The Role of Intelligence in Countering the Islamic State Threat- Dissertation paper

National School of Political and Administrative Studies International Relations and European Integration Department Security and Diplomacy M.A.

Dissertation The role of intelligence in countering the Islamic State threat

Coordinated by Prof.univ.dr. George Cristian MAIOR Graduate Ioana Iulia BLAGA

Bucharest, 2015

Table of contents

INTRODUCTION

4

CHAPTER 1.THEORETICAL APPROACH

5

I. TERRORISM AND RELIGION

5

II. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

12

CHAPTER 2.CASE STUDY: THE ISLAMIC STATE

16

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND II. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES III. ORGANIZATION IV. CAPABILITIES V. MODUS OPERANDI AND TACTICS

16 20 27 33 45

CHAPTER 3.THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERING ISIS

48

I. WHAT IT WAS DONE SO FAR IN COUNTERING THE IS THREAT? II. INTELLIGENCE METHODS A. DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND SHARING B. EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABILITIES C. COUNTERING ONLINE RADICALIZATION D.FINANCIALLY DAMAGING THE ORGANIZATION

48 50 50 54 55 56

III. INTELLIGENCE DIFFICULTIES IN COUNTERING ISIS

57

CONCLUSIONS

60

BIBLIOGRAPHY

62

ACRONYM LIST

AQAP

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

AQI

Al-Qaeda in Iraq

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

COMINT

Communications intelligence

DAESH

ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyahfīl-ʿIrāq wash-Shām

ELINT

Electronic intelligence

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

ICT

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism

IED

Improvised explosive device

IMINT

Imagery intelligence

ISI

Inter-Services Intelligence

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

ISR

Islamic State Report

ITIC

The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

MO

Modus operandi

R&D

Research and Development

SIGINT

Signal intelligence

SMO

Social movement organization

US

United States of America

USA

United States of America

TRAC

The Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium

TSG

The Soufan Group

YPG

The People s Protection Units Kurdish: ek ney nParastina Gel)

1

ABSTRACT Upon entering the old entrance of the CIA headquarters, on the marble wall there is the following inscription: ―And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free‖ (John VIIIXXXII). It is a very nice feeling, but it overdraws and distorts what is going on in that building or any other intelligence agency. It is also ironically, because intelligence is not about the truth.

The present paper presents the important role of intelligence in countering the Islamic State as a terrorist group by analyzing the threat and the intelligence efforts, from a counter-terrorism point of view. Analyzing the relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism, I aimed to ―give to Caesar what is Caesar's‖, showing ad-litteram what has been done and should be done, without making a case just that my assumption (that intelligence has one of the most significant roles in countering this particular threat) to be proven right. Therefore, the entire paper is centered on and built around the intelligence concepts and practices, in relation to counter-terrorism.

The first chapter of the paper called ―Theoretical approach‖ sets off the difficulties in having theories about terrorism and intelligence. The first part ―Terrorism and religion‖ focuses on the controversial relationship between religious radicalization and terrorism, by looking at what counter-terrorism specialists, authors scholars and analysts have to say about this relationship. The second part of the chapter, ―Intelligence and counter-terrorism‖ evinces on the link between the two practices and what kind of intelligence is used in counter-terrorism and mostly why the first one is an indispensable tool for the second one.

The second chapter called ―The Islamic State‖ is the first part of the study case. It is an intelligence analysis of the terrorist group, from historical background – the most important stages until it became what we call today The Islamic State, moving to ideology and objectives (both religious and political), to organizational dimension of the group (leadership system, leader and authority), to capabilities (military and manpower, weapons possession, territorial control and safe heavens, recruiting and training, means- finances and propaganda), modus operandi and tactics points of view. I tried to show in this chapter why this group poses such a threat, not on a local level, but on an international one and why acting against it is mandatory for the sake of humanity.

2

The third chapter, ―The role of intelligence in countering ISIS‖ is the second part of the study case and is focused on a very realistic approach on what exactly was done (on the set period of the analysis) and what should be done in terms of countering the Islamic State, both by military and intelligence methods, stressing out the role of the second one. I also assessed the difficulties that intelligence is having in countering the organization.

In conclusions, I riveted on how the mistakes of not properly understanding the Islamic State`s ideology and confusing it with Al- Qaeda, presuming that the experience and knowledge about one terrorist group is enough to counter another has cost us. Underestimating the power of the Islamic State both in the region and abroad has led to terrible decisions and we are facing now a new type of enemy who has, for now, a big advantage. We have to make a lesson of it, to look deeper and with more critical eyes the geopolitical context of the Middle East in the past years and stop thinking that is too far to affect us. The battle is not lost yet, we still have time and the means to counter this threat and to stop its spreading. And in this stage, intelligence is crucial. Military, we have the capability to counter it, but without good and smart intelligence, it will be costly and inefficient.

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Introduction

Humanity stands of a dangerous edge. Very frequently we are reminded that terrorism keeps on incurring agony and enduring on individuals everywhere throughout the world. Barely a week passes by without a demonstration of terrorism acts in some place on the planet, unpredictably influencing innocent individuals, who simply happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.―Countering this scourge is in the interest of all nations and the issue has been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades.‖1 The topic of my thesis is ―The role of Intelligence in countering the Islamic State threat― and I propose to find out what the Islamic State is and how intelligence agencies worked to counter a global threat; what has the intelligence community has done so far to fight with this terrorist organization and why is so strenuous in this fight, so that more will be known about terrorism, a ―disease that no country is immune for‖2and maybe how to achieve in the future a stage of security in the Middle East. As primary sources for the case study I will rely on the main data from the public reports of intelligence agencies and communities, also from counter-terrorism research groups. As a secondary source I will use additional data that comes from international media. The research will be conducted through mixed methods that combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative method will be used to answer research questions, drawing on the descriptive broad quantitative research design and heavily on statistical analysis techniques to examine the data collected, whether descriptive or inferential in nature, using quantitative data (data sets and structured observation) combined with the qualitative approach by using manly the intelligence and terrorism ―theories‖ to help the research process, interpreting the qualitative data, using the inductive process of going back-and-forth through the data, in order to identify particular aspects of the Islamic State. I justify the choosing of this method by stating that is most appropriate because it combines various methods and approaches, in order to answer the initial questions. The limitations of the case study come from the period of time analyzed and from the intelligence perspective. I settled the period from the begging of the Islamic State as a Caliphate (29th June) to 1st January 2015. There are some matters that this methodology may not help me to explain. In order to find out exactly how reality was shaped as a consequence of intelligence efforts in the area that the Islamic State operates, a useful method would have been to participate and interview the persons that were involved right there, on the huge battlefields, but given the specific conditions of this case, this kind of approach could not be considered nor applied.

1

http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ HRH Crown Prince Hussein of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan speaking before UN Security Council http://jordanembassyus.org/news/terrorism-greatest-challenge-world-peace-crown-prince 2

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Chapter 1 Theoretical approach Terrorism and intelligence, counter-terrorism and counterintelligence as any other concept in International relations are hard to be defined and frame into a theoretical dimension. All of them come from practice and afterwards attempts were made to frame them into theories and concepts, there isn`t yet a single complex and complete definition to describe none of them. In this first chapter, I will try to tackle the theoretical dimension of terrorism and intelligence, by dividing them according to the connections terrorism and religion, respectively, intelligence and counter-terrorism. I chose this partition in conformity with the subject of my paper and with the study case.

i.

Terrorism and religion

There are more than 200 definitions of terrorism, none of them world-wide accepted and treated as such universal truth. Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, because the term has evolved and because it is associated with an activity that is designed to be subjective. Terrorism refers on ―the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties‖3. While some critical theorists blame Terrorism Studies for the ―problem-solving approach‖4, mainstream researchers have no problem with that, arguing that this is entirely legitimate, just as the medical profession studies diseases in order to be able to cure them. Boaz Ganor, one of the most famous counter-terrorism experts in the world, the director of the ICT in Herzlyia, Israel has given a long list of all the reasons why terrorism is difficult to define.: because terrorism is a ‗contested concept‘ and political, legal, social science and popular notions of it often diverge; because the definition questions is linked to (de-) legitimization and criminalization; because there are many ‗terrorisms‘ with different forms and manifestations; because the term has undergone changes of meaning in the more than 200 years of its existence; because terrorist organizations are (semi-)clandestine and the secrecy surrounding them makes objective analysis difficult; because the definition questions is linked to whether or not terrorists work for or against one‘s own national) interests, and, consequently, double standards tend to be Richard Jackson, ‗Research for Counterterrorism: Terrorism Studies and the Reproduction of State Hegemony‘ 2008, p.4 Ibidem p. 51

3 4

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applied; because the boundaries with other forms of political violence (e.g. assassination, guerilla warfare) are hazy or unclear; because the state, with its (claimed) monopoly of the use of force and its legal definition of power, can exclude any of its own activities (e.g. indiscriminate repression) from the definition; because it is linked to a discussion of primary responsibility for initiating a downward spiral of action-reaction violence and a discussion of root causes; because some authors use two different vocabularies (force vs. violence, terror vs. terrorism) for state vs. non-state actors; because the conceptual and normative frameworks of the users of the term differ (e.g. criminal justice model, war model); because the discussion on terrorism has been linked to issues regarding self-determination, and armed resistance against foreign occupation and racist regimes; because those who engage in acts of terrorism often also engage in other, more legitimate forms of armed conflict and/or engage in party politics; because the violence perpetrated by the terrorists‘ opponent might be as indiscriminate as, or worse than, that perpetrated by those who are deemed to be ‗terrorists‘; because the assessment of the terrorist act is intertwined with the discussion concerning the actor‘s goals and the status of the actor him-or herself. 5 He also defined terrorism concisely and unequivocally as ―a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious, etc.)‖ 6. While Ganor has a very valid point, and his thinking on issues of definition and typology is among the most sophisticated, the focus on ‗civilians‘ rather than ‗non-combatants‘ takes away some ambiguity but creates new problems. It also overlooks the fact that there is widespread use of terrorism in war. The essential points of terrorism are: premeditation- terrorism is not an accident or a crime of passion, it takes time, resources and planning; political motivation - this being what makes murder ‗terrorism‘ instead a general crime; non-combatants (which includes military that are not on duty at the time of the attack), like political motivation, this element separates terrorism from an act of war or general crime; sub-national groups or clandestine agents – terrorism allows for independent actors and state-sponsored groups; influence – the act of violence is a message, this element returns to the political motivation behind terrorism.7 Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: illegal state repression; propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state and non-state actors.8 The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involve single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual-phase life-threatening incidents Boaz Ganor, ‗Defining Terrorism: Is One Man‘s Terrorist Another Man‘s Freedom Fighter? ICT Papers, 4, August 1998, pp.22-23, 29; Boaz Ganor, ‗ The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers‘, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 2005, p.17 Schmid, Alex, Jongman, Albert, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988, p. 16 8 Idem 5 6 7

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(like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage taking for coercive bargaining), as well as multi-phase sequences of actions such as in ‗disappearances‘ involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder).9 Public (-ized) terrorist victimizations initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, one the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies, or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators.10 At the origin of terrorism stands terror - instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety - spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment. The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenseless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to the acts of terrorism.11 The direct victims are not the ultimate target, (as in a classical assassination, where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims‘ plight or the terrorists‘ professed cause. Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams). While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime, as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but almost always in its societal repercussions. 12 The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favorable power outcome, for example obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, obtaining submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public. 13

9

Idem Hoffman, Bruce (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press, p. 43 Ibidemp. 60 12 Ibidemp. 72 13 Ibidemp. 117 10 11

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The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives. The following ten elements cover core features of terrorism: the demonstrative use of violence against human beings; the conditional threat of more violence; the deliberate production of terror or fear in a target group; the targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents; the purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda; the act that it is a method, tactic or strategy of waging conflict; the importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences; the illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence; the predominantly political character of the act; its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public. 14 The phenomenon of terrorism in religious movements is not a new one. ―Historically, all three Abrahamic traditions have experienced the rise of radical offshoots that promote extreme interpretations of religion and engage in ‗holy‘ violence to promote worldly political objectives. The same can be said for nearly all non-Abrahamical traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on. Those who want to promote a peaceful agenda that includes compromise with former enemies and accommodation with extant political elites will find in their religious tradition the requisite verses and symbols for peace. Those who want to promote a militant agenda, that includes anti-civilian violence and rebellion against incumbent governments will find in their religion the required verses and symbols for war.‖15 Thus, the best way to proceed analytically is by looking at the political agendas of religious groups, the conditions that may encourage them to turn to violence, and the dynamics of contention that facilitate their growth or decline. There is hardly any evidence to suggest that the content of religion is sufficient to give rise to political extremism and terrorism. All world religions have periods of peace and periods of extreme violence. The review of typological work in terrorism has shown that there is great variety in both the approaches and the conceptual lenses utilized. Arguably, this is because of the range of contexts in which terrorism can occur. From those whose state support affords them impunity, to those who have too few reservations about victimizing the innocent, and those ‗true fanatics‘ who believe their apparently noble ends justify the use of generally ignoble means - the range of motivations and circumstances in which terrorism is used is considerable Further complexities arise, as terrorism is sometimes used as the sole instrument to further a group‘s aims, while other groups use it as one instrument among several tactics that can vary in their legality, justification and impact. Since there is no typical psychological terrorist profile and since most terrorist are normal in a clinical sense

14

Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p.70 Ibidem p. 170

15

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(albeit not it a moral one), typologies of terrorism that take the terrorist actor as their main criterion for classification are bound to be of limited value. 16 The various typologies considering the motivation and purpose of terrorist groups incorporate, inter alia, structural causes, and political and ideological motivation. They respond to the question of why groups resort to terrorism, either with respect to their own internal justifications, or through the wider influences present in the environment. The debate on ‗root causes‘ and terrorist groups justifications is one, and it necessitates multiple levels of analysis, implicating historical, social, political, ideology, group and individual psychology. What would be most helpful is a layered approach allowing the exploration of different levels of analysis within a unified framework of hypothesized causes and justifications for terrorism. The typologies outlining the conflict zone from and in which terrorists operate broadly identify similar features: that terrorist can operate both within and outside their home territory, and that they can potentially do so at a number of levels ranging from domestic, through regional, to international and transnational terrorism and, finally, global terrorism. There is no doubt that locations matter, especially when it comes to issues of jurisdiction and for determining who should take the lead in dealing with terrorist and other militant activists who transgress both geographical and moral boundaries. The increasingly high profile of cross-border terrorism makes this particular aspect or terrorist investigation one of considerable pertinence, with these typologies providing a platform on which to position debate. 17 The various attempts to devise new typologies looking at how terrorist operate may be of some use to counter-terrorists, as they enable them to identify potential organizational weaknesses. They might also sensitize to the evolving nature of terrorist groups. However, given the level of specificity required to verify empirically these typological conceptualizations, sufficient information may be hard to gather, reducing their practical and theoretical utility. A number of developments have been seen in the review of more contemporary typological attempts, with an increased focus on root causes, temporal dimensions and organizational make-up. Some conceptualizations considered structural causes of terrorism, including historical and cultural factors as well as other actors‘ influence, and those of supporters and opponents. Distinguishing between different periods of terrorism has also emerged as a useful approach, with Rapoport‘s four waves of terrorism18 gaining considerable credence. A similar debate is emerging over the genesis of a new type of terrorism. Finally, a new development has been seen in the analysis of the organizational make-up of the terrorist group, with a number of conceptualizations presented

16

Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 246 Ibidemp. 341 18 David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Terrorism, in Attacking Terrorism, Cronin and Ludes, 2004 17

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including networks, dune organizations, and analogies to company structures aiming to inform analysis. Religion has an ambiguous relationship with violence in general. Although religion is often associated with positive values such as compassion and peace, the mythology of most world religions is filled with violent images and bloody histories. The main problem is studying the role played by religious radicalism (extremism) in motivating, supporting, justifying, and guiding a certain group‘s terrorist activity can be most evidently demonstrated by the case of Islamist terrorism. The problem is that while religious extremism may serve as a powerful driving force and/or be effectively instrumentalized to guide/justify terrorist activity, it does not necessarily or automatically lead to terrorism or indeed, to violence. It should also be stressed that groups using terrorist means in the name of religion do not necessarily represent some ‗deviant sects‘, but are often guided by a radical interpretation of religion‘s basic tenets, concepts and notions, such as the radical militant interpretation of a traditional and essential Islamic concept of jihad19. Still, while Islamist jihadi terrorism has become the main form of transnational (in fact, supra-national) terrorism over the recent decade, it does not mean that all Islamist (radical Islamic) movements include jihad in a set of their first priorities and are ready to use violence, particularly against civilians (e.g. the strongly extremist Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement in Central Asia has consciously opted not just for abstaining from the use of terrorist means, but for non-violence in general.20 Religion provides an additional operating and motivational space for violence that other secular ideologies cannot provide. On the margin, the benefits of religion-sanctioned violence can be argued to prove that divine benefits that will always exceed secular costs for those committed to religious violence. For example, the perpetrator‘s personal utility derived from ‗eternal salvation‘ will always trump the risk of imprisonment or even actual imprisonment to an adherent of an organization that uses religiously motivated violence. By dancing around the subject of religion and violence, analysts deprive themselves of this insight that in a fundamental way, religious (ideologies) can motivate different kinds of violence as compared with secular ideologies.21 There is no direct relationship between terrorism and religion. But religious extremists are commonly using incitement and brainwashing messages in order to provoke their followers to use terrorism in order to fulfill the so-called divine command. Religion is also used to challenge the internationally widely accepted laws of war, and permit in the name of God deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian targets. Religious extremists are sometimes trying to justify their

