The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion

DDB.lrettt-78

DEFENSEINTEIIIGEIICE

REPORT

THESO\TET MOTORTT.FDRIFIT BATTALION

1978 SEPTEMBER

.,)2)

TIIE SOWET MOTORIZED RIFII

BATTALION

DDB-11dt197-78

InformationCutoff Date: '197, Z) Dec€mber

This oublicationsuDersedes Sovist Tactics: The Motorized nifle Battalion. AP-1-22G3+04, November1964, which shouldbedestroyed.

Thi. i5 a Depa.nnmr of Osl6ns6 lf,rellisene Docum6nr Pact Divbion. Pr€oacd bv th. Sovi.Vw.r$w Oiroctoralo for Int.llig.nc. R...!rch, Defen* Intelligenco Ag6ncy author: Mdor FoblnM. Frasche, Tacljcalnd Or$nl!8don Secrion, G,olnd Forc€. Bdnch

PREFACE This study, a follow-up to Ihe Soviet Motorized Rifle Company {DD|-1100-7/-76},was written to familiarizethe reader with the organization. training, tactics, and equipmentof the Souet motorizedrifle banalion (lvlRB).lt was especiallywritten for troops, troop commanders,unit intelligenceofficers, seruiceschools,and othercwho requiredet8iledknowledgeof the SovietMRB. The study concentrateson the operationsof those MRBS equippedwhh the BMP (infantry combat vehicle). The organization,training, tactics, and equipment of the BlvlPequippedMRB are analyzedwithin the context of Soviet doctrine. Soviet tacticaltrends since the October 1973War are also considered.The scopeof the study is restrictedto those operations(nuclearand nonnuclear)relevant to northernand centralEurope, Studies which addressin greater detail some of the subiectscovered in this 'L

Soviet Offensive Doctine: Combined Atms Operations Veaus Antitank Deterses{U), DDI-1100'138 76, July 1976. 2. Soviet TacticalTrcndsSince the October lgn Wat (Ul, DDI-11@-160-77, Aoril 197/. 3. TheSovietMoto zed RifleCompanylul, DDl1100--n-76,October1976. 4. Soviet Military Opeetions in Built-Up Areas (U), DDI-1100-I5S77,July 1977. 5. Soviet and Warsaw Pact niver Crcssing: Doctine and Capabilhies lul DDI-1150-7-76, September1976. 6. Evaluation of Soviet Night Combat Capabilhies(U), DDI-1i00'173-7/, February1978. (Ul, DDI-I200-74-76, 7. SovietAmphibiousWaiare Capabilities May 1976. 8. Soviet TacticalLevelloglstlcs {U), DDI-1150-co1+n,Decetnbet1gn. 9. Soviet Field Anilery Tactics and Techniqueslul, {DDB-1130878to be published). Addresseesare requestedto lorward informationwhich will supplementor correct this report, Ouestions6nd comments should be refered in writing to the DefenseIntelligenceAgency{ATTN: DA-184),Washlngton,D.C. 20301.

S U MM A R Y lll€ Sovietsstressthe decisivenatureof the offensiveand emphasi2e the meetingengagementmorethan a.y othertype of offensiveaction, High ratesof advanceare anticipatedfrom the actionsof combinedarms unirsoperatingin coniunctionwith airborne,airmobile,and specialoperationsforcesin theenemyreararea. Sincethe October1973War, the Sovietshaveplacedeven moreemphasison combinedarms operations, and have rnadenumerousorganizationaland tacticaladjustmentsto increasethe suruivabilityof their tank forces.The tank ramainsthebackboneol combinedarmsdoctrine. Though relativelysmall, the BMP-squippedldRA is highly maneuverableand possessesconsiderable organicfirepower,particularlyin antitankweaponry.The MRB is often augmentedby motorizedrifle regi, rnentand/or divisionalassetsto form a heavilyreinforcedcombinedarms groupingto carry out a varietyof The battalioncommander'sage, education,and politicalawarenessprovidethe theoreticalbasisfor effecirve command.Frequentfield trainingand lengthypeacetimecommandassignmentspartiallyoffset his lack ot combatexperi6nce.Thoughtechnicallywell trained,the IMRBcommandefoften failsto exploitthe strong pointsof his men and equipmentduring fiold exercises.Moreover,his initiativeis constrictedwithin narrow paramete.sby institutionaland operationalconstraints. Eattalion-leveltraining is highly centralized,stressesfundmentals,and results in effective battle drill. "Moral political"training,while boringfor many, is probablyeffeclive.Trainingeffectivenessis complicated bYthe 2 vsar term ofservice, The MRB is capableotconductingoperationsunderspecialconditions,althoughthe amountofsuch train ing variesaccordingto geographiclocationand mission, Th€ BlrP-equipped MRB normally operatesas part of the regiment and is mosr effective when so employed.Discrepancies betweendoctrineand practicehavebeennotedin severaltypesof fulRBoperations. Thesediscrepancios, along with constraintson battalionlevelleadership,resultin vulnerabilities which may b€ erDlokedbv Westerncommanders,

TABLEOFCONTENTS

SUMMARY 1. INTFODUCTION CHAPTER CHAPTER 2, D O C T R | N E , T A C T | C S , T R E. N ..D ..S ........ SectionA - Doctrine. . . . . , . , . , . SecrionB SeclionC - TacticalTrendsSinceThe Ocloberl973War

3 3 7 12

CIiAPTER 3. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEDIVISiON AND I\4OTORIZEO RIFLEREGII\4ENT . :8APTER4. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEEATTALION SectionA - Op8rationalPrincipl€sand lvlissions. . . . . . . . . SecrionI - Organization,R€sponsibilities, and Equipment Commandand Conrol SectionD BattalionRearServices.

25 25 26

SHAPTER 5. SectionA SectionB -

BATTALION LEVELLEADERSHIP ,.,.......,. Iniroduction T h e H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p € c. .t .i .v.e. The Present

€ € € 52

CHAPTER 6. SectionA SeciionC SeciionO SecdonE

B A T T A L I O N I R A I N I N G A N D S U B U N I T T A C. .T. .I .C. .S. . , . , . . . . . TrainrngPhilosophyand Obiectives TrainingSchedules. . . CompanyandSectionTraining andTactics B a t t a l i o n T a c t i c a l T r a h. .i .n. s. . . . . Evalu8tionof BatalionTraining.....

57 57 57 59

36

@

70

SHAPTER 7. T H E M O T O R I Z E D R I F L E B A T T A L I O N I N C O M B A T . . . . . . . . . , . , . , . . . . SecrionA Offen6iveOperations SectionI - DefensiveOperation6

71 71 9o

CHAPTER 8. SecrionA SectionB SectionC SectionD SectionF :HAPTER9.

APPENDIX .........,.13s

S o v i eSt y m b o l s , v11

LISTOF ILLUSTRATIONS

1 . S o v i eO t f f e n s i vDeo c t r i nl es B a s e o d n C o m b i n eAdr m sC o m b a t .........3 2 . Airborneand Heliborne TroopsAre Sel€ctively UsedTo MaintainOffensive Momefltum........... 4 a . A i r b o r nDe r o pi n t h eE n e m R y earArea ................ 4 b . H e l i b o r nFeo r c eR s u s hT o E s t a b l i a s hB r i d g e h e a. .d. . . . . . . . . . . . . . BasicFormsof Maneuve ..................... 5 a. FrontalAttack .......................... s b. Shallow E n v e l o p m e{ S n ti n g l e .) . . . . . . . . . ................ 5 c. DeepEnvelopment(Double)............ ................ 5 The MeetingEngagement ................... ....................... 6 5. B a t t a l i o n A n t i t a n k R e s e r v e s R e s p o n d D i r e c t l y t o t h e B a t t a l i o n C o m m a n d e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . , I a . A n t i t a nR keserve i nsa B T R - E q u i p pUendi t ....................... 8 b. ABIMPEquipped lvlotorized RifleBattalion AntitankReserve ......... 9 6. T f a f f i R c e g u l a t o r s ACi o d m m a n d ei n heiU r nits ...........9 r sC o n t r o l l i T ng 7. The RegimentalChiefof Artillery(on the right)CoordinatesRegimentalAnillery During P h a sO e n eF i r e. , , , . , . .....,.,, ro 8. H i g h P e r f o r m a n c e A i r c r a { t i n S u p p o r t o f t h e M a i n A t t a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 9. The MotorizedRifleDivision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. T h e l v l o t o r i z e d R i l l e D i v i s i o n ' s P r i n c i p a l w e a p o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 a . 7 6 m mD i v i s i o nGa ul n Z , I S3 . . . . . ..........14 b . 1 o o m m A T c u n[ ,. 4 - 5 5 /112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........14 c. 122mm H o w i t z eN r ,4 - 1 9 3 8 / D -.3.0. .. . . . . . . ........14 d. 122mm R o c k eLt a u n c h €BrI M2 1 . . . . . . .. -..........15 €. 152mm H o w i t z eD r ,- 1 .. .............15 f. FROGTEL,FROGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 , 6 ..... .. ............. 16 s . G A I N F U L T ESL A r t _ The MotorizedRifleDivision'sPrincipalEquipment . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 a . T r u c kM , i n eD e t e c t oD r ,i m . . . . . . - . . . . . . . ,.,.,.,.16 b. TrackedFerry,GSP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 c - P o n t o oP n M Po n K R A Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 d . T r a c k eAdm p h i b i a K n ,6 1 . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... i7 e. lr.4ine ClearerBTR-5oPK,l\r-1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 f . t ! 4 i n e f a ySePr ,A r m o r e d. . . . . . . . .........17 g . T r u c kD , e c o nT, M S - 6 5. . . . . . . . . ......... 18 ' 2 The l,lotorizedRifleRegiment(B[IP-Equipped) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 PrincipalWeaponsin the MotorizedRifleRegiment(BlvlPEquipped). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 a. MediumTank,T-62164/72................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1s b . l 2 2 m mS PH o w i t z e r ........20 ..........20 c . 2 3 m mS PA A G u n Z , SU-23-4 ... d. SAI\4 ........ 21 {SA-9IGASK|N e . A T G ML a u n c h e r v e h i c l e3A T. . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 ' a Principal (BlvlP-Equipped) Equipment ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 in the Motorized RifleRegiment , e c o nA, R S 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a T r u c kD .........21 5 Truck, Decon,DDA-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 : . B i d g e ,T a n kL a u n c h e ld\ ,4 T U. . . . . . . . . . . . . .........21 a Bridge,TruckLaunched,Tl\rl\r....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 e. Ditchinglvlachine { 1 ) l \ 4 D K - 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 (2) lvlDK2in Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1 . D o z e ra, A T / B A l - l v l / P K -.T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........23 ...........23 g . M i n eC l e a r i nPgl o w K , l \ 4 T - 4. . . . . . . . . . . . ..........23 , MR'3.............. " . M i n eL a y e rT, o w e dP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .23 . M i n eR o l l e K r , l v l T -.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i ;

