The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company

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THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPAI{Y

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7-76 DDr-1lOO-7 Informatior Cut'Off Date: June 1975

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This document was Fepared by Major Robert M. Frasch6 of the Tactics and Organization Section, Ground Forc€s[vlBFR Branch, Soviet/WarsawPact Dvision, Drcctorate for Inteligenc€ (ResearchCenter), and is releasedfor publication by authodty of the Drector, Defens€lnteligenc€ Agency.

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\o PREFACE This study war *rittcn for the us€ of serviceschoolsandfor unit inteligence officeF ,s an aid in pr$€nting classeson the organization,biining, tactics,atrdequipm€ntofthe motodz€drifle company. Th€ material presert€d on unit organlzationshould be u!€d as a guide or y. Soviet organizationsvary widely d€p€ndingupon thetr manninglevels,weaponsand equipm€nt mix,locatton andother factors. Dff€rencesin squadarmam€nt,capabilities,andnumben of men per .rmor€d penonnel carrter (APC) exist betweenunits. Although old€r APC'S are dbcu$ed, this study concentrrtespdmarily on the BMP€quipp€dmotorized dfle comp8nies,sincethey gobably representthe d€sir€dst ndardThe list of Sovietsymbolsusedmey be found in Appendix I. Corunents, correctionsand suggestionsfor improvementof this study are requested. They slrculd be sent thmugh proper channelsto the DefenseIntelligenc€Agercy, Cround Forc€s/MBFRBranch,ATTN: DB-1B4, Washington,D.C.20301.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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doctrineand the orSanistion, l lhis study examinesSovietoffcnsiveand defensive training,racticsand cquiprnentof the Sovietmotorizedritle company.Emphasisis placedon tlrc comp,rny equipped with the infantrycombalvehicle(BMP).Themotorized rifle companyis organized, trainedandcquippcdprimrily fol a wal of rapidmovemcnl and short durltion. Maneuverduringtacticaloperationsis restdctcdto wcil-rchcrn€d combal formrtions and is oficn dictated by hisher authodty. Tactical doctrin€ but usually cmph-asizes offensiveaction-Coordination of fire andmovement is practiccd, in clo!.ly regulated exercises.During operatioff, riflemen Sencrallyremain in lfteir personnel calriersuntil conionted with seriousanti-rrmorfire, thendismounlto assaolt positionswith supportfrom tanks,artillery,mortan,andt}lcil own pcrsonnel carriers. professional 2. Motorizedrine companyofficcrsreceive extensive andpoliticaltrainingin schools,but areSivenlittlc opportunityto exercise initiativeandlackcombalexperience, prc-induction prior to being assigncd to deir units.Although Conscripts rcceive tmining th€ effectivcncss pre'induction uneven, it has shown improvement in somc of trainingis ,Jcas and may eventually provide cons(ripts with the n€c€ssarybasic military skills befor€ they enter the army. About half of th€ consc.ipts,including sergea'tsand APC crew members, rcccivesix montl$ specialisttrainingbeforethey reportto their units. Other conscriptslcam thcir duties by repetitiveon-the-jobtrainmg and are not cross{rained. The lrainingprognm lrnddhciplinarymearure!produccsoldienwho can perforn their duticsadequately. initiaiivc.Tiaining, Thcy arenol expectedto exercise andhenceindividualandunil effectiveness, aredegadedby thc lacl tlut conscnpbserve only two ycars.Ncwtroopsarerotatcdinto unitssemi-annuauy. 3. Equipmentof thc motorizedriile companyprovidestlrc mems neededto conduct operationsand successfullyaccomplishlikely missions.Tlrc htroduction of the BMP is lhe most significantrecentimprovemenlin the companytequipffenldnd consrderably incrcascs its firepower.Shortcomings ofcompanycquipmcntinclude: a. Squadleade$,whendisrnounted from th€irpenonnclcarriers, haveno radios. b- Radiosavailablc to platoonleaders operations hav€limitcdrange. in dismounled c- ThemaingunoI the BMPdoesnor havc stabilizer. d Saggerantitank guided missilcsclnnol be effectivelyfired at night Mthout illumination. 4. Sovietmotorind rinc companies, particularlythoseequippedwith BMPS, arecapable of conductingeffectivccombatoperations. exist Althoughsomequalitativedeficicncies in trainhg,equipmcntdndofganization, the Sovietsapparendy considcrtllal quantitative superiorityis adequ,rte compensation.

