord with their. knowledge of moral matters.

Deinde cum dicit: secundum rationem autem etc., ostendit quis sit conveniens auditor huius scientiae. Et dicit, quod multum est utile scire de moralibus illis, qui secundum ordinem rationis implent omnia sua desideria et exterius operantur.

41. Then [III, c], at “But it will certainly,” he indicates the good student of this science. He says that it is very useful to have a knowledge of moral matters for those who regulate their desires and act in externals according to the dictates of reason.

Ultimo autem epilogat ea quae dicta sunt in hoc prooemio, dicens quod tanta sint dicta prooemialiter de auditore, quod fuit

42. Last, in the conclusion he sums up what has been discussed in the introduction (141), stating that certain things have been

ultimum; et quis sit modus demonstrandi, quod fuit medium; et quid proponimus, idest quid sit illud, de quo ista scientia principaliter intendit.

said in a preliminary manner about the student—this was treated last; stating also what is the method of demonstrating—this was treated in the middle of the introduction; and last what is our purpose, namely, what is the principal aim of this science—this was treated first.

LECTURE 4 Opinions About Happiness Chapter 4 I. FIRST HE EXPLAINS HIS INTENTION. — 43 λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες,

Since all knowledge and choice have some good for

ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν

their objective, let us ask on resuming our inquiry what it is that we call the objective of political science? What is the highest good of all human

οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν.

actions?

II. HE CARRIES IT OUT. A. He investigates the opinions of others about happiness. A’ He gives the opinions of others. 1. HE PRESENTS OPINIONS ABOUT THE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. a. He indicates the aspects of general agreement. — 44-45 ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι

As to the name nearly all agree, for both the common people and the educated say it is happiness. They identify happiness with living well and acting well.

τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦ σι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. b. He shows in what way there is disagreement. — 46-49 οἳ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλοπολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν,

But as to where happiness is to be found men are at variance. The multitude differs from the philosophers, for the people generally think that happiness consists in something apparent and obvious such as pleasure or riches or honors; some place it in one of these, others in another; and oftentimes even the same person shifts his

πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν.

position. For instance, the sick man thinks happiness is found in health, the poor man considers that it is found in riches, while men conscious of their own ignorance esteem those happy who give utterance to lofty ideas that are

ἔνιοι δ' ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά.

above their comprehension. Some philosophers [Platonists] were of the opinion that, over and above the many goods, there exists an absolute good which is the cause of goodness in all other things.

2. HE POINTS OUT HOW WE SHOULD EXAMINE OPINIONS OF THIS KIND. a. He shows which of these opinions we ought to investigate. — 50 ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.

It is perhaps vain to examine all these opinions, and it will be sufficient to give special attention to those appearing probable on the surface or are thought by many to have some probability.

b. He shows in what order we should do this. — 51-52 μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσι& #957; οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ

In this matter we should be difference in arguments, some of from principles and others Previously Plato had learnedly

γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν.

subject when he examined the question whether we proceed from or to principles like athletes in the race-course running from or toward the judges. In either case we must start from things known. Now these are of two kinds, namely, things known to us and things known absolutely. Presumably then we should begin from what is known to us.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ

aware of the which proceed to principles. discussed the

διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. c. He shows how the student should be disposed. — 53-54 διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενο ν ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ

One who is going to devote himself seriously to the study of good and just deeds and to political affairs in general ought to have been accustomed to a virtuous life. This will serve as a principle and if it be adequate he will have no need to know the reasons for virtuous conduct. A student with this

τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

upbringing will discover working principles within himself or readily acquire them from someone else. The man, however, who can do neither of these things should listen to the verdict of Hesiod [Works and Days, 293]. That man, the poet says, is best who understands everything by himself; and that man good who takes what is well 10 said by another. But he who neither himself

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται. ὃς δέ κε μήτ'

understands nor takes to heart what he hears from another is indeed a useless fellow.

αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Dicamus ergo resumentes et cetera. Praemisso prooemio, hic Aristotiles accedit ad tractatum huius scientiae. Et

43. Having finished the introduction, Aristotle here begins the treatise on the science itself. He divides the treatise into

dividitur in partes tres. In prima determinat de felicitate, quae est

three parts. In the first part he investigates happiness, which is the supreme human good,

summum inter humana bona perducens ad hoc considerationem felicitatis quod

and he comes to the conclusion from a study of the subject that happiness is activity

est operatio secundum virtutem. In secunda parte determinat de virtutibus, ibi, si autem est felicitas operatio quaedam secundum virtutem et cetera. In tertia complet suum tractatum de felicitate, ostendens qualis et quae virtutis operatio sit felicitas. Et hoc in decimo libro, ibi: post haec autem de

flowing from virtue. In the second part [Lect. 19] he discusses virtues at “If then happiness is a kind of operation according to perfect virtue etc.” (B.1102 a 4). In the third part he completes his treatise on happiness, explaining which operation it is and of what nature. This he does in the tenth book (B.1172 a 19) at “After these matters we

delectatione et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi: nomine quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo resumendo quod supradictum est, quod cum omnis cognitio et electio desideret aliquod bonum, idest ordinetur ad aliquod

ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure.” In regard to the first he does two things. First [1] he explains his intention. Second [II], at “As to the name etc,,” he carries it out. He says first, resuming what he was investigating before (9-13), that since all knowledge and choice aim at some good, that is, are ordered to some desired good as an end,

bonum desideratum sicut in finem, dicendum est, quid sit illud bonum, ad quod ordinatur civilis scientia; quod scilicet est summum omnium operatorum, idest inter omnia ad quae opere humano perveniri potest. Haec enim duo supra dictum est oportere considerari de ultimo fine humanorum

we must discuss the nature of that good to which political science is ordered. Such is the highest good of all actions, that is, the highest among those attainable by human operation. Moreover, it was said above (18) that these two notions must be studied about the ultimate end of human good; what it is—this is here proposed for consideration and to

bonorum: scilicet quid sit, quod hic proponitur considerandum; et ad quam scientiam pertineat, quod supra in prooemio tractatum est.

what science it belongs and this was treated above in the introduction (25-30).

Deinde cum dicit: nomine quidem igitur etc., determinat de felicitate. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo prosequitur opiniones aliorum de felicitate. Secundo determinat de ipsa secundum propriam sententiam, ibi, rursus autem redeamus ad quaesitum bonum et cetera. Circa

44. Next [II], at “As to the name,” he treats happiness. He proceeds here in two steps. First [A] he investigates the opinions of others about happiness. Second [Lect.9], at “Let us return again to a consideration etc.” (B.1097 a 16), he states his own opinion. In regard to the initial point he does two things.

primum duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones aliorum de felicitate. Secundo inquirit de eis, ibi, nos autem dicamus unde discessimus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones de ultimo

First [A’] he gives the opinions of others about happiness. Second [Lect. 5; I], at “Let us return to the subject etc.” (B.1095 b 12), he examines these opinions. He handles the first point in two ways. Initially [1] he

fine humanorum. Secundo determinat qualiter de huiusmodi opinionibus sit inquirendum, ibi, omnes quidem igitur perscrutari et cetera. Circa primum duo

presents opinions about the ultimate end of human actions. Then [2], at “It is perhaps vain,” he points out how we should examine opinions of this kind. In regard to the first he

facit. Primo ostendit in quo omnes conveniant. Secundo in quo differant, ibi, de felicitate autem, quae est et cetera.

does two things. He indicates the aspects of general agreement [1, a]; and then [1, b], at “But as to where happiness etc.,” he shows in what way there is disagreement.

Ponit ergo primo duo, in quibus omnes conveniunt secundum ultimum finem. Primo quidem in nomine, quia tam multi, id est populares, quam etiam excellentes, id est sapientes, nominant summum humanorum bonorum felicitatem. Secundo quantum ad

45. In the beginning he presents two points on which there is general agreement about the ultimate end. First [1, a], at “As to the name,” he asserts that both the many, that is, the common people and the cultured or philosophers, name happiness the highest human good. Second, they have a common

quamdam communem nominis rationem; quia omnes existimant bene vivere et bene operari (idem esse ei) quod est esse felicem.

understanding of the term because all consider that living well and acting well are identified with being happy.

Deinde cum dicit: de felicitate autem etc., ostendit in quo differunt opiniones hominum circa felicitatem. Et dicit quod de felicitate quid sit in speciali alterantur, idest diversificantur homines. Et hoc triplici differentia. Quarum prima accipitur secundum quod

46. Then [II, b], at “But as to where happiness,” he shows in what respect the opinions of men differ about happiness. He affirms that especially about the nature of happiness men are at variance, i.e., hold different opinions. This difference is threefold. First of all the multitude does not think in

multitudo popularium non similiter in hoc sentit cum sapientibus. Nam populares existimant felicitatem esse aliquid eorum quae sunt in aperto et manifesto, ut sunt illa quae in sensibilibus considerantur, quae sola manifesta sunt multitudini, et adeo aperta, quod non indigent expositione

this matter like the philosophers. People commonly consider that happiness consists in something apparent and obvious among the objects of sense, which alone are evident to the multitude and, therefore, so obvious as not to need exhaustive search-such as pleasure, riches, honor, and the like. The views of the philosophers on this point are

reserante, sicut sunt voluptas, divitiae et honor et alia huiusmodi. Quid autem sapientes super hoc sentiant, ultimo ponet.

given later (49).

Secunda autem differentia est popularium adinvicem. Quorum alii aliud

47. The second difference is found among the common people themselves. Some of them

sensibile bonum aestimant esse felicitatem, sicut avari divitias, intemperati voluptates, ambitiosi honores.

place happiness in one sensible good, others in another. The avaricious place it in riches, the self-indulgent in pleasures, the ambitious in honors.

Tertia autem differentia est eiusdem ad seipsum. Est enim conditio ultimi finis, ut sit maxime desideratum. Unde illud quod maxime desiderat homo aestimat esse felicitatem, indigentia autem

48. The third difference arises from the end in itself. Since it is characteristic of the ultimate end that it be greatly desired, people consider that to be happiness which is desired most of all. Now, need of a good increases the desire

alicuius boni auget eius desiderium. Unde aeger, qui indiget sanitate, iudicat ipsam summum bonum. Et pari ratione mendicus divitias. Et similiter illi, qui recognoscunt suam ignorantiam, admirantur quasi felices eos qui possunt dicere aliquid magnum, et quod eorum intellectum excedat. Et omnia ista

for it, and so the sick man who lacks health judges the supreme good to be health; the beggar looks upon riches in the same way. Likewise those who are conscious of their own ignorance esteem as happy others who give utterance to lofty ideas which are above the comprehension of the ignorant. All this pertains to the opinion of the multitude.

pertinent ad opiniones multitudinis. Sed quidam sapientes, scilicet Platonici, praeter haec diversa bona sensibilia,

49. But some among the philosophers, the Platonists were of the opinion that, over and

aestimaverunt esse unum bonum quod est secundum seipsum, idest quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis separata, sicut et formam separatam hominis dicebant per se hominem, et quod omnibus bonis est causa quod sint bona, inquantum scilicet participant illud summum bonum.

above the many different sensible goods, there exists one which is absolute good and which is the separated essence of goodness itself. As the separated form of man was called by them “man in himself” so the separated good was “good in itself,” and this is the cause of the goodness of all other things as they partake of that highest good.

Deinde cum dicit: omnes quidem igitur etc., ostendit qualiter oporteat inquirere de praedictis opinionibus. Et circa hoc

50. Then [2], at “It is perhaps vain,” he shows how we should proceed in our investigation of the aforesaid opinions. He

tria facit. Primo ostendit de quibus harum opinionum oportet inquirere. Secundo quo ordine, ibi, non lateat autem nos et cetera. Tertio qualiter oporteat auditorem dispositum esse, ad hoc quod bene capiat ea quae dicentur, ibi, propter quod oportet consuetudinibus et cetera. Dicit ergo

handles the discussion in three steps. First [2, a] he shows which of these opinions we ought to investigate. Second [2, b], at “In this matter we should etc.,” he shows in what order we should do this. Third [2, c] he shows how the student should be disposed so that he may properly understand what is taught. He says then that to examine all opinions men

primo, quod perscrutari omnes opiniones

hold about happiness would be useless for a

quas aliqui habent de felicitate esset aliquid magis vanum, quam deceat philosophum; quia quaedam sunt omnino irrationabiles, sed sufficit illas opiniones maxime perscrutari, quae in superficie habent aliquam rationem, vel propter apparentiam aliquam, vel saltem propter opinionem multorum hoc

good philosopher, inasmuch as some of them are altogether unreasonable. But it suffices to examine at most the opinions that on the surface are probable either because they give that appearance or at least are considered to have weight by many.

existimantium. Deinde cum dicit: non lateat autem nos etc., ostendit quo ordine ratiocinandum

51. Then [2, b], at “In this matter we should be aware,” he shows in what order we must

sit de huiusmodi opinionibus, et simpliciter in tota materia morali. Et assignat differentiam in processu ratiocinandi. Quia quaedam rationes sunt, quae procedunt a principiis, id est a causis in effectus: sicut demonstrationes propter quid. Quaedam autem e converso ab effectibus ad causas sive

discuss opinions of this sort and in general all moral matters. He points out a difference in the manner of reasoning. There are some argumentations proceeding from principles, that is, from causes to effects, such as demonstrations of the reasoned fact (propter quid). On the contrary, there are other argumentations proceeding from effects to

principia, quae non demonstrant propter quid, sed solum quia ita est. Et hoc etiam Plato prius distinxit, inquirens utrum oporteat procedere a principiis vel ad principia. Et ponit exemplum de cursu stadiorum. Erant enim quidam athlothetae, idest propositi athletis currentibus in stadio, qui quidem

causes or principles. These do not produce a demonstration of the reasoned fact but only of the fact (quia). This distinction was previously made by Plato when he inquired whether we should proceed from or to principles. Then he offers this example from the racecourse. In order to judge athletes running in a race certain agonothetes or

athlothetae stabant in principio stadiorum. Quandoque igitur athletae incipiebant currere ab athlothetis et procedebant usque ad terminum, quandoque autem e converso. Et sic etiam est duplex ordo in processu rationis, ut dictum est.

judges were stationed at the beginning of the course. Sometimes the athletes started from the judges and ran to the finishing line, and sometimes they started from the end and ran toward the judges. Likewise there is a twofold order in the process of reasoning.

Et ut accipiatur quo ordine oporteat procedere in qualibet materia, considerandum est quod semper oportet

52. In order to know the order of procedure in any subject we should reflect that it is necessary to begin from what is better

incipere a magis cognitis, quia per notiora devenimus ad ignota. Sunt autem aliqua notiora dupliciter. Quaedam quidem quoad nos, sicut

understood. Through things better known we arrive at a knowledge of things unknown. Now things are said to be better known in two ways. Some are better known in regard

composita et sensibilia, quaedam simpliciter et quoad naturam, scilicet

to us such as the composite and the sensible; others are better known absolutely and in

simplicia et intelligibilia. Et quia nobis ratiocinando notitiam acquirimus, oportet quod procedamus ab his quae sunt magis nota nobis; et si quidem eadem sint nobis magis nota et simpliciter, tunc ratio procedit a principiis, sicut in mathematicis. Si autem sint alia magis nota simpliciter et

themselves, as the simple and the intelligible. Because we acquire knowledge by reasoning, we must proceed from what is better known to us. Now if the better known absolutely are the same as the better known to us, the reason proceeds from principles as in mathematics. If, however, the better known absolutely are different from the better known

alia quoad nos, tunc oportet e converso procedere, sicut in naturalibus et moralibus.

to us, then we must use the effect-to-cause procedure as in the natural and moral sciences.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet etc., ostendit qualiter oportet esse dispositum talium auditorem. Et dicit, quod quia in moralibus oportet incipere ab his quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, id est a quibusdam effectibus consideratis circa actus humanos, oportet illum, qui sufficiens auditor vult

53. Then [2, c], at “One who is going,” he shows how a student of such subjects should be disposed. He says that since in moral matters we ought to begin from what is better known to us, that is, from certain effects noted about human acts, a man who wishes to be a competent student of moral science must be well-informed and

esse moralis scientiae quod sit bene manuductus et exercitatus in consuetudinibus humanae vitae, idest de bonis exterioribus et iustis, idest de operibus virtutum, et universaliter de omnibus civilibus, sicut sunt leges et ordines politiarum et si qua alia sunt huiusmodi. Quia oportet in moralibus

experienced in the ways of human living, that is about external good and just actions or works of virtue, and in general about all civil matters like laws and political affairs and other things of this sort. The reason for this is that in moral matters we must take as a principle that a thing is so. For example, we accept from experience and custom that

accipere, ut principium, quia ita est. Quod quidem accipitur per experientiam et consuetudinem; puta quod concupiscentiae per abstinentiam superantur.

concupiscence is restrained by fasting.

Et si hoc sit manifestum alicui, non multum necessarium est ei ad operandum cognoscere propter quid, sicut et medico sufficit ad sanandum scire quod haec herba curat talem aegritudinem. Cognoscere autem

54. If this is obvious to someone it is not so necessary for him in acting to understand the total explanation. Thus to effect a cure a physician need know only that this medicine cures a particular malady. But to know the reason, we must have a scientific knowledge

propter quid requiritur ad sciendum,

that is sought chiefly in speculative sciences.

quod principaliter intenditur in scientiis speculativis. Talis autem, qui scilicet est expertus in rebus humanis, vel per seipsum habet principia operabilium,

Now one who is skilled in human affairs either discovers working principles for himself and sees them as self-evident, or he readily acquires them from someone else. But a man

quasi per se ea considerans, vel de facili suscipit ea ab alio. Ille vero cui neutrum horum convenit, audiat sententiam Hesiodi poetae qui dixit quod iste est optimus qui scilicet potest per seipsum intelligere. Et ille etiam est bonus qui bene recipit quae ab alio dicuntur. Ille autem, qui neque per seipsum potest

about whom neither of these things can be correctly said should listen to the verdict of the poet Hesiod. He calls that man best who can understand by himself, and that man good who takes what is said by another. But the man who is capable neither of understanding by himself nor of bearing in mind what he hears from another is useless

intelligere, neque alium audiens potest in animo reponere, est inutilis, quantum scilicet ad acquisitionem scientiae.

as far as acquiring a science is concerned.

LECTURE 5 Examination of the Opinions Chapter 5 I. HE EXAMINES THE OPINION OF THOSE DISCUSSING HAPPINESS FROM THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW. A. He lays down a notion that opinions on the subject have in common. — 55 ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων

Let us return to the subject from which we have digressed. Some seem to think, not without reason, that the supreme good called happiness is a good belonging to this life.

ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· B. He begins to investigate the variety of opinions. A’ He examines the opinions that seem more likely to be true. 1. HE EXAMINES THE OPINION THAT PLACES HAPPINESS IN... A LIFE OF PLEASURE.

a. He presents the opinion. — 56-57

διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν.

Now, most men, including some very eminent persons, place happiness in pleasure and so logically prefer a sensual life.

b. He distinguishes three types of life. — 58-59 τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν

There are indeed three very prominent types of life: that just mentioned, another called

εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός.

public life, and last the contemplative life.

c. He examines the truth of the opinion presented. i. He disproves it. — 60 οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι,

The majority of men seem quite bestial in choosing to live a life of pleasure.

ii. He advances a reason why some are drawn to this life. — 61 τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ.

They justify their choice on the plea that many in high places share the tastes of Sardanapalus.

2. HE EXAMINES THE OPINION THAT PLACES HAPPINESS IN THE THINGS PERTAINING TO PUBLIC LIFE. a. In regard to honor. i. Presenting the opinion, he notes... — 62 οἱ

δὲ

χαρίεντες

πρακτικοὶ τιμήν·

καὶ

Men of superior refinement however, and those occupied in the active life, place happiness in honor,

ii. He offers a reason for this opinion. — 63 τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος.

βίου

for honor seems to be nearly the whole purpose of public life.

iii. He disproves this opinion. x. FIRST (REASON). — 64 — φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον

But this seems too superficial to be the good we are looking for. Honor consists in the action of those rendering it rather than

εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα.

anything in the power of the person honored; while happiness certainly should be a good proper to man and a thing not easily taken from him.

y. SECOND REASON. — 65 ἔτι δ' ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν

Another reason is that men appear to seek

διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.

honor to convince themselves of their own good qualities. They strive to be honored by the prudent, by those who know them best and for their virtue. Obviously then, in their opinion, virtue is a better thing than honor.

b. In regard to virtue. i. The opinion. — 66 τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι.

From this someone may conclude that virtue rather than honor is the end of public life.

ii. He rejects this (first). — 67 φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου,

But apparently virtue too is lacking in perfection because a man may have a habit of virtue when he is asleep or when he has no opportunity to exercise its acts for a lifetime.

iii. He gives the second reason. — 68 καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ

Moreover, he may be subject to evils and very often may be ill-favored by fortune. No one would call such a man happy, unless he were merely defending an argumentative position. Enough has now been said, for we treated the subject sufficiently in the Encyclis.

ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. 3. HE MENTIONS THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE. — 69 τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα.

Later on we shall investigate the third type of life, the contemplative.

B’ He examines an opinion rather remote from the truth. 1. HE EXAMINES ANOTHER OPINION... WHICH PLACES HAPPINESS IN MONEY. a. He rejects it... first. — 70-71 ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν,

As to the accumulator of riches, he lives a life of constraint;

b. He gives the second reason. καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὑτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.

and riches themselves are not the good we seek, for they are merely useful and sought for the sake of something else. Rather therefore the things previously treated are considered ends, since they are desired for themselves. Yet even these are not the supreme good and happiness, although many arguments have been marshalled to prove this. But these discussions must be terminated now.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Nos autem dicamus unde discessimus et cetera. Postquam philosophus recitavit opiniones aliorum diversas de felicitate, hic inquirit veritatem de praedictis opinionibus. Et primo inquirit de opinione loquentium de felicitate moraliter, qui scilicet ponebant in aliquo bonorum huius vitae felicitatem. Secundo inquirit de opinione loquentium de felicitate non moraliter, ponentium scilicet felicitatem in quodam bono separato, ibi, quod autem universale et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit id quod est commune omnibus

55. After the Philosopher has recounted the different opinions about happiness, he begins to investigate the truth of these opinions. First [I] he examines the opinion of, those discussing happiness from the moral point of view who place happiness in some good of this life. Second [Lect. 6], at “Perhaps it will be better” (B.1096 a 12), he examines the opinion of those who do not discuss happiness from the moral point of view but place it in some separated good. In regard to the first he does two things. He lays down a, notion [A] that opinions on this subject have in common; and next [B], at “Now, most men,” he begins

huiusmodi opinionibus; secundo inquirit de diversitate opinionum. Quia ergo videbatur philosophus digressionem fecisse a principali proposito, dum modum procedendi determinavit, redit ad principale propositum, unde discesserat, id est ad opiniones de felicitate. Et dicit, quod non irrationabiliter aliqui videntur existimare quod finale bonum quod felicitas dicitur sit aliquid ex his quae pertinent ad hanc vitam, scilicet humanam. Est enim finis omnium operum vitae. Ea vero quae sunt ad finem proportionantur fini; unde probabile est quod felicitas sit aliquid de numero bonorum pertinentium ad hanc

to investigate the variety of opinions. Then, because the Philosopher seemed to have made a digression from his principal purpose while he was determining the mode of procedure, he returns to the point whence he had digressed, that is, to the opinions about happiness. He asserts that some seem to think, not without reason, that the final good called happiness is a good belonging to this life on the purely human level. This is the goal of all the works of life. Now, means are proportionate to that end. Hence it is probable that happiness is among the number of goods belonging to this life. But what the truth may be in this matter will be indicated later (60, 64, 65, 70-72).

vitam. Sed de hoc infra dicetur quid verum sit.

Deinde cum dicit: multi quidem et gravissimi etc., inquirit veritatem circa ea in quibus diversificantur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo inquirit de opinionibus, quae magis videntur accedere ad veritatem. In secunda de opinione recedente magis a veritate, ibi, pecuniosus autem violentus quis et

56. Next [B], at “Now, most men,” he searches for the truth about the things on which the opinions differ. In regard to this he does two things. First [A’] he examines the opinions that seem more likely to be true. Second [B’], at “As to the accumulator of riches etc.,” he examines an opinion rather remote from the truth. In regard to the first

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo inquirit de opinione ponente felicitatem in his quae pertinent ad vitam voluptuosam; in secunda de opinionibus ponentium felicitatem in his quae pertinent ad vitam civilem, ibi, qui autem excellentes et operativi et cetera. In tertia facit mentionem de vita contemplativa, ibi, tertia autem est et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit opinionem. Secundo ex incidenti

he does three things. First [1] he examines the opinion placing happiness in the things that pertain to a life of pleasure. Second [2], at “Men of superior refinement etc.,” he examines the opinion placing happiness in the things pertaining to public life. Third [3], at “Later on we shall investigate etc.,” he mentions the contemplative life. In regard to the first he does three things. First [A’, 1, a] he presents the opinion. Second [A’, 1, b], at “There are indeed three etc.,” he

distinguit vitas, ibi, tres enim sunt et cetera. Tertio inquirit de veritate propositae opinionis, ibi: multi quidem igitur et cetera.

distinguishes three types of life without elaborating on them. Third [A’, 1, c], at “The majority of men etc.,” he examines the truth of the opinion presented.

Dicit ergo primo, quod inter bona huius vitae, quidam eligunt voluptatem, in ea felicitatem ponentes. Et hi quidem sunt non solum multi, idest populares homines, qui fere omnes ad voluptates declinant; sed etiam quidam qui sunt gravissimi, vel propter auctoritatem scientiae et doctrinae, vel etiam propter vitae honestatem. Nam etiam Epicuri, qui voluptatem summum bonum aestimabant, diligenter colebant virtutes, sed tamen propter voluptatem, ne scilicet per contraria vitia eorum voluptas impediretur. Gula enim per immoderantiam cibi corporis dolores

57. He says then in the first place that some men, from the goods of this life, choose pleasure and place happiness in it. They include not only the majority or the common people who by and large favor pleasure, but also persons eminent either in knowledge and teaching or in uprightness of life. Even the Epicureans, who considered pleasure the highest good, carefully cultivated the virtues. They did so, however, on account of pleasure, that is, for fear their pleasure would be hindered by means of contrary vices. The vice of gluttony, for instance, causes bodily suffering through excessive eating; because of theft a man is thrown into prison. So

generat, propter furtum aliquis carceri mancipatur. Et ita diversa vitia diversimode voluptatem impediunt. Et quia ultimus finis est maxime diligibilis, ideo illi qui ponunt voluptatem summum bonum, maxime diligunt vitam voluptuosam.

different vices are an impediment to pleasure in different ways. Since then the ultimate end is exceedingly delectable, they who make pleasure the highest good intensely love the life of pleasure.

Deinde cum dicit: tres enim sunt maxime etc., distinguit triplicem vitam: scilicet voluptuosam quae nunc dicta est, et civilem et contemplativam, et has dicit

58. Then [A’, 1, b], at “There are indeed three,” he distinguishes three types of life: the sensual just mentioned, the public, and the contemplative. These he calls the most

esse maxime excellentes. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut infra in IX dicetur, unusquisque id ad quod maxime afficitur reputat vitam suam, sicut philosophus philosophari, venator venari, et sic de aliis. Et quia homo maxime afficitur ad ultimum finem, necesse est, quod vitae diversificentur secundum diversitatem ultimi finis. Finis autem habet rationem boni. Bonum autem in tria dividitur, scilicet in utile, delectabile et honestum. Quorum duo, scilicet delectabile et

prominent types. For evidence of this we must now bear in mind what will later be discussed in the ninth book (1944-1949), that every man thinks his life to be that to which he is most strongly drawn, as the philosopher to philosophizing, the hunter to hunting, and so on. Because man is most strongly drawn to the last end, it is necessary that the types of life be distinguished according to the diversity of the ultimate end. Now the end has the nature of good, and good is threefold: the useful, the pleasurable, and the virtuous or honorable. Two of these,

honestum, habent rationem finis, quia utrumque est appetibile propter seipsum. Honestum autem dicitur, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quod quidem habet aliquam delectationem annexam. Unde delectabile, quod contra honestum dividitur, est delectabile secundum sensum. Ratio autem est et speculativa et practica.

namely, the pleasurable and the virtuous or honorable, have the nature of end because both are desirable for their own sake. That indeed is called virtuous which is good according to reason, and this has pleasure attached to it. Hence the pleasurable, as distinguished from the virtuous, is so called in reference to the senses. Reason, we must remember, is both speculative and practical.

Vita igitur voluptuosa dicitur quae finem constituit in voluptate sensus, vita vero civilis dicitur, quae finem constituit in bono practicae rationis, puta in exercitio

59. Therefore, that life is called sensual which fixes its end in the pleasures of the senses; and that public which fixes its end in the good of the practical reason, for example, in the

virtuosorum operum. Vita autem contemplativa, quae constituit finem in bono rationis speculativae, scilicet in contemplatione veritatis.

exercise of virtuous deeds; and that contemplative which fixes its end in the good of the speculative reason or in the contemplation of truth.

Deinde cum dicit: multi quidem igitur etc., inquirit de praedicta opinione. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo improbat eam. Secundo inducit rationem inducentem ad ipsam, ibi, adipiscuntur autem et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod vita voluptuosa, quae ponit finem circa delectationem sensus, necesse habet ponere finem circa maximas delectationes, quae sequuntur naturales operationes, quibus scilicet natura

60. Next [A’, 1, c], at “The majority of men,” he examines the opinion cited above. In regard to this he does two things. First [c, i] he disproves it. Second (c, ii], at “They justify their choice etc.,” he advances a reason why some are drawn to this life. In regard to the first we must consider that the sensual life, which fixes its end in sense pleasure, necessarily has to place that end in those very intense pleasures following from the natural operations by which the individual is

conservatur secundum individuum per cibum et potum et secundum speciem per commixtionem sexuum. Huiusmodi autem delectationes sunt communes hominibus et bestiis: unde multitudo hominum ponentium finem in huiusmodi voluptatibus videntur esse omnino bestiales, quasi eligentes talem vitam quasi optimam vitam in qua pecudes nobiscum communicant. Si enim in hoc felicitas hominis consisteret, pari ratione bestiae felices essent fruentes delectatione cibi et coitus. Si igitur felicitas est proprium bonum hominis, impossibile est quod in his consistat

preserved by eating and drinking and the race by sexual intercourse. Now pleasures of this kind are found in both men and beasts. It follows then that the multitude of men who fix their end in such pleasures seem quite bestial in choosing a life which even the pigs enjoy. If the happiness of man would consist in this, dumb animals enjoying the pleasure of food and sexual intercourse would have to be called happy for the same reason. Assuming that happiness is a characteristically human good, it cannot possibly consist in these things.

felicitas. Deinde cum dicit adipiscuntur autem etc., ponit rationem inducentem ad hanc

61. Then [c, ii], at “They justify their choice,” he gives the reason why some hold this

opinionem. Et dicit, quod illi qui ponunt hanc opinionem, accipiunt pro ratione quod multi illorum qui sunt in maximis potestatibus constituti, sicut reges et principes, qui felicissimi apud vulgus reputantur, similia patiuntur cuidam regi Assyriorum nomine Sardanapalo, qui fuit totaliter voluptatibus deditus, et ex hoc reputant voluptatem esse optimum, utpote quae ab optimatibus maxime diligitur.

opinion. He says that the reason they offer is that many in high places, like kings and princes who are considered very happy by the common people, share the tastes of a certain Assyrian king named Sardanapalus who was much given to sensuality. On this account it is thought that pleasure is something very good since it is a thing highly esteemed by the great.

Deinde cum dicit: qui autem excellentes etc., inquirit de opinionibus pertinentibus ad vitam activam sive civilem. Et primo quantum ad honorem. Secundo quantum ad virtutem, ibi, forsitan autem et magis et cetera. Et hoc rationabiliter. Nam vita civilis sive activa, intendit bonum honestum. Dicitur autem honestum,

62. At “Men of superior refinement” [2] he investigates opinions concerning the active or public life. First [2, a] he does this in regard to honor; and second [2, b], at “From this someone etc.,” in regard to virtue. This is a reasonable procedure, for the active or public life aims at the honorable good. Now it is called honorable as pertaining to the state of

quasi honoris status, unde ad hoc pertinere videtur et ipse honor, et virtus, quae est honoris causa. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit opinionem. Et

honor. Hence both honor itself and virtue, which is the cause of honor, appear to belong to it. In regard to the first he does three things. First [2, a, i], in presenting the

dicit quod illi qui sunt excellentes, idest

opinion, he notes that persons of superior

virtuosi et operativi, idest dediti vitae activae, ponunt felicitatem in honore.

refinement, namely, the virtuous and those occupied in the active life, place happiness in honor.

Secundo ibi: civilis enim etc., inducit ad hoc rationem. Quia fere totius civilis vitae finis videtur esse honor, qui redditur bene operantibus in vita civili quasi summum praemium. Et ideo colentibus civilem vitam probabile videtur felicitatem in honore consistere.

63. Second [2, a, ii], at “for honor seems,” he offers a reason for this: the sole purpose of public life appears to be honor which is rendered as a reward to the politically successful. Therefore, for those engaged in public life happiness probably seems to consist in honor.

Tertio ibi: videtur autem magis etc., improbat hanc opinionem duabus rationibus. Quarum primam ponit dicens, quod ante assignatam veram rationem felicitatis divinamus, id est coniicimus felicitatem esse quoddam bonum, quod est proprium ipsi felici, utpote ad ipsum maxime pertinens, et quod difficile ab eo aufertur. Hoc autem non convenit honori, quia honor magis videtur consistere in actu quodam honorantis et in eius potestate, quam

64. Third [2, a, iii], at “But this seems” he disproves this opinion by two reasons. In the first [iii, x] of these he says that in a way we divine the true nature of happiness, that is, we surmise happiness to be a good proper to the happy man, a thing belonging preeminently to him and taken from him with difficulty. But this is not true of honor which seems rather to consist in the action of the one rendering the honor, and to be in his power rather than in the power of the one honored. Therefore honor is something more

ipsius etiam qui honoratur. Ergo honor est quiddam magis extrinsecum et superficiale quam bonum quod quaeritur, scilicet felicitas.

extrinsic and superficial than the good we are seeking, which is happiness.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius autem videntur et cetera. Quae talis est. Felicitas est quiddam optimum quod non quaeritur propter aliud. Sed honore est aliquid melius propter quod quaeritur. Ad hoc enim homines videntur honorem quaerere ut ipsi firmam opinionem accipiant de se ipsis quod sint boni et quod ab aliis hoc credatur, et ideo quaerunt homines honorari a prudentibus, qui sunt recti iudicii, et apud eos a quibus cognoscuntur, qui melius possunt de eis iudicare. Et

65. He gives the second reason at “Another reason” [iii, y]. Happiness is some very good thing which is not sought on account of another. But there is something better than honor, namely, that on account of which honor is sought. Men appear to seek honor in order to confirm the solid opinion they have formed of themselves that they are good men and that they may be assured of this by the judgment of others. They look, therefore, for honor from prudent men with correct judgment and from those who know them best and can be better judges. Hence they

quaerunt honorari de virtute, per quam aliquis est bonus, ut in secundo dicetur. Et sic virtus est aliquid melius honore

seek to be honored for their virtue, which is the source of man’s good, as will be shown in the second book (307-308). So virtue, for

propter quam honor quaeritur. Non ergo in honore consistit felicitas.

whose sake honor is sought, is a better thing than honor. It follows then that happiness does not consist in honor.

Deinde cum dicit: forsitan autem etc., inquirit de opinione ponentium felicitatem in virtute. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit opinionem. Et dicit, quod forsitan aliquis existimabit magis esse finem civilis vitae virtutem quam honorem, ratione praedicta.

66. Then [2, b], at “From this someone,” he investigates the opinion of those who place happiness in virtue. In regard to this he does two things. First [2, b, i] he states the opinion and says that perhaps someone will think, by reason of what was just said, that virtue rather than honor is the end of public life.

Secundo ibi: videtur autem imperfectior etc., improbat eam duplici ratione. Quarum prima talis est. Felicitas videtur esse quoddam perfectissimum bonum. Sed virtus non est talis. Invenitur enim quandoque sine operatione quae est perfectio secunda, ut patet in his qui dormiunt et tamen habitum virtutis habent, et in his qui habent habitum virtutis et in tota vita sua non occurrit eis facultas operandi secundum illam

67. Second [2, b, ii], at “But apparently,” he rejects this for two reasons. The first is that happiness seems to be a most perfect good. But virtue is not of such a nature, for sometimes it is found without the perfection of activity, as we see in those who are asleep and yet have the habit of virtue. It is possible, too, that a man may have the habit of virtue, but for lack of opportunity not perform a single act of a particular virtue during his whole life. This is particularly evident

virtutem, ut maxime patet in magnanimitate et magnificentia, quia scilicet aliquis pauper habet habitum huiusmodi, qui tamen nunquam potest magnifica facere. Non ergo virtus est idem felicitati.

regarding magnanimity and magnificence, virtues perhaps possessed by a povertystricken person who is never able to perform great deeds. Therefore virtue is not the same as happiness.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et cum his mala pati et cetera. Quae talis est. Contingit aliquem habentem habitum

68. He gives the second reason at “Moreover he may be” [2, b, iii]. It is this. It happens that one who has the habit of virtue may be

virtutis (mala pati) et infortunatum esse. Sed nullus dicet talem esse felicem, nisi aliquis, qui velit pertinaciter positionem suam defendere contra rationes manifestas; ergo felicitas non est idem virtuti. Et hoc dicit ad propositum satis

ill-favored by fortune. Who will call such a man happy except someone obstinately defending a thesis against the plain truth? Therefore happiness is not the same as virtue. This, he says, is sufficient for his purpose. Enough has been said on the subject

esse. Sed de his sufficienter dictum est in encycliis, idest in quibusdam circularibus versibus quos de felicitate composuit.

in his Encyclis, that is, in certain learned verses that Aristotle composed on happiness.

Deinde cum dicit: tertia autem etc., facit mentionem de vita contemplativa. Et dicit quod de tertia vita, scilicet contemplativa, perscrutabitur inferius, scilicet in decimo.

69. Then [3], at “Later on we shall investigate,” he mentions the contemplative life, saying that it will be investigated later on in the tenth book (2086-2125).

Deinde cum dicit: pecuniosus autem etc., inquirit de quadam alia opinione minus rationabili, quae ponit felicitatem in

70. At “As to the accumulator of riches” [B’, i], he examines another opinion, less probable, which places happiness in a thing which has

aliquo, quod habet rationem boni utilis, scilicet in pecunia. Et hoc repugnat rationi ultimi finis. Nam utile dicitur aliquid ex hoc, quod ordinatur ad finem. Quia tamen pecunia habet universalem utilitatem respectu omnium bonorum temporalium, ideo probabilitatem quamdam habet haec opinio, quae in pecuniis ponit felicitatem.

the nature of a useful good, money. But this is incompatible with the nature of an ultimate end, for a thing is called useful because it is ordered to an end. However, since money has an over-all utility in respect of temporal goods, the opinion that places happiness in money has some probability.

Improbat autem eam Aristoteles duplici ratione. Quarum prima talis est. Pecunia per violentiam acquiritur et per violentiam perditur. Sed hoc non convenit felicitati, quae est finis voluntariarum operationum, ergo felicitas non consistit in pecuniis.

71. But he rejects it for two reasons [B’, i, a]. The first is that money is acquired under coercion and is parted with under coercion. But this is not in keeping with happiness, which is the goal of voluntary operations. Consequently happiness does not consist in money.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et divitiae non sunt et cetera. Quae talis est. Nos quaerimus felicitatem tamquam aliquod bonum quod non quaeritur propter aliud. Sed pecunia quaeritur propter aliud, quia habet rationem boni utilis, ut dictum est.

72. He gives the second reason [B’, 1, b] at “and riches themselves.” It is this. We look for happiness as a good that is not sought for something else. But money is sought for something beyond itself since it is by its nature a useful good, as was just said (70).

Ergo in ipsa non consistit felicitas.

Therefore happiness does not consist in money.

Concludit autem ulterius quod illa quae

73. A further conclusion notes that pleasure,

supra dicta sunt, scilicet voluptas, honor et virtus, possunt existimari ultimi fines:

honor, and virtue, all of which were treated above (57-72), can be considered ultimate

quia propter se requiruntur, ut dictum est, et tamen neque etiam illa sunt ultimus finis ut ostensum est, quamvis a diversis sint multi sermones compositi, ad asserendum felicitatem in praedictis bonis consistere. Sed istae opiniones sunt de cetero relinquendae.

ends at least in the sense that they are sought for themselves, as was said (57, 61, 63, 70)However, the ultimate end is not to be found in these, as has been shown (57-72), although many arguments have been marshalled by various philosophers to prove that happiness consists in these goods. But these discussions must be terminated.

LECTURE 6 Happiness and a Separated Good Chapter 6 A. He disproves the opinion of those placing it in a separated good. 1. HE SHOWS THE NECESSITY OF DISCUSSING THIS OPINION. a. He suggests the advantage of this inquiry. — 74 τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται,

Perhaps it will be better to investigate thoroughly the existence of the universal good and to inquire about its nature,

b. He points out... an unpleasant aspect of the investigation. — 75 καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη.

even if the investigation has become unpleasant owing to the fact that the doctrine of ideas was introduced by good friends.

c. He shows that this should not deter us from seeking the truth. — 76-78 δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν

However, it seems indeed better, and in fact especially obligatory on philosophers, to sacrifice even the rights of friendship for the sake of truth. While it is commendable to have love for both, we

τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

ought to honor truth as sacred above friends.

2. HE BEGINS TO DISPROVE IT. a. He shows there is no one common idea or form of good. i. There cannot be one common idea of good. x. THE FIRST... ARGUMENT. — 79-80 οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι παραφυάδι

Those who hold this opinion did not postulate ideas in which priority and posteriority were found. On this account they made no provision for an idea of numbers. Now good is found in the category of substance and quality and relation. But being in itself, i.e., substance, is naturally prior to being in reference to something else, for the latter

γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.

is likened to an offspring of being and an accident of it. Therefore there will not be any common idea for these.

y. HE LAYS DOWN THE SECOND REASON. — 81 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς

Furthermore, good is convertible with being. For good is predicated of substance such as God and intellect. It is predicated of quality such as virtues, of quantity such as the mean, of relation such as the useful, of time such as the opportune, of place such as a summerhouse, and so on. Hence it is obvious that one common idea of good that is universal does not exist.

κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

Otherwise good would not be found in every category but in one alone.

z. HE GIVES THE THIRD REASON. — 82 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν

Moreover, because a single science treats things failing under one idea, there would

ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ

have to be a single science of all good things. But we have many sciences, even

τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.

of things contained in one category like time, for the opportune is studied in war by strategy, in disease by medicine, and in exercise by gymnastics.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quod autem universale et cetera. Postquam philosophus improbavit opiniones ponentium felicitatem in aliquo manifestorum bonorum, hic improbat opinionem ponentium felicitatem in quodam bono separato. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod necessarium est inquirere de hac opinione. Secundo incipit eam improbare, ibi, ferentes autem opinionem hanc et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit utilitatem huius inquisitionis. Secundo ostendit quid videatur huic inquisitioni repugnare, ibi: etsi obvia tali quaestione facta et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quod illud non debeat

74. After the Philosopher has rejected the opinion of those who place happiness in one of the obvious goods, here [A] he disproves the opinion of those placing it in a separate good, In regard to this he does two things. First [1] he shows the necessity of discussing this opinion. Second [2] he begins to disprove it. in regard to the first he does three things. First [1, a] he suggests the advantage of this inquiry. Second [1, b], at “even if the investigation etc.,” he points out what may seem an unpleasant aspect of the investigation. Third [1, c], at “However, it seems etc.,” he shows that this should not deter us from

retrahere ab inquisitione huius veritatis ibi, videbitur autem utique melius et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod illud bonum separatum in quo Platonici ponebant hominis felicitatem consistere, dicebant esse universale bonum per cuius participationem omnia bona dicuntur. Dicit ergo quod perscrutari de hoc universali bono an sit, et inquirere qualiter esse ponatur, forsitan est melius, quam inquirere de praemissis opinionibus; eius enim inquisitio magis est philosophica, utpote magis pertinens ad considerationem veri boni et ultimi finis quam praemissae, si ipsae opiniones secundum se considerentur. Si autem

seeking the truth. In regard to the first we must consider that the separated good, in which the Platonists asserted that man’s happiness consists, was called a universal good. By participation in it all things are said to be good. Hence he says that perhaps it is better to investigate thoroughly the existence of this universal good and to inquire what its nature is than to discuss the opinions mentioned before. The investigation of the good is more philosophical and more properly belongs to the discussion of the true good and the ultimate end than do the opinions considered in themselves. If, however, they be considered according to our stated

considerentur secundum quod pertinent ad propositum, inquirere de praemissis opinionibus, magis videtur fuisse

intention of inquiring about the opinions mentioned above, it would seem to be more in agreement with our plan. On this account

conveniens proposito. Et ideo dixit forsitan, quod est adverbium dubitandi.

he uses “perhaps,” an adverb indicating doubt.

Deinde cum dicit etsi obvia etc., ponit quid posset eum retrahere ab inquisitione talis opinionis. Et dicit, quod huius inquisitio est contraria suae voluntati, propter hoc quod erat introducta a suis amicis, scilicet a Platonicis. Nam ipse fuit Platonis discipulus. Improbando autem eius opinionem, videbatur eius honori derogare. Ideo autem potius hic hoc dicit quam in aliis libris, in quibus opinionem Platonis improbat, quia improbare opinionem amici non est contra veritatem, quae quaeritur principaliter in speculativis, est autem contra bonos mores, de quibus principaliter agitur in

75. Then [1, b], at “even if the investigation,” he states what might deter him from an investigation of this opinion. He says that the investigation is made reluctantly because the opinion was introduced by friends of his, the Platonists. He himself was a disciple of Plato, and by rejecting this opinion he might seem to disparage his teacher. He raises the point here rather than in his other works where he likewise rejects the opinion of Plato because the repudiation of the opinion of a friend is not contrary to truth, which is the principal object in speculative sciences. It is, however, contrary to good morals, the

hoc libro.

subject discussed in this book.

Deinde cum dicit: videbitur autem utique etc., ostendit quod hoc eum non debet

76. Then [1, c], at “However, it seems indeed better,” he shows that this

retrahere. Quia videbitur melius esse, idest magis honestum et ad bonos mores pertinens, et etiam omnino oportere ut homo non vereatur impugnare familiares suos pro salute veritatis. Est enim hoc adeo necessarium ad bonos mores, ut sine hoc virtus conservari non possit. Nisi enim homo veritatem familiaribus praeferret, consequens esset, quod homo falsa iudicia et falsa testimonia proferret pro defensione amicorum. Quod est contra virtutem. Et quamvis aliter, id est alia ratione pertinente ad omnes homines veritas sit praeferenda amicis, specialiter tamen hoc oportet facere philosophos, qui sunt professores sapientiae, quae est

consideration ought not to deter him. The reason is that it seems to be better, meaning more honorable and in agreement with good morals, and indeed obligatory, that a man should not hesitate to oppose his friends for the sake of truth. It is so necessary for good morals that without it virtue cannot be preserved. Unless a man prefer truth to his friends, it follows that he will make false judgment and bear false witness in their defense. This is contrary to virtue. While reason prescribes that all men should prefer truth to their friends, this holds in a special way for the philosophers whose calling is to study wisdom, which is knowledge of the truth.

cognitio veritatis.

Quod autem oporteat veritatem praeferre amicis, ostendit hac ratione. Quia ei qui est

77. That truth should be preferred to friends he proves in this way. He is the

magis amicus, magis est deferendum. Cum autem amicitiam habeamus ad ambo, scilicet ad veritatem et ad hominem, magis debemus veritatem amare quam hominem, quia hominem praecipue debemus amare propter veritatem et propter virtutem ut in VIII huius dicetur. Veritas autem est amicus superexcellens cui debetur reverentia honoris; est etiam veritas quiddam divinum, in Deo enim primo et principaliter invenitur. Et ideo concludit, quod sanctum est praehonorare veritatem hominibus amicis.

greater friend for whom we ought to have the greater consideration. Although we should have friendship for both truth and our fellow man, we ought rather to love truth because we should love our fellow man especially on account of truth and virtue, as will be shown in the eighth book (1575-1577). Now truth is a most excellent friend of the sort to whom the homage of honor is due. Besides, truth is a divine thing, for it is found first and chiefly in God. He concludes, therefore, that it is virtuous to honor truth above friends.

Dicit enim Andronicus Peripateticus, quod sanctitas est quae facit fideles et servantes ea quae ad Deum iusta. Haec etiam fuit sententia Platonis, qui reprobans opinionem Socratis magistri sui dixit quod oportet de veritate magis curare quam de

78. Andronicus, the peripatetic, says that piety makes men faithful to and observant of the things of God. Along the same line is the judgment of Plato who, in rejecting the opinion of his teacher Socrates, says a man ought to care more for truth than anything

aliquo alio; et alibi dicit: amicus quidem Socrates sed magis amica veritas; et in alio loco: de Socrate quidem parum est curandum, de veritate autem multum.

else. Somewhere else too he affirms that while Socrates is certainly his friend, truth is still more so. In yet another place he says that we should have some care for the views of Socrates but more for truth.

Deinde cum dicit: ferentes autem hanc opinionem etc., improbat positionem Platonis dicentem quod felicitas hominis consistit in quadam communi idea boni. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod non est una communis idea boni. Secundo ostendit, quod etiam si esset, non consisteret in ea humana felicitas, ibi: sed forte haec quidem relinquendum est nunc et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod non sit una communis idea boni. Secundo inquirit de modo loquendi, quo Platonici hanc ideam nominabant, ibi, quaeret autem utique aliquis et cetera.

79. Then [2], at “Those who hold his opinion,” he rejects the position of Plato who maintains that the happiness of man consists in a common idea or form of good. In regard to this he does two things. First [2, a] he shows there is no one common idea or form of good. Second [Lect. 8; 2, b], at “But perhaps we should etc.” (B. 1096 b 29), he shows that even if there were, human happiness would not consist in it. In regard to the first he does two things. First [2, a, i] he shows that there cannot be one common idea of good. Second [Lect. 7; 2, a, ii], at “Someone will rightly etc.” (B. 1096 a

Circa primum considerandum est, quod Aristoteles non intendit improbare opinionem Platonis quantum ad hoc quod

34), he examines the manner of speaking used by the Platonists when they talk about this idea. In regard to the first we must

ponebat unum bonum separatum, a quo dependerent omnia bona, nam et ipse

consider that Aristotle does not intend to reject the opinion insofar as Plato

Aristotiles in XII metaphysicae ponit quoddam bonum separatum a toto universo, ad quod totum universum ordinatur, sicut exercitus ad bonum ducis. Improbat autem opinionem Platonis quantum ad hoc quod ponebat illud bonum separatum esse quamdam ideam communem omnium bonorum. Ad quod quidem improbandum utitur triplici ratione.

maintained a separated good on which all good would depend. In the twelfth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 10, 1075 a 11 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 12, 2627-2663), Aristotle expressly mentions a good, separated from the universe, to which the whole universe is ordered as an army is ordered to the good of the general. He does reject the opinion insofar as Plato held that the separated good is an idea common to all goods. He uses three reasons to disprove the opinion.

Quarum prima sumitur ex ipsa positione Platonicorum, qui non faciebant aliquam ideam in illis generibus in quibus invenitur prius et posterius, sicut patet in numeris. Nam binarius naturaliter prior est ternario et sic inde, et ideo non dicebant Platonici, quod numerus communis esset quaedam idea separata; ponebant autem

80. The first [i, x] of these is taken from the argument of the Platonists themselves who did not postulate an idea for these classes of things in which priority and posteriority are found, as is the case with numbers, for two is naturally prior to three. So the Platonists did not hold that number in general would have a separated idea. They did, though,

singulos numeros ideales separatos, puta binarium, ternarium et similia. Et huius ratio est, quia ea in quibus invenitur prius et posterius, non videntur esse unius ordinis, et per consequens nec aequaliter unam ideam participare. Sed in bonis invenitur prius et posterius. Quod manifestat ex hoc, quod bonum invenitur in eo quodquidest, id est in substantia, et similiter in qualitate et etiam in aliis generibus; manifestum est autem, quod illud quod est ens per seipsum, scilicet substantia, est naturaliter prior omnibus his quae non habent esse nisi in comparatione ad substantiam, sicut est quantitas, quae est mensura substantiae,

place separated ideas for individual numbers, for example, two, three and so on. The reason for this is that the things in which priority and posteriority are found do not seem to be of one order and consequently do not partake of one idea. But among good things there is priority and posteriority. This is clear from the fact that good is found in the quod quid est or substance, and likewise in quality and also in other genera. Now it is evident that what is being in itself, such as substance, is naturally prior to all those things that have being only in relation to substance—as quantity, which is the measure of substance; quality, which is the disposition

et qualitas, quae est dispositio substantiae, et ad aliquid, quod est habitudo substantiae. Et idem est in aliis generibus, quae omnia assimilantur propagini entis, idest substantiae, quae est principaliter

of substance; and relation, which is the reference of substance. The same is true in other categories that are all, as it were, the offspring of being or substance. This is being in the full sense, and from it are

ens, a qua propaginantur et derivantur omnia alia genera. Quae etiam in tantum dicuntur entia, inquantum accidunt substantiae. Et ex hoc concludit, quod non

engendered and derived all other genera, which are called being to the extent that they are accidents of a substance. From this he concludes that there cannot be a

potest esse quaedam communis idea boni.

common idea of good.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi amplius quia bonum et cetera. Ad cuius evidentiam

81. He lays down the second reason [i, y] at “Furthermore, good etc.” To understand

sciendum est, quod Plato ponebat ideam esse rationem et essentiam omnium eorum, quae ideam participant. Ex quo sequitur, quod eorum quorum non est una ratio communis, non possit esse una idea. Sed diversorum praedicamentorum non est una ratio communis. Nihil enim univoce de his praedicatur. Bonum autem sicut et ens, cum quo convertitur, invenitur in quolibet praedicamento; sicut in quod quid est, id est in substantia, bonum dicitur Deus, in quo non cadit malitia, et intellectus, qui semper est rectus. In qualitate autem virtus, quae bonum facit habentem. In quantitate autem commensuratum, quod est bonum

this we must know that Plato held the “idea” to be the “ratio” or nature and essence of all things that partake of the idea. It follows from this that there cannot be one idea of things not having a common nature. But the various categories do not have one common nature, for nothing is predicated of them univocally. Now good, like being with which it is convertible, is found in every category. Thus the quod quid est or substance, God, in whom there is no evil, is called good; the intellect, which is always true, is called good. In quality good is predicated of virtue, which makes its possessor good; in quantity, of the mean, which is the good in everything subject to

in quolibet quod subditur mensurae. In ad aliquid autem bonum est utile, quod est relatum in debitum finem. In quando autem tempus, scilicet opportunum, et in ubi locus congruus ad ambulandum, sicut dieta. Et idem patet in aliis generibus. Manifestum est ergo, quod non est aliquod unum bonum commune, quod scilicet sit idea, vel ratio communis omnium bonorum: alioquin oporteret, quod bonum non inveniretur in omnibus praedicamentis, sed in uno solo.

measure. In relation, good is predicated of the useful which is good relative to a proper end. In time, it is predicated of the opportune; and in place, of a location suitable for walking as a summerhouse. The same may be said of other categories. It is clear, therefore, that there is not some one good that is the idea or the common “ratio” of all goods. Otherwise good would not be found in every category but in one alone.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi amplius autem quia eorum quae sunt et cetera. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut Plato ponebat quod res extra animam existentes assequuntur formam generis vel speciei

82. He gives the third reason at “Moreover, because etc.” [i, z]. To understand this we must know the following. Things existing outside the mind, according to Plato, acquire the form of genus or species by

per hoc quod participant ideam, ita anima formatur per scientiam ex hoc quod participat ideam, ita quod anima non cognoscit lapidem nisi per hoc quod participat ideam lapidis, ex quo sequitur quod omnium eorum, quae habent unam ideam, est una scientia. Si ergo omnium

participating in the “idea” so that the mind does not know a stone except by participating in the “idea” of stone. The mind in this way partakes of science and knowledge of those things when the “forms” or “ideas” of them are impressed in it. It follows that there is a single science of

bonorum esset una idea, sequeretur quod omnia bona pertinerent ad considerationem unius scientiae. Hoc autem videmus esse falsum, etiam quantum ad bona quae sunt in uno praedicamento (quod (dicit) addit, ne aliquis diversificationes scientiarum attribueret diversitati praedicamentorum): tempus enim quod est ex congruitate considerat quidem in rebus bellicis militaris, in aegritudinibus autem medicinalis, in laboribus autem exercitativa. Relinquitur ergo quod non est una communis idea bonorum.

all the things that partake of one “idea.” If, therefore, there be one “idea” of all goods, it will belong to the study of one science. But we see that this is false even in regard to the goods belonging to a single category. He adds this for fear that someone may specify sciences according to the diversity of categories. We see, however, that strategy studies the opportune in war, medicine studies it in disease, and gymnastics in exercise. It remains then that there is not one common “idea” of all goods.

LECTURE 7 The Separated Good and an Absolute Good Chapter 6 (2,a) ii. Whether it is properly called by this name. x. IS NOT PROPERLY NAMED ABSOLUTE GOOD. aa Not properly called absolute good. — 83-84 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν

Someone will rightly ask what they mean in calling anything “absolute” if in both absolute man and this particular man there exists one and the same nature, that of man. This is the truth for they differ in no way as man. On the same supposition an absolute good or a good in itself and a particular good

διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν. bb.

do not differ as good.

He rules out a... rejoinder. — 85-86

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου.

It may not be countered that the good in itself is better because eternal, since what endures a long time is not necessarily better by nature than a thing that lasts a day.

cc. The Pythagorean view. — 87-88 πιθανώτερον δ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν

A more likely explanation seems to have been given by the Pythagoreans who place unity in their list of goods. In this apparently

ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος·

Speusippus followed them. But further discussion of the point will have to wait.

y. THIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH... THE COMMON IDEA... OF ALL GOODS. aa. An absolute good cannot be an idea common to all goods. — 89-90 τοῖς

δὲ

λεχθεῖσιν

Contrary to what they have asserted, some

ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.

doubt arises because their words are not said of every good and yet they do so apply. Now things are said to be good according to one species of good which are sought and desired for their own sake, and things productive or in some way preservative of these or prohibitive of their contraries are said to be good according to an other species. It is obvious then that good is predicated in two ways, for some things are sought for their own sake and some for the sake of others.

bb.

No common idea of... things... good in themselves.

a’. He declares his intention. — 91 χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

Let us separate from the useful good things good in themselves and examine whether they can be called good according to one idea.

b’. He investigates... by proposing a question. — 92 καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; ὥστε

But what would you have enumerated among goods in themselves? Would you include even all the goods sought for themselves alone, as intelligence, sight, and some types of pleasure and honor? These are sometimes sought for the sake of another, but they always have an intrinsic value. Otherwise nothing else seems an absolute good except the “idea” or “form.”

c’. He resolves the second part. — 93 μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.

Wherefore the idea will be empty.

d’. He resolves the first Part. — 94 εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὑτά, τὸν τἀγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι

If things in themselves are demonstrated as absolute good, then the same nature of goodness will have to appear in all of them as the nature of whiteness in snow and in white lead. But just as we find different natures in honor, prudence, and pleasure, so too we find differences in goodness. The absolute good is not, therefore, something common according

ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

to one idea.

cc. He handles a pertinent query. — 95-96 ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης

In what way then are they to be called good? Not as things purely equivocal. Are they at

ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.

least to be compared as things referring to one principle or as all tending to one end? Or still better, should we say according to analogy? Indeed, as sight is the good of the body so intellect is the good of the soul and so of other things.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quaeret autem utique aliquis et cetera. Ostendit supra philosophus quod non est una idea communis omnium bonorum; sed quia Platonici illud bonum separatum non solum vocabant ideam boni, sed etiam per se bonum, hic intendit inquirere Aristotiles utrum hoc convenienter dicatur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod illud bonum separatum, non convenienter nominatur per se bonum. Secundo ostendit, quod ponere bonum separatum esse per se bonum repugnat ei quod dicitur ipsum esse communem ideam omnium bonorum, ibi, his autem, quae dicta sunt, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo

83. The Philosopher has shown above that there is no common idea of all goods. But because the separated good is called by the Platonists not only the “idea” or “form” of good but also absolute good, Aristotle here intends to inquire whether it is properly called by this name [(2, a) ii]. In regard to to this he does two things. First [ii, x] he shows that the separated good is not properly named absolute good. Second [ii, y], at “Contrary to what etc.,” he shows that to postulate a separated good as absolute is inconsistent with saying that it is the common idea or form of all goods. In regard to the first he does three things.

ostendit, quod illud bonum separatum non convenienter dicitur per se bonum. Secundo excludit quandam responsionem, ibi: sed quidem neque perpetuum esse etc.; tertio comparat hoc dictum opinioni Pictagoricorum, ibi, probabilius autem videntur et cetera.

First [x, aa] he shows that the separated good is not properly called absolute (per se) good. Second [x, bb], at “It may not be countered etc.,” he rules out a particular rejoinder. Third [x, cc], at “A more likely explanation etc.,” he compares this doctrine with the Pythagorean view.

Circa primum considerandum est, quod illud bonum separatum, quod est causa omnium bonorum, oportet ponere in altiori gradu bonitatis, quam ea quae apud nos sunt, eo quod est ultimus finis omnium. Per hoc autem dictum videtur, quod non sit altioris gradus in bonitate, quam alia bona. Et hoc manifestat per hoc, quod unumquodque separatorum vocabat Plato per se, sicut ideam hominis vocabat per se

84. In regard to the first we must consider that the separated good, which is the cause of all goods, ought to be placed in a higher degree of goodness than the good things about us because the separated good is the ultimate end of all. But it seems that, according to this doctrine, it is not a higher degree in goodness than other goods. This is apparent because the Platonists called each of the separated things absolute or in

hominem et ideam equi per se equum, manifestum est autem, quod una et eadem ratio est hominis qui est apud nos et per se hominis, idest separati. Et hoc manifestat per hoc, quod homo separatus et homo qui est in materia non differunt secundum quod homo, differunt autem secundum quaedam alia, puta quod ille homo est immaterialis et iste est materialis; sicut animal commune et homo non differunt in ratione animalis, sed differunt in hoc, quod homo addit rationale super animal. Ita etiam videtur quod in ratione hominis non differat homo separatus ab hoc homine, sed hic homo addit materiam. Eadem igitur

itself, as man in himself and even horse in itself. Now it is clear that one and the same nature belongs to man who lives among us and to man in himself, that is, ideal man. He proves this by the fact that ideal man and man clothed with matter do not differ as man, but they do differ in certain other respects—for example, this particular man has matter. Thus the notions of animal and man do not differ in animality but rather in man’s rational principle that he has over and above animality. So too it seems that the ideal man does not differ from this particular man in the nature of man but because this particular man has matter in

ratione illud separatum bonum quod nominant per se bonum, non erit alterius rationis in bonitate, quam hoc particulare bonum, poterit autem esse differentia quantum ad aliqua alia, quae sunt praeter rationem boni.

addition to being man. For the same reason the good that is called absolute will not have goodness different in nature from this particular good, although there can be a difference in other respects than the nature of good.

Deinde cum dicit: (sed quidem) neque perpetuum esse etc., excludit quamdam responsionem. Posset enim aliquis respondere, quod illud per se bonum est melius, quia est perpetuum. Haec autem bona sunt corruptibilia. Quod autem est diuturnius, videtur esse melius et magis eligendum. Sed ad hoc excludendum dicit, quod neque hoc quod est perpetuum esse, facit illud per se bonum esse magis bonum. Perpetuum enim a non perpetuo differt duratione. Differentia autem durationis alicuius rei est praeter rationem propriae

85. Then [x, bb], at “It may not,” he rules out a particular answer. Someone could say that the good in itself is better because eternal while the goods here are perishable. Indeed, a thing that lasts longer does seem better and more desirable. To exclude this he points out that the good in itself is eternal does not mean that it is better. The eternal differs from the non-eternal by reason of duration, and the difference of duration of a thing is outside the nature of the species, as life that lasts only a day and life more enduring are not different by

speciei, sicut vita quae est unius diei et vita quae est diuturna non differunt in ratione vitae, sed solum differunt in duratione. Sic ergo si accipiatur bonum quasi una species, duratio erit praeter rationem boni. Et ita ex hoc quod est aliquid diuturnius non differet secundum rationem boni quasi melius existens quam si esset unius diei

reason of life but only by duration. So then if good be understood as one species, its duration will be outside the nature of good. The longer duration of a thing then does not make that thing any better.

tantum. Sed si ponamus non esse unam speciem vel ideam boni, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed quod bonum dicitur sicut et ens in omnibus

86. If we do not hold that there is one species or idea of good as the Platonists did, but that good, like being, is predicated

generibus, hoc ipsum quod est diuturnius erit bonum in tempore, unde addet ad bonitatem. Et sic quod est diuturnius erit melius. Sed hoc non potest dici si bonum sit una species per se, et ita sequetur quod neque sit melius ex hoc, quod est perpetuum.

in every genus, duration itself will be a good of time. It would, in that case, add something to goodness. Hence what is more lasting will be better. But this cannot be said if the good is one species in itself. It follows then that it is not better because eternal.

Deinde cum dicit: probabilius autem videntur etc., comparat praedictam positionem Platonicorum positioni Pythagoricorum. Circa quod considerandum est, quod secundum Platonicos eadem erat ratio boni et unius. Et ideo ponebant idem esse per se unum et

87. Then [x, cc], at “A more likely explanation,” he compares this opinion with that of the Pythagoreans. We must consider that according to the Platonists the nature of the one and the good is the same, and so they identified one in itself and good in itself. Hence they were obliged

per se bonum, ex quo necesse erat quod ponerent unum primum per se bonum. Quod quidem Pythagorici non faciebant. Sed unum ponebant aliquid eorum quae continentur in coordinatione boni sub quo ponebant

to postulate one first good. The Pythagoreans did not do this’ however, but they put one among the things contained in the list of the good under which they placed:

lumen, e contrario autem sub malo

tenebras,

Light (The contrary evil of which they declared to be:)

Darkness

Unity

Multitude

Rest

Motion

Straight

Curved

Masculine

Feminine

Right

Left

Finite

Infinite

Equal

Unequal

ponebant unum, quietem, musculum, dextrum, finitum, imparem,

multitudinem, motum, feminam, sinistrum, infinitum, parem numerum,

rectum,

curvum

quadratum;

altera parte longius.

Square

Rectangular

Dicit ergo, quod quantum ad hoc probabilius dixerunt Pythagorici quam Platonici, quia non cogebantur ponere

88. He says, therefore, that on this point the Pythagoreans gave a more likely explanation than the Platonists because

unam rationem boni. Et ideo Speusippus, qui fuit nepos Platonis, filius sororis eius, et successor eius in scholis, in hoc non fuit secutus Platonem, sed magis Pythagoram. Dicit autem, quod de his debet fieri alius sermo, scilicet in metaphysica.

the Pythagoreans were not compelled to hold one nature for the good. Even Speusippus, who was a son of Plato’s sister and his successor in the Academy, did not follow Plato but Pythagoras on this point. He adds that further discussion of the subject will be taken up in the Metaphysics. (Cf. Bk. I, Ch. 5, 986 a 13-986 b 9; St. Th. Lect. 8, 124-133, Cf. Bk. XI, Ch. 9, 1066 a 13-17; St. Th. Lect. 9, 2303.)

Deinde cum dicit: his autem quae dicta sunt etc., ostendit, quod dicere illud bonum separatum esse per se bonum, repugnat ei quod est unam esse ideam omnium bonorum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo

89. Then [ii, y], at “Contrary to what,” he shows that the assertion that the separated good is an absolute good or a good in itself is inconsistent with their view that there is one idea or form of all goods.

ostendit, quod per se bonum non potest esse communis idea omnium bonorum. Secundo, quod non potest esse communis idea etiam omnium quae dicuntur per se bona, ibi, dividentes igitur, et cetera. Tertio respondet cuidam quaestioni, ibi sed qualiter utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod contra ea quae dicta sunt a Platonicis, occulte apparet quaedam dubitatio propter hoc quod, cum loquitur de illo per se bono, non videntur de omni bono sermones dici, etiam quantum ad ipsam apparentiam verborum, et fieri quantum ad convenientiam rerum. Et hoc ideo quia diversae sunt species vel rationes bonorum.

He does three things on this point. Firstly, [y, aa] he shows that an absolute good cannot be an idea common to all goods. Second [y, bb], at “Let us separate etc.,” he shows that there cannot be a common idea of all things called good in themselves. Third [y, cc], at “In what way etc.,” he handles a pertinent query. He says then in the first place that contrary to what the Platonists assert, there seems to be a subtle hesitation here. When they speak about the good in itself, it does not seem from the obvious meaning of their words that the discussion concerns every good, but as much can be gathered from the context because there are various species or forms of goods.

Dicuntur enim secundum unam speciem vel rationem bona illa quae secundum se ipsa sunt persecuta, id est quaesita vel desiderata, et dilecta, id est amata. Et secundum aliam rationem dicuntur bona

90. Those things sought, pursued, chosen, or desired for themselves are good according to one species or form of goodness. Those desired insofar as they are good in some way for the sake of others,

illa quae sunt aliqualiter factiva vel conservativa illorum quae sunt secundum se bona. Tertio vero modo dicuntur aliqua bona quia sunt prohibitiva contrariorum. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod bonum dupliciter dicitur. Quaedam enim sunt bona secundum seipsa, scilicet prima; de quibus dictum est, quod propter se quaeruntur. Utraque vero alia, scilicet factiva, vel conservativa, et etiam prohibitiva contrariorum dicuntur bona propter illa quae sunt secundum se bona. Et sic manifestum est, quod ratio per se boni non potest aptari omnibus bonis.

which in their turn are really good, are called good for another reason. In a third way, some things are called good because they prevent the contrary evil. It is clear, therefore, that good is predicated in two ways. Primary goods are good in themselves. As we have already remarked (9-13, 58) they are sought for themselves. Both of the other things called good the productive or preservative of good and the restrictive of contrary evil are called good in reference to things good in themselves. It is obvious then that the “ratio’ , of absolute good is not suited to all goods.

Deinde cum dicit: dividentes igitur etc., ostendit quod una ratio per se boni non potest competere omnibus per se bonis. Et primo dicit de quo est intentio. Circa quod considerandum est, quod factiva vel conservativa secundum se bonorum et prohibitiva contrariorum dicuntur bona sicut utilia. Quia ergo manifestum est quod talibus non aptatur ratio per se boni, separemus ab eis illa quae sunt secundum se bona, et videamus si possint dici bona secundum unam ideam, quam dicunt per se bonum.

91. Then [y, bb], at “Let us separate,” he shows that the “ratio” of absolute good cannot belong to all goods in themselves. First [bb, a’] he declares his intention. We must consider that those things that are productive or preservative of goods in themselves, or restrictive of contraries, are called good because they are useful, and the nature of absolute good does not belong to the merely useful. Let us then separate from these useful things the things that are in themselves good and see whether they can be designated good according to one form, which is called absolute good.

Secundo ibi: secundum se ipsa autem etc., ad hoc investigandum proponit quamdam quaestionem: qualia scilicet sint ponenda secundum se bona. Et hanc quaestionem

92. Second [bb, b’], at “But what would you,” he investigates this last point by proposing a question: what kinds of things should be considered goods in themselves?

determinat per duo membra. Quorum primum est: utrum dicenda sint secundum se bona quaecumque quaeruntur solitaria, id est etiam si sola essent, ut scilicet nulla

He presents this question in two parts. In the first he asks whether we are to call absolute whatever goods are sought for themselves alone to the exclusion of all

alia utilitas ex eis sequeretur, sicut scire, videre, voluptates quaedam et honores. Huiusmodi enim quamvis quandoque quaerantur propter aliquid aliud ad quod sunt utilia, tamen si ad nihil aliud valerent, secundum se essent bona et desiderabilia. Secundum autem membrum quaestionis est: utrum nihil aliud sit per se bonum nisi

others, so that they are not ordered to any further use. Such would be, for example, sight, and certain kinds of pleasure and honors. These things are sometimes sought for the sake of something else to which they are useful, but even if they have no use beyond themselves they are good and desirable in themselves. The second

sola idea.

part of the question asks whether there is any other absolute good besides the idea or form itself.

Tertio ibi: quare erit etc., deducit hoc secundum membrum immediate praemissum. Et concludit, quod si nihil aliud sit per se bonum nisi idea, erit idea inanis, id est sine efficacia. Ponitur enim idea quasi exemplar quoddam cuius similitudo sit aliis impressa. Exemplar autem est supervacuum, si nihil ei assimulatur; unde sequitur quod idea sit

93, Third [bb, c’] at “Wherefore the idea,” he resolves the second part just mentioned. He concludes that if nothing else be a good in itself except the idea, then the idea will be a kind of exemplar whose likeness will be impressed on others. An exemplar is useless if it has no likeness to some thing else. Hence it follows that the idea is useless if there is no other good in itself.

inanis, si nihil aliud sit secundum se bonum. Quarto ibi: si sunt et haec etc., deducit

94. Fourth [bb, d’], at

“Things in

primum membrum. Et dicit quod, si omnia praedicta sint secundum se bona participando ideam, quae est per se bonum, oportebit, quod in omnibus appareat eadem ratio bonitatis, sicut in nive et cerusa est eadem ratio albedinis, eo quod participant unam formam. Sed hoc non apparet esse verum in praedictis. Honor enim et prudentia et voluptas habent diversas rationes non solum proprias, prout scilicet ratio honoris, inquantum est honor, differt a ratione prudentiae inquantum est prudentia, sed etiam in quantum sunt bona; non enim est una ratio bonitatis in omnibus his, nec secundum eamdem rationem sunt appetibilia. Unde

themselves,” he resolves the first part in this way. If all the aforementioned things are good in themselves by partaking of the idea which is itself good, the same nature of goodness must appear in all of them, as we find the same nature of whiteness in snow and in white’ lead from the fact that they share in the one form. But this apparently is not true of the things mentioned above. Honor, prudence, and pleasure differ in their natures, that is, the nature of honor precisely as honor differs from the nature of prudence as prudence. Moreover, the nature of honor as a good differs from the nature of prudence as it is a good. There is not, then, one nature of goodness in all

relinquitur, quod id quod dicunt per se bonum, non est aliquid commune, velut una

good things nor are they all desirable under the same aspect. Hence it remains that

idea communis omnium bonorum.

what is called absolute good is not something common as one idea or form common to all goods.

Deinde cum dicit: sed qualiter utique etc., respondet cuidam tacitae quaestioni, quae est qualiter praedicta dicantur bona secundum diversas rationes. Et haec quidem quaestio locum habet, quia aliquid dici de multis secundum diversas rationes contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationes omnino diversas non habentes respectum ad aliquid unum; et ista dicuntur aequivoca casu, quia scilicet casu

95. Then [y, cc], at “In what way,” he handles a pertinent query. This inquiry belongs here since predication according to different reasons is made in the first of two ways according to meanings that are without any relation to any one thing. These are purely equivocal because it happens by chance that the same word has been used by one person for one thing, and then by someone else for an entirely

accidit quod unum nomen unus homo imposuit uni rei, et alius alii rei, ut praecipue patet in diversis hominibus eodem nomine nominatis. Alio modo unum nomen dicitur de multis secundum rationes diversas non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes. Quandoque quidem in hoc, quod referuntur ad unum principium, sicut res aliqua dicitur militaris, vel quia est instrumentum militis, sicut gladius, vel quia est tegumentum eius sicut lorica, vel quia est vehiculum eius, sicut equus. Quandoque vero in hoc, quod referuntur ad unum finem sicut medicina dicitur sana, eo quod est factiva sanitatis, dieta vero eo quod est conservativa sanitatis, urina vero

different thing, as is plainly evident in the case of different men having the same name. In another way, one word is used of several things with meanings not entirely different but having some sort of common likeness. Sometimes they agree in referring to one principle, as a thing is called military because it is a soldier’s weapon (like a sword), or his clothing (like a uniform), or his transportation (like a horse). Sometimes they agree in referring to one end. Thus medicine is called healthy because it produces health, diet is called healthy because it preserves health, and urine in its turn is called healthy because it is a sign of health. Sometimes the

eo quod est sanitatis significativa. Quandoque vero secundum proportiones diversas ad idem subiectum, sicut qualitas dicitur ens quia est dispositio per se entis, idest substantiae, quantitas vero eo quod est mensura eiusdem, et sic de aliis, vel secundum unam proportionem ad diversa subiecta. Eamdem enim habent proportionem visus ad corpus et intellectus ad animam; unde sicut visus est potentia organi corporalis, ita etiam intellectus est potentia animae absque participatione corporis.

agreement is according to a different proportion to the same subject, as quality is called being because it is a disposition of a being in itself, i.e., a substance, and quantity because it is a measure of substance, and so on. Or the agreement is according to one proportion to different subjects. For instance, sight has the same proportion to the body as intellect to the soul. Hence as sight is a power of a physical organ so also is the intellect a power of the soul without the participation of the body.

Sic ergo dicit, quod bonum dicitur de

96. In this fashion, therefore, he affirms

multis, non secundum rationes penitus differentes, sicut accidit in his quae sunt casu aequivoca, sed in quantum omnia bona dependent ab uno primo bonitatis principio, vel inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Non enim voluit Aristoteles quod illud bonum separatum sit idea et ratio omnium bonorum, sed principium et finis. Vel etiam dicuntur omnia bona magis secundum analogiam, id est proportionem eandem, quantum scilicet quod visus est bonum corporis, et intellectus est bonum animae. Ideo autem hunc tertium modum praefert, quia accipitur secundum bonitatem inhaerentem rebus. Primi autem duo modi secundum bonitatem separatam,

that “good” is predicated of many things not with meanings entirely different, as happens with things completely equivocal, but according to analogy or the same proportion, inasmuch as all goods depend on the first principle of goodness, that is, as they are ordered to one end. Aristotle indeed did not intend that the separated good be the idea and “ratio” of all goods but their principle and end. Likewise, all things are called good by an analogy or the same proportion just as sight is the good of the body and intellect is the good of the soul. He prefers this third way because it is understood according to goodness inherent in things. The first two ways, however, are

a qua non ita proprie aliquid denominatur.

ascribed to a separated goodness from which a thing is not so properly denominated.

LECTURE 8 This Matter Really Belongs to Another Science Chapter 6 2,b Supposing a common idea of good, it would not follow: that happiness would have to be sought according to it. i. He presents a proof of his position. — 97-98 ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας·

But perhaps we should now leave these subjects, for a precise determination of them properly belongs to another branch of philosophy [Metaphysics]. The same too may be said about the idea.

εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτό,

Even if there is some one good univocally predicated or if a separated good in itself does exist, it is obvious that it is not a

δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται.

thing produced or possessed by man. Now it is a good of this kind that we are looking for.

ii. He gives an apparent rejoinder. — 99 τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ'

Perhaps some will think it better for the sake of the goods produced or possessed to obtain a knowledge of the separated good. Using this as a guide we will have a more

ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθά, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν.

thorough understanding of the objects that are good for us, and thus enlightened, we may acquire them.

iii. He refutes it. x. BY TWO REASONS. THE FIRST. — 100 πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ'

This reasoning certainly has some probability, although it does not seem to square with what we observed in the sciences. While sciences tend to some good and seek the necessary, they all neglect to use a knowledge of the separated good. But it is not reason able to suppose that all artists and scientists would be ignorant

ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον.

of and would fail to seek a thing so advantageous to themselves.

y. HE OFFERS A SECOND REASON. — 101-102 ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ

Indeed the separated good would be useless. What help does a knowledge of it afford a weaver and a carpenter in the

τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ'

practice of their trades? Or how is a man a better doctor or a better soldier by studying the idea itself? A doctor surely is not intent on health so understood but on the health of man in the concrete, or even better perhaps, on the health of this man. It is the individual man whom a doctor intends to cure. Enough has now been

ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

said on these topics.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Sed forte haec quidem et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod non est una communis idea boni, nunc ostendit quod etiam si esset, non pertineret ad propositum, ut scilicet

97. After the Philosopher has explained that there is no common idea of good, now [2, b] he shows that even if there were, it would not follow that happiness would have to be sought according to it. In regard to this he

secundum ipsam esset quaerenda felicitas. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo probat propositum. Secundo ponit quandam responsionem, ibi: forte autem alicui videbitur et cetera. Tertio excludit eam, ibi, probabilitatem quidem igitur, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod haec, scilicet qualiter bonum dicatur secundum unam vel diversas rationes de bonis, oportet nunc relinquere, quia per certitudinem determinare de hoc pertinet magis ad aliam philosophiam, scilicet ad metaphysicam. Et similiter etiam consideratio de idea boni, non est propria praesenti intentioni. Et horum rationem assignat: quia si esset unum bonum

does three things. First [i] he presents a proof of his position. Second [ii], at “Perhaps some will think etc.,” he gives an apparent rejoinder. Third (iii], at “This reasoning certainly etc.,” he refutes it. He says first that the manner of predicating good according to one or different reasons must now be put aside because more accurate study of the matter properly belongs to another branch of philosophy, metaphysics. Likewise, the consideration of the idea of good is not pertinent to our purpose. As reason for these statements he maintains that if there were one good univocally predicated of all, or even if a separated good did exist in itself, it would obviously not be a thing produced or

univoce de omnibus praedicatum, vel etiam si esset per seipsum separatum existens, manifestum est, quod non erit tale aliquid quod sit vel operatum, vel possessum ab homine. Nunc autem tale aliquid quaerimus.

possessed by man. Now it is precisely such a thing we are seeking.

Quaerimus enim felicitatem, quae est finis humanorum actuum. Finis autem hominis, vel est ipsa eius operatio, vel est aliqua res exterior. Quae quidem potest esse finis hominis vel quia est operata ab ipso, sicut domus est finis aedificationis, vel quia est possessa, sicut ager est finis emptionis. Manifestum est autem quod

98. We are looking for the happiness that is the end of human acts. The end, however, of man is either some thing he does or some external thing. This can be the end of man because either it is produced, as a house is the end of building or it is possessed as a thing that is used. Now it is clear that the common or separated good cannot be the operation

illud bonum commune vel separatum non potest esse ipsa hominis operatio, nec

itself of man, nor is it something produced by man. Moreover, it does not seem to be

etiam est aliquid per hominem factum. Nec etiam videtur aliquid ab homine possessum sicut possidentur res quae veniunt in usum huius vitae. Unde manifestum est, quod illud bonum commune vel separatum non est bonum humanum, quod nunc quaerimus.

something possessed by man as he possesses things used in this life. Obviously, then, the common or separated good is not the good of man that is the object of our present search.

Deinde cum dicit: forte autem alicui videbitur etc., ponit quamdam responsionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod illud bonum separatum, quamvis non sit operatum vel possessum ab homine, est tamen exemplar omnium operatorum et possessorum bonorum. Expedit autem intueri exemplar ei qui vult pervenire ad exemplata. Et ideo videtur expedire, quod aliquis ipsum bonum separatum cognoscat propter bona possessa et operata. Quia habentes

99. Then [ii], at “Perhaps,” he gives an apparent rejoinder. Someone might say that the separated good, although not produced or possessed by man, nevertheless is the pattern of all the good produced and possessed. Now one who wishes to understand the copies ought to know the pattern. So it would seem that one should know the separated good itself for the sake of the goods produced and possessed. The reason is that, having the separated good as a guide, we will be better able to know and consequently better able to

illud bonum separatum sicut quoddam exemplar, magis poterimus cognoscere, et per consequens melius adipisci ea quae sunt nobis bona, sicut inspicientes ad hominem aliquem magis proprie possunt depingere eius effigiem.

acquire the things that are good for us, as an artist looking at a model is better able to paint a likeness. too.

Deinde cum dicit probabilitatem quidem igitur etc., excludit praemissam responsionem duabus rationibus. Quarum prima sumitur ex eo quod communiter observatur. Et dicit, quod sermo praedictae responsionis videtur esse probabilis, sed tamen videtur

100. Then [iii], at “This reasoning certainly,” he refutes this response by two reasons. The first [iii, x] he takes from ordinary observation. While the reason given seems probable, he says that it does not appear to be in agreement with what we observe in other sciences. All sciences and arts tend to some

dissonare ab eo quod observatur in omnibus scientiis. Omnes enim scientiae et artes appetunt quoddam bonum, ut supra habitum est, et unaquaeque inquirit illud quod est necessarium sibi ad consequendum finem intentum. Nulla autem utitur cognitione illius boni

good, as we said above (8), and to attain the end aimed at, each uses what is necessary for itself. None of them, though, uses the knowledge of this separated good. This would not be reasonable if some advantage could be derived from it. Therefore, the knowledge of this separated good contributes nothing to

separati. Quod non esset rationabile si ex hoc eis aliquod auxilium praeberetur; non ergo aliquid confert ad operata et possessa bona cognitio illius boni

the goods produced and possessed.

separati. Secundam rationem ponit ibi inutile autem et cetera. Quae sumitur ab ipsa natura rei. Et dicit quod illud bonum separatum est omnino inutile ad scientias et artes, et quantum ad earum exercitium, quia textor vel faber in nullo iuvatur ad operationem suae artis ex cognitione illius boni separati. Et etiam quantum ad acquisitionem scientiae vel artis. Nullus enim efficitur magis medicus vel magis miles per hoc quod contemplatur ideam separatam boni.

101. He offers a second reason [iii, y] at “Indeed the separated good would be useless.” This is taken from the very nature of the thing. He states that the good under consideration is altogether useless for the sciences and the arts, both in regard to their exercise, since a weaver or a carpenter is in no way aided in the practice of his art by a knowledge of that separated good, and in regard to the acquisition of a science or an art. No one becomes a better physician or a better soldier because he has studied the

Cuius rationem assignat: quia oportet exemplar, ad quod necesse est inspicere, esse conforme operato. Ars autem non operatur aliquod bonum commune aut abstractum, sed concretum et in singulari, medicus enim non intendit sanitatem in abstracto, sed in concreto, eam scilicet, quae est hominis, et in singulari, eam scilicet quae est huius hominis, quia medicatur non hominem universalem sed singularem. Unde relinquitur quod cognitio boni universalis et separati non sit necessaria, neque ad acquisitionem scientiarum neque ad exercitium earum.

separated form of good. The reason he assigns is that an exemplar, at which it is necessary to gaze, must be in conformity with the work produced. Art, however, does not produce some good in common or an abstract good but a good that is concrete and individual. A physician does not intend health in the abstract but in the concrete, the health of this particular man. He does not give medicine to mankind in general but to this individual man. We must conclude then that the knowledge of a universal and separated good is not needed either for the acquisition or for the exercise of the sciences.

Ultimo autem concludit epilogando tantum dictum esse de opinionibus felicitatis.

102. On this note he concludes his discussion of the opinions offered about happiness.

LECTURE 9 The Nature of Happiness

Chapter 7

I. HE SHOWS WHAT HAPPINESS IS. A. He shows what happiness is. A’ He shows what happiness is. 1.

HE PROPOSES SOME GENERAL NOTIONS AND

CONDITIONS. a. He states that happiness is the ultimate end. — 103-106 πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ

Let us return again to a consideration of the good we are seeking in order to find out what it is. It seems that the good differs in different operations and arts. In medicine it is one good, in war it is another, and in other arts, still other goods. As the thing sought in every activity, the good is the end for the sake of which other things are done. This will be health in medicine, victory in war, a building in architecture, something else in some other art. In

ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται· τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἱρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια·

every activity and choice there is an end, the agent doing everything he does for the sake of that end. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good intended. If there are many ends, there will be many goods, and in this case our discussion will go beyond the many until it arrives at that supreme good.

b. He lays down the conditions belonging to the ultimate end. i. The first is that it be a perfect thing. — 107-111

τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ

We must make a considerable effort to give this a fuller explanation. Apparently there are many ends, some of which we choose for the sake of something else like riches, flutes, and in general all instruments. It is obvious then that not all ends are perfect. But the ultimate end appears to be perfect.

καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο.

Wherefore, if there be only one of this kind, it will be what we are looking for. If there are a number of goods, then it is the most perfect of these. Now we call that object which is desired for its own sake more perfect than one that is desired for some further purpose. That which is never desired for any further utility is more perfect than the things desirable in themselves and for the sake of this further purpose. In the event that the object is perfect without qualification it will always be desirable for itself and never for anything beyond itself. Happiness in fact seems especially to be of this nature, for we choose it in every case for itself and never for something else. Honor and pleasure and knowledge and every virtue we do indeed choose for themselves, for we would choose every one of them even if no advantage accrued to us. But we choose them also on account of happiness because we hope to become happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness for the sake of these goods or for any other good whatsoever.

ii. The second, that it be self-sufficient.

x. FIRST IN REGARD To... THE NATURE OF SUFFICIENCY. — 112-114

φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον

The same seems to follow from the viewpoint of self-sufficiency, for the

ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δ' αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι·

perfect good apparently is selfsufficient. We call it self-sufficient not only as adequate for a man living a solitary life by himself but also for his parents, children, wife, friends in general, and fellow citizens because this good naturally will include man’s social life. But some limitation must be placed on the number provided for, since the extension to relatives, neighbors and friends might go on without limit. We must return to examine this question later. Now we call that self-sufficient which, taken alone, makes life desirable and lacking nothing. In our opinion happiness is of this nature.

y.

AS REGARDS THE PREFIX “SELF.” — 115-

117 ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένηνσυναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί. τέλειον δή

Moreover, happiness without further addition will be the most desirable of all things. With any addition it will certainly be more desirable even though the addition be ever so slight. The reason is that the addition has increased the good, and a greater good

τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.

is always more desirable. Therefore, happiness as the end of all human actions is the perfect self-sufficient good.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Rursus autem redeamus et cetera. Postquam philosophus pertractavit opiniones aliorum de felicitate, hic determinat de ea secundum propriam opinionem. Et dividitur in partes duas.

103. After the Philosopher has thoroughly discussed the opinions of others about happiness, he now gives his own opinion on the subject. He divides this treatment into two parts. In the first [1] he shows what happiness

In prima ostendit quid sit felicitas. In secunda determinat de quadam proprietate felicitatis, ibi, determinatis autem his, scrutemur de felicitate et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima ostendit quid sit felicitas. In secunda removet quamdam dubitationem, ibi, multae autem transmutationes fiunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit felicitas. Secundo ostendit quod praemissae sententiae concordant omnia, quae dicuntur de felicitate, ibi,

is. In the second [Lect. 18; II], at “Having settled these matters etc.” (B. 1101b 10), he treats a particular property of happiness. He makes a twofold division of the first part. In the first division [A] he shows what happiness is. In the second [Lect. 15], at “Many changes take place etc.” (B.1100 a 5), he solves a particular problem. In regard to the first he does two things. First [A’] he shows what happiness is. Second [Lect. 12], at “In our study of the principles etc.” (B.1098 b 8), he shows that everything said about happiness is in agreement with this doctrine. In regard to

scrutandum ergo de ipso et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit quasdam communes condiciones felicitatis, quae quasi sunt omnibus manifestae; secundo inquirit felicitatis essentiam, ibi, sed forte felicitatem quidem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit felicitatem esse ultimum finem. Secundo ponit conditiones, quae competunt ultimo fini, ibi, hoc autem adhuc magis explanare et cetera.

the first he does two things. First [1] he proposes some general notions and conditions of happiness that are obvious to nearly everyone. Second [Lect. 10; 2], at “But to say that happiness etc.” (B.1097 b 22), he inquires into the nature of happiness. In regard to the first he does two things. First [a] he states that happiness is the ultimate end. Second [b], at “We must make etc.,” he lays down the conditions belonging to the ultimate end.

Dicit ergo primo, quod expeditis his, quae pertinent ad opiniones aliorum, rursus oportet redire ad bonum, circa quod nostra versatur inquisitio, scilicet ad felicitatem, ut investigemus quid sit. Circa quod primo considerandum est quod in diversis operationibus et artibus

104. Therefore, he says first that, after completing the treatise (43-102) on the opinions of others, we must again return to a consideration of the good that is the subject of our inquiry—happiness—to find out what it is. Our first consideration about it must be that in different activities and arts the good sought

videtur aliud et aliud esse bonum intentum. Sicut in medicinali arte bonum intentum est sanitas, et in militari victoria et in aliis artibus aliquod aliud bonum.

differs. In the medical art the good sought is health, and in the military art victory, and in other arts some other good.

Et si quaeratur quid sit bonum intentum in unaquaque arte vel in unoquoque negotio, sciendum est, quod hoc est illud cuius gratia omnia alia

105. If it be asked what good is sought in every art and in every activity, we must know that it is the object for the sake of which all other things are done. In medicine everything

fiunt in illa arte vel illo negotio, sicut in medicinali omnia fiunt propter sanitatem, in militari omnia fiunt propter victoriam. Et in aedificativa omnia fiunt propter domum construendam. Et similiter in quolibet alio negotio aliquod aliud est bonum intentum, cuius gratia omnia alia fiunt. Hoc autem bonum intentum in unaquaque operatione vel electione dicitur finis, quia finis nihil est aliud quam id cuius gratia alia fiunt.

is done on account of health, in war everything is done on account of victory, and in architecture everything is done for the sake of the building to be constructed. Likewise, in every other activity the good sought is some one thing for the sake of which all other things are done. This good, the object of every activity or choice, is called the end, for the end is nothing else than that for the sake of which other things are done.

Si ergo occurrat statim aliquis finis, ad quem ordinentur omnia quae operantur omnes artes et operationes humanae, talis finis erit operatum bonum simpliciter, idest quod intenditur ex omnibus operationibus humanis. Si

106. If, therefore, there should be some end immediately apparent to which all the products of all arts and human activities are directed, such an end will be the good unqualifiedly sought, that is, the thing intended in all human operations. But if at this point many

autem adhuc occurrant plura bona ad quae ordinentur diversi fines diversarum artium, oportebit quod inquisitio rationis nostrae transcendat ista plura, quousque perveniat ad hoc ipsum, id est ad aliquod unum; necesse est enim unum esse ultimum finem hominis inquantum est homo, propter unitatem humanae naturae, sicut est finis unus medici inquantum est medicus propter unitatem medicinalis artis; et iste unus ultimus finis hominis dicitur humanum bonum, quod est felicitas.

goods arise to which the different ends of different arts are ordered, our reason will have to inquire beyond this number until it arrives at this one thing, that is, some obvious good. There must be, indeed, one ultimate end for man precisely as man because of the unity of human nature, just as there is one end for a physician as physician because of the unity of the art of medicine. This ultimate end of man is called that human good which is happiness.

Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem adhuc magis explanare etc., ponit duas condiciones ultimi finis: primo quidem quod sit perfectum; secundo quod sit per se sufficiens, ibi, videtur autem et ex

107. Then [b], at “We must make,” he lays down two conditions of the ultimate end. The first [b, i] is that it be a perfect thing; the second [b, ii], that it be self-sufficient, at “The same seems to follow etc.” The ultimate end is

per se sufficientia et cetera. Ultimus enim finis est ultimus terminus motus desiderii naturalis. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit ultimus terminus motus

the ultimate term of desire’s natural inclination. But in order that something be the ultimate term of natural inclination, two things are required. First that it be a thing

naturalis,

duo

requiruntur.

Primo

actually having a species and not on the way

quidem quod sit habens speciem, non autem in via ad speciem habendam. Sicut generatio ignis non terminatur ad dispositionem formae, sed ad ipsam formam. Quod autem habet formam est perfectum, quod autem est dispositum ad formam est imperfectum. Et ideo oportet, quod bonum quod est ultimus finis, sit bonum perfectum. Secundo autem requiritur quod id quod est terminus motus naturalis sit integrum, quia natura non deficit in necessariis. Unde finis generationis humanae non est homo diminutus membro sed homo integer; et similiter etiam finis ultimus, qui est terminus desiderii, necesse est,

to have a species. The generation of fire, for instance, is not terminated at the disposition to the form but at the form itself. Now a thing that has form is perfect, but a thing that is merely disposed to a form is imperfect. Therefore, the good that is the ultimate end must be a perfect good. Second, the term of the natural inclination must be integral since nature is not deficient in necessary things. Hence the end of human generation is not a deformed man but a perfect man. Likewise the ultimate end that is the term of desire must be self-sufficient as an integral good.

quod sit per se integrum bonum.

sufficiens,

quasi

Circa perfectionem autem finalis boni

108. In regard to the perfection of a final good

considerandum est quod, sicut agens movet ad finem ita finis movet desiderium agentis; unde oportet gradus finium proportionari gradibus agentis. Est autem triplex agens. Unum quidem imperfectissimum, quod non agit per propriam formam, sed solum inquantum est motum ab alio, sicut martellus agit cultellum. Unde effectus secundum formam adeptam, non assimilatur huic agenti, sed ei a quo movetur. Aliud autem est agens perfectum, quod agit quidem secundum suam formam, unde assimilatur ei effectus, sicut ignis calefacit, sed tamen indiget moveri ab aliquo principali priori

we must consider that, as an agent moves towards the end, so the end moves the desire of the agent. Hence the gradations of the ends must be in proportion to the gradations of the agent. Now an agent may be of three kinds. One, the most imperfect, does not operate by its own form but only insofar as moved by another, as a hammer forges a blade. Hence, the effect in the acquired form is not like this agent but like the one who moves the agent. Another, a perfect agent, operates indeed according to its form so that the effect is like it, as fire gives off heat, but nevertheless it must be moved by some prior principal agent. In this respect it partakes imperfectly of the nature of an instrument. A third agent, the

agente. Et quantum ad hoc habet aliquid imperfectionis, quasi participans cum instrumento. Tertium autem agens est perfectissimum, quod agit quidem secundum formam propriam, et ab alio non movetur.

most perfect, operates according to its own form and is not moved by any other.

Et similiter est in finibus. Est enim aliquid quod appetitur non propter aliquam formalem bonitatem in ipso existentem, sed solum inquantum est utile ad aliquid, sicut medicina amara. Est autem aliquid quod est quidem appetibile propter aliquid quod in se habet, et tamen appetitur propter aliud, sicut medicina sapida, et hoc est bonum perfectius. Bonum autem perfectissimum est, quod ita appetitur propter se, quod nunquam appetitur propter aliud. Hos igitur tres gradus

109. The same is true in the order of ends. There we find an object desired not on account of some formal goodness existing in itself but only as useful for something else like bitter medicine. We find also an object is indeed desirable on account of what it is, but besides, it is desired for something else like sweettasting medicine. This is better than the first. But the most perfect good is that which is so desired for its own sake that it is never desired for the sake of anything else. Here then the Philosopher distinguishes three degrees of good. He says, as we have just stated (107-

bonorum distinguit hic philosophus. Et dicit, quod hoc quod dictum est, de ultimo fine oportet adhuc magis explanare, inquirendo scilicet conditiones, quae requiruntur ad ultimum finem.

109), that we must give a more complete explanation of the ultimate end by examining the conditions required for it.

Videntur autem esse plures gradus finium, quorum quosdam eligimus

110. There are also, it seems, many degrees of ends. Some of these we choose purely for the

solum propter aliud, sicut divitias, quae non appetuntur nisi in quantum sunt utiles ad vitam hominis, et fistulas quibus canitur, et universaliter omnia organa, quae non quaeruntur nisi propter usum eorum. Unde manifestum est, quod omnes isti fines sunt imperfecti. Optimus autem finis, qui est ultimus, oportet quod sit perfectus. Unde si unum solum sit tale, oportet hoc esse ultimum finem quem quaerimus. Si autem sint multi perfecti fines, oportet quod perfectissimus horum sit optimus et ultimus. Manifestum est autem, quod sicut id quod est secundum se appetibile, est

sake of something else, riches, for instance, which are sought for their utility in human living. Flutes on which music is made is another example. All such instruments are ends sought merely because of their usefulness. It is obvious that such ends are imperfect. The best end, namely the ultimate end, must be perfect. Therefore, if there is only one such end, it must be the ultimate end we are looking for. If, however, there are many perfect ends, the most perfect of these should be the best and the ultimate. What is desirable in itself is more perfect than what is desirable because of another. It clearly follows then that what is never desired for some thing beyond itself is more perfect than the things which,

magis perfectum eo quod est appetibile propter alterum, ita illud quod nunquam appetitur propter aliud, est perfectius his quae, etsi secundum se

although sought for themselves, are also sought as a means.

appetantur, tamen appetuntur propter aliud. Et ita simpliciter perfectum est, quod est semper secundum se eligibile et nunquam propter aliud. Talis autem videtur esse felicitas, quam numquam eligimus propter aliud, sed semper propter seipsam. Honorem vero et

111. Therefore, that is absolutely perfect which is always desirable for itself and never for another. But happiness appears to be of this nature, for we never seek it for something else but always for itself. We do choose honor, pleasure, knowledge, and virtue for

voluptates et intelligentiam et virtutem eligimus quidem propter seipsa. Eligeremus enim vel appeteremus ea etiam si nihil aliud ex eis nobis proveniret. Et tamen eligimus ea propter felicitatem, inquantum per ea credimus nos futuros felices. Felicitatem autem nullus eligit propter haec nec propter aliquid aliud. Unde relinquitur quod felicitas sit perfectissimum bonorum et per consequens optimus et ultimus finis.

themselves. We would choose them or have a desire for them even if no other good would come to us through them. In fact we choose them for happiness precisely because we think we will be happy in having them. But no one chooses happiness for them or for anything else. We conclude then that happiness is the most perfect good, and consequently the ultimate and best end.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem et ex per se sufficientia etc., agit de per se

112. Then [b, ii], at “The same seems,” he treats the self-sufficiency of happiness-first [ii,

sufficientia felicitatis. Et primo quantum ad id quod pertinet ad rationem sufficientiae; secundo quantum ad id quod additur per se, ibi, amplius autem omnium et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod idem videtur sequi ex per se sufficientia, sicut et ex perfectione; scilicet quod felicitas sit optimus et ultimus finis: haec enim duo se consequuntur. Nam bonum perfectum videtur esse per se sufficiens. Si enim quantum ad aliquid non sufficit, iam non videtur perfecte desiderium quietare; et ita non erit perfectum

x] in regard to that which pertains to the nature of sufficiency, and second [ii, y], at “Moreover, happiness etc.,” as regards the prefix “self.” He says first that the same conclusion seems to follow from selfsufficiency as well as from perfection: happiness is the best and the ultimate end. Indeed, the latter two follow one another, for the perfect good seems to be self-sufficient. If it is not sufficient in some particular, it does not perfectly satisfy desire, and so it will not be the perfect good. It is called a self-sufficient good not because it suffices merely for one man living a solitary life but also for his

bonum. Dicitur autem esse per se sufficiens bonum, non quia sit sufficiens

parents, children, wife, friends, and fellow citizens as well, so that it will adequately

soli uni homini viventi vitam solitariam, sed parentibus et filiis et uxori et amicis

provide the necessaries in temporal matters, instruction and counsel in spiritual matters for

et civibus, ut scilicet sufficiat eis et in

them too. Such extension is required because

temporalibus providere, auxilia ministrando, et

necessaria etiam in

man is a social animal, and his desire is not satisfied in providing for himself but he wants

spiritualibus, instruendo vel consiliando. Et hoc ideo quia homo

to be in a position to take care of others. This, however, must be understood within limits.

naturaliter est animal civile. Et ideo non sufficit suo desiderio, quod sibi provideat, sed etiam quod possit aliis providere. Sed hoc oportet intelligere usque ad aliquem terminum. Si enim aliquis velit hoc extendere non

113. If someone should want to extend such

solum ad consanguineos et amicos proprios sed etiam ad amicos amicorum,

care not only to his own relatives and friends but even to the friends of his friends this would

procedet hoc in infinitum et sic nulli poterit talis sufficientia provenire, et ita

go on indefinitely so that no one could have a sufficiency and therefore no one could be

nullus posset esse felix, si felicitas hanc infinitam sufficientiam requireret.

happy, if happiness would require such infinite sufficiency. In this work the Philosopher

Loquitur enim in hoc libro philosophus

speaks of happiness as it is attainable in this

de felicitate, qualis in hac vita potest haberi. Nam felicitas alterius vitae

life, for happiness in a future life is entirely beyond the investigation of reason. To what

omnem investigationem rationis excedit. Quis autem sit terminus usque

extent a man needs a sufficiency to be happy will have to be investigated again elsewhere,

ad quem oporteat felicem esse sufficientem, rursus perscrutandum

namely, in domestic ethics or in political science.

alibi erit, scilicet in oeconomica, vel politica. Et quia exposuerat cui debeat esse sufficiens bonum perfectum, quod

114. Because he has already shown (112-113) that the perfect good called happiness ought to

felicitas dicitur, quia scilicet non soli uni homini, sed sibi et omnibus quorum

be sufficient not for one man alone but for all whose care is incumbent upon him, next he

cura ad ipsum spectat, consequenter exponit quid sit quod dicitur per se

explains the nature of what is called selfsufficient. He says that the self-sufficient is

sufficiens. Et dicit, quod per se sufficiens dicitur illud, quod etiam si

that which, even when had by itself, makes life desirable and free from want. Happiness does

solum habeatur, facit vitam eligibilem et nullo exteriori indigentem. Et hoc

this eminently, otherwise it would not terminate the inclination of desire if something

maxime convenit felicitati; alioquin non

that man needed remained outside it. Certainly

terminaret motum desiderii, si extra ipsam remaneret aliquid, quo homo

everyone in need desires to have what he lacks. Hence it is clear that happiness is a self-

indigeret. Omnis enim indigens desiderat adipisci id quo indiget. Unde

sufficient good.

manifestum

est, quod felicitas est

bonum per se sufficiens. Deinde

cum

dicit:

amplius

autem

115. Then [ii, y], at “Moreover,” he explains

omnium etc., exponit rationem per se

the nature of self-sufficiency as regards the

sufficientiae, quantum ad hoc quod dicit per se. Dicitur autem aliquid per se

expression “self.” A thing is said to be selfsufficient when, taken apart from other

sufficiens, ex eo quod seorsum ab aliis acceptum sufficiens est. Quod quidem

things, it is sufficient. This can happen in two ways. First in such a manner that the perfect

potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo sic, quod illud bonum perfectum quod

good, which is called self-sufficient, would be incapable of receiving an increase of goodness

dicitur per se sufficiens, non possit recipere augmentum bonitatis ex alio

from another-a condition of the being that is totally good, God. As an additional part is not

bono addito, et haec quidem est conditio eius, quod est totale bonum, scilicet Dei;

greater than the whole since the part itself is included in the whole, so too any good

sicut enim pars connumerata toti non est aliquid maius quam totum, quia ipsa

whatsoever added to God does not increase His goodness because the addition is good only

pars in toto includitur, ita etiam quodcumque bonum connumeratum

by participating in the divine goodness. Likewise, a thing taken alone, no addition

Deo non facit aliquod augmentum bonitatis quia nihil est bonum nisi per

being made, is said to be sufficient in that it has everything a man absolutely needs.

hoc, quod participat bonitatem divinam. Aliquid autem dicitur etiam solitarium, vel nullo alio connumerato, esse sufficiens, inquantum continet omne illud, quo indiget homo ex necessitate. Et sic felicitas de qua nunc loquitur

116. In this sense happiness, the subject of our

habet per se sufficientiam, quia scilicet in se continet omne illud quod est

present discussion, has self-sufficiency because of itself it furnishes everything that is

homini necessarium, non autem omne illud quod potest homini advenire. Unde

absolutely necessary, but it does not supply everything that can come to a man. Man can

potest melior fieri aliquo alio addito; nec tamen remanet desiderium hominis

be made better by an additional good. But a man’s desire for this does not remain

inquietum, quia

ratione

unsatisfied because a desire controlled by

regulatum, quale oportet esse felicis, non habet inquietudinem de his quae

reason, such as a truly happy man should have, is undisturbed by the things that are

non sunt necessaria, licet sint possibilia adipisci. Hoc est ergo quod dicit maxime

unnecessary even though attainable. Happiness, therefore, has this quality above

inter omnia convenire felicitati, quod ipsa etiam non connumerata aliis sit

everything else; it is desirable even when not augmented by other goods. However, if it does

eligibilis, sed tamen, si connumeretur alicui alteri etiam minimo bonorum,

receive an addition, be it ever so small, surely that is even more desirable. The reason is that

desiderium

manifestum est, quod erit eligibilior. Cuius ratio est quia per appositionem fit

by the accession, a superabundance or an increase of good is effected, and because

superabundantia vel augmentum bonitatis, quanto autem aliquid est

something is a greater good, it is more desirable.

magis bonum, tanto est magis eligibile. Ultimo autem concludit

epilogando

117. Last, he repeats in the epilogue the

quod dictum est, scilicet quod felicitas,

conclusion of what has been established (104-

cum sit omnium operatorum ultimus finis, est perfectum bonum et per se

116), namely, that since happiness is the ultimate end of all our activities, it is the

sufficiens.

perfect good and self-sufficient.

LECTURE 10 The Definition of Happiness 2. HE ... EXAMINES ITS DEFINITION. a. He shows the necessity of this inquiry. — 118 ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ

But to say that happiness is the best of

ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ'

goods seems merely to state some thing already perfectly obvious. How ever,

ἐναργέστερον λεχθῆναι.

since we wish to bring out more clearly what it is, we must investigate the

τί

ἐστιν

ἔτι

matter further. b. He searches for the definition of happiness. i. First he inquires into its genus. x.

HE SHOWS THAT HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN AN

ACTIVITY OF MAN. — 119-120 τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

Perhaps this can be done by considering the activity of man. As the good of a

ὥσπερ

καὶ

flute player or sculptor or any artist, or

ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ

of anyone who has some special activity, seems to consist in that activity and its

πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν

skillful performance, so also the good of man who has an activity characteristic

καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον

of himself precisely as man.

γὰρ

αὐλητῇ

αὐτοῦ. y. HE SHOWS THAT THERE IS AN ACTIVITY PROPER TO MAN. aa. First by activities incidental to man. — 121 πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ

Have a weaver and a tanner a special

σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν,

work and activity while man precisely as man has none? Is he left by nature

ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν;

without a purpose?

bb.

Second,... by means of the human members. — 122

ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν

If the eye, hand, foot, and each member have a proper operation, surely we will

μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα

not refuse to concede an activity proper to man as man.

θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; z. HE SHOWS WHICH IS MAN’S PROPER ACTIVITY. — 123-126

τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν

What therefore will it be? Life belongs

γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ

even to plants and we are in search of

τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τήν τε θρεπτικὴν

something characteristic of man. The life of nutrition and growth must then

καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται

be ruled out. Even the life of sense experience, which is a step higher, is

δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζώῳ. λείπεται δὴ

shared with the horse, cow, and other animals. The remaining type of life

πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς

belongs to the rational part of man and finds its expression in. actions. This

λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον διανοούμενον. διττῶς δὲ

καὶ καὶ

rational part either follows the dictates of reason, or it possesses and exercises

ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ

the power of understanding. Of the two functions, the latter seems the more

αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.

correct, for when we speak of reasoning, we signify the exercise of our rational powers.

ii. (He inquires) into its differences. x. HE DIVIDES THE INQUIRY INTO TWO PARTS (FIRST) . — 127-128 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς

The function of man, therefore, is

ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον

activity of the soul according to reason or at least not independent of reason.

εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ

Now as a rule we classify in the same way the function of an artist and of a

σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς

skillful artist, of a flute player and of a

δὴ τοῦτ' προστιθεμένης

πάντων, κατὰ τὴν

good flute player. This applies generally where skill is an addition to the function,

ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν,

for a flute player is one who plays the flute and a good flute player one who

σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, [ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν

plays the flute well. If then we place the function of man in a certain kind of life,

τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου,

that is, of an activity of the soul according to reason, it will be proper to a

σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν

good man to act well and to the best of his ability according to reason. In every

οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δ' οὕτω,] τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν

case the good of man will consist in action conformable to virtue, and if there

ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί,

are a number of virtues, action conformable to the best and most perfect

κατὰ τὴν τελειοτάτην.

of them.

ἐπὶ τῆς

ἀρίστην

καὶ

y. HE BEGINS THE SECOND PART. — 129-130 ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία

Further, it must extend to a complete life. A single swallow or one good day

ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος

does not mean that spring has come. So one day (of goodness) or a short practice

χρόνος.

of virtue does not make a man blessed and happy.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Sed forte felicitatem quidem et cetera. Postquam philosophus posuit quasdam

118. After the Philosopher has laid down certain conditions of happiness, he here [2]

conditiones

felicitatis,

hic

investigat

examines its definition. Concerning this he

definitionem eius. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit necessitatem huius

does three things. First [2, a] he shows the necessity of this inquiry. Second [2, b], at

inquisitionis. Secundo venatur definitionem felicitatis, ibi, forte utique fiet

“Perhaps this can be done etc.,” he searches for the definition of happiness. Third [Lect.

hoc, et cetera. Tertio ostendit quod praemissa definitio non est sufficiens, sed

11], at “In this way, therefore etc.” (B. 1098 a 20), he shows that the definition

adhuc oportet amplius dicere, ibi: circumscribatur quidem igitur et cetera.

given is insufficient and further inquiry must be made. He says first that all admit

Dicit ergo primo, quod omnes confitentur

that happiness is the very best of things

felicitatem esse aliquid optimum ad quod pertinet quod felicitas sit ultimus finis et

including the belief that it is the ultimate end and the perfect self-sufficient good. But

perfectum bonum et per se sufficiens. Sed adhuc manifestius oportet dici aliquid de

it is rather obvious that some clarification must be made about happiness to give us a

felicitate, ut sciatur quid ipsa sit in speciali.

knowledge of its specific nature.

Deinde cum dicit: forte utique etc., investigat definitionem felicitatis. Et circa

119. Then [2, b], at “Perhaps this,” he investigates the definition of happiness in a

hoc duo facit. Primo inquirit genus eius. Secundo differentias eius, ibi: si autem est

twofold manner. First [b, i] he inquires into its genus, and second [b, ii], at “The

opus hominis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod felicitas est

function of man,” into its differences. The first point requires a threefold procedure.

operatio hominis. Secundo ostendit quod hominis sit aliqua propria operatio, ibi:

First [i, x] he shows that happiness consists in an activity of man. Second [i, y],

utrum igitur textoris quidem etc.; tertio ostendit, quae sit propria operatio hominis,

at “Have a weaver etc.,” he shows that there is an activity proper to man. Third [i,

ibi: quid igitur hoc utique erit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quid sit felicitas

z], at “What therefore etc.,” he shows which is man’s proper activity. He says first

poterit manifestum esse si sumatur operatio hominis. Cuiuslibet enim rei

that the nature of happiness can be made evident by consideration of human activity.

habentis propriam operationem, bonum

When a thing has a proper operation, the

suum et hoc quod bene est ei consistit in eius operatione. Sicut tibicinis bonum

good of the thing and its well-being consist in that operation. Thus the good of a flute

consistit in eius operatione. Et similiter eius qui facit statuam, et cuiuslibet

player consists in his playing, and similarly the good of the sculptor and of every artist

artificis. Et huius ratio est, quia bonum finale cuiuslibet rei est ultima eius

in their respective activity. The reason is that the final good of everything is its

perfectio. Forma autem est perfectio prima, sed operatio est perfectio secunda.

ultimate perfection, and the form is its first perfection while its operation is the second.

Si autem aliqua res exterior dicatur esse finis, hoc non erit nisi mediante operatione,

If some exterior thing be called an end, this will be only because of an operation by

per quam scilicet homo ad rem illam attingit vel faciendo, sicut aedificator

which a man comes in contact with that thing, either by making it as a builder

domum, aut utitur seu fruitur ea. Et sic relinquitur quod finale bonum cuiuslibet

makes a house, or by using or enjoying it. Accordingly, the final good of everything

rei in eius operatione sit requirendum. Si igitur hominis est aliqua operatio propria,

must be found in its operation. If then man has some characteristic activity, his final

necesse est, quod in eius operatione propria consistat finale bonum ipsius, quod

good which is happiness must consist in this. Consequently, happiness is the proper

est felicitas, et ita genus felicitatis est propria operatio hominis.

operation of man.

Si autem dicatur in aliquo alio felicitas

120. But if happiness is said to consist in

consistere, aut hoc erit aliquid quo homo redditur idoneus ad huiusmodi

something else, either this will be a thing fitting man for an operation of this kind, or

operationem, aut erit aliquid ad quod per suam operationem attingit, sicut Deus

it will be something he attains by his operation, as God is said to be the beatitude

dicitur esse beatitudo hominis.

of man.

Deinde cum dicit: utrum igitur textoris

121. Then [i, y], at “Have a weaver,” he

etc., probat quod sit aliqua propria operatio hominis. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo

proves in two ways that there is an operation proper to man. He does this first

quidem per ea quae accidunt homini.

[y, aa] by activities that are incidental to

Accidit enim homini, quod sit textor, vel coriarius, aut grammaticus, vel musicus

man. It may happen that a man is a weaver, tanner, grammarian, musician, or anything

sive aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Sed nihil istorum est, quod non habeat propriam

else of the kind. In none of these capacities does he lack a proper operation, for

operationem. Alioquin sequeretur quod huiusmodi otiose et frustra homini

otherwise he would possess them as empty and useless things. Now it is far more

advenirent. Multo autem magis inconveniens quod sit otiosum et frustra id

unfitting that a thing ordained by divine reason, as is the naturally existent, should

quod est secundum naturam, quod est ordinatum ratione divina, quam id quod est

be unprofitable and useless than a thing arranged by human reason. Since,

secundum artem, quod est ordinatum ratione humana. Cum igitur homo sit

therefore, man is a being possessing a natural existence, it is impossible that he

aliquid existens secundum naturam, impossibile est, quod sit naturaliter

should be by nature without a purpose, or a proper operation. There is then a proper

otiosus, quasi non habens propriam operationem. Est igitur aliqua operatio

operation of man no less than of the abilities that are incidental to him. The

hominis propria, sicut eorum quae ei

reason is that everything, either natural or

accidunt. Cuius causa est, quia unumquodque, vel naturale vel artificiale,

acquired by art, exists by means of its form which is a principle of some operation.

est per aliquam formam, quae est alicuius operationis principium. Unde sicut

Hence as each thing has a proper existence by its form so also does it have a proper

unaquaeque res habet proprium esse per suam formam, ita etiam et propriam

operation.

operationem. Secundo ibi: vel quemadmodum oculi etc., ostendit idem per hominis partes. Eamdem

122. Second [y, bb], at “If the eye,” he proves the same truth by means of the

enim operationem oportet existimare in toto et in partibus; quia sicut anima est

human members. We must consider that the same mode of operation is found in the

actus totius corporis, ita partes animae quaedam sunt actus quarumdam partium

whole and in the parts of man, because, as the soul is the act of the whole body, so

corporis, ut visus oculi. Sed quaelibet pars hominis habet propriam operationem, sicut

certain powers of the soul are acts of certain parts of the body, as sight is of the

oculi operatio est videre, et manus palpare et pedis ambulare et sic de aliis particulis;

eye. But each part of man has a proper operation; for example, the operation of the

relinquitur ergo quod etiam totius hominis sit aliqua propria operatio.

eye is seeing; and of the hand, touching; and of the feet, walking; and so of the other parts. We conclude, therefore, that some operation proper to man as a whole exists.

Deinde cum dicit: quid igitur hoc etc., inquirit quae sit propria operatio hominis.

123. Then [i, z], at “What therefore, he explores the nature of the operation proper

Manifestum est autem quod propria operatio uniuscuiusque rei est quae

to man. Now it is evident that each thing has an operation which belongs to it

competit ei secundum suam formam. Forma autem hominis est anima, cuius

according to its form. But the form of man is his soul, whose act is life, not indeed life

actus dicitur vivere; non quidem secundum quod vivere est esse viventis, sed

as the mere existence of a living thing, but a special vital operation, for example,

secundum quod vivere dicitur aliquod opus vitae, puta intelligere vel sentire; unde

understanding or feeling. Hence happiness obviously consists in some vital operation.

manifestum est, quod in aliquo opere vitae consistit hominis felicitas. Non autem potest dici, quod secundum quodcumque vivere attenditur hominis

124. It cannot be said that man’s happiness should arise from any kind of life, for even

felicitas, quia vivere est commune etiam plantis, sed felicitas quaeritur sicut

plants have life. But happiness is sought as a good characteristic of man since it is

quoddam proprium hominis bonum. Dicitur enim bonum humanum. Pari

called a human good. Likewise, happiness must be different from the life of nutrition

autem ratione etiam species vitae quae

or growth, which even vegetables posses.

dicitur nutritiva vel augmentativa separanda est a felicitate, quia haec etiam

From this we take it that happiness does not consist in health, beauty, strength, or

communia sunt plantis. Et ex hoc accipi potest, quod felicitas non consistit neque in

great stature, for all these things result from activities of vegetative life.

sanitate, neque in pulchritudine, neque in fortitudine, neque in proceritate corporis.

Omnia enim haec acquiruntur operationes huius vitae. Post

vitam

et

125. On the step above the life of mere

augmentativam sequitur vita sensitiva.

nutrition and growth is the life of sense

Quae etiam non est propria homini, sed convenit etiam equo et bovi et cuilibet

experience. Again, this is not proper to man but is possessed by horses, oxen, and other

animali. Unde nec in hac vita consistit felicitas. Et ex hoc accipi potest, quod

animals. In this kind of life, then, happiness does not consist. So we. conclude that

humana felicitas non consistit in aliqua sensibili cognitione seu delectatione.

human happiness is not found in any form of sense perception or pleasure.

Post

et

126. Beyond the life of assimilation and of

sensitivam non relinquitur nisi vita quae est operativa secundum rationem. Quae

sense experience there remains only the life that functions according to reason. This life

quidem vita propria est homini. Nam homo speciem sortitur ex hoc quod est rationalis.

is proper to man, for he receives his specific classification from the fact that he is

Sed rationale est duplex. Unum quidem participative, inquantum scilicet

rational. Now the rational has two parts. One is rational by participation insofar as it

persuadetur et regulatur a ratione. Aliud vero est rationale essentialiter, quod

is obedient to and is regulated by reason. The other is rational by nature as it can of

scilicet habet ex seipso ratiocinari et intelligere. Et haec quidem pars

itself reason and understand. The rational by nature is more properly called rational

principalius rationalis dicitur, nam illud quod dicitur per se, semper est principalius

because a thing possessed intrinsically is always more proper than a thing received

eo quod est per aliud. Quia igitur felicitas

from another. Since, therefore, happiness is

est principalissimum bonum hominis, consequens est, ut magis consistat in eo

the most proper good of man, it more likely consists in the rational by nature than in

quod pertinet ad id quod est rationale per essentiam quam in eo quod pertinet ad id

the rational by participation. From this we can see that happiness will more properly be

quod est rationale per participationem. Ex quo potest accipi, quod felicitas principalius

found in the life of thought than in a life of activity, and in an act of reason or intellect

consistit in vita contemplativa quam in activa; et in actu rationis vel intellectus,

than in an act of the appetitive power controlled by reason.

vitam

autem

per

autem

nutritivam

nutritivam

quam in actu appetitus ratione regulati.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem (est) opus

127, Then [b, ii], at “The function of man,”

hominis etc., investigat differentias felicitatis. Et dividitur in partes duas,

he inquires into the specific differences of happiness. He divides the inquiry into two

secundum investigat.

duas differentias quas Secunda pars incipit ibi,

parts [ii, x] according to the two specific differences investigated, and he begins the

amplius autem, et cetera. Primo igitur

second part [ii, y] at “Further, it must

accipit ex praemissis quod proprium opus hominis sit operatio animae, quae est

extend etc.” First then we know from the premises (126) that the proper function of

secundum ipsam rationem, vel non sine

a man is a psychic activity in accord with

ratione. Quod dicit propter operationem appetitus regulati ratione. Hoc autem in

reason itself or at least not independent of reason. The latter is mentioned because of

omnibus communiter invenitur, quod idem est opus alicuius rei in genere acceptae et

the activity of the appetite controlled by reason. Now as a rule we find that the

opus illius rei si sit bona: nisi quod oportet apponere ex parte operationis id quod

function of a thing generally and the efficient activity of that thing are of the

pertinet ad virtutem. Sicut opus citharistae est citharizare. Opus autem

same nature, except that allowance must be made for the part played by skill. For

boni citharistae est bene citharizare. Et similiter est in omnibus aliis.

example, the function of a harpist is to play the harp, and the function of a good harpist is to play the harp well. The same is true of all other functions.

Si igitur opus hominis consistit in quadam

128. If, therefore, man’s proper role

vita, prout scilicet homo operatur secundum rationem, sequitur quod boni

consists in living a certain kind of life, namely, according to the activity of reason,

hominis sit bene operari secundum rationem, et optimi hominis, scilicet felicis,

it follows that it is proper to a good man to act well according to reason, and to the

optime hoc facere. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem virtutis, quod unusquisque

very good man or the happy man to do this in superlative fashion. But this belongs to

habens virtutem secundum eam bene

the nature of virtue that everyone who has

operetur sicut virtus equi est secundum quam bene currit. Si ergo operatio optimi

virtue should act well according to it, as a horse with good training or “virtue” should

hominis, scilicet felicis, est ut bene et optime operetur secundum rationem,

run well. If, then, the activity of the very good man or the happy man is to act well,

sequitur quod humanum bonum, scilicet felicitas, sit operatio secundum virtutem:

in fact to act to the best of his ability according to reason, it follows that the

ita scilicet quod si est una tantum virtus hominis, operatio quae est secundum illam

good of man, which is happiness, is an activity according to virtue. If there is only

virtutem, erit felicitas. Si autem sunt plures virtutes hominis, erit felicitas

one virtue for man, his activity according to that virtue will be happiness. If there are a

operatio quae est secundum optimam illarum, quia felicitas non solum est bonum

number of such virtues for man, happiness will be the activity according to the best of

hominis, sed optimum.

them. The reason is that happiness is not only the good of man but the best good.

Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem in vitam perfectam etc., investigat aliam

129. Then [ii, y], at “Further, it must extend,” he inquires into the other specific

differentiam felicitatis. Requiritur enim ad felicitatem continuitas et perpetuitas

difference of happiness. Continuity and perpetuity, to some extent, are also required

quantum

possibile

est.

Hoc

enim

for happiness. These qualities are naturally

naturaliter appetitus habentis intellectum desiderat, utpote apprehendens non solum

desired by the appetite of a person endowed with reason, who apprehends not a

esse ut nunc sicut sensus, sed etiam esse simpliciter. Cum autem esse sit secundum

particular being, as our senses do, but also being in itself. Now being is of itself

seipsum appetibile, consequens est, quod

desirable. It follows then that, as an animal

sicut animal per sensum apprehendens esse ut nunc, appetit nunc esse, ita etiam

which apprehends a particular being by its senses desires that particular being, so also

homo per intellectum apprehendens esse simpliciter, appetit esse simpliciter et

man apprehending being in itself desires it as always existing and not this particular

semper et non solum ut nunc. Et ideo de ratione perfectae felicitatis est continuitas

being alone. So continuity and perpetuity, which are not found in the present life,

et perpetuitas, quam tamen praesens vita non patitur. Unde in praesenti vita non

belong to the nature of perfect happiness. Hence perfect happiness cannot be had in

potest esse perfecta felicitas. Oportet tamen quod felicitas qualem possibile est

this life. However ,the happiness attainable here must extend to a complete life, that is

esse praesentis vitae, sit in vitam perfectam, id est per totam hominis vitam.

through the whole life of man. As the sight of a single swallow or one clear day does

Sicut enim una hirundo veniens non demonstrat ver, nec una dies temperata,

not prove that spring is here, so a single good deed is not enough to make a man

ita etiam nec una operatio semel facta facit

happy. It arises rather form the continued

hominem felicem, sed quando homo per totam vitam continuat bonam

performance of good deeds throughout his whole life.

operationem.

Sic ergo patet, quod felicitas est operatio

130. From this discussion, therefore, it is

propria hominis secundum virtutem in vita

clear that happiness is a virtue-oriented

perfecta.

activity proper to man in a complete life.

LECTURE 11 The Task Before Us Chapter 7 3. HE NOW SHOWS WHAT MAY STILL REMAIN TO BE DONE. a. He indicates first what remains to be done. i. He manifests what has been done and what remains to be done. — 131

περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως

In this way, therefore, the good of happiness has been sketched, for the proper procedure is

ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι.

first to study a subject according to its general notions and afterwards to explain it

εἶθ'

more fully. ii. He assigns the reason for the statement just made. — 132 δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι

It would indeed seem a reasonable mode of procedure to make a sketch of the matter and

τὰ καλῶς περιγραφῇ,

then to investigate its features one by one.

ἔχοντα

τῇ

iii. He shows how a man may be helped in this procedure. — 133-134 καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς

In this matter time seems to be, as it were, a good discoverer and a special assistant. Thus

εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις·

improvements in the arts have been due to successive artists, each making his own

παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ

contribution.

ἐλλεῖπον.

b. (He indicates) how this should be done. i. He presents this in general. — 135 μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν

We must recall what was said before, that the same certitude is not to be expected in all

ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν

sciences but in each according to the subject matter, and that the degree of certitude

ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ

should be suited to the subject taught.

τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. ii. He makes specific what he has said. x.

HE TAKES UP WHAT MUST BE HANDLED

DIFFERENTLY FOR DIFFERENT SUBJECTS. aa. The first... is the difference between a practical and a

speculative science. — 136 καὶ γὰρ γεωμέτρης

τέκτων καὶ διαφερόντως

For a carpenter and a geometrician both study a straight line, but for different

ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς

reasons. The carpenter does so to the extent that this is useful in his work; the

τὸ ἔργον, ὃ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ

geometrician as a student of truth wants to learn what a line is and how it differs from

τἀληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις

other figures. This distinction must be observed in other practical sciences lest they

ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω

be burdened with discussions that are out of place.

γίνηται.

bb.

He treats a second difference. — 137

οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως,

Likewise, we must not seek causes equally in all matters but in some it suffices to establish

ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι

a fact. This is the case with the first

δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι

principles of a science since a principle is a starting point. Now, we understand some

πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἳ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ

principles by induction, some by observation, some by custom and others in other ways.

θεωροῦνται, αἳ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἳ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. y.

(HE TAKES UP) WHAT MUST BE OBSERVED

GENERALLY IN ALL SUBJECTS. — 138 μετιέναι

δὲ

πειρατέον

In all cases we must strive for a thorough

ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως

knowledge of each set of principles according to their nature and must study how to define

διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ

them properly.

ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ

Principles are a great help in understanding

παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι'

what follows. Indeed a single principle seems to be more than half of the whole, for it

αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

furnishes answers to many of our questions.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Circumscribatur quidem igitur bonum et

131.

After

the

Philosopher

has

cetera. Postquam philosophus investigavit diffinitionem felicitatis, nunc ostendit quid

investigated the definition of happiness itself, he now [3] shows in a twofold

post hoc agendum relinquatur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid restat

fashion what may still remain to be done. He indicates first [3, a] what remains to

agendum. oporteat,

Secundo quomodo id agere ibi, meminisse autem et

be done, and second [3, b], at “We must recall etc.,” how this should be done. In

praedictorum oportet et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quid sit

regard to the initial point he does three things. First [a, i] he manifests what has

factum et quid restet agendum. Et dicit, quod ita sicut supra habitum est, circumscribitur

been done and what remains to be done. He says that the final good of man which

bonum finale hominis, quod est felicitas. Et vocat circumscriptionem notificationem

is happiness has been previously sketched (103-130). By a sketch he understands

alicuius rei per aliqua communia quae

that knowledge through some common

ambiunt quidem ipsam rem, non tamen adhuc per ea in speciali declaratur natura

principles which indeed give a picture of the matter but not in such a way that the

illius rei. Quia, ut ipse subdit, oportet quod aliquid primo dicatur figuraliter, id est

nature of that thing in particular is manifested. The reason for this is, as he

secundum quandam similitudinariam et extrinsecam quodammodo descriptionem; et

himself says, that a thing should first be studied according to its general

deinde oportet ut manifestatis quibusdam aliis resumatur illud quod fuit prius

characteristics, i.e., by a general description which is like it and in a way

figuraliter determinatum, et sic iterato plenius describatur. Unde et ipse postmodum

extrinsic to it. Then with other matters clarified, we must take up what was

in fine libri de felicitate tractatum complebit.

previously sketched roughly and etch in the lines more sharply. For this reason he himself will take up in greater detail the treatise on happiness toward the end of this work (Bk. X, Ch. 6-8, 1176 a 301179 a 33; St. Th. Lect. 9-13, 20652136).

Secundo ibi: videbitur autem utique etc., assignat rationem eius quod dictum est, hoc

132. Second [a, ii], at “It would indeed seem,” he assigns the reason for the

enim ad naturam cuiuslibet hominis pertinere videtur, ut ea quae bene continent

statement just made (131) saying that it seems natural for man to advance from

descriptionem alicuius rei perducat, scilicet de imperfecto ad perfectum, et particulatim

the imperfect knowledge which covers a good description things to a perfect

disponat, primo scilicet unam partem, et postea aliam investigando. Ad hominis enim

knowledge of them by filling in the details. This he does by investigating first

naturam pertinet ratione uti ad veritatis

one part and then another, for it is

cognitionem. Rationis autem proprium est ab

according to man’s nature to proceed by

uno in aliud procedere, intellectus autem proprium est statim apprehendere veritatem;

the steps of reason to a knowledge of the truth. Reason has this peculiar

et ideo ad hominem pertinet ut paulatim in cognitione veritatis proficiat, substantiae

characteristic that it grasps the truth gradually, and as a consequence man

vero separatae, quae intellectuales dicuntur, statim absque inquisitionem notitiam

properly perfects himself in knowledge little by little. On the contrary, separated

veritatis habent.

or intellectual substances attain at once to the knowledge of the truth without any such investigation.

Tertio ibi: et tempus talium etc., ostendit per quid homo ad praedicta iuvetur. Et dicit quod

133. Third [a, iii], at “In this matter time,” he shows how a man may be

eorum, quae bene se habent ad aliquid circumscribendum videtur tempus esse quasi

helped in this procedure. He says that time seems to be, as it were, a discoverer

adinventor, vel bonus cooperator: non quidem quod tempus per se ad hoc aliquid

of things well suited to sketch a subject and to be of special assistance in the

operetur sed secundum ea quae in tempore

work. The meaning is not that time itself

aguntur. Si enim aliquis tempore procedente det se studio investigandae veritatis, iuvatur

contributes anything but that this help comes with time. If someone should busy

ex tempore ad veritatem inveniendam et quantum ad unum et eumdem hominem qui

himself investigating the truth for a period, he will be aided in the discovery of

postea videbit quod prius non viderat, et etiam quantum ad diversos, utpote cum

the truth by the passage of time. This is true in the case of the same person who

aliquis intuetur ea quae sunt a praedecessoribus adinventa et aliquid

will understand subsequently what he had not understood before, and also for

superaddit. Et per hunc modum facta sunt additamenta in artibus, quarum a principio

different persons~ as in the case of a man who learns the things discovered by his

aliquid modicum fuit adinventum, et postmodum per diversos paulatim profecit in

predecessors and adds something himself. In this way improvements have been

magnam quantitatem, quia ad quemlibet pertinet superaddere id quod deficit in

made in the arts, in which a small discovery was made first and afterwards

consideratione praedecessorum.

notable advances were made by the efforts of various men, each looking upon it as a duty to supply what is lacking in the knowledge of his predecessors.

Si autem e contrario exercitium studii praetermittatur, tempus est magis causa

134. But if, on the contrary, application to study be neglected, time is rather a

oblivionis, ut dicitur in quarto physicorum, et quantum ad unum hominem, qui si se

cause of forgetfulness, as is said in the fourth book of the Physics (Ch. 12, 221 a

negligentiae dederit, obliviscetur quod scivit,

32; St. Th. Lect. 20, 604). We see indeed

et quantum ad diversos. Unde videmus multas scientias vel artes quae apud antiquos

that the negligent individual forgets what he knows, and in human history we

viguerunt paulatim cessantibus studiis in oblivionem abiisse.

observe that many sciences which flourished among the ancients gradually have been lost when interest in them ceased.

Deinde cum dicit: meminisse autem et praedictorum etc., ostendit quomodo sit

135. Then [3, b], at “We must recall,” he shows how we must follow up the

prosequendum id quod restat. Et primo proponit hoc in generali, reducens ad

remainder of our task. First [b, i] he presents this in general by recalling to

memoriam ea quae supra in prooemio dicta sunt, quod scilicet non oportet similiter

mind what was said in the introduction (32, 36), that we must not look for the

exquirere certitudinem in omnibus, sed in singulis secundum convenientiam materiae,

same certitude in all subjects but in each according to the matter, namely, that

prout scilicet est proprium illi doctrinae quae circa illam materiam versatur.

which is proper to the subject taught.

Secundo ibi: et enim tector et geometra etc.,

136. Second [b, ii], at “For a carpenter,”

manifestat, quod dixerat, in speciali. Et primo quantum ad id quod diversimode in diversis

he makes specific what he has said. First [ii, x] he takes up what must be handled

observari oportet. Secundo quantum ad id quod communiter in omnibus observandum

differently for different subjects, and second [ii, y], at “In all cases we must

est, ibi, pertransire autem oportet, et cetera. Circa primum tradit duplicem diversitatem.

etc.,” what must be observed generally in all subjects. In regard to the first he

Quarum prima est secundum differentiam scientiae practicae et speculativae. Unde dicit

gives a threefold difference. The first of these [x, aa] is the difference between a

quod tector, idest artifex operativus, et geometra, qui est speculativus, differenter

practical and a speculative science. He says therefore that a carpenter, who is a

inquirunt de linea recta. Artifex quidem operativus, utpote carpentarius, inquirit de

practical man, and a geometrician, who is a theorist, study a straight line for

linea recta quantum est utile ad opus, utpote ad secandum ligna vel aliquid aliud

different reasons. A practical—man—a carpenter studies a line insofar as it is

huiusmodi faciendum; sed geometra inquirit

useful for his work, in sawing wood or in

quid est linea recta et quale quid sit, considerando proprietates et passiones

doing anything else of this nature. But the geometrician investigates what a line

ipsius, quia geometra intendit solam speculationem veritatis. Et secundum hunc

is—its qualities and its nature by considering the properties and

modum faciendum est in aliis scientiis operativis, ut non sequatur hoc inconveniens

potentialities. He is interested only in the study of truth. We must proceed in the

ut in scientia operativa fiant plures sermones ad opera non pertinentes illis sermonibus qui

first way to avoid many discussions that are out of place in practical sciences. Fore

sunt circa opera, puta, si in hac scientia

instance, in moral matters we must steer

morali aliquis vellet pertractare omnia quae pertinent ad rationem et alias partes animae,

clear of an exhaustive treatment of the intellect and the other powers of the soul

oporteret plura de hoc dicere quam de ipsis operibus. Est enim in unaquaque scientia

to the neglect of the study of human acts themselves. It is a serious defect in any

vitiosum, ut homo multum immoretur in his quae sunt extra scientiam.

science to squander time on matter outside the science.

Aliam autem diversitatem tangit ibi non expetendum autem et cetera. Quae attenditur

117. He treats a second difference at “Likewise, we must not” [x, bb]. Here he

secundum differentiam principiorum et eorum quae sunt ex principiis. Et dicit quod

considers the difference between principles and deductions made from

non est in omnibus eodem modo causa inquirenda. Alioquin procederetur in

them. He says that the cause is not to be sought equally in all matters, otherwise

infinitum in demonstrationibus. Sed in quibusdam sufficit quod bene demonstretur,

we would proceed to infinity in demonstrating. But in some cases it is

idest manifestetur, quoniam hoc ita est, sicut in his quae accipiuntur in aliqua scientia, ut

sufficient to show clearly that a thing is so. This is true of principles that are

principia: quia principium oportet esse primum. Unde non potest resolvi in aliquid

taken for granted in a science, since they are the beginning and cannot be reduced

prius. Ipsa autem principia non omnia eodem

to anything previous. Now principles

modo manifestantur, sed quaedam considerantur inductione, quae est ex

themselves are not manifested in the same way. But some are understood by

particularibus imaginatis, sicut in mathematicis, puta quod omnis numerus est

induction form particular examples, for instance, that every number is even or

par aut impar. Quaedam vero accipiuntur sensu, sicut in naturalibus; puta quod omne

odd. Some are taken from observation, as in nature, that every living thing needs

quod vivit indiget nutrimento. Quaedam vero consuetudine, sicut in moralibus, utpote quod

nourishment. Some are taken from custom, as in morals, that sensual desires

concupiscentiae diminuuntur, si eis non obediamus. Et alia etiam principia aliter

are diminished if we do not give into them. Still other principles are

manifestantur; sicut in artibus operativis accipiuntur principia per experientiam

manifested in still other ways, as in the practical arts principles are learned by a

quamdam.

sort of experience.

Deinde cum dicit: pertransire autem oportet etc., determinat modum quantum ad id quod

138. Then [ii, y], at “In all cases we must,” he sets down the procedure to be

est communiter observandum in omnibus. Et dicit quod homo debet insistere ad hoc, quod

followed generally in all such matters. He says. that a person out to persist in going

singula principia pertranseat, scilicet eorum notitiam accipiendo et eis utendo, secundum

over thoroughly each set of principles, both speculatively and practically, in the

quod nata sunt cognosci et studendum qualiter determinentur in hominis

way a knowledge of their nature demands and in studying how men understand

cognitione, ut

scilicet

sciat

distinguere

them. Thus a man will learn how to

principia abinvicem et ab aliis. Cognitio enim principiorum multum adiuvat ad sequentia

distinguish one principle from an other, and one set of principles from another

cognoscenda. Principium enim videtur plus

set. A knowledge of principles is a great

esse quam dimidium totius. Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur virtute

help in understanding the conclusions that flow form them. Indeed a single

in principiis. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod per unum principium bene intellectum et

principle seems to be more than half of the whole, since the content of a science

consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum, quae quaeruntur in scientia.

is contained in the principles. He adds that many answers we look for in a science are clear from one principle well understood and completely thought out.

LECTURE 12 Confirmation of the Definition Chapter 8 I.

HE PROPOSES HERE TO CONFIRM THE VIEW HE HAS JUST

GIVEN. A. He indicates his intention. — 139-140 σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν

In our study of the principles we must carefully examine not only the

ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν

conclusions and the premises from which the argument proceeds but also the

γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ

considered views of others. Everything indeed will fall into agreement with what

διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές.

is true, and the truth will be quickly seen to be at variance with the false.

B. He begins to carry it out. A’ He shows... the consensus of others is in agreement with his view. 1. HE SHOWS THAT WHAT IS COMMONLY SAID BY PHILOSOPHERS IS IN HARMONY WITH THE GIVEN DESCRIPTION OF HAPPINESS. a. He proves (this) by dividing human goods into three

classes. — 141-143 νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν

Goods

have

been

classified

as

(a)

τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ

external, (b) of the soul, and (c) of the body. Among these we hold that the

σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά, τὰς

goods of the soul are the best and most properly called goods. We attribute vital

δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν.

actions and operations to the soul. Therefore, our opinion must be sound for

ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε

it is in agreement with that ancient one

ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν

held by the philosophers.

φιλοσοφούντων.

b. He proves the same thing in a different way. — 144

ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος·

It was stated accurately then that we identify the end with certain acts and

οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.

operations. Thus happiness will be accounted one of the goods of the soul and not an external good.

2. HE SHOWS THAT THE SAME IS TRUE FROM WHAT IS GENERALLY AFFIRMED BY EVERYONE. — 145 συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν

This coincides with the common notion

καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία

that one who lives well and does well is a happy man. As a matter of fact, a good

τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία.

life appears to be nothing else but good activity.

B’ He shows that the points on which others disagree substantiate his view. 1. HE BRINGS FORWARD THE POINTS ON WHICH MEN DIFFER ABOUT HAPPINESS. a. He states what he wishes to show. — 146 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα

Everything that philosophers have looked

τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ'

for in happiness seems to be found in our

ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι.

notion of it.

b. He gives different views on happiness. — 147-149 i. The first. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις

Some have taught that happiness consists in virtue either generally, or

εἶναι δοκεῖ,

specifically in prudence or in wisdom. ii. The second opinion.

τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς·

Others say it consists in all or one of these virtues accompanied by pleasure, or at least not without pleasure.

iii. A third opinion. ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν

Still others would include a goodly share

συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν.

of external goods.

c. He indicates the difference in the persons holding the foregoing views. — 150 τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ

The rank and file together with some

παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ

ancient philosophers held this last opinion, while a distinguished minority

τούτων

διαμαρτάνειν

chose virtue. It is likely that no one was

τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν.

entirely wrong but each was right on one or more points.

εὔλογον

2. HE SHOWS THAT EACH OF THESE IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ABOVE VIEW. a. He shows that this is true of the first opinion that virtue is happiness. i.

He shows that the first opinion... is in agreement with

his. — 151 τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν

Our definition of happiness is acceptable

ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ

to those who hold that happiness consists

λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια.

in all or in one of the virtues, for virtuous activity clearly is something belonging to it.

ii. He shows how his opinion is better. x. FROM REASON. — 152 διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν

But besides, it makes a great difference

κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ

whether the chief good be placed in possession or use, in habit or activity

ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν

γὰρ ἕξιν ἀγαθὸν

because a habit may exist in a person not actually performing any good, for

ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως

instance, in one who is asleep or otherwise not engaged in any way

ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης,

whatsoever. This is not possible with an activity, for a man having it necessarily is

καὶ εὖ πράξει.

active, and if the activity be virtuous he will act virtuously.

y. FROM A CUSTOM AMONG MEN — 153 ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι

At the Olympic games the best looking and strongest athletes do not receive the

στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι τούτων γάρ τινες

crown but the victorious competitors. So, too, among those who are good and best

νικῶσιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες

in virtuous living, those who perform righteous deeds become illustrious.

ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Scrutandum ergo de ipso et cetera.

139. After the Philosopher has shown in

Postquam philosophus ostendit in generali quid sit felicitas, hic intendit confirmare

general what happiness is, he proposes here [I] to confirm the view he has just given, by

sententiam suam, quam de felicitate praemisit, per ea quae de felicitate

what is said by others on happiness. Concerning this he does two things. First

dicuntur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo

[I, A] he indicates his intention. Then [I, B ], at “Goods have been etc.,” he begins to

exequitur propositum, ibi, divisis itaque, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, (quia)

carry it out. He says first that it is most important to have a principle thoroughly

principium

maxime

oportet

bene

understood. The principle in

practical

determinare. Principium autem in operativis est ultimus finis. Ad hoc quod

matters is the ultimate end. To insure a more careful study of it, we must examine

diligentior de eo consideratio habeatur, scrutandum est de hoc non solum

not only the conclusions and the premises from which the discussion of the reasoner

considerando conclusiones et principia ex quibus ratiocinativus sermo procedit, sed

proceeds, but also the observations of others concerning the principle itself,

etiam ex his quae dicuntur de ipso, idest de ultimo fine, sive de felicitate. Et huius

namely, the ultimate end or happiness. He then assigns the reason for this procedure,

rationem assignat, quia omnia consonant vero. Et huius ratio est, quia, ut dicetur in

that everything harmonizes with the truth. This is so because, as will be said in the

sexto huius, verum est bonum intellectus;

sixth book (1143), truth is the good of the

bonum autem, ut dicitur in II huius, contingit uno modo, scilicet

intellect. Good, as explained later (320), is achieved only in the concurrence of all the

concurrentibus omnibus quae pertinent ad perfectionem rei.

factors pertaining to the perfection of the thing.

Malum scilicet

contingit multipliciter, cuiuscumque debitae

140. Evil, on the contrary, comes about in a variety of ways by the defect of any single

conditionis defectum. Non autem invenitur aliquod malum in quo totaliter sit bonum

necessary qualification. No evil, however, can be found in which the good is completely

corruptum, ut dicetur in quarto huius, et ideo omnia concordant bono non solum

corrupted, as will be shown in the fourth book (808). So not only all good things are

bona, sed etiam mala, secundum hoc, quod aliquid retinent de bono. Et similiter omnia

in agreement with the good but even evil things in that they retain something of

falsa concordant vero, inquantum aliquid retinent de similitudine veritatis. Non

good. In a similar way all false things are in agreement with the truth insofar as they

enim est possibile, quod intellectus opinantis aliquod falsum totaliter privetur

retain some likeness of truth. It is not possible that the mind holding a false

cognitione veritatis. Sed per verum statim diiudicatur falsum, utpote ab eo deficiens.

opinion is completely deprived of the knowledge of the truth, because by means of

Et hoc est quod subdit, quod falso dissonat

the true it immediately judges something

verum, sicut ab obliquo dissonat rectum.

false as lacking in the truth. This is what he understands by saying that the true is at

autem per

variance with the false, somewhat like a right angle with an oblique angle.

Deinde cum dicit: divisis itaque bonis etc.,

141. Then [I, B], at “Goods have been

prosequitur intentum. Et primo quantum ad ea quae ab aliis de felicitate dicuntur;

classified,” he begins to carry out his intention, first in respect to what he has

secundo quantum ad ea quae supra ab ipso

affirmed about happiness. In regard to this

de felicitate sunt proposita, ibi: confessa autem haec utique erunt et cetera. Circa

he does two things. First [B, A’] he shows that what is the consensus of others is in

primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod praedictae sententiae de felicitate

agreement with his view (touching on the things said above by him at “... our opinion

conveniunt ea quae concorditer ab aliis dicuntur. Secundo quod etiam conveniunt

is in agreement”). Second [B, B’], at “Everything that philosophers etc.,” he

ei ea in quibus alii discordant, ibi, videntur autem et quaesita, et cetera. Circa primum

shows that the points on which others disagree substantiate his view. In regard to

duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod dictae descriptioni felicitatis concordant ea quae

the initial point he does two things. First [A’, 1] he shows that what is commonly

communiter a sapientibus dicuntur. Secundo ostendit idem de his quae

said by philosophers is in harmony with the given description of happiness. Second [A’,

dicuntur communiter ab omnibus, ibi, consonat autem rationi, et cetera. Primum

2], at “This coincides with etc.,” he shows that the same is true from what is generally

ostendit dupliciter.

affirmed by everyone. He proves the first observation in two ways, and

Primo quidem dividendo bona humana in

142. initially [A, 1, a] by dividing human

tria. Quorum quaedam sunt exteriora, sicut divitiae, honores, amici et alia

goods into three classes. Of these some (a) are external, as riches, honors, friends, and

huiusmodi, quaedam vero sunt interiora;

such like. (b) Others concern the soul, as

et haec rursus dividuntur in duo genera. Quia quaedam eorum pertinent ad

knowledge, virtue, and the like. These are the chief goods, for external things are for

corpora, sicut robur corporis, pulchritudo et sanitas. Quaedam vero pertinent ad

the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul, as matter for form and as

animam, sicut scientia et virtus et alia huiusmodi; inter quae bona principalissima

an instrument for a principal agent. Now the common view of all philosophers is that

et maxima sunt ea quae pertinent ad animam: nam res exteriores sunt propter

the goods of the soul are the most important.

hominem, corpus autem propter animam sicut materia propter formam, et instrumentum propter agens principale. Et haec est communis sententia omnium philosophorum, scilicet quod bona animae sunt principalissima. Sed circa alia bona diversimode senserunt

143. The Stoics and the Peripatetics held

Stoici et Peripatetici: nam Stoici posuerunt alia bona non esse hominis

divergent views about some goods. The Stoics were of the opinion that some goods

bona, eo quod eis non fit homo bonus; Peripatetici autem, idest sectatores

are not human goods because they do not make man better. The Peripatetics, that is,

Aristotelis, posuerunt, bona quidem exteriora esse minima bona, bona autem

the followers of Aristotle, asserted indeed that external goods are the least of goods—

corporis quasi media, sed bona principalissima ponebant bona animae,

the goods of the body being, as it were, means—but the chief goods in their

quibus homo fit bonus, alia vero secundum

judgment were the goods of the soul, by

eos dicuntur instrumentaliter

inquantum principalibus

which man is made good. Other goods, however, according to them are called good

deserviunt. Et sic felicitas, cum sit principalissimum bonum, in bonis animae

insofar as they serve as means toward the principal goods. Thus happiness, since it is

est ponendum. Manifestum est autem quod operationes animae ad animae bona

the chief good, must be numbered among the goods of the soul. Hence it is evident

pertinent. Unde manifestum est quod ponere felicitatem in operatione animae

that the placing of happiness in an operation of the rational soul, as we said

rationalis, ut supra diximus, conveniens est secundum hanc opinionem antiquam et

above (110-126), is in agreement with this ancient opinion common to all philosophers,

communem omnibus philosophis, quod scilicet principalissima bonorum sint ea

that the most important goods are those belonging to the soul.

bona ipsis

quae sunt secundum animam. Secundo ibi: recte autem etc., ostendit

144. Second [A’, 1, b], at “It was stated

idem alio modo. Est enim duplex genus operationum animae. Quarum quaedam

accurately,” he proves the same thing in a different way. The soul he says, has two

transeunt in exteriorem materiam, sicut texere et aedificare. Et huiusmodi

kinds of operations. Some of these pass into external matter, as weaving and building.

operationes non sunt fines, sed operata ipsorum, scilicet pannus contextus, et

Operations of this sort are not ends but things done for ends, that is, woven cloth

domus aedificata. Quaedam vero operationes animae sunt in ipso operante

and a completed house. Other operations of the soul, however ,remain in the agent

manentes, sicut intelligere et velle. Et huiusmodi operationes ipsaemet sunt

himself, as understanding and willing. Operations of this kind are ends. It was

fines. Recte ergo dictum est quod ipsi actus et operationes sunt finis, dum

correctly stated (119-120), when we said that happiness is an operation and not a

scilicet

product,

posuimus

felicitatem

esse

that

acts

and

operations

operationem, et non aliquid operatum. Sic enim felicitas ponitur aliquid bonorum

themselves are ends. Thus happiness is classified as one of the goods belonging to

quae sunt circa animam, et non aliquid eorum quae sunt exterius. Operatio enim

the soul and not an external good. Now in an immanent action the operation itself is a

manens in agente, ipsamet est perfectio et bonum agentis, in operationibus autem

perfection and a good of the agent, but in a transient action the perfection and the good

quae procedunt exterius, perfectio et bonum in exterioribus effectibus invenitur.

is found in the external effect. Hence not only is the aforesaid view in agreement with

Unde non solum praemissa sententia convenit opinioni philosophorum

the position of the philosophers who hold that goods of the soul are the chief goods—

ponentium bona animae esse principalissima, per hoc quod felicitatem

and we said happiness was concerned with the operation of the soul—but also in this,

posuimus circa operationem animae, sed etiam per hoc, quod ipsam operationem

that we place happiness in the operation itself.

posuimus felicitatem. Deinde cum dicit: consonat autem etc., ostendit quod praemissae sententiae

145. Then (A’, 2], at “This coincides,” he shows that the things generally agreed on

convenit illud etiam in quo omnes de felicitate conveniunt. Dictum est enim

about happiness fit in with our view, for it was said above (45, 128) that everyone

supra, quod bene vivere et bene operari

identifies living a good life and doing well

idem existimant omnes ei quod est felicem esse. Et huic rationi, id est notificationi

with being happy. What we said is in agreement with this notion or

felicitatis, convenit praedicta assignatio; quia fere nihil aliud videtur esse bona vita

understanding of happiness because a good life appears to be good activity and

quam bona operatio, qualis videtur esse felicitas. Vivere enim dicuntur illa quae ex

happiness seems to be of this nature. Those things truly are said to live which of

se moventur ad operandum.

themselves are moved to activity.

Deinde cum dicit: videntur autem et

146. Then [B, B’], at “Everything that

quaesita etc., ostendit quod praemissae sententiae conveniunt etiam ea in quibus

philosophers,” he shows that even the things in which others differ are in

alii differunt. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit ea in quibus homines differunt

agreement with the aforesaid view. On this point he does three things. First [B’, 1] he

circa felicitatem. Secundo ostendit, quod singula eorum praemissae sententiae

brings forward the points on which men differ about happiness. Second [B’, 2], at

conveniunt, ibi, dicentibus quidem igitur etc.; tertio movet ex praemissis quamdam

“Our definition of happiness etc.,” he shows that each of these is in agreement with the

quaestionem, et solvit, ibi, unde et quaeritur, et cetera. Circa primum tria

above view. Finally [Lect. 14; 3], at “Next we investigate etc.” (B. 1099 b 9), he asks

facit. Primo proponit quod intendit; scilicet

and answers a certain question concerning

quod omnia quae sunt a diversis diversimode circa felicitatem quaesita,

the premises. In regard to the first he does three things. First [B’, 1, a] he states what

videntur existere dicto, idest salvari cum praedicta opinione.

he wishes to show, that everything that was looked for in happiness by various philosophers in various ways seems “to be found in our notion,” that is, to be preserved in his view.

Secundo ibi: his quidem enim etc., ponit

147. Second [B’, 1, b], at “Some have

diversas opiniones de felicitate. Quarum prima est quod felicitas sit virtus. Et haec

taught” he gives different views on happiness. (1) The first. [b,. i] of these is

subdividitur in tres positiones: quidam enim posuerunt quod universaliter

that happiness consists in virtue. This has three variations. Some taught that (a) any

quaelibet virtus sit felicitas, vel specialiter virtus moralis, quae est perfectio appetitus

virtue, especially moral virtue which perfects the appetite under the control of

rectificati per rationem. Quibusdam vero videtur quod felicitas sit prudentia, quae

the reason constitutes happiness. To others it seemed that (b) happiness consists in

est perfectio practicae rationis; aliis autem videtur, quod felicitas sit sapientia, quae

prudence which which perfects the practical reason. Still others think that (c) happiness

est perfectio summa rationis speculativae.

is found in wisdom which is the ultimate perfection of the speculative reason.

Secunda opinio est quod omnia ista vel

148. The second opinion [b, ii] holds that all

aliquod horum sit felicitas, sed oporteat adiungi voluptatem; et haec subdividitur in

or any of these may constitute happiness provide that pleasure be added. This is

duas: nam quidam posuerunt virtutem cum voluptate quasi ex aequo esse

understood in two senses. Some maintained that (a) virtue and pleasure almost in equal

felicitatem, alii vero posuerunt, quod felicitas est virtus non sine voluptate,

measure constitute happiness. Others (b), while placing happiness in virtue primarily,

quasi secundario se habente ad felicitatem.

assign a secondary role to pleasure.

Tertia opinio est, quod quidam cum his

149. (3) A third opinion [b, iii] adds to these

comprehenderunt ad complementum felicitatis abundantiam exteriorum

elements of happiness a full measure of external goods, like riches and other

bonorum, puta divitiarum, honorum et aliorum huiusmodi.

material goods.

Tertio ibi: horum autem haec quidem etc.,

150. Third [B’, 1, c], at “The rank and file,”

assignat praedicta.

differentiam opinantium Et dicit quod quaedam

he indicates the difference in the persons holding the foregoing views. He says that

praedictorum, scilicet quod voluptas et divitiae requirantur ad felicitatem,

the majority, that is, the common people and some men of antiquity who were not

dixerunt multi, idest vulgares homines, et antiqui viri, qui scilicet minus erant in

well grounded in such matters, held some of these opinions such as pleasure and riches

talibus exercitati; alia vero, scilicet quod in bonis animae esset felicitas, dixerunt pauci

being necessary for happiness. But others, the minority but distinguished and famous

et gloriosi viri, idest in scientia famosi. Non est autem probabile, quod aliqui

men, held that happiness consisted rather in goods of the soul. It is likely that none of

eorum in omnibus erraverint, sed quilibet

these was entirely wrong but that each of

eorum in uno vel in pluribus recte sensit.

them was right on some points.

Deinde cum dicit: dicentibus quidem igitur

151. Then [B’, 2], at “Our definition of

etc., ostendit quod praedictae opiniones conveniunt cum praemissa assignatione

happiness,” he shows that these views are in agreement with what he previously

felicitatis. Et primo ostendit hoc de prima opinione, quae posuit virtutem esse

assigned to happiness. First [2, a] he shows that this is true of the first opinion which

felicitatem. Secundo de secunda, quae

held that virtue is happiness. Second [Lect.

addidit voluptatem, ibi: est autem et vita

13; 2, b], at “The life of those etc.” (B. 1099

ipsorum et cetera. Tertio de tertia, quae addidit exteriora bona, ibi: videtur tamen

a 9), he shows that it is true of the second opinion which adds pleasure. Finally [Lect.

et eorum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit (in) quo prima opinio

13; c, i], at “It seems, however etc.” (B. 1099 a 32), that it is true of the third

conveniat cum sua sententia; secundo ostendit in quo sua sententia melior sit.

opinion which adds external goods. In regard to the first assertion he does two

Dicit quod illis qui dicunt felicitatem esse

things. First [2, a, i] he shows that the first

virtutem omnem vel aliquam concordat ratio felicitatis superius posita, quod

opinion given is in agreement with his. Second [2, a, ii], he shows how his opinion

scilicet sit operatio secundum virtutem. Manifestum est enim quod operatio

is better. He affirms, therefore, that the definition of happiness given above (130) as

secundum virtutem est aliquid virtutis.

an activity according to virtue is acceptable to those who held that all virtue or one virtue constitutes happiness. It is evident that virtuous activity is something belonging to virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: differt autem etc.,

152. Then [a, ii], at “But besides, it makes a

ostendit quod suum dictum melius sit. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per

great difference” he shows that his own view is better: first [ii, x] from reason;

humanam consuetudinem, ibi: quemadmodum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo

second [ii, y], from a custom among men by the words “At the Olympic games.” He says

primo, quod sicut non parum differt in exterioribus rebus quod optimum ponatur

first that it makes a great deal of difference in external goods whether the most

in possessione alicuius rei vel in usu eius,

important good is in the possession of a

qui est manifeste melior cum sit possessionis finis, ita etiam se habet circa

thing or in its use—which is obviously better than possession. It is the same, too,

habitum virtutis et operationem, quae est usus eius qui melior est. Potest enim esse

with a habit of virtue and its operation or in its use—which is obviously better than

habitus in eo qui nullum bonum facit, sicut in dormiente, vel in eo qui qualitercumque

possession. It is the same, too with a habit of virtue and its operation or use which is of

est otiosus. Sed de operatione non est hoc possibile. Ex necessitate enim sequitur,

greater value than the habit. A habit can exist in a person who is not actually doing

quod ille operetur cui inest operatio et quod bene operetur si insit ei operatio

any good act, as in one who is asleep or not engaged in any way whatsoever. But this is

secundum virtutem. Unde operatio secundum virtutem est perfectior quam

not possible with an operation. It necessarily follows that that man should

ipsa virtus.

operate in whom there is an operation, and that he should produce a good effect if there be in him a virtuous operation. Consequently, a virtuous operation is more perfect than virtue itself.

Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum autem etc., manifestat idem per consuetudines

153. Then [ii, y] when he says “At the Olympic games,” he proves the same thing

humanas. Circa quod sciendum est, quod in Macedonia est quidam mons altissimus

by a custom among men. Concerning this we must know that in Macedonia there is a

qui vocatur Olympus, in quo fiebant

very high mountain called Olympus where

quidam ludi ad exercitium pugnae, qui vocabantur Olympiades, in quibus non

certain competitive sports, called Olympic games were held. In these, not the

coronabantur aliqui ex hoc quod essent optimi pugnatores et fortissimi, sed solum

strongest and best looking athletes but only the winning contestants received the

illi qui agonizabant, quorum aliqui vincebant. Qui autem non pugnabant non

crown., for those who did not compete were ineligible for the prize. So also, of those who

poterant vincere. Ita etiam de numero eorum qui sunt boni et optimi in vita

are good and best in virtuous living, only those are illustrious and happy who actually

virtuosa illi soli illustres fiunt et felices qui recte operantur. Unde melius dicitur, quod

perform good deeds. Hence it is better to say that happiness is a virtuous operation

operatio secundum virtutem sit felicitas quam ipsa virtus.

than virtue itself.

LECTURE 13 Some Place Happiness in Virtue with Pleasure; Others Say External Goods Are Necessary for Happiness b. (He shows that) the second opinion, which holds that happiness consists in virtue together with pleasure (is in agreement with the definition given above). i. He shows how this position harmonizes with his own opinion. x. FIRST HE STATES HIS PROPOSITION. — 154 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ'

The life of those who act in accord with

αὑτὸν ἡδύς.

virtue is itself pleasurable.

y. HE GIVES EVIDENCE FOR HIS STATEMENT. aa. By showing first that virtuous action should be pleasurable. — 155 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ

Now pleasure is an activity proper to a living being. And everyone finds pleasure

πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος,

in what he is fond of, as a lover of horses

οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν

finds pleasure in horses and a lover of shows in shows. In the same way a man

αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ'

who loves justice finds pleasure in just deeds; and in general one who loves virtue,

ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ.

finds pleasure in virtuous activity.

bb. This pleasure is preferable to others. — 156 τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα

Many experience pleasure in things that

μάχεται τοιαῦτ'

μὴ φύσει τοῖς δὲ

are in opposition to one another because the pleasure is not in accord with human

φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ κατ'

nature. Men, however, who love the good find pleasure in the things which are

ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ'

inherently pleasurable. Of this kind are virtuous operations that therefore are

αὑτάς.

pleasurable not only to virtuous men but also by their very natures.

διὰ τὸ εἶναι,

ii. He shows how it differs (from his own opinion).

x. HE STATES A PROPOSITION. — 157 οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς

This type of life then has no need of

ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν

pleasure as an accessory but is pleasurable in itself.

ἑαυτῷ. y. HE GIVES EVIDENCE FOR HIS STATEMENT. aa. Virtuous life is pleasurable in itself. — 158 εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ

It should be added that every virtuous

κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.

person rejoices in virtuous acts, for no one win call a man just who does not enjoy doing just deeds; no one will call a man generous who does not enjoy giving generously. Similarly we speak of men in other virtuous activities. From this it is clear that actions in accord with virtue are pleasurable in themselves.

bb.

It has nobility and goodness in a high degree. — 459-160

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ

Granting this, such actions are noble and

καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει

good. In fact they have each of these qualities in the highest degree, if a good

περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ

man judge truly in this matter as we have said he does. Happiness is the best,

κάλλιστον

therefore, the noblest and the most

καὶ

ἥδιστον

ἡ

εὐδαιμονία,

pleasurable of all things.

cc. He excludes a false opinion. — 161 καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ

These qualities do not belong to different

Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα· κάλλιστον

τὸ

things as the inscription at Delos has it: “The best is the just thing, the most

δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·

desired is health, and the sweetest is the heart’s desire.” But they are all found

ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

together in the most virtuous actions. In all these or in the best of these we say

ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ταῖς

happiness consists.

ὑπάρχει ἀρίσταις

ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι εὐδαιμονίαν.

τὴν

c. He comes to the third opinion... that external goods are necessary to happiness. i. This opinion may conform to the truth. — 162 φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς

It seems, however, that happiness stands

ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν·

in need of external goods, as we have said,

ii. Evidence for his statement. — 163 ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ

for it is impossible, or at least difficult, for

καλὰ ὄντα.

an indigent man to perform certain virtuous actions. Many good deeds become

πράττειν πολλὰ

πράττεται,

ἀχορήγητον μὲν γὰρ

καθάπερ

δι'

feasible, as we have pointed out, by the aid

ὀργάνων,

διὰ

φίλων

καὶ

of

friends

and

money

and

political

πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι

influence. Then too the lack of other blessings, like noble birth, good children,

ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους·

and physical beauty spoil a man’s happiness. One who is extremely ugly,

οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ

lowborn, or alone in the world and without children cannot be entirely happy. Much

μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι

less is he happy who is cursed with wayward children or evil associates or who

παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν

has lost friends by death. In our opinion then it seems that happiness has need of

εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας·

external prosperity to a degree.

iii. He draws a conclusion. — 164 ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι

For this reason some have identified good

τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

fortune with happiness. Others, however, prefer to place happiness in virtue.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Est autem et vita ipsorum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit de prima opinione quae

154. After the Philosopher has shown how the first opinion, which places

posuit

quo

happiness in virtue, is in agreement

conveniat cum definitione supra posita, et in quo ab ea deficiat, ostendit nunc idem circa

with the definition given above, and how it differs from it, he now does the

secundam opinionem, quae posuit felicitatem esse virtutem cum delectatione. Et circa hoc

same [b] regarding the second opinion, which holds that happiness in virtue

duo facit. Primo ostendit in quo conveniat haec positio cum sua sententia. Secundo ostendit in

together with pleasure. On this point he does two things. First [b, i], he

quo deficiat, ibi, nihil autem indiget voluptate et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit

shows how this position harmonizes with his own opinion. Second [b, ii], at

quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, delectari quidem enim et cetera. Dicit ergo

“This type of life etc.,” he shows how it differs. On the initial point he does two

primo, quod vita eorum, secundum virtutem, est

qui operantur secundum se

things. First [i, x] he states his proposition; and then [i, y] gives

delectabilis. Et ita felicitati, quam ponimus in operatione virtutis, non deest delectatio, quam

evidence for his statement at “Now pleasure is etc.” He says, therefore,

secundum istos felicitas requirit.

first that the life of those who act

felicitatem

esse

virtutem,

in

virtuously is itself pleasurable. Happiness then which we place in an

operation of virtue does not lack pleasure which, in their judgment, happiness requires. Deinde cum dicit: delectari quidem enim etc.,

155. Then [i, y], at “Now pleasure is,”

probat propositum. Et primo ostendit, quod in operatione virtutis sit delectatio. Secundo

he proves his statement by showing first that virtuous actions should be

ostendit, quod haec delectatio est potior aliis, ibi, multis quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo

pleasurable [i, y, aa] and second [i, y, bb], at “Many experience etc.,” that

primo, quod delectari est proprium animalium. Quamvis enim appetitum aliquem, scilicet

this pleasure is preferable to others. He says first that pleasure is an

naturalem, attribuamus rebus inanimatis, delectationem tamen non attribuimus nisi

activity proper to animals. Although we may attribute a natural appetite to

cognitionem habentibus; ex quo datur intelligi, quod delectatio proprie pertinet ad operationes

inanimate things, we attribute pleasure only to a being having

animae, in quibus ponitur felicitas. In huiusmodi autem operationibus unicuique est

perception. From this we see that pleasure properly belongs to the

delectabile id cuius dicitur esse amicus; sicut enim amans desiderat rem amatam si fuerit

activities of a soul, one of which is happiness. Now in activities of this

absens, ita delectatur in ea si fuerit praesens. Sicut equus est delectabilis amanti equum, et

kind, everyone finds pleasure in what he is fond of. As a lover desires the

spectaculum amanti spectaculum. Manifestum

thing which is absent, so he takes

est autem quod unusquisque virtuosus amat operationem propriae virtutis, utpote sibi

pleasure in it when it is present. In this way a lover of horses finds pleasure in

convenientem. Unde iusto, inquantum amat iustitiam, delectabile est operari iusta. Et

a horses; and a lover of shows, in a show. Hence it is evident that every

universaliter operationes, quae secundum virtutem sunt delectabiles virtuosis virtutem

virtuous person loves the activities of his own virtue as something agreeable

amantibus.

to him. To the extent that the just man loves justice he will take pleasure in doing just deeds. It is universally true that virtuous operations are pleasurable to virtuous persons who love virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: multis quidem igitur etc., ostendit hanc delectationem esse potiorem aliis.

156. Then [i, y, bb], at “Many experience,” he shows that this

Et proponit quod ea quae sunt delectabilia multitudini vulgarium hominum, sunt

pleasure is preferable to others. He explains that the things pleasurable to

contraria ad invicem, quia, sicut prodigus delectatur in effusione, ita illiberalis in

the majority of men are contrary to one another. Prodigality, for instance

superflua retentione; et hoc ideo est quia

is

a

source of pleasure to

the

delectationes tales non sunt secundum naturam hominis, quae est omnibus communis: non enim

spendthrift, while hoarding delights the miser. This happens because these

sunt

secundum

pleasures are not in accord with

corruptionem appetitus a ratione deficientis. Sed illis, qui amant bonum virtutis sunt

human nature common to all men, in other words with reason, but rather

delectabilia ea quae sunt secundum naturam delectabilia, quia scilicet conveniunt homini

with the corruption of an appetite departing from reason. But to men

secundum rationem, quae est perfectiva naturae ipsius, et propter hoc omnes virtuosi in

loving the good of virtue, these things are pleasurable that are inherently so,

eisdem delectantur. Tales autem sunt operationes secundum virtutem, scilicet

that is, that are agreeable to man according to reason, the perfection of

naturaliter delectabiles homini, eo quod sunt secundum rationem rectam. Et ideo non solum

his nature. Because of this, all virtuous men take pleasure in the same things

sunt delectabiles quoad ipsos homines, sed etiam sunt delectabiles secundum seipsas.

—virtuous operations—which are naturally pleasurable to men according

Operationes autem vitiosae sunt delectabiles quoad ipsos homines, quibus sunt conformes,

to right reason. These are pleasurable not only to men but also in their very

secundum habitus corruptos quos habent. Cum igitur id quod est secundum se et naturaliter

nature. But evil actions give pleasure to men who get used to them by

tale sit potius, consequens est delectationem

corrupt habits. Since then what is of

quae est secundum operationem virtutis esse delectabiliorem.

itself and by nature such is preferable, pleasure arising from virtuous

secundum

rationem,

sed

operation will be more delightful than other pleasures.

Deinde cum dicit: nihil autem indiget etc.,

157. Then [b, ii], at “This type of life,”

ostendit in quo praedicta positio deficiat a veritate. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit

he shows in what respect this opinion may not be true. In regard to this he

quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, cum dictis enim et cetera. Est ergo

does two things. First [ii, x] he states a proposition. Second [ii, y], at “It

considerandum circa primum, quod dicentes virtutem cum voluptate esse felicitatem,

should be added etc.,” he gives evidence for his statement. We must, therefore,

videbantur innuere quod virtus ad complementum felicitatis indigeat extrinseca

consider in regard to the first, that those who hold that happiness consists

voluptate. Sed ipse hoc excludit; dicens, quod

in

vita eorum qui operantur secundum virtutem, non indiget voluptate, quasi aliquo extrinseco

seemed to intimate that virtue may have need of some extrinsic pleasure

adiuncto; sed habet voluptatem in seipsa.

for the perfection of happiness. Aristotle disagrees her saying that the

virtue

together

with

pleasure

life of those who act in accord with virtue does not need pleasure as an extrinsic addition. pleasurable in itself.

That

life

is

Deinde cum dicit: cum dictis enim etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et circa hoc tria facit.

158. Then [ii, y], at “It should be added,” he gives evidence for what he

Primo probat quod vita virtuosa habet delectationem in seipsa. Secundo ostendit quod

has affirmed. In regard to this he does three things. First [ii, y, aa] he proves

insuper habet pulchritudinem et bonitatem secundum excellentiam, ibi, quinimmo et

that virtuous life is pleasurable in itself. Second [ii, y, bb], at “Granting

pulchrae et cetera. Tertio excludit circa hoc quandam sententiam falsam, ibi: et non divisa

this, such actions etc.,” he proves that it has nobility and goodness in a high

sunt haec et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod cum dictis rationibus quibus ostensum est

degree. Third [ii, y, cc], at “These qualities do not etc.,” he excludes a

operationes

esse

false opinion. He says first that to the

naturaliter delectabiles, etiam addendum est haec quod delectatio est de necessitate virtutis

reasons proving (154-156) that virtuous actions are naturally

et pertinet ad rationem ipsius; nullus enim est bonus vel virtuosus qui non gaudet in bonis

pleasurable, we must add that pleasure necessarily belongs to virtue and

operationibus. Et hoc manifestat per inductionem, quia nullus diceret illum esse

pertains to its very nature. There is no virtuous person who does not enjoy

iustum qui non gaudet de hoc quod operatur iusta. Et idem est in liberalitate, et in qualibet

the good deeds he does. He proves this inductively by saying that no one will

alia virtute. Cuius ratio est quia unicuique virtuoso operatio propriae virtutis est ei

call that man just who does not rejoice in doing just deeds. A similar

conveniens secundum proprium habitum, et per consequens fit ei delectabilis. Ex quo patet quod

observation may be made of the generous man and of a man practicing

operationes secundum virtutem sunt secundum seipsas delectabiles. Et sic non requirunt

any virtue. The reason is that the act of a virtuous man is agreeable to him

delectationem extrinsecam.

according to a proper habit, and as a

secundum

virtutem

consequence he derives pleasure form it. From this it is clear that virtuous actions are pleasurable in themselves and do not require pleasure external to them.

Deinde cum dicit: quin immo etc., ostendit quod operationes secundum virtutem non solum sunt

159. Then [ii, y, bb], at “Granting this,” he shows that actions in accord

delectabiles, sed etiam pulchrae et bonae. Delectabiles quidem sunt in ordine ad

with virtue are not only pleasurable but also noble and good. Actions

operantem cui conveniunt secundum proprium

indeed are pleasurable to an agent

habitum; pulcrae ordinem debitum

when they are agreeable to him by reason of a proper habit. They are

autem sunt secundum circumstantiarum quasi

quarumdam partium. Nam commensuratione partium,

in debita pulchritudo

noble or beautiful because of a right order of circumstances as of parts, for

consistit. Bonae autem sunt secundum ordinem ad finem.

beauty consists in a fitting arrangement of parts. They are good because of ordered to the end.

Addit autem, quod unumquodque horum trium

166. He adds that each of these three

maxime convenit eis. Et hoc probat per iudicium studiosi. Qui, cum habeat rectum

qualities belongs to virtuous actions in a high degree. He proves this by the

sensum circa operabilia humana, verum habet iudicium circa ea; sicut ille qui habet gustum

judgment of a good man. Such a man, since he has the right feeling for

sanum verum habet iudicium circa sapores. Sed studiosus iudicat operationes secundum

human works, judges them correctly. In another field the man with a healthy

virtutem esse maxime delectabiles et pulchras

sense of taste will make correct

et bonas, utpote pro quibus omnia delectabilia et pulchra et bona praetermittit. Cum igitur in

judgment on flavors. But a good man judges that actions in accord with

operationibus virtutum consistat felicitas, consequens est quod felicitas sit optimum et

virtue are eminently pleasurable, noble and good, so much so that he puts

pulcherrimum et delectabilissimum.

them before any other pleasures, beauties or goods. Since therefore, happiness consists in virtuous actions, it follows that happiness is the best, most beautiful and most pleasant.

Deinde cum dicit: et non divisa sunt haec etc., excludit a proposito quamdam opinionem. Ad

161. Then [ii, y, cc], at “These qualities do not belong,” he excludes

cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod apud Delos vel Deluos in templo Apollinis erat

from his doctrine a certain opinion. To understand this we must recall the

superscriptum quod optimum est id quod est iustissimum: desideratissimum autem est

inscription in Apollo’s temple at Delos: “The best is what is most just. The

sanum esse, delectabilissimum autem est id quo quis optat frui. Sed philosophus dicit, quod ista

most desired is to be healthy. The most delightful is that which one desires to

tria non conveniunt diversis, sed omnia conveniunt operationibus quae sunt secundum

enjoy.” But the Philosopher says that these three qualities do not belong to

virtutem, in quibus vel in quarum optima consistit felicitas. Unde unum et idem est,

different things but all three belong to virtuous actions in all of which or in

scilicet felicitas, desideratissimum

the best of which happiness consists. Therefore there is one—happiness—

quod sive

est optimum pulcerrimum

et et

delectabilissimum.

which is the best, most beautiful, most desired or most delightful.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur tamen et eorum etc., accedit ad tertiam opinionem, quae ponebat

162. Then [c], at “It seems, however,” he comes to the third opinion which

quod ad felicitatem requiruntur exteriora bona. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit in quo

held that external goods are necessary to happiness. In regard to this he does

haec

opinio

veritati

conveniat.

Secundo

three things. First [c, i] he brings out

manifestat propositum, ibi, impossibile enim et cetera. Tertio inducit conclusionem ex dictis,

in what way this opinion may conform to the truth. Second [c, ii], at “for it is

ibi, unde in idem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod tertia opinio supra posita quantum ad hoc

impossible etc.,” he gives evidence for his statement. Third [c, iii] at “For

videtur vera esse, quod felicitas indiget exterioribus bonis, ut supra dictum est.

this reason some etc.,” he draws a conclusion from the premises. He says first that the third opinion given above (149) seems true in this that happiness has need of external good, as was indicated previously (111).

Deinde cum dicit impossibile enim etc., manifestat propositum. Circa quod

163. Then [c, ii], at “for it is impossible,” he gives evidence for his

considerandum est, quod exteriorum bonorum quibusdam indiget felicitas, sicut instrumentis

statement. In this matter we must consider that happiness needs certain

quibus indigemus ad exercendum opera virtutis, in quibus consistit felicitas. Et quantum ad hoc

external goods as instruments to perform the good deeds in which

dicit quod est impossibile vel difficile quod homo qui non habet divitias ex quibus possit donare et

happiness consists. Touching on this he says that it is impossible or difficult

expendere, operetur quaedam virtuosa opera; multa enim operum virtuosorum facimus per

for a man, who does not possess the means for gifts and expenditures, to

amicos et per divitias et per civilem potentiam,

practice certain virtuous acts. In many

puta per hoc quod aliquis est rex vel proconsul. Quaedam vero exteriorum bonorum sunt quae

works of virtue we make use of friends, wealth, and political power, as in the

faciunt ad quandam pulchritudinem felicitatis, inquantum scilicet reddunt hominem placitum

case of someone who is a ruler or an official. There are some external goods

in oculis aliorum, quod pertinet ad rationem pulchritudinis. Et quantum ad hoc subdit, quod

which lend a beauty to happiness insofar as they make a man pleasing in

denudari quibusdam exteriorum bonorum, coinquinat beatitudinem, inquantum scilicet

the eyes of others giving him a kind of splendor. At this point he adds that a

reddit hominem aliqualiter contemptibilem in oculis aliorum, sicut patet de eo qui caret

lack of certain externals clouds a man’s happiness making him as it were

nobilitate, vel bona prole, aut etiam pulchritudine corporali. Non enim est omnino

contemptible in the eyes of others, as is evident in a man who lacks noble birth,

felix, qui est turpis specie; quia ex hoc redditur in oculis aliorum contemptibilis et despectus. Et

good children or even physical beauty. A man is not entirely happy when he is

eadem ratio est de eo qui est ignobilis, vel qui caret bona prole et aliis secundum carnem

ugly since this makes him contemptible and despised. The same is true of one

coniunctis

quia

who is lowborn or who does not have

propter omnia ista homo contemnitur. Et multo magis minus est felix si habeat pessimos filios

good children. Much less is he happy who has wicked sons or friends, for

vel amicos, quia per eos impeditur ab operatione

this

quasi

solitarius

existens,

limits

his

virtuous

activity.

virtutis. Et similiter etiam repugnat felicitati si aliquando habuerit bonos et mortui sunt, quia

Likewise, it is incompatible with happiness to have lost good friends by

ex hoc aliqua causa tristitiae remanet in corde eius. Sic igitur videtur quod felicitas indigeat

death, for such a loss means grief of heart. So it seems then that happiness

exteriori prosperitate.

has some need of goods of fortune.

Deinde cum dicit: unde in idem etc., infert conclusionem ex dictis. Quia enim felicitas

164. Then [c, iii], at “For this reason,” he comes to the conclusion that

principaliter consistit in operatione virtutis, indiget tamen aliqualiter exterioribus bonis,

although happiness consists in virtuous actions, nevertheless it needs

quae dicuntur bona fortunae, quia multoties fortuito adveniunt homini vel recedunt, inde est

external goods to some extent. Such externals are called goods of fortune

quod quidam idem posuerunt esse bonam fortunam et felicitatem. Quidam vero dixerunt

because they often fall into a man’s lap, or, in bad luck, desert him. For this

idem esse felicitatem et virtutem, ut supra dictum est.

reason some have held that good fortune and happiness are identical. But others have identified happiness with virtue, as was said above (66-68).

LECTURE 14 The Cause of Happiness Chapter 9 3. HE... INVESTIGATES THE CAUSE OF HAPPINESS. a. He states the question. — 165-166 ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν

Next we investigate whether happiness is

ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά

something which can be learned or acquired by habit or attained in some way by training.

τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται.

Does it come to us by divine providence or by chance?

b. He explains it. i. First... in parts. x. IT IS EMINENTLY REASONABLE FOR HAPPINESS TO HAVE A DIVINE CAUSE. — 167-168

εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι

If anything is the gift of the gods to men it is

θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν

reasonable to think that happiness, the best by far of all human goods, is the gift of God.

θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ

But this subject is perhaps more properly treated in another science.

βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, y.

IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR IT TO HAVE A HUMAN

CAUSE. aa. (This) does not do away with... (it being) most excellent and divine. — 169 φαίνεται

δὲ

κἂν

εἰ

μὴ

On the other hand, if happiness is not sent

θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καί τινα μάθησιν ἢ

directly by God, but comes to men by virtue and study and exercise, it would still be

ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς

judged most divine. As the re ward and end of virtue it is apparently most excellent and

ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ

divine and blessed.

θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. bb.

He proves the same point in this way. — 170

εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι

It will also be common to human nature because, supposing it be the result of

τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος μαθήσεως

discipline and study, happiness can be had by all who are not impeded from virtuous

καὶ ἐπιμελείας.

action.

z. HE SHOWS IT IS NOT FITTING FOR (HAPPINESS) TO BE AN EFFECT OF CHANCE. aa. First. — 171 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν,

If such is the case, it is better that happiness be attained in this way than by chance, and it

εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε

is reasonable to have it so. The things that are in accord with nature are as good as they

κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ

can be by their very make-up. The same too can be said of what is produced by art or by

κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ

any cause especially the highest.

τὴν ἀρίστην.

bb.

He offers a second reason. — 172

τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον

Besides, to abandon the greatest and the best

ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη.

good to the vagaries of chance is most pernicious.

λίαν

ii. Then (he explains) by offering a common reason. — 173 συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ

What we seek is evident from the definition

λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται

of happiness as a certain kind of activity of

γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ

the soul in accord with virtue. Of the remaining goods some are necessary to

λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ

enrich happiness and others instrumentally for its attainment.

work

συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. c. He shows that the previously discussed definition... is in agreement... with his opinion. i. He shows what concurs with his earlier remarks. — 174 ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη

This—that happiness is a virtuous activity—

καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον

is apparent in the light of what was laid down in the beginning. There we stated that

ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ

the end of political science is the best of human goods, for the principal aim of this

ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ

science is the formation of men in such a way that they will become upright citizens and

πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.

doers of good works.

ii. He concludes what is the correct view in accord with this opinion. x. NO DUMB ANIMAL IS CALLED HAPPY. — 175 εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε

That is why we do not say properly that a

ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων

cow or a horse or any other animal is happy,

οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι

for it is not possible for any of them to participate in moral activity.

τοιαύτης

ἐνεργείας. y. HE ALSO EXCLUDES CHILDREN FROM HAPPINESS. — 176 διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὔπω

For the same reason children are not really happy, in that they have not yet attained

γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων

sufficient

διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα

virtuous deeds. Children are called happy because they give promise of happiness, while

μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας

real happiness needs perfect virtue and a complete life, as we have already pointed out.

age for

the performance of

καὶ βίου τελείου.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Unde et quaeritur et cetera. Postquam

165. After the Philosopher has shown how

philosophus ostendit quomodo diversae opiniones concordant definitioni felicitatis

different opinions are in agreement with the definition of happiness presented above,

suprapositae, hic inquirit ex consequenti de causa felicitatis. Et primo movet

here [3] he naturally investigates the cause of happiness. First [3, a] he states the

quaestionem. Secundo determinat eam, ibi, siquidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum

question, and second [3, b], at “If anything etc.,” he explains it. In regard to the first

considerandum

est

we must consider that happiness must

felicitatem procedere, vel a causa per se et determinata, vel a causa per accidens et

proceed from either a per se and determined cause, or an incidental and

indeterminata, quae est fortuna. Si autem a causa determinata et per se, aut hoc erit a

indetermined cause, that is, chance. If from a per se and determined cause, this will be

causa humana, aut a causa divina. A causa autem humana fit aliquid in nobis

either human or divine. In the case of a human cause, the effect is produced in us in

tripliciter. Uno modo addiscendo, sicut scientia. Alio modo assuescendo, sicut

three ways: first by learning, as a science; second by practice, as a moral virtue; third

virtus moralis. Tertio modo exercitando, sicut militaris industria, et alia huiusmodi.

by exercise, as a military drill and other things of this kind.

Proponit

trium

166. Accordingly he proposes the question

membrorum: quorum primum pertinet ad causam humanam. Et hoc est quod quaerit:

in three parts. The first concerns a human cause. He asks whether happiness is

est

igitur

quod

necesse

quaestionem

utrum felicitas sit aliquid discibile, sicut

something that can be learned as a science,

scientia, vel assuescibile, sicut virtus moralis, vel aliqualiter exercitabile, sicut

or that can be acquired by habit as a moral virtue, or that can to some extent be had

industria artificialium operum. Secundum

by training, like setting-up exercises. The

membrum pertinet ad causam divinam; et hoc est quod quaerit: utrum felicitas sit in

second part concerns a divine cause. He asks whether happiness is something

nobis secundum quandam divinam particulam, id est secundum qualemcumque

divine in us and a sharing in some way of godlike qualities which are above men. The

participationem alicuius divinorum super hominem existentium. Tertium autem

third part concerns an incidental and indetermined cause. In other words he asks

membrum pertinet ad causam per accidens et indeterminatam; et hoc est quod quaerit:

whether happiness occurs to man by chance.

utrum felicitas adveniat homini propter fortunam. Deinde cum dicit: si quidem igitur etc.,

167. Then [3, b], at “If anything,” he

determinat praedictam quaestionem. Et primo quasi per modum divisivum

explains the question first [b, i] as it were in parts by considering the individual

considerando singula membra quaestionis. Secundo per rationem communem

sections of the question; and then [b, ii], by offering a common reason taken from the

sumptam ex definitione felicitatis, ibi, manifestum est autem ex ratione et cetera.

definition of happiness at “Whit we seek is evident etc.” In regard to the first he does

Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit

three things. First [i, x] he shows it is

quod maxime rationabile est quod felicitas sit ex causa divina. Secundo ostendit quod

eminently reasonable for happiness to have a divine cause. Second [i, y], at “On the

tolerabile est quod sit ex causa humana, ibi, videtur autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit

other hand etc.,” he shows that it is acceptable for it to have a human cause.

quod inconveniens est quod sit ex causa fortuita, ibi, si autem est ita et cetera. Dicit

Third [i, z], at “If such is the case,” he shows it is not fitting for it to be an effect

ergo primo, quod si aliquid aliud ex dono deorum, id est substantiarum separatarum

of chance. He say first that if the gods (i.e. beings called gods by the ancients) make

quas antiqui deos vocabant, datur hominibus, rationabile est quod felicitas sit

gifts to men, it is reasonable that happiness be the gift of the supreme God because it is

donum Dei supremi, quia ipsa est optimum inter bona humana. Manifestum est enim

the most excellent of human goods. It is obvious that a thing is led to a higher end

quod ad altiorem finem aliquid perducitur ab altiori virtute; sicut ad altiorem finem

by a higher virtue or power, for instance, man is led to a higher end by military art

perducit ars militaris quam frenefactiva.

than

Unde rationabile est quod ultimus finis, scilicet felicitas, proveniat homini ex

reasonable that the ultimate end, happiness, should come to man from the

suprema omnium virtute, scilicet Dei summi.

highest power of all, the supreme God.

by

bridle-making.

Hence

it

is

Quod autem a substantiis separatis aliquid

168. That separated substances may

detur hominibus, evidens fit ex ipsa convenientia hominum ad substantias

bestow something on men becomes evident from the fact that men and separated

separatas

intellectualem

substances are alike in the power of

virtutem. Sicut enim corpora inferiora recipiunt suas perfectiones a corporibus

intelligence. As the lower bodies are brought to perfection by the higher bodies

superioribus, ita intellectus inferiores ab intellectibus superioribus. Circa hoc autem

so the lower intellectual beings by the superior intellectual beings. But there is no

non diutius immoratur, sed dicit hoc esse magis proprium alterius perscrutationis,

reason to delay any longer on this matter for it because it belongs rather to another

scilicet metaphysicae.

science, metaphysics.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc.,

169. Then [i, y], at “On the other hand,” he

ostendit tolerabiliter dici quod felicitas sit ex causa humana, quia, etiam si sit a Deo

shows it is acceptable to say that happiness has a human cause. Although God is the

principaliter, tamen adhuc homo aliquid cooperatur. Hoc autem ostendit dupliciter.

principal cause, man does contribute something to happiness. Aristotle shows

Primo quidem per hoc quod si est a causa humana, non removetur id quod est

this in two ways. First [y, aa], the fact that happiness has a human cause does not do

proprium felicitati, scilicet quod sit aliquid optimum et divinum. Et dicit quod si

away with its chief characteristic, that it is most excellent and divine. He says that if

felicitas non sit aliquod donum missum immediate a Deo, sed adveniat homini

happiness is not a gift sent directly by God but comes to men by virtue as a thing

propter virtutem, sicut aliquid assuescibile,

acquired by habit, or by study as a thing to

vel propter aliquam disciplinam, sicut aliquid discibile, vel propter aliquam

be learned, or by exercise as a thing to be had by training, nevertheless it seems to be

exercitationem sicut aliquid exercitabile, nihilominus videtur felicitas esse aliquid

something especially divine. The reason is that since happiness is the reward and end

divinissimum, quia cum sit praemium et finis virtutis, sequitur quod sit optimum et

of virtue, it follows that it is something most excellent and divine and blessed. A

divinum aliquid et beatum. Non enim dicitur aliquid divinum propter hoc solum

thing is not called divine only because it comes from God but also because it makes

quia est a Deo, sed etiam quia nos Deo assimulat propter excellentiam bonitatis.

us like God in goodness.

Secundo ibi: erit autem etc., ostendit idem

170. Second [y, bb], at “It will also,” he

per hoc quod haec positio conservat felicitati id quod pertinet ad finem alicuius

proves the same point in this way. Applicable to happiness is the idea that

naturae, ut scilicet sit commune aliquid his quae habent naturam illam. Non enim

what belongs to the purpose of a nature should be something common to the things

natura deficit ab eo quod intendit, nisi in paucioribus. Et ita si felicitas est finis

having that nature, for nature does not fail in what it intends except in the minority of

secundum

humanae naturae, oportet quod possit esse

cases. So if happiness is the end of human

communis omnibus vel pluribus habentibus humanam naturam; et istud salvatur si sit

nature, it must be common to all or many having human nature. This principle

ex causa humana, quia sic per quandam disciplinam et studium, poterit provenire

remains intact if the cause be a human one. If happiness be had through discipline and

omnibus non habentibus aliquod impedimentum ad operandum opera

study it could come to everyone who is not impeded in the performance of virtuous

virtutis, vel per defectum naturae, sicut qui sunt naturaliter stulti, vel per malam

works either by defect of nature as those who are naturally stupid, or by an evil

consuetudinem quae imitatur naturam. Ex

habit which imitates nature. From this it is

quo patet, quod felicitas de qua philosophus loquitur non consistit in illa continuatione

clear that the happiness spoken of by the Philosopher, does not consist in that

ad intelligentiam separatam, per quam homo intelligat omnia, ut quidam

contact with separated intelligence by which man can understand all things, as

posuerunt. Hoc enim non provenit multis, immo nulli in hac vita.

certain people have maintained. Such experience does not happen to very many, in fact, to no one in this life.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem est ita etc., ostendit intolerabile esse quod felicitatis

171. Then [i, z], at “If such is the case,” he rejects chance as the cause of happiness for

causa sit fortuna. Et hoc duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Ea

two reasons. First [z, aa], things that are in accord with nature are very good, since

quae sunt secundum naturam optime se habent, sicut apta nata sunt. Et idem est

nature produces what is suitable. The same is true also of everything made by art or by

etiam de omnibus quae fiunt secundum artem vel secundum quamcumque causam;

any cause whatsoever. This is especially the case with the principal cause from

et maxime secundum optimam causam a

which happiness, as the most excellent

qua videtur felicitas dependere, cum sit quiddam optimum; huius autem ratio est

good, seems to depend. ne reason is that art and all efficient causes operate for the

quia et ars et omnis causa agens agit propter bonum. Unde consequens est quod

sake of good. It follows, then, that every agent should most aptly arrange, as far as

unumquodque agens optime disponat id quod agit quanto melius potest et praecipue

possible, what he does. This particularly applies to God who is the cause of all

hoc videtur de Deo, qui est totius naturae causa. Et ideo ea quae sunt secundum

nature. The things which are in accord with nature seem to be better from their

naturam, videntur se habere quanto melius nata sunt esse. Sed melius est quod felicitas

very make-up. But it is better that happiness springs from a per se cause,

sit ex aliqua causa per se vel divina vel humana, quam a fortuna, quae est causa

either divine or human, than from chance which is an incidental cause, for what is

per accidens. Quia semper quod est per se, potius est eo quod est per accidens. Non

per se is preferable to what is incidental. Consequently, chance is not the cause of

ergo felicitas est a fortuna.

happiness.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, maximum autem et optimum et cetera. Quae talis est.