1 5 . T h el v l o t o r i zR ed i f l eB a t t a l i o{ nB M P - E q u i p p e. d , .}. . - . . . - . . . . . . . . 26 16. PrincipalWeaponsand Equipmentof The MotorizedRifleBattalion{BMP-Equippod) a. lmmm Mortar I b. 8MP ............ 27 c. Truck, UAZ-@ 27 d. Truck, GM-66 a e. Truck,ZIL 130 2A f . T r u c kV, a n ,Z l L i M a i n t e n a n c. e . .). . . a g. Truck, POL{4,000or5,200Liters} B h. Truck, FieldKitchen,Van PAK-200. . . E i. Ambulance,UAz-450 30 j. Trailer-lrounrEdFieldKitchen.KP-125 30 1 7 . B a t t a l i o n H e a d q u a r.t.e. .r,s. . . . . . . . . . . 30 1 8 . T h el \ r o r o r i z R e di f l eC o m p a n(yB M P - E q u i p p e . .d. .). . . . . . . . 19. The Monsr Batt€ry I 2 0 . T h oC o m m u n i c a l i oPnl a s t o o n. . . . . . . . . . . & g nepresentative Ritle 21. Communications Net in a Motorized Battallon 22. TheUseof LineCommunicarions by a lrotofizedRitleBattalion in the Detens€, . , . -............. 23. MotorizedRifleBsttalionRearServiceElemontsin an Ass€mblyAret 24. MotorizedRifleEanalionRearServiceSupportEiementsDuringthe March . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cl 25. RearServiceSupportDuringthe A$ack 26. RearSeruiceSupportin the Defense 27. The SupplyPlatoon 40 28, AmmunitionResupply to the Companies in the Defense.......... 2 9 . R e l u e l i nt hgel v l o t o r i zR ed i f l eB a t t a l i o nC' so m b aEt l e m e nD l su r i n g t hM 6 a r c h. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 42 30. The SupplyPlatoonDeliveringFoodto AuackingCompanias € . .l. . . . . . . . . . . , 3 1 . D i v i s i oBna k e rP yersonne 3 2 . T h e M e d i c € l ASi dt a t i o n. . . . . . . . . 3. MedicalEvacuationDuringan Attack . . . . . . . a6 T h s R e p a i r w o r k s h o . , p . . . . , . . . , . . . . . , 34. 6 35. Repairand Evacuationof Weaponsand EquipmentOuringan Atack ........ 3 6 . S e n i o r S o v i e t \ A / V l l C o m m a n d e r s w e r e F l e x i b l e , E n e r g e t i c a n d F u l l o f l n i l i a t i v e . . - . . .50 a. MarshalZhukov,Chielof the Gener6lStafl in E€rly1941and DeputySupremeCommander Thereafter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 b. FrontCohmandersEremenko,Konev.Rokossovsky,andTimoshenko...................... 37. UntilOctoberl94l,TheUnitPoliticalOfficerHadToCountersignTheCommender'sOrders........6 38. Batt6iionCommandersAre Young lvlenwith Considerablg PeacetimeCommandExperience. . . . . . . . 52 *). The RegimentalCommanderand His Staff ErerciseTight ControlOver

S u b o r d i nU a tnei t s ..-............,....,...54 4. A R e p r e s e n t a t i v e S i x - M o n t h T r a i n i n g S c h e d u l e l o r a B M P - E q u i p p e d U n i t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41. A Typicalweek-Day TrainingSchedul€ . . . . . . . . 69 42. TheMo(ar BatteryCommander 6t HisForward Obs€rvation Post ........ @ 4ii. FlagSignalsUsedby the lvlonarBattory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4, Thelvlortar Duringthe Battery March ..-...... @ a . A sP a n o f t h B eattalio F no r m a t i o n ......... 62 b. BatteryMarchOrder - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 62 ,15. M o r t aBr a t t e rDye p l o y m lernotmt h eM a r c .h. . . ..................... €B

-. -...... u 4 6 . l v f o r t aPro s i t i oi n t h eD e f e n s.e. . . . . 4 7 . O o e r a l i o n s o f tM r a t t e r vF ' so r w a rO d b s e r v a t iP .....,.,.,,65 h eo r t a B oo ns t 48.Moral-PoliticalTraininginaCombinedArmsUnitPriortoanExercise.........................6€ 49. CombinedArms Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . 6s r crhd e r o f al v l o t o r i z R e di f l eB a t t a l i o.n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -72 5 0 . T a c t i c a f l M aO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 51. ControllileasuresDuringthe March . . . . . - . r ei s p e r s e -... -.......74 5 2 . V e h i c l e s aD ad n dC a m o u f l a gD ed u r i n gL o n gH a l t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 7E 53. SecurityDuringthe March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54. SA-7 GunnersAreThe MotorizedRifleBattalionCommander'sPrimaryl/lsansof Air Defense . . . . . . 78 ls Conductedby lvlotorizedRilleBattalionAssetsand/orby 55. NBC Reconnaissance BRDM-Equipped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 SpecialistsfromRegiment 56. ChemicP a le r c o n nM e la r k i nag C o n t a m i n a tAerde a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 L se a d i ntgo a l , 4 e e t i n Egn g a g e m e .n. t. . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.Condition 80 58. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionConductinga lvleetingEngagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 59.SovietFigu.esforNATODefensivePositions............................................ 83 60. ArtillerySupportfor FirstEchelonBattalionsinthe Breakthrough ........84 61. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionDeploying{rom the lvlerchto Panicipatein a Division B r e a k t h r o uOg ph e r a t i o n ........... Ea 62. U Z - 2B a n glao r eT o r p e d o ........89 63. T a n k s C l e B areachesThrou Mgi n h eF i e l dfso r[ I o t o r i z eRdi f l e T r o o p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @ T h el / l o t o r i z eRdi f l eB a t t a l i oi n t h eD e f e n s e ........................ 94 A R e i n t o r c e d l M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n A c t i n g a s t h e F o r w a r d A r e a S e c u r i t y F o r c. e. ..9. .7. . . . . . . . 66. A ReinforcedN4otorized RifleBattalionActing as th€ RearGuardDuringa RegimentalWhhdrawal . . . s9 67. R e l i ei nf P l a c e ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 68. T h sl J r b a n i z a t F i oanc t o r .................... r03 69. A R e i n f o r c eMdo t o r i z eRdi f l eB a t t a l i oAnt t a c k i nagB u i l t - U p A r e a .. -.........105 70. Combat-in-Cities Exercises ................. ..... -. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 1 . Flamelhrower Personnel Playan lmportantRolsin UrbanCombat ........107 72. A Reinforced l,4otorized RifleBattalion Defendinga Built'lJpArea ........10€ 73. A B T R - E q u i p p e d M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n P r e p a r i n g f o r a H e l i b o r n e O p e r a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 14. I n e F L U U b E H S e n e s r r o v r d e A f - G r o u n d S u o D o n , , , , . , , , . , . , . , , , . , . , , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , , , 1 1 0 75. H e l i c o p t e r c u n s h i p / T r o o p C a r r i e r s . . . . . . . . . . ..................... i11 a. HIND ........... . -. -. -.............. i11 b . H t P. . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... l]1 76. T h eH O P L I TPEe r f o r mTsa c t i c aRl e c o n n a i sn sc ae. ..... -. -. -. -. - -.....112 n. T h e H I P C a n C o n d u c t A e r i a l l v l i n e l a y i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 74. T h eH e a v y T r a n s pHo er tl i c o p t eHr O , oK ......... r13 79. C o m m u n i c a t i oi nnt sh eA s s e m b l y A r e a .,......114 80. A M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n i n a H e l i b o r n e A s s a u h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r r 5 8 1 . Reconnaissance of BothRiverBanks lJsually Precedes th€ MainAss€ult... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 a. T h e s e n i o r E n g i n e e r o f f i c e r c o n l r o l s t h e C r o s s i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 8 SelfPropolledArtiileryandzSU-23-4sSupportingaRiverCrossing...........................1t9 u. T-62sPreparingfor a RiverCrossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 85. SA-TGunnersSupplementOtherAirDefenseWeaponsDuringaWater-crossingoperation........r20 86. A ReinforcedlvlotorizedBifleBattalionAssauhinga Water Barrierand Establishing -. -. -. -.121 a Bridgehead 4 1 .AttachedArmor RejoinslvlotorizedBifleTroopsAs Soon As Possiblein a RiveFcrossing Operation. . , . . , . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 88. A R e i n f o r c e d M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n D e f e n d i n g a R i v e r L i n e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . l 2 3