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TABLEOF CONTENTS THESOVIETMOTORIZED RIFLECOMPANY P.rr

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ExecutiveSunrJn{y Tableof Corrcnts List of Figur€s Introduction CHAPTERI,

xin PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

CHAPTER2. Sectionl. [. I[.

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CTIAPTER3. HIGTIERLINITS

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CTIAPIER4. SectionI. II. llt.

lv. \{. CHA?TER5. SectionL [. llt. IV. VI.

vlI. YII. C}IAPTER6. Sectiorl. lI. IIIIV.

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TIIE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANY G e D e r.a. l. . . . . . . . . . . . M i s s i o r. s. . . . . . . . . . . . O r g r n i z a t ,i o. .n. . . . . . . E q u i p n e n. .t . . . . . . . . . C o m m a na dn dC o n t r o. .l A d m i n i s t r a tai o nn dS u p p l y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.-.--------- r'1 ....-....... l? ............17 ..........,. 20 .-.-.---. --- 2l -........... 28

MOTORIZEDRIFLECOMPANYTRATNNG -...........3l I n t r o d u c t i.o. n. . . . . . . . W e a p oanns dE q u i p m eTnrta j n i n.g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3l M o r a l P o l i t i cTarl a i n i n g ...........3? chemical ,....-........ 38 Training Eiological & Radiological I a n dN a v i g a t i.o. n. . . . . ...-........38 PhysicalTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 J u n i oO r f f i c earn dN C OT r a i n i n. g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --.... -.... 40 Tactica.lTraining . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 41 THE MOTORZED RIFLE SQUAD G e n e r.a, l. . . , . . . . . . . . M o v e m etnotc o n t a c t . . . F o r m a t i o.n. s. . . . . . . . . OffensiveAction DefenriveAction

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MOTORZEDRIFLE PLATOON Introductlon .........,.......-..... M o v e m etnotC o n t a c. .t . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . Fornations. - . . . -..-......---..... OFensiA v ec t i o t r .. . .... ... .... .... . Dcfensive ... .. . ... . .. .. . .. . . Action

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CTIAPTER8. S € c t i oLn II. IU. lV, V.

T}IE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANYIN COMBAT M o v e m etnotC o n t a c t . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . . . . . . . . , . . - . . . The MeetingEngagemcnt. . . - - . . . . . , . . . - . - - - . . . . . . . - . . . . . . , BreaktfuoughOperations. . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . - - . . . . D e f e n s iO v ep e r a l i o n s ...,............ Withdrawal ........................

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CIIAPTER9.

THE MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY OPERATING UNDER SPFCIAL CONDITIONS G € n e r.a.l. . . . . . . . . . . . .............83 OperationsUnderExtremeWeatherConditions- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E3 Operationsin Forests.nd Swarnpc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . 9l Opentionr io Mountaira ... . . ...... .. 93 W a t eBr a r r i eOr p e r a t i o n s .............99 C o m b aht B u i l t - u fpu e a.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5 Helibome .... . .. . . . -. .. . 110 op€rations N i e hO t peEtions .,..-.........--,. 115

Sectionl. II. I.

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CIIAPIER 7. S e c t i oI n. lI. IIL lV. V.