172. He offers a second reason [z, bb] at “Besides, to abandon.” Happiness is the

Felicitas est maximum omnium bonorum humanorum. Quia omnia alia ad ipsam

most perfect of all human goods because all others are ordered to it as to an end. Now

ordinantur, sicut ad finem. Esset autem maxime perniciosum, si hoc a fortuna

it would be very harmful if this good were to depend on chance, for other goods would

dependeret; quia multo magis alia humana bona essent fortuita; et ita cessaret

be much more subject to chance. As a result man’s zeal in pursuing these goods

humanum studium circa humana bona exequenda, quod esset periculosissimum.

would vanish, a most perilous situation. Chance, therefore, is not the cause of

Non ergo felicitas est a fortuna.

happiness.

Deinde cum dicit: manifestum autem est etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem ex

173. Then [b, ii], at “What we seek,” he settles the question we are considering. He

diffinitione felicitatis supra posita. Et dicit manifestum esse ex diffinitione felicitatis

says it is evident, from the definition already given (130), where the truth lies in

quid sit verum circa id quod quaeritur in quaestione praemissa. Dictum est enim

our investigation of the present question. As was previously indicated (127-128),

supra, quod felicitas est operatio animae rationalis secundum virtutem. Id autem

happiness is an activity of the rational soul in accord with virtue. Now what is in

quod est secundum virtutem, est secundum

accord with virtue is according to reason

rationem motam ab aliqua causa divina. Quod autem est secundum fortunam est

influenced by some divine cause. But what is according to chance is contrary to

praeter rationem. Felicitas igitur non est a fortuna, sed ab aliqua causa humana

reason. It follows that happiness does not spring form chance but from some human

proxima, a causa autem divina principaliter et primo. Concurrunt autem ad felicitatem

cause immediately and from a divine cause principally and ultimately. Certain other

quaedam alia bona, in quibus fortuna aliquid operatur. In eis tamen non

goods, however, in which chance plays a part, do conduce to happiness, but

principaliter consistit felicitas. Sed eorum quaedam necessarium est existere ad

happiness does not chiefly consist in them. Some, though, are necessary for a certain

decorem quemdam felicitatis. Quaedam vero instrumentaliter cooperantur ad

enrichment of happiness, and others work instrumentally to attain it, as we have said

felicitatem, ut supra dictum est. Unde propter ista bona secundaria, non oportet

(169). But we must not attribute happiness to chance because of these

felicitatem fortunae attribuere.

secondary goods.

Deinde cum dicit: confessa autem haec utique erunt etc., ostendit quod praedicta

174. Then [c], at “This-that happiness,” he shows that the previously discussed

felicitatis definitio non solum consonat

definition of happiness is in agreement not

opinionibus aliorum de felicitate, sed etiam aliis quae sunt secundum suam opinionem.

only with the opinions of others on happiness but also with observations made

Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod

in keeping with his own opinion. In regard

consonat his quae ab eo supra de felicitate

to this he does two things. First [c, i] he

sunt dicta. Secundo concludit quid secundum hanc sententiam recte dicendum

shows what concurs with his earlier remarks about happiness (19-42). Second

sit, ibi, decenter igitur neque bovem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod haec, scilicet

[c, ii], at “This is why etc.,” he concludes what is the correct view in accord with this

felicitatem esse operationem secundum virtutem confessa sunt, idest consona his

opinion. He says first “this”—that happiness is an activity in accord with

quae in prooemio diximus. Posuimus enim ibi quod optimum humanorum bonorum,

virtue—“is apparent,” that is, in harmony with the words of the introduction (19-

scilicet felicitas, sit finis politicae, cuius finis manifeste est operatio secundum virtutem.

42). We said there that the best human good, happiness, is the end of political

Politica enim ad hoc praecipuum studium adhibet ferendo leges et praemia, et poenas

science whose goal manifestly is activity in accord with virtue. Political science is

adhibendo,

et

especially concerned with framing laws and

operatores bonorum. Quod est operari secundum virtutem.

apportioning rewards and punishments in order to develop good citizens and doers of

ut

faciat

cives

bonos

good works. This is to operate in accord with virtue. Deinde cum dicit: decenter igitur etc.,

175. Then [c, ii], at “That is why,” he

concludit ex praemissa ratione, a quibus felicitas sit subtrahenda secundum ea quae

concludes from the reason assigned that happiness cannot be attributed to certain

convenienter dicuntur. Et primo dicit, quod nullum animal irrationale dicitur esse felix.

beings according to what has been correctly laid down. First [ii, x] he says

Et hoc convenienter quia nullum eorum potest communicare in operatione virtutis,

that no dumb animal is called happy, and rightly so because none of them can share

quae est secundum rationem, diximus esse felicitatem.

in the activity of virtue which is in accord with reason and which constitutes

quam

happiness.

Secundo ibi: propter hanc autem causam

176. Second [ii, y], at “For the same

etc., excludit a felicitate etiam pueros. Et dicit quod propter eamdem causam, etiam

reason,” he also excludes children from happiness saying that for a similar reason

puer non potest dici felix. Quia propter defectum aetatis nondum habet plenum

they cannot be called happy. Lacking sufficient age they have not attained that

usum rationis ut possit esse operator virtuosarum operationum. Et si aliquando

full use of reason requisite for the performance of virtuous actions. If children

dicuntur beati, hoc est propter spem futurae perfectionis, quae ex aliquibus

are sometimes called happy, this is because we see in them sings that give promise of

indiciis de eis concipitur. Ideo autem in

future excellence. At present, therefore,

praesenti non sunt felices, quia felicitas, ut supra dictum est, indiget et virtute

they are not happy, for happiness, as we have indicated (127-126) needs perfect

perfecta, ad hoc quod sit, non solum bona, sed optima operatio et vita perfecta ad hoc

virtue to be not only a good but the best operation and a life perfected by good

quod sit diuturna.

activity which permanent.

bona

operatio

continua

et

is

continuous

LECTURE 15 A Problem About Happiness Chapter 9 A. Whether anyone can be called happy in this life. A’ He gives the reason for the problem. — 177-179 πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ

Many changes take place in life and all

παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα

kinds of fortune are met with in the course of a lifetime. Sometimes a very

μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς

prosperous man falls into great misfortune in old age as we read of

Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον

Priam in the epic poems. Certainly no one calls a man happy who has enjoyed

τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

such goods of fortune and then ends his days in misery.

Chapter 10 B’ He presents the problem.

1. FIRST HE ASKS A QUESTION. — 179 πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα

Is no man then to be called happy so

ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος

long as he lives, but must we consider the end of life, as Solon believed?

ὁρᾶν; 2. HE BRINGS UP AN OBJECTION. — 180 εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν

If we hold this to be so, it follows that a man will be happy only when he dies.

ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν

But such an opinion is altogether unreasonable especially for us who

and

ἡμῖν

ἐνέργειάν

τινα

τὴν

εὐδαιμονίαν;

maintain that happiness is a kind of activity.

3. REASONS).

HE REJECTS A PARTICULAR ANSWER (FOR TWO

a. in regard to the first. i. He proposes an answer and rejects it. — 181-182 εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο

We may say that a mad man is not happy and that Solon did not wish to

βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον

assert that he is. We may say Solon meant that a man will safely be called

ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ

happy at death because he is then beyond the reach of evils and

τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ

misfortune. This meaning, though,

εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ

gives rise to a problem. It seems that the dead no less than the living, even

αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως

though unaware of it, are influenced by good and evil, for instance, by honors

ἀπογόνων δυστυχίαι.

and dishonors, by the prosperity and misfortune of children and of

εὐπραξίαι

τε

καὶ

descendants in general. ii. He brings up a problem. — 183-184 ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι

A difficulty, however, here presents itself. It may happen that a man lived

γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς

happily to a ripe old age and has died a worthy death, and afterwards many

συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ

changes take place in regard to his children. Some of them are good and

τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς

have gained a position in life they well deserve, while others are just the

ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς

opposite. Indeed, it does happen that children are quite different from their

ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ

parents. Now it is incongruous that a dead man should suffer these same

γίνοιτο ὁτὲ μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ'

changes so that he at one time becomes

ἄθλιος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπί τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι

happy and then again unhappy. On the other hand, it seems unfitting that the

τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν.

affairs of the children should in no way

affect the parents, at least for a certain length of time.

b. He gives the second reason. — 185-186 ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη

But we must return to our first problem. Perhaps from its solution

καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ

light will be shed on our present difficulty. Let us suppose that we must

τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον

look at the end and then declare each man happy, not because he is happy but

ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ'

because he formerly was happy. Now nonsensical, if when a man is happy we

αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας

may not affirm it of him since we are unwilling to call the living happy on

εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς,

account of the changes in the present

καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι

τὴν καὶ

life, because we think happiness permanent and not easily changeable,

μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι

and because fortune often goes in cycles for the same persons. Obviously,

περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν

if we use fortune as our norm we will very often call the same person happy

αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά

and again unhappy as though he were a chameleon, and declare him happy

τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον.

and yet insecure in his happiness.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Multae autem transmutationes et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est

177. After the Philosopher has shown what happiness is, he here raises a problem about

felicitas, hic movet quamdam dubitationem de felicitate: utrum scilicet

happiness, namely [A], whether anyone can be called happy in this life. On this point he

in hac vita possit aliquis dici felix. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit

proceeds in three steps. First [A’] he gives the reason for the problem. Second [B’], at

dubitationis motivum. Secundo ponit dubitationem, ibi, utrum igitur nullum

“Is no man then etc.,” he presents the problem. Third [Lect 16, C’], at “We ought

alium

ponit

not to make etc.” (B. 1100 b 7), he gives the

solutionem, ibi, vel fortunas quidem sequi et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod

solution. He says first that many changes take place in life; for life rarely remains the

multae fiunt transmutationes fortunae,

same either good or bad. It is stable in few

hominem

etc.;

tertio

raro enim et in paucis stabilis est, et huiusmodi transmutationes fiunt

things, changing from good fortune to bad and from bad to good. Sometimes, indeed, the

omnibus modis, puta et de bono in alium et de malo in bonum. Quandoque quidem

changes occur in small matters and sometimes in great, and sometimes in

secundum aliquid parvum, quandoque

matters of medium importance. Changes of

autem secundum quandoque autem

this sort occur at any age, in adolescence, maturity or old age.

aliquid magnum: secundum aliquid

mediocriter se habens. Huiusmodi autem mutationes fieri possunt secundum totam hominis vitam, puta in adolescentia, iuventute vel senectute.

Contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis, qui per totam vitam suam habuit

178. Sometimes it happens that a man has had an abundance of external goods all his

maximam bonorum,

exteriorum incidat in

life, and in old age falls into great misfortune as Priam did, according to the epic poem of

maximas calamitates, sicut de Priamo

Homer. No one will call that man happy who

narrat Homerus in versibus heroicis. Nullus autem dicet eum esse felicem qui

has enjoyed such goods of fortune and ends his life in misery. The fact that one has been

talibus usus est bonis fortunis et postea finit miserabiliter. Quia hoc ad

reduced from great prosperity to extreme wretchedness seems to add to his misery.

abundantiam in senectute

augmentum miseriae pertinere videtur, quod aliquis de magna prosperitate in magnam miseriam deveniat. Deinde cum dicit: utrum igitur nullum

179. Then [B’], at “Is no man then,” he

etc., movet dubitationem intentam. Et primo proponit quaestionem. Secundo

proposes the difficulty. But first [B’, 2], at “If we hold this etc.,” he brings up an objection.

obiicit ad eam, ibi, si autem utique et cetera. Tertio excludit quamdam

Third [B, 3], at “We may say etc.,” he rejects a particular answer. First then he asks the

responsionem, ibi, si autem non dicimus et cetera. Proponitur ergo primo

question about the view of Solon, one of the seven wise men, who framed the laws of the

quaestio de opinione Solonis, qui fuit unus de septem sapientibus et condidit

Athenians. Considering man’s life as subject to the changes of fortune, Solon said that no

Atheniensium leges. Qui considerans humanam vitam fortunae mutationibus

one ought to be called happy so long as he lives, but only at the end of his life. In light of

esse obnoxiam, dixit quod nullus debet

what happened to Priam, the question arises

dici felix quamdiu vivit: sed solum in fine vitae suae. Est ergo quaestio, utrum

whether any man is to be called happy so long as he lives. Is it best, as Solon holds, to

propter id quod accidit circa Priamum, nullus alius homo sit dicendus beatus

consider the end of life if happiness continues that long, in order that a man may be called

quamdiu vivit, sed secundum sententiam Solonis optimum est considerare finem

happy? Or should this be disregarded?

vitae, si scilicet felicitas perseveret usque in finem, ut sic aliquis felix dicatur; vel non oporteat hoc observare. Deinde cum dicit: si autem utique etc., obiicit ad quaestionem praedictam,

180. Then [B, 2], at “If we hold,” he brings up an objection to the question that was

improbando dictum Solonis. Si enim aliquis ita ponat sicut Solon dixit,

asked, and disproves the saying of Solon. If we hold as true what Solon said, it follows

sequitur quod homo sit felix tunc quando moritur. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens,

that man will be happy only when he dies. But this seems unreasonable on other grounds,

et propter alias rationes, utputa quia mors est maximus defectus cum felicitas

for example, because death is the worst of evils and happiness the greatest of

sit summa perfectio, et iterum propter

perfections. Besides, happiness is a kind of

hoc quod supra diximus, quod felicitas est operatio quaedam; mortui autem non

activity, as we indicated above (119-126). But a dead man does not seem to have an

videntur habere operationem aliquam; non igitur possunt dici felices. Et est

activity. The dead, therefore, cannot be called happy. It should be noted that the

notandum quod philosophus non loquitur hic de felicitate futurae vitae,

Philosopher is not here speaking of happiness in a future life, but of happiness in the present

sed de felicitate praesentis vitae, utrum attribui possit homini dum vivit vel

life. Can we attribute happiness to man while he lives or only at death?

solum in morte. Deinde cum dicit: si autem non dicimus

181. Then [B’, 3], at “We may say,” he

mortuum felicem etc., excludit quandam responsionem. Et hoc duabus rationibus,

rejects an answer, and this for two reasons. He gives the second reason [3, b] at “But we

quarum secundam ponit, ibi, sed revertendum ad prius quaesitum et

must return to our first problem etc.” In regard to the first [3, a] he does two things.

cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

Initially [a, i] he propose an answer and

proponit responsionem et improbat eam. Secundo ex hoc movet quamdam

rejects it. Second [a, ii] by reason of this he brings up a problem at “A difficulty, however,

quaestionem, ibi, quaestionem autem et haec tribuunt et cetera. Circa primum

here presents itself etc.” In regard to the first point we must consider that the previous

considerandum est, quod praecedens Aristotelis ratio ostendebat quod aliquis

argument of Aristotle showed that a man is not happy in death. Now this will be granted

non est felix in morte. Concedet autem hoc aliquis, dicens mortuum non esse

by anyone who says that a dead man is not happy: Solon did not mean that a man is

felicem, nec Solon hoc dicere voluit, quod scilicet aliquis cum moritur sit felix. Sed

happy when he dies. But he did mean that when a man is dead, a valid argument can be

voluit dicere quod aliquis tunc cum homo moritur potest firmam sententiam dare

made about his happiness, because the dead man is now beyond the danger of evils and

de eo quod fuerit beatus, quia iam est extra periculum malorum et

misfortune so that there is no longer any doubt about it. But he rejects this answer

infortuniorum, ut de cetero non possit dubitari de felicitate ipsius. Sed hanc

saying it contains an uncertainty.

responsionem excludit dicens quod hoc habet quamdam dubitationem. Mortuus enim a vivo differt in hoc quod caret sensu. Contingit autem quod

182. A dead man differs from a living man in the loss of consciousness. A good thing or a

homini viventi proveniat aliquod bonum vel malum, etiam si illud non sentiat;

bad thing—such as defamation of character, the murder of his children, or the loss of

puta si eo ignorante infametur aut filii eius occidantur aut divitiae eius

riches—could conceivably happen to someone still living, and he might not feel it precisely

diripiantur: ergo pari ratione videtur quod mortuo possit bonum vel malum

because he does not know about it. By the same argument, it seems, some good or evil

accidere, quamvis non sentiat. Et loquitur de bono vel malo vitae civilis, ut

could happen to a dead man who is unaware of it. Here Aristotle is talking about good and

patet per exempla quae subdit, dicens:

evil in public life as his examples—“honor and

puta honores et inhonorationes. Quandoque enim mortuis aliqui honores

dishonor”—show. Sometimes certain honors are given to the dead when they are praised

exhibentur, sicut quod laudantur et memoria eorum celebratur. Et similiter

and their memory celebrated. Likewise certain dishonors are heaped upon them, for

fiunt eis quaedam exhonorationes, puta cum extumulantur et eorum ossa

example, when their bodies are exhumed and their remains burned. Also something good

comburuntur. Similiter etiam videntur aliqua bona vel mala eis posse accidere

or bad can happen to them by reason of the prosperity or misfortune of their children and

secundum prosperitates et infortunia filiorum et nepotum. Sic igitur videtur

their grandchildren. Then it would seem that not even the dead are entirely beyond evils

quod nec etiam mortui omnino sunt extra mala et infortunia et ita (nec)

and misfortunes. Consequently, even in death men cannot be called happy.

etiam in morte posset dici quod essent felices.

Deinde cum dicit quaestionem autem et

183. Then [a, ii], at “A difficulty, however,”

haec tribuunt etc., interponit quamdam quaestionem occasione praemissorum.

he interposes a difficulty arising from the premises. Such things as the prosperity and

Et dicit quod ista, scilicet prosperitates et infortunia filiorum et nepotum,

misfortunes of children and grandchildren present a problem for him. It happens

afferunt quaestionem. Contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis feliciter vivit

sometimes that a man lives happily—in the way we have described happiness—to old age

usque ad senectutem et moritur feliciter secundum rationem felicitatis

and dies a worthy death but afterwards many changes take place in regard to his children,

assignatam, et tamen postea fiunt multae transmutationes circa filios eius,

some of whom are good after the example of a worthy father, but others just the opposite.

quorum quidam sunt boni et vivunt

Indeed it does happen that children are quite

secundum dignitatem patris, quidam autem e contrario se habent. Manifestum

different from their parents: good parents have wicked children and wealthy parents,

est enim quod secundum omnem modum contingit diversificari filios a parentibus,

needy children. from this statement something unfitting seems to follow for both

utpote quod bonorum parentum sint mali filii, et divitum pauperes. Hac autem

parents and children.

positione facta, inconveniens ex utraque parte sequi videtur. Nam inconveniens est si etiam mortuus

184. It is inappropriate that a dead man

transmutetur propter huiusmodi infortunia, ut qui aliquando fuerit felix

should suffer change because of misfortunes of this sort, so that he who at one time is

rursum fiat miser, et ex alia parte inconveniens videtur si ad minus in

happy now becomes unhappy. On the other hand it seems improper if, at least for a short

aliquo vicino tempore, illa quae contingunt filiis in nullo pertineant ad

time after death, the lot of children should in no way affect the happiness of deceased

parentes etiam mortuos, ut ex hoc eorum felicitas impediatur.

parents.

Deinde cum dicit: sed revertendum etc.,

185. Then [3, b], at “But we must return,” he

ponit secundam rationem ad excludendum responsionem praemissam.

gives a second reason for rejecting the previous answer. He says that, passing over

Et dicit, quod praetermissa secunda quaestione, revertendum est ad primam

the second problem, we must return to the first, the solution of which will shed light on

quaestionem, ex cuius solutione videri poterit veritas quaestionis secundae.

the truth of the second. Now it seems that the answer given is not consistent. If we

Videtur autem quod praedicta responsio non sit conveniens. Si enim oportet

must look to the end of life and then call a man happy, not because he is then truly

respicere ad finem vitae humanae et tunc dicere aliquem felicem, non quod tunc

happy but because he was previously happy, there seems to be this inconsistency: that

vere beatus sit sed quod prius beatus erat, hoc videtur esse inconveniens quod

when a man is happy, we may not say of him that he is happy, since the truth of a

quando aliquis est felix non vere dicatur

statement in he past is founded on the

quod sit felix, sed postea vere dicatur de eo quod fuit felix, veritas autem

statement being true at the time it actually occurred. Therefore “fuisse” is true of a thing

propositionis de praeterito dependet ex veritate propositionis de praesenti. Ideo

because “esse” was true of it.

enim aliquid verum est fuisse, quia verum fuit esse. Sed aliqui nolebant dicere hominem esse

186. But some were unwilling to call a man

felicem quando est, propter transmutationes praesentis vitae, et

happy because of the changes in the present life inasmuch as they were under the

propter hoc, quod existimabant felicitatem esse quiddam permanens et

impression that happiness was something permanent and not easily changeable;

non de facili transmutabile, alioquin non quietaret desiderium naturae. Desiderat

otherwise it would not satisfy the natural desire. For everyone naturally desires to

enim unusquisque naturaliter firmiter permanere in bono quod habet. Sed

remain secure in the good he possesses. But the wheel of fortune very often turns for the

fortunae multoties circulariter revolvuntur circa eosdem, ut scilicet de

same persons, so that they change from good fortune to bad and conversely. Thus it is

bonis deveniant in mala et e converso. Et sic manifestum est, quod si in iudicando

evident that if in judging about happiness we should follow the consideration of fortune and

de felicitate, sequamur considerationem fortunae, et dicamus in hac vita de aliquo

should say of someone that he is happy in this life, very often we will say of one and the

quod sit felix, multoties de uno et eodem

same person that he is happy and again that

dicemus quod sit felix et rursus quod sit miser. Et sic annunciabimus aliquem

he is unhappy. In this way we will be saying that a person is happy after the manner of a

esse felicem ad modum camaleontis, qui scilicet est animal mutans colorem,

chameleon, an animal which changes color in keeping with different surroundings. We will

secundum colores diversorum corporum appositorum. Et annuntiabimus felicem

be declaring that the happy are insecure in their happiness which is contrary to the

esse debiliter firmatum, quod est contra rationem felicitatis.

nature of happiness.

LECTURE 16 Happiness and Changes of Fortune Chapter 10 I. HE SOLVES THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM. C’ The philosopher here solves (his problem). a. He introduces a point necessary for the solution of the problem. — 187 ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις

We ought not to make changes of fortune our norm because good and

τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος,

evil do not consist in these, although human living does stand in need of

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ

external goods, as we have indicated.

κατ'

ἀρετὴν

ἐνέργειαι

τῆς

But virtuous action is the dominant

εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου.

factor in human happiness just as vicious action is the dominant factor in man’s unhappiness.

b. He applies it to the solution of the present problem. i. First he shows that deeds of virtue are especially long-lasting compared to other human things. — 188-190 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν

This contention is strengthened by

διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως

what

ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας

virtuous actions are more uniformly constant than other human activities.

τὰς κατ' ἀρετήν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν

They are more abiding apparently than the speculative sciences. Among the

εἶναι· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ

virtues the most noble seem to be more lasting because the happy man is quite

μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο

intent on them and because he lives according to them at all times. For this

γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.

reason man does not forget about the virtues.

we have just

learned, for

ii. He shows that... happiness can endure all during life. x. FROM THE ACTIONS THEMSELVES. — 191-192 ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ

The happy man will have what we had

εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα

inquired about, for he will be happy all his life. He will always, or nearly

πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν,

always, perform virtuous actions and be contemplating the life of virtue.

y. FROM THE GOODS OF FORTUNE. aa. (In general). — 193 καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὅ γ' ὡς

Because he is really good and foursquare without reproach, he will bear

ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος

all changes of fortune most admirably

ἄνευ ψόγου.

and will be eminently prudent in all matters.

bb.

In detail. — 194-197

πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ

Many events differing in importance happen by the change of fortune. A

μικρότητι, τὰ

τῶν

short run of good luck or of bad luck

εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ

clearly does not notably affect life. But great and frequent good fortune will be

ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ

an occasion of a happier life, for external goods were made to enrich

μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν,

human life and their use is becoming and a means of virtue. On the

καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ

contrary, great and frequent evils cause the happy man external

συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ

annoyance and internal affliction bringing about sadness and hindering

ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις

many good works. However, even here the good of virtue shines forth when a

διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας

man gracefully endures frequent and major misfortunes not because he is

ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.

insensible to the sorrow but because he is courageous and magnanimous.

μὲν

μικρὰ

iii. He shows that all inconveniences are avoided if we follow this teaching. — 198-199 εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς

If virtuous actions play the dominant

ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος·

role in a happy life that we have indicated, a happy person will not

οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς

become unhappy nor will he sometimes perform hateful and evil actions. As a

ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως

truly good and wise man in the estimation of all, he will bear the

φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ

changes of fortune in a becoming manner. He will always make the best

στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν στρατοπέδῳ

παρόντι χρῆσθαι

of the existing circumstances like a general who employs his present forces

πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον

to the best advantage in battle or like the cobbler who makes the best shoe

ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας

possible from the leather at hand or like other artisans in similar

ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν

circumstance. This being the case,

τῷ

οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς

then the unhappy man will certainly not become happy. We can say too that

τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ

the happy man will not fall into the misfortunes of Priam. He will not

τῆς

κινηθήσεται

easily be moved. He will not be changed

ῥᾳδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ

from happiness by minor misfortunes but only by great and frequent ones.

πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ

After such catastrophies he will not become happy again soon but, if indeed

χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν

he does, it will take an abundance of good and noble deeds during a long

αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.

period.

εὐδαιμονίας

c. He brings to an end his own thoughts on happiness. — 200-202 τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ

What therefore hinders us from calling that man happy who acts in accord

τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον μὴ τὸν τυχόντα

with perfect virtue and has sufficient external goods not for a short time but

χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω

all during life? We must also add that he will live his whole life in this way

καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν

and will die in a manner befitting reason because the future is not clear

ἐστίν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δ'

to us; and we understand happiness as an end altogether perfect in every

οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ

respect. If this be so, we shall call those happy in this life—happy we must

λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους.

remember as men—who have now and

καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.

will have the conditions we presented. Now we have said enough on these points.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Vel fortunas quidem sequi et cetera. Praemissa dubitatione, hic philosophus

187. After explaining his problem, the Philosopher here [C’] solves it. First [C’, 1]

dubitationem principalem

solvit. Et primo solvit dubitationem. Secundo

he solves the principal problem. Second [Lect. 17; 2], at “It seems quite foreign

secundariam, ibi, pronepotum autem fortunas et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

etc.” (B. 1101 a 22), he solves the lesser one. In regard to the first he does two

Primo praemittit quiddam quod est necessarium ad quaestionis solutionem.

things. First [1, a] he introduces a point necessary for the solution of the problem.

Secundo applicat ad solutionem praesentis

Second [1, b], at “This, contention is

quaestionis, ibi, testatur autem sermoni et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est,

strengthened,” he applies it to the solution of the present problem. In regard to the

quod felicitas essentialiter consistit in operatione virtutis. Bona autem exteriora,

initial point we should consider that while happiness consists essentially in the

quae

pertinent

performance of virtuous actions, external

secundario et quasi instrumentaliter ad felicitatem. Et ideo dicit quod non debemus

goods that are subject to fortune are in a way tools of happiness. Hence he says we

sequi fortunas in iudicando aliquem esse miserum vel felicem, quia bonum vel

ought not to make changes of luck the norm for reckoning a man happy or

malum hominis, quod attenditur secundum rationem, non consistit principaliter in his.

unhappy, because man’s good or evil, which is judged by reason, does not consist

Sed humana vita indiget his instrumentaliter, sicut dictum est. Sed

principally in such changes of luck. Human living however does stand in need of

operationes secundum virtutem sunt principales et dominium habentes in hoc,

external goods as means, as has been indicated (163). But virtuous actions are

quod est aliquem esse felicem, ut scilicet ex hoc principaliter dicatur aliquis felix quod

the principal and predominant factor in a man’s happiness so that he can be called

operatur secundum virtutem; et contrariae operationes, scilicet vitiosae, habent

happy principally because he acts virtuously. On the contrary, vicious actions

principalitatem et dominium in contrario, scilicet in miseria; ut scilicet ille vere sit

are powerful and dominant in the opposite state, which is misery, so that he is truly

miser, qui vitiosis operationibus insistit.

miserable who is occupied with evil deeds.

Deinde cum dicit: testatur autem sermoni

188. Then [1, b], at “This contention is

etc.,

ad

strengthened,” he applies what was said

solutionem quaestionis. Et primo ostendit, quod operationes secundum virtutem,

just now (187) to the solution of the problem. First [b, i] he shows that deeds of

maxime inveniuntur permanentes inter omnes res humanas. Secundo ostendit

virtue are especially long-lasting compared to other human things. Second [b, ii], at

quod secundum praedicta poterit felicitas permanere per totam vitam, ibi, existet

“The happy man will have etc.,” he shows that in keeping with what was said,

autem utique et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quod secundum praedicta evitantur omnia

happiness can endure all during life. Third [b, iii], at “If virtuous actions play etc.,” he

inconvenientia, ibi: si autem sunt operationes dominae vitae et cetera. Dicit

shows that all inconveniences are avoided if we follow this teaching. He says first that

ergo primo, quod huic sermoni, quo scilicet dicimus operationes secundum virtutem

what we have now learned (186) about the permanence of happiness confirms our

esse principales in felicitate, attestatur illud, quod parum supra quaesitum est de

contention that virtuous actions are of foremost importance in happiness. The

permanentia felicitatis. Nihil enim humanorum invenitur esse ita constanter

reason is that no human activity is found so uniformly constant as these. It is clear

permanens, sicut operationes secundum

that external goods, and even internal

subiacent

adaptat

fortunae

quod

dictum

est,

virtutem. Manifestum est enim quod exteriora bona, et etiam interiora ad

bodily goods, because material and corporeal, are subject to change by their

corpus pertinentia, cum sint materialia et corporalia, per se subiecta sunt mutationi;

nature. But the goods that belong to he soul are changeable only indirectly, and so

ea vero quae ad animam pertinent, solum per accidens, unde minus subiacent

less liable to change. Of the goods pertaining to a man’s soul, some belong to

mutationi. Eorum vero, quae ad animam humanam pertinent, quaedam pure

the intellect as the sciences, and some to the activities of living as the virtues. These

pertinent ad intellectum, sicut scientiae;

virtues are indeed more lasting than the

quaedam vero ad operationes vitae, sicut virtutes, quae quidem sunt permanentiores

disciplines, i.e., the demonstrative sciences.

etiam ipsis disciplinis, id est scientiis demonstrativis. Quod quidem intelligendum est, non quantum ad materiam. Nam scientiae

189. However, this must not be understood as referring to the matter, for

demonstrativae sunt circa necessaria, quae impossibile est aliter se habere. Sed est

demonstrative sciences have as their object necessary things which cannot be

intelligendum quantum ad exercitium actus. Non enim imminet nobis ita

otherwise. It is to be understood rather as referring to the exercise of the act. Now we

continuum exercitium speculationis scientiarum, sicut operationum secundum

do not have the same opportunity to cultivate the study of the sciences

virtutem. Continue enim occurrunt nobis ea in quibus oportet nos agere secundum

continually as we do to practice virtue, for situations are constantly arising where we

virtutem, vel contra virtutem; sicut usus ciborum, consortia mulierum, collocutiones

must act according to virtue or contrary to virtue as in the use of food, association

hominum adinvicem, et alia huiusmodi, in quibus continue versatur vita humana.

with women, conversations with other men and similar actions with which human life

Unde oportet quod habitus virtutis magis

is continuously concerned. Hence it is

per consuetudinem firmetur in homine, quam habitus scientiae.

reasonable that the habit of virtue be more firmly fixed in man because it is used more than the habit of science.

Et inter ipsas virtutes illae, quae sunt

190. Among the virtues themselves, the

honorabilissimae videntur esse permanentiores, tum quia magis intensae,

most noble seem to be more lasting both because they are more intense and because

tum etiam quia magis continue operantur

men

ad hoc quod secundum eas vivatur, et tales sunt operationes virtutum, in quibus

according to them. Such are the virtuous operations in which happiness consists,

consistit felicitas, quia sunt perfectissimae, ut dictum est. Et istud videtur esse causa

because they are most perfect as has been proved (128, 130, 150, 160, 164). This is

quare

naturally the reason why man does not

homo

non

obliviscitur

esse

work

more

constantly

to

live

virtuosus; quia scilicet continue in his

forget to be virtuous because he continually

homo exercitatur. Est et alia causa: quia scilicet virtus consistit principaliter in

has the occasion to exercise the virtues. Another reason too is that virtue consists

inclinatione appetitus, quae per oblivionem non tollitur.

chiefly in the inclination of the appetite which is not destroyed by forgetfulness.

Deinde cum dicit: existet autem utique etc., ostendit quod, secundum praedicta,

191. Then [b, ii], at “The happy man will have,” he shows that according to this

felicitas poterit per totam vitam durare. Et dicit quod, cum operationes secundum

doctrine happiness can last a lifetime. He says that virtuous actions are most lasting,

virtutem sint permanentissimae, ut dictum est; si in eis principaliter ponatur felicitas,

as was pointed out (188-190). If then happiness be placed principally in them as

ut diximus, sequetur quod felici inerit id quod quaesitum est in praecedenti

we have said (153-190), it would follow that the happy man will have what was

quaestione, scilicet quod erit talis per

inquired about in a previous question, that

totam vitam suam. Et hoc primo probat per ipsas operationes, ibi, semper enim et

is, he will be happy all his life. He proves this first [ii, x] from the actions themselves

cetera.

at “He will always.”

Ille enim qui habet habitum perfectum, semper potest operari secundum illum

192. One who has a habit perfectly can act always or almost continually according to

habitum vel maxime continue inter omnes; sed felix habet perfectam virtutem, ut

that habit in everything he does. The happy man possesses perfect virtue, as was

supra habitum est. Ergo ipse semper vel maxime poterit operari in vita activa quae

explained above (187, 188). Consequently, he can always or nearly always or nearly

sunt secundum virtutem, et speculari in vita contemplativa.

always perform virtuous actions in a life of activity and can attentively consider in a life of contemplation.

Secundo ibi: et fortunas feret etc., ostendit

193. Second [ii, y], at “Because he is really

idem ex bonis fortunae, quae sunt secundaria in felicitate. Et dicit quod felix

good,” he shows the same thing from the goods of fortune, an object of lesser

optime feret omnes fortunas, et in omnibus se habebit omnino prudenter, utpote qui

importance in happiness. He says [y, aa] that the happy man will bear all changes of

est vere bonus, non secundum apparentiam

fortune most

solam, et est tetragonus sine vituperio, idest perfectus quatuor virtutibus

eminently prudent in all matters, since he is really a good man and not superficially so.

cardinalibus, ut quidam exponunt. Sed hoc non videtur esse secundum intentionem

He is “foursquare” without reproach, or, as some have explained, perfect in the four

Aristotelis, qui nunquam invenitur talem enumerationem facere. Sed tetragonum

cardinal virtues. But this interpretation does not seem to be according to the mind

nominat

of Aristotle who has never been found

perfectum

in

virtute

ad

admirably and will be

similitudinem corporis cubici, habentis sex superficies quadratas, propter quod bene

making such an enumeration. The tetragon does however indicate something perfect in

stat in qualibet superficie. Et similiter virtuosus in qualibet fortuna bene se habet.

virtue after the manner of a cube, which has six squared surfaces and so lies evenly

Quia igitur ad virtutem pertinet omnes fortunas bene ferre, patet quod propter

on any surface. Similarly the virtuous person is of an even temperament in any

nullam fortunae mutationem, desistet felix ab operatione virtutis. Et hoc consequenter

fortune. Since therefore, it pertains to virtue to bear all fortune becomingly,

in speciali ostendit quasi per modum divisionis cum subdit: multis autem factis

obviously the happy man will not cease to act virtuously because of any change of

et cetera.

fortune. He shows this then in detail [y, bb], as it were by way of division, when he adds “Many events.”

Et dicit quod, cum multa bona et mala

194. He says that since many good and bad

secundum

quae

things differing in importance may happen

differunt magnitudine et parvitate, manifestum est quod parvae prosperitates

by changes of fortune, it is evident that a short run of good luck and likewise a short

et similiter parva infortunia, non inclinant vitam de felicitate in miseriam vel e

run of bad luck do not change life from happiness to misery or conversely. If,

converso. Si autem fuerint multa et magna, aut erunt bona aut mala. Si bona,

however, they are great and frequent they will be either good or bad. If good, they will

conferent ad hoc quod vita hominis sit beatior. Quia sicut supra dictum est,

make a man’s life happier. The reason is that, as was indicated above (169, 173),

felicitas indiget exterioribus bonis, vel ad decorem, vel inquantum sunt instrumenta

happiness has need of external goods either as adornments or as means of virtuous

operationis secundum virtutem. Et quantum ad primum dicit quod nata sunt

actions. In regard to adornments he says that they were made to enrich the life of

simul decorare vitam felicis. Quantum autem ad secundum dicit quod usus

man. As to the means of virtuous action, he says that the use of external goods is

exteriorum bonorum est bonus et virtuosus, inquantum scilicet virtus utitur

becoming and virtuous insofar as virtues make use of them to perform worthy deeds.

fortunam

eveniant,

eis, ut quibusdam instrumentis ad bene agendum. Si autem accidant e converso, ut scilicet

195. If on the contrary the evils should be

sint multa et magna mala, inferunt quidem

frequent and great, they will cause the

felici quamdam tribulationem exterius et conturbationem interius; quia interius

happy man external annoyance and internal affliction, because internally they

inferunt tristitias, et exterius impediunt a multis bonis operationibus. Non tamen per

bring about sadness and externally they hinder good works. However they do not

ea tollitur totaliter operatio virtutis; quia etiam ipsis infortuniis virtus bene utitur.

eliminate virtuous action entirely, because virtue makes good use even of misfortunes

Et sic refulget in eis bonum virtutis,

themselves. In this way the good of virtue

inquantum scilicet aliquis faciliter sustinet multa et magna infortunia: non propter

shines forth insofar as a man gracefully endures frequent and great misfortunes,

hoc quod non sentiat dolorem seu tristitiam, sicut Stoici posuerunt; sed quia

not because he may not feel the sorrow or sadness as the Stoics held but, being

tamquam huiusmodi

virilis et magnanimus, tristitiis eius ratio non

courageous and magnanimous, his reason does not succumb to such afflictions.

Haec enim fuit diversitas inter Stoicos et

196. This, in fact, was the difference

Peripateticos, quorum princeps fuit Aristoteles, quod Stoici posuerunt

between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, whose leader was Aristotle. The Stoics held

tristitiam nullo modo cadere in virtuosum, quia in corporalibus et exterioribus rebus

that sorrow in no way afflicts a virtuous man, because, in their view, corporeal or

nullum bonum hominis consistere ponebant; Peripatetici autem ponebant in

external things are not in any sense a good of man. The Peripatetics, on the contrary,

homine virtuoso tristitiam ratione moderatam, non autem quae rationem

said that a virtuous man is affected by sadness, yet this does not overwhelm

subverteret.

in

reason but is moderated by it. In their

corporalibus et exterioribus rebus, aliquod hominis bonum consistat, non quidem

opinion corporeal and external things do not constitute the greatest but the least

maximum, sed minimum, in quantum scilicet adiuvat et decorat virtutem.

good of man and this in the degree that they help him.

Videtur

transmutatio

197. But it should be observed that some

virtuoso posse accidere, quae omnino auferat eius felicitatem impediendo

change could happen that would entirely take away a man’s happiness by hindering

totaliter operationem virtutis, puta si per aegritudinem, maniam vel furiam seu

virtuous action altogether. for example, some sickness could cause madness or

quamcumque amentiam incurrat. Sed cum felicitas non quaeratur nisi in vita humana,

insanity or any other mental breakdown. Since happiness may not be attained except

quae est secundum rationem, deficiente usu rationis deficit talis vita. Unde status

by living humanly or in accord with reason, when the use of reason is gone, human

amentiae reputandus est quantum ad vitam humanam, sicut status mortis. Et

living is not possible. Consequently, in what concerns living humanly, the condition of

ideo idem videtur esse dicendum de eo qui

madness

permansit in operatione virtutis usque ad amentiam, sicut si permansisset usque ad

condition of death. So seemingly we must say the same of him who continues in

mortem.

virtuous action until loss of mind as if he had continued until death.

succumbit.

Deinde

Ponebant

tamen

cum

enim

aliqua

dicit:

si

quod

autem

sunt

must

be

equated

with

the

198. Then [b, iii], at “If virtuous actions

operationes etc., ex praemissis excludit

play,” he excludes the unsuitable things

inconvenientia, quae sequi videbantur. Et

that seemed to follow from the premises.

dicit quod, si operationes virtuosae habent dominium in felicitate, ut dictum est, non

He says that if virtuous actions play the dominant role in happiness, as we have

sequitur quod beatus fiat miser propter infortunia, propter quae non operabitur

asserted (188), it will not follow that the happy man becomes unhappy on account of

aliqua odibilia et mala, scilicet virtuti contraria. Sed possumus existimare de eo

misfortunes, or that because of misfortune he will perform actions contrary to virtue.

probabiliter, quod propter virtutem perfectam, quam habet tamquam vere

But by reason of his perfect virtue the happy man—it can be predicted—will bear

bonus et sapiens omnes fortunas feret decenter, quod est secundum virtutem

all changes of fortune becomingly like a truly good and wise man. In other words he

operari in qualibet fortuna. Etsi non easdem operationes faciet in qualibet, sed

will act according to virtue under every condition. Even if he does not perform the

secundum ea quae existunt, scilicet prospera vel adversa, semper operabitur

same actions in every contingency, he will always act most nobly according as the

optime, quasi utens his quae affert fortuna

circumstances

sicut quibusdam datis; prout etiam ad bonum ducem pertinet ut exercitu sibi dato

unfavorable. He will use the material that fortune provides in the way that a good

maxime utatur bellicose secundum exercitus condicionem, aliter tamen faciet

general with an awareness of the condition of his army ought to dispose his existing

si habeat in exercitu milites expertos et aliter si habeat exercitum tironum. Et

forces to the best advantage in battle. A commander will do one thing if he has

similiter ad incisorem coriorum pertinet, quod ex datis coriis optimum

seasoned troops and another if he has an army of raw recruits. Likewise, a cobbler

calceamentum faciat. Meliora tamen calceamenta faciet ex uno corio quam ex

ought to make the best shoes possible from the leather at hand. He will of course make

alio. Et idem etiam est in omnibus aliis artificibus.

better shoes form one piece of leather than from another. The same may be said of all

are

favorable

or

other craftsmen. Et si ita est, nunquam miser per aliqua

199. If this is so, the unhappy man will not

prospera supervenientia efficietur felix.

be made happy by any additional good

Quia illis prosperis male utetur, et operans vitiose semper miser remanebit. Et

fortune. The reason is hat he will use that good fortune badly and the evildoer will

similiter ille qui est felix, non incidet in infortunia Priami. Primo quidem, quia

always remain unhappy. Likewise the happy man will not fall into the misfortune

prudenter ea praecavebit. Secundo, quia si superveniant ex improviso, optime ea feret,

of Priam. First because he will prudently guard against it. Second, because if he

ut dictum est. Et ita non facile transmutabitur a felicitate ad miseriam

should be stricken unexpectedly, he will bear it most gracefully, as we have pointed

neque per quaecumque infortunia, sed per multa et magna quae eum ab operatione

out (198). He will not, therefore, be changed easily from happiness to

rationis abducent, et si sic sit factus infelix, non rursus de facili fiet felix, sed in multo

unhappiness by any misfortune whatsoever except by frequent and great changes that

tempore abundantiam accipiet magnorum

deprive him of the use of reason. If he has

et bonorum, tum per exercitium virtuosi actus, tum etiam per reparationem

been made unhappy, he will not readily become happy again but he will need an

exterioris fortunae.

abundance of great and noble things acquired after a long time by the exercise of virtuous action and by the restoration of external fortune.

Deinde cum dicit: quid igitur prohibet etc.,

200. Then [1, c], when he says “What

concludit suam sententiam de felicitate. Et dicit quod nihil prohibet dicere illum esse

therefore,” he brings to an end his own thoughts on happiness. He says that

felicem qui operatur secundum virtutem perfectam, et habet exteriora bona

nothing hinders us from calling that man happy who acts in accord with perfect

sufficientia ad operationem virtutis, non quidem in aliquo parvo tempore, sed in vita

virtue and has sufficient external goods for virtuous activity, not just for a short time

perfecta, idest per longum tempus. Et hoc quidem sufficit ad hoc, quod aliquis possit

but all during life or at least for a long period. This is enough for a man to be

dici felix in hac vita.

called happy in this life.

Sed

si

volumus

accipere

felicitatem

201. If we wish to understand happiness in

secundum optimum quod esse potest, sic apponendum est ad rationem felicitatis

the most perfect sense , possible, we must add to the definition of happiness that the

quod sit victurus sicut dictum est per

happy man will live his whole life as we

totam suam vitam et finiturus, id est moriturus, secundum quod convenit

have indicated (129) and will complete it by dying in a manner befitting reason. It

rationi. Ratio autem quare videtur haec condicio apponenda est quia futurum

appears that this condition must be added because the future is unknown to us. Now

ignotum est nobis. Ad rationem autem felicitatis, cum sit finis ultimus, videtur

all that is perfect and best seems to belong to the definition of happiness, since it is the

pertinere omne illud quod est perfectum et optimum. Et hoc secundo modo loquebatur

ultimate end. In this second way Solon was speaking of happiness. If the case be as just

Solon de felicitate. Et si ita est, ut dictum est, (beatos dicemus) illos de numero

described (200) we shall call those men happy in this life who have now and will

viventium in hac vita quibus existunt in praesenti et existent in futuro ea quae dicta

have in the future the conditions we have laid down (177-186).

sunt.

Sed quia ista videntur non usquequaque

202. But because these things seem not to

attingere ad conditiones supra de felicitate positas, subdit quod tales dicimus beatos

measure up in all respects to the conditions required for happiness above (104-117), he

sicut homines, qui in hac vita mutabilitati

adds that those we call happy are men

subiecta non possunt perfectam beatitudinem habere. Et quia non est inane

subject to change in this life, who cannot attain perfect beatitude. Since a natural

naturae desiderium, recte aestimari potest quod reservatur homini perfecta beatitudo

desire is not in vain, we can correctly judge that perfect beatitude is reserved for man

post hanc vitam. Ultimo epilogat dicens,

after this life. He concludes with the

quod de his in tantum dictum sit.

remark that we have said enough on these points.

LECTURE 17 The Fortune of Friends and Happiness of the Dead Chapter I I 2. HE SETTLES A DOUBT... ABOUT THE CHANGE OF FORTUNE IN REGARD TO FRIENDS. a.

He compares the good, fortunes and misfortunes happening to

friends with those which happen to man himself. i.

He proposes that the things happening to one’s friends affect the

man himself. — 203 τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ

It seems quite foreign to the nature of

τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν

friendship and contrary to the common opinion to say that changes in the

ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον·

fortunes of descendants and of friends have no influence on man’s happiness.

ii. He shows what the things are and their nature. — 204-205 πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων

Many and vastly different things happen

διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων

in fortune. Since some of these touch us closely and others remotely, it would be a

τῶν δ' ἧττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον

long, even an endless, task to determine the extent of each. It will be enough to

φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δή,

discuss the subject in broad and general terms. Some of the fortunes affecting a

καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι

man himself are of sufficient importance to better the conditions of life while

βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον

others are of lesser moment. We can

τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως

affirm the same of the events which happen to friends generally.

ἅπαντας, b. He compares the events that happen to the dead with what happens to the living.

i. He shows there is a difference in regard to... the living and dead. — 206-208 διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας

It makes much more difference that an experience should happen to the living or

συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν

the dead than that certain injustices and evils should be indicated as happening

ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν

before the action of the drama or should be committed in the course of the drama.

διαφοράν,

We must take this difference into consideration.

ii. He inquires whether the lot of friends affect the dead. x. FIRST HE EXAMINES THE PROPOSITION. — 209 μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι

Perhaps

we

should

rather

inquire

περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν

whether the dead share in any prosper at or adversity. It seems from what has

ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖται πρὸς

been said that if any event either good or bad affects the dead, it will be fleeting

αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ

and insignificant in itself or in its effect upon them. If this be the case, then the

μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον

event will not be so great or of such a nature as to make happy those who are

ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας

not happy, or to take away happiness from those who have it.

ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. y. HE BRINGS TO A CONCLUSION HIS CHIEF PROPOSAL. — 210-212 συμβάλλεσθαι

μὲν

οὖν

τι

The good actions done by friends,

φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ

therefore, do have some influence on the dead. Misfortunes too seem to affect

καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ

them. But all these take place in such a

τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν

way and to such an extent that they do not make the happy unhappy nor

μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

produce any other like changes.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Pronepotum autem fortunas et cetera.

203. After the Philosopher has solved the

Postquam philosophus solvit principalem dubitationem, quae erat de

principal doubt concerning the change of fortune for the happy man, here [2] he

transmutatione fortunae circa felicem, hic determinat dubitationem super inductam,

settles a doubt raised above (183) about the change of fortune in regard to friends. On

scilicet de mutatione fortunae circa amicos. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo

this point he does two things. First [2, a] he compares the good fortunes and

comparat fortunia et infortunia circa amicos contingentia his quae contingunt

misfortunes happening to friends with those which happen to man himself. Second [2, b],

circa ipsum hominem. Secundo comparat ea quae contingunt circa mortuum his

at “It makes much more etc.,” he compares the events that happen to the dead with

quae contingunt circa vivum, ibi: differt autem passionum et cetera. Circa primum

what happens to the living. In regard to the first he does two things. Initially [a, i] he

duo facit. Primo proponit quod ea quae

proposes that the things that happen to

circa amicos contingunt, redundant in ipsum hominem. Secundo ostendit quae et

one’s friends affect the man himself. Second [a, ii], at “Many and vastly different etc.,” he

qualia, ibi multis autem et omnimodas et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si aliquis

shows what the things are and what their nature is. He affirms, first, that to say that

vellet dicere quod fortunae bonae vel malae pronepotum vel quorumcumque

the prosperity of great grandchildren or of descendants in general and of all friends

posterorum nequaquam

amicorum felicitatem

would have no effect on the happiness of a man, living or dead, seems to be

hominis viventis seu mortui, videretur hoc esse inconveniens, duplici ratione. Primo

incongruous for two reasons. Primarily indeed, because it would be contrary to the

quidem, quia hoc esset contra rationem amicitiae quae est quaedam unio

nature of friendship, that is a union among friends to such an extent that one considers

amicorum, ita quod unus eorum reputat ea quae sunt alterius quasi sua. Secundo,

as his own what belongs to the other. Then too, because this would be contrary to the

quia

common opinion which cannot be entirely

hoc

et omnium conferrent ad

esset

contrarium

opinioni

communi, quae non potest totaliter esse falsa.

false.

Deinde cum dicit: multis autem etc., ostendit quae et qualia amicorum

204. Then [a, ii], at “Many vastly different things,” he shows what events may affect

accidentia conferant ad felicitatem amici.

the happiness of a friend and the nature of

Et dicit quod, cum ea quae accidunt secundum fortunia bona vel mala sint

these events. He says that many and vastly different things happen in prosperity or

multa et omnibus modis differentia, puta secundum speciem, secundum

adversity, in kind, in quantity, in time, and in other respects. Some of them touch us

quantitatem, secundum tempus, et secundum alia huiusmodi, quorum

closely and others remotely. If then we should wish to determine in every case

quaedam magis redundant et quaedam minus, si aliquis vellet omnia singillatim

which of them affect the man himself and which do not, the task would be a long one,

determinare, quid scilicet redundet ex his in hominem et quid non, esset valde

in fact almost endless, because differences happen in an infinite variety of ways.

longum, immo potius infinitum, quia huiusmodi contingit.

diversitas

infinitis

modis

Sed sufficit quod determinetur in universali et in typo, idest figuraliter, idest

205. With regard to the fortunes affecting a man himself it is sufficient to note in

superficialiter vel similitudinarie, si scilicet dicatur quod fortunarum, quae sunt circa

general, and so to speak, typically, by way of distinctive qualities or superficial likeness,

ipsum hominem, quaedam, scilicet magnae, habent aliquod pondus idest vim

that some acts of fortune are of sufficient importance and influence to change the

immutandi conditionem vitae humanae, et conferunt auxilium ad vitam felicem,

condition of human life and do contribute to happiness. Others, however, are of lesser

quaedam autem sunt leviores, ex quibus non multum immutatur vita hominis; ita

moment an help man’s life but little. The same thing takes place in the events that

etiam contingit in his quae eveniunt circa

happen to any of our friends except that

quoscumque amicos; ita tamen quod magis redundant ea quae accidunt circa

things of lesser moment happening to bloodrelatives affect us more.

propinquiores, quantitate.

licet

sint

minora

in

Deinde cum dicit: differt autem passionum etc., ostendit ex quo accidentia amicorum

206. Then [2, b], at “It makes much more difference,” he shows in what manner the

redundant ad hominem; et hoc magis manifestum est quantum ad hominem

changing fortunes of friends affect a person —it is rather evident how this touches a

dum vivit, qualiter circa hoc se habeat

man while he lives, even how this may affect

erga mortuum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo differenter se

the dead. On this point he does two things. First [b, i] he shows in what way there is a

habeat quantum ad hoc circa vivos et mortuos. Secundo inquirit utrum

difference in regard to this about the living and the dead. Second [b, ii] he inquires

accidentia amicorum redundant ad mortuos, cum manifestum sit quod

whether the lot of friends affect the dead, since it is clear they do affect the living. This

redundant ad vivos. Et hoc ibi: magis autem fortassis et cetera. Circa primum

he does at “Perhaps we should rather inquire.” On the first point we must consider

considerandum est quod mortui positi

that the dead are outside the present life, the

sunt extra vitam praesentem, cuius felicitatem Aristoteles hic inquirere

happiness of which Aristotle here intends to inquire about, as appears from what has

intendit, ut ex praemissis patet. Attingunt autem mortui hanc vitam solum

been previously said (180). They have contact with this life only as they remain in

secundum quod remanent in memoriis hominum viventium. Et ideo hoc modo se

the memories of the living. The dead, therefore, may be compared in this way to

habent mortui ad viventes secundum considerationem huius vitae, sicut se

the living—when we consider this life—as the events actually happening now are

habent ea quae nunc actu contingunt ad ea quae olim fuerunt et nunc recitantur,

compared to those that took place long ago and are now recounted—for example, the

puta bella Troiana vel aliquid huiusmodi.

Trojan war or any incident of this kind.

Dicit ergo quod hoc, quod quaecumque

207. He then remarks that it makes a great

passionum, idest accidentium fortuitorum, contingat circa vivos vel circa mortuos,

difference whether a particular misfortune befalls men while they are living or after hey

multo magis differt quam quod aliqua iniusta, puta homicidia vel rapinae, et

are dead—a far greater difference than it makes in a tragedy whether certain evil

mala, idest infortunia quaecumque, praeexistant in tragoediis, idest a poetis

deeds like murder, robbery, or any other kind of misfortune be recounted by the

recitentur ut olim existentia, vel quod nunc fiant. Quia in primo sumitur idem ex

playwrights as preceding the action of the drama or are performed in the course of it.

parte fortuiti eventus, et differentia ex parte personarum, quarum quaedam sunt

The reason is that in the first case (the living and the dead) the same misfortunes

actu in rebus humanis, quaedam autem sunt solum in memoria. In secundo autem

affect them but in a different way because of their different states, for some are actually

e converso accipitur idem ex parte personarum, quae sunt actu in rebus

engaged in human affairs, but some of the trials befalling them are recounted as here

humanis, sed attenditur differentia ex

and now taking place, while others as

parte fortuitorum eventuum, quorum quidam sunt actu in rebus humanis,

having previously occurred. Because happiness refers rather to persons than to

quidam autem solum secundum commemorativam recitationem. Et quia

things happening externally, the Philosopher says that the first difference

felicitas ad personas pertinet magis, quam ad res exterius contingentes, ideo

(which refers to the living and the dead)— precisely as it pertains to the point at issue,

philosophus dicit quod prima differentia, quantum pertinet ad propositum, scilicet

namely, a change of happiness—is of more importance than the second (which refers to

ad mutationem felicitatis maior est, quam secunda. Et ex isto simili inducto de

actions in tragedies). And by reason of a similar inference concerning the difference

differentia eventuum, dicit esse syllogizandum differentiam in proposito.

of events, he says that we must consider the difference in our question.

Manifestum est enim quod praeterita mala recitata, etsi quodammodo pertineant ad

208. Now it is clear that even though a recitation of past evils in a way influences

hominem audientem, qui aliquo modo ad ea afficitur, non tamen ita quod immutent

the the hearer who is in some measure affected by them, it does not do so to the

conditionem ipsius, unde multo minus fortunia vel infortunia immutant

extent of changing his condition. Consequently, much less do fortunes change

conditionem mortui. Et hoc quidem induxit philosophus quasi solvens

the condition of the dead. This is brought out by the Philosopher to clear up, as it

rationem supra positam, quae concludebat quod si aliquid redundat ad vivos non

were, the statement made above (184), which concluded that if something affects

sentientes, mortuos.

ad

men who are not conscious, it affects also the dead.

Deinde cum dicit: magis autem fortassis

209. Then [b, ii], at “Perhaps we should

etc., inquirit ulterius utrum aliquo modo redundent ad mortuos, quae contingunt

rather inquire,” he inquires last whether things happening to friends affect the dead

circa amicos. Et primo inquirit propositum. Secundo concludit principale

in some way. First [ii, x] he examines the proposition; and second [ii, y], he brings to a

intentum, ibi, conferre quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod magis

conclusion his chief proposal at “Therefore the good actions.” He says first that we

videtur esse inquirendum circa eos qui mortui sunt, si aliquo modo communicant

should rather inquire whether the dead in any way share in the prosperity and

vel bonis vel malis quae accidunt in hac vita: quia quod non immutentur ex eis a

adversity that take place in this life. That a man is not changed from happiness to

felicitate in miseriam vel e converso, satis videtur esse manifestum. Quia si aliquid ex

unhappiness or the other way round seems sufficiently established. The reason is that if

his quae hic aguntur ad eos redundat, sive bonum sive malum, erit aliquid fragile et

an event taking place here, either good or bad, affects the dead, it will be fleeting and

parum vel simpliciter vel quantum ad

insignificant in itself or in its effect on them.

ipsos. Si autem hoc ita est, non erit tantum et tale ut faciat felices eos qui non

But if this is the case, it will not be so great or of such a nature as to make them happy

sunt, neque his qui sunt auferat beatitudinem. Dictum est enim, quod

who are not happy, nor to take away happiness from them who have it. It has

parva accidentia non faciunt immutationem vitae, si ergo ex his quae

been said already (194) that trifling happenings do not cause a change in life. If

aguntur parvum aliquid redundat ad mortuos, sequitur quod ex hoc eorum

then an insignificant event, among the things that happen, affects the dead, it

conditio circa felicitatem non immutetur.

follows that their condition of happiness will not be changed.

Deinde cum dicit: conferre quidem igitur

210. Then [ii, y], at “Therefore the good

etc., concludit suam sententiam. Et dicit,

actions,” he concludes his opinion. He says

quod

redundet

etiam

quod bona amicorum, quae agunt vel quae eis accidunt, conferre videntur aliquid

that the good actions done by friends or the evil befalling them seem to have some

mortuis, et similiter infortunia in eos

influence on the dead, and misfortunes too

redundare; tamen sub tali modo, et tanta quantitate, ut neque felices faciant non

seem to affect them. But these take place in such a manner and to such an extent that

felices, neque non felices faciant felices, neque etiam transmutent eos secundum

they do not make the happy unhappy or the unhappy happy, nor do they change the dead

aliquid talium, puta secundum sapientiam et virtutem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest

in such things as wisdom or virtue or the like. However, the construction can be

autem esse constructio suspensiva ab illo loco si autem non tantum et tale etc.: et

conditioned by the words “If this be the case.” Then the statement “do have some

tunc consequens conferre quidem

influence” will be properly conditional, and the conjunctive particle will be superfluous.

condicionalis erit: igitur etc., et

superabundabit illativa coniunctio. Videtur autem secundum intentionem

211. It seems that Aristotle intends that the

Aristotelis ea quae hic dicuntur esse intelligenda de mortuis, non secundum

things said here are to be understood of the dead not as they are in themselves but as

quod sunt in seipsis, sed secundum quod vivunt in memoriis hominum. Sic enim

they live in the memory of men. In this way what happens to their friends after death

videntur redundare in eos ea quae amicis eorum contingunt post mortem, prout ex

seems to affect the dead so that their memory and glory become more distinct and

hoc redditur eorum memoria et gloria magis celebris vel magis obscura. Sed hoc

more obscure. But this, he says, is indeed a fleeting thing because nothing is more

quidem dicit esse fragile quiddam, quia nihil est fragilius eo quod in sola opinione

fleeting than what exists only in the opinion of men. He says also that it is an

hominum consistit. Dicit autem esse parvum quiddam et maxime quoad ipsos,

insignificant thing especially for he dead themselves because it belongs to them only

quia non pertinet ad eos nisi secundum quod sunt in memoriis hominum.

to the extent they are remembered by men.

Quaerere autem, utrum homines post mortem aliqualiter vivant secundum

212. The questions, however, whether the souls of men survive in some fashion after

animam, et utrum cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur, aut si ex his aliquo modo

death and whether they are aware of or are changed in any way by what occurs in this

immutantur, non pertinet ad propositum,

life do not pertain to our purpose since the

cum philosophus hic agat de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut ex supradictis patet.

Philosopher here is treating of the happiness of the present life, as is evident

Et ideo huiusmodi quaestiones, quae longa discussione indigerent, hic

from what was said above (206). Consequently inquiries of this kind, which

praetermittendae sunt, ne in hac scientia quae est operativa, plures sermones extra

need to be considered at some length, must be omitted at this point lest in this science

opera fiant, quod supra philosophus

which is practical many discussions outside

reprobavit. Alibi autem haec plenius

its scope be carried on—a procedure that

disseruimus.

the Philosopher condemned (136). Elsewhere we have treated these subjects more fully.

LECTURE 18 Happiness, A Good Deserving Honor Chapter 12 II. HE INQUIRES ABOUT A CERTAIN PROPERTY OF HAPPINESS. A. He asks a question. — 213-214 διωρισμένων

τούτων

Having settled these matters we must

τῆς τῶν

investigate whether happiness is one of the goods to be praised or, more

ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε

properly, to be honored. It is obviously not in the genius of potentiality.

ἐπισκεψώμεθα εὐδαιμονίας

δὲ περὶ πότερα

δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. B. He ascertains the truth. A’ He shows that happiness is of the number of goods to be honored. 1. HE SHOWS TO WHOM PRAISE IS GIVEN. a. He presents his proposition. — 215 φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ

Now a thing that is praiseworthy has a

ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι·

certain proportion in itself and some sort of relation to another.

b. He proves his proposition. i. From human praises. — 216-217

τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον

Thus we generally praise the just, the

καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς

brave, and the good man and even virtue itself because of the works and

πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ

actions. We raise also the physically strong, the swift, and the like as

τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς

possessing a certain natural ability, and as ordered in some way to a thing good

ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον.

in itself and desirable.

ii. From divine praises. — 218 δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ

Our point is obvious too from the

τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς

praises of the gods, for such praises would be ridiculous if judged by our

ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι'

standard. This happens because praises are given by reason of relation to

ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν.

another, as we have indicated.

2. HE CONCLUDES THAT SOMETHING BETTER THAN PRAISE IS GIVEN TO THE BEST. a. He puts the conclusion this way. — 219 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν

If praise belongs to things of this kind, clearly something greater and better

ἔπαινος, βέλτιον,

than praise is given to the best.

ἀλλὰ

μεῖζόν

τι

καὶ

b. He proves the previous conclusion from what is commonly held. i.

In regard to the things of which there is something

better than praise. x. HE FIRST PRESENTS WHAT SEEMS TO BE COMMONLY HELD. — 220 καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ

This seems to be true, for we call gods blessed and happy, as we do the most

εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους [μακαρίζομεν].

godlike among men. We speak in a similar way of goods, for no one praises

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ

happiness as he praises a just man, but he ascribes to happiness something

καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς

better

and

more

divine,

namely,

θειότερόν

τι

καὶ

βέλτιον

blessedness.

μακαρίζει. y.

SECOND, WHAT SEEMED SO TO EUDOXUS.

— 221 δοκεῖ

δὲ

καὶ

Εὔδοξος

καλῶς

Apparently Eudoxus put pleasure in the

συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι

first place for a good reason. He thought that this is intimated from the

τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν,

fact that pleasure is a good not praised but is better than things praised, such

τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ

as God and any good in itself. To things of this kind, other things are referred.

τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι.

ii. In regard to the things of which there is praise. — 222 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ

Praise surely belongs to virtue since doers of good works are praised for

ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ

activity of body and of soul in accord with virtue. But perhaps a

τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ

consideration of this subject more properly belongs to those who labor

τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν

over the study of laudatory statements. It is obvious now to us from our

ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων.

discussion that happiness is a perfect good and one to be honored.

B’ He shows the same thing from the fact that happiness has the nature of a principle. — 223 ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ

This appears to be true also from the nature of a principle. Now men do all

λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν

that they do for the sake of happiness. But we look upon such a principle and

ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τίθεμεν.

cause of good as something divine and a thing to be honored.

τι

καὶ

θεῖον

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Determinatis

autem

his

et

cetera.

213. After the Philosopher has shown what

Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est felicitas, hic inquirit de quadam

happiness is, here [II] he inquires about a certain property of happiness. First [II, A] he

proprietate felicitatis. Et primo movet quaestionem. Secundo determinat

asks a question, and second [II, B], he ascertains the truth, at “Now a thing that is

veritatem, ibi: videtur autem omne laudabile et cetera. Dicit ergo quod post

praiseworthy etc.” He says that after determining the preceding matters, it is

determinationem praedictorum necesse est perscrutari utrum felicitas sit de

necessary to examine whether happiness is of the number of goods to be honored or to be

numero bonorum laudabilium vel magis de numero bonorum honorabilium. Et

praised. He proves that happiness must be contained under the one or the other kind of

quod necesse sit felicitatem contineri sub

good by the fact that happiness is not in the

altero genere horum bonorum, probat per hoc quod felicitas non est de genere

genus of potentiality. A man is not praised or honored because he has the potentiality to

potentiarum. Non enim aliquis laudatur vel honoratur ex eo solum quod habet

good but because he is somehow disposed to good.

potentiam ad bonum, sed ex eo quod aliqualiter est ad bonum dispositus. Ad huius autem quaestionis evidentiam considerandum, quod honor et laus

214. To have an understanding of this question, we must consider that honor and

dupliciter differunt. Primo quidem ex parte eius in quo consistit honor vel laus.

praise differ in a twofold manner. First on the part of that in which honor or praise

Sic enim honor in plus se habet quam laus. Honor enim importat quoddam

consists. In this respect honor is more extensive than praise. Honor signifies

testimonium manifestans excellentiam alicuius, sive hoc fiat per verba sive per

testimony manifesting a person’s excellence either by word or by deed, as when one

facta, utpote cum aliquis genuflectit alteri vel assurgit ei. Sed laus consistit

genuflects to another or rises for him. But praise consists only in words. Second, praise

solum in verbis. Secundo differunt quantum ad id cui exhibetur laus et

and honor differ in regard to that for which they are given, for both are given on account

honor. Utrumque enim exhibetur alicui

of some excellence. Now there are two kinds

excellentiae. Est autem duplex excellentia: una quidem absoluta et

of excellence. One is absolute and in this sense honor is due to it. But the other is an

secundum hoc debetur ei honor; alia autem est excellentia in ordine ad

excellence in relation to some end, and in this sense praise is due.

aliquem finem, et sic debetur ei laus. Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem omne

215. Then [II, B], at “Now a thing that is,”

laudabile etc., determinat quaestionem. Et primo

motam ostendit

he answers the question. First [B, A’] he shows that happiness is of the number of

felicitatem esse bonorum honorabilium, ex hoc quod est quiddam perfectum et

goods to be honored because it is a thing perfect and best. In the second place [B, B] he

optimum; in secunda parte ex hoc, quod

shows the same thing from the fact that

habet rationem principii, ibi, videtur

happiness has the nature of a principle, at

autem ita habere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualium sit

“This appears to be true also etc.” On the first point he does two things. Initially [A’, I]

laus. Secundo concludit quod optimorum non est laus, sed aliquid melius. Circa

he shows to whom praise is given. Second [A’, 2] he concludes that something better

primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum,

than praise is given to the best, at “If praise belongs etc.” In regard to the initial point he

ibi, iustum enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omne quod laudatur, videtur

does two things. First [1, a] he presents his proposition. Second [1, b] he presents his

esse laudabile ex duobus simul: ex hoc scilicet quod in se habet aliqualem

proposition. Second [1, b] he proves the proposition at “Thus we generally praise the

dispositionem, et ex hoc quod habet

just etc.” He says first that everything that

aliqualem habitudinem ad aliquid aliud.

is praised seems to be praiseworthy for two reasons simultaneously: (1) because it has a certain kind of disposition in itself and (2) because it has a relation of some sort to another.

Deinde cum dicit iustum enim et virilem etc., manifestat propositum. Et primo ex

216. Then [1, b], at “Thus we generally praise,” he proves the proposition first [1, b,

laudibus humanis. Secundo ex laudibus divinis, ibi, manifestum autem est hoc et

i] from human praises and second [1, b, ii] from divine praises at “Our point is obvious

ex his et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod homo laudatur

too from the praises of the gods.” In regard to the first we must consider that a man is

et propter virtutem animi, et propter virtutem corporis. Secundum virtutem

praised both because of virtue of mind and because of power or strength of body. By

autem animi laudatur et ipse homo habens virtutem animi, puta iustus et

reason of virtue of mind, a man (for instance, one who is just or brave or virtuous in any

virilis et communiter bonus secundum

way) is praised for having virtue. The virtue

quamcumque virtutem. Et etiam laudatur ipsa virtus; et hoc propter

also is praised, and this is because of something else, namely, virtuous works and

aliquid aliud, scilicet propter opera et actus; ex hoc enim laudatur virtuosus et

actions. The virtuous man and virtue itself then are praised insofar as they are ordered

ipsa virtus, inquantum ordinatur ad exequendum opus virtutis. Secundum

to do the work of virtue. Second, a man is praised by reason of power or strength of

vero virtutem corporis laudatur aliquis, quia est fortis ad pugnandum et agilis ad

body because he is strong in fighting, swift in running, and so forth. This happens because

currendum et de aliis similibus, ex hoc, quod homo aliqualiter ordinatur ad

the athlete is in a way ordered to something good in itself and desirable as worthy of

aliquid quod est bonum in studiosum quasi studio dignum.

achievement.

se et

Et est attendenda differentia inter virtutes animi et corporis, nam ad

217. We must pay attention to the difference between virtues or powers of mind and body.

laudem virtutis animae sufficit quod aliquis bene se habeat ad proprium actum

It is sufficient in the praise of virtue of soul that a man be well disposed to the proper act

virtutis. Quia bonum hominis consistit in ipso actu virtutis, sed in virtutibus

of the virtue. The reason is that the good of man consists in the very act of virtue, for

corporalibus non sufficit quod aliquis bene se habeat ad actum illius virtutis,

instance, for running or for wrestling. Human goodness does not consist in such

puta ad currendum vel luctandum. In his enim non consistit bonum hominis.

things, since a man can run, wrestle, or fight for both as good and an evil purpose.

Potest enim aliquis currere vel luctare vel pugnare et propter bonum, et propter

Consequently, when speaking of the praises of the virtues of the soul he said they are

malum. Et ideo loquens de laude virtutum animae, dixit quod laudantur

praised because of works and actions (that flow from them). But in speaking of the

propter opera et actus. Sed loquens de

powers of the body he indicated that they are

virtutibus corporalibus, determinavit, quod laudantur in ordine ad aliquod

praised in relation to something else.

bonum et studiosum. Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem est

218. Then [1, b, ii], at “Our point is obvious

hoc etc., manifestat quod dixerat per laudes divinas. Si enim aliquid esset

too,” he explains what is meant by divine praises. If something be praiseworthy

laudabile absolute, et non secundum

absolutely and not as related to some other

habitudinem ad aliquid aliud, sequeretur quod idem in omnibus esset laudabile.

thing, it follows that the thing is praiseworthy in all circumstances. But this is

Hoc autem manifeste falsum apparet si quis consideret laudes quibus laudamus

clearly false in the case of praises given to separated substances that he calls gods. It

substantias separatas quas deos nominat. Si quis enim laudes eorum

would seem ridiculous to praise them for things that are praised in men, for instance,

referret ad ea quae in hominibus laudantur, derisibile videretur; puta si

because they are not overcome by concupiscence or fear. This is so because

quis laudaret Deum de hoc quod non vincatur a concupiscentia seu timore. Et

praises are given by reason of a relation to something else, as has been pointed out

hoc ideo contingit, quia laudes sunt per relationem ad aliquid, ut dictum est.

(214).

Deinde cum dicit: si autem est laus talium etc., ex praemissis concludit

219. Then [A’, 2], at “If praise,” he concludes his proposition from what has been said.

propositum. Et primo ponit conclusionem in hunc modum. Laus est eorum quorum

First [2, a] he puts the conclusion this way. Praise is given to the things whose goodness

bonitas consideratur in ordine ad aliquid aliud. Sed optima non ordinantur ad

is considered in relation to something else. But the best things are not ordered to

aliquid aliud, quinimmo alia ordinantur in

anything else but rather other things are

ipsa. Ergo optimorum non est laus, sed

ordered to them. Therefore, something better

aliquid melius laude; sicut etiam in speculativis principiorum non est

than praise is given to the best. In a somewhat similar way, there is science for

scientia, sed aliquid scientia altius, scilicet intellectus. Scientia vero est

the study of speculative principles, but something higher than science,

conclusionum quae cognoscuntur propter principia. Et similiter laus est

understanding. Science is concerned with conclusions which are known by means of

eorum quorum bonitas est propter alia. Honor autem quasi aliquid melius laude

principles. Likewise, praise is concerned with things whose goodness is for the sake of

est eorum ad quae alia ordinantur.

others. But honor, a thing better than praise, is concerned with things to which other things are ordered.

Secundo ibi: quemadmodum videtur etc.,

220. Second [2, b], at “This seems to be

manifestat conclusionem praemissam per ea quae communiter dicuntur. Et primo

true,” he proves the previous conclusion from what is commonly held. First [2, b, i] in

quantum ad ea quorum est aliquid melius laude. Secundo quantum ad ea quorum

regard to the things of which there is something better than praise; and second [2,

est laus, ibi: laus quidem enim et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inducit ad

b, ii] in regard to the things of which there is praise at “Praise surely belongs etc.” In

propositum

quod

regard to the first he does two things. To

communiter videtur. Secundo id quod visum fuit Eudoxo, ibi, videtur autem et

prove his proposition he first [i, x] presents what seems to be commonly held and second

Eudoxus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod optimorum esse aliquid melius laude

[ i, y] what seemed so to Eudoxus at “Apparently Eudoxus.” He says first that it

videtur communiter omnibus. Quod manifestum est ex hoc quod diis quasi

seems commonly held that there is something better than praise for the best. This is made

aliquid melius laude attribuentes, dicimus eos beatos et felices; et similiter optimos

clear from the fact that those ascribing to the gods as it were something better than praise

virorum, in quibus apparet quaedam divina similitudo propter eorum

call them blessed and happy. They say the same, too, of the best among men who have a

excellentiam. Et sicut optimis personarum attribuimus aliquid melius

certain likeness to the gods by reason of excellence. As we ascribe something better

laude, ita etiam et optimis de numero bonorum, sicut felicitati; nullus enim

than praise to the best among men, so also to the best of goods like happiness. No one

laudat felicitatem per modum quo laudat hominem iustum vel virtuosum, sed

praises happiness in the way he praises a just or virtuous man. Something better is

attribuit ei aliquid maius, dum dicimus

ascribed to happiness when we call it

eam esse beatitudinem.

blessedness.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem et

221. Then [i, y], at “Apparently Eudoxus” he

Eudoxus etc., inducit ad idem dictum

reduces the saying of Eudoxus to the same

manifestandum

id

Eudoxi. Qui in voluptate constituebat

argument. Now Eudoxus called pleasure the

primitias bonorum, ponens scilicet voluptatem esse summum bonum. Et hoc

first fruits of good, saying that pleasure is the supreme good. He thinks this is intimated

denunciari existimat, quod cum sit de

from the following. Pleasure is a good that is

numero bonorum, non tamen aliquis laudatur propter voluptatem, eo quod est

not praised because in itself it is something better than the things that are praised. No

aliquid melius laudabilibus. Et tale est Deus et quicquid aliud est per se bonum.

one indeed is praised on account of pleasure, for instance, God and any other good in itself.

Quia ad huiusmodi quae sunt per se bona etiam alia referuntur, quorum scilicet

The reason is that things whose goodness is praised are referred to things good in

bonitas laudatur in hoc quod se aliqualiter habent ad ea quae sunt per se

themselves. Things that are praised are praised precisely because they are somehow

bona.

related to the things that are good in themselves.

Deinde cum dicit: laus quidem enim etc., manifestat quod dixerat quantum ad ea

222. Then [2, b, ii], at “Praise surely,” he proves what he said in respect of the things

quorum est laus. Et dicit quod laus est virtutis per quam sumus operatores

to which praise is given. He says that praise belongs to virtue which makes us doers of

bonorum. Laudatur enim aliquis propter actus corporis vel animae, ut supra

good works, for a person is praised because of activity of body or soul as was just mentioned

dictum est. Sed considerare ea de quibus consueverunt homines laudari magis

(216-217). But a consideration of the words used by men in bestowing compliments

proprie pertinet ad rhetores, quorum

pertains more properly to rhetoricians who

studium insudat circa laudes. Pertinet enim hoc ad demonstrativum genus

labor over the study of laudatory statements. It belongs to the kind of subject that deals

causarum, quod est unum de tribus, quae cadunt sub consideratione rhetoricae ut

with praise or dispraise (demonstrativum genus)—one of the three falling under the

patet per philosophum in I rhetoricae et per Tullium in rhetorica sua. Sed

study of rhetoric, as is clear from the Philosopher in the first book of the Rhetoric

quantum ad nos manifeste apparet ex praedictis; quod felicitas est de numero

(Ch. 3, 1358 b 21-1359 a 5) and from Tully (Cicero) in his Rhetoric (De Oratore, Bk. II,

honorabilium, eo quod est quoddam bonum perfectum.

Ch. x, xi). So far as we are concerned it is obvious from the above (220) that happiness is of the number of goods to be honored because it is a perfect good.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem ita

223. Then [B, B’], at “This appears to be

habere etc., probat propositum ex ratione principii. Illud enim quod est principium et causa bonorum, ponimus honorabile, quasi quiddam divinum existens. Nam

true also,” he proves his proposition from the nature of a principle. We look upon the principle and the cause of goods as a thing to be honored, for it is as it were something

Deus est primum principium omnis boni.

divine, since God is the first principle of all

Sed felicitas est principium omnium

good. But happiness is the principle of all

bonorum humanorum, quia propter ipsam omnes homines operantur omnia quae agunt. Finis autem in operabilibus et appetibilibus habet rationem principii,

human good because men do all that they do by reason of happiness. Now the end in things to be done and things to be desired has the nature of a principle because the nature

quia ex fine sumitur ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde sequitur quod felicitas sit quoddam bonum honorabile.

of the means is understood from the end. Hence it follows that happiness is a good to be honored.

LECTURE 19 Happiness and Virtue Chapter 13 I.

HE PREMISES CERTAIN THINGS NECESSARY FOR THE STUDY

OF VIRTUE. A. He shows that it pertains to this science to study virtue. A’ First by a reason taken from the doctrine on happiness. — 224 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη·

If then happiness is a kind of operation according to perfect virtue, we must investigate the question of virtue. In this

τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.

way we shall perhaps make a more profound study of happiness.

B’ Second... from the particular nature of this science. — 225 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν

Now political science really seems to be concerned especially with the attainment of virtue. Its object is to produce good citizens obedient to the laws, as is

νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται.

exemplified by the lawmakers of the Cretes and the Spartans, and others like them. If this investigation belongs to political science, the study will be

εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς

Obviously conducted according to the disposition we made in the beginning.

προαίρεσιν. B. He assumes certain things we must know about the parts of the soul. A’ He shows it is necessary that such things be discussed in this science. 1. HE SHOWS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER CERTAIN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PARTS OF THE SOUL. — 226-227 περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ

The virtue we are investigating then will be human virtue, for we were seeking

τἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς

human good and human happiness. Now we call that virtue human which is proper not to the body but to the soul. Besides, we say that happiness is an

ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως

δὲ δὲ δεῖ τὰ

activity of the soul. Since this is so, obviously the statesman must know to some extent the things pertaining to the soul, as he who is to heal the eyes or the

περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ

whole body should know something about physiology. In fact the knowledge of the statesman should be greater

τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ

insofar as political science is nobler and more important than medicine. But skillful physicians make it their business to know much about the body. Therefore,

σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς,

the statesman must study the soul.

2. HE SHOWS HOW WE MUST CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS. — 228 θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον

The soul must be studied for the sake of the objects investigated and to the extent that suffices for them. To make a more

ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.

exhaustive study would be a greater task than the subject requires.

B’ He takes them up. I. HE DIVIDES THE PARTS OF THE SOUL.

a. He gives the division. — 229 λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς

Certain things about the soul are

ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον.

adequately treated in extraneous discourses. We should use these, for instance, the distinction of the soul into irrational and rational.

b. He says that a certain question must be left unanswered. — 230 ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια

But Whether the parts are distinct as particles of a body or anything physically

καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν

divisible, or whether the parts are indivisible in nature and distinguishable according to reason alone, as the convex and concave of the circumference of a

διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν.

circle, is irrelevant to the present question.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Si autem est felicitas et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit

224. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on happiness, he begins the

de felicitate, hic incipit determinare de virtute. Et primo praemittit quaedam quae exiguntur ad considerationem virtutis. Secundo incipit determinare

consideration of virtue. First [I] he premises certain things necessary for the study of virtue. Second (B. 1103 a 14) he begins to define virtue in the beginning of the second book at “Virtue is

de virtute in principio secundi libri, ibi, duplici autem virtute existente et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod ad hanc scientiam

of two kinds etc.” [Lect. 1]. In regard to the first he does three things. First [I, A] he shows that it pertains to this science to study virtue. Second [I, B], at “The virtues we are etc.,” he assumes

pertineat de virtute considerare. Secundo assumit quaedam quae oportet cognoscere de partibus

certain things we must know about the parts of the soul. Third [Lect. 20; C], at “Virtue is divided etc.” (B. 1103 a 4), he divides virtue

animae, ibi: de virtute autem perscrutandum etc.; tertio secundum divisionem partium animae dividit virtutem, ibi, determinatur autem

according to the division of the parts of the soul. He proves the initial point in two ways. First [A, A’] by a reason taken from the doctrine on happiness. It was pointed out previously (128,

virtus et cetera. Primum ostendit dupliciter. Primo quidem ratione

130, 150, 160, 164, 175, 187, 190) that happiness is an action according to perfect

assumpta ex parte felicitatis. Dictum est enim supra, quod felicitas est

virtue. Hence we can study happiness better by means of knowledge of virtue. In keeping with

operatio quaedam secundum virtutem perfectam. Et sic per cognitionem virtutis melius poterimus de felicitate considerare. Unde et in X libro,

this, he completes the treatise on happiness when he finishes the study of all the virtues in the tenth book (1953-2180). Since then the principal object of this science is the good of

determinato de omnibus virtutibus complet tractatum de felicitate. Cum igitur haec scientia principaliter quaerat bonum humanum quod est

man, which is happiness, an inquiry into virtue fittingly comes within the scope of this science.

felicitas, consequens est quod ad hanc scientiam pertineat de virtute scrutari. Secundo

ibi:

et

225. Second [A, B] at “Now political science,” he

veritatem etc., probat ex propria ratione huius Civilis enim scientia rei veritatem maxime

proves the proposition from the particular nature of this science. Political science seems really to make a special study of virtue and its attainment. Indeed the object of political science

videtur studere et laborare circa virtutem. Intendit enim cives bonos facere et legibus obedientes, sicut patet per legislatores Cretensium et

is to produce good citizens obedient to the laws (as is evident from the lawmakers of the Cretes and the Spartans who had model states, and from others framing similar laws to make men

Lacedaemoniorum, qui habebant civilitatem optime ordinatam, vel si qui alii sunt similes leges ponentes ad faciendum homines virtuosos. Sed

virtuous). But the study of the present science is connected with political science because its principles are given here. Obviously then a consideration of virtue will be suitable to this

consideratio praesentis scientiae ad politicam pertinet, quia in hac scientia traduntur principia politicae. Unde

science. Accordingly in the introduction (25-31) we placed political science, which investigates the ultimate end of human actions, above all

manifestum est quod quaestio de virtute fiet conveniens huic scientiae, secundum id quod in prooemio elegimus politicam prae omnibus aliis

other sciences.

secundum propositum scientiae. secundum

videtur

disciplinis, inquirentem finem humanorum.

autem

ultimum

Deinde cum dicit: de virtute autem etc., assumit quaedam de partibus animae necessaria ad cognitionem virtutum. Et circa hoc duo facit.

226. Then [I, B], at “The virtue,” he takes up certain questions pertaining to the parts of the soul, which are necessary for the knowledge of virtues. On this point he does two things. First

Primo ostendit quod necessarium est huiusmodi assumi in hac scientia.

[B, A’] he shows it is necessary that such things be discussed in this science. Second [B, B’] he

Secundo assumit ea, ibi, dicuntur

takes them up at “Certain things about the soul

autem de hac et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod necesse est huic scientiae quod considerat quaedam de partibus

etc.” In regard to the first he does two things. First [A’, 1] he shows that it is necessary in this science to consider certain questions about the parts of the soul. Second [A, 2], at “The soul

animae. Secundo ostendit qualiter debeat ea considerare, ibi, contemplandum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum nos intendimus

must be studied etc.,” he shows how we must consider these questions. First, since it is our intention to investigate virtue, we understand that we are speaking of human virtue. We have

perscrutari de virtute, intelligimus hoc de virtute humana. Dictum est enim supra, quod quaerimus in hac scientia bonum humanum et

just now noted (224) that we are looking for human good and human happiness in this science. If, therefore, we seek virtue for the sake of happiness, we necessarily seek human virtue.

felicitatem humanam. Et ideo si virtutem quaerimus propter felicitatem, necesse est quod virtutem

But that virtue is peculiarly human which is proper to the soul, for it does not belong to the body nor is it shared in common with other

humanam quaeramus. Virtus autem quae est proprie humana, non est ea quae est corporis, in qua communicat cum aliis rebus, sed ea quae est

beings. Pertinent here is what we said before (123-126), that happiness is an activity of the soul.

animae, quae est propria sibi. Sed et hoc etiam competit ei quod supra diximus quod felicitas est operatio animae.

Sic ergo se habet politicus ad considerandum de anima cuius

227. In the study of the soul whose virtue he seeks, the statesman is compared to the

virtutem quaerit, sicut medicus ad considerandum de corpore cuius sanitatem inquirit. Unde manifestum est quod oportet politicum aliqualiter

physician who studies the body seeking its health. Obviously then the statesman must know to some extent the things belonging to the soul, as the physician who treats the eyes and

cognoscere ea quae pertinent ad animam, sicut medicus qui curat oculos et totum corpus oportet quod

the whole body must study something about the eyes and the whole body. The obligation of the statesman to study the soul whose virtue he

consideret de oculis et de toto corpore, et tanto magis hoc pertinet ad politicam ut consideret animam cuius virtutem inquirit, quanto est melior

seeks is greater because political science is more important than the science of medicine—a fact we know from what was said previously (25-30. Consequently, the study of political science must

ipsa quam supradictis quod eius completa.

be more thorough. We see that skillful physicians study many things which will give them a knowledge of the body and not merely what concerns cures. Hence a statesman gives

scientia medicinae, ut ex patet. Et ideo oportet, consideratio sit magis Videmus autem quod

excellentes medici multa tractant

some thought to the soul.

circa cognitionem corporis, et non solum circa medicinales operationes. Unde et politicus debet aliqua considerare de anima.

Deinde cum dicit contemplandum autem etc., ostendit qualiter de his

228. Then [A’, 2], at “The soul must be studied,” he shows in what way the statesman

debeat considerare. Et dicit quod in hac scientia contemplandum est de anima gratia horum, idest virtutum et actuum hominis, de quibus est hic

ought to investigate these things. In this science, he says, the soul must be studied for the sake of the virtues and human actions that are the principle objects here investigated.

principalis intentio. Et ideo intantum considerandum est de anima, quantum sufficit ad ea quae principaliter quaerimus. Si autem

Therefore, the study of the soul must be such as suffices for the things chiefly sought. If a man should wish to make a more exhaustive study, he will be imposing a greater task than the object of

aliquis vellet plus certificare de anima, quam sufficit ad propositum, requireret hoc maius opus quam ea

our investigation requires. So too in all other things sought for the sake of an end, the extent of them must be measured according to the end

quae in proposito quaeruntur. Et ita est in omnibus aliis quae quaeruntur propter finem, quod eorum quantitas est assumenda secundum quod

itself.

competit fini.

Deinde cum dicit: dicuntur autem de

229. Then [B, B’], at “Certain things about the

hac etc., assumit ea quae sunt hic consideranda de partibus animae. Et primo dividit partes animae in rationale et irrationale; secundo

soul,” he takes up the things we must consider here about the parts of the soul. First [B’, 1] he divides the parts of the soul into rational and irrational. Second [Lect. 20; 2], at “One part of

subdividit irrationale, ibi: irrationabilis autem etc.; tertio subdividit rationale, ibi: si autem

the irrational soul etc.” (B.1102 a 33), he subdivides the irrational. Third [Lect. 20; 31, at “If however we must etc.” (B. 1103 a 2), he

oportet et hoc et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit divisionem. Secundo dicit praetermittendam quamdam

subdivides the other member of the first division, that is, the rational part of the soul. In regard to the first he does two things. First [1, a] he gives the division. Second [1, b], at “But whether the

dubitationem, ibi, haec autem utrum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod de anima sufficienter quaedam sunt dicta in libro de anima, quem vocat

parts etc.,” he says that a certain question must be left unanswered. He says first that certain things about the soul have been adequately treated in the book De Anima, which he calls

exteriores sermones, vel quia scripsit librum illum per modum epistolae ad

extraneous discussions because he wrote the book as an epistle to persons living at a

aliquos longe existentes, libri enim quos scribebat docens suos auditores vocabantur auditus, sicut liber

considerable distance. The books that he was accustomed to teach his students (auditors) were called reports or notes (auditions), as the

physicorum dicitur de physico auditu. Vel melius, exteriores sermones vocantur qui sunt extra propositam scientiam. His autem quae ibi dicta

books of the Physics are entitled on the audition of classes about nature; or they are called extraneous for the better reason that they are outside the scope of the immediate science.

sunt hic est utendum; puta quod quaedam pars animae est rationalis, quaedam irrationalis, ut dicitur in tertio de anima.

However, here we must use the things discussed in that book, for instance, one part of the soul is rational, another part irrational as is asserted in the third book De Anima (Ch. 9, 432 a 27; St. Th. Lect. 14, 797).

Deinde cum dicit: haec autem utrum determinata sint etc., movet quandam

230. Then [1, b], at “But whether the parts,” he asks a certain question which is to be left

dubitationem quam dicit esse in proposito praetermittendam, scilicet utrum hae duae partes animae,

unanswered intentionally. Are the two parts of the soul, rational and irrational, distinct from one another in their subject according to

rationale scilicet et irrationale, sint distincta ab invicem subiecto, loco et situ, sicut particulae corporis vel cuiuscumque alterius continui

location and position, as particles of a body or of some other divisible continuum? Plato located the rational part or power in the brain, the emotional part in the heart, and the assimilative

divisibilis, sicut Plato posuit rationale esse in cerebro, concupiscibile in corde et nutritivum in hepate; vel potius hae duae partes non dividantur secundum

part in the liver. Or perhaps these two parts are not divided according to subject but only in concept as in the circumference of a circle the convex and concave are not distinguished by

subiectum sed solum secundum rationem, sicut in circumferentia circuli curvum, idest convexum et concavum non dividuntur subiecto,

subject but in concept alone. He says that so far as it concerns us at present, it does not matter which opinion is held. Hence he leaves the question unanswered because it does not pertain

sed solum ratione. Et dicit quod quantum pertinet ad propositum non differt quid horum dicatur. Et ideo

to our present purpose.

praetermittit hanc quaestionem ut ad propositum non pertinentem.

LECTURE 20 Subdivisions of the Irrational Soul Chapter 13

2. HE SUBDIVIDES THE IRRATIONAL PART. a. He presents one member of the subdivision. i. He mentions an irrational part of the soul. — 231-232 τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν

One part of the irrational soul is like the vegetative soul common to all living things. By vegetative I

τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ

understand that part which is the cause of nutrition and growth. Such a power of the soul is found in all things

ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά.

that assimilate food. It is found even in embryos and in the lowest forms of animal life. To these it is more reasonable to assign the vegetative part than some other.

ii. He shows that this part is not properly human. x.

FIRST HE CONCLUDES THIS FROM THE

PREMISES. — 233 ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται·

Because this power is common, it follows that it is not human.

y. HE ADDS A PROOF FROM A PARTICULAR EVIDENT SIGN. — 234-235 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς

It seems that the vegetative part and potency of the soul are most active during sleep. Now good and evil

ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία

persons are hardly distinguishable in their sleep. Hence the saying that the happy are no better off than the miserable for half their lives. This is a

γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί

reasonable doctrine, for sleep is a cessation from the operation according to which the soul is called

τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν

good and evil. Yet perhaps certain activities do penetrate the soul of the

ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ

sleeper gradually. In this way the dreams of the virtuous become better

θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν.

than the dreams of other persons. But what we have now said on this subject will suffice. Therefore, discussion of the nutritive part must come to an end because it has no part in human virtue.

b. He presents the other (member of the subdivision). i. He indicates what he intends. — 236 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα

Seemingly there is another part of the soul, irrational also but participating

μέντοι πῃ λόγου.

in reason to some extent.

ii. He proves his proposition. x. THERE IS ANOTHER PART OF THE IRRATIONAL SOUL. — 237-238 τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον

We praise the rational principle in the incontinent and continent man, for

ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ

reason rightly induces to what is best. But something besides reason seems to be innate in them, which conflicts with reason and resists reason. As

ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ

paralyzed members of the body are said to move wrongly to the left contrary to the will choosing the

προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν

right, so also in the soul, for the movement of the incontinent are to things contrary to reason. While the uncontrolled movement can be seen in

τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ

bodies, it is invisible in the soul. Nevertheless we must judge that there is something in the soul besides reason which is contrary and resistant to

τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

reason. But how this differs from reason does not matter at present.

y. THIS PART PARTICIPATES IN REASON. aa. His first argument is based on acts taking place within man. a’ He shows that this irrational part participates in reason. — 239 λόγου

δὲ

καὶ

τοῦτο

φαίνεται

Now this part seems to share in

μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦσἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ

reason, as we have said. Therefore, as found in the continent man, it is obedient to reason. But it is even more fully subject in the sober and

ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

courageous man whose every act harmonizes with reason.

b’ He finishes... the difference of this irrational part from the part presented above. — 240 φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ

Apparently the irrational part is twofold. The vegetative power does not partake of reason at all. But the concupiscible power and every

κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχὥσπερ τῶν

appetitive power participate to some extent because they heed and are obedient to reason. Therefore, we say that reason holds the place of a father

μαθηματικῶν.

and friends but not of mathematicians. bb.

His second (argument) is based on acts external to

man. — 241 ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ

Persuasion, reproach and entreaty in

ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις.

all cases indicate that the irrational principle is somewhat influenced by reason.

3. HE SUBDIVIDES THE OTHER MEMBER OF THE FIRST DIVISION, THE RATIONAL PART OF THE SOUL. — 242 εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον

If, however, we must say that this part shares in reason, then the

ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

rational will be of two kinds: one having reason principally and of itself, the other obedient to the reason as to a father.

C. He divides virtue according to this difference in the parts of the soul. — 243-244 διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ

Virtue is divided according to this difference, for we call some virtues

αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς,

intellectual, others moral. Wisdom, understanding and prudence are said to be intellectual virtues, while

ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων·

liberality and sobriety are called moral. When speaking of man’s good morals we do not describe him as wise or intelligent but as mild-tempered or

ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

sober. We do praise a person for acquiring the habit of wisdom since praiseworthy habits are called virtues.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Irrationabilis autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus divisit partes animae per rationale et irrationale, hic subdividit partem irrationalem. Et primo ponit unum

231. After the philosopher has divided the parts of the soul into rational and irrational, here [2] he subdivides the irrational part. First [2, a] he presents one

membrum divisionis. Secundo ponit aliud, ibi, videtur utique et alia quaedam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit quandam partem animae

member of the subdivision; and then [2, b], he presents the other at “Seemingly there is another part etc.” In regard to the initial point he does two things. First [a, i] he

irrationalem. Secundo ostendit quod illa pars animae non est proprie humana, ibi: haec quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo

mentions an irrational part of the soul. Then [a, ii] he shows that this part is not properly human, at “Because this power

primo, quod inter irrationales partes animae una est, quae assimilatur animae plantarum, quae est communis omnibus viventibus hic inferius. Et huiusmodi pars

etc.” He says first that one of the parts of the irrational soul is like the plant soul and is common to all things living here below. It is that part which is the cause of

est illa quae est causa nutrimenti et augmenti in hominibus. Et talis pars animae ponitur in omnibus quae

assimilation and growth. Such a part of the soul is found in every being that assimilates food not only in creatures after birth but

nutriuntur, non solum in animalibus, sed in plantis; in animalibus autem invenitur non solum iam natis, sed etiam antequam

even before birth, as in embryos that are obviously nourished and grow.

nascantur, idest in embryonibus, qui manifeste nutriuntur et crescunt.

Similiter etiam invenitur haec pars animae in animalibus non solum perfectis, idest

232. Likewise this part of the soul is discovered not only in the highly organized

habentibus omnes sensus et motis motu progressivo, sed etiam in animalibus imperfectis, quae habent solum sensum tactus et manent immobilia in eodem loco,

animals having all the senses and endowed with local motion but also in the lowest animals, like oysters having only the sense of touch and rooted to one place. Evidently

sicut sunt conchilia. Manifestum est enim quod omnia praedicta vivunt, et habent aliquam partem animae. Rationabilius autem in eis omnibus ponitur haec pars

all these creatures live and have some kind of soul. But this vegetative type of soul rather than some other part is more reasonably assigned to these lowest animals

animae quam quaevis alia, quia opera huius partis manifestius in eis apparent.

because the effects of this part are more evident in them.

Deinde cum dicit: haec quidem igitur etc., ostendit quod praedicta pars animae non est humana. Et primo concludit hoc ex

233. Then [a, ii], at “Because this power,” he shows that the aforementioned part of the soul is not human. First [a, ii, x] he

praedictis. Humanum enim dicimus, quod est proprium homini. Si ergo haec pars animae maxime est communis, consequens est quod non sit humana.

concludes this from the premises. We call human that which is distinctive of man. If then a part of the soul is altogether common, it will not be human.

Secundo ibi: videtur enim etc., addit

234. Secondly [a, ii, y], at “It seems that,”

manifestationem ex quodam evidenti signo. Haec enim pars animae efficacissime invenitur operari in somnis: recurrente enim calore naturali ad

he adds a proof from a particular evident sign. This part of the soul is found to be especially active during sleep, for when he natural heat has returned to the internal

interiora, dum animal dormit, digestio melius celebratur. Id autem quod est proprium hominis, secundum quod homo dicitur bonus vel malus, non multum

organs and the animal is asleep, digestion works better. But what is proper to man precisely as he is said to be good or evil operates only slightly during sleep. Good

operatur in somno. Nec secundum somnum manifestatur quis sit bonus vel malus. Unde proverbialiter dicunt, quod felices non differunt a miseris secundum

and evil persons are hardly distinguishable in their sleep. Hence the saying that the happy do not differ from the unhappy for half their life which is spent in sleep. The

somnum, qui est dimidium vitae, quia

reason is that judgment of the intellect is

scilicet in somno ligatur iudicium rationis et soporantur exteriores sensus, operatur

bound during sleep, and the external senses do not function, although the imagination

autem phantasia et vis nutritiva.

and he power of nutrition are active.

Hoc autem contingit rationabiliter, scilicet

235. It is reasonable that the god and evil,

quod secundum somnum non differat bonus et malus, felix et miser. Quia in somno quiescit a sua operatione illa pars animae secundum quam homo dicitur

the happy and the unhappy are indistinguishable while asleep because that part of man by which he is called good ceases to function during sleep. Good and

bonus et malus. Contingit tamen per accidens quod bonus et malus in somno differunt non propter differentiam eorum quae sit in dormiendo, sed propter

evil men differ while asleep not on account of a difference occurring during their slumbers but because of what happened in their waking moments. Conscious activity

differentiam quantum vigilantium dormientes,

quae fuit in vigilando, in scilicet quidam motus paulatim pertranseunt ad prout scilicet ea quae homo

gradually penetrates to the soul of the sleeper so that the things a man has seen or heard or thought while awake, present themselves to his imagination in sleep. In

vidit vel audivit vel cogitavit vigilando occurrunt phantasiae dormientis. Et per hunc modum in dormiendo fiunt meliora

this way the virtuous who spend their wakeful hours in good works have more edifying dreams than other persons who

phantasmata virtuosorum, qui circa honesta se occupant in vigilando, quam quorumlibet aliorum qui vanis et inhonestis vigilantes se occupant. Et de his

occupy their conscious moments with idle and evil woks. What we have now said on this subject will suffice (2334-235). We conclude then from the premises (233-235),

sufficiat quod dictum est. Relinquitur autem ex praemissis, quod pars animae nutritiva non est nata esse particeps humanae virtutis.

that the nutritive part of the soul is not adapted by nature to participate in human virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur utique etc., ponit aliud membrum divisionis. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat

236. Then [2, b], at “Seemingly there is,” he presents the other member of the division. First [b, i] he indicates what he

propositum, ibi incontinentis enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod praeter nutritivam partem animae, videtur esse quaedam alia pars animae, irrationalis

intends; and second [b, ii] he proves his proposition at “We praise the rational etc.” He says first that besides the vegetative part of the soul, there seems to be another

quidem sicut et nutritiva, sed aliqualiter participans rationem; in quo differt a nutritiva, quae omnino est expers humanae virtutis, ut dictum est.

part, irrational like the vegetative, but participating in reason to some extent. In this it differs from the vegetative part that has nothing whatsoever to do with human virtue as was just said (235).

Deinde cum dicit incontinentis enim etc.,

237. Then [b, ii], at “We praise the

probat propositum. Et primo quod sit quaedam alia pars animae irrationalis; secundo quod participet rationem, ibi, ratione autem et hoc videtur, et cetera.

rational,” he proves his proposition: first [b, ii, x] that there is another part of the irrational soul; second [b, ii, y] that this part participates in reason at “Now this

Primum autem probat ratione sumpta ex parte continentis et incontinentis, in quibus laudamus partem animae quae habet rationem, eo quod ratio eorum recte

part seems to share in reason.” He proves the first by an argument taken from continent and incontinent men. In this matter we praise the part of the soul having

deliberat et ad optima inducit quasi deprecando vel persuadendo: uterque enim horum eligit abstinere ab illicitis voluptatibus. Sed in utroque eorum

reason because it rightly deliberates and induces to what is best, as if by entreaty and persuasion. Both—continent and incontinent—choose abstain from unlawful

videtur esse aliquid naturaliter eis inditum praeter rationem, quod contrariatur rationi et obviat ei, idest impedit ipsam in executione suae electionis, unde patet quod

pleasures. But seemingly in both there is something innate in them other than reason, and this something conflicts with reason and resists or hinders reason in the

est quiddam irrationale, cum sit rationi contrarium. Et hoc est appetitus sensitivus, qui appetit id quod est

execution of its choice. Obviously it is something irrational, since it is contrary to reason. The sensitive appetite, which

delectabile sensui, quod interdum contrariatur ei quod ratio iudicat esse bonum simpliciter. Hoc autem in eo qui est continens vincitur a ratione, nam

desires what is pleasant to sense and at times opposes what reason judges absolutely good, would be such a thing. This appetite in the continent man is

continens habet quidem concupiscentias pravas, sed ratio eas non sequitur. In incontinente autem vincit rationem, quae deducitur a concupiscentiis pravis.

restrained by reason, for he certainly has evil desires but his reason does not follow them. On the other hand the appetite in the incontinent man overcomes reason, which is seduced by evil desires.

Et ideo subdit exemplum, quod sicut quando corporis membra sunt dissoluta, quia scilicet non possunt omnino contineri a virtute corporis regitiva, sicut accidit in

238. Then he adds an illustration. The members of the body are incapacitated when they cannot be controlled by the regulative power of the soul, as happens to

paraliticis et ebriis, qui moventur in partem sinistram, quando homines eligunt moveri in dextram; ita etiam firmiter verum est ex parte animae in

paralytics and the intoxicated who move to the left side when hey wish to move to the right. This is true also of the souls of incontinent persons who are moved to the

incontinentibus quod moventur ad contraria eorum quae ratio eligit. Sed hoc non ita apparet in partibus animae, sicut

opposite of what the reason chooses. But the process is not so apparent in the parts of the soul as in the parts of the body. We

in partibus corporis. Quia in partibus corporis manifeste videmus quando aliquid

see clearly in what way a bodily member moves unnaturally, but the movement of

inordinate

movetur,

sed

in

partibus

the parts of the soul is not so obvious to us.

animae non ita manifeste hoc videmus. Nihilominus tamen existimandum est, quod aliquid sit in homine quod

Despite this, we must judge there is something that is contrary to reason and resists it. But how this may differ from

contrariatur et obviat rationi. Sed qualiter hoc sit alterum a ratione, utrum scilicet subiecto vel solum ratione, hoc non differt ad propositum.

reason—whether by subject or by concept alone—does not matter at present.

Deinde cum dicit: ratione autem et hoc etc., ostendit secundum, scilicet quod

239. Then [b, ii, y], at “Now this part,” he shows that an irrational part of this kind

huiusmodi irrationale participat rationem. Et primo manifestat hoc ex his quae intra hominem aguntur. Secundo ex his quae aguntur extra hominem, ibi, quoniam

participates in reason. His first argument [y, aa] is based on acts taking place within man; his second [y, bb], at “Persuasion, reproach)” is based on acts external to man,

autem suadetur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod hoc irrationale participat rationem. Secundo quasi concludit differentiam huius

With the first he does two things. First [aa, a’] he shows that this irrational part participates in reason. Second [aa, b’] he finishes the treatment of the difference of

irrationalis partis ad eam quae supra posita est, ibi: videtur utique et irrationabile duplex et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod hoc irrationale de quo nunc

this irrational “ part from the part presented above, at “Apparently the irrational part.” He says first that the irrational part, of which we have now

dictum est, videtur aliqualiter participare ratione, sicut supra dictum est. Et hoc manifestum est in homine continente,

spoken (233-235), seems in some way to participate in reason, as was just said (236). This is obvious in the continent man

cuius appetitus Quamvis enim pravas, non operatur, sed

sensitivus obedit rationi. habeat concupiscentias tamen secundum eas secundum rationem. Et

whose sensitive appetite obeys reason. Although he may have evil desires, nevertheless he does not act according to them but according to reason. In the sober

multo amplius subiicitur huiusmodi pars animae rationi in homine sobrio idest temperato, qui ita habet appetitum sensitivum edomitum per rationem, quod

or temperate man this part of the soul is even more fully subject to reason. Such a man has so subdued his sensitive appetite that evil desires in him are not vehement.

non sunt in eo concupiscentiae pravae vehementes. Et eadem ratio est de forti et de quolibet habente habitum virtutis moralis. Quia in talibus fere omnia

We may say the same of the courageous man and of anyone endowed with the habit of moral virtue. The reason is that in these men nearly everything—both external

consonant rationi; idest non solum exteriores actus, sed etiam interiores concupiscentiae.

actions and internal desires—harmonize with reason.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur utique etc., concludit ex praemissis differentiam utriusque irrationalis. Et dicit, quod videtur, secundum praemissa duplex esse

240. Then [aa, b’], at “Apparently the irrational,” he concludes the difference between the two irrational parts from the premises. He says that according to the

irrationale. Nam nutritivum, quod invenitur, in plantis, in nullo communicat cum ratione. Non enim obedit imperio

premises the irrational part is apparently twofold. Now the vegetative part, found in plants, does not partake of reason in any

rationis. Sed vis concupiscibilis et omnis vis appetitiva, sicut irascibilis et voluntas, participant aliqualiter ratione, secundum quod exaudiunt rationem monentem et

way, for it is not obedient to the direction of reason. But the concupiscible power and every appetitive power like the irascible emotion and the will participate in reason in

oboediunt ei ut imperanti. Et ita rationem dicimus se habere in loco patris imperantis et amicorum admonentium, et non se habet per modum speculantis tantum,

some measure because they heed the movement of the reason and are obedient to its regulations. Hence we say reason holds the place of a father giving guidance and of

sicut ratio mathematicorum. Tali enim ratione haec pars animae irrationalis in nullo participat.

friends offering advice. But reason here does not play the role of a mere theorist like the reason of a mathematician, for the irrational part of the soul does not partake in any way of reason understood in this sense.

Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem suadetur etc., ostendit quod hoc irrationale participet ratione per ea quae exterius

241. Then [y, bb], at “Persuasion, reproach,” he shows through the things externally done that the irrational part

aguntur. Significat enim hoc, ut ipse dicit, et suasio quae est ab amicis, et increpatio quae est a maioribus, et deprecatio quae est a minoribus, ad hoc quod homo suas

participates in reason. In his opinion this is indicated from the fact that the persuasion of friends, the reproach of superiors and the entreaties of inferiors aim to keep a man

concupiscentias non sequatur. Haec autem omnia frustra essent nisi huiusmodi pars animae irrationalis participare possit ratione. Et ex hoc apparet, quod ratio non

from following his desires. But all these would be useless unless this part of the irrational soul could share in reason. From this too it is apparent that reason is not

subditur motibus passionum appetitus sensitivi, sed potest eos reprimere. Et ideo non subditur motibus caelestium corporum, ex quibus per immutationem

controlled by the movements of the passions of the sensitive appetite but quite the contrary—reason can restrain such movements. Therefore, reason is not

corporis humani potest fieri aliqua immutatio circa appetitum animae sensitivum. Cum enim intellectus vel ratio non sit potentia alicuius organi corporalis,

governed by the motions of the heavenly bodies, which can effect some change in the sensitive appetite of the soul through a change in the human body. Since the

non subicitur directe actioni alicuius virtutis corporeae; et eadem ratione nec

intellect or reason is not a faculty of any bodily organ, it is not directly subject to the

voluntas, quae est in ratione, ut dicitur in tertio de anima.

action of any bodily power. The same is true of the will that is in the reason, as was said in the third book De Anima (Ch. 3, 427 a 21; St. Th. Lect. 4, 617-621).

Deinde cum dicit: si autem oportet et hoc

242. Then [3], at “If however,” he

etc., subdividit alium membrum divisionis primae, scilicet rationalem animae partem. Et dicit, quod si oportet dicere illam partem animae, quae participat ratione

subdivides the other member of the first division, the rational part of the soul. According to him (if we must say that that part of the soul that participates in reason

esse aliqualiter rationale, duplex erit rationale: unum quidem sicut principaliter et in seipso rationem habens, quod est

is rational in some way) the rational part will be of two kinds: one, having reason principally and in itself, is rational by

essentialiter rationale. Aliud autem est, quod est natum obedire rationi, sicut et patri, et hoc dicimus rationale per participationem. Et secundum hoc, unum

nature. But the other is inherently adapted to obey reason as a father, and is called rational by participation. In accord with this, one member is contained under both

membrum continetur et sub rationali et irrationali. Est enim aliquid irrationale tantum, sicut pars animae nutritiva. Quaedam vero est rationalis tantum, sicut

rational and irrational. Now, one part of the soul, the vegetative, is irrational alone; another part is rational alone, the intellect and reason. Still another part is of itself

ipse intellectus et ratio; quaedam vero est secundum se quidem irrationalis, participative autem rationalis.

irrational but rational by participation, like the sensitive appetite and the will.

Deinde cum dicit determinatur autem

243. Then [C], at “Virtue is divided,” he

virtus etc., dividit virtutem secundum praedictam differentiam potentiarum animae. Et dicit quod virtus determinatur, idest dividitur, secundum praedictam

divides virtue according to this difference in the parts of the soul. He says that virtue is designated or divided according to the above-mentioned difference in the parts of

differentiam partium animae. Cum enim virtus humana sit per quam bene perficitur opus hominis quod est secundum rationem, necesse est quod virtus humana

the soul. Since human virtue perfects the work of man which is done according to reason, human virtue must consist in something reasonable. Since the reasonable

sit in aliquo rationali; unde, cum rationale sit duplex, scilicet per essentiam et per participationem, consequens est quod sit

is of two kinds, by nature and by participation, it follows that there are two kinds of human virtue. One of these is

duplex humana virtus. Quarum quaedam sit in eo quod est rationale per seipsum, quae vocatur intellectualis; quaedam vero est in eo quod est rationale per

placed in what is rational by nature and is called intellectual. The other is placed in what is rational by participation, that is, in the appetitive part of the soul, and is called

participationem, idest in appetitiva animae parte, et haec vocatur moralis. Et ideo

moral. Therefore, he says, we call some of the virtues intellectual and some moral.

dicit quod virtutum quasdam dicimus esse intellectuales, quasdam vero morales.

Wisdom, understanding and prudence are said to be intellectual virtues, while

Sapientia enim et intellectus et prudentia dicuntur esse intellectuales virtutes, sed liberalitas et sobrietas morales.

liberality and sobriety are called moral.

Et hoc probat per laudes humanas: quia cum volumus aliquem de moribus suis laudare, non dicimus quod sit sapiens et

244. He proves this point from human praises. When we wish to praise someone for good morals, we do not describe him as

intelligens, sed quod sit sobrius et mitis. Nec solum laudamus aliquem de moribus, sed etiam laudamus aliquem propter habitum sapientiae. Habitus autem

wise and intelligent, but as sober and mildtempered. We do not praise a man for good morals alone but also for the habit of wisdom. Praiseworthy habits are called

laudabiles dicuntur virtutes. Praeter ergo virtutes morales, sunt aliquae intellectuales, sicut sapientia et intellectus

virtues. Therefore, besides the moral virtues, there are also intellectual virtues like wisdom, understanding, and some

et aliquae huiusmodi. Et sic terminatur primus liber.

others of this kind. Thus ends the first book.

BOOK II MORAL VIRTUE IN GENERAL LECTURE 1 Moral Virtue Is Caused by Habit Chapter 1 I. HE TREATS THE VIRTUES THEMSELVES. A. He studies the moral virtues. A’ He investigates the matter of the moral virtues in general. 1. HE TREATS MORAL VIRTUE IN GENERAL. a. He is looking for the cause of moral virtue. i. He shows that moral virtue is caused in us by actions. x. HE SHOWS THE CAUSE OF THE FORMATION OF VIRTUE. aa. He proposes that moral virtue originates in us from the habit of acting. — 245-247 διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. bb.

Virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. The intellectual is generated and fostered for the most part by teaching, and so requires time and experience. Moral virtue however is derived from customary action (mos). Hence by a slight variation of the original term we have this name “moral.”

He shows that moral virtue is not in us by

nature. a’ The first (reason) is this. — 248-249 ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν

From this it is clear that moral virtue is

ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥιπτῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.

not instilled in us by nature, for nothing natural is changed by habit; thus a stone that naturally gravitates downward will never become accustomed to moving upward, not even if someone should continue to throw it into the air ten thousand times. Neither will fire become accustomed to tend downward, nor will anything else that naturally tends one way acquire the contrary custom. Therefore, the moral virtues are not in us by nature nor are they in us contrary to nature. We do have a natural aptitude to acquire them, but we are perfected in these virtues by use.

b’ The second reason. — 250 ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν· τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

Again in the things that come to us from nature, we first receive the potentialities and afterwards we put them into operation. This is obvious in the case of the senses, for we did not acquire our senses from seeing and hearing repeatedly but on the contrary we made use of the senses after we have them—we did not come into possession of them after we used them. Virtues however we acquire by previous activity as happens in different arts, for the things we must learn how to make, we learn by making. Thus men become builders by building and harpists by playing the harp. Likewise we become just by doing just actions, we become temperate by doing temperate actions, and we become courageous by doing courageous actions.

cc. He explains by a sign what he had said. — 251

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. y.

Our contention is verified by what is done in the state, for legislators make men good in accordance with political norms. Such is the aim of every legislator. In fact he who does not succeed in this fails in lawmaking. It is precisely in this way that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

(HE SHOWS) WHAT THE CAUSE OF ITS

DESTRUCTION IS. aa. He explains his proposition. — 252-253 ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί.

Again, every virtue has both its origin and its deterioration from the same principles. A similar situation is found in any art, for it is from playing the harp that both good and bad harpists

ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἳ μὲν δίκαιοι οἳ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἳ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἳ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἳ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἳ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται.

are made. Proportionately this can be said of builders and of all the rest. Men become good builders from building well, but they become poor builders by building poorly. If this were not so, there would be no need of a teacher but all would be born good or bad workmen. This is the case also with virtue. Of those who engage in transactions with their fellowmen, some become just and others unjust. Of those exposed to dangers who habitually experience fear or confidence, some become brave and some cowardly. We may say the same of men in reference to concupiscence and anger, for some become temperate and mild, others self-indulgent and irascible; some conduct themselves well in these matters, others badly. We may then universally state in one sentence: like actions produce like habits.

bb.

He infers a corollary. — 254

διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

Therefore, we must cultivate actions of the right sort because differences in actions are followed by differences in habits. It is not of small moment but it matters a great deal— more than anything else—whether one becomes promptly accustomed to good or bad habits from youth.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Duplici autem virtute existente et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit ea quae sunt praeambula ad virtutem, hic incipit de virtutibus determinare. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de ipsis virtutibus. In secunda de quibusdam, quae consequuntur ad virtutes vel concomitantur eas, in septimo libro, ibi, post haec autem dicendum aliud facientes principium et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de virtutibus moralibus. In secunda de intellectualibus, in sexto libro, ibi: quia autem existimus prius dicentes et cetera. Et ratio ordinis est, quia virtutes morales sunt magis notae, et per eas disponimur ad intellectuales. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat ea quae pertinent ad virtutes morales in communi. In secunda determinat de virtutibus moralibus in speciali. Et hoc, ibi: quoniam quidem igitur medietas est et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in duas: in prima determinat de virtute morali in communi. In secunda

245. After the Philosopher has treated the questions introductory to virtue, he now begins the study of the virtues. He divides the treatise into two parts. In the first part [I] he treats the virtues themselves. In the second he examines certain things that follow or accompany the virtues. He does this in the seventh book (B. 1145 a 15) at “Now, making a new start, we must say etc.” [Lect. 1; I]. The first part is subdivided into two sections. In the first [I, A] he studies the moral virtues; in the second the intellectual virtues, in the sixth book (B.1138 b 18) at “But since we previously said etc.” [Lect. 1]. The reason for this order is that the moral virtues are more known, and through them we are prepared for a study of the intellectual virtues. In the first [A, A’], which is divided into two parts, he investigates the matter of the moral virtues in general. In the second [Bk. III, Lect. 14] he examines the moral virtues specifically, at “We stated previously... is a mean etc.” (B.1115 a 7). This first is again subdivided into two parts. In the first of these [A’, 1] he treats moral virtue in general. In the second he examines certain principles of moral actions. This is in the third book [Lect. 1] beginning at “Since virtue is concerned with passions etc.”

determinat de quibusdam principiis moralium actuum, in tertio libro, ibi, virtute itaque et circa passiones et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes tres. In prima inquirit de causa virtutis moralis. In secunda inquirit quid sit virtus moralis, ibi: post haec autem quid est virtus et cetera. In tertia parte ostendit quomodo aliquis possit fieri virtuosus, ibi: quoniam quidem igitur est virtus moralis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod virtus moralis causatur in nobis ex operibus; secundo ostendit ex qualibus operibus causetur in nobis, ibi, quoniam igitur praesens negotium et cetera. In tertia parte movet quamdam dubitationem circa praedicta, ibi, quaeret autem utique aliquis et cetera.

(B. 1109 b 30). This first has a threefold division. In the first part [1, a] he is looking for the cause of moral virtue. In the second [Lect. 5] he seeks to find out what moral virtue is, at “Now we must search out the definition of virtue” (B. 1105 b 20). In the third part [Lect. 11] he shows how a man may become virtuous, at “A sufficient explanation has been given etc.” (B. 1109 a 19). On the initial point he does three things. First [a, i] he shows that moral virtue is caused in us by actions. Second [Lect. 2; a, ii] he shows by what actions it may be caused in us, at “The present study etc.” (B.1103 b 27). In the third part [Lect. IV] he finds a particular problem in what was previously said, at “Someone may rightly ask etc.”

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quae sit causa generationis virtutis. Secundo quae sit causa corruptionis ipsius, ibi: adhuc ex eisdem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod virtus moralis sit in nobis ex consuetudine operum. Secundo ostendit quod non est in nobis a natura, ibi: ex quo et manifestum et cetera. Tertio manifestat quod dixerat, per signum, ibi: testatur autem et quod fit et cetera.

(B.1105 a 18). In regard to the first he does two things. Initially [i, x] he shows the cause of the formation of virtue; and second [I, y] what the cause of its destruction is, at “Again, every virtue etc.”On the initial point he does three things. First [x, aa] he proposes that moral virtue originates in us from the habit of acting. Second [x, bb] that moral virtue is not in us by nature, at “From this it is clear etc?’ Third [x, cc] he explains by a sign what he had said, at “Our contention is ‘verified by what is done etc.”

Dicit ergo primo quod, cum duplex sit virtus, scilicet intellectualis et moralis, intellectualis virtus secundum plurimum et generatur et augetur ex

246. He says first that virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral, and that the intellectual is both generated and increased for the most part by teaching. The reason is that

doctrina. Cuius ratio est, quia virtus intellectualis ordinatur ad cognitionem,

intellectual virtue is ordered to knowledge which we acquire more readily from teaching

quae quidem acquiritur nobis magis ex doctrina quam ex inventione. Plures

than by discovery. More people can know the truth by learning form others than by

enim sunt, qui possunt cognoscere

ascertaining it themselves. Everyone indeed

veritatem ab aliis addiscendo quam per se inveniendo. Plura etiam unusquisque

who finds out from others will learn more than he can discover by himself. But because we

inveniens ab alio didicit quam per seipsum inveniat. Sed quia in

cannot proceed to in the process of learning, men must learn many truths by discovery.

addiscendo non proceditur in infinitum, oportet quod multa cognoscant

Besides, since all our knowledge is derived from the senses, and the senses in turn very

homines inveniendo. Et quia omnis cognitio nostra ortum habet a sensu et

often beget experience, it follows that intellectual virtue may need long experience.

ex multotiens sentire aliquid fit experimentum. Ideo consequens est quod intellectualis virtus experimento longi temporis.

indigeat

Sed moralis virtus fit ex more, idest ex

247. But m moral virtue is derived from

consuetudine. Virtus enim moralis est in parte appetitiva. Unde importat

customary activity. Now moral virtue, found in the appetitive part, implies a certain inclination

quamdam inclinationem in aliquid appetibile. Quae quidem inclinatio vel

to something desirable. This inclination is nature, which tends to what is agreeable to

est a natura quae inclinat in id quod est sibi conveniens, vel est ex consuetudine

itself, or from custom which is transformed into nature. Hence the name “moral” differing

quae vertitur in naturam. Et inde est quod nomen virtutis moralis sumitur a

somewhat from custom is taken from it. In Greek ethos spelled with epsilon—a short

consuetudine, parum inde declinans. Nam in Graeco ethos per e breve

“e”—means habit or moral virtue, while ithos spelled with eta—a long “e”—signifies custom.

scriptum significat morem sive moralem virtutem, ythos autem scripta

With us also, the name “moral” means custom sometimes and other times it is used in relation

per y Graecum quod est quasi e longum significat consuetudinem. Sicut etiam

to vice or virtue.

apud nos nomen moris quandoque significat consuetudinem, quandoque autem id quod pertinet ad vitium vel virtutem. Deinde cum dicit: ex quo et manifestum

248. Then [x, bb], at “From this it is clearly,”

etc., probat ex praemissis, quod virtus moralis non sit a natura, per duas

he proves from the premises that moral virtue is not produced by nature for two reasons. The

rationes. Quarum prima talis est. Nihil eorum quae sunt a natura variatur

first [bb, a’] is that none of the things from nature are changed by use. He illustrates this

propter assuetudinem; et hoc manifestat per exemplum: quia cum

point by the example of a stone that naturally tending downwards will never become

lapis naturaliter feratur deorsum, quantumcumque proiciatur sursum,

accustomed to moving upward, no matter how often it is thrown into the air. The reason is

nullo modo assuescet sursum moveri, et eadem ratio est de igne et de quolibet

that the things which naturally operate either merely operate or they operate and are

eorum quae naturaliter moventur. Et huius ratio est quia ea quae naturaliter

operated upon. If they merely operate, their principle of action is not changed. So long as

agunt, aut agunt tantum aut agunt et patiuntur. Si agunt tantum, ex hoc non

the cause remains the same, the inclination to the same effect remains. If, however, they so

immutabitur in eis principium actionis et ideo, manente eadem causa, semper

operate as also to be operated upon—unless the passivity be such that it removes the

remanet inclinatio ad eumdem effectum. Si autem sic agant quod etiam

principle of action—the natural tendency in them will not be destroyed. But if the passivity

patiantur, nisi sit talis passio quae removeat principium actionis, non

be such as to take away the principle of action, then it will not belong to the same nature.

tolletur inclinatio naturalis quae inerat. Si vero sit talis passio quae auferat

Thus what was previously natural will cease to be natural. When a thing operates naturally,

principium

erit

therefore, no change is effected regarding its

eiusdem naturae. Et sic non erit sibi naturale quod fuerat prius. Et ideo per

action. The same is also true if the operation is contrary to nature unless perhaps the motion

hoc quod naturaliter aliquid agit, non immutatur circa suam actionem. Et

be such that it destroys nature. But if the natural principle of the operation remains,

similiter etiam si moveatur contra naturam; nisi forte sit talis motio quae

there will always be the same action. Therefore, in the things that are according to

naturam corrumpat; si vero naturale principium actionis maneat, semper erit

nature and in the things that are contrary to nature habit plays no part.

actionis,

iam

non

eadem actio; et ideo neque in his quae sunt secundum naturam neque in his quae sunt contra naturam consuetudo aliquid facit. In his autem quae pertinent ad virtutes consuetudo aliquid facit. Cuius ratio est, quia virtus moralis

249. The reason for this is that moral virtue

pertinet ad appetitum, qui operatur secundum quod movetur a bono

pertains to the appetite that operates according as it is moved by the good

apprehenso. Et ideo simul cum hoc quod multoties operatur oportet quod

apprehended. When the appetite operates often, therefore, it must be often moved by its

multoties moveatur a suo obiecto. Et ex hoc consequitur quamdam

object. in this the appetite follows a certain tendency in accordance with the mode of

inclinationem ad modum naturae, sicut etiam multae guttae cadentes lapidem

nature, as many drops of water falling on a rock hollow it out. Thus it is obvious that the

cavant. Sic igitur patet quod virtutes morales neque sunt in nobis a natura

moral virtues are not in us by nature, nor are they in us contrary to nature. We do have a

neque sunt nobis contra naturam. Sed inest nobis naturalis aptitudo ad

natural aptitude to acquire them inasmuch as the appetitive potency is naturally adapted to

suscipiendum eas, in quantum scilicet vis appetitiva in nobis nata est obedire

obey reason. But we are perfected in these virtues by use, for when we act repeatedly

rationi. Perficiuntur autem in nobis per assuetudinem, inquantum scilicet ex eo

according to reason, a modification is impressed in the appetite by the power of

quod multoties agimus secundum rationem, imprimitur forma rationis in

reason. This impression is nothing else but moral virtue.

vi appetitiva, quae quidem impressio nihil aliud est quam virtus moralis. Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc

250. He presents the second reason [bb, b’] at

quaecumque natura quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. In omnibus illis, quae

“Again in the in the things.” In all the things with which nature has endowed us, potency is

nobis insunt ex natura, prius inest nobis potentia quam operatio. Et hoc

previous to operation. This is obvious in the senses. We did not receive the sense of sight

patet in sensibus. Non enim ex hoc, quod multoties vidimus vel audivimus,

and hearing from seeing and hearing repeatedly. On the contrary, from the fact that

accepimus sensum visus et auditus. Sed e converso ex hoc, quod habuimus hos

we had these senses, we began to use them. It did not happen that we came into possession of

sensus, uti eis coepimus, non autem ex hoc quod eis usi sumus factum est, ut

the senses from the fact that we used them. But we have acquired the virtues by acting

eos haberemus. Sed operando secundum virtutem accepimus virtutes,

according to virtue, as happens in the operative arts in which men learn by making

sicut etiam contingit in artibus operativis, in quibus homines faciendo

the things that are to be made after they have mastered the skill. In this way men become

addiscunt ea quae oportet eos facere postquam didicerint, sicut aedificando

builders by building, and harpists by playing the harp. Likewise men become temperate or

fiunt aedificatores et cytharizando cytharistae. Et similiter operando iusta,

courageous by doing just actions or temperate actions or courageous actions. Therefore,

aut temperata, aut fortia, fiunt homines iusti, aut temperati, aut fortes. Ergo

virtues of this kind are not in us by nature.

huiusmodi virtutes non sunt in nobis a natura. Deinde cum dicit: testatur autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat, per signum. Et

251. Then [x, cc], at “Our contention is verified,” he makes known what he had said, by

dicit quod ei quod dictum est, quod operando efficimur virtuosi, attestatur

a sign. He says the statement just made that by performing actions we become virtuous is

hoc quod fit in civitatibus; quia legislatores assuefaciendo homines per

verified by what is done in the state. Legislators make men virtuous by habituating

praecepta, praemia et poenas ad opera virtutum, faciunt eos virtuosos. Et ad

them to virtuous works by means of statutes, rewards and punishment. Such ought to be the

hoc debet fieri intentio cuiuslibet legislatoris, qui vero hoc non bene

aim of every legislator—in fact he who does not succeed in this fails in lawmaking. It is

faciunt, peccant in legislatione. Et horum civilitas differt a recta civilitate

precisely in this way that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

secundum differentiam boni et mali. Deinde cum dicit: adhuc ex eisdem etc.,

252. Then [i, y], at “Again, every virtue,” he

ostendit quod ex operibus corrumpitur virtus. Et primo ostendit propositum.

shows that virtue is produced and destroyed by identical works. First [y, aa] he explains his

Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, propter quod oportet, et

proposition, and second [y, bb] he infers a corollary from what has been said, at

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod eadem sunt principia ex quibus diversimode

“Therefore, we must etc.” He says first that the production and the destruction of virtue

acceptis, fit et corrumpitur virtus. Et similiter est de qualibet arte. Et

have their source in the same principles taken in a different way. The same is true in any art.

manifestat hoc primo in artibus, quia ex hoc quod citharizant aliqualiter

He shows this first from activities, because men become both good and bad harpists—

homines fiunt et cytharistae, si

boni et mali proportionaliter

understanding this proportionately—from the way they play the harp. A similar reason holds

accipiatur. Et eadem ratio est de aedificatoribus et de omnibus aliis

for builders and all other workmen. Men become good builders by building well

artificibus, quia ex hoc quod frequenter bene aedificant fiunt boni aedificatores,

repeatedly, they become poor builders by building poorly. If this were not so, men would

et ex male aedificando mali. Et si hoc non esset verum, non indigerent

not need to learn arts of this kind from some master workman who would direct their

homines ad addiscendum huiusmodi artes aliquo docente qui dirigeret eorum

actions, but there would be good and bad workmen in all the arts no matter how they

actiones, sed omnes, qualitercumque operarentur, fierent vel boni vel mali

would be practiced. As it is in the arts, so also in the virtues.

artifices. Et sicut se habet in artibus, ita se habet in virtutibus.

Qui enim in commutationibus quae sunt ad homines bene operantur, fiunt iusti,

253. Those who act well in their dealings with their fellowmen become just, and those who

qui autem male, iniusti; et similiter qui operantur in periculis et assuescunt

act in an evil way become unjust. Likewise those faced with danger who accustom

timere vel confidere, si hoc bene faciunt fiunt fortes; si autem male, timidi. Et

themselves to fear and confidence in the right way become courageous; in the wrong way,

ita est etiam de temperantia et mansuetudine circa concupiscentias et

cowardly. This is true also of temperance and meekness in the matter of concupiscence and

iras. Et universaliter, ut uno sermone dicatur, ex similibus operationibus fiunt

anger. We may then universally sum up in one sentence: like actions produce like habits.

similes habitus.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet etc., concludit ex praemissis quod

254. Then [y, bb], at “Therefore, we must,” he affirms that a person must give careful

oportet studium adhibere quales operationes aliquis faciat; quia

attention to the performance of such actions because differences in actions are followed by

secundum harum differentiam sequuntur differentiae habituum. Et

differences in habits. He concludes, therefore, it is not of small moment but it makes a great

ideo ulterius concludit quod non parum differt, quod aliquis statim a iuventute

difference—indeed everything depends on it— that one becomes accustomed to perform

assuescat vel bene vel male operari; sed multum differt; quin potius totum ex

either good or evil actions from earliest youth, for we retain longer the things impressed on

hoc dependet. Nam ea quae nobis a pueritia imprimuntur, firmius

us as children.

retinemus.

LECTURE 2 Virtue and Action Chapter 2 ii. He now inquires how (virtues are caused in us by actions). x. HE SHOWS WHAT ARE THE ACTIONS WHICH CAUSE VIRTUE IN US. aa. He shows the necessity of the present investigation. a’ He presents the necessity itself. — 255-256 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία

The present study is not pursued for the

οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν

sake of contemplation like other studies. We seek the definition of virtue not in

ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς, ἀναγκαῖον

order to know but in order to become virtuous; otherwise it would have no utility. We must then thoroughly

ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις,

investigate what concerns actions and how they are to be performed, for actions control the formation of habits, as we have pointed out.

καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. b’ He shows what we must suppose. — 257

τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον

To be in accord with right reason is a

πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθωῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς

quality common to these actions and should be taken for granted. Later we will discuss the question both as to the definition of right reason and as to how

ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

right reason is related to the other virtues.

bb.

He treats the method of investigation. — 258-259

ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς

It must be presupposed that any discussion concerning actions to be performed ought to be given in a general way and not definitively. We remarked in

εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ

the beginning that discussions must be pursued according to the nature of the subject matter. Now things pertaining to actions, and relevant considerations, do

ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην

not have anything fixed about them any more than the things that concern health. If this be true in the general treatment, still more uncertainty will be

οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς

found in the consideration of particular cases. Indeed this study does not fall under either art or tradition. But those who perform moral actions must always

ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.

pay attention to what is appropriate to the occasion as is done in medicine and navigation. Although this is the situation, we ought to try to be of assistance to others in the present study.

cc. He shows actions as causes of virtue. a’ He shows by what actions virtue is caused. — 260-263 πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας

We must then first consider that moral matters are of such a nature as to be

καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς

destroyed by defect and excess. To prove such notions that are not readily manifest we must use obvious signs and evidence such as we have in the case of

ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν,

bodily strength and health. An excessive amount of exercise no less than a lack of it impairs health. Likewise eating and

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ

drinking too much or too little causes damage to health. But health is produced, increased, and preserved by eating and drinking in moderation. It is

σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος

the same then with temperance and fortitude and the other virtues. The man who is afraid of everything, who runs away and will endure nothing becomes a

καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ

coward. On the other hand, the man who fears absolutely nothing and wades into every danger becomes reckless. Likewise a man who tastes every pleasure and

μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός τις·

passes up none, becomes intemperate while he who seeks to avoid all pleasures like a boor becomes as it were insensible. Temperance and fortitude are destroyed

φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται.

by excess and defect but are preserved by the golden mean.

b’ He shows that virtue already formed produces in turn like actions. — 264 ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν

Not only the production, increase, and destruction of virtues have identical sources and causes but the actions themselves also have the same sources

τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν

and causes. We see this in the more obvious actions like bodily strength. A man becomes strong from taking abundant nourishment and from hard

τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ' αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν·

work. Then when he is strong, he will be more able to do these things. We find the same thing in the virtues since we become temperate by giving up

ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

pleasures, and having become temperate we can b very easily give up pleasures. The same is true of the virtue of fortitude. We become brave by

ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ

accustoming ourselves to despise and

καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ

endure terrors, and having become brave we are very capable of enduring terrors.

φοβερά.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quoniam igitur praesens negotium et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod virtutes causantur in nobis ex

255. After the Philosopher has shown that virtues are caused in us by actions, he now inquires how this is done [ii]. On this point

operationibus, hic inquirit quomodo hoc fiat. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quales sint operationes ex quibus virtus causatur in nobis. Secundo ostendit quid

he does two things. First [ii, x] he shows what are the actions that cause virtue in us. Second [Lect. 3; y], at “We may understand etc.” (B.1104 b 4), he shows what is the

sit signum virtutis iam generatae in nobis, ibi, signum autem oportet facere, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit necessitatem praesentis

sign of virtue already produced in us. On the initial, point he does three things. First [x, aa] he shows the necessity of the present investigation. Second [x, bb], at “It must be

inquisitionis. Secundo determinat modum inquirendi, ibi, illud autem praeconfessum sit, et cetera. Tertio ostendit ex qualibus operationibus causantur virtutes. Circa

presupposed etc.,” he treats the method of investigation. Third [x, cc] he shows actions as causes of virtue. In regard to the first he does two things. Initially [aa, a’] he presents

primum duo facit. Primo ostendit necessitatem praesentis inquisitionis. Secundo ostendit quid oporteat hic supponere, ibi, secundum rectam quidem

the necessity itself. Second [aa, b’], at “To be in accord with right reason etc.,” he shows what we must suppose here. Regarding the first we must consider that

igitur et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod in speculativis scientiis in quibus non quaeritur nisi cognitio veritatis, sufficit cognoscere quae

in the speculative sciences where we seek only the knowledge of the truth, it is sufficient to know what is the cause of a determined effect. But in the practical

sit causa talis effectus. Sed in scientiis operativis, quarum finis est operatio, oportet cognoscere qualibus motibus seu operationibus talis effectus a tali causa

sciences whose end is action, we must know by what activities or operations a determined effect follows from a determined cause.

sequatur. Dicit ergo, quod praesens negotium, scilicet moralis philosophiae, non est

256. He says then that the present study, moral philosophy, is not pursued for the

propter contemplationem veritatis, sicut alia negotia scientiarum speculativarum,

sake of the contemplation of truth like the other studies of the speculative sciences, but

sed est propter operationem. Non enim in hac scientia scrutamur quid est virtus ad hoc solum ut sciamus huius rei veritatem;

for the sake of action. In this science we seek a definition of virtue not only to know its truth but to become good by acquiring

sed ad hoc, quod acquirentes virtutem, boni efficiamur. Et huius rationem assignat: quia si inquisitio huius scientiae esset ad solam scientiam veritatis, parum

virtue. The reason he assigns is that if the investigation of this science were for the knowledge of truth alone, it would have little utility. It is not of great importance

esset utilis. Non enim magnum quid est, nec multum pertinens ad perfectionem intellectus, quod aliquis cognoscat variabilem veritatem contingentium

nor does it contribute much to the perfection of the intellect that a man should know the changeable truth about contingent actions with which virtue is

operabilium, circa quae est virtus. Et quia ita est, concludit, quod necesse est perscrutari circa operationes nostras, quales sint fiendae. Quia, sicut supra

concerned. This being the case, he concludes that we must thoroughly inquire about the actions we ought to perform because, as we have already observed (248-253), actions

dictum est, operationes habent virtutem et dominium super hoc, quod in nobis generentur habitus boni vel mali.

have influence and control over the formation of good and bad habits in us.

Deinde cum dicit: secundum rectam quidem igitur etc., ostendit quid oporteat in ista inquisitione supponere. Et dicit quod hoc debet supponi tamquam quiddam

257. Then [aa, b’], at “To be in accord with right,” he shows it should be taken for granted that actions causing virtue possess the common quality of being in accord with

commune circa qualitatem operationum causantium virtutem, quod scilicet sint secundum rationem rectam. Cuius ratio est, quia bonum cuiuslibet rei est in hoc

right reason. This happens because the good of everything consists in the fact that its operation is suited to its form. Now the distinctive form of man is that which makes

quod sua operatio sit conveniens suae formae. Propria autem forma hominis est secundum quam est animal rationale. Unde oportet quod operatio hominis sit

him a rational animal. Hence man’s action must be good precisely because it harmonizes with right reason, for perversity of reason is repugnant to its

bona ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem rectam. Perversitas enim rationis repugnat naturae rationis. Posterius autem determinabitur, scilicet in sexto

nature. Later in the sixth book (1109) we shall ascertain what is right reason, which belongs to the intellectual virtues, and how it pertains to the other virtues, which are

libro, quid sit recta ratio, quae scilicet pertinet ad virtutes intellectuales, et qualiter se habeat ad alias virtutes, scilicet ad morales.

the moral.

Deinde cum dicit: illud autem praeconfessum sit etc., determinat modum

258. Then [x, bb], at “It must be,” he explains the method of investigating

inquirendi de talibus. Et dicit, quod illud oportet primo supponere, quod omnis

matters of this kind. We must presume, he says, that any discussion concerned like this

sermo qui est de operabilibus, sicut est iste, debet tradi typo, idest exemplariter, vel similitudinarie, et non secundum

with actions to be performed ought to be given in a general way, that is, as a precedent or as, likely, but not definitively.

certitudinem; sicut dictum est in prooemio totius libri. Et hoc ideo, quia sermones sunt exquirendi secundum conditionem materiae, ut ibi dictum est, videmus

This was pointed out in the introduction to the whole work (24). The reason is that the discussions are to be carried on according to the nature of the subject matter, as was

autem, quod ea quae sunt in operationibus moralibus et illa quae sunt ad haec utilia, scilicet bona exteriora, non habent in seipsis aliquid stans per modum

noted in the same place (32). We see that things pertaining to moral actions and materials useful to them, like external goods, do not have in themselves anything

necessitatis, sed omnia sunt contingentia et variabilia. Sicut etiam accidit in operationibus medicinalibus quae sunt circa sana, quia et ipsa dispositio corporis

fixed by way of necessity, but everything is contingent and changeable. The same occurs in works relating to medicine, which are concerned with health, because the

sanandi et res quae assumuntur ad sanandum, multipliciter variantur.

disposition of the body to be cured and the remedies used to effect a cure are changeable in many ways.

Et cum sermo moralium etiam in universalibus sit incertus et variabilis, adhuc magis incertus est si quis velit ulterius descendere tradendo doctrinam de

259. The teaching on matters of morals even in their general aspects is uncertain and variable. But still more uncertainty is found when we come down to the solution of

singulis in speciali. Hoc enim non cadit neque sub arte, neque sub aliqua narratione, quia casus singularium operabilium variantur infinitis modis.

particular cases. This study does not fall under either art or tradition because the causes of individual actions are infinitely diversified. Hence judgment of particular

Unde iudicium de singulis relinquitur prudentiae uniuscuiusque, et hoc est quod subdit, quod oportet ipsos operantes per suam prudentiam intendere ad

cases is left to the prudence of each one. He who acts prudently must attentively consider the things to be done at the present time after all the particular circumstances

considerandum ea quae convenit agere secundum praesens tempus, consideratis omnibus particularibus circumstantiis; sicut oportet medicum facere in

have been taken into consideration. In this way a doctor must act in bringing about a cure and a captain in steering a ship. Although this doctrine is such as to be

medicando, et gubernatorem in regimine navis. Quamvis autem hic sermo sit talis, id est in universali incertus, in particulari autem inenarrabilis, tamen attentare

uncertain in its general aspects and incapable of precision in particular cases, we ought to study it so that in these matters we may be of some assistance to men in

debemus, ut aliquod auxilium super hoc hominibus conferamus, per quod scilicet

directing their actions.

dirigantur in suis operibus. Deinde cum dicit: primum igitur hoc speculandum etc., ostendit quales

260. Then [x, cc], at “We must then first,” he shows what are the operations that may

operationes sint quae causent virtutem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit ex qualibus operationibus causatur virtus. Secundo ostendit, quod virtus causata

cause virtue. On this point he does two things. First [cc, a’] he shows by what actions virtue is caused. Second [cc, b’], at “Not only the production etc.,” he shows

similes operationes producit, ibi, sed non solum generationes, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, hoc esse primo considerandum, quod virtutes sive operationes causantes

that virtue already formed produces in turn like actions. He says first we must consider before anything else that virtues or operations causing virtues are of such a

virtutem natae sunt corrumpi ex superabundantia et defectu. Et ad hoc manifestandum oportet assumere quaedam manifestiora signa et testimonia;

nature as to be destroyed by excess and .defect. To prove this we must use certain more obvious signs and evidence, that is, the things happening in regard to the powers of

scilicet ea quae accidunt circa virtutes corporis, quae sunt manifestiores quam virtutes animae.

the body that are more manifest than the capacities of the soul.

Videmus enim quod fortitudo corporalis corrumpitur ex superabundantibus gignasiis, id est exercitiis quibusdam

261. We see that bodily strength is impaired by immoderate games, that is, certain bodily exercises in which the contestants do battle

corporalibus (in) quibus aliqui nudi decertabant, eo quod per nimium laborem debilitatur virtus naturalis corporis; similiter etiam defectus horum

naked, because the natural power of the body is weakened by excessive exertion. Likewise the lack of exercise destroys bodily strength because, when not exercised, the

exercitiorum corrumpit fortitudinem corporalem, quia ex defectu exercitii membra remanent mollia et debilia ad laborandum. Et similiter etiam est in

members remain flabby and incapable of work. A similar comment may be made about health. If someone takes either too much food or drink, or less than he needs,

sanitate. Nam sive aliquis sumat nimis de cibo vel potu, sive etiam minus, quam oporteat, corrumpitur sanitas. Sed si aliquis secundum debitam mensuram

his health is impaired. But if a man uses exercise, food, and drink in moderation, he will become physically strong and his health will be improved and preserved.

utatur exercitiis et cibis et potibus, fiet in eo fortitudo corporalis et sanitas et augebitur et conservabitur. Et ita etiam se habet in virtutibus animae, puta fortitudine et temperantia et aliis virtutibus. Ille enim qui omnia timet et fugit et nihil sustinet terribilium, efficitur

262. It is the same with the virtues of the soul, for instance, fortitude, temperance, and the other virtues. A person who fears everything, takes to flight, and never faces

timidus. Et similiter qui nihil timet, sed ad omnia pericula praecipitanter vadit,

anything terrifying becomes a coward. Likewise he who fears nothing and wades

efficitur audax. Et ita est etiam ex parte temperantiae; ille enim qui potitur qualibet voluptate, et nullam vitat, efficitur intemperatus. Qui autem omnes vitat,

into every danger thoughtlessly becomes rash. The same is true of temperance. He who tastes every pleasure and avoids none becomes intemperate. But he who avoids all

sicut homines agrestes absque ratione faciunt, iste efficitur insensibilis.

pleasures as a boor does, without any reason, becomes as it were insensible.

Nec tamen ex hoc accipi potest quod

263. However we are not to conclude from

virginitas, quae abstinet ab omni delectatione venerea, sit vitium; tum quia per hoc non abstinet ab omnibus delectationibus, tum quia ab his

this that virginity, which abstains from all venereal pleasure, is a vice. The reason is that virginity does not abstain from all pleasures, and that it abstains from

delectationibus abstinet secundum rationem rectam: quemadmodum etiam non est vitiosum quod aliqui milites abstinent ab omnibus delectationibus

particular pleasures according to right reason. Similarly, it is not a vice for some soldiers to refrain from all venereal pleasure in order to devote themselves more fully to

venereis, ut liberius vacent rebus bellicis. Haec autem ideo dicta sunt quia temperantia et fortitudo corrumpitur ex superabundantia et defectu, a medietate

fighting. Now these things have been said because temperance and fortitude are destroyed by excess and defect but are preserved by the golden mean, which is

autem salvatur; quae quidem medietas accipitur non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum rationem rectam.

understood not according to quantity but according to right reason.

Deinde cum dicit: sed non solum generationes etc., ostendit quod virtus similes operationes producit eis ex quibus generatur. Et dicit quod ex eisdem

264. Then [cc, b’] at “Not only,” he shows that virtue produces actions similar to the actions that caused it. He says that the same kinds of activity cause the production

operationibus fiunt generationes virtutum et augmentationes et corruptiones si contrario modo accipiantur, sed etiam operationes virtutum generatarum in

and increase of virtue, and also its destruction if they are taken in a contrary way. Likewise the operations of the virtues already produced consist in these same

eisdem consistunt. Et hoc patet in corporalibus quae sunt manifestiora, sicut fortitudo corporalis causatur ex hoc quod potest multum cibum sumere et multos

works. This is obvious in bodily actions which are more manifest. As bodily strength is caused from the fact that a man can take abundant nourishment and can

labores sustinere, et quando factus est fortis, potest ista maxime facere, ita etiam se habet in virtutibus animae, quia ex hoc quod recedimus a voluptatibus efficimur

work hard, and when he has become strong he will be more able to do these things, so also it is with the virtues of the soul. From the fact that we give up pleasures, we

temperati;

become temperate; and when we have

et

quando

facti

sumus

temperati, maxime possumus recedere a voluptatibus. Et similiter se habet in virtute fortitudinis: quia per hoc quod sumus assueti contemnere et sustinere

become temperate, we can very easily give up pleasures. It is the same with the virtue of fortitude. We become brave by accustoming ourselves to despise and

terribilia, efficimur fortes, et facti fortes maxime hoc possumus facere: sicut etiam ignis generatus ex calefactione potest maxime calefacere.

endure terrors, and having become brave we are very capable of enduring terrors. So also, fire once kindled from generated heat can give off intense heat.

LECTURE 3 Signs of Virtue Chapter 3 y. HE NOW EXPLAINS HOW WE MAY RECOGNIZE VIRTUE ALREADY PRODUCED. aa. He presents what he intends to do. — 265-267 σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος

We may understand pleasure or sorrow that follows activity as an indication of the habits that are

τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ

present. Indeed the man who avoids bodily pleasures is temperate if he is glad about it; intemperate, if sad about it. Likewise, the man who

λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή·

encounters dangers is brave if he rejoices or is not sad, but cowardly if he is saddened. Moral virtue then is concerned with pleasure and sorrows.

bb.

He proves his proposition. a’ By reasons belonging to virtue. A. FIRST REASON. — 268

διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα.

We perform evil actions for the sake of pleasure and avoid good actions because of sadness. Therefore, as

Plato says [Laws 653], we need some sort of training from our earliest years so that we may rejoice and be sorrowful about the right things, for proper instruction consists in this. B. SECOND REASON. — 269 διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ

Besides, if virtues are concerned with activities and passions, and pleasure

λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

and sorrow follow every act and passion, then certainly virtue will deal with pleasures and sorrows.

C. THIRD REASON. — 270 ἔτι δ' εἰ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ

Penalties inflicted because of pleasure and sorrow also prove our point, for penalties are, as it were, remedies.

διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

Remedies by their very nature work through contraries.

D. FOURTH REASON. — 271-272 μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν

Furthermore, as we said previously, every habit of the soul has a natural disposition to do and to be busied

ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρώην εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα

with those things by which it is made better and worse. Men become wicked by pursuing the pleasures and avoiding the sorrows that are wrong,

τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως

or by doing this at the wrong time or in the wrong manner or in some other way that one may deviate from reason. Consequently, some define

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς

virtues as certain quiescent and emotionless dispositions. But they err in speaking absolutely and in not qualifying the passions as to manner,

δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς

time, and so forth. We must suppose therefore that virtue is such that it works what is best regarding

καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον.

pleasures and sorrows, and vice does the contrary.

b’ By reasons on the Part of the virtuous man himself. A. FIRST REASON. — 273-275 γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων

Our contention will become evident

φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν] τῶν

from the following consideration. Three things fall under our choice: the good, the useful, the pleasurable; and three contrary things we avoid:

ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ

the evil, the harmful, the sorrowful. In regard to all these, the virtuous man disposes himself rightly and the vicious man badly. This is especially

τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται.

true in the matter of pleasure that is common to animals and is found in all things obtained by choice, for the good and the useful seem also to be pleasurable.

B. SECOND REASON. — 276 ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν

Pleasure, too, has grown up with all of us from childhood. Therefore, it is

ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ.

difficult to curb this passion which is acquired with life itself.

τὸ

πάθος

C. THIRD REASON. — 277 κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἳ μὲν μᾶλλον οἳ δ' ἧττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ

Some regulate their activities to a greater degree and others to a lesser

λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι.

degree by pleasure and sorrow. About these, then, our whole study must be concerned, for it is not a thing of small importance in human actions to take pleasure or sorrow in the right or wrong way.

D. FOURTH REASON. — 278

ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις

As Heraclitus says, it is even more difficult to fight against pleasure than anger. Now the more difficult is always treated by art and virtue, which operate well and more efficiently in the face of difficulty. Hence the whole business of virtue and of political science is occupied

χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

with pleasures and sorrows. Assuredly he who uses these well will be virtuous, and he who uses them badly will be evil.

cc. He sums up what has been said. — 279 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ

It has been said that (1) virtue treats

ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

of pleasures and sorrows, (2) virtue is produced and increased by the same actions that, when done in a different way destroy virtue, (3) the same actions that produce virtue are in turn produced by virtue.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Signum autem oportet facere et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quales

265. After the Philosopher has shown what kind of activity produces virtue, he now [y]

debeant esse operationes ex quibus causantur virtutes, hic ostendit quid sit signum virtutis iam generatae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, propter voluptatem quidem enim et cetera. Circa primum considerandum quod, cum virtus similia operetur his

explains how we may recognize virtue already produced. On this point he does two things. First [y, aa] he presents what he intends to do; and second [y, bb], at “We perform evil actions etc.,” he proves his proposition. Regarding the first we must consider that when virtue produces actions similar to the actions that formed it, as was

operationibus ex quibus generata est, ut supra dictum est, differt executio huiusmodi operationum post virtutem et ante virtutem. Nam ante virtutem facit homo sibi quamdam violentiam ad operandum huiusmodi. Et ideo tales operationes habent aliquam tristitiam

just noted (264), the performance of this action differs before and after virtue. Before virtue man does a kind of violence to himself in operating this way. Such actions, therefore, have some admixture of sorrow. But after the habit of virtue has been formed, these actions are done with pleasure.

admixtam. Sed post habitum virtutis generatum, huiusmodi operationes fiunt

The explanation is that a habit exists as a sort of nature, and that is pleasurable which

delectabiliter. Quia habitus inest per modum cuiusdam naturae. Ex hoc autem est aliquid delectabile, quod convenit alicui secundum naturam.

agrees with a thing according to nature.

Dicit ergo hic esse signum habituum iam generatorum, vel bonorum vel malorum, quod accipitur ex delectatione vel tristitia, quae supervenit operationibus. Et hoc manifestat per exempla. Ille enim, qui in hoc gaudet quod recedit a voluptatibus corporalibus est temperatus, qui autem in

266. He says that an indication that habits, good or bad, have already been formed is given by the pleasure or sorrow that follows the operations. He illustrates this by examples. The man who is glad that he has avoided bodily pleasures is temperate because he performs an action in keeping

hoc tristatur est intemperatus, quia operatur id quod est contrarium suo habitui. Et similiter ille qui sustinet pericula delectabiliter, vel ad minus sine tristitia, est fortis. Specialiter enim in actu fortitudinis sufficit non tristari, ut infra dicetur in tertio. Ille autem qui cum tristitia pericula sustinet, timidus est.

with the habit. Likewise, he who encounters dangers with pleasure, or at least without sorrow, is brave. Particularly in the act of fortitude it is enough not to have sorrow, as will be explained in the third book (584-585). One who faces dangers with sorrow is cowardly. He then assigns the reason for what he has said from the fact that every

Causam autem eius quod dictum est assignat ex hoc quod omnis moralis virtus est circa voluptates et tristitias.

moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows.

Quod quidem non est sic intelligendum quasi omnis virtus moralis sit circa voluptates et tristitias, sicut circa propriam materiam. Materia enim uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis est id circa quod modum rationis imponit. Sicut

267. From this we must not conclude that ever moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows as its proper matter. The matter indeed of every moral virtue is that on which reason imposes a norm. Thus justice treats of dealing with others,

iustitia circa operationes quae sunt ad alterum, fortitudo circa timores et audacias, temperantia circa quasdam delectationes et tristitias; sed sicut dicetur in septimo huius, delectatio est principalis finis omnium virtutum moralium. Hoc enim requiritur in omni

fortitude treats of fears and aggressiveness, temperance of certain pleasures. But pleasure is the principal end of all the moral virtues, as will be said in the seventh book of the present work (1504-1515). In every moral virtue it is requisite that a person have joy and sorrow in the things he ought.

virtute morali, ut aliquis delectetur et tristetur in quibus oportet. Et secundum hoc, hic dicitur quod moralis virtus est circa voluptates et tristitias, quia intentio

In keeping with this, he says that moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows because the purpose of any moral virtue is that a man be rightly ordered in his

cuiuslibet virtutis moralis est ad hoc quod aliquis recte se habeat in delectando et tristando.

pleasures and sorrows.

Deinde cum dicit: propter voluptatem quidem enim etc., probat propositum. Et primo rationibus sumptis ex his quae pertinent ad virtutem. Secundo ex parte

268. Then [y, bb], at “We perform evil actions,” he proves his proposition: first [bb, a’] by reasons taken from things belonging to virtue, and second [bb, b’], at “Our

ipsius hominis virtuosi, ibi: fiet autem utique nobis et cetera. Circa primum ponit quatuor rationes. Quarum prima sumitur ex studio hominum tendentium in virtutem. Ostensum est enim supra quod ex eisdem contrario modo factis, virtus generatur et corrumpitur. Videmus autem quod propter voluptatem

contention will etc., by reasons on the part of the virtuous man himself. He presents four reasons pertaining to the first point. The first reason [a’, a] is taken from the inclination of men intent on virtue. It was shown previously (264-265) that virtue is produced and destroyed by deeds of the same person done in a contrary way. Indeed, we

et tristitiam virtus corrumpitur. Quia propter concupiscentiam delectationum operamur mala, propter tristitiam autem quam timemus in laboribus honestatis recedimus a bonis, idest virtuosis operibus. Et ideo, sicut Plato dixit, oportet eum qui tendit ad virtutem, statim a iuventute aliqualiter manuduci

see that virtue is destroyed by pleasure and sadness; we perform evil actions out of a desire for pleasure, we avoid good or virtuous works because of the sadness we fear in honest labor. Hence, as Plato said, one who is intent on virtue should have some sort of moral training from his earliest years that he may rejoice and be sorrowful about

(ut) et gaudeat et tristetur de quibus oportet. Haec est enim recta disciplina iuvenum ut assuescant (ut) et delectentur in bonis operibus et tristentur de malis. Et ideo instructores iuvenum cum bene faciunt applaudunt eis, cum autem male agunt increpant eos.

the right things. This is proper instruction for youths so that they become accustomed to take pleasure in good works and be grieved in evil works. Therefore, teachers of youth compliment those who do good deeds and reprove those who do evil.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem si virtutes et cetera. Quae quidem sumitur ex materia virtutis moralis in hunc modum. Omnis virtus moralis est circa actus, sicut iustitia, quae est circa emptiones et venditiones et alia huiusmodi, vel circa passiones, sicut mansuetudo, quae est circa iras: et sic de

269. At “Besides, if” [a’, b] he presents the second reason based on the matter of the moral virtue in the following way. Every moral virtue deals with actions (as justice which treats of buying, selling, and other things of this kind), or with passions (as mildness which treats of anger), and so with the other virtues. But pleasure or sorrow

aliis. Sed ad omnem passionem sequitur delectatio vel tristitia. Quia passio animae nihil est aliud quam motus appetitivae

follows every passion that is nothing else but the motion of the appetitive power in pursuit of good or in flight from evil. When the good

virtutis in prosecutionem boni vel in fugam mali; cum ergo pervenitur in bonum in quod appetitus tendit vel cum vitat malum, quod refugiebat, sequitur delectatio. Quando autem est e converso, sequitur tristitia. Sicut iratus quando consequitur vindictam, laetatur, et

to which the appetite tends is forthcoming, therefore, or when the evil which it flees is avoided, pleasure follows. But when the contrary happens, sorrow follows. Thus the angered man rejoices in getting revenge and likewise the cowardly man in avoiding dangers. But when the opposite is true,

similiter timidus quando evadit pericula, quando autem e contrario se habet tristatur. Relinquitur ergo quod modo praedicto omnis virtus moralis sit circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa quaedam finalia.

these persons are sorrowful. It remains, therefore, that every moral virtue regards pleasures and sorrows as having the aspect of ends.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi demonstrant autem et poenae et cetera. Et sumitur ex medicina virtutis. Sicut enim medicinae ad sanitatem restituendam sunt quaedam

270. The third reason presented at “Penalties inflicted” [a’, c] is taken from the idea of a remedy for the soul. As a medicine used for the restoration of health is a kind of

amarae potiones exhibitae et delectabiles subtractae, ita etiam poenae sunt quaedam medicinae ad reparandam virtutem. Quae quidem fiunt per subtractionem aliquarum delectationum vel adhibitionem aliquarum tristitiarum. Medicinae autem natae sunt fieri per contraria; sicut quando superabundat

disagreeable potion from which the sweetness has been removed, so a penalty used for the restoration of virtue is a kind of medicine, for a penalty consists in taking away certain pleasures or applying certain disagreeable things. The reason for this is that a medicine is naturally to be used as a contrary thing. Thus in the case of fever

calor, medici adhibent frigida. Ergo etiam virtus moralis est circa aliquas delectationes et tristitias.

doctors apply cooling remedies. Hence moral virtue also is concerned with certain pleasures and sorrows.

Quartam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc autem, sicut prius et cetera. Quae sumitur ex eo quod est contrarium et corruptivum virtutis. Et dicit quod omnis habitus naturam habet ad haec et circa haec operanda a quibus fit deterior et melior, id est a quibus augetur in bonitate si sit habitus bonus, vel augetur in

271. At “Furthermore, as [a’, d] he presents the fourth reason, which. is taken from what is contrary to and destructive of virtue. Every habit, he says, has a disposition to do and to be busied with the things by which it is made worse and better, that is, by which the goodness of a good habit and the evil of a bad habit is increased. This can be

malitia, si sit habitus malus. Vel potest intelligi, a quibus innatus est fieri deterior vel melior, idest a quibus natus est generari vel augeri, quod est fieri meliorem, sive corrumpi vel diminui, quod

understood likewise of the things by which the habit naturally becomes worse or better, that is, by which it naturally is formed or increased (which is to be made better), or destroyed or diminished (which is to be made

est fieri deteriorem. Videmus autem quod

worse). We see that men become evil

homines fiunt pravi per corruptionem virtutis ex eo quod sequuntur voluptates et fugiunt tristitias vel quas non oportet vel quando non oportet, vel qualitercumque aliter deviet aliquis a ratione recta.

through the deterioration of virtue from the fact that they pursue the pleasures and steer clear of the sorrows which they ought not, or when they ought not, or in some other way by which one may deviate from right reason.

Et ex hac occasione fuerunt moti Stoici ut dicerent quod virtutes sunt quaedam impassibilitates et quietes. Quia enim videbant quod homines fiunt mali per delectationes et tristitias, consequens esse

272. The Stoics took occasion of this to say that virtues are certain quiescent and passionless dispositions. The reason was that they saw men become evil through pleasures and sorrows, and consequently

putaverunt quod virtus in hoc consistat quod omnino transmutationes passionum cessent. Sed in hoc non bene dixerunt quod totaliter a virtuoso voluerunt excludere animae passiones. Pertinet enim ad bonum rationis, ut reguletur per eam appetitus sensitivus, cuius motus sunt passiones. Unde ad virtutem non

they though that virtue consists in the total cessation of the changes of the passions. But in this they erred wishing to exclude entirely the passions of the soul from a virtuous man. It belongs, of course, to the good of reason to regulate the sensitive appetite— and the passions are movements of this appetite. Hence it is not the business of

pertinet quod excludat omnes passiones, sed solum inordinatas, quae scilicet sunt ut non oportet et quando non oportet, et quaecumque alia adduntur pertinentia ad alias circumstantias. Ex his ergo concludit supponendum esse quod circa voluptates et tristitias virtus optima operetur, malitia autem, quae est habitus

virtue to exclude all, but only the inordinate passions, that is, those which are not as they ought to be and are not at the time the ought to be (he adds also all the other things belonging to the remaining circumstances). From this he then concludes that we must suppose that virtue should work what is best regarding pleasures and sorrows but vice,

virtuti contrarius, mala.

which is the habit opposed to virtue should work what is evil.

Deinde cum dicit: fiet autem utique nobis etc., inducit ad propositum alias quatuor

273. Then [bb, b] at “Our contention will” he introduces to his proposition four other

rationes sumptas ex parte hominum quibus inest virtus, et delectatio, et tristitia. Quarum prima sumitur ex communitate delectationum. Dicit quod tria sunt quae cadunt sub electione humana: scilicet bonum, idest honestum; conferens, idest utile; et delectabile. Quibus tria contrariantur: scilicet malum,

reasons taken on the part of men in whom virtue, pleasure, and sorrow are found. The first reason [b’, a] is derived from pleasures in general. He says that three things fall under human choice: the good or virtuous, the helpful or useful, and the pleasurable. Contrary to these are also three things: evil or vice as opposed to the virtuous, the

idest vitium, quod opponitur honesto; nocivum, quod opponitur utili; et triste, quod opponitur delectabili. Circa omnia

harmful as opposed to the useful, the sorrowful as opposed to the pleasurable. In regard to all these, the virtuous man

autem haec bonus recte se habet, malus autem homo peccat: et praecipue circa delectationem, quae est communior inter praedicta, duplici communitate.

disposes himself rightly but the vicious man badly, especially in the matter of pleasure, which is more common among the things mentioned since it belongs to two of them.

Primo quidem quantum ad ea quae delectantur. Delectatio enim invenitur in omnibus animalibus, quia non solum est secundum partem intellectivam sed est etiam secundum sensitivam. Sed utile et honestum pertinent ad solam partem intellectivam. Nam honestum est, quod fit

274. First in regard to the things partaking of pleasure. Pleasure is found in all animals since it is not only in the intellectual power but also in the sensitive power. The useful and the virtuous, however, pertain to the intellectual power alone. This is so because the virtuous act is performed in, accord with

secundum rationem; utile autem importat ordinationem alicuius in alterum, ordinare autem est proprium rationis.

reason while the useful implies an order of one to another, and “to order” is proper to reason.

Alia autem communitas est ex parte ipsarum rerum; delectatio enim consequitur ad omnia quae cadunt sub electione. Honestum enim est delectabile homini secundum quod est conveniens rationi: utile autem est delectabile propter spem finis. Non autem est e converso, quod omne delectabile sit utile vel

275. Another common feature is on the part of the things themselves in which pleasure is gained. Pleasure, in fact, follows everything that falls under choice. Now the virtuous is pleasurable to man because it is agreeable to reason, and the useful also gives pleasure by reason of the expected benefit. But, on the other hand, not every pleasurable action is

honestum, ut patet in delectabilibus secundum sensum.

useful or virtuous, as is obvious in the pleasures of sense.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc

276. At “Pleasure, too” [b’, b] he presents

autem ex puero et cetera. Quae sumitur ex connaturalitate delectationis. Simul enim cum omnibus hominibus nutritur a pueritia ipsa delectatio, quia puer mox natus delectatur in lacte. Et ideo difficile est, quod homo possit subiugare hanc passionem, quae comparatur vitae, in hoc scilicet quod incepit cum homine a

the second reason, which is taken from an inherent characteristic of pleasure. Pleasure has grown up with us all alike from childhood, since a newborn child delights in his milk. Therefore, it is difficult for man to curb this passion acquired with life because it starts in man at the beginning of life. Hence moral virtue is especially concerned

principio vitae. Et ideo circa delectationem maxime est virtus moralis.

with pleasure.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: regulamus

277. He assigns the third reason at “Some

autem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex humano studio. Omnes enim homines regulant operationes suas delectatione et tristitia, illis scilicet operationibus intendentes in quibus delectantur et ab

regulate” [b’, c]. This reason is derived from man’s inclination. All men regulate their activities by pleasure and sorrow. They are intent on activities they find pleasant and they avoid activities they find distressing.

illis abstinentes de quibus tristantur. Et ideo necesse est quod circa delectationem et tristitiam sit totum negotium moralis virtutis quae scilicet ordinatur ad bene operandum. Non enim parum pertinet ad operationes, quod aliquis bene vel male gaudeat vel tristetur. Quia si gaudet de bonis, bene operabitur, si autem de malis,

Hence the whole business of a moral virtue, which is ordered to good activity, must concern pleasure and sorrow. It is quite important to note what activities one finds pleasant or painful, whether rightly or wrongly so. The reason is that he who rejoices in good performs good actions, but he who rejoices in evil performs evil actions.

male. Quartam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem difficilius et cetera. Quae sumitur ex

278. He assigns the fourth reason at “As Heraclitus says” [b’, d]. This is taken from a

comparatione eius ad iram: quia, ut dixit Heraclitus, difficilius est pugnare contra voluptatem, quam contra iram; quum tamen pugnare contra iram videatur difficillimum propter eius impetum. Sed concupiscentia delectationis, et communior est et naturalior et magis durat. Ars autem et virtus est circa

comparison with anger. It is more difficult, as Heraclitus said, to fight against pleasure than against anger, even though it seems most difficult to fight against anger because of its vehemence. But the desire of pleasure is both more common and more natural, and besides, it lasts longer. Art and virtue however always treat of the more difficult,

difficilius, in quo magis requiritur quod aliquis bene operetur, ad quod ordinatur ars et virtus; nam in facilibus quilibet potest bene operari. Sed bene operari in difficilibus est solum habentis virtutem et artem. Et ideo manifestum est ex praedictis, quod totum negotium virtutis et politicae, idest civilis conversationis,

for anyone can operate well in the easier things. But it takes one skilled in virtue and art to operate well in difficult things. Thus it is obvious, from what has been said, that the whole business of virtue and of political science or of public affairs is concerned with pleasures and sorrows. If a man uses these well he will be virtuous, but if he uses them

consistit circa delectationes et tristitias; quibus qui bene utitur, bonus erit; qui male autem utitur, erit malus.

badly he will be evil.

Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt: scilicet, quod virtus sit circa delectationes et tristitias; et quod eadem sunt ex quibus virtus generatur et augetur, et ex quibus etiam corrumpitur contrario modo factis,

279. Then [y, cc], at “It has been said that,” he sums up in conclusion the points that have been made: virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows; virtue is produced and increased by the same actions that, when done in the opposite way, destroy

et quod eadem sunt ex quibus generatur virtus, et quae operatur virtus iam generata.

virtue; the same actions producing virtue are in turn produced by virtue once formed.

LECTURE 4 Comparison between Virtue and Art Chapter 4 A. He presents a problem. — 280 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα

Someone may rightly ask how we can say that man must become just by doing just actions, and temperate by

σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί.

doing temperate actions. If people perform just and temperate works they are already just and temperate, as those who produce grammatical or musical works are already grammarians or musicians.

B. He solves it. 1. FIRST BY REJECTING WHAT WAS ASSUMED ABOUT ART. — 281 ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ

But this is not true in the arts. A man may at times produce something grammatical by chance or with the help of another. He will therefore be a grammarian only if he produces a grammatical work in a grammatical way, that is, in accordance with the

γραμματικήν.

science of grammar that he possesses.

2. SECOND BY DISPROVING THE LIKENESS SAID TO EXIST BETWEEN VIRTUE AND ART. a. He eliminates the likeness between art and virtue. — 284 ἔτι οὐδ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν

Another dissimilarity between the arts

τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ

and virtues is that works of art have

ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν

their perfection in themselves. It is enough then that these be made with certain qualities. Yet works of virtue are not justly and temperately performed if they have certain qualities, but the agent performing them must fulfill the following conditions. (1) He must know what he is doing. (2) He

προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει,

must choose the virtuous works for their own sakes. (3) He must possess the disposition and operate according to it resolutely and with stability. Except for knowledge, these conditions are not required in the other arts. Mere knowledge, however ,has little or no importance to he virtues but what

τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.

occurs form the frequent performance of just and temperate actions is all important.

b. He concludes the solution. — 285-286 τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ

Works

then

are called just

and

σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.

temperate when they are such as a just and temperate man will do. Now a just and temperate man is not one who performs these actions but who performs them as the just and temperate perform them.

C. He comes to the conclusion principally intended. 1. FIRST HE BRINGS HIS PROPOSITION TO AN END. — 287 εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια

It has been well said, therefore, that a

πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός.

man becomes just by doing just actions an temperate by doing temperate actions. Anyone who does not perform these actions has not the slightest interest in becoming virtuous.

2. HE DISCREDITS A FALSE OPINION. — 288 ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν

Many, however, fail to do good actions but, taking refuge in theory, think that by philosophizing they will become

καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

virtuous. They act like the sick who listen carefully to the doctor but do nothing he prescribes. Hence, just as those who take care of themselves in this way will never have a healthy body, so those who merely philosophize will not have a healthy soul.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quaeret autem utique aliquis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod virtutes causantur ex operibus, hic movet quamdam dubitationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi, vel neque in artibus et cetera. Tertio ex determinatione quaestionis inducit

280. After the Philosopher has shown that virtues are caused by actions, he now raises a doubt about this assertion. Regarding it he does three things. First [A] he presents a problem. Second [B], at “But this is not true etc.,” he solves it. Third [C], from the discussion of the question he comes to the conclusion principally intended, at “It has

conclusionem principaliter intentam, ibi, bene igitur dicitur, et cetera. Est ergo dubitatio, quam primo movet, talis: ita se habet in virtutibus sicut et in artibus: sed in artibus ita se habet, quod nullus operatur opus artis nisi habens artem; sicut nullus facit opera grammaticalia nisi grammaticus existens, neque opera

been well said, therefore, etc.” The doubt that he first raises is this. What is true of virtue is true of art. But in art it is true that no one produces a work of art except one who possesses the art, as no one produces anything grammatical unless he is a grammarian, nor anything musical unless he be a musician. It will be true in virtue,

musicalia nisi musicus existens; ergo etiam ita se habebit in virtutibus, quod quicumque facit opera iusta est iam iustus, et quicumque facit opera (iam) temperata est iam temperatus; non ergo videtur verum esse quod dictum est, quod homines faciendo iusta fiunt iusti, et faciendo temperata fiunt temperati.

therefore, that whoever performs just works is already just and whoever performs temperate works is already temperate. Hence our previous contention (164) does not seem to be true, that men become just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions.

Deinde cum dicit: vel neque in artibus

281. Then [B, 1], at “But this is not” he

etc., solvit dubitationem praedictam. Et primo interimendo id quod assumebatur de artibus. Secundo interimendo similitudinem, quae proponebatur inter virtutes et artes, ibi, adhuc autem neque

solves this doubt first by rejecting what was assumed about art and second [B, 2] by disproving the likeness said to exist between virtue and art, at “Another dissimilarity etc.” He says first that it is not true in art, as was

simile, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in artibus non ita se habet sicut assumebatur, scilicet, quod quicumque facit grammaticalia iam sit grammaticus. Contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis facit opus grammaticale non per artem, sed quandoque quidem a casu, puta si aliquis idiota a casu pronunciet

assumed, that whoever produces a grammatical work is already a grammarian. It happens sometimes that an ignoramus by chance pronounces a word correctly. Sometimes this happens with the help of another whose example is followed, for instance, a mimic imitates the correct pronunciation given by a grammarian. But a

congruam locutionem: quandoque autem hoc contingit alio supposito, ad cuius scilicet exemplar operetur: puta si aliquis mimus repraesentet locutionem congruam, quam aliquis grammaticus profert. Sed tunc aliquis est iudicandus grammaticus, quando facit opus grammaticale et grammaticaliter, idest

man is to be judged a grammarian only when he produces a grammatical work and in a grammatical way, that i&, in accord with the science of grammar that he possesses.

secundum scientiam grammaticae, quam habet. Deinde cum dicit: adhuc autem neque simile etc., ponit secundam solutionem. Circa quam duo facit. Primo interimit similitudinem artium ad virtutem. Secundo concludit solutionem, ibi, res quidem igitur iustae et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non est simile in artibus et

282. Then [B, 2], at “Another dissimilarity” he gives the second solution, in two steps. First [2, a] he eliminates the likeness between art and virtue. Second [2, b] he concludes the solution at “Works then are called just etc.” He says first that there is no similarity in art and virtue since works of art

virtutibus. Quia opera quae fiunt ab artibus habent in se ipsis id quod pertinet ad bene esse artis. Cuius ratio est quia ars est ratio recta factibilium, ut dicetur in sexto huius. Facere autem est operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam. Talis autem actio est perfectio facti. Et ideo in huiusmodi actionibus, bonum consistit in

have in themselves what belongs to the perfection of the art. The explanation is that art is the right plan of making things, as will be said in the sixth book of the present work (1153, 1160, 1166). “Making” is an operation that passes to external matter, and an operation of this kind is a perfection of the thing made. Hence in such actions the good

ipso facto. Et ideo ad bonum artis sufficit, quod ea quae fiunt bene se habeant. Sed virtutes sunt principia actionum, quae non transeunt in exteriorem materiam,

consists in the object made. It is enough for the good of art, therefore, that the things made be good. But virtues are principles of actions that do not go out into external

sed manent in ipsis agentibus. Unde tales actiones sunt perfectiones agentium. Et ideo bonum harum actionum in ipsis agentibus consistit.

matter but remain in the agents. Hence actions of this kind are perfections of the agents. So the good of these actions is identical with the agents themselves.

Et ideo dicit, quod ad hoc quod aliqua fiant iuste vel temperate, non sufficit, quod opera quae fiunt bene se habeant; sed requiritur, quod operans debito modo

283. He says, therefore, in order that actions be justly and temperately performed, it is not enough that the things done be good but the agent must work in a proper manner.

operetur. In quo quidem modo tria dicit esse attendenda. Quorum primum pertinet ad intellectum sive ad rationem, ut scilicet ille qui facit opus virtutis non operetur ex ignorantia vel a casu, sed sciat quid faciat. Secundum accipitur ex parte virtutis appetitivae. In quo duo attenduntur. Quorum unum est, ut non

Regarding this manner, he says we must pay attention to three things. (i) The first, pertaining to the intellect or reason, is that one who performs a virtuous action should not act in ignorance or by chance but should know what he is doing. (2) The second is taken on the part of the appetitive power. Here two things are noted. One is that the

operetur ex passione, puta cum quis facit ex timore aliquod opus virtutis, sed operetur ex electione; aliud autem est ut electio operis virtuosi non sit propter aliquid aliud, sicut cum quis operatur opus virtutis propter lucrum, vel propter inanem gloriam, sed sit propter hoc, id est propter ipsum opus virtutis, quod

action be not done out of passion, as happens when a person performs a virtuous deed because of fear. But the action i, should be done by a choice that is not made for the sake of something else, as happens when a person performs a good action for money or vainglory. The actions should be done for the sake of the virtuous work itself which, as

secundum se placet ei qui habet habitum virtutis, tamquam ei conveniens. Tertium autem accipitur secundum rationem habitus, ut scilicet aliquis firme idest constanter quantum ad seipsum, et immobiliter, id est a nullo exteriori ab hoc removeatur, quin habeat electionem virtuosam, et operetur secundum eam.

something agreeable, is inherently pleasing to him who has the habit of virtue. (3) The third, taken from the nature of a habit, is that a person should possess a virtuous choice and operate according to it resolutely —that is, consistently on his part—and with stability so as not to be moved by any external thing.

Sed ad artes non requiritur nisi primum horum, quod est scire. Potest enim aliquis esse bonus artifex, etiam si

284. Only the first of these, knowledge, is required in the arts. A man can be a good artist even if he never chooses to work

nunquam eligat operari secundum artem, vel si non perseveret in suo opere; sed scientia parvam vel nullam virtutem habet ad hoc quod homo sit virtuosus, sed totum consistit in aliis, quae quidem adveniunt homini ex frequenti operatione

according to art and does not persevere in his work. But knowledge has little or no importance in a person being virtuous, but his goodness consists entirely in other things that take place within him by frequent actions, and thus he becomes stable.

virtuosorum operum, quia ex hoc generatur habitus per quem aliquis eligit ea quae conveniunt illi habitui immobiliter in eis perseverat.

et

Deinde cum dicit: res quidem igitur etc., concludit solutionem praedictae dubitationis. Et dicit, quod res quae fiunt, dicuntur iustae et temperatae quando sunt similes illis quas iustus et temperatus operatur: sed non oportet,

285. Then [2, b], at “Works then,” he concludes the solution of the abovementioned doubt. He states that things done are called just and temperate because they are similar to the things that a just and temperate man does. Whoever performs these actions need

quod quicumque haec operatur sit iustus et temperatus; sed ille qui sic ea operatur, sicut operantur iusti et temperati secundum tria praemissa, dicitur iustus et temperatus. Sic igitur homines primo operantur iusta et temperata, non eodem modo quo iusti et temperati utuntur, et ex talibus operationibus causatur

not necessarily be just and temperate, but he who performs them as just and temperate men perform them according to the three conditions just laid down is said to be just and temperate. Men, therefore, first perform just and temperate actions-not in the same way as the just and temperate do-and such actions in their turn produce the habit.

habitus. Si quis autem quaerat quomodo hoc est possibile, cum nihil reducat se de potentia

286. If it should be asked how this is possible, since nothing can move itself from potency to

in actum? Dicendum est, quod perfectio virtutis moralis, de qua nunc loquimur, consistit in hoc, quod appetitus reguletur secundum rationem. Prima autem rationis principia sunt naturaliter nobis indita, ita in operativis sicut in speculativis. Et ideo sicut per principia praecognita facit aliquis inveniendo se

act, we must answer that the perfection of moral virtue, which we are treating, consists in reason’s control of the appetite. Now, the first principles of reason, no less in moral than in speculative matters, have been given by nature. Therefore, just as by means of previously known principles a man makes himself actually understand by personal

scientem in actu: ita agendo secundum principia rationis practicae, facit aliquis se virtuosum in actu.

effort of discovery, so also by acting according to the principles of practical reason a man makes himself actually virtuous.

Deinde cum dicit: bene igitur dicitur etc., concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam. Et primo concludit propositum. Secundo arguit quorumdam errorem, ibi, sed multi haec quidem et cetera. Concludit ergo primo, quod bene supra dictum est, quod homo fit iustus ex eo

287. Then [C], at “It has been well said, therefore,” he comes to the conclusion principally intended. First [C, 1 ] he brings his proposition to an end; and second [C, 2], at “Many, however, fail etc.,” he discredits a false opinion of certain persons. He concludes that it has been well said above (264, 280)

quod iusta operatur et temperatus ex eo quod temperata operatur. Ex hoc autem quod non operatur, nullus nec studium apponit ad hoc quod fiat bonus.

that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions. But he who does not perform actions nor develop his disposition will never become virtuous.

Deinde cum dicit: sed multi haec quidem etc., arguit quorumdam errorem, qui non operantur opera virtutis, sed confugiendo ad ratiocinandum de virtutibus aestimant se fieri bonos philosophando. Quos dicit esse similes infirmis, qui sollicite audiunt ea quae dicuntur sibi a medicis, sed nihil

288. Then [C, 2], at “Many, however” he discredits the false opinion of certain persons who do not perform works of virtues but, by taking refuge in the discussion of virtues, think they can become virtuous by philosophizing. Such people, he says, are like the sick who carefully listen to what the

faciunt eorum quae sibi praecipiuntur. Ita enim se habet philosophia ad curationem animae, sicut medicina ad curationem corporis. Unde sicut illi qui audiunt praecepta medicorum et non faciunt, nunquam erunt bene dispositi secundum corpus, ita neque illi qui audiunt documenta moralium philosophorum et

doctor has to say but do nothing about carrying out his prescriptions. Thus philosophy is to the cure of the soul what medicine is to the cure of the body. Hence, as those who listen to the advice of doctors and disregard it will never have a well regulated body, so those who listen to the warnings of moral philosophers and do not heed them will

non faciunt ea, nunquam habebunt animam bene dispositam.

never have a well regulated soul.

LECTURE 5 The Definition of Virtue Chapter 5 1. FIRST HE SHOWS WHAT VIRTUE IS. A. He determines what virtue is in general. A’ He investigates the definition of virtue. I. HE INVESTIGATES THE GENUS OF VIRTUE. a. He offers the division. — 289-290 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ

Now we must determine the definition of virtue. Since there are three

γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή.

principles occurring in the soul: passions, powers, and habits, virtue will be one of these.

b. He explains its parts. i. He makes known those which are passions. — 291-296 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη·

By passions I mean: concupiscence, anger, aggressiveness, envy, joy, love, hatred, desire, jealousy, pity, and all the movements followed by pleasure and sorrow.

ii. Those which are powers. — 297 δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι·

I call those principles powers in respect of which we are said to be capable of experiencing passions, for example, of becoming angry or being sad or having pity.

iii. Those which are habits. — 298 ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα.

I call those principles habits in respect of which we are well or badly disposed towards the passions. Thus we are badly disposed in becoming angry in a violent or feeble way, but we are well disposed in doing so with moderation. The same applies to all habits and passions.

c. He argues from the accepted definition. i.

He shows that virtues are not passions... he assigns

four reasons. w. THE FIRST (REASON). — 299 πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ

Neither virtues nor vices, therefore, are passions because: (1) We are not called

λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα,

good or evil by reason of the passions but by reason of virtue or vice.

x. THE SECOND REASON. — 300 καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.

(2) We are neither praised nor reproached for the passions. Now a man is not praised or blamed for being afraid or angry simply but in a particular way. We are, though, praised or blamed for virtues or vices.

y. THE THIRD REASON. — 301 ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως.

(3) We become angry and are afraid without willing it, but the virtues are certain choices or at least not without choice.

z. THE FOURTH REASON. — 302 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς

(4) We are said to be moved by the passions. However we are not moved

ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως.

but disposed in a certain way by the virtues and vices.

ii. He shows that (virtues) are not powers (for two reasons). x. THE FIRST. — 303 διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε

For this reason also the virtues are not powers, for we are not called good or evil, we are not praised or blamed because we are simply capable of being

ψεγόμεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον.

affected by the passions.

y. THE SECOND. — 304

εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

Furthermore, the powers are in us by nature, but we are not good or evil by nature, as we said above.

iii. He concludes (virtues) are habits. — 305 ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται.

If then virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are habits. We say, therefore, that habit is the genus of virtue.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Post haec autem quid est virtus et

289. After the Philosopher has treated the

cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de causa virtutis, hic incipit inquirere quid sit virtus. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit quid sit virtus. In secunda determinat de oppositione virtutis ad vitium, ibi, tribus autem dispositionibus et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in

cause of virtue, he now begins to investigate the definition of virtue. He divides the investigation into two parts. In the first [I] he shows what virtue is, and in the second [Lect. 10] he ascertains the opposition of virtue to vice at “There are three etc.” (B. 1108 b 11). The first part is treated under two headings. In the first [I, A] he determines what virtue is

partes duas. In prima determinat quid est virtus in generali. In secunda manifestat definitionem assignatam in singulis virtutibus, ibi, oportet autem non solum universaliter dici et cetera. Prima autem dividitur in partes duas. In prima investigat definitionem virtutis. In secunda concludit definitionem, ibi,

in general. In the second [Lect. 8] he applies the adopted definition to particular virtues, at “We must speak of virtue not only under its universal aspect” (B.1107 a 28). This first section is also twofold, and in the first of these [A, A’] he investigates the definition of virtue. In the second [Lect. 7; 1] he concludes the definition, at “Virtue then is a habit etc.” (B.

est ergo virtus habitus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat genus virtutis. Secundo differentiam eius, ibi, oportet autem non solum et cetera. Investigat autem genus virtutis per viam divisionis. Unde circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit divisionem. Secundo exponit membra eius, ibi, dico

1107). On the first point he first [A’, 1] investigates the genus of virtue and second [Lect. 6] its specific difference, at “We must consider not only etc.” (B. 1106 a 16). He investigates the genus by parts. Hence, regarding the first he does three things. First [1, a] he offers the division. Second [1, b], at “By passions I mean etc.,” he explains its

autem passiones etc.; tertio ex divisione

parts. Third [1, c], at “Neither virtues nor

posita argumentatur, ibi: passiones quidem igitur et cetera.

vices,” he argues from the accepted definition.

Dicit ergo primo, quod ad perscrutandum quid est virtus, oportet assumere, quod tria sunt in anima,

290. He says first that to establish the definition of virtue we have to take for granted three principles in ‘the soul: passions,

scilicet passiones, potentiae et habitus, quorum alterum necesse est esse virtutem. Dixit enim supra, quod virtus est principium quorundam operum animae. Nihil autem est in anima, quod sit operationis principium, nisi aliquod horum trium. Videtur enim homo aliquando agere ex passione, puta ex ira.

powers, and habits. Virtue must come under one of these, for he just said (282) that virtue is a principle of certain operations of the soul. Now no principle of operation is found in the soul outside these three. Sometimes a man seems to act from passion, for example, anger; sometimes from habit, as when he works by art; sometimes from mere potentiality, as

Quandoque vero ex habitu, sicut ille qui operatur ex arte. Quandoque vero ex nuda potentia, sicut quando homo primo incipit operari. Ex quo patet quod sub hac divisione, non comprehenduntur absolute omnia quae sunt in anima; quia essentia animae nihil horum est neque etiam operatio intelligibilis; sed solum

when he begins a new activity. It is obvious that not absolutely everything in the soul is included under this division—the essence of the soul and the operation of the intellect do not belong here—but only the things that are principles of some operation are considered.

hic tanguntur illa quae sunt principia alicuius actionis.

Deinde cum dicit: dico autem passiones etc., manifestat membra praemissae

291. Then [1, b]; at “By passions I mean,” he indicates the members of the division just

divisionis. Et primo manifestat quae sint passiones; secundo quae sint potentiae, ibi: potentias autem etc.; tertio qui sint habitus, ibi, habitus autem secundum quos et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod secundum vegetabilem animam non dicuntur passiones animae, eo quod vires huius

mentioned. First [b, i] he makes known those that are passions; second [b, ii], those that are powers, at “I call those principles powers etc.”; third [b, iii], those that are habits, at “I call those principles habits etc.” Regarding the first we must consider that passions are not attributed to the vegetative soul because the powers of this part of the soul are not passive,

partis animae non sunt passivae, sed activae. Vires autem apprehensivae et appetitivae sunt passivae tam in parte sensitiva quam in parte intellectiva, praeter intellectum agentem. Et quamvis sentire et intelligere sit pati quoddam, non tamen dicuntur passiones

as they are in both the sensitive part and the intellective part, but active. The perceptive and appetitive powers, except the active intellect, are passive. Although feeling and understanding are in a way passions (i.e., they “suffer” change , passions are properly denominated not because of the apprehension

animae secundum apprehensionem sensus vel intellectus, sed solum secundum appetitum. Quia operatio potentiae apprehensivae est secundum quod res apprehensa est in apprehendente per modum

of sense or intellect but only because of the appetite. The reason is that the operation of the perceptive power takes place according as the thing perceived is in the knower according to the state of the knower. Now the object perceived is, so to speak, drawn to the knower.

apprehendentis. Et sic res apprehensa quodammodo trahitur ad apprehendentem; operatio autem potentiae appetitivae est secundum quod appetens inclinatur ad appetibile. Et quia de ratione patientis est quod trahatur ad agentem et non e converso, inde est quod operationes potentiarum

But the operation of the appetitive power takes place according as the one desiring is inclined to the thing desired. Because it is characteristic of the recipient (patientis) that he be drawn by the agent, and not the converse, it follows that only the operations of the appetitive powers, but not the operations of the perceptive powers, are called passions.

apprehensivarum, non dicuntur proprie passiones, sed solum operationes potentiarum appetitivarum. Inter quas etiam operatio appetitus intellectivi non proprie dicitur passio, tum quia non est secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, quae requiritur ad rationem passionis proprie dictae, tum etiam quia secundum operationem appetitus intellectivi qui est voluntas, homo non agitur tamquam

292. Even among the appetitive powers the operation of the intellective appetite is not properly called passion. It does not take place with a change of a bodily organ, which is necessary to the nature of a passion properly speaking. Also in the operation of the intellective appetite, which is the will, man is not the passive recipient, but rather he directs

patiens, sed potius seipsum agit tamquam dominus sui actus existens. Relinquitur ergo quod passiones proprie dicantur operationes appetitus sensitivi, quae sunt secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, et quibus homo quodammodo ducitur.

himself as the master of his action. It remains, therefore, that operations of the sensitive appetite, which are accompanied by a change of a bodily organ and which in a way draw man, should be called passions in a strict sense.

Appetitus autem sensitivus dividitur in duas vires: scilicet in concupiscibilem, quae respicit absolute bonum sensibile, quod scilicet est delectabile secundum

293. The sensitive appetite is divided into two powers: (1) the concupiscible, which concerns sensible good absolutely (this is pleasurable to sense) and evil contrary to it; (2) the irascible,

sensum, et malum ei contrarium, et irascibilem, quae respicit bonum sub ratione cuiusdam altitudinis; sicut victoria dicitur esse quoddam bonum,

which concerns good under the aspect of a certain eminence. For example, victory is said to be a kind of good, although it is not accompanied by pleasure of sense. Whatever

quamvis

passions concern good or evil absolutely,

non

sit

cum

delectatione

sensus. Sic igitur quaecumque passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum absolute, sunt in concupiscibili. Quae quidem respectu boni sunt tres, scilicet amor, qui importat quandam connaturalitatem

therefore, are found in the concupiscible appetite. Certain of these-three in numberregard the good: love (which implies a certain connaturality of the appetite with the good loved), desire (which implies a movement of

appetitus ad bonum amatum, et desiderium, quod importat motum appetitus in bonum amatum. Et delectatio, quae importat quietem appetitus in bono amato; quibus tria opponuntur in ordine ad malum, scilicet: odium amori; aversio sive fuga desiderio; et tristitia delectationi. Illae vero passiones quae respiciunt bonum vel malum sub ratione cuiusdam ardui, pertinent ad irascibilem: sicut timor et audacia respectu mali; spes et desperatio respectu boni et quintum est ira quae est passio composita, unde nec contrarium habet.

the appetite towards the good loved), and delight (which implies a repose of the appetite in the good loved). Opposed to these in respect to evil are: hatred to love, aversion or flight to desire, sadness to delight. But those passions that concern good or evil under the aspect of difficulty belong to the irascible, as fear and boldness in regard to evil, hope and despair in regard to good. A fifth is anger, which is a composite passion and so has no opposite.