19

David C. Rapoport, Terrorism: The fourth or religious wave, Taylor & Francis, 2006, p. 345 Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 250 21 KürşadTuran, Menderes Çinar, Religious versus Secular Politics: Competing Ideologies in a Changing System, OrtadoğuEtütleri, Volume 4, No 2, January 2013, pp.165-192 20

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wrongdoing as a defensive war that is designed to protect their religion from malicious intent of other religions with the cooperation of the ―infidels‖ from their own religion. In many cases the religious extremist provocateurs have concrete political goals which they are trying to achieve – revolting against regimes, demolishing ―infidel‖ states, or creating a new religious political entity.22 There is something in all religious forms of terrorism, and that is radicalization. There are some complex mental processes at work in the radicalization process, for empirical observations, the more grounded theory of Silbner and Bhatt is useful. In their study, conducted for the New York Police Department, they envisage four steps23. Pre-radicalization is the first step: the life situation before vulnerable individuals were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology, The majority of individuals involved in almost a dozen plots began as ‗unremarkable‘, had ‗ordinary‘ jobs, had lived ‗ordinary‘ lives and had little, if any criminal history.24 Self-identification is the second step: the phase were individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for the ‗religious seeking ‗ is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one‘s certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews. There can be many types of triggers: economic (losing a job, blocked mobility); social (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived); political (international conflicts involving Muslims); and personal (a death in the close family).25 Indoctrination is the third step: the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology, and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause. That action is militant jihad. This phase is typically facilitated and driven by a ‗spiritual sanctioner‘. While the initial self-identification process may be an individual act, as noted above, association with likeminded people is an important factor as the process deepens. By the indoctrination phase, this selfselecting group becomes increasingly important as radical views are encouraged and reinforced. 26 Jihadization is the fourth step: the phase in which members of the cluster accepts their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack. These ‗acts in furtherance‘ will include planning, preparation and execution. 27

Boaz Ganor, ‗ The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers‘ New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 2005, p.35 Mitchell D. Silber, Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, Police Department, 2007 24 Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 246 25 Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 246 26 Idem 27 Idem 22 23

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Therefore, religion isn`t the main cause of terrorism, but there are some potential religious causes of terrorism: political and economic grievances are the primary causes or catalysts, and religion becomes a means to legitimate and mobilize; even though religion may not be the sole cause of terrorism, it can exacerbate the situation. Religion brings to a situation of conflict images of grand struggle and an abiding absolutism. Religion is often centered on themes that can be inherently polarizing – concepts of truth, notions of good, of absolutes and ultimate realities; religion can contribute to a culture of violence where violence becomes a ‗defining issue‘ in the identity of activist groups; examples of religious terrorism can be found in all religious traditions, not one religious tradition holds a monopoly in violence, and all religious traditions can be used to justify acts of destruction and aggression; regarding its role in conflict, religion is seldom the problem, but the role of religion can be problematic.28

ii.

Intelligence and Counter-terrorism

Intelligence is as hard to define as terrorism and has the same theoretical dilemmas and as many definitions as terrorism. To many people, intelligence seems little different from information, except that it is probably secret. However, it is important to distinguish between the two. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it may be discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policymakers and has been collected, refined, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information; intelligence and the entire process by which it is identified, obtained and analyzed respond to the needs of policymakers. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence. Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First, much of what goes on is secret. Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some information from other governments, which, in turn, seek to discover hidden information be means that they wish to keep secret. All of this secrecy leads some authors to believe that there are issues about which they cannot write or may not have sufficient knowledge. Thus, they feel the need to describe the limits of their work. Although numerous aspects of intelligence are – and deserve to be- kept secret, this is not an impediment to describing basic roles, processes, functions and issues.29 Secrecy does make intelligence unique. That others would keep important information from us, that we need certain types of information and wish to keep our needs secret, and that we have 28

Ibidemp. 249 Lowenthal, Mark M., From Secrets to Policy, second edition, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., 2003, p. 23

29

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the means to obtain information that we also wish to keep secret are major reasons for having intelligence agencies. When we use the word intelligence, we are largely referring to issues related to national security – that is, defense and foreign policy and certain aspects of internal security. The actions, policies and capabilities of other nations are primary areas of concern. Most people tend to think of intelligence in terms of military information – troop movements, weapon capabilities, and plans for surprise attack. This is an important component of intelligence (in line with avoiding surprise attack, the first reason for having intelligence agencies), but it is not the only one. Many different kinds of intelligence – political, economic, social, environmental health, and cultural – provide important inputs to analysts. Policymakers and intelligence officials also must think beyond foreign intelligence. They must consider intelligence activities focused on threats to internal security, such as subversion, espionage and terrorism. Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintellingence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.30 Intelligence can be thought of as a process, the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted. Intelligence can be thought of as a product of these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves. Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various functions, therefore an organization. The following are the most frequently mentioned countermeasures for terrorism, in declining order of perceived effectiveness: intelligence, inter-agency and international information sharing and cooperative action; cutting off many of the sources of funding of terrorists; a prudent foreign policy; international consensus over the definition and scope of terrorism; limiting the spread of terrorist ideology through propaganda and the internet; educating the public about what to do if an attack is suspected, and after an attack; providing counter-terrorism assistance to countries lacking expertise; military cooperation; improved borders, airport and maritime security; deterrence; public support and involvement; remedying root causes; international peace building and state building in failed or weak states; arrests of key members or groups; solid alliances-no seams between states which terrorists can exploit; sorting out politics and ethics: support for

30

Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence" Understanding Our Craft Michael Warner https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html

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democracy or for anti-fundamentalist non-democratic regimes; scientific community R&D, e.g. on early warning/detection; decoupling from religion; isolation of radicals.31 Counter-terrorism incorporates the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt to attack terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed. While intelligence is the key to selective counter-terrorism not targeting broad segments of the public, intelligence gathering on underground conspiracies in open societies faces human rights and privacy concerns. Intelligence efforts are also hampered by the increasing use of encryption by terrorists, their use of unfamiliar foreign languages, and the sheer volume of intelligence

gathered

automatically

from

intercepted

phone

calls,

emails

and

other

electromagnetically transmitted communications which have to be read and interpreted in actionable time to be of operational use.32 Counterterrorism intelligence is of three categories33: strategic, tactical and psychological. Strategic: Intelligence about the organization of the terrorist organizations,leadership, intentions, aims, modus operandi, sources of funds, weapons and means attheir disposal, contacts with external elements, including foreign intelligence agencies,etc. Tactical: Intelligence which relates to the specific plans of terrorist action, alsocalled preventive and indications-and-warning intelligence, which would enable the stateto preempt terrorist action, prevent attacks, and frustrate terrorist plans. Psychological: Intelligence which covers details of psychological warfare propaganda of the terrorists against the state that need to be countered, and data relatingto the terrorists, which enable the state to mount its own psychological warfare againstthem. Indicators of discontent against the leadership in terrorist organizations, coercivemethods in the recruitment of volunteers, and misuse of children and women for terroristoperations are examples of such data. While the coverage of strategic and psychological intelligence by the intelligenceservices in general seems to be satisfactory, the collection of tactical, preventive, andindications and warning intelligence has left much to be desired. This is due largely to thedifficulties in penetrating terrorist organizations for collection of human intelligence andtheir communications for the collection of signals intelligence.While strategic and psychological intelligence can be collected from open sources, peripheral secret sources, interrogation of captured or surrendered terrorists, analysis andexploitation of captured documents, IT hardware and software, precise preventive andindications and warning intelligence can generally be obtained only from moles in key positions in the terrorist organizations and through interception of communications.

Richard Jackson, ‗Research for Counterterrorism: Terrorism Studies and the Reproduction of State Hegemony‘ 2008, p.49 Ibidemp. 51 33 James W. Harris, ―Building Leverage in the Long War‖, Policy Analysis, no. 439 (Washington D.C: Cato Institute, May 2002), p. 14. 31 32

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The significance of intelligence in counter-terrorism stems from three main drivers34: its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity, its role in post-incident investigations, its contribution to preventive/protective security measures. Effective counter terrorism intelligence should focus on four areas35: prevention, pursuit, protection, preparedness. Prevention – addressing underlying causes of terrorism. That means, among other things, ensuring that every citizen enjoy the full protection of the law and are able to participate to the full in society. Pursuit – using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists. It should include joint working and intelligence-sharing between governments and law enforcement agencies. It aims to make borders more secure, to make identity theft harder and to curb terrorist access to financial sources. Protection – ensuring that reasonable security precautions are in place. Preparedness – making sure that one has the people and resources in place to respond effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack.

34

KleanthisKyriakidis, 21st Century Terrorism: Wrong Diagnosis, Inadequate Remedy (Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, June 2005), p. 19

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Chapter 2 Case study: The Islamic State ―Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.‖36 To counter, by any means – military or through intelligence, an enemy that enormous and powerful as this terrorist group, we have to know what with are fighting with.

In order do to that, in this chapter and in the next one I will analyze the terrorist group (using most of the times ‗the Islamic State‘, ISIS or IS denomination). Looking it at from the intelligence perspective, as a counter terrorism specialist does, from the following points of view: historical background, ideology and objectives (both religious and political), system and structure (leadership, leader and authority), capabilities (military and manpower, weapons possession, territorial control, recruiting and training, means- finances and propaganda), modus operandi and tactics.

i.

Historical background

The Islamic State is the most renowned Islamic extremist terrorist organization in the world. It has many names, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) or DAESH, from its Arabic name, adDawlah al-Islāmiyahfīl-ʿIrāq wash-Shām, leading to the acronym Da ish or Da eesh. Even if it began to be ―famous‖ in June 2014, it is a group with history. The Islamic State takes pride in claiming the Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadeel al Nazal al Khalayleh) as its founder and inspiration, and it has been assiduously polishing his reputation through its online propaganda.37 In truth, Zarqawi was a local Jordanian hoodlum who discovered that he had an ability to inspire a following through the violent pursuit of an anti-State and anti-Shia agenda based loosely on the teachings of a fellow Jordanian, Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi (Isam Mohammad Tahir al Barqawi), one of the most famous contemporary salafist/takfiri preachers. Maqdisi‘s theories draw from the 14th Century scholar IbnTaymiyya 1263- 1328), who argued inter alia that Muslim rulers were not necessarily true Muslims and so could be overthrown, as well as from the ultra-conservative 18th century Saudi scholar, MohammedIbn ‗Abd al Wahhab. While a strong supporter of Al Qaeda, Maqdisi has condemned the actions of The Islamic State. 38 They first met in Afghanistan in the 1990s and also spent time together in prison in Jordan in the same period.

36

Sun Tzu, The art of war July 2014 issue of Dabiq, The Islamic State‘s on-line English language magazine 38 The Islamic State by Richard Barrett November 2014 http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf 37

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The historical background of ISIS begun in the new era created in Iraq after the Americans took control of the country in 2003. The Second Gulf War led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the dismantling of the Iraqi army and the destruction of the existing governmental structure. As a result, a security and governmental vacuum was created and the country's fragile social fabric (in the middle of which was the volatile Sunni-Shi'ite schism) was severely damaged. Although in contact with al Qaeda at this time, Zarqawi regarded the Levant as a more important battleground than the West and generally kept his distance from Usama bin Laden and Aiman al Zawahiri.39 He set up a training camp in Western Afghanistan and established Jund al Sham (the Army of the Levant). It is believed that many of the Afghan characteristics of The Islamic State in organization and appearance may originate from Zarqawi‘s time in the country.40 The US invasion of Iraq provided Zarqawi an opportunity to build his organization, which he renamed al Tawhidwa al Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), and by August 2003 he was well enough established to launch three major attacks: against the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, the United Nations headquarters there, and the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, an important Shia shrine. During the almost nine years (2003 – 2011) the United States army was stationed in Iraq, the Americans failed to establish effective Iraqi army and security forces to fill the newly-created security vacuum. While in Iraq, the Americans encouraged the establishment of what was supposed to be a democratic national Shi'ite regime headed by Nouri al-Maliki. However, the regime alienated the Sunni population, which had traditionally controlled the country; even though they were a minority (about 22% of the Iraqi population is Sunni Arabs – alongside the Kurds, who are also Sunnis – while about 60% of Iraqis are Shi'ites)41. The branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, established in 2004, entered the security vacuum and took advantage of the increasing political-societal Sunni alienation: it became an important actor in the insurgent organizations fighting the American army, became stronger after the withdrawal of the American troops at the end of 2001, and spread to Syria after the civil war began in March 201142. The establishment of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq and Syria occurred in four stages: Stage One (2004-2006) – The establishment of the branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and called ―Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia‖ It waged a terrorist-guerilla war against the American and coalition forces and against the Shi'ite population. In 2004, after much discussion, Zarqawi joined al Qaeda and changed the name of his group to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), also known as ‗Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers‘ and ‗Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia‘. Zarqawi believed an

39

Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, Robert A. Guffey, The Iraq Effect The Middle East After the Iraq War by, RAND Corp, 2010, pp. 115-120 40 Idem 41 Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis, Center for Strategic and International Studies January 6, 2014 http://csis.org/files/publication/130106_Iraq_Book_AHC-sm.pdf 42 Idem

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association with al Qaeda would attract recruits and funds, while bin Laden needed a presence in Iraq as the most active front for ‗jihad‘ at that time. Bin Laden may also have hoped to limit Zarqawi‘s ability to challenge al Qaeda‘s leading role by accepting him as a subordinate. Zarqawi then brought together several other groups to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council in early 2005. Zarqawi died in an American airstrike in mid-2006 and soon afterwards, under its new leader, Abu Hamza al Muhajir, an Egyptian close to Zawahiri, the group again joined with others to become The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), headed by Abu Omar al Baghdadi. ISI was thus the local al Qaeda affiliate. The first stage ended when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in an American targeted attack in June 2006.43 Stage Two (2006-2011) – Establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI): ISI served as an umbrella network for several jihadi organizations that continued waging a terrorist-guerilla campaign against the United States, its coalition allies and the Shi'ite population. ISI was weakened towards the end of the American presence in Iraq following successful American military moves and a wise foreign policy that supported the Sunni population and knew how to win their hearts and minds. Abu Hamza and Abu Omar were killed together in 2010, by which time the movement had been severely degraded even though it had allied with many secularist opponents of the Iraqi regime who found themselves excluded from power as ex Ba‘athists. It was at this point that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (originally named Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al Badri al Samarrai) became leader of the movement and set about rebuilding it, largely through a relentless campaign of car bombs and suicide bombing attacks, but subsequently much helped by the Syrian civil war, which began in earnest around May 2011. Stage Three (2012-June 2014) – The strengthening of ISI and the founding of ISIS: After the American army withdrew from Iraq ISI became stronger. Following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war ISI established a branch in Syria called the Al-Nusra Front ("support front"). Dissension broke out between ISI and its Syrian branch, leading to a rift between ISI and Al-Qaeda and the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).44 Stage Four (as of June 2014) – Dramatic ISIS military achievements: The most prominent was the takeover of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. At the same time ISIS established its control in eastern Syria where it set up a governmental center (its "capital city") in Al-Raqqah. In the wake of its success, ISIS declared the establishment of an "Islamic State" (IS) (or "Islamic Caliphate") headed by an ISIS leader named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In September 2014 the United States

43

ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014 http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/en/article/20733 44 Idem

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declared a comprehensive campaign against ISIS, which is currently waging a fierce struggle against its many enemies both at home and abroad.45 Before declaring the Caliphate, ISIS had conducted some market research through social media to judge the likely reaction. It had also approached several other ‗jihadist‘ groups; for example, Abu Bakr is said to have approached Nasser al Wuhaishi, the military commander of al Qaeda and the head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)46, who - unsurprisingly – rebuffed him.47 He met a similar response from other leaders though he did receive some support from within Libya, Tunisia, and the Sinai.48 Although the consensus opinion was that the declaration of a Caliphate would be premature because the group‘s control of territory was not yet firm enough, Abu Bakr decided that he had more to gain than to lose, and may also have been deceived by his own appreciation of his historic role. Jabhat al Nusra has since shown that it faces similar disagreements over raising its status, in this case to become an Islamic Emirate or State.49 A supposedly leaked tape of Golani announcing an Islamic State in four areas of Syria under al Nusra control on 12 July 2014 was followed by a partial retraction and some confusion.50 Although Abu Bakr has failed to achieve a significant number of pledges of allegiance to the Caliphate, even from salafist/takfiri groups,51 that does not mean that they all oppose him. Even AQAP has said that it respects the achievements of The Islamic State, even though it does not endorse its claim to leadership. At first the lack of endorsement may have made Abu Bakr appear something of a clown elsewhere in the Muslim world, but his dramatic appearance in Mosul on 4 July, heavy with symbolism that will have impressed some Muslims who watched his performance, and the sheer determination of his fighters in the field, despite the growing alliance against them, have at the very least attracted worldwide interest and admiration among extremists. On the first day of Ramadan 28 June 201452, following rapid territorial gains, which included the capture of Mosul on 10 June, ISIS declared the revival of the Caliphate53, naming it The Islamic State and Abu Bakr as Caliph Ibrahim.54 The declaration was intended as a rallying call to all observant Muslims, but in particular those who shared the salafist/takfiri views expressed by

45

ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014 http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/en/article/20733 46 However, AQAP, like other AQ affiliates, supports the objectives of The Islamic State even though it does not support the declaration of the Caliphate. 47 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18219 which reports the Twitter leaks of a former member of The Islamic State who defected to Jabhat al Nusra. 48 From Ansar al-Sharia branches and AnsarBayt al-Maqdis. JM Berger analysis http://jihadology.net/category/other-groups/jamaatan%E1%B9%A3ar-bayt-al-maqdis/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/islamic_state_vs_al_qaeda_next_jihadi_super_power 49 http://eaworldview.com/2014/07/syria-daily-jabhat-al-nusra-denies-declared-islamic-emirate/ 50 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jul-14/263738-nusra-plans-own-islamic-emirate-insyria 51 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10943404/Most-Muslims-dont-care-about-the-Isis-Caliphate.html. 52 Sunni rebels declare new ‗Islamic caliphate‘ http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new islamiccaliphate201462917326669749.html 53 The last Caliphate, run by the Ottoman Turks, was dissolved by the Turkish Government in 1924. 54 In his first address as Caliph on 4 July, Abu Bakr argued that as soon as Muslims controlled territory that was administered according to Islamic law (sharia), they had an obligation to declare a Caliphate.