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Appcndix€s ...............,123.\24 l . L i s to f s y m b o l s . . . . . Patt€min BasicCombatDuty itr Peacetim€. II. A TypeCareer . . - -.... 125 I T I . ( X f i c eAr g eL i m i t a t i o n. .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . - . - - . - . - - . . - 1 2 7

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LIST OF FIGURES page

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Figurc L Vanedelhnicslructureofthe SovietAnny . . . . . - . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 7 . P r ei n d u c r i ot n r a i n i nf ga c i l i tay t a s e c o n d asrcyh o o l . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . I 3 . A DOSAAF training facility for specialists . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Youngofficcrsat a conmissioning school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 . C o m b i n cadr m st e a mi n t h ea t r a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 3 Basic order of march of a Soviet formation anticipatinga mccting e n g a g € m e.n. .t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . . 4 7 . Dcploymcntof unitsfrom the line of rnarchinto a meetingcngagement. . 5 8 . T h eb r e a l t h r o u g h .................. _......6 9 . Dvision concentrationfor the breatthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0 . T h ep u r s u i t . . . . . . . . . .-..---............ 8 I t . Basicformsof maneuver . a. Frontalattack ,,.................,..,8 b- Doubleenveloprncnt \ritl frontalattack 12. T h cm o i o r i z er di f l er e g i m e (nBr M P a q u i p p e .d. ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n l l Principlcwcaponsh the motorizcdrifle regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . I 2 a . T h em e d i u nt a n kT 5 4 1 5 5 1 .6.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -........... 12 b . 2 3 m mS P A AG u nZ S L2l 3 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --............ 13 c. ATGM launchervehicleAT-3 . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . 13 d. l22mm howitzerD-30 , - - . . . . . . . . . . . . - I3 e. SAM SA-9 Gaskin . . . -. . . . . . . . . . -. . . . I3 t4. Themotorized (BMP+quipp€d) riflebattalion .........t4 1 5 .P r i n c i pwl ee a p o ni nst h em o t o r i z er idf l cb a t t d i o n. . . - - . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 1 4 r . 7 3 m mR c c o ei s s G uS n P C - g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b . M a n p a cAkT G MS e tS a g g (eAr T - 3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . t5 c- l20mmmortar 15 ....-.........-...-1 6 .T h cm o t o r i z er d i f l ec o m p n n( yB M P € q u i p p e.d. .). . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . , . . 18 t 1 Principle weaponsof thc BMP and/or BTR€quippedmororizcd rifle c o m p a n r e. -s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . , , . , , . . . . 19 g€neral purposc (PK) .........Ie a. 7.62nrm machinegun, Kalashnikov (RPK) b. 7.62nrmlight rnaclincgun,Kalashnikov (AKM) l9 c. 7.62mmmod€rntedrinc Kalashnikov

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Page Figure 20. P c r s o nCaB e:u ........-..,...... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 l Rp r o t e c t i 8v e a. ShMmask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 b. St*lS mask. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 23 c. OP.f proiectiv€coat-overall. . - . . . - . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . - . . , . . . . . . . 23 d . I n d i v i d udael c o n t a m i n aktiito,InP P. . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , , . - . . . 2 1 21. Sunner and winter licld uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 24 22. F i e l dC o m b apta c ka n da c c o u t r e m e n. .t.s. . . . . . - - - - . . . - - - - - - . . - - - . . u 23. R-ll3 vehicularrldio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2s 24. R-123vehicularradtowith intercomunit . . . . . . . . - - . . , . . . . . . . , . . - . . . 26 25. R - 1 2 6m a n p a cr ka d i o ... -............. -...25 26. Th€ R-105ard Rlo? railios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 21. Reprcsentativc radionet ofa motorizedrifle company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 28. S o l d i eena t i nign t h cf i € l d .. ....... . .. ..... .29 D . hcliminary w€aponstraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 30. Trdningin firing from an APC . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .32 3 1 . A n t i t a ntkr a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - _ . . . . . .- . . . 3 3 , 3 4 . - -...... -...... -...3s A T C M( S a g S ct ar )i n i n g 33. SA-7(SAM) tnining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 34. Snip€r training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 35. Political indoctination session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3? - 3E 36. C B Rt r a i n i n g ..............,............ 37. Ch€micslrecormaissance personncl preparhgfor an op€ration . .. . . - . . -. 38 . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . 39 38. Traffic regulator .,. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. .,. 39 39. Physical fitnesstraining rifl€ squad . . . . . . . . . . . - . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 43 40. Thc BTR-equipped . . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 t . Exiting the BMP 42. BMPSsupportinSsquadsby lre . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Tank'borneinfantry in t]€ attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 45 mission . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 46 44. Squadon a night reconnaissance ..... -...... -.. -,...... -46 45. S q u a ad s s a ul il nt c 46. A t t a c k i nf gr o ma p o s i t i oinn c f o s ceo n t a c -t . . . . . . . - - . , . . - - - . . . . . . - - . 4 7 4 7 .SquadG)negotiatinga mircfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 positionprcparedwith engineer support . . .. . . .. . ..52 48. The squaddef€nsive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 49. Th€ MDK-2 ditching machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . 53 50. The squadffte plan ... .... . .. . ... . .. . . .. . ..55 rifleplatoon(BMP€quipped) 5 1 .Themotorized rifl€platoonattackinS bchindl,nks -...-..- - -.- -..-...56 52. Th€motorized - 58 5 3 .M o t o r i z eddf l ep l a t o ofno r m a t i o (nms o u n t e d.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54. Motorizedrifl€ platoonforrnations(disnounted) . .. . . .. . .. . . .,. . .. . . - 59 5 5 .The platoon def€nsiveposition . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 A reinforced motorized rifle company as the adidce guard of the . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 65 b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . company reinforced motorized riflc company con. commanderof a 5 7 .Thc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 ductingreconnaissance a meeting engagement66 58. Organizationof a battalion march h anticipation of . g u m € r p o s i t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 8 in firiru ............. 59. A n S A - 7

