The Rationale for Failure of Khilafat Movement

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THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT: RATIONALE FOR FAILURE INTRODUTION Khilafat Movement is one of the momentous chapters of Indian Muslims. Although the Movement failed in its objectives, it had a far-reaching impact on the Muslims of South Asia. After a long time, they took a united action allying themselves with Hindus on a purely Islamic issue which momentarily forged solidarity among them. It also produced a class of Muslim leaders experienced in organizing and mobilizing the public. The consequences and impact of Khilafat Movement on Indian Muslims politics were of great importance.

Any significant

movement in history has its raison d’être for which it strives. Khilfat Movement originally aimed at reestablishing a medieval institution of Khilafat whose revival was not in harmony with the changing time and circumstances. Instead, it deepened the feelings of Muslim nationalism and gave a definite and permanent role to Muslim clergy in Indian politics. This term paper seeks to find out the rationale of the Khilafat Movement and to find out whether the Ideals of Pan-Islamism were workable and realizable in the changing times and circumstances when the non-cooperation movement was launched. This term paper argues that the Khilafat Movement was destined to fail from the very beginning as it was fraught with irresolvable contradictions and anomalies. The term paper also argues that Jinnah’s refusal to participate in joint Khilafat-Congress Non-Cooperation Movement was based on his principled stand that unconstitutional and violent methods would surely be employed once the movement as designed by Gandhi was launched.

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GENESIS OF KHILAFAT MOVEMENT (1918-1924) The Ottoman Empire, having sided with the Central Powers during World War I, suffered a major military defeat. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) reduced its territorial extent and diminished its political influence but the victorious European powers promised to protect the Ottoman emperor's status as the Caliph. However, under the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), territories such as Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt severed from the empire. Muhammad Ali argued that for Muslims to accept mandates over Iraq, Syria and Palestine would amount to a total disregard of the wishes of the Holy Prophet (S. A. W.). Thus the Muslims of India launched the Tehrik-i-Khilafat. The objectives were as follows: 1. To maintain the Turkish Caliphate. 2. To protect the holy places of the Muslims. 3. To maintain the unity of the Ottoman Empire. The institution of Khilafat in Turkey gave the Indian Muslims a sense of strength in the face of educated and powerful Hindu class and ruling British authority. This psychological factor, quite apart from the romantic appeal of pan Islamism, pushed the Muslims to action. The leadership of the movement came from cross-section of the Indian society and included among its ranks both the Western educated and the alumni of the traditional madrassas: Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan belonged to the medical profession, Abdul Bari and Abul Kalam Azad were ulema, the Ali brothers ( Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali ) and Hasrat Mohani were journalists, Seth Chotani and Omar Sobani were wealthy businessmen, and M.H. Kidwai. T.A.K. Sherwani, and Syed Zahur Ahmad were respected members of the legal profession. And together they succeeded in mobilising public opinion to a crescendo. The first formal protest in favour of Turkey after the War was launched in December l919 at the annual sessions of the All- India Muslim League at Delhi. The objective was to highlight Muslim feelings over the caliphate and thus send a clear signal to the Allied statesmen at the peace conference that they meant business. By early the next year the Khilafatists had an efficient organization with sufficient funds to coordinate an agitation. The pace was thus set for

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an orchestrated struggle. In order to achieve their end the Khilafatists put on a religious cloak and mobilised the masses on sufficiently large scale. . M.K. Gandhi and his Indian National Congress used the Khilafat Movement to pressurize the British rulers mainly in two way, (a) petitions and deputations, and (b) agitation through non-cooperation with the government. The commotion was also kept boiling through conferences, demonstrations and processions The pan-Islamist ideologues and the Congress leaders glorified the Khilafat Movement (191824) as an Indian nationalist struggle against British imperialism and expression of loyalty to the Turkish Caliph-Sultan. The Khilafat Movement armed the clergy in the form organization Jamiat Ulama Hind (JUH) . Thanks to the Khilafat Movement, The Ulema’s role in politics and ideological spheres of the Muslim community acquired legitimacy and they interfered when their interest was threatened. The Khilafat movement brought forth ‘religious idiom’ into Indian Muslim politics. All India Muslim League (AIML) struggled for safeguarding of its religious, cultural and economic interests in quota of jobs. It did not raise slogans of practicing commands of Shariah as seen in the fatwas for Hijrat Movement and Civil Disobedience Movement. The League and the Congress were jointly struggling for against their common foe, the British. Jinnah was the leader and member of both of these national organizations. In 1916, these sentiments of communal harmony in the face of common enemy, the British, found their expression in Lukhnow Pact which became the first causality of the Khilafat Movement. HinduMuslim cooperation which began with Lucknow Pact reached its extreme during the Khilafat Movement. The Central Khilafat Committee mobilized the Indian Muslims being influenced by ideals of the past which were not realizable in the modern times and circumstances, took away political leadership

from AIML.According to Dr. Naeem Qureshi the Khilafat Movement was

“ostensibly designed to save the Ottoman Empire from dismemberment following the First World War. It was a conscious attempt to promote Muslim political interests in India. In other words, pan-Islamism was merged Indian nationalism to obtain freedom for India.1

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTION OF KHILAFAT

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The Prophet Muhammad, the inspired Messenger of Allah and the Seal of the Prophets brought the Revelation or Message of Allah to the Muslims. He was both the spiritual and temporal head of the Muslim community. After the death of Prophet, the Muslim community needed head of state to establish law and order and to continue the rule in accordance with Shari’ah in the Muslim state and society as the community in principle has no church and no sacerdotal order that is witnessed in the Chiristian Europe in the Middle Ages.2 The institution of Khilafat occupies an important place in Sunni Muslim polity. The word Khilafaat comes from Khilafa, the original of the English word caliph which in turn is derived from word Khalafa, the Arabic word that means to follow or to come after. After the death of the Prophet, Hazarat Abu Bakr, who was selected as the head of the Muslim community, had adopted the tile of Khalfatu-rasul-i-llah, successor to the Prophet of God. Hazrat Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali are called Khulffai-Rashidin and the period during which they ruled is called Khilafat-i-Rashida. In the office of Khilifa or the Caliph, temporal and spiritual functions of a leader of Umma were combined. The caliph

was supposed to implement shariah and in

accordance with the injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah or Traditions. The caliph used to take advice from other Muslims while formulating the policies.With the accession of Amir Muawiyya, the democratic nature of this institution was changed as the Ummayads rule was hereditary in nature. In the beginning it was considered necessary that the entire Muslim community should form a single Muslim community, but later events shattered such a possibility.3 Ummayad’ seizure of caliphate and the practice to make it dynastic one was called 'counter-revolution against Islam' (Inquilab-e-ma'koos) and a reversion to Jahiliya or the age of ignorance that is said to have preceded the advent of Islam.’4 The word Khalifa came to be associated with the ruler or monarch during the Ummayads rule. The word was used to offer the Ummayad rulers symbolical legitimacy, a kind of variant of the ‘divine right’ of kings in medieval Europe. The title became religious in nature later. The Khilafat gradually sank into an ineffective, effete and weak political institution. 5 Khalifa during the decline of Abbasid Caliphate became the puppet in the hands of in the hands of military commanders or regional princes and the dynasties of Dyalam, Seljuks, Zangis and Ayubbis. These dynasties relegated the caliph to nominal head of the Muslims and themselves ruled in his behalf. The religious position of caliph was employed by them to justify their rule in the eyes of