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The Islamic State, and so draw away support from like-minded groups in Syria, including al Nusra, that might compete for recruits and resources. As Caliph, he demands the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, according to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). When the Caliphate was proclaimed, ISIL stated: ―The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's (caliphate's) authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.‖ This was a rejection of the political divisions in the Middle East that were established by Western powers during World War I in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. The declaration was also a direct challenge to the authority of Zawahiri and the role of Mullah Omar, who until then had been the undisputed Amir al Mu‘minin Leader of the Faithful).55 At Friday prayers at the Grand Mosque of al Nuri in Mosul on 4 July, in his first address as Caliph, Abu Bakr claimed that he had reluctantly accepted the title at the behest of the community of Islamic scholars, albeit that they remained unidentified and silent. The rapid conquest of Mosul and the declaration of the Caliphate caused a brief surge in new recruits 56, but did not achieve the impact that supporters of The Islamic State had expected or hoped for.57

ii.

Ideology and objectives

The Islamic State has a complex ideology and set of beliefs. Coming from Islam, or a particular interpretation of it, their ideology is a combination of political, societal and religious concepts, which not only favor their plans and objectives, but give them a good cover-up for all the atrocities.

Aside from a lust for power, the driving ideological force behind The Islamic State comes from two very different directions, though both have a common theme. The first and now dominant strand is the fundamentalist canon of Islamic opinion that stretches from the 14th Century scholar Ibn Taymiyya through Muhammad ibnʿAbd al Wahhab, who died in 1792, to modern day salafist ideologues. Essentially their interpretation of Islam demands the harsh and absolute rejection of any innovation since the times of the Prophet. They argue that any diversion from puritanical precepts that they draw from a literal reading of the Quran and the Hadith is blasphemy, and must be eradicated. It follows therefore that Shi‘ism, Sufism or essentially anything - and anyone - that does not conform to their interpretation of Islam, should be destroyed. This is the essence of takfirism 58. The Islamic State therefore claims legitimacy for its violence by arguing that all its actions are in 55

A title adopted by Caliphs since the 7th Century, but less presumptuous than the title itself. 6,300 in July alone according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/19/us syriacrisis-islamicstateidUSKBN0GJ0W420140819. 57 http://news.intelwire.com/2014/07/the-caliphate-so-far-flatlining.html , and http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/islamic_state_vs_al_qaeda_next_jihadi_super_power. 58 Alastair Crooke, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isiswahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html . 56

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the interest of reviving Islam, returning it to its pure form, uniting the Muslim world under truly Islamic rule, and so restoring the dignity and greatness of its people while fulfilling the orders of God. This ideology comes from this extreme interpretation of the Quran and has all its roots in the Caliphate concept. The political manner, in which they understand the state, is also a religious concept. Basically, their entire ideology is built on various ways of performing anything it takes, especially promoting religious violence and punishing those

who do not agree with this

interpretation, perceived as infidels or apostates to purify Islam of its flaws and return to what was perceived as the Golden Age of Islam. The three most important concepts that lay at the base of the ideology of ISIS are the Caliphate, jihad and takfiri. On a very minimalist way of explaining their beliefs, these three concepts mean that: they want to restore an age when all of the Muslims lived in peace and they were pure, through a holy war and without mercy towards those who are infidels or apostates.

Religious ideology

The religion aspect is the core of the Islamic State`s ideology and not only. Their entire existence can be seen as a violent religious group. ISIS is an Islamic Salafist-jihadi organization. Salafism is an extremist Sunni politicalreligious movement within Islam that seeks to restore the golden era of the dawn of Islam, the time of the prophet Muhammad and the early Caliphs who followed him (the Arabic word Salaf means ancestor or first generation). That is to be done, according to Salafist jihadist ideology, by jihad (a holy war) against both internal and external enemies. Jihad, according to Salafist jihadism, is the personal duty of every Muslim. ). The modern Salafist movement began in Egypt, a result of the desire to purify Islam of its flaws and return to what was perceived as the Golden Age of Islam. AlQaeda and the global jihad organizations (of which ISIS is the most powerful one) sprang from Salafist jihadism. It follows an extreme interpretation of Islam, promotes religious violence, and regards those who do not agree with its interpretations as infidels or apostates. ―Initially, the Salafist movement focused on religious studies and the winning of hearts and minds (da‗wah) as a way of creating an Islamic society and a state ruled by Islamic law. However, within the Salafi movement an extremist faction called Salafiyya Jihadiyya (i.e., jihadi Salafism) developed, from which Al-Qaeda and the global jihad organizations, including ISIS, have emerged.‖ 59 An ideologically important contribution to the development of the movement was made by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian ideologue whose ideas inspired the establishment of Islamic 59

Rhodes, Darion , Salafist-TakfiriJihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2014

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organizations that supported violent struggle (including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden‘s successor as leader of Al-Qaeda). According to Hayder al Khoei, a repected Islamic scholar, a researcher at the Centre for Academic Shi'a Studies,―ISIL`s philosophy is represented by the symbolism in the Black Standard variant of the legendary battle flag of Muhammad that it has adopted: the flag shows the Seal of Muhammad within a white circle, with the phrase above it, ‗There is no God but Allah‘‖60. In Arabic this is called Shahadah - declaring there is no god except God, and Muhammad is God's Messenger and it represents the first pillar of the Islamic religion. ―Such symbolism has been said to point to ISIL's belief that it represents the restoration of the caliphate of early Islam, with all the political, religious and eschatological ramifications that this would imply.‖61 Even though most of the educated Muslim world doesn`t admit it, and is fair to understand why, probably many Christians didn`t identify themselves with those who were fighting in the Crusades, also most of them nor believe today it was representative for their religion, the reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Because the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam. Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, ―the Prophetic methodology‖, which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn‘t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it. The intelligence community has to get acquainted with the Islamic State‘s intellectual genealogy if their efforts will be more than efforts, but actual solutions. The focus on religion is also evident in the education system, so far as it exists. Schools teach little more than the main Islamic subjects of aqida (belief), fiqh (jurisprudence), and sira (life of the Prophet). There appears to be no provision for general education or vocational training. Artistic expression is considered of no importance and music is banned. The Islamic State therefore appears keener to ensure that the next generation is fully indoctrinated into its propaganda and accepts its salafist/takfiri interpretation of Islam, than it is capable of performing any useful function in society. Political doctrine Before stating what their political doctrine is formed of, it`s important for any kind of ruling to look at how they see peace. We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of 60

Hayder al-Khoei discusses Iraq crisis on BBC News https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_FPo1kaymo Idem

61

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principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of - and headline player in - the imminent end of the world.

The Caliphate ―The political dimension of Islam is embedded in the concept of khilafah that finds its literal meaning in niyabah (representation) and amanah (trusteeship). According to the Qur‘an and Sunnah, khilafah is the basic nature of rule or the character of Islamic rule, not a specific form of government.‖62 According to the ISIS concept, Islam's golden era will be restored through the establishment of a supranational Islamic Caliphate modeled after the regimes of the first Caliphs after the death of Muhammad. They view the caliphate as the only righteous government on Earth and it has to be ruled by Islamic religious law, the Sharia, but not in the same manner as some countries in the Middle East that are ruled by this law, instead, they will rule the Caliphate according to its most extreme interpretation (ISIS does not recognize nation-state legitimacy or the national borders of the Middle East as outlined in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and formulated by the superpowers during and after the First World War). Because, according to the Salafist-jihadi perception, the enemies of Islam are not only external (mainly the US and the West), but also Arab regimes that cooperate with the West or secular Arab regimes that are considered ―infidel‖ Therefore, according to Salafist jihadists, Islamic religious law justifies overthrowing them. Their leader, Baghdadi spoke at length of the importance of the Caliphate in his Mosul sermon. He said that to revive the institution of the caliphate—which had not functioned except in name for about 1,000 years—was a communal obligation. He and his loyalists had ―hastened to declare the caliphate and place an imam‖63 at its head, he said. ―This is a duty upon the Muslims— a duty that has been lost for centuries. The Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it.‖64 Like bin Laden before him, Baghdadi spoke floridly, with frequent scriptural allusion and command of classical rhetoric. Unlike bin Laden, and unlike those false caliphs of the Ottoman Empire, he is Qurayshi. The Islamic prophet, Muhammad was born into the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe and he considers himself coming from the same tribe, therefore, being the only one who has the right to become a caliph and rule the Muslim world to salvation.

62

Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State: True Concept and Eradicating Misconceptions (Khilafah), Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, 2009 , p. 8 63 ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi first Friday sermon as so-called 'Caliph' http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/07/ISIS-Abu-Bakr-alBaghdidi-first-Friday-sermon-as-so-called-Caliph-.html 64 Idem

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Before the caliphate, ―maybe 85 percent of the Sharia was absent from our lives‖,65―These laws are in abeyance until we have khilafa‖66 -a caliphate- ―and now we have one.‖67 Without a caliphate, for example, individual vigilantes are not obliged to amputate the hands of thieves they catch in the act. But create a caliphate, and this law, along with a huge body of other jurisprudence, suddenly awakens. In theory, all Muslims are obliged to immigrate to the territory where the caliph is applying these laws. The caliph is required to implement Sharia. Any deviation will compel those who have pledged allegiance to inform the caliph in private of his error and, in extreme cases, to excommunicate and replace him if he persists. (―I have been plagued with this great matter, plagued with this responsibility, and it is a heavy responsibility,‖68 Baghdadi said in his sermon.) In return, the caliph commands obedience—and those who persist in supporting non-Muslim governments, after being duly warned and educated about their sin, are considered apostates. In their opinion, Sharia has been misunderstood because of its incomplete application by regimes such as Saudi Arabia, which does behead murderers and cut off thieves‘ hands. ―The problem‖, as they perceive it, ―is that when places like Saudi Arabia just implement the penal code, and don‘t provide the social and economic justice of the Sharia—the whole package—they simply engender hatred toward the Sharia.‖69 That whole package would include free housing, food, and clothing for all, though of course anyone who wished to enrich himself with work could do so. Health care is free. This provision of social welfare was not a policy choice of the Islamic State, but a policy obligation inherent in God‘s law. As a caliphate, the Islamic State must conduct its foreign policy through a jihad. It has already taken up what Islamic law refers to as ―offensive jihad,‖ the forcible expansion into countries that are ruled by non-Muslims. ―Hitherto, we were just defending ourselves‖70, because without a caliphate, offensive jihad is an inapplicable concept. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph. ―Khilafah does not vest absolute authority in the ruler, whether it takes the form of a presidential government or a parliamentary government, rather his obedience is primarily to the Qur‘an and Sunnah which override any form which government might take. Therefore, if true Islamic rule is enforced and all governmental policies, injunctions, judicial and executive functions are subservient to the laws legislated by the Qur‘an and Sunnah, it can be considered to be khilafah regardless of the form of government being used.‖71

65

Idem Idem Idem 68 Idem 69 What ISIS really wants by Graeme Wood http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ 70 Idem 71 Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State: True Concept and Eradicating Misconceptions (Khilafah), Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, 2009,pp. 15-16 66 67

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―The state has an obligation to terrorize its enemies - a holy order to scare them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict‖72. Islamic law permits only temporary peace treaties, lasting no longer than a decade. Similarly, accepting any border is anathema, as stated by the Prophet and echoed in the Islamic State‘s propaganda videos. If the caliph consents to a longer-term peace or permanent border, he will be in error. Temporary peace treaties are renewable, but may not be applied to all enemies at once: the caliph must wage jihad at least once a year. He may not rest, or he will fall into a state of sin. I will explain more about the caliph`s role and duties when I will analyze the organization aspect of the group and their leadership. Even if they somehow manage to provide for their people, as a state should do, the costs are huge. You give them your entire life in order to help them, as a soldier in their jihad. Islamic State fighters ―are smacked in the middle of the medieval tradition and are bringing it wholesale into the present day.‖73

Jihad In its basic understanding, Jihad is an Islamic term referring to a religious duty of Muslims. In Arabic, the word jihad is a noun meaning ―struggle‖ or ―resisting‖. Extremists have taken this term to the dimension of the holy war. Their holy war is tied to a specifically place. The Islamic State has attached great importance to the Syrian city of Dabiq, near Aleppo. It named its propaganda magazine after the town, and celebrated madly when at great cost) it conquered Dabiq‘s strategically unimportant plains. It is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies of Rome will set up their camp. The armies of Islam will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome‘s Waterloo or its Antietam. The Islamic State awaits the army of ―Rome,‖ whose defeat at Dabiq, Syria, will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse. ―Dabiq is basically all farmland,‖74 one Islamic State supporter recently tweeted. ―You could imagine large battles taking place there.‖75 The Islamic State‘s propagandists drool with anticipation of this event, and constantly imply that it will come soon. The state‘s magazine quotes Zarqawi as saying, ―The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify … until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.‖76

72

What is the future of the Islamic World? History Forum http://historum.com/middle-eastern-african-history/90567-what-future-islamic-world3.html 73 Nitpicking Wood‘s Piece Matters https://cyberfitna.wordpress.com/category/religion/ 74 Islamic State believes it will beat the ‗Roman‘ armies in Syria http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/islamic-state-believes-it-will-beat-theroman-armies-in-syria/ 75 Idem 76 Idem

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The Prophetic narration that foretells the Dabiq battle refers to the enemy as Rome. Who ―Rome‖ is, now that the pope has no army, remains a matter of debate. But scholars make a case that Rome meant the Eastern Roman empire, which had its capital in what is now Istanbul. We should think of Rome as the Republic of Turkey—the same republic that ended the last selfidentified caliphate, 90 years ago. Other Islamic State sources suggest that Rome might mean any infidel army, and the Americans will do nicely. The army of Rome can stand for anybody who can fit in their definition of the enemy – the takfiri. After its battle in Dabiq, the caliphate will expand and sack Istanbul. Some believe it will then cover the entire Earth, its tide may never reach beyond the Bosporus. An anti-Messiah, known in Muslim apocalyptic literature as Dajjal, will come from the Khorasan region of eastern Iran and kill a vast number of the caliphate‘s fighters, until just 5,000 remain, cornered in Jerusalem. Just as Dajjal prepares to finish them off, Jesus—the second-most-revered prophet in Islam—will return to Earth, spear Dajjal, and lead the Muslims to victory.

Takfiri In Islam, the practice of takfir, or excommunication, is theologically perilous. ―If a man says to his brother, ‗You are an infidel,‘ ‖ the Prophet said, ―then one of them is right.‖77 If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation. The punishment for apostasy is death. Following takfiri doctrine, the Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people. The lack of objective reporting from its territory makes the true extent of the slaughter unknowable, but social-media posts from the region suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions every few weeks. Muslim ―apostates‖ are the most common victims. Exempted from automatic execution, it appears, are Christians who do not resist their new government. They have permission to live, as long as they pay a special tax, known as the jizya, and acknowledge their subjugation. The Koranic authority for this practice is not in dispute. Denying the holiness of the Quran or the prophecies of Muhammad is straightforward apostasy. The Islamic State takes the position that many other acts can remove a Muslim from Islam. These include, in certain cases, selling alcohol or drugs, wearing Western clothes or shaving one‘s beard, voting in an election—even for a Muslim candidate—and being lax about calling other people apostates. Being a Shiite, as most Iraqi Arabs are, meets the standard as well, because the Islamic State regards Shiism as innovation, and to innovate on the Koran is to deny its initial perfection. (The Islamic State claims that common Shiite practices, such as worship at the graves of 77

The Importance of Understanding ISIS/ISIL http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2015/02/18/the-importance-of-understanding-isisisil/

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imams and public self-flagellation, have no basis in the Koran or in the example of the Prophet.) That means roughly 200 million Shia are marked for death. So too are the heads of state of every Muslim country, who have elevated man-made law above Sharia by running for office or enforcing laws not made by God. The ideological purity of the Islamic State has one compensating virtue: it allows us to predict some of the group‘s actions. And this is a very rare situation in the counter-terrorism process. It is a clear advantage that the Islamic State boasts openly about its plans—not all of them, but enough so that by paying attention and listening carefully, it is deductible how it intends to govern and expand.

iii.

Organization

System and structure The importance of ―an organization`s structure and its level of compartmentation is primarily that it deeply affect its counterintelligence fitness‖78. The Islamic State has a tight structure and a tight command structure. The organizational structure is modeled after a military unit, likely because so many of the inner circles have previously served in the Saddam-era Iraqi Army. Its leadership is formed by two religious councils and six other councils – each of them with a specific task and areas of operation, and all of them are ruled by a Caliph. Overall, IS is reported to have an estimated 1,000 mid-to-senior leaders with technical, military and security backgrounds. All the intelligence and security agencies in the world agree on this structure and its leader. From that point forward, there were many names circulated through reports and media, as part of the leadership and also of their roles and duties inside the organization. The one report about the Islamic State`s leaderships that seems most accepted in the international intelligence community is the one conducted by the Soufan Group in November 2014.79 In all of the tops, we have the commander in chief, self-proclaimed the Caliph, identified as (codename) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (debated real name), he has the most authority and it is the best known member of the Islamic State so far. The second most popular and iconic person of the terrorist organization is their already famous spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani.