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.68 ghar. ................ Fisure ne g c o n t a m i n adt iuorni n a 6 0 . C B Ru n i tc o n d u c t i d 61. A feinforcedmotorizedriflc battalionconductinga meetingengaSem€nt. 71 -.... 76 in the defens€........... motodzed rifl€battalion 62. Thereinforced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 63. The rnotorizedrillc cornpanystrongpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . --... -. 84 6 4 . G T - Sa n dG T S Mv e h i c l e .s- - . - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . with sub65. Motorizedrifl€ companyconnanderconductingreconnaissance o r d i n a taen da t t a c h ec do n m . n d e r s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - 8 s ..................... 86 6 6 . T a n k tso w i n ign f a n t r y 86 5 7 . T a n l ( - b o ri n e f a n t rayt t a c k i ni ngw i n t e r. . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. 87 6 8 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p isn a w i n t edr e f e n s ipvoes i t i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,89 6 9 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p tsf a i n i ni gn t } I ed e s e r .t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i. the descri -.... -...... 90 motorized riflebattalion attacking 70. Reinforced 71. Reinforced motorizedrifle bathlion attackingin forest€dswampyterain . e2 , 1966............ .............. 94 72.76rnm m o u n t a gi nu n M es 7 3 . M o t o r i z cr d i f i et r o o ptsr a i n h g i n t h em o u n l a i n .s. . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 rinecompany attacking in mountainoN terrain ..........-.. 74. Motonzed in mounruuusrerrm ...... 98 75. Themururvedrinecompan)in dc defense - -.... -.... -.... - 99 e n e p a1' 9 6 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6 . E x e r c i s" D cericrs unloadingassaulttroops . . . . . r01 77- K'61 and PTStrackedamphibious motorized ifle battrtionforcinga waterbarrier .... -..... 102 78. A reinforced a riverbanl . ... . ..... . 704 79. Reinforcedmotodzedrifle battrlion defending -... -..... 106,10? 8 0 . C o m b a t - i n d ttiaecst i c e a xl c r c i s.e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . 81. The rcinforcedmolorizcdrifle companyin the attackin a builfup arca 108 82.Mi4 Hound .. -.... lll ... --.... 111 8 3 . M i - 6H o o k .......... 111 8,4M . i - 8H i p ....... 111 8 5 . M i - 1 0H a r k e -......... 1r1 8 6 . M i 1 2H o m e r ................. ---..--.. rt2 8 7 . M i - lH a r e .......112 8 8 . M i - 2H o p l i t e . . _. . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . _. I 13 89. Mi-24Hind A .......... 1i4 90. Helicoptcr mockuptrainingdevice 116 9 1 . t R s i g h t i nsgy s . c mm, o d eNi S P - 2 . . - - . . - . . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 116 9 2 . S o v i emt o d ePl P N - l2R s i g h t i nsgy s t e m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . o pocd cTl K N - 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rr1 93. Comrnande I Rr 'ps c r i l e l e s c m 9 4 - C h a r a c t e r i sotfiscosm ei l l u m i n a t i d oe n v i c c .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.. 11? 9 5 . M o t o r i z er idf l ec o m p a ni n y a n i g h at t t a c k. . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - . 1 1 8 96. Possible chxnges in lhe night defensive system of a motorned rifle b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