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Muslims subjects. The regional princes and dynasties emphasized the religious duties and functions of a caliph and they themselves assumed the temporal powers. Under the late Abbasids when 'The Caliph had little left except the capital and even there his authority was shadowy' there was an escalation in his religious attributes.6 Goldziher notes that : 'Under the later Abbasids the title was filled with theocratic content. … (They, the Caliphs) claimed to be Representatives of God's rule on earth and even as "God's shadow on earth". Their ideologues taught that the Caliph is the God's shadow on earth; all those who are troubled find refuge in it (zillu'Ilahi fi'l-ardi ya'wi ilayhi kullu malhafun).7 OTTOMAN AMIRATE, KINGDOM, EMPIRE AND THE CALIPHATE

The founder of Ottoman dynasty was a tribal chief Ertoghrul who had migrated across Asia Minor with a band of some four hundred horsemen. He along with his band of warriors joined the army of Seljuk Sultan Ala-ed-din of Konya against the Mongols. Later Sultan bestowed on his son, Osman the insignia of sovereignty in the form a banner and drum. 8 In 1326 Bursa was captured and Osman died in the same year.He gathered pople around himself and his son Orkhan was to weld the people into a state. For about two-thirds of a century after its establishment about 13,00 in Anatolia at the expense of the Byzantine empire and on the ruins of Saljuk Kingdoms, the Ottoman state was about but a frontier amirate. Its capital was Bursa in the beginning in 1326. By 1366, the amirate became more stable and annexed territories on the European mainland and developed into a kingdom with a new capital Adrianople (Edrine). The conquest in 1453 of Constantinople by Muhammad II the Conquerer (1451-81) finally ushered in a new era, that of the empire. The Ottoman empire had one foot in Asia and the other in Europe. After the destruction of the Mamluks of Egypt, Muhammad II became the rule of the states of Arab caliphate.9 In January 1516, Sulayman’s father, Salim I , destroyed the Mamluk army in North Syria, he took among his prisoners a nonentity who under the name of al Mutawakkil III represented the nominal Abbasid caliphs who maintained there as puppets of the Mamluk Sultan for two and a half centuries. Some of the Abbasid caliphs were dismissed on the grounds of disloyalty to Mamluk Sultan. The line was begun in 1261 by an uncle of Musta’sim who evidently escaped the massacre at Baghdad and was installed as caliph in Cairo by the fourth Mamluk ruler, Baybaars (1260-1277) with grate pomp as caliph under the name al Mustansir.

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After the abolition of the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad in 1258, the Mamluks of Egypt helped reestablish Abbasids caliphate in Egypt in 1263. The caliph was effete and nominal without any significant powers. The real powers to rule were wielded by the Mamluks. The function of the caliph was bestow on the Mamluk ruler the robes of investiture or Khilat at the time his accession to the throne. Khalifa had no political authority. Must’ansir Billah who was made captive by the army of Tatars was freed and Mumluk ruler Al-Zahir Bapras band Qandari made him the caliph so that he could justify his claims to the rule over all Muslim territories. 10 Sultan Salim I carried al Mutawakkil III with him to Constantinople but allowed him to return to Cairo, where he died in 1543. With him the shadowy Abbasid caliphate came to an end. The Ottomans advanced claim that the last Abbasid surrendered his title of caliph with all rights and privileges to Sultan Salim I or to his successor Sulaman I in Constantinople.11

KHILAFATISTS’ FLAWED IDEAS MAULANA AZAD’S CONCEPTION OF KHALIFA

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Abul Kalam Azad, the principal doctrinaire of the Khilafat Movement, explained the raison d’être of the Movement in these words: “'It is an Islamic Shar'i law that in every age Muslims must have one [ék] Khalifa and Imam.By Khalifa we mean such an independent Muslim king or ruler of government and country who possesses full powers to protect Muslims and the territory that they inhabit and to promulgate and enforce Shar'i laws and is powerful enough to confront the enemies of Islam.' 12

Delivering the presidential address at the Calcutta meeting of the Bengal Provincial Khilafat Conference in 1920, Maulana Azad discussed the importance of Khilafah he declared, “the purpose of this institution was to organise and lead the Muslim community in the right path, to establish justice, to bring about peace, and to spread God’s word in the world. For all this it was absolutely necessary for the caliph to possess temporal power”. Maulana Azad had no doubt that “without an Imam, their lives were un-Islamic and that they would be damned after death”.13 Maulana Azad published a book in 1920 called Masla-e-Khilafat (The Issue of Khalifah), he stated: “Without the Khalifah the existence of Islam is not possible, the Muslims of India with all their effort and power need to work for this.”14 In the same book,Maulana Azad said, “There are two types of ahkam shariah, the first is related to the individual like the commands and prohibitions, the fara’id (obligations) and wajibat in order to perfect oneself. The second is not related to the individual but is related to the Ummah, nation, collective obligations and state politics like the conquering of lands, political and economic laws”.15 There are two conditions in which Shariah makes it obligatory for Muslims to go out for Jihad. First when the Khalifa himself asks for help from the Muslims of the world. Second when without the Muslim Ummah, the victory over enemies is not possible for Khalifa.16 The Sultan of Turkey, it was held by the Indian Khilafatists, was such a Muslim ruler and Caliph and it was to him that Muslims of India should pay allegiance although he did not rule over Indian Muslims. Azad writes, “Khalifatul Muslilimeen is now facing the aggression of infidels, so the it is obligatory for every Muslim to do the Jihad against infidels.” 17 Azad justifies the Tark-i-Mawalat, the severing of relations of love, amity, sympathy and obedience with nonMuslims who are bent on waging a war of aggression against Muslims and their Khalifa. 18 He interprets of the verses of the Quran to prove this point. According to him, those non-Muslims who don’t harbor evil intentions to harm Islam and Muslims deserve love, sympathy and cooperation of Muslims. He places Hindus in this category.19

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CRITICISM OF AZAD’S VIEWS OF KHILAFAT