78

Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection,Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, 2012, pp. 151-170 79 The Islamic State by Richard Barrett November 2014 http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf

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He is advised by a Cabinet, formed by his most trusted persons. Documents seized from the house of a member of the Islamic State in a raid by the Iraqi military in July 2014 have revealed, for the first time and in remarkable detail, the leadership structure of this secretive organization. The members identified as part of the Cabinet are: ShawkatHazem al-Farhat (code name: Abu Abdul Kadr) - General Management official; Bashar Ismail al-Hamdani (code name: Abu Mohamed), in charge of prisoners and detainees; Abdul Wahid Khutnayer Ahmad (code name: Abu Louay, aka Abu Ali), general security official; Muafaq Mustafa Mohammed al-Karmoush (code name: Abu Salah), in charge of general finance for the Iraqi provinces of the emirate; Mohammed Hamid alDuleimi (code name: Abu Hajar al-Assafi) - general coordinator between the Islamic state's provinces - transports messages post across the territory; Abdullah Ahmed al-Meshedani (code name: Abu Kassem) - charged with managing the arrival of foreign and Arab jihadists, including overseeing the running of guesthouses for them (he is also reportedly a "transporter of suicide bombers"); Adnan Ismail NajemBilawi (code name: Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi) - chief of the general military council for the Iraqi provinces of the Islamic state, and a captain in the Iraqi military under ousted dictator Saddam Hussein. He was killed on 5th June 2014 in Mosul. His place is now taken by TarkhanTayumurazovichBatirashvili (code name: Abu Omar al-Shishani or Omar al-Shishani), who is a former Sergeant in the Georgian Army.80 The Shura Council, the Islamic State's highest advisory body, responsible for religious and military affairs is headed by Abu Arkan al Ameri. In theory, Baghdadi must run decisions past the Shura Council, which could dismiss the Caliph if it he fails to carry out his duties. It is believed that is formed of nine to eleven members81, all of whom are most probably from Iraq. The next important member is Fadil Ahmad Abdallah al Hayyali (known by its codename: Abu Muslim al Turkmani), Baghdadi`s right hand, who oversees Islamic State in Iraq and is the Deputy Emir of IS, charged with overseeing all of the provinces IS captured on the Iraqi front. Hiyali served as a Lieutenant Colonel in the former regime‘s Istikhbarat Directorate of General Military Intelligence) and served in the Special Republican Guard right up until US forces crossed the berm into Iraq in the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. With the same position, but oversees it in Syria, it was identified Abu Ali al Anbari, who served as a Major General in the former regime‘s Army and is reportedly from the Mosul-area (although there is evidence to indicate he at least has family in Anbar, and was possibly born in the Euphrates River Valley). Both of these men are former members of the Iraqi Ba'ath party, according to the report. Another possible member of the Shura Council is Omar al Shishani (a.k.aTarkhanTayumurazovichBatirashvili), a well-known ethnic Chechen who is distinctive for his red beard and reports of his fighting prowess (the Soufan Group 80 81

The Islamic State by Richard Barrett November 2014 http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf The Islamic State: from Baghdadi the founder to Baghdadi the ―caliph‖http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20599

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cast some doubt on whether Shishani, a military commander, is a member of the council however). Both of them rule over a row of 12 Governors in Iraq, respectively in Syria In the report, along with the names mentioned, we also find Abu Ayman Al-Iraqi, nicknamed Abu Muhannad al-Suweidawi, who previously worked as a colonel in Iraq‘s air defense intelligence under Saddam Hussein and except his senior position in the Islamic State`s hierarchy, there`s very little known about him, being considered a ―shadowy persona‖. According to CNN82, each governor is in charge of eight councils: financial (managing the sale of oil and the purchase of weapons and supplies), leadership (implementation and drafting of laws), military (defence of the territory), legal (crime and punishment), assistance (ensuring fighters are adequately resourced), security (internal policing), intelligence (information gathering) and media (releasing statements and propaganda, and overseeing militants' use of social media). These regional 'councils' operate on the orders of their governor who bases his demands on those issued by Baghdadi himself, and also according to new laws and advice released by another group reporting to ISIS' leader and deputies, namely the Shura or war council. The Sharia Council is directly overseen by Abu Bakr and is the most powerful body of The Islamic State. It has six members. Its duties include selecting a Caliph and ensuring the compliance of all other parts of the administration with sharia law, according to its own interpretation. With 80 help from the Sharia Commissions, headed by Abu Mohammed al Aani, it is responsible for ensuring party discipline, providing rules and deciding penalties for their infringement, supervising the sharia police and courts and overseeing ideological outreach (dawa), both in areas under the State‘s control and beyond.83 The imposition and enforcement of religious observance in behavior and appearance is both a symbol and instrument of Islamic State power. One of its first objectives in a newly secured area is to establish a sharia police force, the sole purpose of which is to supervise the Islamic conduct of the region. This is completely separate from the normal civilian police force. The sharia courts, however, deal with more than religious transgressions; complaints against alleged offenders, civil or religious, can be brought before the sharia courts by the police or by private citizens, and in a country where justice has been partial, sporadic, and subject to corruption, the sharia courts can be popular insofar as they avoid these defects. The more cases that the courts deal with, the more people are vested in the durability of their judgments and accept The Islamic State as the guarantor of their authority. Up to this point, most of the intelligence agencies agreed upon of the identities of the persons in the Shura Council. After this point, different sources have identified various men 82

The anatomy of ISIS: How the 'Islamic State' is run, from oil to beheadings Nick Thompson and Atika Shubert http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/ 83 Idem

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occupying high positions. The Soufan Group`s report mentions Abu al AthirAmr al Asi and Abu Muhammad al Adnani as being part of the Shura Council, but, in other intelligence reports there are many other circulated names. There are other important councils in the systematic scheme of the government of the organization, some of them ruled by persons from the Shura Council. For example, Abu Muslim al Turkmani who rules the Provincial Council, Abu Ali al Anbari who supervises the Security and Intelligence operations and Abu al AthirAmr al Absi who covers the media dimension of the group. Alongside, there is the Military Council ruled by Abu Ahmad al Alwani. The Religious affairs are headed by Abu Mohammed al Aani. With the finance matters is in charge Muafaq Mustafa Mohammed al Khmoush. TRAC proposed another type of leadership structure, on a descending authority scale: leader, senior leaders, war office, governors and brigades. This is also a military system and many names are the same identified by the reports of other intelligence agencies. The only difference is that TRAC considers part of the war office three persons from the notable officials list proposed by TSG. Both agree on the roles that these three men have within the organization: Khairy Abed Mahmoud al Taey supervises IED deployment, Abdul Rahman al Afaru coordinates the affairs of women and orphans and Fares Reif al Naima is the chief of logistic and supplies. These are the identities of the persons that specialists from TRAC believe to form the War Office. Even though it seems to be a clear system and, in theory, it should be easy to predict their locations and whereabouts, it is not. Information about the real structure and leadership of the Islamic State is piece meal and difficult to verify. One of the reasons why is so difficult to counter the Islamic State is their strong military structure, coming from the backgrounds of the persons that al Baghdadi carefully chose to rule his Caliphate. They have managed so far to combine the knowhow of an army (driven by terrorism) as a highly centralized and disciplined organization with the structure of a corporation; their ―success‖ also comes from their ability to think in a very goalorientated manner – they do annual reports, they have a media strategy, a spokesman. The second one is that by trying to do well and eliminate some real threats, the counter terrorism efforts that lead to the deaths of some of the persons listed above, also lead to the inevitable replacement of them with unknown people and they are harder to be identified. The third reason is their organizational capability, combined with determination and focus, of course, all being sustained by huge amounts of money. The versatility of the connection between identities and functions makes the situation even harder for intelligence and counter terrorism.

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Leader The leadership structure of the IS may vary from one source to another, but most of them agree on large amounts of it and are now considered reliable. In the case of the leader, things are even more complicated. There are so many sources, none of them verifiable and reliable about who he is and what his real life was. He is extremely visible and active on social media and gives the appearance that all is known about him, but, in reality, all of the public details of Abu Bakr‘s biography are sketchy and sources often contradict one another. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been its leader since May 2010, but until last summer, his most recent known appearance on film was a grainy mug shot from a stay in U.S. captivity at Camp Bucca during the occupation of Iraq. Then, on July 5 of last year, he stepped into the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, to deliver a Ramadan sermon as the first caliph in generations— upgrading his resolution from grainy to high-definition, and his position from hunted guerrilla to commander of all Muslims. The inflow of jihadists that followed, from around the world, was unprecedented in its pace and volume, and is continuing. Baghdadi has spoken on camera only once. As stated at the beginning of this sub-chapter, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is a ―nickname‖. His real name and identity has been, as well, a subject of contradiction and debates among the intelligence international community. Some sources state him as being Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarrai, while some leaks coming from (supposed) ISIS insights maintain that he is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim BouBadri bin Armoush, known as Abu Awwad or Abu Doaa. All sources agree that Abu Bakr is an alias. Everything about this man is controversial and not for sure known yet. It`s all a supposition and an educated guess. From his real name to his past and present location, from his appointment as a Caliph to his personality, it`s all a blur. There is an unquestionable personality cult and adoration towards him, as it was for Osama Bin Laden, even if he was not recorded by anyone as having charisma or showing leadership skills. His appointment to lead the Islamic State of Iraq in 2010 is reported by a defector from the group84 to have been a surprise to its other members, and to have been engineered by an ex-Colonel from the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard, Samir Abed Hamad al Obeidi al Dulaimi, or Samir AbdMuhammad al Khlifawi, also known as Haji Bakr or Abu Bakr al Iraqi. Haji Bakr was a secularist Ba‘athist who initially attracted criticism from fellow members of the group for his lack of a proper beard and lax observance of other dictates of their religious practice 85. But his organizational skills, knowledge of the Iraqi Army and network of fellow ex-Ba‘athists made him a 84 85

Known on Twitter as @wikibaghdady Al-Qaeda Leaks: Baghdadi and Golani Fight Over the Levant Emirate http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/18186

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valuable resource and by the time the two leaders of The Islamic State of Iraq,Abu Omar al Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al Masri, died in April 2010, he was the head of its main advisory body, the Shura Council. Hajji Bakr, like several of The Islamic State leadership, spent time in US custody (twice) at some point between 2003 and 2010.86 He died fighting the Free Syrian Army North of Aleppo in early January 2014.87 There are many versions of who the leader of ISIS is what he has done so far. But only two of them are notable and the most debated, also is more probably one of them might be the truth. The first one comes from the same ―inside‖ source and states that Abu Bakr was born in Samarra, Iraq in 1971.88 His family was not well off and several of his relatives were preachers. Before moving to Fallujah, he studied at the Islamic University in Baghdad, living in a poor area some way from the center of the city and acting as an assistant prayer leader in the local mosque.89 Accounts from people claiming to have been his classmates suggest that he was an outsider at school, not especially good at anything except soccer, which was the only time he joined in.90 The second one, is a more generous biography, that comes from the propaganda machinery of The Islamic State in July 201391, states that Abu Bakr holds a doctorate in Islamic Sciences from the Islamic University in Baghdad, having done his PhD on Tajweed (other versions add Islamic culture, sharia and fiqh92) and became a Professor at Tikrit University93. It`s claimed that he was an Imam at various mosques in Samarra, Baghdad, and Fallujah before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Some also say that Abu Bakr was in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, which, together with the legacy of Zarqawi, may explain why The Islamic State apes certain characteristics of the Taliban regime at that time. Following the invasion, it claims that he co-founded JamaatJayshAhl al Sunnah (the Army of the Sunnah), which operated in Samarra, Diyala, and Baghdad, and led its Sharia Council before his detention in Camp Bucca in January 2004.94 Abu Bakr‘s group joined al Qaeda in Iraq and others as a founding member of the MajlisShura al Mujahidin (the MujahideenShura Council) in early 2006, which then became The Islamic State of Iraq later that year. Abu Bakr became a member of the ISI Shura Council and the head of its sharia committee, and by the time of Abu Omar‘s death in April 2010, was the third most senior person in the organization, overseeing its military operations, having served as Sharia head or emir in al Anbar, Fallujah, Diyala, Baghdad

86

According to the martyrdom notice published by The Islamic State, on one occasion spending four years in detention ISIS confirms death of senior leader in Syria http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/isis_confirms_death.php 88 The war in Syria: ISIS‘s most successful investment yet http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/20133 89 Profile: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676 90 How a talented footballer became world‘s most wanted man, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948846/How-a-talented-footballer-became-worlds-most-wantedman-Abu-Bakr-alBaghdadi.html 91 A Biography of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/226-the-story-behind-abu-bakr-al%20baghdadi 92 Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi http://www.takvahaber.net/halife-ebu-bekir-el-bagdadi-biyografi,13.html 93 The rise of the Islamic State http://tahrirsouri.com/2014/07/12/profile-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-is/ 94 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Islamic State's driving force http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28560449 87

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and Samarra.95 Coming from the al Badri clan, a sub clan of the Quraish, he had additional status as a putative descendant of the Prophet. Some Islamic scholars argue that the al Badri are outside the group that may claim descent from the Prophet96 His predecessor, Abu Omar al Baghdadi had also claimed to be a member of the Quraish97. The Islamic State also claims that Abu Bakr is an active and effective military commander, leading his troops in battle and being wounded as a result98.This is inherently unlikely. Not only does Abu Bakr have no military background or experience, he is also intensely careful about his security and before his appearance in the Mosul mosque on 4 July 2014, few people even knew what he looked like. When commanders below the leadership level were called to meet him, it is said that they would be told he was present in the group but without his identity being specified 99. Abu Bakr‘s location is not exactly known, but he is thought to lead The Islamic State from Raqqa in Syria, though spending time also in Mosul. As well as disputing his academic and religious qualifications, Abu Bakr‘s detractors say that he is not a true member of the Quraish and therefore not a descendant of the prophet, widely understood to be a prerequisite for anyone holding the position of Caliph. In addition, they say that ―between 2003 and 2006, rather than being an active member of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, he lived in Damascus at a safe distance from the Iraqi civil war. When he returned to Iraq, he joined the resistance through a brother-in-law, who was active in one of the groups that became part of ISI and so came to pledge allegiance to Abu Omar. Shortly afterwards he was arrested and on his release took on the post-box role described above‖100. Authority ―All heads of an Islamic state are entitled to be known as uli‘l-amr(those in command) provided that they fulfill the condition of obedience to Allah and Holy Prophet. Even minor authorities have that status, as the concept of obedience to ―those in command‖ extends to them as well.‖101 Even though his past and skills make a good subject for controversies, the self-appointed Calif is enjoying a huge amount of authority and means to impose it. Having built a form of state that actually functions, on their own terms even if it isn‘t recognized by anybody else then them, he and his leadership command to a vast number of people. There are no cases of people who 95

Idem The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi‘s Ideological Heirs, Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their Self-Styled Islamic State of Iraq NibrasKazimihttp://www.hudson.org/research/9854-the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-a-caliph-and-the-collapseof-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq 97 NibrasKazimi, The necessity of the Caliph being from the Quraish, Talisman Gate Blog, 2008 98 In northeast Syria, Islamic State builds a government http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-syria-crisis-raqqa-insightidUSKBN0GZ0D120140904?irpc=932 99 The quest for the caliph(ate) https://www.hate-speech.org/the-quest-for-the-caliphate 100 Abu Ahmed, ‗The Hidden Truth about al-Baghdadi‘s State‘ '101Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State: True Concept and Eradicating Misconceptions (Khilafah), Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, p. 18 96

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disobeyed and still live. If you don`t respect the authority that is imposed, you are a liability and you will be executed. They manage to sustain all their operations and the state itself by brutal force, fear and, as unusually as it sounds, by promises for a better future.

iv.

Capabilities

Unfortunately for the humankind, the Islamic State has a vast amount of capabilities and it has managed to use them in their interest, without the implication of the intelligence community to stop them, so far.

Military capabilities and manpower For all that it has several ex-members of Saddam‘s military in its top ranks, The Islamic State has shown some strategic weakness, especially in the way that it has often dissipated its effort by attacking multiple targets, some of limited value. In the field, it is particularly reliant on suicide bombers and the skills of certain military commanders, such as Omar al Shishani, who has shown consistent ability to take the enemy by surprise. 102 However, it does have two other strengths: the enthusiasm and determination of its fighters and its reputation for violence. As everything else about the Islamic State, the real number of the manpower that they have is estimation. Estimates of the military strength of The Islamic State vary from a few thousand to tens of thousands, with the CIA reportedly giving a bracket of between 25,000 and 31,500 in December 2014.103 It is of course difficult to estimate the group‘s actual strength and capability as some fighters may be members of tribal militias, others may be coerced and many may be relatively untrained. Nonetheless, it reportedly took just 800 men to capture Mosul and the flexibility and coordination of its military actions demonstrate both strategic and tactical ability.104 Subcommanders are given a degree of latitude in the field that is unusual in the Middle East 105, and many of its fighters are reported to show a degree of commitment and fearlessness that helps overcome any deficiency in training. For so long as there are no effective ground forces deployed against it, The Islamic State is also likely to retain the support of the tribal militias in areas under its control.