Et ideo enumerando passiones, dicit quod passiones sunt concupiscentia, quam nominavimus desiderium, et ira et

294. In enumerating the passions, therefore, he says they are: concupiscence (which we call desire), anger, fear, boldness, envy (which is

timor et audacia, et invidia quae continetur sub tristitia, et gaudium quod continetur sub delectatione (est enim delectatio non corporalis, sed in interiori apprehensione consistens), et amicitia et odium, et desiderium. Quod differt a concupiscentia: eo quod concupiscentia est delectationis corporalis, desiderium autem cuiuscumque alterius delectabilis.

contained under sadness), and joy (which is contained under pleasure) for this is a noncorporeal pleasure that consists in an interior perception of the good, and likewise a love, hatred, and desire of the same interior kind. Desire differs from concupiscence in that concupiscence pertains to bodily pleasure while desire concerns every pleasure without distinction.

Addit autem zelum et misericordiam quae sunt species tristitiae. Nam misericordia est tristitia de malis alienis, zelus autem est tristitia de hoc quod homo deficit ab his quae alii habent.

295. He adds jealousy and pity, which are species of sadness. Pity is sadness at another’s misfortune, and jealousy is sadness because one lacks what others have.

Addit autem quod universaliter ad omnia praedicta sequitur delectatio et

296. He also adds that pleasure and sorrow universally follow the abovementioned

tristitia; quia omnia alia important motus quosdam in bonum et malum, ex quorum superventu causatur delectatio vel tristitia. Unde omnes aliae passiones terminantur ad delectationem vel tristitiam.

passions, because all others imply certain movements to good and evil, and these movements are accompanied by pleasure or sorrow. Hence all other passions are terminated at pleasure and sorrow.

Deinde cum dicit: potentias autem secundum quas etc., manifestat quae sint potentiae, non quidem in generali, sed circa materiam moralem secundum

297. Then [b, ii], at “I call those principles powers,” he identifies the powers not in general but those pertaining to moral study precisely as they differ from the passions. He

differentiam ad passiones. Dicit enim quod potentiae dicuntur secundum quas dicimur passibiles praedictarum passionum, idest potentes pati passiones praedictas, puta potentia irascibilis est secundum quam possumus irasci. Potentia autem concupiscibilis est secundum quam possumus tristari vel misereri.

affirms that powers are said to exist according as we are considered capable of experiencing these passions, that is, the powers are said to “suffer” or to receive these passions. Thus the irascible power exists according as we are capable of becoming angry and the concupiscible power according as we are capable of becoming sad or showing pity.

Deinde cum dicit: habitus autem secundum quos etc., manifestat qui sint habitus: et hoc etiam non in generali, sed in materia morali per comparationem ad passiones. Et dicit quod habitus dicuntur secundum quos nos habemus ad passiones bene vel male. Habitus enim est dispositio quaedam determinans potentiam per

298. Then [b, iii], at “I call those principles habits,” he identifies the habits. Likewise this is not done in general but in regard to those pertaining to moral study by comparison with the passions. Habits, he states, are said to exist according as we consistently use the passions well or badly. Now a habit is a disposition determining a power in reference to something. When the determination is

comparationem ad aliquid. Quae quidem determinatio, si sit secundum quod convenit naturae rei, erit habitus bonus disponens ad hoc quod aliquid fiat bene, alioquin erit habitus malus, et secundum ipsum aliquid fiet male. Et exemplificat quod secundum aliquem habitum habemus nos ad hoc ut irascamur vel male, si hoc fiat vehementer vel remisse, idest secundum superabundantiam aut defectum, vel bene si hoc fiat medio modo.

made conformable to the nature of the thing, there will be a good habit which disposes that a thing be done well, Otherwise there will be a bad habit according to which a thing will be done badly. He illustrates what we do according to habit, how we may be angry either wrongly-when this is done in a violent or weak manner, that is, according to excess or defector well if done with moderation.

Deinde cum dicit: passiones quidem igitur etc., argumentatur ex divisione praemissa. Et primo ostendit quod virtutes non sunt passiones. Secundo, quod non sunt potentiae, ibi: propter haec autem neque potentiae et cetera. Tertio concludit quod sunt habitus, ibi, si igitur neque passiones et cetera. Circa primum ponit quatuor rationes. Quarum

299. Then [1, c], at “Therefore neither virtues,” he argues from the division previously given, First [c, i] he shows that virtues are not passions. Second [c, ii], at “For this reason also etc.,” he shows that they are not powers. Third [c, iii], at “If then virtues etc.,” he concludes they are habits. For the first statement he assigns four reasons. The first is this [i, w]. We are called

prima talis est: secundum virtutes dicimur boni, et secundum malitias oppositas dicimur mali. Sed secundum passiones absolute consideratas non dicimur boni vel mali. Ergo passiones neque sunt virtutes neque malitiae.

good according to virtues and evil according to the opposite vices. But we are not called good or evil according to passions taken absolutely. Passions, therefore, are neither virtues nor vices.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et quoniam secundum passiones quidem et cetera.

300. He presents the second reason at “We are neither” [i, x]. It is taken from praise and

Quae accipitur ex laude et vituperio, quae sunt testimonia quaedam bonitatis vel malitiae. Dicit ergo quod secundum virtutes laudamur, secundum autem malitias oppositas vituperamur. Sed secundum passiones absolute consideratas neque laudamur neque vituperamur. Non enim aliquis laudatur neque vituperatur ex hoc quod absolute timet vel irascitur, sed solum ex hoc quod aliqualiter timet vel irascitur, idest secundum rationem vel praeter rationem. Et idem est intelligendum in aliis passionibus animae. Ergo passiones animae neque sunt virtutes neque malitiae.

reproach, which are kinds of attestation of goodness and evil. He says that we are praised for virtues and reproached for the opposite vices. But we are neither praised nor reproached for the passions taken absolutely. A man is not praised or blamed because he is simply afraid or angry but only because he is afraid or angry in a particular way, that is, according to reason or contrary to reason. The same must be understood of the other passions of the soul. The passions of the soul, therefore, are neither virtues nor vices.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi adhuc irascimur quidem et timemus et cetera. Quae sumitur ex modo agendi secundum

301. At “We become angry” [i, y] he presents the third reason, which is taken from a virtuous manner of acting. Virtues are either

virtutem. Virtutes enim vel sunt electiones, vel non sine electione; potest enim virtus dici ipse actus virtutis. Et sic si accipiamus principales actus virtutum qui sunt interiores, virtus est

choices or not without choice, for the very act of virtue can be called virtue. If we consider the principal acts of virtues, which are interior, virtue is choice; but if we consider the exterior acts, virtue is not without choice

electio. Si autem exteriores, virtus non est sine electione, quia exteriores actus virtutum ab interiori electione procedunt; si autem accipiatur virtus pro ipso habitu virtutis, sic etiam virtus non est sine electione, sicut causa non est sine proprio effectu. Passiones autem adveniunt nobis sine electione, quia interdum praeveniunt deliberationem rationis quae ad electionem requiritur. Et hoc est quod

because the exterior acts of virtue proceed from interior choice. If virtue be taken as the very habit of virtue, even in this sense it does not lack choice, as a cause is not without its proper effect. The passions, however, come to us without choice because they precede the deliberations of the reason necessary for choice. This is what he means saying that we are angry and are afraid without willing it, that is, not by choice of the reason. The passions, therefore, are not virtues.

dicit, quod irascimur et timemus non sponte, id est non ex arbitrio rationis. Ergo passiones non sunt virtutes. Quartam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem secundum passiones quidem moveri et cetera. Quae sumitur secundum ipsam essentiam virtutis. Passiones enim sunt motus quidam secundum quos moveri dicimur. Virtutes autem et malitiae sunt quaedam qualitates secundum quas non dicimur moveri, sed aliqualiter, idest bene vel male disponi ad hoc quod moveamur. Ergo passiones non sunt virtutes neque malitiae.

302. He presents the fourth reason at “We are said” [i, z]. This is taken from the very nature of virtue. The passions are movements according to which we are said to be moved. The virtues and vices are qualities according to which we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in some way, whether well or badly that our movement may ensue. The passions, therefore, are neither virtues nor vices.

Deinde cum dicit propter haec autem neque potentiae sunt etc., ostendit, quod virtutes non sunt potentiae, duabus rationibus. Quarum prima sumitur secundum rationem boni et mali: sicut etiam et supra probavit de passionibus. Et est ratio talis: nullus dicitur bonus

303. Then [c, ii], at “For this reason,” he shows that virtues are not powers for two reasons. The first of these [ii, x] is taken from the nature of good and evil, as has just been proved (299-300) about the passions. The reason is this. No one is called good or evil, no one is praised or reproached, because he is

vel malus neque laudatur neque vituperatur ex hoc, quod potest pati secundum aliquam passionem, puta ex hoc quod potest irasci vel timere. Sed secundum virtutes et malitias dicimur boni vel mali, laudamur vel vituperamur; ergo virtutes et malitiae non sunt potentiae.

capable of being affected by some passion-for instance, that he is capable of becoming angry or being afraid. But we are called good or evil and are praised or reproached because of virtues and vices. Virtues and vices, therefore, are not powers.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et adhuc potentes sumus et cetera. Quae sumitur

304. He gives the second reason at “Furthermore, the powers” [ii, y]. It is taken

ex causa. Et est talis. Potentiae insunt nobis a natura, quia sunt naturales proprietates animae. Sed virtutes et malitiae secundum quas dicimur boni vel mali, non sunt nobis a natura, ut supra probatum est. Ergo virtutes et malitiae non sunt potentiae.

on the part of the cause and is this. Powers are in us by nature because they are natural characteristics of the soul. But virtues and vices by which we are called good or evil are not in us by nature, as was proved above (248-251). Virtues and vices, therefore, are not powers.

Deinde cum dicit: si igitur neque passiones sunt virtutes, etc., concludit propositum, quia scilicet si virtutes non sunt passiones neque potentiae, relinquitur quod sint habitus, secundum

305. Then [c, iii], at “If then,” he concludes his proposition. If virtues are neither passions nor, powers, it remains that they are habits according to the previously given division. Thus he concludes that virtue with regard to

divisionem praemissam. Et sic concludit, quod manifestum est, quid sit virtus, secundum suum genus, quia scilicet est in genere habitus.

its generic definition obviously is a habit.

LECTURE 6 Virtue, a Kind of Habit Chapter 6 I. HE PRESENTS HIS PROPOSITION. — 306 δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις.

We must consider not only that virtue is a habit but also what kind of habit.

II. HE MAKES KNOWN THE PROPOSITION. A. He manifests a certain common quality of virtue. — 307-308 ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν

We must explain, therefore, that virtue perfects everything of which it, is the virtue, rendering both the possessor good and his work good. Thus the virtue or power of the eye makes good both the

σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει.

eye and its operation, for it is by the power of the eye that we see well. Likewise the virtue or excellence of a horse makes the horse good and also makes him good for running, riding and awaiting the enemy. If this be true in all other things, then human virtue will be a habit making man good and rendering his work good.

B. From this quality he explains its specific difference. A’ First according to the property of the operations. — 309 πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν,

How this takes place has already been described,

B’ Second according to the nature of virtue. 1. HE INTRODUCES CERTAIN PRELIMINARIES. a.

He proposes the things necessary to elucidate the

proposition. — 310 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.

But it will become still clearer if we study the nature of virtue. In all continuous and divisible matter, we can take the more, the less, and the equal amount. These are understood either in regard to the thing or in regard to us. But the equal is a mean between excess and defect.

b. He clarifies what he has said. i. First by means of reason. — 311 λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ'

By the mean on the part of the thing, I understand that which is equally distant

ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν

from both extremes and which is one and

ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν.

the same for everybody. By the mean in regard to us, I understand that which is neither in excess nor in defect. This, however, is not one and the same for everybody.

ii. By way of example. x.

FIRST REGARDING THE OBJECTIVE MEAN.

— 312 οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο

For example, if ten be taken as many and

ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.

two as few, then six will be the mean on part of the thing because six both exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount. This mean is according to arithmetic proportion.

y. HE GIVES EXAMPLES OF THE MEAN... IN COMPARISON WITH US. — 313-314 τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

But the mean in regard to us is not to be taken in this way. A trainer will not order six pounds of food for someone simply because eating ten pounds is a great deal and eating two pounds is a small amount. This may be much or little for the person eating. For Milo it would certainly be little, but it would be much for a champion in gymnastics; and the same holds true in running and wrestling. Thus everyone who is wise avoids excess and wants to find the mean, not on the part of the thing but in regard to us.

2. HE CONCLUDES HIS PROPOSITION. — 315-316 εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα

Every practical science then perfects its work by keeping in view the mean and executing the work according to the

τὰ ἔργα ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι,

mean. Hence it is customary to tell a man who has done a good piece of work that nothing is to be added or taken

ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σῳζούσης, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται· ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική.

away, meaning that excess and defect disfigure a work but the mean preserves it. As we have said, good workmen work with an eye on the mean. But virtue like nature is more certain and better than art. Virtue then will aim at the mean.

3. HE EXPLAINS AN INFERENCE. — 317-318 λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς

I am speaking of moral virtue, for it treats of passions and operations in which we find excess, defect, and the mean. Thus aggressiveness, fear, concupiscence, aversion, anger, pity, and, in general, pleasure and sorrow take place with excess and defect. Both of these are evil; but to experience these passions at the right time, for the right objects, toward the right persons, with the right motive, and in the right way is the mean and the highest good of virtue.

ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.

Similarly, excess, defect, and the mean are to be found in actions. Now moral virtue is concerned with passions and operations in which excess is vicious, defect is reproachable, and the mean receives praise and shows the right path. These two (praise and righteousness) pertain to virtue. Moral virtue, therefore, is a kind of middle course and aims at the mean.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Oportet autem non solum sic dicere

306. After the Philosopher has explained, the

quoniam habitus, sed et qualis quidam et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid sit genus virtutis, hic inquirit quae sit propria differentia eius. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod ad hoc quod sciatur quid est virtus, oportet

genus of virtue, he now begins an inquiry into the specific difference of virtue. First [I] he presents his proposition. He says that in order to know what virtue is we must consider not only that it is a habit—thus the genus is understood, but what kind of habit—

non solum dicere quod sit habitus, per quod innotescit genus eius, sed etiam qualis habitus sit, per quod manifestatur differentia ipsius.

thus the specific difference is indicated.

Secundo ibi: dicendum igitur quoniam virtus omnis etc., manifestat propositum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat in communi quamdam conditionem virtutis. Secundo ex illa conditione virtutis manifestat propriam differentiam eius, ibi, qualiter autem hoc erit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnis virtus subiectum cuius est facit bene se habere et opus eius reddit bene se habens, sicut virtus oculi est per quam et oculus est bonus, et per quam bene videmus, quod est proprium opus oculi. Similiter etiam virtus equi est,

307. Second [II], at “We must explain, therefore,” he makes known the proposition. On this point he does two things. First [II, A] he manifests a certain common quality of virtue. Second [II, B], from this quality of virtue he explains its specific difference, at “How this etc.” He says first that every virtue makes its possessor good and his work good. Thus the virtue or power of the eye makes the eye good and gives us good sight, which is the proper function of the eye. Likewise the virtue or excellence of a horse makes a horse good and makes it perform well, that is, run fast, ride easily, and

quae facit equum bonum, et per quam equus bene operatur opus suum, quod est velociter currere, et suaviter ferre ascensorem, et audacter expectare bellatores.

fearlessly await the enemy.

Et huius ratio est, quia virtus alicuius rei attenditur secundum ultimum id quod potest, puta in eo, quod potest ferre centum libras, virtus eius determinatur non ex hoc quod fert quinquaginta, sed ex hoc quod fert centum, ut dicitur in I de caelo; ultimum autem ad quod potentia alicuius rei se extendit, est bonum opus. Et ideo ad virtutem cuiuslibet rei pertinet, quod reddat bonum opus. Et quia perfecta operatio non procedit nisi a perfecto agente,

308. The reason is that the virtue or power of a thing is judged by the best it can do. For example, the power of one who can carry a hundred pounds is determined by his actual carrying of this weight, as is said in the first book De Coelo (Ch. II, 281 a 8; St. Th. Lect. 25, 249) and not by the fact that he carries fifty pounds. Now the utmost or best to which the power of anything extends is called its excellent performance. It belongs to the virtue of every thing, therefore, to render an excellent performance. Because a perfect

consequens est, quod secundum virtutem propriam unaquaeque res et bona sit, et bene operetur. Et si hoc est verum in omnibus aliis, ut per exempla iam patuit, sequitur quod virtus hominis erit habitus quidam, ut supra habitum est, ex quo homo fit bonus, formaliter loquendo, sicut albedine fit aliquid album,

operation proceeds only from a perfect agent, it follows that everything is both good and operates well according to its own virtue. If this be true in all other things—and such was already apparent from our examples—human virtue must be a kind of habit, as was mentioned above (305). From this habit man becomes good formally speaking (as one

et per quem aliquis bene operatur.

becomes white by whiteness) and operates well.

Deinde cum dicit: qualiter autem hoc

309. Then [II, B], at “How this,” he

erit, iam diximus, secundum praemissam conditionem virtutis inquirit differentiam propriam virtutis. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem secundum proprietatem operationum. Secundo secundum naturam virtutis, ibi, adhuc autem et hoc erit manifestum, et cetera. Tertio secundum propriam rationem boni vel mali, ibi, adhuc peccare quidem, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod qualiter homo fiat bonus, et qualiter bene operetur, iam supra dictum est. Dictum est enim supra, quod per operationes, quae sunt in medio, efficimur boni secundum unamquamque virtutem. Et effecti boni operamur similes

investigates the specific difference of virtue according to the quality of virtue previously indicated. He does this under three headings: first [B, A’] according to the property of the operations; second [B, B’], according to the nature of virtue, At “but it will become still clearer etc.”; third [Lect. 7; C’] according to the special character of good or evil, at “Moreover, there are many etc.” (B.1106 b 29). He says first that the way in which a man may become good and do good has been treated already (257). It was noted also (260264) that we are made good in every virtue by operations according to the mean. Then having become good we perform good actions. It remains, therefore, that if virtue makes a

operationes. Relinquitur ergo, si virtus est, quae facit hominem bonum et bene operantem, quod sit in medio.

man good and his work good, it will consist in the mean.

Deinde cum dicit: adhuc autem et hoc erit manifestum etc., probat idem per naturam virtutis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo praemittit quaedam quae sunt necessaria ad propositum ostendendum. Secundo concludit propositum, ibi, si utique omnis scientia, et cetera. Tertio manifestat conclusionem, ibi: dico autem moralem, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit ea quae sunt necessaria ad propositum ostendendum.

310. Then [B, B’], at “but it will become etc.,” he proves the same by the nature of virtue. Regarding this he does three things. First [B’, 1] he introduces certain preliminaries necessary to explain his proposition. Second [B’, 2], he concludes his proposition at “Every practical science then etc.” Third [B’, 3], he explains an inference at “I am speaking of moral virtue etc.” On the first point he does two things. First [1, a] he proposes the things necessary to elucidate the proposition.

Secundo manifestat quod dixerat, ibi, dico utique, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod adhuc magis manifestum erit qualiter efficiamur boni et bene operantes, si consideremus qualis sit natura virtutis. Ad cuius evidentiam oportet praeaccipere, quod tria quaedam, idest plus et minus et aequale, contingit accipere tam in quantitatibus continuis quam etiam in quolibet alio divisibili, sive

Second [1, b] he clarifies what he has said, at “By the mean on the part etc.” He says first that the manner in which we become good and perform good acts will be clearer still if we consider the nature of virtue. For an understanding of this, we must take for granted beforehand that virtue treats three things: the more, the less, and the equal. Virtue treats these both in continuous, contingent matters, and even in any other

dividantur secundum numerum, sicut omnia discreta, sive per accidens, puta per intensionem et remissionem qualitatis in subiecto. Haec autem tria ita se habent, quod aequale est medium inter plus, quod pertinet ad superabundantiam, et minus, quod pertinet ad defectum. Et hoc quidem potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo secundum absolutam quantitatem rei. Alio modo secundum proportionem eius ad nos.

divisible matter, whether it be numerically divided as all discrete things, or whether it be divided incidentally—for example, by intensity and indistinctness of a quality in a subject. These three are so arranged that the equal holds a middle place between the more, which pertains to excess, and the less, which pertains to defect. This can be understood in two ways: one according to absolute quantity in some thing and the other in relation to us.

Deinde cum dicit: dico utique rei quidem medium etc., manifestat quod dixerat de differentia secundum rem et quoad nos. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per exempla, ibi: puta si decem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod medium secundum rem est, quod aequaliter

311. Then [1, b], at “By the mean on the part of the thing,” he clarifies what he said about the difference on the part of the thing (objective) and in regard to us (relative): first [b, i] by means of reason, and second [b, ii] by way of example at “For example, if etc.” He says first that the objective mean is the point

distat ab utroque extremorum. Et quia consideratur secundum absolutam quantitatem rei, est idem quoad omnes. Sed medium quoad nos est quod neque superabundat neque deficit a debita proportione ad nos. Et propter hoc, istud medium non est idem quoad omnes. Sicut si accipiamus in calceo medium quoad nos quod neque excedit mensuram pedis, neque deficit. Et quia non omnes habent eamdem quantitatem pedis, ideo hoc medium non est idem quoad omnes.

equidistant from both extremes. It is the same for all because it is understood according to the absolute quantity of the thing. But the mean is relative in regard to us inasmuch as it neither exceeds nor falls short of a proportion suitable to us. Hence this mean is not the same for all. If we apply the relative mean to a shoe, it will not be more than the length of the foot nor less. It will not be the same for all because not all have the same size foot.

Deinde cum dicit: puta si decem multa etc., manifestat quod dixerat per exempla. Et primo de medio rei, quod aequaliter distat ab extremis: sicut sex media accipiuntur inter decem quae sunt multa, et duo quae sunt pauca: quia aequaliter sex exceduntur a decem, et excedunt duo, scilicet in quatuor. Medium autem, quod sic accipitur in numeris secundum aequidistantiam a duobus extremis, dicitur esse secundum arithmeticam proportionem, quae

312. Then [b, ii], at “For example, if,” he clarifies what he has said, by way of example: first [ii, x] regarding the objective mean which is equally distant from the extremes. Thus six is the mean between ten (which is the more) and two (which is the less) because six is less than ten and more than two by the same amount, four. The mean, which is taken in numbers from the equal distance between two extremes, is said to be according to arithmetic proportion which considers numerical quantity. But the mean, which is

considerat ipsam numeri quantitatem. Medium autem, quod accipitur secundum aequalitatem proportionis dicitur esse secundum geometricam proportionem, ut infra patebit in quinto.

taken from the equality of proportion in regard to us, is said to be according to the geometric proportion as will be made clear afterwards in the fifth book (944, 949, 950, 972).

Secundo ibi: quod autem ad nos etc., exemplificat de medio quoad nos. Et dicit quod medium quod accipitur in comparatione ad nos, non est ita sumendum, scilicet secundum aequidistantiam ab extremis. Et hoc satis apparet in exemplo prius proposito de calceo: non enim si calceus cuius longitudo est viginti digitorum, superabundans est, ille autem, qui est quatuor est diminutus, propter hoc oportet, quod ille qui est duodecim digitorum, medio modo se habeat: sed forte erit abundans in comparatione ad

313. Second [ii, y], at “But the mean in regard to us,” he gives examples of the mean. He says that the mean, which is understood in comparison with us, is not to be taken according to equal distance between extremes. This is sufficiently clear in the previous example of the shoe. If a shoe twenty fingers’ breadth is long and a shoe four fingers’ breadth is short it does not necessarily follow that one twelve fingers’ breadth will be the right fit. Perhaps it will be large compared to the foot of one person and small compared to the foot of another. He also exemplifies this mean in food. If eating

pedem alicuius, et deficiens in comparatione ad pedem alterius. Et hoc etiam ipse exemplificat in cibis. Non enim, si comedere decem minas, idest decem mensuras est multum, et comedere duas est paucum, propter hoc magister, qui debet ordinare de cibo alicuius praecipiet ei quod comedat sex, quia hoc etiam est multum in comparatione ad unum, vel paucum in comparatione ad alterum.

ten pounds or ten portions is much and eating two pounds is little, a trainer—whose duty it is to make out someone’s diet—should not for this reason prescribe six pounds, since even this is much for one person and little for another.

Esset enim paucum ad quemdam qui

314. This would indeed be little for a man

vocabatur Milo, de quo Solinus narrat, quod comedebat unum bovem in die. Sed hoc esset multum dominatori gignasiorum, id est ei qui debeat vincere in ludis gignasticis in quibus homines nudi luctabantur, et oportebat eos modicum cibum sumere, ut essent agiliores. Et simile est etiam de his qui currunt in stadio et de his qui ludunt in palaestra, quae erat quidam locus exercitatorius apud Graecos. Et ita etiam est secundum omnem operativam scientiam quod sciens fugit superabundantiam et defectum et desiderat et inquirit id quod est medium, non quidem secundum rem, sed in

called Milo who, according to Solinus, ate a whole beef in a day. But it would be much for a champion in gymnastics, for one who has to excel in sports—in which men used to contend naked—and must eat lightly to be in better condition. The same is true of those who run at the stadium and of those who take up wrestling—a sport engaged in by the Greeks for exercise. So it is also in every operative science. The wise man avoids excess and defect, and wants to find the mean not objectively but relative to us.

comparatione ad nos.

Deinde cum dicit: si utique omnis scientia sic opus etc., ex praemissis argumentatur in hunc modum. Omnis scientia operativa bene perficit opus suum, ex hoc quod secundum intentionem respicit ad medium et secundum executionem opera sua perducit ad medium. Et huius signum accipi potest ex hoc quod homines quando aliquod opus bene se habet, consueverunt dicere quod nihil est addendum neque minuendum; dantes per hoc intelligere quod superabundantia et

315. Then [B’, 2], at “Every practical science,” he argues from the premises in this way. Every operative science perfects its work in this: that in planning it aims for the mean, and in execution it carries out its work in accord with the mean. Indications of this can be had from the fact that men are in the habit of saying, when a work is well done, that not a thing is to be added nor taken away. Thus they give us to understand that excess and defect spoil a work which is preserved by the mean. Hence good workmen, as has been pointed out (313-314), work with an eye on

defectus corrumpit bonitatem operis, quae salvatur in medietate. Unde et boni artifices, sicut dictum est, operantur respicientes ad medium. Sed virtus est certior omni arte, et etiam melior, sicut et natura. Virtus enim moralis agit inclinando determinate ad unum sicut et natura. Nam consuetudo in naturam vertitur. Operatio autem artis est

the mean. But virtue like nature is more certain and even better than any art. Moral virtue operates by inclining in a determined way to one thing as nature does. Indeed custom becomes nature. But art, which operates according to reason, is indifferent to various objects. Hence like nature it is more certain than art.

secundum rationem, quae se habet ad diversa; unde certius operatur virtus quam ars, sicut et natura. Similiter etiam virtus est melior quam ars; quia per artem est homo potens facere bonum opus; non tamen ex arte est ei quod faciat bonum opus: potest enim pravum opus agere; quia ars non inclinat ad bonum usum artis; sicut grammaticus potest incongrue loqui; sed per virtutem fit aliquis non solum potens bene operari, sed etiam bene operans: quia virtus inclinat ad bonam operationem, sicut et natura, ars autem facit solam cognitionem bonae operationis. Unde relinquitur a minori, quod virtus quae est melior arte, sit coniectatrix medii.

316. Likewise virtue is better than art because by art a man is capable of doing a good work, but art does not cause him to do the good work. He can do a bad work because art does not incline to the good use of art; a grammarian for example can speak incorrectly. But by virtue a man not only is capable of operating but actually performs the action because virtue like nature inclines to a good operation. Art alone gives only the knowledge of the operation. Consequently even for this secondary reason virtue, which is better than art, aims at the mean.

Deinde cum dicit: dico autem moralem etc., exponit conclusionem inductam. Et dicit quod hoc quod dictum est, debet intelligi de virtute morali, quae est circa passiones et operationes in quibus est accipere superabundantiam et defectum et medium. Et exemplificat primo in passionibus. Dicit enim quod contingit timere et audere et concupiscere et averti, id est fugere aliquid, et irasci et misereri, et universaliter delectari et tristari magis et minus quam oportet. Quorum utrumque non bene fit. Sed si aliquis timeat et audeat et sic de aliis quando oportet et in quibus oportet et ad quos oportet et cuius gratia oportet et eo

317. Then [ B’, 3] , at “I am speaking,” he explains a further conclusion. He affirms that what has been said (256-263) ought to be understood of moral virtue that concerns passions and operations to which belong excess, defect and mean. He gives an example first from the passions saying that fear, aggressiveness, concupiscence, aversion (which is a fleeing from something), anger, pity, and any Pleasure and sorrow may happen in greater and less degree than they ought. Both the excess and the defect are evil. But if a man should fear and dare (so of the other passions) what he ought, in the things he ought, in regard to the persons he ought, for the motive he ought, and in the way he

modo quo oportet, hoc erit medium in passionibus et in hoc consistit optimum virtutis. Et similiter etiam circa operationes est superabundantia et defectus et medium. Virtus autem moralis est circa passiones et operationes sicut circa materiam

ought, this will be a mean for the passions. It will be also the highest good of virtue. Similarly excess, defect, and mean are found in actions. Moral virtue treats of passions and actions as its proper matter so that in them excess is vicious and defect worthy of reproach, but the mean receives praise and

propriam; ita quod in eis superabundantia est vitiosa et defectus

shows the right path. These two pertain to virtue: righteousness (which is opposed to

vituperabilis, sed medium laudatur et recte se habet. Haec autem duo ad virtutem pertinent: scilicet rectitudo, quae opponitur perversitati vitiosae et laus quae opponitur vituperio, quae consequuntur ex primis duobus.

vicious perverseness) and praise (which is opposed to reproach). This and vicious perverseness follow from the first two (excess and defect).

Et sic concludit quod virtus moralis, et in se considerata est quaedam medietas, et est etiam medii coniectatrix, in quantum scilicet respicit ad medium et medium operatur.

318. Thus he concludes that moral virtue considered in itself is a kind of middle course and is an indicator of the mean inasmuch as it aims at the mean and accomplishes it.

LECTURE 7 Conclusion of the Definition Chapter 6 C’ The philosopher now adds a third (reason) based upon the nature of good and evil. — 319-321 ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου, τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν, ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν

Moreover, there are many ways of sinning (for evil partakes of the unlimited in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, and good partakes of the limited). However, there is only one way of doing what is right. It is

τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν· καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης· ἐσιλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

easy to sin, therefore, but difficult to do what is right. It is easy indeed to miss a bull’s eye but difficult to hit it. For this reason then defect and excess pertain to vice but the mean to virtue. Men are good in but one way but evil in many ways.

D’ He infers the definition of virtue from the premises. 1. HE PRESENTS THE DEFINITION. — 322-323

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν.

Virtue then is a habit that chooses the mean in regard to us, as that mean is determined by reason and understood by a wise man.

2. HE EXPLAINS IT. a. First he shows between what things there is a mean. — 324 μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν·

Virtue is a mean between two vices: of that which is according to excess and of that which is according to defect.

b. Second in reference to what thing this mean may be considered. — 325 καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι.

In regard to this mean, some vices fall short but others exceed what is right both in the passions and in actions. Virtue, however, discovers and chooses the mean.

c. Third he deduces a corollary. — 326-327 διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

For this reason, virtue according to its essence and definition is a mean. But it is also an extreme as having the nature of what is best and right.

3. HE REJECTS AN ERROR. a. He explains this first from reason. — 328-329 οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα

Not every action or passion of the soul admits a mean. Certain ones imply vice by their very name:

μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα

passions such as ill-will, shamelessness, envy and actions such as adultery, theft, murder. All these and their ilk are said to be evil in themselves and not only in their

εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἣν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἁμαρτάνειν

excess or defect. Neither do we have the option of acting well or badly in an action like adultery, as though it could be considered proper in itself, or done in a fitting manner, or at a right time, or in due circumstances, but to do any of them is sinful without any

ἐστίν.

qualification. b. He gives some examples by way of proof in the matter of vice. —

330 ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ

To seek a mean in these matters would be like assigning a mean to

ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως.

excess and defect in unjust, or in cowardly or lustful actions. Thus there would be a mean of an excess and of a defect, and an excess of an excess and a defect of a defect.

c. He explains the same thing by example in the matter of virtue. — 331-332 ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἁμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὔθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

An excess and defect are not found in temperance and fortitude because a mean is in no way an extreme, so excess or defect cannot be the mean of vice but what is done is vicious. As a consequence there cannot be a mean in any excess or defect, nor can there be excess or defect in any mean.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Adhuc peccare quidem multis modis et cetera. Praemissis duabus rationibus, hic ponit philosophus tertiam, quae sumitur ex ratione boni et mali. Et dicit, quod multipliciter contingit peccare; quia malum quod includitur in ratione peccati, (secundum Pictagoricos) pertinet ad

319. After giving the two previous reasons, the Philosopher now [C’] adds a third based upon the nature of good and evil. Accepting the Pythagorean view, he says that there are many ways of sinning because evil, which is included in the nature of sin, partakes of the unlimited, but good partakes

infinitum; et quia bonum secundum eos pertinet ad finitum: per oppositum est intelligendum quod recte agere contingit solum uno modo.

of the limited. We must understand then, on the contrary, that there is only one way of doing what is right.

Huius autem ratio accipi potest ex eo quod Dionysius dicit in libro de divinis nominibus, quod bonum contingit ex una et integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus; sicut patet in bono et malo corporali. Turpitudo enim, quae est malum corporalis formae, contingit quodcumque membrorum indecenter se

320. The reason for this can be found in the statement of Dionysius in the book De Divinis Nominibus, that good results from a united and complete cause but evil from any single defect, as is evident in physical goodness and badness. Ugliness, which is a defect of physical beauty, results from any member being unsightly. But beauty arises

habeat; sed pulcritudo non contingit, nisi omnia membra sint bene proportionata et colorata. Et similiter aegritudo, quae est malum complexionis corporalis, provenit ex singulari deordinatione cuiuscumque humoris, sed sanitas esse non (potest) nisi ex debita proportione omnium humorum. Et similiter peccatum in actione humana contingit quaecumque circumstantiarum inordinate se habeat qualitercumque, vel secundum superabundantiam vel secundum defectum. Sed rectitudo eius esse non potest nisi omnibus circumstantiis debito modo ordinatis. Et ideo sicut sanitas vel pulchritudo contingit uno modo, aegritudo autem vel turpitudo

only when all the members are well proportioned and of a healthy hue. Likewise sickness, a defect in the constitution of the body, happens from a single disorder of any humor. But health is dependent on the proper proportion of all the humors. Likewise sin is committed in human action from any circumstance being inordinate in any way either by excess or defect. But goodness will be present only when all the circumstances are rightly ordered. As health or beauty comes about in a single way but sickness and ugliness in many, even in an unlimited number of ways, so also moral goodness results in only one way but the act of sin takes place in countless

multis, immo infinitis modis; ita etiam rectitudo operationis uno solo modo contingit; peccatum autem in actione contingit infinitis modis. Et inde est quod peccare est facile, quia multipliciter hoc contingit. Sed recte agere est difficile, quia non contingit nisi uno modo.

ways. Hence it is easy to sin because sin can happen in a variety of modes, but it is difficult to do what is right because rectitude happens only in one way.

Et ponit exemplum, quia facile est divertere a contactu signi, id est puncti sive in centro circuli, sive in quacumque alia superficie determinate signati, quia hoc contingit infinitis modis. Sed tangere signum est difficile, quia contingit uno solo

321. He gives as an example that it is easy to miss the center of the target, because a miss can happen in numerous ways. But to hit the center spot is difficult because a hit happens in only one way. Now it is obvious that excess and defect take place in various

modo. Manifestum est autem quod superabundantia et defectus multipliciter contingunt, sed medietas uno modo; unde manifestum fit quod superabundantia et defectus pertinent ad malitiam, medietas autem ad virtutem, quia boni sunt aliqui simpliciter, idest uno modo; sed mali sunt multifarie, id est multipliciter, ut dictum est.

ways but the mean in a single way. Hence excess and defect manifestly pertain to vice but the mean to virtue because men are good simply, that is, in one way, but evil at sundry times, i.e., in many ways as has just been stated (320).

Deinde cum dicit: est ergo virtus habitus etc., concludit ex praemissis definitionem virtutis. Et primo ponit ipsam definitionem. Secundo manifestat eam, ibi, medietas autem duarum et cetera. Tertio

322. Then [D’], at “Virtue then is,” he infers the definition of virtue from the premises. First [D’, 1] he presents the definition, and second [D’, 2] he explains it, at “Virtue is a mean between two etc.”

excludit errorem, ibi, non autem suscipit omnis et cetera. In diffinitione autem virtutis quatuor ponit. Quorum primum est genus quod tangit cum dicit quod virtus est habitus, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum est actus virtutis moralis. Oportet enim habitum definiri per actum. Et hoc tangit cum dicit electivus, idest secundum electionem operans. Principale enim virtutis est electio, ut infra dicetur. Et quia oportet actum determinari per obiectum, ideo tertio ponit obiectum sive terminum actionis, in hoc quod dicit existens in medietate quae ad nos; ostensum est enim supra, quod virtus inquirit et operatur medium non rei, sed

Third [D’, 3] he rejects an error, at “Not every action etc.” In the definition of virtue he treats four points. The first of these is the genus, which he touches on when he says that virtue is a habit (305). The second is the act of the moral virtue, for the habit must be defined by the act. This he mentions by the word “chooses,” that is, acts according to choice, for the principal act of virtue is choice—he will discuss this later (432). Since the act must be determined by the object he refers then, third, to the object or the term of the action when he says “the mean in regard to us.” It was shown above (314) that virtue seeks out and uses the mean not of the thing but

quoad nos. Dictum est autem supra quod virtus moralis est in appetitu, qui participat rationem. Et ideo oportuit quartam particulam apponi, quae tangit causam bonitatis in virtute, cum dicit determinata ratione. Non enim inquirere medium est bonum, nisi inquantum est secundum rationem determinatum. Verum quia contingit rationem esse et rectam et erroneam, oportet virtutem secundum rationem rectam operari, ut supra suppositum est.

in regard to us. Similarly it has been said (257) that moral virtue is in the appetite, which participates in reason. He had to add, therefore, a fourth notion, which refers to the cause of goodness in virtue, by the words determined by reason.” It is good to seek the mean only insofar as, it is determined by reason, but because reason can be right or erring, we must perform virtue according to right reason, as was ascertained previously (257).

Et ad hoc explicandum subdit, et ut utique sapiens determinabit, scilicet medium. Sapiens autem hic dicitur non ille qui est sapiens simpliciter, quasi cognoscens altissimam causam totius universi; sed prudens qui est sapiens rerum humanarum, ut infra in sexto dicetur. Nam et in arte aedificatoria determinatur quid bonum sit fieri secundum iudicium sapientis in arte illa. Et idem est in

323. To explain this he adds “as understood by a wise man.” “Wise” here does not refer to one who is wise simply, knowing the ultimate causes of the whole universe, but rather to one who is prudent, that is, wise in human affairs, but this he will discuss in the sixth book (1163). Certainly the making of what is good in the art of building is determined by the judgment of one wise in that art, and the same is true in all the

omnibus aliis artibus.

other arts.

Deinde cum dicit: medietas autem duarum etc., manifestat praemissam definitionem quantum ad hoc quod dixit virtutem in medietate consistere. Et circa hoc tria

324. Then [D’, 2], at “Virtue is a mean,” he explains the previously given definition in regard to his saying that virtue consists in the mean. On this point he does three

facit. Primo ostendit quorum sit medietas. Secundo respectu cuius attendatur ista mediatio, ibi: et adhuc et cetera. Tertio concludit quoddam corollarium, ibi, propter quod secundum substantiam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod virtus ipsa est quaedam medietas inter duas malitias, id est inter duos habitus vitiosos: eius scilicet qui est secundum superabundantiam et eius qui est secundum defectum. Sicut liberalitas est medietas inter prodigalitatem quae vergit in superabundantiam, et illiberalitatem quae vergit in defectum.

things. First [2, a] he shows between what things there is a mean and, second [2, b], in reference to what thing- this mean may be considered, at “In regard to this etc.” Third [2, c] he deduces a corollary at “For this reason virtue etc.” He says first that virtue itself is a kind of middle course between two vices and between two vicious habits: one by way of excess and the other by way of defect . Thus liberality is the middle course between extravagance tending toward excess and miserliness tending toward avarice.

Deinde cum dicit: et adhuc etc., ostendit respectu cuius attendatur superabundantia et defectus et medium. Et dicit adhuc esse considerandum quod quaedam malitiae per comparationem ad

325. Then [2, b], at “In regard to this,” he shows in reference to what norm we are to judge excess, defect, and mean. He says we must further consider that some vices fall short of but others exceed, both in the

aliquid deficiunt, aliae vero superabundant tam in passionibus quam in operationibus ab eo scilicet quod oportet a quo quaedam deficiunt et quaedam superabundant. Sed virtus, inquantum servat id quod oportet, dicitur medium et invenire per rationem et

passions and in actions, what is right. In regard to this some are deficient and others are in excess. But virtue, precisely as it observes what it ought, is said to discover the mean by reason and to choose it by the will. Thus it is evident that virtue itself is a

eligere per voluntatem. Et sic patet quod virtus et ipsa est medietas et iterum medium operatur. Medietas quidem est inter duos habitus, sed medium operatur in actionibus et passionibus.

middle course and, on the other hand, it employs the mean. It is indeed the middle course between two habits, but it uses the mean in actions and passions.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod secundum substantiam, infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis; scilicet quod virtus secundum suam substantiam et secundum rationem definitivam est medietas. Sed inquantum habet rationem optimi in tali genere et bene operantis sive disponentis, est extremitas. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod sicut dictum est, tota bonitas virtutis moralis dependet ex rectitudine rationis. Unde bonum convenit virtuti morali, secundum quod sequitur rationem rectam; malum autem convenit

326. Then [2, c], at “For this reason,” he draws a further conclusion from his remarks: that virtue in its essence and definition is a mean. But precisely as it possesses the character of the best and as it acts or guides well in a determined genus it is an extreme. For an understanding of this, we must consider (as has been pointed out in 322), that the entire goodness of moral virtue depends on the rectitude of the reason. Hence good is in harmony with moral virtue according as it follows right reason, but evil has a reference to each vice,

utrique vitio, tam superabundanti quam deficienti, in quantum recedit a ratione recta. Et ideo secundum rationem bonitatis et malitiae ambo vitia sunt in uno extremo; scilicet in malo, quod attenditur secundum recessum a ratione. Virtus autem est in altero extremo, scilicet in bono, quod attenditur secundum sequelam rationis.

viz.: excess and defect inasmuch as both depart from right reason. Therefore, according to the nature of goodness and evil both vices are in one extreme that is, in evil which is thus shown to be a deviation from reason. Virtue however is in the other extreme, that is, in good which is characterized as a following of reason.

Non tamen ex hoc virtus et opposita vitia consequuntur speciem quam definitio significat, quia ratio recta se habet ad appetitum rectum, sicut motivum et regula extrinseca. Appetitus autem perversus per vitium non intendit a ratione recta deficere; sed praeter intentionem hoc ei accidit, per se autem intendit id in quo superabundat vel deficit. Quod autem est praeter intentionem est per accidens: id autem quod est

327. By reason of this, virtue and the contrary vices do not follow the species indicated by the definition, because right reason is the motive and the extrinsic norm for the right appetite. But an evil appetite does not intend by vice to deviate from right reason—this is contrary to its intention— for it directly intends that object in which excess or defect is present. What is contrary to its intention is incidental. Now the incidental and the extrinsic do not

extrinsecum et per accidens non constituit speciem, sed species habitus sumitur secundum obiectum in quod per se tendit.

constitute a species but the species of a habit is taken from the object to which the habit tends. But according to objects the

Secundum obiecta autem medium competit

mean belongs to virtue, and the extremes to

virtuti, extrema autem vitiis. Et ideo philosophus dixit quod secundum rationem boni, virtus est in extremo, sed secundum substantialem speciem est in medio.

vices. He says, therefore, that according to the nature of good, virtue lies in the extreme but according to the essential species, in the mean.

Deinde cum dicit: non autem suscipit etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Posset enim aliquis credere, quia in operationibus et passionibus virtus tenet medium, vitia autem tenent extrema, quod hoc contingeret in omnibus operationibus et passionibus. Sed ipse hoc excludit dicens quod non omnis operatio vel passio animae suscipit medietatem, quae scilicet ad

328. Then [D’ 3], at “Not every action,” he rejects an erroneous view. Because virtue can occupy the middle course and vice the extremes in actions and in passions, someone might think that this would happen in all actions and passions. But he rejects this by saying that not every action or passion of the soul admits a mean in the context of virtue.

virtutem pertineat. Et hoc manifestat, ibi, quaedam enim et cetera. Et primo per rationem: quia

329. He explains this first from reason [3, a], at “Certain ones etc.” Certain actions

quaedam tam passiones quam actiones in ipso suo nomine implicant malitiam, sicut in passionibus gaudium de malo et inverecundia et invidia. In operationibus autem adulterium, furtum, homicidium. Omnia enim ista et similia, secundum se sunt mala; et non solum superabundantia ipsorum vel defectus; unde circa haec non contingit aliquem recte se habere qualitercumque haec operetur, sed semper haec faciens peccat. Et ad hoc exponendum subdit, quod bene vel non bene non contingit in talibus ex eo quod aliquis faciat aliquod horum, puta adulterium, sicut oportet vel quando oportet, ut sic fiat bene, male autem quando secundum quod

and passions by their very name imply vice: passions such as ill-will, shamelessness, envy and actions such as adultery, theft, murder. All of these and their like are evil in themselves and not only in their excess or defect. Hence in such things a person cannot be virtuous no matter how he acts, but he always sins in doing them. In explaining this he adds that right or wrong in actions like adultery does not arise from the fact that a person does the act as he ought or when he ought, so that then the act becomes good, but on the other hand evil when not done as it ought. Without qualification sin is present whenever any of these is present, for each of them implies an

non oportet. Sed simpliciter, qualitercumque aliquod horum fiat, est peccatum. In se enim quodlibet horum importat aliquid repugnans ad id quod oportet.

act opposed to what is right.

Secundo ibi: simile igitur etc., manifestat idem per exempla in vitiis. Et dicit quod

330. Second [3, b], he gives some examples by way of proof in the matter of vice, at “To

quia ista secundum se malitiam important, simile est quaerere in istis medium et extrema, sicut si aliquis attribueret

seek a mean.” He says that because such things imply evil in themselves, seeking a mean and extremes in them is like

medietatem superabundantiam et defectum circa hoc quod est iniusta facere et timidum et incontinentem esse: quod quidem esset inconveniens. Cum enim ista importent superabundantiam et defectum, sequeretur quod superabundantiae et defectus esset medietas, quod est oppositio in adiecto, et quod superabundantiae esset superabundantia et defectionis esset defectus quaerendus, quod in infinitum abiret.

attributing a mean to excess and defect, whether it be in acting unjustly, or cowardly or lewdly—this would certainly be unfitting. Since these actions imply excess and defect, it follows that excess and defect would be a mean (which is a contradiction) and that we would have to find the excess of the excess and the defect of the defect, which could go on forever.

Tertio ibi: quemadmodum autem temperantiae etc., manifestat idem per simile in virtutibus. Manifestum est enim quod quia temperantia et fortitudo de se important medium, non est in eis accipere superabundantiam et defectum, quasi aliquis sit superabundanter vel deficienter temperatus aut fortis. Medium enim non

331. Third [3, c], he explains the same thing by example in the matter of virtue at “An excess.” Because temperance and fortitude imply a mean of themselves, they do not admit excess and defect in the sense that a man can be temperate or courageous in an excessive or defective manner. Likewise the mean of those things, which of

potest esse extremum. Et similiter, quia illa de se important extrema, non potest esse illorum medietas neque superabundantia et defectus. Sed qualitercumque operatum est unumquodque eorum vitiosum est.

themselves imply extremes, cannot be excess and defect. But no matter how any one of them is done, it is vicious.

Ultimo autem concludit quod nullius superabundantiae vel defectus potest esse medietas, neque medietatis superabundantia aut defectus.

332. Last he concludes that there cannot be a mean of any excess or defect, nor can there be an excess or defect of any mean.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Oportet autem non solum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est virtus in generali, hic manifestat definitionem positam in speciali per singulas virtutes. Et circa hoc duo facit.

333. After the Philosopher has explained what virtue is in a general way, he now applies the definition in a special way to each virtue. On this point he does two things. First [I] he shows the necessity of this procedure. Second

Primo ostendit hoc esse necessarium. Secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi, circa timores quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod oportet non solum dici universaliter quid est virtus, sed etiam

[II] he carries out his proposal at “In actions concerned with fear etc.” He says first that we must speak of the essence of virtue not only in its universal aspect but the general doctrine must be applied to each case in a special way.

adaptare in speciali ad singula. Et rationem huius assignat; quia in sermonibus qui sunt circa operationes, universales sunt magis inanes, et particulares sunt magis veri. Et huius rationem assignat, eo quod operationes sunt circa singularia. Et ita opportunum est quod sermones universales qui sunt de operabilibus concordant cum particularibus.

The reason he gives is that in discussions concerned with actions, universals are not of much utility and particulars are more accurate because actions pertain to singulars. Fittingly then discussions about actions should be in harmony with particulars.

Si ergo dicantur sermones operationum solum in universali, erunt inanes, tum quia non consequuntur finem suum qui est directio particularium operationum, tum etiam quia non possunt universales sermones in talibus sumi, qui non deficiant in aliquo particularium, propter varietatem materiae, ut supra dictum est. Sed particulares sermones

334. If then our study be about actions considered only universally, it will be futile both because it does not accomplish its purpose, which is the direction of individual actions, and because a study from a universal viewpoint-where deficiencies in particulars may not occur-cannot be made in these things by reason of the changeableness of the matter, as was said before (32-36). But the study of

sunt et efficaciores utpote apti ad dirigendum operationes; et sunt etiam veriores, quia accipiuntur secundum id in quo universales sermones verificantur. Et ideo illud quod dictum est in universali de virtute, sumendum est ex descriptione circa singulas virtutes.

particulars is more effective, being suitable to control actions, and also more accurate because particulars are understood to the extent that the universal is verified in them. What was said (289-332), therefore, about virtue in general must have been based upon the explanation of individual virtues.

Deinde cum dicit: circa timores quidem etc., exequitur intentum; ostendens per singula quod medium est bonum et laudabile, extremum autem malum et vituperabile. Et primo ostendit hoc in virtutibus; secundo in passionibus, ibi, sunt autem et in passionibus et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod virtutes dupliciter aliqui distinxerunt.

335. Then [II], at “In actions concerned with,” he carries out his proposal, showing by particular cases that the mean is good and praiseworthy but the extreme is evil and blameworthy. He shows this first in the virtues [II, A]; and second [Lect. 9; B], in the passions at “Also in the passions etc.” (B. 1108 a 31). Regarding the first point we must consider that virtues have been distinguished

Quidam enim attenderunt distinctionem earum secundum quosdam generales modos virtutum, qui quidem sunt quatuor. Nam radix virtutis consistit in ipsa rectitudine rationis secundum quam oportet actiones et passiones dirigere. Aliter tamen sunt dirigibiles actiones, quam passiones. Nam actiones

in two ways. Some observe the distinction of virtues according to certain general modes which are four in number. The root of virtue consists in the rectitude of reason according to which we must direct our actions and passions. Actions however are to be directed in a way different from the passions, for actions in themselves do not resist reason, as buying,

quantum est de se non habent aliquam resistentiam ad rationem, sicut emptio et venditio et alia huiusmodi. Et ideo circa eas non requiritur nisi quod ratio quamdam aequalitatem rectitudinis statuat. Sed passiones important inclinationem quandam quae potest resistere et repugnare rationi dupliciter.

selling, and so forth. Consequently, for such things reason need only establish a certain equality of rectitude. But the passions indicate a kind of inclination that can be contrary to reason in a twofold way.

Uno modo ex eo quod rationem trahit ad aliud; sicut patet de omnibus passionibus, quae pertinent ad prosecutionem appetitus; sicut concupiscentia, spes, ira, et alia huiusmodi. Et circa has passiones oportet quod ratio rectitudinem statuat reprimendo et refrenando eas. Alio modo ex eo quod passio retrahit ab eo quod est secundum rationem; ut patet

336. In one way it draws reason to something else, as is evident in all passions that deal with following the appetite—for example, concupiscence, hope, anger, and others of this kind. For these passions reason must establish a rectitude in suppressing and restraining them. In another way passion shrinks from what is according to reason, as in all passions that denote flight of the appetite—for example, fear, hatred, and the like. In passions of this

in omnibus passionibus quae important fugam appetitus, sicut timor, odium et similia. Et in huiusmodi passionibus oportet quod ratio rectitudinem statuat, firmando animum in eo quod est secundum rationem. Et secundum haec quatuor nominantur virtutes quae a quibusdam principales dicuntur. Nam ad prudentiam pertinet ipsa rectitudo rationis. Ad iustitiam vero aequalitas in operationibus constituta. Ad fortitudinem autem firmitas animi, ad temperantiam vero refrenatio vel repressio passionum, sicut ipsa nomina sonant.

kind reason must establish a rectitude by stabilizing the soul in what is conformable to reason. According to this we designate four virtues, which some men call principal. Rectitude of reason itself pertains to prudence, equality established in operations to justice, constancy of soul to fortitude, and moderation of the passions—as the words indicate—to temperance.

Quidam igitur istas virtutes generaliter acceperunt putantes omnem cognitionem veritatis ad prudentiam pertinere, omnem aequalitatem actionum ad iustitiam, omnem firmitatem animi ad fortitudinem, omnem refrenationem vel repressionem ad temperantiam. Et sic locuti sunt de his virtutibus Tullius et Seneca et alii quidam. Unde posuerunt has virtutes

337. Some, therefore, have understood these virtues in a general way, thinking that all knowledge of truth belongs to prudence, the equality of all actions to justice, all constancy of soul to fortitude, and all curbing and moderation of the passions to temperance. Cicero, Seneca, and others spoke of these virtues in this way. They considered such to be general virtues and called all other virtues species of these.

esse quasi generales, et dixerunt omnes virtutes esse earum species. Sed ista virtutum distinctio non videtur

338. But this distinction does not seem to be

esse conveniens. Primo quidem, quia praedicta quatuor sunt talia, sine quibus nulla virtus esse potest, unde per haec non possunt species virtutum diversificari. Secundo quia species virtutum et vitiorum non accipiuntur ex parte rationis, sed ex parte obiecti, ut supra dictum est.

appropriate. First because the abovementioned virtues are of such a nature that without them there can be no virtue. Hence the species of virtue cannot be differentiated by this. Second, virtues and vices are not specified by reason but by their object (322).

Et ideo convenientius Aristoteles virtutes distinxit secundum obiecta sive secundum materias. Et secundum hoc praedictae virtutes quatuor, non dicuntur principales quia sint generales sed quia species earum accipiuntur secundum quaedam principalia; sicut prudentia, est non circa omnem cognitionem veri, sed specialiter circa actum rationis qui est praecipere,

339. Aristotle then distinguishes virtues more fittingly according to their objects or matter. Thus the previously mentioned four virtues are not called principal because they are general but because their species are taken according to certain important notions, as prudence is not concerned with all knowledge of the truth but especially with the act of reason that is command. Justice is not concerned with equality of all actions but only

iustitia autem est non circa omnem aequalitatem actionum, sed solum in actionibus quae sunt ad alterum in quibus melius est aequalitatem constituere; et similiter fortitudo est non circa quamlibet firmitatem, sed solum in timoribus periculorum mortis, temperantia autem est non circa quamlibet refrenationem, sed solum in concupiscentiis delectationis tactus.

of those referring to another, where the better thing is the establishment of equality. Fortitude is not concerned with every kind of constancy but only that which arises at the fear of the danger of death. Temperance is not concerned with all restraint but only with that of the desires and pleasures of touch. The other virtues, however, are as it were secondary. They can be reduced, therefore, to the previously mentioned virtues not as

Aliae vero virtutes sunt circa quaedam secundaria, et ideo possunt reduci ad praedictas, non sicut species ad genera, sed sicut secundariae ad principales.

species to general but as secondary to principal virtues.

His igitur praesuppositis sciendum est, quod de iustitia et prudentia hic philosophus non agit, sed infra in quinto et sexto. Agit autem de temperantia et fortitudine, et quibusdam aliis secundariis virtutibus. Quae omnes sunt circa aliquas passiones. Sed omnes passiones animae respiciunt aliquod obiectum: quod quidem pertinet vel ad ipsam hominis corporalem vitam, vel ad exteriora bona, vel ad humanos actus.

340. Since then these things have been taken for granted, we must know that the Philosopher does not treat justice and prudence here but later on in the fifth book (885-1108) and the sixth book (1161-1173). He does treat here, however, temperance, fortitude, and certain other secondary virtues, all of which are concerned with some of the passions. But all passions regard some object that pertains either to the bodily life of man or external goods or human acts. Therefore, he

Primo ergo facit mentionem de virtutibus quae sunt circa passiones, quarum obiecta pertinent ad corporalem vitam. Secundo de illis quae pertinent ad exteriora bona, ibi, circa dationem autem pecuniarum etc.; tertio de illis, quae respiciunt exteriores actus, ibi, sunt autem et aliae tres et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo loquitur de fortitudine, quae respicit pericula interimentia vitam. Secundo de temperantia, quae respicit ea quae sunt utilia ad conservandam vitam, scilicet cibos, quibus conservatur vita in individuo, et venerea quibus conservatur in specie, ibi: circa

first [A, A’] mentions the virtues touching on the passions, the objects of which pertain to bodily life. Second [A, B’] he mentions those pertaining to external goods at “In respect to the giving and receiving of money etc.”; and third [Lect. 9; C’] those regarding exterior acts at “There are three other means etc.” (B. 1108 a 9). On the first point he does two things. First [A’, 1] he speaks of fortitude, which regards dangers destructive of life. Second [A, 2] he speaks of temperance, which regards things useful for the preservation of life, such as food by which life is preserved in the individual and sex by which life is preserved in the species, at “With regard to pleasures and pains etc.”

delectationes autem et cetera.

Dicit ergo primo, quod fortitudo est medietas circa timores et audacias, inquantum scilicet respiciunt pericula mortis. Sed eorum qui superabundant, ille qui superabundat in hoc quod est esse intimidum, qui etiam deficit in timendo, est innominatus, quia raro hoc accidit. Et multa similiter sunt innominata, propter hoc, quod homines

341. He says first that fortitude is a mean concerned with fear and daring precisely as they regard the danger of death. But of those sinning by excess, the state of the man who is excessive in being fearless and also deficient in fearing is not given any special name because this rarely happens. Likewise many things are without a name because men do not advert to them ordinarily so that they would give them

ea non adverterunt communiter ut sic ipsis nomina imponerent. Ille vero qui superabundat in audendo, vocatur audax. Et differt ab intimido. Nam ille dicitur secundum defectum timoris, audax autem secundum excessum audaciae. Ille vero qui superabundat in timendo, et deficit in audendo, vocatur timidus.

a name. But he who is extreme in daring is called rash. Such a one differs from the fearless man who is so-called from the lack of fear, but the rash man is so-called from an excess of daring. He who fears excessively and lacks daring is called a coward.

Deinde cum dicit: circa delectationes autem etc., introducit de temperantia. Et dicit quod temperantia inducit de temperantia. Et dicit quod temperantia est medietas, non circa omnes delectationes et tristitias, sed circa eas quae sunt tactus pertinentes ad cibos et venerea. Minus autem est circa tristitias quam circa delectationes, nam huiusmodi tristitiae, causantur ex sola

342. Then [A’, 2], at “With regard to pleasures,” he discusses temperance. He says that temperance is a mean not for all pleasures and pains but for those of touch, pertaining to food and sex. It is less concerned with pains than with pleasures, for pains of this kind are caused only from the absence of pleasures. Excess in such things is called intemperance, but the defect does not often occur because everyone naturally desires pleasure. Hence

absentia delectationum. Superabundantia autem in talibus vocatur intemperantia. Sed defectus non multum fit, propter hoc quod omnes naturaliter appetunt delectationem. Et inde est quod iste defectus est innominatus. Sed ipse imponit nomen; et vocat tales insensibiles, eo quod huiusmodi delectationes sensu percipiuntur. Et ideo ille, qui refugit has delectationes praeter rationem rectam, convenienter vocatur insensibilis.

this defect is unnamed. He himself, however, invents a name and calls insensible those who do not feel pleasures of this kind. One who, contrary to right reason, avoids such pleasures is appropriately called insensible.

Deinde cum dicit: circa dationem autem etc., introducit de virtutibus quae respiciunt exteriora. Et primo de his quae sunt circa concupiscentias exteriorum bonorum. Secundo de

343. Then [A, B’], at “In respect to the giving,” he introduces the virtues that, regard external things. First [B’, 1] he treats those virtues concerned with the desire of external goods and second [Lect. 9; B’, 2] those that

virtute quae respicit exteriora mala, ibi, est autem et circa iram et cetera. Exteriora autem bona sunt divitiae et honores. Primo igitur introducit de

regard external evils, at “With respect to anger etc.” (B. 1108 a 3). External goods are riches and honors. First [1, a] then he presents the virtues regulating riches; second

virtutibus quae respiciunt divitias. Secundo de his quae respiciunt honores, ibi: circa honorem autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo introducit de liberalitate, quae est circa mediocres divitias. Secundo de magnificentia, quae est circa magnas, ibi, circa pecunias autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod liberalitas est medietas circa dationem et acceptionem pecuniarum. Sed prodigalitas et illiberalitas se habent secundum superabundantiam et defectum, contrario modo. Nam prodigus superabundat in datione et deficit in acceptione. Illiberalis autem e contrario

[Lect. 9; b] those referring to honors at “The mean in regard to honor etc.” (B. 1107 b 23)Regarding the first he does two things. First [a, i] he treats liberality, which is concerned with moderate riches; then [a, ii] magnificence, which is concerned with great riches, at “Having to do with the use of money etc.” He says first that liberality is a mean between the giving and receiving of money. But extravagance and stinginess constitute, in an opposite way, excess and defect. The spendthrift overdoes the giving and falls short in the acquisition, but the miser on the contrary is excessive in acquiring and deficient in giving. These matters are here discussed in outline or as conforming to a pattern, and as

superabundat in acceptione et deficit in datione. Haec autem hic dicuntur typo, idest exemplariter, et in capitulo, idest summarie; sed postea et de his et de aliis determinabitur certius.

falling under headings or summarily. Later (528-594; 595-648; 658-706) he will treat more accurately both these and other matters.

Deinde cum dicit: circa pecunias autem etc., introducit de magnificentia. Et dicit quod praeter praedictas dispositiones, scilicet liberalitatem et opposita vitia, sunt etiam quaedam aliae circa pecunias, circa quas etiam magnificentia est medietas quaedam. Sed differt magnificus a liberali, in hoc quod magnificus est circa magna, sed liberalis est etiam circa parva. Sed superabundantia respectu magnificentiae vocatur apyrocalia ab a, quod est sine, et pyros quod est experientia, et calos, quod est bonum,

344. Then [a, ii], at “Having to do with the use of money,” he introduces magnificence. He says that besides the above-mentioned habits, liberality and the opposed vices, there are also other virtues concerned with money, for which even magnificence is a kind of mean. The princely or munificent person, as engaged in expending great sums, differs from the generous person who gives small amounts. Excess in respect to magnificence is called apyrocalia: a meaning “without,” pyros meaning “practice,” kalos meaning “good,” that is, without the practice of what is good. Thus those who spend a great deal care little

quasi sine experientia boni; quia scilicet multa expendentes non curant qualiter bene expendant: vocatur etiam haec superabundantia banausia, a banos, quod est fornax, quia scilicet ad modum fornacis omnia consumunt. Sed defectus vocatur parvificentia. Et hae

about how they bestow their goods. This excess is also called banausia from banos meaning “furnace” because, like a furnace, the squanderer consumes everything. The defect however is called meanness. These extremes in fact differ from those that are opposed to liberality, but the way they differ will be

etiam extremitates differunt ab his quae contrariantur liberalitati. Quomodo

treated subsequently in the fourth book (707734).

autem differant, dicetur posterius in quarto.

LECTURE 9 Virtues Dealing with Honors Chapter 7 b. He now treats those (virtues) dealing with honors. i. He deals with the virtue referring to great honors. — 345 περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·

The mean in regard to honor and dishonor is magnanimity. But the excess is chapnotes (i.e., presumption); and the defect, smallness of soul.

ii. (He deals) with the virtue referring to ordinary honors. — 346-348 ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι

As we pointed out, liberality that bestows small amounts differs from magnificence. So also there is a virtue concerned with ordinary honors that differs from magnanimity whose province is great honors. A man can desire ordinary honors in the right way, more than he ought, and less than he ought. If he is excessive in the desire of honors, he is called ambitious; if deficient, he is said to be unambitious. But he who strikes a mean has no special name. Likewise the habits are without names except for ambition, which we call the excessive love of honors. Hence persons who are in the

μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν

extremes argue about the location of the mean. Even we sometimes call the man possessing the mean ambitious, and

φιλότιμον ἔστι ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ῥηθήσεται· νῦν

δ' τίνα ἐν δὲ

ὅτε τὸν δ' αἰτίαν τοῖς ἑξῆς περὶ τῶν

λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.

τὸν

sometimes we call him unambitious. Why we do this will be explained afterwards, but for the present we should refer to the remaining states in the way indicated.

2. HE PROPOSES THE VIRTUE CONCERNING EXTERNAL EVILS. — 349 ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις

With respect to anger we find an excess, a defect, and a mean. Although these are for the most part without names, we call the man following the mean “mild” and the mean “mildness.” In regard to the extremes, he who is excessive is called irascible and his vice irascibility. But he who is deficient is said to be apathetic and to have the defect of apathy.

ἀοργησία.

C’ He proposes the virtues which concern human actions. 1. HE SHOWS THEIR VARIETY. — 350-351 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ

There are three other means which are alike in one respect and different in another. They are all concerned with communicating what we say and do, but they differ because one of them refers to

ὅτι ἣ μέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὔτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὔτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς

the truth, and the others to the pleasantness found in this communication. One of these latter concerns pleasantness in the things said and done in jest, the others regard the things that belong to the usual manner of living. We must speak of these things so that we may better understand that the mean is always praiseworthy but that the extremes are neither right nor to be praised but rather to be

ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου.

condemned. Many of these also are without special names, but as we have done with the others, we shall try to invent names for them for the sake of the clarity and the good that results.

2. HE GIVES EXAMPLES OF THESE. a. First of that which concerns truth. — 352 περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων ὁ ἔχων.

In regard to truth the mean is possessed by the man who is truthful and is called truthfulness. But pretension, which is the excess, is called boasting, and the pretender is known as a braggart. The defect, however, may be named dissimulation or irony and the pretender a dissembler.

b. He gives an example of the virtue concerned with amusement. — 353 περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων

In respect to pleasantness concerned with amusement, the man who observes the mean is called witty and the disposition itself wit. But the excess is

αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία·περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.

designated as buffoonery and the person who is excessive a buffoon. If one falls short in this matter he is said to he boorish and to have the quality of boorishness.

c. He exemplifies the third of these virtues. — 354 #960;ερὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα,

In the remaining kind of pleasantness, that is, in life generally, the man who is pleasant as he should be is called affable, and the mean he attains is affability. But

ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.

he who carries this too far merely for the sake of pleasing is called obsequious. If however he acts for his own utility he is called a flatterer. One who falls short in this matter and is always difficult is termed contentious and perverse.

B. He gives an example of certain laudable passions. a. First of modesty. — 355

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὃ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὃ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων.

Also in the passions and the things regarding the passions a mean exists. Modesty, for example, is not a virtue, but it is praised as is the modest person, or in this question a mean is attainable. The person who exceeds the mean and is embarrassed at everything is bashful. But one who falls short, that is, blushes at nothing, is shameless, while the person who strikes a happy mean is called modest. 355

b. Second he discusses... nemesis. — 356-357 νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ

Righteous indignation may be assigned as the mean between envy and epicacotharchia or rejoicing in evil. These are concerned with pleasure and sorrow over what happens to our neighbors. The righteously indignant

πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

person is saddened at the unmerited prosperity of the wicked. But the envious person goes far beyond this and eats his heart out over the success of everyone. The man called epicacotharchos is so deficient in sadness that he actually rejoices. However, there will be time to treat of these matters elsewhere. Because justice is understood in various ways, we shall later treat its parts showing how the mean is constituted in

them. Likewise we shall discuss the intellectual virtues.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Circa honorem autem et cetera. Positis

345. Having completed the virtues that

virtutibus quae respiciunt divitias, hic ponit virtutes quae respiciunt honores. Et primo ponit virtutem quae respicit magnos honores. Secundo virtutem quae respicit mediocres, ibi, sicut autem dicimus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod magnanimitas est medietas circa honorem et inhonorationem. Superabundantia autem in prosequendo ea quae pertinent ad magnum honorem, est quaedam dispositio, quae dicitur chaumotes, ex eo quod ardet in his quae pertinent ad appetitum honoris. Nam cauma incendium dicitur, sed, quia capnos in Graeco idem est quod fumus, potest etiam si sic scribatur chapnotes

concern riches, he now [b] treats those dealing with honors. First [b, i] he deals with the virtue referring to great honors, and second [b, ii] with the virtue referring to ordinary honors, at “As we pointed out etc.” He says first that magnanimity is the mean between honor and dishonor. But the excess in following after the things belonging to great honors is a certain disposition that is called chaumotes because it blazes forth in things pertaining to the desire of honor. In Greek cauma is fire, and capnos means smoke. If the word be written chapnotes it can be translated “exhalation” or presumption. We are accustomed to say that they who breathe with great difficulty on

dici, quasi fumositas. Consuevimus enim eos qui nimis anhelant ad ascendendum ad aliqua alta vel magna, vocare ventosos vel fumosos. Sed defectio opposita magnanimitati vocatur pusillanimitas.

climbing high altitudes are wheezing or puffing. But the defect opposed to magnanimity is faintheartedness.

Deinde cum dicit: sicut autem dicimus etc., ponit aliam virtutem, quae est circa mediocres honores. Et dicit quod sicut dictum est quod liberalitas differt a magnificentia in eo quod liberalitas est circa parva, cum magnificentia sit circa magna, ita etiam ad magnanimitatem, quae est circa magnum honorem, se habet quaedam virtus, quae est circa honorem qui existit parvus. Et quod circa hoc oporteat esse aliquam virtutem in medio existentem, manifestat per hoc quod subdit, quod contingit etiam

346. Then [b, ii ], at “As we pointed out,” he proposes another virtue referring to ordinary honors. He says, as has been indicated (344), that liberality differs from magnificence because liberality bestows small amounts while magnificence bestows great sums. So too there is a virtue concerned with ordinary honors which differs from magnanimity which is concerned with great honors. That in this question there should be some virtue consisting in a mean is made clear by his adding that ordinary honors are desired as they ought (this belongs to the mean of

mediocrem honorem appetere sicut oportet, quod pertinet ad medium virtutis; et magis quam oportet, quod pertinet ad superabundantiam; et minus quam oportet, quod pertinet ad defectum. Ille autem qui superabundat in desiderio honoris, vocatur philotimus, id est amator honoris; ille autem qui deficit in appetitu honoris vocatur aphilotimus, idest sine amore honoris. Ille autem qui medio modo se habet est innominatus.

virtue), more than they ought (this belongs to excess), and less than they ought (this belongs to the defect). He who excessively desires honor is ambitious or a lover of honor. He who is deficient in the desire of honor is unambitious or without the desire of honor. But he who strikes a happy mean has no special name.

Et similiter etiam dispositiones, id est habitus vitiorum et virtutis mediae, sunt innominatae. Possumus tamen nomina fingere, vocantes dispositionem qua quis est philotimus, philotimiam; et similiter

347. Likewise the dispositions, i.e., the habits of vice or of the mean-virtue are unnamed. However, we can invent names: calling the habit by which a person excessively loves honor, ambition; and the habit by which a

dispositio qua quis dicitur aphilotimus potest dici aphilotimia. Sed quia medium non est nominatum, ideo illi qui sunt in extremo contendunt de media regione, dum scilicet uterque se dicit esse in medio: et loquitur ad similitudinem duarum civitatum, inter quas solet esse contentio de mediis finibus, quando non est certus limes praefixus, dum utraque dicit territorium medium ad se pertinere. Sed quia hoc fere commune est in omnibus vitiis, quod uterque extremorum reputat se esse in medio et virtuosum in altero extremo, sicut timidus reputat fortem audacem, quem audax reputat timidum; consequenter

person is deficient in the love of honor, “unambitiousness.” But because the mean has not been named, the persons who are in the extremes argue about the location of the mean. Both maintain that they possess the mean. He explains this by drawing a comparison with two states that are in the habit of bickering over their common border when the boundary has not been fixed. Both claim the intervening territory as their own. But this is fairly common to all the vices for each of the extremes to think they possess the mean and that the virtuous are in the other extreme, e.g., the coward considers the brave man reckless; the reckless man says the brave man is a coward. Hence Aristotle states what

ponit quod est proprium in hac materia: quia non solum vitiosi ascribunt sibi ipsis nomen virtutis, sed etiam virtuosi, propter hoc quod medium virtutis est innominatum, utuntur nomine vitii, quasi nomine virtutis.

is proper to this matter, that not only do the vicious appropriate the name of virtue to themselves, but even the virtuous use the name of the vice as if it were a virtue because the mean has not been named.

Et hoc est quod subdit quod etiam nos rationabiliter loquentes quandoque illum qui est in medio vocamus philotimum et

348. This is what he refers to when he adds that even we (speaking correctly too) sometimes call a man who possesses the

quandoque vocamus eum aphilotimum. Quandoque enim laudamus hominem ex eo quod est philotimus. Consuevimus enim dicere, aliquem laudantes, quod est homo curans de honore suo et sic ipsum virtuosum vocamus philotimum. Quandoque autem laudamus aphilotimum, sicut cum in laudem alicuius dicimus quod non curat de honoribus hominum sed de veritate. Et sic aphilotimum vocamus virtuosum. Quare autem hoc accidat, dicetur in sequentibus, scilicet in quarto. Sed nunc oportet nos prosequi de reliquis medietatibus secundum praedictum

mean ambitious, and other times unambitious. Also at times we praise a person because he is ambitious. We are accustomed to say in commending a person that he is solicitous about his honor, and thus we call the man who loves honor, virtuous. On the other hand we sometimes praise an unambitious man, saying in his praise that he does not care about the esteem of men, but about the truth. So we call the unambitious man virtuous. Why we do this will be explained afterwards in the fourth book (794795)But for the present we should continue with the remaining mediums in the way designated, that is, as conforming to a

modum, scilicet exemplariter.

pattern.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem circa iram etc., ponit virtutem quae respicit

349. Then [2], at “With respect to anger,” he proposes the virtue concerning external evils

exteriora mala ex quibus homo provocatur ad iram. Et dicit quod circa iram est superabundantia, defectus et medium. Et quamvis omnia ista sint ut plurimum innominata, medium tamen consuevimus nominare mansuetum et medietatem mansuetudinem. Illum autem qui superabundat in hoc vocamus iracundum, et dispositionem eius iracundiam. Illum autem qui deficit vocamus inirascibilem et defectum inirascibilitatem.

by which man is provoked to anger. He says that in regard to anger there is an excess, a defect, and a mean. Although all these for the most part are without names, we are accustomed to call the man following the mean mild, and the mean itself mildness. But he who is excessive in this passion we call irascible and we say he has the quality of irascibility. Ile man however who is deficient we call apathetic and say he has the defect of apathy.

Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem et aliae tres etc., ponit virtutes, quae respiciunt humanos actus. Et primo ostendit earum distinctionem. Secundo exemplificat de ipsis, ibi circa verum quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod sunt tres aliae medietates quae quantum ad aliquid

350. Then [C’], at “There are,” he proposes the virtues that concern human actions. First [C’, 1] he shows their variety, and second [C’, 2] he gives examples of these at “In regard to truth etc.” He says first that three means are alike in one respect and different in another. They are alike in that all refer to words and

conveniunt et quantum ad aliquid differunt. Conveniunt quidem quantum ad hoc quod omnes sunt circa verba et opera quibus homines adinvicem

deeds in which men communicate among themselves. They are different in that one of them refers to the truth of such words and deeds. The others, however, refer to

communicant. Differunt autem quantum

pleasantness in these words and deeds, so

ad hoc quod una earum est circa veritatem talium verborum et factorum. Aliae autem circa delectationem ipsorum, ita tamen quod una earum respicit delectationem eorum quae dicuntur vel fiunt ludo, alia vero in his quae pertinent ad communem vitam, scilicet in seriosis.

that one of them regards pleasantness in the things that are said or done in jest, the others regard what belongs to the usual manner of living, i.e., serious matters.

De his etiam dicendum est, ut magis appareat quod in omnibus medietas est laudabilis, extrema autem non sunt laudabilia, sed vituperabilia. Plura autem horum sunt innominata. Sed sicut in aliis fecimus, tentabimus ponere nomina, ut fiat manifestum quod dicitur et propter bonum quod inde consequitur. Quia finis huius scientiae non est manifestatio veritatis, sed bonum operis.

351. We must speak of these things so it will become more apparent that the mean is always praiseworthy and the extremes are not to be praised but rather condemned. Many of these are without special names, but, as we have done with the others, we shall try to invent names to clarify what is said for the sake of the good that will ensue. The reason is that the purpose of this science is not the manifestation of truth but virtuous activity.

Deinde cum dicit: circa verum quidem

352. Then [C, 2], at “In regard to truth,” he

igitur etc., exemplificat de praemissis virtutibus. Et primo de ea quae est circa verum. Et dicit quod circa verum medius est ille, qui dicitur verus, et medietas dicitur veritas. Sed fictio falsi quae est in plus, quando scilicet aliquis fingit maiora de se quam sint, vocatur iactantia et talis fictor vocatur iactator. Sed fictio quae est ad minus, scilicet quando aliquis fingit de se quaedam vilia, vocatur yronia, quasi irrisio, et talis fictor vocatur yron, id est irrisor.

gives examples of these virtues and first [2, a] of that which concerns truth. He says that in regard to truth the mean is had by the man who is called truthful, and the mean itself is called truthfulness. But pretension, which is the excess (when a person pretends greater things about himself than are true), is called boasting, and the pretender is called a braggart. But dissembling, which is the defect (when a person makes pretense of certain contemptible things about himself), is called dissimulation or irony. Such a pretender is called a dissembler.

Secundo ibi: circa delectabile autem etc., exemplificat de virtute quae est circa ludos. Et dicit quod circa delectationem quae est in ludis, ille qui medium tenet vocatur eutrapelus, quasi bene se vertens ad omnia; et dispositio vocatur

353. Second [2, b], at “In respect to,” he gives an example of the virtue concerned with amusement. He says, regarding pleasantness in amusement, that the man who observes the mean is called witty (eutrapelos) giving as it were a pleasant turn to every incident.

eutrapelia. Ille autem qui superabundat, vocatur bomolochus a bomos quod est altare, et lochos, quod est raptor; et

The disposition itself is called wit (eutrapelia). But the man who is guilty of excess is called a buffoon or bomolochus, from

dicitur ad similitudinem milvi, qui semper volabat circa aras idolorum in quibus animalia immolabantur ut aliquid raperet; et similiter ille qui excedit in ludo, semper insistit ad hoc quod rapiat verbum vel factum alicuius, ut in ludum convertat. Dispositio autem vocatur bomolochia. Ille autem qui deficit, vocatur agroicus, idest agrestis, et dispositio vocatur agroichia.

bomo meaning “altar” and lochos meaning “plundering.” He is said to be like the bird of prey which always flew near the sacrificial altars to snatch some food. In a similar way the man who is excessive in amusement always insists on snatching a word or action of someone to give it a comic turn. The disposition however is called buffoonery. But the man who is deficient is said to be boorish and to have the quality of boorishness.

Tertio ibi: circa reliquum autem etc., exemplificat de tertia dictarum virtutum. Et dicit quod circa reliquum delectabile quod est in vita quantum ad ea quae seriose aguntur, medius vocatur amicus, non ab affectu amandi, sed a decenti conversatione; quem nos possumus affabilem dicere. Et ipsa medietas vocatur amicitia vel affabilitas. Ille

354. Third [2, C], at “In the remaining,” he exemplifies the third of these virtues saying that in the remaining pleasantness, which is in life, touching on our serious actions, the mean is struck by the friendly person-not so designated from the effect of friendship but from amicable conversation. Such a one we term affable. The mean itself is called friendliness or affability. But one who

autem qui superabundat in hoc, si non faciat hoc nisi causa delectandi, vocatur placidus; si autem faciat hoc propter aliquam propriam utilitatem, puta propter lucrum, vocatur blanditor vel adulator. Qui autem in hoc deficit, et non veretur contristare eos cum quibus vivit, vocatur litigiosus et dyscolus.

overdoes this merely for the purpose of pleasing is called obsequious. If he acts for his own utility, for example, his profit, he is called a sycophant or a flatterer. One who falls short in this matter and does not fear to sadden those he lives with is called contentious and perverse.

Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem et in passionibus etc., ponit exemplum de quibusdam passionibus laudabilibus. Et primo de verecundia. Et dicit quod etiam in passionibus et in his quae passionibus adiunguntur sunt quaedam medietates. Verecundia enim non est virtus, ut in IV ostendetur, sed tamen verecundus laudatur, eo quod in talibus est medium accipere. Ille autem qui superabundat, ut de omnibus verecundetur, vocatur

355. Then [B], at “Also in the passions,” he gives an example of certain laudable passionsfirst [B, a], of modesty. He says that a mean is found even in the passions and their phases, modesty, for instance, is not a virtue, as will be explained in the fourth book (867882). The modest person is praised because a mean can be taken in such matters. One who goes to excess so that he blushes at everything is called cataplex, a bashful person. But he who falls short, blushing at

cataplex, id est stupidus. Ille autem qui deficit, vel nihil verecundatur vocatur inverecundus.

nothing is called shameless, while he who strikes the mean is called modest.

Secundo ibi: Nemesis autem etc., agit de alia passione, quae vocatur Nemesis, idest reprehensio, quae est medietas invidiae et epicacocharchiae; charchos enim dicitur gaudium, cacos malum, epi

356. Second [B, b], at “Righteous indignation,” he discusses another passion called nemesis or righteous indignation, which is a mean between envy and epicacotharchia (tharcus meaning

super, ac si dicatur: gaudium de malo. Sunt autem hae dispositiones circa delectationem et tristitiam de his quae eveniunt proximis. Nemesiticus enim, idest reprehensor, tristatur, si aliqui mali prosperantur in sua malitia: invidus autem superabundat ut tristetur de omnibus, qui prosperantur, sive bonis sive malis. Sed ille qui dicitur epicacocharchos in tantum deficit a tristando ut etiam gaudeat de malis qui in sua malitia prosperantur. Sed de his alibi dicetur, scilicet in secundo rhetoricae.

“rejoicing,” kakos meaning “evil,” epi meaning “over”) or rejoicing in evil. These are dispositions concerned with pleasure and sorrow over what happens to our neighbors. The righteously indignant person or the fair critic is saddened at the prosperity of the wicked. But the envious person goes to excess in grieving over all—both good and bad— who prosper. The person however called epicotharchos is so deficient in sadness that he actually rejoices over the wicked who are successful in their wickedness. But these topics are treated elsewhere, in the second book of the Rhetoric (Ch. 10).

Ultimo autem (concludit) quod, quia iustitia habet diversas species, in quibus non similiter accipitur medium, de iustitia post dicetur in quinto, et qualiter partes eius sint in medio: et similiter postea dicetur in sexto de virtutibus rationalibus, idest intellectualibus.

357. Last, because justice has. various parts in which the mean is differently understood, justice will be treated in the fifth book (8851108) together with the manner in which the parts consist in the mean. Likewise, the rational or intellectual virtues will be discussed later in the sixth book (11091291).

LECTURE 10 Opposition Among the Virtues and Vices Chapter 8 1. HE SHOWS THERE IS A TWOFOLD OPPOSITION AMONG THESE HABITS.

a. He states his proposal. — 358 τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς

There are three dispositions, of which two are vices: one by excess, the other

δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις

by defect. The third is virtue and consists in the mean. Everyone of

ἀντίκεινταί πως·

these is opposed in some way to every other one because not only are the extremes opposed to one another and to the mean, but the mean is opposed to the extremes.

b. He proves the proposition. — 359-361 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση

As the average is greater compared to the less and less compared to the

ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ

greater, so mean habits are in excess compared to the defect and in defect

μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις

compared to excess. This is true both in the passions and in actions. The

ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς

brave man seems reckless compared to the coward, and cowardly

πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς

compared to the reckless. Likewise the moderate man seems self-

φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός·

indulgent compared to the insensible

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ

man, and insensible compared to the self-indulgent. Also the generous

τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν

person is a spendthrift in comparison with the miser but a miser in

ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος.

comparison with the spendthrift.

c. He deduces a corollary. — 362 διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ

For this reason the extremes tend to

ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς

throw the mean toward one another. The coward calls the brave man

θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.

reckless, and the reckless man calls him a coward. A similar tendency is found in other extremes.

2.

HE SHOWS THAT THE OPPOSITION AMONG THE VICES

THEMSELVES IS THE GREATER.

a. First reason. — 363 οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ

These things are mutually opposed in such a way that there is a greater

τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα

opposition of the extremes among themselves than to the mean. The

ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ

reason is that the extremes are more removed from one another than from

μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.

the mean, as great is more removed from small and small from great than either from the average.

b. He states the second reason. — 364 ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ

Moreover there seems to be a similarity between some extremes and

θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα·

the mean, for example, between rashness and fortitude, between

τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστον

extravagance and generosity. But between the extremes themselves a

ἀπέχοντα

ἐναντία

complete dissimilarity exists. Now the

ὁρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα.

things that are farthest removed from one another are said to be

ἀπ'

ἀλλήλων

contraries. Therefore the things most removed from one another are more contrary.

3. HE SHOWS HOW ONE OF THE EXTREMES IS MORE OPPOSED TO VIRTUE THAN THE OTHER. a. He states his proposal. — 365 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον

In some cases it is the defect that is

ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ

more opposed to the mean but in

ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ

other cases it is the excess. Thus it is not rashness but cowardice, the

δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια

defect, that is more opposed to fortitude. On the contrary, however,

οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ

it is not insensibility (the defect) but

οὖσα.

self-indulgence (the excess) that is more opposed to temperance.

b. He assigns the reasons. i. One is taken from the thing itself. — 366-367

διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ

This happens for two reasons, one of which is drawn from the very thing

πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ

itself. It is not the extreme that is nearer and more like the mean but its

μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ

contrary that is more opposed to the mean. Thus, since rashness seems

ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον,

nearer and more like fortitude, it is cowardice having less likeness that is

ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην

more opposed to fortitude. Things

μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου

that are more removed from the mean seem to be more opposed to it.

ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ

This first reason then comes from the thing itself.

πράγματος· ii. He assigns another reason. — 368 ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα

But the other reason arises on our part. Those vices which are

μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς

somewhat innate in us seem in a way to be more opposed to the mean. For

τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς

example, we more naturally follow pleasure and so we are more easily

κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις

moved to self-indulgence than to temperance. Therefore, we say that

μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα

the vices that more readily increase are more opposed to virtue. For this

ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

reason self-indulgence (which is an excess) is more opposed to temperance.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Tribus autem dispositionibus existentibus

358. After the Philosopher has shown in

et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit

general what virtue is, and has applied the

in communi quid est virtus et diffinitionem communem applicavit ad speciales virtutes,

definition to particular virtues, he treats the opposition f virtues and vices.

hic determinat de oppositione virtutum et vitiorum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo

Regarding this question he does three things. First [1] he shows that there is a

ostendit

duplicem

twofold opposition among these habits:

contrarietatem: unam quidem vitiorum adinvicem, aliam autem vitiorum ad

one, of the vices among themselves, the other, of the vices to the virtue. Then [2]

virtutem. Secundo ostendit quod maior est contrarietas vitiorum ad invicem quam ad

he shows that the opposition among the vices themselves is the greater, at “These

virtutem, ibi: sic autem oppositis adinvicem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo unum

things are mutually opposed etc.” Last [3] he shows how one of the extremes is more

vitiorum magis opponitur virtuti quam reliquum, ibi, ad medium autem et cetera.

opposed to virtue than the other, at “In some cases etc.” On the first point he does

Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum,

three things. First [1, a] he states his proposal. Second [1, b] he proves the

ibi quemadmodum enim aequale et cetera. Tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis,

proposition, at “As the average etc.” Third [1, c] he deduces a corollary from what has

ibi: propter quod et proiciunt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum sint tres

been said, at “For this reason the extremes tend to throw etc.” He says first that there

dispositiones quarum duae sunt vitiosae, una scilicet secundum superabundantiam,

are three dispositions of which two are vices: one by excess and the other by defect.

alia vero secundum defectum; una vero est

The third is according to virtue which

secundum virtutem, quae est in medio; quaelibet harum aliqualiter opponitur

consists in a mean. Everyone of these is opposed in some way to every other one,

cuilibet; quia extremae dispositiones et adinvicem sunt contrariae, et etiam eis

because not only are the extremes opposed to one another but also the mean to the

contrariatur media dispositio.

extremes.

Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum enim

359. Then [1, b], at “As the average” he

aequale etc., probat quod dixerat. Non fuit autem necesse probare, quod duo vitia,

proves what he had said. It was unnecessary to prove that two vices, which

quae se habent secundum superabundantiam et defectum, sint

are compared to one another as excess and defect, are opposed since they are far

contraria, eo quod maxime distant; sed hoc videbatur esse dubium quod dictum est

removed from one another. But it will seem doubtful that virtue is opposed to vices, as

virtutem contrariari vitiis: quia cum virtus sit in medio vitiorum, non distat maxime ab

was just said (358). Since virtue holds a middle place between the vices, virtue is not

utroque eorum, cum tamen contrarietas sit maxima distantia, ut dicitur in X

very far removed from either of them, while opposition is farthest apart, as stated

metaphysicae, et ideo hoc specialiter hic philosophus ostendit, quod virtus

in the tenth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 4, 1055, a 4-32; St. Th. Lect. 5, 2023-

contrarietur utrique vitiorum.

2035). Therefore, the Philosopher here

in

his

esse

makes a special point that virtue is opposed to both extremes. Circa quod considerandum est, quod cum medium participet aliqualiter utrumque

360. On this subject we must consider that the mean partakes to some extent of both

extremum, inquantum participat unum eorum contrariatur alteri, sicut aequale

extremes. Precisely as it partakes of one of them it is contrary to the other, as the

quod est medium inter magnum et parvum, est quidem in comparatione ad magnum

average—a mean between the great and small—is small compared to the great and

parvum, et in comparatione ad parvum est magnum. Et ideo aequale et magno

great compared to the small. Therefore, the average is opposed both to the great by

opponitur secundum rationem parvi, et

reason of the small and to the small by

parvo secundum rationem magni. Et propter hoc est motus a contrario in

reason of the great. Because of this there is a motion of the contrary against the mean

medium, sicut et in contrarium, ut dicitur in quinto physicorum.

as against a contrary, as is explained in the fifth book of the Physics (Ch. 1, 224 b 3035; St. Th. Lect. 1, 476).

Sic igitur medii habitus, constituti tam in passionibus quam in operationibus, se

361. Therefore, the habits of the mean both in regard to passions and actions

habent ut superabundantes ad eum qui est

appear excessive to one who is in defect and

in defectu et se habent ut deficientes ad eum qui superabundat. Sicut fortis in

deficient to one who is in excess. Thus a brave man compared to a coward is

comparatione ad timidum est audax, in comparatione autem ad audacem est

reckless, but compared to a reckless man, a brave man is a coward. Likewise a

timidus. Et comparatione

similiter temperatus in ad insensibilem est

moderate man compared to an insensible man is self-indulgent, but compared to the

intemperatus, in comparatione ad intemperatum est insensibilis. Ita etiam est

self-indulgent the moderate man is insensible. The same may be said of the

et de liberali, qui est prodigus in comparatione ad illiberalem, illiberalis

generous man who is a spendthrift in comparison with the miser, but a miser in

autem in comparatione ad prodigum. Et sic patet, quod virtus contrariatur utrique

comparison with the spendthrift. It is evident then that virtue is opposed to the

extremorum.

extremes.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod et proiciunt

362. Then [1, c], at “For this reason,” he

etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Quia enim habitus medius se habet in

deduces a corollary from what was said. Because the mean habit is constituted by

comparatione ad unum extremum secundum rationem alterius, inde est quod

comparison of one extreme with the nature of the other, the extremes tend to throw

extremi proiiciunt medium alter ad alterum: idest uterque in extremitate

the mean toward one another. In other words, both extremes consider the mean as

existens aestimat medium, quasi alterum

it were an extreme opposed to them. Thus

extremum sibi oppositum. Sicut timidus fortem vocat audacem, et audax vocat eum

the coward calls the brave man reckless and the reckless man calls him a coward.

timidum. Quod etiam signum est eius quod dictum est; scilicet quod virtus contrarietur

This is an indication of what we just stated (359, 361), that virtue is opposed to both

utrique extremorum.

extremes.

Deinde cum dicit: sic autem oppositis etc.,

363. Then [2], at “These things are

ostendit quod maior est contrarietas vitiorum adinvicem, quam ad virtutem: et

mutually opposed,” he shows there is greater opposition of the vices among

hoc duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est quia, quanto magis aliqua a se distant,

themselves than to virtue for two reasons. The first reason [2, a] is that the more

tanto magis sunt contraria, quia contrarietas est quaedam distantia. Magis

removed things are from one another, the mom opposed they are because opposition

autem distant extrema ab invicem quam a

is a kind of distance. But the extremes are

medio: sicut magnum et parvum magis distant abinvicem quam ab aequali, quod

more removed from one another than from the mean, as great and small are more

est medium inter ea. Ergo vitia magis opponuntur adinvicem, quam ad virtutem.

removed from one another than from the average, which is a mean between them,

Est autem hic considerandum quod loquitur hic de oppositione virtutis ad vitia,

Therefore, vices are more opposed to one another than to virtue. We must consider

non secundum rationem boni et mali, quia secundum hoc ambo vitia continerentur

that Aristotle speaks here about the opposition of virtue to vices, not according

sub uno extremo; sed loquitur prout virtus secundum propriam speciem est in medio

to good and evil—in this way both vices come under one extreme—but according as

duorum vitiorum.

virtue by reason of its own species is a mean between two vices.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc ad

364. He states the second reason [2, b] at

medium quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Virtutis ad unum extremorum est aliqua

“Moreover there seems.” It is this. There is some similarity between virtue and one

similitudo: sicut inter fortitudinem et audaciam, et inter prodigalitatem et

extreme, for instance, between fortitude and rashness, between generosity and

liberalitatem. Sed inter duo vitia extrema, est omnimoda dissimilitudo; ergo maxime

prodigality. But there is complete dissimilarity between the two extremes or

contrariantur ad invicem, quia contrarietas est.

vices. Therefore, they are opposed to one another in the greatest degree because their opposition denotes the greatest distance, as was indicated (359).

Deinde cum dicit: ad medium autem etc., ostendit quod virtuti unum extremorum

365. Then [3], at “In some cases,” he shows that one extreme is more opposed to

magis contrariatur quam aliud. Et circa

virtue than the other. On this point he does

hoc duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo rationem assignat, ibi:

two things. First [3, a] he states his proposal. Second [3, b] he assigns the

propter duas autem causas et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in quibusdam magis

reasons at “This happens for two reasons.” He says first that in some cases it is the

contrariatur medio virtutis vitium quod est in defectu, in quibusdam autem magis

defect that is more opposed to the mean of the virtue, but in other cases it is the

vitium quod est in excessu. Sicut fortitudini non maxime contrariatur audacia, quae

excess. Thus not rashness, which certainly pertains to the excess, but cowardice,

pertinet ad superabundantiam, sed timiditas quae pertinet ad defectum. E

which pertains to the defect, is most opposed to fortitude. On the contrary,

contrario autem temperantiae non maxime contrariatur insensibilitas ad quam

however, it is not insensibility (to which lack and defect belong) but self-indulgence

pertinet

(to which excess pertains) that is most

indigentia

intemperantia ad superabundantia.

et

defectus,

quam

sed

pertinet

opposed to temperance.

Deinde cum dicit propter duas autem

366. Then [3, b], at “This happens for two

causas etc., assignat duas rationes eius quod dixerat. Quarum una sumitur ex

reasons,” he assigns two reasons for what he said. One [b, i] is taken from the thing

parte ipsius rei, idest ex ipsa natura virtutum et vitiorum. Dictum est enim

itself, that is, from the very nature of the virtues and vices. It was just stated (364)

supra quod est quaedam similitudo alterius extremi ad medium virtutis. Et ex hoc ipso

that one extreme has a similarity to the mean of virtue. From the very fact that

quod unum extremorum est propinquius et similius medio virtutis quam aliud, sequitur

one extreme is nearer and more like the mean of virtue than the other, it follows

quod non ipsum, quod est similius, sit

that not the one more similar to the mean

magis contrarium virtuti, sed illud quod ei opponitur. Sicut si audacia est similior

but the one contrary to it is more opposed to the virtue. Thus if rashness is nearer

fortitudini et proximior, sequitur quod timiditas sit dissimilior, et per consequens

and more like fortitude, it follows that cowardice is more unlike and consequently

magis contraria, quia illa quae sunt magis distantia a medio videntur ei esse magis

more opposed to fortitude. The reason is that the habits more removed from the

contraria. Horum autem rationem oportet accipere ab ipsa natura passionum.

mean seem to be more opposed to it. But the explanation of these things must be taken from the nature of the passions.

Contingit enim hoc quod hic dicitur in virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa

367. What Aristotle says here touches on the moral virtues concerned with the

passiones, ad quas pertinet conservare bonum rationis contra motus passionum.

passions. To these virtues it belongs to preserve the good of reason against the

Passio autem dupliciter corrumpere potest bonum rationis. Uno modo vehementia sui

movement of the passions. Now passion can destroy the good of reason in two

motus, impellendo ad plus faciendum quod

ways. First, its vehemence can incite to

ratio dictat, quod praecipue contingit in concupiscentiis delectationum et aliis

greater activity than reason prescribes, especially in the desire of pleasure and in

passionibus quae pertinent ad prosecutionem appetitus. Unde virtus, quae

the other passions pertaining to the following of the appetite. Hence the virtue,

est circa huiusmodi passiones, maxime intendit passiones tales reprimere. Et

which touches the passions of this kind, aims principally at restraining these

propter hoc, vitium quod est in defectu magis ei assimilatur; et quod est in

passions. For this reason the vice referring to the defect is more like the virtue, and the

superabundantia magis ei contrariatur, sicut patet de temperantia. Quaedam vero

vice referring to the excess is more opposed to it, as is evident in temperance. But other

passiones corrumpunt bonum rationis retrahendo in minus ab eo quod est

passions destroy the good by withdrawing to something less than what is according

secundum rationem, sicut patet de timore

to reason, as is evident in the case of fear

et de aliis passionibus ad fugam pertinentibus. Unde virtus, quae est circa

and other passions having to do with flight. Hence the virtue concerned with

huiusmodi passiones, maxime intendit firmare animum in bono rationis contra

such passions strives as much as possible to strengthen man against defect in the

defectum. Et propter hoc, vitium, quod est in defectu magis ei contrariatur, sicut patet

good of reason. On this account the vice of defect is more opposed to the virtue.

circa fortitudinem. Aliam autem rationem assignat ex parte

368. Then [b, ii], at “But the other,” he

nostra. Cum enim ad virtutem pertineat repellere vitia, intentio virtutis est ad illa

assigns another reason on our part. Since virtue ought to restrain vices, the aim of

vitia potius repellenda ad quae maiorem etiam inclinationem habemus. Et ideo illa

virtue is to curb more effectively those vices to which we have a stronger

vitia ad quae sumus qualitercumque magis nati, ipsa sunt magis contraria virtuti.

inclination. For this reason those vices, which are in any way somewhat innate in

Sicut magis sumus nati ad prosequendum delectationes quam ad fugiendum eas,

us, are more opposed to virtue. As from birth we more readily follow pleasures than

propter hoc facillime movemur ad intemperantiam, quae importat excessum

flee from them, we are very early moved to self-indulgence which implies an excess of

delectationum. Sic igitur illa vitia magis

pleasure. Therefore, we say that those

dicimus esse contraria virtuti, quae magis nata sunt crescere in nobis, propter hoc

vices, which rather naturally tend to increase in us because we are by nature

quod naturaliter inclinamur ad ipsa. Et ideo intemperantia, ad quam pertinet

inclined to them, are more opposed to virtue. For this reason self-indulgence, to

superabundantia delectationum, magis est contraria temperantiae quam insensibilitas,

which excess of pleasure pertains, is more opposed to temperance than insensibility is,

ut dictum est.

as has been observed (365).

LECTURE 11 The Ways of Becoming Virtuous

Chapter 9 1.

FIRST HE SHOWS THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR MAN TO

BECOME VIRTUOUS. a. He reviews what has been said. — 369

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ

A sufficient explanation has been given to

ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν

show that moral virtue is a mean, how it is a mean, that it is a mean between two

καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ

vices—one by excess and the other by defect—and that it aims at the mean both

διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν

in the passions and operations.

ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. b. He concludes from the premises. — 370 διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον

It is not easy to be virtuous because in every case it is difficult to discover the

λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ

mean. Thus, not every one can locate the center of a circle—it takes a person who

εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον,

knows. Likewise it is easy for anyone to become angry, or to hand out money and

καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ

waste it. But not everyone (for it is not easy) can give to the right person, the

ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι

right amount, at the right time, for the

παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν

right purpose, in the right manner. All this pertains to virtuous giving , which is

καὶ καλόν.

rare, praiseworthy, and good.

2. HE SHOWS HOW MAN MAY ATTAIN THIS. a. He shows how a person can discover the mean... he gives three admonitions. i. One of these is taken from the nature of the thing. — 371-373

διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν

For this reason he who aims at the mean must first avoid the extreme which is more

τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ

opposed to the mean. (Circe used to give

καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ

this warning: keep your ship beyond spray and rolling billow. [Odyssey xii, 219]) One

κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε νῆα.

of the extremes indeed is a greater sin and the other a lesser sin. Therefore, since it is

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ

exceedingly difficult to reach the mean, we must choose the lesser of the evils, as they

δ' ἧττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως

say in navigation. This will be done best in the way we are going to point out.

χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν.

τὸν

ii. He gives the second admonition. — 374-376 σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ

We must take into account the things to

εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν· τοῦτο δ'

which we are easily inclined. Some of us are more prone by nature to one thing

ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης

than another. Our natural inclination will be made known from the pleasure or

περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοὐναντίον δ'

sorrow we experience. We must then draw

ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς

ourselves to the opposite, for by leading ourselves far away from sin we shall arrive

τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων

at the mean. A similar thing is done by nurserymen who straighten crooked

ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.

saplings.

iii. He lays down the third admonition. — 377-378 ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον

Everyone ought to be on guard especially

τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ

against the pleasurable thing and pleasure,

ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον

for we cannot judge them without being unduly influenced by them. What the

πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν

elders of the people felt toward Helen, we ought to feel toward pleasure, and in all

ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ

that concerns pleasure repeat their words [Iliad iii, 156-160]. Rejecting pleasure in

αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἧττον

this way we will fall into sin less

ἁμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ

frequently. Those who do as we have suggested under this heading will be quite

εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν.

able to acquire the mean.

b. He treats the discovery of the mean. i. He indicates the difficulty of this. — 379

χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ

This is perhaps difficult in individual cases. It is not easy to determine in what manner

γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον

we should be angry, in regard to what persons we should be angry, in what type

χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας

of things we should be angry, and for how long a time we should be angry.

ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν,

Sometimes we praise those who are

ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες.

deficient in becoming angry and call them mild; sometimes we praise the irascible and call them manly.

ii. He shows what suffices to determine the mean. — 380 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ

One who deviates a little from what is

παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ'

virtuous is not censured whether it be in

ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ

excess or defect. But one who deviates much is blameworthy, for his deviation is

λανθάνει.

not hidden.

iii. He answers a latent question. — 381 ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον

It cannot easily be determined, in so many

ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ

words, at what point and how much a

ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν

person is censurable. Neither is any other thing perceived by the senses determined

τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα

in this way, for these are particular things and judgment of them is in the sensitive

τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν

part of the soul. This much, then, shows that the mean habit is praiseworthy in all

δὲ δεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δ' ἐπὶ

instances. However, sometimes we must incline towards excess and sometimes

τὴν τὴν

ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾷστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

towards defect. Thus we shall easily reach the mean and what is virtuous.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quoniam quidem igitur et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

369. After the Philosopher has treated the nature of virtue, he shows here how a person

virtute quid sit, hic ostendit quomodo aliquis possit virtutem acquirere: quia,

can acquire virtue. He does this because, as was indicated before (351), the purpose of

sicut supra dictum est, finis huius doctrinae non est cognitio veritatis, sed

this teaching is not that men may know the truth but that they may become good. On

ut boni efficiamur. Circa hoc autem duo facit. Primo ostendit quod difficile est

this point he does two things. First [1 ] he shows that it is difficult for man to become

hominem fieri virtuosum. Secundo ostendit qualiter ad hoc possit perveniri,

virtuous. Second [2] he shows how man may attain this, at “For this reason he who aims

ibi, propter quod oportet coniectantem medium et cetera. Circa primum duo

etc.” The first notion calls for a twofold procedure. First [i, a] he reviews what has

facit. Primo resumit ea quae dicta sunt.

been said. It has been sufficiently explained

Et dicit quod sufficienter supra dictum est quod virtus moralis est medietas et

before (310, 316), he states, that moral virtue is a mean, how it is a mean (not

qualiter sit medietas, quia scilicet non secundum rem, sed quoad nos: et quorum

objectively but relative to us), and between what things it is the mean, i.e., between two

sit medietas: quia scilicet est medietas duarum malitiarum, quarum una se

vices— one by excess, the other by defect. It has also been explained (317-318) why virtue

habet secundum superabundantiam, alia vero secundum defectum. Dictum est

is a middle course, namely because it aims at the mean; virtue searches out and chooses

etiam quare virtus sit medietas; quia scilicet est coniectatrix medii, inquirendo

the mean both in the passions and actions.

scilicet et eligendo medium tam in passionibus quam in actionibus.

Secundo ibi: ideo et difficile est etc., concludit ex praeostensis, quod difficile

370. Second [1, b], at “It is not easy,” he concludes from the premises that it is difficult

est esse studiosum, idest virtuosum. Quia in omnibus hoc videmus quod accipere

to be good or virtuous because we see that in every case it is difficult to discover the mean

medium est difficile, declinare autem a

but easy to deviate from the mean. Thus, not

medio est facile, sicut accipere medium in circulo non est cuiuslibet, sed scientis,

everyone—only an informed person who is a geometrician—can find the center of a circle.

scilicet geometrae, declinare autem a centro quilibet potest; ita etiam irasci

On the other hand, anyone can easily deviate from the center. Likewise, anyone can hand

qualitercumque quilibet potest et de facili, et similiter dare pecuniam et consumere

out money and waste it. But not everyone (for it is not easy) can give to the right

eam, sed quod aliquis det cui oportet dare

person, the right amount, at the right time,

et quantum oportet et quando oportet et cuius gratia oportet et qualiter oportet,

for the right purpose, in the right manner-all of which belongs to virtuous giving. Indeed,

per quod intelligitur bene dare, non est cuiuslibet, nec est facile, sed propter

because of the difficulty it is a rare and difficult thing, but praiseworthy and virtuous

suam difficultatem est rarum et est laudabile et virtuosum, inquantum est

precisely as conforming to reason.

secundum rationem.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet

371. Then [2], at “For this reason,” he

etc., ostendit modos quibus aliquis potest pertingere ad hoc quod fiat virtuosus. Et

shows the ways in which a person may become virtuous. On this point he does two

circa hoc duo facit: primo docet qualiter aliquis possit ad medium inventum

things. First [2, a] he shows how a person can discover the mean. Second (2, b] he

pervenire. Secundo agit de ipsa inventione medii, ibi, difficile autem

treats the discovery of the mean at “This is perhaps difficult etc.” In regard to the first he

forsitan et cetera. Circa primum ponit tria documenta. Quorum primum

gives three admonitions. One of these [a, i]. is taken from the nature of the thing. He states

sumitur ex ipsa natura rei. Et dicit quod, quia fieri virtuosum et accipere medium

that it is difficult to become virtuous and to discover the mean. Therefore, one who aims

est difficile. Propter hoc oportet eum qui coniectat medium, qui scilicet intendit ad

at the mean (i.e., he who intends to attain the mean) must strive principally to avoid the

medium pervenire, principaliter ad hoc intendere, ut recedat ab extremo quod

extreme more opposed to the virtue. Thus if someone wishes to arrive at the mean of

magis contrariatur virtuti. Sicut si

fortitude he ought to direct his principal

aliquis vult pervenire ad medium fortitudinis, debet principale studium

efforts to avoiding cowardice, which is more opposed to fortitude than rashness is, as has

adhibere ad hoc quod recedat a timiditate, quae magis opponitur

been explained (365).

fortitudini, quam audacia, ut dictum est.

Et ponit exemplum cuiusdam nautae vel poetae qui admonebat navigantes ut

372. He gives an example of a certain Circe who used to warn sailors to beware chiefly of

principaliter

maxima maris

the greatest dangers from the sea, which are

pericula quae sunt undae subvertentes navem et fumositates nebularum

waves sinking the ship and mist obscuring the vision of the sailors. This was the

impedientes aspectum nautarum. Et hoc est quod dicit: extra fumum et undam

warning: “Clear of the smoke take care and clear of the rollers to keep her,” as if to say:

custodi navem, quasi dicat: ita navem custodias ut sic praetereas fumositates et

so guard your ship that you may escape spray and waves.

undas.

caverent

Et rationem praedicti documenti assignat dicens quod unum extremorum

373. He gives the reason for this admonition, saying that one of the extremes—that which

vitiorum, illud scilicet quod est magis contrarium virtuti, est maius peccatum;

is more opposed to the virtue—is a greater sin; but that the extreme, which is less

illud autem extremum quod est virtuti similius est minus peccatum. Et ideo,

opposed to the virtue, is a lesser sin. Therefore, since it is exceedingly difficult to

quia valde difficile est contingere medium virtutis, ideo debet homo niti ut saltem

reach the mean of virtue, a man ought to try to avoid at least the greater dangers that are

maiora pericula vitet, quae scilicet sunt magis virtuti contraria, sicut navigantes

more opposed to virtue. Thus sailors say that after the best voyage on which a man is

dicunt quod post primam navigationem

exposed to no dangers, the next best is to

in qua homo nihil periculi sustinet, secunda navigatio est, ut homo sumat

choose the least of the dangers. A similar thing happens to a man’s life in the way that

minima periculorum. Et simile accidit circa vitam humanam eo modo quo

was explained (371), that he may chiefly avoid the vices that are opposed to virtue.

dictum est, ut scilicet homo principaliter vitet vitia quae maxime contrariantur virtuti.

Secundum documentum ponit ibi tendere autem oportet et cetera. Et sumitur ex

374. He gives the second admonition [a, ii] at “We must take into account.” It is

parte nostra; quantum scilicet ad ea quae sunt propria unicuique. Et dicit quod

understood on our part, as far as concerns the things proper to each of us. One who

oportet eum qui vult fieri virtuosus attendere quid sit illud ad quod magis

wishes to be virtuous, he says, must take into account that to which his appetite is

appetitus eius natus est moveri: diversi

naturally inclined. Different people are by

enim ad diversa naturaliter magis inclinantur. Ad quid autem naturaliter

nature more inclined to one thing than another. Each one can know what he is

unusquisque inclinetur, cognoscere potest ex delectatione et tristitia quae

naturally inclined to from the pleasure and sorrow he experiences, because what is

circa ipsum fit; quia unicuique est delectabile id quod est sibi conveniens

agreeable to each according to his nature is pleasurable.

secundum naturam. Unde si aliquis in aliqua actione vel

375. Hence, if someone takes pleasure in a

passione multum delectetur, signum est quod naturaliter inclinetur in illud.

particular action or passion, this is a sign that he is naturally inclined to it. But men

Homines autem vehementer tendunt ad ea ad quae naturaliter inclinantur. Et

vehemently tend to the things to which they are naturally inclined, and so, easily exceed

ideo de facili circa hoc homo transcendit medium. Et propter hoc oportet quod in

the n in this matter. We, therefore, must draw ourselves as, much as possible to the

contrarium nos attrahamus quantum possumus. Quia quando damus studium

opposite. The reason is that when we make an effort to recede from sin, to which we are

ad hoc quod multum recedamus a

prone, we will finally with difficulty arrive at

peccato, ad quod proni sumus, sic tandem vix perveniemus ad medium. Et ponit

the mean. He makes a comparison with nurserymen who straighten crooked

similitudinem de illis qui dirigunt ligna distorta; qui dum volunt ea dirigere,

saplings. These men wishing to make trees straight force them the opposite way and so

torquent in aliam partem et sic tandem reducuntur ad medium.

bring them to the mean, an upright position.

Et est considerandum quod haec via

376. Here we must consider that this way of

acquirendi virtutes est efficacissima; ut, scilicet homo nitatur ad contrarium eius

acquiring virtues is most effective: that a man should strive for the opposite of that to

ad quod inclinatur vel ex natura vel ex

which he is inclined either by nature or habit.

consuetudine; via tamen quam Stoici posuerunt, est facilior, ut scilicet homo

However, the way advocated by the Stoics is easier: that a man little by little withdraw

paulatim recedat ab his in quae inclinatur, ut Tullius narrat in libro de

from those things to which he is inclined, as Cicero relates in his work Questiones

Tusculanis quaestionibus. Via etiam quam hic Aristoteles ponit, competit his

Tusculanae (Bk. IV, C. 31-35, n. 65-76). The way that Aristotle lays down is suitable

qui vehementer desiderant recedere a vitiis et ad virtutem pervenire. Sed via

for those who strongly desire to withdraw from vice and to attain virtue. But the way of

Stoicorum magis competit his qui habent debilem et tepidam voluntatem.

the Stoics is more appropriate to those who have weak and halfhearted wills.

Tertium modum ponit ibi in omni autem maxime et cetera. Et hoc etiam

377. He lays down the third admonition [a, iii] at “Everyone.” This is also understood on

documentum sumitur ex parte nostra, non quidem secundum id quod est

our part, not in the sense that it is proper to every individual, as has been said (374-376)

proprium unicuique, ut dictum est de

of the second admonition, but precisely as it

secundo documento; sed secundum id quod est commune omnibus. Omnes enim

is common to all. All are naturally inclined to pleasure. Therefore, he says that everyone

naturaliter inclinantur ad delectationes. Et ideo dicit quod universaliter maxime

without exception who aims at virtue ought to be on his guard especially against

debent tendentes in virtutem cavere sibi a delectabilibus et delectationibus.

pleasures. Because men are very inclined to pleasure, pleasurable objects apprehended

Propter hoc enim quod homo maxime inclinatur in delectationem, delectabilia

easily move their appetite. Hence, he notes that we cannot easily judge pleasure by

apprehensa de facili movent appetitum. Et ideo dicit quod non de facili possumus

dwelling on its consideration without the appetite accepting it and bursting forth in

diiudicare delectationem, immorando scilicet circa considerationem eius, quin

desire for it. What the Trojan elders felt toward Helen when they decided that she

appetitus accipiat eam, prosiliendo scilicet in concupiscentiam eius. Et ideo

must depart, we ought to feel toward pleasure; in all that concerns pleasure we

illud quod seniores plebis Troianae patiebantur ad Helenam, iudicantes

ought to reecho their words in order that we may reject bodily pleasures. Rejecting

scilicet eam esse abiciendam, hoc oportet nos pati ad delectationem, et in omnibus

pleasures in this way, we will fall into sin less frequently since the desire of pleasure leads

respectu delectationis dicere vocem illorum, ut scilicet, abiiciamus a nobis

men to many sins.

corporales abiicientes

delectationes. delectationem

Et

sic minus

peccabimus, quia concupiscentia delectationum ducit homines in plurima peccata. Concludit ergo quod facientes ea quae in

378. He concludes then that those who do

capitulo, id est summarie, dicta sunt, maxime poterunt adipisci medium

what has been suggested under this heading, i.e., summarily, will be quite able to acquire

virtutis.

the mean of virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: difficile autem forsitan

379. Then [2, b], at “This is perhaps

etc., ostendit qualiter sit determinandum

difficult,” he shows how the mean of virtue

medium virtutis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit huius difficultatem;

must be determined. On this point he does three things. First [b, i] he indicates the

secundo ostendit quid sufficiat ad medii determinationem, ibi: sed qui quidem

difficulty of this. Next [b, ii] he shows what suffices to determine the mean, at “One who

parum et cetera. Tertio respondet tacitae quaestioni, ibi, hic autem usquequo et

deviates a little etc.” Last [b, iii] he answers a latent question at “It cannot be determined

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod hoc, scilicet invenire medium, est difficile et

etc.” He says first that it is difficult to discover the mean especially when we

maxime considerando singulas circumstantias in singularibus

consider the particular circumstances in individual actions. The reason is that it is not

operabilium. determinare

Quia non est facile qualiter aliquid sit

easy to determine how a thing is to be done and in regard to what persons, and in what

faciendum et respectu quorum et in qualibus rebus et quantum tempus sit

type of things, and how long a time one should be angry. He gives a sign of this

determinandum. Et huius difficultatis signum ostendit; quia illos qui deficiunt,

difficulty: that those, who are deficient in getting angry for instance, are sometimes

puta in irascendo, quandoque laudamus

praised by us and called mild, while those who

et dicimus mansuetos. Et quandoque laudamus illos qui magis aggravant

are rather irascible in inflicting punishment or making resistance are sometimes praised

puniendo vel resistendo, et vocamus illos viriles.

by us and called manly.

Deinde cum dicit: sed qui quidem etc., ostendit quid sufficiat ad medium

380. Then [b, ii], at “One who.” he indicates what suffices for the mean of virtue. He says

virtutis. Et dicit, quod ille qui parum

that one who deviates a little from what is

transgreditur ab eo quod bene fit secundum medium virtutis non

done well according to virtue is not censured, whether he inclines to excess or defect. The

vituperatur, neque si declinet ad maius neque si declinet ad minus, quia modicus

reason is that a slight departure from the mean of virtue is hidden on account of the

recessus a medio virtutis latet propter difficultatem medii. Sed ille qui multum

difficulty with the mean. But one who deviates greatly is censured because the

recedit, vituperatur, quia non latet.

deviation is not hidden.

Deinde cum dicit: hic autem usque quo

381. Then [b, iii], at “It cannot easily,” he

etc., respondet cuidam tacitae quaestioni. Posset enim aliquis quaerere, quantus

answers a latent question. Someone could ask how much departure from the mean

recessus a medio vituperatur et quantus non. Sed ipse respondens dicit quod non

should be censured and how much should not. He himself answers that it cannot easily

potest de facili determinari aliquo sermone usque ad quantum terminum, et

be determined, in so many words, at what point and how much a person departing from

quantum aliquis recedens a medio vituperetur. Sicut nec aliquid aliud

the mean should be blamed. Likewise no other sensible thing, which is judged rather

sensibilium, quae magis sensu discernuntur quam ratione determinari

by sense than reason, can easily be determined. Things of this kind, belonging to

possunt. Huiusmodi autem quae ad

the operations of the virtues, are individual

operationes virtutum pertinent, in singularibus consistunt. Et propter hoc

cases. For this reason judgment about them exists in the sensitive part of the soul, even if

eorum iudicium consistit in sensu, etsi non in exteriori, saltem in interiori, per

not in the external, at least in the internal sense by which a person judges well about

quem aliquis bene aestimat de singularibus, ad quem pertinet iudicium

singulars, and to which belongs the judgment of prudence, as will be said in the

prudentiae, ut infra dicetur in VI. Sed hoc tantum hic sufficit, ut ostendatur

sixth book (1215, 1249). But this much suffices here to show that the mean habit in

quod medius habitus in omnibus est laudabilis, sed quandoque oportet

all cases is rather praiseworthy. However, sometimes we must incline toward excess and

declinare ad quandoque autem

superabundantiam, ad defectum; vel

sometimes toward defect either on account of the nature of virtue or on account of our

propter ipsam naturam virtutis, vel propter inclinationem nostram, ut ex

inclination, as is clear from what was explained above (369-378). Thus the mean

supradictis patet. Et per hunc modum facile adipiscemur medium secundum

according to which a thing is done well will be easily discovered. So ends the second book.

quod

aliquid

bene

fit.

Et

in

hoc

terminatur secundus liber.

Lecture 8

Explanation of the Definition in Detail Chapter 7 I. HE SHOWS THE NECESSITY OF THIS PROCEDURE. — 333-334 δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου

We must speak of virtue not only under

λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ'

its universal aspect but we must apply

ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν

the doctrine to individual cases. In discussions which treat of actions,

καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ

universals are not of much utility and particulars are more accurate, for

καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν

actions are concerned with singulars. It is fitting then that discussions be in

ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.

harmony with particulars. Therefore our teaching must be based on the explanation of individual virtues.

II. HE CARRIES OUT HIS PROPOSAL. A. He shows (by particular cases that the mean is good... but the extreme is evil) first in the virtues. A’ Virtues which pertain to bodily life. 1. FIRST HE SPEAKS OF FORTITUDE. — 335-341 περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη

In actions concerned with fear and

ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ

daring, the mean is fortitude. Here an excess in fearlessness lacks an

ἀνώνυμος πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων

applicable name (many things indeed are unnamed). But the man who is

θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν

extreme in daring is called foolhardy, while the man who fears excessively

ἐλλείπων δειλός.

and lacks daring is a coward.

2. SECOND HE SPEAKS OF TEMPERANCE. — 342 περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπασοὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς

With regard to pleasures and pains— but not all of them—the mean is

λύπασμεσότης μὲν ὑπερβολὴ δὲ

temperance (which is less concerned with pains). Excess in these things is

σωφροσύνη, ἀκολασία.

ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ'

called intemperance, but the defect does not often occur. Hence persons lacking

ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι.

a sense of pleasure are unnamed, although they may be called insensible.

B’ (Virtues) which pertain to external goods. 1. HE TREATS THOSE VIRTUES... CONCERNED WITH THE DESIRE OF EXTERNAL GOODS. a. First... he presents the virtues regulating riches. i. First he treats liberality. — 343 περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν

In respect to the giving and receiving of

μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία

money, the mean is liberality. The excess and defect are found in

καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ

extravagance and stinginess, which in opposite ways do too much and too

ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ

little. The spendthrift overdoes the giving and falls short in the acquisition,

λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ

but the miser on the contrary is excessive in acquiring and deficient in

προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν,

giving. For the present we are content to discuss these matters in outline and

ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον

as contained under headings, later we

δὲ ἀκριβέστερον διορισθήσεται.

shall treat them more in detail.

περὶ

αὐτῶν

ii. Then (he treats) magnificence. — 344 περὶ δὲ διαθέσεις

χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν

μεγαλοπρέπεια μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθερίου· ὃ

ὁ

γὰρ

Having to do with the use of money are other habits, the mean of which is magnificence.

The

magnificent

or

διαφέρει γὰρ περὶ

princely person, as concerned with bestowing great sums, differs from the

μεγάλα, ὃ δὲ περὶ μικρά, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία,

liberal person who gives small amounts. Excess in magnificence is called

ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν

apyrocalia (vulgar display) and banausia, but the defect, meanness.

ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.

These extremes differ from the extremes opposed to liberality, the

μὲν

manner however of the difference will

be treated later.

BOOK III THE VOLUNTARY. FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE

LECTURE 1 Spontaneous Action and the Involuntary Chapter I I. HE DEALS WITH ... THREE... PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUOUS ACTIONS. A. He determines the voluntary and the involuntary. A’ He shows that it pertains to the present discussion to consider the voluntary and the involuntary. 1. THE FIRST (REASON). — 382-384 τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι,

Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and since praise and censures are apportioned for what is voluntary but pardon—or at times even pity—for what is involuntary, the study of the voluntary and the involuntary is required of those who intend to treat of virtue.

2. HE GIVES THE SECOND REASON. — 385 χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.

It is useful also for legislators in decreeing honors and punishments.

B’ He actually treats them. 1. HE TREATS THE INVOLUNTARY. a. He divides the involuntary. — 386 δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα·

Involuntary actions seem to be those that arise either from violence or from ignorance.

b. He treats one member of the division. i. He discloses what the “compulsory action”... is.

x.

HE MAKES KNOWN WHAT THE “PHYSICALLY

FORCED ACTION” IS. — 387 βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν

The “compulsory action” (violentum) is one whose principle is from outside and to which the person

συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι

involved or the recipient contributes nothing, for example, if he is driven somewhere by the wind, or

ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.

if he is in the power other men.

y. ...WHAT THE “MORALLY FORCED” ACTION... IS aa. He raises a doubt. — 388-389 ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ

Some things are done because of the fear of greater evils or because of the hope of some good. Thus a

τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι

tyrant, having in his power the parents or children

πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ

of a certain man commands him to do a disgraceful

τέκνων,

μὲν

deed on condition that they will be spared if he does

σώζοιντο μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει

it but killed if he does not do it. Here a doubt arises whether his actions are voluntary or involuntary.

πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια.

A similar case is found in the decision to throw

τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ

goods overboard during storms at sea. Absolutely

τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται

speaking, no man would do so voluntarily, but if it means that his life and that of others are saved as a

ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν

result, a sensible man will do it.

καὶ

πράξαντος

λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. bb.

He solves the doubt. — 390-391

μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

Operations of this kind are mixed. However, they approach more closely to voluntary actions for they are voluntary at the time they are done, and the end of the action conforms to this particular time. An action then must be called voluntary or involuntary by reference to the time at which it was done. In our case he acts voluntarily because the principle moving his bodily members in these operations is within the man himself. Actions whose source is within man are in his power to do or not to do, and this belongs to the nature of the voluntary. But the actions may be called involuntary in the abstract (simpliciter), for no one would choose to do such a thing in itself.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Virtute itaque et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtute in

382. After the Philosopher has treated virtue in general, he treats here certain principles of virtuous

communi, hic determinat de quibusdam

acts. In defining virtue, he said (305) that virtue is a

principiis actuum virtutis. Dixerat enim,

habit of correct choosing because virtue works by

definiens virtutem, quod virtus est habitus electivus, eo scilicet quod virtus per

means of choice. Now he logically discusses choice together with the voluntary and “willing.” The

electionem

nunc

voluntary is common to these three: for the voluntary

consequenter de electione determinat, et de

is anything that is freely done, choice however

voluntario et voluntate. Horum trium

concerns the things that are for the end, and willing

voluntarium commune est. Nam voluntarium dicitur, omne quod sponte fit.

considers the end itself. Hence this section falls into two parts. In the first part [I] he deals with the three

Electio autem est eorum quae sunt ad

previously mentioned principles of virtuous actions. In

finem. Sed voluntas respicit ipsum finem.

the second part, at “Since willing regards the end etc.”

Dividitur ergo pars ista in partes duas. In prima determinat de tribus praedictis

(B. 1113 b 3), he compares these principles with the acts of the virtues [Lect. 11]. His initial point calls for

principiis virtuosorum actuum. In secunda

a threefold procedure. First [A] he determines the

parte comparat huiusmodi principia ad

voluntary and the involuntary. Next [Lect. 5; B], at

actus virtutum, ibi, existente utique voluntabili et cetera. Circa primum tria

“After the treatise etc.” (B. 1111 b 4), he deals with choice. Last [Lect. 10; C], at “As was stated before

facit. Primo determinat de voluntario et involuntario. Secundo determinat de

etc.” (B.1113 a 15), he treats the act of willing. In regard to the first of these he does two things. Initially

electione, ibi, determinatis autem et cetera. Tertio determinat de voluntate, ibi:

[A’] he shows that it pertains to the present discussion to consider the voluntary and the involuntary. Then

voluntas autem quoniam quidem finis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod ad praesentem doctrinam

[B’] at “Involuntary actions seem etc..” he actually treats them. Two reasons are advanced in proof of the first point.

operatur:

et

ideo

pertinet considerare de voluntario et involuntario; secundo determinat de eis, ibi: videntur autem involuntaria et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes. Quarum prima sumitur ex eo quod est proprium praesenti considerationi, quae est

383. The first of these reasons [1] is taken from what is peculiar to our present study which concerns the

de virtutibus. Et concludit ex praemissis, quod virtus moralis, de qua nunc agitur, est circa passiones et operationes; ita scilicet

virtues. He concludes from his previous remarks that moral virtue, our present concern, deals with passions and actions in such a way that in the things which are

quod in his quae sunt voluntaria circa operationes et passiones, fiunt laudes, cum

voluntary in regard to actions and passions, praise is due anyone acting virtuously and blame for anyone

aliquis operatur secundum virtutem, et vituperia quando aliquis operatur contra virtutem; quando autem aliquis

acting viciously. But when someone involuntarily performs an action in accordance with virtue, he does not merit praise, On the other hand, if his action is

involuntarie operatur, si quidem id quod est secundum virtutem, non meretur laudem:

contrary to virtue he deserves pardon because he acted involuntarily, and so is less blameworthy. Sometimes

si autem contra virtutem, meretur veniam ex eo, quod involuntarie agit, ut scilicet minus vituperetur. Quandoque autem

he even deserves pity, and should be entirely freed from blame.

meretur misericordiam, ut scilicet totaliter

a vituperio reddatur immunis. Vel possunt distingui venia et misericordia

384. Pardon can also be distinguished from pity in this

ut dicatur venia, quando diminuitur seu totaliter dimittitur vituperium seu poena ex iudicio rationis, misericordia autem quando

way: we speak of pardon when censure, i.e., a penalty is lessened or entirely absolved as a consequence of the judgment of reason. Pity, on the other hand, arises as

hoc fit ex passione. Laus autem et vituperium proprie debentur virtuti et vitio.

a consequence of an emotion. But praise and blame are peculiarly due to virtue and vice. Therefore, the

Et ideo voluntarium et involuntarium, secundum quae diversificatur ratio laudis et vituperii debent determinari ab his qui

voluntary and the involuntary, according to which the reason for praise and blame is diversified, ought to be treated by those who intend to study virtue.

intendunt de virtute considerare. Secundam rationem ponit ibi utile autem et legislatoribus et cetera. Quae sumitur ex consideratione politica, ad quam praesens

385. At “It is useful” [2] he gives the second reason. This is taken from the viewpoint of political science to which the present study is ordered. It is useful for

consideratio ordinatur. Et dicit, quod utile est legislatoribus, quod considerent

legislators, he says, to consider the voluntary and the involuntary that they may decree honors for the law-

voluntarium et involuntarium ad hoc quod statuant honores bene agentibus, vel poenas peccantibus, in quibus diversitatem

abiding and punishments for the law-breakers, for in regard to these the distinction of voluntary and involuntary is of importance.

facit voluntarii et involuntarii differentia. Deinde cum dicit: videntur autem involuntaria etc., determinat de voluntario et involuntario. Et primo de involuntario.

386. Then [B’], at “Involuntary actions seem,” he deals with the voluntary and the involuntary. First [B’, I] he treats the involuntary, and second [Lect. 4],

Secundo de voluntario, ibi, existente autem involuntario etc. et ratio ordinis est, quia

at “Since the involuntary etc.” (B. 1111 a 22), he treats the voluntary. The reason for this order is that

involuntarium ex simplici causa procedit, puta ex sola ignorantia vel ex sola violentia; sed ad voluntarium oportet plura

the involuntary proceeds from a simple cause, as ignorance alone, or violence alone, but the voluntary has to take place by the concurrence of many factors.

concurrere. Circa primum tria facit. Primo dividit involuntarium. Secundo determinat

The explanation of the involuntary [B’, 1] is achieved in three stages. First [a] he divides the involuntary.

de uno membro divisionis, ibi, violentum autem est et cetera. Tertio determinat de alio, ibi, quod autem propter ignorantiam et

Second [b], at “The ‘compulsory action’ is etc.,” he treats one member of the division. Third [Lect. 3; c], at “Every action done etc.” (B. 1110 b 18), he treats the

cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod involuntaria videntur aliqua esse dupliciter: scilicet vel illa quae fiunt per violentiam, vel illa quae

other member. He says first that some involuntary actions seem to be of two kinds: those arising from violence, or those arising from ignorance. This division

fiunt propter ignorantiam. Et ratio huius divisionis est, quia involuntarium est

is made in order to indicate that the involuntary is a privation of the voluntary. But the voluntary implies a

privatio voluntarii. Voluntarium autem importat motum appetitivae virtutis, qui praesupponit cognitionem apprehensivae

movement of the appetitive power presupposing a knowledge via sense or reason because a good perceived moves the appetitive power. A thing is

virtutis, eo quod bonum apprehensum movet appetitivam virtutem; dupliciter

involuntary on two accounts: one, because the movement of the appetitive power is excluded—this is

igitur aliquid est involuntarium. Uno modo per hoc quod excluditur ipse motus

the involuntary resulting from violence—the other, because a mental awareness is excluded-this is the

appetitivae

virtutis.

Et

hoc

est

involuntary resulting from ignorance.

involuntarium per violentiam. Alio modo quia excluditur cognitio virtutis apprehensivae. Et hoc est involuntarium per ignorantiam.

Deinde cum dicit: violentum autem est etc., determinat de involuntario per violentiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid

387. Next [b], at “The compulsory action,” he deals with the involuntary resulting from violence. Here he proceeds in two ways: first [i] he discloses what the

sit violentum. Secundo excludit circa hoc errorem, ibi, si quis autem delectabilia et

“compulsory action” (violentum) is. Next [Lect. 2; ii], at “If someone should say etc.” (B. 1110 b 9), he

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid sit simpliciter violentum. Secundo quid sit violentum secundum quid

rejects an error about this. His initial point requires a triple consideration. First [i, x] he makes known what the “physically forced action” (simpliciter violentum)

ibi, quaecumque autem propter timorem etc.; tertio epilogat, ibi: qualia utique dicendum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod

is, and second [i, y], at “Some things are done because of the fear,” what the “morally forced action” (violentum secundum quid) is. Third [Lect. 2; z], at

violentum est cuius principium est extra. Dictum est enim quod violentia excludit

“What sort of actions etc.” (B. 1110 b), he concludes with a summary. He says first that the forced action is

motum appetitivum. Unde, cum appetitus sit principium intrinsecum, consequens est quod violentum sit a principio extrinseco;

one whose principle is from outside. It was just noted (385) that violence excludes the appetitive movement. Hence, since the appetitive faculty is an intrinsic

sed quia ipse etiam appetitus moveri potest ab aliquo extrinseco, non omne cuius

principle, it is appropriate that the forced action arise from an extrinsic principle. However, not every action

principium est extra est violentum, sed solum quod ita est a principio extrinseco, quod appetitus interior non concurrit in

whose principle is from the outside is a forced action but only that action which is derived from an extrinsic principle in such a way that the interior appetitive

idem. Et hoc est quod dicit quod oportet tale esse violentum in quo nihil conferat, scilicet per proprium appetitum, homo qui

faculty does not concur in it. This is what he means by his statement that a forced action must be such that a man contributes nothing to it by means of his own

et dicitur operans, in quantum facit aliquid per violentiam, et dicitur patiens

appetitive faculty. A man is here said to be an agent (operans) inasmuch as he does something because of

inquantum violentiam patitur. Et ponit exemplum: puta si spiritus, idest ventus, per suam violentiam impulerit rem aliquam

violence and a patient inasmuch as he suffers something because of violence. Aristotle gives an example: if the air or wind drives a thing to some place

ad aliquem locum, vel si homines dominium et potestatem habentes asportaverunt

by its violence, or if rulers having dominion and power exile someone against his will.

aliquem contra eius voluntatem.

Deinde cum dicit quaecumque autem etc., ostendit quid sit violentum secundum quid.

388. At “Some things” [i, y], he explains what a morally forced action is. Three steps clarify this

Et circa hoc tria facit: primo movet dubitationem; secundo solvit, ibi, mixtae quidem igitur sunt et cetera. Tertio solutionem manifestat, ibi, in operationibus

conclusion. First [aa] he raises a doubt. Next [bb], at “Operations of this kind etc.,” he solves the doubt. Third [Lect. 2; cc], at “People doing such actions etc.” (B. 1110 a 19), he clarifies the solution. He says first

autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quaedam sunt, quae aliquis operatur

that a man sometimes performs an action because he fears to incur greater evils or because he is afraid to

propter timorem maiorum malorum, quae

lose some good. A tyrant, for instance, has under his

scilicet timet incurrere; vel propter bonum aliquod, quod scilicet timet amittere. Puta si aliquis tyrannus habens in suo dominio et potestate parentes et filios alicuius, praecipiat ei quod aliquid turpe operetur tali

dominion and power the parents or children of a certain man. This tyrant commands the man to do a disgraceful deed on condition that if he does it his relatives will be spared; if he refuses they will be killed.

condicione ut, si ipse operetur illud turpe, conserventur filii et parentes eius in vita, si autem non operetur, occidantur. Est ergo dubitatio utrum illa quae ex tali timore fiunt, sint dicenda voluntaria, vel potius involuntaria. Et ponit aliud exemplum de his qui in tempestatibus maritimis existentes eiciunt res suas in mari, quod quidem simpliciter loquendo

389. There is then a doubt whether things done because of such fear should be called voluntary or involuntary. He gives another example of sailors who during storms at sea throw merchandise overboard. Absolutely speaking, no man does this voluntarily but what he and his shipmates do in order to save their

nullus facit voluntarius. Sed ad hoc quod ipse et illi qui cum eo sunt salventur, faciunt hoc omnes qui habent intellectum bene dispositum.

lives, any sensible man in a similar situation does.

Deinde cum dicit: mixtae quidem igitur etc., solvit praemissam dubitationem, concludens ex eo quod dictum est, quod praedictae operationes, quae ex timore

390. Then [bb], at “Operations of this kind,” he solves this doubt by concluding from his previous remarks (387) that the afore-mentioned actions done out of fear are mixed, i.e., have something both of the

fiunt, sunt mixtae, idest habentes aliquid de utroque; de involuntario quidem inquantum nullus vult simpliciter res suas in mare proiicere; de voluntario autem, inquantum quilibet sapiens hoc vult pro salute suae personae et aliorum. Sed tamen magis

involuntary (inasmuch as no one absolutely wishes to throw his goods overboard) and of the voluntary (inasmuch as a sensible man wishes this for the safety of himself and others). However, these actions approach more closely to the voluntary than to the involuntary. The reason is that throwing merchandise

accedunt ad voluntarias operationes quam ad involuntarias. Cuius ratio est quia hoc quod est proiicere res in mare, vel quicquid est aliud huiusmodi potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo absolute et in

overboard, or any action of this kind, can be considered in two ways: one, absolutely and in general (involuntary); the other, in the particular circumstances occurring at the time the action is to be done (voluntary). But, since actions are concerned

universali, et sic est involuntarium. Alio modo secundum particulares circumstantias quae occurrunt in tempore in quo hoc est agendum, et secundum hoc est voluntarium. Quia vero actus sunt circa

with particulars, the nature of the action must be judged rather according to the considerations of particulars than according to the consideration of what is general. This is what he means in his statement that these actions were done voluntarily at

singularia, magis est iudicanda conditio actus secundum considerationes singularium quam secundum considerationem universalem. Et hoc est quod dicit quod praedictae operationes ex

the time they were performed (i.e., after having considered all the particular circumstances then occurring), and the end and completion of the action conform to this particular time.

timore factae sunt voluntariae tunc quando sunt operatae, idest consideratis omnibus

singularibus

circumstantiis

quae

pro

tempore illo occurrunt, et secundum hoc singulare tempus est finis et complementum operationis. Et ideo dicendum est proprie aliquid

391. Therefore, an action must be properly called

voluntarium et involuntarium secundum considerationem temporis, quando aliquis operatur. Manifestum est autem quod tunc operatur volens. Quod patet ex hoc quod in talibus operationibus principium movendi

voluntary or involuntary in view of the time at which the agent performed it. It is obvious that he acts voluntarily at the time. This is evident because in these actions the principle moving the bodily members to act is within the man himself. It would be different,

organicas partes, idest applicandi membra corporis ad operandum, est in ipso homine. Aliter autem esset si ipsemet non moveret membra, sed ab aliquo potentiori moverentur. Ea autem quae fiunt ex

however, if his members were not moved by himself but by a more powerful agent. The things done by an intrinsic principle are in the power of man to do or not to do, and this belongs to the nature of the voluntary. Obviously then actions of this kind are properly and

principio intrinseco sunt in potestate hominis, ut ea operetur vel non operetur, quod pertinet ad rationem voluntarii. Unde manifestum est quod tales operationes proprie et vere sunt voluntariae. Sed tamen

truly voluntary. They are, however, involuntary simply, that is considering them in general, because no one as far as in him lies would choose to do a thing of this kind except out of fear, as was just stated (390).

simpliciter, idest in universali considerando eas, sunt involuntariae, quia nullus quantum est in se eligeret operari aliquid talium nisi propter timorem, ut dictum est.

LECTURE 2 What Voluntary Actions Merit Chapter 1 cc. He now clarifies the solution. a’ He discloses in what way these actions merit praise and blame... A. HE DISTINGUISHES THREE GRADES... FIRST. — 392-393 ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ

People doing such actions are at times praised for enduring something dishonorable pain to achieve great and good results. But when they do the opposite of this they are blamed, for only a perverse

καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἴσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου.

man suffers very dishonorable things in exchange for little or no good.

B. HE SETS DOWN THE SECOND GRADE. — 394 ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν

Some actions do not deserve praise but only pardon, for example, if a person does things that are wrong because he fears evils beyond human endurance

ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι.

which no one would undergo in any case.

C. HE TREATS THE THIRD GRADE. — 395 ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ

Yet it is probable that there are actions that a man cannot be forced to do and he ought to undergo death of the cruelest kind rather than do them. (The reasons that constrained Euripides’ Alcmaeon to kill his mother seem to be ridiculous.)

ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. b’ He makes known the pending difficulties. A. THE FIRST. — 396 ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον,

Sometimes it is difficult to judge what is to be chosen for the price and what is to be endured for the gain.

B. THE SECOND DIFFICULTY. — 397 ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς

It is still more difficult to abide by our decisions. As

γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς

often happens, the expected results are painful but the compulsory acts are disgraceful. Hence we receive praise and blame according as we yield or stand firm against the constraint.

ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. z. HE CONCLUDES WITH A SUMMARY. — 398-399 τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἁπλῶς μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ

What sort of actions then are to be called compulsory? Those actions are entirely (simpliciter) compulsory that have their cause from the outside, the person involved contributing nothing. Some actions that in themselves are involuntary become

τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς

voluntary in particular circumstances. Although of themselves involuntary, if their principle is in the agent who seeks them at this time and in these circumstances, they are voluntary. They are then more like the voluntary because actions take place in

καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἑκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ

particular cases that are voluntary. It is not easy to assign the sort of things we must choose in such

ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα.

circumstances, for particular cases admit of many differences.

ii. He rejects an error... for five reasons. v. THE FIRST REASON. — 400-401 εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα, πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.

If someone should say that pleasurable and good things are the cause of violence (they are external to us and influence us), all our actions will then be compulsory because men perform all their actions for the sake of something pleasing and good.

w. THE SECOND REASON. — 402 καὶ οἱ μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες

Those who act by violence act involuntarily and with

λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς·

sadness, but those who act to attain something enjoyable act with pleasure.

x. THE THIRD REASON. — 403 γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων,

It is ridiculous that a man blame external goods, and not accuse himself for being snared by such pleasures;

y. THE FOURTH REASON. — 404 καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα.

while he takes to himself the credit for virtuous deeds, and lays the blame for his shameful deeds upon pleasure.

z. THE FIFTH REASON. — 405 ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

It seems that the compulsory action is one whose origin is external in such a way that one who suffers violence contributes nothing to the action.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS In operationibus autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus solvit dubitationem motam circa ea quae fiunt propter metum, ostendens

392. After the Philosopher has solved the doubt raised about the actions done because of fear, showing that such actions are voluntary, he now

huiusmodi operationes magis esse voluntarias,

clarifies the solution [cc] by explaining that praise

hic solutionem manifestat per hoc quod laus et vituperium, honor et poena debentur

and blame, honor and punishment are due to voluntary actions of this kind. On this point he does

huiusmodi operationibus, quae tamen non debentur nisi operationibus voluntariis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter huiusmodi operationibus debeatur laus et vituperium, honor vel poena; secundo

two things. First [a’] he discloses in what way these actions merit praise and blame, honor and punishment. Next [b’], at “Sometimes it is difficult etc.,” he makes known the pending difficulties about this. In regard to the first he distinguishes three

manifestat difficultatem circa hoc imminentem, ibi: est autem difficile et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres gradus talium operationum quae fiunt per metum quantum ad hoc quod mereantur laudem vel vituperium.

grades of these actions performed by reason of fear, as far as they merit praise or blame.

Et quantum ad primum dicit quod in talibus operationibus quas dixit esse mixtas ex voluntario et involuntario, quandoque aliqui laudantur ex eo quod sustinent aliquod turpe,

393. Considering now the first grade [a’, A], he shows that regarding such actions, which he says are a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, some persons are praised for suffering something

non quidem peccatum, sed ignominiam aliquam, vel etiam aliquod triste, idest aliquod afflictivum, propter hoc quod perseverent in aliquibus magnis et bonis, puta in aliquibus virtuosis actibus. Quando autem accidit e

dishonorable—not indeed of a sinful nature but a kind of ignominy —or even saddening or grievous in order to persevere in certain great and good things, or example, virtuous actions. When the opposite happens they are blamed since it seems

converso, vituperantur, quia proprium pravi hominis esse videtur, ut sustineat turpissima, idest aliquas magnas confusiones pro nullo vel modico bono. Nullus enim sustinet aliquod malum pro conservatione alicuius boni, nisi

that only a perverse man suffers very dishonorable things, i.e., great disorders in exchange for little or no good. No one suffers any evil to preserve a good unless that good is of greater value in his estimation than the other goods to which the evil

illud bonum praeponderet in corde suo illis bonis quibus opponuntur mala quae sustinet; pertinet autem ad inordinationem appetitus quod aliquis parva bona praeeligat magnis, quae tolluntur per magna mala. Et ideo dicit hoc esse pravi hominis, qui habet appetitum

he suffers are opposed. It belongs to a disordered desire to prefer small goods to great ones that are destroyed by greater evils. Therefore, he says this pertains to a perverse man, i.e., one who has a disordered desire.

inordinatum. Secundum gradum ponit ibi in aliquibus autem et cetera. Et dicit quod in quibusdam

394. At “Some actions” [a’, B], he sets down the second grade, stating that some actions performed

operationibus propter metum factis non meretur aliquis laudem, sed solum conceditur

because of fear do not deserve praise but only pardon. A person should not be blamed very much

venia, ut scilicet aliquis inde non multum

for doing certain things he ought not do, such as

vituperetur, quando scilicet aliquis operatur quaedam quae non oportet, puta aliqua non

actions unbefitting his state. These actions should not be considered seriously binding on account of

decentia ad statum suum, cum tamen non sint multum gravia, propter timorem aliquorum

the fear of evils beyond human endurance. No one would undergo such evils especially for the reason

malorum,

excedit

alleged, for example, if some one is threatened with

humanam naturam, et quae nullus posset sustinere, praecipue propter hanc causam,

punishment by fire unless he tells a jocose lie, or he performs some lowly menial tasks unbecoming his

puta si alicui immineret sustinere ignis

dignity.

quorum

sustinentia

adustionem, nisi diceret aliquod iocosum mendacium. Vel nisi aliqua vilia et abiecta opera faceret dignitatem.

quae

non

decerent

eius

Tertium gradum ponit ibi: quaedam autem fortassis et cetera. Et dicit quod quaedam

395. At “Yet it is probable” [a’, c], he treats the third grade. He states that other actions are so evil

operationes sunt adeo malae quod ad eas faciendas nulla sufficiens coactio adhiberi

that no amount of force can compel them to be done but a man ought to undergo death of the cruelest

potest, sed magis debet homo sustinere

kind rather than do such things, as St. Lawrence

mortem patiendo durissima tormenta, quam talia operari, sicut beatus Laurentius sustinuit

endured the roasting on the gridiron to avoid sacrificing to idols. The Philosopher affirms this

adustionem craticulae ne idolis immolaret. Et hoc ideo philosophus dicit, vel quia morienti

either because glory remains after death for one dying for the sake of virtue or because courageous

propter virtutem remanet post mortem gloria,

perseverance in virtue is so great a good that

vel quia fortiter persistere in bono virtutis est tantum bonum ut ei aequiparari non possit

continuance of life—which a man loses by death— cannot equal it. He says, therefore, that Alcmaeona

diuturnitas vitae, quam homo moriendo perdit. Et ideo dicit quod Alcmaeona, idest carmina de

or the poems about Alcmaeon written by Euripides seem to be satirical. These poems narrate the story

Alcmaeone facta ab Euripide poeta, videntur

of Alcmaeon who was forced to kill his mother by

esse derisoria, in quibus narratur quod Alcmaeon coactus fuit matrem occidere ex

the command of his father. The father had ordered this when dying in the Theban war to which be had

praecepto patris sui, qui hoc sibi praeceperat in bello Thebano moriens, ad quod ierat ex uxoris

gone by the advice of his wife.

consilio. Deinde cum dicit: est autem difficile etc., ponit

396. Then [b’], at “Sometimes it is,” he brings

duas difficultates quae imminent circa praedictas operationes. Quarum prima pertinet

forward two difficulties which threaten the abovementioned activities. The first of these pertains to

ad iudicium rationis. Et dicit quod quandoque

the judgment of reason [b’, A]. Sometimes it is

difficile est iudicare quid sit eligendum pro hoc quod aliquis evitet aliquod malum, et quid mali

difficult, he says, to judge what is to be chosen so that one may avoid evil and what evil is to be

sit sustinendum pro hoc quod aliquis non deficiat ab aliquo bono.

endured so that one may not be lacking in some good.

Secunda difficultas pertinet ad immutabilitatem affectus. Quam ponit ibi,

397. The second difficulty [b, B], which he gives at “It is still more,” pertains to the stability of the

adhuc autem et cetera. Et dicit quod adhuc difficilius est immorari perseveranter in his

affection. He says that it is even more difficult to be steadfast in a reasonable decision that has been

quae homo cognoscit per iudicium rationis,

made than to make a right judgment. He assigns

quam recte iudicare. Et assignat rationem difficultatis dicens quod, sicut plurimum

the reason for the difficulty saying that—as often happens—the things that are expected are painful,

contingit, illa quae expectantur, id est quae timentur, sunt tristia, idest afflictiva vel

i.e., afflicting or sorrowful, but those to which men are forced because of fear are disgraceful. It is

dolorosa, illa autem ad quae homines coguntur

difficult, however, for a man’s affections not to be

per horum timorem sunt turpia. Difficile est autem quod affectus hominis ex timore doloris

moved by fear of pain. Since those actions to which one is forced by a motive of this kind are

non moveatur, et tamen quia illa ad quae

disgraceful, it is fitting that for those who are

aliquis per huiusmodi cogitur sunt turpia, consequens est quod circa eos qui coguntur ad

forced to do such things by fear of painful effects, blame should be forthcoming. Put those who

huiusmodi turpia agenda per timores tristium, fiant vituperia; circa eos autem qui ad hoc cogi

cannot be forced to do them are worthy of praise.

non possunt, fiant laudes. Deinde cum dicit: qualia utique etc., epilogat

398. Next [i], at “What sort of actions then,” he

quae dicta sunt ut quorundam rationem assignet. Et primo resumit quaestionem

sums up in conclusion the things that have been said and assigns a reason for them. First he

principalem,

dicenda

reviews the principal question, what sort of actions

violenta. Secundo resumit responsionem quantum ad ea quae sunt absolute violenta, et

are to be called compulsory (violenta). Then, he sums up the answer so far as concerns the entirely

dicit quod simpliciter, id est absolute, violenta sunt quorum causa est exterius, ita quod ille

(absolute) compulsory actions, the cause of which is from the outside so that the person involved

qui operatur propter violentiam nihil ad hoc

contributes nothing because of violence. Third he

conferat. Tertio resumit de operationibus mixtis. Et dicit quod illa quae secundum seipsa,

gives a résumé of mixed actions. He says that those actions that in themselves, i.e., abstractly

idest absolute et universaliter considerata, sunt involuntaria, efficiuntur voluntaria

(absolute) and universally considered, are involuntary become voluntary at a definite time and

secundum certum tempus et propter certos

by reason of certain events. Although they are

eventus. Horum autem quamvis secundum se sint involuntaria, principium tamen est in

involuntary in themselves, their principle is in the agent. Therefore, they should be called voluntary at

operante, et ideo dicenda sunt voluntaria secundum hoc tempus et pro istis causis; et sic

this time and for these reasons. Thus it is evident that these actions are more like the voluntary than

patet quod magis assimulantur voluntariis quam involuntariis, quia sunt voluntaria

the involuntary because they are voluntary when we consider the particular circumstances in which

consideratis singularibus in quibus operationes

the actions are performed.

scilicet

qualia

sint

consistunt. Quarto resumit quod dixerat de difficultate in

399. Last, he recapitulates what he had stated

talibus contingente. Et dicit quod non est facile tradere qualia oporteat pro qualibus eligere. Et

about the difficulty occurring in things of this kind. He says that it is not easy to assign the sort of

rationem assignat ex hoc quod multae differentiae sunt in singularibus. Et ideo

thing we must choose in such circumstances. He assigns as the reason that many differences are

iudicium de eis non potest sub certa regula

found in singulars. Hence the judgment of them

comprehendi, sed relinquitur existimationi prudentis.

cannot be comprised under an exact rule but they are to be left to the evaluation of a prudent man.

Deinde cum dicit: si quis autem delectabilia etc., excludit errorem quorumdam de his quae

400. At “If someone” [ii], he rejects an error of certain philosophers concerning actions done as a

per violentiam fiunt. Quia enim homo est id

result of violence. Because man is what he is by

quod est secundum rationem, visum est quibusdam quod illud solum homo per se et

reason, it seemed to some that man of himself, and as it were voluntarily, does only that which he

quasi voluntarie faceret quod facit secundum rationem; quandoque autem contingit quod

performs according to reason. But when it happens that man acts contrary to reason either on account

homo contra rationem operatur, vel propter

of the desire of some pleasure or greed for some

concupiscentiam alicuius delectationis facit, vel

external good, he acts in a violent manner. They

propter cupiditatem alicuius exterioris boni; et ideo dicebant quod delectabilia et exteriora

say, therefore, that pleasurable and external goods like riches cause forced actions inasmuch as being

bona, puta divitiae, sunt violenta effective, inquantum scilicet, cum sint quaedam

external things they force man to act against his reason. Aristotle shows this to be false for five

extrinseca, cogunt hominem ad agendum contra rationem. Sed hoc ipse improbat

reasons.

quinque rationibus, Quarum

prima

talis

est.

Si

exteriora

401. The first reason is this [ii, v]. If external

inquantum sunt delectabilia et videntur bona

things, precisely as they are pleasurable and

violentiam inferunt, sequetur quod omnia quae nos agimus sint violenta et nihil in rebus

seemingly good, cause violence, it would follow that all actions we perform in human affairs are forced

humanis et nihil sit voluntarium: quia omnes homines quaecumque operantur, operantur

actions and none is voluntary. (All men do what they do for the sake of these things, i.e., for

gratia horum, id est propter aliquod delectabile vel propter aliquod quocumque modo bonum.

something that is pleasurable or good under a certain aspect.) But this is unreasonable.

Hoc autem est inconveniens. Ergo et primum.

Therefore, the first (that these external things cause violence) is also untenable.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et qui quidem et

402. He sets down the second reason at “Those

cetera. Quae talis est. Omnes qui operantur ex violentia et involuntarii operantur cum

who act” [ii, w]. All who act as a result of violence, act involuntarily and with sadness. Hence in the

tristitia. Unde et in V metaphysicae dicitur quod necessitas est contristans, quia

fifth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 5,1015 a 26 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 6, 829-831), it is well said that

contrariatur voluntati. Sed illi qui operantur

necessitation is saddening because it is opposed to

propter aliquod bonum seu propter aliquod delectabile adipiscendum, operantur cum

the will. But those who act to acquire something enjoyable act with pleasure. They do not then act

delectatione. Non ergo violentiam et nolentes.

by violence and involuntarily.

operantur

per

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi ridiculum autem et

403. He gives the third reason at “It is ridiculous”

cetera. Et dicit quod ridiculum est causari, idest incusare, exteriora bona et non incusare

[ii, x]. He says it is ridiculous that a man plead as an excuse or blame external goods and not accuse

se ipsum ex eo quod reddit se venabilem, idest

himself that he was spared, i.e., permitted himself

permittit se superari, a talibus appetibilibus; non enim voluntas nostra ex necessitate

to be overcome by such pleasures. Our will is not of necessity moved by these desirable things but it can

movetur a talibus appetibilibus, sed potest eis inhaerere vel non inhaerere, eo quod nihil

cling to them or desert them. None possesses the nature of a universal and perfect good, as happiness

eorum habet rationem universalis et perfecti

(which everyone necessarily wishes) does.

boni, sicut felicitas, quam omnes ex necessitate volumus. Quartam rationem ponit ibi et bonorum

404. He assigns the fourth reason at “while he

quidem se ipsum et cetera. Et dicit quod

takes” [ii, y]. It is ridiculous, he says, that a person

ridiculum est, quod aliquis dicat se ipsum esse causam bonorum, id est virtuosarum

should call himself the cause of his good and virtuous works, and pleasurable things the cause of

operationum, et quod delectabilia sint causa

his shameful deeds inasmuch as they induce desire.

turpium operationum in quantum alliciunt

Aristotle says it is ridiculous because directly

concupiscentiam. Ideo autem hoc dicit esse

opposed operations are referred back to the same

ridiculum, quia contrariae operationes reducuntur in eamdem potentiam rationalem,

power as a cause. Consequently it is necessary that as reason operating according to itself is the cause

sicut in causam. Et ideo oportet quod sicut ratio secundum seipsam agens est causa

of virtuous action so also in following the passions it should be the cause of vicious action.

virtuosae operationis, ita etiam sit causa vitiosae operationis sequendo passiones. Quintam rationem ponit ibi videtur utique violentum et cetera. Et dicit, quod violentum

405. He gives the fifth reason at “It seems that” [ii, z], saying that the forced action is one whose

est cuius principium est extra ita quod ille qui

source is from the outside in such a way that he

patitur vim nihil conferat ad actionem. Sed ille qui agit propter bona exteriora confert aliquid

who suffers by reason of it contributes nothing to the action. But the man who acts on account of

ad actionem. Ergo, quamvis principium inclinans eius voluntatem sit extra, non tamen

external goods does contribute something to the action. Accordingly, although the principle

eius operatio est violenta: neque simpliciter,

inclining his will is from outside, his action is forced

quia aliquid confert ad operationem; neque per aliquam mixtionem, quia in operationibus

neither wholly (simpliciter) because he contributes something to the action, nor by some mixture

mixtis, non redditur aliquid simpliciter voluntarium, sicut accidit hic. Et ideo ibi

because in mixed actions a thing is not rendered simply voluntary, as happens here. Therefore, a

operatur homo cum tristitia, hic autem cum

man acts in that case with sadness but not with

delectatione, ut dictum est.

pleasure, as has been stated (402).

LECTURE 3 The Involuntary Resulting from Ignorance Chapter 1 c. He now turns his attention to the involuntary resulting from ignorance. i. He shows how there is an involuntary resulting from ignorance. x. HE SETS DOWN THREE DIFFERENCES CONCERNING IGNORANCE. THE FIRST. — 406-408 τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν

Every action done because of ignorance is not

ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν

voluntary; it is involuntary if sorrow and repentance follow. One who does something on

πράξας

τι

account of ignorance and is not sorry about what

δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ'

he did, cannot be said to have acted voluntarily, for he was unaware of his action. But neither can

αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ

he be said to have acted involuntarily if he is not sorry. A man who has acted from ignorance and

ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος,

regrets

ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών· ἐπεὶ

involuntarily. But if he does not regret it, his case

ὁτιοῦν,

μηδέν

his

action

seems

to

have

acted

γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν

is different; let us call him non-voluntary. Because

ἴδιον.

of his differ, it is better that he have a distinctive name. y. HE SETS DOWN THE SECOND DIFFERENCE. — 409-410

ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ

There seems to be a difference between acting on account of and acting in ignorance. A drunken or

μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι'

angry person does not act because of ignorance

ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ'

but because of one of the things mentioned (drunkenness or anger). Such a one however does

ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν

not act knowingly but in ignorance. Therefore, every wicked person acts in ignorance of the

ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην

things he ought to do and avoid. Men acting on

ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται·

account of an error of this kind become unjust and wicked generally.

x. HE ASSIGNS THE THIRD DIFFERENCE. — 411-413 τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα· οὐ

When we speak of an action as involuntary we do not mean that a man is ignorant of what he ought

γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας,

to do. The ignorance that accompanies choice is not the cause of an involuntary but of sin. The

οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε

same may be said of ignorance that is of a general

ταύτην ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ

nature because a person is blamed for such ignorance. But a person who is ignorant of

καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως

particular conditions about which and on which human activity is exercised deserves mercy and

πράττει.

pardon because he who is ignorant of any of these circumstances acts involuntarily.

ii. He explains some of his statements. (Circumstances the ignorance of which is a cause of an involuntary.) x. HE POINTS OUT WHAT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE. — 414-416 ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά,

Perhaps it is not out of place to determine the

τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε

nature and number of these circumstances: who, what, concerning what or in what one operates;

δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον

sometimes, too, by what, for example, a tool; for the sake of which, for instance, safety; and in

ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.

what manner, for example, quietly or violently.

y. IN WHAT WAY IGNORANCE OF THEM MAY BE PRESENT. — 417-421 ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν

No one but a madman will be ignorant of all these

ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ'

circumstances. It is obvious that no one can be

ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ

ignorant of the agent. How can he be ignorant

ἑαυτόν γε; ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν

about himself? But someone can be ignorant of

ἄν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα

what he does, for instance, those speaking out of turn say it escaped them unawares or they did not

ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν

know that certain things were not to be disclosed, like Aeschylus when he revealed the sacred

καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις καὶ

mysteries; or someone wishing to show the

τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ

working of a weapon discharges an arrow; or a man mistakes his son for an assailant, as Merope

λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας

did; or he thinks a piked lance blunted, or a rock merely pumice; or he may kill someone by a blow

ἀποκτείναι

meant to save him; or a trainer sparring with a

ἄν·

καὶ

θῖξαι

βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν.

οἱ

boxer to teach him takes his life.

z. HE EXPLAINS HOW IGNORANCE OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS THE CAUSE OF AN INVOLUNTARY. aa. First... man seems to act unwillingly... who is ignorant of one (circumstance). — 422 περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας

Since ignorance can be concerned with every one

οὔσης, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι,

of the circumstances occurring with the action, that man seems to act involuntarily who is

καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις·

ignorant of one of them. This applies especially to ignorance of the most important circumstances.

bb.

The most important circumstances. — 423

κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ

These seem to be the circumstances of the action

πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.

and its motives.

cc. Ignorance of these very things is not enough for an involuntary. — 424 τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν

For an action to be called involuntary in respect of

ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν

such ignorance it must be painful to the agent and cause repentance.

μεταμελείᾳ.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quod autem propter ignorantiam et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

406. After the Philosopher has determined the involuntary resulting from violence, he now turns his

involuntario per violentiam, hic determinat

attention

de involuntario per ignorantiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo sit aliquid

ignorance [c]. Concerning it he does two things. First [i] he shows how’ there is an involuntary

involuntarium per ignorantiam. Secundo

resulting from ignorance. Second [ii], at “Perhaps it

to

the

involuntary

resulting

from

manifestat

quaedam

quae

dixerat,

ibi,

is etc.,” he explains some of his statements. In regard

forsitan igitur non malum et cetera. Circa

to the initial point he sets down three differences

primum ponit tres differentias circa ignorantiam. Quarum prima attenditur

concerning ignorance. The first of these [i, x] is considered insofar as what is done on account of

secundum quod aliquid propter ignorantiam fit, sed diversimode se habet ad voluntatem:

ignorance is related to the will in different ways. Sometimes it is opposed to the will, and then it is

quandoque enim est voluntati contrarium: et

properly called an involuntary. But other times it is

tunc proprie dicitur involuntarium. Quandoque autem non est contrarium

not opposed to the will but is over and above the will precisely as it is unknown. In this sense it is not

voluntati, sed est praeter voluntatem in quantum est ignoratum et hoc non dicitur

called involuntary but non-voluntary.

involuntarium, sed non voluntarium. Dicit ergo, quod hoc quod fit propter

407. He says then that what is done on account of

ignorantiam, ita scilicet quod ignorantia sit causa eius, universaliter est non

ignorance in such a way that ignorance is the cause, is not voluntary in any case because the act of the

voluntarium, ex hoc scilicet quod actus

will is not moved to it. The act of the will cannot be

voluntatis non fertur in illud. Non enim potest actus voluntatis ferri in id quod est

moved to what is entirely unknown since the will’s object is the known good. But only then is that which

penitus ignoratum, cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum cognitum. Sed tunc solum id quod

is done out of ignorance called involuntary—as it were opposed to the will—when on becoming known,

ex

dicitur

sorrow and repentance (which is sorrow over one’s

involuntarium, quasi voluntati contrarium, quando postquam cognoscitur inducit

past actions) follow. A thing is sorrowful because it is opposed to the will, as is stated in the fifth book of

tristitiam et poenitudinem, quae est tristitia de his quae quis fecit; ex hoc enim aliquid est

the Metaphysics (Ch. 5, 1015 a 26 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 6, 829-830).

ignorantia

causatur,

contristans quod est voluntati contrarium, ut dicitur in V metaphysicae. Ille enim qui propter ignorantiam operatur aliquid, et non tristatur de hoc quod operatus

408. One who does something on account of ignorance and is not sorry about what he did after he

est illud postquam cognoscit, puta si accipiat

knows it, for instance, if he takes silver thinking he

argentum aestimans se accipere stamnum, non potest dici quod volens acceperit

took tin, cannot be said to have voluntarily (willingly) taken silver since he did not know that it was silver.

argentum, cum non cognoverit illud esse argentum; neque potest dici quod nolens,

It cannot be said that he involuntarily (unwillingly), i.e., against his will, took silver since he is not sorry

idest contra suam voluntatem acceperit

that he did take silver by reason of ignorance. He

argentum, cum non tristetur de eo quod propter ignorantiam argentum accepit. Ille

seems to have acted involuntarily who has sorrow or repents for the fact that he took silver by reason of

enim videtur esse nolens, qui habet tristitiam et poenitudinem de eo quod propter

ignorance, just as if someone had, on the contrary, taken in thinking he has taken silver. But because he

ignorantiam fecit. Sicut si aliquis accepisset e

who does not repent is different from the man who

converso stamnum putans accipere argentum. Sed quia ille qui non paenitet alter

does repent (he is said to be unwilling) let the first be called non-willing. Since he really differs from the one

est ab illo qui paenitet qui dicitur nolens, vocetur ille non volens. Quia enim differt a

who is unwilling, it is better that he have a proper and separate name.

nolente secundum rem, melius est quod habeat nomen proprium et distinctum.

Secundam differentiam ponit ibi alterum

409. He sets down the second difference at “There

autem videtur et cetera. Quae quidem

seems to be” [i, y]. This is taken according to the

accipitur secundum differentiam respectus eius quod fit ad ignorantiam, quae

difference of what is done in ignorance; for ignorance sometimes is the cause of an action, but sometimes

quandoque est causa eius, quandoque vero procedit ex alia causa. Dicit ergo, quod

the act proceeds from another cause. He says that a person acting on account of ignorance seems to be

alterum videtur esse quod aliquis operetur

different from a person acting in ignorance.

propter ignorantiam ab eo quod aliquis operetur ignorans. Quandoque enim aliquis

Sometimes one acts in ignorance but not on account of ignorance. A drunken or angry person does not

operatur ignorans, sed non propter ignorantiam. Sicut ebrius vel iratus, non

act on account of ignorance but on account of drunkenness or anger. Neither of these, however,

operatur propter ignorantiam, sed propter

acts knowingly because ignorance is caused at the

ebrietatem vel iram. Et tamen neuter eorum operatur sciens, sed ignorans, quia ex

same time as the action by drunkenness and anger. Thus ignorance is concomitant with the action and is

ebrietate et ira causatur ignorantia, simul cum tali operatione: et ita ignorantia se

not its cause.

habet ut concomitans operationem, et non sicut causa eius. Ex hoc autem concludit quod, sicut iratus operatur ignorans, non autem propter

410. From this he concludes that as an angry person acts in ignorance and not on account of ignorance

ignorantiam, sed propter iram: ita omnis

but on account of anger, so every wicked person acts

malus operatur non quidem propter ignorantiam, sed ignorans in particulari quae

not indeed on account of ignorance but partly in ignorance of the good he ought to do and of the evil

bona oporteat facere et a quibus malis oporteat fugere, inquantum scilicet aestimat

he ought to avoid, inasmuch as he thinks that at this moment he should do this evil and refrain from this

hoc malum sibi nunc esse faciendum, et ab hoc bono sibi nunc esse cessandum. Et

good. For this reason he sins because he does what he ought not to do. Men who act in ignorance

propter hoc peccatum, quia scilicet operantur

universally become unjust with respect to others and

quae non oportet. Ignorantes autem universaliter fiunt iniusti quoad alios, et mali

wicked with respect to themselves. From this it is evident that when someone acts in ignorance, and

quoad seipsos. Ex quo patet, quod ex hoc quod aliquis operatur ignorans, et non

not on account of ignorance, he does not cause an involuntary. The reason is that no one, by reason of

propter

what he does involuntarily, is unjust or wicked.

ignorantiam,

non

causatur

involuntarium. Quia nullus propter id quod involuntarius facit, est iniustus vel malus. Tertiam differentiam ponit ibi involuntarium autem vult dici et cetera. Quae quidem

411. He assigns the third difference at “When we speak” [i, z]. This is taken from the object of the

sumitur ex parte eius quod ignoratur. Ubi considerandum est quod duorum potest esse

person’s ignorance. Here we must consider that ignorance can be of two kinds. According to one, a

ignorantia. Uno modo secundum quod aliquis

person is ignorant of what he ought to do or avoid.

ignorat quid oporteat facere vel vitare. Et hanc ignorantiam dicit esse eius quod

He says this is ignorance of what is fitting—of what he ought to be doing. This ignorance does not cause

confert, idest quod operari oportet. Talis autem ignorantia non causat involuntarium,

an involuntary because ignorance of this kind cannot happen to a man with the use of reason except from

quia ignorantia huiusmodi non potest homini

negligence. The reason is that everyone is bound to

habenti usum rationis provenire nisi ex

be solicitous about knowing what he is obliged to do

negligentia. Quia quilibet tenetur adhibere sollicitudinem ad sciendum quid oporteat

and to avoid. Hence if a man does not wish to avoid (as he is bound) ignorance that is considered

eum facere vel vitare: unde si ipsa ignorantia

voluntary, it follows that what is done through this

reputatur voluntaria, dum homo eam non vult vitare sicut tenetur, consequens est

ignorance should not be judged involuntary. This is the meaning of the saying that one does not wish an

quod nec id quod per huiusmodi ignorantiam fit, involuntarium iudicetur. Et hoc est quod

involuntary (i.e., what is by nature an involuntary) if he is ignorant of what he does, that is, of what is

dicit, quod involuntarium vult, idest natum

suitable under the circumstances. Of this someone

est dici, non si quis ignorat quod confert, idest quod est expediens ad operandum. Hoc

can be ignorant in two ways:

autem potest aliquis ignorare dupliciter. Uno modo in aliquo particulari eligibili; puta

412. One is in a particular choice. For instance,

cum aliquis propter concupiscentiam aestimat sibi nunc esse fornicandum. Alio

because of sensual desire a person thinks he should commit fornication at this time. The other way is in

modo in universali, ut patet in erroneo qui opinatur omnem fornicationem esse licitam.

general, as is evident in one who is of the opinion that fornication is always lawful. Both kinds of ignorance

Utraque autem ignorantia est eius quod

concern what is done. Hence neither causes an

confert. Unde neutra involuntarium causat. Et hoc est quod subdit quod illa ignorantia

involuntary. This is what is meant by saying that that ignorance accompanying choice (by which a

quae est in electione, per quam scilicet aliquis aestimat hoc malum sibi nunc esse

person thinks he should do this evil at this time) is not the cause of an involuntary but is rather the

faciendum, non est causa involuntarii, sed

cause of vice or sin. Neither is the ignorance that is

magis est causa malitiae, idest peccati. Neque etiam ignorantia quae est in universali est

of a general nature the cause of an involuntary since a person is blamed on account of ignorance of this

causa involuntarii, quia propter huiusmodi ignorantiam aliquis vituperatur. Non autem

kind. But no one is censured because of an involuntary, as was said previously (410).

vituperatur aliquis propter involuntarium, ut supra habitum est. Alia autem

est

ignorantia singularium

413. The other ignorance (the first is in 411) is of

conditionum, puta quod ista mulier sit uxor, vel quod iste vir sit pater, vel quod iste locus

singular conditions, for instance, that this woman is married, that this man is a parent, that this place is

sit sacer. Et ista sunt circa quae et in quibus est operatio humana, per quorum iustam

holy. It is about these conditions and on them that human activity is exercised; by reason of a justifiable

ignorantiam aliquis meretur misericordiam et veniam, eo quod ille qui ignorat aliquid

ignorance of such conditions that a person deserves mercy and pardon because he who is ignorant of one

horum, operatur involuntarie. Unde patet,

of these conditions acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is

quod ignorantia talium singularium circumstantiarum, causat involuntarium,

obvious that ignorance of particular circumstances of this kind—not however ignorance of what one should

non autem ignorantia eius quod confert.

do—is the cause of an involuntary.

Deinde cum dicit: forsitan igitur non malum

414. Then [ii], at “Perhaps it is not,” he explains

etc., manifestat quod dixerat: scilicet quae sunt istae circumstantiae, quarum

what he had referred to: those circumstances the ignorance of which is a cause of an involuntary. In

ignorantia causat involuntarium. Et circa

regard to this he does three things. First [ii, x] he

hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quae sint istae

points out what these circumstances are. Next [ii, y],

circumstantiae; secundo qualiter ignorentur,

at “No one but etc.,” he shows in what way

ibi, omnia quidem igitur, et cetera. Tertio, qualiter earum ignorantia involuntarium

ignorance of them may be present. Last [ii, z], at “Since ignorance can be etc.,” he explains how

causet, ibi: circa omnia utique haec et cetera.

ignorance of these circumstances is the cause of an

Circa primum considerandum est, quod circumstantiae nihil aliud sunt, quam

involuntary. On the first point we must consider that circumstances are nothing else but certain particular

quaedam singulares conditiones humani actus: quae quidem possunt accipi, vel ex

conditions of a human act. These can be taken either on the part of the causes of the act or on the part of

parte causarum actus, vel ex parte ipsius

the act itself. The cause of the act is efficient or final.

actus. Causa autem actus est efficiens, vel finis. Efficiens autem est vel agens principale

The efficient cause is either the principal or the instrumental agent. On the part of the act three

vel instrumentale; ex parte autem actus, tria accipi possunt: scilicet ipsum genus actus,

things can be understood: the genus of the act, the matter or the object itself, and the mode of acting. In

materia sive obiectum ipsius et modum

agreement with this the Philosopher here places six

agendi; et secundum hoc philosophus ponit hic sex circumstantias et dicit, quod non est

circumstances. He says that it is not out of placeindeed it is very appropriate-to determine what and

malum, immo oportunum, determinare quae et quot sint ista singularia, quorum

how many are these particular circumstances, the ignorance of which is the cause of an involuntary. He

ignorantia, involuntarium facit. Et utitur

uses an adverb (forsitan) indicating doubt, as in

adverbio dubitandi, sicut et in multis aliis locis in hoc libro propter incertitudinem

many other places of this book because of the uncertainty in moral matters.

moralis materiae.

Enumerans ergo haec singularia, dicit, quis, quod pertinet ad personam principalis

415. Enumerating then these particular things he names “who,” which refers to the person of the

agentis. Et quid scilicet agat, quod pertinet ad genus actus. Et circa quid, quod pertinet ad materiam vel obiectum. Apponit autem et

principal agent; “what is done,” which refers to the genus of the act; and “concerning what,” which refers to the matter or the object. But he adds also

circa hoc, id quod pertinet ad mensuram actus aut agentis, id est locum vel tempus, cum dicit, vel in quo operatur. Quia omnes

“concerning this”—which refers to the measure of the act—as belonging to the agent, i.e., place or time, since he says “or in what he operates.” The reason is

res exteriores videntur similem habitudinem habere ad actum humanum. Tullius autem hoc quod dicitur circa quid, comprehendit sub hoc quod dicitur quid. Quod autem dicitur in

that all external things seem to have relation to the human act. Cicero includes what we call “concerning what” under “what.” What is here called “in what” he divides into two circumstances: time and place.

quo, dividit in duas circumstantias, scilicet in quando et ubi. Quantum autem ad agens instrumentale subdit. Quandoque autem et quo, puta

416. So far as concerns the instrumental agent Aristotle adds: sometimes also “by what” (quo), for

instrumento. Non enim omnis actio fit per instrumentum, puta intelligere et velle. Loco autem huius ponitur a quibusdam, quibus

instance an instrument, since not every action is performed through an instrument, for example, understanding and willing. In place of this some put

auxiliis. Nam ille cui praebetur auxilium, utitur auxiliis sicut instrumento. Quantum autem ad finem dicit: et cuius gratia, puta

“by what means” (helps), for one to whom help is given uses help as an instrument. Referring to the end he says “for the sake of which,” for instance, a

cum

doctor cuts for the sake of health. Referring to the

medicus

vulnerat

causa

salutis.

Quantum autem ad modum agendi, dicit et qualiter, puta quiete, id est leviter, vel

mode of acting he says “and in what manner,” for example, quietly, or violently, that is, strongly.

vehementer, id est fortiter. Deinde cum dicit: omnia quidem igitur etc., ostendit qualiter praedictae circumstantiae ignorentur. Et dicit, quod nullus est, qui

417. Next [ii, y], at “No one but,” he shows in what way there may be ignorance about the preceding circumstances. He says that only a totally insane

omnes praedictas circumstantias ignoret, nisi sit totaliter insanus. Et inter ceteras circumstantias, manifestum est, quod non

person is ignorant of all these circumstances. Among the other circumstances it is obvious that a man cannot be ignorant of what is meant by the one

potest ignorare quis sit operans, quia sic ignoraret se ipsum, quod est impossibile. Potest autem ignorare id quod quis operatur,

acting, because in this case he would be ignorant about himself (which is impossible). But someone can be ignorant of what he does, as those who disclose

sicut illi qui dicunt aliqua quae non erant dicenda, dicunt excusando seipsos quod excidit a memoria eorum, vel quod nunquam sciverunt quod talia erant ineffabilia, idest

things that should not be disclosed say in excusing themselves that it slipped their mind or they never knew that such things were secret, i.e., were not to be spoken. Thus were revealed the sacred mysteries

quod talia non erant dicenda, sicut revelata sunt mystica, id est secreta, Hayscili, id est cuiusdam poetae; ille ergo qui talia loquitur

or secrets by Aeschylus, a certain poet. He who speaks such things is ignorant of what he does because he does not know this is a revelation of

ignorat quid facit, quia nescit hoc esse revelationem secretorum.

secrets.

Et ponit aliud exemplum quantum ad facta: sicut sagittator qui vult monstrare discipulo suo qualiter sit sagittandum, et mittit

418. He gives another example so far as concerns what is done, for instance, an archer wishing to teach a pupil how archery is practised shoots an

aliquid, scilicet telum; talis etiam nescit quid facit, quia nescit se dimittere telum. Deinde ponit exemplum de ignorantia eius quod est

arrow into something. Such a one does not know what he does because he does not know he is shooting an arrow. Then he exemplifies ignorance

circa quid: sicut si aliquis filium suum credat esse hostem qui impugnet domum eius et interficiat eum. Sicut quaedam mulier dicta Meropes interfecit filium suum; et sic patet

“concerning what” (circa quid), thus if a man should mistake his son for an enemy besieging his home, and kill him, just as a certain woman named Merope killed her son. So it is obvious that in a case of this kind a

quod in tali facto scit homo quid facit, quia scit se interficere, sed nescit circa quid, quia nescit se interficere filium.

man knows what he does because he knows he kills, but he does not know the “concerning what” of his act because he does not know he kills his son.

Postea

ignorantia

419. Then he gives an example of ignorance of the

instrumenti; sicut si aliquis in hastiludio utatur hasta lanceata, quam putat esse rotundatam, scilicet per amotionem ferri; vel

instrument, thus if a lancer should use a piked lance that he thought was blunted or if a thrower of rocks thinks what he throws are pumice stones.

ponit

exemplum

de

si quis aestimet lapidem quo utitur esse pumicem. Ulterius autem ponit exemplum de ignorantia finis. Et dicit quod si aliquis

420. Farther on he gives an example of ignorance of the end. He says that a doctor or a blood-letter

medicus vel minutor percutiens hominem

lancing a patient to make him better, or a teacher

propter salutem corporalem, vel magister propter salutem spiritualem, occidat, iste

striking a pupil to correct him, may take a life. These have ignorance of the end, not indeed of what they

habet ignorantiam finis; non quidem eius quem intendebat, sed eius qui ex opere consequitur. Ignorabat enim quod opus eius

intended but of what followed from their action. They were ignorant that their action would lead to such an end.

ad talem finem perveniret. Ultimo autem ponit exemplum de ignorantia modi actionis; puta cum aliquis aestimat se leviter ducere manum ad ostendendum alicui

421. Last, he illustrates ignorance of the manner of the action, for instance, a man thinks he is tapping with his fist to show how to hit like boxers do but he

qualiter sit percutiendum, sicut faciunt pugiles, et fortiter percutiat; talis enim ignoranter fortiter percutit.

strikes with force. Such a man strikes with force in ignorance or unknowingly.

Deinde cum dicit: circa omnia utique haec

422. At “Since ignorance can be” [ii, z], he shows

etc., ostendit quomodo praedictorum ignorantia involuntarium causat. Et primo dicit quod, cum ignorantia possit esse circa

how ignorance of the previously named things is a cause of the voluntary. First [aa] he says that since ignorance can be concerned with any one of the five

quodlibet praedictorum quinque quae concurrunt ad operationem, ille videtur nolens sive involuntarius operari qui ignorat aliquod praedictorum. Non autem aequaliter

afore-mentioned that concur with the action, that man seems to act unwillingly or involuntarily who is ignorant of one of the preceding. This does not apply in equal measure to all but it does apply especially if

quantum ad omnia; sed praecipue si sit ignorantia in principalissimis circumstantiis.

the ignorance circumstances.

Secundo ibi: principalissima autem etc., manifestat quae sunt principalissimae

423. Next [bb], at “These seem to be,” he shows what he considers the most important

circumstantiae. Et dicit quod principalissimae circumstantiae esse videntur in quibus est operatio, idest obiectum sive

circumstances. He says that the principal circumstances seem to be those on which the act takes place, i.e., the object or the matter of the act,

materia actus. Et cuius gratia, idest finis. Quia actus specificantur secundum obiecta. Sicut autem materia est obiectum exterioris

and that “for the sake of which” or the end, because acts are specified by their objects. just as the matter is the object of the external act so the end is the

actus, ita finis est obiectum interioris actus voluntatis.

object of the internal act of the will.

Tertio ibi: secundum talem utique ignorantiam etc., ostendit quod ignorantia

424. Last [cc], at “For an action,” he says that ignorance of these very things is not enough for an

horum non sufficit ad involuntarium. Et dicit quod cum involuntarium dicatur secundum praedictorum ignorantiam, adhuc requiritur ad involuntarium quod operatio sit cum

involuntary. He states that although an action may be called involuntary according to the preceding ignorance, a further requirement is that the action be connected with sadness and repentance, as was

tristitia et poenitudine, ut supra dictum est.

pointed out before (408).

LECTURE 4 Definition of the Voluntary

concerns

the

most

important

Chapter 1 I. HE SHOWS WHAT THE VOLUNTARY IS. — 425 ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι

Since the involuntary comes about on account of force and ignorance, the voluntary seems to originate within the agent who has knowledge of the

τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις.

circumstances of the action.

II. HE DISMISSES AN ERRONEOUS VIEW OF IT. A. First he explains (the error). — 426 ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ

Perhaps it is not accurate to call involuntary the things that are done on account of anger or sensual

ἐπιθυμίαν.

desire.

B. Second he rejects this opinion for five reasons. a. The first. — 427 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἑκουσίως πράξει,

(1) The main reason is that neither animals nor children would then act voluntarily.

οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· b. The second. — 428 εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως

(2) Are none of the things done by reason of sensual desire or anger done voluntarily? Are the noble actions done voluntarily but the evil involuntarily?

τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ

The latter views seems ridiculous since there is one cause of all our actions. Likewise it seems unreasonable to call involuntary the things we ought

ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπί τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως.

to seek. We ought to be angry under certain circumstances, and we ought to desire certain things, for example, health and learning.

c. The third reason. — 429 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα.

(3) Involuntary things seemingly are accompanied by sadness. But what is done in agreement with sensual desire seems to be done with pleasure.

d. The fourth reason. — 430 ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια

(4) Further what difference is there from the

εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν

viewpoint of involuntariness between sins committed

ἁμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω,

after reflection and sins committed on account b of anger? It is our duty to avoid both.

e. The fifth reason. — 431 δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αἱ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἄτοπον δὴ

(5) The irrational passions seem to be truly human. So too then are the actions of man proceeding from anger and sensual desire. It is unreasonable, therefore, to regard these as involuntary.

τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Existente autem involuntario et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de involuntario, hic determinat de voluntario. Et

425. After the Philosopher has considered the involuntary, he next turns his attention to the voluntary. First [I] he shows what the voluntary

primo ostendit quid sit voluntarium. Secundo excludit circa hoc quemdam errorem, ibi, forsitan enim non bene dicitur et cetera. Circa

is. Then [II], at “Perhaps it is not accurate etc.,” he dismisses an erroneous view of it. On the first point we must consider that although the term

primum considerandum est quod, quamvis involuntarium videatur dici secundum remotionem voluntarii, tamen, si ad causas respiciamus, voluntarium dicitur aliquid per

involuntary seems to indicate the removal of the voluntary, nevertheless the causes lead us to understand that a thing is called voluntary by reason of the removal of the things causing an

remotionem eorum quae causant involuntarium, scilicet violentiae et ignorantiae; et quia unumquodque cognoscitur per suam

involuntary, such as violence and ignorance. Because every single thing is known through its cause, he gives the definition of the voluntary by

causam, ideo definitionem voluntarii tradit removendo causas involuntarii. Et dicit quod, cum involuntarium sit quod fit propter vim

taking away the cause of the involuntary. He says that since the involuntary comes about through physical compulsion and ignorance, as has been

illatam et propter ignorantiam, ut supra dictum est, voluntarium videtur esse cuius principium est in ipso operante. Et sic excluditur violentia; ita tamen quod ipse operans sciat singulares

determined previously (386), the voluntary seems to be: that which the agent himself originates (thus violence is excluded) in such a way that the agent knows the individual circumstances that

circumstantias quae concurrunt ad operationem. Et per hoc excluditur ignorantia quae causat involuntarium.

concur with the action. Thus ignorance as the cause of the involuntary is excluded.

Deinde cum dicit forsitan enim etc., excludit

426. Then [II], at “Perhaps it is,” he rejects an

quemdam errorem. Et primo ponit ipsum. Quidam enim putabant quod non omne illud cuius principium est intra, etiam cum scientia

error. First [A] he explains it. Certain people were of the opinion that not everything, which the agent originates through a knowledge of circumstances,

circumstantiarum, est voluntarium; potest enim contingere quod illud principium quod est intra non sit appetitus rationalis qui dicitur

is a voluntary. It can happen that that principle which is from within is not the rational appetitive faculty called the will (voluntas), whence the

voluntas a qua denominatur voluntarium, sed aliqua passio appetitus sensitivi, puta ira vel concupiscentia vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi; quod

voluntary receives its name, but a passion of the sensitive appetitive faculty, for instance, anger, sensual desire, or something else of this kind. This,

philosophus dicit non esse bene dictum. Et est notandum quod, quia passiones appetitus

the Philosopher says, is not an accurate statement. It should be noted that because the passions of the

sensitivi excitantur a rebus exterioribus apprehensis per sensum, hic error eiusdem rationis esse videtur cum eo quem supra

sensitive appetitive faculty are aroused by external things grasped by means of an external sense, this error seems to be of the same nature as the one he

removit, secundum quem dicebatur quod res exteriores inferunt violentiam. Sed illud fuit ibi dicendum ubi agebatur de violento cuius principium est extra. Hoc autem est hic

discarded previously (400-405), according to which it was indicated that external things bring about violence. It was imperative to state that in that context it was a question of violence, whose

agendum ubi agitur de voluntario cuius principium est intra; nam passiones intra nos sunt.

origin is external. But this must be treated here where it is a question of the voluntary, the principle of which is intrinsic, for the passions are within us.

Secundo ibi: primum quidem enim etc., improbat praedictam opinionem quinque

427. Second [B], at “The main reason is,” he rejects this opinion for five reasons. Here is his

rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Quaecumque operantur bruta animalia et etiam pueri, operantur secundum passionem

primary reason [a]. Whatever irrational animals and children do, they do in conformity with the affections of the sensitive faculty, and not in

appetitus sensitivi: non autem secundum appetitum intellectivum, quia carent usu rationis. Si ergo quae per iram et concupiscentiam et alias passiones appetitus

conformity with the rational faculty because they lack the use of reason. If then the things that are done through anger, sensual desire, and the other affections of the sensitive faculty were involuntary

sensitivi fiunt, essent involuntaria, sequeretur quod neque bruta animalia neque pueri voluntarie operarentur. Dicuntur autem

it would follow that neither animals nor children would act voluntarily. But agents are said to act voluntarily, not because they operate under the

voluntarie operari, non quia operentur ex voluntate, sed quia proprio motu sponte agunt, ita quod a nullo exteriori moventur. Hoc enim

impulse of the will, but because they operate of their own accord by their proper movement in such a way that they are not moved by any external

dicimus esse voluntarium quod quis sponte et proprio motu operatur. Ea ergo quae propter iram vel concupiscentiam fiunt, sunt voluntaria.

thing. It follows then that things done by reason of anger or sensual desire are voluntary.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi deinde utrum nihil et cetera. Quae talis est. Si ea quae fiunt propter iram vel concupiscentiam non sunt voluntaria: aut hoc est universaliter verum aut

428. He gives the second reason at “Are none” [b]. If the things that are done because of anger or sensual desire are not voluntary, either this is universally true or it is true of evil actions, not of

hoc est verum in malis, non autem in bonis, ut scilicet bona, quae quis facit ex passione voluntarie faciat, mala autem non voluntarie.

good actions, so that the good actions that a person does by reason of passion he does voluntarily but the evil actions involuntarily. The

Quod forte ideo dicebant quia bona concordant rationi, cui mala contrariantur. Voluntas autem in ratione est. Sed hoc secundum videtur

proponents of this view were probably influenced by the fact that good actions conform to and evil actions are opposed to reason. But this second

esse ridiculosum: cum sit una causa omnium quae homo facit, sive sint bona sive mala: scilicet voluntas. Non enim quantumcumque ira vel concupiscentia increscat, homo prorumpit

supposition seems unacceptable since the one cause of all human actions, both good and bad, is the will. A man does not rush to do whatsoever is rendered desirable by anger or sensual desire without the

ad agendum nisi adveniat consensus rationabilis appetitus. Similiter etiam

consent of the rational appetitive faculty. Likewise, the first supposition seems unreasonable, namely,

inconveniens videtur primum, scilicet quod aliquis dicat non voluntaria bona, quae oportet appetere etiam secundum passionem. Nam ad

that someone should call not-voluntary the good things that he ought to seek even according to passion, for the reason by means of the will incites

ea quae oportet appetere ratio per voluntatem inducit. Oportet autem in quibusdam irasci, puta ad coercendum peccata. Et similiter oportet concupiscere quaedam, puta sanitatem

to the things we ought to seek. We ought to be angry under certain conditions, for instance, to curb sin. Likewise we ought to desire certain things, for example, health and learning. It

vel disciplinam. Relinquitur ergo falsum esse, quod ea quae propter passionem fiunt, non sint voluntaria.

remains false then to hold that the things done on account of passion are not voluntary.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi videntur autem involuntaria et cetera. Quae talis est. Involuntaria sunt cum tristitia. Sed illa quae

429. He assigns the third reason at “Involuntary things” [c]. It is this. Actions resulting from violence are accompanied by sadness, but those

fiunt secundum concupiscentiam, fiunt cum delectatione. Non ergo sunt involuntaria.

which are done in agreement with sensual desire are done with pleasure. Consequently they are not involuntary.

Quartam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem quid

430. The fourth reason given at “Further, what”

differunt et cetera. Quae talis est. Sicut supra habitum est, peccata quae sunt voluntaria sunt vituperabilia et fugienda. Quod non potest dici

[d], is this. As has been pointed out before (383, 393), voluntary faults are to be censured and avoided. This cannot be said of the involuntary

de involuntariis; quia neque potest ea homo fugere neque propter ea vituperatur. Sed sicut peccata quae fiunt secundum cogitationem, idest per deliberationem, sunt fugienda et

because a man is neither able to avoid these nor is he censured on account of them. But as sins that are committed after reflection, that is, with deliberation, are to be avoided and are

vituperabilia, ita etiam peccata quae fiunt propter iram, vel aliam passionem. Potest enim homo per voluntatem passioni resistere. Unde

blameworthy so also sins that are committed on account of anger or another passion. A man can, by means of his will, resist passion. Hence if he

si propter passionem aliquid turpe operetur, vituperatur. Non ergo differunt ea quae fiunt ex passione ab his quae fiunt ex deliberatione

does a disgraceful act because of passion he is blamed. Therefore, they do not differ from things done by deliberation so far as they are voluntary.

quantum ad hoc quod sint voluntaria. Quintam rationem ponit ibi videntur autem et cetera. Quae talis est. Passiones irrationabiles,

431. He assigns the fifth reason at “The irrational passions” [e]. Irrational passions, i.e., of the

id est appetitus sensitivi, videntur esse humanae, inquantum scilicet appetitus sensitivus potest obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et operationes quae sunt ab

sensitive appetitive faculty, seem to be human insofar as the sensitive appetitive faculty can obey reason, as was stated before (272). Therefore, the actions proceeding from anger, sensual desire, and

ira et concupiscentia et aliis passionibus, sunt humanae. Sed nulla operatio involuntaria est humana. Non enim attribuuntur homini quae

the other passions are human. But no involuntary operation is human, for neither praise nor blame are imputed to a man who acts involuntarily.

operatur involuntarius, neque ad laudem, neque ad vituperium. Inconveniens ergo est dicere

Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that things done out of passion are involuntary.

quod ea quae involuntaria.

fiunt

ex

passione

sint

LECTURE 5 Choice Chapter 2 I. HE GIVES AN EXPLANATION OF CHOICE ITSELF. A. He shows that it belongs, to our present study to consider choice. — 432-433 διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἕπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ

After the treatise on the voluntary and the involuntary, we naturally proceed to a consideration of choice. Such a study is especially proper to virtue, for moral practices are judged by

ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων.

choice rather than by actions.

B. He investigates the nature of choice. A’ He investigates its genus. — 434-436 ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ

Choice certainly is something voluntary, but choice and voluntary are not identical, for the voluntary is

πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ τὰ

more extensive in range. Children and all the brutes participate in voluntariety but not in choice. Then too the things done on the spur of the

ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὔ.

moment are called voluntary but they are not said to be done by choice.

B’ (He investigates) its different aspects. 1. HE EXPLAINS HIS INTENT. — 437 οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ

Those who say that choice is sensual desire, or

θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοίκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

anger, or wish, or opinion of some sort do not speak accurately.

2. HE PROVES IT. a. He shows first that choice is not sensual desire. i. He gives four reasons. The first. — 438 οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν

Choice does not belong to the brutes while sensual

ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός.

desire and anger are common both to men and

brutes. ii. Second reason. — 439 καὶ

ὁ

ἀκρατὴς

ἐπιθυμῶν

μὲν

The incontinent man acts in conformity with

πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ.

sensual desire but not in conformity with choice. But the continent man on the contrary acts from choice and not from sensual desire.

iii. Third reason. — 440 καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ.