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INTRODUCTION Sovictwritershavecontinuallyemphasizcd thefrcl that the nextwarmustbe won by will nol be possiblc. forcesin bcingand that full mobilizationof a nation'srcsources policy armiesareseenasanachronisms, andthe of mainlainingsucha Small,profcssionrl forcc, "bankrupt." Consequentlythc Soviets€mphasizeblitzkrieg offensivcswith tank-hcaryforcessupponedbylargcamountsofartillery,whichwouldbe ablcto achieve points. the requircdiirc supeliorityat selectcd This study examinesthe organization,trainjng, tactics and equipmcntof the BMP-equipped motorizedrifle companywithin th€ contcxt of Sovietoffensiveand defensive conceprs.ln an effort to presenta rcalisticportrayal,weaknesses a! w€ll aj strenglhs areportrayedthroudout tlc study. fte study beginswilh a brief examination of thc hunzn elernent.Th€ first chapier des€ribespersonncland training. Sovict offensivedd defensiveconceptsarc then describcd. The link betweenthcscconc€plsandtheMR companyis chapterlhree,which descnbes the molorjzedrifle resimentand thc MR batblion. Chaptersfour and five describe equipmentand trainingof lhc MR company,andsetthestage the organization, for a closelook ar eachof its subordinale clcmcnts,the squadandplatoon(chaptensix ,nd seven).Chaptercight lies logetherthe preccdingscvcnchaptersby d€scribing the motorizedrifle companyin combat.Cfiaptcrninc dcscribes ihe MR companyop€rating urderspecialcombrtconditions. Thehistoricalda1lin thischapterareprovidedprimarily for two rcasons: described havebeenpracticed fust, to showthat the typcsof opcrations for many ycarsby the Sovietsand arc an importml nsp€ctof curent Sovietdocline; to haveon theSoviet s€condto illustratctlle sedng impactthat WorldWarll continues military. in chaptcrninc,tacticdlair support Althoughthereis a sectionon heliborneopcralions of groundopcrationsis not discussed. Sovicturutsbelowdivisionlevelhaveno dircct orgadcradiocommunications with supportingancrafl,rnd representatives oftacticalair forc€sarerarcly,ifever,sentto battalionandcompany.

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CHAPTER1. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

1. General The pcrsonnel makeup of rhe motorized rifie company typifics rhe human elementin tie Soviet gound lbrccs (fieLre I). Th. rypicd muro[,ed rllc conpan) i. conrposedprimdily of conscripts,carccr cniistcd nren and office.s constituting a srnal perccnlagc01 th€ total strength.Nomally, the majorily ofofficers are members of thc Comnunisr Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)or the Young Coinnunist League (Komsomol). Most eniisled men arc Party or Konsomol membe6 or belongto a subsidiary organization. All evidencethe advrntagcs of Sovict political and military sysand disadvantages tems. These systemsinvolvc continuous,but not necessarily effective, political indoctrinalioni comprehensive. b u r u n e t e n l \ i m p l " T e l r e d . p r e - . n J u c L i ornr " i n i . r gp r n gramsi and gener.lty adequatcactive duty training. On balance,soldien shrpcd by these systemsappearto be polirically reliableand capableof performingeffectively, although with limited initiatjve at battalion level and