The Islamic State‘s Anbar Offensive And Abu Umar Al-Shishani by DaveedGartenstein-Ross http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/the-islamicstates-anbar-offensive-and-abu-umar-al-shishani/ 103 US weakens al-Qaeda groups around the world but hasn`t wiped any out yet http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-weakensal-qaeda-groups-around-the-world-but-hasnt-wiped-anyout/ 104 Isil‘s Political-Military Power In Iraq by Michael Knights https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/isils-political-military-power-in-iraq 105 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Theory and Practice of Jihad by Gary Anderson http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-thetheory-and-practice-of-jihad 102

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In the ITIC assessment106, as many as 12,000 are operatives from Syria and Iraqand more than 13,000 are foreign fighters. Most of the foreign fighters come from the Arab-Muslim world. An estimated of 3,000 come from Western countries (about half from France and Britain). They usually arrive in Syria via Turkey, are given short military training by ISIS and engage in fighting. For the most part they return to their countries of origin. During their stay in Syria they gain military capabilities and receive Salafist-jihadi indoctrination, and pose a security threat to their countries of origin and to a certain extent to Israel (as illustrated by the attack on the Jewish museum in Brussels, which was carried out by a French national who fought in the ranks of ISIS). More recently, Rasmussen estimated that more than 20,000 foreign fighters from as many as 90 countries, including more than 3400 Westerners, may have travelled to Syria since 2011 in a trend that U.S. officials have described as ―unprecedented.‖ U.S. National Counterterrorism Director Nicholas Rasmussen said that ―the rate of foreign fighter travel to Syria is unprecedented. It exceeds the rate of travelers who went to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last 20 years.‖107 A senior State Department official said: ―we‘ve never seen something like this. We‘ve never seen a terrorist organization with 22,000 foreign fighters from a hundred countries all around the world. To put it in context – again, the numbers are fuzzy – but it‘s about double of what went into Afghanistan over 10 years in the war against the Soviet Union. Those jihadi fighters were from a handful of countries. These guys are coming from a hundred different countries. You combine that with social media, their efforts to inspire homegrown attacks, not even to have fighters come and train but do attacks at home, this is a formidable, enormous threat.‖108

Possession of weapons

ISIS has a large arsenal of weapons, most of them plundered from the Syrian and Iraqi armies. They include light arms, various types of rockets and mortars, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. In addition ISIS possesses heavy arms and the advanced technologies usually found only in regular national armies: artillery, tanks and armored vehicles, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and drones. It has used mustard gas a number of times in Syria and Iraq and may have other types of chemical weapons, such as chlorine gas. Chemical weapons were used to attack the Kurdish militias in Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) in northern Syria and against the Iraqi security forces. ISIS also has at least one Scud missile109 and a number of planes (operating from an ISIS-controlled airport). 106

ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014 Statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, February 11, 2015. 108 Background Briefing on Iraq by Senior State Department Official, Washington, DC, December 20, 2014 109 ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014 107

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Territorial Control The control of territory is an essential precondition for the Islamic State‘s authority in the eyes of its supporters. Where it holds power, the state collects taxes, regulates prices, operates courts, and administers services ranging from health care and education to telecommunications. ISIS core control zones inside Iraq and Syria have not shifted significantly since anti-ISIS operations began in June 2014, though anti-ISIS forces have cleared ISIS from several of its major frontier positions in Iraq and Syria. ISIS lost several frontier positions in late 2014. In eastern Iraq, ISIS lost control of several cities including Jalula, Sadia, Udhaim, and Suleiman Beg, compromising ISIS‘s access to the Hamrin ridge support system. In response ISIS shifted its Hamrin forces to the desert area east of the Tigris. ISIS also lost historic support positions in the Baghdad Belts, specifically in northern Baghdad and southwest of the capital in JurfalSakhar. ISIS still maintains a desert support zone north of Fallujah that provides access to northern Baghdad. ISIS also lost control of Sinjar city and several towns northeast of Tel Afar along its northern frontier in Iraq. ISIS lost territory to YPG forces near Tel Hamis and Hasaka city in November 2014, and subsequently increased attacks against the YPG along the road between Tel Tamr and Ras al-Ayn. Beginning in December 2014, ISIS also increased its activity along the Syrian-Lebanese border, establishing a Shari‘a court east of Arsal and clashing with the Lebanese Armed Forces in the vicinity of Ras Baalbek. This activity sparked rumors that ISIS intends to establish a ―wilayat‖ within Lebanon in the near term. In addition, past ISIS-linked attacks in Beirut and Tripoli indicate that ISIS may project force into these areas in the future. 110 These losses, while substantial, have not compromised ISIS‘s urban priorities of Mosul and Raqqa. Two notable losses did complicate ISIS‘s defenses in the environs Mosul and Raqqa. ISIS lost the battle for Kobane, northwest of Raqqa, in December 2014, and the Syrian Kurdish YPG subsequently pushed ISIS presence back to the perimeter of Raqqa district, re-capturing two strategic bridges along the upper Euphrates (see area on map northwest of Raqqa). In response ISIS consolidated its defenses between Raqqa city and these new Kurdish positions.111 In Iraq, Kurdish Peshmerga attacks at Gwer and anti-ISIS Sunni tribal activity near Qayarra and Sharqat in early 2015 perforated a critical ISIS stronghold in southern Ninewa. Losses in this area compromise ISIS‘s ability to defend Mosul from the south. 110 111

ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014 Idem

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In the areas under its control ISIS instituted alternative administrations to replace those of Syria and Iraq which collapsed. ―They include educational, judicial, policing and law enforcement networks. ISIS uses them to provide vital services and at the same time to enforce its Salafist-jihadi ideology on the local population. To that end it uses brutal measures against its opponents and the minorities living under its control (including mass executions). Nevertheless, so far the local populations seem to have come to terms with ISIS control and sometimes even support it. They do so especially in view of its ability to provide basic services, restore daily life to the status quo ante, and fill the administrative void that was created‖.112 The Islamic State has had and still has many safe havens and also multiple headquarters. Their ability to change them rapidly after the international coalition destroys one by one their buildings, is a sign of strength and adaptability, making the intelligence efforts even harder, in order to counter the threat that they possess to the world.

Recruiting and training

The majority of ISIS fighters are local and regional recruits; a small percentage are fighters from Western nations. But, ISIS encourages its Western members to use their smartphones to instruct, guide and recruit other Westerners on their social media accounts (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Kik, Ask.fm, Skype, and blogs). ISIS facilitators recruit at community events (religious seminars and community activities) and schools (e.g. high schools and colleges), but require an ISIS sheikh recommendation and ―jihad mentor‖113 for Western recruits to be selected and to prevent US intelligence collection. ISIS keeps its messaging simple (―join the Caliphate‖114) within its branding and recruitment campaign on its Google Play App, The Dawn of Glad Tidings and its monthly electronic magazine, Dabiq. ISIS‘s narrative uses group identity to prevent an individual from employing any other values that could disrupt ISIS‘s group coherence and unified action. ISIS makes the sacred value (e.g. governance by Allah) incompatible with other values, which in turn prevents trade-offs and concessions from occurring within their in-group. When the value becomes non-negotiable, the individual relies on emotional processing opposed to complex reasoning processes. ISIS‘s narrative uses group identity to prevent individuals from employing any other values that could disrupt ISIS‘s group coherence and unified actions. Tens of thousands of foreign Muslims are thought to have immigrated to the Islamic State. Recruits hail from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Australia, Indonesia,

112

ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014 http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/en/article/20733 113 Countering ISIS Propaganda http://counterjihadreport.com/tag/isis-propaganda/ 114 Idem

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the United States, and many other places. Also, many non- Muslim persons have come to fight this war for the Islamic State, and many are aware of the fact that this might lead them to death, but in their opinion, is a sacred and honorable way to go. The ability to recruit so vast amount of persons from all over the world raises a huge alarm signal for all of the societies. All of the states providing fighters for ISIS are western, modern and civilized countries that always rank in the top of the world. The sole question is why. Why all those teenagers don`t feel accepted at home and have such a great identity crisis that makes them cross the world, to fight a war that isn`t real and isn`t theirs in the first place? What allures them and how to stop the waves that the Middle East killing machine attracts? This is a sign that there is a big gap in their society and that they don`t feel that they are part of it anymore. That`s how IS takes advantage of this gap, by promising them a better life, a place where they are not only accepted, but welcomed, a new and safe home. It`s ironic how wealthy, educated and with potential great futures teenagers are so easily fooled to go a pandemonium. They mostly recruit through online and those voices have been essential to spreading propaganda and ensuring that newcomers know what to believe. Online recruitment has also widened the demographics of the jihadist community, by allowing conservative Muslim women, physically isolated in their homes, to reach out to recruiters, radicalize, and arrange passage to Syria. Through its appeals to both genders, the Islamic State hopes to build a complete society. Sharia training varies from one member to another, depending on the group‘s assessment of his value or loyalty. New recruits join training that ranges from two weeks, one month, 45 days, six months up to one year. Inside the camps, students receive a mix of military, political and sharia orientation, usually given by around five instructors. During training, recruits can be dispatched to checkpoints but not to the frontlines.

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After they graduate, they will remain under supervision and

can be expelled or punished in case of noncompliance – including being lashed if they express reservations. In some cases, new members who struggle with the brutality of the group‘s acts will be sent back to receive more training to ―strengthen116‖ their faith. Clerics in charge of religious training at ISIS, known as sharii, are mostly academically qualified and have longstanding experience within the organization‘s ranks. Isis also relies on young clerics who have recently joined its ranks to compensate for the shortage of imams to cover the approximately 20 mosques in every town that falls under its control. It often uses imams with limited religious training to speak at pulpits across eastern Syria and western Iraq, where mosques had typically been controlled by Sufis from the Naqshbandi order (a major Sunni spiritual order) of Sufism or its Khaznawi branch before ISIS arrived. (ISIS also uses local imams to pit local 115

Secret Programs in ISIS Training Camps; Sharia or Sword http://en.alalam.ir/news/1669761#sthash.uhP5Qnzq.dpuf Idem

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residents against each other as part of its divide and rule strategy.) These imams are generally asked to preach about three key concepts that are shared by all Salafi and jihadist groups, but ISIS has its own take on their functionalities, namely tawhid (strict monotheism), bida‘a (deviation in religious matters) and walawalbaraa (loyalty to Islam and disloyalty to anything un-Islamic).117 The process of indoctrination does not always happen after members join. In many cases, people are drawn to ISIS during conversations with members or sermons conducted by clerics weeks or even months before they start considering enrolment. By the time an individual is formally recruited, he will have at least bought into ISIS ideology. Inside the camp, the organization benefits from relating these hidden, obscure stories to formulate its own narrative. Isis depends heavily on what Muslim clerics consider isolated incidents described in sacred texts that it believes should not be followed as rules. The function of such incidents is not necessarily to argue a doctrinal idea. Isis sometimes uses them to help members who struggle with beheading, for example, to justify what they have done. When these stories are weaved into the overall ideology of ISIS, new members find it easier to accept them. Means Funding It is without question that such a big organization needs huge amounts of money to sustain their operations and also their recruitment. They are ―good‖ at this, too. They managed to find sources that provide them large and constant amounts of money that can provide them with the fluidity that a state needs, in order to function and prosper. The Islamic State‘s system of financing is likely shaped by the experiences of the group‘s predecessor organizations, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Captured battlefield documents and media reports provide the basis for what researchers know about how precursors to the Islamic State were funded. For example, documents describing ISI operations in Sinjar reveal a group that was reliant on incoming foreign fighters for funds, internal transfers from other areas under ISI‘s control, local donations, and conflict loot. 118 Other areas under ISI‘s control were reportedly funded through oil revenue, agricultural production, ransom payments, and external donors (both states and private; there are some states that were suspected of funding ISIS, for example Saudi Arabia, known for the keen relationship with other terrorist organizations). The Islamic State has kept its financing methods and they just improved them within practice and better partners. The Islamic State has been described by senior U.S. officials as one of the best-funded terrorist organizations. Its wealth has contributed to the group‘s ability to finance sophisticated 117

Secret Programs in ISIS Training Camps; Sharia or Sword http://en.alalam.ir/news/1669761#sthash.uhP5Qnzq.dpuf Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi et al., The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2014. 118

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military operations across parts of Iraq and Syria. It also seeks to use its revenue to administratively control and govern the territory it has seized. In several respects, the Islamic State presents a unique policy challenge to combating terrorist financing. Its financial strength lies in its ability to secure large amounts of funding from primarily internal sources, its lack of reliance on international sources of funds, and its exploitation of ungoverned spaces and porous borders to move funds with impunity. These characteristics often place the organization‘s finances beyond the reach of some of the most common counterterrorist financing policy tools. The Islamic State controls a variety of public resources and infrastructure in parts of Iraq and Syria, enabling it to assemble a ―diverse financial portfolio.‖119 Some of these resources, such as oil and antiquities, can be smuggled and sold for considerable profit. Others—agriculture and energy and water utilities—generate limited revenue and require a significant investment in inputs or technical expertise, but help the group portray itself as exercising the functions of a legitimate government. Activities such as kidnapping for ransom or the looting of state banks in Iraq are profitable in the near-term but not necessarily sustainable. In other cases, IS control over a set of resources is notable not solely for the revenue the group derives from it, but also for the extent to which it limits the ability of the Iraqi and Syrian governments to conduct trade, provide utility services, or feed its citizens. By taking control of the state infrastructure, including most of the oil fields in eastern Syria and several oil fields in Iraq, the Islamic State has gained access to high financial capabilities. The export of petroleum products is the main source of ISIS' income and its profits are estimated at several million dollars a day. However, profits fell in the wake of the aerial attacks carried out by the United States and its allies on its oil infrastructure. Other sources of ISIS income are various types of criminal activity (extortion, collecting ransom for abductees, trading in antiquities), collecting donations and imposing local taxes. The Islamic State has been in control of a number of relatively small oil fields in northern Iraq, selling volumes of oil through Turkey in essentially the same manner as their sales of Syrian oil. In June 2014 the group captured the Bayji refinery which, with its production capacity of 170,000 barrels per day, supplied petroleum products for northern Iraq.120 While in IS hands, the refinery produced only a fraction of its rated capacity due to lack of both personnel and a secure oil supply. Iraqi forces retook the refinery five months later, although control of the city remained contested. While IS forces are not in control of a modern operating oil refinery, the group has refined oil in crude, small, mobile refineries with capacities of about 300 to 500 barrels per day of petroleum products. Refined products may be more useful to the group than crude oil because these 119

Ibidem Carla E. Humud, Robert Pirog, Liana Rosen, Congressional Research Service report on Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches, April 10, 2015 www.crs.gov 120

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products (gasoline and diesel fuel) can be directly used to fuel IS military movements. Petroleum products may also be easier to sell to Turkish brokers because they can enter retail markets directly, avoiding the documentation attendant with processing at a legitimate refinery. Some analysts claim that the second largest source of revenue for the Islamic State is the sale of antiquities looted from areas under the group's control. 121 This includes items stolen from national museums, storage depots, or private collections, as well as those newly excavated from among the hundreds of archeological sites in the area. One archeologist from the Iraqi government‘s Department of Antiquities stated that a third of Iraq‘s archaeological sites are now under IS control.122 Items from these sites are sold in neighboring states or smuggled into Europe. As of early 2015, nearly a hundred Syrian artifacts looted by the Islamic State reportedly had been smuggled into Britain for sale, including Byzantine coins and Roman pottery and glass.123 Some maintain that the Islamic State collects a tax on antiquities excavated and smuggled out of its territory.124In some sites along the Euphrates River in Syria, the Islamic State reportedly grants licenses to excavation crews and oversees their work. 125 In the city of Manbij, the Islamic State reportedly has established an office to handle looted antiquities and a market for digging equipment such as metal detectors. Artifacts are sold to IS-approved dealers, who complete the transaction in U.S. dollars, and are then granted safe passage through IS territory. 126 The group‘s revenue from the sale of antiquities likely depends in part on the stage in the supply chain in which IS members are most involved, which may vary by locality In some cases the Islamic State reportedly imposes a tax of 20-50% on the excavation teams, which themselves only receive a small percentage of the items' ultimate market price. In other cases, the group reportedly has established a direct relationship with buyers, likely netting a higher profit. Some U.S. estimates have placed the total volume of illicit trade at more than $100 million a year,127 while government officials say that the majority of the trade is run by the Islamic State, reports suggest that many groups, including portions of the Syrian government, Free Syrian Army, other Islamist militias, criminal networks, and even foreign forces, also smuggle or trade in antiquities.128 Though ISIS has devised multiple inhuman methods to make money, it still needed a fluid and unhindered system to move it. It seems ISIS has found the most ideal solution: a form of ―Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State‖, testimony of Matthew Levitt, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to the House Committee on Financial Services, November 13, 2014 122 How Does ISIS Fund Its Reign of Terror? http://handsoffsyria.blogspot.ro/2015/02/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-of-terror.html 123 Islamic State Is Selling Looted Syrian Art in London to Fund Its Fight http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/is-looted-syrian-art-showing-up-inlondon-to-fund-activities/2015/02/25/785ab630-bcd0-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html 124 ISIS Antiquities Sideline http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/opinion/isis-antiquities-sideline.html 125 Ibidem 126 Digging In And Trafficking Out: How The Destruction Of Cultural Heritage Funds Terrorism https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/digging-in-andtrafficking-out-how-the-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-funds-terrorism 127 Ibidem 128 Samuel Hardy, "The Lure of Antiquities in the New York Times and the Trap of Poor Evidence in War Zones‖, Conflict Antiquities 121

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currency handling platform – Bitcoin.129 The digital currency that has been amidst numerous controversies, but is adored by technocrats, has offered to rid ISIS of its money handling woes. The terror group‘s international money transfers were becoming quite problematic, complex, and vulnerable to scrutiny and seizure. After ISIS discovered Bitcoin, it has been relying heavily on the digital currency to quickly and quietly transfer funds, allowing it to expand terrorist cells throughout the remaining free world. Referred to as the Dark Web or DeepWeb, tech savvy Jihadists have been using mobile apps that allow them to transfer Bitcoins to terrorist cells in any corner of the world while avoiding the watchful eyes of the law. Multiple agencies have time and again attempted to regulate the World Wide Web, but given the vastness of the internet, it is practically impossible to monitor it for such activities. Taking advantage of the virtually guaranteed anonymity on the internet and the relative ease of dealing in Bitcoins, ISIS has discovered one of the smoothest ways to fund terror across the globe. Moreover, with a little programming knowledge, anyone can log onto the dark web‘s hidden sites and purchase any kind of illegal product and services. The main problem for The Islamic State is whether its revenues cover its essential expenditures, and this appears to be the case, even if the exact amounts involved are unknowable. In middle of 2014, external estimates of its income were consistently in the range of $3 million per day130, and its assets were calculated at between $1.3 and $2 billion.131 Thus, the Islamic State is an exceptional example of a terrorist organization which managed to acquire semi-national financial capabilities to fund its military infrastructure and allow it to establish an alternative governmental system. Against this income, The Islamic State has to pay to keep its war-machine going, including by supplying and maintaining equipment, rewarding successful operations, and providing salaries to its living fighters and benefits to the dependents of those who have died. There could be over 30,000 fighters,132 who are said to receive anything from $200 a month133 to $600 a month134, depending on nationality and size of family, which, if true is a significant increase over the $41 per month they received prior to 2010135. In addition, the fighters receive free housing, generally by being allocated accommodation confiscated from Shia, Christians, and other non-Sunni inhabitants, as well as from Sunnis who have decided to flee136.