Sensual desire is opposed to choice, but one desire is not contrary to an other.

iv. Fourth reason. — 441 καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος.

Sensual desire is accompanied by pleasure or sorrow, but choice is not necessarily associated with sorrow or pleasure.

b. (He shows) that... (choice) is not anger. — 442 θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ

There is less argument in favor of choice being

διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

anger, for the things done on account of anger do not seem to be done by choice.

c. (He shows) that... (choice) is not wishing. i. First he sets forth his proposition. — 443 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ

Choice is not identical with wishing although it is

σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον·

closely connected with it.

ii. Then he proves it. x.

BY THREE REASONS, OF WHICH THE FIRST IS THIS.

— 444 προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη

Choice is not concerned with impossibles, and if a person should say that he does choose the

προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας.

impossible, he will appear foolish. Wishing on the other hand can be directed to the impossible, for instance, to live forever.

y. SECOND REASON. — 445

καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ

Wishing can be concerned with things not done by oneself, for instance, that a man pretending to be an athlete may win, or even that a man who is really an athlete may win. No one, however,

τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὑτοῦ.

chooses these things but only those that he thinks he can do himself.

z. THIRD REASON. — 446 ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους

Moreover, wishing is directed rather to the end,

ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν

and choice to the means. Thus we wish health but we choose the remedies that restore us to health. Likewise, we wish to be happy and we do say this. Yet it is not suitable to say that we elect or choose

βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει·

to be happy.

iii. He deduces the origin of the difference between choice and wishing. — 447 ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι.

In general, choice seems to be directed to the things which are within our power.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Determinatis autem voluntario et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

432. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary and the involuntary, he here makes a

voluntario et involuntario, hic determinat de electione. Et primo determinat de ipsa electione. Secundo de consilio quod in definitione electionis

study of choice. First he gives an explanation of choice itself [I], and then [Lect. 7, II] of counsel (which is placed in the definition of choice) at

ponitur, ibi, consiliantur autem utrum de omnibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod ad praesentem doctrinam

“Should men take counsel about all things etc.” (B. 1112 a 19). Regarding the initial point he does two things. First [A] he shows that it

pertinet considerare de electione. Secundo inquirit quid sit electio, ibi: electio utique voluntarium et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam determinatum est de voluntario et

belongs to our present study to consider choice. Next [B], at “Choice certainly is something,” he investigates the nature of choice. He says first that, after the treatise (382-431) on the

involuntario, consequens est quod pertranseunter de electione determinetur, quia videlicet breviter proponit ea quae sunt

voluntary and the involuntary, he will undertake a passing consideration of choice. Here then he proposes briefly the things necessary to study

necessaria ad considerandum de electione. Quod autem ad hanc doctrinam pertineat de electione determinare, probat per hoc quod electio maxime

choice. He proves here that it belongs to our science to consider choice because choice seems especially proper to virtue, which is our principal

videtur esse propria virtuti, de qua ad praesens principaliter intenditur.

concern at present.

Et huius ratio manifestatur ex hoc quod cum ex habitu virtutis procedat et interior electio et exterior operatio, mores virtuosi vel etiam vitiosi

433. Its appropriateness is clearly shown by the fact that although both inner choice and outward action flow from the habit of virtue, virtuous or

magis diiudicantur ex electione quam ex operationibus exterioribus; omnis enim virtuosus eligit bonum; sed quandoque non

vicious practices are judged rather by choice than by outward works. Every virtuous man chooses good but sometimes he does not do it because of

operatur propter aliquod exterius impedimentum. Et vitiosus quandoque operatur opus virtutis, non tamen ex electione virtuosa,

some external hindrances. On the other hand the vicious man sometimes performs a virtuous deed not out of virtuous choice but out of fear or for

sed ex timore, vel propter aliquem inconvenientem finem, puta propter inanem gloriam, vel propter aliquid aliud huiusmodi: unde patet quod ad praesentem intentionem

some unbecoming motive, for instance, vainglory or something else of this kind. Hence it obviously pertains to our present purpose to consider choice.

pertinet considerare de electione. Deinde cum dicit: electio utique etc., ostendit quid sit electio. Et primo inquirit genus eius. Secundo differentias ipsius, ibi, dicentes autem

434. Then [B], at “Choice certainly” he shows what choice is. First [A’] he investigates its genus, and next [B’] its different aspects, at

ipsam et cetera. Tertio concludit definitionem eius, ibi: quid igitur vel quale quid et cetera. Genus autem electionis est voluntarium, quia

“Those who say that choice etc.” Last [Lect. 6, C’], at “What, then, is its genus etc.” (B. 1112 a 13), he concludes the definition. The voluntary is

praedicatur universaliter de electione et est in plus. Unde dicit primo quod omnis electio est quiddam voluntarium, non autem omnino sunt

the genus of choice because it is universally predicated of choice and of other things besides. Hence first he says that every choice is voluntary,

idem electio et voluntarium, sed voluntarium est in plus. Quod probat duplici ratione.

but choice and the voluntary are not identical, for the voluntary is more extensive. He proves this in twofold fashion:

Quarum primam ponit ibi, voluntario quidem

435. The first proof he gives by the words “...

enim et cetera. Quae talis est. Pueri et alia animalia communicant ipso voluntario, inquantum scilicet proprio motu aliquid sponte operantur, ut supra dictum est. Non autem

participate in voluntariety etc.” It is this. Children and the various brutes participate in voluntariety inasmuch as of their own accord they do things by their own movement, as has been noted above

communicant electione, quia non operantur ex deliberatione, quod requiritur ad electionem: ergo voluntarium est in plus quam electio.

(427). But they do not communicate in choice because they do not act with deliberation, which is required for choice. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et repentina et cetera. Quae talis est. Ea quae repente facimus, dicimus esse voluntaria, quia scilicet principium

436. He assigns a second reason by the words “Then too the things done on the spur of the moment etc.” It is this. The things we do on the

eorum in nobis est; non autem dicuntur esse secundum electionem, quia scilicet non fiunt ex deliberatione. Ergo voluntarium est in plus

spur of the moment are called voluntary because their origin is within us. However, they are not said to be according to choice because they are

quam electio.

not done with deliberation. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.

Deinde cum dicit: dicentes autem ipsam etc., investigat differentias electionis, probando

437. Next [B’], at “Those who say,” he investigates the different aspects of choice,

scilicet eam differre ab his cum quibus videtur convenire. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, non enim commune, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo,

proving that choice differs from things with which it appears to agree. On this question he does two things. First [1] he explains his intent. Then [2], at “Choice does not belong etc.,” he

quod quidam dixerunt electionem esse concupiscentiam, quia scilicet utrumque importat motum appetitus in bonum. Quidam

proves it. He says first that some philosophers have held that choice is sensual desire because both imply a movement of the appetitive faculty

autem posuerunt electionem esse iram, forte propter hoc quod in utroque est quidam usus rationis. Iratus enim utitur ratione, inquantum

toward good. Others maintained that choice is anger, perhaps because in both there is a certain use of reason. The angry person uses reason

iudicat iniuriam illatam esse dignam vindicta. Quidam vero considerantes, quod electio est sine passione, attribuerunt electionem parti rationali, vel quantum ad appetitum, dicentes eam esse

inasmuch as he judges that an injury received deserves punishment. Still others who consider that choice is without passion ascribe choice to the rational part, either so far as concerns the

voluntatem, vel quantum ad apprehensionem, dicentes eam esse quamdam opinionem. Et simpliciter in his quatuor comprehenduntur

appetitive faculty (saying it is wishing) or so far as it concerns perception (saying it is opinion). In these four states all the principles of human

omnia principia humanorum actuum: quae sunt ratio ad quam pertinet opinio, appetitus rationalis, quae est voluntas: appetitus sensitivus, qui dividitur in irascibilem, ad quam

actions are included in a simple way: reason to which opinion belongs; the rational appetitive faculty that is the will; the sensitive appetitive faculty divided into irascible to which belong

pertinet ira, et concupiscibilem, ad quam pertinet concupiscentia. Dicit autem philosophus, quod non videntur recte dicere, qui dicunt electionem

anger, and concupiscible to which belong sensual desire. The Philosopher says, however, that those who hold that choice is one of these do not speak

esse aliquid horum.

accurately.

Deinde cum dicit: non enim commune etc., probat propositum. Et primo ostendit, quod electio non sit concupiscentia. Secundo quod non

438. At “Choice does not” [2], he proves his proposition. He shows first [a] that choice is not sensual desire; next [b], at “There is less

sit ira, ibi, ira autem, et cetera. Tertio, quod non sit voluntas, ibi, sed neque voluntas, et cetera. Quarto quod non sit opinio, ibi, neque iam opinio,

argument etc.,” that it is not anger; third [c], at “Choice is not identical etc.,” that it is not wishing; last [Lect. 6, d], that it is not opinion, at

et cetera. Circa primum ponit quatuor rationes. Quarum prima communis est concupiscentiae et irae, et est talis. Concupiscentia et ira communiter inveniuntur in hominibus, et in

“Choice is not opinion etc.” (B. 1111 b 31). Regarding the first he gives four reasons. The first of these [a, i], common to sensual desire and anger, is this. Sensual desire and anger are found

animalibus irrationabilibus. Sed in irrationabilibus non invenitur electio, ut dictum est. Ergo electio non est neque concupiscentia

both among men and brutes. But choice is not met with among the brutes as has been said (435). Therefore, choice is neither sensual desire

neque ira.

nor anger.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et incontinens et cetera. Quae talis est. Si electio esset

439. He gives the second reason at “The incontinent man” [a, ii]. It is this. If choice were

concupiscentia, quicumque operatur eligens, operaretur concupiscens, et e converso. Hoc autem est falsum. Quia incontinens operatur

sensual desire, whoever acts with choice would act with sensual desire. This, however, is false because the incontinent man acts in conformity

secundum concupiscentiam, non autem secundum electionem. Quia non immanet proprie

with sensual desire but not in conformity with choice, for he does not reasonably direct his

electioni propter concupiscentiam. Continens autem e converso operatur ex electione, non autem ex concupiscentia cui per electionem resistit, ut infra in septimo patebit. Ergo electio

choice because of his sensual desire. But the continent man on the contrary acts from choice and not from sensual desire, which he resists by choice, as will be made evident in the seventh book

non est idem concupiscentiae.

(1143)Therefore, choice is not the same as sensual desire.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: et electioni quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Concupiscentia

440. He assigns the third reason at “Sensual desire is opposed” [a, iii]. It is this. Sensual desire

contrariatur electioni, in eo scilicet qui est continens vel incontinens. Contrarium enim eligit uterque secundum rationem ei quod

is opposed to choice in one who is continent or incontinent. One chooses according to reason the opposite of that which the other desires according

concupiscit secundum appetitum sensitivum. In neutro autem concupiscentia contrariatur concupiscentiae; quia tota concupiscentia

to the sensitive appetitive faculty. But the sensual desire in the one is not opposed to the sensual desire in the other, because the whole sensual

utriusque ad idem tendit, scilicet ad delectabile sensus. Non est autem intelligendum, quod nulla concupiscentia contrarietur alteri concupiscentiae. Inveniuntur enim

desire of each one tends to the same thing, the pleasure of the senses. But this must not be understood in the sense that one desire may not be opposed to another. We do find desires of

concupiscentiae contrariorum: puta cum unus concupiscit moveri, et alius quiescere. Ergo patet quod electio non est idem concupiscentiae.

contraries, for instance, one man desires to move and another to remain in repose. Therefore it is evident that choice is not identical with sensual desire.

Quartam rationem ponit ibi et concupiscentia quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Concupiscentia semper est cum delectatione, scilicet propter

441. The fourth reason, given at “Sensual desire is accompanied” [a, iv], is this. Sensual desire is always accompanied by pleasure because of the

praesentiam rei concupitae, vel cum tristitia propter eius carentiam. Ad omnem enim passionem sequitur delectatio et tristitia ut in

presence of the thing desired, or by sorrow because of the absence of that thing. Every passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, as has

secundo habitum est. Sed electio non est ex necessitate cum delectatione vel tristitia. Potest enim esse absque omni passione, ex solo iudicio rationis. Ergo electio non est concupiscentia.

been pointed out in the second book (296). But choice is not necessarily associated with pleasure or sorrow, for it can occur without any passion by the judgment of reason alone. Therefore, choice is not sensual desire.

Deinde cum dicit: ira autem etc., ostendit quod electio non sit idem irae. Et dicit quod adhuc electio minus est ira quam concupiscentia. Quia etiam secundum apparentiam ea quae facta sunt

442. Then [b], at “There is less argument,” he shows that choice is not the same as anger. As to this, he says that there is less argument in favor of choice being anger than sensual desire. The

propter iram, non videntur esse facta secundum electionem, eo quod propter velocitatem motus irae ea quae fiunt ex ira maxime sunt repentina.

reason is that even according to appearances the things done from anger do not seem to be done by choice because, by reason of the swiftness of the

Quamvis enim in ira sit aliquis usus rationis, inquantum scilicet iratus incipit audire rationem

movement of wrath, the actions done through anger are very sudden. Although in anger there

iudicantem quod iniuria debet vindicari, non tamen perfecte audit eam determinantem modum et ordinem vindictae; unde ira maxime

is some use of reason, insofar as the angry person begins to attend to his reason as it judges that an injury ought to be avenged, nevertheless he does

excludit deliberationem, quae requiritur ad electionem. Concupiscentia autem non ita repente operatur. Unde ea quae fiunt secundum

not perfectly heed reason in determining the manner and the order of the vengeance. Hence anger especially excludes deliberation, which is

concupiscentiam, non videntur esse remota ab electione sicut ea quae fiunt per iram.

necessary for choice. But sensual desire does not act so suddenly. Hence things done in conformity with sensual desire do not seem to be remote from choice as the things done out of anger.

Deinde cum dicit sed neque voluntas etc., ostendit differentiam electionis ad voluntatem. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat

443. Next [c], at “Choice is not identical,” he explains the difference between choice and wish. First [c’ I] he sets forth his proposition. Then [c,

propositum, ibi, electio quidem enim, et cetera. Tertio concludit radicem differentiae voluntatis et electionis, ibi, universaliter autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod neque etiam electio est

ii], at “Choice is not concerned etc.,” he proves it. Last [c, iii], at “In general, choice,” he deduces the origin of the difference between choice and wishing. He says first that choice is not even

voluntas, quamvis videatur esse propinqua voluntati. Utrumque enim pertinet ad unam potentiam; scilicet ad appetitum rationalem, qui

wishing although it seems to be closely connected with wishing. Both belong to the one power, the rational appetitive faculty or the will. Wishing

voluntas dicitur. Sed voluntas nominat actum huius potentiae secundum quod fertur in bonum absolute. Electio autem nominat actum eiusdem

designates an act of this power related to good absolutely. But choice designates an act of the same power related to good according as it

potentiae relatum in bonum secundum quod pertinet ad nostram operationem, per quam in aliquod bonum ordinamur.

belongs to an act by which we are ordered to some good.

Deinde cum dicit: electio quidem enim etc., probat propositum tribus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Electio enim, quia refertur ad

444. At “Choice is not concerned” [c, ii], he proves the statement by three reasons, of which the first is this [x]. Because choice refers to our

nostram operationem, non dicitur esse impossibilium. Et si quis dicat se eligere aliquid impossibilium, videbitur esse stultus. Sed voluntas, quia respicit bonum absolute, potest

activity, it is said that choice is not concerned with impossible things. If a person should say that he chooses something impossible he will appear foolish. But wishing can be directed to any

esse cuiuscumque boni, licet sit impossibile, sicut potest aliquis velle esse immortalis, quod est impossibile secundum statum huius corruptibilis

good even the impossible because it regards good absolutely. Thus a man can wish to be immortal, an impossible thing according to the condition of

vitae. Ergo electio et voluntas non sunt idem.

this perishable life. Therefore, choice and wish are not the same.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi et voluntas quidem est et cetera. Quae talis est. Voluntas alicuius

445. He gives the second reason at “Wishing can be” [y]. The wishing of someone can be concerned

potest esse circa ea quae non fiunt per ipsum: sicut ille qui circumspicit duellum, potest velle quod vincat aliquis ypocrita, id est simulatam

with things not done by himself. Thus he who is a spectator at a duel can wish that a pretender playing an assumed role may win (for example, a

gerens personam, puta qui ingreditur campum

man who comes into the ring as a boxer when he

quasi pugil, cum non sit pugil, vel etiam quod vincat ille qui vere est athleta. Sed nullus eligit talia quae fiunt per alium, sed solum illa quae

is not a boxer) or even that one who is really an athlete may win. No one, however, chooses these things that are done by another but only those

existimat posse fieri per ipsum. Ergo electio differt a voluntate.

that he thinks he can do himself. Therefore, choice differs from wishing.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem voluntas et cetera. Et dicit quod voluntas magis

446. He assigns the third reason at “Moreover, wishing.” He says that wishing is directed rather

est finis quam eius quod est ad finem. Quia ea quae sunt ad finem volumus propter finem. Propter quod autem unumquodque, illud magis.

to the end than to the means because we wish the means on account of the end. But that for the sake of which something exists is itself greater.

Sed electio est solum eorum quae sunt ad finem, non autem ipsius finis. Quia finis praesupponitur, ut iam praedeterminatus. Ea

But choice concerns only the means and not the end itself because the end as already predetermined is presupposed. The means,

vero quae sunt ad finem, inquiruntur ut a nobis disponenda in finem. Sicut sanitatem, quae est finis medicationis, volumus principaliter. Sed eligimus medicinalia per quae sanemur. Et

however, are sought by us as things to be ordered to the end. Thus we wish health principally since it is the end of healing. But we choose the remedies by which we are restored to health.

similiter volumus esse felices, quod est ultimus finis, et hoc dicimus nos velle, sed non congruit dicere quod eligamus nos esse felices. Ergo

Likewise we wish to be happy—happiness is our ultimate end—and we say we wish this. Yet it is not suitable to say that we elect or choose to be

electio non est idem voluntati.

happy. Therefore, choice is not the same as wish.

Deinde cum dicit universaliter autem etc., ponit

447. Then [c, iii], at “In general, choice,” he gives

radicem totius differentiae, ad quam universaliter omnes praedictae differentiae referuntur. Et dicit, quod electio videtur esse

the root of the whole difference to which all the previous differences in general are referred. He says that choice seems to be directed to the things

circa ea quae sunt in potestate nostra. Et haec est causa quare nec est impossibilium, neque eorum quae per alios fiunt, neque finis, qui ut plurimum praestituitur nobis a natura.

that are within our power. This is the reason why it does not concern impossibles, things done by others, nor the end that, for the most part, is prearranged for us by nature.

LECTURE 6 Choice and Opinion Chapter 2 d. He shows that choice is not the same as opinion. i. Choice is not the same as opinion in general. y. HE PROVES THE STATEMENT BY TWO REASONS.... FIRST. — 448 οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα

Choice is not opinion, for opinion can concern everything—no less eternal and impossible things than things lying within our power.

ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· z. SECOND REASON. — 449 καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ,

Then, too, opinion is divided into false and true but not into good and bad, as is the case with choice.

ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον.

Perhaps there is no one who maintains that choice is generally identical with opinion.

ii. Choice is not the same as... particular opinion. v. HE PROVES THIS BY (FIVE) REASONS. THE FIRST. — — 450-451 ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταὐτὸν ἴσως

Nor is choice identical with a particular opinion. In

οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ

choosing good or bad things we are said to be good or bad but this is not the case in forming opinions about them.

δοξάζειν οὔ. w. SECOND REASON. — 452 καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν [ἤ] τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι

We choose to accept or reject this or anything pertaining to our actions. But we have an opinion as to what a thing is or what effect it has or how it

συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν.

is to be used. However, accepting or rejecting something is hardly a matter of opinion.

x. THIRD REASON. — 453 καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ

Choice is rather praised because it chooses what it

εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς.

ought—as it were—in the right way, while opinion is praised because it has the truth about something.

y. FOURTH REASON. — 454 καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα

We choose those things that we especially know

ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν·

are good. But we have an opinion about things we are not sure of.

z. FIFTH REASON. — 455 δοκοῦσι

δὲ

οὐχ

οἱ

αὐτοὶ

And it is not necessarily the same people who make

προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ.

the best choices and form true opinions. Some men form a true opinion of what is better but on account of bad will they do not make the right choice.

iii. He raises a doubt. — 456 εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ

Whether opinion should be said to precede choice or follow it, does not matter, for we do not intend to determine this but whether choice is identical

σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξῃ τινί.

with a particular opinion.

C’ He concludes the definition. — 457 τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ

What then is its genus, what its specific difference, since it is none of the things previously mentioned?

φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ

Seemingly it is a voluntary. However, not every voluntary—but certainly the deliberately intentional voluntary—is a thing chosen, for choice

προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.

must be accompanied by reason and intellect. Even the name seems to imply that one thing be preferred to others.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Neque iam opinio utique erit et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod electio

448. After the Philosopher has shown that choice is not the same as sensual desire; nor anger, which

non est idem neque concupiscentiae neque irae, quae pertinent ad appetitum sensitivum, neque etiam voluntati quae pertinet ad appetitum

belongs to the sensitive appetitive faculty; nor wishing, which belongs to the rational appetitive faculty, he here shows [d] that choice is not the

rationalem, hic ostendit quod non est idem opinioni quae pertinet ad ipsam rationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod electio

same as opinion, which pertains to reason itself. He illustrates this point by a threefold consideration. First [i] he shows that choice is not the same as

non est idem cuilibet opinioni. Secundo, quod non est idem specialiter opinioni quae est de operandis a nobis ibi sed neque cuidam, et cetera. Tertio movet quamdam dubitationem,

opinion in general. Next [ii], at “Nor is choice etc.,” he shows that choice is not the same as that particular opinion that concerns itself with the things we do. Last [iii], at “Whether opinion

quam insolutam relinquit, ibi, si autem praesit opinio et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod secundum praedicta apparet, quod electio non

should be,” he raises a doubt (which he leaves unsolved). He says first—this is apparent from the premises—that choice is not the same as opinion in

est idem quod opinio universaliter sumpta: et hoc probat duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Opinio potest esse circa omnia et non minus circa necessaria et impossibilia quam

general. He proves the statement by two reasons, the first of which is this [i, y]. Opinion can concern everything—no less eternal and impossible things than things lying within our power. But choice

circa ea quae sunt in potestate nostra. Sed electio est solum circa ea quae sunt in nobis, ut dictum est. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni.

concerns these things only within our capacity, as was just noted (447). Therefore, choice is not the same as opinion.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et falso et vero et cetera. Quae talis est. Ea quae diversis

449. He gives the second reason at “Then, too, opinion is divided etc.” [i, z]. It is this. The things

differentiis dividuntur, differunt, nec sunt idem. Sed opinio dividitur vero et falso, quia pertinet ad vim cognitivam, cuius obiectum est verum,

that are distinguished by various reasons are said to differ and not to be the same. Opinion, however, is divided into true and false since it pertains to the

non autem dividitur bono et malo quibus dividitur electio, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam, cuius obiectum est bonum. Et ex

faculty of knowledge, the object of which is the truth. Opinion is not divided into good and bad as is the case with choice which belongs to the appetitive

hoc concludit, quod electio non est idem opinioni universaliter acceptae. Et hoc est adeo manifestum, quod nullus contrarium dicit.

faculty, the object of which is the good. He concludes from this that choice is not the same as opinion in general. This is so obvious that no one affirms the contrary.

Deinde cum dicit: sed neque cuidam etc., ostendit quod electio non est idem cuidam opinioni, quae scilicet est de his quae cadunt

450. Then [ii], at “Nor is choice,” he shows that choice is not identical with that opinion which deals with the things we do. He proves this by (five)

sub nostra operatione. Et hoc ostendit quinque rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Ex hoc quod eligimus bona vel mala dicimur quales quidam, id est boni vel mali, non autem ex hoc

reasons, the first of which is this [ii, v]. From the fact that we choose good or bad things we are said to be such, that is, good or bad. But from the fact that we have an opinion about good or bad things,

quod opinamur bona vel mala, sive vera vel falsa, dicimur boni vel mali. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni quae est de eligibilibus.

or about true or false things, we are not said to be good or bad. Therefore choice is not identical with opinion, which refers to eligible things.

Huius autem differentiae ratio est quia bonus

451. The reason for this difference is that a man is

vel malus dicitur aliquis non secundum potentiam, sed secundum actum, ut habetur in IX metaphysicae, id est non ex hoc quod est

not called good or bad on account of his capabilities but on account of his actions (as noted in the ninth book of the Metaphysics: Ch. 9, 1051 a 4-15; St.

potens bene operari, sed ex hoc quod bene operatur: ex hoc autem, quod homo est perfectus secundum intellectum fit homo

Th. Lect. 10, 1883-1885), that is, not because he is able to act well but because he does in fact act well. When a man understands perfectly he

potens bene operari, non autem bene operans, sicut ille qui habet habitum grammaticae ex hoc ipso est potens loqui congrue; sed ad hoc quod congrue loquatur, requiritur quod hoc

becomes able to act well but he does not yet act well. Thus one who has the habit of grammar is able by that very fact to speak correctly, but that he actually speak correctly he must will it. The

velit. Quia habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator in tertio de anima. Unde patet, quod bona voluntas facit

reason is that a habit is that quality by which a person acts when he wishes, as the Commentator says on the third book De Anima. It is obvious

hominem bene operari, secundum quamcumque potentiam vel habitum rationi obedientem. Et ideo aliquis dicitur simpliciter bonus homo ex

then that good will makes a man act well according to every capability or habit obedient to reason. Therefore a man is called good simply because he

hoc, quod habet bonam voluntatem. Ex hoc autem, quod habet bonum intellectum, non dicitur bonus homo simpliciter, sed secundum quid: puta bonus grammaticus, vel bonus

has a good will. However, from the fact that he has a good intellect he is not called good simply but relatively good, for example, a good grammarian or a good musician. Therefore, since choice pertains

musicus. Et ideo, quia electio pertinet ad voluntatem, opinio autem ad intellectum, ex electione dicimur boni vel mali, non autem ex

to the will but opinion to the intellect, we are called good or bad by reason of choice but not by reason of opinion.

opinione.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et eligimus

452. He gives the second reason at “We choose to

quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Electio praecipue respicit actiones nostras. Eligimus enim quod accipiamus hoc vel fugiamus, vel

accept” [ii, w]. Choice has to do especially with our actions. We choose to accept or reject this thing, or whatever else there is that pertains to our

quicquid est aliud quod ad actiones nostras pertinet. Sed opinio principaliter respicit res. Opinamur enim quid est hoc, puta quod est panis, vel ad quid conferat, vel qualiter sit eo

actions. But opinion principally refers to things. We have an opinion as to what this thing is (for instance, what bread is) or what effect it has or how one must use it. Opinion, however, does not

utendum. Non est autem opinio principaliter circa operationes nostras, puta quod opinemur nos accipere aliquid vel fugere. Quia actiones

principally concern our actions, for example, that we are of an opinion about accepting or rejecting something. The reason is that our actions are

nostrae sunt quaedam singularia contingentia, et cito transeuntia. Unde earum cognitio vel opinio, non multum quaeritur propter

particular contingent things and quickly passing. Hence a knowledge or opinion of them is not often sought for the sake of the truth in them but only

veritatem quae sit in eis, sed solum propter opus. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni.

because of something done. Therefore choice is not identical with opinion.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: et electio quidem laudatur et cetera. Quae talis est. Bonum

453. He assigns a third reason at “Choice is” [ii, x]. It is this. The good of choice consists in a kind of

electionis in quadam rectitudine consistit, prout scilicet appetitus recte ordinat aliquid in finem. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod electio magis laudatur in hoc, quod est eius cuius oportet

rectitude, that is, the appetitive faculty rightly orders something to an end. This is what he means saying that choice is rather praised because it chooses what it ought, as it were in the right way,

quasi recte, sed opinio laudatur in hoc, quod vere est alicuius. Et sic bonum et perfectio opinionis est veritas. Quorum autem sunt

while opinion is praised because it has the truth about something. Thus the good and perfection of choice is rectitude but the perfection of opinion

diversae perfectiones, et ipsa sunt diversa. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni.

consists in truth. Things which have different perfections are themselves different. Therefore choice is not opinion.

Quartam rationem ponit ibi et eligimus quidem

454. The fourth reason, given at “We choose those

et cetera. Quae talis est. Electio est cum quadam certitudine. Illa enim eligimus, quae maxime scimus esse bona. Sed opinio est sine

things” [ii, y], is this. Choice is accompanied by certitude, for we choose those things which we especially know are good. But opinion lacks

certitudine. Opinamur enim illa quae non multum scimus esse vera. Ergo non sunt idem.

certitude, for we have an opinion about the things we are not sure are true. Therefore choice and opinion are not identical.

Quintam rationem ponit ibi et videntur et cetera. Si enim opinio et electio essent idem, oporteret quod idem essent illi qui eligunt optima et qui habent veram opinionem de eis.

455. He assigns the fifth reason at “And it is not necessarily” [ii, z]. if opinion and choice were identical, those who make the best choices and those who have true opinions about them would

Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Quidam enim vere opinantur in universali quid sit melius, sed propter malitiam non eligunt quod melius est,

necessarily be identified. This is obviously false, however, for some men form a true opinion in general of what is better but on account of bad will

sed quod est deterius. Ergo electio et opinio non sunt idem.

they do not choose what is better but what is worse. Therefore choice and opinion are not identical.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem praesit etc., movet

456. At “Whether opinion” [iii] he raises a doubt

quamdam dubitationem: utrum scilicet opinio praecedat electionem, vel sequatur ad ipsam. Et dicit, quod hoc nihil differt ad propositum. Quia nunc non intendimus determinare ordinem

whether opinion should be said to precede choice or follow it. He states that it does not matter for the present because we do not intend to determine the order of these things but only whether choice is

eorum, sed solum utrum electio sit idem alicui opinioni. Sciendum tamen, quod opinio, quum pertineat ad vim cognoscitivam, per se

identical with a particular opinion. Nevertheless, we must know that opinion, since it pertains to the faculty of knowledge, strictly speaking, precedes

loquendo praecedit electionem quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam, quae movetur a cognoscitiva. Per accidens tamen contingit quandoque, quod

choice pertaining to the appetitive faculty, which is moved by the cognoscitive power. However, it sometimes happens accidentally that opinion

opinio sequitur electionem; puta cum aliquis ex affectu eorum quae eligit mutat opinionem quam prius habebat.

follows choice, for instance, when a person on account of the affection for things he loves changes the opinion he formerly held.

Deinde cum dicit: quid igitur etc., ostendit quid

457. Then [C’], at “What then,” he shows what

sit electio. Et dicit quod cum non sit aliquod quatuor praedictorum, oportet considerare quid sit secundum genus, vel quale quid est secundum differentiam. Et quantum ad genus

choice is. He says that, since it is none of the four things previously mentioned, we must consider what it is according to its genus and what according to its specific difference. As to its genus,

videtur, quod sit voluntarium. Non tamen omne voluntarium est eligibile, ut supra dictum est, sed voluntarium praeconsiliatum. Et quod

seemingly it is a voluntary. However, not every voluntary is a thing chosen (as has been pointed out before, 434-436), but only the deliberately

haec differentia sit addenda, manifestat per hoc, quod consilium est actus rationis, et ipsa electio oportet quod sit cum actu rationis et

intentional voluntary. That this difference should be given attention is clear from the fact that counsel is an act of the reason, and choice itself

intellectus. Et hoc videtur subsignare, idest occulte signare ipsum nomen eius, quod signat ut aliquid prae aliis accipiatur. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem conferentem, ut unum

must be accompanied by an act of reason and intellect. The very name—meaning that one be accepted rather than another—seems to imply or signify this in a hidden way. It pertains to

aliis praeferatur.

deliberative reason to prefer one to others.

LECTURE 7 Counsel Chapter 3 II. HE TAKES UP THE QUESTION OF COUNSEL. A. He treats counsel in itself. A’.

He shows the things about which counsel ought to be taken. 1. HE PUTS FORWARD HIS PROPOSITION.

a. He proposes the question he intends to treat. — 458 βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ

Do men take counsel about all things in such a way

πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή;

that everything is worthy of deliberation, or are some things not objects of counsel?

b. He explains the proposed question. — 459 λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων.

A thing must not be called worthy of deliberation because some foolish or insane person takes counsel about it but because men of good sense do so.

2. HE EXECUTES IT. a. He shows where counsel should function, first by distinguishing things according to their own causes. i. He shows where counsel is unnecessary. v. HE SAYS THAT NO ONE SHOULD TAKE COUNSEL ABOUT ETERNAL THINGS. — 460 περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι.

No one takes counsel about: (1) eternal things, for instance, about the whole universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square;

w. NO ONE TAKES COUNSEL ABOUT THINGS IN MOTION... UNIFORM. — 461 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινομένων,

(2) things that are in motion provided their motion is always uniform either by necessity or from nature or

εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διά τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν.

on account of some other cause, for instance, the solstices and the risings of the sun;

x.

DELIBERATION IS UNNECESSARY ABOUT THINGS IN

MOTION FOLLOWING THE SAME PATTERN. — 462 οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων.

(3) things that sometimes happen otherwise, for instance, droughts and rains;

y. COUNSEL IS NOT TAKEN ABOUT THINGS THAT HAPPEN BY CHANCE. — 463

οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως.

(4) things that happen by chance, for example, the finding of a treasure;

Z. MEN DO NOT TAKE COUNSEL... ABOUT ALL HUMAN THINGS ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι

(5) all human things, for instance, the Spartans do not take counsel about how the Scythians ought best

ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν.

to live their lives. None of these things will take place by our efforts.

ii. He infers the areas with which counsel does deal. — 465 βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν·

We do take counsel about practicable things within our power.

iii. He shows that the conclusion follows from the premises. — 466 ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἰτίαι

There is actually no other class of things left.

γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὑτῶν πρακτῶν.

Seemingly the causes are nature, necessity, and chance, to which must be added the intellect and anything else causing what is done by man. Each man takes counsel about those practicable matters which can be done by him.

b. (He shows where counsel should function) by distinguishing things according to every cause. i. He shows in the arts where counsel is taken. — 467 καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν

About certain self-sufficient branches of instruction counsel is not taken, for instance, about writing the letters of the alphabet, for there is no doubt about how the letters must be formed. But counsel is taken

πῶς γραπτέον· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεί,

about whatever is determined by us.

ii. In these matters counsel is not taken in the same way. — 468 περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ

In these matters counsel is not always taken in the same way, for instance, in regard to things pertaining

χρηματιστικήν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικήν, ὅσῳ ἧττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν

to the art of medicine, to business and to navigation. In all these—inasmuch as they are less certain—we take more counsel than in gymnastics. The same is to be understood of other arts.

λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, iii. He shows the difference relative to the necessity of counsel. — 469 μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν.

It is more necessary to take counsel in the arts than in the sciences, for more doubts arise in the arts.

c. (He shows where counsel should function) by distinguishing things according to the qualities of the things themselves. i. Counsel has to do with things that occur more frequently. — 470 τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ,

Counsel has to concern things occurring more frequently.

ii. Counsel must attend to those situations in which no determination has been made. — 471 ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον.

It must concern uncertain things where it has not been determined in what way they will come to pass.

iii. We take others into our confidence for advice in things of importance. — 472 συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς

We invite counsellors in matters of importance not trusting ourselves as capable of coining to a decision.

διαγνῶναι.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Consiliantur autem utrum de omnibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de electione, hic determinat de consilio. Et primo de consilio secundum se. Secundo per comparationem ad electionem, ibi consiliabile autem, et cetera. Circa primum

458. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on choice, he here [II] takes up the question of counsel. First [A] he treats counsel in itself; and then [Lect. 9; B], at “The objects of counsel etc.” (B. 1113 a 3), he treats it in comparison with choice. On the initial point he does two things. First [A’] he shows the things

duo facit. Primo ostendit de quibus debeat esse consilium. Secundo determinat de modo et ordine consiliandi, ibi, consiliamur autem non de finibus, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit; primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, de aeternis autem, et cetera. Circa primum

about which counsel ought to be taken. Next [Lect. 8; B’], at “We do not take counsel about ends etc.” (B.1112 b 13), he treats the method and order of taking counsel. He handles the first consideration in two steps. First [1] he puts forward his proposition; and then [2], he executes it at “... about: (1) eternal things etc.” In regard to this first he also does two

duo facit. Primo proponit quaestionem, quam tractare intendit. Et est quaestio, utrum homines consilientur de omnibus rebus, ita quod unumquodque sit consiliabile, aut quaedam sint de quibus non

things. Initially [1, a] he proposes the question he intends to treat. The question is: should men take counsel about all things in such a way that everything is worthy of deliberation, or are some things not objects of counsel?

est consilium. Secundo ibi dicendum autem forsitan etc., exponit propositam quaestionem. Et dicit quod non dicitur illud consiliabile, de quo

459. Next [1, b], at “A thing must not,” he explains the proposed question with the observation that a thing is not said to be worthy of deliberation from the

quandoque consiliatur aliquis insipiens, qui scilicet habet usum rationis, sed perversum; vel insanus, qui totaliter usu rationis caret. Sed illud vere dicitur consiliabile de quo consiliantur homines habentes intellectum recte dispositum. Tales enim non

fact that sometimes counsel is taken in the matter by some foolish person who perversely uses his reason, or by an insane person entirely lacking the use of reason. But something is deemed worthy of deliberation inasmuch as men with good sense do deliberate about it. Men of this type take counsel only about things that

consiliantur nisi de rebus, quae in natura sua talia sunt ut de eis consilium haberi debeat, quae proprie dicuntur consiliabilia; insipientes autem quandoque consiliantur etiam de his, quae in natura sua sunt talia ut de eis consilium haberi non debeat.

of their nature require careful consideration and that are properly said to be worthy of deliberation. Foolish people sometimes deliberate even about things wherein no counsel is required.

Deinde cum dicit: de aeternis autem etc., ostendit de quibus sit consilium. Et primo distinguendo res secundum causas secundo distinguendo eas secundum artes quascumque, ibi, et quidem circa certas etc.;

460. Then [2], at “... about: (1) eternal things,” he shows where counsel should function, first [2, a] by distinguishing things according to their own causes; next [2, b], at “About certain etc.,” by distinguishing things according to every cause; and last [2, c], at

tertio distinguendo eas secundum ipsarum rerum conditiones, ibi, consiliari autem oportet, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit de quibus non sit consilium. Secundo concludit de quibus sit ibi, consiliamur autem, etc.; tertio ostendit conclusionem sequi ex praemissis, ibi, haec

“Counsel has to concern etc.,” by distinguishing things according to the qualities of the things themselves. On the first point he does (three) things. First [a, i] he shows where counsel is unnecessary. Then [a, ii], at “But we do take counsel etc.,” he infers the areas with which counsel does deal. Last [a, iii], at “There is actually etc.,” he shows that the conclusion

autem et sunt reliqua, et cetera. Circa primum quinque facit. Primo dicit quod nullus consiliatur de aeternis, idest de his quae semper sunt et sine motu. Huiusmodi autem sunt, vel illa quorum substantiae motui non subduntur, sicut substantiae separatae, et ipsa mundi universitas. Vel

follows from the premises. In regard to the first, five considerations require his attention. First [i, v] he says that no one takes counsel about eternal things, that is, about things existing always and without motion. Examples of this sort are either those, the substances of which are not subject to motion (as separated substances and the whole universe itself), or

etiam ea quae, etsi secundum esse sint in materia mobili, tamen secundum rationem ab huiusmodi materia abstrahuntur, sicut sunt mathematica. Unde ponit exemplum de diametro quadrati, et costa idest latere eius, de quibus nullus consiliatur an sint

those which, even though they exist in movable matter, nevertheless according to reason are separated from such matter, as mathematical entities. Hence he gives the example of the diagonal of a square and its rib or side—no one takes counsel about the commensurability of such things.

commensurabiles. Secundo ibi: sed neque de his etc., dicit quod etiam nullus consiliatur de his quae etsi moveantur, motus tamen eorum semper est uniformis; sive uniformitas motus eorum sit ex necessitate non propter aliquam aliam

461. Next [i, w], at “things that are in motion,” he says that no one takes counsel even about things that are in action provided their motion is always uniform. This uniformity of motion may be either of necessity and not by reason of any other cause (as are those

causam sicut ea quae sunt necessaria per seipsa, sive hoc sit per naturam corporum mobilium, sive hoc sit propter aliquam causam separatam, prout ponuntur substantiae immateriales, moventes orbes caelestes, de quibus hic loquitur. Unde exemplificat de versionibus, idest de

things which are of themselves necessary) or from the nature of movable bodies or through the agency of some separated cause as immaterial substances, movers of the heavenly bodies, about which he speaks here. Hence he takes an example from the revolutions or circular motions of the sun and its risings, and so forth.

circularibus motibus solis et ortibus eius. Tertio ibi: neque de his quae alias etc., dicit quod neque etiam est consilium de his quae in motu consistunt, et ut in pluribus eodem

462. Third [i, x], at “things that sometimes,” he says that deliberation is unnecessary about things in motion and usually following the same pattern, even

modo fiunt, aliquando tamen licet in paucioribus aliter accidunt; sicut sunt siccitates, quae ut frequentius accidunt in aestate, et imbres, qui ut pluries accidunt in hieme, licet quandoque aliter accidat.

though sometimes in a minor number of cases they happen otherwise. Such are the droughts that generally occur in summer and the rains that commonly fall in, winter; although this may at times vary.

Quarto ibi: neque de his quae etc., dicit quod neque consilium etiam est de his quae fiunt a fortuna, sicut de inventione thesauri. Sicut enim ea de quibus supra habitum est, non sunt ex operatione nostra, ita fortuita

463. Fourth [i, y], at “things that happen,” he says that counsel is not taken about things that happen by chance as the finding of a treasure. just as the things spoken of above (461-462) do not depend on our action, so things happening by chance cannot depend

non possunt esse ex nostra praemeditatione, quia sunt improvisa, et praeter intentionem.

upon our forethought because they are unforeseen and beyond our control.

Quinto ibi: sed neque de humanis etc., dicit

464. Fifth [i, z], at “all human things,” he says, as

quod non solum homines non consiliantur de necessariis, et naturalibus, et fortuitis, sed nec etiam de omnibus rebus humanis; sicut Lacedaemonii non consiliantur qualiter Scythae, qui sunt ab eis valde remoti, optime debeant conversari. Et subiungit rationem communem

men do not take counsel about necessary, natural, and fortuitous things, so neither do they take counsel about all human things. Thus the Spartans do not take counsel about how the Scythians—who dwell a long way from them—ought best to live their lives. He then subjoins a common reason valid in all the aforementioned cases when he says “None of these things

respondentem omnibus praedictis, cum dicit. Non enim fiet, et cetera. Quia scilicet nihil eorum, quae scilicet sunt necessaria vel naturalia, vel fortuita, vel per alios homines facta, fit per nos.

will take place etc.,” because none of these things that are necessary or natural or fortuitous or done by other men take place by reason of our efforts.

Deinde cum dicit consiliamur autem de his etc., dicit quasi concludens ex praemissis, de quibus sit consilium. Et dicit, quod consiliamur de operabilibus, quae in nobis, idest in nostra potestate existunt.

465. Then [a, ii], at “But we do take counsel,” he concludes as it were from the premises about the Proper field for counsel. He says that men take counsel about practicable things within us, that is, in our power. Counsel is ordered to action.

Consilium enim ad operationem ordinatur. Deinde cum dicit: haec autem sunt etc., ostendit hoc sequi ex praemissis: quia scilicet praeter praemissa, de quibus dictum

466. Next [a, iii], at “There is actually,” he shows that this follows from the premises because, besides the things just mentioned about which it has been

est quod non est consilium, ista sola sunt reliqua, scilicet ea quae sunt in nobis, de quibus dicimus esse consilium. Et hoc probat dividendo causas. Videntur enim esse quatuor causae rerum, scilicet natura, quae est principium motus, sive eorum quae semper eodem modo moventur, sive eorum

indicated that counsel does not apply, there remain these situations within us on whose behalf counsel is required. He proves his contention by separating the causes. Seemingly there are four causes of things: nature, which is the principle of motion either in the case of things always moved in the same way or of things for the most part preserving uniform motion;

quae ut in pluribus uniformitatem motus servant; et necessitas, quae est causa eorum, quae semper eodem modo sunt sine motu. Et fortuna, quae est causa per accidens, praeter intentionem agens, sub qua etiam comprehenditur casus. Et praeter

necessity, which is the cause of things existing always in the same way without motion; fortune, an accidental cause outside the intention of the agent, under which is also included chance. Besides these causes there is the intellect and whatever else is man’s agent, as the will, the senses, and other principles of

has causas adhuc est causa intellectus, et quicquid est aliud, quod producit id quod per hominem fit; sicut voluntas et sensus, et alia huiusmodi principia. Et haec causa diversificatur secundum diversos homines; ita quod singuli homines consiliantur de his operabilibus quae possunt fieri per ipsos, ex

this kind. This cause is different in different men so that each takes counsel about those practicable matters which can be done by him. From this it follows that counsel is not taken about things done by other causes, as already noted (464).

quo de his quae per alias causas fiunt, consilium non est, ut dictum est.

Deinde cum dicit: et quidem circa certas etc., ostendit de quibus potest esse consilium secundum diversas artes operativas secundum quas operamur ea quae in nobis sunt. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit circa quas artes sit consilium, et circa quas non. Et dicit quod

467. At “About certain” [2, b] he shows about what subjects counsel can be taken in the creative arts according to which we do what is within our power. On this point he does (three) things. First [b, i] he shows in the arts where counsel is taken and where it is unnecessary. He says that those creative arts which have a fixed mode of procedure and are self-sufficient

circa illas operativas disciplinas quae habent certos modos operandi et sunt per se sufficientes, ita scilicet quod effectus operis earum non dependet ex eventu alicuius extrinseci, circa has inquam artes non est consilium, sicut de litteris conscribendis. Et

to the extent that what is done rests on nothing, extrinsic do not require counsel, as writing the letters of the alphabet. The reason for this is that we deliberate only about doubtful matters. And there is no doubt about how a letter should be formed because there is a fixed method of writing which is not

huius ratio est quia non consiliamur nisi in dubiis. Non est autem dubium qualiter

doubtful and the written work depends only on the art and hand of the scribe. But counsel is taken about

debeat scribi, quia certus est modus scribendi et non dependet effectus Scripturae nisi ex arte et manu scribentis. Sed de his est consilium quaecumque fiunt per nos, id est in quibus oportet per nos

those situations in which we must fix for ourselves in advance how to proceed since they are not certain and determined in themselves.

determinari qualiter fiant, quia non sunt in se certa et determinata. Secundo ibi: non similiter autem etc., ostendit quod de his non eodem modo est

468. Next [b, ii], at “In these matters,” he shows that in these matters counsel is not taken in the same way

consilium; sed de quibusdam magis et de quibusdam minus. Et primo ostendit hanc differentiam inter artes operativas adinvicem. Et dicit quod non semper de his quae per nos determinantur, similiter, idest aequali dubitatione consiliamur, sed de quibusdam magis, quae sunt minus

but that some cases require more deliberation and others less. First he explains this difference among the creative arts themselves. He states that in those cases in which we have the final say, we do not always take counsel in the same way, that is, with equal deliberation. We deliberate more about some things which are less certain and in which we must take into

determinata et in quibus plura exteriora oportet considerare: sicut in arte medicinali, in qua oportet attendere ad virtutem naturae eius qui sanatur, et in negotiativa, in qua oportet attendere ad necessitates hominum et abundantiam rerum venalium,

consideration more external things: in the art of medicine we must be mindful of the natural strength of the sick person; in business we must assess the needs of men and the supply of goods; and in navigation we must take into account the winds. In all these, we take more counsel than in gymnastics, i.e.,

et in gubernativa in qua oportet attendere ad flatus ventorum; et in his magis consiliamur quam in arte gignastica, id est luctativa vel exercitativa, quae magis habet certos et determinatos modos, quanto praedictae artes sunt minus certae. Et idem intelligendum est in aliis artibus.

the arts of wrestling and exercising that have more fixed and determined methods. According as the previously mentioned arts are less settled, by so much must we take more counsel in them. The same must be understood of other arts.

Secundo ibi: magis autem etc., ostendit differentiam quantum ad necessitatem consilii inter artes operativas et scientias

469. Last [b, iii], at “It is more necessary,” he shows the difference relative to the necessity of counsel in the creative arts and in the speculative sciences. He

speculativas. Et dicit quod magis necesse habemus consiliari circa artes, scilicet operativas, quam circa disciplinas, scilicet speculativas: in quibus non est consilium quantum ad ea de quibus sunt, quia huiusmodi sunt ex necessitate vel ex natura, sed quantum ad usum earum, ut puta

indicates that counsel is more necessary in the arts (the practicable) than in the sciences (the speculative). In the latter, deliberation occurs not in regard to their subject matter, for these exist necessarily or by nature, but as regards the use of these things, for example, how and in what order we are to proceed in the sciences. In this, however, counsel is less

quomodo vel quo ordine sit in eis procedendum. In quo tamen minus est necesse consiliari quam in scientiis practicis, circa quas magis dubitamus propter magnam varietatem quae in istis artibus accidit.

mandatory than in the practical sciences about which we have more doubts because of the great variety occurring in these skills.

Deinde cum dicit: consiliari autem oportet etc., ostendit de quibus debeat esse consilium, considerando conditiones ipsarum rerum. Et circa hoc ponit tres conditiones rerum de quibus est consilium.

470. Then [2, c], at “Counsel has to,” he shows about which things counsel ought to be taken, by considering the qualities of the things themselves. On this point he puts forward three qualities of things with which counsel deals. First [c, i] he says that

Et primo dicit quod oportet consiliari de his quae saepius accidunt. Tamen quia possunt aliter evenire, incertum est qualiter contingent. Si quis enim vellet in consilium deducere ea quae rarissime accidunt, puta si pons lapideus per quem transeundum est,

counsel has to do with things which occur more frequently. However, because they can happen otherwise it is uncertain in what way they may take place. If a man should wish to deliberate about things that rarely happen, for instance, about the possible collapse of a stone bridge over which he must pass, he

cadat, nunquam homo aliquid operaretur.

will never get anything done.

Secundo ibi: et in quibus etc., dicit quod oportet consiliari de illis in quibus non est determinatum qualiter oporteat agere.

471. Second [c, ii], at “It must concern,” he says that counsel must attend to those situations in which no determination has yet been made of their outcome. A

Iudex enim non consiliatur qualiter debeat sententiare in his quae sunt lege statuta, sed forte in casibus in quibus non est aliquid lege determinatum.

judge does not take counsel about how he ought to pass sentence on the cases stated in the law but rather about cases in which something is not determined in the law.

Tertio ibi: consiliatores autem etc., dicit quod assumimus nobis alios ad consiliandum in rebus magnis, quasi non credentes nobis ipsis ut simus sufficientes ad discernendum quid oporteat nos facere.

472. Third [c, iii], at “We invite counsellors,” he says that we take others into our confidence for advice in things of importance, as if we did not acknowledge our own capability of deciding what we ought to do. Thus it is obvious that counsel ought not to be taken about

Et sic patet quod consilium non debet esse de minimis quibuscumque, sed de rebus magnis.

trifling things of every kind but only about things of importance.

LECTURE 8 Method and Order of Taking Counsel Chapter 3 B’ He treats the method and order of taking counsel. 1. HE SHOWS THE METHOD OF DELIBERATIVE INQUIRY. a. He proposes a method of deliberation. i. He shows what is taken for granted. — 473-474 βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ

We do not take counsel about ends, only about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether he will

τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους·

cure a patient; an orator does not deliberate whether he will persuade people; a statesman does not deliberate whether he will achieve peace. Neither does any other agent take counsel about his end.

ii. He shows what is the objective. — 475 ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν

But having taken the end for granted, they will deliberate how and by what means it may be achieved; when the end is attainable in several ways, by which of these it can be most effectively and most easily attained; when the end is attainable by one means only, how it will be attained through this means; and how this means itself will be attained

ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν.

until they arrive at the first cause, which will be the last in the order of discovery.

b. He explains his statement. — 476 ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ

One who takes counsel seems to inquire and to resolve by the method mentioned, as by a diagram. It seems that not every inquiry is a taking of counsel, for instance, a mathematical inquiry, but every taking of counsel is a kind of inquiry. What is last in

μαθηματικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

resolution or Analysis is first in the order of production.

2. HE SHOWS (THE METHOD’S) EFFECT. a. He exposes his proposition. — 477 κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν·

If those taking counsel find the thing to be done is impossible, they give up the project, for instance, if they need money which cannot be provided. But if the thing to be done seems practicable, they begin to act. Things are called possible that can be done by us; what our friends do is done in some way by us, for

τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.

the origin of their action lies in ourselves.

b. He explains certain things that were said. — 478 ζητεῖται δ' ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὁτὲ δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

At times we inquire about what instruments may be used, and at times about the way we ought to use

ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὁτὲ μὲν δι' οὗ ὁτὲ δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος.

them. It is the same in the other cases, for sometimes we investigate the means of doing a thing, sometimes we inquire how or why it is to be done.

3. HE DETERMINES THE LIMIT OF THIS INQUIRY. a. on the part of the agent himself. — 479 ἔοικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὑτῷ πρακτῶν,

As has been previously stated, it would seem that man originates his own actions, and counsel is taken about the things which can be done by him.

b. on the part of the end. — 480 αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. οὐ γὰρ

Actions are performed for the sake of other things.

ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη·

Counsel, therefore, is not taken about the end but the means to the end.

c. on the part of particular instruments. — 481-482 οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει.

We do not deliberate about particular things, for instance, whether this thing is bread, or whether the bread is properly prepared or properly baked. This belongs to sense perception. If a man goes on deliberating forever he will never come to an end.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Consiliamur autem non de finibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit de quibus sit consilium, hic determinat de modo et ordine consiliandi. Et quia consilium est quaedam inquisitio, circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit

473. After the Philosopher has shown about what things counsel is taken, he here he treats the method and order of taking counsel. Because counsel is a kind of inquiry, he does three things concerning it. First [1] he shows the method of

modum consiliativae inquisitionis. Secundo effectum eius, ibi, et si quidem impossibile etc.; tertio ostendit huius inquisitionis terminum, ibi, videtur autem quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit modum consiliandi; secundo manifestat quaedam quae dixerat, ibi, qui enim consiliatur et cetera. Cum

deliberative inquiry; next [2], at “if those taking counsel etc.,” he shows its effect; last [3], at “As has been previously stated etc.,” he determines the limit of this inquiry. On the initial point he does two things. First [i, a] he proposes a method of deliberation. Second [i, b], at “One who takes counsel etc.,” he explains his statement. Counsel is

autem consilium sit quaedam inquisitio practica de operabilibus; necesse est quod sicut in inquisitione speculativa supponuntur principia et quaedam alia inquiruntur, ita etiam et in consilio fiat. Unde primo ostendit quid supponitur in consilio. Secundo quid in consilio

a practical deliberation about things to be done. Hence as in a speculative inquiry, where principles are necessarily taken for granted and certain other things are sought, so also should it be with counsel. Therefore, he shows first [a, i] what is taken for granted regarding counsel. Second [a,

quaeratur, ibi, sed ponentes finem et cetera.

ii], at “But having taken etc.,” he shows what is the objective in taking counsel.

Est autem considerandum quod in operabilibus finis est sicut principium; quia ex fine dependet necessitas operabilium, ut dicitur in II physicorum; et ideo in consiliis oportet finem supponere. Et hoc est quod dicit quod non consiliamur de finibus, sed de his quae sunt ad fines; sicut in speculativis non inquiritur de

474. We must consider that in practicable things the end holds the place of the principle because the necessity of practicable things depends on the end, as has been mentioned in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 9, 200 a 15 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 15, 273-274). On this account we must take the end for granted. This is what he means when he says

principiis, sed de conclusionibus. Hoc autem quod dixerat manifestat per exempla: quia scilicet medicus non consiliatur an debeat sanare infirmum, sed hoc supponit quasi finem; nec etiam rhetor consiliatur si debeat persuadere, sed hoc intendit quasi finem. Nec etiam politicus, idest rector civitatis consiliatur

that we do not take counsel about ends but about the means to the end. Thus in speculative matters we do not inquire about the principles but about the conclusions. He clarifies what he has said by examples: a doctor does not deliberate whether he ought to cure a patient but this is taken f or granted as an end; an orator does not deliberate

an debeat facere pacem quae se habet ad civitatem sicut sanitas ad corpus hominis, quae consistit in convenientia humorum sicut pax in convenientia voluntatum; et sic etiam nullus aliorum operantium consiliatur de fine.

whether he ought to persuade people, for he intends this as an end; a statesman or a ruler of the state does not deliberate whether he ought to achieve peace which is compared to the state as health to the human body (health consists in the harmony of the humors as peace consists in the harmony of wills). Neither does any other agent take counsel about the end in this way.

Deinde cum dicit: sed ponentes finem etc., ostendit de quibus et quomodo sit inquisitio consilii. Circa quod tria ponit. Quorum primum

475. Then [a, ii], at “But having take, the end for granted,” he shows about what and how deliberative inquiry should be made. He introduces

est quod supposito aliquo fine, prima intentio consiliantium est qualiter, idest quo motu vel actione possit perveniri ad illum finem; et per quae instrumenta oporteat moveri vel agere ad finem, puta per equum vel navem. Secunda autem intentio est quando ad finem aliquem per

three things concerning this. The first of these is that, having taken the end for granted, the primary intention of the one taking counsel is how (i.e., by what motion or action) he can attain that end, and by what means he must move or work toward the end, as by horse or ship. His next

plura perveniri potest sive instrumenta sive actiones, per quid eorum et facilius et melius perveniatur. Et hoc pertinet ad iudicium in quo quandoque aliqui deficiunt bene se habentes in inventione viarum ad finem. Tertia autem intentio est, si contingat quod per unum solum instrumentum vel motum vel per unum optime

intention is—when he can attain some end by several things, either instruments or actions—to know by which of these he can better and more easily achieve his goal. This pertains to judgment in finding ways to the end in which some men are at times deficient. His last intention is—if it should happen that the end can be attained by one means

perveniatur ad finem, ut procuretur qualiter per hoc ad finem perveniatur. Ad quod requiritur constantia et sollicitudo. Et si illud per quod est deveniendum ad finem non habeatur in promptu, oportet inquirere ulterius per quid haberi possit et similiter de illo, quousque

or motion alone, or most aptly by a particular means—that the end be procured in such a way that it is reached through this means. For this, perseverance and care are necessary. If the means for attaining the end should not be at hand, we must inquire how it can be gained and so on until

perveniatur ad causam quae occurrit prima in operando, quae est ultima in inventione consilii.

we arrive at a cause which holds first place in operating (this will be last in the order of discovery).

Deinde cum dicit: qui enim consiliatur etc., manifestat quod dixerat per similitudinem inquisitionis speculativae. Et dicit quod ideo causa quae est prima in operatione est ultima in inventione, quia ille qui consiliatur videtur inquirere, sicut dictum est, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam. Quemadmodum

476. Next [i, b], at “One who,” he further clarifies his statement by its likeness to speculative inquiry. He says that the cause that is first in operation is the last in the order of discovery because one who deliberates seems to inquire (as was just pointed out in 473) by some analytic method, just as he who wishes to prove a conclusion by a diagram or

diagramma, id est descriptio geometrica in qua qui vult probare aliquam conclusionem oportet quod resolvat conclusionem in principia quousque pervenit ad principia prima indemonstrabilia. Omne autem consilium est quaestio, idest inquisitio quaedam, etsi non

a geometrical explanation must resolve the conclusion into principles until he reaches the first indemonstrable principles. All counsel is an investigation, i.e., a kind of inquiry, although not every investigation or inquiry is counsel, for example, an inquiry in mathematics. Only an

omnis quaestio, idest inquisitio, sit consilium, sicut inquisitio mathematica. Sola enim inquisitio de operabilibus est consilium. Et quia consilians resolutive inquirit, necesse est quod eius inquisitio perducatur usque ad id quod est primum in operatione, quia illud quod est ultimum in resolutione est primum in

inquiry about practicable things is counsel. Because the man who takes counsel inquires in an analytic manner, his inquiry must lead to that which is the principle in operation. The reason is that what is last in analysis is first in production or activity.

generatione sive in operatione. Deinde cum dicit: et si quidem etc., ostendit effectum consilii. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quaedam quae dicta sunt,

477. At “If those taking counsel” [2] he shows the effect of counsel. First [2, a] he exposes his proposition. Second [2, b] he explains certain

ibi, quaeruntur autem quandoque et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam inquisitio consilii pervenerit ad id quod oportet primum operari, si inveniant consiliantes illud esse impossibile, discedunt, idest dimittunt totum illud negotium quasi desperantes. Puta si ad negotium aliquod persequendum indiget homo

things that were said by the words “At times we inquire etc.” He says first that if those taking counsel, on reaching the point in the deliberative inquiry where the first operation must be done, find this impossible they give up, i.e., dismiss the whole matter as if without hope of success. For example, if in order to carry out a business

pecuniis ad dandum aliquibus et non possit eas dare, oportet dimittere negotium. Si autem appareat quod sit possibile illud quod inventum est per consilium, statim incipiunt operari: quia, ut dictum est, oportet esse primum in operatione id ad quod terminatur resolutiva inquisitio consilii. Possibile autem dicitur aliquid

venture, a man needs money to pay certain persons and he cannot pay it, he must abandon the project. But if it is apparent that what was discovered by means of counsel is possible, operation begins immediately because, as was just mentioned (476), the point at which the analytic inquiry of counsel ends must be the beginning of

operanti non solum secundum propriam potentiam, sed etiam secundum potentiam aliorum. Unde dicit quod possibilia sunt quae fiunt per nos, sub quibus comprehenduntur ea quae fiunt per amicos, quia ea quae fiunt per

operation. A thing is said to be possible to an agent not only through his own power but also through the power of others. Hence things done by friends are enumerated by him among possibles because what our friends do is done in some way

amicos aliqualiter fiunt per nos, in quantum scilicet principium horum est in nobis prout ipsi intuitu nostri hoc faciunt.

by us, inasmuch as the principle of the work is found in us, for they themselves do this in consideration of us.

Deinde cum dicit quaeruntur autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat; videlicet quae sunt illa inquisita quae quandoque inveniuntur

478. Then [2, b], when he says “At times we inquire,” he explains his previous statement, namely, the kinds of things that upon

impossibilia, quandoque non. Et dicit quod quandoque inquiruntur per consilium instrumenta, puta equus aut gladius. Quandoque autem necessitas, idest opportunitas eorum, id est qualiter oporteat eis uti; et ita etiam est in reliquis artibus: quod

investigation we sometimes find possible and sometimes impossible. At times, he says, by counsel we inquire about instruments, for instance, a horse or a sword, and at times we inquire about the need or suitability of the instruments, that is, how we ought to use them. It

quandoque quaeritur per quid aliquid fiat, quandoque autem qualiter vel propter quid, quae pertinent ad necessitatem praedictam.

is the same in the other arts: sometimes we seek the means of doing a thing, sometimes we inquire how or why (these belong to the end just mentioned).

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem, quemadmodum etc., ostendit quod sit terminus sive status in inquisitione consilii. Et hoc quidem secundum tria. Primo quidem ex parte ipsius operantis. Unde dicit quod sicut supra dictum est, homo est principium suarum operationum. Consilium autem uniuscuiusque

479. Next [3], at “As has been previously stated,” he determines the limit or status of the deliberative inquiry. He does this under three headings. First [3, a] on the part of the agent himself. Hence he says, as has been previously stated (292), that man is the principle of his activity. Every individual takes counsel about the things which

hominis est de his quae sunt operabilia ab ipso. Et ideo quando inquisitio consilii pervenit ad id quod homo habet in sua potestate, ut faciat, ibi terminatur consilium.

can be done by him. For this reason when he arrives, in the deliberative inquiry, at what he himself can achieve, at that point counsel ceases.

Secundo ibi: operationes autem etc., ostendit quod consilium habet terminum vel statum ex parte finis. Et dicit, quod operationes omnes sunt aliorum gratia, id est finium. Unde de ipso fine non est consilium, sed de his quae sunt ad finem. Et sic patet, quod status est in inquisitione consilii et ex parte finis et ex parte

480. Second [3, b], at “Actions are,” he shows that counsel has a limit or condition on the part of the end. All operations, he says, are performed for the sake of other things, that is, ends. Hence counsel is not taken about the end but about the means to the end. Evidently then there is a limit in deliberative inquiry (both on the part of the end

agentis sicut in demonstrationibus, et in sursum et in deorsum, quasi ex parte utriusque extremi.

and on the part of the agent) as in demonstrations (both from above and below) as it were on the part of either extreme.

Tertio ibi: neque utique singularia etc., ostendit

481. Third [3, c], at “We do not,” he shows the

quod est status in inquisitione consilii ex parte singularium instrumentorum, quibus utimur in operationibus sicut quibusdam mediis ad perveniendum in finem. Et dicit, quod neque etiam consilium est de rebus singularibus, qualia sunt, puta, si hoc quod proponitur sit

status of deliberative inquiry on the part of particular instruments which we use in our operations as available means for arriving at the end. He says that we do not deliberate about particular things, such as whether what is set before us is bread, whether it is properly prepared,

panis, vel si est digestus, idest coctus, vel confectus sicut oportet. Hoc enim discernit sensus.

i.e., baked or made as it should be. This belongs to sense perception.

Quod autem secundum haec tria in consiliis sit status, sicut et in demonstrationibus, probat per impossibile. Quia si aliquis semper consiliaretur, deveniret hoc in infinitum, quod sub ratione non cadit, et per consequens neque sub consilio, quod est quaedam ratiocinativa

482. That the status of counsel-as also of demonstration-is according to these three considerations is proved by an argument leading to an impossible conclusion. If a man would always be taking counsel, he would be reaching to infinity, which does not fall under the consideration of the

inquisitio, sicut dictum est.

reason and consequently not under counsel, which is a kind of inquiry belonging to reason, as has been pointed out (476).

LECTURE 9 A Comparison Between Counsel and Choice Chapter 3 B. He now treats counsel in comparison with choice. 1. HE COMPARES COUNSEL WITH CHOICE. a. He introduces his proposition. — 483 βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν·

The objects of counsel and of choice are the same, but the object of choice has already been determined by counsel.

b. He proves it. i. He explains what he has said, by a reason. — 484 τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὑτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν

What was previously judged by means of counsel is an object of choice. Every individual inquiring how he is going to act ceases from counsel when he reduces the principle back to himself and this into what is to be

ἀρχήν, καὶ αὑτοῦ εἰς ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ προαιρούμενον.

done first. It is this which is chosen.

τὸ τὸ

ii. By example. — 485 δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ

Our point is also brought out by the ancient political procedure delineated by Homer who presents the Greek kings as proclaiming their decisions to the

προείλοντο δήμῳ.

ἀνήγγελλον

τῷ

people.

2. HE CONCLUDES FROM THIS WHAT CHOICE IS. — 486-487 ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν·

Since the object of choice is one of the things considered by counsel as desirable and within our power, choice will be a desire (arising by reason of counsel) for the things which are in our power. When

ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

we have formed a judgment by taking counsel we desire a thing in accordance with our deliberation.

ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ

Choice has now been defined according to type and in a

εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

general way and not as is customary according to a full explanation. It has been stated of what nature the things are with which choice deals and that choice is concerned with things which are ordered to end.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Consiliabile autem et eligibile et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de consilio absolute, hic determinat de consilio per comparationem ad electionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat consilium ad electionem. Secundo ex hoc concludit quid sit electio, ibi: existente autem eligibili et cetera. Circa primum

483. After the Philosopher has considered counsel in itself, he now [B] treats counsel in comparison with choice. A twofold procedure clarifies this point. First [1] he compares counsel with choice. Second [2], at “Since the object of choice” [2], he concludes from this what choice is. In regard to the initial point he does two things. First [a] he

duo facit: primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, quod enim consilio, et cetera. Comparat ergo primo consilium ad electionem dupliciter. Uno quidem modo quantum ad obiectum sive materiam utriusque in quo conveniunt. Et quantum ad hoc dicit,

introduces his proposition; second [b], at “What was previously judged etc.,” he proves it. First he compares counsel with choice in two ways. In one way relative to the object or matter of each where they are in agreement. Touching on this he says that an object of counsel and an object of choice

quod idem est consiliabile et eligibile; quia videlicet, tam consilium quam electio est de his quae operamur propter finem; alio autem modo quantum ad ordinem utriusque. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, quod quando iam determinatum est aliquid per consilium, tunc primo eligitur, quasi consilio praecedente electionem.

are the same because both counsel and choice deal with things that act for an end. The other way is relative to the order of each. Touching on this he says that when something has already been decided by means of counsel then it is first chosen, counsel preceding choice as it were.

Deinde cum dicit quod enim consilio etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quidem per rationem sumptam ex his quae supra dicta sunt de consilio. Et dicit, quod ideo determinatio

484. Then [b], at “What was,” he explains what he has said, by a reason [b, i] taken from his previous observations (473-484) about counsel. The decision of counsel, he says, precedes choice

consilii praecedit electionem, quia oportet, quod

because after the inquiry of counsel a judgment

post inquisitionem consilii sequatur iudicium de inventis per consilium. Et tunc primo eligitur id quod prius est iudicatum. Et quod iudicium rationis consequatur inquisitionem consilii, manifestat per hoc, quod unusquisque qui

concerning the things discovered must follow. Then what was previously judged is first chosen. He shows clearly that the judgment of the reason should follow the investigation of counsel, by the fact that every individual who inquires by taking

inquirit consiliando qualiter debeat operari, desistit a consiliando, quando inquisitionem suam resolvendo perducit ad id quod ipse potest operari. Et si plura possit operari, quando reduxerit in antecedens, idest in id quod ei primo operandum occurrit. Et hoc est quod eligitur, id scilicet quod primo operandum occurrit. Unde

counsel how he ought to act ceases from deliberation when, by analysing his investigation, he is led to what he himself can do. If he can do several things, then, when he reduces them to the preceding, that is, to what he considers should be done first, this is what is chosen, namely, what presents itself to be done first. Hence it remains

relinquitur quod electio determinationem consilii.

that choice presupposes the decision of counsel.

praesupponit

Secundo ibi: manifestum autem hoc etc., probat quod dixerat, per exemplum. Et dicit, quod hoc, scilicet quod electio sequatur determinationem

485. Second [b, ii], at “Our point is also brought out,” he proves his view by an example. That choice ought to follow the decision of counsel is

consilii, patet ex antiquis urbanitatibus, idest ex consuetudine antiquarum civilitatum secundum quam reges non habebant dominativam potestatem in multitudine, ut facerent omnia, prout eis videretur; sed erant rectores multitudinis ad quam pertinebat eligere ea quae a principibus consilio determinata erant. Et ideo

brought out by the regal procedure of old, i.e., by the custom of ancient states according to which kings did not possess dictatorial power over the multitude so that they could do whatever they wished but were guides of the citizens to whom it belonged to choose the things decided by the kings in counsel. For that reason he says that the kings

dicit, quod antiquitus reges annunciabant plebi ea quae ipsi elegerant per determinationem sui consilii, ut scilicet plebs eligeret quod ab eis determinatum erat. Et hoc secutus fuit Homerus, inducens principes Graecorum, ea quae in consilio determinaverant plebi annunciantes.

of old declared to the people the things they themselves had chosen by the decision of their counsel so that the people might choose what had been determined. Homer followed this by presenting the Greek rulers as proclaiming to the people what they had decided in counsel.

Deinde cum dicit: existente autem etc., ostendit ex praemissis quid sit electio. Et dicit, quod cum eligibile nihil aliud sit, quam quiddam de numero eorum quae sunt in nostra potestate quod ex

486. Next [2], at “Since the object,” he shows from the premises what choice is. He says that, since an object of choice is simply one of the number of the things within our power and which

consilio desideratur, consequens est, quod electio nihil aliud sit, quam desiderium eorum quae sunt in nostra potestate, ex consilio proveniens. Est enim electio actus appetitus rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas. Ideo autem dixit electionem esse desiderium consiliabile, quia ex hoc quod

is considered by means of counsel, it follows that choice is only a desire (arising by reason of counsel) for things in our power. Choice is an act of the rational appetitive faculty called the will. On this account he said that choice is a deliberating desire inasmuch as, via counsel, a man arrives at

homo consiliatur pervenit ad iudicandum ea quae sunt per consilium inventa ---, quod quidem desiderium est electio.

a judgment regarding the things which were discovered by means of counsel. This desire is choice.

Ultimo autem ostendit qualis sit praedicta diffinitio de electione data. Et dicit, quod nunc est definita electio tipo, id est figuraliter, non secundum quod est consuetum sibi determinare id quod est secundum subscriptionem, idest secundum definitionem cuius singulae partes

487. Last [2], at “Choice has now,” he shows of what nature this definition of choice is. He says that choice has now been defined by type, that is, in outline, and not as he customarily determines a thing through a full explanation, i.e., giving a definition and then investigating each element of

investigantur. Sed universaliter tradita est definitio electionis. Et dictum est circa qualia sit, scilicet circa ea quae sunt in nobis. Et supra etiam dictum est, quod est eorum quae sunt ad finem, de quibus etiam est consilium.

it. But the definition of choice has been given in a general way. It has been stated (486) of what nature the things are with which choice deals, i.e., things in our power. Also it has been said that choice is concerned with things that are ordered to ends—about these, too, counsel treats.

LECTURE 10 The Object of Willing Chapter 4 C. He begins the study of willing. 1. HE TAKES NOTE OF WHAT IS OBVIOUS ABOUT WILLING.

ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται,

488

As was stated before, willing is concerned with the end.

2. HE RAISES A DOUBT. a. He sets forth contrary opinions. — 489 δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ.

To some it seems that willing has for its object what is of itself good, but to others what is apparently good.

b. He disproves the first opinion. — 490 συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν [τὸ] βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ

For those who say the object of willing is what is good of itself, it follows that that thing is not an object of willing which a person does not rightly will. If something were an object of willing, it would be good but what is to prevent a

οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν,

man from wishing some thing evil.

c. He disproves the second opinion. — 491 τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο

On the other hand, for those who say the object of willing is apparent good, there is no such thing as a natural object of willing but only what appears so to each man.

δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία.

But different and sometimes contrary things seem to be objects of willing for different men.

3. HE SOLVES THE DOUBT. a. First he gives a solution according to a certain distinction. — 492 εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;

If these conclusions are not acceptable, it must be said, therefore, that in an absolute or true sense it is the good that is the object of willing, but for each man it is the apparent good.

b. He shows with whom both parts of this distinction agree. — 493 τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ

For the good man that thing is an object of willing which is truly good; for the vicious man that thing is an object of willing which seems pleasing to him. Thus when men are

διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα·

in good bodily health those things are healthful which are such in reality, but for men who are ill, it is otherwise. The same applies to bitter, sweet, warm, and heavy things and to others of this kind.

c. He explains what he said.

i. First as it affects virtuous men. — 494 ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν,

The virtuous person correctly passes judgment on each individual thing and in each case what appears to him is truly good. Those things which are proper to each habit seem pleasurable to it. The good man perhaps is much different in his capacity to see what is truly good in

ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν.

individual matters, being as it were a norm and measure of these things.

ii. Next... as it affects vicious men. — 495

ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα

Many men are apparently deceived because of pleasure. What is not good seems good, so they desire as good the

ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

pleasurable and seek to avoid the painful as evil.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Voluntas autem quoniam quidem finis et

488. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise

cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de voluntario et electione, hic determinat de voluntate. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod manifestum est de voluntate. Secundo inducit quamdam dubitationem, ibi: videtur autem his quidem et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi, si autem utique, et cetera. Dicit ergo

on the voluntary and on choice, he here begins the study of willing [C]. He initiates his discussion by three stages. First [1] he takes notes of what is obvious about willing. Next [2], at “To some it seems etc.,” he raises a doubt. Last [3], at “If these conclusions etc.,” he solves the doubt. First he restates what he has previously insisted on (466)

primo, quod dictum est supra, quod voluntas sit ipsius finis. Et loquitur hic de voluntate secundum quod nominat actum potentiae voluntatis. Cuiuslibet enim potentiae actus denominatus ab ipsa potentia respicit id in quod potentia primo et per se tendit: sicut visio dicitur actus potentiae visivae in ordine ad

that willing is concerned with the end itself. He speaks here of willing (voluntas) as it denotes the act of the faculty of the will. The act of any faculty is named from the faculty itself and regards that to which the faculty primarily and of itself tends. Thus the act of the visive faculty is called vision in relation to visible things. In this manner

visibilia. Et per hunc modum intellectus dicitur respectu primorum principiorum ad quae primo et per se comparatur intellectiva potentia; unde et voluntas dicitur proprie ipsorum finium, quos sicut principia quaedam primo et per se respicit potentia voluntatis.

understanding (intellectus) is named in relation to first principles that of themselves are referred primarily to the intellective faculty. Hence also willing is properly said to concern ends themselves which, as certain principles, the faculty of the will primarily and of itself regards.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., inducit quamdam dubitationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim proponit contrarias opiniones circa voluntatem. Et dicit, quod quibusdam

489. Then [2], at “To some it seems,” he raises a doubt. Regarding it he does three things. First [2, a] he sets forth contrary opinions about willing. He says that to some it seems that willing has for its

videtur, quod voluntas sit eius quod est per se bonum; aliis autem videtur, quod sit eius quod est apparens bonum.

object what is of itself good, but to others what is apparently good.

Secundo ibi: contingit autem etc., improbat

490. Next [2, b], at “For those who say,” he

primam positionem. Et dicit, quod illis qui dicunt quod nihil est voluntabile, idest in quod fertur voluntas, nisi id quod est per se bonum, sequitur quod non sit voluntabile quod vult ille qui non recte vult. Quia secundum eorum positionem sequeretur, si esset voluntabile, quod esset bonum. Contingit autem

disproves the first opinion stating that for those who say that only the good in itself is the object of willing (i.e., to which the will tends), it follows that that thing which a person does not rightly will is not an object of willing. The reason is that, according to their opinion, it would follow that if something were an object of willing, it would be

quandoque, quod est malum. Non ergo semper voluntas est per se boni.

good, but it happens sometimes that it is evil. Therefore willing does not always have real good as its object.

Tertio ibi: rursus autem etc., improbat

491. Last [2, c], at “On the other hand,” he

secundam positionem. Et dicit, quod illis, qui dicunt quod voluntabile sit apparens bonum, sequitur, quod nihil sit secundum naturam voluntabile, sed unicuique sit voluntabile id quod sibi videtur. Diversis autem diversa

disproves the second opinion, stating that for those who say the object of willing is apparent good, it follows that there is no natural object of willing but for each one the object of willing is what seems so to him. But for different men different and

videntur voluntabilia, et quandoque contraria. Sicut si non esset visibile color, sed id quod videtur color, sequeretur quod nihil esset naturaliter visibile. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Quia cuiuslibet potentiae naturalis est aliquod obiectum naturaliter

sometimes contrary things seem to be the object of willing. Thus if color were not visible but only what seemed to be color were visible, it would follow that nothing would be by nature visible. This, however, would not be fitting for every natural faculty has some object determined by its nature. Therefore it is

determinatum. Non ergo verum est, quod voluntas sit apparentis boni.

not true that the object of willing is apparent good.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem utique haec etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem. Et primo

492. At “If these conclusions” [3], he solves the afore-mentioned doubt. First [3, a] he gives a

ponit solutionem secundum quamdam distinctionem. Et dicit quod si dicta inconvenientia quae consequuntur ad ambas praedictas opiniones non acceptantur, dicendum est distinguendo, quod simpliciter et secundum veritatem voluntabile est per se

solution according to a certain distinction. He says that if these disagreeable conclusions following from both these opinions are unacceptable, we must answer with a distinction that what seems good to a man is desirable either without qualification or under some aspect, i.e., in relation to this or that.

bonum, sed secundum quid, id est per respectum ad hunc vel ad illum, est voluntabile id quod ei videtur bonum. Secundo ibi: studioso quidem etc., ostendit cui

493. Second [3, b], at “For the good man,” he

conveniat utrumque membrum distinctionis praemissae. Et dicit quod studioso, id est virtuoso, est voluntabile id quod est voluntabile secundum veritatem, idest simpliciter bonum: sed pravo, id est vitioso homini, est voluntabile quod contingit, id est quicquid sit illud indeterminate, quod sibi

shows with whom both parts of this distinction agree. He says that for the good man that thing is an object of willing which is truly worthy of being willed, i.e., good in itself. But for the wicked or vicious man that thing is the object of willing which attracts him, i.e., whatever seems pleasing to himself. He exemplifies this in things of the body.

videtur bonum. Et adhibet exemplum in corporalibus. Videmus enim, quod hominibus quorum corpora sunt bene disposita, sunt sana illa quae secundum veritatem sunt talia. Sed infirmis sunt sana quaedam alia, quae scilicet sunt temperativa malitiae complexionis eorum. Similiter etiam amara et dulcia

We see that for men whose bodies are in good health those things are healthful that are really so. But for the sick, certain other things are healthful, namely, those that moderate their diseased condition. Likewise things really bitter and sweet seem bitter and sweet to those who have a healthy taste, things really warm seem warm to those who

secundum veritatem videntur illis qui habent gustum bene dispositum, et calida his qui habent tactum bene dispositum, et gravia bene diiudicant illi, qui habent virtutem corporalem bene dispositam. His enim qui sunt debiles etiam levia videntur gravia.

have a normal sense of touch. Those who have normal bodily strength properly estimate the weight of objects; those who are weak think light objects heavy.

Tertio ibi: studiosus enim etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quantum ad virtuosos. Et dicit, quod virtuosus singula, quae pertinent ad operationes humanas, recte

494. Third [3, c], at “The virtuous person,” he explains what he said, first 1c, i] as it affects virtuous men. He says that the virtuous person correctly passes judgment on individual things that

diiudicat et in singulis videtur ei esse bonum id quod vere est bonum. Et hoc ideo quia unicuique habitui videntur bona et delectabilia ea quae sunt ei propria, idest ea quae ei conveniunt. Habitui autem virtutis conveniunt ea quae sunt secundum veritatem bona. Quia

pertain to human activity. In each case that which is really good seems to him to be good. This happens because things seem naturally pleasurable to each habit that are proper to it, that is, agree with it. Those things are agreeable to the habit of virtue that are in fact good because the habit of moral

habitus virtutis moralis definitur ex hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam; et ideo ea quae sunt secundum rationem, quae sunt simpliciter bona, videntur ei bona. Et in hoc plurimum differt studiosus ab aliis, quod in singulis operabilibus videt quid vere sit bonum,

virtue is defined by what is in accord with right reason. Thus the things in accord with right reason, things of themselves good, seem good to it. Here the good man differs very much indeed from others, for he sees what is truly good in individual practicable matters, being as it were the norm and

quasi existens regula et mensura omnium operabilium. Quia scilicet in eis iudicandum est aliquid bonum vel malum secundum quod ei videtur.

measure of all that is to be done because in these cases a thing must be judged good or bad according as it seems to him.

Secundo ibi: multis autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat quantum ad pravos. Et dicit quod multis, scilicet pravis, deceptio in discretione boni et mali accidit praecipue propter delectationem. Ex qua contingit quod delectabile quod non est bonum desiderent tamquam bonum, et aliquid tristabile ipsis,

495. Next [c, ii], at “Many men,” he explains what he said as it affects vicious men. He says that for many, the vicious, deception in the distinction between good and evil occurs especially because of pleasure. As a consequence of this it happens that they desire as good the pleasurable, which is not good, and seek to avoid as evil what is for them

quod in se est bonum, fugiant tamquam malum. Quia scilicet non sequuntur rationem, sed appetitum sensitivum.

painful but in itself good. The explanation is that they do not follow reason but the senses.

LECTURE 11 Virtue and Vice Are Within Our Power Chapter 5 I. HE DETERMINES THE TRUTH. A. He shows that virtue is within us. — 496 ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους,

Since willing regards the end but counsel and

βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή,

choice the means to the end, the actions concerning these means will be in accordance with choice and voluntary. But virtuous actions deal with the means. Virtue then is within our power.

B. He shows the same about vice. — 497-498

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ

For a similar reason vice is voluntary. If it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act; and contrariwise. Therefore if to do good is in our power, then not to do evil will also be in our power. If not to do good is in our power, then to do evil will also be in our power.

πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. C. He shows the reason for this necessary consequence. — 499 εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι.

If it is in our power to do and likewise not to do good or evil actions (by reason of this men become good or evil), it will be within our power to be virtuous or vicious.

II. HE REJECTS AN ERROR. A. First he removes the error itself. A’ He explains his rejection of the error. — 500 τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία

It is said that no one is voluntarily evil and that no one is unwillingly happy. The first statement is really false and the second true. In fact no person will be happy unwillingly. Vice, on the other hand, is a voluntary thing.

ἑκούσιον. B’ He raises a doubt over this. — 501 ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων.

Must we dispute even about what has now been said and hold that man is not the principle and begetter of his actions as he is father of his children?

C’ He determines the truth. 1. HE CONFIRMS THE TRUTH FIRST BY REASON. — 502 εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσια.

If these things (counsel, choice and willing) seem to be principles of our actions and we cannot reduce them into principles other than those within our power, then also our actions the

principles of which are under our control will themselves be in our power and voluntary. 2. (HE CONFIRMS THE TRUTH) BY SIGNS. a. He explains his proposition... first in the things that are clearly voluntary. — 503-504 τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ

This view seems to be supported by the testimony of private individuals and of legislators themselves for legislators punish and chastise evildoers, unless these do evil by compulsion or on account of ignorance of which they themselves were not the cause. Likewise legislators decree honors for

πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθ' ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν

those who do good, thus encouraging them as it were but restraining the others. No one persuades a man to do whatever things are not in his power and not voluntary because before it takes place it is of no use to persuade a man not to become hot, or afflicted, or hungry, or anything whatsoever of this kind. We will suffer these things nonetheless.

τοιούτων· οὐθὲν πεισόμεθα αὐτά.

γὰρ

ἧττον

b. In the things that seem to have something of the involuntary. — 505506 καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν

A man who is ignorant will be punished if he is the cause of his ignorance. A drunken man, for instance, is worthy of double punishment. The beginning is within him because he has it in his

αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι'

power not to get drunk. And his intoxication is the cause of his ignorance. Legislators punish those who are ignorant of things stated in the law that they should have known, but not those who are ignorant of the difficult things. Likewise in other cases we punish people whenever it seems

ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

that their ignorance was due to negligence because it is in their power not to be ignorant. They have it in their power to inform themselves.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Existente utique et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de voluntario, electione et consilio et voluntate quae sunt

496. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary, choice, counsel, and willing that are principles of human acts, he here applies what has

principia humanorum actuum, hic applicat ea quae dicta sunt ad vitia et virtutes. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat veritatem. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi, dicere autem quod nullus volens et cetera. Tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt de virtutibus, ibi, communiter quidem igitur et

been said to vices and virtues. Concerning this question he does three things. First [I] he determines the truth. Then [II], at “It is said that no one etc.,” he rejects an error. Last [Lect. 13; III], at “We have discussed virtues etc.” (B. 1114 b 26), he concludes with a summary of what has

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo secundum ea quae dicta sunt ostendit virtutem esse in nobis, idest in potestate nostra. Secundo ostendit idem de malitia, ibi, similiter autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit consequentiae rationem, ibi, si autem in nobis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum voluntas sit de fine, consilium autem

been said about virtue. On the first point he does three things. First [I, A], on the basis of his previous discussion, he shows that virtue is within us, i.e., in our power. Next [I, B], at “For a similar reason etc.,” he shows the same about vice. Last [I, C], at “If it is in our power etc.,” he shows the reason for this necessary consequence. He says

et electio de his quae sunt ad finem, consequens est quod operationes quae sunt circa haec, scilicet circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sint secundum electionem, et per consequens quod sint voluntariae, quia electio voluntarium quoddam est, ut supra dictum est. Sed

first that since willing regards the end but counsel and choice the means to the end, it follows that actions concerning this (i.e., the means to the end) are in accordance with choice and are consequently voluntary. The reason is that choice is a voluntary as was indicated before (434-436,

operationes virtutum sunt circa praedicta. Ergo sunt voluntariae. Et per consequens oportet quod etiam ipsa virtus sit voluntaria et in nobis, idest in potestate nostra existens.

457). But virtuous actions deal with the aforementioned (means) and are voluntary. Consequently, virtue itself must be voluntary and within us, that is, in our power.

Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., ostendit idem de malitia, id est de vitio virtuti opposito. Et dicit quod simili ratione etiam malitia est voluntaria et in nobis existens, quia operationes eius sunt tales. Et hoc sic probat: quia si operari est in potestate nostra, oportet etiam quod non operari sit in potestate nostra. Si enim non

497. Then [I, B], at “For a similar reason,” he shows the same thing about badness, i.e., about vice as opposed to virtue. He says that badness is likewise voluntary and within us because its operations are of this kind. He proves this in the following way: if the capacity to act is within us, the capacity not to act must also be in our power.

operari non esset in potestate nostra, impossibile esset nos non operari: ergo necesse esset nos operari: et sic operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex necessitate. Et similiter dicit quod in quibus rebus non operari est in potestate nostra, consequens est quod etiam operari sit in potestate nostra. Si enim operari non esset in

If the capacity not to act were not in our power, it would be impossible that we would not act. Therefore, it would be necessary that we act, and so the capacity to act would not come from us but from necessity.

potestate nostra, impossibile esset nos operari. Ergo necesse esset nos non operari: et sic non operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex necessitate. Sic ergo dicendum est quod in quibuscumque

498. As a consequence we must conclude that

rebus affirmatio est in nobis, et negatio, et e converso. Operationes autem virtutum et vitiorum, differunt secundum affirmationem et negationem. Puta si honorare parentes est bonum et actus virtutis, non honorare parentes

wherever affirmation is within our power, negation is also; and conversely. Virtuous and vicious actions differ according to affirmation and negation. For instance, if honoring parents is good and an act of virtue, then not to honor one’s

est malum et ad vitium pertinens. Et si non furari pertinet ad virtutem, furari pertinet ad vitium. Unde consequens est quod si operatio virtutum est in nobis, ut probatum est, quod etiam operatio vitii sit in nobis. Et ita per consequens ipsum vitium erit in nobis, id est in

parents is evil and pertains to vice. If not to steal pertains to virtue, to steal pertains to vice. Hence it follows that if the operation of virtue is within us, as has been proved (496), then the operation of vice also is within us. So consequently vice itself is within us, that is, in our power.

potestate nostra. Deinde cum dicit: si autem in nobis etc., assignat rationem praedictae consequentiae: scilicet quod si operationes sint in nobis, quod et

499. Next [I, C], at “If it is,” he assigns the reason for this necessary inference: if the operations are within us, the habits too are within us. He says

habitus sint in nobis. Et dicit quod si in potestate nostra est operari vel non operari bona vel mala, ut nunc ostensum est, quum per hoc quod homo operatur vel non operatur bonum vel malum, fiat bonus vel malus, ut in secundo ostensum est, consequens est quod in potestate nostra sit esse decentes, id est bonos

that if it is in our power to do or not to do good or evil actions, as has now been shown (497-498), while by reason of the fact that man works or does not work good or evil he becomes good or evil as was pointed out in the second book (250-253), it follows that it is within our power to be virtuous, i.e., good in conformity with the habit of virtue,

secundum habitum virtutis, secundum habitum vitii.

and vicious in conformity with the habit of vice.

et

pravos

Deinde cum dicit: dicere autem quod nullus etc., excludit errorem circa praedicta. Et primo

500. At “It is said” [II], he rejects an error about the afore-mentioned teaching. First [II, A] he

excludit ipsum errorem. Secundo radices eius, ibi, sed forsitan talis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo proponit erroris exclusionem. Secundo movet super hoc dubitationem, ibi, vel in nunc dictis et cetera. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, si autem haec videntur et cetera.

removes the error itself. Second [Lect. 12; II, B], at “Perhaps such a person etc.” (B. 1114 a 3], he removes its roots. On the first point his division is threefold. First [A’] he explains his rejection of the error. Next [B’], at “Must we dispute even about what etc.,” he raises a doubt over this. Last [C’],

Circa primum considerandum est, quod quidam dixerunt quod nullus est malus volens, neque aliquis est beatus vel bonus nolens; quod ideo dicebant quia voluntas per se tendit in bonum. Nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, et per consequens voluntas per se refugit malum. Dicit ergo quod unum horum verisimiliter

at “If these things etc.,” he determines the truth. In regard to the first we must consider that some have held that no one is voluntarily evil, nor is anyone unwillingly happy or good. They say this because the will of itself tends to good. Good is what all desire and consequently the will of itself seeks to avoid evil. He says, therefore, that one of

apparet esse mendacium, scilicet quod nullus sit malus volens, quia malitia est quiddam voluntarium; alterum autem videtur esse verum, scilicet quod nullus sit beatus vel bonus nolens.

these statements is in all likelihood false, namely, that no one is willingly evil since vice is something voluntary. The other seems to be true, that no one is unwillingly good and happy.

Deinde cum dicit vel in nunc dictis etc., movet dubitationem circa praedicta. Si enim verum est quod actiones virtutum et vitiorum sint voluntariae, et per consequens virtus et malitia, planum est verum esse quod nunc dictum est.

501. Then [B’], at “Must we dispute,” he raises a doubt about things said before. If it is true that virtuous and vicious actions (and consequently virtue and vice) are voluntary, obviously what has presently been said is true. But is there anyone

Sed numquid est aliquis qui credat esse dubitandum de praedictis, ita quod dicat hominem non esse principium suorum operum neque genitorem per modum quo pater est principium filiorum? Quasi dicat: mirum est si aliquis hoc dicat.

who believes there should be a doubt about what has been said, so that he might say that a man is not the principle and begetter of his actions as a father is the principle of his children? He as much as says: that anyone would say this, is to be wondered at.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem haec videntur etc., confirmat veritatem. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per signa, ibi, his autem videntur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, si haec, scilicet

502. Next [C’], at “If these things,” he confirms the truth first [i] by reason; and then [2], at “This view seems etc.,” by signs. He says first that if counsel, choice, and willing—which are in our

consilium et electio et voluntas, quae sunt in potestate nostra, videntur esse principia operationum nostrarum, et non possumus reducere operationes nostras in alia principia nisi in ea quae sunt in potestate nostra, scilicet consilium et electio, consequens est quod etiam operationes nostrae bonae vel malae sint in

power—are seen as principles of our actions and we cannot reduce our actions to principles other than those that are in our power (i.e., counsel and choice) it follows that our good and bad actions are within our power. Because their principles are in our power, they themselves are in our power and hence are voluntary.

potestate nostra. Quia illa quorum principia sunt in potestate nostra, et ipsa sunt in potestate nostra, et sunt voluntaria. Deinde cum dicit: his autem videntur etc.,

503. At “This view seems” [2], he explains his

manifestat propositum per signa. Et primo in his quae manifeste sunt voluntaria. Secundo in his quae videntur aliquid de involuntario habere, ibi, etenim in ipso ignorare et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod his quae dicta sunt, scilicet quod operationes virtutum et vitiorum

proposition by means of signs: first [2, a] in the things that are clearly voluntary; and then [2, b], at “A man who is ignorant etc.,” in the things that seem to have something of the involuntary. He says first that the particular things that are done by individual private persons seem to bear witness

sint in nobis, videntur attestari propria quae fiunt a singulis privatis personis. Quilibet enim paterfamilias punit filium vel servum male agentem. Et similiter attestantur ea quae fiunt a legislatoribus qui habent curam reipublicae; ipsi enim puniunt levius vel cruciant gravius eos qui operantur mala, dum tamen non faciant hoc

to what has been said, i.e., that virtuous and vicious actions are within our power. Any father of a family punishes a child or a servant who does wrong. Likewise the things that are done by legislators, who care for the welfare of the state, bear witness. They give sometimes a light, other times a heavy sentence to criminals, provided

per violentiam vel propter ignorantiam, cuius scilicet ignorantiae ipsi non sunt causa. Si enim per vim aut ignorantiam operarentur, non essent eorum opera voluntaria, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde manifestum est quod puniunt eos tamquam voluntarie operantes.

however the wrongdoers do not act under coercion or through ignorance (of which they are not the cause); if they acted by compulsion or ignorance, their acts would not be voluntary, as is evident from what was said before (400-405). Hence it is clear that they were punished as acting voluntarily.

Et similiter honorant operantes bona voluntarie: quasi per honores provocantes

504. Likewise legislators decree honors for those who voluntarily do good: as it were encouraging

bonos ad bona et per poenas prohibentes malos

the virtuous to good deeds by means of honors,

a malis. Nullus autem provocat aliquem ad operandum ea quae non sunt in potestate nostra neque voluntaria. Quia in talibus suasio ante opus est omnino inutilis. Sicut si aliquis suadeat alicui ut in aestate non calefiat vel in infirmitate non doleat vel subtractis cibis non

and restraining the vicious from evil by means of punishments. No one encourages a man to do the things that are not in his power and not voluntary because in such matters encouragement before the act is entirely useless. It is useless, for instance, to urge a man in summer not to be hot, or in sickness

esuriat, vel si aliquid aliud est tale quod non sit in potestate nostra, quia nihil minus propter suasionem pateremur haec. Si ergo non provocamur ad ea quae non sunt in nobis, provocamur autem ad faciendum bona et vitandum mala, consequens est quod ista sint in nobis.

not to be afflicted or not to be hungry when there is no food. or to do anything beyond his power. The reason is that he would suffer these things notwithstanding encouragement. If, therefore, we are not urged to do the things that are not within our power, but are urged to do good and avoid evil, such things are in our power.

Deinde cum dicit: et enim in ipso ignorare etc., manifestat idem in his quae videntur habere aliquid de involuntario. Ignorantia autem involuntarium causat, ut supra dictum est: si

505. Then [2, b], at “A man who is,” he manifests the same truth in those things which seem to have something of the involuntary. Ignorance causes an involuntary, as was explained before (406-424). If,

tamen nos simus ignorantiae causa, erit ignorantia voluntaria, et pro ea puniemur. Est autem aliquis causa ignorantiae dupliciter. Uno modo directe aliquid agendo; sicut patet de his qui se inebriant, et ex hoc redduntur ignorantes; qui dupliciter sunt increpandi,

however, we are the cause of the ignorance, the ignorance will be voluntary and we will be punished for it. A man can be the cause of his own ignorance in two ways. in one way directly, by doing something, as is evident in those who get drunk and for this reason are rendered ignorant.

primo quidem quia se inebriaverunt. Secundo quia ex ebrietate aliquod peccatum fecerunt. Principium enim ebrietatis est in potestate ipsius hominis, quia homo est dominus eius, quod non inebrietur, idest in sua potestate hoc habet: ebrietas autem est causa ignorantiae et sic per consequens homo est ignorantiae causa.

These should be doubly blamed. First because they drank too much, and next because they committed a sinful deed in their drunkenness. The principle of drunkenness is in the man himself because he has the power to remain sober and his drunkenness is the cause of his ignorance. Accordingly in this way a man is the cause of ignorance.

Alio autem modo est homo causa ignorantiae indirecte per hoc quod non agit illud quod agere debet; et propter hoc ignorantia eorum quae

506. In the other way a man is the cause of ignorance indirectly by reason of the fact that he does not do what he ought to do. On account of

scire tenetur et potest, reputatur voluntaria, et pro ea homines puniuntur, et hoc est quod dicit quod legislatores puniunt ignorantes ea quae sunt lege statuta, quae omnes scire oportet, sicut quod non est furandum; et non sunt difficilia, sicut subtilitates iuris quas non tenentur omnes scire, quia nec possent. Et idem

this, ignorance of the things a man can and is bound to know is considered voluntary and therefore he is punished for it. This is why he says that legislators punish those who are ignorant of laws everyone ought to know (as that which forbids stealing), but not those who are ignorant of laws which are difficult to know and which not

etiam est in aliis quaecumque homines videntur ignorare propter negligentiam; quia in potestate eorum erat ut non ignorarent; sunt enim domini, id est in potestate sua habentes, ut sint diligentes et non negligentes.

all are bound to know (because it is not possible). The same is true of those things which men do not know apparently by reason of negligence, because they could have learned. They are masters of themselves and they can be diligent and not negligent.

LECTURE 12 Refutation of the opinion: No One Is Voluntarily Evil Chapter 5 (II)B. He removes the root of this error. A’ In regard to the internal disposition. 1. HE PROPOSES THAT WHICH ONE CAN DEPEND ON IN SUPPORT OF THE PRECEDING ERROR. — 507 ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

Perhaps such a person is naturally not diligent.

2. HE DISPROVES THIS. a. He shows that habits of the soul... are voluntary. i. With respect to their formation. x. HE BRINGS FORWARD HIS PROPOSITION. — 508-510 ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·

But men make themselves negligent by having carelessly, and unjust and incontinent by doing evil to others and spending their time in drinking and such things.

y. HE PROVES IT. aa. By means of a likeness. — 511 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς

A man’s outlook depends on the way he exercises his powers. This is clearly manifest in the case of those who devote their attention to some exercise or activity.

ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.

They perfect themselves by constant practice. It seems then that only a man lacking understanding would be ignorant that habits are produced by individual actions.

bb.

By a reason taken from the relation of an act to a habit. — 512

ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὂν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη,

Moreover, it is unreasonable to assert that a man who does unjust actions does not wish to be unjust, or who perpetrates seductions does not wish to be incontinent. If one knowingly does those things from which it follows that he is unjust, he will be voluntarily unjust.

ii. He shows they (i.e., habits) are not voluntary after their formation. — 513 οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ'

Because a person becomes unjust voluntarily, it does not follow that he will cease to be unjust and become just whenever he wishes. One who is sick does not become well in this way. So too it is with a man who voluntarily becomes sick by living immoderately and disregarding the doctor’s advice. Before, it was within his power not to become sick, but having placed the

οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν [καὶ ῥῖψαι]· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ

cause the effect is no longer within his power, just as one who throws a stone has not the power to take back the throwing. Nevertheless it is within a man’s power to cast or throw a stone because the original act was under his control. So it is also with the unjust and the incontinent who in the beginning had the power not to be come like this. For this reason they are

ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.

voluntarily unjust and incontinent although after they have become such it is no longer within their power not to be such.

b. He indicates that even bodily defects... are voluntary. — 514 οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ

Not only vices of the soul are voluntary but also defects of the body in certain men whom we justly reproach. No one reproaches those who are born ugly but only those who are so because of slothfulness and

φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ

carelessness. The same is true with weakness, disgrace, and blindness. No one justly taunts a man who is blind from birth or disease or a wound but he is rather shown sympathy. But everyone does reproach a man blind because of excessive drinking of wine or other incontinence. Men are reproached for those vices

μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν

and bodily defects that are within our power; but not for those beyond our control. This being so, in other things (pertaining to the soul) the vices we are blamed for must be within our power.

κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Sed forsitan talis aliquis et cetera. Postquam philosophus exclusit errorem dicentium quod nullus est voluntarie malus, hic excludit

507. After the Philosopher has rejected the error of those who hold that no one is voluntarily evil, he now [B] removes the roots of this error: first [A’] in

radices huius erroris. Et primo quidem quantum ad interiorem dispositionem ex qua posset aliquis (se) inclinari ad malum praeter suam voluntatem. Secundo quantum ad vim apprehensivam per quam aliquid iudicatur bonum vel malum, ibi. Si autem quis dicat et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

regard to the internal disposition by reason of which (contrary to his own will) someone can tend to evil. Then [Lect. 13; B’], at “Someone may say” (B.1114 a 32), in the matter of the faculty of knowledge by which a thing is judged good or bad. He handles the first point in two steps. First [1] he proposes that which one can depend on in support of the preceding

proponit id cui posset aliquis inniti ad sustinendum errorem praedictum. Secundo hoc improbat, ibi: sed eius quod est tales fieri et cetera. Dixerat autem supra philosophus quod in hominis potestate est quod aliquis sit diligens vel negligens circa aliquid. Sed hoc

error. Then [2], at “But men make themselves,” he disproves this. The Philosopher has stated (506) that it is in the power of man to be diligent or negligent about something. But someone could deny this, saying that some person is naturally not diligent. Thus we see that men with phlegmatic

posset aliquis negare, dicens quod aliquis naturaliter talis est ut non sit diligens. Sicut videmus phlegmaticos naturaliter esse pigros, cholericos autem iracundos, melancholicos tristes et sanguineos iucundos. Et secundum hoc sequitur quod non sit in potestate hominis quod sit diligens.

temperaments are naturally lazy, men with choleric temperaments are naturally irascible, men with melancholic temperaments are naturally sad and men with sanguine temperaments are naturally joyful. According to this, it is not within man’s power to be diligent.

Deinde cum dicit: sed eius quod est tales fieri etc., excludit quod dictum est. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquis potest dici aliqualis dupliciter. Uno modo

508. Then [2], at “But men make,” he rules out what was just said. To understand this we must consider that a man can be said to be of a particular bent in two ways. In one way according to bodily

secundum dispositionem corporalem sive consequentem corporis complexionem, sive consequentem impressionem caelestium corporum: et ex huiusmodi dispositione non potest immediate immutari intellectus vel voluntas quae sunt penitus incorporeae potentiae non utentes organo corporeo, ut

disposition following either the temperament of the body or the influence of the heavenly bodies. By reason of this disposition there can be no direct change of the intellect or will, which are faculties altogether incorporeal not using a bodily organ, as is made clear by the Philosopher in the third book De Anima (Ch. 4, 429 a 29-429 b 4; St. Th. Lect. 7,

patet per philosophum in tertio de anima. Potest autem per huiusmodi dispositionem sequi aliqua immutatio ex parte appetitus sensitivi qui utitur corporeo organo, cuius motus sunt animae passiones. Et secundum hoc ex huiusmodi dispositione nihil amplius

687-699). But by this type of disposition some change can follow in the sensitive appetitive faculty, which does use a bodily organ, the movements of which are the passions of the soul. Accordingly, from such a disposition there is no more movement of the reason and will (which are principles of human acts)

movetur ratio et voluntas quae sunt principia humanorum actuum, quam ex passionibus animae, de quibus supra in I dictum est quod sint suasibiles ratione. Alia autem est

than is had from the passions of the soul, and concerning these it was likewise pointed out in the first book (241) that they are susceptible of persuasion by the reason. The other disposition is on

dispositio ex parte animae: quae quidem est habitus ex quo inclinatur voluntas vel ratio in operatione.

the part of the soul. This is a habit by means of which the will or reason is inclined in operation.

Et ideo philosophus, praetermissis dispositionibus vel qualitatibus corporalibus, agit de sola dispositione habituum. Circa hoc ergo duo facit: primo enim ostendit quod habitus animae secundum quos aliquis est negligens vel iniustus, sunt voluntarii ex hoc

509. On this account the Philosopher, having passed over the dispositions or qualities of the body, treats only the disposition of habits. On this point he does two things. First [2, a] he shows that habits of the soul according to which a man is negligent or unjust are voluntary from the fact that he is censured on

quod propter eos aliquis increpatur; secundo ostendit quod etiam defectus corporales qui sunt increpabiles sunt voluntariae, ibi: non solum autem animae malitiae et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod habitus animae sunt voluntarii quantum ad eorum generationem. Secundo ostendit quod

account of them. Second [2, b], at “Not only vices of the soul etc.,” he indicates that even bodily defects which are blameworthy are voluntary. Regarding the first he does two things. First [a, i] he indicates that habits of the soul are voluntary with respect to their formation. Then [a, ii] he shows that they are not voluntary after their formation has already been

non sunt voluntarii postquam iam eorum generatio est completa. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, quae enim circa singula et cetera.

completed. Touching on the first he does two things. First [i, x] he brings forward his proposition; and next [i, y], at “A man’s outlook etc.,” he proves it.

Est autem considerandum quod habitus mali differunt, sicut et actus mali. Quidam enim sunt mali habitus ex eo quod retrahunt a bene agendo; et quantum ad huiusmodi habitus dicit quod ipsi homines sibiipsis sunt causa, ut fiant tales, idest non diligentes ad

510. We must consider that evil habits differ as evil acts do. Some habits are evil from the fact that they withdraw a man from doing good. With respect to habits of this kind he says that men are the cause of their own evil lives for they are not diligent in doing good; they live carelessly without attempting good

bene operandum, per hoc quod vivunt remisse, idest absque conatu ad bonas operationes. Alii autem habitus mali sunt per quos aliquis inclinatur ad male agendum; sive hoc sit, in nocumentum aliorum, sive in propriam deordinationem. Et quantum ad hoc dicit quod homines sibiipsis sunt causa quod

works. Other habits are evil because through them a man is inclined to do evil, whether this brings about the injury of others or one’s own disordered condition. With respect to these he says men by their own volition are the reason why they are unjust inasmuch as they do evil to others, and incontinent inasmuch as they live their lives in unnecessary

sint iniusti, in quantum mala faciunt aliis, et incontinentes inquantum vitam suam ducunt in superfluis potibus et in aliis huiusmodi quae ad delectabilia tactus pertinent.

drinking and in other things of this kind which pertain to the pleasures of touch.

Deinde cum dicit quae enim circa singula etc., probat propositum. Et primo per similitudinem in aliis. Videmus enim quod in singulis operationes faciunt tales, id est dispositos ad similia operanda. Et istud manifestum est ex illis qui student et operam

511. Next [i, y], at “A man’s outlook,” he proves the proposition first [y, aa] by means of a likeness in other things. We see that things done in individual actions make men of that particular stamp, i.e., disposed to do similar things. This is clearly manifest in the case of those who are diligent in and take

dant ad quodcumque exercitium, puta luctae

pains with an exercise (like wrestling or soldiering)

vel militiae, aut quamcumque operationem. Omnes enim ex hoc quod operantur multoties fiunt tales, ut possint similia perfecte facere. Cum ergo hoc videamus contingere in omnibus, hoc videtur esse hominis quasi sensu carentis, quod ignoret ex operationibus

or any activity whatsoever. Everyone, from the fact that he does the action many times, becomes so adept that he can do similar things perfectly. Since then we see this happen in all cases, it seems that only a man lacking understanding would be ignorant that habits are produced by operations.

habitus generari. Secundo ibi: adhuc autem irrationabile etc., ostendit idem ratione sumpta ex ordine actus ad habitum. Si enim aliquis vult aliquam

512. Then [y, bb], at “Moreover, it is,” he shows the same thing by a reason taken from the relation of an act to a habit. If a man wills some cause from which

causam ex qua scit sequi talem effectum, consequens est quod velit illum effectum. Et quamvis forte non velit illum effectum secundum se, potius tamen vult illum effectum esse quam causa non sit. Sicut si aliquis velit ambulare in aestu, praesciens se sudaturum, consequens est quod velit sudare.

he knows a particular effect results, it follows that he wills that effect. Although perhaps he does not intend that effect in itself, nevertheless he rather wishes that the effect exist than that the cause not exist. Thus if someone wishes to walk when it is hot, knowing beforehand he will work up a sweat, it follows that he wishes to perspire. Although he does

Quamvis enim hoc secundum se non velit, vult tamen potius sudorem pati quam ab itinere abstinere. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid non esse secundum se voluntarium quod tamen est voluntarium propter aliud, sicut potio amara propter sanitatem. Aliter autem esset si homo nesciret quod talis effectus

not wish this in itself, nevertheless he wishes rather to perspire than to forego the walk. Nothing hinders a thing from being non-voluntary in itself, although it may be voluntary on account of something else, as a bitter potion taken for health. It would be otherwise if a man were ignorant that such an effect would follow from such a cause, e.g., a voluntary is

sequeretur ex tali causa. Puta si aliquis ambulans in via, incidit in latrones, non efficitur hoc voluntarium, quia non fuit praescitum. Manifestum est autem quod homines iniusta facientes fiunt iniusti, et stupra committentes fiunt incontinentes.

not effected when a man who walks along the road falls among robbers because he did not know this beforehand. Obviously then men who do unjust actions become unjust and those committing seduction become incontinent. Therefore, it is unreasonable for a man to will to do unjust actions

Ergo irrationabile est quod aliquis velit iniusta facere et non velit esse iniustus, aut velit stupra committere et non velit esse incontinens. Sed manifestum est quod, si non ignorans operatur voluntarie illa ex quibus sequitur quod sit iniustus, voluntarie erit iniustus.

and nevertheless not intend to be unjust or to will to perpetrate seductions and not will to be incontinent. Thus obviously if a man who is aware of his action does voluntarily those things which make him unjust, he will be voluntarily unjust.

Deinde cum dicit: non tamen si velit etc.,

513. At “Because a person becomes unjust” [a, ii],

ostendit quod habitus mali non subiacent voluntati omnino, postquam sunt generati. Et dicit quod non ideo, quia voluntarie fit aliquis iniustus, quandocumque volet desinet esse iniustus et fiet iustus. Et hoc probat per simile in dispositionibus corporalibus. Si enim sit aliquis qui quum sanus esset, volens in

he shows that evil habits are not subject to the will after they have been formed. He says that because a person becomes unjust voluntarily, it does not follow that he ceases to be unjust and becomes just whenever he may will. He proves this by means of a likeness in the dispositions of the body. A man who in good health willingly falls into sickness by living

aegritudinem incidit per hoc quod vivit incontinenter, utendo scilicet immoderato cibo et potu et non obediendo medicis, a principio inerat in eius potestate non aegrotare; sed postquam emisit actionem, sumpto scilicet iam superfluo aut nocivo cibo,

incontinently i.e., by eating and drinking to excess and not following the doctor’s advice, had it in his power in the beginning not to become sick. But after he has performed the act, having eaten unnecessary or harmful food, it is no longer in his power not to be sick. Thus he who throws a stone is able not to

non adhuc est in potestate eius ut non aegrotet. Sicut ille qui proiecit lapidem potest, non proiicere: non tamen in potestate eius est quod resumat quando proiecerit, et tamen dicimus quod emittere vel proiicere lapidem sit in hominis potestate, quia a principio sic erat. Sic etiam est et de habitibus vitiorum:

throw it; however once he has thrown the stone he has not the power to take back the throwing. Nevertheless we do say that it is within a man’s power to cast or throw a stone because it was from a principle under his control. So it is also with the habits of vice; that a man not become unjust or incontinent arises from a principle under his control.

quia a principio in potestate hominis est quod non fiat iniustus vel incontinens. Unde dicimus quod homines volentes sunt iniusti et incontinentes: quamvis postquam facti sunt tales, non adhuc sit hoc in eorum potestate, ut scilicet statim desinant esse iniusti vel incontinentes; sed ad hoc requiritur magnum

Hence we say that men are voluntarily unjust and incontinent, although, after they have become such, it is no longer within their power to cease being unjust or incontinent immediately, but great effort and practice are required.

studium et exercitium. Deinde cum dicit: non solum autem etc., ostendit per similitudinem corporalium defectuum quod habitus vitiosi sint

514. Then [2, b], at “Not only,” he shows by means of a likeness to bodily defects that vicious habits are voluntary. He says that not only vices of the soul are

voluntarii. Et dicit quod non solum malitiae animae sunt voluntariae, sed in quibusdam defectus corporales. Et tales homines iuste increpamus. Nullus enim iuste increpat eos qui sunt turpes naturaliter, sed solum eos qui sunt turpes propter aliquam negligentiam debiti cultus. Et similiter se habet de

voluntary but also defects of the body in certain men. Such men we justly reproach. No one reproaches those who are born ugly but only those who are ugly by reason of some negligence in proper care. The same is true with weaknesses and blindness. No one justly taunts a man who is blind from birth or disease or a wound which is not voluntary. But on

debilitate aut de caecitate: nullus enim iuste improperabit ei qui est caecus a nativitate vel ex infirmitate vel ex aliqua plaga, quia hoc non est voluntarium, sed magis propter hoc homines miserentur eorum. Et sic patet quod malitiarum sive defectuum corporalium illi

account of those things sympathy rather is shown to the victim. Thus it is evident that we are reproached for those vices and bodily defects which are within our power. Hence obviously in other things, i.e., those things which pertain to the soul, the vices or vicious habits are in our power.

increpantur qui sunt in potestate nostra, non autem illi qui non sunt in nostra potestate. Unde manifestum est quod etiam in aliis, id est in his quae ad animam pertinent, malitiae, id est habitus vitiosi, qui increpantur in nostra potestate existunt.

LECTURE 13

Refutation of the Opinion: We Have No Faculty Cognoscitive of Good Chapter 5 B’ He excludes another fundamental principle on the part of the cognoscitive power. 1. HE EXPLAINS THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE. — 515-516 εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ·

Someone may say that every man desires what appears good to him for we are not in command of our imagination, but according to the character of each man, so does the end seem to him.

2. HE REJECTS IT. a. He gives the reason repudiating these allegations. — 517-520 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος·

Since, therefore, everyone is in some measure the cause of his habits, he is to some extent the cause of the manner in which his imagination reacts.

b. He adds an answer that seems to counter this. — 521-523 εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ

Perhaps no one is himself the cause of the evil he does, but each acts because of ignorance of the end under the impression that something very good will follow by means of his action. It ensues then that the end is not an object desired by a man’s free will but must be innate

καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ

as though a man had some (moral) sight to judge correctly and to desire what is really good. He is well-born who has this good judgment from birth. For he will possess the greatest and best of gifts, one which can never be received or learned from others, but kept just as nature gave it, and to be well and nobly

ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.

endowed with this will be a perfect and true and propitious heritage.

c. He disproves the counter-argument. — 524-525 εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε

If this is true how is virtue more voluntary than vice? For both alike, i.e., the good and the wicked, the end appears and is fixed by nature or howsoever it may be. In referring

φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ

everything else to this end, men do whatever they do. Whether the end then, whatever it may be, does not so present itself by nature, but also depends on him, or whether the end is natural, and the good man using the means is voluntarily virtuous, in either case virtue as well as vice will be voluntary. For voluntariety

ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί

exists in the evil man also since it influences him both in his actions and in his view of the end. If then, as is affirmed, virtues are voluntary (for indeed we ourselves are partly responsible for the way our habits dispose us and by living in a certain way we fix our end

ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα, καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

accordingly) it follows that vices also are voluntary because a similar reason is present.

III.

HE

SUMS

UP

IN

CONCLUSION

THE

MATERIAL

PREVIOUSLY

DISCUSSED. A. He shows what has already been said about virtues. — 526 κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ. οὐχ

We have discussed virtues in general and the outline of their genus. We have shown that each is a mean and a habit. We have explained that habits produce the same actions by which the habits themselves are caused. We have said that habits are in our power and

ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως

voluntary, that they follow right reason and that voluntary operations are otherwise than habits because we have control over our operations from the beginning to the end when we know the particular circumstances. We are masters only of the beginning of our habits, but the individual steps by which they grow

ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.

are not known to us, as in sicknesses. But because it was in our power to act or not to act in this way, the habits are called voluntary.

B. He shows what remains to be treated. — 527 ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

Taking up again the consideration of virtues, we will discuss what each virtue is with what matter it deals and in what way it operates. At the same time we will clearly see also how many virtues there are. First we will treat the virtue of fortitude.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Si autem quis dicat et cetera. Postquam philosophus exclusit radicem ponentium malitiam non esse voluntariam ex parte dispositionis inclinantis appetitum, hic excludit

95. After the Philosopher has overthrown the fundamental principle of those who hold that vice is not voluntary on the part of the disposition inclining the appetitive faculty, he here [B’]

aliam radicem ex parte virtutis cognoscitivae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit dictam radicem. Secundo excludit eam, ibi, siquidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum, considerandum est, quod bonum movet appetitum inquantum est apprehensum. Sicut enim appetitus seu inclinatio naturalis, sequitur formam

excludes another fundamental principle on the part of the cognoscitive power. On this point he does two things. First [1] he explains this fundamental principle; and second [2], at “Since, therefore, etc.,” he rejects it. In regard to the first we must consider that good precisely as it is perceived moves the desire. As the natural desire or inclination follows

naturaliter inhaerentem, ita appetitus animalis sequitur formam apprehensam. Ad hoc igitur quod aliquid appetatur, praeexigitur quod apprehendatur ut bonum. Et inde est quod unusquisque desiderat id quod apparet sibi esse bonum.

the form naturally inherent, so the animal desire follows the perceived form. In order then that a thing be desired, it is first required that it be perceived as good. Hence everyone desires what appears good to him.

Potest ergo aliquis dicere quod hoc non est in potestate nostra quod hoc videatur vel appareat nobis bonum quasi nos simus domini phantasiae, idest apparitionis vel visionis: sed

96. Therefore someone can say it is not in our power that this thing should seem or appear good to us. The reason is that we are not in command of our imagination, i.e., over the way things appear or

qualis est unusquisque, talis finis videtur ei: idest tale aliquid videtur ei appetendum quasi bonum et finis. Secundum enim propriam formam est aliquid unicuique conveniens, sicut igni ferri sursum et terrae ferri ad medium. Et sic etiam videmus in animalibus quod unumquodque animal appetit aliquid tamquam

seem to us. But in accord with the disposition of a man, so does his end seem to him, that is, such as a thing seems to a person, it must be desired as good and an end. A thing is agreeable to each according to its proper form: as fire tends upward, and things of earth tend to the center. So also we see that among the animals each one strives after

bonum et finis secundum dispositionem suae naturae. Unde diversa animalia habent diversos motus et operationes, quamvis omnia animalia unius speciei habeant similes motus et operationes. In specie autem humana inveniuntur diversi habentes diversos motus et operationes. Unde aestimaverunt aliqui quod

something as good and an end according to its own natural disposition. Hence different animals have different activities and operations, although all animals of one species have similar movements and operations. But in the human species individuals are found having different movements and operations. Hence some were of the opinion that

hoc esset propter diversam naturalem dispositionem propter quam videtur quidem huic hoc bonum, alii autem illud, ita quod hoc non subiaceat hominis dominio sive potestati.

this arose from a natural disposition on account of which this thing seems good to one person and that to another in such a way that the procedure was not subject to a man’s control.

Deinde cum dicit: si quidem igitur sibi etc., excludit radicem praedictam. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit rationem removentem quod dictum est. Secundo in contrarium subdit

517. Then [2], at “Since, therefore,” he excludes the afore-mentioned principle, and concerning it he does three things. First [a] he gives the reason repudiating these allegations (516). Next [b], at

solutionem interimentem, ibi: si autem nullus sibi causa etc.; tertio improbat eam, ibi, si utique haec sunt vera et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod aliquid potest alicui bonum apparere dupliciter.

“Perhaps no one etc.,” he adds an answer which seems to counter this. Last [c], at “If this is true,” he disproves the counter-argument. On the first point we must consider that a thing can appear good to someone in two ways.

Uno modo in universali, quasi speculativa quadam consideratione. Et huiusmodi iudicium de bono non consequitur aliquam dispositionem particularem, sed universalem vim rationis syllogizantis in operabilibus sicut et in his quae sunt a natura. Sed quia

518. In one way in general, it is so by a kind of speculative consideration. Such a judgment about good follows not any particular disposition but the universal power of reason syllogizing about actions, as it does in the case of natural things. Since practicable things are contingent, reason is not

operabilia sunt contingentia, non cogitur ratio ad assentiendum huic vel illi, sicut accidit in demonstrativis: sed in potestate habet homo, quod assentiat uni vel alii parti contradictionis; sicut accidit in omnibus opinabilibus et maxime circa operabilia in quibus plurima attenduntur,

forced to assent to this or that as it does when demonstration occurs. But man has the power to give assent to one or the other part of a contradiction, as happens in all practicable things especially when we have under consideration many objects, any one of which can be judged good.

secundum quorum quodlibet aliquid potest iudicari bonum vel non bonum. Alio modo potest aliquid apparere bonum alicui quasi practica cognitione per comparationem

519. In the other way a thing can appear good to someone, as it were by a practical knowledge, by

ad opus. Et de huiusmodi iudicio nunc philosophus loquitur, quod quidem potest super aliquo ferri, quod sit bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo ut aliquid videatur alicui simpliciter et secundum se bonum; et hoc videtur bonum secundum rationem finis. Alio autem modo ut videatur aliquid alicui bonum non simpliciter et

reason of a comparison with what is to be done. The Philosopher here speaks of this type of judgment that can be made in two ways about some good. In one way, a thing may appear good to someone absolutely and in itself. This seems to be a good in conformity with the nature of the end. In the other way, a thing may appear to someone not

secundum se, sed prout nunc.

absolutely in itself considerations.

Cum autem appetitus inclinetur in aliquid dupliciter; uno modo secundum animae

520. The appetitive faculty is inclined to an object on two accounts: one, by reason of a passion of the

passionem; alio modo secundum habitum: ex passione contingit quod aliquid iudicetur bonum prout nunc. Sicut illi qui timet submersionem, propter passionem timoris videtur bonum ut nunc, quod merces in mare proiciat, et concupiscenti quod fornicetur, sed iudicium quo homo iudicat aliquid esse bonum

soul, the other by reason of habit. Under the impulse of passion it happens that a thing is judged good as it is at present. Thus to one who is afraid of drowning it appears good at the moment to throw his merchandise overboard; as does fornication to one filled with lust. But the judgment, by which a man accounts a thing good in itself and absolutely,

ut secundum se et simpliciter provenit ex inclinatione habitus, et de hoc nunc agitur. Et ideo dicit quod, cum homo aliqualiter sit causa sui habitus mali propter consuetudinem peccandi, ut ostensum est, consequens est, quod ipse etiam sit sibi causa phantasiae

arises from the inclination of habit. This we will discuss now. He, therefore, says that since a man in some measure is the. cause of his own evil habit by reason of his continual sinning—as has been pointed out (509-92)—it follows that he himself is also the cause of the imaginative reaction that

but

judged

by

present

consequentis talem habitum, idest apparitionis qua sibi videtur hoc esse secundum se bonum.

follows such a habit, i.e., of the appearance by which this thing seems to be good in itself.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem nullus etc., ponit

521. Next [b], at “Perhaps no one,” he gives the

responsionem adversarii interimentis quod dictum est. Et dicit quod forte aliquis ponet quod nullus est sibi causa quod male faciat, sed hoc facit unusquisque propter ignorantiam finis, inquantum scilicet aestimat optimum aliquid consequi per id quod male operatur. Quod autem aliquis desiderat debitum finem,

counter-argument of the adversary against the point that has just been made (518-520). He says that perhaps someone will maintain that nobody is himself the cause of his own evil acts but each individual does evil because of ignorance of the end, inasmuch as he thinks that something very good is to follow from what he does wrongly. That a

non provenit homini propria sponte, sed oportet quod ex sua nativitate hoc ei conveniat: ut scilicet sicut homo visum exteriorem, quo homo bene iudicat colores, habet ex sua nativitate, ita etiam ex sua nativitate habeat bonam dispositionem interioris visus quo bene iudicet, et desideret id quod est secundum

person desires a proper end does not arise from his own free will but must belong to him from birth. As from birth a man has external sight by which he correctly distinguishes colors, so also from birth he should have a well-disposed internal vision by which he may judge well and desire what is really good. Thus he must be said to be of good birth in

veritatem bonum. Et sic ille dicendus erit bonam nativitatem habens, cui praedictum iudicium bene inditum est ex sua nativitate; illa enim videtur esse perfecta et vere bona nativitas per quam homini bene et optime innascitur illud quod est maximum et

whom the previously mentioned judgment has been implanted from birth. When a man innately has in good and perfect fashion what is greatest and best for him, this is a perfect and truly good birth. For man cannot gain this through the help or guidance of another; rather it is proper for him to possess it

optimum, et quod non potest homo alterius auxilio vel disciplina accipere; sed oportet quod tale id habeat quale inditum est sibi a natura. Ergo quod homo hoc bene habeat ex sua nativitate, duplici de causa reddit nativitatem laudabilem. Uno modo propter excellentiam huius boni. Alio modo propter impossibilitatem

in the manner that nature has endowed him with it. Therefore, that a man should have this from birth renders his birth doubly praiseworthy: in one way through the excellence of the good, in the other because of the impossibility of otherwise acquiring it.

aliter acquirendi. Considerandum est autem, quod haec videtur esse positio quorumdam mathematicorum ponentium quod homo in sua nativitate

522. We must consider that this seems to be the opinion of certain mathematicians who hold that man is disposed at his birth by the power of the

disponitur ex virtute caelestium corporum, ut hoc vel illud agat. Quam quidem positionem Aristoteles in libro de anima attribuit his qui non ponebant differentiam inter sensum et intellectum. Si enim aliquis dicat, sicut ibi dicitur: talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in die ducit pater virorum deorumque, idest

heavenly bodies to do this or that. This opinion is attributed by Aristotle in his work De Anima (Bk. III, Ch. 3, 426 a 21 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 4, 616-623) to those who did not hold the distinction between sense and intellect. If anyone should say, as in fact it is said in that place (ibid.), that the human will is impelled by the father of men and gods, i.e., the

caelum vel sol, consequens erit quod voluntas, et ratio in qua est voluntas, sit aliquid corporeum, sicut est sensus. Non enim est possibile, quod id quod in se est incorporeum a corpore moveatur. Et sic intellectus et

heavens or the sun, it will follow that the will (and the reason in which the will resides) is something corporeal as the senses are. It is not possible that what is in itself incorporeal should be moved by a body. Thus the will and intellect will contain a

voluntas habebit organum corporale et in nullo different a sensu et appetitu sensitivo. Unde et hic similitudinem ponit visus sensitivi, et visus quo rem iudicat.

bodily organ and they will differ in no way from the senses and the sensitive appetitive faculty. Wherefore he draws a comparison between the sense of sight and intellectual vision by which we judge a thing.

Est ergo dicendum, quod ex caelestibus corporibus potest aliqua dispositio causari in corpore humano ex qua inclinatur appetitus sensitivus, cuius motus est passio animae; unde ex inclinatione caelestium corporum non habet homo inclinationem ad hoc quod iudicet

523. It must be said then that the heavenly bodies can cause in the human body a disposition inclining the sensitive appetitive faculty, the motion of which is a passion of the soul. Hence by reason of the influence of the heavenly bodies, a man does not have the inclination to judge that a thing is good

aliquid esse bonum simpliciter et secundum se, sicut fit per habitum electivum virtutis et malitiae, sed ad iudicandum aliquid esse bonum ut nunc, sicut fit per passionem. Et idem est dicendum de inclinatione quae accidit ex complexione corporis. Nunc autem non agitur

absolutely and in itself (as through the habit of choice in virtue and vice) but to judge that a thing is good as it is at the moment, for example, in accordance with passion. The same observation must be made about the inclination that occurs from bodily temperament. In the present context,

de iudicio quo iudicatur aliquid bonum ex passione; quia voluntas potest hoc non consequi, ut dictum est, sed de iudicio quo iudicatur aliquid esse bonum per habitum. Unde ista responsio non excludit Aristotelis rationem.

however, there is no question of a judgment by which we judge something good in accordance with passion, for the will is able to reject this—as was stated in (516)—but of a judgment by which we judge that something is good by means of habit. Therefore, this answer does not destroy the reason of Aristotle.

Deinde cum dicit: si utique haec sunt vera etc., excludit praedictam responsionem ex suppositione eorum, quae adversarius supponebat. Supponebat enim adversarius

524. At “If this is” [c] he rejects this answer on the basis of the presuppositions of the adversary who took for granted that virtue is a voluntary but denied this of vice. Then returning to his earlier

quod virtus esset voluntarium, quod de malitia negabant. Et ideo, resumens ea quae praedicta sunt, quae usque huc suspenduntur, dicit, quod si ista sunt vera quae nunc dicta sunt, scilicet quod desiderium finis insit homini a natura, nulla est ratio quare magis virtus quam malitia sit voluntarium. Similis enim ratio est quod

discussion (516)—which he had interrupted—he says that if this is true, namely, that the desire of the end exists in man by nature, there is no greater reason why virtue more than vice is voluntary. Reasoning in a similar fashion we say that, for both the virtuous and the vicious man, the goal must be innate no matter in what way it may seem to be

ambobus, scilicet et virtuoso et vitioso, insit finis a natura, vel qualitercumque aliter ei videatur quantum ad apprehensionem, et

perceived and actually desired. Although virtuous and vicious operation is concerned not only with the end but also with the means to the end,

adiaceat quantum ad appetitum. Et quamvis operatio virtutis et vitii non solum sit circa

nevertheless men act by referring the remaining things (i.e., means to the end) to an end not from

finem, sed etiam circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sed tamen reliqua, idest ea quae sunt ad finem,

nature but howsoever it seems to them.

homines operantur referendo ad finem non a natura, sed qualitercumque eis videtur. Sive ergo dicatur quod finis non videtur

525. Therefore either it should be said that the end

unicuique esse talis a natura, sed apud ipsum est, idest in potestate eius, ut inhaereat tali vel

for every man does not seem to be such by nature but that it is relative to each man as it is in his

tali fini, sive etiam finis sit naturalis et in reliqua operando homo fiat voluntarie

power to cling to such or such an end, or even that the end is natural and by working on the means,

virtuosus, virtus tamen erit voluntaria. Et

man becomes voluntarily virtuous. Then virtue

similiter malitia: quia similiter et vitioso competit id quod est propter finem in

nonetheless will be voluntary. The same is true about vice because what is for the sake of the end in

operationibus, sicut et virtuoso, quemadmodum et similiter se habent in fine. Si

operations is attributable to the vicious man not less than to the virtuous, just as they are alike in

ergo, sicut supra ostensum est, virtutes sunt

regard to the end—as has been pointed out before

voluntariae ex eo quod nos sumus causae habituum, ex quibus disponimur ad hoc quod

(358-362). Therefore, if virtues are voluntary because of the fact that we are the causes of the

talem finem nobis ponamus, sequitur quod etiam malitiae sint voluntariae, quia similis

habits by which we are disposed to fix an end of such a kind, it follows that vices also are voluntary

ratio est de utrisque.

because a similar reason holds for one as well as the other.

Deinde cum dicit communiter igitur etc., epilogat ea quae supra dicta sunt. Et primo

526. Then [III], at “We have discussed,” he sums up in conclusion the material previously discussed

ostendit quid iam dictum sit de virtutibus. Secundo quid restat dicendum. Dicit ergo

(224525). First [A] he shows what has already been said about virtues, and then [B] what remains

primo, quod dictum est de virtutibus in

to be treated. He states first that virtues in general

communi et earum genus typo, id est figuraliter, manifestatum est, dum dictum est

have been treated (ibid.) and their genus has been clearly manifested in type, i.e., according to their

quod sunt medietates, quod pertinet ad genus propinquum, et quod sunt habitus, quod

general characteristics. Then it has been said (324331) what the mean is (this belongs to the

pertinet ad genus remotum, sub quo etiam continentur vitia. Dictum est etiam quod

proximate genus) and what the habits are (this belongs to the remote genus under which the vices

virtutes easdem operationes generant ex

are also contained). It has been affirmed also (255-

quibus causantur: dictum est etiam quod sunt in potestate nostra, et quod sequuntur rectam

279) that habits produce the same actions by which the habits themselves were caused. It has been

rationem, et quod aliter sunt voluntariae operationes quam habitus, quia nos sumus

stated too (496-525) that habits are in our power, that they follow right reason and that voluntary

domini operationum a principio usque ad finem, dummodo sciamus singulares

operations are otherwise than habits because we have control over operations from the beginning to

circumstantias, sed domini habituum non

the

sumus nisi a principio. Postmodum autem nobis ignorantibus per singulas operationes

circumstances. Although we do have control of habits from the beginning, afterwards, when we

adiicitur aliquid in generatione habituum. Sicut etiam accidit in aegritudinibus causatis

are inattentive, something is added in the generation of habits by means of particular

ex voluntariis actibus, ut supra dictum est. Sed quia a principio erat in potestate nostra, ut sic

operations. Thus it happens in sicknesses brought on by voluntary actions, as has been noted (513).

vel non sic ageremus, propter hoc etiam ipsi

But because it was in our power from the

habitus dicuntur voluntarii.

beginning to act or not to act in this way, the habits themselves are called voluntary.

Deinde cum dicit resumentes utique etc.,

527. Next [B], at “Taking up again,” he shows

ostendit quid restat dicendum. Et dicit quod

what remains to be treated. He says we must take

end,

provided

we

know

the

particular

oportet iterato resumere considerationem de

up again the consideration of the virtues in order to

virtutibus ut dicamus de unaquaque virtute quae sit, et circa qualem materiam, et qualiter

determine what each virtue is, its subject matter, and its mode of operation. Thus we will clearly see

operetur. Et sic etiam manifestum erit quot

also how many virtues there are. First we will treat

sunt virtutes. Et primo dicetur de fortitudine.

the virtue of fortitude.

LECTURE 14 Fortitude Chapter 6 I. HE TREATS THE MORAL VIRTUES THAT DEAL WITH THE PRINCIPAL PASSIONS TOUCHING THE VERY LIFE OF MAN. A. He studies fortitude. A’.

He investigates the matter of fortitude. 1.

HE REVIEWS WHAT WAS CLEARLY EVIDENT FROM THE

PREMISES ABOUT THE MATTER OF FORTITUDE. — 528-529 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους

We stated previously that fortitude is a mean

καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται·

dealing with fear and rashness.

2.

HE INVESTIGATES THE OBJECTS OF THESE PASSIONS AS

FORTITUDE IS CONCERNED WITH THEM. a. He shows what the objects of fear are. — 530-531 φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά,

Terrifying things are what we fear. They are the

ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται

things which we universally call evil. For this reason philosophers define fear as the

προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν

expectation of evil. We all fear certain evils, e.g., a bad reputation, poverty, sickness, enmity, and

πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον,

death.

b. He explains with what class of these objects fortitude deals. i. He shows about what evils it is not concerned. x. HE SETS FORTH HIS PROPOSITION. — 532 ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι·

But fortitude does not seem to deal with all evils.

y. HE PROVES HIS PROPOSITION. aa. Fortitude does not deal with the fear of a bad reputation. — 533 ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν

For, to fear some things is both proper and good, and not to fear others is base. For

γὰρ

καὶ

instance, in the matter of a bad reputation, he

αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ' ὑπό τινων

who fears this is said to be decent and modest; one who does not have this fear is called

ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις

shameless. Such a person is said by some to be brave in a metaphorical sense, because he is like

καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

a brave man inasmuch as he is without fear.

φοβούμενος

ἐπιεικὴς

bb. Fortitude does not deal with the fear of poverty. — 534 πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ

Poverty is not to be feared; neither is sickness,

νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας

nor any of those things which are not caused by

μηδὲ δι' αὑτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ

wickedness or man himself. But one who has no fear of these things is not called brave, except

τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες

perhaps by way of similarity. Some are cowardly in the dangers of war, but generous, and

ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων

courageous in the face of the loss of their

ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν.

fortune.

cc. Fortitude does not deal with... personal evils. — 535 οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ

No one is called cowardly because he fears injury

γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ

to his children or his wife, or because he fears envy or any other thing of this kind. No one is

μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος.

called brave because he does not fear a flogging.

ii. He concludes about what evils it is concerned. — 536 περὶ

ποῖα

οὖν

τῶν

φοβερῶν

ὁ

About what kind of terrifying things is a brave

ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν.

man concerned? Is he concerned with the most terrifying? No one can sustain such perils more

φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας

than he. Now the most frightening of all is

γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.

death, for it is the end, and nothing either good or bad seems to exist any longer for the dead.

c. He shows in particular what kind of death fortitude envisages. i. He shows with what kind of death fortitude deals. x. HE SETS FORTH HIS PROPOSITION. — 537

δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν

It does not seem that fortitude is concerned with

παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν

death, which occurs in every case, for instance, at sea or in sickness. In what circumstances

τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν

then? In the most suitable, as when men die

πολέμῳ·

fighting for their country. y. HE PROVES HIS PROPOSITION. aa. By two reasons. The first. — 538

ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ.

Such men lose their lives in the greatest and noblest dangers.

bb.

Next. — 539

ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς

Honors are given to them both in the city-states and in the monarchies.

μονάρχοις. ii. He explains the relation of fortitude to all the kinds of death. x. TO THE FEAR OF DEATH. aa. He explains the death about which fortitude is principally concerned. — 540 κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ

A man is called brave principally because he is

τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα·

not afraid of death for a good cause nor of all emergencies that involve death. Such

τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον.

emergencies are to be met with most often in battle.

bb.

Fear of other kinds of death. — 541

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ

Moreover, brave men are unafraid both in shipwreck and in sickness. They differ from

ὡς

γὰρ

sailors, for these brave men despise this sort of

ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν,

death when there is no hope of rescue, while sailors may well hope to be saved by reason of

οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές ἐμπειρίαν.

their experience.

οἱ

θαλάττιοι·

οἳ

εἰσι

μὲν

παρὰ

τὴν

y. HE SHOWS ITS RELATION TO BOLDNESS. — 542 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς

Likewise, brave men act manfully in danger where it is praiseworthy to be courageous and to

τοιαύταις ὑπάρχει.

δὲ

φθοραῖς

οὐδέτερον

give one’s life. But neither of these conditions exist in these other forms of death.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quoniam quidem igitur medietas et cetera.

528. After Aristotle has finished the treatise on

Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus in communi, hic incipit

virtues in general, he begins here a particularized study of the individual virtues. First he treats the

determinare de singulis in speciali. Et primo determinat de virtutibus quae sunt circa

virtues concerned with the interior passions. Next, he treats justice and injustice (concerned with

passiones interiores. Secundo de iustitia quae

external actions) in the fifth book (Lect. 1) at “We

est circa operationes exteriores, in quinto libro, ibi, de iustitia autem et iniustitia et

must give our attention to justice and injustice etc.” (B. 1129). The first section falls into two parts. In

cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de virtutibus

the first part [I] he treats the moral virtues dealing with the principal passions touching the very life of

moralibus, quae sunt circa principales passiones, respicientes ipsam hominis vitam.

man. Next, he treats the moral virtues that are concerned with the secondary passions touching the

Secundo determinat de virtutibus moralibus

external goods of man, in the fourth book (Lect. 1)

quae sunt circa quasdam secundarias passiones, respicientes exteriora hominis

at “Let us next discuss etc.” (1119 b 21). Concerning the first part he does two things. First

bona, in quarto libro, ibi, dicamus autem deinceps et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

[A] he studies fortitude, which deals with the passions touching things destructive of human life.

Primo determinat de fortitudine quae est circa passiones respicientes corruptiva vitae

Then [Lect. 19] he studies temperance, which deals with the passions touching things preservative of

humanae; secundo determinat de temperantia

human life, i e., food and sex, at “Following this

quae est circa passiones respicientes ea quibus humana vita conservatur, scilicet cibos et

treatise (on fortitude) we must etc.” (B.1117 b 22). On the first point he does three things. First [A’] he

venerea, ibi, post haec de temperantia et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo

investigates the matter of fortitude. Next, “The same thing is not terrifying etc,” [Lect. 15], he

investigat materiam fortitudinis. Secundo determinat modum operationis ipsius, ibi,

treats the method of its operation (B. 1115 b 7). Last, at “Although fortitude is concerned etc.”

terribile autem non in omnibus quidem et

[Lect. 18], he determines certain properties of the

cetera. Tertio determinat quasdam virtutis proprietates, ibi, circa audacias autem et

virtue (B.1117 a 29). In regard to the first he does two things. First [1] he reviews what was clearly

timores et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo resumit quod manifestum est ex

evident from the premises about the matter of fortitude, i.e., with what passions it deals. Next [2],

praemissis de materia fortitudinis, scilicet circa quas passiones sit. Secundo inquirit

at “Terrifying things are what etc.,” he investigates the objects of these passions as fortitude is

obiecta illarum passionum, prout circa eas est

concerned with them.

fortitudo, ibi, timemus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod iam supra dictum in secundo, quod fortitudo est quaedam medietas circa

529. He says, as has already been explained in the second book (267, 341), that fortitude is a kind of

timores et audacias. Importat enim fortitudo

mean dealing with fear and rashness. Fortitude

quamdam animi firmitatem, per quam animus stat immobilis contra periculorum timores.

denotes a firmness of soul by which it remains unmoved by the fear of dangers.

Deinde cum dicit: timemus autem etc., investigat obiecta passionum praedictarum

530. Then [2], at “Terrifying things,” he investigates the objects of the previously mentioned

secundum quod circa eas est fortitudo: et specialiter ex parte timoris circa quem

passions according as fortitude treats them, especially on the part of fear about which fortitude is

principalius est fortitudo: ut infra dicetur. Eadem autem sunt obiecta timoris et

principally concerned, as will be pointed out later (536). The objects of fear and rashness are identical,

audaciae. Nam illud idem quod per timorem

for what one man flees because of fear, another

aliquis refugit, per audaciam aggreditur. Circa hoc ergo tria facit. Primo ostendit quae

attacks in his rashness. On this point three considerations demand his attention. First [2, a] he

sint obiecta timoris. Secundo ostendit circa quod genus horum sit fortitudo, quia circa

shows what the objects of fear are. Next [2, b], at “But fortitude does not etc.,” he explains with what

timorem mortis, ibi, non enim circa omnia et cetera. Tertio ostendit in speciali circa cuius

class of these objects fortitude deals, Since it is concerned with fear of death. Finally [2, c], at “It

mortis timorem sit fortitudo, ibi: videbitur

does not seem etc.,” he shows in particular what

autem utique et cetera.

kind of death fortitude envisages.

Dicit ergo primo, quod terribilia sunt quae timemus, quasi timoris obiecta. Huiusmodi

531. He says first that terrifying things are those we are afraid of, objects of fear, so to speak. All evil

autem

things

sunt,

ut

universaliter

dicatur,

are

universally

of

this

kind.

Hence

quaecumque mala. Unde et philosophi definiunt timorem, dicentes quod est

philosophers in giving a definition of fear say that it is the expectation of evil. Expectation is here taken

expectatio mali. Et sumitur hic expectatio communiter pro quolibet motu appetitus in

generally for any movement of the appetitive faculty toward some future things, although expectation

aliquod futurum; cum tamen expectatio proprie loquendo non sit nisi boni, sicut nec

properly speaking is directed only to good, as is hope. It is evident then that we all fear some evils,

spes. Manifestum est igitur quod omnes

like a bad reputation and disgrace (which are

timemus aliqua mala, sicut malam opinionem, idest infamiam, quae contrariatur honestati;

contrary to respectability), destitution and poverty (which are contrary to the goods of external

inopiam, id est contrariatur bonis

fortune), sickness, enmity, and death (which are contrary to personal goods).

paupertatem, quae fortunae exterioris;

aegritudinem et inimicitiam et mortem quae contrariantur bonis personalibus. Deinde cum dicit: non enim circa omnia etc., ostendit circa quorum malorum timorem sit

532. Next [2, b], at “But fortitude does not,” he shows that fortitude deals with the fear of some

fortitudo. Et primo ostendit circa quae non

particular evils. First [b, i] he shows about what

sit. Secundo concludit circa quid sit, ibi: circa qualia utique terribilium et cetera. Circa

evils it is not concerned. Second [b, ii], at “About what kind of terrifying things etc.,” he concludes

primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit; scilicet quod fortitudo non videtur

about what evils it is concerned. on the first point he does two things. First [b, i, x] he sets forth his

esse circa timorem omnium malorum.

proposition that fortitude does not seem to deal with the fear of all evils.

Secundo ibi: quaedam enim etc., probat

533. Second [b, i, y], at “For, to fear some things,”

propositum. Et primo, quod fortitudo non sit

he proves his proposition, the first part of which is

circa timorem infamiae. Fortis enim laudatur ex eo quod non timet. Sed quaedam sunt quae

that fortitude does not deal with the fear of a bad reputation [b, i, y, aa]. The brave man is praised

oportet timere ad bene vivendum. Et bonum est ea timere, inquantum scilicet ipse timor

because he does not fear. But there are certain things which we ought to fear in order to live a good

non solum necessarius est ad honestatem conservandam, sed etiam ipse timor est

life. It is good to fear these things inasmuch as fear is not only necessary for the preservation of

quiddam honestum, quod autem aliquis non

respectability, but even fear itself is something

timeat huiusmodi mala, est quoddam malum inhonestum; ut patet de infamia quam qui

honorable. There is a kind of disgrace attached to the person who does not fear evils of this sort. This

timet, laudatur quasi decens, idest compositus in moribus et verecundus. Ille autem qui

is obvious from the fact that one who fears a bad reputation is praised as decent, i.e., morally good

huiusmodi malum non timet, vituperatur quasi inverecundus. Ergo patet quod fortitudo

and modest. But one who does not fear evil of this kind is blamed as shameless. It is evident, therefore,

non est circa timorem talium malorum.

that fortitude is not concerned with fear of these

Quandoque tamen ille qui non timet infamiam, a quibusdam metaphorice nominatur fortis;

evils. Sometimes, it is true, a man who does not fear a bad reputation is called by some brave, in a

qui assimulatur impavidus.

est

metaphorical sense, because he has a likeness to a brave man inasmuch as he is without fear.

Secundo ibi: inopiam autem etc., ostendit quod fortitudo non est circa timorem paupertatis.

534. In the second part (of his proposition) at “Poverty is not to be feared” [b, i, y, bb], he shows

Et dicit, quod paupertatem non oportet timere prout dicebatur de infamia; sicut neque

that fortitude does not deal with the fear of poverty. He says that poverty is not to be feared in the way

aegritudinem neque aliquid eorum quae non

that a bad reputation is to be feared (533). Neither

pertinent ad malitiam hominis, cuius ipse est causa. Frustra enim homo timet illa quae

is sickness to be feared, nor indeed any of those things that do not pertain to wickedness of which

vitare non potest. Hoc igitur debet homo circa talia timere, ne ex propria malitia in aliquod

man himself is the cause. It is useless for man to fear what he is unable to avoid. In regard to such

horum incidat. Quia sic timor est utilis ad ista vitanda, non autem aliter. Nec tamen,

things, therefore, a man ought to fear lest he fall into any of them by his own wickedness. The reason

quamvis ista non oporteat timere, ille qui circa

is that fear is useful to avoid these very things, but

haec est impavidus vocatur fortis nisi forte secundum similitudinem. Quia non timere

not otherwise. Although it is not necessary to fear things of this sort, nevertheless one who has no fear

paupertatem videtur ad aliam virtutem pertinere, scilicet ad liberalitatem ex cuius

of them is not called brave except perhaps in a metaphorical sense. The reason is that not to fear

actu aliqui laudantur, inquantum audacter audent pecunias expendere, qui tamen in

poverty seems to belong to another virtue, liberality. Some are praised for the act of this virtue, inasmuch

maioribus periculis, scilicet bellicis, simpliciter

as they spend money freely. Yet they are called

timidi dicuntur. Non ergo circa timorem inopiae est fortitudo.

complete cowards in the greater dangers of war. Therefore, fortitude is not concerned with the fear

forti

in

quantum

of poverty. Tertio ibi: neque utique si quis etc., ostendit

535. In the third part, at “No one is” [b, i, y, cc], he

quod fortitudo non est circa quoscumque timores malorum personalium. Et dicit quod

shows that fortitude does not deal with any fear whatsoever of personal evils. He says that a man is

homo non dicitur timidus ex eo quod timet ne

not called cowardly because he fears injury or envy

aliquis iniurietur vel invideat sibi aut filiis aut uxori, vel quodcumque aliud huiusmodi; neque

of himself, his children or his wife, or any other thing of this kind. A person is not said to be brave

etiam aliquis dicitur fortis ex eo quod non timet flagellari, sed audacter flagella sustinet,

because he does not fear the lash but boldly endures it, since these things are not especially terrifying.

quia ista non sunt maxime terribilia. Dicitur

But a person is brave without qualification from the

autem aliquis fortis simpliciter ex eo quod est fortis circa maxime terribilia. Qui autem in

fact that he is brave in the face of the most terrifying dangers. One who is undaunted in some

aliquibus aliis est intrepidus, non dicitur fortis

other circumstances is not called absolutely brave,

simpliciter, sed in genere illo.

but brave in that particular category.

Deinde cum dicit: circa qualia utique etc., ostendit circa quorum malorum timorem sit

536. At “About what kind of” [b, ii] he shows that fortitude is concerned with the fear of certain evils,

fortitudo. Et

dicitur

saying that man is called absolutely brave from the

simpliciter fortis ex eo quod est intrepidus circa ea quae sunt maxime terribilia. Virtus

fact that he is fearless in the face of dangers which are most terrifying. Virtue is determined according

enim determinatur secundum ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo, et ideo

to the maximum of the faculty, as is pointed out in the first book of De Coelo (Ch. II, 281 a 8; St. Th.

oportet quod virtus fortitudinis sit circa ea quae sunt maxime terribilia, ita quod nullus

Lect. 25, 249)Therefore, the virtue of fortitude must deal with the things that are most terrifying,

magis sustineat pericula quam fortis. Inter

so that no one endures greater dangers than the

omnia autem maxime terribile est mors. Et huius ratio est quia est terminus totius

brave man. Among all dangers the most frightening is death. The reason is that death is the end of all

praesentis vitae et nihil post mortem videtur esse homini vel bonum vel malum de his quae

present life, and after death there does not seem to be any good or evil equal to those things of this life

pertinent ad praesentem vitam, quae nobis sunt nota, ea enim quae pertinent ad statum

that inflict death on us. Things belonging to the state of the soul after death are not visible to us, but

animarum post mortem, non sunt visibilia

that by which a man loses all his goods is appallingly

nobis. Valde autem terribile est id per quod homo perdit omnia bona quae cognoscit. Unde

frightening. Hence it seems that fortitude is properly concerned with fear of the dangers of

videtur quod fortitudo proprie sit circa timorem periculorum mortis.

death.

Deinde cum dicit: videbitur autem utique etc.,

537. Then [2, c], at “It does not seem,” he shows

ostendit circa cuius mortis timorem sit fortitudo. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo

that fortitude is concerned with the fear of a particular kind of death. On this point he does two

ostendit circa quod genus mortis sit fortitudo. Secundo ostendit quo ordine se habeat etiam

things. First [c, i] he shows with what kind of death fortitude deals. Next [c, ii], at “A man is called brave

circa omnia genera mortis, ibi, principaliter autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

etc.,” he explains the relation of fortitude to all the kinds of death. In regard to the first he does two

Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat

things. First [c, i, x] he sets forth his proposition.

propositum, ibi: in maximo enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod neque etiam fortitudo

Then [c, i, y I, at “Such men lose their lives etc.,” he proves his proposition. He says first that fortitude is

est circa mortem quam quis sustinet in quocumque casu vel negotio, sicut in mari vel

not even concerned with death that a man suffers in some kind of accident or employment, as at sea or in

in aegritudine; sed circa mortem quam quis sustinet pro optimis rebus, sicut contingit

sickness, but with death that he suffers from the best of causes, as happens when a man dies fighting

cum aliquis moritur in bello propter patriae

in defense of his country. The same reason holds in

defensionem. Et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia morte, quam quis sustinet

the case of any other death that a person undergoes for the good of virtue. But he makes a special

propter bonum virtutis. Sed specialiter facit mentionem de morte in bello, quia in tali

mention of death in battle because in that undertaking men more frequently suffer death for

negotio ut frequentius homines moriuntur

the sake of good.

dicit

quod

aliquis

propter bonum. Deinde cum dicit: in maximo enim etc., probat

538. Then [c, i, y], at “Such men lose,” he proves his

dupliciter propositum. Primo quidem quia mors quae est in bello, est in maximo periculo,

proposition by two reasons. The first [c, i, y, aa] is that death in battle happens in the greatest danger

quia de facili ibi moritur homo; est etiam in optimo periculo, quia huiusmodi pericula

since a man easily loses his life there. It happens also in the most noble of dangers since a man undergoes

sustinet homo propter bonum commune, quod est optimum, ut in I dictum est. Virtus autem

the danger in that case on account of the common good that is the greatest good, as has been noted in

est circa maximum et optimum. Ergo virtus

the beginning (30). But virtue is concerned with

fortitudinis maxime est circa mortem quae est in bello.

what is greatest and best. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude especially deals with death that takes place in battle.

Secundo ibi: concordes autem etc., probat

539. Next [c, i, y, bb], at “Honors are given,” he

idem ex hoc quod morientibus tali morte vel illis qui fortiter se exponunt periculis

proves the same thing from the fact that honors are given to those who die such a death or bravely

huiusmodi mortis, exhibentur honores tam in civitatibus quae vivunt in communitate, quam

expose themselves to the danger of a death of this kind. (This is the practice both in city-states that

etiam apud monarchias, idest apud reges qui soli dominantur. Quia fortiter in bello

exist by association and in monarchies where kings alone rule.) The reason is that those who fight

dimicantibus, et in vita et post mortem aliqui

bravely in battle are honored both while they live

honores exhibebantur. Honor autem est praemium virtutis. Ergo circa huiusmodi

and after death. But honor is the reward of virtue. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude is considered as

mortem consideratur virtus fortitudinis.

dealing with death of this kind.

Deinde cum dicit principaliter autem etc., ostendit quo ordine se habeat fortitudo circa

540. At “A man is called brave” [c, ii] he shows how fortitude has a relation to all the kinds of death.

omnia genera mortis. Et primo quomodo se habeat in timendo mortem. Secundo quomodo

First [c, ii, x] he shows the way fortitude is related to the fear of death. Next [c, ii, y], at “Likewise,

se habeat in audacia, quae fit circa huiusmodi

brave men etc.,” he shows its relation to boldness

pericula, ibi: similiter autem (et) viriliter agunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

which is a reaction to dangers of this kind. On the first point he does two things. First [c, ii, x, aa] he

Primo ostendit circa quam mortem principaliter sit fortitudo. Et dicit quod

explains the death about which fortitude is principally concerned. A man is called brave, he says,

principaliter dicitur aliquis fortis ex eo quod impavide se habet circa bonam mortem, sicut

mainly because he is not afraid of death for a good cause, nor is he afraid of the threats—especially

et omnis virtus ordinatur ad bonum, et circa

sudden threats—of death. The reason is that every

pericula illativa mortis, praecipue si sint repentina; in his enim quae (ex) repente

virtue is ordered to good. Actions that must be done on the spur of the moment show in a special way

operari oportet maxime ostenditur quod aliquis ex habitu operetur. In aliis autem

that a person acts from habit. In other situations a man after careful deliberations can perform actions

potest aliquis ex praemeditatione operari similia his quae fiunt ex habitu. Maxime

like those that proceed from the habit. Actions pertaining to good and the unexpected dangers in

autem

bonum

battle are especially of this kind. Hence the brave

pertinentia et repentina, pericula bellica. Unde circa ista principaliter est intimidus fortis.

man who is not afraid is concerned principally with these actions.

sunt

talia,

scilicet

ad

Deinde cum dicit: sed adhuc (et) in mari etc.,

541. Next [c, ii, x, bb], at “Moreover, brave men,” he

ostendit quomodo se habeat impavide fortis

shows how the brave man himself is without fear of

circa alias mortes. Et dicit quod etiam consequenter et in mari et in aegritudinibus

other kinds of death. He says that as a consequence brave men are unafraid both in storms at sea and in

fortis est intimidus, quia videlicet non stupescit nec turbatur propter timorem

sickness because they do not lose their heads and become upset because of fear of, such dangers. In

talium. Aliter tamen sunt intimidi fortes in

storms, however, they differ from sailors. Even if

mari quam marinarii. Nam fortes etiam si non sperent salvari, tamen non timent,

the brave have no hope of rescue, they nevertheless despise death and are without fear. But sailors are

contemnentes huiusmodi mortem, non enim tantum de ea curant ut inordinate

unafraid of dangers from the sea by reason of their experience, for they have hope of being easily able to

commoveantur. Sed marinarii sunt intimidi in periculis maris in quantum sperant se bene

escape them.

posse evadere propter experientiam. Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., ostendit

542. Then [c, ii, y], at “Likewise, brave men,” he

quod non solum fortitudo est principaliter

shows that fortitude is principally concerned not

circa timorem mortis bellicae, sed etiam circa audacias talium periculorum. Et dicit quod

only with fear of death but also with boldness in dangers of this kind. He says that brave men

similiter etiam fortes viriliter agunt aggrediendo pericula in illis rebus in quibus

likewise act manfully by meeting dangers in those circumstances where fortitude is praiseworthy and

laudabilis est fortitudo vel in quibus bonum est mori, sicut est in rebus bellicis. Bonum est

where it is noble to die, as in battle. It is good that a man endanger his life for the common welfare. But

enim quod homo vitam suam exponat pro

in the aforesaid modes of death, by shipwreck or by

bono communi. Sed in praedictis corruptionibus, scilicet in morte quae est in

sickness, fortitude is not honorable nor does any good follow from death. Hence it does not belong to

mari vel in aegritudine, neque est fortitudo laudabilis neque ex morte aliquod bonum

the virtue of fortitude to meet such dangers boldly.

sequitur. Unde audacter aggredi talia pericula, non pertinet ad virtutem fortitudinis.

Lecture 15 The Act of Fortitude Chapter 7 I. HE DISTINGUISHES THE ACT OF FORTITUDE FROM THE ACTS OF THE OPPOSITE VICES. A. He determines how acts can be differentiated in the matter presently investigated. A’ He assigns the reason for differentiating acts in this matter. — 543-544 τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ

The same thing is not terrifying to all, but we do call that terrifying which is above the power of man

ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ

to resist. The superhuman is frightening to every sensible person. However, what is within the power

κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ὁμοίως

of man differs according to magnitude and degree. It is the same with daring undertakings.

δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. B’ He shows how they are differentiated. — 545-546 ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ

The brave man does not lose his head but acts like a man. He will, there fore, fear such things, and he

τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα·

will undergo them as he ought, and as reason will judge, for the sake of good which is the end of

τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ταῦτα

virtue. But man sometimes fears dangers more or less; he fears things that are not terrifying as if

φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ

they were terrifying. Man is at fault because he

ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἣ μὲν ὅτι ὃ οὐ δεῖ, ἣ

fears at times the wrong things, at other times in the wrong way or at the wrong time and so forth.

δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

The same observation may be made about what inspires confidence.

περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. B. He shows what the proper act of fortitude is by comparison with the acts of the opposite vices. 1. HE EXPLAINS THE ACT OF VIRTUE AND OF THE VICES. a.

He defines the acts of the virtue and the vices relating to fear and

rashness. i. He defines the act of the virtuous man. x. HE EXPOUNDS HIS PROPOSITION. — 547-548 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς

One who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, and at the right

δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν

time is brave. Likewise the brave man acts daringly, for he endures and acts in conformity with what is

ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ

worthy and according to reason.

ἀνδρεῖος. y. HE MAKES CLEAR SOMETHING HE HAD SAID. — 549-550 τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ

The end of every action is conformity with its own

κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ

habit. The good intended by the brave man is fortitude and this is also an end since every means is

τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος

determined by its end. The brave man endures and works, for the sake of good, the things which are in

ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν

conformity with fortitude.

ἀνδρείαν. ii. (He defines) the acts of the vicious man. x. OF THE MAN DEFICIENT IN FEAR. — 551 τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν

Of those who go to excess, that man who fears nothing is unnamed. We mentioned before that

ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα, εἴη δ' ἄν τις μαινόμενος

many vices are unnamed but a person is a madman or insensible who fears nothing, neither

ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηδὲν φοβοῖτο,

earthquakes nor floods, as it is said of the Celts.

μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς· y. OF THE MAN EXCESSIVE IN DARING. — 552 ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ

He who is excessive in daring when dealing with frightening things is called reckless. The reckless

ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γοῦν

man is thought to be vain but only feigns courage. As the brave man really is in face of danger, so the

ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὗτος

vain man wishes to appear (even imitating the

βούλεται φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ

actions of the brave man). Hence many who seem brave, are in fact cowards. They are daring in these

πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ

circumstances (of little danger) but do not stand up when fearful things occur.

φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. z. OF THE MAN EXCESSIVE IN FEARING. — 553 ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων

One who is excessive in fearing is a coward; he fears

δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ

the things he ought not to fear, as he ought not

δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ

(and similarly in the other circumstances). He is also deficient in daring but he is more conspicuous

τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφανής

from the fact that he fears painful situations too much.

ἐστιν.

b. (He defines) those relating to hope and despair. — 554 δύσελπις δή τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα

The coward is a despairing man inasmuch as he

γὰρ

fears everything. The brave man, on the contrary,

φοβεῖται.

ἐναντίως· εὐέλπιδος.

τὸ

ὁ

δ'

ἀνδρεῖος

γὰρ

θαρρεῖν

has great hope inasmuch as he is courageous.

c. He concludes with a summary. — 555

περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος,

The cowardly, the reckless, and the brave are all concerned with these passions but are disposed

διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἳ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ

towards them in a different way. The reckless and the cowardly have excess and defect but the brave

ἐλλείπουσιν, ὃ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ

man holds a middle course as he ought.

ὡς δεῖ· 2. HE COMPARES THE VIRTUE WITH CERTAIN THINGS THAT SEEM SIMILAR TO IT. a. He shows the difference between the brave and the reckless man. — 556 καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ

The reckless are precipitate and rush to meet

βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι

danger, but, when actually in it, they fall down. The brave however are vigorous while in action and

ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.

calm beforehand.

b. Between the brave man and the man who undergoes death to escape misfortunes. — 557-558 καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία

As has been pointed out, fortitude is a mean

μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ

concerned with situations that inspire confidence or

φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι

terror about which we have spoken; it desires or, endures things because it is good to do so, or

αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἤ τι

because it is base not to do so. But to suffer death in order to avoid poverty or a disappointed love or

λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ

something painful is not characteristic of a brave man but rather of a coward. It is a kind of

φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι

effeminacy not to endure these misfortunes, and

καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία

besides, such a one suffers a death not for an honorable good but to escape evil. Such then is the

τοιοῦτόν τι,

nature of fortitude.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Terribile autem non in omnibus et cetera.

543. After the Philosopher has investigated the

Postquam philosophus inquisivit materiam fortitudinis, hic determinat de actu ipsius. Et

matter of fortitude, he now treats its act. First [I] he distinguishes the act of fortitude from the acts of

primo distinguit

actum eius ab actibus

the opposite vices. Next [Lect. 16; II], at “Other

vitiorum oppositorum. Secundo determinat de quibusdam quae habent actum similem

kinds of fortitude are enumerated etc.,” he treats certain things that have an act similar to fortitude

fortitudini, ibi: dicuntur autem et aliae et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

(B.1116 a 16). He discusses the first point under two aspects. First [A] he determines how acts can

determinat quomodo actus diversificari possunt circa materiam supra inquisitam.

be differentiated in the matter presently investigated. Then [B], at “One who endures etc.,”

Secundo ostendit quis sit proprius actus

he shows what the proper act of fortitude is by

fortitudinis per comparationem ad actus oppositorum vitiorum, ibi, qui quidem igitur

comparison with the acts of the opposite vices. He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First

quae oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

[A, A’] he assigns the reason for differentiating

Primo assignat rationem diversificandi actus circa praedictam materiam. Secundo ostendit

acts in this matter. Second [A, B’], at “The brave man does not lose etc.,” he shows how they are

quomodo diversificantur, ibi: fortis autem instupescibilis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod

differentiated. He observes first that the same thing is not terrifying to all.

non est idem terribile quoad omnes. Cum timor sit in irascibili cuius obiectum est

544. Since fear is in the irascible part—the object of

arduum, non est timor nisi alicuius mali quod est aliqualiter elevatum supra facultatem

which is the difficult—fear is concerned only with an evil which is in some way above the power of the

timentis. Unde aliquid est terribile puero quod non est terribile viro perfecto. Est autem

one fearing. Hence a thing is terrifying to a child which is not terrifying to a mature man. There are

aliquod

facultatem

evils that exceed human power to overcome, such as

humanam, per quam ei resisti non potest, sicut terraemotus, inundationes maris et alia

earthquakes, tidal waves, and other disasters of this sort. Hence evils of this kind are terrifying to every

huiusmodi; unde huiusmodi malum est terribile cuilibet homini sapienti qui habet

sensible man endowed with good judgment. But that terrifying thing which does not seem to exceed

rectum iudicium intellectus. Illud autem terribile quod est secundum hominem quasi

man’s power to resist may be viewed in a twofold way. One, according to the different magnitude of

non excedens facultatem ipsius ad resistendum

the thing, for example, it is more terrifying to have

differt dupliciter. Uno modo secundum diversam rei magnitudinem; puta maius

many enemies come together than to have only a few. The other, according to degree, for instance,

terribile est si conveniant multi hostes quam si pauci. Alio modo secundum magis et minus,

that enemies have greater or less hatred, or that they are closer or farther away. What has been said

puta quod magis vel minus odiunt aut magis vel minus appropinquant. Et quod dictum est

about terrifying things must be said likewise about things inspiring courage because fear and boldness

de terribilibus est etiam similiter dicendum de

have the same object, as has been said previously

ausibilibus. Quia circa idem sunt timor et audacia, ut supra dictum est.

(530).

Deinde cum dicit: fortis autem instupescibilis

545. Then [A, B’], at “The brave man,” he shows

etc., ostendit secundum praedictam rationem

by the reason just given how acts are differentiated

quomodo diversificantur actus circa materiam praedictam. Et dicit quod cum dicitur quod

in this matter. When it is affirmed that the brave man does not lose his head because of fear, this

fortis non obstupescit propter timorem, intelligendum est secundum quod convenit

must be understood as referring to a man of sound judgment. Such a one will fear the things which are

homini qui, si intellectum habeat, timebit ea quae sunt supra hominem. Unde et fortis talia

above man. Hence the brave man too will fear them. However, in case of necessity or utility, he will

timebit. Sed tamen in casu necessitatis vel

undergo such things as he ought and as right

utilitatis sustinebit talia sicut oportet, et sicut iudicabit recta ratio quae propria est homini.

reason, which is proper to man, will judge. In this way he will not forsake the judgment of reason on

Ita scilicet quod propter timorem talium non discedet a iudicio rationis, sed sustinebit

account of the fear of such things, but will endure terrifying things of this kind, no matter how great,

huiusmodi terribilia, quantumcumque magna, propter bonum quod est finis virtutis.

on account of the good which is the end of virtue.

malum

quod

excedit

Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis magis vel minus timet terribilia quae sunt

546. It happens at times that a man fears terrifying things that are above his power, or within his

supra hominem vel secundum hominem magis vel minus quam ratio iudicet; et adhuc, quod

power more or less than reason judges. What is more, it happens that he fears the things which are

plus est, contingit quod ea quae non sunt terribilia timet quasi terribilia: et in hoc

not terrifying as if they were terrifying. Man’s sin consists principally in what is contrary to right

consistit peccatum hominis, quod est praeter

reason. As sickness takes place in the body by

rationem rectam. Et sicut aegritudo contingit in corpore per inordinationem cuiuscumque

reason of a disorder of some humor, so too sin against reason takes place in the soul by reason of a

humoris, ita etiam peccatum contra rationem contingit in anima ex inordinatione

disorder of some circumstance. Hence sometimes a person sins in the matter of fear from the fact that

cuiuscumque

circa

he fears what he ought not to fear, but other times

timorem quandoque peccatur ex hoc quod aliquis timet quod non oportet timere;

from the fact that he fears when he ought not to fear. The same must be said about the other

quandoque vero ex hoc quod timet quando non oportet timere. Et idem dicendum est de aliis

circumstances enumerated above (544). What has been affirmed about terrifying things is to be

circumstantiis supra positis. Et quod dictum est de terribilibus, intelligendum est etiam de

understood about things inspiring boldness where a similar reason is found, as has been said (544).

circumstantiae.

Unde

ausibilibus, de quibus est eadem ratio, sicut dictum est. Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem igitur etc., ostendit quis sit actus fortitudinis per

547. Next [B], at “One who,” he shows what the act of fortitude is by means of a comparison with

comparationem ad vitia opposita. Et circa hoc

the opposite vices. He treats this under two

duo facit. Primo ponit actum virtutis et vitiorum. Secundo comparat virtutem ad

headings. First [1] he explains the act of the virtue and of the vices. Next [2], at “The reckless are etc.,”

quaedam quae ei similia videntur, ibi: et audaces quidem praevolantes et cetera. Circa

he compares the virtue with certain things that seem similar to it. He discusses the first point in a

primum tria facit. Primo determinat actum virtutis et vitiorum quantum ad timorem et

threefold manner. First [1, a] he defines the acts of the virtue and the vices relating to fear and

audaciam. Secundo quantum ad spem et

rashness; and then [1, b], at “The coward is etc.,”

desperationem, ibi: desperans utique quis et cetera. Tertio epilogat, ibi circa haec quidem

those relating to hope and despair. Finally [1, c], at “The coward, the reckless etc.,” he concludes with a

igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat actum virtuosi. Secundo actus

summary. He handles the first point from two aspects. First [a, i] he defines the act of the

vitiosorum, ibi, superabundantium autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

virtuous man; and then [a, ii], at “Of those who go etc.,” the acts of the vicious man. He considers the

proponit quod intendit; secundo manifestat

first point in a twofold way. First [i, x] he expounds

quiddam quod dixerat, ibi, finis autem omnis et cetera.

his proposition. Next [i, y], at “The end etc.,” he makes clear something he had said.

Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui sustinet quae

548. He says first that one who endures the things

oportet sustinere et fugit per timorem ea quae oportet vitare, et facit hoc eius gratia cuius

he ought to endure and flees through fear the things he ought to avoid with the right motivation,

oportet et eo modo quo oportet et quando oportet, vocatur fortis. Qui etiam similiter

in the right manner, and at the right time is called brave. Likewise, he who dares in the things he

audet quae oportet, et cuius gratia et cetera.

ought for the right motive and so forth is also

Et huius rationem assignat dicens quod quia fortis et virtuosus patitur per timorem et

brave. He assigns the reason for this when he says that a brave and virtuous man endures on account

operatur

quod

of fear and he acts by means of daring in conformity

dignum est et secundum quod recta ratio dictat. Omnis enim virtus moralis est

with what is fitting and as right reason indicates. Every moral virtue is in accord with right reason,

secundum rationem rectam, ut supra habitum est.

as was stated previously (323, 326).

Deinde cum dicit: finis autem omnis etc., manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, scilicet cuius

549. At “The end” [i, y] he makes clear something he had said, namely, the right motive for operating.

gratia oporteat fortem operari. Et dicit quod finis cuiuslibet operationis virtuosae est

He remarks that the end of every virtuous operation is in conformity with the nature of its

secundum convenientiam proprii habitus. Movet enim habitus ex consuetudine causatus

own habit. A habit caused by custom operates after the manner of a nature because custom is a kind of

per modum naturae eo quod consuetudo est

nature, as is noted in the book De Memoria et

sicut quaedam natura, sicut dicitur in libro de memoria. Finis autem ultimus agentis

Reminiscentia (Ch. 2, 452 a 28; St. Th. Lect. 6, 383). The ultimate end of an agent naturally

naturalis operantis est bonum universi quod est bonum perfectum. Sed finis proximus est

operating is the good of the universe, a perfect good; but the proximate end is to imprint its

ut similitudinem suam in aliud imprimat. Sicut finis calidi est ut per suam actionem calidum

likeness in another. Thus the end of a warm object is to make things warm by means of its activity.

faciat. Similiter

virtutis

Likewise the ultimate end of operative virtue is

operantis ultimus quidem est felicitas, quae est bonum perfectum, ut in primo habitum est.

happiness, a perfect good, as was said in the first book (45, 111, 112, 117-118, 201, 222). But the

Sed finis proximus et proprius est ut similitudo habitus existat in actu.

proximate and proper end is to impress a likeness of the habit on the act.

Et hoc est quod dicit, quod bonum quod intendit fortis, est fortitudo. Non quidem

550. This is what he means in his statement that the good, which the brave man intends, is fortitude

habitus fortitudinis qui iam praeexistit, sed similitudo ipsius in actu. Et hoc etiam est finis,

—not the habit of fortitude, for this already exists, but the likeness of it in the act. This also is the end

quia unumquodque quod est propter finem determinatur in propria ratione secundum

since every means is determined by its proper end because the character of means to the end is derived

proprium finem quia ex fine sumitur ratio

from the end. For this reason the end of fortitude is

eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo finis fortitudinis est aliquid ad rationem fortitudinis

something pertaining to the nature of fortitude. In this way the brave man endures and works for the

pertinens. Sic igitur fortis sustinet et operatur gratia boni. Et hoc est inquantum intendit

sake of good, that is, inasmuch as he intends to perform the actions which are in conformity with

operari ea quae sunt secundum fortitudinem.

fortitude.

Deinde cum dicit superabundantium autem

551. Then [ii], at “Of those who go to excess,” he

etc., determinat actus vitiosorum. Et primo eius qui deficit in timendo. Secundo eius qui

defines the acts of vicious men: first [ii, x] of the man deficient in fear; next [ii, y], of the man

superabundat in audendo, ibi, qui autem in audendo et cetera. Tertio eius qui abundat in

excessive in daring, at “He who is excessive in daring etc.” Last [ii, z], at “One who is excessive in

timendo, ibi, qui autem in timendo et cetera.

fearing etc.,” he defines the acts of the man

per

audaciam,

autem

secundum

et

finis

Dicit ergo primo, quod inter vitia ad superabundantiam pertinentia ille est

excessive in fearing. He says first that there is no special term for the man who abounds-speaking of

innominatus qui superabundat in impaviditate, qui scilicet nil timet. Supra autem dictum est,

the vices pertaining to excess in fearlessness, i.e. who fears nothing. It was said before (341) that

quod multa sunt innominata. Et hoc praecipue

many vices have no names. This particularly

contingit in his quae raro accidunt. Talis autem impaviditas raro accidit. Non enim

happens in things that rarely occur. And fearlessness of this sort rarely happens. It occurs

contingit nisi in aliquo insano, vel in aliquo qui non habet sensum doloris, quod scilicet nihil

only in the case of madmen and insensible persons who fear nothing—not even earthquakes, floods, or

timeat, puta neque terraemotum, nec inundationes, nec aliquid talium, sicut dicitur

anything of this kind. This is said to happen among certain people called Celts (the name of a race). He

accidere quibusdam qui vocantur Celtae, quod

speaks here of one who is insensible or without a

est nomen gentis. Hic autem dicit esse sine sensu doloris, quia eadem sunt quae timemus

sense of pain because the future things we fear and the things that cause us pain when present are the

futura et de quibus, cum fuerint praesentia, dolemus.

same.

Deinde cum dicit: qui autem in audendo etc., agit de his qui superabundant in audendo. Et

552. Next [ii, y], at “He who,” he treats those who are excessive in daring. He says that the man who,

dicit quod ille qui circa terribilia superabundat in audendo, ut scilicet audacter terribilia

dealing with terrifying things, abounds in daring by boldly attacking them beyond what reason suggests

aggrediatur ultra quam ratio dictat, vocatur audax. Est autem aliquis qui non est vere

is called reckless. But there is also one who is apparently but not really reckless, the vain man

audax, sed videtur, scilicet superbus quoniam

who pretends to be brave. Hence as the brave or

fingit se esse fortem. Unde sicut fortis vel audax se habet circa terribilia, ita superbus

reckless man really is in regard to terrifying things, so the vain man seeks to appear. Because of this the

quaerit apparere. Et propter hoc quando potest sine periculo imitatur opera fortis vel

vain man imitates the works of the brave or reckless man when he can do so without danger.

audacis. Unde multi eorum qui videntur fortes vel audaces sunt timidi quia, cum audacter se

Hence many of those who seem brave or reckless are cowardly. Many of those who are reckless in

habeant in his quae habent parum periculi,

circumstances having little danger do not endure

quando ea quae sunt multum terribilia superveniunt, non sustinent ea.

when truly frightening things occur.

Deinde cum dicit: qui autem in timendo etc., determinat de eo qui superabundat in timendo;

553. At “One who” [ii, z], he treats of one who is excessive in fearing. The Philosopher says a man is

et dicit quod talis vocatur timidus qui timet quae non oportet timere et eo modo quo non

a coward when he fears what he should not fear, in the way he should not fear, and so on. The man

oportet et similiter secundum alias circumstantias. Et iste quidem qui

inordinate in fear is lacking in daring. The only reason why a person does not attack to destroy

superabundat in timendo deficit in audendo.

frightening things is fear. But the lack of fear can

Nulla est enim ratio quare aliquis non aggrediatur aliqua terribilia ad destruenda

exist without the recklessness of attack. It does not follow then that everyone, who does not flee as he

ipsa, nisi propter timorem. Sed defectus timoris potest esse absque audacia

ought, attacks more than he ought. But whoever is deficient in attacking the right things is motivated

aggrediendi. Non enim sequitur quod quicumque non fugit sicut oportet, invadat

only by fear. For this reason Aristotle separates the defect of fear from the excess of recklessness, but

plusquam oportet. Sed quicumque deficit ab

joins the excess of fear with the defect of

invadendo quod oportet non facit hoc nisi propter timorem. Et ideo defectum timoris

recklessness. Although the coward is extreme in fearing and deficient in daring, nevertheless he is

separavit a superabundantia audaciae, sed superabundantiam timoris coniungit defectui

more conspicuous from the fact that he abounds in the fear of painful situations than from the fact that

audaciae. Et quamvis timidus superabundet in

he is lacking in daring, because the defect is not so

timendo et deficiat in audendo, magis tamen est manifestus ex hoc quod superabundat in

easily seen as the excess.

timore tristitiarum, quam ex hoc quod deficit in audendo, quia defectus non ita percipitur sicut abundantia. Deinde cum dicit desperans utique etc.,

554. Then [i, b], at “The coward is,” he shows, how

ostendit quomodo praedicta se habeant ad spem et desperationem. Ad cuius evidentiam

the previously named things are related to hope and despair. For an understanding of this we must

considerandum est quod audaciae et timoris

consider that the object of recklessness and fear is

obiectum est malum. Spei autem et desperationis obiectum est bonum. In bonum

evil. But the object of hope and despair is good. The appetitive faculty of itself tends towards the good,

autem per se appetitus tendit, sed per accidens refugit ipsum ratione alicuius mali adiuncti.

but incidentally flees the good by reason of some evil attached. Likewise, the appetitive faculty of itself

Similiter etiam malum per se refugit appetitus; quod autem est per se est causa eius quod est

flees the evil. But what is essential causes that which is incidental. For this reason, hope—whose

per accidens. Et ideo spes, cuius est tendere in

characteristic is to tend towards good—causes

bonum, est causa audaciae quae tendit in malum quod aggreditur. Et eadem ratione

recklessness that tends towards the evil it attacks. For the same reason fear, which flees evil, is the

timor qui refugit malum est causa desperationis quae recedit a bono. Et ideo dicit

cause of despair, which withdraws from good. He says, therefore, that the coward is a despairing man

quod timidus est desperans inquantum timet circa omnia deficere. Fortis autem e contrario,

inasmuch as he fears his deficiency in everything. On the contrary the brave man has great hope

in quantum audet ostenditur esse bonae spei.

because he is courageous.

Deinde cum dicit circa haec quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt, concludens ex

555. Next [i, c], at “The cowardly, the reckless,” he sums up what has been said, concluding from the

praedictis, quod circa praedictas passiones sunt et timidus et audax et fortis, sed

premises that the cowardly, the reckless, and the brave man all are concerned with these passions but

differenter se habent ad eas. Nam audax et

related to them in a different way. The reckless man

timidus superabundant et deficiunt in audendo et timendo. Sed fortis medio modo se habet in

exceeds in daring and is lacking in fear; the cowardly man exceeds in fear and is lacking in

his et sicut oportet, id est secundum rationem rectam.

daring. But the brave man follows a middle course in these matters as he ought according to right reason.

Deinde cum dicit: et audaces quidem etc.,

556. At “The reckless” [2] he compares fortitude

comparat fortitudinem ad quaedam sibi similia. Et primo ostendit differentiam fortis ad

with things similar to it. First [2, a] he shows the difference between the brave and the reckless man.

audacem; secundo ad eum qui mortem sustinet propter vitandas aliquas molestias, ibi,

Next [2, b], at “As has been pointed out etc.,” he shows the difference between the brave man and

quemadmodum igitur dictum est et cetera. Timidi autem in nullo videntur cum fortibus

the man who undergoes death to escape misfortunes. The coward seems to have nothing in

convenire, et ideo non curat inter eos differentiam assignare. Dicit ergo primo quod

common with the brave man, and for this reason Aristotle does not care to assign the difference

audaces ante pericula sunt praevolantes et

between them. He remarks that the reckless are

volentes, id est velociter et ardenter ad ipsa currentes, quia moventur ex impetu passionis

impetuous, rushing into danger, i.e., swiftly and spiritedly going out to meet it, because they are

praeter rationem. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis discedunt, quia motus passionis

moved by a surge of passion beyond reason. When they are actually in the danger they are checked, for

praecedentis vincitur a difficultate imminente. Sed fortes quando sunt in ipsis operibus

the movement of the preceding passion is overcome by the threatening danger. But when the brave are

difficilibus, sunt acuti: quia iudicium rationis

in the very midst of the dangers, they are vigorous

ex quo agunt non vincitur ab aliqua difficultate. Sed priusquam ad pericula

because the judgment according to which they act is not overcome by any danger. But before they

veniant, sunt quieti: quia non agunt ex impetu passionis, sed ex deliberatione rationis.

meet the difficulties, they are calm because they do not act from violence of passion but from deliberate reason.

Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum igitur etc.,

557. Then [2, b], at “As has been pointed out,” he

ostendit differentiam fortis ad eum qui sustinet mortem ut vitet molestias. Et dicit

shows the difference between a brave man and the man who undergoes death to escape misfortune. He

quod, sicut dictum est, fortitudo est medietas circa ausibilia et terribilia, quae sunt mala, et

says, as has been noted (535-540), that fortitude is a mean in terrifying things, which are evils

in quibus dictum est, scilicet in periculis

concerned with the dangers of death spoken of

mortis; et desiderat operari virtuose, et sustinet talia pericula, ut eveniat aliquod

before (535-540); that fortitude tends to operate virtuously and sustains sufferings of this kind in

bonum, scilicet honestum, vel ut fugiat aliquod turpe, scilicet inhonestum. Sed quod aliquis

order to bring about something good and honorable, or in order to flee something disgraceful

moriatur sibi ipsi manus iniiciens, vel ab alio mortem illatam libenter patiens ad fugiendum

and dishonorable. However, that one should die by laying hands on himself or by voluntarily suffering

inopiam vel cupidinem alicuius rei quam non

death inflicted by another (in order to escape

potest habere, vel quicquid est aliud quod ingerit tristitiam, non pertinet ad fortem, sed

poverty or a longing for a thing which he cannot possess or whatever else there is that causes

magis ad timidum, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia videtur esse quaedam mollities

sorrow) does not belong to a brave man but rather to a coward. This happens for two reasons. First,

animi contraria fortitudini, quod aliquis non

because a certain effeminacy of soul, contrary to

possit sustinere laboriosa et tristia. Secundo quia non sustinet mortem propter bonum

fortitude, seems to exist when a person is unable to undergo hardships and sorrows. Second, because

honestum, sicut fortis, sed fugiendo malum tristabile.

such a one does not suffer death for an honorable good, as the brave man does, but to escape a painful evil.

Ultimo autem concludit quod ex praedictis

558. Finally, he concludes that we can know, from

potest sciri quid sit fortitudo.

what was said, the nature of fortitude.

LECTURE 16 Acts of Civic and Military Fortitude

Chapter 8 II. HE TREATS CERTAIN DISPOSITIONS HAVING AN ACT SIMILAR TO BUT LACKING REAL FORTITUDE. (PRENOTES) — 559-560 A. He treats civic fortitude (three kinds). 1. THE FIRST BELONGS TO THOSE WHO UNDERGO DANGERS FOR THE SAKE OF HONOR. a. He brings out this kind of fortitude. — 561-562 λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε

Other kinds of fortitude are enumerated according

τρόπους· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική·

to five types. Among these, fortitude of the citizen

μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ

holds first place, for it is most like real fortitude. Citizens apparently undergo dangers because of

πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς

legal penalties and the disgrace of cowardice, and also for the sake of honor. For this reason men are

τιμάς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ

found to be very brave in those states where the cowardly are censured and the brave accorded

ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι.

honors.

b. He gives examples taken from Homer. — 563 τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν

Homer mentions men of this kind, Diomede and Hector, for instance. Polydamas (says Hector)

Ἕκτορα· Πουλυδάμας

would be the first to reproach me [Iliad xxii. 100]. And Diomede: “Hector at some time or other when

μοι

πρῶτος

ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει· καὶ [Διομήδης]

boasting to the Trojans will say: Tydides has fled from me” [Iliad viii. 148].

Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσς' ἀγορεύων Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο. c. He clarifies what he has said. — 564 ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν

This fortitude is most like that we just discussed as being exercised on account of virtue. It is indeed

γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ

practiced on account of shame and the desire of the

ὄρεξιν τιμῆς γάρ καὶ ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος.

honorable, for fortitude of this sort is for the sake of honor and the avoidance of the disgrace of

φυγὴν

opprobrium.

2.

THE SECOND (BELONGS) TO THOSE WHO UNDERGO DANGERS

BECAUSE OF FEAR OF PUNISHMENTS. — 565 τάξαι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν

Those who are under compulsion from their rulers

ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό· χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ

will be included in the same type of fortitude. They are less worthy of the title, however, insofar as

ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ

they do not act bravely because of shame but rather out of fear, for they flee not what is

λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ

οἱ

disgraceful, but what is painful. Masters coerce their subjects by threats as Hector did: “Anyone I

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε

find giving way to fear and not doing battle will not

μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω, οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν

have a chance to escape the dogs” [Iliad ii. 191].

γὰρ

κύνας. 3.

THE THIRD (BELONGS) TO THOSE WHO ATTACK AND EXPOSE

THEMSELVES TO DANGEROUS SITUATIONS. — 566 καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ

Rulers do the same thing when they command their subjects not to give ground, and beat those

δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ

who do. A similar judgment is to be passed on

τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ

those who before battle construct walls, trenches, and other such obstacles to retreat. All such have

δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν.

coerced their subjects. But the virtuous man must be brave not because of constraint but because of the good of virtue.

B. (He treats) the fortitude of the soldier. 1. HE SHOWS WHAT LEADS SOLDIERS TO FIGHT BRAVELY. — 567569 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ

In particular cases experience seems to be a kind of

ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾠήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι

fortitude. For this reason Socrates thought that fortitude was knowledge. As others are brave in

τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν

other things from experience, so soldiers are brave

ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ

in warfare. In war there are many operations without danger which soldiers know very well.

κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὴ

Those engaged in these exercises seem brave to others who are ignorant of the nature of such

ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ

things. Hence professional soldiers are especially able by reason of experience to attack their

παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς

adversaries without harm to themselves: skilled in

ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα

the use of arms, they are able to guard themselves from blows and to strike back. They possess other

ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα·

skills like those that enable them to inflict injury while they themselves are not injured. They fight

ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὡπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις·

against others like the armed against the unarmed, like well-trained athletes against inexperienced

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν

rustics. In athletic contests of this kind it is not the

οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες

brave who can fight the most but rather those who are physically powerful and well-conditioned.

καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. 2.

HE COMPARES THE FORTITUDE OF THE SOLDIER AND THE

CITIZEN. — 570 οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται,

Soldiers turn cowards when they see that the

ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς

danger exceeds their skill and that they are inferior in numbers and military preparations. They are the

παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα

first to run away, while those possessing the fortitude of the citizen, refusing to leave, give up

ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ κἀπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ

their lives. This actually happened in the battle at the temple of Hermes. Citizens think it disgraceful

φεύγειν

τῆς

to flee, and choose to die rather than to be saved

τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἳ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς

under such circumstances. But soldiers expose themselves to danger because from the beginning

κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ

they think themselves more powerful. When the truth dawns on them they take flight fearing death

αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος

more than disgrace. Not so the brave man.

καὶ

ὁ

θάνατος

οὐ τοιοῦτος.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Dicuntur autem et aliae secundum quinque

559. After the Philosopher has ascertained how the

modos et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit qualis sit actus verae fortitudinis

act of real fortitude and of the opposite vices is constituted, he treats here certain dispositions

et oppositorum vitiorum; hic determinat de

having an act similar to but lacking real fortitude

quibusdam quae habent actum similem fortitudini, sed deficiunt a vera fortitudine.

(II). This happens in five ways. Since real fortitude is a moral virtue (for which knowledge is required

Quod quidem quinque modis contingit. Cum enim vera fortitudo sit virtus moralis, ad

and because of this, choice), a person exercising an act of fortitude can fall short of real virtue in three

quam requiritur scire, et propter hoc eligere, potest quidem aliquis exercens actum

ways. In one way because he does not operate with knowledge. This is the fifth type of counterfeit

fortitudinis tripliciter

a vera fortitudine

fortitude, according to which a person is said to be

deficere. Uno modo quia non operatur sciens, et sic est unus modus non verae fortitudinis

brave through ignorance. In another way because a person does not operate by choice but by passion

secundum quem dicitur aliquis fortis per ignorantiam. Alio modo quia aliquis non

(whether it is a passion urging one to undergo dangers as anger does, or a passion quieting fear of

operatur ex electione, sed ex passione: sive sit passio impellens ad pericula subeunda, sicut

the mind as hope does). According to this consideration, there are two kinds of counterfeit

est ira; sive passio quietans animum a timore,

fortitude.

sicut est spes: et secundum hoc sumuntur duo modi non verae fortitudinis. Tertio modo deficit aliquis a vera fortitudine

560. The third way a person falls short of real

ex eo quod aliquis ex electione quidem operatur, sed aut (non) eligit id quod eligit

fortitude is that he operates by choice, but he does not choose what the brave man chooses. In

fortis, scilicet pericula sustinere, dum propter armorum peritiam reputat sibi non esse

undergoing dangers he does not think it hazardous, because of his skill, to fight in battle, as is evident

periculosum in bello confligere, sicut apparet

among soldiers; or he chooses to undergo the

in militibus. Aut quia eligit aliquis pericula sustinere, sed non propter illum finem propter

dangers not on account of the end that a brave man chooses but on account of honors or punishments

quem eligit fortis, sed propter honores vel poenas, quae a rectoribus civitatum

decreed by rulers of states.

proponuntur. Secundum hoc ergo dividitur pars ista in

561. Accordingly, this portion falls into five parts.

quinque partes. In prima parte determinat de fortitudine politica sive civili. In secunda de

In the first part [A] he treats civic fortitude or fortitude of the citizen; in the second [B], the

fortitudine militari, ibi: videtur autem et experientia et cetera. In tertia parte de

fortitude of the soldier at “In particular cases etc.”; in the third part [Lect.17, C], fortitude that

fortitudine quae est per iram, ibi, et furorem

operates through anger, at “People confuse rage

autem super fortitudinem etc.; in quarta parte de fortitudine quae est per spem, ibi, neque

etc.” (B.1116 b 23); in the fourth part [Lect. 17, D], fortitude that operates through hope, at “Likewise

utique bonae spei et cetera. In quinta de fortitudine quae est per ignorantiam, ibi,

the confident etc.” (B.1117 a ii); in the fifth part [Lect. 17, E], fortitude that operates through

fortes autem videntur et ignorantes et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres gradus politicae

ignorance, at “Those who operate in ignorance etc.” (B.1117 a 23). In regard to the first he indicates

fortitudinis. Quorum primus est eorum, qui

three kinds of civic fortitude. The first kind [A, 1]

sustinent pericula propter honorem; secundus eorum, qui sustinent propter timorem

belongs to those who undergo dangers for the sake of honor. The second [A, 2], to those who undergo

poenarum, ibi, ponet autem utique etc.; tertius eorum qui aggrediuntur et sustinent

dangers because of the fear of punishments, at “Those who are under compulsion etc.” The third

periculosa propter praesentem coactionem, ibi, et qui praecipiunt et cetera. Circa primum

[A, 3], at “Rulers do the same etc.,” to those who attack and expose themselves to dangerous

tria facit.

situations because of pressing compulsion. He discusses the first point under three headings.