u.

x1

89. A Roinforced Motorized Rffl6 Battalion Conducting a Night Attack . . . , . , , .127 Sn. A Reintorced Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Night Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i29 91. NavalInfantryon Paradein Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . .130 92. NavalIntantryOft€n Formthe FirstEchelonin a Se€bomoAssauh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13r 9 3 . E m b a r k a t iaonndo e b a r k a t i oPno i n t s ............132 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . .13' Sl4.AmDhibiousShios . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ...,... -133 a . A L L I G A T OCRl a s s .,. -.................133 b , R O P U C HCAl . s s .. . . .. . - .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .1ir4 c. POLNOCNYC|aSS.. 9 5 . A m p h i b i o uAs$ a u l t sM a yB eC o n d u c t oWd i t hA i rC u s h i oVne h i c l €.s. . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . r34 96. A Roinforced Motorized Rifle Sattalion Conducting an Amphibious Assault - . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . 138

xli

1. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. RELEVANCE

2. CONCEPTUALAPPROACH

Flvl lO0-5examin6sthe basicdoct nal concepts of the United States Army and pres€ntsthe principlesdeemednoc$sary for winning the land battle. For thos€ m6n tasked with directing and fighring th6 battle {that is, for colonelsand captainal, The Soviet Moton2ed Rille Eattalion is par ticularlyrelBvant.BMP-equippedMRBs are widely distributedthroughoutthe ground forces, poss€ss mobility and firepowor superior to that ol BTRequipped MRBS, and allow mol€ flaxibility in employment. The MRB is the major maneuver elementof the molorizedrffle r€gimont(according to the Soviets, tho most irhportant unit in rh€ ground forces) and plays 6n irnportantrole in oflensive and defensivo ooerationa. Studv oI the MRB reveals strongths to be countered and weaknessesto be exploited; and providesan insight into Soviet op6rationalprocsdures at the nsxt higherlevel.

A straightlorwardanalysisof MRB opsrations per se would b6 hisleadingand dangerous,as the [/lRB normallyoperatesas part of the MRR and, in addilion, may receiveadditionalsupport frcm the motorized rifle divlsion (MRD). Accordingly, this studv analyzesthe MRB within the context of regimentaloperations,and illustraressome of the whichmay€lsobe in support. MRD'sequipm€nt 3. DIAGRAMS The tactical diagrams arc not templates and should not be used as such. lroreover, while illustratingSovi€t tactical concepts, they arg not intended to portray rigidly how ths Soviets will conductevervooeration.

CHAPTER2. DOCTRINE.TACTICS,AND TRENDS SectionA - Docttine 1 .G E N E R A L

2. OFFENSIVE PRINCIPLES

Soviet doctrine sl.esses that the offensive ts ihe decisivefofm of combat. To achievesuccess, the Soviets stress high averagerates of advance r30 50 kilometersper day in nonnuclearsituations and 50-m kilometels per day when nuclear weapons are used) by combin€d arms units lilgure1).

Soviet olfensive doctrine is based upon combined arms operations,that is the closely coordinatedefforts of the missile,tank, motorizedrifle, attillery,and combatsupportunits.This doctrine does not separat€ fire and maneuverj it seeks ways to improve their integration and effec,

To achieve such high rates of advance, the Sovietsadvocatethe concentrationof numerically superiorlorces and firepowerw;thin selectedsec:ofs; the use ot airborne, heliborne,and special 3perstionsforces throughout the depth of the enemyreararea;and the achievement of surprise figure2). Shouldnuclear/chemical weaponsnot 3e used, conventionalartillerywould be used to schievethe desired density of firepower. Soviet {r tings stress the crilical transition from non-!c ear to nuclearoperations, and frequendyex:'cise going from one mode of combat to the

In fo"ning combined arms group,ngs,the Soviets do not cross-attach units as in some Western armies. Within a Soviet motorized rifle regim€ntfor example,one tank companymay be assigned1o a MFB, but that I\,'lRB will not, in turn, assignone of its N4Rcompaniesto the tank battalion. In the Soviet Army, units are often at tached or placed in support of othe. units, Attachm€nts are more responsiveto the com mander of the unit to which they are attached, while units placed in support are controlied throughtheirparentunitcommander.

Detensiveconcepts are less frequentlydescrib.l and practiced.Ahhough they acknowledge '-ar a parricularsitualionmay diclaredefensive ::ton, the Sovietsstressthat the primarypur::se ol the defenseis to preparefor the resump::. of offensiveoperationsassoon as possible.

The Soviets idenrify rhree types of combat action''tl:e meeting engagement,* the offense, 6nd the defense.The offenseis funher subdivid' ed into the attackand its exploitation, and the pJrsuitculm:natiag in encirce.nent.The offensive is conductedby maximizingmaneuver,firepower, and shock action. Approximately80 percentof a

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a Figore 1. Sov et OlrenslveDoclrine s Basedo. CombinedArms Cornbar. ':'-r-sh :-:

rh. meeling ehgaoementis ofiensiv6in nature, the Soviers,in order Io emphaszeiG frpodance, r€cosnizeit as a : . rormol combar.

battalion'stactical training is offensive in nature, a biasalsor€flectedin the Sovietpress.

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are the basic types of haneuver describedby the Soviets, who clearly favor the latter (figure 3). Envelopmentis often employed in the meeting engagementand generallywhenever the enemy has an assailabl€flank. Envelopmentis also often conducted in conjunction wilh a frontal attack designedto pin down enemyforces. 8€'caused rheir perceptionsof the fluid nature ot modern war, the Soviets place more emphasis on the rne€ting€ngagement(combatbeween op posing columns rdpidly advancing toward each oth€d than on any other form of offensiveaction (figure 4). Meeting engagem€ntsrequire a high degree of;nitiativ€ because of their inherent -- Th€ n€ed to seizeand haintain the initiative. -- Freedornol .n€neuver,often with open flanks.- Comb€ron a wadefront. Rapidtroop deploym€nt. .. tr4obile,highspeedcombat.

o. Airbon.

Drop in the Ene6y Reot Ateo.

b. Ho,ibo.ne Forc€s Flsh 16trtobli5l'd Brdg.h.od. Fieure2. Anborneand HeliborneTroopsAre Set€ctivety Usedto MainiainOtlensiv€ Monentum. The Soviets define maneuver as the movement of a forco into a favorable position {in relation to the enemy), from which it can launch an effective

aftack.The frontal attack and the enveloDment

Although th€ Soviets believe th€t their numerousintelligencegarhering means will help commanders ptepate tor the meeting engagement, they acknowledgethat planningmust often be conducted with incomplete data on enemy forces. Soviet comrnandersare encouraged1o aggressively seek rne€ting engagements and to make rapid decisions based upon availabte intelligence. Nuclear and nonnucl€ar breakthrough operations may be conducted against hasty, prepared, or fortified defenses. In the breakthrough,the Soviets envision penetration, accompanied wheneverpossibl€by envelopment,the relegation of pockets of resistance for destruction to second-echelon formations,meetingengsgements with advancing enemy reserves,and pursuit of withdrawing enemy forces. Against a prepared defensive position, and when nuclear weapons are not used, the soviets concentratea reinforced battalionand the fire of m-100 artillerypiecesper kilometer of breakthroughsector, while exerting pressureall along the remaining portion of the

In nuclearbreakthroughop€rations,the Soviets rely primarilyon nuclear weapons and penetratE enemy defenses in column. Pursuit operations, conductedon frontal, parallel,or combinedaxes, have the purpose of cutting off and de6troying enemy forces. Tactical hgliborne and airborne lorces occupy and hold locationsin the snemy's re€r and otherwise attempt to disorganizeand delayhiswithdrawal.