This basic religious premise of the Khilafat Movement as stated by Azad was taken for granted without being subjected to critical examination. In analyzing the Azad’s views about Khalifa, it would become clear that Khilafat Movement ideologues lost sight of the times and conditions in which they were living. There is an inherent contradiction between the Ottoman claim that caliphate was transferred to them via Sultan Salim by al –Mutwakkil and the condition necessary as outlined by Azad. By virtue of the conditions as set out by Azad, al-Mutawakkil was not a legitimate custodian of the Caliphate. He was neither a Muslim king or ruler of any country nor was he independent, being a pensioner of the Mamluk ruler. In the circumstances the question of his possessing the power to enforce Shar'i laws of course does not arise. al-Mutawakkil was in no position to transfer the Caliphate to the Ottomans, not being a valid Caliph himself. He had nothing to give. The rhetoric and verbosity used by Azad was self-contradictory out of which no resolution seemed to be possible. This objection to the validity of the Ottoman Caliphate is quite separate from that put forward by the Barelvi Ahmad Reza Khan in which he questioned the legitimacy of Ottoman caliphate. Ahmad Riza Khan called Sultan Abdul Hamid Khan as the Sultan of Turkey and not as the caliph.20 Azad used two words Imam and Khalifa alternatively to expound his conception of Khilafat. He gives his interpretation of the Quranic concept of Khialfat by declaring that the purpose of Khialfat is to establish the rule of Allah on the earth (Khilfat-i-Arzi).21 He employs term Khalifatul Allah to explain his conception of Khilafat,22 a term whose use was strongly criticized by al-Mawardi, a great Muslim thinker. Al-Mawardi writes: : 'We disagree that he can also be called Khalifat Allah … The consensus of the Ulama has prohibited this and condemned any one who says it as a fajir (i.e. a sinner or liar) because there can be a Khalifa (successor) only of such a person who has disappeared or who has died. Allah can neither disappear nor can he die.'23 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan thinks that Khalifa is administrative head of the community without any religious authority.24 Azad’s arbitray contention that there must be one caliph [ek khalifa] in every age runs counter to historical truth. “ With the fall of Ummayads in 749, there was no longer any universally recognized caliph. Independent rulers in the ‘core’ and on the fringe of Islamic Empire appropriated to themselves

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the titles significantly meant for the caliph. So much so there were as many as three overlapping caliphates in the Muslim world. Abbasids in Baghdad (749-1258), the Ummayads in Spain ( 7561492), and the Shi’ite Fatmids in Egypt (909-1171)-each claming the prerogative of legitimacy. Yet in spite of the Shia schism and impotence of central caliphate, the fiction of its authority under the hieractic cloak and exalted for political and religious considerations by jurists like al Mawardi (974-1058) and al-Ghazali (1058-11), still survived and lingered on after the disappearcne of the Abbasids at the hands of Mongols in 1258.” India became accustomed to fiction of ‘central’ caliphate from the time of Arab conquest of Sind in 712.25 The concept of one Universal Caliph [ek khalifa] was propagated by the Ottomons especially Sultan Abdul Hamid. Azad accepted it without any religious authority or sanction by Shariah.Azad betrays his lack of knowledge when he fails to see that besides three famous caliphates, there existed numerous kingdoms whose heads claimed to be caliphs. In Bosworth’s Islamic Dynasties, an account of more than 80 such Islamic caliphates can be found.26 Sir Syed’s concept of caliphate definitely exhibited advance over Azad’s and corresponded more to reality of the times than did Azad’s. For him, the caliphate authority could be held on the territories controlled by the caliph which the Indian Khilfatists rejected by accusing Syed Ahmad Khan of being servile subject to the British. Ironically. It was the British who helped propagate the view of one universal caliph in the Muslim world. Ottoman Sultans’ interest lay in the propagation of this term in the Muslim world in order to enhance their political stature vis-à-vis other powers like Russian, Britain, Germany and others. The titles like Khalifatul Allah and Khalifatul Muslimeen who enjoys universal Muslim loyalty strengthened him immensely by giving him religious authority over the Muslims. Muslim clergy in India got a chance to enhance its position as the sole champions of Islam and Indian Muslims by being mediators between the ‘caliphs and his people’. As Gail Minault is of the view that a ‘particular groups of Muslim leaders tried to unite and mobilize Indian Muslim community by means of political and religious symbols meaningful to all strata of Muslim society.’27

OTTOMAN CALIPHATE AND BRITISH EMPIRE: FACTS AND FICTION OTTOMAN-BRITISH RELATIONS

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Khilafatatists’ propaganda suggested that Britain and France being the Christian powers wanted to take revenge on the Turks for their conquest by ‘brandishing swords’ and rule over Constantinople in the heart of Christian Europe.28 It is reversal of the true picture. The Turks have been steadfast allies of Britain against expansionists Czarist Russia for guarding the imperial interest of both the empires, Ottoman and Britain. Maritime trade and naval power were central factors in the alliance between two empires. The strategic power over high seas was determined the imperial interests. Czarist Russian two fleets, Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet at the Bosphorous and Dardanelles were vulnerable to British naval attacks. For Russia, the access to important sea routes and oceans was of crucial importance if it were to play some role in world power politics. Ottoman Empire stood in Russia’s way to the warm waters that lay to the South. The common threat of Czarist expansionism made Britain and Ottomans the enduring allies. In the Crimean War (1845-56), the Ottomans and Britain fought on the one side and share blood and money. The war ended in treaty practically banning the entry of Russian naval units

in Bosphorous and Dardanelles. The

Russian Black Sea Movement was curtailed. As a famous historian Razi Wasit says: Strangely enough, it was the British who tried to magnify Turkey in the eyes of the Muslim of the subcontinent. Partly owing to their imperialistic designs and partly out of fear of Russian advance in Central Asia which threatened the safety of the subcontinent, the British, during the nineteenth century, pursued a policy of bolstering up Turkey against Russia. In 1878, when there was an imminent danger of Russian invasion of Constantinople, the British send Indian troops to Malta and Lord Beaconsfield was ready even to wage another war against Russia with a view to saving Turkey.29 Indian Muslims began to regard the Sultan of Turkey as Khaliftul Islam after the decline of Mughal Empire. The Mughals never accepted him as the caliph and enjoyed power, wealth and territory equal to the Ottomans’. After the advent of the British rule, the idea of universal caliph gained currency among Indian Muslims. The British encouraged the idea the universal caliphate of the Ottomans to use their alliance with Turkey to neutralize the Muslim resistance to consolidation of British power in India. Tipu Sultan who paid allegiance to the Ottoman caliph in 1789 as a gesture of defiance against the Mughals. In return, Tipu was awarded with Sanad (Charter of Office) and Khilat (robes of investiture) and recognized the rule of Mysore by the Ottoman caliph. When Tipu put up resistance against the British colonialists,

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the caliph sent him a letter through Lord Wellesly, commander of the British forces, advising him to refrain from hostile action or fighting against the British. Tipu rejected this advice replying ‘ the caliph was too far away to know the situation in India.’ Rather he requested the caliph to join his fight against infidels. The second incident of Ottoman support for British colonialist happened when Sultan Abdul Majid condemned the mutineers in 1857 War of Independence calling upon Indian Muslims to remain loyal to British. The British exploited the idea of universal Ottoman caliphate to control the Indian Muslims. Sultan Abdul Aziz was given unexampled reception during his visit to London in 1867. The huge expenses incurred due to the lavish entertainment offered to the Sultan were charged by the British government from the Indian revenues with the explicit desire the cordial relations with the Sultan were necessary for the good government in India and to propitiate the Muslims.30 WORLD WAR I AND DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION IN EUROPE A Diplomatic Revolution occurred in 1907-17 in which Britain, France and Russian entered Triple Entente for the preservation of balance of power in Europe which was threatened by the growing ascendancy of Central powers with their Triple Alliance of Germany Austria, and Italy (1882).31 Turkey made many request to the British to let them join in the war which Britain politely rejected. Turkey decided to adopt a policy of ‘wait and see’. It refrained from showing hostility to the Germans while discussing how to gain benefits from the War. The choice they faced was whether to align with any side in the War or whether to stay neutral. They at last stumbled into a major European War about whose outcome they themselves were not certain.32 The caliph’s power to make final decision was taken away by the military-dominated political class known as Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