Primo proponit hunc gradum fortitudinis, et dicit quod, cum praeter fortitudinem veram

562. First [i, a] he brings out this kind of fortitude. He says that over and above real fortitude, certain

dicantur quaedam aliae fortitudines secundum

other kinds of fortitude are enumerated according to

quinque modos; primum locum inter eas tenet fortitudo politica idest civilis, eo quod talis

five types. Among these, civic fortitude or fortitude of the citizen holds first place because this type is

fortitudo maxime assimilatur verae. Sustinent enim cives pericula ut vitent increpationes et

very similar to real fortitude. Citizens undergo dangers to avoid penalties and disgrace which,

opprobria quae secundum statuta legum civilium inferuntur timidis, et ut adipiscantur

according to the civil laws, are inflicted on the cowardly, and to acquire honors which by the same

honores qui secundum easdem leges fortibus

laws are bestowed on the brave. So in those states

exhibentur. Et inde est quod apud illas civitates in quibus timidis adhibentur

where blame is heaped on the cowardly and honors on the brave, men are found most brave according

vituperia, fortibus autem honores, inveniuntur viri fortissimi secundum hanc

to this type of fortitude, and perhaps even according to the real virtue by reason of habit.

fortitudinem, et fortassis etiam secundum

veram, propter assuetudinem. Secundo ibi: tales autem etc., inducit exempla

563- Second [i, b], at “Homer mentions,” he gives

ex Homero, qui describens Troianum bellum

examples taken from Homer who, describing the

inducit taliter fortes, scilicet propter honores vel vituperia, puta Diomedem ex parte

Trojan War, introduces men brave for honor or fear of blame: Diomede among the Greeks and Hector for

Graecorum, et Hectorem ex parte Troianorum. Inducit enim Hectorem dicentem

the Trojan side. He represents Hector as saying these words: “Polydamas, the Trojan leader, will be

haec verba: Polidamas, idest quidam dux Troianorum, primum redargutionem reponet

the first to reproach me (i.e., he will find fault first of all with me) if I do not fight manfully.” And Diomede

mihi, id est primo me redarguet nisi fortiter

exhorting himself to act bravely said: “Hector

egero. Et Diomedes dicebat seipsum exhortans ad fortiter agendum: Hector

haranguing the Trojans will say in praise of himself and in vituperation of me that Tydides (a name

concionando apud Troianos dicet, ut laudans se et me vituperans, Titides, id est Diomedes

given him from his father’s), alias Diomede, has fled from me and has been beaten.

qui sic nominatus est a patre, a me scilicet fugit vel victus est. Tertio ibi assimilatur autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat, scilicet quod ista fortitudo

564. Third [i, c], at “This fortitude,” he clarifies what he has said: that this kind of fortitude is very

maxime assimilatur verae. Et dicit quod haec

similar to the genuine virtue. He says that the

politica fortitudo maxime assimulatur ei de qua supra dictum est quod fit propter

citizen’s fortitude is much like the one of which we have spoken (562), since it is for the sake of virtue.

virtutem. Haec enim politica fortitudo fit propter verecundiam, quae est timor de turpi,

This fortitude of the citizen is practiced through shame or fear of the disgraceful, inasmuch as

inquantum scilicet aliquis fugit opprobria, et fit propter boni, id est honesti, desiderium,

someone flees disgrace, and through a desire of the good or honorable insofar as this fortitude seeks

inquantum ista fortitudo quaerit honorem,

honor, which is the testimony of goodness. For this

qui est testimonium honestatis. Et ideo hoc exponens subdit, quod huiusmodi fortitudo fit

reason he adds in explanation that fortitude of this sort is motivated by honor and avoidance of

propter honorem et propter fugam opprobrii quod turpe existit. Quia igitur honor

opprobrium, which is the disgraceful. Since then honor is a thing near to an honorable good, and

propinquum aliquid est bono honesto, et vituperium turpi inhonesto, inde est quod ista

blame to the disgraceful, it follows that this fortitude is close to real fortitude, which seeks what

fortitudo propinqua est verae fortitudini quae

is honorable and flees from what is shameful.

intendit honestum, et fugit inhonestum.

Deinde cum dicit: ponet autem aliquis etc.,

565. Then [A, 2], at “Those who,” he indicates the

ponit secundum gradum fortitudinis politicae, qui est propter timorem poenae. Et dicit quod

second kind of civic fortitude that is practiced on account of punishment. He says that those who are

ad eundem modum politicae fortitudinis possunt reduci illi, qui sunt fortes propter hoc

brave, because compelled by the fear of punishments inflicted by rulers of the state, can be assigned the

quod timore poenarum coguntur a principibus

same type of civic fortitude. They are, however,

civitatis. Sunt tamen deteriores praemissis, inquantum non agunt fortiter propter

inferior to the previously mentioned insofar as they do not act bravely on account of the shame of

verecundiam turpitudinis, sed propter timorem poenae. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod

disgrace but on account of fear of punishment. This is why he adds that they do not flee what is

non fugiunt turpe, idest inhonestum, sed triste aliquid idest dolorosum vel damnosum

disgraceful or dishonorable but what is sorrowful, i.e., painful or injurious, from the fact that someone

ex quo aliquis tristatur. Per hoc enim domini cogunt suos subditos fortiter pugnare. Sicut

is made sad. In this way the masters compel their subjects to fight bravely. According to Homer,

secundum

Troianis

Hector threatened the Trojans in these words:

comminabatur dicens: ille quem intelligam fugientem sine bello, idest sine hoc quod

“Anyone running away and not doing battle, i.e., without fighting bravely, I will handle so roughly

fortiter pugnet, ita male tractabo eum quod non erit sufficiens ad fugiendum canes.

that he will not have a chance to escape the dogs.”

Deinde cum dicit: et qui praecipiunt etc., ponit tertium gradum politicae fortitudinis, prout

566. Next [A, 3], at “Rulers do the same,” he presents the third kind of civic fortitude according

scilicet aliqui praesentialiter

a principibus solum timore

as some are compelled by their rulers then and there and not only by fear of future punishment. This is

futurarum poenarum. Et hoc est quod dicit quod idem operantur sua actione principes qui

why he says that rulers do the same thing by their actions when they command their subjects not to

praecipiunt subditis, ut non fugiant a praelio,

run away from battle, and beat those who do. A

et eos qui recedunt percutiunt, et similiter illi qui ante pugnatores ne fugere possint

similar judgment is to be passed on those who, before battle, construct walls and trenches and

constituunt muros et foveas et alia huiusmodi impedimenta fugae. Omnes enim principes

other such obstacles to retreat so that their subjects cannot take to flight. All rulers who do things of

talia facientes, cogunt subditos ad pugnandum. Sed illi qui sic coguntur non sunt

this kind coerce their subjects to fight. And those who act under compulsion in this way are not really

vere fortes. Quia oportet virtuosum esse

brave, because the virtuous man must be brave not

fortem non propter necessitatem patitur, sed propter bonum virtutis.

quam

on account of the constraint he suffers but because of the good of virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem et experientia

567. At “In particular cases” [B] he treats the

etc., determinat de fortitudine militari. Et

fortitude of the soldier. He explains this question in

circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit milites (per experientiam aptos esse) ad

a twofold manner. First [B, 1] he shows what leads soldiers to fight bravely. Next [B, 2] he compares

fortiter agendum; secundo comparat militarem fortitudinem ad politicam, ibi,

the fortitude of the soldier and the citizen, at “Soldiers turn cowards.” He says first that in

milites autem timidi sunt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in singulis experientia videtur

individual cases experience seems to be a kind of fortitude. In any undertaking one who has

esse quaedam fortitudo. In quolibet enim

knowledge from experience works boldly and

negotio audacter et sine timore operatur ille, qui est expertus, sicut Vegetius dicit in libro

without fear, as Vegetius says in his book on military affairs: “No one fears to do what he believes

de re militari: nemo facere dubitat quod se bene didicisse confidit. Et propter hoc

he has learned to do well.” For this reason Socrates thought fortitude was knowledge which is acquired

Socrates aestimavit quod fortitudo esset scientia quaedam quae etiam per experientiam

by experience. He even thought all the virtues are kinds of knowledge. But this question will be studied

acquiritur: aestimavit etiam omnes alias

later in the sixth book (1286). Therefore, since

virtutes esse scientias. Sed de hoc infra in sexto agetur. Sic ergo cum quidam alii sint

certain others are brave by experience in particular affairs, so soldiers are brave in warfare by reason of

fortes per experientiam in quibusdam aliis rebus, in rebus bellicis milites sunt fortes per

experience.

Homerum,

experientiam.

Hector

coguntur et non

Ex qua quidem duo consequuntur. Quorum

568. Two things follow from this. The first is that in

primum est quod in bellis multa sunt inania, quae scilicet inexpertis terrorem incutiunt,

war there are many great things like the clash of arms, the charge of the cavalry, and so on that

quamvis parum vel nihil periculi habeant;

strike the inexperienced with terror, although there

sicut fragor armorum, concursus equorum et alia huiusmodi, quae quidem milites maxime

is little or no danger in them. These things, as the professional soldiers know, are not really to be

aspexerunt per experientiam non esse terribilia. Unde videntur fortes, cum talibus

dreaded. Hence men seem brave when engaging, without fear, in exercises that appear dangerous to

sine timore se ingerunt, quae aliis, scilicet inexpertis, periculosa videntur, quia nesciunt

others who are inexperienced and ignorant of the nature of what is taking place. Second, it follows

qualia

ex

that by reason of experience professional soldiers in

experientia quod possunt facere, idest gravare adversarios, et non pati, id est non gravari ab

fighting can do hurt to their adversaries, and not suffer or be harmed in turn. They can guard

eis, custodiendo scilicet se ab ictibus et percutiendo alios inquantum habent

themselves from blows and can strike back, for they are clever in the use of weapons, and they possess

potestatem ad bene utendum armis, et alia huiusmodi habent, quae sunt efficacia ad hoc

other skills effective in enabling them to inflict injury while they themselves are not injured. Hence

quod ipsi possint laedere alios, ita quod non

it is obvious they fight against others as the armed

laedantur. Unde manifestum est, quod ipsi pugnant cum aliis sicut armati cum

against the unarmed. A man is in effect unarmed if he does not know how or is unable to use arms.

sint.

Secundo

consequuntur

inermibus. Quasi enim inermis videtur qui armis non potest uti aut nescit. Et simile est de athletis, idest pugilibus fortibus et instructis cum idiotis, idest rusticis

569. The same can be said of athletes, i.e., strong and well-trained boxers compared to simple and

inexpertis. Quia in talibus agonibus, scilicet

inexperienced farm boys. In such athletic contests it

athletarum, non illi qui maxime possunt pugnare sunt fortissimi, sed illi qui sunt

is not the brave who can fight the most but those who are: physically powerful and wellconditioned.

potentes secundum virtutem corporalem, ut habentes corpora bene disposita. Deinde cum dicit: milites autem timidi sunt etc., comparat militarem fortitudinem ad

570. Then [B, 2] at “Soldiers turn,” he compares the fortitude of the soldier and the citizen. He says

politicam. Et dicit quod milites tamdiu fortiter agunt quandiu non vident periculum

that soldiers fight bravely so long as they do not see danger threatening. But when the danger exceeds

imminere, sed quando periculum excedit peritiam, quam habent in armis, et quando

the skill they have in arms and when they lack numbers and adequate military preparations, they

non habent multitudinem secum nec alias

become cowardly. Then they are the first to run

praeparationes bellicas, tunc efficiuntur timidi. Et tunc primi fugiunt: non enim

away; they were daring for no other reason than that they thought the danger was not imminent.

propter aliud erant audaces, nisi quia aestimabant sibi periculum non imminere. Et

Therefore, when they first see the danger, they take to their heels. But those who possess the fortitude of

ideo quando vident periculum primi fugiunt;

the citizen—refusing to leave the danger—lose their

sed illi qui sunt civiliter fortes, permanentes in periculis moriuntur. Sicut accidit in quodam

lives, as happened in a certain place where the citizens remained after the soldiers had fled. The

loco ubi militibus fugientibus cives remanserunt. Quia cives turpe reputabant

reason is that citizens think it disgraceful to run away, and choose to die rather than save themselves

fugere, et magis eligebant mortem quam salvari per fugam. Sed milites a principio

by flight. But soldiers expose themselves to dangers because, from the beginning, they think themselves

exponebant se periculis quasi existimantes se potentiores. Sed postquam cognoverunt

more powerful. But after they have recognized that the enemy is more powerful, they take to flight

adversarios esse potentiores, fugerunt, magis

fearing death more than ignominious escape. It is

timentes mortem quam turpem fugam. Non est autem ita de forti, qui magis timet

not so with the brave man who fears disgrace more than death.

turpitudinem quam mortem.

LECTURE 17 Counterfeit Fortitude Chapter 8 C. He proposes... a third kind operating by means of rage. 1. HE SHOWS HOW RAGE INCLINES TO THE ACT OF FORTITUDE. — 571572 καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν

People confuse rage or wrath with fortitude.

φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς

Indeed the enraged appear brave in the way that wild animals turn on those who have

τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς

wounded them. The brave man does give the appearance of rage which acts most

πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος

impetuously against danger. Hence Homer

σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ καὶ μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε καὶ δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥῖνας

warns: “Put strength into thy wrath” [Iliad xiv. 151], and “arouse thy might and wrath”

μένος καὶ ἔζεσεν αἷμα· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ

[Iliad v. 470]; and (in reference to a certain man) “he panted harsh courage through both

ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν.

nostrils” [Odyssey xxiv. 318], and “his blood boiled” [Theocritus xx. 15]. All such expressions seem to signify the stirring up and the impulse of rage.

2. HE SHOWS HOW THIS FORTITUDE DIFFERS FROM REAL FORTITUDE. a. He shows what pertains to true fortitude. — 573 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν

The brave are incited to valorous deeds by

πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς·

reason of honor with rage co-operating.

b. (He shows) what pertains to the rage of beasts. — 574-575

τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ

Wild animals attack danger because of pain

πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε

from a wound or from fear; undisturbed in

ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἕλει] ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται.οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος

the woods and swamps they do not come out to attack. They are not truly brave because,

καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν

aroused against danger by pain and rage, they do not foresee the risks involved.

προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι

Otherwise hungry jackasses would be brave

ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ

since they do not stop eating when beaten. (Adulterers too undertake many risks for

δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. [οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ δι'

their sensual desire.) Animals, therefore, who are incited against danger by pain and rage

ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.] φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ

are not truly brave. That reaction which is prompted by passion seems to be a most

τὸν

natural one, and, if to it be added choice and a

θυμὸν

εἶναι, καὶ

προσλαβοῦσα

προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι.

proper end it is fortitude.

c. (He shows) what pertains to human rage. — 576 καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν

Angry men are grieved (because of injury

ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἥδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ

suffered) but delighted when taking vengeance. Those who acting this way

ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ'

perhaps are fighters, but hardly brave men, for they do not do what is honorable, nor are

ἔχουσί τι.

they led by reason but rather by passion. They do though possess something similar to real fortitude.

D. He mentions a fourth kind of fortitude. 1. HE EXPLAINS THIS TYPE OF FORTITUDE. — 577 οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ

Likewise the confident are not truly brave;

γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις·

they are hopeful because they have often conquered many enemies in the midst of dangers.

2. HE COMPARES THIS TYPE WITH TRUE FORTITUDE. — 578 παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ'

However, such confident people are like the

οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κράτιστοι

truly brave because both are daring. But the truly brave are daring in the fashion already

εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ

indicated, while the confident dare because

ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ

they think themselves better fighters and expect to suffer nothing. The intoxicated too

τὰ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα

act in this way, becoming abundantly hopeful, but when they fail to get what was expected,

ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.

they give up. The brave man though will suffer evils that seem, and really are, terrifying to men—and this for the sake of

what is honorable and to avoid disgrace.

3. HE DEDUCES A COROLLARY. — 579 διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν

Therefore, that man seems to be braver who

τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ

does not fear more, and is not more disturbed by unexpected terrors than by those that

ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ

were foreseen. He seems to act more by habit since he acts less from preparation. Someone

λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

can choose by reason and deliberation things that are foreseen, but in unexpected events habit asserts itself.

E. He introduces the fifth kind of counterfeit fortitude. — 580-582 ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων,

Those who operate in ignorance of dangers seem to be brave. They do not differ greatly

χείρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον·

from people who are brave by reason of great hope. They are, however, inferior since they

οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ

have no self-reliance unlike the confident who remain in the fight for some time. Those who

Ἀργεῖοι

τοῖς

are bold through ignorance take flight as

Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες

soon as they know the situation is different from what they suspect. This happened to the

ἀνδρεῖοι.

Argives when they fell on the Spartans whom they thought Sicyonians [Xenophon,

ἔπαθον

περιπεσόντες

Hellenica, iv. 4, 10]. We have now discussed both the brave and those thought to be brave.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Et furorem autem super fortitudinem et cetera.

571. After having disposed of two types of

Positis duobus modis fortitudinis non verae, hic ponit tertium modum, qui scilicet est per iram

counterfeit fortitude, he proposes here [C] to treat a third kind operating by means of rage

impellentem ad actum fortitudinis. Et circa hoc

which urges to the act of fortitude. He treats this

duo facit. Primo enim ostendit quomodo furor inclinet ad actum fortitudinis. Secundo ostendit

point in a twofold manner. First [C’ 1] he shows how rage inclines to the act of fortitude. Next [C,

differentiam ad veram fortitudinem, ibi, fortes quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod

2], at “The brave are etc.,” he shows how this fortitude differs from real fortitude. He observes

homines in communi usu loquendi inferunt furorem supra fortitudinem, dum scilicet

first that men in common usage of speech confuse rage with fortitude when they attribute

fortitudini attribuunt ea quae per furorem fiunt.

to fortitude things that enraged or angry people

Furentes enim vel irati videntur esse fortes. Sicut et bestiae, quae in furorem concitatae

do. Indeed the enraged and angry do seem to be brave. So too do beasts who, when aroused to

irruunt in homines qui eas vulnerant; habet enim fortitudo quamdam furoris similitudinem,

rage, attack men beating them. Fortitude has some likeness to rage inasmuch as rage incites

inquantum scilicet furor cum maximo impetu

against danger with a very strong impulse. But

inducit in pericula. Fortis autem cum magna virtute animi in pericula tendit.

the brave strives against danger with strength of soul.

Et inducit ad hoc exempla Homeri qui admonendo quemdam dicit: virtutem immitte

572. As an example he quotes the verses of Homer who warned someone in these words:

furori, ut scilicet furor per virtutem animi reguletur. Et virtutem erige et furorem, ut

“Put strength into your wrath” so that wrath may be directed by the virtue of the soul; “Arouse

scilicet per iram virtus animi promptior ad actum reddatur. Et alibi dicit de quibusdam, quod per

your might and wrath” that the virtue of your soul may be rendered more prompt by anger.

singulas nares emittebant austeram virtutem,

Elsewhere he remarks that certain people “pant

scilicet furorem, qui propter calefactionem cordis facit cum magno impetu respirare, intantum

harsh courage through both nostrils;” in other words, wrath, because of the beating of the heart,

quod aliquando ex impetu irae ebullit sanguis per nares. Et subdit philosophus quod praedicta

makes breathing so heavy that sometimes “the blood boils up” through the nostrils from the

verba Homeri videntur significare quod furor erigatur, et impetum faciat ad actus fortitudinis.

force of rage. And the Philosopher observes that Homer’s statements here seem to indicate that anger is aroused and gives impetus to fortitude’s act.

Deinde cum dicit: fortes quidem igitur etc., ostendit differentiam huius fortitudinis ad veram

573. Then [C, 2], at “The brave,” he explains the difference between this and genuine fortitude. He

fortitudinem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo

discusses this point from three aspects. First [2,

ostendit quid conveniat verae fortitudini. Secundo quid conveniat furori bestiarum, ibi,

a] he shows what pertains to true fortitude; next [2, b], at “Wild animals attack etc.,” what

ferae autem propter tristitiam et cetera. Tertio quid conveniat furori humano, ibi, et homines

pertains to the rage of beasts; and finally [2, c], at “Angry men,” what pertains to human rage.

utique irati et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod fortes non impelluntur ad opera fortitudinis peragenda ex

He says that the brave are not incited to perform works of fortitude by the impulse of rage but by

impetu furoris, sed ex intentione boni; sed furor

the intention of good. Rage, however, does

secundario se habet in actu eorum ad modum cooperantis.

operate secondarily in these acts in the manner of a co-operator.

Deinde cum dicit: ferae autem propter tristitiam

574. Next [2, b], at “Wild animals,” he shows

etc., ostendit quomodo ira bestiarum se habeat

how the anger of beasts compares with the act of

ad actum fortitudinis. Et dicit, quod ferae aggrediuntur pericula propter tristitiam, id est

fortitude. He remarks that wild animals attack dangers out of pain from harmful things—which

malorum, quae actu patiuntur, puta cum vulnerantur, vel propter timorem eorum, quae

they are actually suffering when wounded, for instance—or because of the dread of the things

timent

se

they fear they are about to suffer, e.g., when

vulnerandas, ex hoc enim incitatae ad iram homines invadunt, quia si essent in silva vel in

incited to anger by fear of being wounded, they attack men. The reason is that if they were in the

palude, non vulnerarentur neque timerent vulnerari et ita non venirent ad homines

woods or swamps they would not be wounded nor fear to be wounded, so would not come out to

invadendos. Unde patet quod in eis non est vera fortitudo, quia impelluntur ad pericula solum

attack men. Hence it is clear that real fortitude is not found in these animals because they are

dolore et furore, cum tamen nihil periculorum

aroused against the dangers only by pain and

praevideant, sicut illi, qui ex electione fortiter

rage, since they do not foresee dangers, as those

se

passuras,

puta

si

timeant

operantur. Si enim bestiae, quae ex passione agunt, fortes essent, pari ratione et asini essent

who act bravely by choice. If beasts who act by passion were brave, then by the same argument

fortes, qui propter concupiscentiam cibi non desistunt a pascuis, quando esuriunt, licet

hungry jackasses (who, because of the desire for food do not stop eating even when beaten) would

percutiantur.

(adulteri)

be brave. Adulterers too undertake many risks

propter concupiscentiam venereorum, multa ausibilia aggrediuntur, nec tamen in his est vera

for the sake of lust, but real fortitude is not found in them because they do not act by choice of good,

fortitudo. Quia non operantur ex electione boni, sed propter passionem. Et sic patet, quod nec

but by reason of passion. So it is clear that animals who are incited against danger on

etiam animalia, quae propter dolorem impelluntur ad pericula (non) habent veram

account of pain do not have true fortitude.

Et

similiter

etiam

fortitudinem.

Et

quamvis

posita

sit

similitudo

de

575. However much is the likeness between

concupiscentia et furore, inter omnes tamen passiones illa fortitudo videtur esse

desire and rage, nevertheless among all the passions fortitude out of rage seems to be more

connaturalior verae fortitudini, quae est propter furorem: ita quod si praeaccipiat electionem et

connatural to genuine fortitude, so that if rage be antecedently directed by choice and the

debitum finem cuius gratia operetur, erit vera fortitudo. Et signanter dicit praeaccipiens quia in

motivation of a fitting end, real fortitude will be present. He expressly says “antecedently

vera fortitudine furor debet sequi electionem

directed” because in true fortitude rage ought to

rationis, non praeire.

follow rather than precede choice.

Deinde cum dicit: et homines utique irati etc., ostendit quid conveniat fortitudini, quae est ex

576. At “Angry men” [2, c] he shows what belongs to fortitude that operates by the anger of

ira in hominibus, qui quidem videntur ex

men who seem to act by choice and to intend

electione operari et aliquem finem intendere, scilicet punitionem eius contra quem irascitur.

some purpose—the punishment of the person with whom they are angry. For this reason he

Unde dicit quod homines dum sunt irati dolent propter iniuriam illatam et nondum vindicatam,

says that angry men are grieved over an injury received and as yet unavenged. But when they

sed quando iam puniunt, tunc delectantur,

are taking vengeance they are delighted in the

utpote suum desiderium implentes. Qui autem propter hoc fortiter operantur, possunt quidem

satisfaction of their desire. Those who work vigorously at this may perhaps be called

dici pugnantes, sed non fortes. Quia non operantur propter bonum neque ductu rationis,

pugnacious but hardly brave because they are not doing the right thing, nor are they led by reason

sed propter passionem qua vindictam appetunt. Habent tamen aliquid simile verae fortitudini ut

but rather by passion for the sake of which they desire vengeance. However, they do possess

ex praedictis patet.

something similar to genuine fortitude as is evident from the premises (571-572).

Deinde cum dicit neque utique bonae spei etc.,

577. Then [D], at “Likewise the confident ‘ “ he

ponit quartum modum fortitudinis, secundum quod aliqui fortes dicuntur propter spem. Et

mentions a fourth kind of fortitude according to which some are called brave by reason of hope.

circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit hunc modum

He develops this idea in a threefold fashion. First

fortitudinis. Secundo comparat hunc modum ad veram fortitudinem, ibi, consimiles autem et

[D, i] he explains this type of fortitude. Next [D, 2], he compares this type with true fortitude at

cetera.

“However, such confident people etc.”

Tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi,

Finally [D, 3], he deduces a corollary from what

propter quod fortioris et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut illi, qui propter iram fortiter agunt,

has been said, at “Therefore, that man etc.” He says first that, as those who act bravely on

non sunt vere fortes, ita neque illi qui propter solam spem victoriae, vere fortes dicuntur, est

account of anger are not truly brave, so neither are they who act bravely for the sole reason of

tamen in eis aliqua praeeminentia per quam

their hope for victory. But they have a certain

differunt ab aliis, quia propter hoc quod multoties vicerunt in periculis existentes,

preeminence by which they differ from others. From the fact that they have very often

confidunt etiam nunc se victoriam obtinere, non propter aliquam peritiam, quam ex experientia

conquered in the midst of danger, they are now confident of obtaining victory not by reason of

sint adepti, hoc enim pertinet ad secundum modum fortitudinis, sed propter solam fiduciam,

any skill acquired through experience—this belongs to the second type of fortitude—but

quam ex frequentibus victoriis acceperunt.

solely by reason of a confidence derived from their frequent victories in the past.

Deinde cum dicit: consimiles autem etc., comparat hanc fortitudinem verae fortitudini. Et

578. Next [D, 2], at “However, such confident people,” he compares this fortitude to real

dicit quod isti qui sic sunt bene sperantes, sunt

fortitude. He notes that those who have

consimiles vere fortibus, quia ambo sunt audaces, idest pericula audacter aggredientes,

abundant confidence in this manner are like the truly brave because both are daring-resolute in

non autem secundum quod audax dicitur aliquis vitiose. Sed differunt, quia fortes audacter

meeting dangers-but not in the way that a reckless person is at fault. They differ however

aggrediuntur propter praedicta, scilicet ex electione, et propter bonum; sed isti qui sunt

since the brave boldly attack in the fashion already indicated, i.e., by choice and on account of

bonae spei, aggrediuntur audacter propter hoc

good. But those who have high hopes attack

quod aestimant se esse meliores in pugna, et nihil se passuros contrarium ab aliis. Et est simile de

boldly because they think themselves more able fighters and are not going to suffer any reverse

inebriatis, qui etiam multiplicatis spiritibus propter vinum efficiuntur bonae spei. Sed quando

from others. They resemble drunkards who also become confident when their spirits are

talibus non accidunt ea quae sperant, non persistunt sed fugiunt. Sed proprium est fortis

reinforced by wine. But when such persons fail to get what they expect, they do not persist; they

ut sustineat propter bonum vel ad vitandum

run away. It is a mark of the brave man,

turpitudinem inhonesti, ea quae sunt homini terribilia secundum rei veritatem, et non solum

however, to suffer—for the sake of what is honorable and to avoid disgrace—evils that are

secundum apparentiam.

terrifying to men, real evils and not merely apparent ones.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod fortioris etc.,

579. At “Therefore, that man” [D, 3] he deduces

infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Quia enim ad fortem pertinet secundum inclinationem

a corollary from what has been said. Because the brave man characteristically endures terrifying

proprii habitus terribilia sustinere, magis videtur esse fortis, qui in repentinis timoribus non timet

things according to the inclination of a proper habit, that person seems to be braver who is not

neque perturbatur, quam si hoc accidat in his

more afraid or disturbed by unexpected terrors

quae (non) sunt prius manifesta. Magis enim videtur esse ab habitu, inquantum minus videtur

than by those which were apparent beforehand. Such a one seems to act more from habit

se praeparasse ad talia sustinenda. Illa enim quae

inasmuch

as he apparently has had less

sunt praemanifesta potest aliquis eligere per rationem et deliberationem etiam contra

opportunity to prepare himself to endure these evils. A man can choose by reason and

inclinationem habitus vel passionis. Nulla enim est tam vehemens inclinatio habitus vel

deliberation (even contrary to the inclination of habit and passion) the things that are foreseen.

passionis,

resistere,

In no case is the inclination of habit or passion so

dummodo remaneat homini rationis usus per quem se habet ad opposita; sed in repentinis

vehement that reason is unable to resist provided that the use of reason—which of itself has a

homo non potest deliberare. Unde videtur operari ex interiori inclinatione, quae est

relation to contraries—remains with man. But in unexpected events a man, cannot deliberate.

secundum habitum.

Hence he seems to; operate by an interior inclination according to habit.

Deinde cum dicit: fortes autem videntur etc., ponit quintum modum fortitudinis non verae. Et

580. Then [E], at “Those who operate,” he introduces the fifth kind of counterfeit fortitude.

dicit quod etiam illi qui ignorant pericula videntur esse fortes, dum scilicet audacter

He says that those who are ignorant of dangers seem to be brave when they resolutely attack

aggrediuntur ea quae sunt periculosa, licet eis

things equally dangerous, but which do not seem

non videantur. Et non longe differunt ab his qui sunt fortes propter bonam spem. Utrique enim

so dangerous to them. They do not differ much from people who are brave by reason of great

aestimat non imminere eis pericula.

confidence. Each thinks that dangers do not threaten him.

Sed in hoc differunt, quod ignorantes non aestimant ea quae ipsi aggrediuntur esse

581. They differ, however, in that the ignorant do not consider the evils they attack to be

simpliciter et in se ipsis periculosa, illi autem qui sunt bonae spei cognoscunt quidem qualia sint in

dangers in themselves and without qualification. On the other hand those who have high hopes

se ipsis ea quae aggrediuntur. Sed tamen non reputant ea esse sibi periculosa. Unde illi qui

know the nature of the evils they assail but do not think that these constitute dangers for them.

sunt ignorantes, tanto sunt deteriores illi qui

Those who are ignorant are the more inferior to

sunt bonae spei, quanto nullam dignitatem habent, sed ex solo defectu scientiae ad pericula

those who have high hopes inasmuch as the ignorant have no self-reliance at all, but go out to

currunt. Illi autem qui sunt bonae spei habent aliquam dignitatem in quantum propter

meet dangers only because of the lack of knowledge. But those who have great hopes

consuetudinem vincendi bene de se confidunt. Et ideo illi qui sunt bonae spei etiam postquam

remain for some time—even after they recognize the dangers—until the greatness of the danger

cognoscant pericula, permanent per aliquod

overwhelms their hope. Those who are brave

tempus, donec scilicet magnitudo periculi superet eorum spem. Sed illi qui per ignorantiam sunt

through ignorance, however, take flight as soon as they know the situation is different from what

fortes statim cum cognoscunt aliud esse quam suspicarentur, fugiunt. Quod passi sunt Argeny,

they suspected. The Argives, Greek citizens, reacted in this way when thinking they were

qui erant quidam cives Graeciae, et dum putarent contra Syconios pugnare, qui erant alii

fighting against Sicyonians—citizens weaker than themselves—they in fact fell upon other

cives eis infirmiores, inciderunt in quosdam alios

stronger soldiers.

cui

ratio

non

possit

fortiores. Ultimo autem concludit quod hi de quibus dictum

582, He concludes that those we have discussed

est dicuntur fortes, inquantum existimantur fortes propter actus similitudinem, non quod

(571-581) are called brave inasmuch as they are considered brave by a similitude and not because

vere sint fortes.

they are truly brave.

LECTURE 18 The Properties of Fortitude Chapter 9 1. HE DETAILS THE PROPERTIES OF FORTITUDE. a. He shows how fortitude is related to fear and daring. — 583 περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία

Although fortitude is concerned with both

οὖσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν

daring and fear, it is not concerned with each in the same way. Its task rather is to manage

τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ

terrifying things, for one who is not disturbed by these things, but conducts himself as he ought

θαρραλέα.

in regard to them, is braver than the man who behaves well in regard to daring.

b. (He shows) how fortitude is related to pain. — 584-585 τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς

As has been said, men are called brave because

εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως

they endure distressing things. Consequently, fortitude is justly praised because it does not

ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων

with draw on account of pain. It is more difficult to endure afflictions, as we have indicated, than

ἀπέχεσθαι.

to abstain from what is pleasant.

c. (He shows) how fortitude is related to pleasure. i. He submits his proposition. — 586-587 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν

Still the brave man seems to take pleasure in attaining the end for the sake of fortitude but

κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ

this pleasure vanishes on account of the accompanying discomforts, as we see happen in

πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ

athletic contests. Boxers take pleasure in the end

στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι,

they strive for, the laurel wreath and the honors. But being flesh and blood they suffer

καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ

pain from blows, and all the labor they undergo is disagreeable. Because these distressing things

ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν. εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν

are many and the end insignificant, they do not seem to feel any pleasure. Such also is it with the

ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ

act of fortitude, for death and wounds are

τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι

painful to the brave man who endures them to attain the good of virtue and to avoid disgrace.

καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. ii. He rejects an error. x. HE PROVES THAT VERY INTENSE PAIN BEFALLS THE BRAVE MAN. — 588-590 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ

As a man is more perfect in virtue and happier,

πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ

so much the more is he saddened by death. The virtuous man most of all deserves to live and he

τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται

is knowingly deprived of the most excellent goods.

εἰδώς, y. BECAUSE OF THIS, HIS FORTITUDE IS NOT LESSENED BUT INCREASED. — 591 λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον

This is saddening but it does not lessen the

ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ' ἐκείνων

virtue of the brave man. Rather a man is said to be brave because he prefers the good of fortitude

αἱρεῖται.

in battle to those goods.

iii. He deduces a corollary. — 592 οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ

The pleasurable operation is not found in all

ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.

virtues except as it attains to the end.

2. HE EXCLUDES (THESE PROPERTIES) FROM FORTITUDE OF THE SOLDIER. — 593 στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι,

Nothing hinders men, who are not such as we have described, from being very good soldiers.

ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἕτοιμοι γὰρ

But perhaps even those who are less brave and have no other good in view are good soldiers.

οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη

They are prepared for dangers and barter their life for trifling gains.

καταλλάττονται. 3. HE SUMS UP... WHAT HAS BEEN SAID. — 594

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ

So much then have we discussed the question of fortitude. From what has been said we can,

γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

without difficulty, understand the outline of the definition of fortitude.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Circa audacias autem et timores et cetera.

583. After the Philosopher has treated the matter

Postquam philosophus determinavit materiam

and the act of fortitude, he considers here certain

et actum fortitudinis, hic determinat quasdam proprietates fortitudinis secundum quod

properties according as it is related to pleasure and pain. On this point he does two things. First

fortitudo se habet ad delectationem vel tristitiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit

[1] he details the properties of fortitude. Then [2] he excludes them from fortitude of the soldier, at

fortitudinis proprietates. Secundo excludit eas a militari fortitudine, ibi: milites autem nihil

“Nothing hinders etc.” He develops the first consideration in three ways. First [a] he shows

forsitan et cetera. Circa primum tria facit.

how fortitude is related to fear and daring; next

Primo ostendit quomodo se habet fortitudo ad timorem et audaciam. Secundo quomodo

[b], how fortitude is related to pain, at “As has been said etc.”; last [c], how fortitude is related to

fortitudo se habeat ad tristitiam, ibi: in sustinendo utique et cetera. Tertio quomodo se

pleasure, at “Still the brave man seems etc.” He says first that although fortitude is concerned

habeat ad delectationem, ibi: sed adhuc videbitur utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod cum

with both daring and fear, it is not concerned with each in the same manner. But praise of this virtue

fortitudo sit circa audacias et timores, non

consists rather in this, that a person behaves well

aequaliter est circa utrumque. Sed magis laus huius virtutis est in hoc quod aliquis bene se

with respect to terrifying things. One who is not disturbed by frightening evils but conducts himself

habet circa terribilia. Ille enim qui in terribilibus non perturbatur, sed circa ea se habet sicut

as he ought in regard to them is more commended for bravery than one who conducts himself well in

oportet, magis commendatur quod sit fortis quam ille qui bene se habet circa audacias. Et

regard to daring. The reason is that fear is a threat to a man from someone stronger rising up

hoc ideo quia timor imminet homini ab aliquo

against him. But daring originates from the fact

fortiori contra ipsum insurgente. Audacia autem consurgit ex hoc quod aliquis aestimat

that a man thinks that the one he attacks is not too powerful to overcome. It is more difficult to

eum quem invadit, suam non excedere potestatem. Difficilius autem est stare contra

stand against a stronger man than to rise up against an equal or weaker one.

fortiorem, quam insurgere in aequalem vel minorem. Deinde cum dicit: in sustinendo utique etc., ostendit qualiter fortitudo se habeat circa

584. Then [b], at “As has been said,” he shows in what manner fortitude is concerned with pain. To

tristitiam. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod idem est obiectum timoris et tristitiae,

understand this we must consider that the object of fear and pain is the same, evil. But they differ

scilicet

secundum

according to past and future. Future evil is

differentiam praeteriti et futuri. Nam malum futurum est terribile; malum autem

something terrifying while evil threatening in the present is something afflicting. It pertains to the

praesentialiter imminens est contristans. Ad fortem autem pertinet non solum stare contra

brave man not only to stand against the fear of future dangers but also to continue steadfastly in

timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam in

the midst of these very dangers, as was noted

ipsis periculis persistere, sicut prius dictum est. Et ideo dicit quod aliqui praecipue dicuntur

previously (548). For this reason he says that men are called brave particularly because they

fortes ex eo quod bene sustinent tristia, id est pericula praesentialiter imminentia, puta

stout-heartedly endure distressing things, i.e., immediately threatening things like blows and

percussiones et vulnera. Et inde est quod fortitudo habet tristitiam adiunctam.

wounds. So it is that fortitude has pain connected with it.

malum,

sed

differt

Et ex hoc iuste laudatur quod non recedit a bono virtutis ad hoc quod fugiat tristitiam.

585. Consequently, fortitude is justly praised because it does not withdraw from the good of

Rationabiliter autem ex hoc fortitudo est

virtue to escape pain. On this account it is

maxime laudabilis, quia laus virtutis maxime consistit in hoc quod aliquis bene operetur circa

reasonable that fortitude is most praiseworthy, since the praise of virtue consists especially in the

difficilia. Difficilius autem est quod aliquis sustinet tristia, quod pertinet ad fortitudinem,

fact that a person deals courageously with troublesome matters. It is more difficult to endure

quam quod abstineat a delectabilibus, quod

distressing things (which pertains to fortitude)

pertinet ad temperantiam. Unde laudabilior est fortitudo quam temperantia.

than to abstain from pleasurable things (which pertains to temperance). Therefore fortitude is more praiseworthy than temperance.

Deinde cum dicit: sed adhuc videbitur etc.,

586, Next [c], at “Still the brave man, ‘ he shows

ostendit quomodo fortitudo se habeat circa delectationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo

in what manner fortitude is related to pleasure. He discusses this point from three aspects. First

ostendit propositum. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi: et quanto utique et cetera. Tertio infert

[i] he submits his proposition. Next [ii], he rejects an error, at “As a man is more perfect etc.” Last

quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, non utique in omnibus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum

[iii], he deduces a corollary from what has been said, at “The pleasurable operation etc.” He says

fortitudo sit in sustinendo tristia, videtur

first that since fortitude consists in enduring

quidem fortis habere aliquam delectationem ex consecutione finis propter quem fortiter agit;

distressing things, the brave man seems to take some pleasure in attaining the end for which he

sed ista delectatio evanescit, idest debiliter sentitur propter circumstantes tristitias, sicut

bravely struggles. But this pleasure is vapid, i.e., feebly felt on account of the accompanying griefs,

accidit in agonibus gignasticis, in quibus scilicet pugiles nudi pugnant.

as happens in athletic contests in which boxers fight with no protection.

Delectantur enim pugiles in fine, cuius gratia pugnant, scilicet quia coronantur et

587. Boxers take pleasure in the end they strive for, i.e., that they may receive the crown and be

honorantur. Sed sustinere percussiones est eis dolorosum. Et hoc negare est negare eos esse

honored. But to take a beating is painful to them. To deny this is to deny that they have flesh and

carnales. Quia si habent carnem sensibilem,

blood, because if they have sensitive flesh, hurtful

necesse est quod laesiva inferant eis dolorem. Et similiter omnis labor quem sustinent in

things must cause them pain. Likewise, all the drudgery they suffer in fighting is disagreeable to

pugnando, est eis tristabilis. Et quia multa sunt haec tristabilia et dolorosa quae sustinent, et

them. Since there are many disagreeable and painful experiences they undergo, and since the

bonum quod habent pro fine est aliquid parvum, non videntur aliquam delectationem sentire,

good they possess as an end is something insignificant, they do not seem to be sensible of

quia delectatio absorbetur a maiori tristitia. Et

any pleasure because the pleasure is absorbed by

ita etiam accidit in actu fortitudinis, quia mors et vulnera sunt dolorosa et tristia forti, quamvis

the stronger pain. So it occurs too in the act of fortitude, for death and wounds are painful to the

fortis ea sustineat volens propter assequendum bonum virtutis et propter vitandam

brave man, although he endures them to attain the good of virtue and to avoid disgrace—an end

turpitudinem vitiosam, qui quidem finis est potior quam pugilum. Unde magis remanet

more important than that of boxers. Hence some pleasure abides rather by reason of the end.

aliquid de delectatione finis.

Deinde cum dicit: et quanto utique etc., excludit

588. At “As a man is more” [ii] he rejects the

errorem Stoicorum qui ponebant quod virtuosus nullam tristitiam habet. Circa hoc

error of the Stoics who held that virtuous men feel no pain. He considers this point in a twofold

autem duo facit: primo ostendit quod forti

manner. First [x] he proves that very intense pain

imminet maxima tristitia. Secundo, quod per hoc non minuitur eius fortitudo, sed augetur,

befalls the brave man; and next y I that, because of this, his fortitude is not lessened but increased, at

ibi: sed nihil minus et cetera. Arguit autem in prima parte ex eo quod supponebant Stoici,

“This is saddening etc.” He argues in the first part from what the Stoics took for granted, that there

scilicet quod nihil esset bonum hominis nisi virtus. Et ideo dicebant virtuosum non tristari,

was no human good except virtue. Therefore, they said that the virtuous man is not subject to grief

quia in proprio bono non patitur aliquod

because, by reason of his own good, he suffers no

detrimentum. Sed e converso philosophus dicit quod quanto aliquis est magis perfectus in

harm. On the contrary, the Philosopher says that as a man is more perfect in virtue and happier

virtute et magis felix secundum felicitatem praesentis vitae, tanto magis imminet ei tristari

according to the happiness of the present life, so much more he is saddened (according to the

in morte secundum considerationem bonorum praesentis vitae.

consideration of the goods of this life) by the imminence of death.

Duo enim sunt quae augent tristitiam alicuius hominis in amissione alicuius boni. Primo

589. A man’s sadness at the loss of any good can be increased by two circumstances. First if the

quidem quando privatur bono quo dignus erat. Secundo propter magnitudinem boni quo

loss is of a deserved good, and second if the loss is of something great. Both things are present in

privatur. Et utrumque accidit in proposito quia

our case because the virtuous man most of all

virtuoso maxime dignum est quod vivat. Privatur etiam virtuosus scienter maximis

deserves to live. Likewise he is knowingly deprived of the most excellent good, i.e., the best life and the

bonis, scilicet optima vita sua et virtutibus quas amittit quantum ad usum praesentis vitae. Et

virtues which he loses so far as the use in the present life is concerned. This causes him distress,

hoc infert ei tristitiam, etiam dato quod non immineat ei tristitia respectu quorumcumque

even granted that sorrow does not befall him in respect of any other evils whatsoever that are

aliorum malorum quae tolerantur salva vita.

suffered without the loss of life.

Considerandum tamen quod aliquibus virtuosis

590. We must consider, however’ that to some

propter spem futurae vitae fit mors desiderabilis. Sed neque Stoici sic loquebantur,

virtuous men death is desirable on account of the hope of a future life. But the Stoics did not discuss

neque ad philosophum pertinebat de his quae ad

this, nor did it pertain to the Philosopher in this

statum alterius vitae pertinent, in praesenti opere loqui.

work to speak of those things that belong to the condition of another life.

Deinde cum dicit: sed nihil minus etc., dicit quod

591. Then [y], at “This is saddening,” he says that

praedicta tristitia non minuit fortitudinem. Sed

this sorrow, of which we were speaking, does not

ex hoc dicitur aliquis magis fortis, ex eo quod bonum fortitudinis quod quaeritur in bello eligit

lessen fortitude. Rather someone is said to be brave from the fact that he chooses the good of

prae illis bonis quae moriendo amittit, magis appetens unum magnum bonum facere quam

fortitude—which is sought in battle—in preference to those goods that he loses by death,

multa minora bona servare, sicut infra in IX huius dicetur.

desiring more to do one great good than to preserve many lesser goods, as will be explained later in the ninth book of this work (1879-1880).

Deinde cum dicit: non utique autem etc.,

592. Next [iii], at “The pleasurable operation,” he

concludit ex praemissis quod, licet in primo et secundo dictum sit, quod operationes virtutum

concludes from the premises that, although it was stated in the first and second books (154-160,

sunt delectabiles, non tamen in omnibus

267, 275-279) that virtuous operations are

virtutibus existit operatio delectabilis nisi secundum quod attingit finem. Et hoc dicitur

pleasurable, the pleasurable operation is not found in all virtues, except as it attains to the end. This

propter fortitudinem, ut ex dictis patet.

is noted on account of fortitude, as is evident from what was just said (586-587).

Deinde cum dicit: milites autem etc., excludit praedictas proprietates a militari fortitudine. Et

593. At “Nothing hinders” [2] he excludes the previously mentioned properties from the fortitude

dicit quod nihil prohibet aliquos esse optimos milites qui non sunt tales quales descripsimus

of the soldier. He says that nothing hinders some men from being very good soldiers, who are not

esse fortes. Sed forte illi qui sunt minus fortes

such as we have described the brave man to be.

sunt milites meliores, et nullum aliud bonum attendunt, sicut nec fortitudinis; sunt enim isti

But perhaps those who are less brave and attend to no other good, not even the good of fortitude,

parati ad pericula non propter aliquod bonum virtutis, sed vitam suam, quam exponunt

are better soldiers. They are prepared for danger not by reason of any good of virtue, but in a

discrimini, quodammodo commutant ad parva lucra, puta stipendiorum vel praedae.

measure they barter their life, which they expose to risk, for trifling gains of money and booty for instance.

Deinde cum dicit: de fortitudine quidem igitur

594. Then [3], at “So much then,” he sums up in

etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit quod tantum dictum est de fortitudine et ex his quae

conclusion what has been said. He states that the definition of fortitude can be understood according

dicta sunt potest figuraliter accipi quid est

to its general outlines, so that we may say that it

fortitudo: ut dicamus quod fortitudo est virtus medio modo se habens secundum rationem

is a virtue consisting in a mean according to right reason dealing with fear and daring on account of

rectam circa timores et audacias propter bonum.

the good.

LECTURE 19 Temperance Chapter 10 I. HE INDICATES WHAT HE INTENDS TO DO. — 595-597 μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης

Following this treatise (on fortitude) we must

λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί.

discuss temperance, for these virtues seem to pertain to the irrational parts of the soul.

II. HE CARRIES OUT HIS INTENTION. A. He inquires what the matter of temperance is.

A’ He proposes the matter of temperance in general. — 598 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· ἧττον

Temperance is a mean dealing with pleasures, as we have said before. It is less concerned, and not

γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ

in the same way, with sorrows. Intemperance too seems to deal with these things.

ἀκολασία φαίνεται. B’ He inquires about its special matter. 1. HE SAYS WHAT HE INTENDS TO DO. — 599 περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν.

We must now determine with what kind of pleasures temperance has to do.

2. HE DISTINGUISHES THE KINDS OF PLEASURES. — 600 διῃρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ

There are pleasures of the body and pleasures of

σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἑκάτερος γὰρ τούτων

the soul, such as the love of honor and learning. The lovers of each of these latter (i.e., of honor

χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ

and learning) rejoice not as a result of any bodily passion but more as a result of mental activity.

μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· 3. HE SHOWS WITH WHAT KIND OF PLEASURES TEMPERANCE DEALS. a. He shows that temperance is not concerned with pleasures of the soul. i. That have an appearance of propriety. — 601 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε

Men are not called temperate or intemperate on

σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται.

account of pleasures of the soul.

ii. With other pleasures that are not of the body. — 602 ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι

Likewise, temperance is not concerned with any

μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ

other pleasures that are not of the body. Those who love to listen to and tell stories, and who

τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς

waste the day making small talk are not called

ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν,

intemperate but garrulous.

iii. (With) a third class of pleasures of the soul that refer to external things. — 603

οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν

Those who are inordinately saddened by the loss

ἢ φίλοις. περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη

of friends and money are not called intemperate,

ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη,

Therefore, temperance will be concerned with the pleasures of the body, b. He shows that temperance is not concerned with all but with, some

bodily pleasures. i.

Does not regard the pleasures of the three senses which perceive

through a separate medium. x.

DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE PLEASURES OF THE

THREE SENSES. aa. Does not concern pleasures of sight. — 604-606 οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ

but not with all of them. Those who take delight

χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ,

in things seen: colors, figures and writing for instance, are not called temperate or

οὔτε

ἀκόλαστοι

intemperate, although it happens that men take

λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ'

pleasure in such things as they ought, and according to excess and defect.

σώφρονες

οὔτε

ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. bb.

Does not have to do with pleasures proper to hearing. —

607 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας

Temperance is related in a similar way to pleasures concerned with hearing. No one, who

μέλεσιν

οὐθεὶς

delights excessively or as he ought in songs or

ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας.

instrumental music will be called intemperate or temperate on this account.

ἢ

ὑποκρίσει

cc. Does not have to do with the pleasures of smell. — 608-609 οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας

The same is to be said in respect to those who take pleasures, except incidentally, in odors. We

μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον

do not call intemperate people who delight in the fragrance of apples or roses or incense, but

τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ

rather those who take pleasure in the perfume of

τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν

cosmetics or the aroma of tasty dishes. The intemperate enjoy these pleasures because in this

ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς

way things they desire are recalled. One may see others too taking delight in the aroma of food

τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· τούτῳ

when hungry. But it pertains to the intemperate man to rejoice in this aroma as representing

γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα.

what is desirable.

y.

SUCH PLEASURES DO NOT BELONG TO THE BRUTES.

— 610-611 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις

Other animals do not take pleasure according to

κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς

these senses except incidentally. Hounds do not delight in the scent of rabbits for itself but in the

ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ'

prospect of food, the sense of which they get through smell. The lion does not rejoice in the

αἴσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδ' ὁ

lowing of the ox, but in the meal that he senses is

λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοὸς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς

at hand because of the sound he apparently enjoys. Likewise, he does not take pleasure in the

φωνῆς ᾔσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ

sight of the stag or the wild she-goat which he discovers, but in the hope of possessing food.

[εὑρὼν] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει. z. HE DRAWS A CONCLUSION. — 612 περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἡ

Temperance and intemperance then have to do

σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν

with such pleasures as the other animals have in common with man. Hence gratifications of touch

ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ

and taste seem to be servile and brutish.

γεῦσις.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Post haec de temperantia dicamus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

595. After the Philosopher has treated fortitude concerned with terrifying things which are

fortitudine quae respicit terribilia quae sunt corruptiva humanae vitae, hic agit de

destructive of man’s life, he now takes up the question of temperance concerned with pleasurable

temperantia quae respicit delectabilia, quibus

things which preserve human life, i.e., food and sex.

humana vita conservatur, scilicet cibos et venerea. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit de

On this point he does two things. First [I] he indicates what he intends to do. Next [II] he carries

quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, quoniam quidem igitur et

out his intention, at “Temperance is a mean etc.” He says first that, after the treatise on fortitude,

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post haec quae dicta sunt de fortitudine, dicendum est de

we must speak about temperance. He finds the reason for this succession in the fact that these two

temperantia.

continuationis

virtues agree in subject. Both pertain to the

assignat ex hoc quod istae duae virtutes conveniunt in subiecto. Utraque enim est

irrational part, according as that part of the soul is called irrational which is designed by nature both to

irrationabilium partium, prout scilicet irrationabilis pars animae dicitur quae nata est

conform to, and to obey reason, as was stated in the beginning (239). Such is the sensitive appetite to

et contraire et oboedire rationi, ut supra in I habitum est. Huiusmodi autem est appetitus

which the passions of the soul belong.

sensitivus,

Et

ad

rationem

quem

pertinent

animae

passiones. Unde oportet quod in appetitu sensitivo sint omnes virtutes quae sunt circa passiones. Est

596. Hence all the virtues dealing with the passions must be placed in the sensitive appetite. Fortitude is

autem fortitudo circa passionem timoris et

concerned with the passions of fear and daring,

audaciae quae sunt in irascibili; temperantia autem circa delectationes et tristitias quae

which reside in the irascible part, but temperance is concerned with pleasures and pains, which reside in

sunt in concupiscibili. Unde fortitudo est in irascibili, sed temperantia in concupiscibili.

the concupiscible part. Consequently, fortitude is placed in the irascible part, but temperance in the concupiscible Part.

Considerandum tamen est quod delectationes

597. We must consider that the pleasures of food

circa quas est temperantia sunt communes nobis et brutis, scilicet delectationes ciborum

and sex, with which temperance deals, are common to us and the brutes. Likewise, the fear of death,

et venereorum. Et similiter timores circa quos est fortitudo sunt communes nobis et brutis,

with which fortitude is concerned, is common to us and them. For this reason he notes particularly

scilicet timores mortis. Et ideo specialiter dixit

that these two virtues are of the irrational parts,

quod hae duae virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium, quia ad irrationabiles partes animae

because they belong to the irrational parts of the soul not only on account of the passions themselves

pertinent, non solum propter ipsas passiones, sed etiam propter passionum obiecta. Sunt

but also because of the objects of the passions. There are some passions whose objects do not

enim quaedam passiones ex quarum obiectis bruta animalia non patiuntur, sicut divitiae,

concern the brutes, like riches, honors and so on.

honores et alia huiusmodi. Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc.,

598. Then [II], at “Temperance is a mean,” he

incipit determinare de temperantia. Et primo inquirit quae sit materia temperantiae.

begins to define temperance. First [A] he inquires what the matter of temperance is. Second [Lect.

Secundo

et

20, B], at “Some desires are,” he defines the act of

oppositorum vitiorum, ibi, concupiscentiarum autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

temperance and of the opposite vices (B.1118 b 8). He considers the first point under two aspects.

Primo proponit in generali temperantiae. Secundo inquirit

materiam materiam

First [A’] he proposes the matter of temperance in general. Next [B’], at “We must now determine

specialem, ibi, circa quales igitur et cetera.

etc.,” he inquires about its special matter. In regard

Circa primum resumit tria quae supra in secundo dicta sunt. Quorum primum est quod

to the first point he reviews three considerations which were discussed in the second book (342). The

temperantia medium tenet circa delectationes. Secundum est quod ipsa etiam est circa

first is that temperance keeps a mean concerning pleasures. The second is that temperance deals also

tristitias, quae scilicet proveniunt ex absentia delectabilium, unde minus est temperantia

with sorrows that arise from the absence of pleasures. Temperance is less concerned, however,

circa tristitias quam circa delectationes quia

with sorrows than with pleasures because a thing

efficacius aliquid agit per suam praesentiam quam per suam absentiam. Tertium autem

acts more efficaciously by its presence than by its absence. The third is that intemperance likewise

quod intemperantia est similiter circa delectationes et tristitias, eo quod contraria

deals with pleasures and sorrows because contraries are concerned about the same thing.

determinat

fiunt circa idem.

actum

ipsius

Deinde cum dicit: circa quales igitur etc.,

599. Next [B’], at “We must now determine,” he

inquirit specialem materiam temperantiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo dicit de quo est

inquires about the special matter of temperance. Three aspects claim his attention. First [1] he says

intentio. Secundo distinguit delectationes, ibi: determinentur autem etc.; tertio ostendit circa

what he intends to do. Then [2], at “There are,” he distinguishes the kinds of pleasures. Last [3], at

quales delectationes sit temperantia, ibi, qui

“Men are not called etc.,” he shows with what kind

autem tales et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum temperantia sit circa delectationes,

of pleasures temperance deals. He says first that, since temperance deals with pleasures, we must

oportet nunc determinare circa quales delectationes sit ut etiam in speciali ratio

now determine with what kind of pleasures it deals, so that the nature of temperance in particular may

temperantiae cognoscatur.

be known.

Deinde cum dicit: determinentur autem etc.,

600. At “There are” [2] he distinguishes the kinds

distinguit delectationes. Et dicit quod earum quaedam sunt animales, quaedam corporales.

of pleasure. He says that some of them are of the soul, others of the body. Pleasures of the body are

Corporales quidem delectationes sunt, quae consummantur in quadam corporali passione

those that are completed in some bodily affection of an external sense. Pleasures of the soul are those

exterioris

autem

that are completed by interior apprehension alone.

delectationes sunt quae consummantur ex sola apprehensione interiori. Et exemplificat de

He gives an example of pleasures of the soul, beginning with the cause of pleasure—which is

delectationibus animalibus, incipiens a causa delectationis quae est amor. Unusquisque enim

love. Every one takes pleasure from the fact that he possesses what he loves. In some men we find the

delectatur ex hoc quod habet id quod amat. Invenitur autem in quibusdam amor honoris,

love of honor; in others, the love of learning. This love is not perceived by an external sense but by an

et in quibusdam amor disciplinae, quae non

apprehension of the soul, which is interior.

apprehenduntur exteriori sensu, sed interiori apprehensione animae, unde uterque horum,

Therefore each of these, i.e., the man who loves honor or learning, rejoices on account of what he

scilicet et ille qui est amator honoris, et ille qui est amator disciplinae, gaudet per id quod

loves while he has it. This joy does not arise as the result of any bodily passion, but as a result of the

amat, dum scilicet habet ipsum. Et hoc gaudium non fit per aliquam corporis

mind’s awareness alone.

sensus.

Animales

passionem, sed per solam apprehensionem mentis. Deinde cum dicit: qui autem circa tales etc., ostendit quod circa animales delectationes non

601. Then [a], at “Men are not called,” he shows that temperance is not concerned with pleasures of

est temperantia. Et designat tria genera

the soul. He indicates three classes of these

harum delectationum. Quaedam enim sunt animaliter delectabilia, quae habent quamdam

pleasures. Some [a, i] that have an appearance of propriety like honor and learning, as we have just

speciem honestatis, sicut honor et disciplina, sicut praemissum est. Et ideo dicit quod circa

noted (600), are pleasurable to the soul. For this reason he says that men are not called temperate or

huiusmodi delectationes non dicuntur aliqui neque temperati neque intemperati, quia

intemperate on account of such pleasures, since temperance seems to refer to pleasures which have

temperantia

videntur

something of shame about them. Concerned with

respicere aliquas delectationes turpitudinem habentes. Sunt tamen et circa delectationes

the pleasures of honor and learning there are, however, certain other means and extremes

honorum et disciplinae quaedam alia media et extrema pertinentia ad alias virtutes, ut

pertaining to other virtues, as will be clearly shown in the fourth book (792-799).

et

intemperantia

patebit in quarto. Secundo autem ibi: similiter autem etc., ponit

602. Second [a, ii], at “Likewise, temperance,” he

quasdam alias delectationes animales, quae consistunt in dictis vel factis hominum. Et dicit

now recalls other pleasures of the soul which consist in the sayings and deeds of men. He says

quod sicut temperantia non est circa delectationes honoris et disciplinae, ita etiam

that, as temperance is not concerned with pleasures of honor or learning, so also it is not concerned

non est circa alias delectationes, quae non sunt corporales. Illos enim qui amant audire fabulas

with other pleasures which are not of the body. Those who love to listen to and tell stories, and who

et narrare, et totum diem terunt vel expendunt

waste the whole day talking about all kinds of

in quibuscumque contingentibus dictis vel factis, scilicet non necessariis neque utilibus,

contingent remarks and deeds (unnecessary and useless affairs) are said to be garrulous but we do

dicimus esse garrulos, sed non dicimus eos esse intemperatos. Quia intemperantia non

not call them intemperate. The reason is that intemperance has not only a futility about it, but

solum habet vanitatem, turpitudinem quamdam.

also a certain baseness.

sed

etiam

Tertio ibi: neque contristatos in pecuniis etc., ponit tertium genus animalium delectationum,

603. Third [a, iii], at “Those who are,” he introduces a third class of pleasures of the soul

quae sunt respectu exteriorum rerum sicut sunt pecuniae et amici. Unde dicit quod illi, qui

which refer to money and friends. Hence he says that those, who are in ordinately saddened by the

inordinate

loss of money and friends, are not

contristantur

in

subtractione

called

pecuniarum et amicorum, non dicuntur intemperati, sed possunt dici secundum aliquid

intemperate. But they can be called vicious from one aspect, because such sorrows do not show

aliud vitiosi, quia tales tristitiae non habent turpitudinem, sed solam inordinationem

turpitude but only a disordered condition of the appetite. From this, that temperance is not

appetitus. Et ex his concludit quod ex quo temperantia non est circa aliquod genus

concerned with any class of pleasures of the soul, he concludes that it does concern pleasures of the

animalium

body.

delectationum, quod sit

circa

corporales delectationes. Deinde cum dicit non omnes autem etc.,

604. Then [b], at “but not with all,” he shows that

ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa omnes

temperance is not concerned with all but with some

delectationes corporales, sed circa aliquas. Et primo ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa

bodily pleasures. First [b, i] he discloses that temperance does not regard the pleasures of the

delectationes trium sensuum qui per exterius medium sentiunt. Secundo ostendit quomodo

three senses which perceive through a separate (from the sense organ) medium. Next [Lect. 20; b,

sit circa delectationes duorum sensuum, qui sentiunt per medium coniunctum, ibi: videntur

ii], at “Any use of taste etc.,” he explains in what manner temperance regards the pleasures of the

utique et gustu et cetera. Circa primum tria

other two senses which perceive through a

facit. Primo ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa delectationes trium sensuum

contiguous (with the sense organ) medium (B.1118 a 26). He develops the first point [b, i] in three

praedictorum. Secundo huiusmodi delectationes

ostendit quod non conveniunt

steps. First [i, x] he shows that temperance does not deal with the pleasures of the three previously

animalibus brutis, ibi, non est autem neque in aliis et cetera. Tertio infert quamdam

mentioned senses. Next [i, y], at “Other animals do not etc.,” he shows that such pleasures do not

conclusionem ex dictis, ibi circa tales igitur et

belong to brutes. Last [i, z], at “Temperance and

cetera. Circa

primum

tria

facit. Primo

intemperance etc.,” he draws a conclusion from

manifestat quod temperantia non sit circa delectationes visus.

what has been said. Regarding the first he excludes the three senses. First [x, aa] he proves that temperance does not concern pleasures of sight.

Et dicit quod temperantia non est circa omnes

605. He says that temperance is not concerned

delectationes corporales, quae fiunt per exteriores sensus. Illi enim qui delectantur in

with all bodily pleasures which arise by means of the external external senses. Those who take

visibilibus, non dicuntur ex hoc temperati neque intemperati. Et exemplificat de tribus

delight in things seen are not on that account called temperate or intemperate. He gives examples of

generibus visibilium. Quorum quaedam sunt

three classes of visible objects. Some are the proper

sensibilia propria visus, sicut colores. Quaedam autem sunt sensibilia communia, quae tamen

sensibles of sight, as colors. Others are common sensibles, which however are known most

per visum maxime cognoscuntur, sicut figurae. Quaedam autem sunt sensibilia per

particularly through sight, as figures, Still others are sensible incidentally, as writing, by reason of

accidens, sicut Scriptura, ratione eius quod per Scripturam significatur.

what is signified through the writing.

Nec hoc dicitur quin in his possit esse virtus et vitium, contingit enim quod in talibus aliquis

606. This does not mean that virtue and vice are not to be encountered here. It happens in such

delectetur sicut oportet, idest medio modo, et secundum superabundantiam et defectum,

matters that a person may take pleasure as he ought this is the mean, or according to excess and

quae pertinent ad curiositatem, non autem ad

defect, but this pertains to curiosity and not to

intemperantiam, quae est circa delectationes vehementiores.

intemperance which regards the more vehement pleasures.

Secundo ibi: similiter autem etc., ostendit quod

607. Next [x, bb], at “Temperance is related,” he

temperantia

delectationes

proves that temperance does not have to do with

proprias auditus. Et dicit quod similiter se habet et in delectationibus quae sunt circa

the pleasures proper to hearing. He says that temperance is related in a similar way to the

auditum, quod scilicet circa eas non est temperantia vel intemperantia. Si enim aliquis

pleasures concerned with hearing; neither it nor intemperance is involved. If someone delights too

in melodiis, idest in consonantiis humanarum vocum, et hypocrisi, idest simulatione

much, or as he ought, in melodies (i.e., harmonies of human voices) and symphony (that is, the imitation

humanae

musica

of the human voice achieved through instruments)

instrumenta, aliquis gaudeat vel superabundanter, vel secundum quod oportet,

he will not be called temperate or intemperate on this account because these are not very vehement

non ex hoc dicetur temperatus vel intemperatus, quia nec etiam hae sunt multum

pleasures either. But this matter can belong to another virtue or vice,

non

vocis

est

quae

circa

fit

per

vehementes delectationes. Potest autem hoc pertinere ad aliam virtutem vel vitium. Tertio ibi: neque eos etc., ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa delectationes

608. Third [x, cc], at “The same is to be said,” he proves that temperance does not have to do with

olfactus. Circa quod considerandum est, quod

the pleasures of smell. Regarding this we must

sicut in libro de sensu et sensato dicitur, species odorum dupliciter distinguuntur. Uno

consider that, as stated in the work De Sensu et Sensato (Ch. 5, 443 b 17 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 13, 177-

modo

186), the kinds of scents are distinguished in two

secundum

se.

Alio

modo

per

comparationem ad species saporum. Dicit ergo, quod neque illi dicuntur temperati vel

ways. In one way in themselves. In the other way by a comparison with the species of savors. He says

intemperati, qui delectantur in odoribus in se consideratis secundum quod oportet vel plus

then that they are not called temperate and intemperate who take reasonable or excessive

quam oportet; sed solum si delectentur secundum accidens, idest secundum quod

pleasure in odors considered in themselves but only when they take pleasure in odors incidentally, i.e.,

coincidunt odores cum delectabilibus gustus et

according as these odors coincide with the

tactus.

pleasures of taste and touch.

Illos enim qui gaudent odoribus pomorum vel rosarum vel thymiamatum, qui sunt species

609. We do not call intemperate those who take pleasure in the fragrance of apples or roses or

odorum

dicimus

incense, which are species of odor in itself, but those

intemperatos. Sed illos, qui delectantur in odoribus pulmentorum vel unguentorum

who take pleasure in the aroma of foods or the perfume of cosmetics used by women. The

quibus mulieres unguntur. In his enim delectantur intemperati propter memoriam

intemperate delight in these pleasures on account of memory of certain things they long for. He clearly

quorumdam aliorum quae concupiscunt. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum eorum qui

shows this by the example of the hungry who take pleasure in odors that do not interest them when

esuriunt, qui gaudent odoribus ciborum, in

they have eaten. So it is evident that these men do

quibus non delectantur cum sunt repleti. Et sic patet quod non delectantur in odoribus

not take pleasure in odors as such but incidentally. In this way it pertains to the intemperate man—to

secundum se, sed per accidens. Sic enim gaudere odoribus pertinet ad intemperatum,

whom the things represented by the odors are desirable—to take pleasure in those odors.

secundum

se,

non

cui sunt concupiscibilia ea quae per odores repraesentantur.

Deinde cum dicit: non est autem neque in aliis etc., ostendit quod delectationes praedictorum

610. At “Other animals do not take” [i, y] he proves that pleasures arising from these senses belong

sensuum non conveniunt aliis animalibus per

only indirectly to other animals. He says that the

se, sed solum per accidens. Et dicit quod in aliis animalibus non fit delectatio secundum

brutes find pleasure via these three senses indirectly, i.e., by reference to taste and touch. He

praedictos tres sensus nisi secundum accidens, id est in ordine ad gustum et tactum. Et hoc

clearly shows this first in regard to the sense of smell. Hounds do not take pleasure in the scent of

manifestat primo in sensu olfactus; quia canes non delectantur in odore leporum propter

rabbits on account of the scent itself but on account of the expected food, the sensation of which they

ipsum odorem, sed propter cibum quem

receive through smell. Second, he makes the same

sperant, cuius sensum per odorem accipiunt. Secundo ostendit idem in sensu auditus. Et

point in regard to the sense of hearing. He says that the lion takes pleasure in the lowing of an ox

dicit, quod leo non delectatur in voce bovis, sed in eius comestione, quem appropinquare

because the lion knows from the sound that a meal is near. Hence he seems to delight in the bellow of

cognoscit per vocem. Unde videtur gaudere voce bovis. Sed hoc est per accidens. Tertio

the bull, but this is incidental. Third, Aristotle manifests the same thing in regard to seeing. He

manifestat idem in visu. Et dicit, quod etiam

says that the lion does not take pleasure even at the

leo non delectatur in aspectu cervi vel caprei, quem vocat agrestem capram, quando invenit

sight of the stag or roe (which he calls a wild shegoat) when he finds something of this kind, but he

aliquid huiusmodi, sed delectatur in spe habendi cibum.

is delighted by the hope of getting a meal.

Horum autem ratio est, quia appetitus animalium aliorum movetur solo instinctu

611. The reason for these things is that the appetite of the other animals is moved by the

naturae. Et ideo non delectantur nisi in his quae pertinent ad sustentationem naturae,

instinct of nature alone. On this account animals take pleasure only in the things referring to the

propter quam dantur huiusmodi sensus animalibus; sed hominibus dantur propter

preservation of nature; that is why senses of this kind were given them. But senses have been given

cognitionem sensibilium, ex quibus proceditur

to men for the perception of sensible things leading

ad cognitionem rationis, quae movet hominis appetitum. Et inde est quod homo delectatur in

in turn to a knowledge of reason which moves the appetite of man. So it is that man takes pleasure in

ipsa sensibilium convenientia secundum se consideratorum, etiam si non ordinentur ad

the very appropriateness of sensible things considered in themselves, even if they are not

sustentationem naturae.

ordered to the conservation of nature.

Deinde cum dicit: circa tales igitur operationes etc., concludit ex praemissis quod temperantia

612. Then [i, z], at “Temperance and intemperance,” he concludes from the premises that

est circa tales operationes seu delectationes, in quibus et reliqua animalia communicant cum

temperance has to do with such operations or pleasures as the other animals have in common

homine; et similiter intemperantia. Unde

with man. The same is true of intemperance. Hence

huiusmodi delectationes videntur esse serviles et bestiales. Quia id in quo communicamus

pleasures of this kind seem to be servile and brutish because what we have in common with irrational

cum bestiis est in nobis servile et naturaliter rationi subiectum. Huiusmodi autem sunt

animals is slavish and naturally subject to reason in us. Such are the pleasures of touch and taste which

delectationes tactus et gustus, qui sunt duo sensus praeter tres praedictos.

are the two senses besides the three mentioned before.

LECTURE 20 Temperance in Relation to Touch and Taste Chapter 10 ii. He shows what concerns the pleasures of taste and touch. x.

DOES NOT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PLEASURES

OF TASTE BUT... TOUCH. — 613-614 φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ

Any use of taste made by temperance, or intemperance for that matter, is small or even non-

γεύσεώς

τῶν

existent. Taste here means the discernment of

χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα

flavors, the occupation of wine-tasters and cooks sampling their own food. The intemperate do not

ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι,

take delight in these things or at least not much, but in the enjoyment by touch in the taking of food and

ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν

drink and in the gratification of sex.

ποτοῖς

ἐστιν

καὶ

λεγομένοις.

ἡ

τοῖς

κρίσις

ἀφροδισίοις

y. HE CLARIFIES... WHAT HE HAS AFFIRMED. — 615 διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα αὑτῷ μακρότερον

On this account a certain man by the name of Philoxenus Erichius—a voracious eater—prayed for

γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἁφῇ.

a gullet longer than a crane’s, so he could take more pleasure in the contact with his food.

z. HE DRAWS A CONCLUSION. — 616-617 κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν

Touch, with which intemperance deals, is the most widely shared of all the senses. Rightly then

δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι

intemperance seems worthy of reproach, since it

οὐχ ᾗ ἄνθρωποί ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ᾗ ζῷα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις

does not exist in man as belonging to what is proper to him, but to what he has in common with the

χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ

animals. To take pleasure in things of this sort and to love them above everything else is brutish. We

ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς

exclude those pleasures of touch which are especially liberal, for instance, those taken in gymnasia by

γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς

massages and heat-treatment. But the pleasure of

θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου

touch, which the intemperate man seeks, is not that of the whole body but of certain parts of the body.

ἁφή, ἀλλὰ περί τινα μέρη. Chapter 11 B. He shows how the act of temperance and of the opposite vices is constituted. A’ He explains his proposition. 1. HE TREATS INTEMPERANCE. a. He shows how temperance is related to pleasures. i. He makes a certain division of desires. — 618-619 τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἳ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἳ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ

Some desires are common, and others are proper and acquired.

ἐπίθετοι· ii. He explains the division. x. HE POINTS OUT WHAT THE COMMON DESIRES ARE. — 620 οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς

The desire for food is natural, for everyone—when he is without it—desires food and drink (and

ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀμφοῖν,

sometimes both) just as, according to Homer [Iliad,

καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων·

xxiv. 130], the young and growing man longs for a bed.

y.

HE POINTS OUT WHAT THE PROPER DESIRES ARE. —

621 τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι

Not all men, however, do want such and such a bed,

πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει

or the same kinds of food. For this reason such desires seem to be peculiar to each of us, although

γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ

they still have something of the natural. Different

ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων.

people enjoy different pleasures, and some persons take more pleasure in certain kinds of things than in chance objects. iii. He shows in what manner intemperance deals with both desires.

x.

IN THE NATURAL DESIRES WHICH ARE COMMON. —

622-623 ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἁμαρτάνουσι

In natural desires few men go astray and then only in one way, by excess. This happens when men eat

καὶ ἐφ' ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ

or drink even to an immoderate fullness, which is an

ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ

excess in the quantity of food nature requires. (Nature desires that its need be supplied.) These

τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ

people are called “belly-mad” because they stuff their stomachs beyond need. Such persons become very

φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ

brutish.

δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. y. WITH PROPER DESIRES. — 624-625 περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν

But in regard to proper desires, many sin in

πολλοὶ καὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν.

πολλαχῶς τῶν γὰρ

numerous ways. Those who love such pleasures sin in delighting in things they ought not, or more than

φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ

they ought, or as many of the foolish do, or not according to measure. The intemperate are

ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ

excessive in all these ways because they enjoy

πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν

certain odious things they ought not to enjoy. If pleasure may be taken, they delight in such things

ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ μισητὰ γάρ, καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων,

(as many do) more than they ought. Therefore, since intemperance is excess in regard to pleasures,

μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς

it is despicable.

ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία

καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον·

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Videntur utique et gustu et cetera. Postquam

613. After the Philosopher has proved that

philosophus ostendit quod temperantia et intemperantia non sunt circa delectationes

temperance and intemperance do not deal with the pleasures of three senses but with the pleasures of

trium

delectationes

two, i.e., taste and touch, he shows now [b, ii] what

duorum, scilicet gustus et tactus, hic ostendit qualiter sit circa delectationes utriusque. Et

concerns the pleasures of taste and touch. He treats this from three aspects. First [ii, x] he shows that

circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod directe temperantia non est circa delectationes

temperance does not deal directly with the pleasures of taste but with the pleasures of touch. Next [ii, y],

gustus, sed circa delectationes tactus. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat per

at “On this account etc.,” he clarifies by an example what he has affirmed. Finally [ii, z], at “Touch, with

exemplum, ibi, propter quod et oravit et

which etc.,” he draws a conclusion from what has

cetera. Tertio infert conclusionem ex dictis: communissimus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo

been said. He says first that temperance and intemperance seem to make little or no use of what

primo, quod temperantia et intemperantia parum vel nihil videntur uti eo, quod proprie

is proper to taste, namely, the discernment of flavors. Those who test wine use taste in this way;

pertinet ad gustum, prout scilicet ad gustum pertinet iudicare de saporibus. Sic autem

likewise, those who season food and sample to see whether their dishes have a delicious taste.

sensuum,

sed

circa

utuntur gustu, illi qui probant vina, vel qui condiunt pulmenta et experiuntur utrum convenientem saporem pulmentis dederint. In hoc autem non multum delectantur

614. The intemperate do not take much delight in

intemperati, vel etiam non subtrahitur eis

this, and they are not deprived of much pleasure

multum de delectatione, si ciborum sapores non bene discernant. Sed tota eorum

when they do not perfectly discern the flavors of food. But all their delight consists in the enjoyment

delectatio consistit in usu quarumdam rerum delectabilium, puta in sumptione ciborum et

of certain pleasurable things, for instance, in eating, drinking, and sex—all of which occur through

potuum, et in usu venereorum, qui quidem

touch. It is obvious, therefore, that the pleasure of

usus fit per tactum. Unde manifestum est, quod delectatio intemperati, directe est circa

the intemperate has to do directly with the sense of touch, and with taste only because flavors make the

tactum. Circa gustum autem, non est nisi secundum quod sapores faciunt

enjoyment of food delectable. For this reason he previously said (608-611, 613) that intemperance

delectabiliorem usum ciborum. Et ideo dixit supra quod in parum utitur intemperantia

has little use for taste, i.e., as it is ordered to touch, or no use, i.e., in respect to what belongs to taste in

gustu, scilicet secundum id quod ordinatur ad

itself.

tactum, vel nihil quantum ad id quod secundum se convenit gustui. Deinde cum dicit propter quod et oravit etc.,

615. Then [ii, y], at “On this account,” he clarifies

manifestat

exemplum.

by an example what he had said. A certain man

Quidam enim Philosenus nomine, Erixius patria, cum voraciter comederet pultes,

named Philoxenus Erichius who, since he ate his meals greedily, desired to have a throat longer than

desideravit quod guttur eius fieret longius

a crane’s so the food would remain a long while in

quod

dixerat

per

gutture gruis, ut scilicet diu cibus in eius

his throat. From this it is evident that he did not

gutture remaneret. Ex quo patet quod non delectabatur gustu, qui non viget in gutture

take pleasure in taste (which is active in the tongue and not in the throat) but in touch alone.

sed in lingua, sed delectabatur solo tactu. Deinde cum dicit communissimus autem etc.,

616. Next [ii, z], at “Touch, with which,” he draws a

infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Sensus enim tactus, circa quem est intemperantia, est

corollary from what has been said. The sense of touch, which temperance deals with, is the most

communissimus inter omnes sensus, quia in hoc sensu communicant omnia animalia. Et

common of all the senses because all the animals share in it. On this account intemperance seems to

ideo

iuste

be really despicable since it does not exist in man as

exprobrabilis, quia inest hominibus non quantum ad id quod est proprium hominis, sed

belonging to what is proper to him, but to what he has in common with other animals. But to take

quantum ad id in quo communicat cum aliis animalibus. Delectari autem in talibus, et

pleasure in things of this sort and to love them as the highest goods seems to be especially animal-like.

huiusmodi diligere tamquam maxima bona, videtur esse maxime bestiale. Et inde est quod

So it is that vices of intemperance possess the most disgusting shamefulness because they make man

vitia intemperantiae maximam turpitudinem

like the brutes. Therefore, by reason of such vices,

habent, quia per ea homo bestiis assimilatur. Et inde est quod ex huiusmodi vitiis redditur

man is rendered notoriously evil and blameworthy.

intemperantia

videtur

esse

homo maxime infamis et vituperabilis. Et quia posset aliquis dicere, quod etiam in his

617. Someone might say that even in things

quae ad tactum pertinent, est aliquid proprium homini quod non est bestiale, ideo ad

pertaining to touch there is some properly human good that is not bestial. In order to answer this

hanc obviationem excludendam subdit, quod temperantiae subtrahuntur illae delectationes

objection, he adds that we exclude from temperance those pleasures of touch that are especially liberal—

quae sunt maxime liberales, utpote hominibus appropriatae, et secundum rationem factae,

appropriate for humans—and used according to reason. Such pleasures are found in gymnasia by

sicut

in

massage and heat-treatment in view of the games

gignasiis, id est in exercitiis ludorum, per contritionem et calefactionem, dum aliqui ad

(since some are going to wrestle or indulge in other sports). These pleasures of touch are not ordered to

invicem luctantur aut aliter exercentur, non per ordinem ad concupiscentias ciborum vel

the desire of food or sex. The pleasure of touch which the intemperate man seeks is not that of the

venereorum. Delectatio enim tactus quam intemperatus quaerit, non est circa totum

whole body but of certain parts of the body.

sunt

delectationes

quae

fiunt

corpus, sed circa quasdam corporis partes.

Deinde cum dicit concupiscentiarum autem etc., ostendit qualis sit actus temperantiae

618. At “Some desires” [13] he shows how the act of temperance (in the previously mentioned matter)

circa praedictam materiam et etiam oppositorum vitiorum. Et circa hoc duo facit.

and of the opposite vices is constituted. Here he proceeds in twofold fashion. First [A] he explains

Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo comparat vitia intemperantiae ad quaedam

his proposition. Next [Lect. 22, B’], at “Intemperance is more etc.” ( B. 1119 a 21 ), he

alia

magis

compares the vices of intemperance with certain

assimilatur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat de intemperantia,

other vices. Regarding the first he has three considerations. First [i] he treats intemperance,

vitia,

ibi,

voluntario

autem

ostendens qualiter operetur circa praeinquisitam materiam. Secundo

showing in what manner it operates in the previously investigated matter. Next [Lect. 21, 2],

determinat de insensibilitate, ibi, deficientes autem et cetera. Tertio de temperantia, ibi,

at “It does not happen etc.,” he treats insensibility (B. 1119 a 5). Last [Lect. 21, 3], at “The temperate

temperatus autem medie et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo

man etc.,” he treats temperance (B. 1119 a 12). In regard to the first he does two things. First [a] he

intemperantia se habeat circa delectationes;

shows how temperance is related to pleasures. Then

secundo quomodo se habeat circa tristitias, ibi, circa tristitias autem et cetera. Sicut

[Lect. 21, b], at “With regard to sorrows etc.,” how it is related to sorrow (B.1118 b 29). Fear and

autem supra dictum est, quod ad idem ordinantur timor et tristitia, quia tristitia est

sorrow are ordered to the same thing—we noted this before (584)—because sorrow has to do with

praesentium malorum, sicut timor futurorum, ita etiam in idem ordinantur concupiscentia,

present evils, as fear with future ones. So also desire (which concerns future goods) and pleasure (which

quae est futurorum bonorum, et delectatio

concerns present goods) are ordered to the same

quae est praesentium; unde et temperantia est eadem ratione circa concupiscentias et

thing. Temperance is in the reason concerned with sensual desires and pleasures First [a, i] he makes a

delectationes. Primo ergo ponit quamdam divisionem concupiscentiarum. Secundo

certain division of desires. Next [a, ii], at “The desire for food etc.,” he explains the division. Last [a, iii],

manifestat eam, ibi: puta quae cibi etc.; tertio ostendit qualiter intemperantia sit circa

at “In natural desires etc.,” he shows in what manner intemperance deals with both desires.

utrasque concupiscentias, ibi, in naturalibus quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quaedam concupiscentiae sunt communes, et quaedam

619. He says first that some desires are common and others are proper, being in addition to the

sunt

common.

propriae,

quae

se

habent

per

appositionem quamdam ad communes. Deinde cum dicit puta quae cibi etc., manifestat divisionem praemissam. Et primo

620. Then [a, ii], at “The desire for food,” he explains this division. First [a, ii, x] he points out

manifestat

concupiscentiae

what the common desires are, saying that the desire

communes. Et dicit, quod concupiscentia cibi in communi est naturalis, utpote consequens

for food in general is natural, as following the whole nature of the species and genus. Hence every man

totam naturam speciei aut etiam generis. Et inde est, quod omnis homo ad subveniendum

desires dry nourishment called food or moist nourishment called drink—and sometimes both—in

indigentiae naturae concupiscit siccum alimentum quod dicitur cibus, vel humidum

order to succor a natural need, just as according to Homer every man (the young as well as the

quod dicitur potus et quandoque utrumque.

growing, i.e., the adolescent) longs for a bed to rest

Sicut etiam Homerus dicit, quod omnis homo tam iuvenis quam crescens, idest adolescens

in.

quae

sunt

concupiscit lectum in quo requiescat.

Secundo etiam ibi talem autem etc., ostendit quae sint propriae delectationes. Et dicit, quod

621. Next [a, ii, y], at “Not all men however,” he points out what the proper desires are, saying that

non omnes homines concupiscunt talem vel talem lectum, puta stratum plumis aut

not all men want this particular bed—say a couch strewn with feathers and costly covering. Likewise,

pretiosis tegumentis. Similiter etiam non

not everyone craves such and such a food, an

omnes desiderant talem vel talem cibum, puta

expensive dish for example, or one daintily prepared.

pretiosum aut delicate paratum; neque etiam omnes idem concupiscunt; sed quidam in

All do not yearn for the same gratification, but in such matters some desire one thing, others another.

talibus, concupiscunt hoc, quidam aliud. Unde huiusmodi concupiscibilia videntur esse

Hence desires of this kind seem to be our very own because we are not inclined to them by nature but

nostra, quia scilicet ad ea non inclinamur ex natura, sed potius ex nostra adinventione.

by our own devising. Here nothing hinders a thing from being natural as belonging to the nature of the

Nihil tamen prohibet etiam in his esse aliquid

individual, although it may not belong to the nature

naturale quasi pertinens ad naturam individui licet non pertineat ad naturam generis vel

of the genus or species. We see that different people enjoy different pleasures according to their different

speciei. Videmus enim quod diversa sunt delectabilia diversis, secundum diversas

temperaments. And because of natural temperament, some persons take more pleasure in

complexiones eorum. Et quibusdam sunt

certain kinds of things than in other commonplace

quaedam delectabiliora quam alia indifferenter propter naturalem complexionem eorum.

objects.

Deinde cum dicit: in naturalibus quidem igitur

622. At “In natural desires” [a, iii] he explains in

etc., ostendit qualiter sit intemperantia circa

what manner intemperance has to do with the

concupiscentias praedictas. Et dicit quod in concupiscentiis naturalibus quae sunt

desires just mentioned. He says that in the natural desires that are common [a, iii, x] few men go

communes, pauci peccant. Et non est peccatum in hoc nisi uno modo, scilicet

astray. Here transgression occurs only in one way, according as someone takes more than nature

secundum quod plus aliquis quam natura requirat comedit vel bibit. Contingit enim

requires. This happens when someone eats or drinks what is given him in an immoderate amount, in

quod aliquis comedit vel bibit quicquid ei detur,

which there is an excess in regard to the quantity of

si tamen hoc faciat usque ad superfluam repletionem, in quo est superabundantia

food nature needs. Nature desires only that the need be supplied. Therefore, that someone should take

respectu multitudinis cibi vel potus quam natura requirit; natura enim non concupiscit

more than he needs is an excess above nature.

nisi quod suppleatur indigentia. Unde quod aliquis assumat ultra indigentiam, est excessus supra naturam. Et ideo tales dicuntur gastrimargi, a gastir, quod est venter, et margos, quod est furor vel

623. People of this type are called “belly-mad” (gastrimargoi: from gastir meaning belly and

insania, quasi furor vel insania ventris, quia

marges meaning a raving or madness) as if they had

scilicet implent naturam praeter indigentiam. Et tales fiunt illi qui sunt multum bestiales,

a raving or mad stomach, because they stuff nature beyond requirement. Such persons are very brutish

quia videlicet ad hoc solum adhibent curam, ut ventrem impleant absque discretionem, sicut

because their only concern is to fill their bellies without discrimination like animals.

et bestiae. Secundo

ibi:

circa

proprias

autem

624. Next [a, iii, y], at “But in regard to proper

delectationes etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat intemperantia circa proprias concupiscentias

desires,” he explains in what manner intemperance has to do with proper desires or pleasures. He says

sive delectationes. Et dicit quod circa eas multi et multipliciter peccant, scilicet secundum

that in regard to them, many sin in numerous ways, i.e., according to all the circumstances. Those who

omnes circumstantias. Illi enim qui sunt amatores talium delectationum peccant eo

love such pleasures sin because they enjoy things they should not (like eating food which does not

quod gaudent in his quibus non oportet, puta in sumendo cibos non convenientes eis, vel

agree with them) or they sin by taking more enjoyment than they should (for instance, someone

etiam peccant, quasi magis gaudentes eis quibus oportet; puta si quis nimis delectetur in

takes too much pleasure in eating agreeable dishes). Others sin by taking pleasure in foods without

sumptione convenientium ciborum; vel etiam

discernment—like most fools do—or finally they do

quia in his delectantur absque discretione, sicut stultorum multitudo, vel etiam non

not observe due measure in enjoyment, as they should. The intemperate are excessive in all these

servant debitum modum ut delectentur sicut oportet. In omnibus enim his superabundant

ways because they enjoy objects highly indecorous and blameworthy by nature, which they ought not

intemperati, quia gaudent de quibusdam, de quibus non oportet gaudere, quia sunt

to enjoy. Even when pleasure in certain things may be lawful, they commonly take more enjoyment than

indecentia, et

they ought without discrimination.

secundum

suam

naturam

odibilia. Et si in quibusdam talium oporteat gaudere, gaudent magis quam oportet et absque discretione sicut multi gaudent. Et

sic

ultimo

concludit

quod,

cum

625. So he concludes that, since intemperance is

intemperantia sit superabundantia huiusmodi delectationes, quod

circa est

excess in regard to pleasures of this kind, it is blameworthy like other excesses, as was explained in

vituperabilis, sicut et aliae superabundantiae, ut supra in II dictum est.

the second book (333-334).

LECTURE 21 How Sorrows, Pleasures, and Desires Affect the Temperate Man Chapter 11 b. He shows that the brave, the temperate... are affected in different ways by sorrow. — 626-627 περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ

With regard to sorrows, one is not—as in fortitude

τῆς

ὑπομένειν

—called temperate because he faces them, nor

λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μή, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ

intemperate because he does not undergo them. But the intemperate man grieves more than he ought

λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει καὶ τὴν λύπην

because he does not attain the pleasures he desires. But his pleasure is what causes him grief. On the

δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή, ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ

contrary, the temperate man does not grieve for absent things, and in abstention from pleasure.

ἀνδρείας

τῷ

ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος. c. He makes clear his assertion. — 628-629 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ

The intemperate man then desires all pleasures and

τῶν

ἡδέων

πάντων

ἢ

τῶν

he especially desires exquisite pleasures. He is led by

μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων

sensual desire to choose pleasurable things in preference to all others. For this reason the

ταῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν·

intemperate man is saddened when he does not get the pleasure he wants; his desire in fact brings

μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν

sorrow. He is like the incontinent person who is also saddened by pleasure.

λυπεῖσθαι. 2.

HE CONSIDERS THE VICE OPPOSITE TO TEMPERANCE WHICH FALLS

SHORT IN REGARD TO PLEASURES. — 630-631 ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς

It does not happen too often that men become

καὶ ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν

deficient in pleasure, taking less enjoyment than they ought. Insensibility of this kind is not in

ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα,

keeping with human nature because the other animals differentiate foods in this, that they take

καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὔ· εἰ

pleasure in some things, and in others they do not. If

δέ τῳ μηδέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν

someone finds no joy in anything and does not prefer one thing to another, he is a long way from being

εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος

human. As this rarely happens, there is no special name for it.

διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. 3. HE EXPLAINS IN WHAT WAY THE TEMPERATE MAN SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF IN REGARD TO THE MATTER PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED. a. He shows from what things the temperate man should abstain. — 632 ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ

The temperate man follows the golden mean in these

ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ

matters. He does not delight in those shameful things in which the intemperate man takes the

μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς

keenest pleasure, but rather he is saddened if they

μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται

occur. In no way does he rejoice in things more ardently than he ought. He is not unnecessarily

οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ'

saddened by the absence of pleasurable things. If he desires them, he does so in the right measure. He

ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·

does not crave pleasures more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor according to any other unreasonable circumstance.

b. He shows what things the temperate man should enjoy and in what manner. — 633-634 ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς

The temperate man desires whatever pleasures are

εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ

useful to the health and well-being of the body, and he wants them according to right measure and as he

τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων

ought. He desires other pleasures only if they are

τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως

not a hindrance to health, nor opposed to what is honorable, nor beyond his means. One who is

ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ

otherwise disposed takes more enjoyment than is reasonable. The temperate man is not of this nature

τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

but he acts according to right reason.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Circa tristitias autem non quemadmodum et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit

626. After the Philosopher has defined in what way temperance is concerned with pleasures, he

qualiter temperantia sit circa delectationes, hic ostendit quomodo sit circa tristitias. Et circa

now explains how it is concerned with sorrows. On this point he does two things. First [(1) b] he

hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo diversimode se habeat circa tristitiam fortis,

shows that the brave, the temperate, and the intemperate are affected in different ways by

temperatus

Secundo

sorrow. Then [(1) c], at “The intemperate mail

manifestat quod dixerat, ibi, intemperatus quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod

then etc.,” he makes clear his assertion. He says first that the brave, the temperate, and the

non similiter se habent circa tristitiam fortis, temperatus et intemperatus. Fortis enim

intemperate are not disposed toward sorrow in the same way. The brave man indeed suffers many

patitur quidem magnas tristitias; sed laudatur in hoc quod bene sustinet eas, ut supra dictum

sorrows, but he is praised for this very endurance which is done nobly. This has already been

est. Sed temperatus non laudatur ex eo quod

remarked (584, 596). The temperate man however

sustineat tristitias. Neque intemperatus vituperatur in hoc quod non sustineat eas,

is not praised because he undergoes sorrows. Nor is the intemperate man blamed for not undergoing

sicut vituperatur timidus. Sed vituperatur intemperatus de hoc quod magis tristatur

them, although the cowardly man is blamed. But the intemperate man is censured for the f act that

quam oportet. Et est eius tristitia non ex aliquo laesivo imminenti, sicut est tristitia timidi; sed

he grieves more than he should. His sorrow does not arise from any harmful thing threatening him

tristatur

adipiscitur

—which is the cause of the coward’s sorrow—but

delectabilia quae concupiscit. Et sic delectatio per suam absentiam causat in eo tristitiam. E

he is sorry because he does not get the pleasures he wants. Thus it is by its very absence that pleasure

contrario autem temperatus laudatur in hoc quod non tristatur in hoc quod abstinet a

causes him grief. On the contrary the temperate man is praised for not grieving and for undertaking

delectabilibus, sed promptus est a delectabilibus

to abstain from pleasures that he does not desire

abstinere. Quia non multum ea concupiscit. Est autem potior effectus qui consequitur ex

very much. An effect that follows from the presence of a cause is more important than an

praesentia causae alicuius, consequitur ex absentia.

effect that follows from its absence.

et

de

hoc

intemperatus.

quod

non

quam

qui

Et ideo fortitudo principalius est circa tristitias quae consequuntur ex praesentia nocivorum,

627. For this very reason fortitude is primarily concerned with sorrows which follow from the

temperantia autem est secundario circa tristitias quae consequuntur ex absentia

presence of harmful things. Temperance, however, is secondarily concerned with sorrows that follow

delectabilium, principaliter autem circa delectationes quae ex delectabilium praesentia

from the absence of pleasures but primarily with pleasures following from the presence of

consequuntur.

pleasurable things.

Deinde cum dicit intemperatus quidem igitur

628. Then [(i) c], at “The intemperate man then”

etc., manifestat quod dixerat, scilicet quod

he makes evident his assertion, that pleasure is the

intemperato delectatio tristitiam faciat. Hoc enim accidit quia intemperatus concupiscit

occasion of sorrow for the intemperate man. This happens because the intemperate man desires all

delectabilia omnia. Appetit enim delectationem propter seipsam. Et ideo appetit omnia quae

pleasurable things. He strives after pleasure itself. On this account he strives after everything giving

delectationem faciunt, vel appetit ea quae maxime sunt delectabilia, in quorum

pleasure and he strives after the thing pleasurable in the highest degree in comparison with which he

comparatione alia delectabilia minus curat. Et

cares less for other delightful things. Therefore his

inde est quod eius electio non regitur ratione, sed ducitur a concupiscentia, ut eligat

pleasure is not guided by reason, but led by sensual desire to choose pleasurable things—especially

delectabilia, et praecipue quae maxime sunt talia, supra alia bona quae sunt utilia vel

those which are most abundantly so—in preference to all other useful and honorable goods. The

honesta. Postponunt enim intemperati utile et honestum, ut delectationem assequantur. Et

intemperate put aside what is useful and decent in order that they may obtain pleasure. For this

ideo

non

reason the intemperate man is saddened when he

adipiscitur delectationem, quam concupiscit. Concupiscentia enim quando non adipiscitur

does not get the pleasure he wants. Sensual desire brings sorrow when it does not gain the thing

rem concupitam est cum tristitia.

coveted.

Et

629.

intemperatus

licet

hoc

tristatur

videatur

quando

esse inconveniens

Although,

according

to

a

superficial

secundum superficialem verisimilitudinem quod aliquis propter delectationem tristetur, tamen

likelihood, it seems incongruous that anyone should be saddened by reason of pleasure,

verum est intemperatum propter delectationem tristari. Non enim tristatur nisi propter eius

nevertheless’ it is true that the intemperate man is distressed by pleasure. He is saddened only by its

absentiam, sicut et navis gubernatoris absentiam.

absence, like a ship lost by the absence of its pilot.

perit

propter

Deinde cum dicit: deficientes autem etc., determinat de vitio intemperantiae opposito,

630. Next [2], at “It does not happen,” he considers the vice opposite to temperance which falls short in

quod deficit circa delectationes. Et dicit quod non multum contingit quod aliqui deficiant

regard to pleasures. He says it does not happen very often that men become deficient in pleasures

circa delectationes, ita ut minus gaudeant

(so that they take less enjoyment than they ought,

quam oportet, idest quam requiratur ad sanitatem et bonam habitudinem corporis et ad

i.e., than is required for the health and well-being of the body and for decent living with others) in

decentem conversationem cum aliis, in quo consistit vitiosus defectus, quem supra in

which this vice consists and which we have called insensibility in the second book (262, 342). This

secundo nominavit insensibilitatem: quae non convenit humanae naturae, quia etiam reliqua

defect is not in keeping with human nature because the other animals differentiate foods in this, that

animalia

quorum

they take pleasure in some, and in others not. So it

quibusdam delectantur, in aliis autem non. Et sic acceptare aliquas delectationes videtur

seems to belong to the common nature of the genus to take some pleasure.

discernunt

cibos,

in

pertinere ad communem naturam generis.

Unde si aliquis sit cui nihil sit delectabile, iste videtur esse longe a natura humana. Et quia

631. Therefore, if there is anyone, who does not take pleasure in anything, he seems to be a long

hoc raro contingit, ille qui sic deficit non habet

way from being human. Because this rarely

aliquod nomen nisi quod supra vocavit eum insensibilem. Non autem ad supra vocavit

happens, he who falls short in this manner does not have a special name, except that before (262, 342)

insensibilem. Non autem ad hanc insensibilitatem pertinet quod aliqui a

we called him insensible. When men abstain from pleasures for a useful or honorable reason, as

delectationibus abstineant propter aliquem finem utilem vel honestum, sicut negotiatores

merchants for gain and soldiers for victory, we do not have instances of insensibility. This is not

propter lucra et milites propter victoriam. Hoc

beyond what is reasonable, as is the case with the

enim non fit praeter id quod oportet, quod pertinet ad vitium defectus.

vice.

Deinde cum dicit: temperatus autem etc.,

632. At “The temperate man follows” [3], he

ostendit qualiter temperatus se habeat circa

explains in what way the temperate man should

praedictam materiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit a quibus temperatus abstineat.

conduct himself in regard to the matter previously mentioned. He clarifies this point in two stages.

Secundo quibus et qualiter utatur, ibi: quaecumque autem ad sanitatem et cetera.

First [3, a] he shows from what things the temperate should abstain, Next [3, b], at “The

Dicit ergo primo quod temperatus medio modo se habet circa praedicta, scilicet circa

temperate man desires etc.,” he shows what things the temperate man should enjoy and in what

delectationem, tristitiam et concupiscentiam.

manner. He says first that the temperate man

Nam primo quidem quantum ad delectationes non delectatur in illis turpibus in quibus

follows the golden mean regarding the preceding, i.e., pleasure, sorrow, and desire. First in regard to

maxime delectatur intemperatus, sed magis tristatur, si quando aliquid tale occurrat, et

pleasure, he does not delight in those shameful things in which the intemperate take pleasure but

universaliter non delectatur in quibus non oportet, neque etiam vehementius delectatur

rather is saddened if any such thing should occur. In general he does not rejoice in things he ought

quam oportet. Et similiter secundum nullam

not, nor does he rejoice more ardently than he

aliam circumstantiam superabundat. Secundo autem quantum ad tristitias non superflue

ought. Likewise he is not excessive according to any other circumstance. Next, in respect to sorrow

tristatur in absentia delectabilium. Tertio autem quantum ad concupiscentiam non

he is not saddened beyond measure by the absence of pleasurable, things. Third, in respect to desire he

concupiscit delectabilia absentia quia non multum curat de eis vel concupiscit ea cum

does not long for absent pleasures, because he cares little for them, or he longs for them in the

debita mensura, quam non excedit neque

right measure which is not excessive; he does not

concupiscens concupiscens

crave pleasure more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor according to any other

magis quam oportet quando non oportet

secundum aliquam aliam mensuram rationis excedit.

neque neque

circumstantiam

circumstance exceeding the norm of reason.

Deinde cum dicit: quaecumque autem etc.,

633. Then [3, b], at “The temperate man desires,”

ostendit quibus et qualiter utatur temperatus. Et dicit quod quaecumque delectabilia

he shows which pleasures the temperate man enjoys and in what way. He says that the

expediunt ad sanitatem corporis vel ad bonam

temperate man desires whatever pleasures are

habitudinem, ut scilicet homo sit promptus et expeditus ad ea quae habet facere, huiusmodi

useful to the health of the body or its well-being so that he may be prompt and unimpeded for the

temperatus appetet, tamen secundum debitam mensuram et secundum quod oportet. Si qua

things of this kind which he has to do. He desires these pleasures, however, according to the right

autem sunt alia delectabilia, quae non sint necessaria ad duo praedicta, appetet ea

measure and as he ought. If there are other pleasures not necessary for the two reasons

temperatus triplici tamen conditione observata.

previously named, the temperate man desires them under the three following conditions.

Primo quidem ut non sint impeditiva sanitatis et bonae habitudinis, sicut est superfluus cibus

634. First, that they are not hindrances to health and well-being, like superfluous food or drink.

vel potus. Secundo ut non sint praeter bonum,

Second, that they are not contrary to good, i.e.,

idest praeter honestatem, sicut est delectatio adulterii. Tertio ut non sint super substantiam,

opposed to decency, like the pleasure of fornication. Third, that they are not beyond his means, i.e.,

idest ut non excedant facultatem hominis, sicut si pauper velit uti cibariis nimis sumptuosis. Ille

they do not exceed a man’s power to possess, as would be the case if a poor man desired to enjoy

enim qui sic se habet ut appetat delectationes impeditivas sanitatis et bonae habitudinis atque

foods which are too costly. One who is so disposed that he longs for pleasures harmful to health and

contrarias honestati vel excedentes divitias

well-being, and contrary to decency, or exceeding

suas, magis amat delectationes quam dignum sit. Quod non convenit temperato qui amat eas

his means takes more enjoyment than is reasonable. This does not pertain to the temperate

secundum rationem rectam.

man who loves these pleasures in conformity with right reason.

LECTURE 22 Intemperance Compared with Cowardice and the Sins of Children Chapter 12 B’ He compares the sin of intemperance with other sins. 1. HE COMPARES INTEMPERANCE WITH THE VICE OF COWARDICE. a. He shows that intemperance has more of the voluntary than cowardice has. i. He explains... (by two reasons). x. FIRST. — 635-636 ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία

Intemperance is more like the voluntary than

τῆς δειλίας. ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἣ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ

fear is, because the former is motivated by pleasure, and the latter by pain. One of these

φευκτόν·

(pleasure) is to be chosen, the other (pain) is to be avoided. y. SECOND. — 637

καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ

Pain stupefies and corrupts the nature of its possessor but pleasure does no such thing, and

οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο

so is more voluntary.

ἑκούσιον.

ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον δὴ

ii. He infers a corollary from his discussion. — 638-639 διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ

For this reason intemperance is also more despicable; it is easy to become accustomed to the

γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ

objects of temperance, for many occasions occur

ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν.

in a man’s life and the habits can be practiced without danger. With terrifying objects,

ἐπὶ

δὲ

τῶν

however, the reverse is the case. b. He shows that the voluntary in each vice is found in a different order. i. He shows in what order the voluntary is found in cowardice. — 640 δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ

There does not appear to be a likeness in voluntariety between fear itself and individual

μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτεῖν

cases of it. Fear itself seems to be painless, but particular cases stupefy men by reason of pain,

καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι.

so that they throw away their arms and do other disgraceful actions. On this account these things seem to be done under compulsion.

ii. In intemperance. — 641-642 τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἑκούσια ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ

In regard to intemperance the order is reversed. Particulars are voluntary because they are in

ὀρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἧττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.

accord with what a man strives for and desires, but the condition (intemperance) as a whole is less voluntary, for no one wants to be intemperate.

2. (HE COMPARES INTEMPERANCE) WITH THE SINS OF CHILDREN. a. He states the agreement as to the name. — 643 τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ

We transfer the name intemperance to the sins

τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον

of children, for they do have a certain resemblance. But which one is named from the

δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς

other does not concern us now. It is clear,

τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου.

however, that the later is derived from the earlier.

b. He assigns the reason for the agreement. i. In respect to the necessity of chastising or restraining. — 644-646 οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν

This transference does not seem to be unsuitable. He who strives after what is base and increases

ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον,

greatly in evil must be punished. In this, sensual

τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ

desire and the child are alike. Children live in accord with sensual desire and they strive most

παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται

of all after pleasure. Therefore, if it will not be properly obedient, sensual desire will come to

εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος

rule and increase considerably. To a stupid person the desire for pleasure is insatiable and

ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ,

omnipresent; and the exercise of desire increases

καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ

its natural power. For the appetites are strong and violent, going even to the extent of

ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.

interrupting the act of reasoning.

ii. In respect to the manner of chastising and restraining. — 647-648 διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ

For this reason sensual desire and pleasure must

ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαιτὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς

be moderated, that is, sense pleasures must be few in number and in no way contrary to reason.

λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένονὥσπερ δὲ

Such a state is what we call obedient and

τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ

disciplined. As a child must live according to the instructions of his tutor, so the concupiscent

ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν

part must conform to reason; each, i.e., the tutor and reason aspires to the good. And the

συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ

temperate man desires the right things at the right time as reason disposes. These then are the

σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε·

things we have to say about temperance.

οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Voluntario autem magis assimulatur et cetera.

635. After the Philosopher has treated the act of

Postquam philosophus determinavit de actu temperantiae et oppositorum vitiorum, hic

temperance and the opposite vices, he now compares the sin of intemperance with other sins

comparat peccatum intemperantiae ad alia peccata. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat

[B’]. He makes two points here. First [1] he compares intemperance with the vice of cowardice;

intemperantiam ad vitium timiditatis. Secundo ad vitia puerorum, ibi: nomen autem

and then, with the sins of children, at “We transfer the name” [2]. He clarifies the first point

intemperantiae et cetera. Circa primum duo

by a twofold distinction. First [1, a] he shows that

facit. Primo ostendit quod intemperantia plus habeat de voluntario quam timiditas. Secundo

intemperance has more of the voluntary than cowardice has. Next [1, b], at “There does not

ostendit quod alio ordine invenitur voluntarium in utroque vitio, ibi, videbitur autem utique et

appear etc.,” he shows that the voluntary in each vice is found in a different order. In regard to the

cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod intemperantia plus habeat de voluntario

first he does two things. First [a, i] he explains that intemperance has more of the voluntary than

quam

quoddam

cowardice has. Next [a, ii], at “For this reason

corollarium ex dictis, ibi, propter quod exprobrabilius et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod

intemperance etc.,” he infers a corollary from his discussion. He says first that intemperance is

timiditas.

Secundo

infert

intemperantia magis assimilatur voluntario quam timor, quia scilicet plus habet de

more like the voluntary than fear is, because intemperance has more of the voluntary. He

voluntario. Et hoc probat duabus rationibus.

proves this by two reasons.

Quarum prima sumitur ex eo quod proprie

636. The first of these is taken from what follows

consequitur ad voluntarium et involuntarium. Unusquisque enim delectatur in eo quod

the voluntary and the involuntary as a property [i, x]. Everyone delights in what he does voluntarily,

voluntarie agit: tristatur autem in eo quod est involuntarium. Manifestum est autem quod

but is sad over what is contrary to his will. It is obvious that the intemperate man acts for the

intemperatus agit propter delectationem quam concupiscit. Timidus autem agit propter

pleasure he desires. The coward, on the other hand, acts because of the pain which he flees. (Of

tristitiam quam fugit. Horum autem duorum,

course the operation of both is pleasing because

delectatio est desiderabilis, quia non solum delectatur ille qui delectatione actualiter fruitur,

not only is actual pleasure a matter for joy but even the hope of future pleasure.) But pain is a

sed etiam ille qui delectationem quaerit propter spem delectationis consequendae. Tristitia

thing to be avoided and consequently is contrary to the will. So it is evident that intemperance is

autem est fugienda, et per consequens involuntaria. Et sic manifestum est quod

caused by what is of itself voluntary. Cowardice, however, is caused by something involuntary and

intemperantia movetur ab eo quod est per se

repugnant. Therefore intemperance comes closer

voluntarium. Timiditas autem movetur ab eo quod est fugiendum et involuntarium. Plus

to the voluntary than cowardice.

igitur accedit ad voluntarium intemperantia, quam timiditas. Secundam rationem ponit ibi et tristitia quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex ignorantia quae

637. He gives the second reason at “Pain stupefies” [i, y]. This is taken from the fact that

causat involuntarium. Quia enim tristitia consequitur ex praesentia alicuius contrarii et

ignorance causes an involuntary. Because pain follows from the presence of some contrary and

nocivi, sequitur quod tristitia stupefaciat et corrumpat naturam eius qui habet tristitiam, et

harmful principle, it stupefies and corrupts the nature of its possessor. So it is that the mind of

inde est quod sensus hominis ex tristitia

man is impeded by pain from proper knowledge.

impeditur a propria cognitione. Sed delectatio causatur ex praesentia convenientis quod non

But pleasure is caused by the presence of an agreeable object that does not corrupt the nature.

corrumpit naturam. Unde delectatio non stupefacit, neque corrumpit sensum eius qui

Hence pleasure does not stupefy nor corrupt the mind of the one who takes pleasure. From this it

delectatur. Ex quo sequitur quod intemperantia quae operatur propter delectationem plus

follows that intemperance, which operates on account of pleasure, has more of the voluntary

habeat de voluntario quam timor qui movetur

than fear does -which is caused by pain.

propter tristitiam. Deinde cum dicit propter quod exprobrabilius etc., concludit quod quia voluntariis debetur

638. Then [a, ii], at “For this reason intemperance,” he concludes that, since in

laus in bonis et vituperium in malis, quod vitium

voluntary acts praise is due to the good and blame

intemperantiae sit exprobrabilius quam vitium timiditatis quod habet minus de voluntario. Ad

to the evil, the vice of intemperance is more disgraceful than the vice of cowardice which has

quod etiam addit aliam rationem ex eo quod tanto aliquod vitium est magis exprobrabile,

less of the voluntary. To this he adds also another reason taken from the fact that a vice is more

quanto facilius vitari potest.

worthy of reproach insofar as it is more easily

avoidable. Vitari autem potest unumquodque vitium per

639. Each vice can be avoided by the contrary

assuetudinem ad contrarium. Facile autem est assuescere bene operari in his circa quae est

habit. For two reasons it is easy to become accustomed to good actions in matters of

temperantia, duplici ratione. Primo quidem,

temperance. First, because pleasures in food,

quia delectabilia ciborum et potuum et aliorum huiusmodi multotiens occurrunt in vita

drink, and so forth take place very often in man’s life. Hence there is no lack of opportunity to get

humana. Unde non deest homini occasio assuescendi bene operari circa talia. Secundo

used to virtuous actions in such matters. Second, becoming accustomed to good deeds of temperance

quia assuescere bene operari in talibus non habet periculum, non enim est magnum

does not constitute a danger. A person does not run any great risk in abstaining at times from

periculum si aliquis abstineat aliquando ab

some pleasure of touch. But quite the reverse is

aliquo delectabilium tactus. Sed in vitio timiditatis est e converso, quia et raro

true in the vice of cowardice because the dangers from war happen rarely. Besides it is dangerous to

occurrunt bellica pericula. Et huiusmodi aggredi periculosum est. Unde consequens est

get mixed up in wars. It follows then that the vice of intemperance is more worthy of reproach than

quod exprobrabilius est vitium intemperantiae quam timiditatis.

the vice of cowardice.

Deinde cum dicit videbitur autem utique etc., ostendit quod non eodem ordine voluntarium

640. Next [1, b], at “There does not appear” he shows that the voluntary in each vice is not found

invenitur in utroque vitio. Et primo ostendit quo ordine inveniatur in timiditate. Secundo

in the same order. First [1, b, i] he shows in what order the voluntary is found in cowardice; and

quo ordine inveniatur in intemperantia, ibi:

second in

intemperato autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod timor non videtur similiter voluntarium

intemperance etc. [1, b, ii]. He says first that fear does not seem to be voluntary in the same way for

habere in universali et in singularibus. Universalia enim videntur esse sine tristitia,

the universal and for particular cases. Universals seem to be without pain, for example, anyone may

puta quod aliquis vadat ad pugnam et invadat hostes. Sed singularia quae occurrunt, puta

go into battle and attack the enemy. But particular happenings, for instance, that a man is wounded

quod aliquis vulneretur et depellatur et alia

or routed or suffers other misfortune, bring such

huiusmodi patiatur, tantam tristitiam ingerunt ut homines propter huiusmodi stupefiant in

great pain that men are stupefied on account of these things-so much so that they throw away

tantum quod proiciant arma et alia huiusmodi turpiter faciant. Unde quia in universali sunt

their arms and do other disgraceful actions. Hence, since in reference to the universal these

voluntaria

involuntaria

acts are voluntary, and in reference to the

redduntur, videntur esse violenta, inquantum scilicet ab exteriori principio homo inducitur ad

particular they become involuntary, they seem to be done under compulsion (inasmuch as a man is

hoc quod deserat hoc quod prius volebat.

induced by an external principle to give up what he had previously wished).

Deinde cum dicit: intemperato autem etc., ostendit quis sit ordo circa intemperantiam. Et

641. At “In regard to intemperance” [1, b, ii ], he shows what the order is in regard to

dicit

conversus; quia

intemperance. He says that in this case the order

singularia sunt maxime voluntaria, quia proveniunt secundum quod homo concupiscit et

is reversed, for singular things are voluntary in the highest degree because they occur in

appetit. Sed totum in universali consideratum

accordance with what a man strives for and

et

in

quod ibi est

singulari

ordo

intemperance, at

“In

regard to

est minus voluntarium, puta quod aliquis

desires. But the whole, considered in the abstract,

adulterium faciat. Nullus enim concupiscit esse

is less voluntary-for instance, that anyone should

intemperatus in universali. Sed singularia quibus homo fit intemperatus sunt delectabilia.

commit adultery. No one desires to be intemperate in general. However particular things, by which a man becomes intemperate, are delightful.

Huius autem differentiae ratio sumenda est ex

642. The reason for this difference is taken from

hoc quod tristitia, quae movet timorem, pertinet ad involuntarium, sicut delectatio, quae movet

this: pain that causes fear pertains to the involuntary, as pleasure that causes intemperance

intemperantiam, pertinet ad voluntarium. Omnis autem affectio animae circa singularia

pertains to the voluntary. Every inclination of the soul towards particular things is rather vehement.

vehementior est. Et ideo circa singularia

For this reason cowardice regarding particular

timiditas plus habet de involuntario, intemperantia vero plus de voluntario. Et ideo

things has more of the involuntary but intemperance more of the voluntary. Therefore in

in vitiis intemperantiae maxime nocivum est immorari cogitatione per quam homo ad

sins of intemperance it is exceedingly harmful to dwell upon the thought by which a man comes

singularia descendit quae alliciunt voluntatem.

down to the particular that entices the will.

Deinde cum dicit: nomen autem intemperantiae

643. Then [2], at “We transfer the name,” he

etc., comparat vitium intemperantiae ad peccata puerorum. Et primo ponit convenientiam

compares the vice of intemperance with the sins of children. First [2, a] he states the agreement as to

quantum ad nomen. Secundo rationem convenientiae assignat, ibi, non male autem

the name. Next [2, b], at “This transference etc.,” he assigns the reason for the agreement. He says

videtur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod nomen

first that the name intemperance is transferred to

intemperantiae transfertur ad peccata puerorum; quod quidem in lingua nostra magis

the sins of children. This is more apparent in our language on the part of the virtue than on the part

apparet ex parte virtutis quam ex parte vitii. Dicimus enim castitatem temperantiae speciem

of the vice. We call chastity a species of temperance, as we say that disciplined children are

sicut et pueros disciplinatos dicimus castigatos. Eos autem, qui sunt indisciplinati, possumus

chastened. And those who are not disciplined can be called unchastised. So too one who is not chaste

dicere incastigatos. Sicut et ille, qui non est

is said to be “incestuosus” (in-castus). The reason

castus, dicitur incestuosus. Et huiusmodi translationis ratio est, quia habent quamdam

for this transference is that sins of this kind have a certain likeness, as will be shown later (647). But

similitudinem huiusmodi peccata, ut postea ostendetur. Sed quid horum nominetur ab alio,

which of these is named from the other does not concern us now. It is clear, however, that the

non refert ad propositum. Manifestum est tamen quod id cui posterius est nomen

thing given the name later was called after that which had the name earlier.

impositum nominatur ab eo cui nomen fuit impositum prius. Deinde cum dicit: non male autem videtur etc., assignat rationem praedictae translationis

644. Next [2, b], at “This transference,” he assigns the reason for the previous transference in

nominis

peccati

accordance with the likeness of the sin of

intemperantiae ad peccata puerorum. Et primo quantum ad necessitatem castigationis, sive

intemperance to the sins of children. First [2, b, i] in respect to the necessity of chastising or

refrenationis. Secundo quantum ad modum castigandi vel refrenandi, ibi: propter quod

restraining; and second 12, b, ii] in respect to the manner of chastising and restraining, at “For this

oportet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non

reason sensual desire etc.” He says first that the

secundum

similitudinem

male videtur esse facta translatio huius nominis

transference of this name from one sin to another

ab uno peccato ad aliud. Et hoc propter similitudinem, secundum quam translationes

does not seem to be unsuitable because of the likeness according to which the transferences are

fiunt. Oportet enim puniri, id est castigari et refrenari eum qui prava appetit, et cuius malus

made. It is necessary to punish, i.e., chastise and discipline, one who strives after improper things

appetitus multum augetur: in quo conveniunt concupiscentia et puer.

and whose evil inclination is greatly increased points on which sensual desire and the child are in agreement.

Et haec convenientia videtur esse rationabilis;

645. This agreement seems to be reasonable

quia pueri maxime vivunt secundum concupiscentiam, quia ipsi appetunt maxime

because children live especially in accord with sensual desire, since they strive most of all after

delectationem, quod pertinet

ad rationem

pleasure, which belongs to the nature of sensual

concupiscentiae. Causa autem quare appetant delectationem, dicetur in septimo. Et ideo si

desire. The reason why they strive after pleasure will be given in the seventh book (1531).

puer et concupiscentia non bene ratione persuadeantur, perveniunt ad quoddam

Therefore, if the child and sensual desire are not rightly restrained by reason, they come to rule and

dominium et ad multum augmentum, ita scilicet quod dominabitur delectationis appetitus, qui

increase so that the appetite for pleasure, i.e., sensual desire, will be lord and master.

est concupiscentia. Et huius ratio est, quia appetitus delectationis

646. The reason for this is that the desire of

est insatiabilis; quinimmo quanto plus gustatur plus concupiscitur, eo quod est secundum se

pleasure is insatiable; indeed the more pleasure is enjoyed, the more it is desired in that pleasure

appetibilis. Et inde est, quod sicut puero

itself is desirable. Hence, just as with a child and a

insipienti, ita etiam concupiscentiae propria operatio auget cognatum, id est hoc quod est eis

simpleton so with sensual desire-the proper operation increases what is innate, i.e., that which

simile; nam, si puer insipiens dimittatur operari secundum suam insipientiam, magis in eo

is like them. If a child and a simpleton should be allowed to work according to their folly, the folly

insipientia crescet; et si homo concupiscentiae satisfaciat, magis concupiscentia crescit in

increases more in them. When a man satisfies sensual desire, it increases more in him and

homine,

si

becomes master. This is especially true if sensual

concupiscentiae vel delectationes sint magnae, ex parte obiecti, id est de rebus multum

desire or pleasure is great by reason of the object, that is, things very delightful and also vehement

delectabilibus, et vehementes ex parte eius qui concupiscit et delectatur, qui multum ex eis

for the man who desires and takes pleasure. This man is so influenced by pleasures that they may

afficitur, in tantum quod impediant hominis

impede his knowledge or reasoning. The power of

cogitationem sive ratiocinationem, quae quanto magis remanet, tanto concupiscentia minus

thought remains more efficient, the less sensual desire can dominate.

et

dominatur.

Et

praecipue

potest dominari.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet etc.,

647. Then [2, b, ii], at “For this reason sensual

ostendit similitudinem utrorumque peccatorum, quantum ad modum castigandi, sive refrenandi.

desire,” he shows the likeness between the two sins in respect to the manner of chastising or

Et dicit, quod quia concupiscentia et delectatio, si sit vehemens, facit sui augmentum, ideo

restraining. He says that, since sensual desire and pleasure are vehement, they grow by themselves.

oportet, quod sint mensuratae, idest non

For this reason they must be moderated, i.e., not

excedentes in magnitudine, sive in vehementia

excessive in extent or in vehemence of inclination

affectionis, et paucae secundum numerum, et

or in number. They must not be contrary to

quod nil contrarientur rationi quantum ad speciem concupiscentiae seu delectationis, quae

reason in any way, especially in regard to the species of sensual desire or pleasure taken on the

sumitur ex parte obiecti. Et illud quod ita se habet in concupiscentiis et delectationibus,

part of the object. That which is so disposed in the matter of sensual desires and pleasures is said to

dicimus esse bene persuasum et punitum, idest

be readily obedient and chastised, i.e., corrected by

castigatum a ratione. Sicut enim oportet quod puer vivat secundum praeceptum paedagogi, sic

reason. As a child must live according to the instructions of his tutor, so the faculty of sensual

oportet, quod vis concupiscibilis consonet rationi. Intentio enim utriusque, scilicet et

desire must be in conformity with reason. Each, i.e., reason and the tutor, aspires to the good. The

rationis et paedagogi, est ad bonum. Et ita se habet concupiscibile in homine temperato, qui

concupiscent part in the temperate man is so disposed that he desires the right things, in the

concupiscit quae oportet et sicut oportet et

right way, and at the right time—as reason

quando oportet, prout ordinat ratio.

directs.

Ultimo autem concludit, quod ista sunt, quae dicta sunt a nobis de temperantia. Et in hoc

648. He says in conclusion that these are the things we have discussed about temperance. With

finitur tertius liber.

this the third book ends.

BOOK IV OTHER MORAL VIRTUES LECTURE 1 Liberality Chapter 1 I. HE EXAMINES THE MATTER OF LIBERALITY AND THE OPPOSITE VICES. A. He shows that liberality has to do with wealth. A’ He says what his intention is. Let us next discuss liberality, — 649-650 λέγωμεν δ' ἐλευθεριότητος.

ἑξῆς

περὶ

Let us next discuss liberality.

B’ He shows the matter of liberality. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ

which seems to be a mean in regard to wealth. No one is praised as liberal for exploits in war, or for conduct in matters with which the temperate man is

σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει.

concerned, or again for pronouncing judgments. But a man is praised as liberal for his giving and taking of wealth.

C’ He explains what he had said. — 651-653 χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.

(Wealth here means whatever can be evaluated in terms of money.)

B. He shows that there are opposite vices dealing with this matter. A’ He states his general intention. — 654 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα

Extravagance is the excess and miserliness, the defect in the use of

ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις·

wealth.

B’ He mentions... we always... charge with miserliness people who are more diligent... about... wealth than they ought to be. — 655 καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι,

Miserliness is always attributed to people who are more careful about money than they should be.

C’ He explains in what manner extravagance may be concerned with wealth. — 656-657 τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἓν κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα.

But the intemperate are sometimes accused of extravagance by inference, for the incontinent and the intemperate are notorious as extravagant wasters. For this reason, too, they seem to be very depraved; indeed they have many vices. However, they are not properly called prodigal, for a spendthrift is a man who has acquired one vice, that of wasting his substance (he is ruined by his own fault). The dissipation of one’s substance seems to be a kind of ruin of one’s being, since a man lives by means of riches. It is in this sense that extravagance is treated here.

II. HE DEFINES THEIR ACTS CONCERNED WITH THE PROPER MATTER (I.E., OF LIBERALITY AND OPPOSITE VICES). A. ...considering first the liberal man. A’ He examines the act of liberality. 1.

HE SHOWS WHAT THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF

LIBERALITY IS. a. He makes clear that the act of liberality is the proper use of wealth. — 658 ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις

Things that have utility—among which

χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος.

are riches—can be used well or badly. And the man who possesses the virtue concerned with particular objects uses each one best. Therefore he who has the virtue dealing with wealth will use riches to the best advantage. This man is the liberal man.

b. He explains what the use of wealth is. — 659 χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις μᾶλλον.

The spending and distribution of wealth seem to be the use of it; the acceptance and saving of wealth more properly are the possession.

c. He draws a conclusion. i. He states it. — 660 διὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.

For this reason liberality bestowal of wealth on the than the acceptance of proper sources or the improper sources.

is rather the right persons wealth from refusal from

ii. He substantiates the conclusion by five reasons. v. FIRST. — 661 τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν.

Virtue consists more in bestowing than in receiving benefits, more in performing good actions than in refraining from disgraceful ones. But it is obvious that the conferring of benefits and the performance of good deeds accompany disbursements.

w. SECOND. — 662 καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ

Thanks and, in a special way, praise are

λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον.

due the giver and not the recipient.

x. THIRD. — 663 καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον.

Likewise, it is easier not to take from another than to give, for people prefer not to accept what belongs to others rather than give what is theirs.

y. FOURTH. — 664 καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ.φιλοῦνται δὲ σχ.

People who give donations are called liberal, but not so those who receive gifts even honorably—such persons are praised for justice rather than liberality; those who simply accept gifts, however, are praised very little.

z. FIFTH. — 665 εδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει.

Of all virtuous men the liberal person is particularly loved, since he is useful because of his benefactions.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Dicamus autem deinceps de liberalitate et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de fortitudine et temperantia, quae respiciunt ea quibus conservatur ipsa hominis vita, hic incipit agere de aliis medietatibus, quae respiciunt quaedam secundaria bona vel mala. Et primo determinat de medietatibus laudabilibus, quae sunt virtutes. Secundo de his quae non sunt virtutes, sed passiones, ibi: de verecundia autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus respicientibus res exteriores.

649. Having completed the study of fortitude and temperance which deals with means preservative of human life itself, he now begins to examine other mediums which concern certain subsidiary goods and evils. First he defines the laudable mediums which are the virtues. Then [Lect. 17], at “Shame is not properly spoken of etc.” (B. 1128 b 10), he defines the mediums that are not virtues but passions. On the first point he does two things. Initially, he considers the virtues that regard external things. Next [Lect. 14], at “Some men seem to be etc.” (B. 1126 b 10), he considers the virtues pertaining to human actions. In

Secundo de virtutibus pertinentibus ad actus humanos, ibi, in colloquiis autem et convivere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus quae respiciunt exteriora bona. Secundo de virtute mansuetudinis, quae respicit exteriora mala, ibi, mansuetudo autem est quaedam medietas et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus respicientibus divitias. Secundo de his quae respiciunt honores, ibi, magnanimitas autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de liberalitate.

regard to the first point he considers the virtues relating to riches. Second [Lect. 8], at “Judging by the name etc.” (B. 1123 a 33), he considers the virtues having to do with honors. He handles the initial point in two ways. First he considers liberality. Then [Lect. 7, at “it seems logical etc.” (B. 1122 a 18), he investigates magnificence.

Secundo de magnificentia, ibi: videbitur autem consequens esse et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit materiam liberalitatis et oppositorum vitiorum. Secundo determinat actus eorum circa propriam materiam, ibi, quorum autem est aliqua utilitas, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod liberalitas est circa pecunias. Secundo ostendit quod circa eandem materiam sunt opposita vitia, ibi: est autem et prodigalitas et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo ostendit materiam liberalitatis, ibi: videtur enim esse et cetera. Tertio exponit quod dixerat, ibi, pecunias autem et cetera.

The first point he subdivides in a twofold manner. Initially [I] he examines the matter of liberality and the opposite vices. Next [II], at “Things that have utility etc.,” he defines their acts concerned with the proper matter. He discusses the initial point from two aspects. First [I, A] he shows that liberality has to do with wealth. Then [I, B], at “Extravagance is the excess etc.,” he shows that there are opposite vices dealing with this matter. The first point is developed in three ways. Initially [I, A, A’] he says what his intention is. Next [A, B’], at “which seems to be a mean etc.,” he shows the matter of liberality. Last [A, C’], at “Wealth here etc.,” he explains what he had said.

Dicit ergo primo, quod post temperantiam dicendum est de liberalitate: et hoc propter convenientiam liberalitatis ad temperantiam. Sicut enim temperantia

650. After the treatise on temperance, he says first that we must take up the study of liberality because of the likeness between liberality and temperance. As temperance moderates the desires of tactile pleasures, so

moderatur concupiscentias delectationum tactus, ita liberalitas

liberality moderates the desire of acquiring or possessing external goods.

moderatur cupiditatem acquirendi vel possidendi res exteriores.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur enim esse

651. At “which seems” [A, B’] he defines the

etc., ostendit quae sit materia liberalitatis; et dicit quod est medietas

matter of liberality, saying that it is a certain mean in regard to wealth. This is obvious from

quaedam circa pecunias sicut manifeste apparet, ex hoc scilicet quod liberalis

the fact that a man is praised as liberal not in military affairs (with which fortitude is

laudatur non in rebus bellicis, circa quas est fortitudo, neque in

concerned), nor in tactile pleasures (temperance has to do with these), nor in

delectationibus tactus circa quas est temperantia, neque etiam in iudiciis

judgments (which are matters for justice). But he is praised for the giving and taking, i.e., the

circa quae est iustitia. Sed laudatur in datione et sumptione, id est acceptione

acceptance of wealth—more in giving than in taking, as will be shown afterwards (660, 661,

pecuniarum; magis tamen in datione quam in acceptione, ut infra

665, 666, 683).

ostendetur. Est tamen considerandum quod aliquid potest dici materia virtutis moralis

652. We must consider that something can be called the matter of moral virtue in two ways:

dupliciter. Uno modo sicut materia propinqua. Et hoc modo passiones sunt

in one way as the proximate matter (thus the passions are the matter of many moral

materia plurimarum virtutum moralium. Alio modo sicut materia

virtues); in the other way, as the remote matter (thus the objects of the passions are

remota, et hoc modo obiecta passionum ponuntur materiae. Sicut fortitudinis

called their matter). Accordingly the proximate matter of fortitude is fear and recklessness; the

materia proxima est timor et audacia, materia autem remota pericula mortis.

remote matter, the fear of death; the proximate matter of temperance is desires and pleasures

Temperantiae autem materia proxima concupiscentiae et delectationes,

but the remote matter is food, drink, and sexual acts. Hence we find that the proximate matter

materia autem remota cibi et actus venerei. Sic igitur et liberalitatis

of liberality is desire or love of wealth, and the remote matter is wealth itself.

materia quidem propinqua est cupiditas vel amor pecuniarum, materia autem remota ipsa pecunia. Deinde cum dicit: pecunias autem etc., exponit quid nomine pecuniae

653. Then [A, C’], at “Wealth here,” he explains what is understood by the name

intelligatur. Et dicit quod nomine pecuniarum significantur omnia illa,

“wealth,” saying that the term signifies everything the value of which can be computed

quorum dignum pretium potest numismate mensurari; sicut equus,

in dollars and cents, like a horse, a coat, a house, or whatever can be evaluated in cash.

vestis, domus, et quaecumque denariis appretiari possunt; quia idem est dare

The reason is that to give or take these objects is the same as to give or take wealth.

vel accipere ista, et dare vel accipere pecunias.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem prodigalitas etc., ostendit quomodo

654. At “Extravagance is” [I, B] he shows in what manner there are vices contrary to

circa praedictam materiam, sunt etiam vitia liberalitati opposita. Et circa hoc

liberality. Here he makes the following points. First [B, A’] he states his general intention,

tria facit. Primo proponit in communi, quod intendit. Et dicit, quod etiam circa

saying that extravagance and miserliness in the use of wealth are denominated such by

pecunias se habent superabundantiam et

excess and defect.

secundum defectum

prodigalitas et illiberalitas. Medium enim et extrema circa idem sunt. Unde cum prodigalitas et illiberalitas sint extrema liberalitatis, consequens est quod etiam ipsa sint circa pecunias.

Secundo ibi: illiberalitatem quidem etc.,

655. Next [B, B’], at “Miserliness is always,” he

ostendit specialiter de illiberalitate, quod semper copulamus eam, idest

mentions particularly that we always connect or charge with miserliness people who are more

attribuimus illis qui student, id est sollicitantur, circa pecunias

diligent, i.e., solicitous, about making or keeping wealth than they ought to be.

acquirendas vel conservandas magis quam oportet. Tertio ibi prodigalitatem autem etc.,

656. Finally [B, C’], at “But the intemperate”

ostendit quomodo prodigalitas se habeat circa pecunias. Et dicit quod

he explains in what manner extravagance may be concerned with wealth. By extension the

nomen prodigalitatis quandoque extendimus attribuentes ipsum

term “extravagance” is applied occasionally to the intemperate, for men who live riotously and

intemperatis hominibus: vocamus enim quandoque prodigos illos qui

dissipate their riches by overindulgence in food and sex are sometimes called spendthrifts.

incontinenter vivunt et consumunt divitias suas in intemperantiam sive

Hence they seem very depraved in the sense that they also possess many vices, like

ciborum sive venereorum. Unde et tales videntur esse pravissimi in hoc

intemperance and extravagance. Although such men at times may be called extravagant,

genere, quia simul habent multa vitia, id est intemperantiam et

nevertheless they do not strictly deserve the name that is used to signify a vice consisting in

prodigalitatem. Et quamvis quandoque tales vocentur prodigi, nomen tamen

inordinate waste or consumption of one’s substance or riches. He proves the statement

intemperantiae proprie competit eis; quia nomen prodigi impositum est ad

by the name “extravagance.” The extravagant person is spoken of as ruined inasmuch as

significandum unum vitium quod consistit in indebita corruptione vel

dissipation of his own riches, by which he ought to live, seems to destroy his existence-a

consumptione substantiae, idest propriarum divitiarum. Et hoc probat

thing sustained by riches.

ex ipso nomine prodigalitatis. Nam prodigus dicitur quasi perditus, inquantum scilicet homo corrumpendo proprias divitias per quas vivere debet, videtur suum esse destruere quod per divitias conservatur. Sed oportet quod hoc conveniat ei

657. This name should be predicated of a man

propter seipsum; quia unumquodque habet speciem et denominationem ab eo

in relation to himself because each thing receives its species and name from what

quod convenit ei per se; ille ergo vere dicitur prodigus cui per se hoc convenit

pertains to it essentially. Therefore a man is truly called extravagant who dissipates his

quod consumat suas divitias quasi non habens curam debitam de eis. Ille vero

riches precisely because he does not have proper care of them. On the other hand, he who

qui consumit suam substantiam propter aliquid aliud, puta propter

wastes his substance for some other reason, for example, intemperance, is not essentially a

intemperantiam, non per se est consumptor divitiarum, sed per se est

spendthrift but an intemperate person. It happens now and then that even the covetous

intemperatus. Contingit enim quandoque quod etiam homines cupidi

and grasping waste their goods because of the influence of concupiscence. For the present

et tenaces propter vim concupiscentiae bona sua consumant. Sic ergo nunc de

then we are treating extravagance according as some squander riches themselves and do not

prodigalitate loquimur, prout scilicet aliqui consumunt proprias divitias

waste them in some other way.

secundum se et non propter aliud. Deinde cum dicit: quorum autem est

658. Then [II], at “Things that have,” he

aliqua utilitas etc., ostendit qualiter liberalitas et opposita vitia circa

explains in what way liberality and the opposite vices function in this matter. Here he takes up

praedictam materiam, operantur. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo determinat

two (three) points, considering first [II, A] the liberal man; next [Lect. 3; II, B] the

de liberali. Secundo de prodigo, ibi, qui autem superabundat et cetera. Tertio

spendthrift, at “But the spendthrift etc.” (B. 1120 b 25); and finally [Lect. 5; II, C], the

de illiberali, ibi, illiberalitas autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

miser, at “Illiberality etc.” (B. 1121 b 13). He treats the first point from two aspects. First

determinat de actu liberalitatis. Secundo ponit quasdam proprietates

[II, A, A’] he examines the act of liberality; then [Lect. 2; II, A, B’], he states certain

ipsius, ibi, liberalis autem est vehementer et cetera. Circa primum

characteristics of it at “The liberal person however” (B. 1120 b 5). He discusses the first

duo facit. Primo ostendit quis sit praecipuus actus liberalitatis; secundo

point in a twofold manner. First [A’, 1] he shows what the principal act of liberality is; and

ostendit qualis esse debeat, ibi, quae autem secundum virtutem et cetera.

next [Lect. 2; A’, 2], what qualities this act should have, at “Since virtuous actions” (B.

Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod actus liberalitatis est bonus usus

1120 a 23). He handles the initial point under two headings. First [i, a] he makes clear that

pecuniae, tali ratione. Quaecumque sunt ad aliquid utilia, contingit his uti

the act of liberality is the proper use of wealth, by the following argument. Whatever has any

bene vel male. Sed divitiae quaeruntur tamquam ad aliud utiles; ergo contingit

utility can be used well or badly. But riches are sought because they have some utility.

eis uti bene vel male; sed si aliquibus rebus contingat bene uti, bonus usus

Therefore they can be used well or badly. Now the proper use of things pertains to that virtue

illarum rerum pertinet ad virtutem quae est circa illas res. Ergo bene uti

which deals with those things. Consequently, the proper use of wealth belongs to liberality,

pecuniis pertinet ad liberalitatem quae est circa pecunias, ut supra ostensum

which is concerned with wealth, as we proved before (651-653).

est. Secundo ibi: usus autem etc., ostendit quis sit usus pecuniae: et dicit quod

659. Next [1, b ], at “The spending,” he explains what the use of wealth is, indicating

usus pecuniae consistit in emissione eius, quae quidem fit per sumptus

that it consists in spending which takes place by disbursements and gifts. To accept or save

expensarum et per dationes, sed accipere vel custodire pecunias non est

wealth is not to use it, for acceptance brings about possession, and saving is the

uti pecuniis, sed est possidere eas. Nam per acceptionem pecuniae acquiritur

preservation of wealth; acceptance is a kind of production, and saving is an habitual retention.

eius possessio; per custodiam autem conservatur: acceptio enim est sicut

Use, however, does not signify production or habit but act.

quaedam pecuniae generatio, custodia autem sicut quaedam habitualis retentio. Usus autem non nominat generationem vel habitum, sed actum. Tertio ibi: propter quod etc., infert

660. Finally [1, c], at “For this reason,” he

quamdam conclusionem ex dictis. Et primo ponit eam, concludens ex

draws a conclusion from what has been said. First [c, i] he states it, inferring from the

praemissis quod magis pertinet ad liberalem dare pecuniam quibus

premises that it is more characteristic of a liberal man to distribute wealth to the right

oportet, quod est bene uti eis, quam accipere unde oportet quod pertinet ad

persons than to accept wealth from the proper sources (this pertains to a lawful increase of

pecuniae generationem debitam, et non accipere unde non oportet quod

wealth), and to refuse wealth from improper sources (this pertains to removal of the

pertinet ad remotionem contrarii.

contrary).

Secundo ibi: virtutis enim magis etc.,

661. Then [c, ii], at “Virtue consists,” he

confirmat inductam conclusionem quinque rationibus. Quarum prima

substantiates the conclusion by five reasons. The first reason [ii, v] is that it is more

talis est. Magis pertinet ad virtutem benefacere quam bene pati, quia

characteristic of virtue to bestow than to receive benefits because the act of benefitting is

benefacere est melius et difficilius. Similiter etiam magis pertinet ad

better and more difficult. Likewise, it is more characteristic of virtue to perform a good

virtutem bene operari quam abstinere a turpi operatione. Quia recessus a

action than to refrain from an evil one, because departure from a terminus is the principle of

termino est principium motus, cui assimilatur vitatio turpis operationis.

motion to which the avoidance of an evil action is likened. But the performance of a good action

Sed operatio boni assimilatur perventioni ad terminum quae perficit

is likened to the arrival at the goal which perfects motion. It is obvious when someone

motum. Manifestum est autem quoniam ex eo quod aliquis dat,

gives gifts that he bestows a benefit and performs a good action. On the other hand, it

benefacit et bene operatur; ad sumptionem autem, idest receptionem

pertains to taking or acceptance to receive benefits worthily (inasmuch as a man acquires

pertinet bene pati, inquantum scilicet aliquis recipit unde oportet, vel non

them from proper sources), and not to act unworthily (inasmuch as a man refuses them

turpe operari, inquantum scilicet non recipit unde non oportet. Ergo

from improper sources). Consequently, it belongs to the virtue of liberality to give well

consequens est quod ad virtutem liberalitatis magis pertineat bene dare

rather than to receive worthily or refrain from reprehensible acceptance of gifts.

quam bene accipere vel abstinere a mala acceptione. Secundam rationem ponit ibi et gratia

662. The second reason [ii, w], at “Thanks

danti et cetera. Quae talis est. Operationi virtutis debetur laus et

and,” follows. Praise and thanks are due in return for a good act. But each one of these is

gratiarum actio. Sed utrumque horum magis debetur danti quam accipienti

ascribed with better reason to the giver than the receiver, worthy or unworthy. Therefore,

bene vel non male accipienti; ergo virtus liberalitatis magis consistit in dando quam in accipiendo.

the virtue of liberality consists rather in giving than receiving.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et facilius autem et cetera. Quae talis est. Virtus

663. The third reason is presented at “Likewise it is easier” [ii, x]. Virtue is concerned with the

est circa difficile. Sed facilius est quod aliquis non accipiat aliena, quam quod det proprium. Quia cum aliquis dat id quod est sibi proprium, quasi abscidit a

difficult. But it is easier not to receive what belongs to others than to give what is one’s own because a person giving what is his cuts himself away, so to speak, from what was a

se id quod est sibi incorporatum. Ergo virtus liberalitatis magis est circa

part of him. Therefore, the virtue of liberality more property has to do with giving than

dationem quam circa acceptionem.

receiving.

Quartam rationem ponit ibi, sed et liberales dicuntur et cetera. Quae sumitur ex communi modo loquendi.

664. The fourth reason, beginning at “People who” [ii, y], is taken from common usage. Men who give gifts are said to be liberal in a marked

Dicuntur enim maxime liberales illi qui dant. Illi vero qui non accipiunt inordinate non multum laudantur de liberalitate, sed magis de iustitia; illi

degree; those who do not accept dishonest gifts are commended not so much for liberality as justice, and those who simply accept presents are praised very little. Therefore, the virtue of

vero qui accipiunt non multum laudantur. Ergo liberalitas maxime videtur esse circa dationes.

liberality seems to be concerned in a special way with giving gifts.

Quintam rationem ponit ibi, amantur autem maxime et cetera. Quae talis est. Inter omnes virtuosos maxime amantur liberales, non quidem amicitia

665. The fifth reason is given at “Of all virtuous men” [ii, z]. Among all virtuous men the liberal person is especially loved not by an honorable friendship—as if liberality was a

honesti, quasi liberalitas sit maxima virtus, sed amicitia utilis, inquantum scilicet sunt aliis utiles. Sunt autem utiles per hoc quod dant. Ergo

most excellent virtue—but by a friendship of utility precisely as he is useful to others. The liberal are indeed useful in this that they make disbursements. Therefore, liberality deals

liberalitas dationes.

especially with giving gifts.

maxime

consistit

circa

LECTURE 2 The Act of Liberality Chapter 1 (II, A, A’) 2. HE SHOWS WHAT ITS QUALITIES (OF THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF LIBERALITY) SHOULD BE. a. He explains the quality of the principal act. i. What should be the quality of giving... x. THE GIVING OF THE LIBERAL MAN SHOULD BE ENDOWED WITH CIRCUMSTANCES... — 666 αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.

Since virtuous actions are good both in themselves and in their intent, the liberal

καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε,

man will give with a good intention and in the right circumstances. He will make gifts to the proper persons, at the opportune time,

καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως·

of whatever gifts are fitting and with all the requisites of reasonable giving.

y. THE GIVING OF A LIBERAL PERSON SHOULD BE ENJOYABLE. — 667 τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ

Besides, he will give with pleasure and

ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν.

without sadness, for a virtuous action is pleasurable and either not sad at all or in a very slight degree.

ii. The other kinds of donations do not pertain to liberality. x. ONE WHO GIVES TO THE WRONG PERSONS... IS NOT CALLED LIBERAL. — 668 ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος

The man, however, who gives to the wrong persons, or not with the right intention, but for some other cause will be called not liberal

ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται.

but by some other name.

y.

A MAN WHO GIVES WITH SADNESS IS NOT

LIBERAL. — 669 οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς

Nor will anyone be called liberal who gives with sadness, for he would choose money

καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου.

rather than the generous deed. Such a one surely is not liberal.

b. (He explains) the qualities of the secondary acts. i. What the liberal person avoids in accepting. — 670 οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ·

Nor will a liberal man accept a gift from an

οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος

improper source, since an accepting of this sort is not characteristic of one who does not pay homage to wealth. And certainly he will not be inclined to seek favors, for it is not the

εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι.

usual thing that a man who bestows benefactions readily accepts them.

ii. What (the liberal man) should observe. — 671 ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ'

He will take from the proper sources, i.e., from his own possessions, for money is not good itself but necessary that he may have something to give. He will not give to

ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ

everyone so that he can give to the right persons when and where it is fitting.

διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. B’ He states four properties of liberality. 1. IT PERTAINS TO THE LIBERAL PERSON TO GIVE EAGERLY AND GENEROUSLY. — 672 ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν

The liberal person, however, is characteristically eager to be generous, keeping things of lesser value for his own use, for he is not solicitous about himself.

ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου.

2.

LIBERALITY IS ATTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO THE...

QUANTITY OF A MANS SUBSTANCE. — 673

κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ

Liberality makes allowance for the amount of one’s wealth, since the liberal deed does not

ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὴ

lie in the number of gifts but in the condition of the giver who gives according to his means. Nothing hinders the smaller donor from being more liberal, if he contributes

κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῷ.

from more limited resources.

3. PEOPLE WHO INHERIT RICHES... ARE MORE LIBERAL THAN THOSE WHO ACQUIRE THEM BY THEIR OWN LABOR. — 674

ἐλευθεριώτεροι

δὲ

εἶναι

People who inherit wealth—not having any

δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι

experience of need—are more liberal than those who earn their money. All men esteem more highly what they themselves have produced, like parents and poets.

μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. 4. THE FOURTH PROPERTY. a. He indicates the property. — 675 πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν,

It is not easy to increase the wealth of the liberal man who is inclined neither to accept nor keep riches but rather to distribute them,

προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως.

placing value not on riches themselves but on the bestowal of them.

b. He makes clear... what he had said. — 676 διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες

Men bring the accusation against fortune that of those who deserve wealth most do not

ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ

become rich—a fact that has a reasonable explanation. Here (and the same is true in other matters) it is not possible for a person to possess money who does not trouble

ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

himself about it.

c. He excludes a false opinion. — 677 οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι

The liberal man, however, will not give to the wrong persons, nor at the wrong time, nor in any other wrong manner, for he would not

πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ

be directed to these things according to liberality. Besides, by this squandering he would be without the resources on which to draw. As has been explained, the liberal man

εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ

then spends according to his means and in the way he ought.

εἰς ἃ δεῖ·

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quae autem secundum virtutem (et)

666. After the Philosopher has made clear

operationes et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quis sit praecipuus actus liberalitatis, hic ostendit qualis debeat esse. Et primo ostendit qualis sit

what the principal act of liberality is, he now [(II, A, A’)2] shows what its qualities should be. First [2, a] he explains the quality of the principal act; and next [2, b]

praecipuus actus eius. Secundo quales sint actus eius secundarii, ibi: neque accipiet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualis debeat esse liberalitatis

the qualities of the secondary acts, at “Nor will a liberal man accept.” In regard to the initial point he does two things. First [a, i] he shows what should be the quality of

datio quae est praecipuus actus eius. Secundo ostendit quod aliae dationes non pertinent ad liberalitatem, ibi: qui autem dat quibus non oportet et cetera. Circa

giving which is the principal act of liberality. Then [a, ii] he shows that other kinds of donations do not pertain to liberality, at “The man, however, etc.” He treats the first

primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod datio liberalis debeat debitis circumstantiis esse vestita, quia scilicet omnes operationes quae sunt secundum virtutem

point in a twofold manner. First [i, x] he explains that the giving of the liberal man should be endowed with circumstances because all virtuous operations ought to be

debent esse bonae, id est rectificatae a ratione secundum debitas circumstantias, et ulterius ordinatae per intentionem ad bonum finem. Cum igitur datio sit

good, directed by reason according to the required circumstances and ordered to a good end. Since, then, giving is the principal act of liberality, it follows that the liberal

praecipuus actus liberalitatis, consequens est quod liberalis det propter bonum finem, et quod recte, id est secundum regulam rationis; inquantum scilicet dat quibus

man should give with rectitude of intention and of deed, i.e., in conformity with the norm of reason. This means that he bestows on the proper person, in a fitting

oportet et quando oportet et quaecumque aliae debitae circumstantiae consequuntur ad rectam dationem.

manner and according to all other requisite circumstances called for by right reason.

Secundo ibi: et haec delectabiliter etc., ostendit quod datio liberalis debet esse delectabilis. Et hoc est quod dicit quod

667. Next [i, y], at “Besides, he will give with pleasure,” he shows that the giving of a liberal person should be enjoyable. This is

liberalis dat delectabiliter, vel saltem sine tristitia. Ita enim est in omni virtute, ut ex supradictis patet, quod actus virtuosus, vel est delectabilis, vel saltem est sine

what he means saying that the liberal man gives cheerfully, or at least without sadness. It is true of any virtue, as evident in previous discussions (265-279, 371-378),

tristitia; vel si oporteat aliquam tristitiam admisceri, minimum habebit per

that virtuous action is either pleasurable or at least without sadness. If the virtuous

comparationem ad alios homines, sicut supra dictum est de forti quod, si non multum delectetur in suo actu, tamen non tristatur, vel saltem minus tristatur inter

man has some sadness mingled with his activity, it will be very slight compared with what other men suffer. This was said before in regard to the brave man who, even if he

omnes qui huiusmodi pericula subeunt.

does not take much pleasure in his operation, nevertheless is not made sad or at least has less sadness than anyone who undergoes trials of this kind in his activities.

Deinde cum dicit: qui autem dat quibus non oportet etc., ostendit quod aliae dationes non pertinent ad liberalem. Et

668. Then [a, ii], at “The Man, however,” he brings out that other donations do not pertain to the liberal man. First [ii, x] he

primo de dationibus quibus desunt debitae circumstantiae. Et dicit quod ille qui dat quibus non oportet, vel non propter honestatem, sed propter aliquam aliam

says—speaking of disbursements that lack the proper circumstances—that one who gives to the wrong persons, or not for an honorable motive but for some other

causam licitam vel illicitam, non dicitur liberalis. Sed alio nomine nominatur secundum differentiam finis propter quem dat, ex quo moralia speciem et nomen

reason, good or bad, is not called liberal. But he is given a different name according to the difference of the end for which he gives, since moral matters take their species and

sortiuntur.

name from the end.

Secundo ibi: neque qui triste etc., ostendit

669. Second [ii, y], at “Nor will anyone,” he

idem de dationibus quae sunt cum tristitia. Et dicit quod neque illi qui cum tristitia dant sunt liberales, quia ex hoc ipso quod tristantur in dando, videtur quod magis

affirms that a man who gives with sadness is not liberal. The reason is that the cheerless giver seems to prefer wealth to the virtuous action of honorable giving—

eligerent pecunias quam operationem virtuosam honestae dationis. Quod non pertinet ad liberalem.

which is not the case with a liberal person.

Deinde cum dicit: neque accipiet etc., ostendit quales sint operationes

670. Next [2, b], at “Nor will a liberal man accept,” he explains the nature of the

liberalitatis sicut acceptio et alia huiusmodi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid vitet liberalis in accipiendo. Secundo ostendit quid observet, ibi, unde

secondary acts of liberality like receiving and so on. Here he makes two points, showing first what the liberal person avoids in accepting; and then [b, ii] what he should

autem oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo ponit. Quorum primum est, quod liberalis non accipit unde non oportet. Sic enim accipere non videtur competere

observe, at “He will take etc.” On the first point he makes two comments. The first is that the liberal man does not take from improper sources, for to take in this way

homini, qui non appretiatur pecunias.

does not seem becoming to a man who does

Secundum est, quod liberalis non est promptus ad petendum. Sicut enim in

not highly prize wealth. The second is that the liberal man is not quick to make

naturalibus, quod est multum activum est parum passivum, ut ignis, ita etiam in moralibus liberalis, qui est promptus ad benefaciendum donando, non de facili vult

requests. As in the natural order, what is greatly active has little receptivity, for example, fire, so in the moral order the liberal person, who is prompt in making

beneficia ab alio recipere, quod est bene pati.

benefactions, is not eager to accept benefits from others, i.e., to be easily receptive.

Deinde cum dicit: unde autem oportet etc.,

671. Then [b, ii] , at “He will take,”

ostendit quid observet liberalis in accipiendo vel retinendo; et ponit tria. Quorum primum est, quod liberalis accipit unde oportet, scilicet a propriis

Aristotle shows what the liberal man should observe in taking and retaining. He makes three observations, of which the first is that the liberal man takes from the proper

possessionibus vel ab aliis huiusmodi, non quia quaerit pecuniam quasi per se bonum, sed quasi necessarium ad dandum. Secundum est, quod liberalis non negligit

sources, i.e., from his own possessions and not from others, since he seeks wealth not as a good itself but as something necessary for making gifts. The second is that he does

procurationem bonorum propriorum, quia vult habere unde sufficiat ad dandum aliis. Tertium est, quod liberalis non dat quibuscumque, sed retinet ad hoc quod

not neglect the care of his own goods because he wants to have enough to bestow on others. The third is that he does not give to everyone but holds back so he can give to

possit dare quibus oportet, et loco et tempore debito.

the right persons at a fitting place and time.

Deinde cum dicit: liberalis autem etc.,

672. Then [B’], at “The liberal person,” he

ponit quatuor proprietates liberalitatis. Quarum prima est, quod ad liberalem pertinet, ut vehementer superabundet in datione, non quidem sic quod

states four properties of liberality. The first [B’, 1] is that it pertains to the liberal person to give eagerly and generously, not however without right reason but in such a

superabundet a ratione recta, sed ita quod datio in ipso superabundet retentioni. Quia minus sibi relinquit, quam aliis det. Paucis enim in seipso contentus est; sed dum vult

way that what he gives is more than what he retains, because he keeps less for himself than he gives to others. He is indeed content with a few things for himself but if

multis providere oportet, quod pluribus largiatur. Non enim pertinet ad liberalem quod sibi soli intendat.

he wants to care for many people, he must distribute much more. It is not a mark of the generous man to have himself alone in mind.

Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: secundum substantiam autem et cetera.

673. At “Liberality makes allowance” he gives the second property [B’, 2], saying

Et dicit quod liberalitas commendatur secundum proportionem substantiae, idest

that liberality is attributed according to the relative quantity of a man’s substance or

divitiarum. Non enim datio iudicatur liberalis ex multitudine donorum sed ex habitu, idest ex facultate et voluntate dantis, qui scilicet dat secundum modum

riches. Hence there is no reason why someone who bestows smaller gifts may not be judged more liberal, if he gives from more moderate means.

suarum divitiarum. Unde nihil prohibet, quod aliquis, qui minora dat, liberalior iudicetur, si a minoribus divitiis det. Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: liberaliores autem et cetera. Et dicit quod illi qui suscipiunt divitias a parentibus sunt magis liberales quam illi qui proprio labore

674. He presents the third property at “People who inherit” [B’, 3], affirming that persons who inherit riches from their parents are more liberal than those who

eas acquirunt. Et huius assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima est, quod illi qui suscipiunt divitias a parentibus, nunquam fuerunt experti indigentiam; unde non

acquire them by their own labor. He assigns two reasons for this. The first is that people who are given wealth by their parents have never felt the pinch of need. Consequently,

timent eam et propter hoc non timent expendere, sicut illi qui aliquando experti sunt paupertatem. Secunda ratio est, quia naturale est quod omnes diligant sua

they are not afraid to spend, as those are who have experienced poverty at one time. The second reason is that all men naturally love their own works; parents love their

opera, sicut parentes diligunt suos filios, et poetae sua poemata. Illi autem qui acquirunt proprio labore divitias, reputant eas quasi sua opera. Unde magis volunt

children, and poets, their poems. Likewise, those who acquire riches by their labor look upon them as their own works and rather desire to keep them.

eas conservare. Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: ditari autem non facile et cetera. Et circa hoc

675. He presents the fourth property at “It is not easy” [B’, 4]. He considers this point

tria facit. Primo ponit proprietatem. Et dicit quod non est facile quod ditetur homo liberalis, quum non de facili accipiat, neque multum custodiat divitias; sed magis a se

under three aspects. First [4, a] he indicates the property, saying that the liberal man is not easily made rich, since he is not disposed to accept or keep riches but rather to

emittit eas dando et expendendo et non appretiatur divitias propter ipsas, sed solum propter dationem.

distribute them in gifts and disbursements. Nor does he value riches for themselves but for their distribution.

Secundo ibi: propter quod etc., manifestat quod dixerat per quoddam signum. Quia enim liberales non de facili sunt divites, homines vulgares accusant fortunam, cui

676. Next [4, b], at “Men bring the accusation,” he makes clear by a certain sign what he had said. Since the liberal do not readily become wealthy, the common

attribuunt divitias, quod non sunt divites illi qui maxime essent digni, scilicet liberales, qui aliis largiuntur. Sed ipse

people blame fortune—to which they attribute riches—because those who would be especially deserving (i.e., the liberal who

dicit, quod hoc non irrationabiliter accidit: quia non est possibile, quod homo habeat

give generously to others) are not rich. But Aristotle says that this is not an

pecunias, qui non multum curat habere; sicut etiam non est possibile, quod aliquid aliud habeatur, de quo homo non curat.

unreasonable occurrence, for it is not possible that a person should possess wealth who troubles himself very little about it, just as it is not possible that anything else which a man does not care for should be retained.

Tertio ibi: non tamen dabit etc., excludit

677. Finally [4, c] he excludes a false

falsam opinionem. Non enim propter hoc dictum est quod non curet divitias, quia det quibus non oportet, vel quando non oportet, vel indebite secundum

opinion at “The liberal man, however, will not.” It was not said that the liberal man does not care about riches because he gives to the wrong person, or at the wrong time,

quamcumque aliam circumstantiam. Tum quia talis operatio non esset liberalis: tum quia per hoc impediretur ab operatione liberali, dum inutiliter consumens non

or in the wrong manner according to some other circumstance. The reason is both that such an operation would not be liberal and that the liberal person would be hindered in

haberet quod oportune consumeret. Sicut enim dictum est, liberalis dicitur, qui expendit secundum proportionem propriae substantiae, et in ea quae oportet.

this way from truly generous action, for by reason of useless waste he would lack the means to make the most worthy disbursements. As has been explained (658659), he is called liberal, then, who gives donations in the proper manner and according to the condition of his own resources.

LECTURE 3 Extravagance Chapter 1 (II) B. He begins the consideration of the spendthrift. A’ He treats the person who is altogether extravagant. 1. HE CONSIDERS THE SPENDTHRIFT AS SUCH. a. In what respect the spendthrift is excessive. — 678 ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν

But the spendthrift is a man who squanders. Hence we do not call tyrants spendthrifts,

ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν.

for it is not easy to be excessive in gifts and expenditures with a vast sum of money in their possession.

b. Of what nature (the spendthrift’s) act is. i.

He ... resumes what was said about the act of the liberal

man. x. HOW THE LIBERAL MAN SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF IN MATTERS PRINCIPALLY PERTAINING TO HIM. — 679 τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ

Since liberality is the mean concerned with the giving and taking of wealth, the liberal man will both give and expend whatever he

ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως·

ought and in the way he ought, whether the sum be large or small. He will also do this gladly.

y. IN MATTERS SECONDARILY PERTAINING TO HIM. aa. The liberal man’s reaction to taking. — 680 καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν

Likewise he will accept both large and small amounts from the proper sources and under the proper conditions. Since virtue consists in the mean regarding both (taking and giving), he will do both as he ought because virtuous taking goes hand in hand with virtuous giving, while improper taking is

οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ.

contrary to virtuous giving. Accordingly, the operations that go hand in hand exist at the same time in the liberal man, but contrary operations obviously cannot.

bb. (The liberal man’s reaction) to sadness. a’. Saddened by disordered giving. — 681

ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.

If it should happen that he spends inopportunely and unsuccessfully, he will be sad but in a moderate and fitting manner, for it is characteristic of virtue to be pleased and saddened at the proper things and in the proper circumstances.

b’. By the privation of wealth. — 682 καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα,

But the liberal man is disposed to share his wealth with others. He is even willing to suffer loss by not valuing money highly.

c’. Is grieved at inappropriate retention of money. — 683 καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.

He is more grieved over failure to make an appropriate outlay than over an inopportune expenditure—a thing displeasing to Simonides.

ii. How the act of the spendthrift is constituted. — 684 ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον.

The spendthrift, however, sins in these matters too. Besides, he neither takes pleasure in the right things, nor is saddened when he should be. This will be clarified by what follows.

2. HE MAKES A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SPENDTHRIFT AND THE MISER. a. In regard, first to opposition. — 685 εἴρηται δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν

We have seen that extravagance and miserliness pertain to excess and defect, and occur in two actions, namely, giving and taking. Extravagance then abounds in giving and falls short in taking. On the

τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν

other hand, miserliness falls short in giving and abounds in taking, except in trifling

ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς.

things.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Qui autem superabundat et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de liberali, hic determinat de prodigo. Et

678. After the Philosopher has finished the study of the liberal man, he now [(II)B] begins the consideration of the spendthrift.

primo determinat de eo, qui est totaliter prodigus. Secundo de eo qui est partim prodigus et partim illiberalis, ibi: sed multi prodigorum, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de eo prodigo absolute; secundo comparat prodigum illiberali, ibi: dictum est autem a nobis, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

First [A’] he treats the person who is altogether extravagant; and next [Lect. 4, B’] the person who is partly extravagant and partly liberal at “But, as we have noted etc.” (B. 1121 a 30). In regard to the first, lie does two things. Initially [1] he considers the spendthrift as such. Then [2] he makes a comparison between the spendthrift and

ostendit respectu cuius prodigus superabundet. Secundo ostendit qualis sit prodigi actus, ibi, liberalitate utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum dicatur aliquis liberalis ex hoc quod expendit secundum proportionem suae substantiae; prodigus dicitur, qui superabundat proportionem suae substantiae

the miser, at “We have seen etc.” He clarifies the initial point by a twofold distinction. First [1, a] he shows in what respect the spendthrift is excessive; and next [1, b], of what nature his act is, at “Since liberality is the mean etc.” Although I man may be called liberal when he spends according to his means, he is called

expendendo vel dando. Et ex hoc concludit, quod tyranni, qui habent indeficientem divitiarum abundantiam, utpote omnia quae sunt communia sibi usurpantes, non dicuntur prodigi, quia multitudine eorum quae possident, non videtur esse facile quod in dando et expendendo superabundent proportionem propriarum

extravagant when he spends or gives beyond his means. From this he concludes that tyrants, who have an inexhaustible supply of wealth-usurping as they do public goods for themselves-are not called extravagant. The reason is that it is not easy f or tyrants to exceed the amount of their riches by donations and expenditures

divitiarum.

because of the great amount of their possessions.

Deinde cum dicit: liberalitate utique etc.,

679. Then [i, b], at “Since liberality.” he

manifestat qualis sit actus prodigi. Et quia

discloses what the act of the spendthrift is.

opposita resumit liberalis. prodigi,

ex invicem manifestantur, primo ea quae dicta sunt de actu Secundo ostendit qualis sit actus ibi, prodigus autem, et cetera.

Because opposites are mutually revealing, he first [b, i] resumes what was said about the act of the liberal man. Next [b, ii], he shows how the act of the spendthrift is

Circa primum duo facit. Primo resumit qualiter liberalis se habeat circa ea quae principaliter ad eum pertinent, scilicet circa dationem et delectationem dationis. Secundo qualiter se habeat in his circa quae est secundario liberalitas, ibi: et accipiet unde oportet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum liberalitas sit quaedam

constituted, at “The spendthrift, however, etc.” On the first point he proceeds in two ways. First [i, x] he reviews how the liberal man should conduct himself in the matters principally pertaining to him, i.e., in giving and in the pleasure of giving; and next [i, A in matters secondarily pertaining to him, at “Likewise he will accept.” He says first that,

medietas circa dationem et acceptionem pecuniarum, liberalis emittit pecunias dando et expendendo, et hoc secundum rationem rectam, in quae oportet et quaecumque alia oportet in huiusmodi observare, per quod differt liberalis a prodigo; et hoc facit tam in parvis quam in magnis: per quod differt liberalis a

since liberality is a certain dealing with giving and taking of wealth, the liberal person, disposes of his funds by making gifts and disbursements—and this in agreement with right reason—in the proper way, of the proper things, and according to other appropriate circumstances. By this the liberal man is distinguished from the

magnifico, qui est tantummodo circa magna, ut infra dicetur. Et hoc facit delectabiliter: per quod differt ab illiberali, qui in emissione pecuniarum contristatur.

spendthrift; by the fact that he gives both in large and small amounts he is distinguished from the munificent man, who is concerned only with great donations; by the fact that he gives with pleasure he differs from the miser who is saddened by the giving away of his wealth.

Deinde cum dicit: et accipiet unde oportet etc., resumit quomodo liberalis se habeat circa ea quae secundario ad liberalitatem pertinent. Et primo quomodo se habeat

680. Next [i, y], at “Likewise he will accept,” Aristotle reviews the way the liberal man should act in matters which secondarily pertain to liberality. He touches

circa acceptionem. Secundo quomodo se habeat circa tristitiam, ibi: si autem praeter optimum et bene et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod liberalis accipit unde oportet, et observat quaecumque oportet in accipiendo observari. Cum enim liberalitatis virtus medium teneat circa utrumque, scilicet acceptionem et

first [y, aa] on the liberal man’s reaction to taking; and next [y, bb], to sadness at “If it should etc.” He says first that the liberal person accepts from the proper sources and observes all proper conditions. Since the virtue of liberality abides by the golden mean in regard to both, i.e., taking and giving, the liberal man will perform both as

dationem, liberalis utrumque faciet sicut oportet, quia ad decentem dationem sequitur quod sit decens acceptio. Sed si

he ought-worthy acceptance going hand in hand with worthy giving. But acceptance that is not virtuous is contrary to virtuous

acceptio non sit decens, contraria est decenti dationi, quia ex contrariis causis procedunt. Decens enim datio procedit ex hoc, quod homo praefert bonum rationis cupiditati pecuniae. Sed indecens acceptio provenit ex hoc quod homo cupiditatem pecuniae praeponit bono rationis. Et quia

giving because the two proceed from contrary causes. Virtuous giving proceeds from the fact that a man prefers the reasonable good to the desire for wealth. But dishonorable taking arises from placing the desire of wealth before the reasonable good. Things that go hand in hand exist at

ea quae seinvicem consequuntur simul fiunt in eodem, quae vero sunt contraria simul esse non possunt: inde est quod decens datio et decens acceptio, quae seinvicem consequuntur, simul adunantur in liberali. Sed indecens acceptio non simul invenitur in eo cum decenti acceptione, cui contrariatur.

the same time in the same subject, but not things that are contrary. Hence virtuous giving and taking that accompany one another are united in the liberal person, but dishonorable taking is not found in him together with virtuous taking, its contrary.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem praeter optimum etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat

681. Then [y, bb], at “If it should,” he explains how the liberal man reacts to

liberalis circa tristitiam, quae est de amissione pecuniae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quomodo tristetur de inordinata datione. Et dicit quod si contingat ipsum aliquid de suis divitiis consumere praeter ordinem ad finem optimum et praeter hoc quod bene se habeat in dando secundum debitas

sadness arising from the loss of wealth. He develops this point in three steps. First [bb, a’] he shows in what manner the liberal person is saddened by disordered giving, affirming that if some of his own money be lost by reason of foolish spending and unfortunate conditions, he becomes sad as any virtuous man is saddened by doing

circumstantias, de hoc tristatur, sicut et quilibet virtuosus tristatur si contingat ipsum aliquid facere quod sit contra virtutem, et tamen circa ipsam tristitiam modum rationis observat, ut scilicet tristitia sit moderata et secundum quod oportet. Quia ad virtutem pertinet, ut aliquis delectetur et tristetur in quibus

something contrary to virtue. In this sorrow, however, he observes the rule of reason with moderation and as he should. The reason is that it is characteristic of the virtuous person to be delighted and to be saddened by the right thing and in the right manner.

oportet et secundum quod oportet. Secundo ibi: sed etiam bene communicativus etc., ostendit quomodo

682. Next [bb, b’], at “But the liberal man,” he shows how the generous person is

tristetur circa ablationem pecuniarum. Et dicit, quod liberalis est bene communicativus in pecuniis, idest promptus ad hoc, quod pecunias suas quasi communes cum aliis habeat. Potest

saddened by the privation of wealth, saying that he is disposed to share his wealth, i.e., is inclined to possess it in common, as it were, with others. He can, without grief, permit someone to injure him in money

enim absque tristitia sustinere, quod

matters because he does not attach great

aliquis ei in pecuniis iniurietur, eo quod non multum pecunias appretiatur.

importance to wealth.

Tertio ibi: et magis gravatus etc., ostendit

683. Third [bb, c’], at “He is more grieved,”

qualiter tristetur circa indebitam retentionem pecuniae. Et dicit quod magis gravatur, idest tristatur, si non consumit dando vel expendendo, quam tristetur, si consumat aliquid quod non oportebat consumere; et hoc ideo, quia magis ad ipsum pertinet dare quam accipere vel conservare, quamvis hoc non placeret

he discloses in what manner the liberal man is grieved at inappropriate retention of money, explaining that he is more grieved or saddened over not using his wealth in gifts or expenditures than over spending something which he should not have spent. The reason is that he is more concerned with giving than taking and keeping,

Simonidi idest cuidam poetae, contrarium fieri oportere dicebat.

qui

although this would not please Simonides, a certain poet, who said we ought to do the opposite.

Deinde cum dicit: prodigus autem etc., ostendit ex praemissis qualis sit actus prodigi. Et dicit quod in omnibus praedictis

684. Then [b, ii], at “The spendthrift, however,” he explains by the premises how the act of the spendthrift is constituted,

prodigus peccat, idest non solum in dando et accipiendo, sed etiam in delectando et tristando; quia neque delectatur neque tristatur in quibus oportet et secundum quod oportet. Et hoc erit magis manifestum in sequentibus.

saying that the spendthrift sins in all the preceding matters, i.e., not only in giving and accepting but also in taking pleasure and grieving because he is neither delighted nor saddened by the right things and in the right way. This will be made clearer by what follows.

Deinde cum dicit: dictum est autem a nobis etc., comparat prodigalitatem illiberalitati. Et primo quantum ad oppositionem. Secundo quantum ad quantitatem peccati,

685. Next [2], at “We have seen,” he compares extravagance to miserliness in regard, first [2, a] to opposition; and second [Lect. 4, (A’, 2), b] to the gravity of the sin,

ibi, quae quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo dictum esse supra quod prodigalitas et illiberalitas se habent secundum superabundantiam et defectum in duobus, scilicet in datione et acceptione, et hoc ideo quia expensae, quae etiam ad liberalitatem pertinent, sub datione comprehenduntur. Contrarie autem in his superabundat et

at “The things that” (B. 1121 a 16). He affirms, as was noted before (654), that extravagance and miserliness are constituted by excess and defect in two things, viz., taking and giving. He says this because expenditures, which pertain to liberality, are included under giving. And it is precisely in expenditures that the

deficit prodigus et illiberalis. Prodigus enim superabundat in dando, et in hoc quod non accipiat. Illiberalis autem e

spendthrift and the miser exceed and fall short in opposite things. The spendthrift is excessive in giving and in not taking. But

contrario deficit in dando, et superabundat in accipiendo; nisi forte in parvis, quae illiberalis dat et non curat accipere.

the miser, on the contrary, is deficient in giving and excessive in taking, except perhaps in trifling things that he gives and does not care to take.

LECTURE 4 The Gravity of Extravagance Chapter 1 b. He shows that miserliness is the more serious fault for three reasons. i. The first reason is taken from the mutability of extravagance. — 686-687 τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία

The things that are proper to extravagance are not increased very much at the same time, because a man cannot easily take nothing and at the same time give with an open hand to everyone. A generous

τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας,

simpleton-such the spendthrift seems to be-is soon separated from his money. A person of this sort, though, is somewhat better than the miser, for he is quickly set right both by age and want.

ii. The second reason... based on the likeness of extravagance to liberality. — 688-689 καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο

He can attain the mean of virtue, for he possesses qualities of the liberal person. He gives and does not take, although he does neither of these things properly and as he ought. If indeed he performs them out of

ἐθισθείη ἤ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι

custom or by reason of some change, he will become liberal, for he will then give to the right persons and not take from the wrong sources. For this reason he does not seem to be entirely evil in the moral sense, for it is not

φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ.

characteristic of an evil or vicious person, but of a foolish one, to give excessively and not to take.

iii. The third reason taken from a defect in extravagance. — 690 ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὃ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὃ δὲ οὐθένα,

In this way the spendthrift seems to be much better than the miser because of what has been said and because he benefits many people while the miser benefits no one, not even himself.

ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὑτόν. (II)B’ He considers the man who is a blend of spendthrift and miser. 1. HE SHOWS IN WHAT MANNER SOME SPENDTHRIFTS HAVE A BIT OF ILLIBERALITY. a. He... explains how some spend thrifts sin in taking.

i. He presents his proposition. — 691 ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι.

But, as we have noted, many spendthrifts take from tainted sources and in this way they are ungenerous.

ii. He assigns two reasons. — 692-693 ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ

They are inclined to take because they want to spend. But they cannot readily take enough, for their resources quickly vanish forcing them to acquire from others. Likewise they care nothing about what is right, and take from any quarter whatsoever. They want to give presents, so the how and

μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ

the whence make no immediate difference to them.

πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. b. How (spendthrifts) conduct themselves in giving. — 694 διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα,

For these reasons their donations are not liberal, being good neither in motive nor mode. But they make rich those who would

οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά.

better remain poor. They would give nothing to good men, yet are generous with flatterers and others who provide them with other pleasures.

2. HE DRAWS SOME CONCLUSIONS. a. The first is... many spendthrifts are intemperate. — 695 διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν.

Therefore, many of them are intemperate, for being inclined to spend, they waste their resources by intemperance. Moreover, since they do not order their life to good, they turn aside to sensual pleasures.

b. He draws the second conclusion. — 696 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν.

The spendthrift then who will not learn (the way of virtue) suffers consequences. But with effort he may attain the mean and adopt the right attitude.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quae quidem igitur prodigalitatis et cetera.

686. After the Philosopher has explained

Postquam philosophus ostendit oppositionem prodigalitatis ad illiberalitatem, hic ostendit quod illiberalitas excedit in gravitate peccati. Et

the opposition between extravagance and miserliness, he now shows [b] that miserliness is the more serious fault for three reasons. The first reason [b. i] is

hoc tribus rationibus. Quarum prima

taken from the mutability of extravagance:

sumitur ex mutabilitate prodigalitatis, quia non de facili augetur, sed de facili removetur. Unde dicit, quod ea quae pertinent ad prodigalitatem non multum possunt augeri simul, ut scilicet aliquis nullo modo accipiat et superflue omnibus det, eo quod substantia, idest divitiae, velociter deserit eos qui dant indiscrete,

although not readily increased it is easily eliminated. Hence he says that the things belonging to extravagance cannot at the same time be increased very much, so that a person takes nothing and gives to everyone because resources or riches are quickly exhausted for those who spend recklessly, like the simple and senseless. And

quasi quidam ydiotae et irrationabiles, et tales videntur esse prodigi. Et quia vitium, quod non multum augetur, sed de facili curatur, est minus grave, inde est, quod prodigus non modicum est melior, idest minus malus illiberali.

spendthrifts seem to be of this type. Since then a vice, which is not increased very much but easily remedied, is not so serious, it: follows that the spendthrift is somewhat better, i.e., less evil than the miser.

Prodigus enim de facili sanabilis est a suo vitio ex duobus. Uno quidem modo ab aetate, quia, quantum aliquis magis accedit ad senectutem, fit magis pronus ad retinendum, et ad non dandum. Quia enim

687. The spendthrift is easily cured of his vice in two ways. In the first way by age because the older a man grows the more inclined he is to keep things and not give them away. The reason is that riches are

divitiae appetuntur, ut per eas humanis defectibus subveniatur, consequens est ut, quanto aliquis maiores sentit defectus, tanto pronior sit ad retinendum, et ad non dandum. Secundo propter paupertatem, quae consequitur ex superflua prodigi datione. Paupertas autem impedit prodigalitatem tum propter

desired to supply the needs of man, and as these needs become greater so a man is more prone to husband and not hand out his wealth. Second, the spendthrift is cured by poverty resulting from excessive giving, for poverty prevents extravagant spending both by reason of the impossibility of further giving and the experience of need.

impossibilitatem dandi, experientiam defectus.

tum

propter

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et ad

688. At “He can attain” [b, ii] he gives the

medium potest venire et cetera. Quae sumitur ex similitudine eius ad liberalitatem. Unde dicit, quod prodigus de facili potest reduci ad medium virtutis propter convenientiam quam habet cum liberali. Habet enim prodigus ea quae habet liberalis, quia scilicet libenter dat, et non de facili accipit. Differt autem a

second reason, which is based on the likeness of extravagance to liberality. Hence he says that the spendthrift can easily be directed to the mean of virtue on account of the similarity he has with the liberal man. Since the spendthrift generously gives and does not readily take, he has qualities possessed by the liberal person. But he

liberali, quia neutrum horum facit secundum quod oportet, et bene, idest

differs from the liberal man in not doing either of these actions properly and as he

secundum rationem rectam. Et ideo si perducatur ad hoc quod faciat praedicta secundum quod oportet, sive per

ought, i.e., according to right reason. Therefore, if he is induced to perform these things as he ought, either by custom or by

assuetudinem, sive per quamcumque aliam transmutationem, puta aetatis vel fortunae, erit liberalis, ut scilicet det quibus oportet, et non accipiat unde non oportet.

some change in age or fortune he will become liberal so that he will give to the right persons and not take from the wrong sources.

Et ex hoc concludit, quod prodigus non videtur esse pravus secundum id quod pertinet proprie ad virtutem moralem, quae respicit directe appetitivam potentiam. Non enim pertinet ad malum sive corruptum appetitum, neque ad

689. He concludes from this that the spendthrift does not seem to be evil precisely as it pertains to moral virtue, which directly regards the power of the appetite. It is not characteristic of an evil or perverted appetite or of an effeminate mind

defectum virilis animi, quod aliquis superabundet in dando et in non accipiendo, sed hoc videtur pertinere ad insipientiam quamdam. Et sic videtur, quod prodigalitas non tam pertineat ad malitiam moralem, quae respicit pronitatem appetitus ad malum, quam secundum rationis defectum.

to give excessively and not to take. This belongs rather to a kind of stupidity. Thus it seems that extravagance does not belong so much to moral depravity, which regards the inclination of the appetite to evil, as to a lack of common sense.

Tertio ibi: secundum hunc autem modum etc., ponit tertiam rationem, quae sumitur ex effectu prodigalitatis. Unde dicit, quod

690. At “In this way” [b, iii] he presents the third reason taken from a defect in extravagance. That the spendthrift is much

prodigum esse multo meliorem illiberali, non solum apparet propter praedictas duas rationes, sed etiam propter hanc tertiam, quoniam prodigus multis prodest per suam dationem, licet sibi noceat inordinate dando. Sed illiberalis nulli prodest, in quantum deficit in dando, nec etiam prodest sibiipsi inquantum deficit in

better than the miser is apparent not only from the two reasons already stated but also from a third, namely, the spendthrift helps many by his giving, although he may hurt himself by giving extravagantly. The miser, on the other hand, benefits no one for he fails in giving; he does not benefit even himself, for he fails in spending.

expendendo.

Deinde cum dicit: sed multi prodigorum etc., determinat de eo qui est commixtus ex prodigo et illiberali. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo aliqui prodigi aliquid illiberalitatis habent. Secundo infert

691. Then [II, B’], at “But, as we have noted,” he considers the man who is a blend of spendthrift and miser. First [1] he shows in what manner some spendthrifts have a bit of illiberality. Next [2] he draws some

quasdam conclusiones ex dictis, ibi, propter quod intemperati et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo quidam prodigi male se habent in accipiendo. Secundo quomodo male se habent in

conclusions from what has been said, at “Therefore.” On the initial point he first [1, a] explains how some spendthrifts sin in taking; and then [1, b] how they conduct themselves in giving, at “For these

dando, ibi, propter quod neque liberales et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod multi qui sunt prodigi secundum superfluam dationem, sunt etiam secundum aliquid illiberales, inquantum accipiunt unde non oportet.

reasons.” In regard to this first, he presents his proposition [a, i], saying that many who are extravagant in unnecessary donations are also ungenerous in some way, taking as they do from the wrong sources.

Secundo ibi: acceptivi autem etc., assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima talis est. Quia tales proni sunt ad accipiendum

692. Next [a, ii], at “They are inclined” he assigns two reasons. The first is that spendthrifts are disposed to take because they want to spend their goods in

propter hoc quod volunt consumere sua superflue dando et expendendo, et de facili consumunt; quia ea quae habent, cito eos deserunt. Unde ad hoc quod implere possint voluntatem suam circa superfluas dationes et expensas, coguntur aliunde inordinate acquirere quae non habent.

superfluous gifts and expenditures. They readily succeed in this, for their resources are quickly depleted. Hence, in order that they may satisfy their desire regarding unnecessary gifts and disbursements, they are forced to acquire dishonestly from some other place the means they do not possess.

Secunda ratio est, quia magis dant ex quadam concupiscentia dandi, quam ex ratione recta, quasi intendentes ad aliquod bonum: unde volunt quidem dare; sed

693. The second reason is that they give rather out of a desire of giving than according to right reason, tending, as it were, to some good. They want to give

qualiter, aut unde dent, nihil apud eos differt, et ideo, quia nullam curam habent de bono, indifferenter undecumque accipiunt.

presents but it makes no difference to them how or whence these come. Consequently, they do not concern themselves about what is right and so take from any source without distinction.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod neque liberales etc., ostendit quomodo deficiant circa dationes. Et dicit quod quia nullam curam habent de bono, ideo dationes eorum non sunt liberales quia neque sunt bonae neque propter bonum neque modum

694. Then [i, b], at “For these reasons,” he explains how spendthrifts may be at fault in making donations. He declares that, because they do not care about what is right, their gifts are neither liberal nor good, either in motive or circumstance. But

debitum habent. Sed quandoque divites faciunt malos homines quos oporteret

sometimes they make rich evil men who would be better off poor-men who abuse

pauperes esse, quia, dum divitiis male utuntur, et sibi et aliis sunt nocivi. Et tamen hominibus, qui habent mores moderatos secundum virtutem nihil darent, in quo deficiunt in dando. Sed multa dant adulatoribus, vel aliis hominibus, qui eos qualitercumque delectant; puta hystrionibus, vel lenonibus;

their riches and thereby cause harm both to themselves and others. Yet they would give nothing to men who regulate their lives according to virtue. Thus they are deficient in giving. They are, however, generous with sycophants or others who give them pleasure in any way whatsoever, e.g., buffoons or panderers. In this way they go

in quo superabundant in dando.

to excess in giving.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod intemperati

695. Next [2], at “Therefore,” he draws

etc., inducit duas conclusiones ex praemissis. Quarum prima est, quod propter praemissa multi prodigorum sunt intemperati. Et hoc apparet ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia cum sint faciles ad consumendum sua, de facili etiam consumunt in intemperantias, puta in cibos, et venerea, a quibus multi

two conclusions from the premises. The first [2, a] is that many spendthrifts are intemperate. This is evident first, because (being inclined to spend), they readily waste their substance by intemperance in food and sex, from which many people are restrained by fear of the cost. Second, because they do not order their life to an honorable good,

retrahuntur timore expensarum. Secundo, quia cum non ordinent vitam suam ad bonum honestum, consequens est, quod declinent ad voluptates. Haec enim duo sunt propter se appetibilia. Honestum quidem secundum appetitum rationalem. Delectabile autem secundum appetitum sensitivum; utile autem refertur ad

consequently they turn aside to the pleasures of sense. These two (the honorable and the pleasurable) are desirable in themselves—the honorable according to rational desire, the pleasurable according to sensual desire. The useful refers to both.

utrumque horum. Secundam conclusionem ponit ibi prodigus quidem igitur et cetera. Et dicit quod ex praemissis patet, quod prodigus si non potest induci ad virtutem, transit in praedicta vitia. Si autem potiatur studio, scilicet virtutis, perveniet de facili ad medium et ut det et abstineat ab accipiendo secundum quod oportet, ut supra dictum

696. He draws the second conclusion [2, b], at “The spendthrift,” pointing out what is clear from the premises: that if the spendthrift cannot be attracted to virtue, he falls into the previously mentioned vices. But if he possesses zeal for virtue, he will easily attain the mean so that he will give and refrain from taking according to what

est.

he ought, as was stated before (688).

LECTURE 5 The Incurableness of Illiberality

Chapter 1 (II)C. He treats illiberality. A’ He states a quality of illiberality. — 697-698 ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ' ἐστίν δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν, καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί.

Illiberality, however, is incurable for it seems that old age and every other disability make men miserly. Besides, it is more innate to men than extravagance because more men are lovers of wealth than donors of it.

B’ He distinguishes the... species of illiberality. 1. HE SHOWS THAT ILLIBERALITY IS CONSIDERED FROM TWO ASPECTS. — 699 καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ'

Likewise illiberality can greatly increase, and is very diversified since many species of it seem to exist. It is made up of two elements, namely, deficient giving and needless grasping, which are sometimes found separately and not always together in all subjects. Some

ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἳ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.

indeed are always getting and others never giving.

2. HE GIVES THE SPECIES... ACCORDING TO DEFICIENCY IN GIVING. — 700-702 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις

All those who are given names like

προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἳ μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή

stingy, grasping, close, fall short in giving. But they do not covet the goods of others, nor do they want to acquire them. With some this is due to a kind of moderation and fear of disgrace. They seem to be, or say that they are, careful about this in order not to be forced at times to do anything dishonorable.

ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ

Among these are the cumin-splitter and anyone of the type designated before by

κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι· οἳ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν

reason of an excessive desire of not giving to anyone. Some again refrain from what is not theirs for fear that their taking of what belongs to others

ἀλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους μή· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι.

should make it easy for others to take what is theirs. Therefore, they are content neither to give nor to take.

3. HE GIVES THE SPECIES... ACCORDING TO UNNECESSARY TAKING. a. Those who take in a disgraceful way. — 703 οἳ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν

Others again are immoderate in their taking by accepting anything and from

λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται·

any quarter, for example, those who engage in disreputable enterprises, those who live from the proceeds of prostitution, and such like, and usurers who lend small sums and at high rates. All of these receive more than they should and from reprehensible sources. Common to them is sordid gain because

πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ

they all become infamous for the sake of a little money. People who wrongly take great sums from wrong sources are not called illiberal, for instance, usurpers who plunder cities and despoil sacred places but rather wicked, impious, and unjust.

ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. b. Who take in an unjust way. — 704 ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ λῃστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν· αἰσχροκερδεῖς

Among the illiberal, however, we count the gambler, the despoiler of the dead and the robber—shameful profit-

γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἳ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ

makers. For the sake of evil gain, these engage in occupations having the stamp of infamy. Some run the risk of very great danger for gain, while others

λήμματος, οἳ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι.

would take from friends to whom they should give. In both cases, those wishing to enrich themselves are makers of shameful profit. It is clear then that all taking of this kind is opposed to liberality.

C’ He makes a comparison of illiberality with its opposite. — 705-706 εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν

Appropriately then illiberality is said to be the vice opposed to liberality, for it is a graver evil than extravagance. Likewise men sin more by illiberality than by extravagance. So far, therefore,

λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

we have discussed liberality and the opposite vices.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Illiberalitas autem insanabilis est et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de prodigalitate, hic determinat de illiberalitate. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit

697. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on extravagance, he now [(II)C] treats illiberality, examining it under three headings. First [A’] he states

quamdam conditionem illiberalitatis. Secundo distinguit illiberalitatis modos seu species, ibi: extendit autem in multum etc.; tertio comparat illiberalitatem ad suum oppositum, ibi, congrue utique illiberalitati et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod vitium illiberalitatis est insanabile. Et huius assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima est

a quality of illiberality. Next [B’], he distinguishes the modes, i.e., the species of illiberality, at “Likewise etc.” Last [C’], he makes a comparison of illiberality with its opposite at “Appropriately then etc.” He says first that illiberality is incurable, and assigns two reasons for this. The first reason is that human life, and even

quia vita humana et etiam res mundanae, ut plurimum tendunt in defectum; manifestum est autem ex experimento quod et senectus et quaelibet alia impotentia vel defectus facit homines illiberales, quia videtur homini quod pluribus indigeat. Et ideo magis cupit res exteriores quibus humanae indigentiae subvenitur.

earthly things, tend to be defective for the most part. It is obvious from experience that old age and every other disability or defect make a man parsimonious, because it seems to him that he is very much in need. Therefore, he has a great desire for external things that supply the wants of man.

Secunda ratio est, quia illud ad quod homo naturaliter inclinatur, non de facili removetur ab eo. Magis autem inclinatur homo ad illiberalitatem, quam ad prodigalitatem. Cuius signum est, quod plures inveniuntur amatores et conservatores pecuniarum, quam datores, id autem quod naturaliter est in pluribus

698. The second reason is this. That to which man is naturally inclined cannot easily be removed from him. But man is more inclined to illiberality than extravagance. A sign of this is that more lovers and custodians of money exist than donors. What is natural is found in the majority of cases. And nature inclines to

invenitur. In tantum autem natura inclinat ad amorem divitiarum, inquantum per eas vita hominis conservatur.

the love of riches to the extent that man’s life is preserved by them.

Deinde cum dicit: extendit autem in multum etc., distinguit modos seu species illiberalitatis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod illiberalitas attenditur secundum duo; scilicet secundum superfluum in accipiendo et secundum defectum in dando. Secundo ponit species, quae accipiuntur secundum defectum in

699. Then [B’], at “Likewise,” he distinguishes the modes or species of illiberality. On this point he does three things. First [i] he shows that illiberality is considered from two aspects, viz., excess in getting and defect in giving. Next [2], at “All those who,” he gives the species which are understood according to

dando, ibi, qui quidem enim in talibus et cetera. Tertio ponit species, quae accipiuntur secundum superfluam acceptionem, ibi: hi autem rursus secundum acceptionem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod illiberalitas in multum augetur, ad multa etiam se extendit, et multiformis est, inquantum scilicet sunt multi modi

deficiency in giving. Last [3], at “Others again,” he gives the species that are able to be distinguished according to unnecessary taking. He says first that illiberality is increased greatly; it extends to a multitude of things and is diversified inasmuch as there are many kinds of illiberality. Although illiberality may exist

illiberalitatis. Cum enim illiberalitas in duobus existat, scilicet in defectu dationis et in superabundantia acceptionis; non omnes illiberales in utroque peccant, quasi totam rationem illiberalitatis habentes. Sed dividitur aliquando in diversis; ita quod quidam superabundant in acceptione qui tamen non deficiunt in datione, sicut de

in two forms, defect of giving and excess of taking, not all illiberal people sin in both ways as though they possessed the whole nature of illiberality. But it is found separately in various persons so that some abound in taking who nevertheless do not fall short in dispensing, like the spendthrift previously considered (678).

prodigis supra dictum est. Alii vero deficiunt in datione, et tamen non superabundant in acceptione.

Others, however, fall short in dispensing and, notwithstanding, do not abound in taking.

Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem enim etc.,

700. Next [2], at “All those who,” he sets

determinat modos eorum, qui in datione deficiunt. Et dicit, quod tales appellantur

down the types of persons who are deficient in giving. He says that some are

parci, eo quod parum expendunt, et tenaces, a defectu dationis quasi multum retinentes;

called stingy who spend very little; others are called grasping who retain nearly

dicuntur etiam kyminibiles, quasi venditores cymini, a quodam superexcessu tenacitatis, quia scilicet nec minimum aliquid darent absque recompensatione. Et tamen isti non superabundant in accipiendo; quia nec aliena appetunt, nec oblata multum curant accipere. Et hoc propter duas rationes.

everything from a defect in giving. Still others are called closefisted, or cuminsplitters from an excessive tenacity they manifest in refusing to give the smallest thing without a return. However, these are not excessive in taking because they do not covet the goods of others, nor do they care much about accepting gifts. This happens for two reasons.

Quarum prima est, quia scilicet hoc dimittunt propter morum moderantiam et

701. The first reason is that they pass up these opportunities out of moral

propter timorem turpitudinis. Videntur enim propter hoc custodire sua, et etiam hoc dicunt verbo, ne si sua dent cogantur aliquando propter penuriam aliquid operari; et inde est etiam, quod nolunt recipere aliena, turpe hoc existimantes: vel etiam dubitant ne ab his, qui eis darent, inducerentur ad aliquid indecens. Et de

consideration and fear of turpitude. They seem to keep what is theirs—they even say so expressly—lest, if they give what they have, they may be forced sometimes to a shameful act because of need. Likewise, they are unwilling to accept the goods of others since they think it dishonorable. They even hesitate lest they

eorum numero videtur esse kyminibilis, id est cymini venditor, qui sic nominatur propter hoc quod in hoc superabundat quod nulli dare vult; et eadem ratio est de omnibus similibus.

be induced to something unseemly by those who gave to them. Among these seem to be the skinflint or the cuminsplitter, so named because he has an aversion to giving anyone even a tiny seed. The same reason holds in all similar cases.

Secunda ratio est, quia aliqui abstinent ab accipiendo aliena propter hoc, quod timent ne oporteat eos dare: quasi non sit facile, ut ipse ea quae sunt aliorum accipiat, et alii non

702. The second reason is that some refrain from taking other people’s goods because they fear they may have to give, as if it were not easy for men to take the

accipiant ea quae sunt eius; et ideo placet eis quod neque dent, neque accipiant.

things that belong to others and others not to take the things which are theirs. On this account they are content neither to give nor to take.