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3. DEFENSIVE PBINCIPLES

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For the Soviets,the purposeof the dgfenseis ro inflict maximumcasualties,to hold the defended area,and to creat€favorableconditionsfor the resumptionof the offensive. Sovietdefensiveconceplsinclude: Stabrrt-Achieved by d€fensein depth, clos6coordinat€d tire and obstacleplans, and strong V Secuity-Providdd by combat secuity lorces which give e€rly waming, prevent enemy reconnaissanceof the main defensive position, forcg fi€ enemy to deploy prematurely, inflict max.num casualties,and coordinatelong-rangefires on enemylormations. Use of key te'/ain-lncludes a fire and obstaclo dan which restricts the enemy's freedom of -aneuver and canalizeshis lorces into prepared xillinggrounds.

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Dispersion-Ailows maximum protection from huclear and chemical weapons by posi1bning ttoops on a wide front dnd in grcat depth. All-rcund detense-Pteparedalternateand supp€menrary positions provide 3mo defensive ..p€bilities. Battalion strongpoints, echolonedin oepth wirh €xtensivebarriersEnd fire pbnning, xovide the backboneofthe regirhentaldefense.

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Delensein depth-Echelonedbattalionstrongtdnts absorb the momentum of the attack and tolride time for mobilEreservesto counterattack, Antitank defense-Ptovided by the liberal a4ocatjonof antitankweaponsdown to all levels, and $e formation of strong antitank reservesat Sanalionleveland above. Cootdinated fircs-Planned to destroy the at. tackerapproachingthe defendedarea, in tront of

.. DeapE^velop eht (Doeble). Figure3. BasicFofmsol Maneuver

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Figure4. TheMeetinS E.gagem€nr (FEBA), the forward 6dg€ oI the battle arga on rain, or to escap€ enemy pressure. Du€ to th6 the flanks, and in prepared killing zones within complexity and inherent danger of withdrawal the defendedarea. Nuclearstrikssare plannedby operations,panicularlyunder snehy pressure,the division and higher units agains! the en6my's Soviets try to achieve su.prise by conducring nucl9ar weapons, major reserves,€nd command them on multiple rout€s at night or during other and controlposts. condirionsof limiredvisibiliry.

Mobile countenftack to.ces-Requirodto launchcountetattacks, Sovietcommanderc from trattalionand up maintainreservesfor this puF pos€ Approximatety 20 percentof th6 battation.s tac ticaltrainingconcerns dgfensiveoperations.

The groupingof forces for a withdrawalincludes convering{orces, the rear guard, main body, and flank security dotachmentslwhen necessary). Normally,the Sovietsleaveone-third to doceivethe enemv :1"il1:fi':::J:"contact Covering torcesdepartsuddenlyand.as a rule, Aft€r the main body has passsd simultaneously. then withdraws through' the covering -force lhroughthe rear-guardshouldthe enemypress lhe withdrawingforces'lhe rearguardwithdraws

4. WTTHDRAWAL Withdrawaloperations,initiatedonly by the next highercommander,are conductedby rhe sovists to regroup.occupymore favorabli ter6

designated area of d€fense, reconnaissance groups are formed. These groups conduct a survey oI the new ar€a, determinethe area to be occupiedby each unit, designat€approachroutes to them, mark off any mined or contamanated areas,and test the water, As the main body approachesthe area, its subordinateelementsare met by guides from the reconnaissancegroups and ars takento theirdesignatedareas.

in a leapfrog manner, rend€ringmutual fire support. lf the rear guard is successful,withdrawalof the main body is unimpeded. The rear guard occupies defensavepositions b6hind first-echelondefense forces. Subsequent defensive positions ar€ designatedfor the rear guard, wh;ch conducts ambushesand erects bar rigrsas it withdraws to subsequentpositaons.The rear guard moves to subsaquentpositions in a leapfrog manner, rendering mutual support and defendingeachposition.

Security is organized as soon as the lead elementsclose on the new defensiveareas, and engineering work is begun,

Prior to arrivsl of the rear guard in the newly

Section B - Tactics tjon of the Soviet deployhent system, as well as confusion' over how the system, particularly echelonment,works. Basically,the Soviet syst€m of echelonmentwhh "t!vo up" and "one back" is sihilar to our own and seeksthe same effects in theattac(r

1. GENERAL In spite of the superiorqualitiesof the BMP visa-vis the BTR, we are not aware of any new regulations governing employment of 8MPequipped and BTR-equippedunits. Soviet commanders still seem to be debating the tactical €mploymentof the BMP in an effort to maximize ns principalsrrengthsvis a vrs the BTR: superior lirepower {panicularlyanthank)and cross'country mobility, and better crcw protecrion.Training as also being condricted to determinethe optimum with use of BMPSoperatingin close coordinataon tanksandartillery.

- Timelybuildup of ths attackeffort. '' Beating the enemy in th€ use of correspondrngreserves. - Preventingan overdensityof lroops and eqlipment {thereby denying the enerny lucrativenucleartargets).

The BMP'S superiorityover the BTR makes |t units of a motorized likelythat the BN4P-equipped rifle division {MRDI wiil be assigned these key

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- Reconnaissance.

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-- Usein the forwarddetachment.

tin en to

Achievinghigh rates of advanceby attacks in depth. And in the defensel - Presenting the enemy with a series of defensiveposilions. - Preventingan overdensityof lroops and equipment. The difterence beoveen the Soviet and US systemsconcernsexactnessin terminologyand preparation.

- Positioning in the first echelon during nuclea. conditions,and/or if enemy delenses have been sufficiently neutGlized; otherwise in th€ second echelonas an exploitationforce {The BTR-equippedregimen(s) would {orm the MBD'sfirstechelon).

b. Definitions The firsi echelon is the most important echelonand normallyconsistsof up to two-thardt of the forces available.In the attack it comprises the leading assaultunits; in the defense,it comprisesthe forwardd6fenseunitson the FEBA.

- Operatingon the mainaxisof attack. 2. ECHEIONSANO RESERVES ed

a. Geneal In the West, there has been an overdramatiza_

'Byl@quenrlywrrting'secondechelonkerudl,"Sovietw.heBhaveconrriburedbrhecontusio..

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The second echelon, normally consisting oI about one-third ot the availablelorces, gives the commanderthe capabilityto intensifythe attack, to shift rapidly the attack effort from one axis to another,to repulsecounterattacks,and to replace heavilyattritedf irst-echelonun;ts. The commanders of the first and second echelonsreceive their missionsprior to combat. First-echeloncommandersare assignedimmedi6te and subseouentobiectivesand an axis of further advance, while second-echelon commanders receive an immediate objective and an axis for further adv6nce. Commandersmust get permission from the next higher commanderto commit their second echelon. A second echelon as not committ€din a piecemealfashion. Reseruesclearly differ from echelons.Wh€n the Soviets wrile "second echelon (res€rvol," they are not equating the two; they m€an that sometimes a cohmander will have a second echelon and at other times a reserve, Starting at battalion level, commandersnormally haintain reserves,usuallyconsistingof l6ss than one'third of the forces available. Reserves may be of severaltypes lantitank, branch, combined arms) and be employed separatelyor together, The commander ot the reserverac€ives no specific mission prior to battle, but must be pfeparedto carryout a numberof contingsncies, c. Employment of Echelonsand Reserves The commander's decision tor the emDlovment of his force deoendsuoon lVlETT.rFor example, bec€usea hasty defense does not have well-coordinatedfire and obstacleplans, speed in rhe atrack, combined with maximum combat power forward, is preferred to echeloning, Accordingly, a single echelon and a reservowould mostprobrblybe us€dto attacka hastydef6ns6. Moreover, unless a commander r€ceives augmentation, he must weaken his assault elements in ordsr to have tlvo echelons and a branch or combined arms reserve. For thas reason,units at regimentallevel and abov€ may, when attacking in two echelons,have chemical, engineer,and antitank reserves,but no moto zed rifle, tank, or combined arms reserve.lf sullably augmented, they may have two echelons plus branch,combinedarms,and/orother reserv€s, 'MBsion, 6n€hy, r6iiain€ndwoarher,troopsdvailabl6.

The MRB is the lowest level where echelonmeni occurs in the Soviet Army (the Sovietshave experimented with echelonment within companies,but this practicehas been discouragedby general officers who wrote that such practice dis$pates the company's combat power and increasesthe command and control problems of the comoanvcommander), When two ech€lons and a reserve are employed,reserveslor BTR- and BMP-equippad battalionscould consjsrof 6 designatedMR unit {normallya plaroon), usually taken from the second echelon,or a olatoonfrom an attachedtank The antitank reserve of the BTR-equipped [,4R8is normallyils antirankplatoon of manpack SAGGERSand SPG9s, whilefor a BMP- equioped MRB it may be pan of an attachedtank company or an anached platoon of rhe MRR'S antitank missile ban€ry (figur€ 5). Both types ol reserves ar€ usuelly under the battalion commander'sdirectcontrol. Dependingupon METT, the banalion'ssecond echelon{reserveloperatesfrom 1 to 3 kilometers behind the first echelon in order ro avoid unnecessarylosses, while being close enough for timely commitment to banle. When a second echelon passes through a firsr €chelon. the former lights independentlyof the latter, and is usually supponed by fjre froh the first echelon. Reserves and the second echelon are reconstituted as soon as possiblefollowing theh commitment.

d. Anriron*t6ov.! Jt o 8lR-Equtppod Uni,. RespondDirectly Figur€5. &ttalion AnlitanhReserves io the BattallonCommander.