YOUNG TURKS, CUP AND DEPOSITION OF CALIPH In 1889, at the Istanbul Military Medical College, a group of students organized a secret society, the Ottomon Unity Society, which subscribed to nationalist ideas It tried to depose the Sutlan Abdul Hamid II in a coup in 1896 which failed. Sultan sent the leaders to remote parts of

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the empire from where they slipped away to Paris and Geneva and formed the Committee of Union and Progress. The members of the Committee of Union and Progress were also called as the Young Turks or Young Ottomons. The Young Turk opposition included a wide array of Ottomons, but its core consisted of Turkish speaking Muslim army officers organized in the committee of Union and Progress.33 Turkey's decision to join Germany and the Central Powers in the World War was a complete surprise to everyone, including the Turks themselves. In April 1908, a radical group, called the 'Committee for Union and Progress' (the CUP), the so-called 'Young Turks', seized power in Turkey in a coup, deposing the tyrannical Caliph Abdul Hamid II. In his place the CUP installed his brother Mohammad Reshad as Caliph. Abdul Majid’s reactionary rule proved incompatible with the trend of liberal progress which was taking root slowly since the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and of which the neighboring nation-states of the Balkans were now setting a visible example.34 Shortly after the deposition of Abdul Hamid II in 1909, the committee of Union and Progress held party congress and established a central executive committee that remained active until the party was dissolved at the end of World War I. The executive committee ruled the party and the government and ministers. Provincial branches of the Committee consisted of local notables, professionals, merchants, guild leaders, landowners, and soldiers, mostly Muslim and Turkish-speakers.35 The Committee of Union and Progress were now the masters of the empire, effectively backed by the authority of Shekel Pasha, the army commander.36 The Young Turk regime itself soon degenerated into a military oligarchy. Behind the scenes there was an ongoing triangular 'struggle for power within the Turkish state between the Caliph supported by conservatives and reactionaries, the High Bureaucrats supported by Liberals, and (on the third hand) the radical Unionists', the Young Turks. Turkey ruling elite was convinced that survival of Turkey depended on being the side of Triple Entente rather than on the side Central Powers (Germany, Italy, Austria). Initially, Turkey itself approached Britain and the Allies offering to join them in the War. Feroz Ahmad writes: 'After the traumatic experience of the Balkan War diplomacy the CUP was convinced that the Ottoman state could survive only as an ally of one of the two blocs, preferably the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia). Delegations were dispatched to London and Paris and finally to Czar Nicholas … The Unionists were pro-English and pro-French, rather than pro-German because they were sure that Turkish

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interests would be best served by the Entente powers.'

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Britain was chiefly concerned with

curtailing the rising tide of Central Powers by having strong Russia rather than ‘sick man of Europe’ on its side. It could alienate Russia and become isolated if it had allowed Turkey to be its ally. Tawfiq Pasha, the Turkish ambassador to London, was of the opinion that Russia would not agree to Turkey’s joining the war on the side of allies as it would imperil Russian expansionist ambitions in the North East around Ererum or Southward at the Turkey’s expense. 38 Besides, the Entente Powers held the military strength of the Ottomans in low esteem and were not willing to offer the Ottomans the assurances they demanded for terminating the capitulation caused by the Italian occupation of Turkish imperial possessions in Africa and the Balkans. At last, Turkey made a fateful choice. A hard core of army officers, dominant in the Committee of Union and Progress came under the spell of German military genius. Guided by the Minister of War Enver Pasha who was confident that Germany would quickly win, key members of Turkish cabinet signed with Germany on 2 August , 1914, a secret alliance directed against entente powers, and Ottomans began to mobilize the armies. The Triumvirate as it came to be known, Enver, Talat and Jema told Germany that it would shoulder a major share of the burden of the war material, transport and financing the Ottomans would join the war. By October 16, 1914, shipments of the promised German gold reached Istanbul.39 Turkey’s decision to join war on the side of Central Power was not due to so called ‘long-standing’ hostility between the Khaliftul Islam and Christian European Powers as the Khilafatisists propaganda suggested to the Indian people. Rather, the caliph at this time was not a having any authority to make a decision on this important matter himself. POST-WAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CALIPH AND BRITAIN When the Anglo-French forces entered Istanbul on 16 March 1920, the Khilfatists intensified their movement charging the allies with holding the caliph captive. The caliph was rather under the protection of the British who made a common cause with him to fight against the Turkish nationalists and republicans being led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The Turk republicans used the captivity of caliph as a ploy in propaganda war against the caliph and British. 40 The CUP leaders fled on German gunboat after defeat of Central Powers at the hands of the Allies in the World War I. Muhammad Wahduddin was installed in place of Muhammad Reshad. Armstice was signed on 30th October, 1918. Demad Ferid Pasha in message said that "their entire hope was

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in God and in England, that a certain amount of financial aid was a must and that they were

prepared to arrest anyone the British wanted. Mim Kemal Oke, a Turkish historian, brands him as British agent who conspired against Ankara government and Turkish National Assembly. 41 It was refutation of the Khilafatists allegation that British, due to their Christian bias, were opposed to Islamic institution of Khalifatul Muslimeen. British government was cognizant of the fact that it was CUP rather than the Khalifa who joined the war and that the caliph was just a figurehead. The British also knew that the caliph and old establishment wholeheartedly supported relations with Britain. Contrary to the Khilafatist's charges against it, Britain was fully committed, after her victory in the war, to preserve the Caliphate, to protect the Caliph, and in so far as it was possible, to reinforce his authority in Turkey and abroad. TURKISH REPUBLICANISM- A REAL THREAT TO CALIPHATE On 23 April 1920, the Grand National Assembly began it session and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected its president. He infused a spirit of nationalism in Turkish nation. On 11 August 1920, the Treaty of Sevres was signed between Turkey and the Allies. It deprived Turkey of all rights in Cyprus, Egypt and the Sudan, transferred the Arab Areas of Turkey to British and French mandate, gave some Aegean Islands to Italy and allowed Greece to administer Izmir for five year. Kemal and his supporters faced five armies, Armenians in the East, the French in Cilicia, the Italians in Adalia, the Greeks in Symrna and British in Constantinople. He settled problems of foreign relations wisely. On 13 March 1921, he concluded an agreement with Italy based on some economic concessions for the Italians. On 16 March, Kemal signed treaty with Russian making it a friendly country. On 20 October, he struck a deal with French and Italians and concentrated all his strength the Greek. Eventually, his army pushed back Greek army into the Mediterranean Sea. On 15 September, Lloyd George appealed to his allies to defend the Straits, but he received a negative response. On 11 October 1922, Turks got their first great victory in the form of Armistice signed in Madaniya. Lloyd George resigned due to humiliation. Now the road was opened for comprehensive revision of Treaty of Sevres and signing of Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, whose terms were favorable for the Turks. Turkey regained its independence and secured its unity.42