effective as suggestedin officiai statcments.Only career enlistedand officer personnel,who havea vcstcdintcresl in the mi1itary, appear to react favorably to the indoctrination- Conscdpts are generally unenilusiasric dd, to somedegree,irntated by the training. r. r.e-rnoudron r rarntnq Theoretically, the eniisted personneiof the motorizcd ritlc company reccivcnilitary training prior to entenng service.The 1967 law governingnilitary servicein rhe USSR requirespre-induction training for all malesand o r e { n b e , a ( o m p r e h e n s r vceo u r s eo t i n s l r u r . u o-r- u p to 140 hou6 ofclassroomwork -in addition to training with weaponsand equiprnent.'The pros.am, beginning in the ninlh gade. is unevenlyconductedin schoolsand traini g ccnteB throughout the USSR (Figurc 2). pre-inductiontfain Aflcr 1967, fie USSRreemphasized ing to compensarefor the rcduction ofconscript se.vice from three to two yea6. It appeaB,however,that thc requirementis not uniformly appliedro all individuals, probably becauseof a lack offacilities in somearcas.As jt now operates, the program provides most Sovicl youths with rudimentary military skills, bu1 cannot . o n p l e r e l y c o m p e n \ a r et o r d r c d u c r o n o l o 1 e y e J r I n activeduty training time. Specialisttraining. commencingal agc 17, is the respon sibility of the AI'Union Volunlary Sociely for Coopera' tion with tlre Army, Avialion 8nd Fleel (DOSAAF) and ofthe vocarionaischoolsysicm(Fisure 3).

Figure 1. Vaded ethnic structure ofthe Soviet Army. 2. PoliticalTrainingand Control

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Thc company is ihc lowcsi cchclon at which a political officer functions. The politicJl officer, whose cliain of command is s€pafateand €xtends to the Main Political Directorateof the Ministry ofDefense,is responsiblefor political hdoctrination and for ensuringloyalty to the civilian leadership.He conducts poiilical lraining, primarily in the form of lectufes. and monitors company actilities for indicationsof dissent.Th€ arnountof time devoted to polirical training is inordinate and not as

Figure2. Pre-induction trainingfacilityat a secondaryschool,

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Figure4. Youngofiicersat a commissionang school. 5. ConscriptTraining. Prior to cnrctmentof lhe 1967lawon universal military traininS,fie nujority of conscdpts weretraincdby the Figure3.A DOSAAFtraining facilityfor specialists. units to which they werc assigned. Sincethc!, x, d, effort to compcnsate for thc reduced tenn ofservicc,rhe 4. Ofiice.Training Soriclshaveexpandedtherr facilibeslor tiainingcon,'fficeIs Mort commrsroneLl arcobraiqed iom cornm6- scnptsprior to assignm€nr. Currcnlly,incrcasing num, sioningschools(Figure4), but a smallpercentage comes bcn uf conscriDrs. nordblyspe.ialisrr rnd non.comnis. from univcrsity.lev€l res€ € offic€r trainingprograns sioncd ofnce|s,receiveup 1o six monthsof tmining and from drre!t conmi\s,ons. The commissiuning beforcassignment 10a unitschoolscomparcto the U.S. Military Academyand Datagapsprecludcdefinitiveevaluation of the individual producecomparably trainedofficers.Subsequent educ!- soldierproducedby the trainingpmglams.Personnel in lional opportunitiesfor offic€rs include advanced rnotoriTcdnne companies probablyperformsatisfactocourses,mjd.carcerschoolinginvolflng threc to five nly. considedng thc relativelylow skill lcvelsinvolvcd yetrrsat a militaryacadeny,rnd r two-yearcouneat the and the emphasis on lepetitionin training.Conscriprs Military Academy of the cereral St3ff. In 8encral, sering in morc complexassignnents arclikely to vary Sovietofficersare reliableandequipped to functionin a considerablyin then effectiv€ncss. Specialists suffer contemporary but areprobably som€whatfrom aII extensive battlcfieldenyironmcnt, dcpendence on simulaton sonewhatinlibited, padicularlyst the lowcr command and l-romscvereconstrainlsgovemingthe usc of full l€vels,by the poiilicalsystem.Equallyimportant,most calibcr,live anmunition. Thc expansionof specialist Soviet officers hdve not had tle benefirof warrinre training lacilitics,however,is expectedgradualy to experiencc. A type of Sovietofliccr'scareerpattcrnis providecons.riph with an adequarebaseof skill for individualassignm€nil. includedin appcndixII.