The battalion'schief of staff, the deputy com mandersfor politicalaffairs and technicalaffaiis, and the headsof the variousrear serviceelements communicatewith their countelpartsat regiment, thus relievingthe battalioncommanderof many administrative and supplydetailsand allowinghim to concentrate on implementingregimentaltac4. TRAFFICREGULATORS

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A B[P.Equipped lAototi2ed RIll. B.nolton Antttank

: g!re5. Battalion Reserves Respond Antitank Drrecllyto (Contnued) Commander. theBatialon 3. COMMAND AND STAFF In the Soviet Army, position and branch are ..ore importantthan rank, lt is not unheardof for 3 Commanderto be junior to his chief of staff A 3nd/or one or moresubordinate commanders, Soviet major commandinga regimentcould have eutenantcolonelsas his deputies,Moreover,the :cmbined arms commandercommandsattach-ents, regardlessof whether or not the com-rander of the attached unit is superior in rank. Shouldan aftilleryor tank battalioncommanded ay a major or lieutenantcolonel be attachedto a r,!RBcommandedby a captain,the IVIRBcom -3nder would commandboth battalions. .

ChainofCommand

lo reconstitute a destroyed command ele-*_1. the Sovietsfirst attenpt to util;zethe unit's !.3 3ble assets.shouldthe battalioncommander :E -epacitated, he would normallybe succeedr: .v his chief of staff and the first N4Rcompany ::--'13nder (who is normallythe senior company ::Tmander), respectively. The battajion comnander may designatehis political officer to be 'ris successor, since this man is well trained .nilitaily. The regimentalcommandermay appoint one of his staff officers to temporarilycommand :hebattalion,

Extensiveuse of tmffic regulators(figure 6) by the Soviet ground forces is often interpretedas indicating a weakness in mapreadingskills. Thoughmapreading seemsto be a problemat the lower levelsdue to a number of factors (see 7re Soviet Motorized Rille Conpany, DDI-1100-T|-76, October1976,paragraphs51.53),the extensive use of traffic regulatorsrnay aid the achievement of high rates of adv6nce-Traffic regulatorsmove out with the advanceguard battalion,and their placementat key locationsspeedsup the movein ment of Sovietcolumnsby aidingcommanders the control of their subordinate elements, Because the Soviets move under vinual radio enemyconsilenceduringthe march (preceding tact), traffic controllers are panicularly useful. if ihey ate inlvloreover. Theyare alsovulnerable. capacitated, advancing columns may have difficulty.

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Fieure6Traflic ReellatorsAid Commandersin Con t r o l l i r E T hrel J n i l s .

5. ATTACKTIME AND OBJECTIVES In the Soviet Army the at'racktime (H hour) is the time the first man reachesthe enemy FEBA, whereas in most Western armiesthe attack time refersto crossingthe lineof departure. A unit is given intermediateand subsequentob jectives and a direction for fufther attack. The depths of these objectivesdepends upon IIETT and whetheror not nuclearweaponsare used, The unit's immediate objective includes the enemy'sforward positions;the subsequentobjec tive, his reserves.The battalion'ssubsequentob-

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one), fires in support of an attack (phasetwo), and fires in support o{ operations within the depths of the enemy's dafenses {phase three), The battalion commander's control over his organic monars and attached artilleryvarieswith

iective is included in the immediateobjective of the regiment; the subsequent objective of the regimentis within the immediateobjectiveof the division, etc. 6. COMBINEDARMS OPERATIONS Sovietemohasison combinedarms oDe.alions has increasedover the last 5 years. [Iotorized rifle r€giments and divisions and tank divisions are units with an excellentmix ol motorizedrifle, aF tillery. tank, and engineer troops. Recently, motorized rifl€ comoanies have been added to tank regimentswithin tank divisions.These companies may be the p€cursors ot liR battalions becoming organic to tank regiments. Combined arms conceDtsand how thev affect the [lRB are describedb€lowi

The MRB commander,though responsiblefor rhe lraining and €mploymentof his organic moF tar battery, does not always have control over this unit. The regimentalchief of artillery plans and supervisesthe training of the mortar batterigs (as well as the regiment'santitank means)in thg regiftent s subordinatebattalionsand supervases execution of the fire plan by organic regimental artillery,to includemortars{figure7}. Artilleryfire planning is centrally coordanatedwith flexibility built in to allow lor close suD9ort ol maneuver

a. Tanks A tank unit(s) is usuallyattachedto or in support of a MRB, Normally, however, tanks are placed in support, thus allowing lhe rank comrnander to maintain control over his subunits. Such an afi6ngementfacilitatesmassing of pla toon and companytireson particularobjectives,

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When cenlralizedcontrol of tanks is not practical {for example,in combat in built-up areas6nd in forests), however, tank platoons may bs decentralizedand rqspondto l/lR company com' manders. b. Attilery To achieve desired fire suooort in a breakthrough,the Soviets form regimental,divisional, and 6rmy anillery groupings {respectively RAG, DAG, and AAG). An anillerygroupingis temoorarvin nature and consistsof two or more artillerybattalions.Wh6n a RAG is formed it does not includo the lrRR's organic artillery battaljon. The battalionis, howsv€r, normallyplacedin supoort of the MRR'Ssubordinatemotoriz€drifle battalions. In some cases each of the artillery battalion's battsries may bs attached to a lvlRB. In such cases. coordinalion of arlillerv fire is accomplishedby the aftillery battery commander {working wilh the MRB commanded under the close suosrvisionoI thg artillerv battalion commsnder(workingwith th€ IVIRRcommander)Artillerysupportfor an ofiensivsmay be divided into thr€€ phasesr preparatorylires {phase

Figu.eT-TheR€timental ChElol Artillery(onthe rieht) C@rdinat€s Resimerial ArtilleryDurinsPhase During phase one, all artillery, including mor tars, and all weapons {tanks and antitank guns) firing in th€ preparation,are centrally controlled by means of a fire plan. During phas€ two, the MRB'S organic mortars are controlled by the MRB, The attached anillerv battery, while less centralized.is responsiveto requests for fires from rhe IMRB, while still being controlled by higher headquaners.During phase thGe. attached anillery, whh the senior commander's approvsl, could advancewith the [lRB to provide close support, In the aftack, the mortgr battery displacesaccording to the tactical situation {see chapt€r 6 for details). Firing oltside a maneuver

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unit's boundariesis not permittedwithout approvalf romhigherauthority.

trained for specific rnissions.The latter type of engineeris normallyorganicro atmy andftunt

Duringtraining,when employedin an indirect fife role,Sovietanillery(depending upon the type of artillerybeing fired) will not fire within 300 rrelers of friendlytroops mou4teo in APCs or within 200 meters of friendly tanks. Artillery will not fire within 400 meters of dismountedtroops. Artilleryfired in the difect fire mode will fire much closer, Peacetimefire restrictionswould be considerablyreducedin wartime.

Ffom his seniorcommanders, the MHB commander receivesengineer support to enable his unit to crossnaturaland manmadeobstacles, and 1o colstruct defensivepositionsand barrierc. N4RBIroopsare trainedto performson'eengineer tasks such as buildingweaponsemplacements and trenches,emplacingand clearingminesby hand,andcamouflaging weaponsandequipment.

Dufing the pursuit, attachedartillerywoutd Direct air support to an l,4RB commander provide close support and on call fires. Owing to would be a rarity, since the IMB division comthe speedof pursuit operations,a continuingbar mander normally directs supporting air assets rage of fire foMard of the maneuverunits is not through air liaison staffs. Forwardair controllers deemedpractical. could, however,be assignedto a regimentattack, ingon a division s mainaxis, The prol;feration,types, and quality of Soviet engineer equipment complement their doctrine stressing high rates of adv6nce. Rivercross;ng equipment,mineclearers,and minelayersare par ticularlyimpressive(seechapter3). There are two types of Soviet engineers:Sapper, or combatengineers found at regimentand division,and moreskilledengineers organized and

This is not to say that Soviet tacticalair assets wouid not be used to "prep" an area prior to an i.4RB attack. For example, Soviet high peF formanceaircraft{suchas the FLOGGER seri€s) and or helicoptergunshipsoften "prep" areas prior to a fiver crossing,on the main axis of attack, €nd in other selectiveoperations{figure 8). Th€ l\lBB commander has no directorganiccom, municationwith high-performance aircraftor attack helicopters.