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The institution of caliphate was threatened not by the British but by the rising forces of Turkish Republicanism which Mustafa Kemal Ata Turk was leading. Kemal Ata Turk and his supporters declared their intention to abolish the Sultanate and on 18 November 1922, Abdul Majid was appointed the new caliph. Caliph Wahduddin boarded the British warship and fled to Malta.43 The Khilafatist either ignored it or proved to be incapable of perceiving the conflict between decadent monarchic institutions of caliphate and rising democratic aspirations of the Turkish Republicans. They were still living in the medieval times or doing it on purpose to enhance their political stature among Indian Muslims. The Khilafatists failed to see that it was Turkish nationalist forces rather than caliph who put up successful resistance against the Treaty of Sevres and led to repudiation of this humiliating treaty. The conflict between two forces was so strong that Sheikh-ul-Islam, Dürrezadé Abdullah Effendi, issued a fatwa, on the invitation of the Grand Vezir Damad Ferid Pasha, declaring that killing of the nationalists was a religious duty of Muslims.44 Mustafa Kemal himself was to face death sentence as a result of this fatwa. The Khilafatist who glorified Mustafa Kemal as ghazi and also venerated caliph at the same time were confused as to the real situation in Turkey. Caliph Wahdudin started purging the Turkish army and disarming it to forestall a revolt or coup d’état. He even ordered formation of special forces of discipline to fight the Turkish Army.45 DENUNCATION OF CALIPH ANS HIS COTERIE AS ‘FRIENDS OF ENGLAND’ Mustafa Kemal, in his 1927 famous speech condemned Caliph Wahddudin and his vizir Ferid Pasha for conspiring at the behest of Britain against Turkish republican revolution. In this long six-day October 1927 speech, Ata Turk explained the raison d’être for abolition of Caliphate in Turkey in 1924. He denounced the caliph and his coterie as Society of Friends of England. He accused the caliph of seeking protection of England and conspiring against the democratic revolution that came about in Turkey. KHILAFATIST AND ARAB NATIONALISM After the War, the Entente powers decided to enforce mandate system over the Fertile Crescent areas of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Palestine through the League of Nations. Britain had to govern Iraq and Palestine and France Syria and Lebanon till the people of these regions were trained for self rule. Soon after the enforcement of mandate systems, freedom struggle arose in Syrian under

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the leadership of Taj al-Din al-Hasani (d. 1943) who demanded Latakia and Jabal druze be joined to Syria and that Syria join the League of Nations as independent nation and French troops be evacuated. The army of French General Sarrail shelled Damascus in 1924.46 Syrian objected to Turkish claim over it. Turkish hold on Arab territories was weakening even before the War, and Arab nationalist movements were gaining strength, Indian Khilafatisit were busy campaigning for the restoration of Turkish rule over Arabs. Azad,the ideologue of Khilafat movement, led a powerful crusade in defense of his Pan-Islamic ideas. He wrote in his newspaper al-Hilal: “The real aim is the promotion of Pan-Islam, which is the true foundation and link for progress and reform of Islam. Today no local or national movement can benefit the Muslims so long as the whole world of Islam does not come together under the banner of Ottoman caliphate.”47 It was blatant antipathy towards aspirations of freedom and liberation of Arabs. Indian freedom fighters like Azad violated the basic cannons of freedom when they opposed the aspirations of Arabs to be free from the yoke of Turkish imperialism and strongly campaigned for the restoration of Turkish rule in the name of caliphate. FLAWED IDEAS BEHIND HIJRAT MOVEMENT Famous German dramatist, novelist and poet, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749 - 1832) rightly says, “When ideas fail, words come in very handy” it hold equally true of the Khilafatists whose verbosity and rhetoric knew no limits especially when it came to issuing fatwas. Their flawed ideas regarding hijrat couched in religious chicanery brought disaster to Indian Muslims.When Khialfat Movement reached its peak in 1920, thousands of Indian Muslims started migrating to neighboring Afghanistan obeying the fatwas or religious verdicts made by some eminent ulema. The British were thought to be the enemy of Islam and British Indian was considered Darul harb ( land of war) rather than Darul Islam ( a country under religious law). Originally the fatwa was passed by Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824) because of British interference in the inherited tradition and practice of Islamic Shariah Law in India.48

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The question of Hijrat arose when Indian Khilafatist wanted to infuse fury into their movement hence caused the thousands of Muslims to move towards Afghanistan believing that Khilafat was imperiled by the British and India had become Darul Harb. Such views had already been expressed by the 'Ali brothers- Shawkat (1873-1938) and Muhammad (1878-1931)-in their memorial to Lord Chelmsford (1868-1g33), the Viceroy of India, in April 1919: “ When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives, Jehad or Hijrat. That is to say, he must either make use of every force God has given him for the liberation of the land and the ensurement of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of Islam, or he must migrate to some other and freer land with a view to return[ing] to it when it is once more safe for Islam. . . . In view of our weak condition, migration is the only alternative for us. . . . This step, which we shall now have to consider with all the seriousness that its very nature demands, will be perhaps the most decisive in the history of our community since the Hijrat of our Holy Prophet (PBUH).”49

A fatwa was needed to boost an exodus. The first enquiries in this connection were addressed to Qayygm al-Din Muhammad 'Abd al-Bari (1879-1926), the head of the Farangi Mahall (Nizamiyya) seminary in Lucknow (U.P.)Abd al-Bari was not only a preeminent 'alim and a leading Pir of British India, he was also the theoretician of the Khilafat movement. He had not declared the hijrat mandatory but had only described it commendable. The hijrat was to be undertaken only as a last resort and when it served the best interests of Islam. Abul Kalam Azad for instance, believed that hijrat was an important constituent of the five pillars which firmly held the structure of the Islamic society, i.e., fealty of the jam'a to the caliph, its rallying to his call, its submission to his authority and jihdd or religious war. To him the hijrat was a sacrifice of inferior gains for nobler objectives. It was noble because it inculcated a spirit of sacrifice.50 In his book Masla-i-Khilafat, he writes: “If the Kuffar (infidels) establish a government in the land ruled by the Muslims, the Muslims must revolt against them. If they don’t have power to remove the infidels from the power, they should migrate to other land. 51 Ali brothers actually supported the practical displacement of the Muslims in the name of hijrat. Khilafat Committees and Khilafat Conferences played an important role in organizing the groups for Hijrat. Amir of Afghanistan, Aman Allah Khan (1892-1960) added fuel to fire by exploiting the agitated state of Indian Muslims to harass and pressurize Britain with whom he