129

http://www.inquisitr.com/2152230/isis-is-moving-money-using-bitcoin-digital-currency-aiding-recruitment-training-and-weapons-procurement/ Islamic State group's war chest is growing daily http://bigstory.ap.org/article/islamic-state-groups-war-chest-growing-daily-0 131 How an arrest in Iraq revealed Isis's $2bn jihadist network http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power 132 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-weakens-al-qaeda-groups-around-the-world-but-hasnt-wiped-anyout/2014/09/11/3c28d626-39bb-11e4-8601-97ba88884ffd_story.html 133 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/security/2013/11/syria-islamic-state-iraq-sham-growth.html# 134 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-syria-crisis-raqqa-insight-idUSKBN0GZ0D120140904?irpc=932 135 http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/23/231223_records-show-how-iraqi-extremists.html?rh=1 136 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-syria-crisis-raqqa-insight-idUSKBN0GZ0D120140904 130

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The State also has to maintain the civilian infrastructure of the towns and villages it has captured and pay an increasing army of employees to manage its administration. Monthly salaries range from $300 to as much as $2,000 for those in senior management positions.137 Although all figures for income and expenditure are unreliable, The Islamic State appears to have sufficiently diverse sources of income to survive the loss of one or another. Clearly the greatest loss would be its ability to sell oil products. Not only are these the largest source of income, but also oil sales put The Islamic State in touch with people who are most likely to meet any shortfall in its need for refined products. With a highly mobile fighting force dependent on a large fleet of vehicles, The Islamic State goes through a lot of fuel. Propaganda Once again, the Islamic State has a built something hard to counter: a huge propaganda apparatus. In order to exist, they need publicity, recruiting and founding sources and they found a cheap solution in order to do that: media. The Islamic States takes advantage of media and uses it with smartness and accuracy. The media effort of The Islamic State is an integral and essential part of its operations, on a par with its military and administrative effort. In this respect it is greatly helped by the decentralized nature of social media (particularly Twitter)138, which has allowed each of its supporters effectively to create and operate his/her own ministry of information, echoing a standard party line as well as creating and spreading their own memes and messages. In effect, The Islamic State is crowd sourcing its propaganda. There is no precedent for this, given the novelty of social media platforms and file sharing sites, and so, in a counterintuitive move, The Islamic State has maximized control of its message by giving up control of its delivery. The importance to The Islamic State of social media is evident in the way that pictures of Abu Bakr declaring the Caliphate on 4 July 2014 appeared on Twitter before the video of his full speech was uploaded on YouTube, helping to ensure that it would be carried on most major international news networks. Although occasionally its followers make mistakes and start sending links to products before the official launch time, for example with the video of the murder of Stephen Sotloff on 2 September 2014,139 The Islamic State has a well disciplined and well organized media department. The media department of The Islamic State is highly productive, churning out a wide range of media material that its supporters can use to attract potential recruits, raise money, promote the image of the organization, or just spread fear among its enemies. The production of extremely

137

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11052919/How-Isil-is-funded-trained-and-operating-in-Iraq-and- Syria.html Follow ISIS on Twitter: A Special Report on the Use of Social Media by Jihadistshttp://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/192-followisis-on-twitter 139 http://www.vocativ.com/world/iraq-world/isis-beheads-u-s-journalist-steven-sotloff/ 138

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violent action films right before the military offensive in northern Iraq in June 2014, ‗Clanging of the Swords I-IV,‘ is a good example of both the nature of the group‘s propaganda and of the audience it hopes to attract. The naming of the movies and the use of Roman numerals suggesting that they form a series is straight out of Hollywood, as are the impressive techniques used, to include an opening sequence in the fourth installment that zooms in from a satellite image of Iraq and Syria to a drone flying over Fallujah. As a result, references to the group by its supporters and others interested in its activities resulted in 4.1 million mentions of the English acronym ISIS between 17 September and 17 October 2014. The Arabic acronym was mentioned 1.9 million times over the same period, with the group‘s preferred name of ―Islamic State‖ being tweeted a comparatively meager 880,651 times. Although the group has gone to great lengths to suppress the use of the Arabic acronym (daesh) which it correctly regards as derogatory, and to rebrand itself as The Islamic State, so far as Twitter references are concerned, it has failed. The official media wing of the group is Al Furqan, which posts messages from the leadership, including videos of mass executions, and retweets material from the other Islamic State sites. One of its productions is a series of glorified accounts of recent Islamic State achievements, ―Messages from the Land of Epic Battles‖. Another outlet, Fursan al Balagh Media, now suspended, provided transcripts of Islamic State videos. There are other official pages, such as Ajna, which post religious citations, as well as the Al Hayat Media Center. Furthermore, each Islamic State province has its own media outlet, which focuses on local news.140 The ISR (Islamic State Report), also known as ―An Insight Into The Islamic State‖, contains articles about Islamic State events and agendas. On July 8, the group released its magazine,Dabiq, an extended version of the ISR, consisting of more detailed writings all in English. It resembles the well-known English-language magazine, Inspire, published by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and famous for providing basic instructions for terrorists; but its content is quite different.141 It is well produced and richly illustrated with a mixture of scenes of calm and of extreme violence. It is designed to attract recruits and contains lengthy exegeses of Islamic texts to justify its actions as well as encouragement for all sorts to make the journey to join the State. It does not shy away from portraying its worst excesses, such as the execution of hostages, the mass murder of prisoners and the enslavement of women, providing graphic photographs of the dead and of those about to die. It is unapologetic and self-congratulatory, explaining everything bad as the fault of someone else. The name Dabiq itself refers to a place in Northern Syria where the Ottoman Empire had a decisive victory over the Egyptian Mamluk Empire, but the reference is to a hadith often quoted by 140

The Islamic State's social media strategy http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/is-clinton-atrocities-social-media-baghdadimccain.html 141 Dabiq: the smiling face of Iraq-Syria ‗caliphate‘ http://news.yahoo.com/dabiq-smiling-face-iraq-syria-caliphate-081415767.html

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Abu Musab al Zaqawi that predicts Dabiq as the place where Islam will win a great victory over the infidels, so leading to world domination and the end of times.142 The Islamic State therefore shows a good understanding of both the importance and the use of media. It appeals to a wide range of audiences and designs both content and presentation accordingly, from violent action as in ―The Flames of War‖ to a more intellectual appeal as in the ―Lend Me Your Ears‖ propaganda series first trailed on 18 September 2014 by John Cantlie, a journalist held hostage by The Islamic State since November 2012. The Islamic State is also reactive, as in the campaign it launched on Twitter following the start of the US air campaign in August 2014 with the hashtag #AmessagefromISIStoUS.143 Needless to say, The Islamic State imposes such strict conditions on any independent journalist wishing to report from its territory as to make objective and uncensored reporting impossible.144

v.

Modus operandi and tactics

The Islamic State`s MO is a mixt of techniques, all of them absolutely clear to be included in the crimes against humanity category. ISIS has publically and frequently encouraged attacks against the West. Since its declaration of the Caliphate in July 2014, ISIS has instructed supporters in the West who cannot perform hijrah, or emigration, to Iraq and Syria to remain in place and organize. ISIS Spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani released a on September 21, 2014 urging ―soldiers of the Islamic State‖ to conduct lone-wolf attacks against the West145. On November 13, 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a statement accepting pledges of allegiance from groups abroad, declaring five wilayats, or provinces, outside of Iraq and Syria, and encouraging groups to ―erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere.‖146 ISIS possesses a global network of foreign fighters and Western influencers who are also supporting ISIS by encouraging travel to Iraq and Syria, and so the threat of attacks against Western countries exists in the context of ISIS‘s main effort in Iraq and Syria. ISIS is, in sum, imparting three concurrent messages to foreign supporters: perform Hijrah- participate in jihad by traveling to Iraq and Syria; declare Bay‘atremain in place and create communities of ISIS support; Conduct Lone-Wolf Attacks- remain in place and conduct attacks against the enemies of ISIS.147 One of the specificities of the Islamic State is the very dangerous combination between terrorism organization and a large insurgency. IS appears to be both of them in the same time, using strategies and tactics quiddity simultaneously for a terrorist organization and for an insurgency. They use classical terrorist methods: killings, the warnings of western attacks, the Dabiq: What Islamic State‘s New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction, Recruitment Patterns and Guerilla Doctrine http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42702&cHash=0efbd71af77fb92c064b9403dc8ea838#.U-JY7FYkhZg 143 The Islamic State‘s social media strategy http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/is-clinton-atrocities-social-mediabaghdadimccain.html 144 http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/10/6200/isis-issues-11-rules-journalists-deir-ezzor/ 145 Dabiq, issue of October 2014 146 Audio Message by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such Audio Message by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/11/14/audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-even-if-the-disbelievers-despise-such/ 147 Idem 142

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apocalyptical ideology, the kidnappings and extortions, the dominant religious component, targeting civilians, the reconciliation and negotiations refusals. On the other hand, they use classical insurgency methods: taking and holding territory, controlling populations, even governing at the local level, consolidating their power in cities and towns under their control. These activities make ISIS a semi-overt insurgency bent on mobilizing the population against the government. Terrorist groups by most definitions do not seek control over territory and populations. They operate in secret, keep their distance from society and rarely depend on popular support for their survival, ISIS doesn`t do this, it is wide opened and they are dependable of publicity. This specificity of the combination between insurgent and terrorist tactics makes the counter terrorism strategy very hard to build in order to be effective. The military tactics of The Islamic State include acts of terrorism, insurgency operations, and more conventional military action. By aiming to hold on to territories, IS breaks with conventional terrorist strategies that rely on hit-and-run warfare. Controlling terrain is usually seen as a way to expose terrorist groups, making it easier to identify their location and limit their mobility, thereby rendering them vulnerable to regular army attacks. Terrorists typically avoid engaging in direct confrontation with regular armies that have larger forces, superior firepower and better equipment. Yet, IS did engage in a direct confrontation with the Iraqi armed forces in Mosul, causing them to withdraw and leave behind military equipment and supplies148. Generally, the Islamic State softens its targets through a campaign of terrorist attacks, then infiltrates the population and the defending forces, gradually gains control of some areas of the target, and then launches an assault on the rest. The Islamic State has in any case already established a reputation for ruthless and indiscriminate violence – beheadings, assassinations and interrogating through torture methods, crimes against humanity, destroying historical artifacts, monuments and churches and it hardly need do more to turn the rest of the world against it. Specifically for the Islamic State, that distinguishes it from other terrorist groups is this complexity of elements that made them ―successful‖ and so hard to counter. They are without doubt a very powerful enemy that took the world by surprise. It looks like they learned from all the existing terrorist organizations what to do and what not to do, in order to achieve their goals. They waited patiently until the geopolitical context of Middle East was ready to ―embrace‖ them without having the change to show signs of opposition, letting alone fighting back and winning against them. They also learned how to be with a step before the rest of the world, they were able to use world`s vulnerabilities in their favor, knowing exactly what societies have integration, social and political problems and that became their targeted public and their primary sources for recruiting. ISIS understood that, in order to fuel their propaganda, the Internet is the best tool. Their intellectual capabilities are undeniable, you have to be smart to have such a strategy and make it work. Al-Qaeda tried before them to build a Caliphate and they failed. ISIS learned from their mistakes, but also from their ―success stories‖. Their ―success story‖ is based on the resources and means maybe the most prominent and never seen before is the huge propaganda apparatus) and the ability to use all of them at 148

ISIS: Terrorism Upgraded http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-terrorism-upgraded-10825

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maximum potential; their MO – atrocities for which they will not face legal accountability soon; their capacity to build a functional organization, similar to a state and to an army in the same time; the ability to quickly adapt and change the tactics; the way in which their ideology even though harsh criticized by most Muslim believers attracts large numbers of recruiters; being always with a step before their enemies; knowing that they are hunted and taking all the necessary measures to make counter terrorism and counter intelligence efforts so difficult in their case.

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Chapter 3 The role of intelligence in countering ISIS This chapter, as the last part of the study case, focuses on what intelligence methods have been used to counter ISIS and what can intelligence further do to change this struggle into a won battle. ―ISIS‘s merger of terrorist tactics against its enemies and state-building behavior in areas it controls, in addition to its exploitation of sectarian tensions, has succeeded in winning the support of local communities.‖149 - Mario AbouZeid, research analyst at the Carnegie Middle East Center.Thus, in dealing with this upgraded form of terrorism, upgraded counterterrorism methods must also be used. The Islamic State is a highly visible but clandestine organization. Despite the vast amount of publicity and analysis it has generated since 2011, verifiable facts concerning its leadership and structure remain few and far between. The picture is obscured by the misleading propaganda of the State itself and by the questionable accounts of people who claim to be familiar with it. It is a movement that has accelerated fast along the path from terrorism through insurgency towards protostatehood, but it is also one that for all its bravado seems fearful that it could just as quickly be forced back underground.

i. What it was done so far in countering the IS threat?

There is a popular rhetoric nowadays that implies the fact that nothing has been done to stop the Islamic State. This is, by far, false and inadequate, but indeed it has a small part of truth- IS wasn`t countered in the sense that is no longer a threat; efforts were done in order to stop it from spreading. There are two sides of the same problem. ISIS is acting as a military force and to counter it, a form of military power has to engage in a war with the group. The second side is that the Islamic State has a huge propaganda apparatus and to counter it, intelligence seems the only solution. Therefore, from the beginning, there were two kinds of solution to counter the largest terrorist organization we`ve seen. The first one has force at its core, being a military coalition, led by United States and it`s composed of 60 states. Many local forces, non-states actors have also been part of this battle, for example the Kurdish forces, who are a key asset on the ground. The military coalition has done, so far, anything that involves an actual war. They pledged their continued military support, through the provision of equipment, training and airstrikes, opening their air space and allowing the other states to use military facilities on their territories, as well as stressing the importance of reforms and reconciliation by Iraq's government to tackle sectarian division. It is also 149

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-terrorism-upgraded-10825

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highlighted the need for an urgent political solution to the situation in war-torn Syria, which has enabled ISIS' expansion into neighboring Iraq. Thus, this is who has done what: intervening in Iraq & Syria: United States Canada, Jordan, Morocco, United Kingdom (limited surveillance and training in Syria); only intervening in Iraq: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (trainers on ground), Italy (exploratory, logistic support, and trainers on ground), Netherlands, New Zealand (exploratory, protection and training), Norway (trainers on ground), Portugal (trainers on ground), Spain (trainers on ground), Turkey (trainers on ground)150; only intervening in Syria: Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates151. This solution is not entirely ineffective, it had good results, but the problem is that is a long-term fight, with slow advances but also with reversals. I will not detail the explanation about what military efforts have been done in countering ISIS, because it is not the subject of my paper. But, from a strategic point of view, military intervention of any kind needs also intelligence in order to be safe and effective. Therefore, the second solution can be found in intelligence efforts. Actionable intelligence is essential for preventing acts of terrorism. The timely and thorough analysis and dissemination of information about terrorists and their activities will improve government‘s ability to disrupt and prevent terrorist acts, and to provide useful warning to the population.152―One way is to expose at every opportunity the false nature of Daesh's claim to be 'the' Islamic State. In reality, Daesh is no more a state than I am a helicopter‖153 Kerry said. To beat ISIS, we have to ―maintain momentum in the battle of ideas‖154. It is also important to repeat the fact that they have in their leadership an Intelligence Council, therefore the intelligence efforts of the international community are vital. Thus, it feels redundant at least to find another explanation for why intelligence is important in countering this threat, as long as, for the moment is not only the best solution, but also the best. Great intelligence efforts in this international coalition have been done by world leading agencies in this domain: the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Israeli famous Mossad and Shin Bet. Intelligence agencies and counter-terrorist experts have assessed the Islamic State as a real threat and have responded accordingly. Starting from the exchange of specialist liaison staff for particular agencies, intelligence became a form of international diplomacy in its own right, though still inchoate and undeveloped, rather like diplomacy itself before its seventeenth-century

150

Liveleak's official Iraq channelhttp://www.liveleak.com/c/Iraq Liveleak's official Syria channel http://www.liveleak.com/c/syria 152 Theodor Winkler, Theodor H. Winkler, Anja H. Ebnöther, Mats B. Hansson, Combating Terrorism and Its Implications for the Security Sector DCAF, Jan 1, 2005 - Militärunderrättelsetjänst, p. 148 153 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, excerpts from the call to Counter-terrorism Conference, Paris, provided by the State Department. 154 Ibidem 151

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legitimation and codification. The effect has been to establish regular and systematic intelligence exchanges, and a structure of alliances and agreements of varying degrees of formality.