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SectionC - TacticalTrcndsSincetheOctober198 War combined arms operationsbuil! primarily around the tank. lt should be noted rhat in the 1973w6r. Thg Octob6r1973War had considerable imDsct tank gunnery destroyed rhree to four times as on the tacticaldoctrineof someW€sterncoun- manvtanksas did antitankmissiles.

1.GENERAL

lries, but did not c€useany ladicalchangeain Sovietdoctrineor tactics,in spite of a dgofous examination oI basicdoctrinalprinciples.Th€se principlgs lor the mostpartgo backto WorldWar ll. and rcmainthe primaryoriginof curent Soviet doctrinalthinking.Sovietoffensivedoctrine,built high€tes of adaroundths tank and enMsioning vance,remains basically unchanged. 2. SOVIETANALYSISOFTHEWAR

3. TRENOSSINCETHEWAR Sinc€ October 1!m, rhe Soviets have tak6n numeroussteos lo incr€se the viabilitv of their tank forces and to allow for anticipated losseSoI armored vehicl€s. Th6y have incroased the numbers of ranls and anillery pieces {especially self-propelled artileryl within the MRD. and ar6 stressingthe use ot combined arms units oven more than previoudy. Moreover, ther€ are clear indications that hdi:opters will be assign6d a greatsr role in ofiefldv€ op€radons.

While impr€5sedwith the increas€dcomplgxity of modern defens€s.the high exponditur€of munitions,and the lothalityof antitankweaponry, Nowherc aa6 dEse tr€ids morc apparent lhan the Soviets werc equary impressed by the ot Sovbt battalionand regimensnhanced otf€nsive capabilitiesp.osentedby in the op€radroaE mobileair defgnsesvstemsand wellcoordinated tal comb€t groupa€6.

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R I F L ED I V I S I O N C H A P T E R3 . T H E M O T O R I Z E D H I F L ER E G I M E N T AND MOTORIZED 1 .G E N E B A L

dependentop€rations.The lvlRD is organiz€das shown in fjgure L The tvlBD'sprincipalweapons andequipment areshownin figures10and 11.

Although the N4RBhas considerablefirepower, it lacks sufficient organic combat and combat support elementsfor many types of operations, 3. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEREGIMENT For this reasonit usuallyoperatesas part of the Though capable of independentaction, the f RR. Since the MRB is normallyreinforcedor rifle regimentnormallyoperatesas part motorized supported by regiment, and sometimes by diviof a division, The division commanderallocates sion, the organizationsand equipment of the additional support to his regimentsas required. MRD and the MRR will be covered in this Regimentalattillery,for example,may be reinforc chapter. ed with units from the division's artillery and muk;ple rocket launcherbattalions,forming a 2, THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEDIVISION regimental artiherygrouping(RAG).The regimenunit possessing tal commanderrequestsnuclearfire supportfrom The MRD is a well.balanced sufficient combat, combat suppon, and combat division. service suppon units to enable it to conduct a The BMP-equipped MRR;s organized as shown variety of offensive and defensive operations the regiment'sprincipal under conventional or nuclear conditions- ln figure 12. Some of part or of corps weapons and equipmentare shown in figures 13 Although it normallyoperatesas army, the l\4RD;s fully capableof conductingin- and 14.

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' Alsoioundin otherunitsln ihe motorized rilledNision Fi€ure13.Pr ncipalweapons inthe Motorized ued) RilleRegime.i(BMP.Equipped).(Contin

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o lfuck, De.or, ARS-,1.

b.Iruck, De.on, DDA 66.

Eridse,f onk Lolnched,Mf U

Figure 1 4 .P r n c r p a l E qpum e n t i n t h le\ , l o t o r i zReidi l eR e gn r e n t ( B MEPq up p e d ) .

2r

:11*

d Bnd\e. rru.kLounched ltuA

*Er--''-'

.. (t ) MDK-2DitchtngAo.hine.

e. (2)MDK 2OitchinsMd.hine(inopaatran) Figure 14. PrincipaI Equipment in the Molorzed RiileReg ment(BMP Eq!rpped).(Continued)

22

g. Lrihe Cleori^g Pl6w, KMf.l

i. Min. Rollet, KJAI.5

NOTE A l o l t h e a b o v e e q u i p m esnats o l o u n d i n o t h e r u n tnst h e m o l o r z e d r i l l e d i v i s o n . (BMP'Equipped). RilleRecimeni (Cofiin!ed) Figure14.Principa I Equipnenlinthe Motorized

2i

CHAPTER 4. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEBATTALION SectionA - OperationalPinciplesand Missions 1, OPERATIONALPRINCIPLES

A second-echelonbattalion may be given any of thefollowing missions:

Although it normally operates as paft of the regiment, the [r1RBmay aiso be designatedthe division reserve. In the latter role, the battalion op€ratesunder the division commander.In addi tion to their normal operations,IMRBSmay also participalein operationsunder specialconditions (seechapter8).

- Assuming the mission of severelyattrited firct-echelonunits. -- Exploitingthesuccessof the first echelon, - Eliminating bypassed pockets of enemy resistance,

Becauseit is relatively"light" in combat and 'Counterattacking. combat-supportelements,the battalionis normal iy reinforced by regiment and/or division. This -. Destroyingenemyforces on the flanks and augmentationmay occur when the battalionacts in the intervalsbetweenaxes of attack and in as a forward detachment,advance,flank, or rear the rearofattackingtroops, guard; when it attacks or defends in the first -- Attackingin a newdirection. echelonof the regiment;or when it conducts independent operations. For such operations, a As a divisionreserve,the l\,4R8would be given Sovietbattalioncommander couldbe allocated, in no mission p of to combat, but would be addition to his own assets,one tank company* a prepared to executea numberof contingencies: l22mm howitzer battaiion, an antitank guided missileplatoon, an antiaircraftmissileand anillery -- Flepulsing enemycounterattacks, platoon,an engineerplatoon,and a chemicalpla-- Combatting airbornelandings. 2. MtSStONS The missionof the MRB dependsupon the role it has been assignedwithin the regimentalcombat formation, lt may attack or defend as part of the first echelon,be placedin the secondechelon,be designatedas pad of the division res€rve,or be assignedspecial missions. As part of the regi ment's first echelon in the attack, the battalion would have the mission of penetrating enemy defenses,neutralizing enemv toops and equipment, and seizingand consolidatingthe enemy's defensivepositions.Fhstechelonbattalionswould also take pa.t in repellingenemy counterattacks and pursuinga withdrawingenemyforce. ln the def€nse,first-echelonbattalionshave the m|ssron of defeatingor wearing down the enemy's initial assaultelements.

- Beplacing weakened first-echelon units (rarely done). -- Intensifyingthe attackeffort. '- Exploitingsuccess, The MRB may also be assigneda numberof special missions:forward detachment or recon naissanceelement (the N,4RB would be the basis group)for division,advance for a reconnaissance guard of the regiment,and flank or rear security guard for the division (see chapter 7, section A, paragraph4 for further details). lt may also be given a variety of missionsin heliborneoperations and, on occasion,in ship-to-shoreoperations

'< panoi the regimenfsinstechelonin a bre.kihroughoperation,the MBB commandermay b€ sivonmorolanksuppon.

25

Section B * Organization, Responsibilities,and Equipment 1. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEBATTALION The organizationand principal weapons and equipmentof the BMP,equippedMRB are shown

in figures 15 and 16. For a detailedlist and photos of weaponsand equipmentat companylevel,see The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company, DDt 11q0,7/,76.

1h..upp|Yehton|.d.l,ulu.

FiC!re 15. The Motorzed R lle Battalron(BMP.Eq!rpped)

o.l20nnMor,ar. Figure16.Principa I WeaponsandEquipment oflhe MotortedRitteBartation (BMp,Equpped).

26

.r.. ''fi,; . nZ'

..ftutk,UAZ.69. Figure 16. Principa Weaponsa nd Equipmentoi the Motonzed Rille Batlalion(BMP Equ ipped).(Continued)

27

:..s-

28

g. Irr.k,

POL (1,000 ot 5,20OLitett)

l. ftuck, v6^, ztL (Mointeha^.e).

!E::

ft ( B M PE q u i p p e d( )C. o n t i n u e d ) d i f l eB a t l a l o n eo i o r z eR a i e a p osran dE q ! i p m e n t o l t hM F c u r e1 6 .P r i n c i p W

29

for technicalaffairs,the battalioncommunications officer {who is also the communicationsplatoon leader,and the supply platoon leader la pEpotsrch,:k.roughlyequivalentto warreniotlicerl

i Anhulonce, UAZ a50.