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fought Third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. He encouraged the Muslims migration or hijrat to Afghanistan. The Khilafatists’ press al-Hilal, Zamindar, Comrade, Hamdard, and other newspapers like Pysa Akhbar, Aftab and Siyast carried the message of hijrat to remote corners of India. Thousands of people responded to the call. Professor Naeem Qureshi reflects on the damage and disruption which the hijrat movement caused in these words: ‘The peasants gave up their agricultural pursuits and abandoned their lands in anticipation of joining the hijrat. Crafty landlords and speculators, mostly Hindus, exploited the ignorant and encouraged them to emigrate in order to buy up cheaply the property and crops of the intending muhajiree. As a result, the poor peasants were forced to sell their belongings at very low prices. At some places in the Frontier land valued at Rs I0,000 could not fetch Rs 100. Cow buffaloes worth Rs 200 were offered at Rs 40. Crops and houses were similarly undervalued.” 52 After 13,000 muhajireen had already crossed into Afghanistan, nearly 18,000 more gathered in a few weeks time at the frontier of Afghanistan, and asked for admission. This alarmed the Amir, who never expected such large hordes of muhajireen to gather on the borders. He declined to receive them and the poor muhajireen who had disposed of their lands and businesses felt forced to return to India which they left in ‘pious haste’.53 MAULANA JAUHAR’S POLITICAL UNREALISM Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar was the one of the principal architects of Khilafat agitation. His speeches and firebrand rhetoric were behind much of enthusiasm of Khilafat agitation. He excessively influenced by Gandhi while the movement was gaining strength day by day. While replying to an accusation of being a Gandhipile, he said: 'I cannot find in any communityJewish, Christian or any other a man who has as noble a character as Mahatma Gandhi. My pir and murshid is Abdul Bari whom I greatly respect. Yet I can say that I have not found anyone superior to Mahatma Gandhi. After the Prophet, on whom be peace,' he said, 'I consider it my duty to carry out the commands of Gandhiji.54 It was the same Gandhi whom he later described as much less than the meanest among the Muslims. Jauhar’s irrational reverence for Gandhi led him to his regrets over his actions. JAUHAR’S MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE ‘RETURN OF PAST TIMES’

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Mohammad Ali's had unrealistic expectation from the Turks that if they had not been weakened by intrigues by the Euopreans, they would have helped their co-religionists in India in their struggle for freedom. Mushirul Hasan describes his state of mind thus: “ “His lack of realism in assessing the Turkish aims did not stop here. He pictured them fighting for an ideal Khalifa, even though the Kemalist revolution was already well on course. He believed that once the Turks were free from their 'distractions', they would revive the glories of the Umayyads or Abbasids and the pristine purity of the Khilafat-i Rashida.”55 Muhammad Ali Jauhar could not appreciate deeply the implication of republican revolution in Turkey. He failed to see that tyranny of the Sultan-Caliph was no longer the need of time. He was unfamiliar with the intellectuals like Ziya Golp, who rejected the idea of the uniting Muslim nations under one ruler or caliph as unrealizable ‘messianic hope.’‘Mohamed Ali was striving to recreate the Khilafat of the classical theorists’ when the Muslims elsewhere were striving to establish nation-states free from foreign domination. In order to prove his sincerity for the cause of caliphate, he even became so indiscreet as to invite the Amir of Afghanistan to liberate India from British imperialism. He put up strong defense for Ibn Saud who demolished the numerous sepulchers which the Muslims held to be highly sacred. His spiritual guide, Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahall started keeping distance from him due to his unreasonable defense of Saudi monarch. His belief to inordinate degree that Khilafat committees would bring truly Islamic rule in Holy Land of Hijaz limited his political actions around nucleus of the Indian Muslims Khilafat group. He hoped that through active contribution of money, assistance, and moral support, Indian Muslims would be able to reform Hijaz and remove the squalor in the Holy land and reestablish a genuine Islamic rule. His defense of Ibn Saud, who had demolished numerous sepulchers held sacred by Muslims, also alienated him from his spiritual mentor, Abdul Bari, and other friends. But he was not impressed. Nor did he learn from his own experiences. During his visit to the Arab lands in June 1926 he discovered the squalor of Mecca and Medina, the barrenness of the surrounding land, the degeneracy of the social conditions, and the mismanagement of the haj traffic. Yet he continued to insist that the Khilafat committees were destined to bring about a truly Islamic rule in the Holy Land. He wanted India's Muslims to form a party around the nucleus of the Khilafat

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group, persuade other Islamic people to their way of thinking, and thus achieve a united Muslim voice. He wanted them to contribute money, time, technical assistance and moral support to the Hijaz, devote themselves wholeheartedly to the reformation of the Centre of Islam, and thus earn the good requital in both worlds. He was confident that it was possible to resist Ibn Saud's arrogation of control of the Holy Land and help re-establish a genuine Islamic rule.

KHILAFATISTS’ ATTITUDE TOWARDS QUAID-I-AZAM Quaid-i-Azam began to be regarded as ‘ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity’ after he became an instrument in striking a historic agreement known as Lucknow Pact in 1916 between the League and the Congress. He was emerging as a leader towards whom Indian Muslims looked for guidance. There is an impression in some circles that the early Jinnah was non-religious in his political attitude. Jinnah's stand on the Khilafat issue, which arose in and after World War I,

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is sometimes cited in support of this view. However, Jinnah was not opposed to the Khilafat issue as such. On August 27, 1919, Jinnah and three others, sent to Lloyd George, the then British Prime Minister, a representation on behalf of the All-India Muslim League on the Khilafat question. The representation was concerned with the position of the Sultan of Turkey as the Khalifa. The penultimate paragraph of the representation is: "We need not add that if Great Britain becomes a party in reducing H.I.M. the Sultan of Turkey and the Khalifa of the Muslim world to the status of a petty sovereign, the reaction in India will be colossal and abiding." The representation was signed by M.A. Jinnah, Hasan Imam, Bhurgari and Yaqub Hasan.56 He supported the Khilafat issue constitutionally and legally for which there is ample documentary evidence. In the Indian Review ( October, 1919), the Quaid reminds the Viceroy of the promises the British government made to Indian Muslims about the maintenance of Turkish caliphate before the First World War in these words: “Now that victory has been achieved, to which the Muslim blood and money have contributed no a little, the Muslims have a right to claim that nothing will bedone to whittle down or alter the pledge you gave the world generally and Muslims in particular.”57 AIML met in Culcutta under Quaid-i-Azam. In his presidential speech at the Calcutta session of the Muslim League in September 1920, Jinnah described the Khilafat issue as one "which we consider, from a purely Musalman point of view, a matter of life and death."58 In the same address he said: “First came the Rowlatt Bill -- accompanied by the Punjab atrocities -- and then came the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire and the Khilafat. One attacks our liberty and the other our faith…. Notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the Musalmans and in breach of the Prime Minister’s solemn pledges unchivalours and outrageous terms have been imposed upon Turkey and Ottoman Empire has served for plunder for the Allies under the guise of Mandates.”59 Thus Jinnah opposed Gandhi’s plan of starting a mass non-violent, non-cooperation movement all over the country. Gandhi became the head of the Khilafat movement and declared that the Indians would boycott all British goods, courts, institutions, elections etc. He urged that such large scale protest movement would force the British to grant India self rule. He had envisaged four progressive stages of the movement; first the resignation of titles and offices; second, with