Deinde cum dicit: hi autem rursus etc., ponit modos illiberalitatis (qui accipiuntur secundum superfluam acceptionem). Et primo quantum ad eos qui turpiter

703. Then [3], at “Others again,” he mentions the species of illiberality in regard first [3, a ], to those who take in a disgraceful way; and next [3, b], who take

accipiunt. Secundo quantum ad eos qui accipiunt iniuste, ibi, aleator quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam illiberales superabundant in acceptione, non

in an unjust way, at “Among the illiberal.” He says first that certain illiberal persons are immoderate in taking, not caring what or whence they take or

curantes quid vel unde accipiant seu lucrentur. Quorum quidam lucrantur de vilibus et servilibus operationibus. Quidam vero lucrantur de turpibus et illicitis, puta de meretricio, vel de aliquo simili, sicut lenones. Quidam vero lucrantur per improbam exactionem, sicut usurarii, et qui saltem aliquid parvum volunt lucrari in aliquo

profit. Some benefit from cheap and servile operations. Others, like pimps, make profit from sordid and unlawful dealing, e.g., prostitution and the like. Still others enrich themselves by unjust exaction, for instance, usurers and those who want at least a little gain from a large gift or loan. All these receive from

multo quod dant vel mutuant. Omnes enim praedicti accipiunt unde non oportet, scilicet de servilibus vel turpibus operationibus, vel quantum non oportet, sicut usurarii, qui accipiunt ultra sortem. Quibus omnibus commune est quod turpiter lucrantur inquantum scilicet sustinent ut opprobrio habeantur propter aliquod, lucrum, et hoc

reprehensible sources, i.e., mean or shameful works, or they receive more than they should, like usurers who take more than the interest. All have profit, and this paltry, in common. nose who make enormous profits, and make them b y shameful means—they are considered disgraceful for this reason—are not called

parvum. Quia illi qui, ut magna lucrentur, accipiunt unde non oportet, vel quae non oportet, sicut tyranni, qui depraedantur civitates et templa, non dicuntur illiberales, sed magis dicuntur perniciosi, in homines, et impii, in Deum, et iniusti, quasi legis transgressores.

illiberal but rather wicked, unjust, and impious against God, as if they were criminals. Men of this caliber are not so designated even though they take when they ought not and what they ought not, for example, usurpers who despoil cities and temples.

Deinde cum dicit: aleator quidem etc., ponit illiberales, qui accipiunt iniuste, sicut aleator, qui lucratur ex ludo taxillorum. Et ille, qui spoliat mortuos, qui antiquitus cum

704. Next [3, b], at “Among the illiberal,” he mentions those who take unjustly, like the gambler who makes money by throwing dice, the fellow who steals from

magno apparatu sepeliebantur. Et latro qui spoliat vivos. Omnes enim isti turpiter lucrantur, inquantum propter lucrum negotia quaedam faciunt unde sunt opprobriosi. Quod etiam et de superioribus dictum est, sed in istis est aliqua specialis ratio turpitudinis. Quidam enim horum, scilicet spoliator mortuorum et latro,

the dead (formerly buried in rich apparel), and the robber who plunders the living. All these are enriched by shameful means, inasmuch as, for the sake of gain, they engage in certain occupations considered disgraceful. This agrees with what was said about those persons just mentioned (703). But in these there is a special

exponunt se magnis periculis propter lucrum, agentes ea quae legibus puniuntur: alii vero, scilicet aleatores, volunt lucrari ab

reason for turpitude. Some, for example, the despoiler of the dead and the robber expose themselves to great danger in

amicis cum quibus ludunt, cum tamen magis conveniat secundum liberalitatem amicis aliquid dare. Et sic patet, quod utrique, dum volunt lucrari unde non oportet, sunt turpes lucratores. Et sic patet quod omnes praedictae sumptiones, id est acceptiones,

doing things punishable by law. Others, namely, gamblers want to take something from their friends with whom they play, although it is more appropriate to liberality to give something to friends. It is obvious then that both types, by

sunt illiberales.

wanting to enrich themselves from improper sources, are makers of shameful profits. It is necessary, therefore, to say that all the previously mentioned taking or accepting is opposed to liberality.

Deinde cum dicit: congrue utique etc., determinat de illiberalitate per comparationem ad oppositum vitium. Et dicit, quod illiberalitas congrue denominatur ab oppositione liberalitatis. Semper enim peius vitium magis opponitur virtuti.

705. Then [C’], at “Appropriately then,” he explains illiberality by comparison with the opposite vice, saying that illiberality is fittingly named from the contrast with liberality. It always happens that the worse vice is more opposed to the virtue.

Illiberalitas autem est peior prodigalitate, ut supra ostensum est; unde relinquitur quod magis opponatur liberalitati. Secunda ratio est, quia homines magis peccant secundum vitium quod dicitur illiberalitas, quam secundum vitium quod dicitur prodigalitas. Et propter hoc nominatur a privatione liberalitatis, quia pluries per hoc vitium

But illiberality is worse than extravagance, as was shown before (686690). Consequently, it remains that illiberality is more opposed to liberality. The second reason is that men commit graver sins by the vice of illiberality than by the vice of extravagance. Therefore, illiberality gets its name from the

corrumpitur liberalitas.

privation of liberality because liberality is frequently destroyed by this vice.

Ultimo autem epilogat quae dicta sunt,

706. Lastly, he sums up what has been

dicens, tanta dicta esse de liberalitate, et de oppositis vitiis.

said, stating that so far we have discussed liberality and the opposite vices.

LECTURE 6 Magnificence Chapter 2 I. HE TREATS THE MATTER OF MAGNIFICENCE AND THE OPPOSITE VICES. A. He shows what the matter of magnificence is.

A’ He proposes the matter common to magnificence and liberality. — 707 δόξαιε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι·

It seems logical to pass now to the consideration of magnificence which apparently is a certain virtue concerned with wealth.

B’ He explains the difference between the two. 1. HE PROPOSES THE DIFFERENCE. — 708 οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει

Unlike liberality it does not embrace all but only lavish expenditures of money; it is in wealth’s magnitude (as the name itself indicates) that magnificence exceeds liberality, although the amount expended is not out of proportion.

πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. 2. HE MAKES CLEAR WHAT HE SAID. — 709 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ.

But magnitude is a relative term, for the same expenditure is not fit for a captain of a trireme and a leader of a solemn mission to Delphi; it is fitting according to the spender, the thing, and the purpose.

C’ He proves his proposition. — 710 ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ

The man, however, who spends small or moderate sums in a becoming manner is not called munificent, for instance, if he

πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής.

makes frequent donations that in the aggregate are large; only he who gives on a grand scale. The munificent man is indeed liberal, but man certain qualities pertaining to the one who is liberal and nothing more is not munificent.

B. (He shows) what the vices opposed to it are. — 711 τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ

In this matter the habit of defect is called meanness, and of excess banausia (ostentation); the name apirocalia (lack

ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν.

of taste) is given to all other such defects that are not excessive in the sums expended on the right projects but in the wrong circumstances and with a certain vulgar display. We shall discuss these vices afterwards.

II. HE EXPLAINS IN WHAT MANNER MAGNIFICENCE AND THE OPPOSITE VICES OPERATE. A. Magnificence. A’ He assigns to the munificent manner of spending. 1. HE ATTRIBUTES... SIX QUALITIES: THE FIRST... — 712-713

ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι

A munificent person is like a wise man,

ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.

for he can judge rightly and spend great sums prudently. (As we said in the beginning, habit is determined by operations and is a product of them.) He makes great and dignified expenditures, and the effects are of a like nature. Thus his expenses will be great and also suited to the work. Therefore, the work must be worth the cost, and the cost equal to or in excess of the work.

2. THE SECOND QUALITY... ON THE PART OF THE END. — 714 δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.

Things of this kind he spends for the sake of good, and this is common to virtues.

3. THE THIRD... TO SPEND GREAT SUMS CHEERFULLY. — 715 καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές.

Furthermore, he acts cheerfully and open-handedly, for closeness in reckoning is niggardly.

4. THE FOURTH QUALITY. — 716 καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.

He plans how the best and most splendid work may be achieved rather than how he may acquire as much for a minimum cost.

5. THE FIFTH... ONE WHO IS MUNIFICENT SHOULD BE LIBERAL. — 717 ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης,

Likewise the munificent man is necessarily liberal, since the liberal person makes the right expenditures in the right manner; and it is in this that the greatness of the munificent person lies—a greatness in these matters being a kind of grand liberality.

6. THE SIXTH QUALITY. — 718 καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν· καὶ

Besides, for the same cost he will produce a more magnificent work, for the perfection of possession and work does not reside in the same thing. But the perfect possession consists of what is most valued and honored, for example, gold. On the other hand, the perfect work consists of what is great and good, for consideration of it brings about

ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή, μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει.

admiration. And truly a magnificent work is a cause of admiration, and the perfection of the work, magnificence, resides in its magnitude.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Videbitur autem consequens esse et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de liberalitate, hic determinat de magnificentia. Et dividitur pars ista in duas partes. In prima inquirit materiam magnificentiae et oppositorum vitiorum. In secunda ostendit qualiter magnificentia et

707. After the Philosopher has finished the study of liberality, he now begins to consider magnificence, the treatment of which he divides into two parts. In the first part [I] he treats the matter of magnificence and the opposite vices. In the second [II] he explains in what manner

opposita vitia, circa propriam materiam operantur, ibi, magnificus autem scienti assimilatur, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quae sit materia magnificentiae. Secundo ostendit, quae sint vitia ei opposita, ibi, talis autem habitus, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit materiam communem magnificentiae et liberalitati. Secundo ostendit differentiam inter utrumque, ibi: non quemadmodum autem liberalitas, et cetera. Tertio probat propositum, ibi, qui autem in parvis, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post liberalitatem videtur esse conveniens, quod sequatur tractatus de magnificentia. Et ratio convenientiae est,

magnificence and the opposite vices operate in their respective matter, at “A munificent person is like a wise man etc.” On the first point he does two things. First [I, A] he shows what the matter of magnificence is; and second [I, B] what the vices opposed to it are, at “In this matter etc.” To clarify the first division he does three things. First [I, A, A’] he proposes the matter common to magnificence and liberality. Next [I, A, B’] he explains the difference between the two, at “Unlike liberality etc.” Last [I, A, C] he proves his proposition, at “The man, however etc.” He says first it seems appropriate that the treatise on magnificence should follow that on

quia magnificentia videtur esse quaedam virtus circa pecunias sicut et liberalitas.

liberality. The reason is that magnificence, like liberality, is apparently a virtue concerned with wealth.

Deinde cum dicit: non quemadmodum autem etc., ostendit differentiam quantum ad materiam inter liberalitatem et magnificentiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit differentiam. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat, ibi, magnitudo autem et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas differentias. Quarum prima est, quod liberalitas se extendit ad omnes operationes quae sunt circa pecunias, scilicet ad acceptiones, dationes et expensas, sed magnificentia est solum circa sumptus, idest expensas. Secunda differentia est, quia etiam in sumptibus

708. Then [1, A, B’], at “Unlike liberality,” he explains the difference between the matter of magnificence and liberality. He explains this point in a twofold manner. First [1, A, B’, 1] he proposes the difference. Next [1, A, B’, 2] he makes clear what he said, at “But magnitude etc.” Regarding the first he mentions two differences. The first is that liberality refers to all transactions concerned with money, viz., expenditures, receipts and donations. But magnificence refers only to disbursements or expenditures. The second difference is that in disbursements or

sive in expensis, magnificentia excedit liberalitatem magnitudine expensarum. Magnificentia enim est solum circa magnas expensas, sicut ipsum nomen demonstrat. Sed liberalitas potest esse etiam circa moderatas vel etiam modicas. Nec tamen intelligendum est, quod quia magnitudo importat excessum quemdam, quod magnificus ita magnos sumptus faciat, quod excedat id quod debet fieri secundum rationem. Sed sumptus magnifici ita est cum magnitudine quod cum hoc est decens; decet enim et

expenditures magnificence exceeds liberality in the magnitude of the amount expended. Magnificence deals only in princely outlays, as the name implies, while liberality can be concerned also with moderate or excessive expenditures. Although magnitude indicates a kind of excess, we are not to understand that the munificent person spends on such a grand scale that he exceeds the bounds of reason, but his expenditures are made in amounts that are also in keeping with what is becoming. It is in keeping with both the one who spends

personam facientis, et opus in quo fiunt expensae, ut infra dicetur.

and the projects on which the money is spent, as will be pointed out later (721724).

Deinde cum dicit magnitudo autem etc., exponit quod dixerat; scilicet qualiter magnitudo sumptus conveniat magnifico. Et quia magnum dicitur relative, ut habetur in praedicamentis, ideo et hic dicitur, quod magnitudo sumptus accipitur per respectum ad aliquid aliud; puta ad illud, in quo fiunt expensae, vel ad personam expendentis; quia non idem sumptus dicitur esse magnus per comparationem ad trierarcham, id est principem galearum, quae habent tres

709. Next [I, A, B, 2], at “But magnitude,” he explains what he said, i.e., the manner in which the greatness of the expense is becoming to a munificent person. Because the word “great” is predicated relatively, as stated in the Categories (Ch. 6, 5 b 15), it is said here that the greatness of the expenditure is judged in reference to something else, for instance, the thing for which the expenditures are made or the person spending. The reason is that not the same outlay is considered large for a triarch

ordines remorum, unde et trieres vocantur, et architheorum, idest principem speculationis. Puta si aliquis fuerit praefectus templi, vel etiam studii. Oportet enim sumptum esse decentem per comparationem ad ipsum qui expendit, et per comparationem ad id in quo expendit. Circa quod etiam oportet attendere circa quae illud fiat. Puta si fiunt expensae in aedificatione domus, oportet ulterius considerare cui domus illa aedificetur; utrum scilicet principi, vel privatae personae; quia scilicet secundum hoc diversi sumptus requiruntur.

(a commander of galleys having three rows of oars and called a trireme) and for a leader of a solemn enterprise, i.e., the chief superintendent, like a master of a temple or a school. The expenditure must be suitable in comparison with the dispenser and the thing for which the money is spent. Likewise the purpose for which the thing is used must be taken into consideration. Thus if expenses are incurred for the building of a house, we must consider further for whom the house is intended, whether for a public official or a private person, because different expenditures are

demanded for different purposes. Deinde cum dicit: qui autem in parvis etc., probat quod dixerat, scilicet quod ad magnificentiam pertineat magnitudo sumptus. Quia ille qui expendit in rebus parvis vel etiam moderatis secundum quod dignum est, non dicitur magnificus; puta si multoties divisim expenderet multa in

710. Then [I, A, C’], at “The man, however,” he proves his statement, i.e., that great expenditure pertains to magnificence. The reason is that one who spends small or even moderate sums in a proper manner is not called munificent, for instance, if he frequently makes many separate

parvis rebus, ita quod omnes illae expensae congregatae facerent aliquid tantum quantum est illud quod expendit magnificus, nihilominus tamen magnificus non diceretur, etiam si prompte et liberaliter illa parva expenderet. Quia omnis magnificus est liberalis; non tamen sequitur, quod omnis liberalis sit magnificus.

disbursements for trifling things, so that all his expenditures taken together would make as great an amount as that which the munificent man spends, nevertheless he would not be called munificent even though he disbursed these small sums promptly and generously. Because every munificent person is liberal, it does not follow that every liberal person is munificent.

Deinde cum dicit: talis autem habitus etc., ostendit, quae sint vitia opposita magnificentiae. Et dicit, quod vitium oppositum habitui magnificentiae per modum defectus vocatur parvificentia. Sed vitium, quod opponitur ei per modum superabundantiae vocatur bannausia, a bannos, quod est fornax. Quia tales sicut in fornace omnia sua consumunt. Vocatur etiam apyrocalia, quasi sine experientia

711. At “In this matter” [I, B ] he shows what vices are contrary to magnificence. He says that the vice opposed to the habit of magnificence by defect is called meanness; but the vice by excess, banausia (ostentation) from baunos meaning furnace,’ because such as have the vice consume all their goods as in a furnace. If other terms of this kind exist, they come under the name apirocalia (lack of taste):

boni, quia scilicet inexperti sunt qualiter oporteat bonum operari: et si quae etiam sunt aliae tales nominationes. Quae quidem important superabundantiam, non quia excedant magnificum in magnitudine expensarum, circa quae oportet expendere; sed superabundant in hoc, quod excedunt rationem rectam in hoc, quod faciunt magnos sumptus cum quadam praeclaritate, in quibus non oportet et sicut non oportet. Ex quo patet quod medium et extrema in virtutibus moralibus non accipiuntur secundum quantitatem absolutam, sed per respectum ad rationem

offenders being, as it were, without experience of what is suitable because they do not know how to do the proper thing. Such names signify excess not because they surpass the munificent person in the amount of disbursements on the right projects, but they are excessive in going beyond right reason, spending, with a certain display, great sums on the wrong things. It is obvious from this that the mean and the extremes in moral virtues are not taken according to absolute quantity but in relation to right reason. He adds that he will discuss these vices afterwards in this

rectam. Subdit autem, quod de istis vitiis

book (784-790).

posterius dicetur in hoc eodem capitulo. Deinde cum dicit: magnificus autem etc., ostendit quomodo magnificentia et opposita vitia circa praedictam materiam se habeant. Et primo determinat de magnificentia. Secundo de vitiis oppositis, ibi, superabundans autem et bannausus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quasdam proprietates magnifici, pertinentes ad modum expendendi. Secundo ostendit, in quibus magnificus expendat, ibi, est autem sumptuum et cetera. Circa primum ponit sex

712. Next [II], at “A munificent person,” he explains in what manner magnificence and the opposite vices are concerned with the previously mentioned matter. First [II, A] he treats magnificence, and then [Lect. 7 (II) B] the opposite vices, at “One who sins etc.” (B. 1123 a 19). On the initial point he does two things. First [II, A, A’] he assigns to the munificent man certain qualities pertaining to the manner of spending. Then [Lect. 6, (II, A), B’] he shows on what objects the munificent person makes

proprietates magnifici. Quarum prima est, quod magnificus assimilatur scienti. Quia scilicet, sicut ad scientem artificem pertinet cognoscere proportionem unius ad aliud, ita etiam ad magnificum pertinet cognoscere proportionem expensarum ad id in quo fiunt expensae. Potest enim magnificus ex virtute habitus sui considerare quid deceat expendere; et sic faciet magnas expensas prudenter, quod requiritur ad omnem virtutem moralem, ut scilicet prudenter operetur.

expenditures, at “Magnificence belongs etc.” (B. 1122 b 19). In regard to the first he attributes to the munificent person six qualities, the first (II, A, A’, 1] of which is that he is like a wise man. The reason is that, as it belongs to a wise craftsman to know the proportion of one thing to another, so also it belongs to the munificent man to know the proportion between expenditures and that for which the expenditures are made. In virtue of his habit the munificent man is able to judge what may be proper to spend. Thus he will make grand disbursements in a prudent way because prudent operation is required for every moral virtue.

Hoc autem quod dictum est, manifestat per hoc quod supra dictum est in secundo, quod quilibet habitus determinatur per operationes, et per obiecta quorum est habitus: quia scilicet determinati habitus sunt determinatorum operationum et obiectorum. Et quia operationes magnificentiae sunt expensae, et obiecta operationum sunt ea in quibus fiunt

713. The Philosopher clarifies the statement by what was said in the second book (322), that every habit is determined by operations and objects of which it is the habit, because determined habits have their own proper operations and objects. Since the operations of magnificence are expenditures, and the objects of the operations are the things for which the

expensae magnae, consequens est, quod ad magnificum pertineat considerare et facere

expenditures are made, it is therefore the duty of the munificent man to consider and

magnos sumptus et convenientes, quod non potest fieri sine prudentia. Oportet etiam quod opera, id est operata, sint talia,

expend large and handsome sums, which cannot be done without prudence. In this way the vast outlay will be in keeping with

id est magna et decentia; per hunc enim modum expensae erunt magnae et convenientes operi operato, puta domui aedificandae, vel alicui huiusmodi. Sic igitur oportet, quod opus, in quo fiunt expensae sit tale quod sit dignum huiusmodi sumptu, id est expensa, sumptum autem, id est expensam, oportet esse talem ut proportionetur operi vel quod etiam superabundet. Quia enim difficillimum est medium attingere, si contingat a medio declinare, semper virtus declinat in id quod minus habet de malo, sicut fortis in minus timendo et liberalis (in plus) dando, et similiter magnificus in plus expendendo.

the operation, for instance, the construction of a house or something of this sort. So then the project on which the money is spent must be such that it is worthy of the cost or expense and this ought to be worthy of the work, or in excess of it. It is very difficult to attain the mean; hence if a departure from the mean should occur, virtue always inclines to what has less evil, as the brave man to less fear, the liberal man to giving and so the munificent man to more spending.

Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: consumet autem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex parte finis. Et dicit, quod magnificus consumet, scilicet expendendo, talia magna et decentia propter bonum honestum sicut propter finem; operari enim propter bonum est commune in omnibus virtutibus.

714. He gives the second quality [II, A, A’, 2], at “Things of this kind,” which is understood on the part of the end. The munificent person, he says, consumes grand and proper amounts for an honorable good as for an end. Now, to work for a good is common to all the virtues.

Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: et adhuc delectabiliter et cetera. Et dicit, quod ad magnificum pertinet delectabiliter magna expendere, et emissive, idest prompte, et sine difficultate emittendo. Quia quod aliquis sit multum diligens in ratiocinio, id est in computatione expensarum, pertinet ad parvificentiam.

715. At “‘Furthermore” [II, A, A’, 3] he presents the third consideration, saying that it is characteristic of the munificent man to spend great sums cheerfully and with an open hand, dispensing them promptly and readily. The reason is that great caution in accounting or computing expenses pertains to illiberality.

Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: et qualiter optimum et cetera. Et dicit, quod magnificus magis intendit quomodo faciat opus optimum et decentissimum, quam

716. He introduces the fourth quality at “He plans” [II, A, A’, 4], affirming that the munificent person plans how he may accomplish the best and most splendid work

quomodo minimum possit expendere ad opus intentum faciendum.

rather than how he can spend the least in doing the desired work.

Quintam

proprietatem

ponit

ibi:

717. He enumerates the fifth quality, at

necessarium autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod necessarium est quod magnificus sit liberalis. Quia ad liberalem pertinet expendere ea quae oportet et sicut oportet. Et hoc etiam magnificus expendit; expendit enim circa magna et decentia opera, ut dictum est. Et hoc facit delectabiliter et emissive et propter bonum. Sed ad magnificum proprie pertinet, quod aliquid magnum circa hoc faciat, ac si magnificentia nihil aliud sit quam quaedam magnitudo liberalitatis circa praedicta.

“Likewise the munificent” [II, A, A’, 5] when he says that one who is munificent should be liberal. The reason is that the liberal person should make the right expenditures in the right manner. The munificent man, too, acts in this way, for he makes outlays for great and noble achievements, as was just said (708); and he docs this cheerfully, generously, and for a good purpose. But it is characteristic of the munificent person to do something on a grand scale touching this matter. In fact magnificence is nothing other than a kind of magnified liberality concerning these things.

Sextam proprietatem ponit ibi: et ab aequali sumptu et cetera. Et dicit quod dum magnificus in aliquo magno opere

718. At “Besides, for the same cost” [II, A, A’, 6] he gives the sixth quality. He says that, although the munificent person incurs

facit magnas expensas, constituit opus magis magnificum ex aequalitate expensarum. Quia non ad idem pertinet virtus, idest ultimum et optimum in possessione divitiarum et in opere quo divitiae expenduntur. Quia virtus, idest maximum et optimum in possessionibus, est illud quod est plurimo pretio dignum et quod homines maxime honorant, idest appretiantur. Sed virtus operis est, quod sit magnum et bonum. Quia consideratio talis operis inducit admirationem. Et tale est opus magnificentiae, ut scilicet sit admirabile. Et sic patet, quod virtus operis, idest optima excellentia eius, est secundum magnificentiam cum magnitudine

great expense for some noble work, he produces a more magnificent work with equal expenditure. This is so because excellence (what is ultimate and best) is not the same in possession of money and in a work for which money is spent. Excellence (what is greatest and best) in possessions is found in the most valued object, viz., gold, which men highly honor and prize. But excellence in a work is found in this that a work is great and good; for the contemplation of such a work gives rise to admiration-and this is what magnificence does. So it is evident that the “virtue” of a work, i.e., its greatest excellence corresponds to magnificence involving

expensarum.

expenditures on a large scale.

LECTURE 7 The Objects of Magnificence

Chapter 2 B’ He shows the principal object on which the munificent person should spend money. 1. FOR WHAT THINGS THE MUNIFICENT MAN SHOULD MAKE EXPENDITURES. a. The principal objects for which the munificent should spend money. i. The principal objects... for which the munificent person disburses funds. — 719-720 ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που

Magnificence belongs to those princely outlays we call most honorable, like votive offerings to the gods, preparations, sacrifices and other things pertaining to divine worship. It belongs, also, to any lavish gifts made for the common good, such as a splendid donation for the benefit

χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν.

of all, or the fitting out of a trireme, or the giving of a banquet to the whole community. ii. Who should make such expenditures. x.

FOR WHOM, IN GENERAL, SUCH

EXPENDITURES ARE APPROPRIATE. — 721 ἐν ἅπασι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα

But in all these things, as was just stated, reference is made to the agent—who he is

ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν.

and what possessions he has, for the disbursements must be commensurate with these circumstances and appropriate not only to the work but also to the spender.

y. FOR WHOM, IN PARTICULAR, THEY ARE INAPPROPRIATE. — 722

διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς.

For this reason the poor man will not be munificent, since he has not the resources from which he may spend large sums becomingly. If he tries to do so, he is unwise for this would be improper and inopportune. And what is according to virtue is done rightly.

z. FOR WHOM, IN PARTICULAR, THEY ARE APPROPRIATE. — 723-724 πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τοιαῦτα

A great expenditure is suitable for those

προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα.

who have wealth themselves, from their parents, or from others transferring it to them; likewise for the noble and those renowned for fame or other similar public acclaim, since all these things have a certain greatness and distinction.

iii. He sums up his views. — 725 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα·

Such then, especially, is the munificent person, and as we have said, by such expenditures magnificence is exercised in the greatest and most honorable works;

b. The secondary objects (for which the munificent person should spend money). i. The first. — 726 τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον,

or even in any private affair that happens once, for example, a wedding and the like;

ii. The second kind. — 727 καὶ εἰ περί τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ

or in any event of great interest to the whole city and the dignitaries; or in the

περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον.

reception and departure of foreign guests, in the presentation of gifts and in the repayment of favors. Yet the munificent man does not spend lavishly on himself but donates for the public welfare gifts that have a likeness to those consecrated to God.

iii. The third kind. — 728-729 μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον

It is the privilege of the munificent man to use his riches to build a home which is indeed an ornament, and to spend larger sums on whatever portions are of a

δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα,

permanent nature, for these are best.

2. HE PRESERVES PROPORTION BETWEEN THE COST AND THE OBJECTS PAID FOR. — 730-731 καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ

He will spend in a manner proper to each thing. The same expenditure is not

ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ἁπλῶσ μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ

appropriate to gods and men, nor in building a temple and a tomb. He will make an outlay for each thing according to the kind, being most munificent in spending a great amount on a great work. But the expense will be great in comparison with the things. What is great in regard to the work differs from what is great in cost considered in itself. A very pretty ball or jar takes on magnificence when presented as a gift to a child, although the price is trivial and not in the category of liberal. Hence the munificent person has the advantage of performing a great work in any category. And a work, great in its

γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπέρβλητον καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής·

class and reasonable in its cost, can hardly be surpassed. This, then, is a description of the munificent person.

B. He treats the opposite vices. A’ First, considering excess. — 732 ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων,

One who sins by excess, i.e., the vulgarian, is immoderate in spending contrary to what he ought, as has been pointed out. He expends great sums on paltry things, and his lavishness is out of harmony, figuratively speaking. He banquets buffoons with dishes fit for a marriage feast, gives presents to comedians, and rolls out a red carpet for their entry like

ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά.

the Megarians. In all such affairs he does not act to attain the good but to show off his wealth, hoping in this way for admiration. Where grand outlays are called for, he spends little; where small expenditures are in order, he lays out much.

B’ Next (considering) defect. — 733 ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ.

But the petty person falls short in everything; and after spending very much he will spoil the whole good effect for the sake of a trifle. Whatever expenditures he makes, he makes tardily and he takes care to spend as little as he can. Moreover, he does this glumly and is of the opinion that he has done more than he should.

C’ Finally (considering) what is common to both. — 734 εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

These, then, are habits of vice; yet they do not bring shame because they do not injure our neighbor and are not very disgraceful.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Est autem sumptuum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter magnificus se habeat in expendendo, hic ostendit in quibus magnificus expendat. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit in quibus expendit magnificus; secundo ostendit quomodo servat proportionem sumptuum ad ea in quibus expendat, ibi, et in singulis decens, et cetera. Circa

719. After the Philosopher has shown in what manner the munificent person should be concerned with spending, he now [II, B’] shows the principal object on which the munificent person should spend money. He gives two explanations of this point. First [B’, 1] he explains for what things the munificent man should make expenditures; and next [B’, 2.], how he preserves proportion between the

primum duo facit: primo ostendit in quibus principaliter magnificus expendat. Secundo, in quibus expendat secundario, ibi propriorum autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit, quae sunt principalia, in quibus magnificus expendit; secundo ostendit ad quos pertineat in talibus expendere, ibi, in omnibus autem quemadmodum dictum est, et cetera. Tertio epilogat quod dictum est, ibi, maxime quidem igitur, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod magnificus facit sumptus circa ea quae sunt maxime honorabilia. Huiusmodi autem sunt duorum generum. Primum genus est

cost and the objects paid for, at “He will spend in a manner proper to each etc.” He manifests the initial point in a twofold manner. First [i, a] he sets forth the principal objects for which the munificent should spend money; and then [i, b], the secondary objects, at “or even in any private etc.” On this first point he does three things. First [a, i] he discloses what the principal objects are for which the munificent person disburses funds. Next [a, ii], he indicates who should make such expenditures, at “But in all these things etc.” Last [a, iii], he sums up his views, at “Such then, especially etc.” He says first that the munificent man lays out large amounts for things that are honorable in the highest degree. These sums

eorum quae pertinent ad res divinas, puta cum aliqua donaria reponuntur in templis deorum, et praeparationes, puta templorum aedificia, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Et etiam sacrificia ad idem pertinent. Gentiles autem non solum colebant deos, idest quasdam substantias separatas, sed etiam colebant Daemones, quos dicebant esse medios inter deos et homines. Et ideo subdit, quod ad idem genus pertinet quicquid expenditur circa cultum cuiuscumque Daemonis. Et loquitur hic philosophus secundum consuetudinem gentilium, quae nunc manifestata veritate est abrogata, unde, si aliquis

are of two kinds. The first of them pertains to divine things (for example, the placing of votive offerings in the temples of the gods) and preparations (the building of the temple or some other things of this kind). Even sacrifices come under this heading. The gentiles, however, worshipped not only gods, i.e., certain separated substances, but also demons whom they held to be intermediaries between gods and men. Therefore, he adds that everything expended on the worship of any demon whatsoever belongs to this same classification. The Philosopher speaks here of a heathen custom that has been abrogated by the plain truth. Hence if someone now spent any money on the worship of a demon he

nunc circa cultum Daemonum aliquid expenderet, non esset magnificus, sed

would not be munificent but sacrilegious.

sacrilegus. Secundum autem genus honorabilium sumptuum sunt ea quae magnifice fiunt per respectum ad bonum publicum, puta quod aliquis ad aliquid utile communitati praeclare et magnifice largiatur, quod oportet. Vel si aliquod officium committitur alicui a civitate, puta quod sit princeps trieris, idest exercitus navium, vel galearum, quod circa executionem officii faciat magnos sumptus. Vel etiam quod convivium faciat toti civitati, sicut solitum erat apud ---, ut habetur in II politicae.

720. The second kind of honorable expenditures are those made for the common good in a sumptuous manner: a person nobly and lavishly gives a becoming donation of something useful to the community; a man, charged with an office by the state like the captaincy of a trireme (a fleet of ships or galleys), makes great expenditures in the execution of that office; or someone gives a banquet for the whole community according to a custom, as is said in the second book of the Politics (Ch. 9, 11271 a 33; St. Th. Lect. 14, 317).

Deinde cum dicit: in omnibus autem etc., ostendit quibus competat tales sumptus facere. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit in generali quibus

721. Next [a, ii], at “But in all these,” he shows for whom such expenditures are appropriate. Regarding this he does three things. First [ii, x] he explains for whom, in

competat tales sumptus facere; secundo concludit in speciali, quibus non competat, ibi: propter quod inops quidem etc.; tertio ostendit in speciali quibus competat, ibi, decet autem et eos et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in omnibus quae expenduntur, sicut supra dictum est, oportet haberi respectum, non solum ad ea in quibus expenditur, (sed etiam ad eum qui expendit,) ut scilicet consideretur quis est qui expendit, utrum scilicet sit princeps vel privata persona, nobilis aut ignobilis; et etiam consideretur quas possessiones habeat, utrum scilicet magnas vel parvas. Oportet enim expensas esse

general, such expenditures are appropriate. Then [ii, y], at “For this reason the poor man,” he infers for whom, in particular, they are inappropriate. Finally [ii, z], at “A great expenditure etc.,” he shows for whom, in particular, they are appropriate. He says first that in all these things that are expended—as was just mentioned (712-713).we must have regard not only for the objects for which a Person spends money (so that we should consider whether the spender is a prince or a private person, a noble or a commoner) but also what possessions, large or small, he may have. Expenditures must be proper, i.e., well proportioned to the wealth and station of the person, so that the expenses may be suited not

dignas, idest bene proportionatas his, scilicet conditioni personae et divitiis, ita quod expensae non solum deceant tale opus in quo expenditur, sed etiam deceant facientem.

only to the work for which they are incurred but also to the spender.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod inops etc., concludit quos non deceant tales sumptus. Et dicit, quod propter praedicta inops, idest qui habet parvas

722. Then [ii, y], at “For this reason,” he infers that such expenditures may not be appropriate. Because of what was just said, the poor man who has little wealth cannot be

divitias, non potest esse magnificus, quia non habet tot ex quibus possit convenienter multa consumere. Et si tentet ultra posse expendere, erit insipiens, quia hoc erit praeter dignitatem et praeter id quod fieri oportet et ita non pertinet ad virtutem magnificentiae. Quia secundum virtutem omnia fiunt recte idest secundum quod oportet.

munificent, for he does not have so great an amount that he can rightly afford to spend much. If he attempts to spend more, he is foolish since it is contrary to good taste and beyond what is proper. So it does not pertain to the virtue of magnificence because, by means of virtue, all things are done correctly, i.e., properly.

Deinde cum dicit: decet autem et eos etc., ostendit quos deceat facere praedictos sumptus. Et accipit hoc

723. Next [ii, z], at “A great expenditure,” he discloses who may make these expenditures fittingly, understanding this in regard to two

secundum duo. Primo quidem secundum quantitatem divitiarum. Unde dicit quod praedictos sumptus facere decet illos homines quibus talia praeexistunt, id est qui habent magnas divitias ex quibus possunt multa consumere decenter, sive habeant huiusmodi divitias abundantes per seipsos, puta acquirendo eas per propriam industriam sive etiam habeant eas per progenitores quibus succedunt, sive etiam per quoscumque alios, per quos ad eos transeunt divitiae; puta cum relinquuntur haeredes extraneorum.

things. First he takes it according to the amount of riches. He says that great expenditures should be made by men who are wealthy, i.e., who possess great riches, much of which can be expended becomingly. It makes no difference whether they possess this abundant wealth of themselves, i.e., by acquiring it through their own industry, or have it from their parents (whose heirs they are), or even from ‘any others through whom riches come to them, for example, when they become heirs of those outside the family.

Secundo autem accipit propositum per conditionem personarum. Decet enim, quod faciant magnos sumptus nobiles genere et gloriosos, puta in honoribus

724. Second, he considers the proposition according to the condition of persons. It is becoming that great sums be disbursed by the highborn and the renowned, i.e., those

constitutos, et quaecumque similia sunt; omnia enim huiusmodi habent in se quamdam magnitudinem, et quamdam dignitatem, ut deceat tales magnos sumptus facere.

established in honor and other similar things. Everything of this nature has about it a certain greatness and decorum, so that such splendid donations may be made appropriately.

Deinde cum dicit: maxime quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit, quod talis est magnificus qualis supradictus est. Et in talibus sumptibus est magnificentia, sicut dictum est, scilicet in rebus divinis et communibus: huiusmodi enim inter omnia humana sunt maxima et honorabilissima.

725. Then [a, iii], at “Such, then,” he sums up his views, affirming that the munificent person is of the sort described above, and that magnificence consists in expenditures of this kind—as was stated in 719-720—viz., on things for divine worship and the public welfare, for such are the greatest and most honorable among all human goods.

Deinde cum dicit propriorum autem etc., ostendit in quibus secundario magnificus expendit. Et ponit circa hoc tres gradus. Quorum primus est quod magnificus magnos sumptus facit in his quae proprie ad ipsum pertinent, quae semel tantum fiunt, puta nuptiae, militia et si aliquid tale est.

726. Next [i, b], at “or even,” he shows on what secondary objects the munificent person spends money. He mentions three kinds of objects, the first [b, i] of which consists in the munificent man spending great sums on affairs pertaining properly to himself and happening only once, like marriage, military service, and so on.

Secundum gradum ponit ibi, et (si) circa aliquid et cetera. Et dicit, quod si tota civitas vel principes civitatis student ad aliquid faciendum, et circa

72.7. He gives the second kind [b, ii], at “or in any event.” If the whole city or the rulers are anxious to do something and a man makes great expenditures on this he will be

hoc faciet magnos sumptus magnificus. Sicut si oporteat honorifice suscipere aliquos extraneos, puta principes vel reges, vel si oporteat eis mittere magna exenia, vel etiam si oporteat eis praesentialiter dona magna offerre. Vel si oporteat eis retribuere pro aliquibus beneficiis impensis, in omnibus his magnos sumptus faciet magnificus. Magnificus enim non est sumptuosus in se ipsum, ut scilicet multum expendat in proprium usum. Sed facit magnos sumptus in communia. Dona autem, quae magnifice aliquibus dantur, habent aliquid simile cum his quae Deo consecrantur, quia scilicet sicut Deo

munificent, for instance, if he should honorably receive some guests such as princes or kings, if he should give them great banquets, or even personally offer presents to them, or if he should repay certain favors received; in all these situations, the munificent person will spend large sums. He is not lavish with himself so that he spends much for his own use, but he makes great expenditures for the common good. The splendid gifts bestowed on some resemble those given to God. The reason is that, as offerings are consecrated to God not because He needs them but out of reverence and honor, so also presents are made to distinguished men more on account of honor than any need.

dona consecrantur, non quia eis Deus indigeat, sed propter reverentiam et honorem, ita etiam et magnis viris dona offeruntur magis propter honorem, quam propter indigentiam.

Tertium gradum ponit ibi, magnifici autem et cetera. Et dicit quod ad magnificum etiam pertinet praeparare domum convenienter propriis divitiis. Quia habere decentem domum pertinet ad hominis ornatum. Et in aedificiis faciendis magis intendit magnificus facere sumptus circa opera diuturna et permanentia, quam circa aliquos

728. Then [b, iii], at “It is the privilege,” he mentions the third kind, stating that it pertains to magnificence to build a home in the proper manner with one’s own riches, for a decent home adds to a man’s distinction. And in constructing buildings the munificent man desires to spend money rather on lasting and permanent parts than on fragile decorations, for instance, on marble columns in the house

fragiles ornatus; puta circa columnas marmoreas in domo, quam circa fenestras vitreas. Ista enim, quae sunt magis permanentia, sunt optima.

rather than on glass windows. Things that are more permanent are best.

Sic igitur ex praedictis patet, quod magnificus principaliter expendit circa res divinas et publicas. Sed circa ea quae pertinent ad privatas personas expendit secundario propter tres conditiones. Primo, quia semel fiunt. Secundo, quia communiter ad hoc insistitur. Tertio, quia sunt diuturna. Haec enim sunt quae afferunt etiam rebus privatis magnitudinem.

729. Hence, it is clear from what has been said that the munificent man spends money principally on the things destined for divine worship and the public welfare, but secondarily on things pertaining to private persons under three conditions: first that the things happen once, second that in addition the common good is pursued, third that they are of a permanent nature. These are the requisites making for greatness in private matters.

Deinde cum dicit: (et) in singulis decens etc., ostendit quomodo magnificus conservat debitam proportionem sumptuum ad ea in quibus expendit. Et dicit, quod magnificus in singulis expendit illud quod decet, et secundum speciem, et secundum quantitatem. Manifestum est enim quod non idem

730. Next [B’, 2], at “He will spend,” he explains in what way the munificent person maintains the proportion Of costs appropriate to the things for which the expenditure is made, spending on each object what is fitting both in kind and quantity. It is obvious that not the same kind and quantity of outlay is suitably offered to gods and men, nor used in

secundum speciem aut quantitatem congruit exhibere diis et hominibus, neque in templo et sepulcro construendo. Hoc tamen observabit, quod semper faciet magnum sumptum in genere illo. Unde magnificentissimum erit quando in magno facto magnum sumptum facit, sed hic, idest in hoc facto, faciet id quod

the construction of a temple and a tomb. He will see to it that he spends a sum large according to the kind of thing. Hence he will be very munificent when he makes a great expenditure on a great work. But in this work he will make what is great in this class. So, sometimes what is great in regard to the work differs from what is absolutely great in expense. From the fact that someone makes a

est magnum in tali genere. Et ita quandoque differt magnum respectu operis ab eo quod est simpliciter magnum in expensa: puta, quod aliquis faciat pulcherrimam sphaeram, idest pilam, vel lecythum, idest aliquod vasculum ad dandum alicui puero, habet magnificentiam in genere puerilis doni, et tamen pretium pulcherrimae sphaerae secundum se consideratum est parvum, et non pertinens ad liberalem

very pretty globe, i.e., a ball, or a vase (a small vessel) as a gift to a boy, he is said to possess magnificence in the genus of children’s gifts, although the price of the beautiful globe in itself is small, not belonging to the class of generous donations. Obviously, therefore, the munificent person has the advantage of performing a great work in any genus, making expenditures commensurate with the merit of the work. A production of this sort, which is great according to its kind and reasonable in

donationem. Et propter hoc manifestum est, quod ad magnificum pertinet ut in quolibet genere magnum aliquod opus faciat. In quo etiam facit sumptus secundum operis dignitatem; tale autem factum, scilicet quod est in genere suo magnum et habet sumptus convenientes, non est de facili superabile.

its cost, can hardly be surpassed.

Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod magnificus est talis, qualis dictus est.

731. Last, he succinctly states the conclusion that the munificent man is such as has been described.

Deinde cum dicit superabundans autem etc., determinat de oppositis vitiis. Et primo de superabundantia. Secundo de

732. Then [(II) B], at “One who sins by excess,” he treats the opposite vices: first [B, A’], considering excess; next [B, B’] defect, at

defectu, ibi, parvificus autem, et cetera. Tertio determinat communiter de utroque, ibi, sunt quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui superabundat in sumptibus magnis, qui vocatur bannausus quasi in fornace sua consumens, excedit magnificum non quidem in absoluta sumptuum quantitate, sed in expendendo praeter id quod oportet; quia in superfluis sumptibus multa consumit, et vult splendidos sumptus facere praeter melodiam, idest praeter debitam proportionem (quod parabolice sive metaphorice dictum est), puta quia facit

“But the petty person etc.”; and last [B, C’] what is common to both, at “These, then, are.” He says that the man who is immoderate in grand outlays—called banausos because he consumes his goods as in a furnace—exceeds the munificent person not in the absolute amount spent but in spending in a way contrary to what he should. The reason is that he uses much money in superfluous expenses, and wants to make lavish expenditures contrary to harmony, i.e., against the right proportion—which is said by way of metaphor —for instance, he entertains buffoons and comedians with nuptial banquets, contributes much to actors, even rolling out the red carpet

nuptialia convivia histrionibus et comoedis, idest repraesentatoribus multa tribuit et viam cooperit purpura, sicut faciunt Megares qui erant quidam cives Graeciae. Et omnia haec et similia facit, non propter aliquod bonum, sed solum ad ostentandum divitias, et propter hoc existimat quod in admiratione habeatur. Nec tamen ubique superflue expendit; sed quandoque deficit; quia ubi oporteret multa expendere, ibi expendit pauca, et ubi oporteret pauca expendere, ibi

for their entry, as the Megarians (certain Greek citizens) are in the habit of doing. He does all these and similar things not for some good but for making a show of his riches, thinking that he will be admired for this reason. However, he does not always spend lavishly but sometimes he falls short. Where he ought to spend much, he spends little; but where little, much. The reason is that he does not keep his eye on the good but on vanity.

expendit multa, quia non attendit ad bonum, sed ad vanitatem. Deinde cum dicit: parvificus autem etc., determinat de vitio defectus. Et dicit quod parvificus est qui circa omnia deficit. Et ponit quinque proprietates eius. Quarum prima est quod, cum faciat magnas expensas pro modico, perdit quod non bene facit. Secunda proprietas est quod quicquid facit in sumptibus facit cum quadam tarditate. Tertia est quod semper intendit qualiter possit minimum expendere. Quarta est

733. Next [B, B’], at “But the petty person,” he considers the vice of defect and states that the petty person falls short in everything, assigning him five traits. The first is that when the petty person does make great expenditures he fails to do well because of a trifle. The second, what sums he expends he expends tardily. The third, he always keeps his mind on how he may spend the least. The fourth, he is a gloomy spender. The fifth, when he lays out everything, he thinks he has done

quod expendit cum tristitia. Quinta est quod omnia reputat se maiora facere quam oporteat. Videtur enim ei quod oporteret eum minus expendere.

more than he should, for it seems to him that he ought to spend less.

Deinde cum dicit: sunt quidem igitur etc., determinat communiter de utroque vitio. Et concludit ex praedictis quod praedicti duo habitus sunt quidem malitiae propter hoc quod contrariantur virtuti (per) recessum a medio, non tamen sunt opprobriosi, quia neque inferunt aliquod nocumentum proximo neque sunt multum turpes eo quod difficile est in magnis sumptibus non recedere a medio.

734. Then [B, C’], at “These, then,” he considers what is common to either vice. He comes to the conclusion that the two previously mentioned habits are certain vices because they are opposed to virtue by a departure from the mean. However, they are not opprobrious since they do not injure our neighbor in any way, and are not very disgraceful because it is difficult in disbursing large amounts not to depart from the mean.

LECTURE 8 Magnanimity Chapter 3 I. HE INVESTIGATES THE MATTER OF MAGNANIMITY AND THE OPPOSITE VICES. A. He sets forth his proposition. — 735 ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ

Judging by the name, magnanimity seems to be concerned with great things the nature of which we should first understand. However,

ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν· διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν.

it does not matter whether we consider the habit or the man who operates according to the habit.

B. He explains it. A’ He exposes the matter of magnanimity generally. 1. MAGNANIMITY REFERS TO GREAT THINGS. a. He exposes his viewpoint. — 736 δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν·

A person seems to be magnanimous in thinking himself worthy of great things when he is worthy.

b. The magnanimous person must be worthy of great things. — 737 ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος.

αὐτὸ κατ' οὐδ' μὲν

But he who presumes this when it is not really so is foolish; yet the man who operates according to virtue in these matters is not unwise or foolish. Consequently, the magnanimous person is such as we have described.

c. The magnanimous man should think himself worthy of great things. — 738

ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι

He who is worthy of small things and considers himself so is temperate, although he is not magnanimous. Magnanimity consists in greatness, as beauty consists in a good build. Short-statured people may be fair and well-proportioned but hardly

καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ.

handsome. 2. HOW THE OPPOSITE VICES OCCUR IN REGARD TO THE SAME MATTER. a. First regarding the vice of excess.

ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος.

The person who judges himself worthy of great things and is in fact unworthy is conceited. But one who judges himself worthy of greater things than he merits is not always said to be conceited.

b. Then (regarding) the vice of defect. — 740 ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ

On the other hand, the man who thinks he deserves lesser things than he deserves— whether the things be great, ordinary, or little—is pusillanimous. This will be especially evident in one capable of splendid

μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος;

achievements. What would he have done if he had not this capability?

3. HOW THE VIRTUE CONSISTS IN THE MEAN. — 741 ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν

However, the magnanimous man holds an

μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ· οἳ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν.

extreme in extension but a mean in appropriateness, for he thinks himself deserving in accord with his worth. Others exceed and fall short of this mean.

B’ He exposes (the matter of magnanimity) specifically.

1. MAGNANIMITY IS CONCERNED WITH HONOR. a. (The magnanimous man) should deem himself deserving of the greatest things. — 742 εἰ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη.ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν

If a man deems himself deserving of great things and especially of the greatest things when he deserves them, then he will be concerned with one particular object. He is said to be deserving in reference to external goods. But we place that external good highest which we attribute to the gods, which is desired most of all by prominent men and is the reward for virtuous action. Such a good is honor, for it is the best of all external goods. Therefore, the magnanimous man will manage honors and dishonors in a manner which is fitting.

ὡς δεῖ. b. He manifests his proposition by experience. — 743 καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,

Even independent of reasoning, the magnanimous seem to be concerned about honors, for the great exalt themselves in dignity principally by honor.

κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. 2. HOW THE OPPOSITE VICES SHOULD DEAL WITH THIS MATTER. — 744 ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ

The pusillanimous person is deficient in regard both to his own merit and the worthiness of the magnanimous man. But

χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον.

one who is presumptuous is excessive respecting his own merit although he does not exceed the merit of the magnanimous person.

3. IN WHAT MANNER MAGNANIMITY IS RELATED TO OTHER VIRTUES. a. Magnanimity is related to the other virtues. i. First by a general argument. — 745 ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν

But the magnanimous man as worthy of the greatest goods will be best. Since the better

εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.

person is worthy of greater things, the best will be worthy of the greatest. Therefore, the magnanimous person must be truly good.

x. WHAT MAKES MAGNANIMITY A SPECIAL VIRTUE. — 746 τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.

What is great in every virtue pertains to magnanimity.

y. HE REJECTS AN ERROR. — 747 καὶ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ

It is never becoming for a magnanimous man to flee one about to give unsought

ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα;

advice, nor to practice injustice. Will not the man who considers nothing great be the one to do disgraceful deeds for gain?

ii. By the things appearing in individual cases. — 748 καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

To an observer of what happens in individual cases, that person will seem altogether ludicrous who thinks himself magnanimous when he is not really virtuous. One who is in fact evil will not be magnanimous nor deserving of honor, for honor is a reward of virtue and is attributed to the virtuous.

b. Next drawing certain conclusions from what has been said. —

749 ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

Therefore, it seems that magnanimity is an embellishment of the virtues, since it makes virtue more excellent and does not exist without them. It is difficult to be truly magnanimous because this is not possible without goodness.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Magnanimitas autem circa magna quidem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus quae sunt circa

735. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on the virtues concerning money, he treats here the virtues having to do with

pecunias, hic determinat de virtutibus quae sunt circa honores. Et primo de magnanimitate quae est circa magnos honores. Secundo de quadam virtute innominata quae est circa moderatos honores, ibi, videtur autem et circa hunc esse virtus quaedam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat materiam magnanimitatis et oppositorum vitiorum. Secundo determinat actus et proprietates eorum, ibi: maxime quidem igitur circa honores et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: videtur magnanimus esse et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod ex ipso nomine

honors. First he considers magnanimity, which regards great honors [Lects. 8, 9, 10, 11]; and then a nameless virtue concerned with ordinary honors [Lect. 12], at “As we remarked in the beginning etc.” (B. 1125 b). In the first consideration he does two things. First [I] he investigates the matter of magnanimity and the opposite vices; and second [Lect. 9; II] their acts and properties, at “For the most part etc.” (B. 1124 a 4). On the first point he does two things. First [A] he sets forth his proposition; and next [B] he explains it, at “A person seems to be etc.” He says first: from its name, magnanimity apparently is concerned with great things. But at the beginning we must

magnanimitatis apparet quod magnanimitas est circa magna. Oportet autem primo accipere circa qualia magna sit. Et determinat de modo considerationis, quod nihil differt utrum loquamur de ipso habitu magnanimitatis, vel de eo qui disponitur secundum habitum, idest de magnanimo.

understand the nature of the things with which it deals. Then he designates the manner of consideration, viz., it does not matter whether we speak of the habit of magnanimity or of the man who is disposed by the habit, i.e., the magnanimous person.

Deinde

736. Next [B], at “A person seems,” he

cum

dicit:

videtur

autem

magnanimus esse etc., manifestat propositum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat materiam magnanimitatis in generali. Secundo in speciali, ibi, si autem utique magnis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod magnanimitas est circa magna. Secundo ostendit quomodo circa eadem fiunt vitia opposita, ibi, qui autem magnis seipsum dignum facit etc.; tertio ostendit quomodo

explains his proposition by doing two things. First [A’] he exposes the matter of magnanimity generally; and then [B’] specifically, at “If a man etc.” On the first point he does two (three) things: First [A’, i] he shows that magnanimity refers to great things; and then [A’, 2], at “The person who judges etc.,” how the opposite vices occur in regard to the same matter. Last [A’, 3] he explains how the virtue

virtus in medio consistit, ibi: est autem magnanimus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: dicens quod ille videtur esse magnanimus qui dignum seipsum aestimat magnis, idest ut magna faciat et magna ei fiant, cum tamen sit dignus.

consists in the mean, at “However, the magnanimous etc.” He treats the first point under three aspects. First [A’, i, a] he exposes his viewpoint, saying that a person seems to be magnanimous who thinks himself worthy of great things, viz., that he may perform great deeds and that great things should happen to him when in fact he is worthy.

Secundo ibi: qui enim non secundum dignitatem etc., ostendit quod ad magnanimum requiratur quod sit dignus magnis. Ille enim qui magnis se dignificat non secundum dignitatem, idest quorum non est dignus, est insipiens. Sapientis enim est in omnibus debitum ordinem

737. Then [A’, i, b], at “But he who presumes,” he teaches that the magnanimous person must be worthy of great things. One who thinks himself worthy of great things contrary to truth, i.e., of which he is not really worthy, is foolish. It is characteristic of a wise man to

servare. Nullus autem virtuosus est insipiens vel stultus; quia virtus operatur secundum rationem rectam, ut in secundo habitum est. Sic igitur patet quod magnanimus est ille qui dictus est, qui scilicet dignus est magnis quibus seipsum dignificat.

keep everything in proper order. But the virtuous man is neither unwise nor foolish because virtue operates according to right reason, as was affirmed in the second book (257, 322, 335). Consequently, it is clear that the magnanimous man is the person just described, i.e., one worthy of great things who thinks himself worthy.

Tertio ibi: qui enim parvis dignus etc., ostendit quod magnanimus dignificet seipsum magnis. Ille enim qui est dignus parvis, et his seipsum dignificat, potest

738. Finally [A’, i, c], at “He who is worthy,” he shows that the magnanimous man should think himself worthy of great things. One who is worthy of small things

dici temperatus, prout temperantia large sumitur pro quacumque moderatione.

and considers himself so, can be called temperate in the sense that temperance is

Non tamen potest dici magnanimus: quia magnanimitas consistit in quadam magnitudine, sicut pulchritudo proprie consistit in corpore magno. Unde illi qui sunt parvi, possunt dicit formosi propter decentiam coloris, et commensurati, propter debitam commensurationem membrorum, non tamen possunt dici pulchri propter magnitudinis defectum.

taken for any moderation whatsoever. However, he cannot be called magnanimous because magnanimity consists in a certain size, just as beauty properly consists in a good build. Hence those who are short can be called fair by reason of complexion or well-proportioned members but not handsome because they lack size.

Deinde cum dicit: qui autem magnis etc., ostendit quomodo circa magna se habeant opposita vitia. Et primo quomodo se habet

739. Next [A’, 2], at “The person who judges” he shows in what manner the opposite vices should be concerned with

circa magna vitium quod est in excessu; secundo quomodo ad hoc se habeat vitium quod est in defectu, ibi: qui autem minoribus quam dignus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui aestimat seipsum dignum magnis cum sit indignus, vocatur chaymus, idest fumosus; quem possumus dicere ventosum, vel praesumptuosum. Sed ille qui est dignus magnis, et adhuc maioribus se dignum aestimat, non semper vocatur chaymus, eo quod difficile est mensuram rectam attingere, ut aliquis non maioribus vel minoribus se ipsum dignum aestimet.

great things, first [A’, 2, a] regarding the vice of excess; and then [A’, 2, b] the vice of defect, at “on the other hand etc.” Aristotle says first that the man who thinks himself worthy of great things when he is really unworthy is called conceited, i.e., puffed upwe can call him inflated or presumptuous. But the person who is really worthy of great things and thinks himself worthy of still greater things is not always called conceited, because it is difficult to find an exact norm so that someone may judge himself not worthy of great things.

Deinde cum dicit: qui autem minoribus quam dignus etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat ad magna vitium quod est in defectu. Et dicit quod ille qui aestimat seipsum dignum minoribus quam sit

740. Then [A’, 2, b], at “On the other hand,” he explains how the vice of defect is concerned with great things, saying that the man who thinks himself worthy of lesser things than he is worthy is called

dignus, vocatur pusillanimus. Et hoc, sive sit dignus magnis, sive mediocribus, sive parvis, dum tamen adhuc minoribus seipsum dignificet. Maxime tamen vocatur pusillanimus ille, qui est dignus magnis, si illis magnis intendere recuset et intendat aliquibus minoribus; multo enim magis ad parva se deiiceret nisi esset magnis dignus.

pusillanimous. This is so, whether in fact he is worthy of great, mediocre, or small things. However, the small-souled person is one who refuses to strive after great accomplishments and aims at certain petty undertakings when he is truly capable of what is great. He would bring himself down to affairs more trifling still, except for the fact that he is capable of great things.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem magnanimus etc., ostendit quomodo magnanimitas sit in medio. Videtur enim, si est circa magna, quod sit in extremo. Nam cum aequale medium sit inter magnum et parvum, magnum habet rationem extremi. Unde dicit quod magnanimus quidem quantum ad magna quibus seipsum dignificat, in extremo consistit. Sed inquantum hoc facit secundum quod oportet, consistit in medio, quia scilicet seipsum dignificat magnis secundum suam dignitatem. Medium enim virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem rei,

741. Next [A’, 3], at “However, the magnanimous man,” he shows how magnanimity is in the mean, for, treating as it does of great things, magnanimity seems to consist in the extreme. Since the average is the mean between the large and the small, the great has the nature of an extreme. Hence he says that the magnanimous person holds an extreme in reference to great things of which he deems himself worthy. But he holds the mean inasmuch as he does this in an appropriate manner in considering himself deserving according to his worth. The mean of virtue is not Judged

sed secundum rationem rectam. Unde quantumcumque sit opus quod homo faciat, dummodo a ratione recta non recedat, non propter hoc est extra medium virtutis. Sed vitia opposita superabundant et deficiunt ab eo quod oportet.

according to the quantity of the thing but according to right reason. Hence a man is not placed outside the mean of virtue by a work no matter what its size, provided he does not depart from reason. But the opposite vices exceed and fall short of what should be.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem utique magnis etc., manifestat materiam magnanimitatis in speciali. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod magnanimitas est circa honores; secundo ostendit quomodo circa hoc se habeant vitia opposita, ibi: pusillanimis autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo magnanimitas se habeat ad alias virtutes, ibi: magnanimus

742. Then [B’], at “If a man deems,” he explains the matter of magnanimity specifically, taking up three points. He shows first [B’, 1] that magnanimity is concerned with honor; second [B’, 2] how the opposite vices should deal with this matter, at “The pusillanimous person etc.”; and third [B’, 3] in what manner magnanimity is related to other virtues at

autem siquidem et cetera. Primum autem ostendit dupliciter. Primo quidem per rationem; dicens quod si magnanimus dignificat se ipsum magnis tamquam eis dignus existens, consequens est quod maxime dignificet seipsum maximis. Et ulterius quod magnanimitas sit praecipue circa unum; quia id quod per excellentiam dicitur, uni attribuitur. Cum autem dicitur aliquis esse aliquibus dignus, talis dignitas refertur ad bona exteriora quae homini pro praemio dantur. Illud autem

“But the magnanimous man etc.” He explains the first point in two ways. First he reasons that if the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of great things when he is worthy of them, consequently [B’, i, a] he should deem himself deserving of the greatest things when he is deserving of the greatest. He says further that magnanimity is concerned with one object in particular, for what is predicated by excellence is attributed to one. When someone is said to be worthy of certain things, the worthiness

oportet ponere maximum quod Deo attribuitur et quod maxime desideratur ab his qui sunt in dignitate, et quod est praemium optimorum actuum. Huiusmodi autem est honor. Honorem enim Deo exhibemus. Honor etiam est quem requirunt hi qui sunt in dignitate. Honore etiam praemiantur virtuosi actus. Unde manifestum est quod honor est optimum inter omnia exteriora bona. Et ita sequitur quod magnanimitas maxime attendatur circa honores et opposita, inquantum scilicet magnanimus se habet sicut oportet circa talia.

refers to external goods which come to a man as a reward. But that must be placed highest which is attributed to God, which is desired especially by those in eminent positions, and which is the reward of the most noble deeds. Such is honor, for honor is shown to God, is sought by the prominent and is the reward of virtuous action. Obviously then honor is the best of all external goods. Consequently, magnanimity should give the greatest consideration to honors and dishonors, inasmuch as the magnanimous person manages things of this kind in the proper manner.

Secundo ibi: et sine ratione autem etc., manifestat propositum per experimentum;

743. Second [B’, i, b], at “Even independent of reasoning,” he manifests his proposition

dicens quod etiam sine ratione apparet quod magnanimitas maxime est circa honorem ex hoc quod experimento videmus quod magnanimi maxime dignificant seipsos honore, sed non supra suam dignitatem.

by experience, saying that, even without discussion, it is clear that magnanimity has to do with honor for the most part because experience shows the magnanimous deem themselves worthy of honor but not above their deserts.

Deinde cum dicit: pusillanimis autem etc., ostendit quomodo opposita vitia se habeant circa praedictam materiam. Et dicit quod pusillanimis deficit et per respectum ad se ipsum, quia scilicet dignificat se minoribus quam dignus sit; et etiam per respectum ad dignitatem magnanimi, quia videlicet dignificat se ipsum minoribus, quam magnanimus sit dignus. Sed chaymus, idest praesumptuosus, superabundat quidem per respectum ad seipsum, quia scilicet magnificat seipsum maioribus quam sit

744. Next [B’, 2], at “The pusillanimous,” he explains in what manner the opposite vices should be concerned with the previously mentioned matter. He says that the smallsouled person is deficient in regard to himself because he considers himself deserving of lesser things than he deserves, and also in regard to the worthiness of the magnanimous man because he considers himself deserving of lesser things than a magnanimous man deserves. But the conceited or presumptuous person is excessive in regard to himself because he

dignus: non tamen superabundat magnanimum, quia scilicet non dignificat seipsum maioribus, quam magnanimus sit dignus.

makes himself greater than his worth, however, not in regard to the magnanimous man because he does not consider himself deserving of greater things than the magnanimous man deserves.

Deinde cum dicit magnanimus autem etc., determinat de magnanimitate per comparationem ad alias virtutes. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod magnanimitas non est sine aliis virtutibus. Secundo infert quasdam conclusiones ex dictis, ibi, videtur quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

745. Then [B’, 3], at “But the magnanimous,” he compares magnanimity with other virtues: first [B’, 3, a] showing that magnanimity is related to the other virtues; and next [B’, 3, b] drawing certain conclusions from what has been said, at “Therefore it seems.” On the first point he does two things: he shows that

Primo ostendit per rationem communem quod magnanimitas non est sine aliis virtutibus. Secundo ostendit idem per ea quae in singulis apparent, ibi, secundum singula autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod magnanimitas non est sine aliis virtutibus; secundo ostendit quid faciat magnanimitatem esse specialem virtutem, ibi: videtur autem esse etc.; tertio excludit quemdam errorem, ibi, et nequaquam utique congruit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum magnanimus dignificet seipsum maximis bonis, et eis dignus existat, consequens est ut sit optimus.

magnanimity is related to the other virtues, first [i] by a general argument; and then [ii] by the things appearing in individual cases, at “To an observer etc.” Regarding the first he does two things. First [x] he explains what makes magnanimity a special virtue, at “What is great etc.”; and next [y] he rejects an error, at “It is never becoming etc.” Aristotle says first that when the magnanimous person deems himself worthy of the greatest goods and is really worthy of them, it follows that he is best. The. better man is always deserving of greater things, and consequently he who is deserving of the greatest must be best. Therefore, the

Maiori enim bono semper melior est dignus; et per consequens ille qui est maximis dignus oportet quod sit optimus. Oportet ergo, quod magnanimus vere sit bonus; alioquin non esset dignus maximis honoribus.

magnanimous man must be truly good, otherwise he would not be deserving of the highest honors.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem esse magnanimi etc., ostendit per quid magnanimitas sit specialis virtus, cum concomitetur alias virtutes. Et dicit quod ad magnanimitatem videtur pertinere id

746. Then [x], at “What is great,” he shows how magnanimity is a special virtue when it accompanies other virtues. He says that what is great in any virtue seems to pertain to magnanimity because one who does not

quod est magnum in unaquaque virtute, propter hoc, quod non est dignus magno honore, qui non operatur magnum virtutis actum. Sic igitur circa actum alicuius alterius virtutis operatur illa virtus attendens id quod est proprium sibi. Puta fortitudo intendit fortiter agere, sed

perform a great act of virtue is not worthy of great honor. So, when that virtue strives for what is proper to itself, it performs an act of another virtue, for example, fortitude intends a courageous action, magnanimity strives for a great deed in the courageous action. Since moral acts take their species

magnanimitas attendit magnum operari in fortiter agendo. Et quia moralia speciem habent ex fine quem intendunt, manifestum est quod magnanimitas et

from the end to which they tend, it is clear that magnanimity and fortitude differ in species (although they operate in the same matter) because neither virtue follows the

fortitudo specie differunt, licet circa idem operentur; quia scilicet non ad eamdem rationem motivi attendit utraque virtus.

same motive.

Deinde cum dicit: et nequaquam utique etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Videtur enim quibusdam quod ad magnanimum pertineat, ut suo sensui semper innitatur et nullius alterius admonitionem sequatur. Et quod non dubitet cuicumque iniustitiam facere. Sed philosophus dicit hoc esse falsum. Quia nullus operatur aliquid indecens nisi propter appetitum alicuius. Sed magnanimus non tantum appretiatur quamcumque rem exteriorem, ut propter eam aliquid turpe operari velit.

747. Next [y], at “It is never becoming,” he rejects an error. Some seem to think that the magnanimous man should rely upon his own opinion and follow the advice of no one. Likewise, that he should not hesitate to do injustice to anyone. The Philosopher, however, says this is false because no one does a shameful deed except for the desire of something. But the magnanimous person does not place so great a value on any external thing that he would wish to do a shameful action for it.

Deinde cum dicit: secundum singula autem etc., manifestat quod dictum est, per ea quae in singulis apparent. Et dicit quod, si aliquis velit ad singularia intendere, omnino videbitur derisibilis ille,

748. Then [ii], at “To the observer” he explains the clause: “of what happens in individual cases.” He says that to someone willing to observe individual cases, that man will seem altogether ridiculous who judges

qui reputat se magnanimum nisi sit bonus, quia si sit malus non erit dignus honore. Nam honor est praemium virtutis. Unde magnanimus dignificat seipsum magnis honoribus. Unde non potest esse quod aliquis malus sit magnanimus.

himself magnanimous without being virtuous. The reason is that if a man is evil he is not deserving of honor, for honor is the reward of virtue. Hence the magnanimous man thinks himself worthy of great honors. Consequently, no evil person is able to be magnanimous.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur quidem igitur etc., infert duas conclusiones ex praemissis. Quarum prima est quod magnanimitas videtur esse quasi ornatus quidam omnium virtutum. Quia per magnanimitatem omnes virtutes efficiuntur maiores, eo quod ad magnanimitatem pertinet operari magnum in omnibus virtutibus. Et ex hoc

749. Last [B’, 3, b], at “Therefore it seems’ “ he draws two conclusions from the premises. The first is that magnanimity seems to be an ornament of all the virtues because they are made more excellent by magnanimity, which seeks to perform a great work in all the virtues. In this way the virtues increase. Likewise, magnanimity accompanies the other virtues and so seems

crescunt virtutes. Et iterum non fit magnanimitas sine aliis virtutibus; et sic videtur superaddi aliis tamquam ornatus earum. Secunda conclusio est quod difficile est, esse vere magnanimum. Quia magnanimitas non potest esse sine

to be added to them as their ornament. The second conclusion is that it is difficult to be magnanimous because magnanimity cannot exist without the goodness of virtue, and even without great virtue to which honor is due. But it is difficult to attain this.

bonitate virtutis, et etiam sine magna virtute, cui debeatur magnus honor. Hoc autem consequi est difficile. Unde difficile est hominem esse magnanimum.

Consequently, it is difficult for a man to be magnanimous.

LECTURE 9 The Acts of Magnanimity Chapter 3 II. HE... STUDIES... ACTS AND PROPERTIES (OF MAGNANIMITY AND THE OPPOSITE VICES). A. First as touching magnanimity. A’ How the magnanimous person should work on matter proper to him. 1. HOW THE MAGNANIMOUS MAN SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF TOWARD HONORS. a. The matter of magnanimity. — 750 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι·

For the most part the magnanimous man deals with honors and dishonors.

b. How the magnanimous man deals with matter of this kind. i.

The nature and mode of this man’s reaction to great

honors. — 751 καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως

He takes moderate delight in great and desirable honors, receiving good things

ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία

as his own or less than his due. In his opinion, honor is not an appropriate tribute to perfect virtue, but still he

τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν·

accepts it from men who have nothing greater to bestow on him.

ii. The way... the magnanimous person should regard trifling honors. — 752 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος·

Honors given him by transitory things and for insufficient reasons he values very little as unworthy of him.

iii. In what manner the magnanimous should deal with dishonor. — 753 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς,

He likewise counts of little value any dishonor that will be imputed to him unjustly. As we have said, then, the magnanimous man for the most part will be concerned with honors.

2. (HE SHOWS HOW THE MAGNANIMOUS MAN SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF) TOWARD OTHER THINGS. a. How the magnanimous man should act in regard to such objects. — 754-755 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν

Moreover, he will observe moderation about wealth, power, good fortune, and adversity, no matter what may happen.

γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

He will not be exalted by prosperity nor cast down by misfortune, nor does he even regard honor as if it were a very great thing. Power and wealth should be desirable for the sake of honor; and those who possess them seek to be honored by reason of them. But a man to whom honor is a trifle will place little value on the other things. For this reason the magnanimous seem to be disdainful.

b. How the objects benefit magnanimity.

i. They increase it. — 756 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν· κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς.

The goods of fortune seem to contribute something to magnanimity, for the noble, the powerful, and the rich are thought to be worthy of honor as possessing goods of great excellence. But anything that excels in goodness is held in greater honor. For this reason such things make men more magnanimous, since they are honored by some people, but in fact the good or virtuous man alone is to be honored. However, he who possesses both (virtue and goods of fortune) becomes more worthy of honor.

ii. Without virtue they cannot make a man magnanimous. — 757-758 οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ

Men who possess goods of this kind without virtue are not justified in thinking themselves worthy of great things, nor are they rightly called magnanimous, for this supposes perfect virtue. But those having such things become evil by disdaining and harming others, since it is not easy to bear the

ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲφέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.

goods of fortune with moderation. They are not able to endure good b fortune gracefully, but thinking themselves more excellent, they look down on others, and do as they please. Although not similar to the magnanimous man, they imitate him in the way they can, not by acting according to virtue, but in disdaining others. The magnanimous person justly disdains and properly glorifies others but many do not always act in this manner.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Maxime quidem igitur circa honores et cetera. Postquam philosophus inquisivit

750. After the Philosopher has investigate&-the matter of magnanimity

materiam magnanimitatis et oppositorum vitiorum, hic determinat de actibus et proprietatibus eorum. Et primo determinat de magnanimitate. Secundo de oppositis vitiis, ibi, deficiens autem pusillanimus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter magnanimus operetur circa propriam materiam. Secundo determinat proprietates magnanimi, ibi: non est autem microkindinos et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo se habeat circa honores, qui sunt materia propria magnanimitatis. Secundo quomodo se habeat circa alia, ibi, sed adhuc, et circa divitias et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo resumit quod supra dictum est de

and the opposite vices, he now [II] studies their acts and properties, first [A] as touching magnanimity; and then [Lect. 11; B] the opposite vices, at “But the man who fails etc.” (B. 1125 a 16). On the initial point he does two things. First [A’] he shows how the magnanimous person should work on matter proper to him. Next [Lect. 10; B’] he defines the traits of the magnanimous person, at “The magnanimous man does not run risks foolishly etc.” (B. 1124 b 6). He explains the first point by a twofold procedure. Initially [1] he shows how the magnanimous man should conduct himself toward honors, the matter of

materia magnanimitatis. Et dicit, quod ex supra dictis patet, quod maxime et principaliter dicitur aliquis esse magnanimus eo quod bene se habet circa honores, et opposita, scilicet inhonorationes. Eadem virtus est circa opposita, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias.

magnanimity; and then [2] toward other things, at “Moreover, he will etc.” He treats the first in two ways. First [1, a] he resumes the previous discussion (735749) about the matter of magnanimity, reaffirming what was clear from the premises, that someone is called magnanimous especially and principally from the fact that he conducts himself well in regard to honors and the opposites, viz., dishonors. The same virtue is concerned with opposites; fortitude, for instance, deals with fear and rashness.

Secundo ibi: et in magnis et studiosis etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat circa huiusmodi materiam. Et primo ostendit qualiter se habeat circa magnos honores; dicens, quod si magnanimo exhibeantur magni et boni honores et pro bonis actibus, moderate de eis delectatur. Contingit enim quod aliquis immoderate de aliquibus adeptis delectetur,

751. Then [1, b], at “He takes moderate delight,” he shows how the magnanimous man deals with matter of this kind. First [1, b, i] he shows the nature and mode of this man’s reaction to great honors, saying that great and desirable honors bestowed on the magnanimous for virtuous activity are a source of moderate

ex eo quod ex insperato sibi adveniunt, et

delight to them. A man might take

admiratur ea quasi quaedam maxima supra seipsum existentia. Sed, cum magnanimus adipiscitur maximos honores, existimat quasi quaedam bona proprie sibi convenientia, et adhuc minora quam ei debeantur. Considerat enim quod nullus honor exterius ab hominibus exhibitus est condignum praemium virtutis. Quia bonum rationis ex quo laudatur virtus, excedit omnia exteriora bona. Nec tamen propter hoc indignatur, quod sibi minora exhibentur, quam debeantur. Sed recipit aequanimiter, considerans, quod homines non habent aliqua maiora quae ei retribuant.

inordinate pleasure in goods acquired because they come to him unexpectedly, and value them far above their worth. But when the magnanimous person acquires things, he looks upon them as goods peculiarly suitable to him and, besides, less than his due. He judges that no honor outwardly shown to men is a sufficient reward of virtue. The reason is that the good of reason, for which virtue is praised, exceeds all external goods. Nevertheless, he is not displeased because lesser honors are bestowed on him than he deserves. But he accepts them with equanimity considering that men have nothing better to give him.

Secundo ibi: eum autem qui a contingentibus etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat circa parvos honores. Et dicit quod, si exhibeantur ei honores a contingentibus, id est si honoretur pro quibuscumque aliis rebus praeter virtutem, puta si honoretur propter divitias, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi, vel si honoretur in aliquibus parvis honoribus, tales honores contemnet, quia reputat se non esse talibus honoribus dignum. Non enim sufficit virtuoso, ut

752. [1, b, ii], at “Honors given him,” he sets forth the way in which the magnanimous person should regard trifling honors. If honors are given him by transitory things and for any other reason than virtue (for example, if he is extolled for riches or the like, or by some insignificant honors), he will despise such honors because he considers himself undeserving of this type of thing. It is not enough for the virtuous to be honored like

honoretur tamquam dives.

the rich.

Tertio ibi: similiter autem etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat circa inhonorationes. Et

753. Last [1, b, iii], at “He likewise counts,” he explains in what manner the

dicit quod etiam in hoc se habet moderate; sicut enim non extollitur magnis honoribus, ita animus eius non deiicitur per contumelias, quia considerat iniuste eas sibi inferri. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod magnanimus maxime laudatur circa honores.

magnanimous man should deal with dishonor, saying that here also he shows moderation. As his mind is not exalted by great honors, so it is not cast down by insults which he considers imputed to him unjustly. Hence it is obvious that the magnanimous person is especially praised in regard to honors.

Deinde cum dicit: sed adhuc et circa divitias

754. Then [2], at “Moreover, he will

etc.,

ostendit

quomodo

se

habeat

observe,” he shows in what way the

magnanimitas circa quasdam secundarias materias, puta circa divitias et circa alia huiusmodi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo magnanimus circa talia operetur. Secundo ostendit quomodo talia conferant ad magnanimitatem, ibi, videntur autem et bonae fortunae et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis magnanimus principaliter sit circa honores, est tamen adhuc secundario circa divitias et potentatum et omnia quae pertinent ad bonam fortunam, in quantum scilicet propter huiusmodi aliquis honoratur, et tam circa ista quam circa infortunia magnanimus moderate se habebit qualitercumque sibi accidat; ita scilicet quod

magnanimous person should deal with secondary matters, for example, riches and so forth. On this point he does two things. First [2, a] he explains how the magnanimous man should act in regard to such objects; and next [2, b] how the objects benefit magnanimity, at “The goods of fortune etc.” He says first that, although the magnanimous person is concerned with honors principally, nevertheless secondarily he has to do with riches, power, and everything belonging to good fortune, inasmuch as someone is honored for these reasons. Likewise he will show moderation about such things and about misfortune, whatever may be

neque si sit bene fortunatus superflue gaudebit, neque etiam, si infortunia patiatur, superflue tristabitur.

the turn of events, so that he will not rejoice exceedingly in prosperity nor grieve unduly in adversity.

Quod probat per hoc quod supra dictum est quod etiam moderate se habet circa honorem, qui tamen est maximum aliquid inter omnia exteriora bona. Quod patet ex hoc, quod tam potentatus quam divitiae desiderantur propter honorem, prout scilicet homines habentes talia, volunt honorari per ipsa. Si ergo magnanimus ipsum honorem parvum aestimat, ut non

755. He proves the point by the argument given before (741-742) that the magnanimous man conducts himself with moderation in regard to honors that are the greatest of all external goods. This is clear from the fact that both power and riches are desired for the sake of honor according as men who have such things want to be honored for them. If then the

superflue pro ipso gaudeat, multo magis et alia reputabit parva, ita quod non superflue gaudebit pro eis. Et inde est quod a quibusdam iudicantur esse despectores, pro eo, quod exteriora bona contemnunt, et sola interiora bona virtutis appretiantur.

magnanimous person thinks honor itself of little account so that he does not rejoice in it exceedingly, for a greater reason he will judge the other things of small moment, so that he will not rejoice in them immoderately. As a consequence, some judge the magnanimous to be disdainful because they despise external goods and value only the internal goods of virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: videntur autem et bonae fortunae etc., ostendit quomodo exteriora

756. Next [2, b], at “The goods of fortune,” he shows how external goods of

bona fortunae conferant ad magnanimitatem. Et primo ostendit, quod conferunt ad magnanimitatem augentes

fortune do confer something on magnanimity. He explains first [2, b, i] that they increase it when accompanying

eam quando sunt cum virtute; secundo ostendit, quod sine virtute non possunt magnanimum facere, ibi, qui autem sine virtute et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod omnia exteriora bona fortunae videntur aliquid conferre ad magnanimitatem, in quantum scilicet propter ea aliqui reputantur digni honore, puta nobiles et potentes, vel divites. Omnia enim ista consistunt in quadam superexcellentia, prout scilicet nobiles excedunt ignobiles, et sic de aliis. Omne autem illud quod superexcedit in bono est magis honorabile. Honor enim est quaedam reverentia, quae debetur superexcellenti bono. Et quia magnanimus est dignus honore, inde est

virtue; and second [2, b, ii] that without virtue they cannot make a man magnanimous, at “Men who possess.” He says that all external goods of fortune seem to add something to magnanimity inasmuch as, for these very things, some are judged worthy of honor, viz., the noble, the powerful, and the rich. All such goods consist of a certain great excellence, just as the noble surpass the baseborn in excellence, and so on. Everything that is surpassing in goodness is honorable in a high degree, for honor is a kind of reverence due to a very excellent good. Since the magnanimous person is worthy of honor, such goods consequently make

quod talia faciunt homines magis magnanimes, prout scilicet honorantur a quibusdam vulgaribus hominibus, qui sola haec bona cognoscunt. Sed secundum rei veritatem solus bonus, idest virtuosus, est honorandus. Quia scilicet honor est proprium praemium virtutis. Si autem aliquis habeat ambo simul, scilicet virtutem, et bona fortunae, fiet magis dignus honore, inquantum scilicet utroque modo est honorabilis, et secundum veritatem et secundum opinionem. Ipsa etiam bona fortunae organice deserviunt ad operationes virtutum.

men more magnanimous accordingly as they are honored by some people who recognize only these goods. But really only the good or virtuous man should be honored because honor is the proper reward for virtue. If someone should possess both at the same time, viz., virtue and the goods of fortune, he will become worthier of honor inasmuch as each matter is honorable. According to truth and opinion, even the goods of fortune are a help to virtuous operations after the manner of instruments.

Deinde cum dicit: qui autem sine virtute etc., ostendit quod bona fortunae sine virtute non possunt facere magnanimum. Et dicit quod illi qui habent talia bona sine virtute, non possunt iuste reputare se

757. Then [2, b, ii], at “Men who possess’ “ he establishes that goods of fortune without virtue cannot make a man magnanimous. He says that those who have goods of this kind without virtue

dignos magnis honoribus, unde nec recte magnanimi dicuntur, quia quod aliquis sit dignus magnis honoribus et quod sit magnanimus non potest contingere sine

cannot rightly esteem themselves deserving of great honors. Hence they are not correctly called magnanimous because it cannot happen that a man deserves

virtute perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed tales qui virtute carent propter excellentiam exteriorum rerum despiciunt alios, et iniuriantur eis, et in similia mala incidunt, eo quod non est facile quod aliquis moderate

great things and is magnanimous without perfect virtue, as was pointed out before (749). But because of the excellence of external goods men who lack virtue look down on others, do them injury, and fall

ferat bona fortunae sine virtute. Hoc enim est magnum opus virtutis, ut aliquis moderate se habeat in bonis fortunae. Unde cum illi, qui carent virtute, non possunt bene ferre fortunas, dum existimant quod simpliciter excellant alios quos in divitiis excellunt, contemnunt eos. Et quia non reputant aliquam excellentiam esse secundum operationem virtutis, ideo ipsi non curant operari aliquid boni, sed operantur quicquid venit eis ad cor.

into similar evils, since without virtue it is not easy for someone reasonably to bear the goods of fortune. To conduct oneself with moderation among the goods of fortune is a great work of virtue. Those who lack virtue cannot bear good fortune gracefully. Consequently, thinking themselves better absolutely, they despise those whom they exceed in riches. Since they do not consider that any excellence is acquired by virtue, they take no pains to do anything good but do whatever comes to mind.

Volunt enim imitari magnanimum, cum tamen non sint ei similes. Imitantur autem eum in quibus possunt; non quidem in hoc quod operentur secundum virtutem, quod maxime facit magnanimus; sed in hoc quod contemnunt alios, non tamen eodem modo

758. They want to imitate the magnanimous person when in fact they are not like him. They imitate him in the way they can, not I grant in operating according to virtue—a thing the magnanimous man does especially—but in

sicut magnanimus. Nam magnanimus iuste contemnit scilicet malos, et vere glorificat scilicet bonos, sed multi, scilicet qui carent virtute, contemnunt et glorificant indifferenter qualitercumque contingit, contemnendo scilicet interdum bonos, et glorificando malos.

despising others although, not in the same way as he does. The magnanimous person justly despises the wicked, and properly glorifies the virtuous. But many, who are without virtue, manifest disdain and honor indiscriminately, i.e., sometimes despise the virtuous and honor the wicked.

LECTURE 10 Properties of Magnanimity Chapter 3 B’ He considers the traits of the magnanimous person. 1.

THE TRAITS THAT ARE TAKEN BY COMPARISON WITH

MATTERS OF THE VIRTUES.

a. The traits ... understood in comparison with externally connected things. i. The traits ... by a comparison with external dangers, x. FIRST. — 759-760 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ

The magnanimous man does not run risks

φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ

foolishly, nor is he a lover of danger since he places a high value on few things. But he

ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ,

does undergo danger for things of great worth.

y. SECOND. — 761 ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον

When in danger, he exposes his life as if it

ὂν πάντως ζῆν.

were altogether unbecoming to continue living. ii. (The traits) by comparison with external benefits.

v. FIRST. — 762 καὶ

οἷος

εὖ

ποιεῖν,

He is good at helping others—which is a

εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ'

mark of the man of excellence, but he shies away from taking favors—a thing

ὑπερεχομένου.

characteristic of a man of lesser gifts.

w. SECOND. — 763 καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ

He makes lavish, recompense, so that the man who gave in the beginning will receive

ὑπάρξας καὶ πεπονθώς.

abundantly and become a debtor.

ἔσται

εὖ

x. THIRD. — 764 δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὗ

The

magnanimous

person

likes

to

ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ

remember those he benefits but not those by whom he is or was treated generously.

παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος,

That man is less noble who gratefully

βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν,

receives benefits than he who bestows them. Hence it is in the bestowal that the magnanimous man wants to be eminent.

y. FOURTH. — 765 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ

Likewise he gladly hears of the benefits he has bestowed but not of those he has

λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς

received, For this reason Thetis did not recount to Jove [Iliad i. 503], nor the

Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ.

Spartans to the Athenians the favors they had done but the benefits received.

z. FIFTH. — 766 μεγαλοψύχου

δὲ

καὶ

τὸ

The magnanimous person likes to show

μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως,

himself in need of nothing or hardly anything, but to minister to the needs of others promptly.

iii. (The trait) by a comparison with honors. x. THE TRAIT. — 767 καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι,

He acts with great dignity toward those in high places and the wealthy but with

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον·

moderation toward the middle class.

y. TWO REASONS FOR WHAT HE SAID. — 768-769 τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ

To attain excellence among the great is difficult and worthy of reverence, but

ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ

among the mediocre it is easy. To seek respect from the great is not without

τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν,

nobility, but from the lowly is to make oneself irksome,

z. AN ILLUSTRATION. — 770 ὥσπερ

εἰς

τοὺς

ἀσθενεῖς

for instance, to display one’s power against

ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα

the weak, and to avoid tasks that are

μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι·

generally honorable or at which others excel.

b. (The traits) in comparison with human acts. i. Pertaining to himself. — 771

καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν

Leisure and slowness are marks of the

ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν

magnanimous man, but where there is either great honor or great work he

πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν.

performs at least some noteworthy operations.

great

and

ii. (Pertaining) then to others. x. IN REGARD TO TRUTH. aa. First. — 772 ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῆ εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον τὸ γὰρ

Of necessity he is an evident friend or enemy, for to be so in secret smacks of

λανθάνειν φοβουμένου,

timidity.

bb.

Second. — 773

καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης,

He cares more for the truth than the opinion of men.

cc. Third. — 774 καὶ

λέγειν

καὶ

πράττειν

He speaks and works in the open, freely

φανερῶς παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι,

divulging things in public, since he pays little attention to others.

dd.

Fourth. — 775

καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ

He is truthful in his speech, excepting what

δι' εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ] πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς,

he says in irony, which he uses with the common people.

y. IN REGARD TO PLEASANTNESS. — 776 καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ·

He cannot conform his life to that of another, except perhaps a friend, since this

διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ

is servile. Because of servility all flatterers are obsequious and lowly people flatterers.

κόλακες.

2.

(THE TRAITS THAT ARE TAKEN) ACCORDING TO THE

INCLINATION OF THE MAGNANIMOUS MAN. a. Some that exist in the soul. i. First. — 777 οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ

Nor is he given to admiration, for nothing

μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν.

seems great to him.

ii. Next. — 778 οὐδὲ

μνησίκακος·

οὐ

γὰρ

Nor is he mindful of injuries, since it is not

μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ

becoming that a magnanimous person remembers evils at all, but rather despises

κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν.

them.

b. Others which exist in speech. i. First. — 779 οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ

Neither is he a gossip, for he does not speak

περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται

about himself or others. He is not anxious that he be praised, and he neither blames

μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός

nor praises others. Therefore, he does not speak evil of his enemies except to ward off

ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι'

injuries.

ὕβριν. ii. Third (second). — 780 καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν

In necessary or trivial matters he does not

ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ

lament or seek help, for this is characteristic of one who cares excessively

οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα.

about these things.

c. Traits that exist in communication with others.

i. In regard to external possessions. — 781 καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ

He is willing to possess unfruitful rather

καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων·

than fruitful and useful goods, for he is somewhat self-sufficient.

αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. ii. In regard to bodily movements. — 782-783 καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ

But the movements of the magnanimous

μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις

man seem deliberate, his voice solemn and his speech measured. He is not hasty since

στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ

he is concerned about few things. As he

περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα

considers nothing too important, he is not given to contention from which sharpness

οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων.

of voice and hastiness of speech arise.

τοιοῦτος μὲν μεγαλόψυχος·

Such then is the magnanimous person.

οὖν

ὁ

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Non est autem microkindinos et cetera.

759. After the Philosopher has explained

Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter magnanimus operetur circa propriam

how the magnanimous man should work on proper matter, he here [B’] considers the

materiam, hic determinat proprietates magnanimi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo

traits of the magnanimous person. First [1] he proposes the traits that are taken by

ponit

quae

comparison with matters of the virtues; and

accipiuntur per comparationem ad materias virtutum. Secundo ponit

then[2] those according to the inclination of the magnanimous man himself, at “Nor is he

proprietates, quae accipiuntur secundum dispositionem ipsius magnanimi, ibi,

given to admiration etc.” On the initial point he proceeds in a twofold manner. First [1, a]

neque admirativus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit

he sets forth the traits of the magnanimous person, which are understood in comparison

proprietates

magnanimi

proprietates

magnanimi,

quae

with externally connected things; and next

accipiuntur per comparationem ad res exteriores. Secundo per comparationem

[1, b] in comparison with human acts, at “Leisure and slowness etc.” In regard to the

ad humanos actus, ibi, et otiosum esse et tardum et cetera. Circa primum tria

first he makes a triple enumeration. He enumerates the traits of the magnanimous

facit. Primo magnanimi per

ponit proprietates comparationem ad

person first [1, a, i] by a comparison with external dangers that are the matter of

exteriora pericula, quae sunt materia fortitudinis. Secundo per comparationem

fortitude; then [1, a, ii] by a comparison with external benefits that properly pertain to

ad exteriora beneficia, quae proprie

liberality, at “He is good at helping others

pertinent ad liberalitatem, ibi: et potens benefacere etc.; tertio per comparationem

etc.”; and last [1, a, iii] by a comparison with honors that properly pertain to

ad honores, qui proprie pertinent ad magnanimitatem, ibi, et ad eos quidem

magnanimity, at “He acts with great dignity etc.” He passes over the matter of

qui in dignitate et cetera. Praetermittit autem de materia temperantiae, quia non

temperance, which does not have any greatness of itself but deals with material

habet de se aliquam magnitudinem, sed est circa ea quae sunt nobis et brutis

common to man and brute, as was stated in the third book (612). Nevertheless

communia, ut in tertio habitum est. Magnanimitatis autem est operari

magnanimity tends to do what is great in all the virtues-this was pointed out before (746,

magnum in omnibus virtutibus, ut supra habitum est.

749).

Circa primum ponit duas proprietates; quarum prima est, quod magnanimus

760. Touching on the first point he sets forth two traits, the first [1, a, 1, x] of which is

non est microcindinos, idest pro parvis periclitans, neque est philocindinos, idest

that the magnanimous man is not microkindinos, does not expose himself to

amator periculorum, quasi prompte et de facili se ad pericula exponens. Et hoc ideo,

dangers for trifles, nor is he philokindinos, i.e., a lover of danger, as it were exposing

quia nullus exponit se periculo, nisi

himself to dangers hastily and lightly. This is

propter aliquid quod multum appretiatur. Ad magnanimum autem pertinet pauca

so because no one lays himself open to danger except for something having

in tantum appretiari quod pro eis se velit periculis exponere. Unde non de facili,

considerable value. But it is characteristic of the magnanimous man that he values few

neque pro parvis rebus pericula subit. Est autem magnanimus megalokindinus,

things to such a degree that he is willing to expose himself to dangers for them. Hence he

idest pro magnis periclitans, (quia) exponit se quibuscumque periculis pro

does not undergo danger readily nor for insignificant things. However, the

magnis rebus, puta pro salute communi, pro iustitia, pro cultu divino et aliis

magnanimous man is megalokindinos, i.e., braves great dangers for great things

huiusmodi.

because fie puts himself in all kinds of danger for great things, for instance, the common welfare, justice, divine worship, and so forth.

Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et cum

761. He assigns the second trait [1, a, i, y] at

periclitetur et cetera. Et dicit, quod magnanimus quando periculis se exponit,

“When in danger.” He affirms that the magnanimous person in exposing himself to

hoc facit vehementer, ita ut non parcat vitae suae quasi non sit dignum quod

danger acts ardently, so that he does not spare his own life, as if it were unfitting for

magis velit vivere, quam magna bona per

him to prefer to live rather than gain great

mortem consequi.

good by his death.

Deinde cum dicit: et potens benefacere etc., ponit quinque proprietates

762. Next [1, a, ii], at “He is good,” he enumerates five traits of the magnanimous

magnanimi, quae accipiuntur per comparationem ad beneficia, quae sunt

man, which are understood by comparison with benefits proper to liberality. The first [1,

propria liberalitati. Quarum prima est, quod magnanimus est potens benefacere,

a, ii, v] is that the magnanimous person is proficient at doing good for others, i.e.,

idest promptus ad beneficia largienda, sed

prompt to bestow benefits, but is ashamed to

verecundatur ab aliis beneficia accipere. Nam beneficia dare est excellentis,

accept favors from others. To receive favors pertains to one who has lesser gifts, while

beneficia autem recipere est eius qui exceditur. Magnanimus autem semper

the magnanimous man tries to surpass others in virtue.

intendit ad hoc, quod superexcedat in bono.

Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et

763. At “He makes lavish recompense,” he

retributivus plurium et cetera. Et dicit quod si magnanimus beneficia accipiat,

indicates the second trait [1, a, ii, w], saying that if the magnanimous person does accept

semper studet ut retribuat maiora. Sic enim ille, qui incepit beneficia conferre,

benefits he is anxious to return greater ones. In this way the man who bestowed benefits

erit magis bene passus, id est beneficia recipiens, in quantum plura accepit quam

in the beginning will rather receive them, i.e., becomes the recipient of benefits inasmuch as

dedit.

he receives more than he gave.

Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi videntur

764. At “The magnanimous person likes to

autem et in memoria et cetera. Et haec quidem proprietas non est ex electione

remember,” he gives the third trait [1, a, ii, x], which does not follow the choice but the

magnanimi, dispositione

ex est

disposition of the magnanimous man-he is so disposed that he cheerfully confers but

dispositus magnanimus, ut delectetur beneficia dare, invitus autem beneficia

unwillingly receives benefits. We think often about the things that delight us and

recipiat. Ea vero, quae nos delectant, frequenter cogitamus, et per consequens

consequently remember them. However, we rarely think of things which displease us and

in memoria habemus. Ea vero quae non

consequently

sunt nobis delectabilia raro cogitamus, et

Accordingly it seems characteristic of the

et consequitur ipsius. Ita enim

hardly

ever

recall

them.

per consequens non multum in memoria

magnanimous person to remember those for

tenemus. Et inde est, quod magnanimi videntur in memoria habere eos quibus

whom he does favors but not those who do favors for him, since this is contrary to his

dant beneficia, non autem eos a quibus recipiunt. Hoc enim est contrarium

desire of wanting to excel in goodness. That man who is properly receptive, i.e., accepts

voluntati eius secundum quam vult superexcellere in bono, ille autem qui

favors, is less noble than he who grants favors. The magnanimous man does not

bene patitur, recipiendo scilicet beneficia, est minor eo qui beneficia confert.

choose to be unmindful of favors received but is anxious to bestow greater favors, as was

Secundum magnanimus

just said (763).

electionem autem non obliviscitur

beneficiorum. Sed studet ad hoc, quod maiora recompenset, sicut dictum est.

Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: et haec quidem et cetera. Et dicit, quod

765. At “Likewise,” he places the fourth trait [1, a, ii, y ], saying that the magnanimous

magnanimus delectabiliter audit beneficia quae ipse contulit. Non autem

person cheerfully listens to the benefits he has bestowed but does not enjoy hearing of

delectabiliter audit beneficia quae recepit. Delectari siquidem potest in amore eius

the benefits he has accepted. He can take delight in the love of him on whom he has

cui beneficia contulit. Sed de hoc quod ipse beneficia recepit, non delectatur. Et

conferred benefits but does not find pleasure in the fact that he himself has accepted

circa hoc ponit duo exempla. Quorum

benefits. He gives two examples of this. The

primum sumitur ex dictis Homeri, qui introducit Thetim, quam dicebant esse

first is taken from the writings of Homer who represents Thetis (called the goddess of

deam aquarum, accedentem ad Iovem, quem dicebant esse regem omnium

water) approaching Jove (called the king of all the gods). She does not recount the

deorum. Et quod Thetis non dixit Iovi beneficia quae ipsa Iovi contulerat, quasi

benefits she herself has conferred on Jove, as if this would not be acceptable to him, but

hoc non esset ei acceptum, sed potius beneficia quae ipsa acceperat a Iove, quod

rather the benefits she has received from Jove. To this Jupiter listened more willingly.

Iupiter libenter audiebat. Aliud autem exemplum sumit ex historia Graecorum;

The other example is taken from Greek history in which it is narrated that certain

in qua narratur quod quidam cives, scilicet Lacones Atheniensium auxilium

Spartans, when seeking the help of the Athenians, did not recite the favors they had

implorantes non dixerunt eis beneficia quae fecerant, sed quae receperant.

done for the Athenians but the favors received from them.

Quintam proprietatem ponit ibi: magnanimi autem et cetera. Et dicit,

766. He assigns the fifth trait [1, a, ii, z], at “The magnanimous person likes to show,”

quod ad magnanimum pertinet, quod exhibeat se tamquam nullo indigentem,

saying that it pertains to the magnanimous man not to show himself in need of anything

vel non de facili, inquantum scilicet non petit aliquid neque accipit, sed quod sit

at all or at least not readily, inasmuch as he does not ask for or take anything, but to be

promptus ad hoc quod aliis beneficium ministret.

prompt to minister to the needs of others.

Deinde cum dicit et ad eos quidem qui in dignitate etc., ponit proprietatem

767. Then [1, a, iii], at “He acts with great dignity,” he indicates a trait of the

magnanimi per comparationem ad honores. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo

magnanimous person by a comparison with honors. He treats the first point in a

ponit proprietatem. Et dicit, quod ad magnanimum pertinet, ut se magnum et

threefold manner. First [1, a, iii, x] he names the trait, saying that it belongs to the

honorabilem exhibeat ad illos qui sunt in dignitate et excellentia bonorum

magnanimous man to show himself noble and honorable to men of dignity and wealth,

fortunae. Sed ad mediocres moderationem quamdam exhibet non

but to display a certain moderation with the middle class, not using a grand manner

utendo magnitudine sua ad eos.

toward them.

Secundo ibi: hos quidem enim etc., inducit duas rationes eius quod dixerat. Quarum

768. Second [1, a, iii, y ], at “To attain excellence,” he offers two reasons for what

prima est quia omnis virtus nititur ad id quod est difficile et honorabile. Quod

he said. The first is that every virtue strives for what is difficult and honorable. That

autem aliquis excellat in bono magnos viros, est difficile et venerabile. Sed quod

someone should excel great men in virtue is difficult and worthy of honor, but to excel

aliquis excellat mediocres viros, facile est.

mediocre men is easy.

Secunda ratio est quia, quod aliquis inter

769. The second reason is that it is

magnos viros exhibeat se venerandum, pertinet ad quamdam animi virilitatem.

characteristic of a manly soul to show himself worthy of respect among the great.

Sed quod aliquis velit magnam reverentiam sibi exhiberi ab infimis

But to wish respect shown him by men of lowly rank is the attitude of a man who is a

personis, est eorum qui sunt aliis onerosi.

nuisance to others.

Tertio ibi, quemadmodum ad imbecilles

770. Finally [1, a, iii, z], at “for instance,” he

etc., ponit exemplum. Et dicit, quod simili

gives an illustration, stating that such a

modo hoc quod dictum est est vitiosum, sicut et quod aliquis exhibeat se fortem

condition indicates lack of virtue, namely, that a man demonstrates his strength

contra imbecilles, et aggrediatur difficilia

against the weak, and does not undertake difficult and honorable ventures in which

quod quae

non sunt

honorabilia et in quibus alii praecellunt.

others excel.

Deinde cum dicit: et otiosum esse etc.,

771. Next [1, b], at “Leisure and slowness”

ponit proprietates magnanimi secundum

he

distinguishes

the

traits

of

the

actus humanos. Et primo quantum ad seipsum. Secundo per respectum ad alios,

magnanimous person by means of human acts pertaining first [1, b, i] to himself; and

ibi: necessarium autem manifestum et

then [1, b, ii ] to others, at “Of necessity etc.”

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad magnanimum pertinet, quod sit otiosus,

Aristotle says first that the magnanimous man is disposed to be leisurely, i.e., does not

ex eo scilicet quod non multis negotiis se ingerit, et quod sit tardus, idest non de

engage in many undertakings, and is disinclined, i.e., not readily occupied with

facili se ingerat negotiis. Sed solum illis actibus insistat qui pertinent ad aliquem

business. He devotes himself only to those activities that are connected with some great

magnum magnum

honorem, vel ad aliquod opus faciendum. Et sic

honor or the accomplishment of some great work. Therefore, the magnanimous person

magnanimus est operativus paucorum. Sed operatur magna, et quae sunt digna

performs at least some great operations that are worthy of the name.

nomine magno. Deinde cum dicit necessarium autem etc.,

772. Then [1, b, ii], at “Of necessity,” he

ponit proprietates magnanimi circa actus humanos, qui sunt per comparationem ad

indicates the traits of the magnanimous person concerned with human acts that are

alium. Et primo quantum ad veritatem. Secundo quantum ad delectationem.

related to another, first [1, b, ii, x] in regard to truth; and next [i, b, ii, y] in regard to

Haec enim praecipue requiruntur in convictu ad alios, ut infra dicetur;

pleasantness, at “He cannot conform.” These things are required especially for social

secundum ibi: et ad alium non posse

intercourse with others, as will be explained

vivere et cetera. Circa primum ponit quatuor proprietates. Quarum prima

later (816-849). To the first he ascribes four traits, the first [aa] of which regards internal

respicit interiorem affectum. Et dicit quod necessarium est, quod magnanimus

inclination. The magnanimous man, he says, cannot make a secret of his friends and

manifestus sit amicus, et manifestus inimicus. Quia quod aliquis latenter amet

enemies. The reason is that a secret love or hatred of another arises from some fear, and

vel odiat, provenit ex aliquo timore. Timor autem magnanimitati repugnat.

fear is repugnant to a magnanimous person.

Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et curare et cetera. Et dicit quod ad

773. At “He cares more” [bb] he notes the second trait, saying that it is characteristic

magnanimum pertinet, quod magis curet de veritate, quam de opinione hominum.

of the magnanimous man to be more solicitous about the truth than the opinion of

Non enim propter humanam opinionem recedit ab eo quod facere debet secundum

man. He does not depart from what he ought to do according to virtue because of what

virtutem.

men think.

Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: et dicere

774. At “He speaks” [cc] he gives the third

et operari et cetera. Et dicit, quod ad magnanimum pertinet, quod manifeste

trait, saying that it is a mark of the magnanimous person to speak and work

loquatur et operetur, eo quod ipse est

openly because he pays little attention to

contemptivus aliorum. Et inde est, quod ipse libere propalat sua dicta et facta.

others. Consequently, he publicly divulges his words and deeds. That a man hides what he

Quod enim aliquis occultet ea quae facit vel dicit, provenit ex hoc quod timet alios.

does and says arises from the fear of others. But no one fears those he contemns.

Nullus autem timet eos quos contemnit.

Therefore,

Unde ista duo convertuntur ad invicem, ut scilicet aliquis sit libere propalativus et

interchangeable, viz., that a man freely divulge things and that he cares little for

contemptivus. Non autem dicitur magnanimus esse contemptivus eo quod

others. However, we do not say that the magnanimous man cares little for others in

despiciat alios quasi privans eos debita reverentia; sed quia non appretiatur eos

the sense that he despises them—as it were depriving them of proper respect—but

ultra quam debeat.

because he does not value them above their worth.

Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: et veridicus et cetera. Et dicit, quod

775. At “He is truthful” [dd] he assigns the fourth trait, saying that the magnanimous

magnanimus in verbis suis non falsum, sed verum dicit; nisi forte aliqua ironice

man does not speak falsehood but the truth, except perhaps that he playfully utters

loquatur ex ludo. Utitur autem ironia in societate multorum.

certain things in irony. However, he does use irony in the company of the common people.

Deinde cum dicit et ad alium non posse vivere etc., ponit proprietatem

776. Next [1, b, ii, y], at “He cannot conform,” he indicates the trait concerned

magnanimi circa delectationem quae est in convictu. Et dicit, quod ad

with pleasure companionship,

magnanimum pertinet ut non promptus sit ad convivendum cum aliis, nisi cum

magnanimous person does not easily associate with others; he finds company only

amicis; quod enim aliquis ingerat se

with his friends. The servile soul has a

familiaritatibus omnium, est servilis animi. Unde et omnes blanditores, qui

tendency to occupy himself with the intimate affairs of everyone. Consequently all

volunt omnibus indifferenter placere, sunt obsequiosi, idest ad serviendum

flatterers, who want to please everybody without distinction are obsequious, i.e.,

parati. Et e converso omnes humiles, qui scilicet sunt abiecti animi, sunt

prepared to be subservient. People of low station who lack greatness of soul are

blanditores.

flatterers.

Deinde cum dicit: neque admirativus etc.,

777. Then [2], at “Nor is he given,” he

ponit proprietates magnanimi, quae accipiuntur secundum dispositionem

enumerates the traits of the magnanimous man which arise from his natural bent.

ipsius. Et primo ponit quasdam, quae consistunt in corde. Secundo quasdam,

Aristotle first [2, a] gives some that exist in the soul; then [2, b] others existing in speech,

quae consistunt in locutione, ibi, neque

at “Neither is he a gossip etc.” Last [2, c], he

these

two

that saying

things

arises that

are

from the

humaniloquus et cetera. Tertio ponit illas, quae consistunt in exteriori

sets forth those traits that exist in communication with others, at “He is willing

conversatione, ibi, et potens possedisse et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas

etc.” In regard to the first he places two traits, the first [2, a, i] of which is that the

proprietates. Quarum prima est, quod magnanimus non est promptus ad

magnanimous person is not quick to show admiration because this is prompted by great

admirandum, quia admiratio est de rebus

things. But there is nothing great for him

magnis. Sed magnanimo non est aliquid magnum eorum quae exterius occurrere

among the things that can happen externally, because his whole life is busy with

possunt, quia tota intentio sua versatur circa interiora bona, quae sunt vere

internal goods, which are truly great.

magna. Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: neque

778. Next [2, a, ii], at “Nor is he mindful,” he

memor mali et cetera. Et dicit quod magnanimus non multum recordatur

says that the magnanimous person is not too mindful of the evils he has suffered, giving

malorum, quae passus est. Et ad hoc inducit duas rationes. Quarum una est,

two reasons for this. The first is that the magnanimous man refuses to remember

quia non convenit magnanimo multa recordari, sicut neque admirari; eorum

many things, just as he refuses to wonder at them. Another reason is that the

enim solemus multum recordari quae tamquam magna admiramur. Alia ratio

magnanimous person deliberately determines to forget injuries he has suffered inasmuch

est, quia ad magnanimum specialiter pertinet oblivisci malorum quae passus

as he despises the things by which he could not be disparaged. Hence Cicero said of

est, inquantum scilicet ea despicit, utpote a quibus minorari non potuit. Unde de

Julius Caesar that he was in the habit of forgetting nothing but injuries.

Iulio Caesare Tullius dicit, quod nullius oblivisci solitus erat nisi iniuriarum. Deinde cum dicit: neque humaniloquus

779. Then [2, b], at “Neither is he a gossip,”

etc., ponit duas proprietates magnanimi circa locutionem eius. Quarum prima est,

he gives two traits of the magnanimous man concerned with speech. First [2, b, i] he

quod non multum loquitur de hominibus, quia particulares res hominum non

seldom speaks about men because he does not value highly their particular affairs. But his

multum appretiatur. Sed tota eius intentio est circa bona communia et

whole attention is taken up with the goods of the community and God. Consequently, he

divina. Unde nec de seipso multum loquitur, neque de aliis. Non enim est sibi

says little either about himself or others. He is not solicitous that lie be praised nor that

curae, quod ipse laudetur, neque quod alii vituperentur. Unde neque ipse multum

others be blamed. Hence he does not have much praise for others nor does he speak evil

laudat alios, neque etiam male loquitur de aliis, nec etiam de inimicis, nisi propter

of others, even his enemies, except to ward off an injury inflicted on him by them.

iniuriam sibi ab eis illatam repellendam.

Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et de

780. At “In necessary or trivial” [2, b, ii] he

necessariis et cetera. Et dicit, quod de necessariis ad vitam humanam, vel

assigns a third (second) trait, that the magnanimous person neither complains by

quibuscumque aliis rebus neque etiam est planctivus, scilicet conquerendo vel

lamenting and grumbling about his lack of the necessities of life and other things, nor

murmurando

neque

asks that they be given to him. This is the

deprecativus ut ei exhibeantur; haec enim pertinent ad illum qui studet circa

characteristic of one who is anxious about the necessities of life, as if they were great

necessaria vitae consequenda quasi circa aliqua magna, quod est contrarium

things, and this view is contrary to magnanimity.

si

ei

desint,

magnanimitati.

Deinde cum dicit: et potens possedisse etc., ponit proprietates magnanimi per

781. Next [2, c], at “He is willing,” he indicates the traits that have a relation to

comparationem ad exteriora. Et primo quantum ad exteriores possessiones. Et

external things, and first [2, c, i] in regard to external possessions. He says that the

dicit quod magnanimus est promptus magis ad possidendum quaedam bona, id

magnanimous man is more ready to own certain honorable and unfruitful goods which

est honorabilia, et infructuosa, id est quae non sunt lucrosa, quam aliqua quae

are profitless than goods which are profitable and useful. The reason is that a self-

sunt lucrosa et utilia. Quia magis pertinet ad hominem sibi sufficientem,

sufficient man has no need of profit from other quarters.

quod non indigeat aliunde lucrari.

Secundo ibi: sed et motus lentus etc.,

782. Then [2, c, ii], at “But the movements,”

ponit proprietatem magnanimi quantum ad motus corporales. Et dicit, quod

he gives the trait of the magnanimous man referring to bodily movements, stating that

motus magnanimi videtur esse lentus et vox eius videtur esse gravis et locutio

his movements seem deliberate, his voice solemn, his speech measured and slow.

eius videtur esse stabilis, id est tarda. Et horum rationem assignans dicit, quod

Assigning the reason for these things, Aristotle says that the movements of the

non potest motus magnanimi esse festinus, cum ipse ad pauca operanda

magnanimous person cannot be hasty since he is intent on few things. Likewise he is not

intendat. Similiter etiam magnanimus non est contentiosus, eo quod nihil

contentious because he holds nothing external of value. Now, no one contends

exteriorum magnum existimat, nullus

except for something of value. But sharpness

autem contendit nisi pro aliquo magno. Acuitas autem vocis, et velocitas

of voice and hastiness of speech are resorted to be cause of contention. Therefore, the

locutionis accidit propter contentionem. Patet ergo quod ipsa affectio magnanimi

temperament of the magnanimous man obviously requires a solemn voice together

requirit gravitatem vocis, et tarditatem locutionis et motus. Dicit autem

with deliberate speech and movement. The Philosopher says in the Categories (Ch. 8, 9

philosophus in praedicamentis quod si aliquis naturaliter inclinatur ad aliquam

b 12 sq.) that if someone is naturally inclined to a passion, for example, bashfulness, he

passionem, puta ad verecundiam, oportet eum naturaliter habere talem colorem,

must have by nature that complexion which corresponds to bashfulness Hence if a man

qui competat verecundiae. Unde si aliquis habet naturalem aptitudinem ad

has a natural proneness toward magnanimity, consequently he should have a

magnanimitatem, consequens est etiam quod habeat naturalem dispositionem ad

natural disposition to qualities of this kind.

huiusmodi accidentia. Ultimo vero concludit epilogando, quod

783. He concludes with the summary

magnanimus talis est, qualis dictus est.

observation that the magnanimous man is just as we have described him.

LECTURE 11 Vices Opposed to Magnanimity Chapter 3 B. He now begins to treat the opposite vices. A’ What is common to each vice. — 784 ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ'

But the man who fails by defect is small-

ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι

souled, and the man who fails by excess is conceited. These people, however, do not

οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί ἡμαρτημένοι δέ.

seem to be criminals although they do sin.

εἰσιν,

B’ Each (vice) in itself. 1. THAT WHICH IS ACCORDING TO DEFECT. a. The act proper to the small-souled man. — 785 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν

The small-souled person, although indeed worthy of excellent things, deprives

ἄξιός ἐστι,

himself of them. b. The cause of small-mindedness. — 786

καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ

There seems something bad in such a man

μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο

because he does not consider himself deserving of good. Besides, he does not

γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ

really know himself; otherwise he would want the goods of which he is worthy.

τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί.

However, men of this kind are more lazy than stupid.

c. The effect of small-mindedness. — 787 ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ

This opinion (of themselves) seems to

χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν,

make them worse, for everybody strives after the things they deserve. But,

ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν

thinking themselves unfitted, they forsake good works and undertakings, and even

ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς

external goods.

ἀγαθῶν.

2. THAT (WHICH IS) ACCORDING TO EXCESS. a. The cause of this vice. — 788 οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς·

Conceited people are silly and obviously ignorant of their capability, for they set

οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται·

about those things to which honor is attached and thereupon they are discredited.

b. The act of this vice. — 789 καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ

They adorn themselves with clothing and outward show, and such like. They want

βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα καὶ φανερὰ εἶναι αὑτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι

these goods of fortune to be indicative of themselves. They even talk about

περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι.

themselves in order to receive honor from their conversation.

C’.

He compares one vice with the other. — 790-791

ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ

But small-mindedness is more opposed to

ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται

magnanimity than presumption is. As more opposed, it is also worse.

μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμήν

Magnanimity then is concerned with great honor, as was said.

ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Deficiens autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

784. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on magnanimity, he now [B] begins

magnanimitate, hic determinat de vitiis

to treat the opposite vices. Here he does two

oppositis. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo determinat id quod est commune utrique

(three) things. First [A’] he determines what is common to each vice. Then [B’] he

vitio. Secundo determinat de utroque secundum se, ibi, pusillanimus quidem

considers each in itself, at “The small-souled person etc.” Last [C’] he compares the one

enim et cetera. Tertio comparat unum alteri, ibi, opponitur autem magnanimitati

vice with the other, at “But smallmindedness etc.” He says first that the man

et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui deficit a medio magnanimitatis, vocatur

who falls short of the mean of magnanimity is called small-souled. But he who exceeds

pusillanimus. Ille autem, qui superabundat, vocatur chaymus, id est

the mean is said to be conceited, i.e., puffed up-what we call inflated or presumptuous.

fumosus, quem nos dicimus inflatum vel praesumptuosum. Non autem dicuntur

These persons are not said to be evil to the extent of being criminals, for they injure no

esse mali, quantum ad hoc quod non sunt malefactores. Non enim alicui

one and do nothing disgraceful. However, they do sin in this: they depart from the

nocumentum inferunt, nec faciunt aliquid

mean of reason.

turpe. Sed tamen peccant in hoc quod recedunt a medio rationis. Deinde cum dicit: pusillanimis quidem

785. At “The small-souled person” [B’] he

enim etc., determinat de utroque vitiorum secundum se. Et primo de vitio quod est

considers each vice: first [1] that which is according to defect; and next [2] that

secundum defectum; secundo de vitio quod est secundum excessum, ibi, chaymi

according to excess, at “Conceited people etc.” He discusses the first point in a

autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit proprium actum

threefold manner. First [i, a] he states the act proper to the small-souled man, saying

pusillanimi. Et dicit, quod pusillanimus, cum sit dignus bonis, privat seipsum illis

that although such a man is worthy of good things, he deprives himself of those he

quibus dignus est, dum scilicet non conatur ad operandum vel consequendum

deserves by not attempting to work or obtain things due to him.

ea quae sibi competerent.

Secundo ibi: et videbitur malum habere

786. Next [1, b], at “There seems,” he

etc., ostendit causam pusillanimitatis. In qua quidem causa tria consideranda sunt

shows the cause of small-mindedness, pointing out that in this cause three things

per ordinem. Quod enim aliquis se privet bonis quibus dignus est, primo quidem

must be taken by turns. That a man deprive himself of goods he is deserving of happens

contingit ex hoc quod non reputat se dignum talibus bonis, cum tamen sit

first from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of such goods when in fact

dignus; hoc autem secundum contingit ex hoc quod ignorat suam conditionem. Cum

he is worthy. This occurs because he is ignorant of his ability. If the small-souled

enim proprium bonum appetibile, si seipsum

sit cuilibet cognosceret

man knew himself, he would strive for the things he deserves because they are good

pusillanimus, appeteret ea quibus est dignus, cum sint quaedam bona et de se

and desirable, since one’s own good is desirable to everyone. Ignorance of this kind

appetibilia. Huiusmodi autem ignorantia non contingit ex insipientia, quia

does not come from stupidity-for the stupid are not worthy of great things -but rather

insipientes non sunt digni magnis; sed magis contingit ex quadam pigritia, per

from a certain laziness by reason of which they are unwilling to engage in great things

quam contingit, quod nolunt magnis se

according to their dignity. This is the third

ingerere secundum suam dignitatem. Et hoc est tertium ex quo alia duo oriuntur.

source from which the other two arise.

Tertio ibi: talis autem opinio etc., ponit

787. Third [ 1, c], at “This opinion,” he

effectum pusillanimitatis. Et dicit quod talis opinio per quam alicui videtur, quod

explains the effect of small-mindedness. A person’s opinion that he is unworthy of the

homo non sit dignus bonis quibus est dignus, videtur homines facere deteriores.

goods he really deserves appears to make him worse. Individual men strive for the

Singuli enim homines appetunt illa, quae conveniunt eis secundum propriam

things befitting their own worth. Hence when they are ignorant of their worth, they

dignitatem. Et ideo, quando nesciunt suam dignitatem, dupliciter detrimentum

suffer a twofold damage to their goodness. First, they abandon works of virtue and the

patiuntur suae bonitatis. Primo quidem, quia recedunt ab ipsis operationibus

pursuit of speculative truths, as if they were unfitted for and unequal to things of this

virtutum,

adinventionibus

kind. From this omission of great and good

speculabilium veritatum, quasi indigni et insufficientes ad talia existentes: ex hoc

works, they become worse, since it is such actions that make men more virtuous.

autem, quod magna bona praetermittunt, efficiuntur peiores, quia magnorum

Second, by reason of this opinion they shirk certain external good works of which they

bonorum exercitatio facit homines meliores. Secundo, quia per praedictam

are capable and which instrumentally serve for the performance of virtue.

et

opinionem recedunt aliqui ab exterioribus bonis quibus sunt digni, quae instrumentaliter ad operationes virtutum deserviunt.

Deinde cum dicit: caymi autem etc., determinat de vitio quod est per excessum.

788. Then [2], at “Conceited people,” he discusses the vice of excess under two

Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim proponit causam huius vitii. Et dicit quod

considerations. First [2, a], he gives the cause of this vice, saying that the conceited

chaymi, id est praesumptuosi, et sunt

or presumptuous are both stupid and

insipientes et ignorant suam conditionem; non quidem propter pigritiam, sicut

ignorant of their ability not because of laziness like the small-souled but because of

pusillanimes, sed propter insipientiam. Et hoc apparet manifeste, quia ipsi conantur

stupidity. This is obvious because they attempt to do or attain certain honorable

ad agendum vel consequendum aliqua honorabilia, ad quae eorum dignitas non

things utterly beyond their ability. So, when they fail in the action or accomplishment

se extendit; unde, quando in eorum operatione vel consecutione deficiunt,

they manifestly appear to be discredited.

manifeste redarguendi apparent.

Secundo ibi: et veste ornantur etc., ponit

789.

Next

[2,

b],

at

“They

adorn

actum huius vitii qui consistit in quadam exteriori magnificatione, in quantum

themselves,” he introduces the act of this vice, which consists in a kind of external

scilicet magnificant seipsos. Primo quidem quibusdam exterioribus signis, dum

glorification, inasmuch as the presumptuous greatly exalt themselves. First, they do this

scilicet ornatis utuntur vestibus, et etiam figura ornantur pompose incedentes, et

by certain external signs, that is, they wear elegant clothing and set off their figure by

alia huiusmodi faciunt ad manifestandum excellentiam suam in exterioribus bonis

walking pompously. Likewise they do other things to show their excellence in the

fortunae. Secundo, quia huiusmodi etiam verbis manifestant quasi per haec volentes

external goods of fortune. Second, they manifest things of this sort by words, as if

assequi honorem.

wishing to achieve honor in this way.

Deinde cum dicit: opponitur autem etc.,

790. At “But small-mindedness” [C’] he

comparat praedicta vitia adinvicem. Et dicit quod pusillanimitas magis opponitur

compares these two vices with one another, stating that small-mindedness is more

magnanimitati, quam chaymotes, id est praesumptio. Et huius assignat duas

opposed to magnanimity than conceit is. He assigns two reasons for this. The first

rationes. Quarum prima est, quia in secundo habitum est, vitium quod magis

reason, given in the second book (368), is that the vice, which occurs more frequently

accidit propter maiorem inclinationem

because of a stronger inclination of human

naturae humanae in ipsum magis opponitur virtuti quae ad hoc praecipue

nature toward it, is more opposed to virtue whose chief purpose is to restrain man’s

ordinatur ut reprimantur humanae inclinationes ad malum. Manifestum est

inclination to evil. But some men are obviously more inclined to be small-souled

autem, quod pluries accidit aliquos esse pusillanimes, qui scilicet omittunt facere

(i.e., to omit the virtuous deeds possible to them) than to extend themselves in the

bona quae possent, quam quod se extendant ad faciendum bona quae non

performance of laudable feats beyond them. Hence small-mindedness is more opposed to

possunt. Unde pusillanimitas magis opponitur virtuti. Alia ratio est, quia

virtue. The other reason is that smallmindedness is worse from the aspect of

pusillanimitas deterior est, utpote faciens

making men less virtuous, as was just

homines deteriores, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem est peius, magis virtuti

stated (787). But what is worse is more opposed to virtue. Therefore, it is evident

opponitur. Et sic patet pusillanimitatem magis opponi virtuti.

that small-mindedness is more opposed to virtue.

Ultimo autem concludit epilogando, quod magnanimitas est circa magnum

791. He summarily concludes that magnanimity is concerned with great honor,

honorem, ut dictum est.

as has been pointed out (346, 742-744, 750, 754).

LECTURE 12 The Virtue Concerned with Ordinary Honors Chapter 4 1.

HE POINTS OUT THAT SUCH A VIRTUE EXISTS AT TIMES. —

792 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι

As we remarked in the beginning, there

ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν

appears to be a virtue that deals with honor and is compared to magnanimity as

παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ

liberality is to magnificence. Neither of these virtues is in any way concerned with what is

ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ

great, but both rightly dispose us in regard to mediocre and small things.

αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ· 2. HE PROVES HIS STATEMENT. a. First by reasoning from similarity. — 793

ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει

Just as one can take and give small sums of

χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις,

money according to a mean, and also according to excess and defect, so too one

οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ

can desire honor more or less than he ought, and also from the source he ought

ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.

and as he ought.

b. By the general manner of speaking.

i. The ordinary manner of usage. — 794 τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν

We blame the ambitious man because he

ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν

desires honor inordinately and from the wrong sources. Likewise we blame the

τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς

unambitious man for not choosing to be

καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν

honored even for the good that he does. On the other hand, it is a fact that we praise the

φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ'

ambitious person as noble and enamored of what is virtuous, but the unambitious

ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς

person as moderate and temperate. We indicated this in our earlier discussion of the

πρώτοις εἴπομεν.

subject.

ii. Then (he) argues from this to the proposition. — 795 δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ

Clearly, inasmuch as the term lover of

φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ

honor (or ambitious man) has been used in different contexts, the expression does not

φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί,

always receive the same meaning. But we praise him as more concerned about honor

ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

than most people and we blame him for desiring honor more than is right.

3. HE EXPLAINS IN WHAT MANNER THE MEAN AND THE EXTREME MAY BE CONSIDERED. a. The uncertainty occurring here. i. The uncertainty. — 796

ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν

Since the mean lacks a name, being as it were abandoned, the extremes are not

ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα.

clearly distinguished.

ii. What the truth is. — 797 ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον·

Now, where there is an excess and defect, there also is a mean. But people strive for honor more than is becoming and less than is becoming, hence also becomingly.

iii. The basis for this uncertainty. — 798 ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι

Therefore, this unnamed habit as being a mean concerned with honor is praised. By

δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα

comparison with ambition it seems to be contempt of honor, but by comparison with

περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν

lack of ambition, love of honor. But by comparison with each, the habit seems to be

φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία,

one as well as the other. This seems to be true in regard to other virtues also.

πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. b. The consequences of that uncertainty. — 799 ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι

However, here the extremes appear to be

φαίνονται διὰ τὸ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

contradictory because the mean has no name.

μὴ

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Videtur autem et circa hunc et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

792. After the Philosopher has concluded his study of magnanimity, which treats of

magnanimitate, quae est circa magnum honorem, hic determinat de quadam alia

honors on a grand scale, he now considers a certain unnamed virtue having to do with

virtute innominata, quae est circa mediocres honores. Et circa hoc tria facit.

ordinary honors. To explain it he does three things. First [1] he points out i that such a

Primo proponit esse aliquam talem virtutem; secundo probat quod dixerat, ibi,

virtue exists at times. Next [2] he proves his statement, at “Just as one can etc.”

quemadmodum autem in acceptione, etc.;

Last [3], he explains in what manner the

tertio ostendit quomodo considerentur medium et extremum in hac virtute, ibi,

mean and the extreme may be considered in this virtue, at “Since the mean lacks a name

innominata autem existente, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut prius in II

etc.” lie says first, as was stated in the second book (346-348), that there appears

dictum est, quaedam virtus videtur esse circa hunc, scilicet honorem, quae ita se

to be a virtue concerned with honor. That virtue seems to be related to magnanimity

habet ad magnanimitatem sicut liberalitas ad magnificentiam. Ambae enim istae

as liberality is to magnificence. Both these virtues, i.e., liberality and the virtue under

virtutes, scilicet liberalitas et illa de qua nunc loquimur, distant ab illis duabus,

consideration, are separated from magnificence and magnanimity as from

scilicet magnificentia et magnanimitate,

something great. The reason is that

sicut a quodam magno; quia scilicet magnanimitas est circa magnum honorem,

magnanimity deals with great honors and magnificence with great expenditures. But

magnificentia autem circa magnos sumptus. Sed duae virtutes, scilicet

the two virtues, liberality and the virtue under consideration, dispose us in regard to

liberalitas et illa de qua nunc agimus, disponunt nos circa parva et moderata, vel

small and mediocre things, either honors or riches.

honores, vel divitias. Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum autem

793. Then [2], at “Just as one can,” he

etc., probat quod dixerat. Et primo per rationem a simili sumptam. Secundo per

proves his statement, first [2, a] by reasoning from similarity; and second [2, b]

communem usum loquendi, ibi, philotimum enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut

by the general manner of speaking, at “We blame the ambitious man etc.” He says that

in acceptione et datione pecuniarum, scilicet parvarum et mediocrium, est

in taking and giving of small or ordinary sums of money there is a mean-and also an

medietas et superabundantia et defectus, ut supra habitum est, ita etiam et in

excess and defect-as was said before (679, 710-711). Likewise in the desire of small or

appetitu honoris parvi vel mediocris contingit aliquem se habere plus quam

mediocre honors, it happens that a man strives more or less than he ought, or for

oportet, et minus quam oportet, quantum ad intentionem appetitus. Et etiam ex

improper reasons inasmuch as one desires to be honored for more or greater things

causa unde non oportet, inquantum scilicet

than he ought and another for fewer and

unus ex pluribus vel maioribus cupit honorari, quam oporteat, et alius ex

lesser things. Likewise it happens that a man strives to be honored rightly in all

paucioribus vel minoribus. Contingit etiam, quod aliquis appetat honorari

things. So, clearly there is reason to hold for a mean of virtue and extremes of vice in

secundum quod oportet quantum ad omnia. Et sic patet, quod circa parvos vel

small or mediocre honors as in smaller sums of money.

moderatos honores est accipere medium virtuosum, et extrema vitiosa, sicut et circa moderatas pecunias.

Deinde cum dicit philothimum enim etc.,

794. Next [2, b], at “We blame the

manifestat propositum per communem usum loquendi. Et circa hoc duo facit.

ambitious man,” he explains his proposition by an ordinary use of words. On this point

Primo proponit communem usum loquendi. Secundo ex eo argumentatur ad

he does two things. First [2, b, i] he indicates the ordinary manner of usage;

propositum, ibi, manifestum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quandoque

and then [2, b, ii] he argues from this to the proposition, at “Clearly, inasmuch etc.” He

vituperamus philotimum, idest amatorem honoris, quasi appetat honorem magis

says first that sometimes we blame the ambitious man, i.e., the lover of honor, for

quam oportet et unde non oportet. Et similiter quandoque vituperamus eum qui

desiring honor more than he ought and from an improper source. Likewise, we

non est amator honoris, quasi non velit bona operari ex quibus honoretur. E

blame at times the unambitious person for not wanting to do those good actions by

contrario autem quandoque laudamus eum, qui est amator honoris, quasi

reason of which he would be honored. On the other hand, we praise at times one who

existentem virilem, idest magnum animum

is a lover of honor as being manly or having

habentem, et quasi amatorem boni, scilicet virtuosi actus, cui debetur honor. Et

a noble soul, and as a lover of the good, i.e., virtuous action to which honor is due.

similiter quandoque laudamus eum, qui non est amator honoris, quasi moderantem

Again we praise occasionally a man who does not love honor—as it were regulating

et temperantem seipsum, ut non excedat suam conditionem, sicut dictum est in

and ruling himself—so that he does not exceed his ability, as was stated in the

secundo.

second book (345-348).

Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc.,

795. At “Clearly, inasmuch” [2, b, ii] he

argumentatur ex praedicto usu loquendi.

draws a conclusion from this manner of

Et dicit quod, quia quandoque laudamus amatorem honoris, quandoque autem

speaking, saying that at times we praise then again we blame the lover of honor.

vituperamus, manifestum est quod multipliciter dicitur amator honoris; et ideo

But it is obvious that one is called a lover of honor in various senses, and for this reason

non ad idem referimus laudem et vituperium. Sed laudamus amatorem

we do not praise and blame him for the same thing. But we praise the lover of

honoris prout magis studet ad ea quae sunt honoris, quam vulgaris multitudo.

honor according as he is more concerned than the general run of people for the

Vituperamus autem inquantum magis cupit honores quam oporteat. Et eadem

things pertaining to honor. We blame him, however, inasmuch as he desires honors

ratio est de non amatore honoris. Unde sequitur quod medium circa hoc est

more than is proper. The same line of reasoning applies to one who does not love

laudabile, prout scilicet honor et appetitur et contemnitur secundum quod oportet,

honor. Consequently, the mean in this matter is praiseworthy according as honor

extrema autem sunt vituperabilia, inquantum scilicet appetitur honor plus vel

and desire for honor are valued at their true worth. However, the extremes are

minus quam oportet.

blameworthy insofar as one desires more than he ought or less than he ought.

Deinde cum

dicit: innominata

autem

796. Next [3], at “Since the mean,” he

existente etc., determinat de medio et extremis circa hanc virtutem. Et circa hoc

treats the mean and the extreme of this virtue. On this point he does two things.

duo facit. Primo ostendit dubietatem, quae circa hoc contingit. Secundo ostendit, quid

First [3, a] he shows the uncertainty occurring here; and then [3, b] the

ex illa dubietate sequatur, ibi, opponi autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit.

consequences of that uncertainty, at “However, here the extremes etc.” He

Primo proponit dubietatem. Et dicit, quod quia medietas circa appetitum honoris est

discusses the first point under three headings. First [3, a, i] he indicates the

innominata et sic videtur esse quasi deserta, quia non designatur aliquo

uncertainty with the observation that, since the mean concerned with desire for

nomine, inde est quod extrema videntur esse dubia, inquantum quandoque

honor has no name-and so, because of this lack, appears as if passed over the extremes

laudantur, quandoque vituperantur.

do not seem consequently to be clearly drawn, inasmuch as they are sometimes praised, sometimes blamed.

Secundo ibi: in quibus autem etc., ostendit

797. Then [3, a, ii], at “Now, where there

qualiter in hac materia se habeat veritas circa medium et extrema. Et dicit quod in

is,” he explains what the truth is concerning mean and extremes. He says

quibuscumque invenitur superabundantia et defectus, ibi etiam oportet esse medium.

that whenever we find an excess and defect, there also we must find a mean. Therefore,

Et ideo, cum aliqui appetant honorem et magis et minus quam oporteat, consequens

since some strive for honor both more and less than they ought, it follows that some

est, quod etiam aliqui appetant secundum quod oportet, quod pertinet ad rationem

strive as they ought—which belongs to the notion of a true mean.

medii. Tertio ibi: laudatur igitur etc., ostendit rationem praedictae dubietatis: quia enim

798. Finally [3, a, iii ],at “Therefore, this unnamed habit etc.,” he shows the basis for

est medium accipere circa honores, habitus medius laudatur. Et quia est innominatus,

this uncertainty. Because there is reason to accept a mean in regard to honors, the

nominatur nominibus extremorum, inquantum per comparationem ad unum

habit of the medium is praised. Likewise, because unnamed, it is designated by the

extremum, videtur habere similitudinem cum alio extremo. Habitus enim medius

names of extremes, as by a comparison with one of the extremes it seems to have a

per comparationem ad superfluum amorem honoris videtur esse contemptus honoris;

likeness to the other extreme. By comparison with excessive love of honor,

per comparationem autem ad contemptum

the medium appears to have contempt of

honoris videtur esse amor honoris et per

honor; but by comparison with contempt of

comparationem ad utrumque videtur esse

honor, love of honor; by comparison with

utrumque aliqualiter. Et hoc etiam apparet in aliis virtutibus. Nam fortis per

each it appears to be one as well as the other in some way. This is evident also in

comparationem ad timidum videtur esse audax, per comparationem autem ad

other virtues, for the brave man seems reckless by comparison with the timid man

audacem videtur esse timidus. Sic ergo in proposito extrema vituperantur secundum

but timid by comparison with the reckless man. So, then, in our proposition the

se considerata, laudantur autem secundum quod attribuuntur medio.

extremes considered in themselves are censured but as attributed to the mean they are praised.

Deinde cum dicit: opponi autem etc.,

799. Then [3, b], at “However, here,” he

ostendit, quod ex praedicta dubietate sequitur quod extrema vitia solum

explains how it follows from this uncertainty that the extremes seem

adinvicem videantur opponi, non autem ad medium virtutis, propter hoc, quod est

opposed only to one another but not to the mean of virtue because the as well as the

innominatum.

other in some way. This mean has no name.

LECTURE 13 Meekness and Its Opposed Vices Chapter 5 I. HE TREATS MEEKNESS AND ITS OPPOSED VICES. A. He shows how the mean and the extreme are discovered for anger. — 800 πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ

Meekness is a kind of moderation concerned with anger. The mean in the

μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα

strict sense being without a name (and the extremes nearly so), we refer to

φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἡ

meekness as the mean, although it inclines to the defect which is also

δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν.

nameless. However, the excess can be called irascibility.

B. Then he discusses them. A’ He treats meekness.

1. WHAT BELONGS TO MEEKNESS AS... A VIRTUE. — 801 τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ'

Anger is a passion arising from many

ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ

and various causes. Hence a man who is angry over the right things, with the

καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον,

right persons, and moreover in the right way, at the right time, and for the

ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται.

right interval is praised. He is a meek man. But if meekness is an object of

βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ

praise, the meek man seeks to be undisturbed and not controlled by

πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ,

passion, but to be angry at the things

οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν·

and for the length of time that reason directs.

2. WHAT BELONGS TO (MEEKNESS) ACCORDING TO THE REAL MEANING OF THE WORD. — 802

ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς

However, he seems to sin more on the side of defect, for the meek person is not

ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικός.

vindictive but rather forgiving.

μᾶλλον

B’ (He treats) the opposite vices. 1. FIRST THE VICES OF DEFECT. a. The defect of anger... is censurable for three reasons... the first. — 803-804 ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ' ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ

But the defect—either a certain apathy or something of the kind—is censured,

γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ

for a man seems to be foolish who does not get angry at the things he should

ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ

both in regard to the manner, the time, and the persons. Such a one appears not

λυπεῖσθαι,

to feel things nor to be pained at them. b. Second. — 805

μὴ ὀργιζόμενός

τε οὐκ εἶναι

ἀμυντικός,

Moreover, he who does not get angry will not stand up for himself;

c. Third. — 806 τὸ δὲ ἀνέχεσθαι

προπηλακιζόμενον καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους

περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες.

and it is considered slavish to endure insults to oneself and to suffer one’s associates to be insulted.

2. THEN THOSE OF EXCESS. a. This vice takes place in many ways. — 807-808 ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν

The excess can happen in all likely ways,

γίνεται καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ

for a man can be angry with the wrong people, at the wrong things, more than

θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον, οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ

he should, more readily than he should, and for a longer time than he should.

γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν

However, all these excesses do not belong to the same man who certainly

ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.

would not be able to survive, for evil which is complete destroys itself and would be unendurable.

b. He considers its species i. Three kinds of excess in anger. First. — 809 οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν

Those persons are hot-tempered who

ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ,

become angry too readily, with the wrong people, at the wrong things, and

παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ'

more than they should. They do quiet down quickly—a very commendable

αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ

trait which belongs to them because they do not retain anger, but in accord

φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ' ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ

with their openness retaliate in a flareup of temper, and then become tranquil.

ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ

But the irascible (acrocholi) are intense in their excess, and get angry on every

τοὔνομα.

occasion and at every turn. It is from this that the name is derived.

ii. Second. — 810 οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ

However, the sullen are angry for a

πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα

long time and are mollified with difficulty, for they do not relinquish

δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν

their anger. But they are appeased when they have taken vengeance. The

ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν·

infliction of punishment calms the surge of anger and brings delight in place of

διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ

sadness. When this is not done they are glum because they do not externally

δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι

express their anger, and no one can prevail upon them. In this case time is

καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις.

needed to absorb the anger. Such persons are burdensome to themselves and especially to their friends.

iii. Third. — 811 χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς

We call those persons ill-tempered who

τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ

are angry at the wrong things, more than they should be, for too long a time,

μὴ διαλλαττομένους τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.

and who are not appeased until they inflict vengeance and punishment.

3. ANOTHER. — 812

ἄνευ

HE COMPARES THESE TWO VICES WITH ONE

τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ

Excess is more opposed to meekness, for it happens more frequently since man is

μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον

prone to take vengeance, and it makes

γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι· καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους.

the ill-tempered worse to live with.

II. HE ANSWERS AN IMPLIED QUESTION. A. This cannot be determined with certitude. — 813 ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται,

As was observed in previous discussions

καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ

and made plain, it is not easy to determine how, at what, and how long

τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον

one ought to be angry, or when one acts

χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι

rightly or makes a mistake. Persons,

τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ

who transgress slightly, either in great or lesser things, are not blamed. In fact,

ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς

sometimes we praise men as meek who are wanting in anger, and as manly and

ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν πράους φαμέν, καὶ

καὶ τοὺς

competent to rule who abound in anger. However, it is not readily ascertain able

χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ

by reason to what extent and in what manner a transgressor is blameworthy,

πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ

for judgment is to be made according to sense perception in individual cases.

τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. B. What is clear in this matter. — 814-815 ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ

But it is evident in these matters that

μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ

the mean habit is praiseworthy according to which we are angry with

καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,

the right people, about the right things,

αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν

in the right manner, and so on in other circumstances. Likewise, it is evident

γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον

that excess and defect are blameworthy, in such a way however that if they are

οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν

slight, they can be tolerated; if greater, then more blameworthy; and if very

ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

great, then very blameworthy. But obviously one must adhere to the mean habit. We have now discussed the habits concerned with anger.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Mansuetudo autem est quidem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

800. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the virtues dealing

virtutibus respicientibus bona exteriora, scilicet divitias et honores, hic determinat de

with external goods, riches, and honors, he now considers meekness, which deals

mansuetudine, quae respicit exteriora mala ex quibus aliquis provocatur ad iram. Et

with the external evils which provoke people to anger. On this point he does two

circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat de mansuetudine et vitiis oppositis. Secundo

things. First [I] he treats meekness and its opposed vices; and then [II] he answers

respondet tacitae quaestioni, ibi, quod

an implied question, at “As was observed.”

autem in prioribus dictum est et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit

On the initial point he does two things. First [I, A] he shows how the mean and

quomodo circa iram inveniuntur medium et extrema; secundo de eis determinat, ibi,

the extreme are discovered for anger; and then [I, B] he discusses them, at “Anger is

passio quidem enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod mansuetudo est quaedam

a passion etc.” He says first that meekness is a certain mean for anger. However, in

medietas circa iras. In qua tamen materia medium proprie acceptum est innominatum,

this matter the mean taken in the proper sense has received no name. The same can

et fere etiam extrema, quia non expressis nominibus distinguuntur. Nomen autem

almost be said about the extremes because they are not distinguished by explicit

mansuetudinis assumitur ad significandum medium, cum tamen ex vi nominis magis

names. The name meekness is taken to signify a mean, although the word implies

declinet ad defectum irae. Dicitur enim

a lack of anger. People are called meek

aliquis mansuetus ex eo quod non irascitur quasi manu assuetus ad similitudinem

because they are not violent, as it were like domesticated animals who lose their

bestiarum quae iracundiam deponunt manibus hominum assuetae. Ipse etiam

irascibility. Even the disordered lack of anger has not been given a name.

defectus inordinatus irae est innominatus. Dicitur enim aliquis mansuetus

Someone is said to be meek who is not angry for any reason whatsoever, either

qualitercumque non irascatur, sive bene, sive male. Sed superabundantia vocatur

good or bad. However, the excess is called rage or irascibility.

iracundia. Deinde cum dicit: passio quidem enim etc., determinat de mansuetudine et vitiis

801. Then [I, B], at “Anger is a passion,” he first [A’] treats meekness; and then

oppositis. Et

de mansuetudine.

[B’], the opposite vices. He treats the first

Secundo de vitiis oppositis, ibi: defectus autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.

point from two aspects. Initially [A’, I] he explains what belongs to meekness as it is

Primo ostendit quid conveniat mansuetudini secundum quod ponitur

considered a virtue; and then [A’, 2] what belongs to it according to the real meaning

virtus. Secundo quid conveniat ei secundum nominis proprietatem, ibi, peccare autem

of the word, at “However, he seems to sin etc.” He says first that irascibility is

videtur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iracundia ponitur vitium extremum, quia

considered the vice of the extreme because it implies an excess of anger which is a

importat quendam superexcessum irae quae est passio quaedam quae ex multis et

passion arising from many and various causes. So, according to the diversity of

differentibus rebus fit, et ita secundum horum diversitatem contingit in ira accipere

these things, a mean and an extreme are found in anger. Consequently, the

medium et extrema. Ille igitur qui irascitur in quibus rebus oportet et etiam quibus

praiseworthy man is the one who is angry about the right things, at the right people,

personis oportet et insuper medio modo se habet in modo irascendi, quia irascitur sicut

and in due moderation (since he is angry as he should be, when he should be, and as

oportet et quando oportet et quanto

long as he should be). However, if the

primo

tempore oportet, talis homo laudatur; et iste

word meekness is used as a compliment, it

est mansuetus, si tamen nomen mansuetudinis in laudem accipiatur.

would seem that the meek man is so disposed: first, that he is not disturbed

Videtur enim ad hoc disponi mansuetus, ut primo quidem interius iudicium rationis non

internally in the judgment of reason by anger; second, he is not led by anger in

perturbetur ab ira, secundo ut in exteriori actione non ducatur ab ira, sed secundum

external choice, for reason determines the objects of anger and the length of time

ordinationem rationis et in his rebus et in tanto tempore irascatur.

within which anger should react.

Deinde cum dicit: peccare autem etc., ostendit quid pertineat ad mansuetum

802. Next [A’, 2], at “However, he seems to sin,” he explains, in accord with the true

secundum nominis proprietatem. Et dicit quod secundum hoc videtur magis peccare

meaning of the word, the character of the meek man who (he says) in this respect

in hoc quod accedit ad defectum. Cum enim dicitur aliquis mansuetus, significatur quod

seems to err more in approaching the defect. When we call a person meek, we

non sit punitivus, sed magis remittat et

signify that he is not inclined to punish but

condonet poenas, quod pertinet ad defectum irae. Nam ira est appetitus vindictae quae fit

to forgive and remit punishments. This is a thing belonging to a lack of anger which

per poenam.

is a desire for vengeance achieved by punishment.

Deinde cum dicit: defectus autem etc.,

803. At “But the defect” [B’], he treats

determinat de vitiis oppositis. Et primo de vitio defectus. Secundo de vitio

the opposite vices, taking up first [B’, i] the vices of defect; and then [B’, 2] those

superabundantiae, ibi, superabundantia autem et cetera. Tertio comparat haec duo

of excess, at “The excess etc.” Last [B’, 3], he compares these two vices with one

vitia adinvicem, ibi, mansuetudini autem

another, at “Excess is more opposed etc.”

magis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod defectus a medio in ira, sive vocetur

He says that the defect of the mean in anger is censured whether we call it

inirascibilitas per oppositum ad iracundiam, sive qualitercumque aliter, vituperatur.

apathy or any other name whatsoever.

Et quia Stoici dicebant omnem iram esse vituperabilem, ideo consequenter ostendit

804. Since the Stoics were of the opinion that all anger is censurable, he

quod defectus irae quandoque est vituperabilis triplici ratione: quarum

consequently shows that the defect of anger sometimes is censurable for three

primam ponit, ibi non irasci enim et cetera. Et est talis. Omne quod pertinet ad

reasons [B’, i, a]. He proposes the first reason at “a man seems to be foolish etc.”

insipientiam est vituperabile; quia laus virtutis est in hoc quod operatur secundum

Whatever indicates, a lack of wisdom is blameworthy because virtue is praised for

rectam

working

rationem

prudentiae.

Sed

ad

in

accord

with

the

right

insipientiam videtur pertinere quod aliquis

understanding of prudence. But for a man

non irascatur in rebus in quibus oportet

to fail to be angry at the things, in the

irasci et eo modo et tempore quo oportet irasci et quibus personis irasci oportet.

manner, at the time, and with the persons he should be angry seems to denote a lack

Manifestum est enim quod ira causatur ex tristitia. Tristitia autem est sensus

of wisdom. It is evident that anger is caused by sadness. But sadness is a feeling

nocumenti. Si igitur aliquis non irascitur in quibus oportet irasci, consequens est quod

of injury. If then someone fails to be angry at the things he should, he does not grieve

non doleat de eis et ita quod non sentiat ea esse mala, quod pertinet ad insipientiam.

for them and so does not feel they are evil. This pertains to a lack of wisdom.

Patet ergo vituperabilis.

est

Therefore it is clear that a defect of anger is blameworthy.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et non iratus et cetera. Ira enim est appetitus vindictae.

805. He gives the second reason [B’, i, b] at “Moreover, he who does not get angry.”

Qui ergo non irascitur in quibus debet irasci, sequitur quod non vindicet ea quae

Anger is a desire for vengeance. Hence one who is not angry at the things he

debet vindicare, quod est vituperabile. Non est autem haec ratio sic intelligenda quasi

should, accordingly does not punish the actions he ought to punish. This is

non possit aliqua vindicta fieri ex iudicio rationis sine ira; sed quia motus irae

blameworthy. However, this explanation is not to be understood as if another

excitatus

facit

vengeance cannot be taken according to

promptiorem ad recte vindicandum. Nisi enim appetitus sensitivus adiuvaret ad

the judgment of the reason without anger, but as if the movement of anger stirred up

exequendum iudicium rationis, frustra esset in natura humana.

by the judgment of the reason makes one more prompt to take vengeance in the

ex

quod

defectus

iudicio

irae

rationis

right way. If the sensitive appetite did not help to carry out the judgment of the reason, it would be useless in human nature.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi iniuriantem

806. He introduces the third reason [B’, i,

autem et cetera. Et dicit quod ad servilem animum pertinet quod aliquis despiciat

c] at “and it is considered,” saying only a cringing man suffers his household to be

familiares suos et quod sustineat iniuriantes sibi, ita scilicet quod non repellat iniurias

insulted and permits others to injure him without repelling the injury with due

debito modo. Hoc autem consequitur ex defectu irae, quia per hoc redditur homo

force. This follows from a defect of anger which renders a man slothful and remiss

piger et remissus ad repellendum iniurias. Unde patet quod defectus irae est

in warding off injury. Hence it is evident that the defect of anger is blameworthy.

vituperabilis.

Deinde cum dicit superabundantia autem etc., determinat de superabundantia irae. Et

807. Then [B’, 2], at “The excess can happen,” he treats the excess of anger.

primo ostendit quod hoc vitium multipliciter

First [B’, 2, a] he shows that this vice

contingit. Secundo determinat de speciebus ipsius, ibi: qui quidem iracundi et cetera.

takes place in many ways; and second [B’, 2, b] he considers its species, at “These

Dicit ergo primo, quod superabundantia irae potest fieri secundum omnes

persons are hot-tempered etc.” He says first that excess of anger can occur

circumstantias: inquantum scilicet contingit quod aliquis irascatur quibus personis non

according to all the circumstances. It happens that someone is angry with the

oportet et in quibus rebus non oportet et magis quam oportet et velocius etiam

wrong people and in the wrong things, that he is provoked too much and too

provocetur ad iram et pluri tempore duret ira quam oportet. Non tamen omnes isti

easily angered, that he is angry too long. However, all these excesses are not found

excessus inveniuntur in uno homine, tum propter molestiam quam ipse ex sua ira

in one man, both because of the trouble he himself would suffer from his own anger,

pateretur, tum etiam quia aliis molestus existens inter homines vivere non posset.

and also because, being burdensome to all, he could not live with others.

Et ita etiam est universaliter loquendo de malo; quia si esset integrum, seipsum

808. This is universally true of evil —if it were complete, it would destroy itself. It

destrueret. Fieret enim importabile tollendo subiectum a quo portari debet si sit. Quod

could not continue to exist in taking away the subject by which it must be sustained

enim nihil est, non potest dici malum, cum

if it is to continue to be. What does not

malum privatio sit; quodlibet autem ens inquantum huiusmodi, est bonum. Unde

exist can hardly be called evil, because evil is a privation of good. But every being

patet quod malum non aufert totum bonum, sed aliquod particulare bonum cuius est

precisely as existing is good. Obviously then evil does not take away good entirely,

privatio. Sicut caecitas aufert visum, non autem aufert animal, quo sublato iam non

but some particular good of which evil is a privation. In such a way blindness takes

esset caecitas. Ex quo patet quod malum non potest esse integrum; quia sic

away sight but does not destroy the animal. If the animal were destroyed,

auferendo totum bonum auferret etiam se ipsum.

blindness would cease to exist. Manifestly, then, evil cannot be complete because in so taking away the good entirely, it would destroy itself.

Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem igitur iracundi

809. Next [B’, 2, b], at “Those persons,”

etc., ponit tres species superabundantiae in

he presents three kinds of excess in anger.

ira. Circa quarum primam dicit quod illi qui dicuntur iracundi, id est prompti ad iram,

The first [2, b, i] is that of those called hot-tempered, those easily aroused to

velociter irascuntur et etiam quibus personis non oportet et in quibus rebus non

wrath, readily becoming angry both with the wrong persons, and at the wrong

oportet et vehementius quam oportet; non

things, and too vehemently. However,

tamen multo tempore durat eorum ira, sed

their anger does not last long but quickly

velociter ab ea requiescunt, et hoc est optimum in eis. Quod accidit quia non

subsides. This is very fortunate in a way for them that anger is not retained

retinent iram interius in corde, sed statim prorumpit exterius, quia vel retribuunt

internally in their heart, but immediately bursts forth externally because they either

statim

qualitercumque

take vengeance at the time or show their

manifestant iram suam per aliqua signa propter velocitatem motus irae; et sic ira

anger in some other way by clear indications with a burst of temper. In this

exterius exhalante requiescunt. Sicut etiam calor inclusus magis conservatur,

way, when their anger is expressed they quiet down. So, also, heat which is shut up

evaporans autem citius evanescit. Ad hanc autem speciem irae maxime videntur disponi

is kept at a higher degree, but when dispersed in vapor it disappears rather

cholerici propter subtilitatem et velocitatem colerae. In hac autem velocitate

quickly. To this kind of anger the choleric seem disposed most readily by reason of

superabundantiam obtinent acrocholi, id est extremi in ira, ab acros quod est extremum,

the subtlety or speed of the bile. It is from this speed that excess is acquired by the

et ethymos, quod est ira; qui sunt acuti et prompti ut irascantur circa omnia, unde et

irascible or acrocholi, i.e., those excessive in anger, from acros meaning extreme and

nominantur.

cholos meaning anger, because they are intense and quick in anger.

Secundam speciem ponit ibi, amari autem et cetera. Et dicit quod amari secundum iram

810. He presents the second kind (of anger) [2, b, ii], at “However, the sullen,”

dicuntur quorum ira difficile solvitur; et diu

saying that some are called sullen whose

irascuntur, quia retinent iram in corde. Tunc autem eorum ira quiescit, quando

anger is dispelled with difficulty and lasts a long time because they keep it pent up in

retribuunt vindictam pro iniuria illata: punitio enim facit quiescere impetum irae,

their hearts. But they cease to be angry only when they have satisfaction for the

dum loco tristitiae praecedentis inducit delectationem, in quantum scilicet aliquis

injury inflicted. Punishment calms the surge of passion when the previous

delectatur de vindicta. Sed si hoc non fiat quod puniant, graviter affliguntur interius;

sadness is replaced by delight, inasmuch as a man takes pleasure in vengeance. But if

quia enim non manifestant iram suam, nullus potest persuadendo eorum iram

this does not happen, that is, if punishment is not inflicted, they are sorely

mitigare quae ignoratur, sed cum hoc ad hoc quod eorum ira digeratur necessarium

grieved inwardly, since they do not show their anger. No one can persuade them to

est longum tempus per quod paulatim tepescat et extinguatur accensio irae. Tales

moderate this wrath that is not indulged. But the dissolution of anger requires a

autem, qui sic iram retinent diuturnam sunt

long time in which the fire of wrath may

sibiipsis molestissimi et praecipue amicis cum quibus delectabiliter non possunt

cool off gradually and be extinguished. Such persons who retain anger for a long

convivere, et propter hoc vocantur amari. Ad hanc autem speciem superabundantiae

time are a trial to themselves and especially their friends with whom they

vindictam

vel

maxime videntur disponi melancolici, in quibus impressiones susceptae diu propter

cannot live pleasantly. For this reason they are called sullen. To this kind of

humoris grossitiem perseverant.

excess, the melancholic seem particularly inclined because the influence received from the coarseness of the humor lasts a long time in them.

Tertiam speciem ponit ibi, difficiles autem et cetera. Et dicit quod illos dicimus difficiles

811. He introduces the third kind (of anger) [2, b, iii], at “We call those

sive graves qui irascuntur in quibus non oportet et magis quam oportet et pluri

persons,” saying that some are called illtempered or morose who are angry at

tempore quam oportet; et non commutantur ab ira sine hoc quod crucient,

improper things, in an improper degree and for an improper length of time, and do

vel puniant eos quibus irascuntur. Non enim est in eis diuturnitas irae ex sola

not leave anger until they wreak vengeance on or punish those with whom

retentione irae ut possit tempore digeri, sed ex proposito firmato ad puniendum.

they are angry. Indeed their anger lasts long not because of a retention alone that can be dissolved in time but because of a firm resolve to inflict punishment.

Deinde cum dicit mansuetudini autem etc.,

812. Then [B’, 3], at “Excess is more

comparat praedicta adinvicem. Et dicit quod superabundantia irae magis opponitur

opposed,” he compares the things just treated with one another, stating that the

mansuetudini quam defectus: quod probat duplici ratione. Primo quidem quia in

excess of anger is more opposed to meekness than the defect is. He proves

pluribus

magis

this by two arguments: first, it is the usual

inclinatur naturaliter ad puniendum post iniuriam sibi illatam; licet quando non est

occurrence. Man is inclined more naturally to inflict punishment after suffering an

iniuriam passus naturaliter inclinetur homo ad mansuetudinem. Secundo quia illi qui

injury to himself, while he is naturally inclined to meekness when he has not

superabundant in ira, magis sunt difficiles ad convivendum. Et in hoc sunt deteriores,

suffered any injury. The second reason is that the excessive in anger are more

unde et magis contrariantur bono virtutis.

difficult to live with and to this extent are worse. Hence they are more in opposition

accidit.

Homo

enim

to the good of virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: quod autem in prioribus

813. Next [II], at “As was observed,” he

etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni: scilicet in quibus, et qualiter homo debeat irasci. Et

answers an implied question, namely, at what things and in what manner ought a

circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quid circa hoc non possit determinari per

man be angry. On this point he does two things. First [II, A] he affirms that this

certitudinem. Secundo quid sit in hoc

cannot be determined with certitude; and

manifestum, ibi sed quod quidem tale et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut dictum

second [II, B] he states what is clear in this matter, at “But it is evident etc.” He

est in II et ibidem manifestatum, non est facile determinare qualiter sit irascendum,

says first that, as was observed in the second book (379) and there made clear, it

et in quibus, vel qualibus rebus, et quanto tempore, et usque ad quem terminum recte

is not easy to determine in what manner one should be angry, i.e., at things of what

facit, qui irascitur et usque ad quem terminum peccat. Ille enim qui parum

nature, for how long a time, and up to what point one acts correctly or errs in

recedit a medio vel in maius vel in minus,

becoming angry. One who departs a little

non vituperatur; sed potius quandoque eos qui deficiunt in ira laudamus et vocamus eos

from the mean, either in great or small matters, is not blamed. In fact, at times we

mansuetos; illos autem, qui parum excedunt, vocamus viriles, quasi potentes, et

praise those who are somewhat deficient in anger and call them meek, but those

aptos ad principandum propter promptitudinem ad vindictam, quae

who are a little excessive we call manly, as if able and qualified to rule by reason of

competit principibus. Sed per quantum et qualem recessum a medio aliquis

their promptness for vengeance, which is appropriate to rulers. It is not easy to

vituperetur vel non vituperetur, non de facili potest ratione determinari, quia huius

determine by reason the extent and kind of deviation from the mean for which a man

rei iudicium consistit in singularibus et in sensu, non tam exteriori quam interiori

should or should not be blamed. The reason is that judgment in this case

aestimatione.

depends on particulars and on sense perception which is more an interior than an exterior evaluation.

Deinde cum dicit: sed quod quidem tale etc.,

814. At “But it is evident” [II, B] he

ostendit quid sit in talibus manifestum. Et dicit manifestum esse, quod laudabilis est

shows what is obvious in these matters, saying it is evident that the mean

medius habitus, secundum quem irascimur

according to which we are angry with the

quibus oportet et in quibus rebus oportet et secundum quod oportet et similiter de aliis

right persons, at the right things, and so on with regard to the other

circumstantiis, et quod superabundantia et defectus sunt vituperabiles; ita tamen quod,

circumstances, is praiseworthy. Likewise, it is evident that excess and defect are

si in parvum fiant, tolerabile est, si autem plus fiant, magis vituperabile est. Si autem

blameworthy, in such a way however that if they are slight they can be tolerated; if

multum fiant, valde vituperabile est. Unde semper se debet aliquis ad medium trahere.

they are greater, they are more blameworthy; and if very great, they are blameworthy in the highest degree. Hence a man ought to draw himself towards the mean.

Ultimo autem epilogat, quod dictum est de

815. Last, he says in the epilogue that we

habitibus, qui sunt circa iram.

have discussed the habits that deal with anger.

LECTURE 14 Amiability I. HE TREATS THE SERIOUS (ACTIONS). A. He investigates the virtue concerned with pleasantness and sadness arising from the serious actions of men.

A’ A mean and extremes are found. 1. THE VICE PERTAINING TO THE EXCESS OF PLEASANTNESS. — 816 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἳ

Some men seem to be obsequious in association with others and in

μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν

interchange of words and deeds. They praise everything for the sake of

ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι·

pleasantness, and never contradict anyone, being of the opinion that unpleasantness ought to be avoided.

2. THE VICE WHICH PERTAINS TO THE DEFECT. — 817 οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα

Others, on the contrary, always find

ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ

fault, taking care to emphasize anything unpleasant. They are called

δυσέριδες καλοῦνται.

perverse and quarrelsome.

3. THE CONCLUSION... THE MEAN IS PRAISEWORTHY. — 818 ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί

These habits being reprehensible,

εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν

obviously the mean habit is laudable —that habit according to which a

ἀποδέξεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ·

person approves what he should and also disapproves what he should.

B’. He examines (the mean and extremes). 1. FIRST THE MEAN. a. The name of the mean habit. i. The mean habit has no name. — 819 ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι,

This mean habit has not been given a name.

ii. He gives the habit a name from friendship. — 820 ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος γάρ

But it has a remarkable resemblance

ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον,

to friendship, for the man who is disposed according to the mean habit

τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα.

is a man worthy of friendship, assuming that he loves us.

iii. How this virtue differs from friendship. x. THE DIFFERENCE. — 821

διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ

However, since this virtue is with out

πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν

passion or affection for people with whom we associate, it differs from

ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς

friendship. A man does not take particular things as becoming

ἀγνῶτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει,

because he is influenced by love or hatred but because he is disposed in this way. He will act similarly with strangers, intimates, and outsiders.

y. A FALSE UNDERSTANDING OF IT. — 822 πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει· οὐ

Nevertheless, in particular cases, he

γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν.

does the proper thing; it is not becoming to treat intimates and strangers in the same way, nor

similarly to show displeasure toward them. b. Properties (of the mean habit). i. First. — 823 καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ

Therefore, as has been pointed out, he

ὁμιλήσει,

always communicates with others in an amiable manner. ii. Second. — 824

ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ

Considering it honorable and useful,

συμφέρον στοχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν.

he aims to cause no offense, and even to give pleasure, for he is concerned with pleasure and sadness which occur in social intercourse.

iii. Third. — 825 ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας

Any virtuous man of this type will

εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας· τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ

refuse to give pleasure and will choose to cause pain over what is

καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται

dishonorable and harmful to himself or to the person doing an injury or a

λυπεῖν·

δ'

great wrong. Although his opposition

ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἡ δ' ἐναντίωσις

brings not a little offense, he will disregard it.

κἂν

τῷ

ποιοῦντι

μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ.

iv. Fourth. — 826 διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν

He converses differently with persons

ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως

in high places and with others, with friends, and with acquaintances.

δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς,

Likewise,

ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον,

differences he attributes what is becoming to each.

v. Fifth. — 827

according

to

other

καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ

He primarily strives to give pleasure

συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ μείζω,

and declines to inflict pain, considering that future events may be

συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα

of greater importance. (I speak of what is honorable and useful.) But he

τῆς εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός

will cause grief especially in a slight degree for the sake of a pleasure in a

ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ·

good that is to come. The mean then is of this nature but is nameless.

2. (HE DEFINES) THE EXTREMES.

a. The vice that belongs to the excess of pleasantness. — 828 τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς

Of those who are agreeable, the man

εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ διά τι ἄλλο

who aims at being pleasant without

ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὑτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ

personal profit is called affable, but he who does so for money and things

χρημάτων, κόλαξ·

valued in terms of money is called a flatterer.

b. He refers to the opposite vice. — 829

ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις.

But the individual who is a trial to everyone is called quarrelsome and perverse, as has been stated.

c. He compares the two vices. — 830 ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ

However, the extremes seem to be mutually opposed because the mean is

μέσον.

nameless.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS In colloquiis autem et convivere et

816. After the Philosopher has considered

cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus, quae

virtues relating to external things, now he considers the virtues that relate to human

respiciunt res exteriores, hic determinat

actions. First [I] lie treats the serious; and

de virtutibus, quae respiciunt actus

then [Lect. 16, II] the humorous actions, at

humanos. Et primo in seriis. Secundo in ludicris, ibi, existente autem requie et

“Since recreation should have a place etc.” (B. 1127 b 33). In the investigation of the

cetera. In actibus autem seriosis est duo

serious actions, he examines pleasantness

considerare, scilicet delectationem et veritatem. Primo ergo determinat de

and veracity. First [A] he investigates the virtue concerned with pleasantness and

virtute quae est circa delectationes et tristitias in seriosis actibus hominum;

sadness arising from the serious actions of men; and then [Lect. 15, B] the virtue

secundo de virtute quae est circa veritatem, ibi, circa eadem autem fere est

concerned with veracity, at “Likewise, the mean opposed to boasting etc.” (B. 1127 a

et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit circa delectationes et tristitias

13). He develops the first point in a twofold fashion. Initially [A’] he shows that a mean

humanorum actuum esse medium et extrema. Secundo determinat de eis, ibi,

and extremes are found in regard to pleasantness and sadness in human acts; and

nomen autem non redditur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit

then [B’] he examines these, at “This mean habit has not etc.” He discusses the first from

vitium pertinens ad superabundantiam delectationis. Et dicit, quod circa

three aspects. First [A’, 1] he presents the vice pertaining to the excess of pleasantness.

colloquia humana, per quae maxime homines adinvicem convivunt secundum

He says that in human conversation (by which men especially associate with one

proprietatem

et

another according to a natural tendency) and

universaliter circa totum convictum hominum qui fit per hoc quod homines

generally in all human companionships (made possible by the fact that men communicate

sibi invicem communicant in sermonibus et in rebus, quidam videntur esse placidi,

with one another in words and deeds) some seem to be obsequious, as it were straining to

quasi hominibus placere intendentes. Unde omnia laudant, quae ab aliis

please men. Wherefore, they praise everything that others say and do for the

dicuntur et fiunt, ad hoc, quod delectabiles se eis exhibeant. Et in nullo

purpose of making themselves agreeable. They never contradict people for fear of

contradicunt eis quibus convivunt, ne eos contristent; aestimantes, quod oportet

giving offense, thinking they must live without causing pain to anyone.

suae

naturae,

omnibus convivere sine tristitia. Secundo ibi: qui autem contrario his etc.,

817. Second [A’, 2], at “Others, on the

ponit vitium quod pertinet ad defectum in talibus. Et dicit, quod illi, qui contrario

contrary,” he introduces the vice that pertains to the defect in such matters. He

modo se habent ad placidos, volunt contrariari omnibus quae dicuntur vel

states that people who are cross-grained wish to be contrary to everything said or

fiunt, quasi intendentes alios contristare, et nihil curantes praetermittere ne alios

done as if trying to make others sad and taking care to emphasize anything that will

contristent: et isti vocantur discoli et litigiosi.

make life unpleasant for others. These persons are called perverse or quarrelsome.

Tertio ibi: quoniam quidem igitur etc., concludit esse quendam medium habitum

818. Last [A’, 3], at “These habits’ he draws the conclusion that the mean is praiseworthy,

laudabilem. Et dicit, quod quia praedicti habitus, qui sunt in extremo sunt

saying that these habits, which consist in an extreme, are unworthy of praise. Obviously,

vituperabiles, manifestum est quod medius habitus est laudabilis, secundum

then, the mean habit is worthy of praise— that habit by which a man accepts what

quem aliquis acceptat ea quae ab aliis

others say or do, or rightly rejects and

dicuntur vel fiunt, vel etiam despicit, et contradicit secundum quod oportet.

contradicts it.

Deinde cum dicit: nomen autem non

819. Next [B’], at “This mean habit,” he

redditur et cetera. Determinat de praedictis. Et primo de medio; secundo de

defines the previous matter: first [B’, 1] the mean; and then [B’, 2] the extremes, at “Of

extremis, ibi, condelectantis autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

those who are etc.” He handles the initial point in a twofold manner. First [B’, 1, a] he

determinat de nomine medii habitus; secundo de eius proprietatibus, ibi,

treats the name of the mean habit; and then [B’, 1, b] its properties, at “Therefore, as has

universaliter quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit

been pointed out.” He considers the name under three headings. First [a, i] he states

medium habitum esse innominatum.

that the mean habit has no name.

Secundo ibi: assimulatur autem etc.,

820. Second [a, ii], at “But it has” he gives

nominat ipsum per similitudinem amicitiae. Et dicit, quod ista virtus

the habit a name from a resemblance to friendship. This virtue, he says, is very much

maxime assimilatur amicitiae, quia communicat cum ea in actu exteriori,

like friendship because there is agreement in the external act which is especially proper to

maxime proprio ei, qui est delectabiliter convivere ad amicos. Ille enim, qui est

friendship, viz., to live amicably with friends. That person, who is disposed according to the

dispositus secundum medium habitum huius virtutis, taliter se habet in

mean habit of this virtue, conducts himself in agreeable association with others in a

delectabili convictu ad alios, sicut dicimus competere amico, cuius scilicet amicitia

manner becoming to a friend whose friendship is moderated by reason-a thing

moderatur ratione, quod pertinet ad

that pertains to honorable friendship. Not

amicitiam honesti. Non enim omnis amicitia est secundum virtutem, ut infra

every friendship is virtuous, as will be pointed out later (1574-1577). If the man who has

dicetur. Et si ita esset, quod ille qui habet istam virtutem, assumeret affectum

this virtue should love those with whom he lives, his friendship will be entirely virtuous.

dilectionis ad eos quibus convivit, esset omnino talis qualis est omnino virtuosus.

Tertio ibi: differt autem ab amicitia etc.,

821. Last [a, iii], at “However, since,” he

ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad

shows how this virtue differs from friendship.

veram amicitiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit differentiam. Secundo

He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [iii, x] he presents the difference; and

excludit falsum intellectum, ibi, verumtamen et in singulis et cetera.

then [iii, y] rejects a false understanding of it, at “Nevertheless, in particular cases etc.” He

Dicit ergo primo, quod haec virtus differt a vera amicitia, quia ista virtus est et

says first that, since this virtue is without love (which is a passion of the sensitive

sine amore, qui est passio appetitus sensitivi, et sine dilectione ad eos quibus

appetite) and without affection (which pertains to the intellective appetite) for those

colloquitur, quae pertinet ad appetitum

with whom we associate, it differs from true

intellectivum. Non enim ex hoc acceptat singula ab aliis dicta vel facta, sicut

friendship. A man does not take the particular things said or done by others as

oportet, quia afficiatur ad eos odio vel amore; sed quia est ita dispositus

becoming, because he is influenced by hatred or love of them but because he is disposed in

secundum habitum. Et huius signum est quia hoc observat non solum ad amicos,

this way by habit. This is proved by the fact that he observes the same not only with

sed communiter ad omnes ignotos et notos, consuetos et inconsuetos. Et est

friends but generally with all acquaintances and strangers, intimates and outsiders.

simile de liberalitate. Amicus enim dona confert amicis propter amorem. Liberalis

Liberality is like this. A friend gives gifts to his friends because he loves; the liberal man

autem non ex eo quod amat, sed ex eo quod est talis, ut facile emittat pecuniam.

however gives not because he loves but because his nature is to be a free spender.

Deinde cum dicit verumtamen et in singulis etc., excludit falsum intellectum

822. Then [iii, y], at “Nevertheless,” he rejects a false understanding of these things.

praedictorum. Quia enim dixerat quod similiter se habet haec virtus ad ignotos

Since he just stated (821) that this virtue is practiced alike toward strangers and

et

intelligere

acquaintances, a man might consider this

similitudinem istam quantum ad omnia. Est autem intelligenda praedicta

likeness as extending to everything. But the previously mentioned likeness must be taken

similitudo quantum ad hoc commune, quod est delectabiliter omnibus

as referring to this common characteristic, which is to live agreeably with others. There

convivere; est autem differentia quantum ad speciales modos convivendi; quia in

is a difference in regard to the special ways of living with others. The reason is that the

singulis facit secundum quod congruit, non autem convenit quod similiter aliquis

virtue affects the proper actions in particular cases, for a person should not delight or

delectet aut contristet consuetos et extraneos.

displease intimates and outsiders in the same way.

Deinde cum dicit universaliter quidem etc., ponit proprietates quinque huius

823. At “Therefore, as has been” [B’, 1, b], he enumerates the five properties of this

virtutis quarum prima sumitur ex modo colloquendi. Et dicit quod, sicut dictum

virtue; the first [b, i] of which is taken from the manner of communicating with others.

notos,

posset

aliquis

est, in universali omnibus colloquitur sicut oportet.

As has been noted (821), one having this virtue always communicates with others in a becoming way.

Secundam ponit ibi: referens autem et

824. At “Considering,” Aristotle gives the

cetera. Quae sumitur ex parte finis. Et dicit, quod tendit ad hoc quod sine

second property [b, ii], which is understood on the part of the end, saying that one having

tristitia, vel etiam cum delectatione aliis convivat. Et hoc refert ad bonum

this virtue aims at living with others without offense or even with pleasure. This end

honestum, et ad conferens, idest utile,

pertains to a good that is honorable and

quia est circa delectationes et tristitias quae fiunt in colloquiis, in quibus

advantageous, i.e., useful, because it is concerned with pleasure and sadness

principaliter et proprie consistit convictus humanus. Hoc enim est

occurring in associations in which human companionship principally and fittingly

proprium hominum respectu aliorum animalium, quae sibi in cibis vel in aliis

consists. This is proper to men in contrast to animals who share food and the like in

huiusmodi communicant.

common.

Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: horum

825. At “Any virtuous man,” he introduces

autem et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem ad tristitiam. Et dicit

the third property [b, iii], which is understood by comparison with pain, saying that the

quod quandoque habens hanc virtutem refugit delectare alium, quin immo eligit

man who possesses this virtue sometimes refuses to give pleasure to another, in fact

contristare ipsum. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo ex parte suiipsius, puta si

sometimes chooses to cause pain. This may take place in two ways. In one way it can

non sit sibi honestum, ut cum alius loquitur verba turpia, vel si etiam sit sibi

happen on his part: if a thing is not honorable to him, for instance, another uses indecent

nocivum, puta cum alius loquitur in detrimentum eius; alio modo ex parte

language; or if a thing is harmful to him, for instance, another injures him in word. In the

illius cui convivit, puta si dicat vel faciat

other way, it can happen on the part of the

aliquid quod ad propriam suiipsius magnam inhonestatem pertineat, vel

person he lives with. This person may say or do something pertaining to his own great

etiam sit ei multum nocivum. Et per hoc quod ei contradicitur ingeritur ei parva

disgrace, or he may be greatly harmed. By reason of the fact that he is contradicted he is

tristitia. Sic enim non acceptabit virtuosus quod ab aliis dicitur vel fit, sed

grieved to some extent. So the virtuous man will not take what is said by others, or if he

magis reprehendet.

does he will nonetheless reprove them.

Quartam

proprietatem

ponit

ibi:

826. At “He converses differently” he

differenter autem colloquitur et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem ad

introduces the fourth property [b, iv], which is understood by comparison with different

diversas personas. Et dicit quod hic

persons. He says that a virtuous man speaks

virtuosus

diversimode colloquitur

et

and converses in a different way with persons

cum his qui sunt in constituti et cum

in high places and with private persons, with friends and with acquaintances, and so on

quibuscumque privatis personis. Et similiter diversimode cum magis vel

according to other distinctions of persons, ascribing to each individual what is

minus notis, et secundum alias diversitates personarum. Singulis enim

appropriate.

conversatur dignitatibus

attribuit quod est conveniens. Quintam proprietatem ponit ibi: et per se

827. At “He primarily strives,” he presents

quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem delectationis ad

the fifth property [b, v] which is taken by comparison of pleasure with pain. He affirms

tristitiam. Et dicit, quod per se quidem intendit delectare et renuit contristare;

that the virtuous man primarily strives to give pleasure and declines to inflict pain.

tamen aliquando parum contristat considerans futura, si praeponderent

However, at times he causes some grief considering that future events will outweigh

praesenti contristationi, quantum ad

the existing affliction in what concerns

honestatem et utilitatem, vel etiam quantum ad futuram delectationem

decency and utility or even a future important consideration, the evidence for

magnam, cui locus paratur per praesentem contristationem. Concludit

which is provided by the present distress. He concludes that the mean habit is like this but

autem, quod talis est medius habitus, cum tamen sit innominatus, licet apud

is without a name, although we can call it affability.

nos possit affabilitas nominari.

Deinde cum dicit condelectantis autem

828. Then [B’, 2], at “Of those who,” he

etc., determinat de oppositis vitiis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat de

defines the opposite vices, doing three things. First [B’, 2, a] he treats the vice belonging to

vitio quod pertinet ad superabundantiam delectationis. Et dicit quod ille qui

the excess of pleasantness. He says that the man who is immoderate in being pleasant—if

superabundat in condelectando, si hoc non faciat propter aliud, vocatur

he does not act for something else—is called obsequious. But if he acts to acquire money

placidus; si autem hoc faciat, vel propter

or any other thing computable in money, he

adipiscendam pecuniam, vel quicquid aliud pecunia aestimari potest, vocatur

is called a sycophant or a flatterer.

blanditor sive adulator. Secundo ibi, qui autem omnes contristat

829. Next [B’, 2, b], at “But the individual,”

etc., determinat de opposito vitio. Et dicit, quod ille qui omnes contristat,

he refers to the opposite vice, saying that the individual who is a trial to everyone is called

vocatur litigiosus et dyscolus, ut dictum

contentious and perverse, as has been stated

est.

previously (817).

Tertio ibi opponi autem videntur etc., comparat praedicta duo vitia adinvicem.

830. Finally [B’, 2, c], at “However, the extremes, “ he compares the two vices one

Et dicit, quod extrema videntur opponi

with the other, saying that the extremes

sibiinvicem, non autem virtuti, quia medium virtutis est innominatum.

seem to be opposed to one another but not to the virtue because the mean of the virtue is nameless.

LECTURE 15 Veracity Chapter 7 B. A virtue ... that possesses a mean in the same human actions. A’ He explains his intention. 1. A CERTAIN VIRTUE IS A MEAN OPPOSED TO BOASTING. — 831 περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας καὶ εἰρωνείας

Likewise, the mean opposed to boasting treats of almost the same subject, and it

μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή.

too is nameless.

2. WE MUST TREAT THIS VIRTUE. a. First (reason). — 832

οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας

It is not a loss to examine these matters,

ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος,

for in making the investigation we will learn more about particular habits.

b. Second. — 833 καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς

Observing what is so in all cases, we are assured that virtues are certain median

πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες.

states.

3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND THE PRECEDING VIRTUE. — 834 ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες

We have already discussed the people who cause pleasure or pain in their association

εἴρηνται,

τῶν

with others. In like manner we will now

ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ

investigate those persons who manifest truth and falsehood by words, operations,

πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι.

and pretense.

περὶ

δὲ

B’ He defines his proposition. — 1. HE PRESENTS THE VIRTUE AND THE OPPOSITE VICES.

a. What belongs to the mean and extremes in this matter. — 835 δοκεῖ

δὴ

ὁ

μὲν

ἀλαζὼν

The

boaster

simulates

non-existent

προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ

qualities, or claims a greater distinction than he really has. On the contrary, the

μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ

dissembler denies or minimizes the qualities he has. But the man who

ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ

observes the mean is admirable, being

δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ

truthful both in life and speech, acknowledging that his own qualities are

λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω

neither more nor less excellent than they really are.

οὔτε ἐλάττω. b. How the things... discussed pertain to the median habit and the extremes. — 836

ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά

Each of these acts may be done both for

τινος

μηδενός.

the sake of something else and for nothing

ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτω ζῇ,

other than itself. As a man is, so he speaks, acts, and lives, unless some other

ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ.

cause affects him.

ποιεῖν

καὶ

c. The median habit is praiseworthy. — 837

καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος

A lie is intrinsically evil and to be avoided

φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ

but the truth is both good and to be praised. So, the man who speaks the truth

καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν

is worthy of praise as being better, while

ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον

the above two who do not tell the truth are worthy of blame, more especially the

δ' ὁ ἀλαζών.

boaster.

2. HE INVESTIGATES THEM. a. First the virtue. i. What truthful person we are discussing. — 838 περὶ

ἑκατέρου

δ'

εἴπωμεν,

We will discuss both, but first the truthful

πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν

man. We are not going to investigate the person who speaks the truth in his

ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ

agreements nor on any subject pertaining to right or its b violation, for this belongs

δικαιοσύνην συντείνει ἄλλης γὰρ

to another virtue. But we do intend to

ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος

study the person who manifests the truth by his conversation and way of living

καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

(insofar as he does this from habit) in matters not touching justice and injustice.

ii. What is especially characteristic of this person. — 839 δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς

Such a man seems to observe moderation,

εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων,

for he is a lover of the truth and, being truthful where it makes little difference, he

ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ

will speak the truth all the more where it does matter. He will fear a lie as

ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ

disgraceful because he feared it in itself. Such a man is worthy of praise.

τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. iii. To what extreme the person is most inclined. — 840 ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει·

He turns aside from the truth more by understatement, for this seems rather

ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς

prudent since irritating.

overstatements

are

εἶναι. b. Then the opposite vices. i. The vice pertaining to excess. x.

IN HOW MANY WAYS WE MAY COMMIT...

BOASTING. — 841-842 ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων

The person who boasts more excellent

προσποιούμενος μηδενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν οὐ γὰρ ἂν

talents than he possesses for 10 no ulterior motive has a semblance of evil;

ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει, μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ'

otherwise, he would not find pleasure in lying. He is really, though, more vain than

ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ

evil. But one who boasts for something else, like glory or honor, does not deserve

δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον,

great blame. However, the man who boasts for the sake of money or objects valued in money is more vicious.

y. IN WHAT RESPECT WE MAY... TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOASTING. — 843 ἀσχημονέστερος οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ'

A boaster is constituted not by capability but by choice. He is such in accordance

ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι

with a habit, as is the case with the liar who finds pleasure in lying itself, or the

ἀλαζών ἐστιν· ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ

one who lies because he desires glory or profit.

χαίρων, ὃ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. z. IN WHAT WAY...WE. COMMIT... BOASTING. — 844-845

οἱ

μὲν

οὖν

δόξης

χάριν

Therefore, people who boast for the sake

ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ

of fame simulate qualities that win praise and admiration. Those who boast for the

εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας

sake of gain pretend things more closely connected with profit and things whose

καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο

absence is not clearly apparent. For this reason many braggarts pretend to be

οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ

doctors, soothsayers, or wise men, for the

τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα.

qualities mentioned are verified in them.

ii. The vice pertaining to defect. x. HE COMPARES THIS VICE WITH BOASTING. — 846 οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον

Dissemblers, however, who say less than

λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους

what is true seem to be more gracious. For they apparently speak not to acquire

ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν·

gain but to avoid offense and vanity.

ἀλλὰ

y. HE POINTS OUT ITS DIFFERENCE. — 847-848

μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα

Some people especially deny qualities about

ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ

themselves that bring renown, as Socrates did. Others, who disclaim insignificant and

καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ

obvious things are called affected humbugs (blato-panurgi). They are

εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον

readily despised; and at times they seem guilty of ostentation, like the Spartans by

ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις

their clothing. For this reason excess and immoderate deficiency seem characteristic

ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ

of the boastful. Still others who moderately employ dissimulation, even

τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες

dissembling about things obvious and ready at hand, seem rather agreeable.

φαίνονται. iii. The opposition of vices among themselves. — 849 ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' φαίνεται τῷ

ὁ ἀλαζὼν ἀληθευτικῷ·

As being more vicious, the boaster seems more opposed to the truthful man.

χείρων γάρ.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Circa eadem autem est fere et cetera.

831. After the Philosopher has finished the

Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtute, quae tenet medium in humanis

treatise on the virtue possessing the mean in human actions in regard to amiability, he

actibus quantum ad delectationem, hic determinat de virtute quae tenet medium

now [B] treats a virtue called veracity, which possesses a mean in the same human

in eisdem humanis actibus quantum ad veritatem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo

actions. First [A’] he explains his intention; and then [B’] he defines his proposition, at

dicit de quo est intentio; secundo determinat propositum, ibi, videtur utique

“The boaster simulates etc.” He develops the first point in three ways. First [A’, 1] he

iactator, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit.

discloses that a certain virtue is a mean

Primo proponit quamdam virtutem mediam esse oppositam iactantiae.

opposed to boasting. Next [A’, 2], at “It is not a loss etc.,” he shows that we must

Secundo ostendit, quod de hac virtute est tractandum, ibi, non malum autem et

treat this virtue. Last [A’, 3], at “We have already discussed etc.,” he explains the

cetera. Tertio ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad praecedentem, ibi, in convivere

difference between this and the preceding virtue. He says first that the mean opposed

utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod medietas opposita iactantiae est fere circa

to boasting treats about nearly the same subject as the previous virtue. The reason is

eadem cum praedicta virtute, quia est circa actus humanos. Sed non secundum

that it is concerned with human actions, but not in relation to the same thing, since it

idem; quia non secundum delectationem, sed secundum aliquid aliud, ut post

does not regard pleasantness but another topic to be discussed shortly (838). As in

dicetur; et tamen ipsa medietas est innominata sicut et praedicta virtus.

the case of the previous virtue, this mean too is nameless.

Deinde cum dicit: non malum autem etc., ostendit quare necessarium est

832. Then [A’, 2], at “It is not a loss,” he explains why it is necessary to investigate

determinare de hac virtute. Et ponit ad hoc duas rationes. Circa quarum primam

this virtue, giving two reasons. First [A’, 2, a] he says that it is not profitless but in fact

dicit, quod non est malum, immo utile ad

useful to moral science to treat the virtues

scientias morales, pertranseunter tractare de huiusmodi virtutibus, quia per hoc

as we go along. In this way we will learn better what pertains to morals if, as we

magis sciemus ea quae pertinent ad mores, si pertranseamus tractando ea, quae

proceed, we treat the material pertaining to individual habits. The reason is that the

pertinent ad singulos habitus. Quia cognitio rerum moralium perficitur per

science of moral matters is completed by a knowledge of particulars.

hoc quod particularia cognoscuntur. Secundam

rationem

ponit

ibi:

et

833. At “Observing what,” he presents the

medietates et cetera. Et dicit, quod considerando in singulis ita se habere,

second reason [A’, 2, b]. We shall be assured that the virtues are kinds of median

magis certificabimur, quod virtutes sint medietates quaedam.

states by seeing how this is the case in the individual virtues.

Deinde cum dicit: in convivere utique etc.,

834. Next [A’, 3], at “We have already,” he

determinat differentiam huius virtutis ad praecedentem. Et dicit, quod de illis, qui

defines the difference between this and the preceding virtue. He states that we have

aliqualiter se habent ad delectationem vel tristitiam in convictu et collocutione

already considered (816-830) the people who in some way give pleasure or pain in

dictum est. Restat autem dicendum de illis qui secundum veritatem et falsitatem se

their association and conversation with others. But we must still discuss those

habent in sermonibus et operationibus secundum veritatem vel secundum

people who are truthful or deceitful in their words and actions or who simulate these

fictionem factis.

qualities by their deeds.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur utique etc.,

835. Then [B’], at “The boaster simulates,”

determinat de virtutibus et vitiis. Et primo ponit virtutem et vitia contraria. Secundo

he treats the virtues and vices. First [B’, 1] he presents the virtue and the opposite

determinat de eis, ibi, de utrisque autem dicemus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit.

vices; and then [B’, 2], at “We will discuss both etc.,” he investigates them. He handles

Primo ostendit quid pertineat ad medium et extrema in hac materia. Secundo

the first point from three aspects. First [B’, 1, a] he shows what belongs to the mean

ostendit qualiter ea, quae dicta sunt, pertineant ad medium habitum et

and extremes in this matter. Next [B’, 1, b], at “Each of these etc.,” he explains how the

extremos, ibi, est autem horum singula etc.; tertio ostendit medium habitum esse

things which were discussed pertain to the median habit and the extremes. Third [B’, 1,

laudabilem, extremos autem esse vitiosos, ibi, per se autem et cetera. Dicit ergo

c], at “A lie is intrinsically etc.,” he reveals that the mean habit is praiseworthy but the

primo, quod iactator, qui peccat per

extremes, vicious. He says first that the

superabundantiam, simulat aliqua gloriosa, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo quia

boaster who sins by excess pretends certain praiseworthy qualities, and this in two

simulat sibi inesse aliqua gloriosa quae non insunt; alio modo quia simulat ea quae

ways. In one way he pretends to have some distinctions that he does not possess. In the

insunt maiora esse quam sint. Ille autem qui peccat per defectum dicitur esse eyron,

other way, he claims distinctions greater than they really are. But the person who

et hoc dupliciter: uno modo quia negat sibi inesse gloriosa quae insunt; alio modo quia

sins by defect is called a dissembler. However, the man who possesses the mean

dicit ea esse minora quam sint. Ille vero qui tenet medium dicitur autochiastos, id

is said to be autocastos, i.e., admirable in himself, because he does not seek to be

est per se admirabilis, quia scilicet non quaerit magis in admiratione esse quam

admired more than becomes him. He is also said to be autophastos, i.e., essentially

sibi secundum se conveniat; vel dicitur autophastos, id est per se manifestus, quia

sincere, manifesting himself to be what he is. He is truthful inasmuch as the things he

talem se manifestat qualis est. Est enim verax inquantum de se confitetur ea quae

divulges about himself are true. He does this not only by word but also by his

sunt; et hoc non solum sermone, sed etiam

manner of living, according as his exterior

vita; inquantum scilicet exterior sua

conduct and his speech conform to his

conversatio conformis est suae conditioni, sicut et sua locutio.

nature.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem horum singula etc., ostendit qualiter praedicta

836. At “Each of these” [B’, 1, b], he explains how these things pertain to the

pertineant ad tres habitus dictos. Et dicit, quod unumquemque praedictorum actuum

three specified habits, saying that each of the above-mentioned acts may happen in

contingit dupliciter facere. Uno modo propter aliquid aliud; puta cum aliquis

two ways. In one way, it may be done for the sake of something else, for instance, a

negat se esse talem qualis est, propter timorem. Alio modo non propter aliquid

man denies that he is what he is because of fear; in the other way, not for the sake of

aliud, sed propter hoc quod in tali actu delectatur. Et hoc proprie pertinet ad

something else but because he takes delight in the act itself. This property belongs to a

habitum. Quia unusquisque secundum qualitatem sui habitus loquitur et

habit, since everyone speaks, acts and lives according to the quality of his habit. Of

operatur et vitam ducit, nisi quandoque

course at times he may act differently

aliter operetur emergens.

because something else arises.

propter

aliquid

aliud

Deinde cum dicit: per se autem mendacium etc., ostendit quid in praedictis habitibus

837. Then [B’, 1, c], at “A lie is intrinsically etc.,” he discloses what deserves praise and

sit laudabile et vituperabile. Et dicit quod mendacium secundum se est pravum et

what blame in the habits mentioned, saying that a lie is essentially evil and to be avoided,

fugiendum, verum autem est bonum et laudabile. Ad hoc enim signa sunt

but truth is good and to be praised. Signs were instituted to represent things as they

instituta quod repraesentent res secundum quod sunt. Et ideo si aliquis

are. Therefore, if a person represents a thing otherwise than it is by lying, he acts

repraesentat rem aliter quam sit, mentiendo, inordinate agit et vitiose. Qui

in an inordinate and vicious manner. But if he speaks the truth, he acts in an orderly

autem verum dicit, ordinate agit et virtuose. Manifestum est autem quod ille

and virtuous manner. Now, it is clear that the man who speaks the truth possesses the

qui verum dicit, medium tenet, quia significat rem secundum quod est; veritas

mean because he designates a thing as it is. The truth consists in an equality that is a

enim in aequalitate consistit quae est

mean between great and small. But the

medium inter magnum et parvum. Qui autem mentitur est in extremo, quia vel

person who lies stands in an extreme either by excess because he affirms more than

secundum superabundantiam, quia plus dicit quam sit, vel secundum defectum,

really is, or by defect because less than really is. Hence, it is evident that both are

quia minus dicit quam sit. Unde patet quod ambo sunt vituperabiles, sed magis

blameworthy. But the boaster who sins by excess deserves more blame since he departs

iactator qui excedit ad plus, quia plus recedit a vero: in aequali enim invenitur

farther from the truth; for the less, not the more, is found in the mean.

minus, non autem maius. Deinde cum dicit: de utrisque autem etc.,

838. Next [B’, 2], at “We will discuss both,”

determinat de praedictis habitibus. Et

he investigates the previously mentioned

primo de virtute. Secundo de vitiis oppositis, ibi, maiora autem existentibus et

habits, treating first [B’, 2, a] the virtue and then [B’, 2, b] the opposite vices, at

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat de quo veraci sit agendum.

“The person who boasts etc.” He treats the first point in a threefold manner. First [a, i]

Secundo ostendit quid ad eum principaliter pertineat, ibi, videbitur utique talis et

he determines what truthful person we are discussing. Next [a, ii], at “Such a man

cetera. Tertio ostendit ad quod extremum magis declinet, ibi, in minus autem et

etc.,” he shows what is especially characteristic of this person. Third [a, iii],

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod de praedictis habitibus dicendum est, sed

at “He turns aside etc.,” he explains to what extreme the person is more inclined. He

prius de veraci. Non autem intendimus nunc de eo qui veritatem loquitur in

says first that we must talk about these habits, but first about the truthful man.

confessionibus iudiciorum, puta cum aliquis interrogatus a iudice confitetur

However, we do not have in mind now the person who speaks the truth in judicial

quod verum est; neque etiam de eo qui verum dicit in quibuscumque pertinentibus

testimony, for example, a witness who reveals the truth when questioned by a

ad iustitiam vel iniustitiam; haec enim

judge; nor the person who speaks the truth

pertinent ad aliam virtutem, scilicet ad iustitiam. Sed de illo veridico intendimus

in any matter touching right—this pertains to another virtue, viz., justice. But we are

qui verum dicit et vita et sermone in talibus, quae non habent differentiam

directing our attention to that truthful man who manifests the truth in his life and

iustitiae et iniustitiae. Sed verum dicit solum propter dispositionem habitus: sicut

conversation in matter not having distinction of justice and injustice.

etiam supra dictum est de virtute praemissa, quod delectabiliter vult aliis

However, he manifests the truth only by reason of the disposition of the habit, as was

convivere non propter amorem, sed propter dispositionem sui habitus, ita

said before about a previous virtue (821) that it aims at living pleasantly with others,

etiam et haec virtus verum dicit non propter servandam iustitiam, sed propter

not by reason of love but by reason of its habit. So, too, this virtue shows the truth

aptitudinem dicendum.

not on account of the observance of justice but on account of the inclination it has to

quam

habet

ad

verum

manifest the truth.