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CONCEPTS CHAPTEF2. OFFENSIVEAND DEFENSIVE Sectionl. MOVEMENTTO CONTACT 6. Genelal Soviet doctrinc stressesthat the ofl-ensivcis the decisive forn of conbal; that the main purposc of offensive combat is the complete destrucrion ol tlle enemy s forces. To scl the stagefor successfuloftcnslveaction, the Sovietsstresslhc use of diversionaryunits (agents, parachutistsand heliborne infantry) deep in tlte encmy rea Jers and the achievementol surprisethtough thc the intensity and mobiljty ot usc of deceptionmeasures, l'iepowcr. a1o 'afid lrFs ol advance Sufces i5 achieled by tnc rapid concentrrtion of supefio. forces wiih massive air and artille.y support to disruPl, penetratc,and ultimately rout opposingforces(FiSure5). Air and ariilcry interdiction would occur thtoughout ihe depth of the eremy's defensivcposilion. Ifnuclcat chenricalwcapons are not used, conventionalartilcry would be used in grealcr quantitiesin order to .chieve dre desiredfirc superiority. Soviet forces are trained to go rapidly lion a nonnuclearto a nuclearenvironmcnt, and Soviel writcn stres the essenlial arld critical ifansition bctwcen these modesof conbat. Despitelhis ernphasison offensiveoperalions,thc Sovjelsrealizethat in son1esituationstheir forceswill haveto go over 1o the defensive,but stress that the primary purpose of ihe defenseis to prepare for the resumption of offensive operdtionsassoon as possible. 7. The March a. The Sovictsdescrjbea much asan organizedlroop movementconductedin column fomations on roads,or

crosscountry. Troops ale trarned to bc rcady 1br action at any time. If possible,the marchis conductcdat night or under conditions of limited visibility. The speed at which the march is conducted is dependcnton many facto^ : encmy, lerfain, weathcr. makcup of the colum, condition of v€hicles,the levcl of driver training, etc. (Figure 6). ,. Average spccds ibr vehiculal lrafiic by day are 3040 knttu and by night and dunng other conditions of limited visibility 20-30 km/tu. For foot movement averasespecdsare 4 km/hr and bctween 5'7 knthr on skis. c. The inrcrval between vehiclcs is 1550 merers during road movementmd 50-100metersdunng tacticd cross-country movem€nl. Both the interval md the spccd of l}e vehjclc, are in(ted'ed lvhcn crosing a contaminatedeea or when under air dttrck. d Control measures along rhe route of advance nrclude initial start points and casily recognizablecontlol or phase lines. Thc number and spacingof these control measuresis dcpendentupon the lcngtl of the march. dre condition of thc ioads and tlt weather. c. ln a motorized march, halts of up to one hour occur evcry three-four houis. ln foot mdches, io'minute hdts are made elery 50 minutes. During fie second hJlf of a motorized Inlch, a long halt of iwo four hours is held. Such Longhalts arc not held at nidt (so as to make maximunr use of Lhc hours of drkncss), nor are ilrcy made during foot marches tlhich can be coveredin a 24-hour period- Durine slort hdlls,

armsteamin the attack. Fioure5. Combined

column dist ncesbetwcenvehiclesin column fomation ,l. All-around sccurity is providcd on the march in are not changed;men snd vehiclesmaintain the proper order to ensureuninterruptedmovement,to prevent aredisperscd surpriseaatack,to keepenemyreconnissance marchintervals.Duringlonghrlts, vehiclcs unitsfroh observingthe main body and to crcare fie most andcamouflaged. , To asrnt thc conrnandorin organizingthe rnarch, favorableconditions for deploymentof the rnain body Advancc,Ilank, the Sovietsdividethe marchinto two distinctelemcnts, in a mectingengagement. andrearguard units ensure all-around security durinS march rhe march.In thc movementorganizationand security. addition, stationary flank outposts arc often used to & Movcrnent orSanizltion is formulated to ensure occupy pass€d. critical tcrain until the main body has high speed, rapid combat deployment, and effective control. Tank and artillery are usually towards the front, and antiaircraftweaponsaredistributedthrough-