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drawl from all government services except police and military; third, withdrawal from police and military; and fourth, suspension of payment of taxes to the State. Jinnah, while commenting on Gandhian style of politics, said, “ he [Gandhi] had placed before the League his programme of non-cooperation, and it was for the League to give its verdict on it. It was for you to consider whether or not you approve of the principle; and approving of it principle whether or not you approve of the details. The operation of this scheme will strike at the individual in each of you, and therefore, it rests with you to measure your strength and to weigh the pros and cons of the question before you arrive at a decision. But once you have decided to march, let there be no retreat under any circumstances.”60 Jinnah vehemently opposed the non-cooperation movement. The discussion in subject committee was so heated that at one point, Shaukat Ali threatened to lay violent hands on Jinnah’ and was ‘only prevented by from doing so by the physical intervention of other delegates.’61 Jinnah, in protest against Gandhian style of agitation, resigned from the membership of Home Rule League in the last months of the year 1920. Gandhi wrote to the Quaid to reconsider his resignation but Jinnah refuses his offer saying: “ I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me ‘to take my share in the new life that has opened up hefore the country’. If by ‘new life’ you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I can not accept them, for I am fully convince that that it must lead to disaster.”62

In the same reply, Jinnah made unscathing criticism on Gandhian non-cooperation in these words: “ your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and sons; people generally are desperate all over the country and your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganization and chaos. What the consequence of this may be, I shudder to contemplate…”63

The Culcutta Congress special session held on 4 th September to 9th September 1920, adopted a resolution in deference of Gandhi’s wishes despite bitter opposition from the leaders like Malviya, C. R. Das, Bapin Chandra Pal and Bengali leaders calling on the party leaders to refrain

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from taking part in the elections. The Quaid on the other hand, felt that the Indians should fight Imperialism constitutionally instead. The Nagpur Session which was thirty-fifth Congress was held in December 1920. Gandhi’s noncooperation movement had been approved at a special session at Amritsar and during the Nagpur session, Jinnah was the only person who had the courage to openly oppose the resolution proposed by Gandhi, despite strong opposition by the crowd. The Quaid doubted the wisdom of Gandhi and Mohammad Ali Johar in launching a non-cooperation on ‘peaceful methods’: “ But let me tell you once more that the weapon will not succeed in destroying the British Empire. I, therefore, object to the methods, because if you want complete independence let us not be limited by methods……..I am unable to agree with this programme [ non-cooperation] for the reason it is neither logical nor is it politically sound or wise, nor practicable.”64

Muhammad Ali Johar taunted and ridiculed Jinnah for his cautious approach. The mob was frenzied by Gandhian and Khilafatists’ rhetoric. No one was prepared to listen to cautious counsel Jinnah was making. He was to be howled down with cries of ‘shame, shame’ and political impostor…After the Nagpur session Jinnah and his young wife Rutti came back to Bombay, the non-cooperators hounded Jinnah all the way. At Akola Railway Station, in particular, Shaukat Ali, who was travelling by the same train, incited an emotional mob to yell invectives at Jinnah. Ruttie was much disturbed.’65 He displayed his defiance of the crowd when he on purpose chose to call Mahatama Gandhi as Mr. Gandhi and Maluan Muhammad Ali Johar as Mr. Muhammad Ali. The crowd shouted no, no and asked him to use the titles. At such protestation of crowd, Jinnah said: “I refuse to be dictated by you. I am entitled to use my discretion to call a man by whatever designation I choose, provided it is parliamentary. I don’t recognize Mr. Mohammad Ali’ claim to be Maulana.” Mualana Shukat Ali, being short-tempered became enraged and at his brother’s insult as his own and he rushed to the Quaid-i-Azam with a stick but some people came in way saved Jinnah from Maulana’s displaced wrath and intolerance.66 The Nagpur Session of the Congress, held in December 1920 was its last gathering in which the Quaid participated. He disassociated himself from the Congress. The citizens of Bombay organized a public meeting to commemorate the service of Indian nationalist Gokhale on 21st

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February 1921.. Jinnah was invited to that gathering. In his further disapproval of Gandhian noncooperation, Jinnah said that he was convinced that Gandhi was wrong, utterly wrong. “ I have great respect and admiration for him, but I am sure his taking the country to wrong channel…… . If we are going to regulate everything in our country by the doctrine of non-violent noncooperation, then I am afraid we are forgetting human nature”67 Jinnah knew what was at stake. He accurately predicted that the movement would divide the communities and breed disrespect for law and order. He supported the Khilafat cause, opposed the Ali brothers' methods, and gave up once Turkey made its own decision.The fusion of politics and religion was against the grains of Jinnah when the breeze of the constitutional methods of the Lucknow Pact 1916 was fresh. Jinnah was totally suspicious this of mixing religion with politics by Gandhi and had total antipathy to the religious militancy of those Muslims who had joined Gandhi in pushing the moderate nationalist cause. Jinnah’ attitude to the Khilafat Movement was underlines his moderation in politics, his political priorities and his constitutional methods which were the permanent feature of his political life. Jinnah sought to revive the League after the abolition of caliphal office by Angora Assembly in February 1924. Naeem Qureshi makes studied observation of situation Indian Muslims were facing: “The Khilafatists were indeed indignant at the prospect of leadership slipping out of their hands and tried to divert attention from extra-territorial matters to domestic issues. But they had no solution for the new situation…. Jinnah’s attitude toward the Khilafat Movement seems fairly consistent and suggestive of political acumen and foresight.”68

CONCLUSTION Khilafat Movement not so much an anti-colonial movement as it was an attempt of Indian Muslim clergy to reassert its role which it had lost after the decline of Mughal empire. It resulted in the sharp political cleavage between Hindus and Muslims. One of its ironies in the words of Hamza Alavi is ‘it betrayed both Turkish nationalism and Arab nationalism’ in order to support a moribund institution of caliphate which had outlived its time and utility. In the word of Professor Abid, “The Khilafat Movement failed to achieve its objectives. As a matter of fact, this

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movement had little to do with India. It was not realized by the Khilafatists that their objectives were neither practicable nor wholly justifiable. It was due to these factors, pragmatic Muslim leaders like Quaid-i-Azam, Sir Wazir Hasan, Raja Sahib Mahmoodabad, Mian Fazl-i-Hussain and Sir Muhammad Shafi did not actively participate in this movement.” 69

The failure of

Khilafat Movement was also caused by their forgetting the lessons which Sir Syed Ahmad Khan gave on the question of importance of modern and scientific education. The Khilafatis tried to put back the clock which was set right by Sir Syed. They were swayed by the medieval ideas and rhetoric of returning to old glorious time. But Mohamed Ali was swayed by his own religious/Islamic rhetoric. They even became intolerant of wise voice of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and tried to silence him through force in the pursuit of their ideals which were had outlived their utility and relevance in modern politics. The Khilafatists could not appreciate that Muslim identity in multi-religious plural society could not be solely defined in relation to the Islamic world. They did not take into consideration peculiar religio-social make up of Indian society which demanded politics on the lines of modern nation-state and Muslim nationalism, though Khilafat Movement contributed to this end.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Naeem Qureshi, Pan Islam in British Indian: A Study of Khilafat Movement (1918-1924)

Politics (London: Brill , 1999), 112. 2. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent

(Karachi: Ma’aref Printers, 1977), 309. 3. Ibid. 4. Abul ‘Ala Maududi, Khilafat va Maukiyat Urdu (Lahore: 1961), 38.