Deinde cum dicit: videbitur utique etc., ostendit quid maxime pertineat ad

839. At “Such a man” [a, ii], Aristotle explains what particularly pertains to the

veracem de quo intendit. Et dicit quod talis videtur in suis verbis et factis

truthful man we have in mind, saying he is one who apparently observes moderation in

moderationem habere vitando excessum et

his actions, avoiding excess and defect. He

defectum. Amat enim veritatem et verum

loves truthfulness and the truth even where

dicit etiam in illis in quibus non multum

damage or profit is of little importance. The

refert ad nocumentum vel profectum: et multo magis in illis in quibus dicere verum

reason is that he hates a lie as something shameful in itself, and not only because it

vel falsum, facit aliquam differentiam ad nocumentum vel iuvamentum alterius. Et

injures another. A person of this kind is to be commended.

hoc ideo quia abhorret mendacium secundum se tamquam quoddam turpe, et non solum secundum quod cedit in nocumentum alterius: talem autem dicit esse laudabilem. Deinde cum dicit: in minus autem etc.,

840. Then [a, iii], at “He turns aside,” he

ostendit ad quod extremum magis declinat. Et dicit quod si aliquando difficile

explains to what extreme the truthful man more inclines, affirming that since

sit omnino ad punctum dicere veritatem, magis vult declinare ad minus quam ad

sometimes it is quite difficult to tell the exact truth, he wishes to lean towards

maius. Hoc enim videtur magis ad prudentiam pertinere, eo quod homines

understatement rather than overstatement, This seems to pertain more to prudence

superabundanter de se ipsis loquentes, efficiuntur aliis onerosi, quia per hoc

since men tend to excess, and when speaking about themselves, they become

videntur aliis se velle praeferre.

tiresome

to

others.

The

reason

for

annoyance is that they seem in this to prefer themselves to others. Deinde cum dicit: maiora autem etc., determinat de vitiis oppositis. Et circa hoc

841. Next [B’, 2, b], at “The person who boasts,” he examines the opposite vices. He

tria facit. Primo determinat de vitio quod pertinet ad superabundantiam. Secundo de

considers this point under three aspects. First [b, i] he investigates the vice

vitio quod pertinet ad defectum, ibi, eyrones autem et cetera. Tertio

pertaining to excess; next [b, ii] the vice pertaining to defect, at “Dissemblers,

determinat de oppositione vitiorum ad virtutem, ibi: opponi autem videtur et

however etc.”; and last [b, iii] the opposition of vices among themselves, at “As being

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quot modis committatur vitium

more vicious etc.” He treats the first point in a threefold manner. First [i, x] he shows

iactantiae quod excedit in plus. Secundo

in how many ways we may commit the vice

ostendit secundum quid praecipue vitium iactantiae attendatur, ibi: non in potentia

of boasting which is an extreme by excess. Second [i, y], at “A boaster is constituted

autem etc.; tertio ostendit in quibus vitium iactantiae praecipue committatur, ibi: qui

etc.,” he explains in what respect we may especially take into account the vice of

quidem igitur gloriae gratia iactant et cetera.

boasting. Finally [i, z], at “Therefore, people who etc.,” he shows in what things we may principally commit the vice of boasting.

Dicit ergo primo, quod quandoque aliquis

842. He states first that sometimes a man

iactat de se quae non sunt, vel maiora quam sint, non propter aliquem alium

says boastfully about himself things that are untrue or exaggerated, not for some

finem, sed quia in hoc delectatur, et talem dicit habere quamdam mali similitudinem,

other purpose but for the enjoyment he gets out of it. Such a man is said to have a

alioquin non gauderet de mendacio. Hoc enim ex inordinatione animi provenit. Non

semblance of evil, otherwise he would not find pleasure in lying, for this arises from a

tamen talis est omnino malus, quia non intendit aliquam malitiam. Sed est vanus,

disordered soul. However, he is not at all evil since he does not intend any malice; he

inquantum delectatur in re, quae secundum se, nec est bona nec utilis.

is only vain for taking pleasure in a thing which is really neither good nor useful. In

Secundo modo contingit quod aliquis se iactat propter appetitum gloriae vel

another way, a person speaks boastfully about himself because he wants glory or

honoris et talem dicit non esse multum

honor. This person really ought not to be

vituperabilem, in quantum scilicet gloria et honor habent quamdam affinitatem cum

blamed since glory and honor have a certain relationship to honorable things for which

rebus honestis propter quas aliqui laudantur et honorantur. Tertio modo

people are praised and honored. in still another way, people brag about themselves

aliqui se iactant causa argenti, vel cuiuscumque alterius quod argento

for the sake of money or some other thing that can be valued in money. An individual

aestimari potest. Et talem dicit esse magis deformem, quia propter minus bonum

belonging to this class is more vicious because he lies for an inferior good.

mentitur.

Deinde cum dicit: non in potentia autem etc., ostendit secundum quid praecipue

843. At “A boaster is constituted” [i, y], he explains in what respect we may take

attenditur iactantia. Et dicit quod non iudicatur aliquis iactator ex eo quod habet

boasting into account, saying that a man is not considered a boaster from the fact that

aliquid vel non habet unde se potest sic iactare, sed ex eo quod hoc eligit. Dicitur

he has or has not the capability, but from the fact that he chooses to boast. He is

enim aliquis iactator secundum habitum

called a boaster according to the habit that

quem consequitur talis electio; sicut etiam (est) de quocumque mendaci qui dicitur

this choice follows. It is the same with any liar who is such in choosing to lie, or finding

mendax ex eo quod eligit mentiri, vel quia gaudet de ipso mendacio, vel quia mentitur

pleasure in lying, or lies out of his desire for fame or profit.

propter appetitum gloriae vel lucri.

Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem igitur etc.,

844. Then [i, z], at “Therefore, people who,”

ostendit de quibus praecipue aliqui se iactant. Manifestum est autem quod illi qui

he explains the things that people usually boast about. Obviously, persons who find

de ipsa iactantia gaudent, indifferenter de

enjoyment

in

boasting

boast

quibuscumque se iactant. Illi vero qui iactant se causa gloriae fingunt talia quae

indiscriminately. But those who boast for the sake of fame pretend things that seem

videantur esse laudabilia, sicut sunt virtuosa opera vel quae pertinent ad

worthy of praise, like virtuous works, or that have reference to good fortune, like the

felicitatem, sicut nobilitas divitiae et alia

dignity of wealth and so on. Those,

huiusmodi. Illi vero qui iactant se causa lucri, fingunt talia in quibus alii

however, who boast for the sake of profit pretend things in which others find

delectentur, alioquin nihil lucrarentur, et iterum observant quod sint talia illa de

pleasure, otherwise it would profit them nothing. Again, when the things they boast

quibus se iactant quae, si non sint vera, possit hoc latere, ita quod eorum

about are not true, they take care that this fact can be hidden so their lie may not be

mendacium non deprehendatur.

discovered.

Et ponit exemplum de duobus: scilicet de

845. He takes an example from two fields:

his quae pertinent ad medicinam; quia omnes desiderant sanitatem, nec potest a

first, from things belonging to medicine, since everyone wants health and no one can

quibuscumque deprehendi, utrum aliquis in medicando erret. Alia autem sunt quae

find out whether the doctor makes a mistake; second, from divination, which

pertinent ad divinationes futurorum, de quibus naturaliter homines sollicitantur,

naturally disturbs men and where they cannot easily discover a lie. For this reason

et circa quae non de facili mendacium deprehenditur. Et ideo illi qui iactant se

people who boast for profit especially pretend to be doctors or men wise in

propter lucrum, praecipue fingunt se esse medicos vel sapientes in divinando.

foretelling the future. Perhaps his use of the word “wise” can be referred to this that

Quamvis hoc quod dicit sapientem possit

these men boast that they have a knowledge

referri ad hoc quod tales se iactent de cognitione divinorum, quae est

of divine things that is desirable and hidden.

desiderabilis et latens. Deinde cum dicit: eyrones autem etc., determinat de vitio quod pertinet ad

846. Next [b, ii], at “Dissemblers, however,” he considers the vice belonging to the

defectum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat hoc vitium iactantiae. Secundo

defect. On this point he docs two things. First [ii. x] he compares this vice with

ostendit diversitatem huius vitii, ibi: maxime autem et isti et cetera. Dicit ergo

boasting; and then [ii, y] points out its difference at “Some people especially etc.”

primo, quod irones qui minus de seipsis dicunt quam sit, videntur habere mores

He says first that dissemblers who minimize the truth about themselves seem to have

magis gratiores quam iactatores, quia non videntur talia dicere gratia lucri, sed quasi

more pleasing ways than boasters, because they apparently do not speak this way for

fugientes tumorem superbiae.

the sake of gain but as if fleeing from vanity.

Deinde cum dicit: maxime autem et isti etc., ostendit quomodo diversimode hoc

847. At “Some people especially” [ii, y] he explains how this vice is practiced in

vitium contingat. Et dicit quod quidam

different ways, saying there are some who

sunt qui maxime de se negant ea quae videntur ad magnam gloriam pertinere,

especially deny about themselves things pertaining to great renown, for example,

sicut Socrates qui negabat se esse scientem. Quidam vero sunt qui in

Socrates denied that he was wise. There are others who want to show by certain

quibusdam parvis et manifestis volunt ostendere quod non fingant de se maiora

insignificant and obvious things that they do not pretend more excellent things about

quam sint, et isti vocantur blancopanurghy, quasi in quadam astutia

themselves than they possess. Such are called blato-panurgi, i.e., men who have

simulationis suas delitias habentes; panurghy enim Graece dicuntur astuti,

their delight in a certain cunning pretense. Panurgi is a Greek word for “cunning

blancon autem idem est quod deliciosum. Hos autem dicit esse de facili

fellow,” while blaton means something done amusingly. These, he says, are readily

contemptibiles, quia nimis manifesta est eorum simulatio. Et talis defectus in

despised because their pretense is too obvious. A defect of this nature in external

exterioribus

ad

things sometimes seems to pertain to

iactantiam pertinere, dum per hoc volunt se ostendere meliores et magis moderatos,

boasting when in this way they want to appear better and more observant of

sicut Laconii qui deferebant vestimenta magis despecta quam deceret statum

moderation, like the Spartans who wore clothing humbler than became their state.

eorum, quia tam superabundantia exteriorum quam etiam immoderatus

For this reason an excess and an immoderate deficiency in externals seem to

defectus videtur ad iactantiam pertinere, inquantum per utrumque ostenditur

pertain to boasting precisely because a certain singularity in a man is displayed in

quaedam hominis excellentia.

case of each.

Quidam vero sunt qui moderate utuntur

848. Still others exercise this vice in a

hoc vitio, quia neque omnino negant de se gloriosa, neque etiam assumunt aliqua

mitigated form, since they neither altogether deny famous deeds done by

nimis parva et utuntur hoc vitio in his

themselves nor do they even attribute to

quae non sunt prompta et manifesta, et tales videntur esse gratiosi, ut supra

themselves negligible qualities, practicing the vice in matter obvious and at hand.

dictum est.

People like this seem to be pleasing, as was just said (846).

Deinde cum dicit: opponi autem videtur etc., determinat de oppositione vitii ad

849. Then [b, iii], at "As being more vicious," he considers the opposition

virtutem. Et dicit quod magis videtur opponi veridico iactator, inquantum est

between the vice and the virtue, saying that the boaster is more in opposition to the

deterior sicut dictum est. Semper enim peius vitium magis virtuti opponitur.

truthful man because more vicious, as we have already noted (837). The worse vice is

quandoque

videtur

always more opposed to virtue.

LECTURE 16 Amusement Chapter 8 II.

HE CONSIDERS A CERTAIN VIRTUE THAT DEALS WITH

AMUSEMENT. A. There can be a virtue and vice having to do with amusement. — 850851 οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ

Since recreation should have a place in

βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι

out life and our social living by means of playful conversation, this would be a

ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

suitable time for a discussion of what things are proper to say and hear. In

ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων

matters of this nature, speaking and listening are different, but it is clear that

ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ

we have both excess and defect in respect

ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου.

to the mean.

B. He treats the virtue and the opposite vices concerned with amusement. A'. The nature of each habit. 1.

WHAT THE MEAN AND THE EXTREMES IN

AMUSEMENT ARE. a. What belongs to excess. — 852 οἱ μὲν οὖν ὑπερβάλλοντες

τῷ γελοίῳ βωμολόχοι

People who engage in too much derision are buffoons and nuisances wanting

δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου,

laughter at any cost. They try more to get a laugh than to converse politely and

καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν

avoid offending the persons they mock.

εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν

σκωπτόμενον·

b. The nature of the vice by defect. — 853 οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι

On the other hand, persons who say nothing funny and are disagreeable to

δυσχεραίνοντες

those who do, seem uncultured and rude.

ἄγροικοι

καὶ

σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

c. The nature of the mean in amusement. — 854

οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται,

But men indulging in jest with good taste are called witty, like those who give

οἷον εὔτροποι·

a humorous turn to things. 2.

(THE MEAN AND THE EXTREMES) BELONG TO A

DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. — 855 τοῦ

γὰρ

ἤθους

αἱ

τοιαῦται

Actions of this kind seem to belong to

δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων

character, for as bodies are judged from their movements, so too are characters.

κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη. 3.

THE EXTREME IS SOMETIMES TAKEN FOR THE

MEAN. — 856 ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου,

Since laughter is quite popular, most

καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ

people take more pleasure in fun and in joking reproach of others than they

δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες·

should. Hence they are pleased with buffoons who are called witty. However,

ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον.

from what has been said it is obvious that buffoons are quite different from persons of wit.

B’ What is proper to each habit.

1. WHAT IS PECULIAR TO THE MEAN OF THIS VIRTUE.

a. How the witty person conducts himself in general. i. That the use of clean fun pertains to the mean habit. — 857 τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ

Tact belongs to the mean habit of this

ἐπιδεξιότης

δ'

virtue. It is characteristic of a tactful

ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ

person to tell and listen to such tales as become a decent and liberal man.

ἐστίν·

τοῦ

ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει· ii. Proof for what he has said. — 858 ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ

Now, the witty person speaks and listens

τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει

to what is becoming in jest. But the

καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ

jesting of the liberal man differs from that of the servile man; the jesting of the

ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου.

cultured man uncultured.

from

that

of

the

iii. The jesting of the cultured and the uncultured person differs. — 859 ἴδοι

δ' ἄν τις

καὶ

ἐκ τῶν

Anyone can see this in the comedies of

κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν

the ancient and modern authors. In the

καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ

earlier plays obscene language appears and is an object of laughter; in the later it

ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην.

is rather implied. This difference towards obscenities is of no small importance for decency.

b. How (the witty person) especially acts in friendly banter. i. He asks (a) question. — 860 πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ

We must determine, then, whether a man is good at raillery because he says

ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν;

what becomes a liberal man, or because he does not offend his listener, or because he even delights him.

ii. He answers the second part. — 861 ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ

This norm is indefinite to the extent that what is hateful to one person is pleasing

ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ

to another. But each will listen to the

γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ.

things which give him pleasure, while he seems to encourage the things which he permits.

iii. Something is settled as to the first part. — 862-863 οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ

The virtuous person will not employ

σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ

every kind of jest, for some jokes are in

νομοθέται κωλύουσιν·

λοιδορεῖν ἴσως καὶ

fact an insult. But legislators forbid the making of some insulting remarks.

σκώπτειν. ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος

Actually they should forbid all reviling. Here the pleasing and liberal man will be

ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ'

as it were a law unto himself. Therefore, either the witty or the tactful person

εὐτράπελος λέγεται.

possesses the mean in this matter.

ἔνια ἔδει δ'

2. WHAT IS PROPER TO THE EXTREME BY EXCESS. — 864 ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε

However, the buffoon, less vicious than the derider, spares neither himself nor

τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν

others for the sake of a laugh. Likewise, he says such things as the polite person

οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ'

would never think of saying-would not in

οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι.

fact listen to.

3. WHAT PERTAINS TO THE EXTREME BY DEFECT. — 865 ὁ δ' ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ

But the lout is useless at these conversations, contributing nothing and

συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει.

making

δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον.

Nevertheless, recreation and jest seem to be necessary for human life.

everyone

uncomfortable.

C. The difference between this and those virtues already considered. — 866

τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ

In human living there are three median courses, all of which regard

λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἣ

communication in speech and action. They differ, however, for one deals with

μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἳ δὲ

truthfulness and the others with what is

περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἣ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἣ

pleasing. Of this second class, one concerns pleasure taken in amusements,

δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

the other concerns pleasure in things according to another aspect of life, viz., conversations.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Existente autem requie et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de

850. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the virtues dealing with

virtutibus quae sunt circa humanos actus seriosos, hic determinat de

human actions of a serious nature, he now considers a certain virtue which deals with

quadam virtute quae est circa ludicra.

amusement [II]. He develops this point in

Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit quod circa ludos, potest esse virtus et

three ways. First [A] he shows there can be it virtue and vice having to do with amusement.

vitium. Secundo determinat de virtute quae circa ludos existit et de vitiis

Next [B], at “People who engage in too much etc.,” he treats the virtue and the opposite

oppositis, ibi, qui quidem in derisione et cetera. Tertio ostendit differentiam

vices concerned with amusement. Third [C], at “In human living there are etc.,” he

huius virtutis ad supradictas, ibi, tres igitur quae dictae sunt et cetera. Circa

explains the difference between this and those virtues already considered. In regard to the

primum, considerandum est, quod circa id quod est secundum se malum et non

first we must consider that, as has been shown (329), there can be no corresponding

potest habere rationem boni, non est virtus et vitium, ut in II ostensum est; si

virtue and vice concerned with what is intrinsically evil and incapable of having an

igitur ludus nullam rationem boni posset habere, non esset circa ludum aliqua

aspect of good. Consequently, if no aspect of good can be found in amusement there will be

virtus.

no virtue connected with it.

Habet autem aliquam rationem boni,

851. But amusement does have an aspect of

inquantum est utilis humanae vitae. Sicut enim homo indiget a corporalibus

good inasmuch as it is useful for human living. As man sometimes needs to give his

laboribus interdum desistendo quiescere, ita etiam indiget ut ab intentione animi

body rest from labors, so also he sometimes needs to rest his soul from mental strain that

qua rebus seriis homo intendit interdum

ensues from his application to serious affairs.

anima hominis requiescat: quod quidem

This is done by amusement. For this reason

fit per ludum. Et ideo dicit quod, cum sit

Aristotle says that, since there should be

quaedam requies hominis ab anxietate sollicitudinum in hac vita et in

some relaxation for man from the anxieties and cares of human living and social

conversatione humana per ludum, et sic ludus habet rationem boni utilis,

intercourse by means of amusement—thus amusement has the aspect of useful good—it

consequens est quod in ludis possit esse

follows that in amusement there can be a

quaedam conveniens collocutio hominum adinvicem; ut scilicet homo

certain agreeable association of men with one another, so they may say and hear such

dicat et audiat qualia oportet et sicut oportet; et tamen in talibus multum

things as are proper and in the proper way. Yet, in matters of this kind, talking and

differt dicere et audire. Multa enim aliquis homo decenter audit quae non

listening are very different, for a man properly listens to things he could not properly say.

decenter diceret. Ubicumque autem est differentia eorum quae oportet fieri et

But wherever difference exists between the things that ought to be done and ought not to

eorum quae non oportet ibi non solum est medium, sed etiam superabundantia

done, there is found not only a mean but also excess and defect in regard to this mean.

et defectus a medio. Unde circa ludum contingit esse medium virtutis et

Hence we have a virtuous mean and extremes concerned with amusement.

extrema.

Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem in derisione etc., determinat de medio et extremis. Et

852. At “People who engage” [B] he considers the mean and the extremes. First

primo ostendit quid sit circa unumquodque eorum. Secundo ostendit

[A] he speaks about the nature of each habit; then [B’], at “Tact belongs etc.,” he shows

quid unicuique eorum conveniat, ibi, medio autem habitui et cetera. Circa

what is proper to each habit. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner: initially [A’,

primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid

1] he explains what the mean and the

sit medium et extremum in ludo. Secundo ostendit quod hoc pertineat ad

extremes in amusement are; then [A’, 2] at “Actions of this kind etc.,” he shows that they

diversitatem morum, ibi, moris enim et cetera. Tertio ostendit quod quandoque

belong to a difference of character; last [A’, 3], at “Since laughter is quite etc.,” he

extremum accipitur pro medio, ibi, redundante autem risu et cetera. Circa

discloses that the extreme is sometimes taken for the mean. He treats this first point from

primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid pertineat ad superabundantiam. Et dicit,

three aspects. In the beginning [A’, 1, a] he shows what belongs to excess, saying that

quod illi qui superabundant in derisione ludi, dicuntur bomolochi, idest raptores

those who indulge excessively in playful derision are bomolochi or temple plunderers

templi ad similitudinem milvorum, qui volabant circa templum, ut raperent

because of a resemblance to birds of prey who used to fly over the temple to pounce upon the

intestina animalium immolatorum. Ita et isti insidiantur ad hoc quod possint

entrails of sacrificed animals. In that way these people lie in wait so they can pounce

aliquid rapere, quod convertant

in

upon something to turn into a laugh. On this

derisionem. Et ideo tales sunt onerosi,

account persons of this kind are a nuisance

quia desiderant undecumque facere risum; ad quod magis student, quam ad

because they want to make laughter out of everything. They make more effort to do this

hoc, quod dicant aliqua decora, idest honesta, et quod non turbent illum cui

than to engage in becoming or polite conversation and avoid disturbing the man

ingerunt convicium ex ludo. Magis enim volunt dicere aliqua turpia, vel ex quibus

they heap with playful reproach. They would rather tell scandalous stories, even at the risk

alii turbentur, quam quod non inducant

of offending others, than (not) cause men to

homines ad risum.

laugh.

Secundo ibi: qui autem neque ipsi etc.,

853. Second [A’, 1, b], at “On the other

ostendit quid sit vitium per defectum. Et dicit quod illi qui neque volunt dicere

hand,” he explains the nature of the vice by defect, stating that men who never want to

aliquid ridiculum et molesti sunt illis qui

say anything funny and are disagreeable to

dicunt, dum ex hoc irrationabiliter turbantur, videntur esse agrii, idest

the people who do (these being reasonably disturbed) seem to be uncultured or boorish

agrestes, et duri, quasi qui emolliantur delectatione ludi.

non

and coarse, like those who are not mellowed by amusing recreation.

Tertio ibi: moderate autem ludentes etc., ostendit quid sit medium in ludo. Et

854. Third [A’, 1, c], at “But men indulging,” he explains the nature of the mean in

dicit, quod illi qui moderate se habent in ludis vocantur eutrapeli, quasi bene

amusement, saying that men who devote themselves to amusement in moderation are

vertentes, quia scilicet ea quae dicuntur vel fiunt convenienter in risum

called witty (eutrapeli), as it were, good at turning because they becomingly give an

convertunt.

amusing turn to what is said and done.

Deinde cum dicit moris enim etc.,

855. Then [A’, 2], at “Actions of this kind,”

ostendit quod praedicta pertineant ad diversitatem morum. Et dicit quod

he shows that the actions just mentioned belong to different habits. lie says that these

praedicti motus, scilicet quod aliquis

movements by which a person wishes to

velit facere risum vel superabundanter vel diminute vel moderate est quoddam

amuse others too much, or too little, or in a moderate way are indications of internal

indicium interioris moralis dispositionis. Sicut enim per motus corporales

dispositions of habit. As external movements of bodies clearly indicate their internal

exteriores discernuntur interiores corporum dispositiones, ita etiam per

dispositions, so external actions manifest internal characters.

exteriores hominum operationes discernuntur interiores mores. Deinde cum dicit: redundante autem risu etc., ostendit quomodo extremum

856. At “Since laughter is quite” [A’, 3], he explains how the extreme sometimes is taken

quandoque sumitur pro medio. Et dicit,

for the mean. He says that many people

quod quia risus ad multos redundat, et

bubble over with laughter and take more

multi sunt qui magis quam oportet delectantur in ludo, et in hoc quod dicant

pleasure than they should in jest and in joking reproach of others. Hence, they give the name

aliis convitia iocosa, inde est, quod apud eos bomolochi vocantur eutrapeli, quia

witty to buffoons who please them by excessive indulgence in jest which the

sunt eis gratiosi. Superabundant enim in ludo quem plures hominum

majority of men love immoderately. Nevertheless, as is clear from what was said

superabundanter diligunt. Differunt tamen non parum bomolochi ab

before (852-854), buffoons are quite different from witty people.

eutrapelis, ut ex supradictis patet. Deinde cum dicit: medio autem habitui etc., ostendit quid proprie pertineat ad

857. Next [B’] at “Tact belongs,” he shows what properly belongs to the preceding habits.

praedictos habitus. Et primo ostendit quid proprie pertineat ad medium

First [B’, 1] he explains what is peculiar to the mean of the virtue; and then [B’, 2], at

virtutis. Secundo quid ad extremum superabundantiae, ibi, bomolochus

“However, the buffoon etc.,” what is proper to the extreme by excess. Finally [B’, 3], at “But

autem etc.; tertio quid pertineat ad extremum defectus, ibi, agrios autem et

the lout etc.,” he discloses what pertains to the extreme by defect. He handles the initial

cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter se habeat eutrapelus

point from two aspects. First [B’, 1, a] he shows how the witty person conducts himself

universaliter circa ludum. Secundo qualiter se habeat specialiter circa

in general with reference to fun; and then [B’, 1, b], at “We must determine etc.,” how he

convicia iocosa, ibi: et utrum igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo

acts especially in friendly banter. He considers this first in a threefold way. In the beginning

proponit, quod ad medium habitum

[a, i] he brings out that the use of clean fun

pertinet, convenientibus ludis uti. Et dicit, quod ad medium habitum huius

pertains to the mean habit. He affirms that what is characteristic of a tactful person

virtutis pertinet id quod est proprium epydexiotis, idest bene aptati et dispositi

(epydexiotis), i.e., of a man well-fitted and prepared to engage in conversation with

ad hoc, quod cum hominibus conversetur. Ad talem enim pertinet

others, belongs to the mean habit of this virtue. It is proper to men of this sort to

quod dicat et audiat talia ludicra quae congruant viro modesto et liberali, qui

narrate and listen to such amusing incidents as become a decent and liberal man who

scilicet liberum animum servilibus passionibus.

possesses a soul free from slavish passions.

habet

a

Secundo ibi: est enim quaedam etc.,

858. Next [a, ii], at “Now, the witty person,”

probat et inducit rationem ad hoc quod dixerat: quia scilicet ubicumque est

he gives a reason as proof for what he has said, viz., that wherever something is found

invenire aliquid quod decenter fieri potest, hoc pertinet ad virtutem. Sed

that can be done in a becoming manner, there is a thing that belongs to virtue. But it

contingit aliquem ludentem dicere et

happens that a witty person says and listens

audire quaedam convenientia. Et hoc patet ex differentia ludorum. Ludus

to what is becoming. This is obvious from the different kinds of jest. The jesting of the

enim liberalis hominis, qui scilicet intendit propria sponte bonum agere,

liberal man who spontaneously strives to act virtuously differs from the jesting of the

differt a ludo hominis servilis, qui circa servilia occupatur. Et ludus hominis

servile man who is engaged in disreputable activities. The jesting of the cultured man

disciplinati, qui scilicet instructus est qualiter debeat ludere, differt a ludo

who has been instructed how he should recreate differs from the jesting of the

hominis indisciplinati, qui nulla disciplina in ludo refrenatur. Unde

uncultured man who has not been trained by any instruction in jesting. Hence, it is clear

manifestum

medium

that it pertains to the mean habit of virtue to

habitum virtutis pertinet decentia in ludo dicere et audire.

speak and listen to what is becoming in jesting.

Tertio ibi: videbit autem utique aliquis

859. Last [a, iii], at “Anyone can see,” he

etc., inducit quoddam signum ad supradicta, quod scilicet differat ludus

introduces a proof for the previous statement that the jesting of the cultured and the

disciplinati et indisciplinati. Et dicit, quod hoc maxime apparet considerando

uncultured person differs. This, he says, is particularly evident in considering the

tam in veteribus, quam in novis comoediis, id est repraesentationibus

conversation of the players with one another in the old and new comedies or plays. The

collocutionum hominum adinvicem. Quia si alicubi in talibus narrationibus

evidence is that where these narratives in places contain obscene language, some create

occurreret aliquod turpiloquium, ex hoc quibusdam generabatur derisio, dum

derision when they turn the obscene words into laughter; but others create a suspicion

talia turpia in risum vertebantur. Quibusdam vero generabatur suspicio,

when they imply that those who were speaking in an obscene manner had evil in

dum scilicet suspicabantur eos, qui turpia loquebantur, habere aliquod

their hearts. However, obviously it is of great importance to human decency whether a man

malum in corde. Manifestum est autem quod non parum differt ad honestatem

in playful conversation speaks obscenely or properly.

est,

quod

ad

hominis, utrum dicat in ludendo turpia vel honesta.

Deinde cum dicit: et utrum igitur etc.,

860. At “We must determine” [B’, 1, b], he

ostendit qualiter se habeat virtuosus circa convicia iocosa. Et circa hoc tria

explains how the virtuous man conducts himself regarding jesting insults. On this

facit. Primo movet quaestionem, utrum

point Aristotle does three things. First [b, i]

scilicet determinandum sit quod aliquis bene convicietur in ludo ex parte eorum

he asks the question whether we must decide that a person does well at raillery by reason of

quae dicit, quia scilicet dicit ea quae decet dicere liberalem hominem, id est

the things which he says, i.e., because he says what is becomingly said by a liberal man who

virtuosum

et

modestum.

Vel

non

is virtuous and decent; or that lie is not

determinatur penes hoc bene convicians, sed potius ex parte finis vel effectus, quia

determined according to this but rather by reason of the end or effect, i.e., because he

scilicet intendit non contristare audientem. Vel etiam quod plus est,

aims not to offend his listener; or, what is more, aims to give him pleasure.

intendit eum delectare. Secundo ibi: vel et tale quidem etc., respondet quaestioni quantum ad

861. Then [b, ii], at “This norm is indefinite,” he answers the second part of the question,

secundum membrum. Et dicit quod hoc est indeterminatum, quid scilicet

saying that it is indeterminate what may offend or please the listener because different

contristet vel delectet audientem, quia scilicet diversis diversa sunt odibilia et

things are odious and pleasant to different people. Everyone will gladly listen to what

delectabilia, talia autem unusquisque libenter audiet, quae sunt sibi

pleases him. And, as long as no offense is intended, a man seems to promote those

delectabilia. Illa enim quae aliquis patienter sustinet audire, haec facere

things which he patiently hears by cooperating in them with others.

videtur, scilicet

ingerendo

ea

aliis,

dummodo non intendat eos contristare. Tertio ibi: non utique omne etc., ostendit

862. Third [b, iii], at “The virtuous person,”

aliquid esse determinatum quantum ad primum membrum, scilicet quantum ad

he shows that something is settled as to the first part, viz., as to affronts that are offered.

convicia quae dicuntur. Manifestum est enim quod virtuosus non faciet, idest

It is clear that the virtuous man does not make use of every reproach, since reproach is

non proponet omne convicium, quia convicium est quaedam contumelia; dum

a kind of insult. Besides, legislators forbid the hurling of any insult that defames a man.

tale quid in convicio dicitur, ex quo homo infamatur, et hoc prohibent dicere

They do not forbid reproachful remarks that are fittingly uttered for amusement or for a

legispositores. Sunt autem quaedam convicia, quae non prohibent, quae

man’s correction (a thing to be managed without loss of good name). That man who

oportet dicere propter delectationem, vel propter hominum emendationem, quae

acts in a pleasing and polite manner in raillery seems to be a law unto himself, provided. that

fit dummodo fiat absque infamia. Ille enim qui se habet in conviciando sicut

by his own choice he avoids the things forbidden by the law and makes use of the

gratiosus et liberalis vir, est sibi ipsi lex, dum scilicet per propriam electionem

things sanctioned by the law.

vitat ea quae lex prohibet, et utitur his quae lex concedit. Ultimo autem concludit, quod talis

863. Finally, he comes to the conclusion that

qualis dictus est, est medius, sive nominetur epydissius, id est aptus, sive

the man possessing the mean is such as was described, whether he is called epidexios, i.e.,

eutrapelus, id est bene vertens.

tactful, or eutrapelos, i.e., witty.

Deinde cum dicit: bomolochus autem

864. Next [B’, 2], at “However, the buffoon,”

etc.,

vitio

he explains the viciousness of the excess,

superabundantiae. Et dicit, quod bomolochus est minor derisore, quia

saying that the buffoon is less vicious than the mocker because the mocker tries to put

scilicet derisor intendit confundere, quod non

aliquem intendit

another to shame while the buffoon does not aim at this but only at getting a laugh. The

bomolochus, sed solum intendit risum facere. Et neque recedit a se ipso neque

latter spares neither himself nor others in attempting to create laughter, since he makes

ab aliis, si debeat risum facere, quia scilicet exempla sua, et aliorum dicta et

fun both of his own tales and of the sayings and deeds of others. Besides, he says things

facta convertit in risum; et talia dicit, quorum nullum diceret homo gratiosus,

that a polite and virtuous person would not say, and some that he should not say and

id est virtuosus, et quaedam eorum non solum non diceret sed nec etiam audiret.

should not even listen to.

Deinde cum dicit: agrios autem etc., determinat de vitio defectus. Et dicit,

865. Then [B’, 3], at “But the lout,” he treats the vice by defect, saying that the man who is

quod ille qui est agrios, idest agrestis, est inutilis ad tales collocutiones, scilicet

uncultured, i.e., boorish, is useless at these witty conversations. He contributes nothing

ludicras; nihil enim confert ad eas, sed in omnibus contristatur. Et in hoc est

to them but is disagreeable to everyone. He is vicious in that he completely abhors jest,

vitiosus,

which is necessary for human living as a kind

determinat

dum

de

totaliter

abominatur

ludum, qui est necessarius ad vitam humanam sicut requies quaedam.

of recreation.

Deinde cum dicit: tres igitur etc., ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad

866. Next [C], at “In human living there are,” he deduces the difference between this virtue

praedictas duas. Et dicit quod tres sunt medietates praedictae in vita humana,

and the two previously discussed, stating that in human life there are the three median

quae omnes communicationem

sunt circa sermonum et

states mentioned, all of which regard communication in words and works. But they

operum. Differunt autem abinvicem, quia una earum consistit circa veritatem

differ among themselves, since one of them deals with truthfulness in speech and action,

in dictis vel factis. Aliae vero duae circa delectabile. Quarum una consistit circa

while the others pertain to what is pleasing. One of these concerns pleasure taken in

delectationem quae est in ludis, alia vero

amusement; the other concerns pleasure

consistit circa delectationem quae est in colloquiis quae est secundum aliam

taken in conversation according to our usual way of living, i.e., in serious matters.

vitam, consistentem scilicet in seriis.

LECTURE 17 Shame Chapter 9 A. He shows that shame is not a virtue. A’ He investigates the genus of shame. 1. HE PRESENTS HIS PROPOSITION. — 867 περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ

Shame is not properly spoken of as a

προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει.

virtue because it is more like a passion than a habit.

γὰρ

2. HE PROVES HIS PROPOSITION. a. By means of a definition of shame. — 868 ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας,

In any case shame is defined as fear of disgrace.

b. By the effect of shame. — 869-870 καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ

Like fear, shame is brought about by

φόβῳ ἐρυθραίνονται

παραπλήσιον· γὰρ οἱ

reason of danger, for people who feel ashamed blush, and those who fear

αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ

death grow pale. Both qualities are in some measure modifications of the body,

δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ

and so pertain rather to passion than habit.

ἕξεως εἶναι. B’ He examines its subject. 1. AT WHAT AGE IT IS BECOMING. a. He presents his proposition. — 871 οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος

This passion is not becoming to persons

ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ.

of every age but only to the young.

b. Shame is becoming to adolescence. — 872 οἰόμεθα

γὰρ

δεῖν

τοὺς

We are of the opinion that it is well for

τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ

the young to feel shame because, living according to their emotions, many of

ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ

them would fall into sin but are

κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας,

restrained by shame. Moreover, we are in the habit of praising youngsters who have a sense of shame.

c. Shame is not becoming to... old age. — 873 πρεσβύτερον

δ'

οὐδεὶς

ἂν

But no one praises an old man because

ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν

he is shamefaced, for we think it unbecoming of him to commit acts

πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη.

giving rise to shame.

2. FOR WHAT CONDITION (SHAME IS BECOMING). a. It is not becoming to the virtuous person. — 874 οὐδὲ

γὰρ

ἐπιεικοῦς

ἐστὶν

ἡ

Likewise, shame is not characteristic of

αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ

a virtuous person but follows evil actions such as must not be done.

τοιαῦτα· b. He answers certain frivolous objections against his thesis. i. First. — 875-876 εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν

If some actions are shameful in fact and others only considered such, this does

διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον· φαύλου δὲ

not matter for neither kind should be done, and so should not be objects of

καὶ

shame. The wicked, however, perform

τὸ

εἶναι

τοιοῦτον

οἷον

πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν.

disgraceful actions of this kind.

ii. Second. He proves in two ways that this (shame belongs to the virtuous person) is untenable.

x. SHAME... REGARDS FAILINGS FOR WHICH BLAME IS DUE. — 877-878 τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ

It is unreasonable to hold that if a man is so constituted that he is ashamed if he

τοῦτ'

does

οἴεσθαι

ἐπιεικῆ

εἶναι,

a

disgraceful

action,

he

is

ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ' ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε

considered virtuous on this account. Shame is felt because of acts voluntarily

πράξει τὰ φαῦλα.

done, and no virtuous man voluntarily does evil. y. HE EXCLUDES THE PRECEDING OBJECTION. —

879 εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι,

Shame will be a virtue resulting from the supposition of something else, viz., if

αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.

a man did such an act, he would be ashamed. But virtue does not work this way.

iii. Third. — 880-882 εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν,

But, if shamelessness and the absence of shame at doing dishonorable actions is

οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές.

evil, it is not on that account virtuous to be ashamed to do things of this kind.

B. He says a similar thing about continence which... is not a virtue. — 883884 οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια

Likewise, continence is not a virtue but

ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς

has a mixture of virtue. Hence, we shall consider this in a later treatise, but now

ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

we must treat justice.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS De verecundia autem ut quadam et cetera. Postquam philosophus

867. After the Philosopher has completed the treatise on the median qualities that are

determinavit de medietatibus quae sunt

virtues, he now treats a median quality that

virtutes, hic determinat de quadam medietate quae non est virtus, scilicet de

is not a virtue, viz., shame. First [A] he shows that shame is not a virtue. Then [B],

verecundia. Et primo ostendit verecundiam non esse virtutem; secundo

at “Likewise, continence is not etc.,” he says a similar thing about continence, which,

inducit simile de continentia; quae cum sit laudabilis, non est virtus, ibi: non est

although laudable, is not a virtue. He discusses the first point from two aspects.

autem neque continentia et cetera. Circa

First [A] he investigates the genus of shame;

primum duo facit. Primo inquirit genus verecundiae. Secundo ostendit subiectum

and then [B’], at “This passion is not etc.,” he examines its subject. He treats this first in a

ipsius, ibi: non omni utique aetati et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

twofold manner. Initially [A’, 1] he presents his proposition, saying that shame is not

proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod de verecundia non convenit loqui sicut de

properly called a virtue. But shame is more like a passion than a habit which is the genus

quadam virtute. Sed magis assimilatur passioni quam habitui, qui est genus

of virtue.

virtutis. Secundo ibi, determinatur igitur etc., probat propositum dupliciter. Primo

868. Next [A’, 2.], at “In any case,” he proves his proposition in two ways: first [A’, 2, a] by

quidem per definitionem verecundiae.

means of a definition of shame. Shame is said

Dicitur enim verecundia esse timor ingloriationis, idest confusionis quae

to be fear of disgrace or confusion which is the opposite of glory. But fear is a certain

opponitur gloriae. Sed timor est passio quaedam. Ergo verecundia est in genere

passion. Consequently, shame belongs to the genus of passion.

passionis. Secundo ibi: perficitur autem circa pericula etc., probat idem per effectum

869. Then [A’, 2, b], at “Like fear,” he proves the same thing by the effect of shame. In this

verecundiae. Circa quod considerandum est quod passiones sunt motus appetitus

regard we must consider that passions are movements of the sensitive appetite that uses

sensitivi qui utitur organo corporali.

bodily organs. Hence all the passions are

Unde passiones omnes cum aliqua corporali transmutatione fiunt; similiter

accompanied by some corporeal change. Shame and fear—which is concerned with

autem se habet in generali quantum ad hoc de verecundia et de timore qui est

the danger of death—have a general resemblance in that each passion is judged by

circa pericula mortis, quantum ad hoc scilicet quod utraque passio indicatur per

a change in the color of the body.

transmutationem corporalis coloris. Sed in speciali differunt; quia illi qui

870. But they have particular differences,

verecundantur rubescunt, illi autem qui timent mortem pallescunt. Cuius

since people who are ashamed blush, while those who fear death turn pale. The reason

differentiae ratio est quia natura spiritus et humores transmittit ad locum ubi

for this difference is that the spirit and the humors naturally rush to the place feeling

sentit defectum. Sedes autem vitae est in corde; et ideo quando periculum vitae

the need. Now, the seat of life is the heart, and so when danger of death is feared, the

timetur, spiritus et humores recurrunt ad cor. Et ideo exteriora quasi deserta

spirit and the humors speed to the heart. Consequently, the surface of the body, being

pallescunt. Honor autem et confusio in exterioribus est, et ideo, quando homo

as it were deserted, grows pale. On the other hand, honor and confusion are numbered

timet per verecundiam (periculum) honoris, recurrentibus humoribus et

among external things. Therefore, since a man fears the loss of honor by shame, he

spiritibus ad exteriora, homo rubescit.

blushes as the humors and spirits stream

Sic igitur patet quod et verecundia et timor mortis sunt quaedam corporalia,

back to the surface. It is evident then that both shame and fear of death are certain

inquantum scilicet habent corporalem transmutationem annexam, quod videtur

alterations of the body inasmuch as they are accompanied by a change. Because this

magis ad passionem quam ad habitum pertinere. Et ita patet quod verecundia

apparently belongs rather to passion than habit, it is obvious that shame is not a virtue.

non est virtus. Deinde cum dicit: non omni utique aetati etc., ostendit quid sit subiectum

871. At “This passion” [B’], he discloses what is the fitting subject of shame. First

conveniens verecundiae. Et primo ostendit cui aetati conveniat. Secundo

[B’, 1] he shows at what age it is becoming; and then [B’, 2], at “Likewise shame is not

ostendit cui conditioni, ibi, neque enim studiosi et cetera. Circa primum tria

etc.,” for what condition. He develops the first point in a threefold fashion. First [B’, 1,

facit. Primo proponit quod intendit, scilicet quod passio verecundiae non

a] he presents his proposition, viz., that it is not becoming to persons of every age but to

convenit omni aetati, sed iuvenili.

the young.

Secundo ibi, existimamus enim etc.,

872. Then [B’, 1, b], at “We are of the

probat quod iuvenili aetati congruat verecundia. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo

opinion,” he proves in two ways that shame is becoming to adolescence. In one way he

per proprietatem iuventutis. Quia scilicet iuvenes propter fervorem aetatis vivunt

shows this from the peculiar nature of youth, namely, that on account of the intense

secundum passiones. Et ideo proni sunt

desires of their age they live according to

ad multipliciter peccandum. Et ab hoc prohibentur per verecundiam, per quam

their emotions. For that reason they are inclined to sin in various ways. But they are

turpitudinem timent. Et ideo iuvenes decet verecundia. Alio modo probat idem

restrained from this because of shame by which they fear disgrace. Therefore, shame is

per humanam consuetudinem. Iuvenes enim verecundos laudare consuevimus.

becoming to youth. In the other way he gives evidence of the same thing from usage. We are accustomed to praise young people who have a sense of shame.

Tertio ibi: senem autem nullus etc.,

873. Third [B’, 1, c], at “But no one praises,”

ostendit quod alii aetati, scilicet senili, non congruit verecundia. Et dicit quod

he explains that shame is not becoming to another period of life, i.e., old age, saying that

nullus laudat senem de hoc quod est verecundus. Quia existimamus quod non

no one praises an old man for feeling shame. The reason is that we think it unbecoming of

oporteat eum aliquod turpium operari pro quibus consuevit esse verecundia.

him to do any shameful deed from which shame usually arises. Besides, we think both

Tum quia propter longitudinem temporis reputamus eos esse expertos. Tum quia,

that old men have been proved by their years and that they ought not to do any shameful

cessante fervore aetatis, reputamus quod

act from passion after the fire of youth has

propter passionem non debeat aliquid turpe operari.

subsided.

Deinde cum dicit neque enim studiosi etc., ostendit cui condicioni hominum

874. Next [B’, 2], at “Likewise, shame is not” he shows to what condition shame is or is not

competat vel non competat verecundia. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit

becoming. He handles this point under two headings. First [B’, 2, a] he explains that it is

quod non competat virtuoso. Secundo excludit quasdam cavillationes contra

not becoming to the virtuous person. Then [B’, 2, b], at “If some actions etc.,” he

propositum, ibi, si enim sunt haec quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod neque ad

answers certain frivolous objections against his thesis. He says that shame does not

virtuosum pertinet verecundia. Verecundia enim est respectu pravorum.

belong to the man of virtue, for it occurs in regard to evil deeds. But the virtuous man

Sed virtuosus non operatur prava. Quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem et

does not do wicked actions because virtue is a quality which makes good both its possessor

opus eius bonum reddit. Ergo verecundia non competit virtuoso.

and his work. Therefore, shame is not becoming to a virtuous person.

Deinde cum dicit: si enim sunt haec etc., excludit tres obviationes contra

875. Then [B’, 2, b], at “If some actions,” he answers three objections dealing with what

praedicta. Quarum prima est. Quia posset aliquis dicere quod verecundia non

has just been said. The first [b, i] is that someone might say that shame arises not

solum est de his quae secundum veritatem sunt turpia quae contrariantur

only from truly disgraceful acts, which are contrary to virtue, but also from actions

virtuti, sed etiam de his quae sunt turpia

believed to be disgraceful.

secundum opinionem. Sed ipse dicit quod nihil differt ad propositum; quia virtuoso neutra sunt

876. But Aristotle says that it does not make any difference for our thesis, since the

operanda: scilicet neque turpia secundum

morally good man must not do things

veritatem, neque turpia secundum opinionem. Et ideo non imminet virtuoso

shameful either according to truth or opinion, and so is not in danger of being

quod de aliquo verecundetur. Sed hoc pertinet ad pravum, ut sit talis quod

ashamed of anything, But the wicked person characteristically is of the sort who perform

operetur aliquid turpium, vel secundum veritatem vel secundum opinionem.

acts certainly disgraceful or held to be such.

Secundam obviationem ponit ibi: sic

877. He introduces a second objection at “It

autem ad turpia habere et cetera. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod licet virtuosus

is unreasonable” [b, ii]. A person could say that, although the man of virtue does not

non habeat aliquid de quo verecundetur, est tamen ita dispositus, ut si aliquid

have anything to be ashamed of, nevertheless he is so disposed that if he did something of

talium operaretur, de hoc verecundaretur. Si quis ergo propter hoc

the kind, he would be ashamed of it. Therefore, in case anyone should think on

existimaret quod verecundia competeret studioso, probat hoc esse inconveniens

this account that shame belongs to the virtuous person, he proves in two ways that

dupliciter.

this is untenable.

Primo quidem quia verecundia, proprie

878. First [ii, x] he says that shame, strictly

loquendo, non respicit nisi voluntarios

speaking, regards only voluntary failings for

defectus, quibus debetur vituperium. Sed hoc repugnat virtuti quod aliquis

which blame is due. But it is inconsistent with virtue that someone should voluntarily

voluntarie operetur malum. Ergo non competit ei verecundia propter rationem

do evil. Therefore, shame does not belong to virtue for the reason just given. The case

praedictam. verecundia

autem esset si eorum quae

would be otherwise if shame were among the things which can happen involuntarily like

involuntarie possunt accidere, sicut aegritudo involuntarie accidit homini.

sickness. Hence, it can be proper for the virtuous man even when well to be solicitous

Unde virtuoso etiam sano potest competere curare de medico propter

about a doctor on account of the sickness that can happen.

Secus esset

infirmitatem quae posset accidere.

Secundo excludit praedictam obviationem

879. Second [ii, y], he excludes the preceding

ibi: erit autem utique et cetera. Et dicit quod secundum praedictam obviationem

objection at “Shame will be.” He says that if the objection were valid, shame would be a

verecundia esset quiddam virtuosum ex suppositione, quia scilicet verecundaretur

certain conditional virtuous state, for the virtuous man would be ashamed if he were to

virtuosus si turpia operaretur. Hoc autem non est de his quae proprie

do wrong. But a conditional state (that a man would be ashamed) is not one of the

conveniunt virtuosis. Immo absolute eis conveniunt, sicut patet circa omnes

qualities that properly belong to virtuous people. Rather, it belongs to them absolutely,

virtutes. Unde verecundia non

as is the case of all the virtues. We must conclude then that shame is not a special

relinquitur quod proprie conveniat

virtuoso.

quality in a virtuous person.

Tertiam obviationem ponit ibi, si autem

880. At “But if shamelessness” [b, iii] he

inverecundia et cetera. Posset enim aliquis concludere quod quia inverecundia

gives a third objection. Someone could draw the conclusion that, because shamelessness

et non verecundari de turpi operatione

and the absence of shame concerning a

est quiddam pravum, quod propter hoc verecundari sit virtuosum.

disreputable operation is an evil thing, for this reason shame is virtuous.

Sed ipse dicit hoc non esse necessarium: quia utrumque, scilicet tam verecundia

881. But Aristotle says that this is not a necessary inference because both shame and

quam inverecundia, supponit operationem turpem, quae non competit

shamelessness suppose a dishonorable act which is not attributable to a morally good

virtuoso. Qua tamen supposita, convenientius est quod eam aliquis

man. On this basis it is more reasonable that a man should reject the disgraceful operation

aspernetur per verecundiam quam quod de ea non curet per inverecundiam. Ex

by reason of shame than not care about it by reason of shamelessness. From this it is clear

his etiam apparet quod verecundia non sit virtus; nam si esset virtus, inesset

also that shame is not a virtue, for if it were a virtue it would exist in a virtuous person.

virtuoso.

Est autem attendendum quod supra

882. We must take into account that the

posuit passionem laudabilem, scilicet

Philosopher previously (356) treated the

Nemesym, de qua hic mentionem non facit quia non est intentionis suae de his

praiseworthy passion of righteous indignation (nemesis), and that here he does

passionibus hic determinare: hoc enim magis pertinet ad rhetoricam, ut patet in

not mention it because it is not his intention to treat these passions on this occasion. This

II rhetoricae. Unde nec hic de verecundia determinavit nisi ostendens eam non esse

matter pertains rather to rhetoric, as is clear from the second book of the Rhetoric (Ch. 9,

virtutem, et relinquitur intelligendum de Nemesi.

1386 b 9 sq.). Hence, neither does he here consider shame except to show that it is not a

idem

virtue. He leaves the same thing to be understood about righteous indignation. Deinde cum dicit: non est autem etc., inducit simile de continentia; quae cum

883. Then [B], at “Likewise, continence,” he introduces something similar concerning

sit laudabilis, non est virtus, sed habet aliquid virtutis admixtum. Continens

continence which, although laudable, is not a virtue but has an admixture of virtue.

enim sequitur rationem rectam, quod pertinet ad virtutem. Patitur tamen

Certainly, the continent man follows right reason, and this pertains to virtue.

concupiscentias pravas vehementes, quod pertinet ad defectum virtutis. Et de his

Nevertheless, he suffers vehement and evil desires, and this pertains to lack of virtue.

dicetur infra in septimo. Satis autem

We will discuss these subjects afterwards in

convenienter inducit similitudinem de continentia, quia verecundia maxime

the seventh book (1435-1454). It is enough that he brings out in a fitting manner

requiritur

passiones

shame’s resemblance to continence because

pravae, quod convenit continentibus, ut dictum est.

shame is especially necessary where evil passions abound, as they do in continent

ubi

abundant

people. We have already remarked this (873). Ultimo autem continuat se ad sequentia, dicens quod dicendum est deinceps de

884. Finally, he makes a connection with what follows, saying that we must next

iustitia. Et in hoc terminatur sententia quarti libri.

discuss justice. With this the teaching of the fourth book comes to an end.

BOOK V JUSTICE

LECTURE 1 Justice Chapter 1 I. HE EXAMINES JUSTICE IN THE PROPER SENSE.

A. He investigates the virtue of justice. A’ He indicates what he intends to treat. 1. WHAT SUBJECT HE INTENDS TO CONSIDER. — 885886 περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον.

We must give our attention to justice and injustice so as to determine what is the nature of the actions done, what is the mean of justice, and between what extremes the just action is a mean.

2. BY WHAT METHOD WE ARE TO EXAMINE THE DIFFERENCES. — 887 ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις.

It is our intention to proceed according to the same method we used with the virtues just studied.

B’ He carries out his intention. 1.

HE DISTINGUISHES PARTICULAR FROM LEGAL

JUSTICE. a. He divides justice into legal and particular. i. What the names... signify.

x.

HE EXPLAINS JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. —

888-889 ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα.

Apparently everyone wants to call justice that habit by which men are disposed to just works, and by which they actually perform and will just deeds. We must speak in a similar way about injustice, viz., that it is a habit by which men are disposed to unjust deeds and by which they do and will unjust actions. For that reason we must presuppose what is said here in outline.

y. THE EXPLANATION IS REASONABLE. — 890891 οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων.

Likewise, the same is not true in regard to sciences and potencies as in regard to habits, for contraries belong to the same potency and the same science, but with a habit contrary things are not referred to it. We see, for example, that things contrary to health do not proceed from health, but only things in keeping with it. Thus we say that a man walks in a healthy way when he walks like a healthy man.

z. HE INFERS A COROLLARY. — 892 πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ᾖ φανερά, καὶ ἡ καχεξία φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν

Oftentimes, then, one contrary habit is known by another, and oftentimes by its subject. If a healthy condition is known, then an unhealthy condition also becomes known. But from the things that make a man healthy a healthy condition is known, and the things themselves from the condition. If firmness of flesh is a sign of good condition, then flabbiness is necessarily a sign of bad condition. Likewise, what makes a man healthy necessarily makes his flesh firm.

πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ii. He distinguishes the two concepts. x. HE GIVES THE DIVISION. aa. Various meanings of justice. — 893 ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. bb.

It follows in most instances that if one of opposites is spoken of in various ways then the other also can be, as is the case with what is just and unjust.

He explains the meanings. — 894

ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον, ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεὶς ὁμωνύμως ἥ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ᾗ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν.

Justice and injustice can be spoken of in various ways but the different meanings lending themselves to equivocation are not immediately apparent, and are not so evident as in the things which are widely separated. In these there is a great difference in concept, for instance, the name key is used equivocally both for the clavicle in the shoulder of animals and for the instrument which locks doors.

cc. He explains... habits. — 895-896 εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ [ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον.

The unjust man should be understood in as many ways as he is designated. He is spoken of as lawbreaking, as covetous and as unfair. It is clear then that the just man will be taken as law-abiding and fair. Hence what is just is according to law and fair, but what is unjust is contrary to law and unfair.

y. THE PARTS OF THE DIVISION. aa. He shows... the covetous... unjust. — 897

ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώκουσιν· δεῖ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθά.

bb.

Since the unjust man is covetous, he will be concerned not about all goods but about whatever pertains to fortune and misfortune. Goods of this kind are always good in themselves but not always for a particular man. They are objects of his prayers and pursuits. This ought not to be so, but a man should pray that the things that are good in themselves become good for him, and should choose such as are good for him. He shows... the unjust person... unfair. —

898 ὁ δ' ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν.

But the unjust man does not always choose too much, rather sometimes too little of the things burdensome in themselves. However, because a lesser evil apparently is in some way a good— covetousness is concerned with a good— therefore it seems that this type of man is covetous. But he is unfair—a term which contains both and is common.

cc. How the unjust man is... lawbreaking. — 899 [Not in Greek]

Besides, the unjust man is lawbreaking, but this lawlessness or inequality contains all injustice and is common in respect of all kinds of injustice.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS De iustitia autem et iniustitia et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa passiones, hic determinat de virtute iustitiae quae est circa operationes; et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de iustitia proprie dicta. In secunda determinat de iustitia

885. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral virtues dealing with the passions, he now begins to consider the virtue of justice dealing with actions. He divides the inquiry into two parts, in the first of which [I] he examines justice in the proper sense; and then [Lect. 17], at “Whether or not it is possible etc.” (B. 1138 a 4), in the

metaphorica, ibi, utrum autem contingit sibiipsi iniustum facere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtute iustitiae. Secundo determinat de quadam virtute, scilicet epiichia, quae est communis iustitiae directiva, ibi: de epiikya vero et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, videmus utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo intendat, quia de iustitia et iniustitia. Et proponit tria circa iustitiam consideranda, in quibus differt iustitia a supradictis virtutibus.

metaphorical sense. He discusses the first point under two headings. Initially [A] he investigates the virtue of justice; and then [Lect. 16], at “Next we will treat equity etc.” (B. 1137 a 31), a certain virtue, namely, equity that gives direction to ordinary justice. He handles the initial point in a twofold manner. First [A’] he indicates what he intends to treat; and next [B’] at “Apparently everyone wants to call etc.,” he carries out his intention. He considers the first under two aspects. Initially [A’, 1] he shows what subject he intends to consider, viz., justice and injustice. Concerning justice he proposes for consideration three differences existing between justice an the previously mentioned virtues.

Quorum primum, tangit cum dicit quod intendendum est circa quales operationes sint iustitia et iniustitia. Virtutes enim et vitia de quibus supra dictum est, sunt circa passiones; quia scilicet in eis principaliter consideratur qualiter homo interius afficiatur secundum passiones; sed quid exterius operetur, non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, inquantum scilicet operationes exteriores ex interioribus passionibus proveniunt. Sed circa iustitiam et iniustitiam praecipue attenditur quid homo exterius operatur. Qualiter autem afficiatur interius non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, prout scilicet aliquis iuvatur vel impeditur circa operationem. Secundum autem tangit cum dicit et qualis medietas est iustitia et iustum, quod scilicet est obiectum

886. The first difference is touched upon when he says that we must aim it such operations as are done by justice and injustice. The virtues and vices discussed before (649-884) are concerned with the passions, for there we consider. in what way a man may be internally influenced by reason of the passions; but we do not consider what is externally done, except as something secondary, inasmuch as external operations originate from internal passions. However, in treating justice and injustice we direct our principal attention to what a man does externally; how he is influenced internally we consider only as a by-product, namely, according as he is helped or hindered in the operation. The second difference is touched upon when he says “what is the mean of justice and the just action,” i.e., the object of justice. In the virtues previously treated we took the mean of reason and not of the thing. But in justice the mean of the thing is used, as

iustitiae. In praehabitis enim virtutibus accipitur medium rationis et non rei.

will be determined later (932-977). The third difference is touched upon when he says “and

Sed in iustitia accipitur medium rei, ut infra dicetur. Tertium autem tangit

between what extremes the just action is the mean.” Each of the afore-mentioned virtues is

cum dicit et quorum est medium.

a mean between two vices, but justice is not a

Quaelibet enim supradictarum virtutum est medium duorum vitiorum;

mean between two vices, as will be clear afterwards (993-994).

iustitia autem non est medium duarum malitiarum ut infra patebit. Secundo

ibi:

intentio

autem

etc.,

887. Then [A’, 2], at “It is our intention,” he

ostendit secundum quem modum tractanda sunt praedicta. Et dicit quod

shows by what method we are to examine the differences just mentioned. He says that we

intendendum est tractare de iustitia secundum eamdem artem, secundum

intend to investigate justice in the same way as we investigated the virtues just discussed, i.e.,

quam tractatum est de praedictis virtutibus, scilicet figuraliter et aliis

according to type and so on.

huiusmodi modis. Deinde cum dicit: videmus utique etc., incipit determinare de iustitia. Et primo

888. Next [B’], at “Apparently everyone etc.,” he begins the investigation of justice. First [B’,

distinguit iustitiam particularem a iustitia legali. Secundo determinat de

1] he distinguishes particular from legal justice. Then [Lect. 4], at “One species of

iustitia particulari, de qua principaliter intendit, ibi, eius autem quae secundum

particular etc.” (B.1130 b 30), he considers particular justice, his principal concern. He

partem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo dividit iustitiam in legalem

discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [i, a] he divides justice into legal and

et particularem. Secundo ostendit quae et qualis sit iustitia legalis, ibi, quia

particular. Second [Lect. 2], at “Since it was said that etc.” (B.1129 b 12), he shows what

autem illegalis et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quod praeter iustitiam legalem

the nature of legal justice is. Third [Lect. 3], at “We are now investigating etc.” (B. 1130 a

est quaedam particularis iustitia, ibi: quaerimus autem eam et cetera. Circa

14), he explains that, besides legal justice, there is a particular justice. He treats the

primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid significetur nomine iustitiae vel

initial point in a twofold manner. First [a, i] he shows what the names, justice and injustice,

iniustitiae. Secundo distinguit utrumque, ibi: consequitur autem et

signify; and then [a, ii], at “It follows in most instances etc.,” he distinguishes the two

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo notificat iustitiam et iniustitiam.

concepts. He develops the first under three headings. At the outset [i, x] he explains

Secundo ostendit notificationem esse convenientem, ibi: neque enim eundem

justice and injustice. Next [i, y], at “Likewise, the same etc.,” he shows that the explanation

habet et cetera. Tertio infert corollarium ex dictis, ibi, multoties

is reasonable. Last [i, z], at “Oftentimes then etc.,” he infers a corollary from the premises.

quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnes videntur velle dicere

He says in the beginning that all seem to contend that justice is the sort of habit that

quod iustitia sit talis habitus per quem tria causantur in homine: primo quidem

brings about three effects in man. The first is an inclination to a work of justice in accord

inclinatio ad opus iustitiae, secundum quam dicitur homo operativus

with which a man is said to be disposed to just works. The second is a just action. The Third

iustorum. Secundum est operatio iusta. Tertium autem est, quod homo velit

is that a man wants to perform just operations. We must say the same about

iusta operari. Et similiter dicendum est de iniustitia, quod est habitus a quo

injustice, namely, that it is a habit by which men are disposed to unjust deeds and by which

homines sunt operativi iniustorum, et faciunt et volunt iniusta. Et ideo hoc

they do and will unjust actions. For that reason we must presuppose these things about

nobis primo supponendum est de iustitia, sicut id quod figuraliter

justice as apparently typical in such matters.

apparet. Et

est

considerandum,

quod

889. Likewise, we must take into consideration

convenienter notificavit iustitiam per voluntatem, in qua non sunt passiones

that he properly explained justice after the manner of a will, which does not have passions

et tamen est exteriorum actionum principium, unde est proprium

but nevertheless is the principle of external actions. Consequently, the will is a proper

subiectum iustitiae quae non est circa passiones.

subject of justice, which is not concerned with the passions.

Deinde cum dicit neque enim eundem

890. At “Likewise, the same” [i, y] he shows

etc., ostendit praedictas notificationes esse convenientes, quantum ad hoc

that the preceding explanations are reasonable in this respect, viz., that justice is explained by

scilicet quod, iustitia notificata est per hoc quod se habet ad volendum et

the fact that its purpose is to will and perform just actions, and injustice to will and perform

operandum iusta, iniustitia autem ad volendum et operandum iniusta. Non

unjust actions. What is true of sciences and potencies is not true of habits, for contraries

enim eodem modo se habet in habitibus, sicut in scientiis et potentiis. Contraria

belong to the same potency (for example, white and black to sight) and to the same science (for

enim pertinent ad eamdem potentiam, sicut album et nigrum ad visum, et ad

instance, health and sickness to medicine). But in regard to habits, contrary things are not

eamdem scientiam, sicut sanum et aegrum ad medicinam. Sed habitus

referred to them.

contrarius non se habet ad contraria sibi. Et

ponit

exemplum

de

habitibus

891. He takes an example from habits of the

corporalibus. Nam a sanitate non procedunt ea quae sunt contraria

body. Not the things that are contrary to health but only those in keeping with health

sanitati, sed solum ea quae sanitati congruunt. Sicut dicimus, quod aliquis

proceed from health. In this way we say that a man walks with a vigorous step who is

sane ambulat quando ita ambulat sicut ille qui sanus existit. Unde et ipsa

vigorous in health. Hence science itself, as it is a kind of knowledge, refers to contraries

scientia, licet secundum quod est cognitio quaedam, ad contraria se

inasmuch as one of contraries is the reason for knowing the other; nevertheless, inasmuch as

habeat, inquantum unum contrariorum est ratio cognoscendi aliud, tamen

science is a certain habit, it is attributed to one act only (which is knowing the truth) and not

inquantum est habitus quidam, se habet tantum ad unum actum, qui est

to the contrary error. So then it was properly said that by justice we do just actions; by

cognoscere veritatem; non autem se habet ad errorem contrarium. Sic

injustice, unjust actions.

igitur convenienter dictum est, quod per iustitiam operamur iusta et per iniustitiam iniusta. Deinde cum dicit: multotiens quidem

892. Then [i, z], at “Oftentimes, then,” he

igitur etc., infert quoddam correlarium ex dictis. Quia enim contrarii habitus

infers a corollary from the premises. Since contrary habits belong to contraries, and one

sunt contrariorum, et unus actus est determinate unius obiecti, inde est,

act belongs to one object in a fixed manner, it follows that frequently one contrary habit is

quod multoties unus habitus contrarius cognoscitur per alium et multotiens

known by another and oftentimes by its object which is, as it were, matter subject to the

habitus cognoscitur a suo obiecto, quod est quasi materia obiecta operationi

operation of the habit. He illustrates this by an example. If evexia or a healthy condition is

habitus. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum. Si evexia sit manifesta, idest

known, cachexia or an unhealthy condition is also known. In this way a habit is known by its

bona dispositio, et cachexia est manifesta, idest mala dispositio. Et sic

contrary. Likewise it is known from its object because from the things that make a man

habitus cognoscitur a suo contrario. Cognoscitur etiam ex obiecto, quia ex

healthy, a healthy condition becomes known. This is further illustrated in a more particular

his quae faciunt hominem bene se habere fit manifesta euechia. Et hoc

way. If the fact that a man has very firm flesh is a characteristic of a healthy condition, then

ulterius specialius manifestat, quia si ad evexiam pertinet, quod homo habeat

the fact that he has flabby flesh—as it were loosely compressed by reason of disordered

carnes bene densatas, necessarium est, quod ad cachexiam pertineat, quod

humors—is necessarily characteristic of an unhealthy condition. Again, that which makes

homo habeat carnes raras, id est incompactas propter indigestos

a man healthy is necessarily a condition making him have firm flesh.

humores. Et iterum necessarium est, quod illud quod facit hominem bene se habere, sit illud quod faciat eum habere carnes bene densatas.

Deinde cum dicit: consequitur autem

893. Next [a, ii], at “It follows in most

etc., distinguit iustitiam et iniustitiam. Et primo ponit divisionem; secundo

instances,” he distinguishes justice and injustice. First [ii, x] he gives the division; and

manifestat membra divisionis, ibi, quia autem avarus et cetera. Circa primum

then [ii, y], at “Since the unjust man etc.,” the parts of the division. He treats the first point

tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod multiplicitas iniustitiae manifestat

in three ways. At the outset [x, aa] he shows that various meanings of injustice indicate

multiplicitatem iustitiae. Quia ut in pluribus consequens est, ut si unum

various meanings of justice. The reason is that it follows in most instances that if one of

oppositorum dicatur multipliciter, et reliquum. Et ita etiam se habet de iusto

opposites may be spoken of in diverse ways, then the other can be. This is the case, too,

et iniusto.

with what is just and unjust.

Secundo ibi: videtur autem multipliciter etc., ostendit qualis sit horum

894. Second [x, bb], at “Justice and injustice,” he explains the nature of their various

multiplicitas. Et dicit quod tam iustitia quam iniustitia videtur multipliciter

meanings. He says that both justice and injustice can be spoken of in diverse ways, but

dici: sed multiplicitas eorum est latens, propter hoc, quod ea quae faciunt

their many meanings lie concealed because the things making for equivocation are close to one

aequivocationem sunt propinqua adinvicem secundum convenientiam

another in their agreement among themselves. But in widely separated things equivocation is

ipsorum. In his autem quae multum distant magis est manifesta

evident, if the same name be given them, because their great difference in concept, i.e., in

aequivocatio si idem nomen eis imponatur, eo quod in promptu apparet

the essential element of the proper species, is immediately apparent. In this way the name

multa differentia ipsorum, quae est secundum ideam, idest secundum

key is used equivocally of an instrument which locks doors and of the clavicle (clavicula i.e.

rationem propriae speciei; sicut hoc nomen clavis aequivoce dicitur de

little key) which covers the artery in the shoulder of animals.

instrumento quo clauduntur ostia, et de quodam operculo quod cooperit traceam arteriam, quae est in collo animalium. Tertio ibi: sumatur autem iniustus etc.,

895. Third [x, cc], at “The unjust man,” he

ostendit quot modis praedicta dicantur:

explains in how many ways the previously

et dicit quod primo sumendum est quotiens dicatur iniustus. Dicitur enim

mentioned habits may be signified, saying that first we must consider the unjust man in as

tripliciter. Uno modo illegalis, qui scilicet facit contra legem. Alio modo

many ways as he is designated. He is spoken of in three ways: in one way as the lawbreaking

dicitur iniustus avarus, qui scilicet vult plus habere de bonis. Tertio modo

man, i.e., one who acts contrary to the law; in another way as the covetous man who wants

dicitur iniustus inaequalis, qui scilicet vult minus habere de malis.

too much prosperity; in the last way as the unfair man who determines to have too few burdens.

Unde manifestum est, quod iustus dicetur dupliciter: uno enim modo

896. It is obvious then that the man is taken in two ways: in one way as a law-abiding person,

dicitur iustus legalis, idest ille qui est observator legis. Alio modo dicitur

i.e., as one who observes the law; in the other way as the fair person who is willing to have

iustus aequalis, qui scilicet aequaliter vult habere de bonis et malis; aequale

the smiles and frowns of fortune in equal measure. The equal is opposed to both, i.e., to

enim opponitur utrique, scilicet, et ei quod est in plus, et ei quod est in minus.

what is excessive and to what is deficient. From this he draws a further conclusion that

Et ex hoc ulterius concludit quod iustum dicitur legale et aequale, et

what is just is said to be according to the law and fair; and what is unjust, contrary to the

iniustum illegale et inaequale, inquantum obiecta notificantur per

law and unfair inasmuch as objects are made known by habits, as was said before (892).

habitus, ut supra dictum est. Deinde cum dicit: quia autem avarus etc., manifestat membra praemissae

897. At “Since the unjust man” [ii, y] he makes clear the parts: of the division just

divisionis. Et primo ostendit qualiter avarus dicatur iniustus. Et dicit quod

given. First [y, aa] he shows in what way the covetous man is said to be unjust. He affirms

quia avarus qui vult plus habere est iniustus, consequens est, quod sit circa

that since the covetous person who wants to have too much is unjust, it follows that he will

bona quorum abundantiam homines appetunt. Non tamen circa omnia bona,

be concerned about an abundance of goods which men desire. However, he will not be

sed solum circa illa circa quae est fortuna et infortunium; huiusmodi

solicitous about all goods but only those pertaining to fortune and adversity. Goods of

autem sunt simpliciter, id est absolute et in se considerata, semper bona, sed

this kind are beneficial if we do not make qualification, i.e., they are good considered

non semper sunt bona alicui, quia non semper sunt proportionata homini nec

independently and in themselves. But they are not always beneficial for an individual because

semper ei expediunt. Homines autem haec petunt a Deo, et in oratione, et suo

they are not always proportionate to him nor always expedient for him. However, men seek

desiderio haec inquirunt quasi semper essent eis bona et ex hoc efficiuntur avari et iniusti. Non autem ita fieri

these goods from God, and pray for and desire them as if such things were always beneficial. By reason of this they become covetous and

oportet: sed oportet orando a Deo petere, ut ea quae sunt secundum se bona efficiantur homini bona, ita quod unusquisque eligat id quod est sibi

unjust. It should not be this way, but a man ought to pray that those things that are in themselves good be made good for him, so that each may choose what is good for him, i.e., the

bonum, scilicet operari recte secundum virtutem.

proper exercise of virtue.

Secundo ibi: iniustus autem etc., manifestat quomodo inaequalis dicatur

898. Then [y, bb], at “But the unjust man,” he shows how the unjust person is said to be

iniustus. Et dicit, quod iniustus non

unfair, stating that a man is not always called

semper dicitur aliquis ex eo quod plus eligit, sed ex eo quod minus eligit in his quae simpliciter et absolute considerata sunt mala, sicut sunt labores, inopia et

unjust because he chooses too much but because he chooses too little of the things that simply and considered in themselves are burdensome—like labors, lack of necessities

alia huiusmodi. Sed quia etiam minus malum videtur aliqualiter esse bonum inquantum est eligibile, cum avaritia sit boni sicut dictum est, videtur propter

and so on. However, since lesser evil apparently is in some way a good precisely as it is eligible—covetousness regards a good as was just said (897)—it seems for this reason

hoc, quod ille qui appetit minus habere de malis sit quodam modo avarus. Sed verius dicitur quod sit inaequalis, quia hoc continet utrumque, et est commune

that a person who desires too little of what is arduous is in some way covetous. But it is nearer the truth to say that he is unfair-a term that contains both and is common to excess

ad plus et ad minus.

and defect.

Tertio ibi: et illegalis etc., manifestat quomodo iniustus dicitur illegalis. Et dicit quod etiam illegalis dicitur iniustus. Haec enim illegalitas

899. Last [y, cc], at “Besides, the unjust ,” he explains how the unjust man is said to be lawbreaking, affirming that he who is unlawful is also called unjust. A person is designated a

secundum quam dicitur aliquis illegalis, quae etiam est inaequalitas, inquantum homo non adaequatur regulae legis, continet universaliter omnem

lawbreaker by reason of unlawfulness which is also an inequality inasmuch as a man is not equal to the norm of the law. This unlawfulness contains in general all injustice

iniustitiam, et est quiddam commune respectu omnis iniustitiae ut infra patebit.

and something common in respect of every kind of injustice, as will be made clear later (911, 919, 922).

LECTURE 2 Legal justice Chapter 1 A. He treats the legally just itself. 1. THE LEGALLY JUST IS DETERMINED BY LAW. — 900-901 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ

Since it was said that the lawless

νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων

person is unjust and the law-abiding person just, obviously lawful acts are in some measure just acts. Likewise, what is determined by the positive law

δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν.

is lawful, and we say that such a

determination is just. 2. THE NATURE OF LEGAL ENACTMENTS. a. For whose sake a law is enacted. — 902-903 οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς

But laws aim to touch on everything which contributes to the benefit of all, or of the best, or of the rulers, either

ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ

on account of virtues or something else. Therefore, for one such reason we call those laws just that bring about and preserve happiness and the things

φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.

that make for happiness in the civic community.

b. On what matters laws are made. — 904-905 προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ

A law commands deeds of bravery, for instance, that a soldier should not leave

λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥιπτεῖν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ

the battle line nor throw away his arms. It commands things belonging to temperance, for example, that no one should commit adultery, that no one

τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος

should be commands meekness: another, no

ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον ἀπεσχεδιασμένος.

another. It is the same with other virtues and vices, the law ordering the former and forbidding the latter. In accord with this, a law rightly drafted

δ'

ὁ

guilty of outrage. It things that pertain to no one should strike one should contend with

will be excellent but one insufficiently considered will be bad. B. He considers legal justice. 1. THE NATURE OF LEGAL JUSTICE. — 906 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο

Justice itself then is a perfect virtue, not in itself but in relation to another. For this reason justice seems to be the

πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν

most excellent among the virtues.

εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν

Hence we have the proverb: “neither evening star nor morning star is so wonderful as justice.”

2. IN WHAT WAY IT IS RELATED TO THE VIRTUES. a. He sets forth his intention. — 907 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην

But under justice every virtue is

πᾶς' ἀρετὴ ᾿νι

included at the same time, and it is especially the perfect virtue because it is the exercise of perfect virtue.

b. He explains his proposition. i. Legal justice is an especially perfect virtue. — 908-910 καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι,

Legal justice is perfect because the person who has this virtue can exercise it in relation to another and not in relation to himself alone. Some people

ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὑτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο

can apply virtue but not to affairs Because of this, seems to be

εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον

authority tests a man, for the prince is already engaged in communication with others. Therefore, justice alone among the virtues seems to be

ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ.

another’s good because it refers to another. It produces goods useful to another, viz., the prince or the common good. Consequently, the man who

κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον·

practices vice in regard to himself and his friends is most wicked. On the other hand the man who practices virtue in regard to himself and toward others—

τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.

a difficult honorable.

to their own affairs pertaining to others. the saying of Bias commendable that

thing

to

do—is

most

ii. (Legal justice) includes every virtue. — 911

αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος

This

virtue,

therefore,

is

not

a

ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία.

particular but a general virtue, Likewise, the opposite injustice is not a particular vice but a general one.

c. He settles a point which could be called in question. — 912 τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν

How virtue and justice differ from one another is evident from what has been

εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ᾗ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.

said, for they are the same in substance but different in concept. Virtue as related to another is justice; as this kind of habit it is virtue without qualification.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quia autem illegalis et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit iustitiam, hic determinat de iustitia legali. Et primo

900. After the Philosopher has given the division of justice, he now considers legal justice. First [A] he treats the legally just

determinat de ipso iusto legali, quod est obiectum legalis iustitiae. Secundo determinat de ipsa legali iustitia, ibi, ipsa quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo

itself, which is the object of legal justice. Second [B], at “Justice itself then etc., he considers legal justice. He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First [A, 1 ] he

facit. Primo ostendit, quod iustum legale determinatur secundum legem. Secundo ostendit qualia sunt illa, quae lege determinantur, ibi, leges autem dicunt et

shows that the legally just is determined by law. Now [A, 2], at “But laws aim etc.,” he explains the nature of legal enactments. He affirms first that, since it was said above

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia supra dictum est, quod illegalis est iniustus, et legalis est iustus, manifeste consequitur, quod omnia legalia sunt aliqualiter iusta.

(895-896, 899) that the lawless man is unjust and the law-abiding man just, it clearly follows that all lawful acts are just in some measure.

Dicit autem aliqualiter, quia omnis lex datur in ordine ad aliquam politiam: non autem in omni politia est simpliciter

901. He says “in some measure” because every law is determined in relation to some state. Now, not every state possesses what

iustum, sed in quibusdam est iustum solum secundum quid, ut patet per philosophum in III politicae, nam in politia democratica, in qua populus totus vult

is simply just but some states have only what is partially just, as is evident in the third book of the Politics (Ch. 9, 1281 a 10; St. Th. Lect. 7, 413). In a democratic state

dominari, attenditur iustum secundum quid, sed non simpliciter: ut scilicet quia

where all the people govern, what is partially just is observed but not what is

omnes cives sunt aequales secundum quid, scilicet secundum libertatem, ideo habeantur ut aequales simpliciter; unde

simply just, so that because all the citizens are equal in one respect (i.e., in liberty), therefore they are considered equal in every

nec ea quae secundum legem democraticam statuuntur sunt simpliciter iusta, sed aliqualiter. Dicit autem illa esse legalia, quae sunt statuta et determinata

respect. Consequently, acts that are prescribed by law in a democracy are not simply but only in some measure just. But Aristotle says that those enactments are

per legispositivam, quae competit legislatoribus. Et unumquodque eorum sic determinatorum dicimus esse aliqualiter iustum.

lawful that have been fixed and determined by positive law, which is within the competence of legislators, and that each enactment so decreed is said to he just in some way.

Deinde cum dicit: leges autem dicunt etc., ostendit qualia sint, quae lege statuuntur.

902. Next [A’, 2] , at “But laws aim,” he explains with what the decrees of law are

Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit respectu cuius finis aliquid lege statuatur; secundo ostendit de quibus aliquid statuatur lege, ibi: praecipit autem lex et

concerned. He considers this point from two aspects. First [2, a] he shows for whose sake a law is enacted. Then [2, b], at “A law commands,” he shows on what matters

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod leges de omnibus loquuntur, secundum quod potest conici quod pertineat ad aliquid utile vel toti communitati, sicut est in

laws are made. He says first that laws touch on everything that can be of any possible utility for the community (as in the ideal states where the common good is kept in

rectis politiis, in quibus intenditur bonum commune. Vel ad aliquid quod sit utile optimis, idest aliquibus maioribus de civitate, per quos civitas regitur, qui et

mind), or for the utility of the best (i.e., certain elders of the state who govern it and are called nobles), or for the utility of he rulers (as happens in states ruled by kings

optimates dicuntur. Vel ad aliquid utile dominis, sicut contingit in politiis quae reguntur regibus vel tyrannis. Semper enim in legibus ferendis attenditur id quod

and tyrants). In the framing of laws attention is always given to what is useful to the affair of chief importance in the city.

est utile ei quod est principale in civitate.

Quod autem aliqui habeantur ut optimi vel ut dominantes, contingit quidem, vel secundum virtutem sicut in aristocratica

903. Some may be considered as best or as ruling either because of virtue (as in an aristocratic state where certain ones rule on

politia, in qua aliqui propter virtutem principantur; vel secundum aliquem alium modum, puta in politia oligarchica, in qua aliqui pauci principantur propter divitias

account of virtue), or for the sake of something else (as in an oligarchy where the few rule on account of riches or power). Since human utility of every kind is finally

vel potentiam. Et quia omnis utilitas humana finaliter ordinatur ad felicitatem, manifestum est, quod secundum unum modum iusta legalia dicuntur ea quae sunt

ordered to happiness, obviously the legal enactments that bring about happiness and the means to it (i.e., the things that are ordered to happiness either principally, like

factiva et conservativa felicitatis et particularum ipsius, idest eorum quae ad felicitatem ordinantur, vel principaliter sicut virtutes, vel instrumentaliter sicut

the virtues, or instrumentally like riches and other external goods of this kind) are called just in some fashion. This is by comparison with the civic community to which the

divitiae, et alia huiusmodi exteriora bona; et hoc per comparationem ad communitatem politicam ad quam respicit legispositio.

framing of a law is directed.

Deinde cum dicit: praecipit autem lex etc., ostendit de quibus aliquid lege statuatur. Et dicit, quod lex praecipit ea quae

904. At “A law commands” [2, b] he explains on what matters laws are made, saying that a law commands what belongs

pertinent ad singulas virtutes. Praecipit enim facere opera fortitudinis, puta cum praecipit, quod miles non derelinquat aciem, et quod non fugiat, neque proiiciat

to individual virtues. It commands deeds of bravery, for instance, that a soldier should not leave the battle line, nor take flight, nor throw away his arms. Likewise, it

arma. Similiter etiam praecipit ea quae pertinent ad temperantiam, puta cum praecipit quod nullus moechetur, et quod nullus faciat mulieri aliquod convicium in

commands things pertaining to temperance, for example, that no one should commit adultery, that no one should dishonor the person of a woman. Also it commands the

propria persona; et similiter etiam praecipit ea quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem: sicut cum praecipit quod

things belonging to meekness: no one should strike another in anger, no one should contend with another by insults. It is

unus non percutiat alium ex ira, et quod non contendat cum eo opprobria inferendo. Et similiter est de aliis virtutibus quarum actus lex iubet, et de

the same with other virtues whose acts the law commands, and with other vices whose acts the law forbids.

aliis malitiis quarum actus lex prohibet. Et si quidem lex recte ponatur ad hoc, dicetur lex recta: alias vero dicitur lex

905. If the law is rightly drafted according to this, it will be declared an excellent law.

apostomasmenos, ab a quod est sine, et postochios, quod est scientia, et menos, quod est perscrutatio; quasi lex posita sine perscrutatione scientiae; vel schedos

Otherwise it is called aposchediasmenos (from a meaning without, poschedias meaning knowledge, and menos meaning a searching) as if the law was drafted without

dicitur dictamen ex improviso editum, inde schediazo, idest ex improviso aliquid facio, unde potest dici lex aposchediasmenos, idest quae caret debita providentia.

a thorough knowledge, or the expression may come from schedos signifying a decree published without being thoroughly scanned, from which we have schediazo, i.e.,

I am doing something off-hand. Hence a law is said to be aposchediasmenos which lacks proper forethought. Deinde cum dicit: ipsa quidem igitur etc., determinat qualis sit iustitia legalis. Et

906. Then [B], at “Justice itself then,” he determines how legal justice is constituted,

circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit conditionem legalis iustitiae. Secundo ostendit qualiter legalis iustitia se habeat ad alias virtutes, ibi: in iustitia autem et

showing first [B, 1] the nature of legal justice; and then [B, 2], at “But under justice,” in what way it is related to the virtues. He says first that justice itself is a

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ipsa iustitia est quaedam virtus perfecta non simpliciter, sed in comparatione ad alterum. Et quia esse perfectum non

certain perfect virtue not in terms of itself but in relation to another. Since it is better to be perfect not only in oneself but also in relation to another, therefore it is often said

solum secundum se, sed etiam in comparatione ad alterum, potius est, propter hoc (cum) multoties dicitur, quod haec iustitia sit praeclarissima inter

that this justice is the most excellent among all virtues. This is the origin of the proverb that neither Hesperus nor Lucifer, the brightest of the morning and evening stars,

omnes virtutes; et proverbium inde sumitur, quod neque Hesperus, idest stella praeclarissima vespertina, neque Lucifer, idest stella praeclarissima matutina, ita

shine with such brilliance as justice.

fulgeat sicut iustitia.

Deinde cum dicit: in iustitia autem etc.,

907. Next [B, 2], at “But under justice,” he

ostendit ex hoc quod dictum est, qualiter iustitia legalis se habeat ad virtutes. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum,

shows from our discussion thus far how legal justice is related to the virtues. He treats this point under three headings. First [B, 2, a] he sets forth his intention. Then

ibi, perfecta autem est et cetera. Tertio determinat quiddam quod poterat esse dubium ex praedictis, ibi: quid autem differt virtus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo,

[B, 2, b], at “Legal justice is perfect etc.,” he explains his proposition. Lastly [B, 2, c], at “How virtue and justice etc.,” he settles a point which could be called in question by

quod quia iustitia legalis consistit in usu virtutis qui est ad alterum et secundum omnem virtutem de qua lex praecipit, inde est, quod in ipsa iustitia simul

the present discussion. He states first that justice itself comprehends every virtue at the same time and is even the perfect virtue in a special way. The reason is that legal

comprehenditur omnis virtus, et ipsa est etiam virtus maxime perfecta.

justice consists in the exercise of virtue having do with another and is in agreement with every virtue prescribed by the law.

Deinde cum dicit: perfecta autem est etc.,

908. At “Legal justice is perfect” [ B, 2, b]

ostendit quod propositum est. Et primo quod iustitia legalis sit virtus maxime perfecta. Secundo quod comprehendat omnem virtutem, ibi, haec quidem igitur

he explains what was set forth: first [b, i] that legal justice is an especially perfect virtue; and then, at “This virtue, therefore” [b, ii], that it includes every virtue. He says

iustitia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ideo iustitia legalis est perfecta virtus, quia ille qui habet hanc virtutem, potest uti virtute ad alterum, et non solum ad

first that legal justice is a perfect virtue because a man who has this virtue can employ it in relation to another and not to himself only—something not characteristic

seipsum; quod quidem non contingit omnibus virtuosis; multi enim possunt uti virtute in propriis, qui non possunt ea uti in his quae sunt ad alterum. Et ad

of all virtuous people. Many can practice virtue in things pertaining to themselves but not in the things pertaining to others. To make clear the previous statements he

manifestationem praemissorum inducit duo quae communiter dicuntur sive proverbialiter.

introduces proverbs.

Bias enim, qui fuit unus de septem sapientibus, dixit, quod principatus ostendit virum, utrum scilicet sit perfectus, vel insufficiens. Ille enim qui est

909. Bias, one of the seven wise men, said that authority tests whether a man is perfect or deficient. The man who rules is already engaged in communication with

princeps iam se habet in communicatione ad alterum, quia ad eum pertinet disponere ea quae ordinantur ad bonum commune. Et ita ex hoc habetur, quod

another because it is his business to arrange the things which are ordered to the common good. So from this we see that the perfection of virtue is indicated by the fact

perfectio virtutis ostenditur ex hoc, quod unus bene se habet ad alterum. Aliud autem proverbialiter dictum inducit ad ostendendum, quod iustitia legalis sit ad

that one person is in touch with another. He proposes another saying to show that legal justice refers to another. For this reason legal justice alone seems to be the good of

alterum. Propter hoc enim sola iustitia inter virtutes videtur esse alienum bonum, quia est ad alterum in quantum intendit operari ea quae sunt utilia alteri, scilicet

another (that is, relates to our neighbor) inasmuch as it aims to perform actions useful to another, viz., to the community or the ruler of the community. But some

vel ipsi communitati vel principi communitatis; aliae vero virtutes intendunt operari bonum proprium, puta temperantia intendit quietare animum a

virtues aim to achieve an individual’s good, for instance, temperance strives to quiet the disgraceful desires of the soul. The same is true of the other virtues.

two

common

sayings

or

turpibus concupiscentiis. Et idem est in aliis virtutibus.

Concludit igitur quod, sicut pessimus est ille, qui utitur malitia, non solum ad

910. He draws the conclusion that, as that man is most wicked who practices vice not

seipsum, sed etiam ad amicos, ita optimus dicitur ille, qui utitur virtute non solum ad

only in regard to himself but also in regard to his friends, so, that man is most

seipsum, sed etiam in comparatione ad alterum. Hoc enim est maxime difficile. Sic

honorable who practices virtue in relation not only to himself but also to others. This

igitur patet, quod iustus legalis est optimus, et iustitia legalis est perfectissima virtus.

is especially difficult. So then it is clear that the law-abiding just man is most virtuous and legal justice is the most perfect of virtues.

Deinde cum dicit: haec quidem igitur etc.,

911. Then [b, ii], at “This virtue, therefore,”

concludit quod iustitia legalis includat omnem virtutem. Ad eam enim pertinet uti virtute ad alium. Qualibet autem virtute potest aliquis uti ad alterum. Unde

he infers that legal justice embraces every virtue, for it pertains to legal justice to exercise virtue in regard to another. But a person can practice every virtue in his

manifestum est quod iustitia legalis non est quaedam particularis virtus, sed ad eam pertinet tota virtus. Neque etiam contraria malitia est pars malitiae, sed ad

relation with another. Hence obviously legal justice is not a particular virtue but has a connection with virtue in general. Likewise, the opposite vice is not a particular vice but

eam pertinet tota malitia, quia similiter qualibet malitia potest homo uti ad alterum.

a general vice, since in a similar way man can exercise every vice in his relations with his neighbor.

Deinde cum dicit: quid autem differt virtus etc., manifestat quiddam quod possit esse dubium circa praemissa. Et dicit, quod ex dictis manifestum est in quo differant

912. Next [B, 2, c], at “How justice and virtue,” he clarifies something that may be doubtful from the premises. He says that it is clear, from what has been said, the way in

virtus et iustitia legalis. Quia secundum substantiam est eadem, sed secundum rationem non est idem; sed per comparationem ad alterum dicitur iustitia;

which virtue and legal justice differ since they are the same in substance but different in concept. However, virtue in its relation to another is called justice, but precisely as it is

inquantum autem est habitus operativus talis boni, est simpliciter virtus. Hoc autem intelligendum est quantum ad ipsum actum iustitiae et virtutis. Actus

a habit operative of such good, it is a virtue simply. This must be understood in regard to the act itself of justice and virtue, for an act identical in subject but diverse in

enim idem subiecto producitur a iustitia legali et a virtute simpliciter dicta, puta non moechari; tamen secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Verum, quia ubi est

concept is produced by legal justice and by virtue simply so called, for instance, not to commit adultery. But where a special formal aspect of an object exists even in general

specialis ratio obiecti etiam in materia generali, oportet esse specialem habitum, inde est, quod ipsa iustitia legalis est determinata virtus habens speciem ex hoc

matter, thee a special habit must be found. For this reason it follows that legal justice is a definite virtue taking its species from this, that it tends to the common good.

quod intendit ad bonum commune.

LECTURE 3 Particular Justice Chapter 2 A. He indicates his proposition. — 913 ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει

We are now investigating that justice

ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος.

which is a part of the general virtue. As we have remarked, there is such a virtue. We also intend to speak in a similar way about particular injustice.

B. He explains (the proposition). 1. THERE IS A JUSTICE WHICH IS A PARTICULAR VIRTUE. a. First argument. — 914-915 σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν

The proof for the existence of a particular

γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ

justice is that a man who practices other vices acting unjustly, nevertheless does not act covetously, for example, one who throws away his shield out of cowardice, or who speaks ill of another out of anger, or who

βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά ψέγομεν γάρ καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς

refuses financial help because of stinginess. On the other hand, a person often sins by covetousness, although not by one or all of the other vices, but he does sin by this particular vice, for we reproach him for being unjust. There is then another kind of injustice, a part of injustice in general. Likewise, there is a certain unjust thing

ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον.

that is a part of that which is legally unjust.

b. Second argument. — 916 ἔτι εἰ ὃ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ

Moreover, if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by this

προσλαμβάνων, ὃ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος

act, while another commits adultery for the sake of concupiscence and pays, thus

δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὔ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν.

sustaining a loss; the second man seems to be more lustful than the first who is unjust rather than lustful, for obviously he acted for gain.

c. Third argument. — 917 ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἆλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοχθηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ'

Yet in all other kinds of injustice’ there is always a reference to some particular vice, for instance, if a man commits adultery it is ascribed to lust. If a soldier deserts his leader, it is 30 referred to cowardice. If anyone strikes another, it is attributed to anger. But if a person makes an exorbitant

ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει,

profit, it is not reduced to any other vice but only to injustice. Hence it is clear that over and above general justice, there is a particular justice.

2. WHY IT HAS A NAME IN COMMON WITH LEGAL JUSTICE.

a. The reason for this. — 919 συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν

This justice has the same name because

τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν,

defined under the same genus, since both agree in a relation to another.

b. The difference between them. — 919 ἀλλ' ἣ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι

But particular justice is concerned with honor, money, security, and all other things

ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἣ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

of this kind whatever name they may have, and also with the pleasure that follows upon possession. But general justice touches upon everything by reason of which a man can be called virtuous.

C. He sums up what has already been said and shows what remains to be

discussed. 1. HE SETS THIS FORTH IN A GENERAL WAY. — 920 ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ

Obviously then there is more than one justice, there is another justice besides the general virtue. What this other justice is and its characteristics will be considered

ποία τις, ληπτέον.

now.

2. HE TAKES IT UP IN A SPECIFIC WAY. a. What was said about the distinction between justice and injustice. — 921 διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον.

We have determined that the unjust thing is both the illegally unjust and the unjust simply, but the just thing is both the just corresponding to the law and the just that is equal or fair.

b. There is a twofold justice. — 922 κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον τὸ

Therefore, in accord with the illegally unjust thing, there is an injustice that we previously discussed. Now, the unjust thing that consists in a desire for inequality is not the same, but is related to the other as a

μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη

part to the whole, for every unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality is an illegally unjust thing but not the reverse. Besides, the excessive is unequal but not the reverse. Because one unjust thing is not the same as another, so also one injustice is not the same as another but different from it as a part from the whole. The same

τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

comparison holds for one injustice with the other.

c. Which... we must discuss. i. We must treat particular justice after this. — 923

ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ

We must then discuss particular justice and injustice, and also the just and the unjust thing taken in the same sense.

δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ii. Here we are not going to treat legal justice. — 924 ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἣ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς

Justice that corresponds to all of virtue and injustice that corresponds to all of vice, as their exercise pertains to our neighbor, are both to be passed over for the present. It is

ἄλλον ἣ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς προσταττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν

evident in these cases how the just thing must be determined. Nearly all legal enactments are prescribed by the general virtue, for the law commands us to live according to every virtue and forbids us to live according to any vice.

προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. iii. He raises a doubt. — 925-926 τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα

However, positive laws are productive of virtue in general in regard to instruction

νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι

which pertains to the common good. But that instruction according to which a man is good simply, whether it belongs to political science or some other science, must be determined afterwards. Perhaps, to be a good man and to be a good citizen are not the same thing in any state.

καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quaerimus autem eam quae in parte virtutis et cetera. Postquam philosophus

913. After the Philosopher has shown that besides this there is a particular what is the

ostendit qualis sit iustitia legalis quae est omnis virtus, hic ostendit, quod praeter eam est quaedam particularis iustitia. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo ostendit propositum, ibi: signum autem etc.; tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt et ostendit quae restant

nature of legal justice, which is a general virtue, now he shows justice. He treats this point under three headings. First [A] he indicates his proposition; and then [B], at “The proof for etc.,” he explains it. Last [C], at “Obviously then etc.,” he sums up what has already been said and shows what

dicenda, ibi: quoniam quidem igitur sunt iustitiae plures et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum iustitia legalis sit omnis virtus, non eam nunc principaliter quaerimus, sed illam quae est pars totius virtutis sicut quaedam particularis virtus; est enim quaedam talis iustitia, sicut communiter dicimus. Et similiter etiam

remains to be discussed. He says first that, while legal justice is a general virtue, we are not principally investigating this at present, but that which as a part of the general virtue is a particular virtue. As is commonly held, there is such a virtue. Also we intend to speak about particular injustice in a similar manner.

intendimus de iniustitia particulari. Deinde cum dicit: signum autem etc., ostendit propositum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod praeter iustitiam legalem quae est omnis virtus est quaedam iustitia quae est particularis

914. Then [B], at “The proof for,” he explains the proposition. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [B, 1] he shows that besides legal justice, which is a general virtue, there is a justice that is a

virtus; secundo assignat rationem quare communicat in nomine cum iustitia legali, ibi: univoca quoniam diffinitio et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est quod, ad ostendendum esse quandam iustitiam quae est particularis virtus, assumit probandum quod est quaedam iniustitia quae est particularis malitia; nam supra

particular virtue. Next [B, 2], at “This justice etc.,” he assigns the reason why it has a name in common with legal justice. On this question we must consider that to prove there is a justice that is a particular virtue, he takes for granted that there is an injustice that is a particular vice, for we said above (892) that habits are made known by

dictum est quod habitus ex contrariis manifestantur. Inducit autem ad hoc tres rationes. Quarum prima sumitur secundum separationem iniustitiae ab aliis malitiis, in quantum scilicet iniustitia invenitur sine aliis malitiis et e converso, ex quo patet quod iniustitia est quaedam particularis malitia ab aliis distincta.

their contraries. He proposes three arguments for this. The first argument [B, 1, a] is taken according to the real distinction of injustice from other vices inasmuch as injustice is found without the others and conversely. From this it is evident that injustice is a particular vice distinct from other vices.

Dicit ergo quod hoc signum habemus quod sit quaedam particularis iustitia vel iniustitia, quia ille qui operatur secundum

915. He says that we have this proof that there is a particular justice and injustice because a man, who practices other

alias particulares malitias facit quidem

particular vices acting unjustly according to

iniuste secundum iniustitiam legalem, non

legal injustice, nevertheless does not act

tamen facit avare, ut scilicet aliquid accipiat de alieno; sicut cum aliquis miles abicit clipeum in bello propter timiditatem, vel qui dixit alicui opprobrium propter iram, vel qui non praestitit auxilium amico suo in pecuniis, propter vitium illiberalitatis. Et sic aliae malitiae possunt esse sine avaritia quae est specialis

covetously in taking something from his neighbor, for example, when a soldier throws away his shield because of cowardice, or a man casts opprobrium on someone because of anger, or a person refuses financial help to a friend because of the vice of stinginess. So other vices can exist without covetousness which is a special kind

iniustitia. Quandoque autem est e converso quod aliquis peccat per avaritiam tollendo aliena, et tamen non peccat secundum unam aliquam aliarum malitiarum, neque secundum omnes, et tamen peccat secundum quamdam malitiam. Quod patet quia propter hoc vituperatur et quasi iniustus. Unde patet

of injustice. Sometimes, on the contrary, it happens that a person sins by covetousness in taking another’s goods; although he does not sin by some one or all of the other vices, he does sin by a particular vice. This is clear because he is reproached as unjust for that reason. Hence obviously there is another justice-a part of the virtue-that is a special

quod est quaedam alia iniustitia (quae est sicut pars totius malitiae, et quaedam alia iustitia) quae est sicut pars totius virtutis, sicut quaedam specialis virtus, et similiter etiam patet quod est quoddam iniustum quod est pars iniusti legalis, quod est commune iniustum.

virtue. So evidently there exists also a certain unjust thing that is a part of what is legally unjust-the legally unjust being the unjust thing in general.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc si hic quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex ordine ad finem. Manifestum est enim quod, si actus unius vitii vel malitiae ordinetur ad alium finem indebitum, ex hoc ipso

916. At “Moreover, if one man” [B, 1, b] he gives the second argument, which is taken from the order to the end. Clearly, if a vicious or evil act is ordered to another unbecoming end, from this fact it will obtain

sortitur quamdam novam speciem malitiae. Sit ergo aliquis qui adulterium committat causa lucri, ut scilicet spoliet mulierem, vel qualitercumque ab ea accipiat. Contingit etiam quandoque quod aliquis adulterium committit propter concupiscentiam, non quidem ut lucretur, sed magis apponit aliquid de suo et in

a new species of vice. This is so when a man commits adultery for the sake of gain, for example, to rob a woman or to take from her in any way whatsoever. Also it happens sometimes that a man commits adultery entirely because of concupiscence, so that he not only does not gain but rather gives something of his own and suffers a loss of is

rebus suis patitur iacturam; talis autem proprie videtur esse luxuriosus, quia vitium luxuriae praecipue ordinatur ad satisfaciendum concupiscentiae. Ille autem qui moechatur ut accipiat aliena

goods. A man of this sort seems to be lustful, essentially speaking (per se), since the vice of lust is strictly ordered to the satisfaction of concupiscence. But the man who commits adultery to take a woman’s

non videtur esse luxuriosus, per se loquendo, quia non intendit luxuriae finem. Sed magis videtur esse iniustus,

goods does not seem to be lustful, absolutely speaking, because he does not intend lust as his end. He seems rather to be unjust since

quia propter lucrum contra iustitiam fecit. Sic ergo patet quod iniustitia est quaedam specialis malitia.

he sins against justice for the sake of gain. So it is clear then that injustice is a special vice.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc circa alias quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem ad iustitiam legalem. Sicut enim nihil est in genere quod non sit in aliqua eius specie, ita omne quod fit secundum iniustitiam legalem reducitur ad quandam particularem malitiam; sicut

917. At “Yet in all” [B, i, c] he assigns the third argument, which is taken by comparison with legal justice. As nothing is contained in a genus that is not contained in some species, so anything that is done according to legal injustice is reduced to a particular vice. If a man acts contrary to

si aliquis fecit contra legalem iustitiam moechando, hoc refertur ad vitium luxuriae. Si autem aliquis miles in bello derelinquat ducem exercitus, reducitur hoc ad malitiam timiditatis. Si autem inordinate percussit proximum, hoc reducitur ad malitiam irae. Si vero aliquis inordinate lucratus est surripiens aliena,

legal justice by committing adultery, this will be referred to the vice of lust. If a soldier deserts his general in battle, this will be attributed to the vice of cowardice. If anyone immoderately strikes his neighbor, this will be ascribed to the vice of a anger. But if a person inordinately enriches himself by pilfering another’s goods, this will not be

hoc non reducitur ad aliquam aliam malitiam, sed ad solam iniustitiam. Unde relinquitur quod sit quaedam iniustitia particularis, praeter aliam iniustitiam quae est tota malitia. Et eadem ratione est alia iustitia particularis praeter iustitiam legalem quae est tota virtus.

ascribed to any other vice except injustice. Hence it remains that there is a particular injustice over and above the other injustice that is a general vice. For a like reason there is another particular justice besides legal justice that is a general virtue.

Deinde cum dicit: univoca etc., ostendit quare huiusmodi particularis virtus etiam iustitia nominetur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim assignat rationem huius ex

918. Then [B, 2] at “This justice has,” he shows why a particular virtue of this kind is also named justice. First [B, 2, a] he assigns the reason for this from the agreement of

convenientia particularis iustitiae cum legali. Secundo ostendit differentiam inter ea, ibi: sed haec quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod iniustitia particularis est univoca, id est conveniens in nomine cum iniustitia legali, et hoc ideo quia conveniunt in diffinitione secundum idem genus, in quantum scilicet utraque est in

particular with legal justice. Next [B, 2, b], at “But particular justice,” he explains the difference between them. He says first that particular justice is univocal, that is, has a common name with legal justice. The reason is that they agree in definition according to the same genus inasmuch as both are concerned about what relates to another.

eo quod est ad alterum: licet iustitia legalis attendatur in ordine ad aliud quod est bonum commune, iustitia autem particularis ordinatur ad alterum quod pertinet ad aliquam personam privatam.

However, legal justice is taken into account in relation to what is the common good, while particular justice is ordered to another as pertaining to a private person.

Deinde cum dicit: sed haec quidem etc., ostendit differentiam utriusque iniustitiae ex parte materiae. Et dicit quod iniustitia

919. Next [B, 2, b], at “But particular justice,” he explains the difference between justice and injustice on part of the matter.

particularis est circa illa, secundum quae attenditur communicatio inter homines; sicut honor et pecunia et ea quae pertinent ad salutem vel dispendium corporis, et circa alia huiusmodi. Est etiam particularis iniustitia non solum circa res exteriores, sed etiam propter delectationem quae consequitur ex lucro,

He says that particular justice regards hose things hat take into account social intercourse, like honor, money, whatever pertains to the safety or harm to the body, and so on. Likewise, particular justice is concerned not alone with external things but also with pleasure consequent on the profit by which a man takes his neighbor’s goods

per quod scilicet aliquis accipit aliena ultra quam debeat. Sed iustitia legalis et iniustitia est universaliter circa totam materiam moralem, qualitercumque potest aliquis circa aliquid dici studiosus vel virtuosus.

beyond what he ought. But legal justice and injustice treat all moral matters in general in whatsoever way a man may be said to be good or virtuous about a thing.

Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt, et ostendit quid restat dicendum. Et primo proponit hoc in generali. Secundo resumit in speciali, ibi, determinatum est utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod manifestum

920. At “Obviously then” [C] he summarizes what has been said and shows what remains to be discussed. First [C, 1] he sets this forth in a general way; and then [C, 2] at “We have determined etc.,” he takes it up in a specific way. He says first that it is clear

est ex praemissis, quod sunt plures iustitiae, scilicet legalis et aequalis; et quod praeter iustitiam legalem quae est tota virtus, est quaedam alia particularis iustitia. Sed quae et qualis sit, posterius determinandum est.

from the premises (913-919) that there is more than one justice, viz., legal justice and justice aiming at equality, and that over and above legal justice, as a general virtue, there is a particular justice. But we must determine later on (927-1077) the nature and characteristics of particular justice.

Deinde cum dicit determinatum est utique etc., ostendit in particulari quid sit dictum

921. Then [C, 2], at “We have determined,” he shows in detail what has been treated and

et quid restat dicendum. Et primo resumit id quod dictum est de divisione iusti et

what remains to be discussed. First [C, 2, a] he resumes what was said about the

iniusti. Et dicit quod determinatum est supra quod iniustum dicitur illegale et inaequale, sive in plus sive in minus, sed iustum dicitur e contrario legale et aequale.

distinction between justice and injustice. He affirms that we have determined that the unjust thing is called illegal and unequal either by excess or defect. On the contrary, the just thing is called legal and equal.

Secundo ibi: secundum quidem igitur etc., resumit quod secundum duplex iustum est duplex iustitia. Et dicit quod secundum iniustum illegale est quaedam iniustitia, de qua supra dictum est quod est omnis

922. Next [C, 2, b], at “Therefore, in accord with,” he resumes what he has said, viz., that as there is a twofold just thing, so there is a twofold justice. He affirms that in accord with the illegally unjust thing there

malitia. Et similiter secundum iustum legale est quaedam iustitia legalis quae est omnis virtus. Sed quia iniustum inaequale et iniustum illegale non sunt penitus idem, sed alterum se habet ad alterum ut pars ad totum, ita scilicet quod omne iniustum inaequale est illegale, sed non convertitur, et iterum omne iniustum

is a certain injustice, previously discussed (911, 919), which is a general vice. Likewise, in accord with the just corresponding to the law, there is a certain justice that is a general virtue. Now, the unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality and the illegally unjust thing are not altogether the same, but one is related to

quod se habet ut in plus est inaequale, sed non convertitur, quia est etiam quaedam iniustitia inaequalis in hoc quod est habere minus de malis; quia (inquam) unum iniustum est pars alterius iniusti et non sunt penitus idem, ideo similiter iniustitia quae dicitur inaequalitas non est penitus idem cum iniustitia illegali; sed

the other as a part to the whole so that every unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality is an illegally unjust thing, but not the reverse. Again, every thing that is excessive is unequal but not the reverse, since there is a certain illegal injustice in having too few burdens. Because (I say) one unjust thing is a part of the other unjust

comparatur ad ipsam ut pars ad totum; et similiter comparatur iustitia aequalitatis ad iustitiam legalem.

thing, and they are not entirely the same; in a similar way, therefore, the injustice called inequality is not entirely the same as illegal injustice but is compared to it as a part to the whole. Also the justice aiming at equality is compared to legal justice in a similar manner.

Tertio ibi, itaque de ea etc., ostendit de qua harum sit agendum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo dicit quod agendum est infra de iustitia particulari et similiter de iusto

923. Last [C, 2, c], at “We must then,” he shows which of these things we must discuss. On this point he does three things. First [c, i] he says that we must treat

et iniusto particulariter dicto.

particular justice after this (927-1077), and similarly the just and the unjust thing particularly so called.

Secundo ibi: secundum quidem igitur etc.,

924.

Then

[c,

ii],

at

“Justice

that

ostendit quod non est hic agendum de iustitia legali. Et dicit quod dimittenda est ad praesens iustitia legalis quae ordinatur secundum totam virtutem, in quantum scilicet ad eam pertinet usus totius virtutis ad alium. Et similiter dimittenda est iniustitia ei opposita ad quam pertinet usus totius malitiae. Manifestum est enim

corresponds,” he explains that here we are not going to treat legal justice. He affirms that legal justice-which conforms to all of virtue inasmuch as the use of the whole of virtue referring to our neighbor pertains to it-is to be passed over for the present. Likewise, the opposite injustice (inasmuch as the use of the whole of vice pertains to it)

quomodo debeat determinari id quod dicitur iustum vel iniustum, secundum huiusmodi iustitiam vel iniustitiam, quia ea sunt quae determinantur lege. Maior enim pars legalium praeceptorum praecipiuntur secundum quod convenit toti virtuti, in quantum scilicet lex praecipit vivere secundum unamquamque

is to be passed over. It is clear how what is just and unjust ought to be determined according to justice and injustice of this kind, because they are the precepts as laid down by the law. The greater part of legal prescriptions are enjoined in agreement with the whole of virtue inasmuch as the law commands us to live according to every

virtutem, et prohibet vivere secundum quamcumque malitiam. Sunt vero quaedam lege determinata quae non pertinent directe ad usum alicuius virtutis, sed ad aliquam dispositionem exteriorum bonorum.

virtue and forbids us to live according to any vice. However, there are certain determinations of the law that do not belong directly to the exercise of any virtue but to some disposition of external goods.

Tertio ibi: factiva autem totius etc., movet quandam dubitationem. Manifestum est enim quod illa quae sunt lege posita sunt factiva totius virtutis secundum disciplinam qua instruitur homo in ordine ad bonum commune. Est autem quaedam alia disciplina secundum quam instruitur

925. Last [c, iii], at “However, positive law,” he raises a doubt. It is evident that positive laws are productive of virtue in general by the instruction given a man in reference to the common good. But there is another kind of instruction by which a man is trained in virtuous actions as applicable to him

homo ad actus virtutum secundum quod competit singulariter sibi in respectu scilicet ad proprium bonum, in quantum per hoc homo efficitur bonus in seipso. Potest ergo esse dubitatio, utrum huiusmodi disciplina pertineat ad politicam, vel ad aliquam aliam scientiam.

individually, i.e., to his proper good inasmuch as in this way a man becomes virtuous in himself. Therefore, there can be a doubt whether instruction of this kind should belong to political science or to so-me other science.

Et hoc dicit, posterius esse determinandum, scilicet in libro politicae. In tertio enim libro politicae ostenditur quod non est idem esse simpliciter virum

926. He says that this question must be settled afterwards in the work on Politics. It is proved in the third book of the Politics (Ch. 4, 1276 b 16-1277 b 33; St. Th. Lect.

bonum et esse civem bonum, secundum quamcumque politiam. Sunt enim quaedam politiae, non rectae, secundum

3, 365-377) that to be a good man simply and to be a good citizen are not the same in every state. There are some states not

quas aliquis potest esse civis bonus, qui non est vir bonus; sed secundum optimam politiam non est aliquis civis bonus qui non est vir bonus.

worthy of honor in which a person can be a good citizen yet not be a good man. Bt in the most worthy state no one is a good citizen who is not a good man.

LECTURE 4 Distributive and Commutative justice Chapter 2 I. HE CONSIDERS PARTICULAR JUSTICE IN A GENERAL WAY. A. He makes a division of particular justice. A’ He indicates a species of particular justice. — 927 τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας

One species of particular justice and of the just thing corresponding to it consists in the distribution of honor, money, and other common goods that are to be apportioned to people sharing in social community, for in these matters one man as compared with another may have an equal or unequal share.

ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, B’ He gives a second kind of particular justice. — 928 Another species gives directions for use in private transactions.ἓν δὲ συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν.

τὸ

ἐν

τοῖς

C’ He subdivides commutative justice. 1. THERE ARE TWO PARTS. — 929 τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν

There are two parts of this species, as some

γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμὸς ἐγγύη χρῆσις

types of transaction are voluntary and others involuntary. Examples of the voluntary are selling, buying, bail, loan, deposit, rent. They are called voluntary because the origin of these exchanges is voluntary.

παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, 2. THE OTHER DIVISION OF TRANSACTIONS. — 930-931 ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος, τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων

Some kinds of involuntary transaction are occult, like theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of a slave, assassination, false

τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμὸς θάνατος ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις κακηγορία

testimony. Others are one done with manifest violence, for example, beating, imprisonment, murder, robbery, despoiling parents of children, reproach, outrage.

προπηλακισμός.

B. How a mean may be taken in this virtue. A’ The just thing is a mean. 1. DETERMINED.

IN WHAT WAY THE JUST THING... MAY BE

a. The just thing may be taken as a mean according to distributive justice. i.

He proves that the mean... should be taken according to

a... relationship of proportions. x. FROM THE VERY CONCEPT OF JUSTICE. aa. The just thing is a certain mean. — 932-933 Chapter 3

ἐπεὶ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον

Since the unjust person is unfair and the unjust thing is unequal, it is clear that there is a mean corresponding to what is unjust. This is the equal, for in operations of this kind where there is more or less, there is also an equal. Therefore, if the unjust thing is the unequal and, the just thing the equal—and this is evident in all situations without need of proof—then the just

ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη.

thing will be the mean since the equal is the mean.

bb. The mean is according to a certain relationship of proportions. — 934-935 ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ᾗ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον

However, the equal implies at least two things. Therefore, since the just thing is both a mean and an equal, it necessarily is related to another and pertains to certain matters of equality. As a mean it will be between two things which are more and less. As it is an equal it will be between

καὶ ἔλαττον, ᾗ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ

two things. As it is a just thing it will concern matters in relation to other persons, for justice regards another. Therefore, the just necessarily involves at least four objects, viz., two persons by whom justice is observed and two things about which justice is done. There will be the same equality between persons and between things in such a way that, as things are related

αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ μὴ ἴσα ἴσοι ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι

to one another, so are persons. If they are not equal they will not have equal shares, and from this source quarrels and complaints will arise, when either persons who are equal do not receive equal shares in distribution, or persons who are not equal do receive equal shares.

καὶ νέμωνται.

y. FROM THE CONCEPT OF MERIT — 936-937

ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ

Moreover, this is clear from the fact that bestowal should be made according to merit, for

δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες [ὑπάρχειν], ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον,

the just thing in distribution has to be done according to a certain merit. But all do not agree that merit consists in the same thing. People of a democracy place it in a condition of freedom, people of an oligarchy in one’s riches or nobility of birth, and people of an aristocracy in a state of virtue.

οἳ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Eius autem quae secundum partem et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit iustitiam particularem a iustitia legali, hic incipit de iustitia particulari determinare, praetermissa legali. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de iustitia

927. After the Philosopher has differentiated particular justice from legal justice, he now begins to investigate particular justice without treating legal justice. He divides the investigation into two parts. In the first part [I] he considers particular justice in a general way by comparison with its proper object, and in the

particulari in communi per comparationem ad proprium obiectum; in secunda applicando ad subiectum, ibi: quia autem est iniustum facientem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dividit iustitiam particularem. Secundo ostendit qualiter in ea accipiatur

second part [Lect. 11], at “Since someone etc.” (B. 1134 a 16), he considers it in its application to the subject. In regard to the first part, he does two things. Initially [A] he makes a division of particular justice. Next [B], at “Since the unjust person etc.,” he explains how a mean may be taken in this virtue. He discusses the initial point from three aspects. First [A’] he indicates a

medium, ibi, quia autem et iniustus inaequalis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit unam speciem particularis iustitiae. Et dicit, quod una species eius, et similiter iusti, quod secundum ipsam dicitur, est illa, quae consistit in distributionibus aliquorum

species of particular justice. He says that one species—the same holds for the unjust thing corresponding to it—consists in the distribution of certain common goods (either honor or money or any other thing belonging to external goods or even to external evils, like labor, expenses and so on) that are to be apportioned among people who share in social community. He proves that

communium, quae sunt dividenda inter eos qui communicant civili communicatione: sive sit honor, sive sit pecunia, vel quicquid aliud ad bona

this should belong to particular justice because in matters of this kind, equality and inequality— which belong to particular justice and injustice, as was stated before (922).Of one person to

exteriora pertinens, vel etiam ad mala; sicut labor, expensae et similia. Et quod hoc pertineat ad particularem iustitiam, probat, quia

another are taken into consideration.

in talibus contingit accipere (unius ad alterum) aequalitatem vel inaequalitatem unius ad alterum, quae pertinent ad iustitiam vel iniustitiam particularem, ut supra dictum est.

Secundo ibi: una autem etc., ponit secundam speciem particularis iustitiae. Et dicit, quod una alia species particularis iustitiae est, quae constituit rectitudinem iustitiae in commutationibus, secundum quas transfertur aliquid ab uno in alterum;

928. Next [B’], at “Another species,” he gives a second kind of particular justice. He says that another species establishes a measure of justice in transactions, by which a thing is transferred from one person to another -in the first species the transfer of a thing from the community to the individual was considered.

sicut prima species iustitiae attendebatur secundum quod transfertur aliquid a communi ad singulos.

Tertio ibi: huius autem partes etc., subdividit iustitiam commutativam secundum differentiam commutationum. Et hoc dupliciter.

929. Last [C’], at “There sire two parts,” he subdivides commutative justice according to the different kinds of transactions, making a twofold division. He says first [1] that there are two

Primo enim dicit, quod iustitiae commutativae sunt duae partes, eo quod duo sunt genera commutationum. Quaedam enim sunt voluntariae, quaedam involuntariae. Dicuntur autem voluntariae, propter hoc, quod principium commutationis est voluntarium ex utraque parte;

parts of commutative justice because there are two kinds of transactions. Some are voluntary, others involuntary. The voluntary are so-called because the principle of transaction is voluntary in both parties as is evident in selling and buying, by which one man transfers the dominion over his own property to another as compensation for a price received; in barter, by

sicut patet in venditione et emptione, quibus unus transfert dominium rei suae in alterum propter pretium inde acceptum. Et in mutatione, secundum quam aliquis rem suam tradit alteri ut aequale recipiat; et in fideiussione,

which someone gives what is his to another for something of equal value; in bail, by which a person voluntarily appoints himself a debtor for another; in a loan, by which a man grants the use of his property to another without recompense but reserves ownership of the thing

per quam aliquis voluntarie se constituit debitorem pro alio. Et in usu, quo aliquis usum rei suae alteri gratis concedit reservato sibi dominio rei. Et in depositione, per quam aliquis deponit rem suam apud alium

to himself; in a deposit, by which one commits something of his to the custody of another; in rent, by which a person accepts the use of something belonging to another for a price.

in custodiam. Et in conductione, per quam aliquis usum rei alienae accipit pro pretio.

Secundo ibi, involuntariarum autem

930. Then [2], at “Some kinds of involuntary,”

etc., subdividit alterum membrum commutationum. Et dicit, quod involuntariarum commutationum quaedam sunt occultae, sicut furtum, quo aliquis accipit rem alterius eo invito; moechia, idest adulterium, quo aliquis occulte accedit ad uxorem alterius. Veneficium, quando scilicet

he subdivides the other division of transactions, saying that some involuntary transactions are occult: like theft by which one takes a thing belonging to another who is unwilling; adultery, by which a man secretly approaches the wife of another for sexual intercourse, poisoning, which a person poison another with intent either to kill or injure in some way. Also they are especially

aliquis occulte alteri venenum procurat, vel ad occidendum, vel ad laedendum qualitercumque, unde et magi venefici dicuntur, inquantum per aliqua maleficia occulte hominum nocumenta procurant; paragogia, idest derivatio vel deductio; puta cum aliquis occulte derivat aquam alterius

called poisoners who by some sorcery bring about murder or harm. Paragogia is a derivation or a leading away, for example the occult diversion of a stream belonging to one person to the property of another. The enticement of a slave takes place when someone induces another’s slave to flee from his master. Assassination is that slaying which happens

ad alium locum; servi seductio, cum scilicet aliquis servum alterius seducit, ut a domino suo fugiat. Dolosa occisio, quae scilicet fit per vulnera fraudulenter illata. Falsum testimonium, quo scilicet aliquis veritatem occultat mendacio. Quaedam vero sunt involuntariae

from wounds inflicted by trickery. Testimony is false in which a person conceals the truth by lying. Other transactions are involuntary and done by manifest violence. Thus a man may use violence either upon a person by beating, fettering, murdering, or upon things by robbing another of his goods, by despoiling parents of their children through murder. Likewise, a man

commutationes, quae fiunt per violentiam manifestam; sive aliquis inferat violentiam in personam verberando vel ligando vel occidendo; sive etiam in res, puta rapiendo bona, vel orbando parentes per occisionem filiorum, sive etiam inferatur violentia

may use violence through infamy by using reproachful words, or through injury by inflicting outrage.

in famam, quod fit accusando, et iniurias sive contumelias irrogando. Est

autem

considerandum

quod

931. We must consider that the voluntary and

voluntarium et involuntarium in commutationibus diversificat iustitiae speciem; quia in commutationibus voluntariis fit subtractio solius rei, quam oporteat recompensari secundum aequalitatem iustitiae. In commutationibus autem involuntariis fit etiam quaedam iniuria. Unde

involuntary in transactions make a difference in the species of justice because voluntary transactions cause the subtraction of only a thing which must be repaid according to the equality of justice. But involuntary transactions cause a certain injury. Hence the robber is forced not only to return the thing plundered but to undergo punishment because of the affront

raptor non solum compellitur reddere rem quam rapuit, sed etiam ultra punitur propter iniuriam quam intulit. Et quia involuntarium est duplex: scilicet per violentiam et per ignorantiam, ut in tertio dictum est, ideo involuntarias commutationes dividit in occultas, quasi per

inflicted. Since the involuntary is twofold, viz., arising from force and from ignorance, he divides involuntary transactions into those which are occult, as it were through ignorance, and those that are done openly through violence.

ignorantiam factas, et in eas quae manifeste per violentiam fiunt. Deinde cum dicit: quia autem et

932. Next [B], at “Since the unjust person,” he

iniustus etc., ostendit qualiter medium in praedictis accipiatur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo iustum sit medium. Secundo, quomodo iustitia sit medium, ibi, determinatis autem his et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo

shows how a mean is understood in these matters. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [13, A’] he explains how the just thing is a mean; and then [Lect. 10], at “From these discussions etc.” (B. 1133 b 30), how justice is a mean. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [A’, 1 ] he shows in what way the just thing, consisting in a mean

determinetur iustum in medio existens secundum utramque iustitiam. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi, videtur autem aliquibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo accipiatur iustum in medio, secundum iustitiam distributivam; secundo quomodo

according to either justice, may be determined. Next [Lect. 8], at “Some philosophers seem to think etc.” (B. 1132 b 21), he rejects an error. He further discusses the first point in two stages. First [1, a] he explains how the just thing may be taken as a mean according to distributive justice; and second (Lect. 6], at “There remains another etc.” (B. 1131 b 25),

accipiatur secundum iustitiam commutativam, ibi, reliqua autem una et cetera. Circa primum duo

according to commutative justice. He considers the first point in two ways. First [a, i] he proves that the mean of distributive should be taken

facit. Primo probat, quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipiatur

according to a certain relationship of proportions. Next [Lect. 5],at “Therefore the

secundum quamdam proportionalitatem. Secundo ostendit qualis sit illa proportionalitas, ibi: est ergo iustum proportionale et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum ex ipsa ratione iustitiae. Secundo ex ratione dignitatis, ibi, adhuc ex eo et cetera.

just thing etc.” (B. 1131 a 30), he shows what the nature of that relationship of proportions is. On the initial point he does two things. First [i, x] he proves the proposition from the very concept of justice; and then [ i, y ], at “Moreover, this is clear etc.,” from the concept of merit. He treats the first point under two headings. First [x, aa] he shows from the very notion of justice

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit ex ipsa ratione iustitiae, quod iustum sit quoddam medium. Secundo ostendit quod sit medium, secundum aliquam proportionalitatem, ibi, est autem aequale et cetera.

that the just thing is a certain mean. Second [x, bb], at “However, the equal etc.,” he explains that the mean is according to a certain relationship of proportions.

Dicit ergo supradictum

primo, quod sicut est, iniustus est

913. He says first that, as was said previously (898, 921), the unjust man is one who desires an

inaequalis, et iniustum est inaequale, et secundum plus et secundum minus. In quibuscumque autem est plus et minus, ibi oportet accipere aequale. Aequale enim est medium inter plus et minus. Unde in quibuscumque est invenire aequalitatem, ibi est invenire medium. Patet ergo quod, si iniustum

inequality of good and evil, and the unjust thing is that which consists in an inequality, and concerns both too much and too little. But wherever there is more and less, there the equal must be found, for the equal is the mean between the greater and the less. Hence wherever we find equality, there we find a mean. It is clear then that the unjust thing is a kind of unequal thing.

est quiddam inaequale, quod iustum sit quiddam aequale, et hoc etiam absque omni ratione probante est omnibus manifestum, quod scilicet iustum est quoddam aequale. Quia ergo aequale est medium inter plus et minus, ut dictum est: consequens est, quod iustum sit quoddam medium.

That the just thing is a kind of equal thing is obvious to everyone without any proof. Therefore, since the equal is a mean between more and less, as has been shown (310, 896, 898), it follows that the just thing is a kind of mean.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem aequale etc., ostendit quod iustum sit medium, secundum aliquam

934. At “However, the equal” [x, bb] he explains that the just thing is a mean according to a certain relationship of proportions. To prove this

proportionalitatem. Et ad hoc probandum assumit, quod aequale ad minus consistit in duobus, inter quae

he takes for granted that the equal consists in at least two things between which an equality is considered. Therefore, since the just thing is

consideratur aequalitas. Cum ergo iustum sit et medium et aequale, oportet quidem quod inquantum est iustum, sit ad aliquid, idest per

both a mean and an equal, inasmuch as it is just, it is necessarily a relation to something, i.e., with respect to another, as is evident from what has been indicated (922); but inasmuch as it is an

respectum ad alterum, ut ex supra dictis patet; in quantum autem est aequale, sit in quibusdam rebus, secundum quas scilicet attenditur aequalitas inter duas personas. Et sic patet quod si consideremus iustum inquantum est medium, sic est medium inter duo, quae sunt plus et

equal it pertains to certain matters in which equality between two persons is taken into account. Thus it is evident that if we consider the just thing precisely as a mean, it will then be a mean between two things that are more and less. But precisely as the just thing is an equal, it must be between two things (as a just thing, of course, it must concern some matters in relation

minus; inquantum est autem aequale, oportet quod sit duarum rerum: sed inquantum est iustum, oportet quod sit aliquorum ad aliquos alios, quia iustitia ad alterum est. Plus autem et minus respicit iustitia secundum quod est medium, velut quaedam extrinseca, sed duas res et duas

to other persons, because justice regards another person). However, justice insofar as it is a mean, an extrinsic thing, considers more or less; but as something intrinsic it considers two things and two persons in which justice is established. So it is clear that what is just, necessarily consists in at least four objects, viz., two persons by whom justice is observed and

personas respicit quasi intrinseca, in quibus scilicet constituitur iustitia. Sic ergo patet, quod necesse est iustum ad minus in quatuor consistere: duo enim sunt homines, quibus observatur iustitia, et duae sunt res in quibus eis iustitia fit.

two things about which justice is done.

Et oportet ad rationem iustitiae, quod sit eadem aequalitas personarum quibus fit iustitia et rerum in quibus fit: ut scilicet sicut se habent res ad invicem, ita et personae: alioquin non habebunt aequalia sibi. Sed ex hoc

935. In the concept of justice there must be the same equality between persons who practice justice and between things about which justice is done, so that as the things are related to one another, so are the persons. Otherwise they will not have shares proportional to themselves. But,

fiunt pugnae et accusationes quasi sit iustitia praetermissa; quia vel aequales non recipiunt aequalia in distributione bonorum communium, vel non aequalibus dantur aequalia; puta si inaequaliter laborantibus dantur aequalia stipendia vel aequaliter laborantibus dentur

by reason of this quarrels and complaints arise as if justice had been neglected because, either persons who are equal do not receive equal shares, for example, if laborers are paid wages for doing an unequal amount of work, or are paid unequal wages for doing an equal amount of work. So then it is evident that the mean of distributive justice is taken according to a

inaequalia. Sic igitur patet quod

certain relationship of proportions.

medium distributivae iustitiae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem quandam. Deinde cum dicit: adhuc ex eo etc., ostendit idem secundum rationem dignitatis. Et dicit quod etiam ex ratione dignitatis manifestum est quod iustum consistit in quadam proportionalitate. Sic enim aliquid

936. Then [i, y], at “Moreover, this is,” he shows that it is obvious also by reason of merit that the just thing consists in a certain relationship of fore they think it proper that equal proportions. In this way a thing is said to be just in distributions inasmuch as allotment is made

dicitur esse iustum in distributionibus in quantum unicuique datur secundum dignitatem, id est prout cuique dignum est dari, in quo designatur proportionalitas quaedam, ut scilicet ita hoc sit dignum uni sicut aliud est dignum alteri.

according to merit as each is worthy to receive. A certain relationship of proportions is designated by this—that as one person is deserving of one thing, so another is deserving of another thing.

Non tamen dignitatem distributionis omnes secundum idem attendunt; sed in democratica politia, in qua scilicet plebs dominatur, attenditur dignitas secundum libertatem, quia enim plebei sunt aequales aliis in libertate,

937. However, all do not judge merit in distribution in agreement with the same norm. In a democratic state where everyone governs, they judge merit according to a condition of freedom. Because the common people are the equal of others in freedom, therefore they think

ideo reputant dignum esse ut aequaliter eis principentur; sed in oligarchica politia, in qua aliqui pauci principantur, mensuratur dignitas secundum divitias vel secundum nobilitatem generis, ut scilicet illi qui sunt excellentiores genere vel divitiis plus habeant de bonis communibus;

it proper that equal distribution be made to them. In an oligarchy where some few rule, they measure merit according to a man’s riches or according to nobility of birth, so that men who are more eminent by birth or riches should have more of the common goods. In an aristocracy where certain men govern because of their virtue, they measure merit according to a state

sed in politia aristocratica in qua aliqui principantur propter virtutem, mensuratur dignitas secundum virtutem; ut scilicet ille plus habeat qui plus abundat in virtute. Et sic patet quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem.

of virtue, so that a man should have more who practices virtue more perfectly. Thus it is clear that the mean of distributive justice is understood according to a relationship of proportions.

LECTURE 5 Proportionality

Chapter 3 A. He explains in what way the just thing should be taken according to a certain proportionality. 1. SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT PROPORTIONALITY. a. The just thing is fittingly said to be according to proportionality. — 938-939 ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ·

Therefore, the just thing is something belonging to proportion, for the proportional is proper not only to abstract number but to all enumerations. Proportionality is an equality of ratios.

b. The second comment. — 940 ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διῃρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δὶς λέγει,

Proportionality consists of four parts at least. It is clear that discrete proportionality has four terms, but so does continuous proportionality, for we use one term in two different aspects

οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως ἡ τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δὶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δίς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα.

and state it twice, for example, A is in proportion to B as B is to G. So B has been stated twice. Wherefore if B is used twice there will be four proportioned terms.

2. HOW THE JUST THING CONSISTS IN A CERTAIN PROPORTIONALITY. — 941-943 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· διῄρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἅ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν δ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς

Like proportionality, what is just is also found in four terms at least, for both the things and persons are divided according to a similar proportion. Therefore, as the term A will be to B, so G will be to D. Hence, alternating, as

τὸν δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει,

A is to G, B will be to D. Therefore, the whole will be related to the whole, and this is what distribution conjoins.

κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον

If adjustment be made in this way, it will be justly done. Therefore, the union of term A with G, and of B with D will be the just thing and the mean guiding distribution. But the unjust thing is outside of what belongs to proportion, for the proportional is a mean and the

ἀνάλογον.

just thing belongs to proportion.

3. THE NATURE OF PROPORTIONALITY. a. The above-mentioned proportionality... is called geometrical. — 945 καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ

Mathematicians call this proportionality geometrical, for in geometry it happens that the whole is compared to the whole as part to part.

ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον. b. This proportionality ... cannot be continuous. — 449 ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ.

But this proportionality is not continuous because there is no numerically common term for the person and the thing.

B. He shows how the unjust thing is outside that proportionality. — 946 τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο, τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν

This just thing then is a proportional. But the unjust thing is outside the proportional either by excess or defect. This occurs in distributions where a man acts unjustly when he accepts too much and a man suffers unjustly when he has too little of good. The reverse is true in regard to evil. By comparison with a greater evil a lesser evil has the

πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον κακόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ δ' αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

aspect of good, for a lesser evil is preferable to a greater one. Good is preferable, and a greater good is more to be preferred. This then is one kind of the just thing.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Est ergo iustum proportionale et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem quandam, hic ostendit secundum quam proportionalitatem accipiatur et quomodo. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo iustum accipiatur secundum quamdam proportionalitatem. Secundo ostendit quomodo iniustum praeter illam proportionalitatem accipiatur, ibi, iustum quidem igitur et

938. After the Philosopher has shown that the mean of distributive justice is taken according to proportionality, he now shows according to what proportionality and in what way it is understood. He considers this point in a twofold manner. First [A] he explains in what way the just thing should be taken according to a certain proportionality. Second [B], at “This just thing etc.,” he shows how the unjust thing is outside that proportionality. He discusses the initial point under three aspects. First

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo praemittit quaedam de proportionalitate in communi. Secundo ostendit quomodo iustum distributivum in proportionalitate quadam consistit, ibi, est autem et iustum in quatuor et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualis sit proportionalitas secundum quam attenditur iustum in distributiva iustitia, ibi: vocant autem talem et cetera. Circa primum praemittit duo. Quorum primum, est quod non inconvenienter iustum dicitur esse secundum proportionalitatem; quia proportionalitas non solum invenitur in numero unitatum qui est numerus simpliciter, et hic vocatur numerus monadicus; sed

[A, 1] he presents in advance some general comments about proportionality. Then [A, 2], at “Like proportionality etc.,” he explains how the just thing consists in a certain proportionality. Last [A, 3], at “Mathematicians call etc.,” he shows the nature of proportionality by which a thing is judged just in distributive justice. On the first point he premises two comments. The first [1, a] is that the just thing is fittingly said to be according to proportionality, because proportionality is found not only in the enumeration of units (which is number simply taken and here called abstract number), but the quality of being proportionate is met with wherever number

universaliter invenitur proportionalitas in quibuscumque invenitur numerus.

is found.

Et hoc ideo quia proportionalitas nihil est

939. This is so because proportionality is

aliud quam aequalitas proportionis, cum scilicet aequalem proportionem habet hoc

simply geometrical equality, i.e. this to this and that to that contains the proportion of

ad hoc, et illud ad illud. Proportio autem nihil est aliud quam habitudo unius quantitatis ad aliam. Quantitas autem habet rationem mensurae: quae primo quidem invenitur in unitate numerali, et exinde derivatur ad omne genus quantitatis, ut patet in X metaphysicae; et ideo numerus primo quidem invenitur in numero unitatum: et exinde derivatur ad omne aliud quantitatis genus quod secundum rationem numeri mensuratur.

equality. Proportion is only a relation of one quantity to another. But quantity has the nature of a measure. It is found in numerical unity and is transferred from there to every kind of quantity, as the tenth book of the Metaphysics indicates (Ch. 1, 1052 b 20 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 2, 1938). Therefore, number primarily is found in the enumeration of units, and thence is attributed to every genus of quantity which is measured according to the idea of number.

Secundum ponit ibi, et in quatuor minimis et cetera. Et dicit quod omnis proportionalitas ad minus consistit in

940. He makes the second comment at “Proportionality consists” [1, b], saying that every proportionality consists of four parts

quatuor. Est enim duplex proportionalitas: una quidem disiuncta et alia continua. Disiuncta quidem proportionalitas est aequalitas duarum proportionum non convenientium in aliquo termino. Cum ergo omnis proportio sit inter duo, manifestum est quod proportionalitas disiuncta in quatuor terminis consistit; ut si dicam: sicut se habet sex ad tria, ita se habet decem ad quinque; utrobique enim est dupla proportio. Continua autem proportionalitas est aequalitas duarum proportionum convenientium in uno termino, puta si dicam: sicut se habet octo ad quatuor, ita quatuor ad duo;

at least. It has a twofold division, one of which is a disjunctive proportionality and the other a continuous proportionality. The disjunctive proportionality is an equality of two proportions not alike in any term. Therefore, when any proportion exists between the two, it is evident that the disjunctive proportionality consists of four terms, as when I say: as six is to three as ten is to five. There is a double proportion on both sides. The continuous proportionality is an equality of two proportions alike in one term, for instance, if I say: as eight is to four so four is to two. There is a double proportion on both sides. Therefore in this continuous proportionality there are in some

utrobique enim est dupla proportio. In hac igitur continua proportionalitate sunt quodammodo quatuor termini; inquantum scilicet utimur uno termino ut duobus, unum terminum bis dicendo, scilicet in utraque proportione, ut si dicam: quae est proportio a ad b, puta octo ad quatuor, eadem est proportio b ad c, id est quatuor ad duo; sic igitur b dicitur bis; unde, quamvis b sit unum subiecto; quia tamen accipitur ut duo, erunt quatuor proportionata.

measure four terms inasmuch as we use one term in two different aspects, declaring it twice, i.e., in either proportion as when I say: the proportion of A to B (or eight to four) is the same as the proportion B to C (or four to two). There is a double proportion from both sides. In this way B is used twice. Hence, although B is one in subject, nevertheless, because it is taken in two different aspects there will be four proportioned terms.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem et iustum etc., ostendit quomodo secundum proportionalitatem medium distributivae iustitiae accipiatur. Et dicit quod sicut proportionalitas, ita et iustum ad minus in quatuor invenitur, in quibus attenditur

941. Then [A, 2], at “Like proportionality” he shows how the mean of distributive justice is taken according to proportionality. He says that, like proportionality, the just thing is found in four terms in which the same proportion is observed, because the

eadem proportio; quia scilicet secundum eamdem proportionem dividuntur res quae distribuuntur et personae quibus distribuuntur. Sit ergo a unus terminus, puta duae librae: b autem sit una libra, g autem sit una persona, puta sortes qui duobus diebus laboravit. D autem sit Plato qui uno die laboravit. Sicut ergo se habet a ad b, ita se habet g ad d, quia utrobique invenitur dupla proportio; ergo et permutatim, sicut a se habet ad g, ita se habet b ad d, quaecumque enim sunt ad invicem proportionalia, etiam permutatim proportionalia sunt; sicut in praedicto exemplo: sicut se habet decem ad quinque, ita octo ad quatuor. Ergo commutatim,

things that are distributed and the persons to whom distribution is made are divided according to the same proportion. Therefore, let A be one term, for example, two pounds, and B one pound. But let G be one person, for example, Socrates who has worked two days, and D, Plato, who has worked one day. Therefore, as A is to B so G is to D, because a double proportion is found on the one side and the other. Hence by alternation, as A is to G, so B is to D. Whatever things are proportionable one to another are proportionable by alternation, as is evident in the preceding example (940), for instance, as ten is to five so eight is to four. Therefore, by alternation, as ten is to eight, so five is to

sicut se habet decem ad octo, ita se habet quinque ad quatuor: utrobique est sesquiquarta proportio; sic ergo permutatim verum erit dicere quod, sicut se habet a ad g, idest duae librae ad eum qui duobus diebus laboravit, ita b ad d, idest una libra ad eum qui uno die laboravit.

four, for there is a ratio of five to four on one side and the other. In this way then, by alternation, it will be true to say that as A is to G, i.e., two pounds to the man who worked two days, so B is to D, i.e., one pound to the man who worked a day.

Est etiam in talibus considerandum quod

942. In such matters we must also consider

in his quae sic sunt proportionalia, quae est proportio unius ad alterum, eadem est proportio totius ad totum. Puta, si quae est proportio decem ad octo, eadem est proportio quinque ad quatuor, sequitur ulterius quod quae est proportio decem ad octo et quinque ad quatuor, eadem etiam sit proportio decem et quinque simul acceptorum quae sunt quindecim, ad octo et quatuor simul accepta, quae sunt

that in the things proportionable in this way, the ratio of one to the other is the ratio of the whole to the whole. For example, if the ratio ten to eight is the same as five to four, it follows further that the ratio ten to eight and five to four will be the same ratio as ten and five taken together’ i.e., fifteen to eight and four taken together, i.e., twelve. The reason is that here we have also the ratio of five to four. How does this happen? Because

duodecim: quia hic etiam est sesquiquarta proportio.

fifteen contains twelve and its fourth part, i.e., three.

Unde et in proposito sequitur quod, si sicut se habet ista res ad istam personam, ita se habet illa ad aliam personam; quod etiam ita se habet totum ad totum; idest utraque res simul accepta ad utramque personam simul acceptam: et hoc est quod distributio coniungit. Et si ita aliquis distribuendo res hominibus coniungat, iuste facit. Patet ergo quod coniunctio a cum g, idest rei duplae cum persona duplo digniore et b cum d, idest dimidii cum dimidio, est iustum distributivum et tale iustum est medium. Iniustum autem est quod est praeter hanc proportionalitatem. Proportionale enim est medium inter excessum et

943. In the proposition it follows that, if as this thing is to this person, so that thing is to that person, then also the whole will be to the whole in the same way, i.e., both things taken together will be to both persons taken together. This is as distribution connects them. If in distribution man unites the things to the persons in this way, he acts justly. It is plain then that the union of A with G, i.e., of a thing doubled with a person doubly more deserving, and of B with D, i.e., of a half thing with a person deserving only half is the just thing in distribution and such a just thing is a mean. But the unjust thing is outside this proportionality. The proportional is a mean between excess and

defectum; quia proportionalitas est aequalitas proportionis, ut dictum est. Et sic iustum, cum sit quoddam proportionale, est medium.

defect because the proportionality is an equality of proportion, as has been remarked (939). So the just thing is a mean since it is a certain proportional.

Deinde cum dicit: vocant autem talem etc., ostendit qualis sit proportionalitas secundum quam hoc iustum accipitur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit quod praedicta proportionalitas quae attenditur secundum aequalitatem proportionum, a mathematicis vocatur geometrica: in qua scilicet accidit quod ita se habet totum ad totum sicut altera partium ad aliam, ut in praemissis dictum est. Non autem hoc accidit in proportionalitate arithmetica, de qua infra dicetur.

944. At “Mathematicians call” [A, 3] he explains the nature of proportionality according to which this just thing is understood. On this point he does two things. First 13, a] he says that the abovementioned proportionality, which is considered according to the equality of proportion, is called geometrical by mathematicians. In this it happens that as the whole is to the whole so one part is to another, as we have pointed out in previous discussions (939-940). But this does not take place in arithmetical proportionality, which we will treat later (950).

Secundo ibi: est autem non continua etc., dicit quod ista proportionalitas quae

945. Next [3, b], at “But this” he says that this proportionality, which is observed in

attenditur in iustitia distributiva non

distributive justice, cannot be continuous

potest esse continua; quia ex una parte sunt res et ex alia parte sunt personae. Et ita non potest accipi aliquid quasi terminus communis, quae sit persona cui datur et res quae datur.

because on one side are the things and on the other the persons. So it is not possible to take for a common term a person to whom distribution is made and the thing which is distributed.

Deinde cum dicit: iustum quidem igitur etc., agit de iniusto in distributionibus. Et dicit quod, quia iustum est proportionale, sequitur quod iniustum sit praeter proportionale. Quod quidem fit, vel in plus vel in minus quam exigat aequalitas proportionis, ut patet in ipsis operibus iustae vel iniustae distributionis. Ille enim qui iniustum facit circa bona, plus accipit sibi. Qui autem iniusta patitur, minus habet. In malis autem est e converso, quia minus malum habet rationem boni per comparationem ad maius malum: minus enim malum est magis eligibile, quam

946. Then [B], at “This just thing,” he considers what is unjust in distributions. He says that, since the just thing is proportionable, it follows that the unjust thing is outside the proportionable. This happens either by reason of more or less than the equality of proportion demands, as is evident in the very operations of just and unjust distribution. That man acts unjustly who accepts for himself too many goods, but he suffers unjustly who has too few. The reverse is true in regard to evils. Since a lesser evil has the aspect of good by comparison with a greater evil, the lesser evil

maius malum. Unumquodque autem eligitur sub ratione boni. Et ideo illud quod magis eligitur habet rationem maioris boni. Sic igitur una species iustitiae est quae dicta est.

is more to be preferred than the greater evil. Everything is chosen under the aspect of good, and for this reason the thing which has the aspect of greater good is more to be preferred. So then this is one species of justice that has been discussed.

LECTURE 6 The Mean of Commutative justice Chapter 4 A. He shows that there is a species of justice in addition to distributive. — 947 There remains another kind of justice directive of what is done both in voluntary and involuntary transactions. B. This differs from the other justice.

1. HE SETS FORTH HIS PROPOSITION. — 948 This differs in species from the preceding justice.

2. HE PRESENTS THE DIFFERENCE. a. He reviews something relative to distributive justice. — 949

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ

What is just in the distribution of common goods is always in conformity with proportionality previously discussed, for when distribution is made of common wealth, it will be made according to the proportion contributed by each one. on the other hand the unjust thing opposed to this

τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν.

just thing is outside the proportional.

b. What pertains to commutative justice. i. A fact relative to commutative justice. — 950-951 τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ

However, in transactions the just thing is an equal—and the unjust thing an unequal —not according to geometrical but according to arithmetic proportion. Here it does not matter whether the good man steals from the wicked man or the wicked from the good, whether the good or wicked man commits adultery. But the law looks at only the nature of the damage done, and

βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὃ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὃ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὃ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὂν ἰσάζειν

treats the parties as equals, if indeed one does an injustice and the other suffers an injustice, if this one injures and that one is injured. Therefore, the judge attempts to reduce to equality the unjust thing which has an inequality.

πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· ii. He clarifies this by an example. x. THE EXAMPLE. — 952

καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὃ μὲν πληγῇ ὃ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὃ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διῄρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ

If one of two contestants receives a wound and the other inflicts a wound or even one commits murder and the other is murdered the division of action and passion brings

πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους.

about inequality. However, a judge tries to remove inequality by awarding damages.

y. HE RESOLVES A DOUBT. — 953 λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ

In the interest of plain talk, we speak of gain in these matters, even though the name is not appropriate to some cases, for

κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος.

example, to the person who strikes another or to the person injured. But when passion is measured, one thing is called loss and another gain.

iii. Some corollaries. x. ON THE PART OF THE JUST THING ITSELF. — 954 ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν

Therefore, that which is just is an equal, a mean between more and less in such a way that gain is taken as more, and loss as less.

πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον

Gain is understood in contrary ways, for it is more in relation to good and less in relation to evil, while the opposite is true of loss. Between gain and loss stands a mean, the equal which we call the just. This then is a directive, and will be the mean between

ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.

gain and loss.

y. ON THE PART OF THE JUDGE. — 955 διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι.

For this reason when men are in doubt they have recourse to a judge. But going to a judge is going to justice, for a judge ought to be living justice. Men approaching a judge are seeking an intermediate, and this is why judges are called intermediaries or mediators, as if they touch the mean when they attain what is just. Therefore, the just thing is a mean as also is the judge who brings about an equality.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Reliqua autem (una) directivum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo accipiatur medium in iustitia distributiva, hic ostendit quomodo accipiatur medium in iustitia commutativa. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit esse quamdam speciem iustitiae praeter distributivam. Secundo ostendit differentiam huius ad

947. After the Philosopher has shown how the mean should be taken in distributive justice, he now explains in what way the mean should be understood in commutative justice. He discusses this point under three aspects. First [A] he shows there is a species of justice in addition to distributive. Then [B], at “This differs etc.,” he says this

illam, ibi, hoc autem iustum et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualiter accipiatur medium in hac iustitiae specie, ibi, et quemadmodum linea et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod praeter praedictam speciem iustitiae quae consistit in distributionibus, relinquitur una quae est directiva in commutationibus, tam voluntariis quam involuntariis.

differs from the other justice. Third [Lect. 7], at “It is as though etc.” (B. 1132 a 25), he shows how a mean should be understood in this kind of justice. He says first that in addition to the preceding species of justice which exists in distributions, there remains one that is directive of transactions both voluntary and involuntary.

Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem iustum etc., ostendit differentiam huius speciei ad praemissam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit, dicens quod istud iustum quod consistit in commutationibus,

948. Then [B], at “This differs,” he shows the difference between this species and the preceding. He treats this point under two headings. First [ B, 1] he sets forth his proposition, saying that the just thing

est alterius speciei a supradicto iusto, quod consistit in distributionibus.

existing in transactions belongs to another species than distributive justice.

Secundo ibi, distributivum quidem enim etc., assignat differentiam. Et primo resumit quid pertineat ad distributivam iustitiam. Secundo ostendit quid pertineat ad iustitiam commutativam, ibi, in commutationibus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iustum supradictum semper est distributivum communium bonorum secundum supradictam proportionalitatem, scilicet geometricam, quae attenditur secundum aequalitatem

949. Second [B, 2], at “What is just,” he presents the difference. First [2, a] he reviews something relevant to distributive justice. Then [2, b], at “However, in transactions etc.,” he shows what pertains to commutative justice. He says first that the justice mentioned before always directs the distribution of common goods in conformity with proportionality, i.e., the geometrical which is observed in the equality of proportion. This is clear because

proportionis. Et hoc manifestat; quia si communes pecuniae civitatis, vel aliquorum hominum debeant distribui in singulos, hoc erit ita faciendum ut singulis detur aliquid de communi, secundum illam proportionem secundum quam ipsi intulerunt in commune; puta in negotiationibus, quantum aliquis plus posuit in societatem, tanto maiorem partem accipit. Et in civitatibus, quanto aliquis plus servivit communitati, tanto plus accipit de bonis communibus. Et sicut iustum distributivum consistit in hac proportionalitate, ita iniustum oppositum consistit in hoc quod praetermittitur huiusmodi proportionabilitas.

if wealth belonging to the city or to certain men must be distributed to individuals, the distribution will be made in such a way that each may receive from the community in that ratio according to which he contributed to the community. We suppose in business ventures that the more a man invests in a company the greater is his return. As the just thing directing distributions consists in this proportionality, so the opposite unjust thing consists in disregarding proportionality of this kind.

Deinde cum dicit: in commutationibus autem etc., ostendit quid pertineat ad iustitiam commutativam. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quid pertineat ad iustitiam commutativam. Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi, etenim cum hic quidem vulneretur et cetera. Tertio infert quaedam corollaria ex dictis, ibi, quare pluris quidem et minoris et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iustum quod consistit in commutationibus, in aliquo

950. At “However, in transactions” [2, b], he shows what pertains to commutative justice. He gives a threefold consideration of this notion. First [b, i ] he explains a f act relative to commutative justice. Next [b, ii], at “If one of two contestants etc.,” he clarifies this by an example. Third [b, iii], at “Therefore, that which etc.,” he deduces some corollaries from the premises. He says first that the Just thing that exists in transactions agrees somewhat with the just

quidem convenit cum iusto distributivo, quod scilicet iustum est aequale, et iniustum inaequale. Sed in hoc differunt: quod aequale in iustitia commutativa non attenditur secundum proportionalitatem illam, scilicet geometricam, quae attendebatur in distributivo iusto; sed magis secundum arithmeticam, quae scilicet attenditur secundum aequalitatem quantitatis, et non secundum aequalitatem proportionis sicut geometrica. Sex enim secundum arithmeticam

thing directing distributions in this-that the just thing is equal, and the unjust thing, unequal. But they differ in the fact that the equal in commutative justice is not observed according to that proportionality, viz., geometrical, which was observed in distributive justice, but according to arithmetical proportionality which is observed according to equality of quantity, and not according to equality of proportion as in geometry. By arithmetical proportionality six is a mean between eight

proportionalitatem, medium est inter octo et quatuor. Exceditur enim ab uno, et excedit alterum duobus: sed non est proportio eadem utrobique. Nam sex se habet ad quatuor in sesquialtera proportione. Octo autem ad sex in sesquitertia. E contrario vero secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, medium exceditur et excedit secundum eamdem proportionem sed non secundum eamdem quantitatem: sic enim sex est medium inter novem et quatuor. Utrobique enim invenitur sesquialtera proportio, sed non eadem quantitas. Novem enim excedunt sex in tribus, sex vero quatuor in duobus.

and four, because it is in excess of the one and exceeds the other by two. But there is not the same proportion on the one side and the other, for six is to four in a ratio of three to two while eight is to six in a ratio of four to three. On the contrary by geometrical proportionality the mean is exceeded and exceeds according to the same proportion but not according to the same quantity. In this way six is a mean between nine and four, since from both sides there is a three to two ratio. But there is not the same quantity, for nine exceeds six by three and six exceeds four by two.

Quod ergo in commutativa iustitia attendatur aequale secundum arithmeticam proportionem manifestat per hoc, quod non consideratur ibi diversa

951. Therefore, in commutative justice the equal is observed according to arithmetic proportion. This is clear from the fact that here the different relations of persons are

proportio personarum. Nihil enim differt, quantum ad iustitiam commutativam, si aliquis bonus privavit per furtum vel rapinam aliquem malum re sua, vel e converso. Neque etiam differt si bonus vel malus commisit adulterium. Sed lex attendit solum ad differentiam nocumenti; ut scilicet qui plus nocuit plus recompenset, cuiuscumque conditionis sit. Et sic patet, quod si unus duorum iniustum faciat, et alter iniustum patiatur,

not considered. It does not matter, insofar as commutative justice is concerned, whether a good man has stolen or robbed an evil man of his property or an evil man has done it to a good citizen. Likewise, it does not matter whether a good or evil man commits adultery. The law takes into account only the nature of the injury, so that the man who has done more damage, whatever his condition, must make more restitution. So it is evident that if one of two

et unus laedat et alter laedatur, lex utitur his duobus quasi aequalibus, quantumcumque sint inaequales. Unde et iudex, qui est minister legis, hoc attentat ut istud iniustum quo unus laesit alium, quod habet quamdam inaequalitatem, reducat ad aequalitatem, constituendo scilicet aequalitatem in ipsa quantitate rerum, non secundum proportionem diversarum personarum.

contestants does an injustice and the other suffers an injustice, one injures and the other is injured, the law treats them as equals, however much they may be unequal. Hence a judge, who is a dispenser of the law, attempts to reduce that injustice-by which one man injures another and which has a certain inequality-to an equality by establishing an equality in the very quantity of things and not according to the relation of different persons.

Deinde cum dicit etenim cum hic etc., manifestat per exemplum, quod dixerat. Et primo proponit exemplum. Secundo removet quoddam dubium, ibi, dicitur enim ut simpliciter et cetera. Primo ergo ponit exemplum de laesione personali, in qua

952. Next [b, ii], at “If one of two contestants,” he clarifies what he had said, by an example. First [ii, x] he presents the example; and then [ii, y], at “In the interest of plain talk etc.,” he resolves a doubt. First he sets forth the example of a personal

minus est manifestum. Et dicit, quod si duorum unus vulneretur et alius percutiat, vel etiam unus occidat et alius moriatur, divisa est hic actio et passio in inaequalia, quia scilicet percutiens vel occidens habet plus de aestimato bono, inquantum scilicet implevit voluntatem suam, et ita videtur esse quasi in lucro. Ille autem qui vulneratur vel etiam occiditur habet plus de malo, in quantum scilicet privatur incolumitate vel vita contra suam voluntatem; et ita videtur esse quasi in damno. Sed iudex tentat hoc adaequare, subtrahens a lucro et apponens damno, inquantum scilicet aufert aliquid percutienti vel occidenti contra suam

injury about which too little is clear. He says that if one of two contestants receives a wound and the other inflicts it, or even if one commits murder and the other is murdered, this division of action and passion brings about inequality because the assailant and the murderer have more of what is esteemed good, inasmuch as they have done their own will and so seem as it were to have gained. But the man who is wounded or murdered has more of evil insofar as he is deprived against his will of well-being or life, and so he seems as it were to have suffered loss. The judge tries to equalize this by subtracting from the gain and allotting compensation for the loss,

voluntatem, et exhibet in commodum vel honorem vulnerati vel occisi.

inasmuch as he takes away something from the assailant and the murderer contrary to their will and bestows it to the gain or honor of the person wounded or murdered.

Deinde cum dicit dicitur enim etc., removet quoddam dubium quod possit oriri circa nomen lucri et damni. Et dicit quod, ut simpliciter loquamur, lucrum et damnum

953. Then [ii, y], at “In the interest of plain talk,” he resolves a certain doubt that could arise from the words “gain and loss.” He says that, in the interest of plain talk, the

dicitur in talibus, quando scilicet aliquis habet plus vel minus. Et proprie accipiuntur haec nomina in bonis possessis: sed in aliquibus ista nomina non videntur proprie competere, puta in iniuriis personalibus, ut cum unus percutit et alius percutitur et in hoc quasi damnum patitur, eo quod non potest certa mensura accipi actionis et passionis in huiusmodi iniuriis personalibus, ut sic id quod est plus possit dici lucrum, et quod est minus possit dici damnum. Sed quando passio est mensurata, scilicet secundum mensuram iustitiae, tunc id quod est plus vocatur lucrum, et id quod est minus vocatur damnum.

terms “gain and loss” are used in matters where a person has more or less. Strictly these words refer to what we possess, and sometimes they do not seem suitable, for example, in the case of personal injuries (as when one person receives a blow and another inflicts it, some injury results) because a fixed measure of action and passion cannot be taken in injuries of this kind so that what is more can be called gain and what is less, loss. But when passion is measured, i.e., according to the measure of justice, then what is more is called gain and what is less, loss.

Deinde cum dicit: quare pluris quidem etc., infert duas conclusiones. Primam quidem ex parte ipsius iusti; secundam ex parte iudicis, ibi, propter quod et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia iustum commutativum est quoddam aequale, (sit) quod sit medium inter plus et minus, ita quod lucrum et damnum se habeant sicut plus et minus. Diversimode tamen in bonis et malis. Nam habere plus de bono et minus de malo, pertinet ad rationem lucri. Contrarium autem pertinet ad rationem

954. At “Therefore, that which is just” [b, iii], he deduces two conclusions: the first [iii, x] on the part of the just thing itself; and the second [iii, y], at “For this reason etc.,” on the part of the judge. He says first that the just thing in transactions is a kind of equal that is a mean between more and less in such a way that gain is taken as more and loss as less. However, they are understood in different ways in good and evil, for to have more of good and less of evil belongs to the nature of gain. But the

damni: inter quae duo, scilicet damnum et lucrum, medium est illud aequale quod dicimus iustum. Unde sequitur, quod iustum, quod est directivum in commutationibus, sit medium inter damnum et lucrum, communiter accipiendo utrumque.

contrary pertains to the idea of loss. Between these two, gain and loss, stands a mean, that equal which we call the just thing. Consequently that just thing, which gives directions in transactions, is a mean between gain and loss as both these terms are commonly understood.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod et quando etc., infert conclusionem ex parte iudicis, de quo supra dixit, quod tentat adaequare. Et dicit, quod quia iustum est medium inter damnum et lucrum, inde est, quod

955. Next [iii, y], at “For this reason,” he draws a conclusion on the part of the judge of whom it was said (952) that he tries to bring about an equality. Aristotle affirms that because the just thing is a mean

quando homines dubitant de hoc, refugiunt ad iudicem, quod idem est ac si

between gain and loss, it follows that when men are in doubt about the mean they have

refugerent ad id quod est iustum; nam iudex debet esse quasi quoddam iustum animatum, ut scilicet mens eius totaliter a iustitia possideatur. Illi autem qui refugiunt ad iudicem, videntur quaerere medium inter partes quae litigant; et inde est, quod iudices vocant medios vel mediatores, ac si ipsi attingant medium in hoc quod perducunt ad id quod est iustum. Sic ergo patet, quod iustum, de quo nunc loquimur, est quoddam medium quia iudex, qui determinat hoc iustum medius est, inquantum scilicet constituit id quod est aequale inter partes: aequale autem medium est inter plus et minus, ut supra dictum est.

recourse to a judge. A judge ought to be, as it were, living justice, so that his soul is entirely possessed by justice. But the people who go to a judge seem to be seeking a mediator between parties who quarrel. Consequently, judges are called intermediaries or mediators as if they may attain the intermediate or the mean, and lead the way to what is just. So then it is evident that what is just, the subject of our discussion, is a certain mean because the judge, who determines this just thing, is the middle inasmuch as he proposes what is equal between the parties. But the equal is the mean or middle between more and less, as we have pointed out (310, 933).

LECTURE 7 Finding the Mean of Commutative Justice Chapter 4 C. He shows how the mean of that justice which regulates transactions is understood. 1. HE DISCLOSES HIS PROPOSITION. a. How we may discover the mean of commutative justice. i. An example to show how the mean is applied. x. THE EXAMPLE. — 956-957 μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει,

It is as though the judge were dealing with a line divided into unequal sections, and took from the greater section the length exceeding the half and added it to the smaller section. When a whole

τοῦτ' ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι

belonging to two men is divided by the

τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὑτοῦ ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος

dicha or measure, then it is said that each has what is his inasmuch as each receives an equal portion—the equal portion being a mean between

καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.

something greater and something less according to arithmetic proportionality.

τὴν

y. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE EXAMPLE. — 958 διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς

Therefore, this mean is called dicheon (dikaion)—since it is a dicha (measure) —in the way they say dicheon (just

διχαστής.

thing) and dichastes (just man) and dichaste (justice). [W. D. Ross translates it: “It is for this reason also that it is called dikaion, because it is a division into two equal parts (dicha), just as if one were to call it dichaion; and the judge (dicastes) is one who bisects (dichastes).” –p. 1009]

ii. He clarifies what he has said. x. HE EXPLAINS HIS STATEMENT. — 959-960 ἐπὰν γὰρ δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφῃρέθη μέν, μὴ

If there are two equals and the half of one is taken from it and added to the other, the other will exceed it by two. But if what was taken away was not

προσετέθη δέ, ἑνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἑνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη, ἑνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριοῦμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου.

added to the other, the other would exceed the half by one. Therefore, the half taken is equal to one, and the half from which subtraction was made is equal to one. From this we know both what must be taken from the person with too much, and what must be added to the one with too little. The amount exceeding the mean must be awarded to the man with too little and taken from the one with too much.

y. HE EXPRESSES IT BY TERMINALS. — 961

ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν αα ββ γγ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς αα ἀφῃρήσθω τὸ αε, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ γγ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ γδ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ δγγ τῆς εα ὑπερέχει

Let us take three equal lines and mark them by the terms AA, BB and GG. Subtract AE (the half of A) from AA, and add it to GG and call it GD.

τῷ γδ καὶ τῷ γζ· τῆς ἄρα ββ τῷ γδ.

Therefore the whole line DGG exceeds the line AE by that which is GD and by that which is GB (the half of G), but it exceeds line BB by that which is GD.

b. He shows how we may discover (the mean) in the matter of the different arts. — 962 [ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων

This is true also in other arts, for they

τεχνῶν· ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.]

would be destroyed if the craftsman doing the quality and quantity of work which he should is not supported accordingly.

2. HE EXPLAINS THE ORIGIN OF THE NAMES, GAIN AND LOSS. — 963-964 ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἑκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὑτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις

The names, gain and loss, have their origin in voluntary transactions. When a man owns more than he did own he is said to have profit, but when less he is said to have loss, as in buying, selling, and other exchanges permitted by law. However, when men have neither more

ἄλλοις ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὑτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

nor less but the same after their transactions they are said to have what is theirs, neither gaining profit nor suffering loss. Therefore, justice is a mean between some kind of gain and loss arising in involuntary transactions; it is having an equal amount of these both before and after the transaction.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Et quemadmodum linea et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit differentiam inter iustum quod est directivum commutationum et iustum distributivum, hic ostendit qualiter accipiatur medium in hoc iusto, quod est directivum commutationum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat

956. After the philosopher has shown the difference between the mean of justice regulating transactions and the mean of justice regulating distributions, now [C] he shows how the mean of that justice which regulates transactions is understood. He handles this point in a twofold fashion. First [ C, 1] he discloses his proposition. Then [C, 2], at “The names etc.,” he explains the origin of

originem horum nominum damnum et lucrum quibus usus fuerat, ibi: venerunt autem et nomina haec et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo inveniatur medium commutativae iustitiae circa easdem res. Secundo, quomodo inveniatur circa res diversarum artium, ibi, est autem et in aliis artibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inducit exemplum ad ostendendum qualiter accipiatur medium in commutativa iustitia. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat, ibi si enim duobus aequalibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit exemplum ad propositum ostendendum.

the names, gain and loss, which he has used. He discusses the initial point from two aspects. First [1, a] he shows how we may discover the mean of commutative justice in these things; next [1, b], at “This is true etc.,” how we may discover it in the matter of the different arts. He treats the first point in two ways. First [a, ij he introduces an example to show how the mean is applied in commutative justice. Then [a, ii], at “If there are etc.,” he clarifies what he has said. In regard to the initial point he first [i, x] gives the example to explain his proposition. Then [i, y], at “Therefore, this mean etc.,” he shows the appropriateness of the example from the very manner of speaking.

Secundo ostendit convenientiam exempli ex ipso modo loquendi, ibi, propter quod, et nominatur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod ita iudex ad aequalitatem reducit, sicut si esset una linea divisa in partes inaequales, ille qui vellet ad aequalitatem reducere, auferret a maiori parte illud in quo excedit medietatem totius lineae et apponeret illud minori parti, ita quod medietas totius lineae esset quasi quaedam dica, id est regula vel mensura, per quam inaequalia reducerentur ad aequalitatem. Et sic quum totum quod est duorum hominum dividatur tali dica, id est mensura, tunc dicunt, quod unusquisque habet quod

957. Aristotle says that this is the way a judge expresses a reduction to equality. If he wishes to reduce to equality a line divided into unequal parts, he takes away from the larger part that portion by which it exceeds the half of the whole line and adds it to the smaller part so that the half of the whole line is a certain dicha, i.e., rule or measure for reducing unequal portions to an equality. So when a whole thing belonging to two men is divided by such a dicha or measure, then it is said that each one has what is his inasmuch as he receives equality—which is the mean between more and less—according to

suum est, inquantum scilicet accipiunt aequale, quod est medium inter maius et minus, et hoc secundum arismeticam proportionalitatem, quia scilicet quantum medium iustitiae exceditur ab eo qui habebat plus, tantum excedit illum qui habet minus, quod pertinet ad proportionabilitatem arithmeticam, ut prius dictum est.

arithmetic proportionality. The reason is that the mean of justice is exceeded by the one with more to the extent that it exceeds the person with less-this pertains to arithmetic proportionality, as we pointed out before (944,950).

Deinde cum dicit propter quod et nominatur etc., manifestat exemplum praemissum esse conveniens per modum loquendi apud Graecos. Et dicit, quod quia medium huius iustitiae est

958. Then [i, y], at “Therefore, this mean,” he shows that the preceding example is suitable according to Greek usage. He says that since the mean of this justice is a certain dicha, hence it is that the just thing is called dicheon

sicut quaedam dicha, inde est quod iustum apud Graecos, vocatur dicheon, sicut si aliquis volens huiusmodi nomina variare dicat quod dicaon est iustum et dicastes iustus et dicaste iustitia.

by the Greeks, as if a person wanting to vary the names should say that dicheon is the just thing, dichastes the just man, and dichaste justice.

Deinde cum dicit: si enim duobus etc., manifestat quod dixerat, scilicet quod oporteat subtrahere ab eo qui habet

959. Next [a, ii], at “If there are two equals,” he makes clear what he has said, viz., that it is necessary to take from one with more in the

plus id in quo excedit medietatem, et apponere ei qui habet minus. Et primo manifestat quod dictum est. Secundo exponit in terminis, ibi: aequales in quibus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod si sint duo aequalia, quorum utrumque habeat duas mensuras, puta duas palmas, aut duos pedes, et medietas auferatur ab uno et apponatur alteri. Manifestum est quod illud cui apponitur superexcedit alterum in duobus: quia ei cui subtrahitur non remanet nisi unum, illud autem cui additur habet tria; sed si id quod subtrahitur ab uno non apponatur alteri, manifestum est quod non erit excessus nisi in uno. Per id

amount exceeding the mean and to give to one with less. First [ii, x] he explains his statement; and then [ii, y], at “Let us take etc.,” he expresses it by terminals. He says first, let us take two equal lines both of which are two measures long, for example, two palms breadth or two feet; let us subtract half from one line and add it to the other. Obviously, the line receiving the addition exceeds the other by two units because the line from which the subtraction was made has only one unit remaining, and the line to which the addition has been made has three units. But if the section subtracted from one line is not added to the other, there will be an excess of only one unit. By that line, to which nothing is

autem cui nihil additur nec subtrahitur, intelligitur ipsum medium iustitiae, quia habet quod suum est et nec plus nec

added or from which nothing is subtracted, we understand the mean of justice, having as it does neither more nor less than what belongs

minus; per id autem cui additur intelligitur ille qui plus habet. Per id autem cui subtrahitur intelligitur ille qui minus habet.

to it. By the line to which addition has been made we understand the person who has too much. By the line from which subtraction has been made we understand the person who has too little.

Sic ergo patet quod ille qui plus habet excedit medium in uno, quod scilicet est sibi superadditum, medium vero excedit id a quo ablatum est in uno, quod scilicet est sibi subtractum. Hoc ergo, scilicet medio, cognoscemus et quid oportet auferre ab eo qui plus habet et

960. In this way then it is evident that the man who has too much exceeds the mean by one unit, which has been added to it over and above, but the mean exceeds by one-which has been taken from it-that from which subtraction has been made. Therefore, we will know by this mean what we ought to take

quid oportet apponere ei qui minus habet; quia illud oportet apponere minus habenti in quo medium excedit ipsum, hoc autem oportet auferre a maximo, id est ab eo qui plus habet, in quo medium superexceditur ab eo.

from him who has more and give to him who has less. Besides, we will know that we ought to take from the greater, i.e., from him who has more, the amount by which he exceeds the mean because we ought to give him who has less in the amount the mean exceeds him.

Deinde cum dicit aequales in quibus etc., proponit quae dicta sunt in terminis. Sint enim tres lineae aequales, in quarum una scribatur in terminis aa, in alia bb, in tertia gg; linea ergo bb maneat figura indivisa, linea vero aa

961. At “Let us take” [ii, y] he sets forth in figure what was said. Let us take three equal lines and mark the terminations of one AA, of another BB, of the third GG. Then let BB remain undivided, but divide AA in half at the point E, and divide GG in half at the point 3.

dividatur per medium in puncto e, linea vero gg dividatur per medium in puncto z. Auferatur ergo a linea quae est aa, una pars quae est ae, et apponatur lineae quae est gg et vocetur hoc appositum gd; sic ergo patet quod tota linea quae est dgg superexcedit eam quae est ae in duobus, scilicet in eo quod est gd, et in eo quod est gz, sed lineam quae est bb excedit in uno solo, quod est gd. Sic ergo patet quod id quod est maximum excedit medium in uno, minimum autem in duobus, ad modum arismeticae proportionalitatis.

Next, take away from line AA a section AE, add it to the line GG and call the addition GD. It is clear then that the whole line DG exceeds the line A E by two units, viz., by that which is GG and by that which is GD, but it exceeds the line BB by one unit only, viz., GD. Therefore, obviously, that which is longest exceeds the mean by one unit and the shortest by two units after the manner of arithmetic proportionality. E A—————A B—————B 3

G—————G——D Deinde cum dicit: est autem et in aliis

962. Then [1, b], at “This is true,” he shows

etc., ostendit quod illud quod dictum est, observari oportet etiam in commutatione diversarum artium. Destruerentur enim artes, si ille qui facit aliquod artificium non pateretur, id est non reciperet pro illo artificio tantum et tale quantum et quale fecit. Et ideo oportet commensurari opera unius artificis operibus alterius ad hoc quod sit iusta commutatio.

that what has been said must be observed in transactions having to do with the different arts. The arts would be destroyed if the craftsman, who works at some handicraft, would not be supported, i.e., would not receive for his workmanship according to the quantity and quality of what he produced. For that reason the work of one craftsman must be commensurate with the work of another to the extent that there is a just transaction.

Deinde cum dicit: venerunt autem etc., ostendit originem horum nominum, damnum et lucrum. Et dicit quod ista nomina provenerunt ex commutationibus voluntariis in quibus

963. Next [C, 2], at “The names,” he explains the origin of the names, gain and loss, saying that they come from voluntary transactions in which names of this kind were first used. When a man owned more than he previously

primo fuit usus talium nominum. Cum enim aliquis plus haberet quam prius habuerat, dicebatur lucrari: quando autem minus, dicebatur damnificari, sicut in emptionibus et venditionibus et in omnibus aliis commutationibus quae sunt licitae secundum legem. Sed quando aliqui neque plus neque minus habebant eo quod a principio habuerant, sed ipsamet reportabant in aequali quantitate per commutationem eorum quae attulerant, tunc dicebantur habere ea quae eorum sunt et nihil lucrari neque amittere.

had owned, he was said to have gained; but when less, he was said to have suffered loss, as in buying, selling and in all other transactions which are permitted by law. However, when men have neither more nor less than they had in the beginning, but bring back in equal quantity the same as they had taken by their transactions, then they are said to have what belongs to them, neither gaining nor losing.

Concludit autem ulterius conclusionem principaliter intentam. Ex praemissis enim patet quod iustum de quo nunc agitur, est medium damni et lucri: quod quidem iustum nihil est aliud quam habere aequale ante commutationem et post, etiam praeter voluntatem; ut patet in eo qui, iudice cogente, restituit alteri

964. He draws the final inference that he had principally intended. It is evident from the premises that the justice we are now discussing is a mean between gain and loss, that justice is simply the possession of an equal amount before and after a transaction even an involuntary one, as we see in the person who, when constrained by a judge,

quod plus habebat.

restores to another what he had in excess.

LECTURE 8 The Opinion of Pythagoras

Chapter 5 I. HE STATES THE ERRONEOUS OPINION. — 965 δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὡρίζοντο γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ.

Some philosophers seem to think that, generally speaking, justice is reciprocation, as the Pythagoreans held; in this way they defined justice with out qualification.

II. HE REJECTS IT. A. In regard to distributive justice. — 966 τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον

οὐκ τὸ

However, reciprocation does not belong to distributive justice.

B. In the case of commutative justice. 1. HE PROPOSES WHAT HE INTENDS TO DO WITH COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE. — 967 οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν, καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον· εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο

Likewise, it is not suited to the justice that regulates all transactions, although Rhadamantus wished to say that it was, holding that if a man suffers what he himself did to another, justice is attained.

2. HE REJECTS THIS VIEW FOR TWO REASONS. a. First. — 968-969

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα

Such justice is at variance with true justice in many situations, for example, if a prince strikes another it is not required that the

ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι.

prince be struck, but if another strikes a prince such a man should not only be struck but also punished in addition.

b. Second. — 970 ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ.

Moreover, it makes a great deal of difference whether the offender acts voluntarily or involuntarily.

III. HE SHOWS WHERE AND HOW THE TRUTH MAY BE FOUND. A. There must be reciprocation in exchanges according to proportionality.

1. HE STATES HIS INTENTION. — 971-972 ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα.

But in dealings of exchange justice is such that it includes reciprocation according to proportionality but not according to equality.

2. HE PROVES HIS STATEMENT. — 973-974 τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι [εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει]· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον.

By reason of proportional reciprocation the state continues to exist, for either the citizens seek to return evil (for evil)—if not, a kind of servitude seems to be present when revenge may not be taken—or they seek to return good (for good) and if not, proper recompense will not b made. It is by return of favors that men live together. Because of this the promptly express gratitude as if it were a sacred duty to make repayment—a thing characteristic of gratitude. It is fitting that a man should be of service to one who has done him a favor

and in return begin to do a greater favor. B. He explains the form of this proportionality. 1. HE GIVES AN EXAMPLE. — 975-976 ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις. οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ β, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὑτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾖ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἶτα τὸ

A conjunction by means of a diagonal shows how to make that compensation which is according to proportionality. Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, G a house, and D a sandal. It is necessary that a builder should take from the shoemaker his product and in return give what he himself makes. If first an equality according to proportionality be found and then reciprocation be made, it will be as we have said. But if not, there will not be an

ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι.

equality-and the state will not continue to exist-because nothing hinders the work of one craftsman from being of more value than the work of another. Therefore these things must be equated.

2. THE SAME IS FOUND IN OTHER ARTS. — 977 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὃ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον

This is to be observed also in the other arts, for they would be destroyed if a workman did not receive according to the quantity and quality of what he produced.

ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.

Between two doctors an exchange does not take place but between a doctor and a farmer who are altogether different and unequal. These then must be equated.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Videtur autem aliquibus et cetera. Postquam

965. After the Philosopher has shown how the mean should be understood in both kinds of justice, now he

philosophus ostendit qualiter accipiatur medium in utraque iustitiae specie, hic excludit quamdam falsam sententiam circa acceptionem medii iustitiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit sententiam

rejects a false opinion about the understanding of the mean of justice. He discusses this point under three headings. First [I] he states the erroneous opinion. Next [II], at “However, reciprocation etc.,” he rejects it. Third [III], at “But in dealings etc.,” he shows where and how the truth may be found. He says first it seems to some that, generally speaking, justice is nothing other than reciprocation, viz., that a man should suffer according to

erroneam. Secundo improbat eam, ibi, et contrapassum autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit in quibus et qualibus habeat veritatem, ibi, sed in communicationibus quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quibusdam visum est quod universaliter loquendo nihil aliud esset iustum quam contrapassum, ut scilicet aliquis pateretur secundum quod fecerat. Et haec fuit sententia

what he has done. This was the opinion of the Pythagoreans who decided that justice is the same as reciprocation.

Pythagoricorum, qui determinabant quod simpliciter iustum est idem quod contrapassum alii.

Deinde cum dicit contrapassum autem etc., improbat praedictam positionem. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem quantum ad distributivam iustitiam; dicens quod contrapassum non congruit circa iustum distributivum:

966. Then [II], at “However, reciprocation,” he rejects this opinion on two accounts; and first [II, A] in regard to distributive justice, he says that reciprocation does not correspond to what is just distributively. The reason for this is evident. The just thing in distributions is not judged according to what one of two, who must be equated by justice, does against the other or suffers from the other. This is necessary for the nature of reciprocation; but in distribution a share of the common

et huius ratio manifesta est. Iustum enim distributivum non attenditur secundum quod unus duorum, quos oportet per iustitiam aequari, agit in alium vel

goods is given to each by an equality of proportion.

patitur ab alio, quod requiritur ad rationem contrapassi; sed quod aliquid communium bonorum distribuatur utrique secundum aequalitatem proportionis.

Secundo ibi: neque in directivum etc., improbat praedictam positionem quantum ad iustitiam commutativam. Et primo proponit quod de hac iustitia intendebant. Et dicit quod contrapassum non congruit etiam omnibus modis circa iustum quod est directivum commutationum; quamvis

967. Next [II, B], at “Likewise, it is not,” he rejects the preceding error in the case of commutative justice. First [II, B, I] he proposes what he intends to do with commutative justice. He says that reciprocation does not coincide with all the processes in justice that regulate transactions, although the philosophers who expressed the foregoing opinion meant that in transactions justice is the same as reciprocation. This is clear from the fact that a legislator named Rhadamantus maintained that this justice is of such a nature that if a man suffers those very things he inflicted on others, justice is vindicated.

illi qui protulerunt praedictam sententiam hoc voluerunt dicere quod in commutationibus sit idem iustum quod contrapassum: quod patet per hoc quod quidam legislator, nomine Rhadamantus, introduxit tale iustum quod si aliquis patiatur illa quae fecit, fit recta vindicta.

Secundo ibi: multis enim in locis etc., improbat quod dictum est, duabus rationibus. Circa quarum primam dicit quod in multis locis talis vindicta invenitur dissonare verae iustitiae, ut si aliquis in principatu constitutus percusserit aliquam privatam personam, non requirit hoc iustitia

968. Then [II, B, 2], at “Such justice,” he rejects this view for two reasons. In regard to the first [2, a] he says that in many situations vengeance of this kind is found to be at variance with true justice, for instance, if a ruler strikes a private person justice does not require that the ruler be struck. But if a person strikes a ruler it is necessary that such a person not only be struck but be more gravely punished.

quod princeps repercutiatur, et similiter, si aliquis percutiat principem, oportet quod non solum percutiatur, sed quod etiam gravius puniatur. Videtur autem hoc esse contra id quod philosophus supra dixerat, quod in iustitia commutativa non attenditur diversa conditio personarum, sed lex utitur omnibus quasi aequalibus. Sed attendendum est quod ibidem philosophus dixit

969. This seems to contradict what the Philosopher said before (951) that in commutative justice the different rank of persons is not taken into account—all being equal under the law. But it should be noted what the Philosopher had said was this: in commutative justice the law considers only the nature of the damage. It is clear that when damage is considered in the taking of an external thing—money for instance—the amount of damage does not vary according to a person’s rank. Still

quod in commutativa iustitia lex attendit solum ad differentiam nocumenti. Manifestum est autem quod quando nocumentum attenditur circa subtractionem rei exterioris, puta pecuniae, non variatur quantitas nocumenti secundum diversam conditionem personae, sed quando est nocumentum personale, tunc necesse est quod quantitas nocumenti diversificetur secundum conditionem personae.

when the injury is personal, the extent of the injury necessarily changes according to the rank of the person. Obviously, worse damage is done when someone strikes a ruler, by reason of the fact that injury is done not only to the person of the ruler but also the whole commonweal. Therefore, reciprocation simply taken is not suitable for justice in matters of this kind.

Manifestum est enim quod maius est nocumentum cum aliquis percutit principem, per quod non solum personam ipsius sed totam rempublicam laedit, quam cum percutit aliquam privatam personam. Et ideo non competit iustitiae in talibus simpliciter contrapassum.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc involuntarium et cetera. Et dicit quod circa

970. At “Moreover, it makes” [2, b] he gives the second reason. He says in the matter of imposing punishment, it makes a great deal of difference whether the offender

vindictas inferendas multum differt utrum aliquis iniuriam intulerit voluntarius an involuntarius, scilicet propter ignorantiam vel vim aut metum. Gravius enim debet vindicari si voluntarius peccavit quam si involuntarius, et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia in vindictis non solum attenditur quod aequalitas iustitiae reparetur per hoc quod aliquis restituat alteri quod ei subtraxit; sed etiam

inflicted the injury voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e., because of ignorance or violence or fear. The man who sinned voluntarily ought to be punished more severely than the man who sinned involuntarily, for two reasons. First, because in regard to punishments, consideration is given to the restoration of equality of justice not only by a person restoring what he has taken but also by his being punished for the crime. For this reason some are punished by law even for sins causing no injury or damage to another. Likewise a thief is compelled not only to restore what he took—by which the equality of justice is reestablished—but beyond that he is punished for the offense perpetrated. But the offense is increased or diminished by the fact that a man sins voluntarily or involuntarily. Hence the voluntary offender is punished more severely than the involuntary offender. The second

quod pro peccato commisso poenam sustineat; et propter hoc lege aliqui puniuntur etiam pro peccatis quibus nulla iniuria vel damnum alii irrogatur, et fur non solum compellitur restituere quod accepit, per quod aequalitas iustitiae reintegratur; sed etiam ulterius punitur pro culpa commissa. Culpa autem aggravatur vel diminuitur ex hoc quod quis peccat voluntarius vel involuntarius. Unde gravius punitur voluntarius quam

reason is that the injury of the deliberate transgressor is greater, for internal contempt is added to the external damage.

involuntarius. Secundo quia maior est voluntarie peccantis iniuria; additur enim exteriori nocumento interior contemptus.

Deinde cum dicit: sed in

971. Next [III], at “But in dealings,” he explains in what

communicationibus quidem etc., ostendit in quibus et qualiter sit verum quod dictum est, scilicet quod contrapassum sit iustum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod contrapassum oportet fieri in commutationibus secundum proportionalitatem. Secundo manifestat formam huius proportionalitatis, ibi, facit enim retributionem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo talis forma observari possit, ibi, propter

matter and manner the statement is true that reciprocation is justice. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [III, A] he shows that there must be reciprocation in exchanges according to proportionality. Then [III, B], at “A conjunction by means etc.,” he explains the form of this proportionality. Last [Lect. 9; C], at “Therefore all etc.” (B. 1133 a 18), he shows how such a form can be observed. On the initial point he does two’ things. First [III, A, 1] he states his intention. Next [III, A, 2], at “By reason of proportional etc.,” he proves his statement. He says that in dealings of exchange it is true that justice is of such a nature that it includes reciprocation not according to equality but according to proportionality.

quod omnia comparabilia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, per contrafacere, enim et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod in communicationibus commutativis verum est quod tale iustum continet in se contrapassum, non quidem secundum aequalitatem, sed secundum proportionalitatem.

Videtur autem hoc esse contra id quod supra dictum

972. It seems this is contrary to what was said before (950), that in commutative justice the mean is taken not

est, quod scilicet in commutativa iustitia, medium accipitur non quidem secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, quae consistit in aequalitate proportionis, sed secundum arithmeticam, quae consistit in aequalitate quantitatis.

according to geometrical proportionality, which consists in an equality of proportion, but according to arithmetic proportionality, which consists in a quantitative equality. We must say that, in regard to commutative justice there should always be an equality of thing to thing, not, however, of action and passion, which implies corresponding requital. But in this, proportionality must be employed in order to bring about an equality of things because the work of one craftsman is of more value than the work of another, e.g., the building of a house than the

Dicendum est autem, quod circa iustitiam

production of a penknife. Hence, if the builder exchanged his work for the work of the cutler, there would not be

commutativam, semper quidem oportet esse aequalitatem rei ad rem, non tamen actionis et passionis, quod importat contrapassum. Sed in hoc oportet adhiberi proportionalitatem ad hoc, quod fiat aequalitas rerum, eo quod actio unius artificis maior est quam actio alterius, sicut aedificatio quam fabricatio cultelli; unde si aedificator commutaret actionem suam pro actione fabri, non esset aequalitas

equality of thing, given and taken, i.e., of house and penknife.

rei datae et acceptae, puta domus et cultelli.

Deinde cum dicit: per contrafacere enim etc., probat propositum, dicens, quod per hoc manifestum esse potest, quod iustum commutativum contineat contrapassum secundum proportionalitatem, quia per hoc commanent cives sibiinvicem in civitate, quod

973. Then [III, A, 2], at “By reason of proportional,” he proves his statement, saying that justice in exchanges includes reciprocation according to proportionality. This can be shown by the fact that the citizens live together amicably because they have proportionate kindliness towards one another. Accordingly, if one does something for another, the other is anxious to do something in proportion in return. Obviously, all citizens desire that reciprocation be done to them proportionately. By reason of this all men can live together because they do for one

sibiinvicem proportionaliter contrafaciunt, prout scilicet si unus pro alio facit aliquid, alius studet proportionaliter facere pro eodem. Et manifestum est, quod omnes cives hoc quaerunt, ut eis proportionaliter contrafiat: per hoc enim commanent homines adinvicem, quod sibiinvicem faciunt quod quaerunt. Numquid ergo hoc

another what they themselves seek. Therefore, they never seek in regard to evil that corresponding requital be done to them proportionately. But if they do not seek this in regard to evil, for example, when one man does not take vengeance on another who injures him, a kind of servility seems to result. Indeed it is servile when a man cannot gain by his own activity something that he does not desire in an evil way.

male quaerunt, quod scilicet eis proportionaliter contrafiat? Si autem non quaerunt hoc male, videtur esse servitus, si uni facienti, alius non contrafaciat proportionaliter; servile enim est, quod aliquis non adipiscatur ex suo opere id quod non male quaerit.

Vel dicemus, quod non solum non male quaerunt homines sibi proportionaliter contrafieri, sed etiam bene? Et sic, si non contrafiat eis proportionaliter, non fiet

974. We may even say that men not only do not desire that corresponding requital, when unjust, be done to the m proportionately, but they do not desire that it be done when just. In this way if corresponding requital is not done them in a proportionate way, proper retribution will not be effected. But men live together because one makes

retributio debita. Per hoc autem homines commanent adinvicem, quod unus retribuat alteri pro his quae ab eo accepit. Et inde est, quod boni homines prompte exhibent suis benefactoribus gratiarum actionem quasi quiddam sacrum, ut per hoc eis retribuant; retribuere enim proprie pertinet ad gratiarum actionem. Oportet enim quod homo iterato serviat ei qui sibi fecit gratiam idest gratuitum beneficium impendit, et quod

a return to another for the favors he has received. So it is that virtuous men promptly express gratitude to their benefactors as if it were a sacred duty to make them a return in this way-repaying a favor is characteristic of gratitude. It is fitting that a man should be of service to one who has done him a favor, i.e., bestowed a gratuitous kindness, and that he be not content to give only as much as he received but that in return he begins to offer more than he got so that he himself may do a favor.

non sit contentus tantum facere quantum accepit, sed quod rursus ipse incipiat amplius exhibendo, quam accepit, ut sic ipse gratiam faciat.

Deinde cum dicit facit enim retributionem etc.,

975. Next [III, B], at “A conjunction by means,” he makes known the form of proportionality according to

manifestat formam proportionalitatis secundum quam debet fieri contrapassum. Et primo proponit ipsam in coriario et aedificatore; secundo

which reciprocation ought to be made. First [III, B, 1] he gives an example in the shoemaker and the builder; then [III, B, 2], at “This is to be observed etc.,” he shows that the same is found in other arts. He says first that a conjunction by means of a diagonal shows how to make compensation or reciprocation according to

ostendit idem esse in aliis artibus, ibi: est autem hoc et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod coniugatio, quae est secundum diametrum, facit in commutationibus retributionem vel contrapassum secundum proportionalitatem. Ad cuius intellectum describatur quadratum abgd et ducantur duo diametri se intersecantes, scilicet ad et bg. Sit ergo aedificator a, coriarius b, figura domus quae est opus aedificatoris g,

proportionality. To understand this draw A B G D, make two diagonals intersecting one another, viz., AD and BD. Let A represent a builder, B a shoemaker, G a house that is the work of the builder, and D a sandal that is the work of a shoemaker. It is necessary at times that the builder should take from the shoemaker his product, a sandal. But the builder himself ought to give his product as a recompense to the shoemaker.

calceamentum, quod est opus coriarii, d. Oportet igitur quandoque quod aedificator accipiat a coriario opus eius, scilicet calceamentum. Debet autem et ipse pro retributione dare ei opus suum. Si ergo primo adinveniatur secundum proportionalitatem aequalitas, ut scilicet constituantur ex una parte tot calceamenta contra unam domum quot plures expensas facit aedificator in una domo, quam coriarius in uno calceamento, deinde fiat contrapassum, ut scilicet aedificator

accipiat

multa

976. Therefore, if first an equality according to proportionality is found so that on one side a certain number of sandals be fixed as equal to one house (for a builder incurs more expense in building one house than a shoemaker in making one sandal), next, corresponding reciprocation is had so that the builder may receive many sandals equal to one house and the shoemaker one house, there will be recompense—as was said—made according to proportion by a diagonal conjunction. BUILDER: A

B: SHOEMAKER

calceamenta adaequata uni domui et coriarius unam domum, erit quod dicitur, scilicet retributio, secundum proportionalitatem facta per diametralem coniunctionem:

HOUSE: G

D: SANDAL

quia scilicet calceamenta proportionata dantur aedificatori, cui secundum diametrum opponuntur et domus coriario. Si autem non sic fiat retributio, non

The reason is that a proportionate number of sandals are given to the builder, and the house to the shoemaker. But if compensation is not made in this way, there will not be an equality of things exchanged—and so men will not be able to live together—since nothing hinders the work of one craftsman from being worth more than the work of

erit aequalitas rerum commutatarum, et sic homines non poterunt adinvicem commanere, eo quod nihil prohibet opus unius artificis esse melius quam opus alterius: sicut domus quam calceamentum: et ideo oportet haec adinvicem aequari secundum dictam proportionalitatem ad hoc quod fiat iusta commutatio.

another, a house than a sandal. For this reason these things must be equated one with the other according to the previously mentioned proportionality, so that a just exchange may take place.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem hoc etc., ostendit idem esse in aliis artibus. Et dicit quod hoc quod dictum est de aedificatore et coriario, est etiam observandum in aliis artibus, ut scilicet fiat contrapassum commutatio secundum proportionalitatem diametralem. Destruerentur

977. Then [III, B, 2], at “This is to be observed,” he shows that the same thing is found in the other arts. He affirms that what was said (975, 976) about the builder and the shoemaker must be observed also in the other arts, so that reciprocation and exchange may take place according to diagonal proportionality. Indeed the arts would be destroyed if a workman did not receive according to the quantity and quality of what he produced —a thing that must be discovered in the way indicated. It is not common for men practicing one art, for example, two doctors, to communicate their work with one

enim artes, si non tantum et tale reciperet aliquis, quantum et quale faceret. Et

another, but very often men practicing different arts do, for instance, a doctor and a farmer, both entirely different and unequal. These must be equated in the preceding way.

hoc oportet adinvenire, secundum modum praedictum. Non enim saepe communicant sibi mutuo sua opera duo homines unius artis, puta duo medici, sed plerumque homines diversarum artium, puta medicus et agricola, et omnino diversi et inaequales; quos tamen oportet aequari secundum praedictum.

modum

LECTURE 9 Money Chapter 5 (III) C. He shows in what way this form of proportionality can be observed. 1. HE EXPLAINS HIS INTENTION. a. It is necessary to make everything commensurate. i. The nature of that which measures all things. — 978-979 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή. ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,

Therefore all things capable of exchange ought to be compared in some way. For this purpose money was invented and became a kind of medium measuring everything including excess and defect.

ii. How such a commensuration is established in exchanges. — 980 πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν

A certain number of sandals are equal in value to a house or to a quantity of food. Therefore, as many sandals must be exchanged for a house or a quantity of food

ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία. τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται.

in proportion as the builder contributes more than the shoemaker (or the farmer). If this is not observed, there will be neither exchange nor sharing. But this reciprocation will not be possible unless things are equated.

iii. He indicates the nature of this commensuration. — 981-982 δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἣ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· οἷον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ'

Therefore, it is reasonable to measure all things by one norm, as has been pointed out previously. This norm in reality is demand which connects all things. If men were not in need there would be no exchange, or if they did not have a similar demand, exchange would not be the same. Money originated by agreement on account of necessary exchange. Hence money (numisma) has the name because it is a norm not by nature but by law (nomos). We have the power to change money and to

ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον.

make it useless.

b. How a just reciprocation in exchanges may be effected. i. He explains his proposition. — 983 ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι.

When things have been equated there will be reciprocation, so that as the farmer is to the shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker’s work is to the amount of the farmer’s work. When things are to be exchanged they ought to be represented in a figure b showing proportionality. If this is not done one extreme will have both excesses, but when all have what is theirs they will be equal and will do business with one another because this equality can be brought about for them.

ii. (He) puts it in a diagram. — 984 γεωργὸς

α,

τροφὴ

γ,

Let A represent the farmer, G the food, B

σκυτοτόμος β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία.

the shoemaker and D his equated work. If there is no such reciprocation, there will not be any sharing of goods.