FiEUre 1 7 B € t l a l o nH e a d q u a r t e r s .

ll) The battalion commander is resoonsible for his unit's mobilizationreadiness,combat and political training, €ducarion, military discipline, and morale.He is also responsible for the units eouiDmentandfacilities. (21 The battalion chief of staff is the commander's"rjght arm.' He has the authorityto give orders to all subordinateelementsand insures compliancewith orderc from the batlalion commanderand highercommanders.The chief of stalf draws up the combat and training plans ibasedupon the regimentalplan and the baltalion commander'sguidance)for the unit and insures FitL,re16.Principal Weaponsand Equipment ofthe Molorired that they are carriedout, He also insurcsthat reR(le Aattalion(BMP-Equ ipped).(Continued) quired reports are preparedand dlspatchedon time to regimentalheadquarters.He is principal 2. SUEONDINATEELEMENTS organizerofaear servicesupportfor the battalion. a. Th6 Battalion Headquafterc {3) The deoutu battalion commander for The battalionstaff consistsof six officersand political affairs organizesand conducts political 6ight enlisted men (figure 17). Office. personnel trainingdesignedto rally rhe battalion'spersonnel includ€ the battalion commander, the battalion eround the Communist Pafty and th€ Soviet chief of statf, the deputy battalioncommanderfor Government. He repons through the battalion politicalaffairs, the deputy battalion commander commanderto the regimentalpoliticalofficer,

30

(4) The deputy battalion commander for functions as the head of the forward observer technical aff6irs supervises the battalion's {FOl/reconnaissance section, maintenanceseruiceelement and reports direcdy to the botblion commanderor chief of staff. The technicalaffahs officer is responsiblefor the combat, political,and specializedtraining of rear servic€s personnel,and for the technicalconditionof rheirequipmsnt. {5) The communicationsofficer is a battalion staff officer and the communications platoon leader.lt is his responsibilityto train banalionper' sonnelin signalproceduresand to supervisecorhmunicationstraining of the battalion, to include the conduct of classesfor radio operators and periodicinspectionsof communications equiprnent. In combat, the battalion signal officer receivesinslfuctions from the senior regimental signal officer, as well as from the battalioncommanderand chiefof staff. (6) The supply platoon leader may be a prapotshchik or senior NCO. He works closely with the battalion chief of staff on all aspectsof banalionsupply. (7) Enlistedpersonnelin the battalion headquart€rsincludea sergeantmajor and his driver,a chemicalinstructor/dosimeler operator,a senior nedic lthe feld'sheL who headsthe medicalsec:ion, is a medical assistant whose skills fall Equrpped). RlleCompaiy(BMP Frgure l8 TheMoiorlzed somewhere between those of a nurse and a !hysician), two clerks,a driverand gunnerfor the aattalioncomfiander's BMP, and a driver for the Each mortar platoon contains wvo squads, :hiefof staff'sAPC. each of which containsa crew chi€f, a gunnef, one telephone opbrator, a loader, one ammo b. TheMotoized Rifle Company anda vehicledriver, bearer, The battalion'sprimarymaneuverelementsare d. TheCommunications Platoon s lhree motorized rifle (l/lR) companies. The 3MP-equippedirR company is organizedas The communicationplatoon'sorganizationand srown in figure 18- For detailed information on equipment are depicted in figure 20. The com'-6 unit, the reader should .efet to The Soviet municationsplatoon leader has an NCO assistant \.otorized Ritle Company. DDl1100-77-76, and tlvo sectionleadels. ::rober 1976, e. Battalion Rear ServiceSupport c. The Battalion Mortat Battery The deputy battalioncommanderfor technical The mortar battery contains six l20mm moF affairs is assistedin supervisingrear seruicesupr.s and is organized and equippedas shown in port elementsby the supply platoon leader, the . S J r e1 9 . NCos responsiblefor the repair workshop, and the medicalaid station. The mortar battery commanderis assistedby -€ headquartersbatlery platoon leader,who also

3I

FBufeI9 TheMortaraaltery

Figure20.TheComhunicationsPtat@n

32

SectionC - Commandand Control 1.COMMAND Tho Sovlatsroggrdcornmandas the exorcla€ot conotrntand offactivecontrol.ThebattElioncomntanderleliosprlmarilyuponhis chiefof 8taff,but b roluctant to dal€g€te authority, pref6rdng to nlake most docisiong hirns€ff. Company confiEnders and the command6rsof other oqanic a.d atboh€d uniE ara clogelysupervis€dby th€ hgttalioncommanderand/or the chiel of statf.

zco tnol In th6 offuiEiw, th€ p.irmry rneansc'f oont ol

of th6 MBB is radio,althoughm668engeE, p€raonElcontactbelwe€ncommsnde6,aignglfh.e6. tlags, snd s vadetyof oth6r methods6rs a|so us6d. Prior to contacti radio silonceb Etrictlv ob3€rued,excoptingreporE from loconnsissanc€ olslh€ntsand th6 crossingot phaselln63.A typs ot battalionradionet is shownin figur62l . In tfi€ detense,the battalionr€lir6 primsrily on wire. although messengeGrsignsl flar6, and radio6ar6 also usedext€nsiv€ly.A battalionin th€ d€fons€would employa wire sryatemas shown in lburc2'

,1

ELEMENTS MOTOR Z'D RIFT€BA'TALION

cosMNDEF r:-^r --:-Phror)

toRr^R l Fr ' z3 )| E A T E R Y

-rl KEY -------S..----.D"'Nd'dN"i!

-----S"=-co*-ar"r.

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''ir' ban'bnmu a - 5 @t o' ' ( ' e N B ch r l i ' 3 t

icalionsN€l lna MolorizedRitleBattalion Commun Fieure2l Representatlve

34

d

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NOTES r. $iE euld ak b€laidlrcm @n

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2 ououts aE rod. Mry 5c70 mdie6 abo! virc in op€n leraii to pmvidd sh;her ror wn€ t6ns .hekinc ihe iins in mb.t

Figure22.TheUseol lineCommuni6tionstyalvotorazed RirreBattalionin the Delense.

Section D - Battalion Rear Setvices and combat servicesupportelementshave normal spacing between vehicles in the column {figure Pfior to the march. the lvlRBnormallyoccupies 24). During the attack (figure 25), €nd in the an asssmblyarea, For operationalconven:ence, delense {figure26}, the rear servicesare position reliabledefense,and protectionof the rear service ed closelybehindthe combatunits. elemenls,the latter normallyoccupy the center of The battalion's administrative 6nd logistics the MRB area{figure23}. respon$bilitiesare purposely minimizedlo allow During offensiveand delensiveop€rations,the the battalion commander to concentrate on his MRB'S rear seruice elements are positioned to primary mission'defeating the enemy in combat. enable them to provide rapid material,technical, The regimentassumesmost of the battalion'sadand medical support, In order to maintain minist€tive burden and augments the battalion, frsedom of mansuverduring the marc as required,logistically. 1. GENERAL

AA)

A A

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in an AssembyArea Fi8ure23MolorizedRilleBatialDnRearS€rviceElements

36

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Ouringlhe March Figure24. ltoto'i2ed RitleEsftalion R€r S€ruic! SupportElements

37

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F gure25.RearServrce SupporlD!rinCth€ Atlack

38

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Fi8ure26. RearServiceSupport in the Deiense

39

|nii'nk)

necessary,the batlalion's supply pl€toon (ligure 271 picks up suppliesfrom regiment. Priorlty lor The regimentalassistantchiel of staff for psr- resupply is ammunition, POL, technical supplies 6onnelis responsiblofor maintainingall personnel {repair parts), rations, and nontechnicaleupplies. records.such as officers' leavesof absence{bat' Resupplynormallytakos place prior to battle and talion keeps records of enlisted perconnel on at the end of the day. The Sovierstry to r6upply l6ave), daily strength r6ports, and peBonnol at night or during other periods of limired visibilawards. In combst, h6 is also responsiblefor ad' ity. Emptyvehiclesreturningto battalionand regiministrationre$rding POWS, captured m8teriel, ment are used to evacuatepersonnolend aquipand processingof personnelreplacements. 2. ADMINISTRATION

Forms and reoorts maintainedat battalion include strength r6porte,training schedules,supply and maintenancerequisitionforms, and political reoorts. Ths battalion commande. is assistedin hiB administrativeresponsibilitiesby his principal staff officersand clericalpsrsonnel.

The battalion chief of staff. assistedby the battalion t€chnical officer, the supply pl6toon feader.and the hatlalionfeld'sheL has the overall responsibility for coordinating the battalion's logisticrequirements.

There is no forrnal re3r service element at company level, where the company commander, assistedby his technicalofficer and lirst sgrgeant, a. Genenl handle all logisticsfunctions. Normally, the batits organic talion delivers supplies to its subordanate Normally the r€giment, using assets, deliverc supplies to the battalions. This principle is flexible, however, and whsn 3. SUPPLY

rlEr'mLotd'Ui^!80[d ldr'ndr6h,f.p*l'/:o

Fi8ur€27 TheSupplyPlatoon

40

During a high-spe€doffBnsive,platoon guides lead the battalion ammunition carri€rs lo individual combat vehicles. In the del€ns€, comp€ny ammunirion supply point6 (RPBS)may be €stablished(figure 28). This procedu16reduces theexposureof supplyvehicleslo enemyfire.

The chi6l of th6 battElionammunitionsupply point (BPB) is usually an NCO from the supply platoon. He signsfor the ammunitiondeliveredby regiment,deliversrequestedamounts to the companies, and keeps the remainder on trucks The battallon's support platoon lgader and {th6r6bylacilitatingrapid delivery)at the battalion BPB. Additional excess ammunition may be company lirst sergeants maintain ammunition stored on lhe ground, particularlywhen ths bat statusteDorts. talionis occupyinga delensiveposition.