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5. Qureshi, 309. 6. Phillip. K. Hitti , History of the Arabs (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1984), 465. 7. Ignza

Goldziher, Ummayads and Abbasids in Muslim Studies, tran. Kate Seelye

(London: Oxford University Press, 1971) 67-68 8. Lord Kinross, The Otttoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New

York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977), 23. 9. Hitti, 709. 10. Shah Moinud Din Nadawi, Tarikh-i-Islam, vol. 3-4 (Lahore: Maktaba-i-Rahmania, 1995),

726. 11. Ibid., 489. 12. Abul Kalam Azad, Masla-e-Khilafat (Lahore: Datta Publishers,1978), 108. 13. Qazi Mohammad Adeel Abbasi, Tehrik-e-Khilafat (Lahore: Datta Publishers, 1986), 15

14. Azad, 176. 15. Ibid., 248. 16. Ibid., 261. 17. Ibid., 293. 18. Ibid.., 297. 19. Ibid., 298-99. 20. Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam’iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan (1948-1979) (Islamabad: National Institute

of Historical and Cultural, 1993), xvi-xv. 21. Azad, 6. 22. Ibid., 7.

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23. Al-Mawardi, Abul-Hassan. Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniya, (Arabic) Cairo, 1960). 69-70. See

also Hanna Mikhail, Politics & Revelation: Mawardi & After (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995). 24. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Maqalat-i-Sir Syed (Lahore: Dost Associates, 1962), 165. 25. Qureshi, Pan Islam in British Indian, 11. 26. Clifford.Edmund Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical

Handbook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,1967), 14. 27. Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilizations

in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2. 28. Azad, 188-189. 29. Syed Razi Wasti, Muslim struggle for Freedom in British India (Lahore: Book Traders,

1993), 289-90. 30. R.L Shukla, Britain, India and the Turkish Empire (1853-1882) ( New Delhi: 1973),

123. 31. Kinross, 599. 32. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey ( London: Oxford University Press,

1961), 233 33. Sydney Nettleton Fisher, William Ochsenwald, The Middle East: A History (New York:

McGraw-Hill Comapanies, Inc, 1997) vol. 2, 326-27. 34. Kinross, 577-578. 35. Fisher, 330. 36. Kinross, 583. 37. Feroz Ahmad, , The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish

Politics 1908-1914( London: Oxford University Press,1969), 40.

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38. Agha Khan, The Memoirs of Aga Khan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 164.

39. Fisher, 377. 40. Feroz Ahmed, The Making of Modern Turkey ( London: Routledge, 1993), 48. 41. Mim Kemal Oke, Tehreek-i-Khilafat, trans. Nisar Ahmad Israr (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam

Academy, 1991), 265. 42. S. Qalb-i-Abid, Jinnah, Second World War and the Pakistan Movement, (Multan: Beacon

Books, 1999), 33-34. 43. Ibid., 34. 44. Lewis, 246. 45. Ibid., 242.

46. Fisher, 443. 47. Shukat Ali, Pan-Movements in the Third World (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1976),

217. 48. M. Naeem Qureshi, “The 'Ulama' of British India and the Hijrat of 1920” Modern Asian

Studies 13, no. 1 (1979): 41-59. P 41. 49. Ibid.,43. 50. Ibid. 51. Azad, 109. 52. Qureshi, Ulema and Hijrat of 1920. 55. 53. S.M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan ( Lahore: Institute of

Islamic Culture, 1997), 161.

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54. Rajmohan Gandhi, The Good Boatman: A Portrait of Gandhi (Delhi: Viking India,

1995), 104. 55. Mushirul Hasan, ed. “Introduction" to Maulana Mohamed Ali.” In My Life: A Fragment,

An Autobiographicl Sketch of Maulan Mohammad Ali (Delhi: Manohar, 1999), 35. 56. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence (Karachi: East

and West Pub. Co., 1977), 71-73. 57. Ahmad Saeed, Writings of Quaid-i-Azam ( Lahore: Progressive Books, 1985), 29. 58. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League

Documents: 1906-1947, Vol 1, .544 59. G Allana, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation ( Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1975),

151. 60. M.Naeem Qureshi, “Jinnah and the Khilafat Movement (1918-1924),” in World

Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, 1979), 149. 61. Ibid.

62. Allana, 152. 63. Ibid. 64. Riaz Ahmad, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The Formative Years (1892-1920)

(Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986), 197. 65. Qureshi, Jinnah and Khilafat Movement, 152. 66. Allana, 157. 67. Ibid. 159. 68. Qureshi, “Jinnah and the Khilafat Movement.”160.

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69. S. Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Struggle for Independence from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan to Quaid-

i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1857-1947) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1997), 45.

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Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-191. London: Oxford University Press,1969. Ahmed, Feroz. The Making of Modern Turkey. London: Routledge , 1993. Ahmad, Mujeeb. Jam’iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan1948-1979. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural, 1993. Ahmad, Riaz. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The Formative Years (1892-1920). Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986. Ali, Shaukat. Pan-Movements in the Third World. Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1976 Azad, Abul Kalam.Masla-e-Khilafat. Lahore: Datta Publishers, 1978. Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Handbook. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,1967. Fisher, Sydney Nettleton, William Ochsenwald. The Middle East: A History. Vol. 2. New York: McGraw-Hill Comapanies, Inc, 1997. Gandhi, Rajmohan. The Good Boatman: A Portrait of Gandhi. Delhi: Viking India 1995. Goldziher, Ignza. Ummayads and Abbasids in Muslim Studies. Translated by Kate Seelye London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Hasan Mushirul. Ed. “Introduction" to Maulana Mohamed Ali.” In My Life: A Fragment, An Autobiographical Sketch of Maulan Mohammad Ali .Delhi, Manohar, 1999. Hitti , Philip K. History of the Arabs. London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1984. Ikram, S.M. Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1997. Khan, Agha. The Memoirs of Aga Khan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954. Khan, Sir Syed Ahmad. Maqalat-i-Sir Syed. Vol 1.Lahore: Dost Associates, 1962.

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Kinross, Lord. The Otttoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977. Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Maududi, Sayyid Abul’ A’la. Khilafat va Maukiyat. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1961. Al-Mawardi, Abul-Hassan. Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniya, (Arabic) Cairo, 1960. See also Mikhail, Hanna. Politics & Revelation: Mawardi & After. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995.

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Saeed, Ahmad. Writings of Quaid-i-Azam. Lahore: Progressive Books, 1985.

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Shukla, R.L. Britain, India and the Turkish Empire (1853-1882). New Delhi: Viking India, 1973. Wasti,Syed Razi. Muslim struggle for Freedom in British India Lahore: Book Traders, 1993.