ii. Intelligence methods

A. DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND SHARING All that we know today about the Islamic State, information which is in the news and in academic papers like mine, is the result of a massive intelligence effort. Beginning with the valuation as a terrorist group, many counter-terrorism experts have assessed the problem of ISIS` threat by analyzing it from historical, ideological, leadership and structure, capabilities and MO points of view. The evaluations are done by various national and international counter-terrorism experts, are a public matter and periodically updated. They base their assessments on gathering, analyzing and reporting intelligence sources (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, SOCMINT, open sources). An important role for intelligence in counterterrorism is acquiring information concerning the terrorist‘s plans, that is, where they are likely to strike next.155 Unlike unconventional operations where discerning enemy plans amounts to evaluating alternative courses of action, discerning enemy plans in terrorism can be almost impossible at times because the enemy generally seizes opportunities to strike as they occur and because decisions occur at low levels and operations involve relatively few people and pieces of equipment. Predictive analysis aims at forecasting where, and sometimes when the enemy will strike next. In the absence of data on friendly behavior, these techniques invariably depend on some statistical analysis of past behavior. The predictions are therefore based solely on what the terrorists have done in the past. Most assume an underlying randomness associated with terrorist‘s behavior. Early in the collection process, the identity of the source is removed from reports to protect clandestine sources from being discovered. A basic model is to separate the raw material into three parts: true source identity, very closely held; pseudonyms, code names or other identifiers; all reports from the source. Since the consumer will need some idea of source quality, it is not uncommon in the intelligence community to have several variants on the source identifier. The sources of intelligence are very valuable in this case. ―HUMINT refers to all information obtained directly from human sources. It includes a wide range of activities from direct reconnaissance and observation to the use of informants and spies‖156. Giving the fact that ISIS

155

Richard K. Betts, ―Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable‖, World Politics October 1978), p. 34 156 Michael Herman, Intelligence power in peace and war, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 62

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relies so much on recruiting, HUMINT may be used in our advantage, providing insights into their plans and intentions, and it includes overt, sensitive, and clandestine activities and the individuals who exploit, control, supervise, or support these sources. This source is also used for monitoring the new recruits that come through Turkey in Syria and Iraq. The disadvantage of this source might come from the fact that ISIS has an Intelligence Council and persons designated to assure the identities of their new recruiters, therefore counter-intelligence capabilities, so infiltration and penetration into this system poses great threats (they behead their traitors, without necessitating many evidence, suspicion is enough). HUMIT can also be used in counterintelligence methods. To asses this, there are some aspects of the IS as a structured organization that can be used,157: the group has a tight command and control structure; has a set of individuals responsible for groupwide counterintelligence, counterespionage, or security (leadership and councils); maybe some of these individuals can be targeted for recruitment to spy against the group (giving their high ranks and apparent dedication and loyalty is hard to say whom); the group doesn`t rotate its security and counterintelligence personnel to other units and tasks – it only replaces persons when somebody is killed; the selection of members to serve in its security or counterintelligence branch has been made from the leader`s closest and trustee advisors; is unknown if the group mandate or offer counterintelligence training to members or appear to have uniform counterintelligence, counterinterrogation, or operational security practices, but giving the fact that most of them are former Iraqi commanders it is very possible that they have been trained before joining ISIS. The uniformity of these practices might be exploited very hardly, by co-opting a high ranked member of the Intelligence Council or of the War Cabinet. SIGINT, as ―the category of intelligence comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronics intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted‖158, is vital for any military intervention. The information obtained is used to ensure missions are properly assigned and duplication of effort is avoided. Mission route planning requires current intelligence on enemy defensive positions and capabilities. Targets can be detected and located through airborne direction finding techniques. Intelligence concerning ISIS` operational plans may be obtained through signal analysis or cryptologic procedures. Confirmation of other types of intelligence can be made by targeting personnel with the aid of SIGINT reports. Finally, post-strike or attack data and damage resulting from missions may also be obtained, for example: valuable information has been extracted by analyzing materials (documents, cellphones, laptops, etc.) seized after a commando raid. This 157

Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terorist Groups Elude Detection Columbia University Press, Aug 20, 2013, p. 251 158 Michael Herman, Intelligence power in peace and war, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 64

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source is also important for surveillance of ISIS` capabilities and large movements. The biggest disadvantages of SIGINT in this case are that false information may be passed by ISIS for deception purposes and that the locations derived from SIGINT may be imprecise, giving the multitude of safe-houses and headquarters that ISIS has. As SIGINT, IMINT is used on military purposes. Coming from ―visual photography, radar sensors such as side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics, imagery can provide some advantages: capability of pinpoint target positioning, detection of activity, counting the order of battle, detailed target characteristics (physical or environmental), possibility of large area collection, excellent resolution possible and high credibility‖ 159. On 26 August 2014, the U.S. began sending surveillance flights, including drones, into Syria to gather intelligence and continues until today. Its main disadvantages come from the costs, the extensive support facilities that are required and from the fact that the situation represented on the image may exist only for the instant it was captured. Open source might be the biggest source of intelligence in regards to ISIS. Their magazine, Dabiq, Islamic books, their own broadcasts, their websites that are being carefully monitored make up the greatest volume of intelligence materials. Telephone directories, films, maps, and charts are also useful. Also, their social media accounts are being used as an intelligence open source (official and semi-official). The biggest advantage of this source is the ―insider`s‖ view, without jeopardizing anyone`s safety and it may be the most timely information available and less costly. The disadvantage of this source is the big amount of data that has to be analyzed, also most information are in Arabic and need to be translated. Analyzing these information it`s vital for countering the idea with the plain truth about ISIS. This multiple sources of information have to evaluated and rated, before the analytical process can begin, in order to be accurate and for the effectiveness of the report. For example, in collection department rating, USA uses a typical system, based on simple A-F and 1-6 conventions160. They use a Source and Information Reliability Matrix161 with A-F codes for reliability, from most reliable and trustworthy source (A) to those who cannot be judged, because no basis exists (F). A similar matrix is used for the Information content ratings162 with 1-6 codes, from code 1- a confirmed logical and consistent with other information on the subject source to those with no base (6). One of the biggest problems in collecting data regarding ISIS is the sources` assessment. In order to be sure of the veracity and reliability of the sources, it is needed a vast amount of resources (human, financial, technical capabilities).

159 Michael Herman, Intelligence power in peace and war, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 72 US Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations September 2006, Chapter. 2, Article 5 161 US Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations September 2006, Appendix B-1 162 US Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations September 2006, Appendix B-2 160

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Most intelligence reports are somewhere in the middle, and a "B-2" is taken seriously. It is sometimes impossible to rate the reliability of the source (often from lack of experience with it), so an F-3 could be a reasonably probable report from an unknown source. An extremely trusted source might submit a report which cannot be confirmed or denied, so it would get an "A-6" rating. Raw reports are typically given a two-part rating by the collection department, which also removes all precise source identification before sending the report to the analysts. Other intelligence methods to counter ISIS can be found in the assessment proposed by Blake Mobley163 by identifying and keeping close watch on areas that often exhibit weakness whiting the terrorist organization, because no group can achieve perfect secrecy while functioning effectively and that every adaptation or new advantage also produces new vulnerabilities. This weakness and vulnerabilities can be exploited by typologising164 the terrorist organization and by answering some key questions about the group`s organizational structure, popular support, controlled territory, paranoia and mistrust vulnerabilities, points of exposure, bureaucratization vulnerabilities165. When it comes to typology, the Islamic State as a terrorist organization has a very complex dynamic. As explained it the theoretical frame of the present paper, there are many types of terrorism and many scholars have different views and theories about it. Typologising the terrorist acts helps preventing them and finding the best solutions in counter-terrorism and intelligence strategies. Giving the fact that is at its core a religious terrorist group, because of its actions, the Islamic State can also be framed into the political violence typology. Looking at the spectrum of terrorist political violence166, it is identifiable that the direction of IS` violence is between state and anti-state; their magnitude varying from micro to macro, depending on their actions; their type is transnational terrorism with perpetrators raging from assassins, bombers, ethnic nationalists, religious militants, ideological radicals towards military forces and other state-sponsored groups. Another way of identifying their type is by analyzing ISIS according to Löckinger`s typological tree of terrorism167- by actors involved, ISIS fits in both categories – state-sponsored and revolutionary terrorism; by means and methods used, it fits in suicide terrorism and possibly cyberterrorism; by motives is both religious and political terrorism and by geographic range is international terrorism.

163

Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terorist Groups Elude Detection Columbia University Press, Aug 20, 2013 Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, pp.11-12 Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terorist Groups Elude Detection Columbia University Press, Aug 20, 2013, p. 229 166 R. HrairDekmejian, Spectrum of Terror, CQ Press, Feb 7, 2007, p. 10 167 Georg Löckinger, Terrorismus, Terrorismusabwehr, Terrorismusbekämpfung, Vienna Ministry of Defence 164 165

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B. EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABILITIES Other methods of countering the ISIS threat is by assessing their about possible exploitation of ISIS` vulnerabilities168: it is not known if the group has standardized vetting procedures or standardized communications protocols or codes, or investigatory procedures; the general profile for group members who have been accused of spying is somebody who lacks the motivation to do what it`s told, for whatever reason, they are not expelled from the group – they are beheaded instantly; there aren`t any known cases of members who have been detained by the adversary and released, therefore this isn`t a vulnerability or something easily exploitable, in the sense of recruiting retained individuals as spies and ISIS` paranoia and mistrust vulnerabilities169: unfortunately, not much is enough for members to come under suspicion of spying, any kind of rebellion or non-obedient behavior in their lifestyles alert the group as sign of spying; giving the fact that there is an Intelligence Council with counterintelligence capabilities, the group‘s capacity for investigating suspected spies is high, even though they don`t investigate much – they suspect and behead. Other exploitation can be on ISIS` popular support170: the group has popular support in its areas of operation, especially in Iraq and Syria where they have their headquarters; the group has a very active publicity or media outreach campaign; the group maintains assumptions about the need to tell its unique stories to its popular base, mainly that they are the messenger of God and that jihad is the only solution for their Caliphate and everyone controlled by them believes it; both Abu Bakr – their Caliph and Adnani- the spokesman are particularly susceptible to being drawn into the media limelight; for now, it is impossible for these leaders to be manipulated into giving up even more information to their popular base. Another vulnerability can be their controlled territory171:the group controls territories in Syria and Iraq and expands them constantly; the group hasn`t fixed headquarters and other important facilities, but it is known they are both in Syria and Iraq; is unknown yet where they keep the sensitive files and personnel information, some information has been found in some safe havens; the security of sensitive hard-copy and electronic information is very high, giving the fact that many tech savvy Jihadists are part of the organization; the group is not a ―guest‖ within a state or non-state actor‘s controlled territory, it controls the places where it operates; the security vulnerabilities that this produces are related to human resource and ISIS` points of exposure172: the group conducts informal liason exchange of information, weapons, or personnel with states and non-state actors and who among these other actors might be the easiest

Georg Löckinger, Terrorismus, Terrorismusabwehr, Terrorismusbekämpfung, Vienna Ministry of Defence Idem Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terorist Groups Elude Detection Columbia University Press, Aug 20, 2013, p. 251 171 Ibidem p. 252 172 Ibidemp. 254 168 169 170

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target for penetration, but information vary from one source to another, therefore when this will become a certain and verified thing it will be one of the keys for solving this huge and complicated puzzle. Before having an international sharing system for the intelligence data about ISIS, every country involved in countering it, does its own data collection. But, this entitles some difficulties: ―data are scarce for assessing the functioning of individual components of the intelligence effort: it is difficult to quantify the level of effort going into counterterrorism intelligence, as assets support multiple activities; the extent of the terrorist threat is impossible to know with any precision, so it is difficult to measure effectiveness against the threat; and the complexity of a domestic intelligence enterprise makes it difficult to determine how capable a country is overall at collecting, analyzing, and acting on intelligence information‖173. Giving the complexity of resources that ISIS has at its disposal and the ability to use them at maximum potential and the enormous amount of data that it produces, it only complicates the intelligence and counter-terrorism efforts. C. COUNTERING ONLINE RADICALIZATION ―The Internet has evolved into a unique and significant arena in which radicalization plays out. Violent extremists themselves have recognized this and become adept at using the new technology to their advantage‖174. The Islamic State is using its huge propaganda apparatus at maximum through internet, basing much of their campaigns on influencing and trying to recruit persons. For that, they rely on online radicalization, which is already a big movement and they have acquired skills to use it and full potential. Therefore, a good intelligence measure to counter the IS is to prevent and counter the online radicalization that require a balanced and sophisticated approach. The first element is ―the recognition that—for constitutional, political, and practical reasons— it is impossible to remove all violent extremist material from the Internet and that most efforts aimed at reducing the supply of violent extremist content on the Internet are costly and counterproductive.‖175 The second one is formed of the ―measures that seek to reduce the demand for radicalization and violent extremist messages: for example, by discrediting, countering, and confronting extremist narratives or by educating young people to question the messages they see online.‖176 The third key component is ―exploiting online content and interactions for the purpose of gathering information, gaining intelligence, and pursuing investigations.‖177 173

Treverton, Gregory F., Reorganizing U.S. domestic intelligence: assessing the options, RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 27 Peter R. Neumann, Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 36, Number 6, Rutledge, June 2013 , p. 437 175 Ibidem , pp. 432-433 176 Idem 177 Peter R. Neumann Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 36, Number 6, Rutledge, June 2013 , pp. 432-433 174

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The Islamic State uses the Internet as everyone else, for instrumental uses, for example terrorists frequently use online tools for logistics and reconnaissance: they e-mail, chat, and instantmessage; search for addresses and pictures; look up maps; and book flights online. None of these behaviors and activities, however, are unique to terrorists, and in most cases, they are difficult to distinguish from the online behaviors of ordinary people. IS is taking advantage of terrorist-linked websites to encourage their readers to raise money, and some provide buttons and links to make online contributions, but it remains unclear how much money can be raised in this way or how much of their finances comes from this method.178 ―As long as the Internet has been in existence, violent extremists and terrorists have used the technology to publicize their causes, generate political support, and recruit new followers.―179 ISIS maintains some websites for communicative use, too. They made available alternative platforms, circumventing the mainstream media‘s censorship, conveying unfiltered news, and disseminating ideological texts and materials. They also have started online forums, which turned into virtual town squares, where people met, bonded, and talked to each other—and where even the most controversial issues could be debated without fear of retribution. Another mean of using the internet is for the dissemination of multimedia products, especially videos, in which ISIS has become a master of shocking the world (the most famous one is their first beheading video). Social media is used by ISIS for promoting violent extremist content on mainstream blogging, social-networking, video-sharing, and instant-messaging platforms which enables them to reach more people and engage new demographics with minimum costs. They can be countered on the Internet by reducing the supply (online censorship, filters, legal takedowns, aggressive takedowns, commercial takedowns, hiding and prosecution), by reducing the demand (activating the market place of ideas, creating awareness, building capacity, counter messaging, engagement, promoting media literacy) and by exploiting cyberspace (setting rules for cyberspace, gaining strategic intelligence, gaining tactical intelligence, gathering evidence).

D. FINANCIALLY DAMAGING THE ORGANIZATION A social movement is ―a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society.‖180 As such, a social movement brings individuals together, and attempts to use organized 178

Ibidemp. 434 Idem

179

180

John David McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, in Steven M. Buechler and F. Kurt Cylke, eds., Social Movements: Perspectives and Issues (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 1997), p. 153

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action to bring about a change in society. Such actions are generally organized within structured groups known as social movement organizations (SMOs). A given SMO is ―a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preference of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.‖181 One type of social movement that has received focused attention by the U.S. government over the last decade has been radical Islamic SMOs. Since 1999, the United States has exerted enormous effort to socially control the organizational and financial infrastructure of radical Islamic SMOs182. For The Islamic State, the radical Islamic SMOs are a great asset and a primary source for their propaganda, recruiting and maybe for funding, too. Money is the primary resource that ISIS needs. Without the huge amounts of money that now has at its disposal, its Caliphate will crumble. Therefore, to counter it, one of the most important measures that can be applied is to damage their funding sources. This can be done through some particular strategies. The U.S. government uses ―the next strategies to socially control the financial resources of radical Islamic terrorist-labeled social movements: discover sources of funding; deny or restrict access to money; establish information networks and communication norms; create derogatory labels; influence the media; impose legal sanctions; offer financial incentives; construct a shared collective identity; and force terrorist-labeled organizations on the defensive183‖. The same strategies can be used to socially control ISIS` financial resources.

iii. Intelligence difficulties in countering ISIS

There is not a central international intelligence community. There are several intelligence agencies that are trying to help countering the ISIS threat, but they are facing many problems. One of the biggest problems in collecting data regarding ISIS is the sources` assessment. In order to be sure of the veracity and reliability of the sources, it is needed a vast amount of resources (human, financial, technical capabilities). Who can finance such a large operation? So far, the largest amounts of resources were used in humanitarian aid, for those whose lives have been affected by ISIS, and not in real countering measure. Another problem that intelligence is facing in countering the ISIS threat is with the analytical capabilities at the state and international level as well: ―State, local, tribal, and private sector entities lack a standard training program for homeland security intelligence analysts. This

181

Gary T. Marx, External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes and Complications, in Social Movement: Perspectives and Issues, Steven M. Buechler and F. Kurt Cylke, Jr., eds. (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing, 1997), pp. 360–384 182 Subcommittee on the Committee on Appropriations, Counterterrorism and Infrastructure Protection, S. Hrg. No. 106-45, pt. 1 (1999) 183 Samuel C Lindsey, Michael J. Williams, State-Sponsored Social Control of Illegitimate Social Movements: Strategies Used to Financially Damage Radical Islamic, Terrorist-Labeled Organizations, in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Jun2013, Vol. 36 Issue 6, p. 463

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lack of standard training creates disparities in analyst capabilities, terminology, and approach to homeland security analysis‖184. Another different set of problems ―is seen to plague the analysis component: a lack of trained analysts, law enforcement cultures that discounts exploratory analysis (e.g. USA), competing and uncoordinated analysis, and insufficient analytic techniques and data to identify as yet unknown threat‖185. Giving the fact that information sharing is a matter of domestic intelligence first, while assessments differ on just how information is flowing from states to states, there are very few cases of truly two-directional information-sharing effort to allow useful information to flow.186 Another problem comes from the fact that the management of information related to counterterrorism efforts might be inefficient, constraining the ability of organizations to collect, share, protect, and utilize information effectively.187 There is, in the ISIS` case a pressure to enhance collaboration: ―to increase collaboration among separate organizations, the two most frequent techniques are to create coordinating bodies or processes or to designate a lead agency.‖188 To be effective, collaboration mechanisms must overcome the separate interests of the organizations the effort is seeking to bridge, either by producing common incentives for cooperative behavior or linking the success of the participating organizations tightly to the cooperative action. Without incentives for collaboration and cooperation, as well as clear guidance as to the regulations governing group behavior, the separate interests of the participating organizations will threaten the effectiveness of the effort. For example of effective organizations there are many national entities that deal with intelligence and counterterrorism, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has an ―International Branch, which deals with Sunni and Shi‘ia extremism in Canada and overseas and a Middle Eastern and Africa Branch, which primarily focuses on WMD proliferation concerns, both to groups and movements associated with global jihadist network and rogue regimes such as Iran‖.189 Such organizations should be somehow centralized into a major body, a responsible for the management of anything that encompasses countering terrorism, otherwise, because of the managerial chaos and the hard difficulties that countering ISIS is inflicting on the international community, this war will be lost. One of the key factors affecting the ability to effectively prosecute counter terrorism operations regarding the Islamic State is the linkages between and among the different security, military and intelligence agencies involved. ―Often equal partners and stakeholders in the same fight, each agency will nevertheless carry its own legacy of operating procedures, cultural biases

184

Lessons Learned Information Sharing System, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Final_LLIS_Intel_Reqs_Report_Dec05.pdf , p. 4 Treverton, Gregory F., Reorganizing U.S. domestic intelligence: assessing the options, RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 33 186 Ibidem p. 36-37 187 Ibidem p. 44 188 Ibidem p. 46 189 Canadian Security Intelligence Service https://www.csis.gc.ca/hmndbrd/index-en.php#bm02 185

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and bureaucratic inertia that can make an inter-agency operation difficult and frustrating. The disadvantage is of course is that each unique agency has its particular strengths, distinct specializations and core skills that bring a huge amount of added value to the operations. The trick is to leverage these advantages in a framework that retains the distinct talents and strengths of each partner and minimizes disruption to the mission goal‖190.