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Fisure89.A Reinlorced Motoraz€d RilleBrttalionConductanga NightAttack.

127

I

Prior to daylight, the l/lFB commander plans for the transition to daytime defense; casualtaes Thr6€ major factors involvedin a night defense are evacuated,resupplyis accomplished,personare security, illumination, and forward defenses nel are fed, and the manningof defensesis again (Jigure 90). The lvlRB, ;n addition to normal changed,resultingin more depth to the defensive defensivemeasures,makes the following special preparatrons: 6, VULNERABILITIES - Listening posts and foot patrols to the {ront and flanks are increased in order to The discrepencybetlveendoctrine and practice reducethe possibilityofsurpriseattack. is considerable.Although they are supposed to spend about 40 percentof their tacticalfiring and -- A larger percentageof pe.sonnel on the tactical exercisesat night, Soviet units often do FEBA are maintainedat full combat readi- not meet the requirement.Frequently,night tactical exercisesare unrealistic;despite a variety of - The manningof daytimedefenseschanges; night vision devices, vehicular headlights and crew-servedweapons are moved to alternate flashlightsare often used to help maintaincontrol fi.ing positionsand attached and supporting and orientation, artillery and tanks are moved closer 1o the As in World War ll, the Soviets will probably FEBA. The IMRB'Srear services also move continue to use the night primariiy for troop 5. NIGHTDEFENSE

movement, attack preparation, construction of fortifications, and resupply. Night attacks in greater than regimentalstrength will probablybe a rarity {at least initially) and be undertaken -. Periodicilluminadonof the terrain forward primarilyto take an objectivewhich could not be of the FEBA is scheduled.The senior com- takenduringdaylight. mander'silluminationplan is supplementedby The complexitiesof night operationsare par battalionassets,as in the offensive. ticularly evident at battalion level and below. - Guide posts are established within the Two-year conscripts. inexperiencedNCOs, and junior officers unaccustomedto flexibilityand in MRB s AO to aid counteratiacking forces. itiative, make night combat a costly affair. Higher The IVIRB commander positions his second commanders seem reluctant to comm;t their echelon (reserve) on key terrain astride the forces at night. Soviet commandersare, however, enemy's must likely avenue of penetration. aware of their deficienciesin night operationsand Counterattacksare launchedby the battalion'sse are attemptrngto cofiect them, cond echelon {reserve)in accordancewith the regimentalcommander'sdefense plan, CounteF attacking forces nofmally have a shallow objective. Upon elimination of the penetration, consolidationtakes placealong with further efforts to improvedefenses, -- The availabilityand serviceabilityof night visiondevicesarechecked.

128

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i

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I

Section F - Seabone Assault and Defense of a Coastline 1. GENERAL Although rslalivslylittl€ has been written about th6 MRB conducting Seaborneassaultsand cl€f€nding a coastline, thes€ are probably current missions of some motorized rifle troops, Moreov6r, there is sound historicalprecedentfor using army troopsin this manner. 2. HISTORICATPEBSPECTIVE

- Seaborne assaults were rarely conducted by units largsr than a regiment. This was an part du€ to a criticalshortageof landingcraft, and the subsequent use of fishing boats, launches, and whatever else was available, Seaborn€assaultswere freouentlvconducted st night and usually successful in spite of highcasualties. - The existence of seaborneassault forcss immobilizedlargenumbersoI Germantroops,

During World War ll, th6 Soviets conduct6d ovor 100 seaborneassaults.Twenty-fivenaval an- The naval commanderwas usuallyin comprovided each usually brigades of 3000 nen fantry mand whjle forces were afloat, while the thg first-echelonassault forces in these opelasenior landing force commander w6s in tions. Special naval detachments (armed and changeoncethelandingsitewassecured. lrained for land combat, but separatefrom the Today, the Soviet naval infantry {figu16 9l), naval inlantry) and army units often comprised consisting of approximately15,000men organized for these reserves operathe second echelonand in 6 regiments, has the primary lnission of lrons, seaborne assault, ln event of war, because of Five factors in World Waf ll Soviet seaborne their small numbers and light equipment, Soviet assault operationshavecurrentrelevance: naval infantry would probably be augmented by specially trained ermy units. Dus to r€lalively - Soviet naval infanlry, relatively lew in small numbers of amohibious craft. sea assault number. had to be sugmented by naval operationswould probably be conductod in batdetachmentsand army units. talion and regimentalstrength. Wh6n6ver possi. '- The naval intantry were usuallywithdrawn ble, navalinfantry would form the first echslonoI the assaultforce (figure 92), with motorizedrifle oncethe beachheadwas secured, units comprisingthe second echelonand reserve; in other cases,sp€ciallytlained army forc€s might comprisethe wholeassaultforce.

'i:S,$

'*i;

ik{')a '^..-i

Fi8ure9l.Navalln,anlryonParad€in Moscow.

I30

i

and transit phases to decreasethe damage of nuclearattack. In addition to normal attack planning,the MRB commanderconductsreconnaissance of the waiting area, embarkationpoint, and ths alternate sites, preparesmen and equipment for loading aboard ships, and conducts loading and beach assaultexercissswilh the naly, b. Augmentation As in most other operations, the MRB receivesreinforcementaccordingto l{ETT. In this case,it hasbe€nreinforcedasfollows: One tank company {PT-76 amphibious tanks). - Oneartillerybattery. - Oneairdefense platoon, rna Fi€ure92. NavallniantryOllenFormTheFifst Echelon

3. MTSStONS

-- Onesapperplatoon, - One ground'air-navysuppon team {to adjustnavalgunfire andairsuppo().

The [4RB in a seaborneassaultcould have the following missions: Loading principles include unit integrity and -- The capture of key teffain and installations reverce loading (first off, last on). Logistical (islands,land areasborderingstrategicstraits, elementsload first, followed by the reserve,sepo s, coastaI airfields,etc), cond echelon, and first echelon. The battalion .' The conduct of divErsionaryraids and commanderprobably lands wiih (or immediately reconnaissance. behind) his fi|st echelon. Whenever possible, loading and moving to the objectivearea is done -- Securinga beachheadfor the openingof a at nrght. d. Trcnsport Craft Thes€ opefationswould be primarily designed The Soviet Navy uses three principletypes of to aid land offensivesalreadyin progressor about amphibious ships: the ALL|GAToR ctass LsT, to stan, Ouite often, seaborneassaults involve the ROPUCHAClassLST, and the POLNOCNY heliborn6and/ or airborneforces, ClassLslvl ({ig!re 94). The Sovieis are also using air-cushionvehicleswhich, becauseof their speed 4. THE ASSAULT and ability to operate over land and water, provide a new dimensionto amphibiousoperations (figure95l. Strategic seaborneassaultmissionswould be planned primarilyat frcnt level by a joint operae. Tftnsit and fueassault Phases tions group consistingof naval,air, and army per ldeally, transit of the amphibioustask force sonnel. The landing force is assigneda wailing '15 occtirs during darknessor other periodsof l;mited to kilometets from the embarkation area, l0 point, a main embarkationpoint with one or two visibility.l\,4issile and antisubmarineescort vessels protect point provide and cover for lhe assaultforces. alternates,and a main debarkation with one Ships armedwith missiles,guns, and rocketsproor two altarnates{figure 93).Unnecessary concenpreparatory vide fire and navalguniire suppoft for tration of forces is avoided during embarkalion l3l

the assault troops during th€ latter's inland ad' vance. Minesweepers,under cover of naval and clear channelsthtough mine_ air bombardment, fields and are {ollowed by hydrographic and hydfometeorological vessels, which provide weather data, take soundings,determinethe bottom contours in approachesto landing sites, and mark the cleared channels through minetields. NaW undeMater demolition teams are transported by high speedwatercraftand/or helicopter to clear water and b€ach obstacles,lf possible,a minimum of one channel is clearedfor each MR

The assault may be preceded by a heliborne/airborneoperation in conjunction wath air attacks in the objective area (figure 96). Heliborne/airborneforces often have the mission of blocking the arrival of enemy reinlorcements into the beachhead. In an unopposedlandingor against light resistance,the MRB in most cases offloadson the beach. In an opposed landing, BlvlPs, amphibious tanks, and/or tanks equippedwith snorkelsleave their landingships at sea and swim ashore.Once ashore,the lvlRB'sattack is similarto that aheady described-

,'2.,,4:,tl: -ji

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F gure93 EmbarkatonandDebarkaiotrPornts

t32

MRBASSEMBTAREA

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. POTNOCNYCi!!s

Fisure94.AmphlbiolsShps. (Continued)

Figure95.Amphibious AssautisMayBeConducred WithAnC!shionvehictes.

r34

sEr FRIENOIYFORCE ISEV€FA BOUFS

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KEY YiC

l5cil.d moib.G

rirb @prnr (m pr.6 or raiB E afi!.h.d to o.h .mFny)

€

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