2. HE CLARIFIES THE PREVIOUS STATEMENTS. a. How things are made commensurate. i. Necessity is a measure according to reality. — 985 ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἅτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγήν. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο

That human demand connects everything as by a kind of measure is evident because when men are so mutually situated that both or at least one is not in need, they do not exchange their goods. But they engage in exchange when one needs what the other has, e.g., wine, and they give grain for it. An equation then must be made between

ἰσασθῆναι.

these goods. ii. Currency is a measure according to the provision of law. —

986-987 ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ, τὸ

For future exchanges money is as it were a guarantee that a man, who has no present need, will be helped when he is in want later

νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.

on. The man who offers currency should receive what he needs. However, currency suffers like other things, for it is not always of the same value; although it tends to be more stable than other things.

b. How the things made commensurate may be exchanged. i. In what manner there is exchange of goods... measured in currency. — 988

διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι·

Everything then must be evaluated in

οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας.

money, for in this way exchange will always take place and consequently association among men. Money equates goods making them commensurate after the manner of a measure. Indeed association is not possible without exchange, nor exchange without equality which cannot exist unless there is commensuration.

ii. Under what aspect currency serves as a measure. — 989 τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. ἓν δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι.

It is impossible that things so greatly different be made commensurate according to reality, but they agree sufficiently by comparison with the needs of man, and so there must be one measure determined by man. And this is called money, which makes all things commensurate inasmuch as they are measured by money.

iii. He puts in terminals what was said. — 990-991 οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

Let A represent a house and B five minae. Let G represent a bed worth one mina. The bed then will be one fifth the value of the house. Therefore it is obvious how many beds equal a house, viz., five. Likewise it is obvious that barter took place before money existed. But it makes no difference whether five beds or the value of five beds are given.

τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται.

We have now discussed the nature of what is just and what is unjust.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Propter quod omnia comparabilia et cetera. Postquam philosophus

978. After the Philosopher has proposed the form of proportionality, with which reciprocation is identified in exchange, he now shows [III, C] in what way this form

proposuit formam proportionalitatis secundum quam contrapassum est idem quod iustum in commutationibus, hic ostendit qualiter praedicta forma proportionalitatis possit observari. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quaedam, quae dicta sunt, ibi, quoniam autem indigentia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod ad praedictam formam proportionalitatis

of proportionality can be observed. First [C, 1] he explains his intention. Then [C, 2], at “That human demand etc.,” he clarifies the previous statements. He discusses the initial point in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he shows that to preserve the form of proportionality perfectly it is necessary to make everything commensurate. Next [1, b), at “When things have been etc.,” lie explains how a just reciprocation in exchanges may be effected by a commensuration of this kind. He treats the first point under three aspects. Initially [1, a, i] he explains the nature of that which measures all things, Then [1, a, ii], at “A certain number etc.,” he shows how such a commensuration is established in exchanges. Last [ 1, a, iii ], at “Therefore, it is etc.,” he indicates the nature of this commensuration.

observandum necesse est omnia commensurare; secundo ostendit quomodo per huiusmodi commensurationem fiat iuste contrapassum in commutationibus, ibi, erit utique contrapassum et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quid sit illud per quod omnia commensurantur. Secundo ostendit quomodo talis commensuratio in commutationibus fiat, ibi, quanta quaedam utique et cetera. Tertio assignat rationem praedictae commensurationis, ibi, oportet enim uno aliquo et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad hoc, quod opera diversorum

979. He says first, in order that the products of the different workmen be equated and thus become possible

artificum adaequentur, et sic commutari possint, oportet, quod omnia illa quorum potest esse commutatio, sint aliqualiter adinvicem

to exchange, it is necessary that all things capable of exchange should be comparable in some way with one another so that it can be known which of them has greater value and which less. It was for this purpose that money or currency was invented, to measure the price of

comparabilia, ut scilicet sciatur quid eorum plus valeat et quid minus. Et ad hoc inventum est nummisma, id est denarius, per quem mensurantur pretia talium rerum, et sic denarius fit quodam modo medium, inquantum scilicet omnia mensurat, et superabundantiam et defectum, id est quantum una res superexcedat aliam, sicut supra dictum est, quod medium iustitiae est quasi dica quae mensurat

such things. In this way currency becomes a medium inasmuch as it measures everything, both excess and defect, to the extent that one thing exceeds another, as was pointed out before (955, 959-960). It is a mean of justice—as if someone should call it a measure of excess and defect.

superabundantiam defectum.

et

Deinde cum dicit: quanta

980. Next [1, a, ii], at ‘W certain number,” he shows

quaedam etc., ostendit quomodo, secundum commensurationem praedictam fit commutatio. Licet enim domus sit magis aliquid in pretio quam calciamentum, tamen aliquanta calceamenta adaequant in pretio unam domum, vel et cibum unius hominis per aliquod longum tempus. Oportet igitur ad hoc quod sit commutatio ut tanta calceamenta dentur pro una

how exchange takes place according to the preceding commensuration. Although a house is worth more than a sandal, nevertheless, a number of sandals are equal in value to one house or the food required for one man during a long period. In order then to have just exchange, as many sandals must be exchanged for one house or for the food required for one man as the builder or the farmer exceeds the shoemaker in his labor and costs. If this is not observed, there will be no exchange of things and men will not share their goods with one another. But what has been said, that a number of sandals are exchanged for one house, is not possible unless the sandals are equated with the house in some way.

domo vel pro cibo unius hominis, quantum aedificator vel etiam agricola excedit coriarium in labore et

expensis, quia si hoc non observetur, commutatio

non rerum,

erit neque

homines sibiinvicem sua bona communicabunt. Id autem quod dictum est, scilicet quod aliqua calceamenta dentur pro una domo, non poterit esse nisi aliqualiter sint aequalia calceamenta domui. Deinde cum dicit: oportet

981. At “Therefore, it is” [i, a, iii] he indicates the nature

enim etc., assignat rationem praedictae

of this commensuration made by means of money. He states that for this reason it is possible to equate things

commensurationis, quae fit per numisma. Et dicit, quod

because all things can be measured by some one standard, as was pointed out (957). But this one

ideo possunt adaequari, quia

omnia omnia

standard which truly measures all things is demand. This includes all commutable things inasmuch as

possunt commensurari per

everything has a reference to human need. Articles are

aliquid unum, ut dictum est; hoc autem unum, quod omnia

not valued according to the dignity of their nature, otherwise a mouse, an animal endowed with sense,

mensurat secundum rei veritatem est indigentia, quae

should be of greater value than a pearl, a thing without life. But they are priced according as man stands in need

continet omnia commutabilia, in quantum scilicet omnia

of them for his own use.

referuntur ad humanam indigentiam; non enim appretiantur res secundum dignitatem naturae ipsorum: alioquin unus mus, quod est animal sensibile, maioris pretii esset quam una margarita, quae est res inanimata: sed rebus pretia imponuntur, secundum quod homines indigent eis ad suum usum.

Et huius signum est quia, si

982. An indication of this is that if man were not in need

homines nullo indigerent, nulla esset commutatio; vel si

there would be no exchange, or if they did not have a similar need, i.e., of these things, exchange would not be

non similiter indigerent, idest

the same because men would not exchange what they

non his rebus non esset

have for something they did not need. That demand

eadem commutatio, quia non

really measures everything is evident from the fact that

darent id quod habent pro eo quo non indigerent. Et quod

money originated by arrangement or a kind of agreement among men on account of the necessity of

secundum rei veritatem indigentia omnia mensurat,

exchange, i.e., exchange of necessary goods. There is an agreement among men that what a person needs will be

manifestum est per hoc, quod numisma factum est

given him in exchange for currency. Hence currency is called money (numisma)—nomos means law—since

secundum idest

currency is not a measure by nature but by law (nomos). It is in our power to change currencies and make them

compositionem, secundum

conventionem quamdam inter homines, propter

useless.

commutationem necessitatis, idest rerum necessariarum. Est enim condictum inter homines quod afferenti denarium

detur

id

quo

indiget. Et inde est quod denarius vocatur numisma: nomos enim lex est, quia scilicet denarius non est mensura per naturam, sed nomo, id est lege; est enim in potestate nostra transmutare denarios et reddere eos inutiles.

Deinde cum dicit: erit utique contrapassum etc., ostendit

983. Then [i, b], at “When things have been,” he shows how just reciprocation takes place in exchanges

quomodo praedictam

according to the preceding commensuration. First [i, b, i] he explains his proposition; and then [i, b, ii], at “Let A

secundum

commensurationem contrapassum iuste

in

represent etc.,” puts it in a diagram. He says first that the norm measuring all things by need according to

commutationibus fiat. Et primo manifestat propositum.

nature and by currency according to human convention will then become reciprocation when everything will be

Secundo ponit in terminis, ibi:

equated in the way just mentioned. This is done in such a

agricola a et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo

manner that as the farmer (whose work is raising food for men) excels the shoemaker (whose work is making

omnia mensurantur per indigentiam naturaliter, et

sandals), in the same proportion the work of the shoemaker exceeds in number the work of the farmer, so

per denarium secundum condictum hominum, tunc

that many sandals are exchanged for one bushel of wheat. Thus when exchange of things takes place, the

iuste fiet contrapassum quando omnia secundum

articles to be exchanged ought to be arranged in a proportional figure with diagonals, as was stated

praedictum modum adaequabuntur, ita scilicet

previously (957). If this was not done, one extreme would have both excesses; if a farmer gave a bushel of

quod quantum agricola, cuius

wheat for a sandal, he would have a surplus of labor in

opus est cibus hominis, excedit coriarium cuius opus

his product and would have also an excess of loss because he would be giving more than he would receive. But

est calceamentum, in tanta proportione excedit

when all have what is theirs, they are in this way equal and do business with one another because the equality

secundum numerum opus coriarii opus agricolae, ut

previously mentioned is possible for them.

scilicet multa calciamenta dentur pro uno modio tritici. Et ita quando fit commutatio rerum oportet ducere res commutandas in diametralem figuram proportionalitatis, ut supra dictum est: et si hoc non fieret, alterum extremum haberet

utrasque

superabundantias. Puta si agricola daret modium tritici pro calceamento, haberet superabundantiam laboris in opere et haberet etiam superabundantiam doni, quia scilicet plus daret quam acciperet. Sed quando omnes habent quae sua sunt, sic sunt aequales et sibiinvicem communicant, quia praedicta aequalitas potest fieri in ipsis. Deinde cum dicit agricola a etc., ponit in terminis quod

984. Next [1, b, ii], at “Let A represent,” he puts in a diagram what has been said about the proportional

dictum est de proportionalitatis.

figura

figure. Take then (as in the previous example) a square A, B, G, D, and two diagonals AD and BG intersecting

Describatur ergo, sicut et prius, quadratum abgd; et

one another. Let A represent the farmer and G the food, his product, e.g., a bushel of wheat. Let B represent the

duo diametri se intersecantes

shoemaker and D his equated product, i.e., as many

ad, bg; et sit ergo agricola a, cibus quod est opus eius, g

sandals as have the value of a bushel of wheat. There will then be a just reciprocation if A be joined with D and B

puta modius figura tritici;

with G. If there is not such a compensation men will not

coriarius sit b, d vero sit opus coriarii adaequatum, idest tot calceamenta quae valeant modium tritici. Erit ergo iuste contrapassum si a

share their goods with one another. FARMER:

B:

A

SHOEMAKER

FOOD: G

D: SANDAL

coniungatur cum d et b cum g: et si non sit talis contrapassio, homines non communicabunt invicem.

res

suas

Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem indigentia etc.,

985. At “That human demand” [C, 2] he explains more fully what has already been mentioned. First [2, a] he

manifestat planius quod supra dictum est. Et primo

shows how things are made commensurate; and next [2, b], at “Everything then,” how the things made

manifestat quomodo res mensurentur; secundo

commensurate may be exchanged. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [2, a, i] he shows that

quomodo commensuratae commutentur, ibi: propter

necessity is a measure according to reality; and then [2, a, ii], at “For future exchanges etc.,” how currency is a

quod oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

measure according to the provision of law. He says first the statement (981-982) that human need contains

ostendit quod necessitas sit mensura secundum rei

everything as a certain measure is explained in this way. When men are so situated among themselves that either

veritatem. Secundo quomodo denarius sit mensura

both, or at least one, do not need a thing possessed by the other, they do not engage in mutual exchange. But

secundum legis positionem,

exchange does take place when a man owning grain is in

ibi, pro futura autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod

need of wine which his neighbor has, and thus gives the grain for the wine, so that a quantity of grain is allotted

hoc quod dictum est, quod indigentia hominum

according to the value of the wine.

contineat omnia sicut una quaedam mensura, ostenditur per hoc quod quando homines hoc modo se habent adinvicem quod vel uterque vel saltem alter non indigeat re quam alius habet, non commutant adinvicem, sicut commutant cum aliquis qui habet frumentum indiget vino quod habet alius et ita dat frumentum pro vino. Oportet igitur ad hoc quod

iusta sit commutatio quod aequetur frumentum vino, ut scilicet tantum de frumento detur quantum valet vinum. Deinde cum dicit: pro futura

986. Then [2, a, ii], at “For future exchanges,” he shows

autem etc., manifestat quomodo denarius mensurat.

clearly how currency serves as a measure. On this point we must consider that if men always needed immediately

Circa quod considerandum est, quod si semper homines

the goods they have among themselves, they would have no need of any exchange except of thing for thing, e.g.,

in praesenti indigerent rebus quas invicem habent, non

wine for grain. But sometimes one man (who has a surplus of wine at present) does not need the grain that

oporteret fieri commutationem nisi rei ad

another man has (who is in need of wine), but perhaps later he will need the grain or some other product. In

rem, puta frumenti ad vinum: sed quandoque contingit quod

this way then for the necessity of future exchange, money or currency is, as it were, a surety that if a man

ille cui superabundat vinum

has no present need but may want in the future, the

ad praesens non indiget frumento quod habet ille qui

thing he needs will be available when he presents the currency.

indiget vino, sed forte postea indigebit vel frumento vel aliqua alia re. Sic ergo pro necessitate futurae commutationis numisma, id est denarius, est nobis quasi fideiussor quod si in praesenti homo nullo indiget sed indigeat in futuro, aderit sibi afferenti denarium illud quo indigebit.

Oportet

enim

istam

esse

987. The particular virtue of currency must be that

virtutem denarii, ut quando

when a man presents it he immediately receives what he

aliquis ipsum affert, statim contingat accipere illud quo

needs. However, it is true that currency also suffers the same as other things, viz., that it does not always obtain

homo indiget. Verum est autem quod etiam denarius

for a man what he wants because it cannot always be equal or of the same value. Nevertheless it ought to be so

patitur hoc idem quod aliae res, quod scilicet non semper

established that it retains the same value more permanently than other things.

pro eo homo accipit quod vult, quia non semper potest aequale, idest non semper est eiusdem valoris; sed tamen

taliter debet esse institutus, ut magis permaneat in eodem valore quam aliae res. Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet etc., manifestat

988. Next [2, b], at “Everything then,” he explains how, by the measure of currency, there is exchange of things

quomodo secundum commensurationem

which are made commensurate in currency. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [2, b, i] he shows in

denariorum fit commutatio. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo

what manner there is exchange of goods that are measured in currency. Then [2, b, ii], at “It is

ostendit qualiter commutatio rerum

fit quae

impossible,” he discloses under what aspect currency serves as a measure. Last, [2, b, iii], at “Let A represent

denariis mensurantur. Secundo ostendit secundum

a house,” he puts in terminals what was said. He states first that, because currency as a measure ascertaining

quam

denarii

quantity retains its value longer, all goods must be

mensurent, ibi, secundum veritatem quidem et cetera.

evaluated in currency. In this way exchange of goods can take place and, consequently, association among men.

Tertio ponit quod dictum est in terminis, ibi, domus in quo

Money equates commutable goods, as a certain measure making them commensurate. He clarifies what has been

a et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, propter hoc (quod)

said by stating that association is not possible if there is no exchange. But exchange is impossible unless an

denarius diutius manet in suo valore, oportet omnia

equality is established in goods, which in turn cannot exist without commensuration.

rationem

appretiari denariis. Per hunc enim modum poterit esse commutatio rerum, et per consequens communicatio inter homines. Numisma quidem adaequat res commutabiles, sicut quaedam mensura faciens res commensuratas. Manifestat autem quae dicta sunt per hoc quod communicatio esse non poterit si non sit commutatio: quae non erit, si non constituatur aequalitas in rebus, et si hoc non sit, non erit commensuratio.

Deinde cum dicit: secundum veritatem quidem etc.,

989. Then [2, b, ii], at “It is impossible,” he shows in what way currency is used as a measure. He says that it

ostendit per quem modum denarii mensurent. Et dicit

is impossible that things so greatly different be made commensurate according to reality, i.e., according to the

quod res tam differentes impossibile est commensurari

peculiar nature of the things themselves. But they can be sufficiently contained under one measure by comparison

secundum secundum

with the needs of men. Hence there must be some one criterion that measures all things of this kind and is not

veritatem, idest proprietatem

ipsarum rerum; comparationem

sed

per ad

a measure by reason of nature but because so fixed by men. Therefore, this is called money owing to the fact

indigentiam hominum sufficienter possunt contineri

that it makes all things commensurate insofar as they are measured by money.

sub una mensura. Unde oportet esse unum aliquid quo

omnia

huiusmodi

mensurentur, quod quidem non mensurat ex sui natura, sed quia ita positum est inter homines. Unde etiam vocatur nummisma; quod quidem omnia facit commensurata inquantum omnia mensurantur numismate.

Deinde cum dicit domus in quo a etc., manifestat quod

990. At “Let A represent a house” 12, b, iii] he explains in terminals what has been said, stating: let A be a house

dictum est in terminis, dicens:

worth five minae, B a bed worth one mina, and in this

sit a domus quae valeat quinque mnas, b autem sit

way the bed will be one fifth the value of the house. Hence it is obvious how many beds are equal in value to

lectus qui valeat unam mnam, et sic lectus erit in

one house, viz., five. Likewise it is obvious that barter took place before there was currency, since five beds have

valore quinta pars domus. Unde manifestum est quot

been exchanged for one house. But it makes no difference whether five or the value of five beds are given.

lecti sint aequales in valore uni domui, scilicet quinque. Et manifestum est quod sic fiebat commutatio antequam essent denarii: dabantur enim quinque lecti pro una domo; nihil autem differt utrum dentur pro una domo quinque lecti vel quantum quinque lecti.

valent

Ultimo

autem

epilogando

concludit quod dictum est quid est iustum et quid

991. He concludes saying that we have now discussed the nature of what is just and what is unjust.

iniustum.

LECTURE 10 Just Action as a Mean Chapter 5 1. HE STATES HIS INTENTION. a. The operation of justice is a mean. — 992 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία

From these discussions it is clear that a just action is a mean between doing what is unjust

μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ

and suffering what is unjust. To be unjust is to have too much, to be injured is to have too

πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττόν ἐστιν.

little.

b. How justice itself is a mean. — 993 ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς

But justice is a mean, not in the same way as

ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς,

the preceding virtues but in the sense that it produces a mean. However, injustice pertains

ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων.

to extremes.

2. HE PROVES HIS STATEMENT. a. The nature of justice. i. What justice is. — 994-995 καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ

Justice is also a habit by which the just man is

καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται

said to operate by choosing what is just and to

πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ

distribute both to himself in relation to his neighbor and to one man in relation to

διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὑτῷ πρὸς

another.

ἄλλον καὶ ἕτερον

ἑτέρῳ

πρὸς

ii. What injustice is. — 996 οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ

He does not act in such a way that he bestows more desirable things on himself and less

ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ

desirable things on his neighbor, and on the

βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ'

contrary less hurtful things on himself than on his neighbor, but he distributes equally

ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ'

according to proportion. Likewise, he observes a rule regarding one man in relation to

ἀδικία ἀδίκου.

τοὐναντίον τοῦ τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν

another. On the other hand injustice is a habit operative of what is unjust. This takes place by

ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ

excess and defect of useful or hurtful things contrary to what is proportional. Hence

τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι

injustice is called excess and defect because it brings about excess and defect, the unjust man

ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ' αὑτοῦ μὲν

assigning himself an excess of what is simply useful and a deficiency of what is harmful. In a

ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ

similar way he attributes both an excess and a deficiency to others. But this too is contrary to

βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ

what is proportional in whatever way it takes place.

παρὰ

τὸ

ἀνάλογον,

ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν.

b. Some remarks to bring his subject to a conclusion. — 997-998 τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν

One injustice, which is to have too little, is to

ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ

suffer what is unjust. Another injustice, which

δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

is to have too much, is to do what is unjust.

3. HE RECAPITULATES WHAT HA S BEEN SAID. — 999 περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης

We have then discussed justice and injustice,

καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω

and the nature of both. Likewise we have treated in a general way what is just and

τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ

unjust.

ἀδίκου καθόλου.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Determinatis autem his et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo

992. After the Philosopher has shown how the just thing is a mean, now he shows how

iustum sit medium, hic ostendit quomodo

justice is a mean. On this point he does three

iustitia sit medium. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo

things. First [1] he states his intention. Then [2], at “Justice is also etc.,” he proves

probat propositum, ibi, et quidem iustitia etc.; tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt, ibi: de

his statement. Finally [3], at “We have then discussed etc.,” he recapitulates what has

iustitia quidem igitur et cetera. Quia vero habitus cognoscuntur per actus, circa

been said. Since habits are known by acts, he treats two aspects of the initial point. First

primum duo facit: primo proponit quomodo operatio iustitiae sit medium.

[1, a] he proposes that the operation of justice is a mean; and second [1, b], at “But

Secundo, quomodo ipsa iustitia sit medium, ibi, iustitia autem medietas et

justice etc.,” how justice itself is a mean. He says first that, from previous considerations

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex praemissis quae determinata sunt,

(978-991), it is evident that a just operation, that is, an operation of justice, is a mean

manifestum est quod iusta operatio, quae est actus iustitiae, medium est inter

between doing what is unjust and suffering what is unjust. The first is to have more

iniustum facere et iniustum pati, quorum

than is due to oneself, i.e., to do an unjust

alterum est plus habere quam sit sibi debitum, scilicet iniustum facere, alterum

action; but the other, viz., to suffer an unjust thing, is to have too little by reason of the

autem, scilicet iniustum pati, est minus habere propter hoc quod privatur aliquis

fact that a person has been deprived of what is due him. The act of justice is to do what is

eo quod sibi debetur; actus autem iustitiae est facere aequale, quod est

equal, i.e., the mean between too much and too little. Obviously then it follows from the

medium inter plus et minus; unde manifeste sequitur ex praemissis quod

premises that a just action is a mean between doing what is unjust and suffering

iusta operatio medium est inter iniustum facere et iniustum pati.

what is unjust.

Deinde cum dicit: iustitia autem etc., ostendit qualiter iustitia sit medium. Et

993. Then [i, b], at “But justice,” he explains how justice is a mean, saying that justice is

dicit, quod iustitia non est medietas eodem modo quo aliae virtutes morales,

not a mean in the same way as the other moral virtues. Their mean lies between two

quarum unaquaeque medietas est inter duas malitias, sicut liberalitas, quae est

vices; liberality is a mean between parsimony and extravagance. But justice is not a mean

media inter illiberalitatem et prodigalitatem, sed iustitia non est media

between two vices. However, it can be called a mean by reason of its effect inasmuch as it

inter duas malitias. Potest autem dici medietas effective, inquantum scilicet est

constitutes a mean, since its act is a just operation which is a mean between doing

constitutiva medii, quia scilicet actus eius est iusta operatio, quae est medium inter

what is unjust and bearing the unjust. The first of these, active injustice pertains to a

iniustum facere et iniustum pati, quorum

vice of injustice which is a habit of extremes

duorum alterum tantum, scilicet iniustum facere, pertinet ad malitiam,

inasmuch as it takes for itself too many goods and too few evils. But the other, i.e.,

scilicet iniustitiam, quae est extremorum, inquantum accipit sibi plus de bonis et

the toleration of the injustice is not a vice, but a suffering.

minus de malis; sed iniustum pati, non pertinet ad aliquam malitiam, sed magis est poena.

Deinde cum dicit: et quidem iustitia etc.,

994. Next [2], at “Justice is also,” he proves

probat quod dictum est, scilicet quod iustitia non sit medietas duarum

what was said, viz., that justice is not a middle course between two vices, as is the

malitiarum, sicut aliae virtutes morales. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo assumit

case with other moral virtues. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [2, a] he

quid sit iustitia. Secundo adiungit quaedam ad concludendum propositum,

takes up the nature of justice; then [2, b], at “One injustice etc.,” he adds some remarks to

ibi, iniustificationis autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit quid sit

bring his subject to a conclusion. He discusses the first point from two aspects.

iustitia. Secundo quid sit iniustitia, ibi, iniustitia autem et cetera. Dicit ergo

Initially [a, i] he states what justice is; and next [a, ii] at “He does not act etc.,” what in

primo, quod iustitia est habitus, secundum quem ille qui est iustus, dicitur

justice is. He says first that justice is a habit by which the just man does the just thing—

esse operativus iusti; et hoc secundum electionem; quia sicut supra in secundo

and this by deliberate choice because, as was previously pointed out in the second book

dictum est, virtus moralis est habitus electivus. Hoc autem, quod dicitur

(305, 308, 382), a moral virtue is a habit of correct choice. Doing the just thing can be

operativus

ad

referred to justice directing exchanges, in

iustitiam directivam commutationum, in qua magis apparet ratio iustitiae propter

which the nature of justice is more apparent by reason of the equality of the thing. Hence

aequalitatem rei: unde addit et distributivus ut comprehendat etiam

he adds an “and to distribute” in order to include also distributive justice, which

iustitiam distributivam, quae consistit in aequalitate proportionis.

consists in the equality of proportion.

Potest autem aliquis secundum electionem operari iustum tam in

995. A man can do the just thing by choice, both in exchanges and in distributions, in

commutationibus quam in distributionibus, dupliciter. Uno modo

two ways. In one way he does this between himself and another, and touching this point

inter se et alterum: et quantum ad hoc

Aristotle says “both to himself in relation to

dicit: et ipsi - sibi - ad alium; alio modo inter duos alios, quod pertinet ad iudicem

his neighbor.” In the second way a man does this between two others—this pertains to a

vel arbitrum, unde subdit et alteri ad

judge or an-arbiter—and so the Philosopher

iusti,

potest

referri

alterum. Quomodo autem iustus operetur iustum, manifestat per exclusionem

adds “and to one man in relation to another.” He explains, by exclusion of the contrary,

contrarii, subdens: quod non sic facit, quod de rebus eligibilibus, puta divitiis et

how the just man does a just deed. He adds that the just man does not so act that in

honoribus, plus conferat sibi et minus proximo; et de rebus nocivis, idest

regard to desirable things (for example, riches and honors) he bestows more on

laboriosis et poenalibus, e converso plus

himself and less on his neighbor, and in

proximo quam sibi; sed aequaliter secundum proportionem; et hoc observat

regard to harmful things (i.e., burdensome and painful), on the contrary, more on his

non solum inter se et alium, sed etiam inter duos alios.

neighbor than himself; but he makes an equal distribution according to proportion— a thing he observes not only between himself and another but also between two others.

Deinde cum dicit: iniustitia autem etc., proponit quid sit iniustitia; et dicit quod

996. At “He does not act” [a, ii] he presents the nature of injustice. He affirms that on

iniustitia e contrario est habitus secundum electionem operativus iniusti:

the contrary injustice is a habit which does by choice what is unjust. This happens by

quod quidem contingit in superabundantia vel defectu rerum

excess or defect of useful or harmful things which the just man accepts according to due

utilium vel nocivarum, quas accipit praeter debitam proportionem. Propter

proportion. Hence, as justice is called a mean because it produces a mean, so also injustice

quod sicut iustitia dicitur medietas, quia est operativa medii, ita etiam iniustitia

is called excess and defect because it produces excess and defect in such a way

dicitur superabundantia et defectus quia est factiva superabundantiae et defectus,

that the unjust man bestows on himself an excess of things which are simply useful but

ita quidem, quod iniustus attribuit sibiipsi

a deficiency of things which are harmful. In a

superabundantiam rerum quae sunt simpliciter utiles, defectum autem rerum

similar way he attributes to others both excess and defect, however not of the same

nocivarum; sed aliis quidem similiter attribuunt totum, idest

things, but a defect of the useful and an excess of the harmful. Nevertheless, it has

superabundantiam et defectum, sed non in eisdem; sed defectum quidem utilium,

not been determined in what way injustice may depart from the proper proportion, i.e.,

superabundantiam vero nocivorum. Nec est determinatum qualiter iniustitia

how much more or how much less it may accept than is due. But injustice does this,

debitam proportionem relinquat, idest quantum plus vel quantum minus debito

howsoever it may happen.

accipiat; sed hoc facit qualitercumque contingit, idest prout sibi occurrit.

Deinde cum dicit iniustificationis autem etc., adiungit quaedam necessaria ad

997. Next [2, b], at “One injustice,” he adds some remarks required to conclude the

concludendum propositum. Et dicit, quod

subject. He says there is a twofold injustice:

duplex est iniustificatio: una quidem quae consistit in minus habere de bonis, ad

one consists in a lack of beneficial things, and indicates an excess of onerous things-which

quam refertur plus habere de malis, quod est eiusdem rationis: et hoc est iniustum

amounts to the same. This is to suffer what is unjust. The other injustice is to have an

pati. Alia autem iniustificatio est habere maius in bonis et minus in malis, et hoc

excess of beneficial things and a lack of onerous things-and this is to do an injustice.

est iniustum facere. Ex his ergo potest sic argumentari: ad

998. From what has been said we can come

iniustitiam pertinet iniustum facere: sed habere minus in bonis vel plus in malis,

to three conclusions. To do an unjust act pertains to injustice. However, to have a lack

non est iniustum facere sed iniustum pati;

of benefits or an excess of burdens is not to

ergo hoc non pertinet ad malitiam iniustitiae. Iustitia vero est medium inter

do what is unjust but to suffer what is unjust. Therefore this does not pertain to

plus habere et minus habere, ut supra habitum est; ergo iustitia non est media

the vice of injustice. But justice is a mean between having too much and too little, as

inter duas malitias.

was pointed out before (992, 993). Consequently, injustice is not a mean between two vices.

Deinde cum dicit: de iustitia quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit

999. Then [3], at “We have then discussed,” he concludes by recapitulating what has been

dictum esse de iustitia et iniustitia quae sit natura utriusque; et similiter de iusto

said. He affirms that we have discussed justice and injustice and the nature of both.

et iniusto in universali; nam quosdam particulares modos iusti et iniusti postea

Likewise we have treated what is just and what is unjust in a general way, for he will

determinabit.

determine afterwards (1000-1008) certain particular modes of what is just and unjust.

LECTURE 11 The Unjust Man Chapter 6 I.

HE DETERMINES THE TRUTH (SHOWING HOW A MAN...

BECOMES UNJUST). A. He asks a question. A’.

He presents the question. — 1000-1001

ἐπεὶ

δ'

ἔστιν

ἀδικοῦντα

Since someone doing an unjust act may not

μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη

be unjust himself, we will investigate the nature of the unjust actions that show the

ἄδικός ἀδικίαν,

ἐστιν ἑκάστην οἷον κλέπτης ἢ

doer—for example, a thief or an adulterer or a robber—already unjust according to the

μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν

injustice proper to each case. Or does not this make any difference? If a man having sexual

συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ

intercourse with a woman knows with whom

ᾗ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος.

he sins and acts not by choice but by passion, he does an unjust act but is not unjust. So

ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐ κλέπτης,

neither is a man a thief although he steals, nor an adulterer although he commits

ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

adultery. The same is true in other cases.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. B’. He shows that another question was settled previously. — 1002 πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς

τὸ τὸ

We have previously discussed reciprocation is related to what is just.

how

δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· B. He interposes some subjects necessary for a solution of the question. A’ What is justice in the absolute sense. 1. HE STATES HIS INTENTION. — 1003 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ

We must not forget that we seek what is just

ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ

in the absolute sense and political justice.

τὸ τὸ

πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

2. HE CARRIES OUT HIS INTENTION. a. What political justice is. i. What he intends. x. WHAT POLITICAL JUSTICE IS. — 1004-1005

τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν

The latter consists in a community of life for

βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ

the purpose of having a self-sufficiency among free men equal according to

ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν·

proportionality or arithmetical equality.

y.

THERE ARE OTHER KINDS OF JUSTICE. —

1006 ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς

Therefore, among those persons in whom this does not exist we find not political justice but

ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ

a special kind of metaphorical justice.

καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ii. His intention.

x. IN REGARD TO POLITICAL JUSTICE. aa. He clarifies his statement. — 1007-1008 ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὑτούς· νόμος δ',

For justice exists between those very persons whose relations are governed by law. But the

ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη

law is enacted for those among whom

κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ

injustice is found, because punishment is a judgment of what is just and what is unjust.

τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν

Among these there is unjust action, but injustice does not exist in everyone who does

ἀδικία, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν

an unjust action, which is to attribute to oneself too many of the things good in

ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν.

themselves and too few of the things onerous in themselves.

bb.

He draws some corollaries. a’. First. — 1009

διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον,

For this reason we do not permit the rule of man but of reason, for a man rules for himself

ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ

and becomes a tyrant. But a prince is the

γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ

guardian b of justice and of equality.

δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. b’. Second. — 1010 ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον

Since a prince, if he is just, attributes nothing

εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος οὐ

excessive to himself, it follows that he does

γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς

not give himself more of what is simply good, except according to proper proportion, and on

αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο

this account he works for others. Therefore it is said that justice is the good of another, as

ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην,

was previously pointed out.

καθάπερ πρότερον·

ἐλέχθη

καὶ

c’. Third. — 1011 μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο

Consequently a reward should be allotted to

δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι

him, namely, honor and glory. Rulers who are not satisfied with these are tyrants.

γίνονται τύραννοι. y.

IN REGARD TO THE JUSTICE OF A MASTER

OR A FATHER. aa. Of a master and of a father. a’. What he intends. — 1012 τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ

However, the justice of a master and of a

τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον·

father are not the same as but similar to those we have examined. b’. (This) justice is not unqualified. — 1013

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ

Toward one’s own things injustice does not

αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ

exist in an unqualified manner. But a chattel and a son, until he is a certain age and acts in

πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὑτοῦ, αὑτὸν δ' οὐδεὶς

his own right, are as it were a part of a man. Now no one chooses to injure himself.

προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ

Therefore, there is no injustice done to

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν·

oneself, and consequently no injustice simply speaking. c’. (This) justice is not political justice. — 1014

οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον

Nor is political justice observed here which is according to the law and is found in men

γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει

naturally bound by the law. Such are the

εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν

persons who have equality in regard to ruling and being ruled.

καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. bb.

(Of) a husband in relation to a wife. — 1015

διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά

Hence justice concerns rather a wife than

ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα

children and chattels. In the first there is

καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον·

domestic justice, and this is also different from political justice.

ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quia autem est iniustum facientem et

1000. After the Philosopher has treated

cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de iustitia et iusto et

justice and the unjust thing in themselves together with their opposites, now he treats

oppositis horum absolute, hic determinat de eis per comparationem ad subiectum,

them in comparison with their subject, showing how a man in doing an unjust

ostendendo scilicet qualiter aliquis, faciendo iniustum, fiat iniustus. Et circa

action becomes unjust. He handles this point under two headings. First [I] he determines

hoc duo veritatem.

facit. Primo determinat Secundo movet quasdam

the truth. Then [Lect. 14, [II], at “Someone may raise etc.” (B. 1136 a 10), he raises

dubitationes circa praedeterminata, ibi,

some doubts about matters previously

dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo movet

settled. He discusses the initial point from three aspects. First [A] he asks a question.

quaestionem. Secundo interponit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad

Next [B], at “We must not forget etc.,” he interposes some subjects necessary for a

quaestionis solutionem, ibi, oportet autem non latere et cetera. Tertio solvit

solution of the question. Finally [Lect. 13, C], at “Since just and unjust etc.” (B. 1135

quaestionem, ibi, existentibus autem iustis

a 15), he answers the question. He treats

et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

the first point in a twofold manner. First [A,

movet quaestionem intentam. Secundo ostendit quamdam aliam quaestionem

A’] he presents the question. Then [A, B’], at “We have previously etc.,” he shows that

prius esse determinatam, ibi: qualiter

another question was settled previously. He

quidem igitur habet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod contingit aliquem, qui facit

says first that a person who does an unjust action still may not be unjust. Therefore, we

aliquam rem iniustam, nondum esse iniustum. Et ideo quaerendum est quales

must inquire into the characteristics of injustice, i.e., the actions of unjust men

iniustificationes, idest operationes iniustorum oporteat esse ad hoc quod ille

must be of such a type that the man who does unjust deeds is already unjust in that

qui facit iniusta, iam sit iniustus in unaquaque specie iniustitiae, puta furti,

particular species of injustice, for example, theft or adultery or robbery. Or, passing

vel adulterii, vel latrocinii: vel potest dici, removendo praedicta, quod sic quidem

over the cases just mentioned, can it be said that for a man to be unjust it makes no

nihil differt, id est quod nihil differt ad hoc quod homo sit iniustus secundum

difference in what actions he may act unjustly?

qualescumque operationes iniusta faciat. Ideo autem quaesitum est secundum

1001. For this reason we ask with what

quales iniustificationes, quia multipliciter contingit aliquem facere iniustum, quia

kind of injustice it occurs, because the doing of an unjust action takes place in many

contingit, quod aliquis commiscetur mulieri, quae est uxor alterius, non

ways. A man may have sexual intercourse with a woman, the wife of another, and not

ignorans

faceret

be ignorant who the person is (ignorance

involuntarium, sed sciens cui commiscetur, non tamen hoc facit ex

could cause an involuntary) but know with whom he is having intercourse, and still not

electione sed ex passione. Talis igitur facit quidem rem iniustam, non tamen videtur

perform the act by deliberate choice but by passion. Such a man does an unjust act

esse iniustus, quia non operatur ex electione; sicut etiam in speciali possumus

although he does not seem to be unjust because he does not act by deliberate choice.

dicere, quod aliquis non est fur licet sit furatus, quia non ex electione, et similiter

So also we can say in a particular case that a man is not a thief although he has stolen,

non est moechus licet sit moechatus; et similis ratio est in aliis.

since he did not commit theft by deliberate choice. In a similar way a man is not an

personam,

quod

adulterer although he has committed adultery. The same idea is found in other matters.

Deinde cum dicit: qualiter quidem igitur

1002.

Then

[A,

B’],

at

“We

have

etc., ostendit quamdam dubitationem iam esse solutam; scilicet qualiter se habeat

previously,” he shows that a particular doubt has already been solved, viz., in what

contrapassum ad iustum, de quo prius dictum est.

way reciprocation is related to justice—a point we discussed previously (971-972).

Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem non latere etc., interponit quaedam, quae sunt

1003. Next [B], at “We must not forget,” he interposes some subjects that are necessary

necessaria ad solutionem propositae quaestionis. Et primo quid sit simpliciter

for the solution of the proposed question: first [B, A’] what is justice in the absolute

iustum. Secundo quid sit iustificatio, ibi, differt autem iniustificatio et cetera. Circa

sense; and second [Lect. 12; B, B’] at “There is a difference etc.” (B.1135 a 9), what is

primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum,

unjust action. He handles the initial point in a twofold fashion. First [A’, 1] he states his

ibi, hoc autem est et cetera. Dicit ergo

intention. Then [A’, 2] at “The latter

primo, quod ad evidentiam quaestionis, qua quaeritur quali operatione aliquis

consists etc.,” he carries out his intention. He says first that for a clear understanding

faciens iustum vel iniustum sit iustus vel iniustus, oportet non latere quod iustum,

of the question (in which we seek by what actions a man who does a just or an unjust

de quo nunc quaeritur est iustum simpliciter, quod est iustum politicum.

act is said to be just or unjust) we must not forget the fact that the justice sought is justice in the absolute sense which is political justice.

Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem est etc., exequitur propositum. Et primo ostendit

1004. Then [A’, 2], at “The latter consists’ “ he carries out his intention. First [2, a] he

quid sit iustum politicum. Secundo dividit ipsum ibi, politici autem iusti et cetera.

shows what political justice is. Then [Lect. XII; 2, b], at “One kind of political justice

Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit, scilicet quid sit iustum

etc.” (B. 1134 b 18), he divides it. He treats the initial point under two aspects. First [a,

politicum. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, est enim iustum, quibus

i] he proposes what he intends, viz., what political justice is Next [a, ii], at “For justice

et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit iustum politicum.

exists etc.,’; he explains his intention. He discusses the first point under two headings.

Secundo concludit, quod sunt quaedam

Initially [i, x] he shows what political justice

alia iusta ab hoc differentia, ibi, quare quantis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod

is. Second [i, y], at “Therefore, among those persons etc.,” he concludes that there are

iustum politicum consistit in quadam communitate vitae quae ordinatur ad hoc,

other kinds of justice differing from this. He says first that political justice consists in a

quod sit per se sufficientia eorum quae ad vitam humanam pertinent. Et talis est

community of life that is ordered to a selfsufficiency of the things pertaining to

communitas civitatis, in qua debent omnia inveniri quae sufficiant humanae vitae.

human living. And the state-community should be such that everything sufficient for

Hoc autem iustum consistit in liberis non autem in servis, quia dominorum ad

the needs of human life is found in it. This justice is found in free men, not slaves,

servos non est politicum iustum sed dominativum, ut infra dicetur; consistit

because masters exercise towards slaves not political justice but the justice of dominion,

etiam

of which more later (1006-1012). However,

iustum

politicum

in

personis

aequalibus, id est quarum una non

political justice is encountered with persons

subditur alteri naturali ordine vel civili, sicut filius patri, inter quos, ut infra

who are equal, i.e., one of whom is not subject to the other in the natural or

dicetur, non est politicum iustum sed paternum.

political order, as a son to a father between whom there is no question of political justice but of paternal right.

Hoc autem iustum politicum, vel est

1005.

secundum secundum

according to proportionality, proportional equality pertaining

proportionalitatem, idest aequalitatem proportionis

This

political

justice

is

either i.e., to

quantum ad iustitiam distributivam; vel secundum numerum, id est secundum

distributive justice, or numerical equality, i.e., the equality of numerical quantity

aequalitatem

pertaining to commutative justice.

numeralis

quantitatis,

quantum ad iustitiam commutativam. Deinde cum dicit: quare quantis etc.,

1006. Next [i, y], at “Therefore, among

concludit quaedam alia iusta a praedicto differentia; dicens, quod ex quo iustum

those persons,” he concludes there are other kinds of justice differing from that just

politicum consistit in liberis et aequalibus, quibuscumque non inest hoc, scilicet quod

mentioned. He states that-since political justice exists among the free and equal—in

sint liberi et aequales, his non est adinvicem politicum iustum, quod est

people who do not have this (that they are free and equal) there is not found political

iustum simpliciter, sed quoddam iustum, idest dominativum vel paternum, quod est

justice, which is unqualified justice, but a peculiar justice, viz., of a master or father,

iustum secundum quid, in quantum habet aliquam similitudinem politici iusti.

which is a qualified justice inasmuch as it has some likeness to political justice.

Deinde cum dicit: est enim (iustum,)

1007. At “For justice exists” [a, ii], he

quibus etc., manifestat quod dictum est. Et primo quantum ad iustum politicum,

clarifies his statement: first [ii, x] in regard to political justice, which is unqualified

quod est iustum simpliciter. Secundo quantum ad iustum dominativum vel

justice; second [ii, y] in regard to justice of a master or a father, which is qualified justice,

paternum, quod est iustum secundum quid, ibi, dominativum autem iustum et

at “However, the justice of a master etc.” First [x, aa] he clarifies his statement, viz.,

cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat quod dictum est, scilicet quod

that political justice is in free and equal persons. Next [x, bb], at “For this reason we

iustum

et

do not etc.,” he draws some corollaries from

aequalibus. Secundo infert quaedam corollaria ex dictis, ibi, propter quod non

the premises. He says first-as has been pointed out (1004).that political justice is in

sinimus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod ideo dictum est quod iustum politicum est

the free and equal because, being determined by law, it necessarily is found in those for

in liberis et aequalibus, quia cum iustum politicum determinetur lege, necesse est

whom the law is enacted. But law is enacted principally not for slaves who are restrained

politicum

sit

in

liberis

quod in illis sit ad quos datur lex. Lex autem non datur principaliter pro servis,

by masters nor for children who are restrained by fathers but for the free and

qui cohibentur a dominis, neque pro filiis qui cohibentur a patribus, sed pro liberis

equal. That political justice exists in men of this kind, for whom law is enacted, is

et aequalibus; unde in talibus est politicum iustum. Quod autem in illis sit politicum

obvious from this that justice and injustice exist in them. Now, law extends to persons

iustum ad quos datur lex, manifestum est per hoc, quod iustitia et iniustitia in

in whom there can be injustice. This is clear from the fact that punishment, which is

eisdem sunt; lex autem ad illos se extendit in quibus potest esse iniustitia; quod patet

fixed by law, is nothing other than a judgment about what is just and unjust.

ex hoc, quod vindicta, quae fit secundum legem, nihil aliud est quam iudicium de iusto et iniusto. Et ex quo lex est, in quibus est iniustitia,

1008. From this statement—the law exists

sequitur quod sit in quibus est iniustum et per consequens in quibus est iustum, quia

for those between whom justice exists—it follows that it is for those between whom

in quibuscumque est iniustitia, in his invenitur iniustum facere, sed non

there is unjust action and for those between whom there is Just action. The reason is

convertitur. Dictum est enim in secundo, quod contingit aliquem facere virtuosa

that in whomsoever there is injustice, in these the performance of an unjust act is

absque virtute et similiter vitiosa absque

found but not the reverse. It was pointed out

habitu vitii: hoc autem iniustum nihil est aliud quam quod aliquis attribuat sibiipsi

in the second book (252-253) that the doing of a virtuous action may take place without

plus de his quae sunt simpliciter et absolute bona, sicut sunt divitiae et

virtue, and likewise the doing of vicious actions without the habit of vice. An unjust

honores, et minus de his quae sunt simpliciter et absolute mala, sicut sunt

act arises from the fact that a person should attribute to himself too many of those

contraria praedictorum.

things which are absolutely and of themselves good, like riches and too few of those things which are simply and of themselves evil, as the opposite of these.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod non sinimus etc., infert tria correlaria ex

1009. Next [x, bb], at “For this reason we do not permit,” he draws three corollaries

praedictis. Et primo dicit quod quia iniustum est quod aliquis sibi plus

from the premises. First [bb, a’] he says that because injustice consists in this that a man

attribuat de bonis et minus de malis, inde est quod in recta gubernatione

attributes to himself too many of the benefits and too few of the burdens, it

multitudinis

quod

follows that in good government of the

homines principentur, scilicet secundum voluntatem et passiones humanas, sed

multitude we do not permit that men should rule, that is, according to whim and human

quod principetur ratio, id est lex quae est

passion but that the law, which is a dictate

non

permittimus

dictamen rationis, vel homo qui secundum

of reason, should rule man, or that man who

rationem agat, quia, si princeps sequatur passiones humanas, faciet hoc sibi,

acts according to reason should rule. The explanation is that if a prince follows human

scilicet, quod plus accipiet de bonis et minus de malis, et ita fiet tyrannus, quum

passions he will do this for himself; he will take more of the good things and less of the

hoc sit contra rationem principis. Ad hoc enim princeps institutus est ut custodiat

burdensome and so become a tyrant, although this is contrary to the concept of a

iustitiam, et per consequens aequalitatem quam praeterit, dum sibi usurpat plus de

prince. A prince was given the office to observe justice, and consequently equality,

bonis et minus de malis.

which he passes over when he usurps for himself too many beneficial and too few onerous things.

Secundum corollarium ponit ibi quia autem nihil ipsi et cetera. Et dicit, quod

1010. He gives the second corollary [bb, b’] at “Since a prince.” He affirms that since a

quia princeps, si sit iustus, nihil plus sibi attribuit de simpliciter bonis quam aliis

prince—if he is just—attributes no more of the good things to himself than to others

nisi

debitam

(unless perhaps according to a proper ratio

proportionem distributivae iustitiae, inde est, quod princeps non laborat ad

of distributive justice), it follows that he does not labor for the advantage of himself

utilitatem suam sed aliorum. Et propter hoc supra dictum est, quod iustitia legalis,

but of others. Because of this it was said before (909) that legal justice, by which the

secundum quam princeps gubernat multitudinem, est alienum bonum.

prince rules the multitude of the people, is the good of another.

Tertium corollarium ponit ibi merces ergo

1011. He presents the third corollary at

et cetera. Manifestum est enim, quod quilibet debet dare mercedem ei qui pro se

“Consequently a reward” [bb, c]. It is clear that everyone should reward the man who

laborat. Quia ergo princeps laborat pro multitudine, danda est ei merces a

labors for him. Therefore, since the prince labors for the multitude, a reward should be

multitudine, scilicet honor et gloria, quae sunt maxima bonorum quae ab hominibus

given by the multitude, namely, honor and glory, which are the greatest goods that can

dari possunt; si autem sint aliqui principes, quibus ista non sufficiant pro

be offered by men. But if there are some princes who are not satisfied with these for

mercede sed quaerant lucra, isti fiunt iniusti et tyranni. Super hanc autem

a reward but seek wealth, they are unjust and tyrannical. Over and above this reward

mercedem ab hominibus exhibitam boni principes expectant mercedem a Deo.

proffered by man, good princes look for a reward from God.

Deinde cum dicit dominativum autem iustum etc., manifestat quod supradictum

1012. Then [ii, y], at “However, the justice of a master,” he explains what was indicated

est de eo quod non est iustum simpliciter,

previously about the fact that this is not

forte

secundum

sed secundum similitudinem. Et primo quantum ad iustum dominativum et

justice in the absolute sense but by similitude. First [y, aa] (he explains) in

paternum. Secundo quantum ad iustum quod est viri ad uxorem, ibi, propter quod

regard to the justice of a master and of a father; and second [y, bb], at “Hence justice

magis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit

concerns etc.,” in regard to justice which belongs to a husband in relation to a wife.

quod dominativum iustum, quod scilicet est domini ad servum, et paternum, quod

On the prior point he does three things. First [aa, a’] he proposes what he intends,

scilicet est patris ad filium, non est idem his iustis quae sunt politica; sed habet

saying that the justice of a master, i.e., of a lord over a slave, and paternal justice, i.e., of

aliquam similitudinem cum eis, secundum quod aliqualiter est ad alterum.

a father over a son, are not the same as political justice but have some likeness to it according as it has a relation to another in a way.

Secundo ibi: non enim est iniustitia etc., ostendit quod dictum est, quantum ad

1013. Second [aa, b’], at “Toward one’s own things,” he explains what was pointed out

hoc, quod dominativum vel paternum

regarding this that the justice of a master

iustum non est simpliciter iustum: manifestum est enim, quod non potest

or of a father is not justice without qualification. It is evident that injustice

esse simpliciter iniustitia hominis ad ea quae sunt ipsius, sicut neque iustitia, quia

cannot exist in an unqualified way for a man in regard to the things belonging to him,

utrumque est ad alterum. Sed servus est domini sicut possessio, et filius quousque

and neither can justice, because both have a relation to another. But the slave belongs to

est pelicon, idest magnus, et separetur a patre, per emancipationem, est quasi

the master as a chattel, and a son is—so to speak—a part of the father until he is a

quaedam pars patris. Et quod non sit iniustitia ad seipsum, patet per hoc, quod

certain age or mature and separated from the father by emancipation. That there is no

nullus eligit nocere sibiipsi. Unde patet quod simpliciter loquendo non est iustum

injustice toward oneself is clear from the fact that no one chooses to injure himself.

vel iniustum ad filium vel servum.

Hence it is obvious that absolutely speaking there is no justice or injustice towards a son or a slave.

Tertio ibi: neque iustum politicum etc.,

1014. Third [aa, c’], at “Nor is political

ostendit, quod dominativum et paternum

justice,” he explains that even if the justice

iustum, etiam si esset simpliciter iustum, non esset politicum iustum, quia iustum

of a master and of a father would be justice without qualification, it would not be

politicum est secundum legem, et in quibus nata est esse lex. Et huiusmodi

political justice because political justice is according to the law and in those for whom

sunt illi quibus competit aequalitas quantum ad hoc quod est principari et

the law is designed by its nature. Such are those persons who have equality in regard

subici, ita scilicet quod unus eorum non

to ruling and being ruled; but of these one is

subicitur alteri, sicut servus subiicitur

subject to another, e.g., a slave to a master

domino, et filius patri. Unde in his non est politicum iustum.

and a son to a father. Hence political justice does not exist in these matters.

Deinde cum dicit: propter quod magis etc., determinat de iusto uxorio; et dicit, quod

1015. Then [y, bb], at “Hence justice concerns,” he treats justice pertaining to a

quia uxor minus est subiecta viro quam servus domino, vel filius patri; ideo plus

wife. He says that because a wife is less subject to a husband than a slave to a

habet de ratione iusti illud quod est viri ad uxorem quam id quod est patris ad natos,

master or a son to a father, therefore the relation of a husband to a wife has more of

id est filios, et domini ad possessiones idest servos. Iustum enim quod est viri ad

the nature of justice than the relation of a father to his children, and of a master to his

uxorem est oeconomicum, quia vir praeest in domo sicut princeps in civitate. Hoc

chattels or slaves. The justice that belongs to a husband in regard to a wife is domestic

tamen iustum oeconomicum est alterum a politico, sicut domus est aliud a civitate.

because the husband is the head of the home, as the prince of the state. However, domestic justice is different from political, as the home is different from the state.

LECTURE 12 A Division of Political Justice Chapter 7 b. He makes a division of it. i. He divides political justice into species. x. HE PROPOSES THE DIVISION. — 1016-1017 τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ

One kind of political justice is natural and the other is legal.

νομικόν, y. HE EXPLAINS IT. aa. First he explains natural justice. — 1018-1019 φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν

Natural justice is that which has the same

αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή,

force everywhere and is not affected by what men may or may not think.

bb.

He explains legal justice. — 1020-1024

νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως,

That is called legal justice which in the beginning is indifferent about a thing being

ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα

done this way or that. But when something just is decreed a difference arises, for

θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα

example, a mina for redeeming a captive, a goat but not two sheep for sacrifice; also

νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν

when things are mentioned individually in

Βρασίδᾳ, ψηφισματώδη.

the law, for instance, sacrifice to Brasidas; and again when sentences are passed by

καὶ

τὰ

judges. z.

HE REJECTS AN ERROR OPPOSED TO THE

DIVISION. aa. He proposes the error. — 1025 δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα

Some people were of the opinion that all

τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν

justice is of this kind because what is by nature is unchangeable and has the same

αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ

force everywhere (fire, for instance, burns

πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα

both here and in Persia). But just things are looked upon as variable.

ὁρῶσιν.

bb He refutes it. — 1026 τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρά γε

However, that opinion is not true universally but in some respect, although

τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς, παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει,

there may be no change at all among the gods. But with us there is something

κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ

natural and this is changeable because everything in us is changeable. Moreover,

φύσει.

there is in us something natural and something not natural. cc He asks a question occasioned by the refutation. a’. First he asks the question. — 1027

ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν,

Among the things subject to change, what kind is just by nature and what kind is just

καὶ ποῖον οὒ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκῃ, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ

not by nature but by law and agreement, if both kinds are changeable in a similar way?

ὁμοίως, δῆλον. b’. Then he answers it. a.

THINGS JUST BY NATURE ARE

CHANGEABLE. — 1028-1029 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ

Obviously, the same determination applies to other natural things. Now by nature the

ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους

right hand is stronger, although some people are ambidextrous.

γενέσθαι. b.

THINGS JUST BY LAW ARE

CHANGEABLE. — 1030

τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ

Those things that are just according to

συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὅμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ

agreement and utility are similar to the measures of commodities. But the measures

πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν

of wine and grain are not equal everywhere, for where these articles are bought

ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ

(wholesale) the measures are greater, where sold (retail), smaller. Likewise, things

καὶ

ἀλλ'

just not by nature but by agreement among

ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ

men are not the same everywhere, as neither is the form of government. But one

πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ

form only is best everywhere by nature.

τὰ

μὴ

φυσικὰ

ἀρίστη. ii. The division of this justice into individual parts. — 1031 τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς

Particular just and legal things hold the place of universals in regard to singulars,

τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά,

for there are many actions performed but each of the just things is one and a

ἐκείνων δ' καθόλου γάρ.

universal.

ἕκαστον

ἕν·

B’. What just action and unjust action are. 1. WHAT UNJUST ACTION IS. — 1032 διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ

There is a difference between an unjust action and an unjust thing, between a just

δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι

action and a just thing. The unjust thing is

τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά

something unjust by nature or ordinance of man, but when it is performed it becomes an

ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὔπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον.

unjust action. Before a thing has been done it is not an unjust action but something unjust.

2. WHAT JUST ACTION IS. — 1033-1034 ὁμοίως δὲ καλεῖται

καὶ δὲ

δικαίωμα· μᾶλλον

It is the same with just action. In general it is more often called the doing of a just thing

δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα

(diceopragma) but it means the correction of unjust action. In regard to each of these

τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἴδη καὶ

we must see afterwards of what nature they are, what are their species and how many

πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

they are.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Politici autem iusti et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quale sit politicum

1016. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of political justice, i.e., unqualified

iustum, quod est simpliciter iustum, hic ponit divisionem huius iusti politici. Et

justice, now [b] he makes a division of it. First [i] he divides political justice into

primo dividit iustum politicum in species. Secundo tangit divisionem huius iusti in

species. Then [ii], at “Particular just and legal things etc.,” he touches upon the

individua, ibi, iustorum autem, et legalium et cetera. Circa primum tria

division of this justice into individual parts. He discusses the first point from three

facit. Primo proponit divisionem. Secundo exponit eam, ibi, naturale

aspects. First [x] he proposes the division. Next [y], at “Natural justice etc.,” he

quidem et cetera. Tertio excludit errorem contra divisionem praedictam, ibi: videtur

explains it. Last [z], at “Some people were etc.,” he rejects an error opposed to the

autem quibusdam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod politicum iustum dividitur in

division. He says first that there is a twofold division of political justice: natural justice,

duo: quorum unum est iustum naturale,

and legal justice. This is the same as the

aliud autem iustum legale. Est autem haec eadem divisio cum divisione quam

division that the jurists make, namely, that one kind of right is natural and the other

iuristae ponunt, quod iuris aliud est naturale, aliud est positivum; idem enim

positive. They call right the very thing that Aristotle calls the just object. Isadore too

nominant illi ius quod Aristotiles iustum, nam et Isidorus dicit in libro

says in Libri Etymologiarum (Bk. V, Ch. 3) that right is as it were what is just. But

Etymologiarum, quod ius dicitur quasi iustum. Videtur autem esse contrarietas

there seems to be inconsistency in that political is the same as civil. In this way what

quantum ad hoc, quod politicum idem est

the Philosopher considers the whole division

quod civile; et sic id quod apud philosophum ponitur ut divisum, apud

seems to be considered by the jurists as a part of the division, for they make civil law a

iuristas videtur poni ut dividens, nam ius civile ponunt partem iuris positivi.

part of positive law.

Sed attendendum est, quod aliter sumitur politicum vel civile hic apud philosophum

1017. But we must take into account that political or civil is taken here in one way by

et aliter apud iuristas; philosophus enim hic nominat politicum iustum vel civile ex

the Philosopher and in another way by the jurists. The Philosopher here calls justice

usu, quo scilicet cives utuntur; iuristae autem nominant ius politicum vel civile

political or civil from the usage the citizens are accustomed to, but the jurists call right

ex causa, quod scilicet civitas aliqua sibi constituit, et ideo convenienter hic a

political or civil from the cause, viz., that some city has decreed for itself. For this

philosopho nominatur legale, idest lege positum, quod et illi dicunt positivum;

reason the Philosopher appropriately designates legal or posited by law that which

convenienter autem per haec duo dividitur iustum politicum, utuntur enim

they call positive. Political justice then is properly divided by means of these two, for

cives iusto et eo quod natura menti humanae indidit, et eo quod est positum

the citizens use justice to the extent that it is imparted to the human mind by nature and

lege.

to the extent that it is posited by law.

Deinde cum dicit: naturale quidem etc., manifestat membra divisionis

1018. Then [y], at “Natural justice,” he indicates the parts of the preceding, division.

praemissae. Et primo manifestat iustum

First [y, aa] he explains natural justice in

naturale dupliciter. Uno modo secundum effectum vel virtutem, dicens quod

two ways: in one way according to its effect or power, saying that that justice is natural

iustum naturale est quod habet ubique eandem potentiam, id est virtutem, ad

which everywhere has the same force and power to induce to good and prevent evil.

inducendum ad bonum et ad arcendum a malo. Quod quidem contingit eo quod

This happens because nature, the cause of this justice, is the same everywhere among

natura, quae est causa huius iusti, eadem est ubique apud omnes, iustum vero quod

all men. But justice by the decree of a state or prince has force only among those who

est ex positione alicuius civitatis vel principis apud illos tantum est

are subject to the jurisdiction of that state or prince. In the other way he explains this

virtuosum, qui subduntur iurisdictioni

justice according to its cause, when he says

illius civitatis vel principis. Alio modo manifestat hoc iustum secundum

that natural justice does not consist in what seems or does not seem to be, i.e., it does not

causam, cum dicit, quod iustum naturale non consistit in videri vel non videri, idest

arise from human conjecture but from nature. In speculative matters there are

non oritur ex aliqua opinione humana, sed ex natura. Sicut enim in speculativis

some things naturally known, like indemonstrable principles, and truths closely

sunt quaedam naturaliter cognita, ut principia indemonstrabilia et quae sunt

connected with them; there are other things discovered by human ingenuity, and

propinqua his; quaedam vero studio hominum adinventa, ita etiam in

conclusions flowing from these. Likewise in practical matters there are some principles

operativis

principia

naturally known as it were, indemonstrable

naturaliter cognita quasi indemonstrabilia principia et propinqua

principles and truths related to them, as evil must be avoided, no one is to be unjustly

his, ut malum esse vitandum, nulli esse iniuste nocendum, non esse furandum et

injured, theft must not be committed and so on; others are devised by human diligence

similia, alia vero sunt per industriam hominum excogitata, quae dicuntur hic

which are here called just legal enactments.

sunt

quaedam

iusta legalia.

Est autem considerandum, quod iustum

1019. We must consider that that justice is

naturale est ad quod hominem natura inclinat. Attenditur autem in homine

natural to which nature inclines men. But a twofold nature is observed in man. One, is

duplex natura. Una quidem, secundum quod est animal, quae est sibi aliisque

that which is common to him and other animals. The other nature belongs to man

animalibus communis; alia autem est natura hominis quae est propria sibi

properly inasmuch as he is man, as he distinguishes the disgraceful: from the

inquantum est homo, prout scilicet secundum rationem discernit turpe et

honorable by reason. However, jurists call only that right natural which follows the

honestum. Iuristae autem illud tantum dicunt ius naturale, quod consequitur

inclination of nature common to man and other animals, as the union of male and

inclinationem naturae communis homini et aliis animalibus, sicut coniunctio maris

female, the education of offspring, and so forth. But the right which follows the

et feminae, educatio natorum, et alia

inclination proper to the nature of man, i.e.,

huiusmodi. Illud autem ius, quod consequitur propriam inclinationem

precisely as he is a rational animal, the jurists call the right of the peoples (jus

naturae humanae, inquantum scilicet homo est rationale animal, vocant ius

gentium) because all people are accustomed to follow it, for example, that agreements are

gentium, quia eo omnes gentes utuntur, sicut quod pacta sint servanda, quod

to be kept, legates are safe among enemies, and so on. Both of these, though, are

legati etiam apud hostes sint tuti, et alia huiusmodi. Utrumque autem horum

included under natural justice as it is here taken by the Philosopher.

comprehenditur sub iusto naturali, prout

hic a philosopho accipitur. Secundo ibi: legale autem etc., manifestat iustum legale. Et videtur ponere tres

1020. Next [y, bb ],at “That is called legal justice,” he explains legal justice and seems

differentias huius iusti. Quarum prima est: cum universaliter vel communiter

to give three differences in justice of this kind. The first is this: when something is

aliquid lege ponitur; et quantum ad hoc dicit quod legale iustum dicitur quod ex

universally or commonly imposed by law it becomes legal. Regarding this he says that

principio quidem, scilicet antequam lege statuatur, nihil differt utrum sic vel aliter

that justice is called legal which in the beginning, i.e., before it becomes law, is

fiat: sed quando iam ponitur, idest statuitur lege, tunc differt, quia hoc

indifferent whether something is done in this way or that, but when it is laid down, i.e.,

servare est iustum, praeterire iniustum. Sicut in aliqua civitate statutum est quod

enacted into law, then a difference arises because observing it is just, disregarding it is

captivus redimatur mna, quocumque scilicet certo pretio, et quod sacrificetur

unjust. Thus in some state it has been decreed that a prisoner may be redeemed at a

capra, non autem quod sacrificentur duae

fixed price and that a goat should be offered

oves.

in sacrifice but that two sheep are not to be sacrificed.

Alia vero differentia iusti legalis est, secundum quod aliquid lege statuitur in

1020. The second difference in legal justice is that something is stated by law in a

aliquo singulari; puta cum civitas vel princeps alicui personae concedit aliquod

particular case, for instance, when a state or a prince grants some privilege—called a

privilegium, quod dicitur lex privata. Et quantum ad hoc dicit: quod adhuc sunt

private law—to an individual person. Touching this point he says there are also

iusta legalia, non solum illa quae communiter statuuntur, sed quaecumque

legal enactments, not those that are decreed in a general way but whatever are prescribed

homines ponunt pro lege in aliquibus singularibus; sicut in quadam civitate

by legislators as law in individual cases. It was enacted, for example, in a particular

statutum est quod sacrificetur cuidam mulieri, nomine Brasidae, quae magnam

state that sacrifice should be offered to a woman named Brasidas who rendered great

utilitatem civitati attulerat.

service to the state.

Tertia differentia iusti legalis est, prout

1022. The third difference in legal justice is

sententiae a iudicibus datae dicuntur quaedam iusta legalia. Et quantum ad

that sentences passed by judges are called a kind of legal justice. In regard to this he adds

hoc subdit, quod etiam sententialia sunt iusta legalia.

that the decrees of judges are also legal enactments.

Est autem hic considerandum, quod iustum legale sive positivum oritur

1023. But here we must take into consideration that legal or positive justice

semper a naturali, ut Tullius dicit in sua

always has its origin in natural justice, as

rhetorica. Dupliciter tamen aliquid potest

Cicero says in his Rhetoric [Rhetorica, De

oriri a iure naturali. Uno modo sicut conclusio ex principiis; et sic ius

Inventione, lib. II, cap. 53]. Origin from natural right can occur in two ways: in one

positivum vel legale non potest oriri a iure naturali; praemissis enim

way as a conclusion from a principle, and in such a manner positive or legal right cannot

existentibus, necesse est conclusionem esse; sed cum iustum naturale sit semper

originate from natural right. The reason is that once the premises are stated the

et ubique, ut dictum est, hoc non competit iusto legali vel positivo. Et ideo

conclusion necessarily follows. But since natural justice exists always and everywhere,

necesse est quod quicquid ex iusto naturali sequitur, quasi conclusio, sit

as has been pointed out (1018), this is not applicable to legal or positive justice. On this

iustum naturale; sicut ex hoc quod est nulli esse iniuste nocendum, sequitur non

account it is necessary that whatever follows from natural justice as a conclusion will be

esse furandum, quod item ad ius naturale pertinet. Alio modo oritur aliquid ex iusto

natural justice. Thus, from the fact that no one should be unjustly injured it follows that

naturali per modum determinationis; et

theft must not be committed—this belongs to

sic omnia iusta positiva vel legalia ex iusto naturali oriuntur. Sicut furem esse

natural justice. In the other way something can originate from natural justice after the

puniendum est iustum naturale, sed quod sit etiam puniendum tali vel tali poena,

manner of a determination, and thus all positive or legal justice arises from natural

hoc est lege positum.

justice. For example, that a thief be punished is natural justice but that he be punished by such and such a penalty is legal justice.

Attendendum est etiam quod iustum

1024. Also we must consider here that legal

legale dupliciter oritur a naturali secundum modum praedictum. Uno

justice has its origin in two ways from natural justice in the preceding manner. In

modo cum permixtione. Alio modo sine permixtione alicuius humani erroris, et

one way it exists with an admixture of some human error, and in the other without such

hoc etiam exempla Aristotilis demonstrant; naturaliter enim iustum

error. Aristotle explains this by examples. It is natural justice that a citizen who is

est quod civi non ob suam culpam oppresso subveniatur et per consequens

oppressed without any fault on his part should be aided, and consequently that a

quod captivus redimatur: taxatio autem pretii, quae pertinet ad iustum legale,

prisoner should be ransomed, but the fixing of the price pertains to legal justice which

procedit ex praedicto iusto naturali absque omni errore. Est etiam naturale

proceeds from natural justice without error. Likewise it is natural justice that honor be

iustum

honor

bestowed on a benefactor but that divine

exhibeatur; sed quod honor divinus exhibeatur homini est ex errore humano

honor be given him—that he be offered sacrifice—arises from human error. But the

et tale est quod sacrificetur Brasidae. Sententialia vero iusta sunt applicationes

just decrees of judges are applications of legal justice to particular cases.

quod

benefactori

iustorum legalium ad particularia facta.

Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc.,

1025. At “Some people were of the opinion”

excludit errorem contra praedictam divisionem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo

[z] he rejects an error opposed to this division. On this point he does three things.

proponit errorem cum sua ratione. Secundo solvit, ibi, hoc autem non est et

First [z, aa] he proposes the error together with the reason for it. Second [z, bb], at

cetera. Tertio movet quamdam quaestionem ex solutione ortam. Dicit

“However, that opinion etc.,” he refutes it. Last [z, cc], at “Among the things etc.,” he

ergo primo quod quibusdam visum est

asks a question occasioned by the refutation.

quod omnia iusta sint talia, scilicet lege posita, ita quod nihil sit iustum naturale.

He says first that some were of the opinion that all justice is that which is established by

Quae quidem fuit opinio Cirenaeorum, sectatorum Aristipi Socratici. Et

law and there is then no natural justice. This was the opinion of the followers of the

movebantur tali ratione: quia illud quod est secundum naturam est immobile et

Socratic philosopher Aristippus. They were influenced by this reason: that which is

ubicumque sit habet eamdem virtutem, (sicut patet de igne qui ardet et in

according to nature is invariable, and wherever it is it has the same force, as is

Graecia et in Perside, quod non videtur esse verum circa iusta, quia omnia iusta

obvious fire burns in Greece as well as in Persia. Apparently this is not true of justice

videntur aliquando esse mota. Nihil enim videtur esse magis iustum quam quod

because all just things seem to be changed at times. Nothing seems to be more just than

deponenti depositum reddatur; et tamen non est reddendum depositum furioso

that a deposit should be returned to the owner. Nevertheless the return must not be

reposcenti gladium vel proditori patriae reposcenti pecunias ad arma: sic ergo

made to a madman demanding his sword or to a traitor to his country demanding money

videtur quod nulla sint naturaliter iusta.

for arms. So then it seems that there is nothing just by nature.

Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem non est etc.,

1026. Then [z, bb], at “However, that

ponit solutionem. Et dicit quod id quod dictum est quod naturalia sint immobilia,

opinion,” he provides a refutation, saying that the statement that natural things are

non ita se habet universaliter, sed aliquo modo est verum; quia natura rerum

unchangeable is not so universally but is true in some respect. The reason is that the

divinarum nequaquam aliter se habet, puta substantiarum separatarum et

nature of divine things never changes, for example, the nature of separated substances

caelestium corporum, quae antiqui deos vocabant; sed apud nos homines, qui

and of the heavenly bodies, which the ancients called gods. But with us humans,

inter res corruptibiles sumus, est aliquid quidem secundum naturam, et tamen

who’ are counted among perishable things, there is something according to nature and

quicquid est in nobis est mutabile vel per

yet whatever is in us is changeable either

se vel per accidens. Nihilominus tamen est in nobis aliquid naturale sicut habere

intrinsically or extrinsically. Moreover, there is in us something natural like having two

pedes, et aliquid non naturale, sicut habere tunicam, et sic etiam, licet omnia

feet, and something not natural like having a coat. Undoubtedly all the things that are just

quae sunt apud nos iusta aliqualiter

among us are variable, although some of

moveantur, nihilominus tamen quaedam eorum sunt naturaliter iusta.

them are naturally just.

Deinde cum dicit: quale autem natura

1027. Next [z, cc], at “Among the things,”

etc., movet quamdam dubitationem ex praecedenti solutione exortam. Et circa

he raises a doubt occasioned by the preceding refutation. He handles the first point in a

hoc duo facit: primo proponit quaestionem; secundo solvit, ibi:

twofold manner. First [cc, a’] he asks the question. Then [cc, b’], at “Obviously, the

manifestum et in aliis et cetera. Primo igitur proponit talem quaestionem. Si

same,” he answers it. First he proposes this question. If all just human things are

enim omnia iusta humana mobilia sunt, restat quaestio, inter ea quae contingunt

changeable the question remains: of the things that change, what kind is just by

aliter se habere, quale secundum naturam, et

sit iustum quale non

nature and what kind is just not by nature but by the decision of the law and agreement

secundum naturam, sed secundum legis positionem et ad placitum hominum, ex

among men, if both are changeable in a similar way?

quo ambo sunt similiter mobilia.

Deinde cum dicit manifestum et in aliis

1028. At “Obviously, the same” [cc, b’] he

etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem. Et

answers

circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter iusta naturalia sint mobilia.

considers this point in a twofold manner. First [b’, a] he shows how things just by

Secundo qualiter iusta legalia, ibi, quae autem secundum compositionem et

nature are changeable. Then [b’, b), at “Those things that are,” he shows how

cetera. Dicit ergo primo manifestum esse quod etiam in aliis naturalibus quae sunt

things just by law are changeable. He says it is obvious that the arrangement found in

apud nos eadem determinatio congruit sicut et in naturaliter iustis. Ea enim

other natural things, likewise applies to things just by nature. Those things that are

quae sunt naturalia apud nos sunt quidem eodem modo ut in pluribus, sed ut

natural with us occur in the same way in the greater number of cases but fail in a few.

in paucioribus deficiunt; sicut naturale est quod pars dextra sit vigorosior quam

Thus it is natural that the right hand is stronger than the left, and this is so in the

sinistra, et hoc in pluribus habet veritatem; et tamen contingit ut in

greater number of instances, although it happens occasionally that some men are

paucioribus aliquos fieri ambidextros, qui

ambidexterous since their left hand is as

sinistram manum habent ita valentem ut dextram: ita etiam et ea quae sunt

strong as their right. So also the things that are just by nature, for example, that a

naturaliter iusta, utputa depositum esse reddendum, ut in pluribus est

deposit ought to be returned must be observed in the majority of cases but is

the

question

just

asked.

He

observandum, sed ut in paucioribus

changed in the minority.

mutatur.

Est

tamen

attendendum

quod quia

1029. However, we must keep in mind that

rationes etiam mutabilium sunt immutabiles, si quid est nobis naturale

the essences of changeable things are immutable; hence whatever is natural to us,

quasi

hominis

so that it belongs to the very nature of man,

rationem, nullo modo mutatur, puta hominem esse animal. Quae autem

is not changeable in any way, for instance that man is an animal. But things that follow

consequuntur dispositiones,

puta motus

a nature, like dispositions, actions, and movement, are variable in the fewer

mutantur ut in paucioribus. Et similiter etiam illa quae pertinent ad ipsam

instances. Likewise those actions belonging to the very nature of justice cannot be

iustitiae rationem nullo modo possunt mutari, puta non esse furandum, quod

changed in any way, for example, theft must not be committed because it is an injustice.

est iniustum facere. Illa vero quae consequuntur, mutantur ut in minori

But those actions that follow (from the nature of justice) are changeable in a few

parte.

cases.

Deinde cum dicit: quae autem secundum

1030. Then [b’, b], at ‘Those things that

compositionem etc., ostendit qualiter iusta legalia sunt mutabilia indifferenter.

are,” he shows how the legally just are changeable without exception. He says that

Et dicit quod illa quae sunt iusta secundum compositionem et conferens,

regulations that are just according to arrangement and advantage, i.e., by what is

idest secundum quod est condictum inter homines propter aliquam utilitatem, sunt

agreed among men for some utility, are similar to measures of salable commodities,

similia mensuris rerum venalium, puta

wine and wheat. These are greater where

vini et frumenti. (Non enim sunt ubique aequales mensurae vini et frumenti,) sed

products are bought wholesale but smaller where products are sold retail. So also things

ubi emuntur propter maiorem copiam sunt maiores, ubi autem venduntur

that are not naturally just but fixed by men are not the same everywhere, thus the same

propter minorem copiam sunt minores. Ita etiam iusta quae non sunt naturalia,

punishment is not inflicted everywhere for theft. The reason is that civil life and the

sed per homines posita, non sunt eadem ubique, sicut non ubique eadem poena

administration of the state are not the same everywhere. All laws are framed as they are

imponitur furi. Et huius ratio est, quia non est eadem ubique urbanitas sive

needed for the end of the state, although only one form of government is everywhere best

politia. Omnes enim leges ponuntur secundum quod congruit fini politiae, sed

according to nature.

pertinens

ad

ipsam

naturam, actiones et

tamen sola una est optima politia secundum naturam ubicumque sit.

Deinde cum dicit: iustorum autem etc., agit de divisione iusti in particularia. Et

1031. Next [ii], at “Particular just and legal things,” he treats the division of justice in

dicit quod unumquodque iustorum naturalium et etiam legalium se habet ad

regard to the individual parts. He says that each particular just and legal thing is related

res humanas ut universale ad singularia; quia ea quae operantur secundum

to human affairs as a universal to singulars. The reason is that actions which are done

iustitiam sunt multa; sed unumquodque iustorum est unum quasi quoddam

according to justice are many but each just thing is one, as it were a kind of universal.

universale, sicut hoc quod est depositum

Thus, that a deposit must be returned is one

esse reddendum est unum quod se habet ad multas personas et ad multas res.

which has a reference to many cases.

Deinde cum dicit: differt autem etc.,

1032. At “There is a difference” [B’] he

ostendit quid sit iustificatio. Et primo quid sit iniustificatio. Secundo quid sit

shows what just action and unjust action are. First [1], what unjust action is. Then

iustificatio, ibi, similiter autem et iustificatio et cetera. Dicit ergo primo,

[2], at “It is the same etc.,” what just action is. He says first that unjust action and

quod iniustificatio et iniustum differunt; quia iniustum est aliqua res quae est

unjust thing differ, for an unjust thing is something that is contrary to justice either

contra iustitiam, vel secundum naturam vel secundum ordinationem humanam,

by nature or by human decree, as theft. But the doing of an action by someone, for

sicut furtum, sed quando aliquis hoc

instance, stealing is called unjust action, the

operatur, puta furando, vocatur hoc iniustificatio, quasi executio iniustitiae:

execution of injustice so to speak. However, before this is done by anyone it is not called

sed antequam quis hoc operetur, non vocatur iniustificatio, sed iniustum.

an unjust action but an unjust thing.

Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., ostendit quid sit iustificatio. Et dicit quod

1033. Then [2], at “It is the same,” he shows what just action is. He says that in a similar

similiter iustificatio est quando quis operatur iustum quod est natura vel

way just action is present when a person does a thing which is just by nature or by

ordine legis. Sed apud Graecos operatio

regulation of law. But with the Greeks the

iusti in communi magis vocatur dikeopraema, id est operatio iusti,

doing of a just thing in general is rather called dicaeopragma or doing of what is just,

iustificatio autem non videtur dici quaelibet operatio iusti, sed solum

but every doing of a just thing does not seem to be called justifying action but only when a

quando aliquis dirigit iniustificationes, scilicet reducendo id quod est iniustum ad

person is corrected in the justifying action, i.e., by restoring what is unjust to justice.

iustitiam. Ultimo autem dicit quod, quales, et quot,

1034. Finally, he says that we must discuss

et quae sint species iusti secundum

later, in the Politics (Bk. I, Ch. 6, 1255 a 3-

unumquodque

iustorum,

scilicet

naturalis et legalis, posterius videndum, scilicet in politica.

est

1255 b 15; St. Th. Lect. 4, 75-88), the nature, the number, and the species of each type of justice, viz., natural and legal.

LECTURE 13 Actions Which Make a Man just or Unjust Chapter 8 C. By what just or unjust actions may a man become just or unjust? A’ He explains his plan. 1. WHEN A JUST OR UNJUST THING MAY EXIST WITHOUT A JUST OR UNJUST ACTION. a. He explains his intention. — 1035-1036 ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ

Since just and unjust acts are such as have been described, a man acts unjustly

μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων,

or justly when he acts voluntarily. But when he acts involuntarily he works

οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς

neither injustice nor justice except incidentally, for it is incidental that the

γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκοις, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ

actions are just or unjust. An act of justice and a just action are indicated by reason of

καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ

a voluntary and an involuntary. When a voluntary is done and a person is blamed,

ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ

then there is at the same time an unjust

ἀδίκημα τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὔπω,

action. Wherefore something unjust may be present but an unjust action never

ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ.

exists if there is no voluntary.

b. He clarifies what he said. i. He indicates his intention. — 1037-1038 λέγω δ' ἑκούσιον μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ

As has been pointed out previously, I call

πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ

voluntary any of the actions within a man’s power, which he does knowingly and

ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε ὃν μήτε ᾧ

without ignorance of the what, how and

μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα,

why; for example, whom he struck, with what instrument, and with what

κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ ὥσπερ εἴ

intention-none of these being unintentional. Also the act must be done

τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑκών· οὐ

without violence, thus when one takes a person’s hand and strikes another, that

γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ'

person does not act voluntarily because it was not in his power to hinder this. It can

ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ

happen that the one struck is the man’s father, the striker knowing the person is a

πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ

human being or someone present but not recognizing his father. Likewise the same

οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν

should be determined in what concerns the

ὅλην. τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ'

intention and the whole operation. Certainly the act done without knowledge,

ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων

or knowingly and not being in our power, is like an involuntary. We knowingly do

εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ'

and experience many natural things none of which are either voluntary or

ἑκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.

involuntary, for example, growing old and dying.

ii. The previous explanation is applicable to both just and unjust acts. — 1039 ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων

The same is true even when the act is just

καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν

or unjust incidentally, because if someone restores a deposit unwillingly and on

παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε

account of fear his act is not said to be just, nor is it an act of justice except

δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ

incidentally. In a similar way a person forced against his will not to restore a

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ

deposit is said to do an unjust thing or an act incidentally unjust.

ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. 2. THERE IS JUST OR UNJUST ACTION WITHOUT THE AGENT BEING JUST OR UNJUST.

a.

First he premises a division necessary to explain the

statement. — 1040 τῶν

δὲ

ἑκουσίων

τὰ

μὲν

We perform some voluntary actions by

προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι

choice and others without deliberation. When we make a choice of anything we

μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅς'

first deliberate, but things we do without choice are without previous deliberation.

ἀπροβούλευτα. b. He explains the statement. i. He repeats when there may be an unjust thing without an unjust action. — 1041-1043 τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ'

Injury may occur in dealings among men in three ways. Through ignorance sins are

ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ

committed in which neither the person against whom, nor the what, nor the how,

μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ

nor the end are known, and they take place for an end not considered, for example, a

οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ

man intends not to wound but to tap, not this person or not in this way. When

ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ

therefore (1) injury is inflicted unintentionally, we have an unfortunate

οὐχ ᾧ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα·

accident, but when (2) the injury is not unintentional although without evil intent,

ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα ἁμαρτάνει

we have a sin certainly since the principle of the cause is in the agent. But what

μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ

happens incidentally has an external cause.

τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν·

ii. He restates when there is unjust action without the agent being unjust. — 1044 ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον

However, when (3) injury is inflicted knowingly but without deliberation, we

ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ

have unjust action, thus whatever is done through anger or other passions which are

συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ

necessary or natural to man. Under these circumstances persons sinning and

ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω

injuring others act unjustly and their actions are unjust but they are not unjust

ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί·

or evil on account of this, for they do not inflict injury from wickedness.

iii. He shows when one is unjust by the injustice and wickedness of the agent. — 1045 οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος

But when injury is inflicted by choice the perpetrator is unjust and evil.

καὶ μοχθηρός.

c. He clarifies some things which have been said. i.

He explains... what is done from weakness or passion (by

two reasons) x. FIRST. — 1046 διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει

Therefore, it is in their favor that the things done out of anger are judged not to

ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας.

arise from premeditation, for it is the man who gave the provocation that began it and not he who acted in sudden anger.

y. SECOND. — 1047 ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ

Besides, it is not a question of whether the

μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ

act is done but whether it is done justly, for anger indicates some injustice which is

ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι

obvious. The case is different when the fact is questioned as in transactions where the

περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν

alternative is necessarily evil if the action is not done through forgetfulness. But

ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ'

angry people, acknowledging the fact, are uncertain in what way there is injustice.

ὁμολογοῦντες

τοῦ

However, those who act deviously are not

πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν

ignorant on this point. Therefore the cunning, but not the angry, know that the

ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, ὥστε ὃ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὃ

injured party suffered unjustly.

περὶ

δ' οὔ. ii. He explains... what is done by deliberate choice. — 1048

ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ,

If a man inflicts injury by deliberate choice,

ἀδικεῖ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος,

he acts unjustly and he is now called unjust because of those unjust acts since

ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

they are contrary to the proportional or the equal. In a similar way a person is

δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ,

called just when he acts justly by deliberate choice, but he is said to be a doer

ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν πράττῃ.

of a just act only if he acts voluntarily.

B’ He introduces a division to explain things mentioned previously. — 1049 τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μέν ἐστι

Some involuntary acts deserve pardon,

συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ

others do not. Whatever sins men commit not only in ignorance but also because of

μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι'

ignorance are excusable. However, the sins

ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι'

they commit not by reason of ignorance but in ignorance because of passion, which

ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ'

is neither natural inexcusable.

nor

human,

are

ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Existentibus autem iustis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid sit

1035. After the Philosopher has shown what justice in itself is, and what just

iustum simpliciter et quid sit iustificatio et iniustificatio, hic iam solvit quaestionem

action and unjust action are, now [C] he answers a question that he previously

quam prius moverat, scilicet secundum

asked, viz., by what just or unjust actions

quales iustificationes vel iniustificationes aliquis sit iustus vel iniustus. Et circa hoc

may a man become just or unjust? He treats this point in a twofold manner. First

duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo inducit quamdam divisionem ad

[A’] he explains his plan. Then [B’], at “Some involuntary acts etc.,” he

manifestationem praedictorum, ibi: involuntariorum (autem) haec quidem et

introduces a division to explain things mentioned previously. He discusses the

cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

initial point from two aspects. First [1] he

ostendit quando sit iustum vel iniustum

shows when a just or unjust thing may

sine hoc quod sit iustificatio vel iniustificatio. Secundo ostendit quando est

exist without a just or unjust action. Next [2], at “We perform some voluntary etc.,”

iustificatio vel iniustificatio sine hoc quod

he shows that there is just or unjust

ille qui operatur sit iustus vel iniustus, ibi, voluntariorum autem et cetera. Circa

action without the agent being just or unjust. He discusses the first point under

primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum; secundo manifestat quiddam

two headings. Initially [1, a] he explains his intention. Second [1, b], at “As has

quod dixerat, ibi, dico autem voluntarium quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod

been pointed out etc.,” he clarifies what he said. He affirms first that since just and

cum iusta et iniusta sint talia qualia supra dicta sunt, tunc aliquis facit iniustum ita

unjust acts are such as have been described before (1000-1001), then a man

quod sit iniustificatio et operatur iustum ita quod sit iustificatio vel dikeopraema quando

acts unjustly or justly in this way: there is an act of injustice or a just action when he

aliquis operatur ipsa, scilicet iustum vel iniustum, volens. Sed quando aliquis

voluntarily does these very things, i.e., what is just and unjust. But when a man

operatur ipsa nolens, non est ibi facere iniustum vel operari iustum, nisi forte per

does them involuntarily he does not act justly or unjustly except perhaps

accidens, in quantum scilicet accidit praeter intentionem operantis quod illa quae quis

incidentally; it happens contrary to his intention that the acts he does are just or

facit sint iusta vel iniusta.

unjust.

Illa enim dicimur per se facere et non per

1036. Those things that we intend to do

accidens, quae intendimus facere. Nihil autem specificatur per id quod est per

are said to be done in themselves and not incidentally. However, nothing is specified

accidens, sed solum per id quod est per se, et ideo iustificatio et dikeopraema, id est

by what is incidental but only by what is in itself (per se). Therefore the act of justice

operatio iusti, et similiter iniustificatio determinatur per voluntarium et

and the dicaeopragma or the just operation, and likewise the act of injustice

involuntarium; ita scilicet quod cum aliquid sit voluntarium laudatur aliquis vel

are indicated by a voluntary or involuntary, in such a way that when

vituperatur. Unde manifestum est quod erit ex parte ipsius operati aliquid iniustum, sed

something is voluntary a person is praised or blamed. Hence, obviously, on the part of

non erit iniustificatio quantum ad speciem

the thing done there will be something

operationis, si non assit voluntarium ex parte operantis. Et eadem ratio est de

unjust, but there will not be an unjust action as regards the species of the

iustificatione.

operation if there is not a voluntary on the part of the agent. The same holds for just action.

Deinde cum dicit: dico autem voluntarium

1037. Then [1, b], at “As has been pointed

etc., manifestat quaedam quae dicta sunt, scilicet quid sit voluntarium et quid

out,” he clarifies some things that have been said, what a voluntary and an

involuntarium. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat propositum. Secundo

involuntary are. He handles this point in a twofold fashion. First [1, b, i] he indicates

ostendit quod praedicta manifestatio competit tam circa iusta quam circa iniusta,

his intention. Second [1, b, ii], at “The same is true etc.,” he shows that the

ibi, est autem similiter et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod voluntarium, sicut dictum est

previous explanation is applicable to both just and unjust acts. He says first that a

in tertio, dicitur esse quando aliquis

voluntary, as has been pointed out in the

operatur aliquid eorum quae sunt in sua potestate sciens et non ignorans, neque

third book (382, 391, 427, 435, 436), is said to be present when a person

circa quem operetur neque quo instrumento neque etiam cuius gratia hoc faciat, puta

knowingly does a thing that is in his power and is not ignorant either of what is done,

quod sciat quem percutit et quo percutiat, sicut instrumento, et cuius gratia; et

or by what means, or for what end he does this. For example, he knows whom he

horum unumquodque sciat per se et non per accidens. Requiritur etiam ad hoc quod

struck, how he delivered the blow—as by an instrument—and the purpose of it; so

sit voluntarium quod non sit per violentiam: puta, si aliquis accipiat manum alicuius per

too he knows each of these in themselves and not incidentally. In order that there be

violentiam et cum ea percutiat alterum, hoc quidem ille cuius est manus non facit

a voluntary it is necessary that the thing not happen by violence, for instance, if one

voluntarius, quia non erat in eius potestate hoc vitare, sed cogitur.

takes a person’s hand by force and strikes another, he whose hand it is does not do this voluntarily, because it is not in his power to avoid being forced.

Exponit autem consequenter quomodo cognoscatur aliquid secundum accidens.

1038. After this, he explains how a thing may be known incidentally. It is possible

Contingit enim quod ille qui est percussus ab aliquo sit pater eius. Ille autem qui

that the man struck is his father. He who delivers the blow knows that a human

percutit cognoscit quidem quod percussus est homo vel aliquis de praesentibus; sed

being or someone present was struck but not that his father was; thus he knows

ignorat quod ipse sit pater eius, et sic cognoscit patrem per accidens, inquantum

incidentally that this was his father inasmuch as he knows that the person to

cognoscit eum cui accidit esse patrem. Et

whom this happened was his father. As we

sicut dictum est ex parte eius quem percutit, similiter est determinandum et ex

have discussed the man who delivers the blow, similarly we must investigate the

parte eius cuius gratia et circa totam operationem, idest circa omnes

purpose of the whole operation, i.e., all the circumstances of the operation. From the

circumstantias operationis. Et ex hoc quod dictum est quid sit voluntarium potest sciri

statement of what the voluntary is we can know what the involuntary is. The reason

quid sit involuntarium; quia si aliquid sit ignoratum vel cessante ignorantia, non sit

is that if something is done through ignorance or (after ignorance has ceased)

in potestate eius qui operatur, vel magis fiat per violentiam, hoc erit involuntarium. Ideo

is not in the power of the agent, or still more is done through violences it will be an

autem additum est, per violentiam, quia

involuntary. On this account it was added

multa quae non sunt in nobis non sunt involuntaria: multa enim sunt naturalia

“by violence” because many things that are in us are not involuntary, for there are

quae et operamur et patimur scientes, puta senescere vel mori; quorum tamen nullum

many natural things we knowingly do and experience, for example, growing old and

est voluntarium vel involuntarium, quia utrumque eorum est circa ea quae (non)

dying. Nevertheless none of these is voluntary or involuntary because each one

sunt nata in nobis esse. Si autem accidat per violentiam quod aliquid eorum non sit in

of them concerns the things which are in us by nature. But if it happens through

nobis, tunc dicitur involuntarium.

violence that one of them is not in us, then it is called an involuntary.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem similiter etc., manifestat id quod dictum est circa iusta et

1039. Next [1, b, ii ], at “The same is true,” he explains what was said about just

circa iniusta. Et dicit quod secundum accidens operari eo quod quis non operatur

and unjust acts. In regard to just acts, for example, if a man hands over a deposit to

voluntarie, accidit similiter et circa iusta et circa iniusta. Circa iusta quidem, puta si

its owner not willingly but on account of fear, we do not say there is just action in

aliquis reddat pignus ei cuius est non

this case except incidentally. Likewise if a

quidem voluntarius sed propter timorem, non est dicendum quod ibi sit operatio iusti

person forced against his will abstains from restoring a deposit, we say he does an

vel dikeopraie, nisi per accidens. Et similiter, si aliquis coactus et nolens

unjust thing or acts unjustly by accident.

desistat reddere pignus, per accidens dicitur facere iniusta vel operari iniusta.

Deinde cum dicit voluntariorum autem etc., ostendit quando est iustificatio vel

1040. At “We perform some voluntary actions” [2] he shows when there is just or

iniustificatio, et tamen ille qui operatur non est iustus vel iniustus. Et circa hoc tria

unjust action and yet the agent himself is not just or unjust. First [2, a] he premises

facit. Primo praemittit quamdam divisionem necessariam ad propositum

a division necessary to explain the statement. Next [2, b], at “Injury may

ostendendum.

ostendit

occur etc.,” he explains the statement.

propositum, ibi: tribus utique existentibus etc.; tertio manifestat quaedam quae dicta

Last [2, c], at “Therefore, it is etc.,” he clarifies some things that have been said.

sunt, ibi, propter quod bene et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod voluntariorum quaedam

He states first that we do some voluntary actions by deliberate choice and others

operamur praeeligentes, et quaedam non praeeligentes quidem sive ex electione

without deliberate choice. Whatever we do by deliberate choice we do with preceding

operamur illa quaecumque ex praecedenti consilio vel deliberatione facimus; sed illa

counsel or deliberation; but whatever is not subject to choice or is performed

sunt ineligibilia, idest absque electione

without choice we do without previous

Secundo

facta, quaecumque fiunt impraeconsiliata, idest absque praecedenti deliberatione.

counsel or deliberation.

Deinde cum dicit: tribus utique existentibus etc., ostendit propositum. Et primo resumit

1041. Next [2, b], at “Injury may occur,” he explains the statement. First [2, b, i] he

quando sit iniustum absque iniustificatione. Secundo quando est iniustificatio sine hoc

repeats when there may be an unjust thing without an unjust action. Then [2, b, ii], at

quod ille qui operatur sit iniustus vel malus, ibi: quando autem sciens quidem etc.; tertio

“However, when etc.,” he restates when there is unjust action without the agent

ostendit quando est iniustificatio cum iniustitia et malitia eius qui operatur, ibi,

being unjust. Last [2, b, iii], at “But when injury etc.,” he shows when one is unjust

quando autem ex electione et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut ex supra dictis

by the injustice and wickedness of the agent. He says first, as appears from what

apparet, tripliciter contingit nocumentum inferre

aliquod circa

has been stated previously (1037-1038), that injury may occur in dealings among

communicationes hominum adinvicem. Uno

men in three ways: in one way by

modo per ignorantiam et involuntarie. Alio modo voluntarie quidem, sed sine electione.

ignorance and involuntarily, in another way voluntarily but without choice, and in

Tertio modo voluntarie et cum electione.

a third way voluntarily and with choice.

Illa igitur peccata fiunt per ignorantiam quando aliquis neque scit quid faciat neque

1042. Those sins are committed through ignorance that are done by a man who

circa quem neque quo instrumento neque etiam cuius gratia existimavit se aliquid

does not know what he is doing, nor against whom he acts, nor with what

facturum, (haec) operatus est. Puta si non aestimavit se iacere telum, sed solum

means, nor for what end even if he was aware of performing an act. Thus a man

vibrare; vel non existimavit se percutere hoc instrumento, puta lancea ferrata, sed

thought that he landed a blow not with this instrument, e.g., a piked lance but

rotunda; vel non existimavit se percutere hunc, puta patrem, sed hostem. Vel non

with a rounded one; or he thought that he struck not this man, viz., not his father but

existimavit se huius gratia percussurum, sed accidit illud cuius gratia non

an enemy; or he did not think he was about to strike for this objective but an objective

existimavit, puta cum existimavit se percutere non ad vulnerandum sed ad

was achieved he did not think of, for example, when he intended to strike not to

pungendum. Et simile est cum est ignorantia quantum ad quem percutiat vel

wound but to tap. The case is similar when ignorance, exists in regard to the way a

cum non cognoscit ut, id est quomodo,

man landed a blow, mightily or lightly.

percutiat, puta lente vel fortiter.

Sed circa hoc considerandum est quod quando nocumentum infertur paralogice, id

1043. But on this point we must consider that when injury is inflicted

est praeter rationem seu intentionem, tunc

unintentionally, i.e., contrary to plan or

est omnino infortunium, puta cum aliquis

intention, then an altogether unfortunate

putat vibrare telum et iacit. Sed quando aliquis infert nocumentum non paralogice,

accident happens. For instance, a man means to brandish a spear and instead

idest non absque intentione nocendi sed sine malitia, quia scilicet non putat multum

throws it. But when someone inflicts injury not unintentionally, that is, not

nocere, vel non putat tali personae nocere, tunc est aliquod peccamen, licet non

without the intention of injuring but without malice in the sense that he does

tantum; peccat enim aliquis cum principium inordinati actus est in se ipso per hoc quod

not mean to injure much or injure such a person, then there is some sin, although

intendit aliquid operari, sed quando principium operationis est totaliter ab extra

not so great a one. A man sins when the principle of an inordinate act is in his

quia praeter intentionem operatur, tunc est infortunium (est fortuna causa intellectiva

power in this that he intends to perform the act. But when the principle of

agens praeter rationem, ut dicitur in II

operation is entirely external so that it

physicorum).

works contrary to the intention, then an unfortunate accident occurs since fortune is an intellectual cause acting outside of reason, as is explained in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 5, 196 b 10-197 a 8; St. Th. Lect. 8, 207-216).

Deinde cum dicit: quando autem sciens etc.,

1044. Then [2, b, ii], at “However, when,”

ostendit quando sit iniustificatio sine malitia vel iniustitia operantis. Et dicit

he shows when there may be unjust action without wickedness or injustice of the

quod,

quidem

agent. He says that when a man inflicts

nocumentum infert, sed non praeconsilians, id est absque deliberatione, tunc est quidem

injury knowingly but not with previous counsel, i.e., without deliberation, then

iniustificatio; sicut quaecumque aliquis committit per iram et alias passiones, si

there is a kind of injustice, as there is in any action that a person commits through

tamen non sint naturales vel necessariae hominibus, sicut est concupiscentia cibi et

anger and other passions-provided these passions are not natural and necessary to

potus in extrema necessitate, quae excusat a subtractione rei alienae. Illi igitur qui

men, like desire for food and drink in extreme necessity which excuses the

propter praedictas passiones nocent aliis et peccant, faciunt quidem iniustum et actus

taking of what belongs to another. Therefore, those who injure others

eorum sunt iniustificationes: non tamen propter hoc ipsi sunt iniusti et mali, quia

because of these passions sin and do an unjust thing and their acts are unjust

non inferunt nocumentum propter malitiam sed propter passionem. Et tales sunt qui

actions. Nevertheless by reason of this they are not unjust and evil because they

dicuntur propter infirmitatem peccare.

do not inflict injury from wickedness but

quando

aliquis

sciens

from passion. Such people are said to sin from weakness.

Deinde cum dicit: quando autem ex electione etc., ostendit quando sit

1045. At “But when injury” [2, b, iii] he shows when there may be unjust action

iniustificatio cum iniustitia operantis. Et dicit quod quando aliquis ex electione

with injustice on the part of the agent. He says that when a man by deliberate choice

inducit alteri nocumentum, est iniustus et malus. Et talis dicitur ex certa malitia

causes injury to another, he is unjust and evil. Such a one is said to sin out of sheer

peccare.

wickedness.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod bene etc., manifestat quae dicta sunt. Et quia primum

1046. Next [2, c], at “Therefore, it is,” he clarifies what has been said. Because the

trium praedictorum, scilicet de his quae fiunt ex ignorantia, supra manifestum est,

first of the three things mentioned previously (which treats of what is done

manifestat primo secundum, scilicet de his quae fiunt ex passione. Secundo tertium,

from ignorance) was commented on before (1042-1043), in the beginning [2, c, i] he

scilicet de his quae fiunt ex electione, ibi, si autem ex electione et cetera. Dicit ergo

explains the second, which deals with what is done from weakness or passion. Then [2,

primo, quod quia cum aliqui peccant ex ira, non propter hoc sunt mali vel iniusti;

C, ii], at “If a man inflicts injury by choice etc.,” he explains the third, which treats of

propter hoc, bene possumus hoc signum accipere praedictorum quod ea quae fiunt ex

what is done by deliberate choice. He says first that when people sin from anger they

ira non iudicantur esse facta ex providentia. Et hoc consequenter, ibi, non enim et

are not evil or unjust because of this. Therefore we are well able to judge from

cetera. Probat duplici ratione. Quarum

this proof of previous statements that

prima talis est: quia ille qui facit aliquid per iram non incipit ipse nocere, sed ille qui eum

what is done from anger is not considered to be done with premeditation. He proves

ad iram provocavit. Et ita non videtur ex providentia nocumentum processisse.

this afterwards, at “for it is the man” [i, x], by two reasons. The first is this, that it is not the man himself who does something in anger that begins the process of injuring but the person who provoked him. So it does not seem that the injury arose with premeditation.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc neque de fieri et cetera. Et dicit quod quando

1047. Then [i, y], at “Besides, it is not,” he gives the second reason. He says that

aliquis infert nocumentum ex ira, non versatur tunc in dubio utrum faciat vel non

when a man inflicts injury in anger there is no question whether he does the act or

faciat, sed utrum iuste faciat. Ira enim est quaedam iniustitia manifesta, idest

not but whether he does it justly, for by anger some injustice is obvious, i.e.,

manifeste operans. Vult enim iratus vindictam esse manifestam, sed videtur sibi

operates openly. And the angry man wishes the punishment to be obvious but it

quod iuste moveatur. Non enim ita est apud iratos sicut in commutationibus iniustis,

seems to him that he is justly provoked. It is not the same thing with unjust dealings,

puta in furto et similibus, in quibus

like theft and so forth in which there is

dubitatur an factum sit: oportet enim alterum eorum esse malum, puta vel dare

doubt whether the act should have been done. One of the things must be evil, for

vel non dare peccatur enim quandoque per omissionem, quandoque per

instance, giving or not giving; for we sin sometimes by omission, other times by

transgressionem, nisi forte excusentur per oblivionem, sicut cum aliquis obliviscitur

transgression unless we are excused by reason of forgetfulness, as when a person

reddere debitum creditori tempore statuto. Sed operantes ex ira confitentur de re idest

forgets to pay a debt to a creditor at an agreed time. But people acting in anger

de facto, sed dubitant an sit iniustum illud quod fecerunt; quod non contingit illis qui

admit the thing, or the fact, but doubt whether what they did is unjust. This does

ex electione insidiose operantur, qui non ignorant se iniuste agere. Quare hic, idest

not happen to those who act deviously by choice and are not ignorant that they act

insidiosus, existimat iniuste pati illum cui nocet; sed hic, idest iratus, non existimat

unjustly. Wherefore, the insidious person judges that the man he injured suffers

hoc. Et ita patet, quod ille qui ex ira iniustum facit, non agit ex providentia.

unjustly; but the angry person does not think this. So it is evident that he who does an unjust thing in anger does not act with premeditation.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem ex electione etc.,

1048. At “If a man inflicts injury” [2, c, ii]

manifestat tertium, scilicet de his quae fiunt

he explains the third reason concerned

ex electione. Et dicit, quod si aliquis ex electione noceat, manifestum est quod facit

with acts done by deliberate choice. He says that if a man inflicts injury by

iniustum per se loquendo, quia voluntarie operatur. Et secundum huiusmodi

deliberate choice, it is obvious that absolutely speaking he acts unjustly,

iniustificationem iam dicitur ille qui facit, iniustus, quum hoc sit praeter

because he operates voluntarily. He who acts according to an injustice of this kind

proportionale, id est contra iustitiam distributivam, vel praeter aequale, idest

is called unjust since this action is contrary to the proportional, i.e., against

contra iustitiam commutativam. Et similiter aliquis dicitur iustus cum ex

distributive justice, or contrary to the equal, i.e., against commutative justice. In

electione operatur iustum. Si autem volens operetur et non eligens, dicetur iustum

a similar way a man is called just when he acts justly by deliberate choice. However, if

operans vel iustificans.

he should act voluntarily and not by choice he will be called the worker or doer of what is just.

Deinde cum dicit involuntariorum autem etc., ponit quamdam divisionem ad

1049. Then [B’], at “Some involuntary things,” he gives a division to explain

manifestationem praedictorum. Et dicit quod involuntariorum quaedam sunt

things mentioned previously. He says that some involuntary acts are venial, i.e.,

venialia, idest venia digna, et quaedam non.

deserving of pardon, and others are not.

Illa enim sunt venia digna quae homines

Those sins deserve pardon that men

peccant non solum ignorantes, idest habentes ignorantiam concomitantem, sed

commit not only in ignorance, that is, when they have concomitant ignorance,

propter

habentes

but on account of ignorance, viz., when

ignorantiam causantem, quod accidit illis qui quando cognoscunt dolent. Sed illa non

ignorance is the cause so to speak-this happens to those who are sorry when they

sunt digna venia quae aliqui non peccant propter ignorantiam causantem, sed

become aware. But those sins do not deserve pardon that men commit not on

peccant ignorantes propter passionem, quae non est naturalis neque humana, id

account of causative ignorance but in ignorance because of passion, which is

est ratione regulata; in talibus enim passio causat et ignorantiam et peccatum, et de

neither natural nor human nor according to right reason. In actions of this kind

his supra in tertio plenius dictum est.

passion is the cause of ignorance and sin; these have been more fully treated in the

ignorantiam,

quasi

third book (406-424).

LECTURE 14 Suffering Injustice, an Involuntary Chapter 9 II. SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE QUESTIONS JUST DISCUSSED. A. He raises the doubts and solves them. A’ The first part is divided into two. 1. HE PROPOSES THE QUESTION. a. He proposes the matter of the question. — 1050 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς

Someone may raise a doubt whether

διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ

suffering and doing injustice have been treated sufficiently. Does Euripides speak

ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

the truth when he unseemly says: “I killed my mother: briefly, willingly or unwillingly I

μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.

killed her who was willing to be put to death?”

ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν, ἢ οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών;

b. He puts the questioning into form. i. One question. — 1051 πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὒ ἀλλ'

Is it true or not that a person willingly suffers injustice? Or is this an involuntary,

ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον;

as every doing of injustice is a voluntary?

ii. Another question. — 1052 καὶ ἆρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως,

Is suffering injustice always voluntary or

[ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον,] ἢ τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον

always involuntary, or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary? The

τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

same question can be asked about the

ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι·

reception of justice.

2. HE FOLLOWS UP THE QUESTION. a. He argues that every reception of justice is voluntary or every reception is involuntary. — 1053

τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ὥστ' εὔλογον

Every doing of justice is a voluntary. Therefore it is reasonable that suffering

ἀντικεῖσθαι

καθ'

injustice and the reception of justice, in a

ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ

similar way, are opposed according to both, viz., the voluntary and the involuntary (so

ἀκούσιον εἶναι.

that all of the one are voluntary and all the other are involuntary).

ὁμοίως

b. He argues that not every suffering of injustice is voluntary. i. He argues for the proposition. — 1054 ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ

It seems unreasonable that every suffering

δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ

of injustice is voluntary, for some people unwillingly suffer injustice.

ἑκόντες.

ii. He asks a question on this point. — 1055 ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν

Wherefore, doubt can arise whether a

ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον

person who has undergone damage suffers

πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν,

injustice.

iii. He answers the objection. — 1056

καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ

In regard to what is incidental the same holds for receiving as for doing, since

ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων·

clearly we take one for the other in matters concerning justice and in justice alike.

ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ

Acting unjustly is not the same as doing something unjust, nor is suffering unjustly

τἄδικα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ

the same as suffering something unjust. Likewise, doing an unjust thing and

ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ

suffering an unjust thing are not the same. It is impossible to suffer unjustly without

δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ

someone doing what is unjust, or receive justice without someone doing what is just.

δικαιοῦσθαι

μὴ

δικαιοπραγοῦντος. c.

He argues that not every suffering of injustice is

involuntary. i. He argues for the proposition. x.

HE OFFERS TWO REASONS. IN... THE FIRST

HE PRESENTS THREE CONSIDERATIONS. aa. He gives a definition of doing injustice. — 1057 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα τινά, τὸ δ'

Doing an injustice in itself is present when a man voluntarily inflicts injury, that is,

ἑκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς,

knowing who is injured, by what means, and in what manner.

bb.

He argues from the definition given. — 1058

ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν βλάπτει

The incontinent person who voluntarily

αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκών τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸς

injures himself also voluntarily suffers an injustice and does an injustice to himself.

αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. cc. He asks an incidental question. — 1059 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται

But this is one of the doubtful points whether it is possible for a man to do an

αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

injustice to himself.

y. HE GIVES THE SECOND REASON. — 1060 ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις δι' ἀκρασίαν

Moreover,

it

happens

ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.

incontinence that a man is voluntarily injured by another acting voluntarily. Hence someone injustice.

by

willingly

reason

suffers

of

an

ii. He solves the proposition. x.

HE CORRECTS THE DEFINITION... GIVEN

ABOVE. — 1061 ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν

Perhaps the definition is not correct, and we should add to the words “knowing who

εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὣς τὸ

is injured, by what means and in what

παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν

manner” the further qualification “contrary to the will of the injured person.” Anyone,

καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών· οὐδεὶς γὰρ

then, can have an unjust thing done to him voluntarily, but no one can suffer injustice

βούλεται,

voluntarily. y. HE ANSWERS THE FIRST REASON. — 1062

οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ

No one wants to suffer injustice not even the incontinent person unless he acts

βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς

contrary to his will. No one wishes what he does not think is good. But the incontinent

οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει.

person performs actions he thinks he ought not to perform.

z.

HE ANSWERS THE SECOND REASON. —

1063-1064 ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν

Anyone who gives what is his, as (according to Homer’s story [Iliad vi. 236])

Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει χρύσεα χαλκείων,

Glaucus gave Diomede golden armor for brass armor and a hundred oxen for nine

ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων, οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ

oxen, suffers no injustice. It is in this man’s power to give but not in his power to suffer

γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ,

injustice—there must be someone who inflicts the injustice. Therefore it is obvious

ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν

that suffering injustice is not voluntary.

τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit

1050. After the Philosopher has shown by what just actions a person may be called just

secundum quales iustificationes vel iniustificationes dicatur aliquis iustus

or unjust, now [II] he raises some doubts about the questions just discussed. He treats

vel iniustus, hic movet quasdam dubitationes circa praedicta. Et circa

this point from two aspects. First [A] he raises the doubts and solves them. Then [Lect. 15,

hoc duo facit. Primo movet dubitationes et solvit eas. Secundo

B], at “Men are of the opinion etc.” (B. 1137 a 5), he refutes the errors of some philosophers

excludit quorumdam errores circa praedicta, ibi, homines autem in seipsis

about these subjects. The first part [A’] is divided into two according to the two questions

et cetera. Prima pars dividitur in duas, secundum duas quaestiones quas

he answers. The second part begins at [Lect. 15, B’] “There are still etc.” (B.1136 b 15). He

determinat. Secunda pars incipit ibi, adhuc autem quae praeeligimus et

handles the initial part under two headings. First [1] he proposes the question. Then [2], at

cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quaestionem. Secundo

“Every doing of justice,” he follows up the question. He discusses the first point in a two-

prosequitur eam, ibi, iustum operari

fold manner. First [1, a] he proposes the

enim et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit materiam quaestionis.

matter of the question. Next [1, b], at “Is it true or not etc.,” he puts the questioning into

Secundo format quaestionem, ibi: utrum enim ut vere est et cetera.

form. in the first place the matter of the question is taken from material that was

Materia autem quaestionis, primo, quidem sumitur ex his quae supra

settled earlier (1035-1040). Hence he says that someone can raise a doubt whether the

determinata sunt. Unde dicit, quod

suffering and doing of injustice have been

aliquis potest dubitare: utrum per praemissa sit sufficienter

sufficiently discussed by reason of what has been said already. It was stated (1035) that

determinatum de iniustum pati et de iniustum facere: dictum est enim quod

doing justice is voluntary. So it can be questioned whether this must be referred to

iniustum facere est voluntarium; unde potest dubitari: utrum hoc referendum

suffering injustice. In the second place the matter of the doubt is taken from the words of

sit ad iniustum pati. Secundo materia dubitationis sumitur ex verbo Euripidis

the poet Euripides who somewhat unbecomingly introduced a character saying:

poetae, qui introducere

inconvenienter videtur quemdam dicentem:

“I killed my mother—to make the story short, either I voluntarily killed her who wished to be

matrem occidi meam; et ut breviter dicam, vel volens occidi volentem occidi,

put to death or else I killed her involuntarily.” In either case we understand that the mother

vel ego non volens occidi volentem occidi. In quorum utroque intelligitur,

had expressed a wish to be killed.

quod mater occidi voluerit.

Deinde cum dicit: utrum enim ut vere est etc., format quaestionem. Et circa

1051. Then [1, b], at “Is it true or not,” he puts the questioning into form. He considers

hoc duo facit. Primo proponit unam quaestionem, utrum scilicet vere

this in two ways. First [1, b, i] he proposes one question, viz., whether it is really proper to say

contingat dicere quod aliquis volens patiatur iniustum, vel hoc non sit

that a man voluntarily suffers injustice or whether this is untrue, but that every

verum, sed omne pati iniustum sit involuntarium, sicut et omne facere

suffering of injustice is involuntary, as every doing of injustice is voluntary.

iniustum est voluntarium. Secundo ibi: et utrum omne etc., movet

1052. Second [1, b, ii], at “Is suffering

aliam quaestionem. Et est quaestio, utrum omne iniustum pati sit sic vel illo

injustice,” he proposes another question. The question is whether every suffering of injustice

modo, ita scilicet quod vel omne iniustum pati sit voluntarium vel omne

is constituted in this way or in such a way that every suffering of injustice is either voluntary

sit involuntarium? Sicut enim haec quaestio potest moveri de hoc quod est

or involuntary. As this question can be asked about doing injustice—whether every such

iniustum facere, utrum omne voluntarium aut quoddam

sit sit

action is voluntary or whether some are voluntary and others involuntary—so in a

quoddam

similar way the same question can be asked

voluntarium

et

involuntarium, similiter etiam potest moveri eadem quaestio et de iniustum

about the reception of justice.

pati.

Deinde cum dicit: iustum operari enim etc., prosequitur prius motam

1053. Next [2], at “Every doing of justice,” he follows up the question previously asked. He

quaestionem. Et circa hoc tria facit.

develops this in a threefold fashion. First [2, a]

Primo argumentatur ad hoc quod omne iniustum pati sit voluntarium vel

he argues that every reception of justice is voluntary or every reception is involuntary.

omne sit involuntarium. Secundo argumentatur ad hoc, quod non omne

Then [2, b], at “It seems unreasonable,” he argues that not every suffering of injustice is

iniustum pati sit voluntarium, ibi, inconveniens autem utique videbitur et

voluntary. Last [2, c], at “Doing an injustice,” he argues that not every suffering of injustice

cetera. Tertio argumentatur ad hoc, quod non omne iniustum pati sit

is involuntary. He argues in this way for the first point. Every doing of justice is voluntary,

involuntarium, ibi, si autem (est) simpliciter et cetera. Ad primum ergo

as is clear from what has been pointed out (1035). But doing justice is the opposite of

argumentatur sic: omne hoc quod est operari iustum est voluntarium, ut ex

receiving justice. Therefore it seems reasonable that receiving justice or injustice should be

supradictis patet; sed operari iustum est oppositum ei quod est pati iustum:

opposed similarly according to both, i.e., voluntary and involuntary, so that all of the

rationabile

one is voluntary and all of the other

igitur

videtur

quod

iniustum vel iustum pati simili modo opponatur secundum utrumque, scilicet

involuntary.

voluntarium et involuntarium, ita ut vel omne huiusmodi sit voluntarium vel omne sit involuntarium.

Deinde cum dicit inconveniens autem

1054. At “It seems unreasonable” [2, b] he

utique etc., argumentatur ad hoc, quod non omne iniustum pati sit

argues that not every suffering of injustice is voluntary. He treats this point from three

voluntarium. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo argumentatur ad propositum; et

aspects. First [2, b, i] he argues for the proposition, saying it seems unreasonable to

dicit, quod inconveniens videtur si ponatur, quod omne iniustum pati sit

hold that every suffering of injustice is voluntary. Obviously some people unwillingly

voluntarium. Manifeste enim quidam patiuntur iniustum non volentes, sicut

suffer injustice, like those who are flogged or whose possessions are taken by others.

illi qui verberantur vel quibus aliquis sua furatur. Secundo ibi: quia et hoc etc., movet circa hoc quamdam quaestionem:

1055. Second [2, b, ii], at “Wherefore, doubt can arise,” he asks a question on this point:

utrum scilicet omnis qui patitur id quod

whether

est iniustum materialiter et per accidens, possit dici quod sit iniustum

materially and incidentally can be said to suffer injustice formally and in itself. Thus someone

patiens formaliter et per se. Sic enim posset aliquis obviare praedictae rationi

may readily object that the man who unwillingly suffers robberies or blows, suffers

dicendo quod ille qui non volens patitur rapinas vel verbera, patitur quidem id

injustice incidentally, nevertheless he is not, so to speak, simply a victim of injustice.

everyone

who

suffers

injustice

cui accidit esse iniustum, non tamen se habet quasi per se patiens iniustum. Tertio ibi: vel quemadmodum etc.,

1056. Last [2, b, iii], at “In regard to what is

solvit motam quaestionem. Et dicit, quod sicut se habet et circa facere, ita

incidental” he answers the objection. He says that the same holds for doing as for receiving.

se habet et circa pati: quia in utroque

The reason is that in both cases it is possible to

contingit transumere, idest accipere id quod est secundum accidens circa iusta

take one for the other: to understand what is incidental about justice in a similar way to

et similiter circa iniusta. Et hoc manifestat, quia operari ea quibus

what is incidental about injustice. He gives this explanation, that performing acts incidentally

accidit esse iniusta, non est idem ei quod est per se facere iniustum. Dictum

unjust is not the same as doing an act unjust in itself. It was pointed out (1035-1036) that

est enim, quod quandoque aliquis ignorans facit per accidens id quod est

sometimes a person in ignorance does by chance what is unjust, nevertheless, absolutely

iniustum, non tamen per se loquendo iniustificat. Et similiter pati ea quibus

speaking, he does not act unjustly. Similarly, undergoing things that are incidentally unjust

accidit esse iniusta non est idem ei quod est iniustum pati per se. Similiter etiam

is not the same as undergoing what is simply unjust. Likewise it is impossible that these

impossibile est quod ista sint eadem in eo quod est iustum operari et in eo

things are the same in the doing of justice and in receiving justice; and that the same reason

quod est iustum pati; et quod sit eadem

holds for the doing and receiving both in

ratio circa facere et pati, tam circa iusta quam circa iniusta, manifestat

regard to just things and unjust things. He explains this afterwards by the fact that it is

consequenter per hoc quod non contingit aliquem pati iniustum vel

not possible to suffer something just or unjust simply speaking because passion is an effect of

iustum per se loquendo, nisi sit aliquis faciens iustum vel iniustum per se

action. If then, a man does what is unjust incidentally and does not become unjust simply,

loquendo, quia passio est effectus actionis; si ergo aliquis faciat id quod

it follows that neither does he suffer injustice simply who suffers an unjust thing. The same

est iniustum per accidens et non iniustificet per se, consequens est quod

argument holds for justice.

nec ille qui patitur per se iniustum patiatur. Et eadem ratio est de iusto.

Deinde cum dicit: si autem est simpliciter etc., argumentatur contra

1057. Then [2, c], at “Doing an injustice,” he argues against the idea that suffering injustice

hoc, quod omne iniustum pati sit involuntarium. Et primo argumentatur

is involuntary. First [c, i], he argues for the proposition. Second [c, ii], at “Perhaps the

ad propositum. Secundo solvit, ibi, vel non recta definitio et cetera. Circa

definition etc.,” he solves the proposition. Concerning the initial point he offers two

primum ponit duas rationes. Circa quarum primam tria facit. Primo

reasons. In regard to the first [i, x] of these he presents three considerations. First [x, aa] he

proponit quandam definitionem eius quod est iniustum facere, quae supra

gives a definition of doing injustice, which was defined previously (1035, 1045): doing

posita est: scilicet quod simpliciter et per se iniustum facere nihil est aliud

injustice simply and in itself is simply the voluntary inflicting of injury. By voluntary is

quam quod aliquis volens noceat: et in

meant that one knows who is injured, what

hoc quod sit volens intelligitur, quod sciat et quem laedat, et quod

inflicts the injury, and how, i.e., in what manner together with other circumstances of

nocumentum inferat, et ut, idest qualiter, et alias huiusmodi

this kind.

circumstantias.

Secundo ibi, incontinens autem etc.,

1058. Second [x, bb], at, “The incontinent

argumentatur ex praemissa definitione. Manifestum est enim, quod incontinens

person,” he argues from the definition given. It is obvious that the incontinent person

volens nocet ipse sibi, in quantum scilicet volens operatur id quod scit sibi

voluntarily injures himself, inasmuch as he does voluntarily what he knows is harmful to

esse nocivum. Si ergo ad iniustum

him. If then suffering injustice resembles doing

facere sequitur iniustum pati, sequitur quod ipse volens iniustum patiatur a se

injustice, it follows that the person acting voluntarily himself may suffer injustice from

ipso ita quod contingat aliquem sibi ipsi iniustum facere: et sic sequitur, quod

himself, so it is possible for someone to do injustice to himself. Thus it follows that not

non omne iniustum involuntarium.

every suffering of injustice is involuntary.

pati

sit

Tertio ibi: est autem et hoc etc., movet quamdam quaestionem incidentem:

1059. Third [x, cc], “But this is one,” he asks an incidental question: whether in fact

utrum scilicet contingat, quod aliquis sibiipsi faciat iniustum. Sed hanc

someone can do an injustice to himself. But he takes up this question later (1091-1108).

quaestionem postea prosequetur. Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc

1060. At “Moreover, it happens” [i, y] he gives

volens et cetera. Et dicit, quod si contingit de aliquo quod propter

the second reason. If it happens that anyone by reason of incontinence is knowingly and

incontinentiam sciens et volens laedatur ab alio, puta cum aliquis

willingly injured by another (for example, a man ensnared by love of a prostitute allows

captus amore meretricis permittit se ab

himself to be robbed) then it is possible that a

ea spoliari; contingit igitur quod aliquis volens patiatur iniustum. Et sic non

person may willingly suffer injustice. So, not every suffering of injustice is involuntary.

omne iniustum pati est involuntarium. Deinde cum dicit: vel non recta etc.,

1061. Then [c, ii], at “Perhaps the definition,”

ponit solutionem. Et circa hoc tria

he gives the solution. He discusses this point

facit. Primo corrigit definitionem supra positam eius quod est iniustum facere.

from three aspects. First [ii, x] he corrects the definition of doing injustice given above

Et ex hoc concludit veritatem quaestionis. Et dicit quod diffinitio

(1057), and from it he infers the truth of the question. He says that the definition of doing

supra posita, eius quod est iniustum

injustice, stated without qualification, is not

facere, non est recta, sed debet aliquid apponi, ut dicatur quod iniustum facere

correct. But the statement should be added that doing injustice is present when someone

est nocere aliquem, scientem circumstantias, alicui praeter illius

with a knowledge of the circumstances inflicts injury on another against his will. From this it

voluntatem. Et secundum hoc sequitur quod licet aliquis volens laedatur et

follows that although a person voluntarily may be injured and suffer incidentally what is

patiatur per accidens ea quae sunt iniusta, tamen nullus volens patitur

unjust; nevertheless, no one voluntarily suffers injustice, absolutely speaking, because in itself

iniustum, per se loquendo, ex quo per se iniustum facere est inferre

doing injustice is to inflict harm on another against his will.

nocumentum voluntatem.

alicui

praeter

eius

Secundo ibi: nullus enim vult etc., solvit primam rationem: et dicit quod nullus

1062. Next [ii, y], at “No one wants,” he answers the first reason. No one wishes with a

vult completa voluntate pati iniustum, neque etiam incontinens; sed

complete will to suffer injustice, not even the incontinent person, although he does things

incontinens operatur sibi nociva praeter voluntatem. Habet enim per se

harmful to himself against his will. Essentially he wills good, but by concupiscence he is drawn

voluntatem

per

to evil. Aristotle proves this statement from

concupiscentiam trahitur ad malum. Et hoc quod dictum est, probat per hoc,

the fact that, since the will desires what appears good, no one wills what he does not

quod cum voluntas sit apparentis boni, nullus vult illud quod non aestimat esse

think is good. But the incontinent person in a passionless moment does not think what he

bonum; incontinens autem extra passionem existens non reputat bonum

does is good and therefore he does not will it absolutely; nevertheless he does what he thinks

illud quod facit, unde absolute non vult illud; sed tamen operatur illud quod

he ought not to do, on account of concupiscence which is in the sensitive

aestimat non oportere operari, propter concupiscentiam quae est in appetitu

appetite, the will being in the reason.

boni,

sed

sensitivo, voluntas autem in ratione est. Tertio ibi: qui autem quae ipsius etc.,

1063. Last [ii, z], at “Anyone who gives,” he

solvit secundam rationem de eo qui volens ab alio laeditur. Et dicit quod

answers the second reason concerning the person who is willingly injured by another. He

non patitur, per se loquendo, iniustum

says that a man does not suffer injustice

ille qui volens dat sua, sicut Homerus narrat de quodam, nomine Glauco,

absolutely speaking who voluntarily gives what is his own, as Homer narrates [Iliad vi. 236]

quod dedit Diomedi aurea arma pro aereis et centum boves pro novem

about an individual named Glaucus that he gave Diomede golden armor for brass armor

bobus. Ideo autem talis non patitur iniustum, quia in potestate hominis est

and a hundred oxen for nine oxen. Therefore this type does not suffer injustice because it is

quod ipse det sua; sed iniustum pati non est in potestate eius qui iniustum

in the man’s power to give what belongs to him. However, suffering injustice is not in the

patitur, sed oportet existere aliquem

power of him who suffers injustice, but there

qui faciat iniustum. Ideo ergo iniustum pati est involuntarium, iniustum autem

must be someone who does the injustice. Consequently suffering injustice is

facere voluntarium, quia principium actionis est in agente, quod pertinet ad

involuntary, and doing injustice is voluntary because the principle of action is in the agent—

rationem voluntarii; principium autem passionis non est in patiente, sed in

this belongs to the nature of a voluntary. However, the source of suffering is not in the

alio; et hoc pertinet ad rationem involuntarii.

patient but in another—and this belongs to the nature of an involuntary.

Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, manifestum esse quod iniustum pati sit

1064. He concludes by way of summary that suffering injustice obviously is involuntary.

involuntarium.

LECTURE 15 Who Does Injustice in Distributions? Chapter 9 B’ He comes to another (doubt). 1. HE PROPOSES IT. — 1065 ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ

There are still two questions we wish to discuss. Who does an injustice, he who

νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλέον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν

distributes more than one’s share or he who receives it? And does a person do

αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

injustice to himself?

2. HE FOLLOWS IT UP. a. First he objects to the false part. — 1066

εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον

If the first proposal is true, viz., he who

λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἴ τις

distributes but not he who receives commits injustice; then when a person

πλέον αὑτοῦ ἑτέρῳ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὑτὸν

knowingly and willingly gives more to another than to himself, he does injustice

ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς

to himself, as moderate men seem to do, for the person who keeps within measure

ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν.

takes what is of less value for himself.

b. Next... he solves it: i. By two reasons. The first. — 1067

ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν; ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ,

But it does not seem entirely true, for in this case he abounds in another good,

οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ.

namely, glory or moral good.

ii. The second reason. — 1068 ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν

Again we can answer in accord with the definition of doing injustice, for the

αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ'

distributor suffers nothing contrary to his will. Therefore he does not suffer

εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον.

injustice by reason of this but only damage.

c. Last he determines the truth. i. injustice. — 1069

The man who distributes more than one’s share does an

φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων

However, it is obvious that he who distributes too much, but not always he

ἀεί·

who receives it, does an injustice. ii. He proves the proposition by three reasons. x. FIRST. — 1070

οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει

Not the man in whom the unjust thing

ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ᾧ τὸ ἑκόντα τοῦτο

exists does injustice but the man who

ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἥ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ

wills to do it. He is the one who is the principle of action. This is in the

διανέμοντι ἀλλ' λαμβάνοντι.

distributor, not in the recipient.

οὐκ

ἐν

τῷ

y. SECOND. — 1071 ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν

Action is said to occur in various ways: in

λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης

one way as inanimate things or the hand or servant of the owner are said to take

ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.

life. These do not act unjustly but do unjust things.

z. THIRD. — 1072-1073 ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ

Moreover, he who has formed a judgment

ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ'

through ignorance of what is legally just does not do an injustice nor is his

ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ

judgment unjust but it resembles injustice, for legal justice differs from

γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος

primary justice. But if a person knowingly forms an unjust judgment, he

ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ

acts covetously to obtain favor or avoid punishment. Hence-just as if he shares in

διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν

the injustice-the man, who judges unjustly for that purpose, has more than

ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν.

his due; for in such cases the man who awards a field does not receive a field but silver.

B. He refutes some errors. 1.

HE REFUTES SOME FALSE OPINIONS CONCERNED WITH

ONE DOING JUSTICE OR INJUSTICE. a. The first. — 1074 οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ

Men are of the opinion that they are unjust when they do what is unjust, and

τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾴδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ

for this reason they think it easy to become unjust. But this is not true. It is

τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν

easy and within their power to have

πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ

carnal intercourse with a neighbor’s wife,

ἀργύριον ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα

to strike another, and to hand over silver, but doing these things as a habit is not

ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς.

(immediately) in their power.

b. Second he refutes a false opinion about the knowledge of just and unjust things. — 1075 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται

Similarly, some people think that no wisdom is needed to know what things

σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι

are just and unjust because it is not difficult to understand what the law says.

ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἀλλὰ πῶς

However, these things are only incidentally just but become truly just

πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον ἢ

when done and distributed in a particular way. Now to know this way is a more

τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον καὶ

difficult task than to know the things that are healthful because there it is easy

καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν

to know the virtue of honey, wine, and hellebore, to know the effect of cautery

καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι.

and surgery, but how they ought to be prescribed for health, for what patient, and when is as great an accomplishment as that of being a doctor.

c. Third... concerning the facility in doing justice and unjust things. — 1076 δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου

For this very reason it is thought also

οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἧττον ὁ δίκαιος

that the just man is not less able to do injustice but rather can do any unjust

ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ

thing: for example, he can have carnal intercourse, strike a blow, and a brave

συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν

man can throw away his shield, can turn and run away. However, perpetration of

ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεὶς ἐφ' ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ

a cowardly action or of something unjust is doing these things only incidentally,

δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν κατὰ

but the doing is absolute for one having the permanent facility, just as healing

συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα

and restoring to health do not consist in

ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ

cutting or not cutting, in giving medicine

ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ

or not giving it, but in prescribing these

τέμνειν

things as they should be.

ἢ

μὴ

τέμνειν

ἢ

φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδί. 2. 1077

HE SHOWS IN WHOM JUST AND UNJUST ACTS EXIST. —

ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς

Just acts are found among people who

μέτεστι

ἀγαθῶν,

participate in things good in themselves

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ

but have both defect and excess of them. For some persons there is no excess in

ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν μόριον

regard to such goods (possibly so with the gods). For others, the hopelessly evil,

ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ

no particle of these goods is useful but every one of them is harmful. In still

μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

others the goods become harmful at a determined point; and this is human.

τῶν ἁπλῶς

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Adhuc autem quae praeeligimus et cetera. Postquam philosophus solvit

1065. After the Philosopher has then [2], at “If the first proposal etc.,” solved one doubt,

unam dubitationem, hic accedit ad aliam. Et primo proponit ipsam; secundo

now [B’] he comes he follows it up. He says first that in to another. First [1] he proposes

prosequitur eam, ibi, si enim contingit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod circa ea

it, the matter of justice and injustice two questions still remain which he wishes to

quae ad iustitiam et iniustitiam pertinent adhuc sunt duo quae prae aliis eligit

treat in preference to others. The first of these is, which of the two persons does an

dicere. Quorum primum est, quis duorum faciat iniustitiam circa distributiones,

injustice in regard to distribution: he who gives to someone without regard to worth or

utrum ille qui dat aliquid alicui praeter dignitatem, vel ille qui recipit. Secundum

he who accepts? The second—Can a person do injustice to himself?—is a question he

est, utrum contingat quod aliquis faciat

asked before (1059) and resolves later

sibi ipsi iniustum, quod etiam supra movit et inferius prosequitur.

(1091-1108).

Deinde cum dicit: si enim contingit etc.,

1066. Then [2], at “If the first proposal,” he

prosequitur prius motam quaestionem. Et primo obiicit ad partem falsam.

follows up the question previously asked. First [2, a] he objects to the false part. Next

Secundo solvit, ibi: vel neque hoc et

[2, b], at “But it does not seem,” he solves it.

cetera. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, manifestum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo

Last [2, c], at “However it is,” he determines the truth. He says first that if what was just

primo quod, si contingat illud quod prius

said (1065) is true, viz., that the dishonest

positum est, scilicet quod male distribuens faciat iniustum et non ille qui

distributor does injustice and not he who receives too much, something inappropriate

plus accipit, videtur sequi inconveniens. Potest enim esse quod aliquis plus alteri

seems to follow. It can happen that a person knowingly and willingly gives more to

quam sibi tribuat sciens et volens; et sic videtur quod iste faciat iniustum sibi ipsi.

another than to himself, and so it seems that he may do injustice to himself a thing that is

Quod est inconveniens, quia moderati homines hoc videntur facere, ut sibiipsis

inappropriate. The reason is that moderate men apparently do this, as they retain things

minora retineant. Pertinet enim ad virum modestum quod sit minorativus, idest

of less value for themselves. It is characteristic of the virtuous man that he

minora sibi accipiens.

belittles himself, i.e., accepts things of less value for himself.

Deinde cum dicit: vel neque hoc etc., solvit duabus solutionibus. Quarum

1067. Next [b, i], at “But it does not seem,” he solves this by two reasons. The first is

prima est quod hoc non videtur simpliciter verum esse, quod distributor

that sometimes it is not entirely true that the distributor retains things of less value for

minora sibi retineat. Quamvis enim retineat sibi minora de bonis exterioribus,

himself. Although he keeps the less valuable external goods for himself, he nevertheless

tamen superabundat in altero bono,

has an abundant share of another good, viz.,

scilicet gloria, vel simpliciter bono, idest honesto.

glory, and of moral or honorable good.

Secundam solutionem ponit ibi: adhuc

1068. At “Again we can answer” [b, ii] be

solvitur

procedit

gives the second reason proceeding from the

secundum definitionem supra positam eius quod est iniustum facere. In qua

definition of doing justice given before (1061). To this an addition was made

additum est quod hoc sit voluntatem patientis. Iste

praeter autem

indicating that it is contrary to the will of him who suffers. But the distributor suffers

distributor nihil patitur praeter suam voluntatem. Et ideo sequitur quod non

nothing contrary to his will. Consequently he does not suffer injustice but only undergoes

patiatur iniustum, sed solum patitur quoddam nocumentum.

some damage.

Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., determinat veritatem dicens, manifestum

1069. Then [2, c], at “However it is obvious,” he determines the truth. He says

esse quod ille qui distribuit praeter dignitatem, facit iniustum; non tamen

[c, i] that obviously the man who distributes more than one’s share does an injustice, yet

semper

this is not always true of him who accepts

et

ille

cetera.

qui

Quae

plus

accipit,

sed

quandoque, quando ad hoc operatur.

too much but only when he works to bring about this object.

Secundo ibi: non enim etc., probat

1070. Next [c, ii], at “Not the man in whom,”

propositum tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est quod non dicitur ille facere

he proves the proposition by three reasons. The first [ii, x] is that the man in whom the

iniustum cui inest, quia sic ille qui laeditur faceret iniustum; sed ille facit

unjust thing exists is not said to do injustice, because in this way the one who is injured

iniustum cui accidit quod volens hoc

would do injustice; but he does injustice who

faciat, id est in quo est principium actionis: quod quidem est in eo qui

wills to do it—he is the principle of action. This is the case of the person who distributes

distribuit, non autem in accipiente: ergo distribuens facit iniustum, non autem

but not so with the recipient. Therefore the distributor does injustice and not the

accipiens.

receiver.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc si

1071. Aristotle gives the second reason at

multipliciter et cetera. Et dicit quod multipliciter dicitur aliquis facere. Uno

“Action is said” [ii, y], affirming that a man is said to act in various ways. In one way he

modo sicut principale agens facit. Alio modo sicut instrumenta faciunt. Et hoc

acts as a principal agent, and in another, as instruments act. In the latter way it can be

modo potest dici, quod quaedam inanimata, puta lapides, gladii vel

said that inanimate things, like stones, swords, or arrows cause death, and that the

sagittae, occidunt, et quod manus occidit, et quod famulus praecipientis occidit:

hand or the servant of the one who commands brings about death. None of

quorum nihil, per se loquendo facit iniustum, quamvis faciat ea quibus

these, absolutely speaking, does injustice although they are the means by which unjust

accidit esse iniusta; quia iniustum facere, cum sit voluntarium, competit ei in quo

actions are done. The reason is that doing injustice, since it is voluntary, is attributable

est principium actionis, ut dictum est;

to the agent in whom the principle of action

manifestum est autem quod in distributione distribuens se habet ut

lies, as has been pointed out (1063). But it is clear that in distribution the distributor

principale agens, recipiens autem se habet ut agens instrumentale per modum

holds the place of the principal agent while the recipient holds the place of an instrument

obedientis; unde relinquitur distribuens faciat iniustum.

after the manner of one obeying. Hence it remains that the distributor does the

quod

injustice.

Tertiam

rationem

ponit

ibi,

adhuc

1072. At “Moreover, he has formed” [ii, z] he

siquidem ignorans et cetera. Et dicit quod si aliquis per ignorantiam legalis iusti

gives the third reason. He says that if a person by reason of ignorance of legal justice

male iudicet, per se loquendo non facit iniustum, neque iudicium, secundum

wrongly judges, tic does not do injustice, absolutely speaking, nor is the judgment by

quod est actio eius, est iniustum per se; sed tamen est quasi iniustum, quia id

which his action is done unjust in itself; but it is unjust in a way because the thing judged is

quod iudicatur iniustum est. Ideo autem dictum est de ignorantia legalis iusti,

unjust. Therefore we spoke of legal justice because one kind of justice is legal which can

quia alterum est legale iustum, quod ignorari potest, et primum iustum,

be unknown, another is natural which cannot be unknown because it is impressed

scilicet

potest

by nature on the human mind. But if

ignorari, quia naturaliter est menti humanae impressum; sed si aliquis

someone knowing legal justice judges unjustly, then he acts greedily, that is,

cognoscens iustum legale iudicet iniuste, tunc ipse facit avare, idest iniuste, vel

unjustly either for the sake of acquiring the favor of another or to avoid a penalty.

naturale

quod

non

propter gratiam alicuius acquirendam, vel propter poenam evadendam. Si quis enim velit per partes inaequales dividere iniustificationem, ille qui propter

1073. If a man wishes to share injustice in unfair portions, he who judges unjustly to

hoc iniuste iudicat, ut acquirat gratiam alicuius, plus habet de bono quam sibi

curry someone’s favor has more good than belongs to him. So he acts greedily, although

competat; et ita avare facit, licet non plus habeat de illo bono in quo alterum

he may not have more of that good in which he injured another. The reason is that in

damnificat: quia et in illis qui manifeste propter avaritiam lucri iniuste

such affairs a man who unjustly awarded a field to someone obviously for profit, did not

adiudicavit alicui aliquem agrum, non accepit ab eo agrum sed argentum; ita

get the field but money. And so a distributor is situated in distribution as a judge in

autem se habet distribuens distributionibus, sicut iudex

in in

exchanges. Therefore as a judge wrongly judging with full knowledge does an

commutationibus: unde, sicut iudex male

injustice, so too does he who distributes

iudicans scienter iniustum facit, ita et ille qui iniuste distribuit.

unjustly.

Deinde cum dicit: homines autem in se

1074. Then [B], at “Men are of the opinion,”

ipsis etc., excludit quosdam errores. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo excludit

he refutes some errors. Regarding this he does two things. First [B, 1] he refutes some

quasdam falsas opiniones ex parte facientis iustum vel iniustum. Secundo

false opinions concerned with one doing justice or injustice. Next [B, 2], at “Just acts

ostendit in quibus consistant iusta et

are found,” he shows in whom just and

iniusta, ibi: sunt autem iusta et cetera. Circa primum excludit tres falsas

unjust acts exist. In regard to the first point he refutes three false opinions. The first of

opiniones. Quarum prima est circa facilitatem eius quod est esse iniustum.

these [1, a] concerns the facility in becoming unjust. He says that many people are of the

Et dicit quod homines multi aestimant quod statim in promptu habeant facere

opinion that they are ready to do even injustice immediately. Hence they think that

iniustum, unde reputant quod facile sit

it is easy to be habitually unjust. Certainly it

aliquem esse habitualiter iniustum. Sed

is easy, and immediately in a man’s power, to

hoc non est ita. Facile enim est, et statim in potestate hominis, quod aliquis faciat

do unjust things: to have sexual intercourse with his neighbor’s wife, to strike his

ea quae sunt iniusta, puta quod commisceatur uxori vicini sui et quod

neighbor, to take money from the hand of another, or to hand over money to have

percutiat proximum et quod tollat argentum de manu alterius, vel quod de

murder or some crime done. But that men should do actions of this kind in such a way

manu sua det aliquis argentum ad procurandum homicidium, vel aliquid

that they act promptly and with pleasure is not easily nor immediately in a man’s power,

huiusmodi. Sed quod homines huiusmodi

but they come to this point through

faciant sic se habentes, scilicet prompte et delectabiliter, non est facile, neque

persistent habit.

statim in potestate hominis; sed ad hoc pervenitur per longam consuetudinem.

Secundo ibi: similiter autem etc., excludit falsam opinionem circa cognitionem

1075. Second [1, b], at “Similarly, some people,” he refutes a false opinion about the

iustorum et iniustorum. Et dicit, quod quidam non aestimant esse magnae

knowledge of just and unjust things. He says some people think great wisdom is not needed

sapientiae quod aliquis cognoscat iusta et iniusta, propter hoc, quod non est difficile

for a man to discern just and unjust acts because it is not difficult to understand the

intelligere ea quae leges dicunt, quae sunt iusta legalia. Sed decipiuntur: quia haec

decrees of the law determining legally just acts. However, such people are self-deceived

simpliciter considerata non sunt iusta

because these acts simply considered are just

nisi secundum accidens, inquantum accidit ea esse iusta; sed vere iusta sunt

only accidentally inasmuch as it is an accident that such things are just. But they

secundum quod aliqualiter operantur et distribuuntur (idest attribuuntur)

become genuinely just when in some way they are performed and distributed (i.e.,

aliqualiter negotiis et personis; hoc autem, scilicet accommodare

attributed) in some way to affairs and persons. But proper adaptation to affairs and

convenienter ea quae sunt lege posita negotiis et personis, est magis operosum

people is more laborious and difficult than knowing remedies in which the whole art of

et difficile quam scire sanativa, in quo consistit tota ars medicinae. Maior enim

medicine consists. There is a greater diversity among voluntary acts about which

est diversitas rerum voluntariarum, in quibus consistit iustitia, quam

justice is concerned than among the humors about which health is concerned. Also it is

corporalium complexionum in quibus consistit sanitas: quia et in sanativis scire

easy to know the virtue of honey, wine, and hellebore, and the effect of cautery and

virtutem mellis et vini et hellebori et effectum ustionis et incisionis, facile est;

surgery, but to prescribe these things for the restoration of health in the right way, for the

sed distribuere ista ad sanandum, sicut

right person, and at the right time is as great

oportet et cui oportet et quando oportet,

an accomplishment as being a doctor, for one

tanti operis est quanti et medicum esse, quia qui hoc scit, medicus est.

who has this knowledge is a doctor.

Tertio ibi: propter ipsum autem hoc etc., excludit falsam opinionem circa

1076. Third [i, c], at “For this very reason, “ he refutes a false opinion concerning facility

facilitatem eius quod est iustum operari iniusta. Et dicit, quod propter praedicta

in doing justice and unjust things. He affirms that, on account of what has been

etiam homines aestimant quod nihil minus sit facile iusto facere iniustum

said, people also are of the opinion that the just man can do injustice as readily as any

quam cuicumque alii, quia per hoc quod aliquis est iustus non minus, sed magis

one else, because from the fact that he is just he knows not less but more and can do any

scit et potest operari unumquodque horum quae dicuntur iniusta; sicut

one of the things called unjust, like having sexual intercourse with another’s wife,

commisceri mulieri alterius et percutere alium et dimittere clypeum in bello, et

striking another, throwing away his shield in battle; and a man can attack anyone he

quod

in

pleases. But they deceive themselves because

quemcumque. Sed decipiuntur, quia quod aliquis faciat opera timiditatis et facere

the perpetration of cowardly actions and the doing of what is unjust is doing these things

iniustum, non est facere praedicta nisi secundum accidens, inquantum scilicet

only incidentally inasmuch as it happens that the acts are unjust, but to do what is simply

accidit ista quae fiunt esse iniusta: sed facere iniustum est facere praedicta sic se

unjust is for someone to do these things in such a way that he is willing and prompt at

habentem, scilicet quod sit volens et promptus ad hoc; sicut et circa

it. So it is in medicine-healing and restoring to health do not consist in operating or not

medicinam medicari et sanare non consistit in hoc solum quod est incidere

operating, in prescribing or not prescribing a drug, i.e., a laxative, but in a person

vel non incidere vel dare pharmacum, idest medicinam laxativam vel non dare;

prescribing them as he ought.

aliquis

faciat

insultum

sed in hoc quod aliquis sic det sicut oportet.

Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem iusta etc.,

1077. Then [B, 2], at “Just acts are found,”

ostendit in quibus competant iusta. Et dicit quod iusta competunt in illis

he shows to whom they are attributable. We say that just acts are attributable to the

personis quibus possunt adesse ea quae sunt bona simpliciter et absolute, sicut

people among whom are found things simply and in them-selves desirable, like riches and

divitiae et alia huiusmodi, et tamen habent quandoque circa hoc

so on, although these persons (as is common among men) have excess and defect in this

superabundantiam et defectum, sicut sunt communiter homines. Quibusdam

matter. For some there is no excess in such things that are used most laudably, as

enim circa talia non est aliqua superabundantia; sed semper optime

becomes men perfect in virtue and perhaps the gods (according to the error of people

utuntur talibus bonis, sicut contingit

who hold that gods use things of this

hominibus perfectis in virtute, et forte diis, secundum errorem eorum qui

nature). For others, viz., the very wicked and the incurably evil no particle of these goods is

ponebant eos talibus uti. Quibusdam vero, idest valde malis et insanabilibus a

useful but everything is harmful. For still others not everything is harmful but it

sua malitia nulla particula talium rerum est utilis, sed omnia eis nocent.

becomes so at a certain fixed point. Hence it is evident that justice is a human good

Quibusdam vero non omnia nocent, sed usque ad aliquem determinatum

because it regards the general condition of man.

terminum. Unde patet quod iustitia est humanum bonum, quia respicit communem hominum statum.

LECTURE 16 Equity Chapter 10

I. HE INDICATES HIS INTENTION. — 1078 περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν

Next we will treat equity and the equitable thing; we will consider in what way equity is

ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,

related to justice, how the equitable is related to the just thing.

ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν.

II. HE PROCEEDS WITH HIS PROPOSITION. A. He determines the object of equity. 1. HE RAISES A DOUBT. — 1079-1080 οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς

When we stop to think of it, they are not

οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις· καὶ

absolutely the same nor do they altogether differ in kind. Sometimes we praise a thing

ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν

and a man as equitable, and hence transfer “equitable” as a greater good to the things b

τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ

we praise, showing that it is better. Other

ἄλλα μεταφέρομεν

times it seems unfitting, to those following reason, that the equitable—as something

ἐπαινοῦντες ἀντὶ τοῦ

ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ

beyond the just—is praiseworthy. Either the just thing or the equitable (which is other

λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ

than the just) is not good. Or if both are good then they are the same. The doubt

δίκαιόν τι ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ

generally arises because of the things said about the nature of what is equitable.

σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, 2. HE SOLVES IT. a. He sets forth the truth. — 1081 ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ

Everything said is true in a certain way and

ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς

contains no latent contradiction. The equitable is something just and is better

δικαίου τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι

than some other just thing, but it is not better as another genus separated from the

γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον

just. Therefore the equitable is the same as the just thing and when both are good the

καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ

equitable is better.

ἐπιεικές. b. He assigns the reason. i. He assigns the reason for doubt. — 1082 ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ

What raises the doubt is that the equitable is

ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ'

a just thing, yet it is not something legal but is a directing of the legally just.

ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. ii. He indicates the reason for the truth proposed. x. A DEFECT IN LEGAL JUSTICE. — 1083-1084

αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ'

The reason for this is that every law is proposed universally, but it is not possible to

οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη

deal with some things in a universal way. Where the necessary exists we can speak

μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν

universally but it is impossible to apply this

τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ

rightly where the law understands the application to be valid in the majority of

ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον.

cases, while being clearly aware that a defect is present.

y. THIS DEFECT DOES NOT DESTROY THE RECTITUDE OF LEGAL JUSTICE. — 1085 καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ

Nevertheless the law is good, for the defect is not in the law nor the making of it but in the

νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ

nature of the thing. And clearly the matter of human actions is such that they are not

πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη

always done in the same way.

ἐστίν. z. THE NECESSITY FOR DIRECTION. — 1086

ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος

Therefore, when the law proposes something

καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς

universally and a particular thing happens contrary to this, then, where the legislator

ἔχει, ᾗ νομοθέτης

παραλείπει ὁ καὶ ἥμαρτεν

has left a gap and erred in speaking absolutely, it is right to correct what is

ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης

deficient. The legislator would have spoken on the point in this way if he had been

αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾔδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν.

present, and if he had known he would have filled this gap in the law.

iii. He infers the truth intended. — 1087-1088 διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ

For this reason what is equitable is just and is something more excellent than one kind of

ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. καὶ

just thing, not better than that which is absolute but better than that which errs by

ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα

reason of being proposed absolutely. This thing that is the equitable is the directing of

νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον

the law where there is deficiency because of faulty universal application. The reason why

καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον

everything cannot be judged according to

εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε

the law is that it is impossible to make a law for certain cases. Hence there is need of

ψηφίσματος

passing

δεῖ.

τοῦ

γὰρ

judgment,

for

the

rule

of

ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς

indeterminate matter is itself flexible, like the leaden rule used by builders in Lesbos; just

Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος κανών· πρὸς γὰρ

as that rule conforms to the shape of the stone, and does not remain the same, so also

τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ

the sentence is adapted to the conditions. In this way then it has been made clear what

κανών, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ

the equitable is, that it is both the just and better than the just thing.

τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. B. (He determines) the subject of (equity). — 1089 φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν

From this it is obvious who the equitable man is. He is one who chooses and does the

τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ μὴ

things spoken of; he is not a zealous enforcer of justice in the worse sense, but a mitigator

ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ

although he recognizes the law as a deterrent.

ἔχων τὸν νόμον ἐπιεικής ἐστι,

βοηθόν,

C. He determines the habit. — 1090

καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια,

And this habit of equity is a species of justice

δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

and not another kind of habit.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS De epiikia vero et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de iustitia

1078. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of justice in general, he now

communi, hic determinat de epiichia quae est communis iustitiae directiva.

begins to consider equity which is a general directive of justice. First [I] he indicates his

Et primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo prosequitur propositum, ibi,

intention. Then [II], at “When we stop to think etc.,” he proceeds with his proposition.

neque autem ut idem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod proximum praemissis

He says first that following what has been said, we should discuss equity that designates

est ut dicatur de epiichia quae nominat quemdam habitum, et de epiiche quod

a certain habit and the equitable thing that is its object. In the discussion we should declare

est obiectum eius. Dicendum est autem de eis qualiter quidem epiichia se habeat

how equity is related to justice and how its object, which is called the equitable thing, is

ad iustitiam, et qualiter eius obiectum

related to the just thing, the object of justice.

quod dicitur epiches se habeat ad iustum quod est iustitiae obiectum. Dicitur

In Greek epiiches is understood as what is reasonable or becoming; it is derived from epi

autem in Graeco epiiches quasi id quod est conveniens vel decens, ab epy, quod

meaning “above” and ikos meaning “obedient,” because by equity a person is

est supra, et ycos, quod est oboediens; quia videlicet per epiichiam aliquis

obedient in a higher way when he follows the intention of the legislator where the words of

excellentiori modo obedit, dum observat intentionem legislatoris ubi dissonant

the law differ from it.

verba legis. Deinde cum dicit: neque autem ut idem

1079. Then [II], at “When we stop to think,”

etc., prosequitur propositum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat de

he proceeds with his proposition. He discusses it under three headings. First [II, A] he

obiecto epiichiae. Secundo de subiecto eius, ibi: manifestum autem ex hoc etc.;

determines the object of equity. Second [II, B], at “From this it is obvious etc.,” the subject of

tertio de ipso habitu, ibi, et habitus iste et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo

it. Last [II, C], at “And this habit etc.,” he determines the habit. He considers the initial

movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit, ibi, habent autem omnia et cetera. Dicit

point in a twofold manner. First [A, 1] he raises a doubt; then [A, 2], at “Everything

ergo primo, quod si aliqui diligenter

said is true,” he solves it. He says first that if

attendant, non videtur quod epiiches et iustum sint simpliciter idem, quia

we look closely, it does not seem that the equitable thing is absolutely the same as the

aliquando recedit a iusto legali: neque etiam videtur quod omnino sit diversum

just, because the equitable sometimes departs from what is legally just; nor does it seem to

genere a iusto. Et horum assignat rationem: quia quandoque laudamus id

be altogether different in species from what is just. He assigns a reason for these things:

quod est epiiches, dicentes hoc esse bene factum; et similiter laudamus talem

sometimes we praise what is equitable and declare that it is well done. Likewise we praise

virum qui hoc operatur; vel dicimus eum virum, idest virilem et perfectum. Et sic

the kind of man who does it-we even call him a manly and perfect individual. So it is evident

patet quod, cum transferimus laudem ad id quod est epiiches vel ad hominem

that, when we transfer praise to what is equitable, or to a person, as if to a greater

quasi ad aliquid magis bonum, in hoc ostendimus quod epiikes sit aliquid

good, we show what is equitable as something better than what is just. Hence the equitable -

melius quam iustum. Unde non videtur

does not seem to be the same absolutely as the

esse idem simpliciter cum iusto.

just thing.

Ex alia vero parte, si velimus sequi rationem, videtur esse inconveniens, si

1080. On the other hand (if we wish to follow reason) it seems inappropriate if what is

id quod est epiiches sit laudabile et sit aliquid praeter iustum. Oportet enim ut

equitable is praiseworthy and something over and above the just. It seems necessary that

videtur

sit

either the just thing is not desirable, i.e., good,

studiosum, idest bonum, vel quod id quod est epiiches si sit aliud a iusto, non

or that if what is equitable is different from the just, it is not good because good (in the

sit bonum, quia bonum contingit uno modo, ut in secundo dictum est; vel

law) is achieved in one way, as was pointed out in the second book (319-321); or it is

oportet, si ambo sint bona, quod sint idem. Et sic concludit quod circa id quod

necessary that if both are good, they are identical. So he infers that a doubt arises

est epiiches accidit dubitatio propter praedicta: quia ex una parte videtur

about what is equitable on account of the things just stated. On the one hand it seems

quod non sit idem, inquantum laudatur ut melius quam iustum; ex alia parte

that it is not the same inasmuch as it is praised as better than the just thing, on the

videtur quod sit idem cum iusto, inquantum id quod est praeter iustum

other it seems that it is the same as the just thing, for what is beyond the just apparently

non videtur esse bonum et laudabile.

is not good and praiseworthy.

Deinde cum dicit: habent autem omnia

1081. Next [A, 2], at “Everything Said is

etc., solvit motam dubitationem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit

true,” he solves the question raised. He handles this point in two ways. First [2, a] he

veritatem. Secundo rationem assignat,

sets forth the truth. Then [2, b], at “What

ibi, facit autem dubitationem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnia quae dicta

raises the doubt etc.,” he assigns the reason. He says first that everything that has been

sunt pro utraque parte dubitationis quodammodo recte se habent; et si quis

said for either side of the doubt is in some way right, and if correctly understood no

recte intelligat, nulla contrarietas ibi latet. Verum est enim quod id quod est

opposition lies hidden there. It is true that what is equitable is one kind of just thing and

epiikes est iustum quoddam et tamen est melius quodam alio iusto. Quia, ut supra

is better than another just thing because, as was noted before (1016-1017), justice which

dictum est, iustum quo cives utuntur dividitur in naturale et legale: est autem

citizens practice is divided into natural and legal. But what is equitable is better than

id quod est epiiches melius iusto legali, sed continetur sub iusto naturali. Et sic

what is legally just but is contained under the naturally just. Consequently it is not said to

non dicitur melius quam iustum, quasi sit quoddam aliud genus separatum a

be better than the just thing as if it were some other kind of norm distinct from the genus of

genere iusti. Sic ergo patet quod idem est iustum et epiikes, quod sub genere

just things. Although both, viz., the legally just thing and the equitable, are good, the

iusti continetur, (et,) cum ambo sint

equitable is better.

quod

vel

iustum

non

bona, scilicet iustum legale et epiiches, melius est illud quod est epiiches.

Deinde

cum

dicit:

facit

autem

1082. At “What raises the doubt” [2, b] he

dubitationem etc., assignat rationem praedictorum. Et circa hoc tria facit.

assigns the reason, treating it in a threefold manner. First [b, i] he assigns the reason for

Primo assignat rationem dubitationis. Secundo assignat rationem veritatis

doubt. Second [b, ii], at “The reason for this etc.,” he indicates the reason for the truth

propositae, ibi, causa autem et cetera.

proposed. Third [b, iii], at “For this reason

Tertio concludit veritatem intentam, ibi, propter quod iustum quidem et cetera.

what is equitable etc.,” he infers the truth intended. He says first that this is what raised

Dicit ergo primo, quod hoc est quod faciebat dubitationem, quia id quod est

the doubt: that the equitable is a just thing, yet it is not something legal. But it is a certain

epiikes est quidem aliquod iustum, sed non est iustum legale, sed est quaedam

directing of legal justice, for we said (1023) that it was contained under natural justice

directio iusti legalis. Dictum est enim quod continetur sub iusto naturali a quo

from which legal justice has its origin.

oritur iustum legale; unumquodque enim natum est dirigi secundum principium a quo oritur. Deinde cum dicit: causa autem etc.,

1083. Then [b, ii], at “The reason for this,” he

assignat rationem veritatis propositae, scilicet quare iustum legale indigeat

assigns the reason for the truth proposed, i.e., why legal justice has need of direction. He

directivo. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit iusti legalis defectum. Secundo

discusses this point from three aspects. First [ii, x] he points out a defect in legal justice.

ostendit quod talis defectus non excludit eius rectitudinem, ibi et est nihil minus

Next [ii, y], at “Nevertheless the law,” he shows that this defect does not destroy the

et cetera. Tertio concludit directionis

rectitude of legal justice. Last [ii, z], at

necessitatem, ibi, cum igitur dicat lex et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod causa

“Therefore, when,” he infers the necessity for direction. He says first that the reason why

quare iustum legale indiget directione est ista, quia omnis lex datur

legal justice has need of direction is that every law is proposed universally. Since particulars

universaliter. Quia enim particularia sunt infinita, non possunt comprehendi

are infinite, our mind cannot embrace them to make a law that applies to every individual

ab intellectu humano, ut de singulis particularibus lex feratur; et ideo

case. Therefore a law must be framed in a universal way, for example, whoever commits

oportet quod lex in universali feratur, puta quod quicumque fecerit homicidium

murder will be put to death.

occidatur.

Manifestum

est

autem

quod

de

1084. It is evident that our intellect can

quibusdam intellectus noster potest aliquid verum dicere in universali, sicut

predicate something universally true about some things, in the case of what is necessary

in necessariis in quibus non potest

where no defect can occur. But about other

defectus accidere. Sed de quibusdam non

things it is not possible that something true

est possibile quod dicatur aliquid verum in universali, sicut de contingentibus; de

be predicated universally, in the case of what is contingent. Here even though something is

quibus etsi aliquid sit verum ut in pluribus, in paucioribus tamen deficit; et

true in most instances, nevertheless it errs as we know in a few instances. And of such a

talia sunt facta humana: de quibus dantur leges. Quia igitur in talibus

nature are human acts about which laws are framed. In, these things the legislator

necesse est quod legislator universaliter loquatur propter impossibilitatem

necessarily speaks in a universal way on account of the impossibility of comprehending

comprehendendi particularia, nec tamen est possibile quod in omnibus recte se

particulars; however, he cannot be correct in all the situations for which he legislates since

habeat id quod dicitur propter hoc quod

error arises in some few cases. For this

deficit in paucioribus, legislator accipit id quod est ut in pluribus, et tamen non

reason the legislator accepts what happens in most cases, and nevertheless he is not

ignorat quod in paucioribus contingit esse peccatum: sicut etiam naturalis

ignorant that defect is possible in some cases. Thus the anatomist says that man has five

dicit quod homo habet quinque digitos et tamen novit quod propter errorem

fingers, although he knows that by a mistake of nature it happens that man has more or

naturae, ut in paucioribus accidit aliquos habere plures vel pauciores.

less in rarer cases.

Deinde cum dicit: et est nihil minus etc., ostendit quod praedictus defectus non

1085. Next [ii, y], at “Nevertheless the law,” he shows that the previously mentioned defect

tollit rectitudinem legis vel iusti legalis; dicens quod, licet peccatum accidat in

does not destroy the rectitude of law or of legal justice. He says that, although a fault

aliquibus ex observantia legis, nihilominus lex recta est, quia peccatum

may be committed in some cases by the observance of the law, nevertheless the law is

illud non est ex parte legis, quae rationabiliter posita est, neque ex parte

good because that fault is not on the part of the law (since it was made according to

legislatoris qui locutus est secundum conditionem materiae, sed est peccatum

reason) nor on the part of the legislator (who legislated according to the condition of the

in natura rei. Talis enim est materia

material), but the fault arises from the nature

operabilium humanorum, quod non sunt universaliter eodem modo, sed ut in

of the thing. Such is the nature of human actions that they are not done always in the

paucioribus diversificantur; sicut reddere depositum secundum se iustum,

same way but are done otherwise in certain infrequent instances. For example, the return

est et ut in pluribus bonum; in aliquo tamen casu potest esse malum, puta si

of a deposit is in itself just and good, as it happens in most cases, but in a particular

reddatur gladius furioso.

situation it can be bad, for instance, if a sword is returned to a madman.

Deinde cum dicit: cum igitur dicat etc.,

1086. At “Therefore, when” [ii, z] he infers

concludit necessitatem directionis iusti

the necessity for directing legal justice. He

legalis. Et dicit quod cum lex proponit aliquid in universali, et in aliquo casu

says that when the law proposes something in a universal way, and the observance is not

non sit utile illud observari, tunc recte se habet quod aliquis dirigat illud quod

beneficial in a special instance, reason rightly dictates that a person should correct what is

deficit legi, ubi scilicet legislator reliquit casum particularem in quo lex deficit,

deficient in the law. Where the legislator evidently left indeterminate a particular case

non determinatum et peccavit, idest rem defectibilem proposuit, in hoc quod

(in which the law falls short) he is at fault, i.e., he proposed a defective proposition in

simpliciter id est universaliter dixit. Quia et ipse legislator, si praesens esset ubi

speaking absolutely or universally. The reason is that even the legislator himself, had he been

talis casus accidit, sic determinaret esse dirigendum et si a principio

present where such a case happened, would have determined in this way and the

praescivisset, posuisset hoc in lege. Sed non potuit comprehendere omnes casus

correction would have been made. Moreover, had he foreseen this from the beginning he

particulares. Sicut in quadam civitate

would have put it in the law. But he could not

statutum fuit sub poena capitis quod peregrini non ascenderent muros

comprehend all particulars; in a certain city it was decreed under penalty of death that

civitatis, ne scilicet possent dominium civitatis usurpare. Hostibus autem

strangers were not to climb the walls of the city for fear they would usurp the civil

irruentibus in civitatem, peregrini quidam ascendentes muros civitatis

government. But during an enemy invasion some strangers by climbing the walls defended

defenderunt civitatem ab hostibus, quos tamen non est dignum capite puniri,

the city from the invaders. They do not deserve to be punished by death; it would be

esset enim hoc contra ius naturale ut benefactoribus poena rependeretur. Et

against the natural law to reward benefactors with punishment. Therefore in this case legal

ideo secundum iustum naturale oportet hic dirigere iustum legale.

justice must be directed by natural justice.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod iustum

1087. Then [b, iii], at “For this reason what is

quidem etc., intentam. Et

concludit veritatem dicit quod propter

equitable” he infers the truth intended, affirming that by reason of what has been said

praedicta manifestum est quod id quod est epiikes est quidem iustum et est

it is clear what the equitable is. It is a just thing and it is better than one kind but not

melius quodam iusto, non quidem iusto naturali, quod simpliciter, id est

better than what is naturally just that is laid down absolutely, that is, universally. Hence

universaliter, est observandum, sed iusto legali, in quo accidit peccatum

the nature of the equitable is that it be directive of the law where the law is deficient

propter hoc quod simpliciter, idest universaliter proponitur. Unde haec est

for some particular case. Indeed the law does fail in particular cases. The reason why not

natura eius quod est epiiches, ut sit directivum legis ubi lex deficit propter

everything can be determined according to the law is that the law cannot possibly be framed

aliquem particularem casum. Quia enim lex deficit in particularibus, ista est

to meet some rare particular incidents, since all cases of this kind cannot be foreseen by

causa

quod

non

omnia

possunt

man. On account of this, after the enactment

determinari secundum legem, quia de quibusdam quae raro accidunt,

of the law, a decision of the judges is required by which the universal statement of the law is

impossibile est quod lex ponatur, eo quod non possunt omnia talia ab homine

applied to a particular matter. Because the material of human acts is indeterminate, it

praevideri. Et propter hoc necessaria est post legem latam sententia iudicum per

follows that their norm, which is the law, must be indeterminate in the sense that it is

quam universale dictum legis applicatur ad particulare negotium. Quia enim

not absolutely rigid.

materia humanorum operabilium est indeterminata, inde est quod eorum regula, quae est lex, oportet quod sit indeterminata, quasi non semper eodem modo se habens. Et ponit exemplum de regula Lesbiae

1088. He offers an example of a norm for

aedificationis. In Lesbia enim insula sunt lapides duri qui non possunt de

building in Lesbos. In this island there are certain hard stones that cannot easily be

facili ferro praecidi, ut sic redigantur ad omnimodam rectitudinem; et ideo

dressed by chisel so they may be arranged in an entirely correct position. Therefore the

aedificatores

regula

builders there use a leaden rule. just as this

plumbea. Et sicut illa regula complicata adaptatur ad figuras lapidum et non

leaden rule conforms to the shape of the stone and does not stay in the same form, so the

manet in eadem dispositione, ita oportet quod sententia iudicum adaptetur ad res

sentence of the judge must be adapted to things according to their suitableness. In this

secundum earum convenientiam. Sic ergo epilogando concludit, manifestum

way then he ends by way of summary that it is clear from the premises what the equitable

esse ex praedictis quod id quod est epiikes est quoddam iustum et quod est

thing is, that it is something just which is better than one kind of just thing, viz., the

melius quodam iusto, scilicet legali.

legally just.

Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem ex

1089. Next [B], at “From this it is obvious, —

hoc etc., determinat de subiecto epiichiae; et dicit manifestum esse ex hoc

he determines the subject of equity. He affirms that it is evident from what has been

quod dictum est, quis homo sit epiiches, ille scilicet qui eligit et operatur ea quae

proposed (1078-1088), who the equitable man is: he who chooses and does the things which

dicta sunt. Et ponit quamdam proprietatem talis virtuosi; et dicit quod

have been discussed. He lays down a certain characteristic of this kind of virtuous person.

talis non diligenter

est acrivodikeos, id est exequens iustitiam ad

He says that such a one is not acribodikaios, i.e., a zealous enforcer of justice in the worse

deterius, idest ad puniendum, sicut illi qui sunt rigidi in puniendo, sed diminuit

sense, for vengeance, like those who are severe in punishing, but rather like those who

poenas,

mitigate the penalties although they may have

utuntur

quamvis

ibi

habeat

legem

adiuvantem ad puniendum. Non enim

the law on their side in punishing. The

poenae sunt per se intentae a legislatore, sed quasi medicina quaedam

legislator does not intend punishments in themselves but as a kind of medicine for

peccatorum. Et ideo epiiches non plus

offenses. Therefore the equitable person does

apponit de poena quam sufficiat ad cohibenda peccata.

not add more punishment than is sufficient to prevent violations.

Deinde cum dicit: et habitus iste etc., determinat de ipso habitu virtutis. Et

1090. At “And this habit” [C] he determines the habit of virtue. He says that this habit,

dicit quod iste habitus qui dicitur epiikia est quaedam species iustitiae et non est

called equity, is a particular species of justice and is not a habit different from legal justice;

aliquis alius habitus a iustitia legali, sicut et de eius obiecto dictum est:

we said the same about its object, for habits are known by reason of their objects.

habitus enim per obiecta cognoscuntur.

LECTURE 17 Injustice to Oneself Chapter 11 I. NO ONE, PROPERLY SPEAKING, CAN DO HIMSELF AN INJUSTICE. A. No one can do himself an injustice nor suffer an injustice from himself. A’ A question of this kind can be settled from what has been said before. — 1091 πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

Whether or not it is possible to do injustice to oneself is clear from what has been discussed.

B’ Certain grounds on which it seems that a person can do himself an injustice. 1. HE GIVES TWO REASONS... THE FIRST. — 1092 τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ

There are certain just acts arising from every virtue that are ordained by law.

νόμου

τεταγμένα,

οἷον

οὐ

κελεύει ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει.

Hence, for

example, the

law never

commands a man to kill himself. But what it does not command it forbids.

2. THE SECOND REASON. — 1093 ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτῃ μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων ἑκών, ἀδικεῖ, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν

Again, however, when someone inflicts damage contrary to the law (it being not against one resisting injury from another) he voluntarily does injustice. By

σφάττων ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα.

“voluntary” is meant the agent knows both the nature of what he does and the circumstances. But the man who voluntarily kills himself in anger does an act contrary to a just law by willing what the law does not permit. Therefore he does an injustice.

C’ He determines the truth. 1. FIRST HE PRESENTS AND CONFIRMS THE SOLUTION.

a. He solves the doubt raised before regarding legal justice. i. He proposes the solution. — 1094 ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὑτὸν δ' οὔ;

But to whom? Does he not injure the state rather than himself?

ii. He confirms the solution given. x.

ONE DOES NOT DO HIMSELF AN INJUSTICE.

— 1095 ἑκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών.

y. 1096

He voluntarily suffers what is unjust but no one voluntarily suffers injustice.

(HE DOES) INJUSTICE TO THE STATE. —

διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι.

For this reason the state imposes punishment and a certain disgrace on the person who commits suicide as on one who does an injustice to the state.

b. He solves the doubt regarding particular justice. i. He proposes what he intends. — 1097 ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλος ἐκείνου· ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ

Besides, inasmuch as a man is called unjust not as being entirely evil but only as performing particular injustice, he does not do injustice to himself. This is different

ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ

from the other kind of injustice because a person unjust in a limited way—like the coward is evil—does not possess total

ταύτην ἀδικεῖ·

perversity. Hence he does not do in justice to himself according to this injustice. ii. He proves the proposition by four reasons. w. FIRST. — 1098

ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφῃρῆσθαι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ'

Indeed something will be given to and taken from one and the same person at the same time. This is impossible, for it is

ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

necessary that justice and injustice be found in different persons.

x. SECOND. — 1099 ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ

Again, doing injustice is voluntary and

προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον· ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὑτόν, ταὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ

with choice and happens previous to suffering injustice. A man who first suffers injustice and resists it does not seem to do an injustice. But the person

πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

receiving injustice from himself suffers and does the same injustice at the same time. y. THIRD. — 1100

ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι.

Moreover, he will be voluntarily suffering injustice.

z. FOURTH. — 1101 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν

Besides, no one does injustice to himself in regard to particular injustice. No one, for example, commits adultery with his own wife, nor breaks into his own home, nor

ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὑτοῦ.

steals his own goods.

2. SECOND HE GIVES THE ROOT OF THE SOLUTION. — 1102

ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι.

This question of doing injustice to oneself is completely solved according to the definition that suffering injustice is contrary to the will.

B. Whether it is worse to do an injustice or suffer an injustice. A’ First... both of them are evil. — 1103

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου

Obviously both are evil, that is, suffering injustice and doing injustice for the former is to have less and. the latter to have more than the mean, (this corresponds to what

καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ·

produces health in medicine and good condition in physical training.)

B’ Next... in itself it is worse to do injustice. — 1104 ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς οὐ

However, to do injustice is worse because it is blameworthy and wicked either completely and absolutely, or for the most part (not every voluntary injury takes

γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἑκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ

place with injustice). But a man suffers injustice without being guilty of

κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας. καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἧττον

wickedness or injustice. Therefore in itself suffering injustice is a lesser evil,

φαῦλον, C’ By chance the contrary can be true. — 1105 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ'

although nothing hinders it from being by chance a greater evil. But art does not

οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ

care about what is by chance, for example, medicine considers pleurisy a worse ailment than an injured foot, even if it should happen that the latter may be

συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίη ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν.

worse. An example of this would be the case when the one so injured falls and so is captured and put to death by enemies.

II. (ONE CAN DO HIMSELF AN INJUSTICE) IN A METAPHORICAL SENSE. — 1106-1108 κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς

By metaphor and likeness, there is justice not of a man toward himself but among

αὑτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις

the parts of man toward one another. However, not every kind of justice is found here but the justice of master or administrator. According to these

διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον· εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι

concepts, one part of the soul has been divided as against the irrational part (irascible and concupiscible). Looking at

ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι

these, some people think that injustice to oneself is present because in them it is possible to suffer something contrary to one’s own desire. Here a kind of injustice

πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν, διωρίσθω τὸν

is found as between master and slave. We have, then, finished the treatise on justice and the other moral virtues according to the preceding plan.

τρόπον τοῦτον.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Utrum autem contingit sibi ipsi et

1091. After the Philosopher has finished the

cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de iustitia proprie dicta, hic intendit determinare de iustitia metaphorice dicta. Et quia huiusmodi

treatise on justice in the proper sense, he now intends to treat justice in the metaphorical sense. Because justice of this kind exists in things that relate to oneself, therefore, he

iustitia consistit in his quae sunt ad se ipsum, ideo ostendit quod nullus potest, proprie loquendo, sibiipsi facere iniustum. Secundo ostendit quomodo

first [ I ] shows that no one, properly speaking, can do himself an injustice. Second [II], at “By metaphor etc.,” he shows how this takes place in a metaphorical sense. He

hoc contingit secundum metaphoram. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod nullus potest sibi ipsi facere iniustum vel pati iniustum a se ipso;

develops this point in a twofold manner. First [A] he shows that no one can do himself an injustice nor suffer an injustice from himself. Then [B], at “Obviously both are evil etc.,” he

secundo ostendit quid sit peius, utrum facere iniustum vel pati iniustum, ibi: manifestum autem et quoniam ambo et

shows whether it is worse to do an injustice or suffer an injustice. He considers the first under three aspects. Initially [A, A’] he

cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod huiusmodi quaestio ex supradictis determinari potest; secundo ponit quaedam per quae videtur quod

suggests that a question of this kind can be settled from what has been said before. Next [A, B’] at “There are certain just acts etc.,” he proposes certain grounds on which it

aliquis sibiipsi possit facere iniustum, ibi: quaedam quidem enim etc.; tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, sed cui et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex dictis

seems that a person can do himself an injustice. Last [A, C’] at “But to whom? etc.,” he determines the truth. He says first that from the premises it can be made clear

potest esse manifestum utrum contingat quod aliquis sibi ipsi faciat iniustum vel non. Hanc autem quaestionem supra movit; sed hic eam prosequitur propter

whether a man may do an injustice to himself. He raised this question before (1059-1064). But here he follows it up because of the connection it has with an understanding of

proximitatem quam habet cognitionem metaphoricae iustitiae.

justice taken in a metaphorical sense.

ad

Deinde cum dicit: quaedam quidem enim etc., ponit duas rationes, ex quibus videtur quod aliquis possit sibiipsi

1092. Then [A, B’] at “There are certain just acts,” he gives two reasons from which it seems that someone can do himself an

iniustum facere. Quarum prima talis est. Manifestum est, secundum supradicta, quod illa quae sunt iusta secundum quamcumque virtutem, ordinantur a

injustice. The first is this [ B’, 1 ]. Obviously from what has been said before, the things that are just according to any virtue are ordered by law. Hence what is not ordered at

lege. Unde illud quod in nullo casu ordinatur a lege, non videtur esse iustum secundum aliquam virtutem: et ita videtur esse iniustum. In nullo enim

all by law does not seem to be just in terms of any virtue and hence is unjust. In no case does the law command a man to take his own life. But those acts that the law does not

casu lex iubet quod aliquis se interficiat.

command as just, it forbids as unjust. This is

Illa autem quae lex non iubet tamquam iusta, prohibet tamquam iniusta. Quod non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil sit medium inter praeceptum et

not to be understood as if no mean exists between the command and the prohibition of the law, since there are many acts that are neither commanded nor forbidden by the law

prohibitionem legis, cum multa sint quae a lege nec praecipiuntur nec prohibentur, sed permittuntur hominum voluntati, sicut emere rem aliquam vel

but are left to man’s will, for example, buying or not buying a particular thing. But this is to be understood in the sense that it is only those things which are forbidden as unjust in

non emere; sed est sic intelligendum quod illa sola lex in nullo casu iubet quae sunt prohibita quasi per se iniusta: et ita videtur quod occidere seipsum sit per se

themselves that the law in no case commands. So it seems that to take one’s own life is of itself unjust, since the law never commands it.

iniustum, cum praecipiat.

hoc

lex

nunquam

Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem etc. et dicit quod ille qui nocet alicui praeter legis praeceptum, ut cum lex praecipit aliquem puniri, dummodo

1093. At “Again, however” [B’ 2] he gives the second reason, saying that one who injures another contrary to the precept of the law (as when the law commands that an

non sit contranocens, idest resistens nocumento sibi ab altero illato, puta cum repercutit percutientem, talis inquam

action be punished provided it is not against a person defending himself, i.e., resisting injury inflicted on oneself by another), such a one, I

facit volens iniustum. Et in hoc quod dico volens, intelligitur quod sciat quid et quomodo faciat et alias circumstantias. Sed ille qui occidit

say, willingly does injustice. When I say “willingly,” it is understood the person should know what he does, in what manner, and the other circumstances. But he who takes his

seipsum propter iram, operatur praeter rectam legem volens hoc quod non permittit lex. Ergo facit iniustum. Ergo videtur quod aliquis possit sibiipsi

own life because of anger acts contrary to a good law in willing something the law does not permit. Therefore he does injustice. Consequently it seems that a man can do

iniustum facere.

himself an injustice.

Deinde cum dicit sed cui? et cetera, solvit praedictam dubitationem. Et primo ponit solutionem et confirmat eam; secundo ponit radicem principalem

1094. At “But to whom” [A, C] he solves the previously mentioned doubt. First [C, 1] he presents and confirms the solution. Second [C’, 2], at “ This question,” he gives the root

solutionis, ibi: totaliter autem solvitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo solvit dubitationem supra motam quantum ad iustitiam legalem. Secundo

of the solution. He treats the first point in two ways. Initially [1, a] he solves the doubt raised before, regarding legal justice. Second [1, b], at “Besides, inasmuch etc.,” he solves the

quantum ad iustitiam particularem, ibi, adhuc secundum quod iniustus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit

doubt regarding particular justice. On the initial point he does two (three) things. First [a, i] he proposes the solution saying that the

solutionem. Et dicit quod ille qui interficit se ipsum facit quidem iniustum, sed considerandum est cui

man who commits suicide does some injustice. But we must consider against whom he acts unjustly. Certainly he does an injustice to the

iniustum faciat. Facit enim iniustum civitati quam privat uno cive, sed non facit iniustum sibi ipsi.

state, which he deprives of a citizen, even if he does no injustice to himself.

Secundo ibi: volens enim etc., confirmat solutionem positam. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod non facit iniustum sibi. Ipse

1095. Next [a, ii], at “He voluntarily suffers,” he confirms the solution given; first [a, ii, x] in regard to the fact that one does not do himself

enim volens patitur occisionem; nullus autem patitur iniustum volens, ut supra habitum est: ergo iste non patitur iniustum. Non ergo facit sibi iniustum.

an injustice. He may willingly endure the slaying but no one willingly suffers injustice, as was said before (1094). Therefore this person does not suffer an injustice and does not do himself an injustice.

Secundo ibi: propter quod etc., confirmat

1096. Then [a, ii, y], at “For this reason,” he

solutionem quantum ad hoc quod facit iniustum civitati: et hoc per quoddam signum. Videmus enim quod civitas infert damnum quale possibile est,

confirms the solution in regard to the injustice to the state-this by a certain sign. We see that the state imposes what punishment is possible, dishonor or censure

scilicet inhonorationem sive vituperium ei qui occidit seipsum; puta quod facit trahi cadaver eius vel dimittit ipsum insepultum, ut per hoc detur intelligi

on the suicide; that it has his body dragged or left unburied. In this way we are given to understand that this man committed injustice against the state.

quod ipse fecit iniuriam civitati. Deinde cum dicit: adhuc secundum quod

1097. At “Besides, inasmuch” [1, b] he shows

iniustus etc., ostendit quod nullus facit sibiipsi iniustum secundum iniustitiam particularem. Et primo proponit quod

that no one does himself an injustice according to particular justice. First [b, i] he proposes what he intends. He says that

intendit. Et dicit quod secundum quod aliquis dicitur iniustus non quasi totaliter pravus secundum omnem malitiam, sed solum quasi faciens

inasmuch as a person is called unjust not as being completely perverse in evil but only as doing particular injustice, according to this injustice it is not possible for a person to do

iniustum particulare, secundum inquam hoc iniustum non contingit quod aliquis sibiipsi faciat iniustum. Hoc enim iniustum particulare est aliud ab iniusto

injustice to himself. This particular injustice, which we discussed before (913-926), is different from legal injustice. A man may be called unjust in some measure not as being

legali de quo supra loquebamur. Contingit enim quod aliquis dicatur iniustus secundum aliquem modum non quasi habens totam malitiam, sed quasi

completely evil but as being partially evil, for example, someone is called cowardly according to a particular evil. Hence neither according to particular injustice can anyone do injustice

habens aliquam particularem malitiam, sicut et aliquis dicitur timidus secundum particularem malitiam. Unde nec secundum istam particularem contingit sibiipsi faciat iniustum.

to himself.

iniustitiam quod aliquis

Secundo ibi, simul enim eidem etc., probat propositum quatuor rationibus.

1099. Next [b, ii], at “Indeed something,” he proves the proposition by four reasons. The

Quarum prima est quia ille qui facit iniustum secundum iniustitiam particularem, habet plus quam sibi debeatur; ille autem qui patitur habet

first [b, ii, w] is that one who does injustice according to particular injustice has more than is due him, and he who suffers injustice has less. If then someone could do injustice to

minus; si ergo aliquis sibi ipsi faceret iniustum, sequeretur quod simul uni et eidem auferretur aliquid de suo et adiaceret sibi quasi superappositum;

himself, it would follow that something could be taken from him and added to him at one and the same time-things that are opposites. Therefore it is impossible for the same person

ergo impossibile est quod idem sit iniustum faciens et iniustum patiens a seipso. Sed tam iustum quam iniustum necesse est in pluribus personis inveniri.

to be the one doing injustice and suffering injustice from himself. But justice and injustice necessarily implies more than one person.

Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc voluntarium et cetera. Et dicit quod

1099. At “Again, doing injustice” [b, ii, x] he gives the second reason saying that doing

iniustum facere oportet esse voluntarium et cum electione, et oportet etiam quod sit prius quam iniustum pati. Ille enim qui primo passus est iniustum

injustice must be voluntary and with-choice, and must be previous to suffering injustice. That man, who first has suffered injustice and reacts against it according as the law allows,

et idem contrafacit secundo, quod lex permittit, non videtur facere iniustum, puta si reaccipit rem sibi ablatam. Sed si

does not seem to do injustice, for example, if he repossesses a thing taken from him. But if a person injures himself, he suffers and

aliquis sibiipsi noceat, eadem simul et patitur et facit. Non ergo videtur sibiipsi facere iniustum.

inflicts the same act at the same time. Therefore he does not seem to do injustice to himself.

Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc erit utique et cetera. Voluntarie enim aliquis

1100. Then [b, ii, y], at “Moreover, he will,” he offers the third reason. Certainly a person

sibiipsi nocet. Si igitur talis iniustum patitur a seipso, sequitur quod iniustum pati sit voluntarium; quod supra

voluntarily does harm to himself. If then such a one suffers injustice from himself, it follows that suffering injustice is a voluntary. This

improbatum est.

we disproved before (1094-1096).

Quartam rationem ponit ibi, cum his autem et cetera. Quia si quis consideret

1101. Next [b, ii, z], at “Besides, no one,” he gives the fourth reason. If we look at

in particularibus iniustificationibus, idest in speciebus particularis iniustitiae, maxime apparet quod nullus sibiipsi facit iniustum. Est enim una species

particular injustice, that is, the species of particular injustice, it is apparent that no one does himself an injustice. One particular species of injustice is fornication, i.e., adultery.

particularis iniustitiae moechia, idest adulterium. Nullus autem moechatur, idest adulterat uxorem suam, neque

But no man fornicates or commits adultery with his own wife. No one is called a burglar —burglary belongs to another species of

aliquis dicitur suffossor murorum, quod pertinet ad aliam iniustitiae speciem, propter hoc quod suffodit proprium murum; neque etiam dicitur aliquis fur,

injustice—because he breaks into his own home, nor a thief if he secretly takes his own goods. Obviously then it is not possible to do oneself injustice.

si accipiat clam bona sua. Unde patet quod non contingit sibiipsi iniustum facere. Deinde cum dicit: totaliter autem solvitur etc., ponit principalem radicem

1102. At “This question” [C’, 2] he gives the principal root of the previously mentioned

praedictae solutionis. Et dicit quod totaliter solvitur praedicta quaestio de eo quod est iniustum facere sibiipsi, secundum hoc quod supra

solution. He says that this question about doing injustice to oneself is completely solved in accord with what was determined before (1063, 1071, 1099) on the point that it is

determinatum est de hoc quod impossibile est voluntarie aliquem iniustum pati. Ex hoc enim manifeste sequitur quod nullus sibi iniustum facit,

impossible to suffer any injustice voluntarily. From this it clearly follows that no one unwillingly does injustice, since doing injustice is a voluntary, as was pointed out

cum iniustum facere sit voluntarium, ut supra dictum est.

previously (1063, 1071, 1099).

Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem et quoniam ambo etc., comparat adinvicem ista duo. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod utrumque eorum est

1103. Then [B], at “Obviously both,” he compares these two things with one another. In regard to the comparison he takes up three points. First [B, A’] he shows that both of

malum. Secundo, quod iniustum facere per se est peius, ibi, sed tamen deterius etc.; tertio ostendit quod per accidens potest esse e converso, ibi, secundum

them are evil. Next [B, B’], at “However, to do injustice etc.,” he shows that in itself it is worse to do injustice. Last [B, C’], at “although nothing hinders etc.,” he shows

accidens autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ambo, scilicet iniustum facere et iniustum pati, sunt prava.

that by chance the contrary can be true. He says first that both, doing injustice and suffering injustice, are evil. He proves the

Quod quidem probat per hoc quod hoc

statement from the fact that to suffer

quidem, scilicet iniustum pati est minus

injustice is to have less than the mean of

habere quam medium iustitiae requirat. Hoc autem, scilicet iniustum facere, est plus habere quam sit mensura iustitiae. Medium autem iustitiae quod dicitur

justice requires. But the first, to do injustice, is to have more than the measure of justice. Now the mean of justice, called the just thing, is related to exchanges and distributions as

iustum ita se habet in commutationibus et in distributionibus, sicut sanum in medicinali et bene habitivum in arte

the healthful is to medicine and the wellconditioned to gymnastics. Consequently, as in medicine and gymnastics what is too much

exercitativa; unde, sicut in medicinali et exercitativa illud quod est plus vel minus est malum, ita etiam circa iustitiam.

or too little is evil, so also in regard to justice.

Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen deterius etc., ostendit quod peius sit iniustum facere quam iniustum pati. Quod quidem

1104. Next [B, B’], at “However, to do injustice,” he shows that it is worse to do injustice than to suffer injustice. This he

probat per hoc: quod iniustum facere est vituperabile et cum malitia: quod quidem intelligendum est vel de malitia perfecta et simpliciter, puta cum aliquis iniustum

proves from the fact that to do injustice is blameworthy and evil—a thing that is to be understood either as complete and absolute evil (for instance, when someone does

facit non solum voluntarie, sed ex electione; vel se habet proxime ad perfectam malitiam, ut patet de eo qui iniustum facit non ex electione, sed ex

injustice not only voluntarily but by choice) or “Coming close to complete evil (evident in the person who acts unjustly not by choice but by anger or some other passion). It has been

ira vel alia passione. Ostensum est enim supra, quod non omne voluntarium est cum iniustitia. Quandoque enim aliquis voluntarie iniustum facit et tamen non

explained before (1041) that not every voluntary accompanies injustice, because sometimes a man does an unjust act and nevertheless is not unjust, although he is

est iniustus, nihilominus tamen vituperatur. Sed iniustum pati est omnino sine malitia et iniustitia. Ille

blameworthy. But a person’s suffering injustice is entirely without evil and injustice, for he who suffers injustice can in no way be

enim qui iniustum patitur nullo modo propter hoc dicitur iniustus vel malus. Manifestum est autem quod illud est magis malum a quo denominatur aliquis

considered unjust or evil. But, obviously, that by which a man is called evil is worse than that by which he is not called evil, an actual whiteness by which a person is called white is

malus, quam a quo non denominatur malus; sicut albedo in actu, qua denominatur aliquis albus, magis dicitur vere albedo quam illa quae est in

whiteness in a greater degree than potential whiteness by which a person is not called white. It follows then that suffering injustice is in itself less evil than doing injustice.

potentia, a qua non denominatur aliquis albus. Sequitur igitur quod iniustum pati secundum se sit minus malum quam iniustum facere.

Deinde cum dicit secundum accidens autem etc., ostendit quod secundum accidens potest esse e converso. Et dicit

1105. At “although nothing hinders” [B, C’] he shows that the contrary can be true by chance. He says nothing prevents suffering

quod nihil prohibet quin iniustum pati per accidens sit magis malum quam iniustum facere, puta cum aliquis ex hoc quod iniustum patitur provocatur ad

injustice from being more evil by chance than doing injustice, as when a man is provoked to do greater injustice by the fact that he suffers unjustly. But this is by chance, and art does

maiores iniustitias faciendas. Sed de hoc quod est per accidens non curat ars, sed iudicat secundum id quod est per se. Sicut ars medicinae dicit pleuresim, quae

not care about what is by chance but judges only according to what is essential. Thus the art of medicine calls pleurisy a dangerous and deadly abscess under the ribs, a worse ailment

est apostema sub costis periculosum et mortale, esse maiorem aegritudinem quam sit offensio pedis, quamvis

than a sore foot that nevertheless can by chance be worse, for instance, when a man falls because of an injured foot and so by

quandoque offensio pedis per accidens possit esse peior; puta cum aliquis propter hoc quod habet pedem laesum cadit, et sic accidit quod capiatur ab

accident is captured and slain by an enemy.

adversario et moriatur. Deinde cum dicit secundum metaphoram autem etc., ostendit qualis sit

1106. Next [II], at “By metaphor and likeness,” he shows of what nature

metaphorica iustitia. Et dicit quod secundum quamdam metaphoram et similitudinem contingit, non quidem quod sit iustum vel iniustum totius

metaphorical justice is. He says that by a kind of metaphor and likeness, it is possible to have, not justice or injustice of the whole man toward himself, but a certain species of justice

hominis ad seipsum, sed quod sit quaedam species iusti inter aliquas partes hominis adinvicem. Non tamen

among the parts of man. However, this is not justice in the full sense but only the justice of a master or an administrator (viz., the head of

inter eas est omne iustum, sed solum iustum dominativum vel dispensativum, id est yconomicum. Quia secundum has rationes, scilicet dominii vel

a household), because corresponding to these reasons of dominion and administration the rational part of the soul seems to be distinguished from the irrational part, which

dispensationis videtur distare rationalis pars animae ab irrationali, quae dividitur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Nam ratio dominatur

is divided into irascible and concupiscible. The reason is master of the irascible and concupiscible parts and governs them.

irascibili et concupiscibili et gubernat eas. Et ad ista respiciunt illi quibus videtur quod sit iniustitia hominis ad se ipsum

1107. In view of such consideration some people think that a man’s justice extends to

propter hoc quod in talibus contingit aliquem pati propter proprios appetitus. Puta cum ex ira vel concupiscentia

himself because, by reason of these parts, he can suffer from his own desires, for instance, when he acts against reason out of anger or

aliquis facit contra rationem. Sic igitur in his est quoddam iustum et iniustum, sicut inter imperantem et eum cui imperatur. Non autem est verum

concupiscence. Hence, among the parts a kind of justice and injustice is found, as between one who commands and one who obeys. However, it is not genuine justice because it is

iustum, quia non est inter duos; sed est similitudinarium iustum, inquantum diversitas potentiarum animae assimulatur diversitati personarum.

not between two, but it has a resemblance to justice inasmuch as the diversity in the soul is like the diversity between persons.

Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod determinatum est de iustitia et aliis

1108. Finally, as a summary, he concludes that we have finished the treatise on Justice

virtutibus moralibus secundum praedictum modum. Et in hoc terminatur sententia quinti libri.

and the other moral virtues according to the preceding plan. With this the teaching of the fifth book is completed.

Thomas Aquinas Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics 1 Books 1 to 5

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