190

―The Road to Sept. 11‖, Newsweek , October 1, 2001, p. 38.

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Conclusions Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East, has admitted that they had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State‘s appeal. ―We have not defeated the idea‖191 he said. ―We do not even understand the idea‖192. They have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways. Firstly, they sawjihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al-Qaeda to an organization that has decisively eclipsed it. But jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda‘s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group‘s priorities and current leadership. The misleading comes in a second way, by a wellintentioned but dishonest campaign to deny the Islamic State‘s medieval religious nature. Bin Laden corporatized terror and franchised it out. He requested specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. His foot soldiers navigated the modern world confidently.The failure to appreciate the essential differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda has led to dangerous decisions.If they had identified the Islamic State‘s intentions early, and realized that the vacuum in Syria and Iraq would give it ample space to carry them out, we might, at a minimum, have pushed Iraq to harden its border with Syria and preemptively make deals with its Sunnis. That would at least have avoided the electrifying propaganda effect created by the declaration of a caliphate just after the conquest of Iraq‘s third-largest city. There is a general temptation to rehearse this observation—that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern political concerns, wearing medieval religious disguise—and make it fit the Islamic State. In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse. Properly contained, the Islamic State is likely to be its own undoing. No country is its ally, and its ideology ensures that this will remain the case. The land it controls, while expansive, is mostly uninhabited and poor. As it stagnates or slowly shrinks, its claim that it is the engine of God‘s will and the agent of apocalypse will weaken, and fewer believers will arrive. And as more reports of misery within it leak out, radical Islamist movements elsewhere will be discredited: ―No one has tried harder to implement strict Sharia by violence. This is what it looks like‖193.Even so, the death of the Islamic State is unlikely to be quick, and things could still go badly wrong: if the Islamic State obtained the allegiance of al-Qaeda—increasing, in one swoop, the unity of its base— it could wax into a worse foe than we‘ve yet seen. 191

Who is Gen. Michael Nagata, the Man Tapped by Obama to Train the Syrian Rebels? http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2014/10/3/who_is_gen_michael_nagata_the 192 Idem 193 Idem

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That the Islamic State holds the imminent fulfillment of prophecy as a matter of dogma at least tells us the mettle of our opponent. It is ready to cheer its own near-obliteration, and to remain confident, even when surrounded, that it will receive divine succor if it stays true to the Prophetic model. Ideological tools may convince some potential converts that the group‘s message is false, and military tools can limit its horrors. But for an organization as impervious to persuasion as the Islamic State, few measures short of these will matter, and the war may be a long one, even if it doesn‘t last until the end of time. Giving the hard lessons learned, the complex but not yet complete profile of the Islamic State, the capabilities that we can use, mainly intelligence and military, maybe there is a solution to stop the atrocities that this radical Islamist group is spreading. These solutions are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary, only together will make from efforts a battle that has been won. As the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said ―unity and common determination‖194is necessary to beat back ISIS, by all means – military, intelligence, awareness and international education of the people through information. Nonetheless, much of the ISIS` power comes from its publicity. As Margaret Thatcher famously said ―publicity is the oxygen of terrorism‖195, terrorists use the media to shrink the asymmetry, by reaching larger publics and bigger audiences with minimum costs, in order to insight fear. Therefore, the solution to counter the Islamic State and any other group with same behavior can be countered with people`s power, because people are the center of any counter-terrorism strategy and should naturalize the neutral majority (they are the ones that become jihadi fighters for ISIS). A perfect synergy in organizing the best solution in countering ISIS is needed.

194

Laurent Fabius speaking at the Paris anti ISIS Coalition, June 2015 http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/06/02/us-led-coalition-doubles-down-on-is-group-strategy/28352163/ 195 Margaret Thatcher Speech to American Bar Association, 1985 Jul 15 http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988; Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection,Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, 2012; Boaz Ganor, ‗The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers‘, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 2005; Brian A. Jackson, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Bruce Newsome, John V. Parachini, William Rosenau, Erin M. Simpson, Melanie Sisson, and Donald Temple, Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, 2007; David C. Rapoport, Terrorism: The fourth or religious wave, Taylor & Francis, 2006; David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Terrorism, in Attacking Terrorism, Cronin and Ludes, 2004; K. Jack Riley, Gregory F. Treverton, Jeremy M. Wilson, Lois M. Davis, State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism, 2005; Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, Robert A. Guffey, The Iraq Effect The Middle East After the Iraq War by, RAND Corp, 2010; Hoffman, Bruce (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press;

Lowenthal, Mark M., From Secrets to Policy, second edition, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., 2003; Michael Herman, Intelligence power in peace and war, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting ―the Enemy Within‖: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies, 2004; R. HrairDekmejian, Spectrum of Terror, CQ Press, Feb 7, 2007; Richard Jackson, ‗Research for Counterterrorism: Terrorism Studies and the Reproduction of State Hegemony‘ 2008; Richard K. Betts, ―Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable‖, World Politics (October 1978); Theodor Winkler, Theodor H. Winkler, Anja H. Ebnöther, Mats B. Hansson, Combating Terrorism and Its Implications for the Security Sector DCAF, - MilitärUnderrättelsetjänst, Jan 1, 2005; Treverton, Gregory F., Reorganizing U.S. domestic intelligence: assessing the options, RAND Corporation, 2008;

Journal Articles Boaz Ganor, ‗Defining Terrorism: Is One Man‘s Terrorist Another Man‘s Freedom Fighter? ICT Papers, 4, August 1998 ; 2. Dabiq, issue of July 2014, English version received from Dr. Jonathan Fine, ITC Herzlya teacher; 3. Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State: True Concept and Eradicating Misconceptions (Khilafah), Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, 2009; 4. Georg Löckinger, Terrorismus, Terrorismusabwehr, Terrorismusbekämpfung, Vienna Ministry of Defence, ebook version; 5. James W. Harris, ―Building Leverage in the Long War‖, Policy Analysis, no. 439 (Washington D.C: Cato Institute, May 2002; 6. Jessica Lewis McFate , HarleenGambhir, Evan Sterling ‗Isis‘s Global Messaging Strategy Fact Sheet‘ December 2014, Institute For The Study Of War; 7. KürşadTuran, Menderes Çinar, Religious versus Secular Politics: Competing Ideologies in a Changing System, OrtadoğuEtütleri, Volume 4, No 2, January 2013; 8. Mitchell D. Silber, Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, Police Department, 2007; 9. Richard A. Best, Jr, The Road to Sept. 11 in CRS Report for Congress , Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress February 21, 2002 Richard A. Best, Jr, 20012; 10. Richard K. Betts, ―Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable‖, World Politics,October 1978; 11. Samuel Hardy, "The Lure of Antiquities in the New York Times and the Trap of Poor Evidence in War Zones‖, Conflict Antiquities. 1.

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Online Journal Articles 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

A Biography of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/226-the-story-behind-abu-bakr-al%20baghdadi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Theory and Practice of Jihad by Gary Anderson http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-the-theory-and-practice-of-jihad Al-Qaeda Leaks II: Baghdadi Loses His Shadow http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18219 Al-Qaeda Leaks: Baghdadi and Golani Fight Over the Levant Emirate http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/18186 Carla E. Humud, Robert Pirog, Liana Rosen, Congressional Research Service report on Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches, April 10, 2015 www.crs.gov From Ansar al-Sharia branches and AnsarBayt al-Maqdis. JM Berger analysis http://jihadology.net/category/other-groups/jamaat-an%E1%B9%A3ar-bayt-al-maqdis/ Isil‘s Political-Military Power In Iraq by Michael Knights https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/isils-political-military-power-in-iraq ISIS confirms death of senior leader in Syria http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/isis_confirms_death.php ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20733 Salafist-TakfiriJihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate http://www.ict.org.il/Article/132/SalafistTakfiri%20Jihadism%20the%20Ideology%20of%20the%20Caucasus%20Emirate The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi‘s Ideological Heirs, Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their SelfStyled Islamic State of Iraq NibrasKazimi http://www.hudson.org/research/9854-the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-acaliph-and-the-collapse-of-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq The Islamic State http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf The Islamic State vs. al Qaeda. Who‘s winning the war to become the jihadi superpower? http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/islamic_state_vs_al_qaeda_next_jihadi_super_power The Islamic State: from Baghdadi the founder to Baghdadi the ―caliph‖ http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20599 The Islamic State‘s Anbar Offensive And Abu Umar Al-Shishani http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/the-islamic-states-anbar-offensive-and-abu-umar-al-shishani/ The war in Syria: ISIS‘s most successful investment yet http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/20133 What ISIS really wants by Graeme Wood http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ Who is Gen. Michael Nagata, the Man Tapped by Obama to Train the Syrian Rebels? http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2014/10/3/who_is_gen_michael_nagata_the Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis, Center for Strategic and International Studies January 6, 2014

Articles in newspapers 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Theory and Practice of Jihad by Gary Anderson http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-the-theory-and-practice-of-jihad Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Islamic State's driving force http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28560449 Dabiq: the smiling face of Iraq-Syria ‗caliphate‘ http://news.yahoo.com/dabiq-smiling-face-iraq-syria-caliphate-081415767.html Dabiq: What Islamic State‘s New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction, Recruitment Patterns and Guerilla Doctrine http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42702&cHash=0efbd71af77fb92c064 b9403dc8ea838#.U-JY7FYkhZg Digging In And Trafficking Out: How The Destruction Of Cultural Heritage Funds Terrorism https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/digging-in-and-trafficking-out-how-the-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-fundsterrorism

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Follow ISIS on Twitter: A Special Report on the Use of Social Media by Jihadists http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/192-follow-isis-on-twitter How a talented footballer became world‘s most wanted man, Abu Bakr alBaghdadihttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948846/How-a-talented-footballer-becameworlds-most-wantedman-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi.html How ISIL is funded, trained and operating in Iraq and Syriahttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11052919/How-Isil-is-funded-trained-and-operatingin-Iraq-and- Syria.html In northeast Syria, Islamic State builds a government http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-syria-crisis-raqqa-insight-idUSKBN0GZ0D120140904?irpc=932 ISIL declares new Islamic caliphate http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new islamiccaliphate-201462917326669749.html ISIS Antiquities Sideline http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/opinion/isis-antiquities-sideline.html ISIS Beheading of U.S. Journalist James Foley Posted to YouTube http://www.vocativ.com/world/iraq-world/isis-beheads-u-s-journalist-steven-sotloff/ Islamic State Is Selling Looted Syrian Art in London to Fund Its Fighthttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/is-lootedsyrian-art-showing-up-in-london-to-fund-activities/2015/02/25/785ab630-bcd0-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html Islamic State recruits at record pace in Syria: monitor http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/19/us syriacrisis-islamicstate-idUSKBN0GJ0W420140819. Jabhat al-Nusra Denies It Declared ―Islamic Emirate‖ http://eaworldview.com/2014/07/syria-daily-jabhat-al-nusra-denies-declared-islamic-emirate/ Most Muslims don't care about the Isis Caliphatehttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10943404/Most-Muslims-dont-care-about-theIsis-Caliphate.html. Nusra plans own Islamic emirate in Syria http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jul-14/263738-nusra-plans-own-islamic-emirate-insyria Profile: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676 Records show how Iraqi extremists withstood U.S. anti-terror effortshttp://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/23/231223_records-show-how-iraqi-extremists.html?rh=1 The Evolution of ISIS http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/security/2013/11/syria-islamic-state-iraq-sham-growth.html# The Islamic State‘s Anbar Offensive And Abu Umar Al-Shishani http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/the-islamic-states-anbar-offensive-and-abu-umar-al-shishani/ The Islamic State‘s social media strategy http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/is-clinton-atrocitiessocial-mediabaghdadi-mccain.html The Islamic State's social media strategy http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/isclinton-atrocities-socialmedia-baghdadi-mccain.html The State Of The 'Caliphate'is... Meh http://news.intelwire.com/2014/07/the-caliphate-so-far-flatlining.html US weaknes: Al Qaeda groups around the world http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-weakens-al-qaeda-groups-around-the-world-but-hasntwiped-anyout/ You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabiahttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isiswahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html Laurent Fabius speaking at the Paris anti ISIS Coalition, June 2015 http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/06/02/us-led-coalition-doubles-down-on-is-groupstrategy/28352163/ HRH Crown Prince Hussein of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan speaking before UN Security Council http://jordanembassyus.org/news/terrorism-greatest-challenge-world-peace-crown-prince The anatomy of ISIS: How the 'Islamic State' is run, from oil to beheadings Nick Thompson and Atika Shubert http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/ 6.

7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29.

Theses 1.

KleanthisKyriakidis, 21st Century Terrorism: Wrong Diagnosis, Inadequate Remedy (Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, June 2005

Paper presented at conference 64

1.

Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi, The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2014.

Websites 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

Background Briefing on Iraq by Senior State Department Official, Washington, DC http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/05/242665.htm BBC News interviews https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_FPo1kaymo ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi first Friday sermon as so-called 'Caliph' http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/07/ISIS-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdidi-first-Friday-sermon-as-socalled-Caliph-.html Senior State Department Officials On the Counter-ISIL Coalition Meeting Special Briefing http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234642.htm Stratfor Global Intelligence https://www.stratfor.com/search/site/islamic%20state?f[0]=bundle%3Astratfor_analysis Terrorism and Homeland Security http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/terrorism/ ―Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State‖, testimony of Matthew Levitt, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to the House Committee on Financial Services, November 13, 2014 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/LevittTestimony20141113.pdf The Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group http://www.ict.org.il/ContentWorld.aspx?ID=21 United Nations Action To Counter Terrorism http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ What is the future of the Islamic World? History Forum http://historum.com/middle-eastern-african-history/90567-what-future-islamic-world-3.html Liveleak's official Syria channel http://www.liveleak.com/c/syria Liveleak's official Iraq channel http://www.liveleak.com/c/Iraq Margaret Thatcher Speech to American Bar Association, 1985 Jul 1 http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096 Lessons Learned Information Sharing System https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Final_LLIS_Intel_Reqs_Report_Dec05.pdf Canadian Security Intelligence Service https://www.csis.gc.ca/hmndbrd/index-en.php#bm02 US Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence" Understanding Our Craft Michael Warner https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html Secret Programs in ISIS Training Camps; Sharia or Sword http://en.alalam.ir/news/1669761#sthash.uhP5Qnzq.dpuf Countering ISIS http://counterjihadreport.com/tag/isis-propaganda/

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Blog entries Audio Message by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/11/14/audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-even-if-the-disbelieversdespise-such/ 2. Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi https://www.hate-speech.org/the-quest-for-the-caliphate 3. How Does ISIS Fund Its Reign of Terror? http://handsoffsyria.blogspot.ro/2015/02/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-of-terror.html 4. ISIS Issues 11 Rules for Journalists http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/10/6200/isis-issues-11-rules-journalists-deir-ezzor/ 5. ISIS: Terrorism Upgraded http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-terrorism-upgraded-10825 6. Islamic State believes it will beat the ‗Roman‘ armies in Syria http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/islamic-state-believes-it-will-beat-the-roman-armies-in-syria/ 7. NibrasKazimi, The necessity of the Caliph being from the Quraishhttp://talismangate.blogspot.ro/2008_04_01_archive.html 8. Nitpicking Wood‘s Piece Matters https://cyberfitna.wordpress.com/category/religion/ 9. The Importance of Understanding ISIS/ISIL http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2015/02/18/the-importance-of-understanding-isisisil/ 10. The rise of the Islamic State http://tahrirsouri.com/2014/07/12/profile-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-is/ 1.

Other sources

1. ―Although the disbelievers dislike it‖ Documentaryfound on:https://archive.org/details/AlthoughDisbelieversDislikeItBangla

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