The Rasa Theory and the Darśanas

Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

THE RASA THEORY AND THE DARŚANAS Author(s): K. S. Arjunwadkar Source: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 65, No. 1/4 (1984), pp. 81100 Published by: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41693108 . Accessed: 14/02/2015 16:23 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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THE RASA THEORY AND THE DARŠANAS BY K. S. Arjunwadkar The Rasa-sütraof Bharata1has served as a fountain-headof all later discussionson rasa. Bharata treatsof the rasa complexas a resultantof its correlativesconsistingof some mentaland some physicalphenomena. The mentalphenomenaare bhävas dividedintopermanent( sthãyins) and visiting ( samcãrins);and the physical phenomenaare the hang-onsor the objectsof the sthãyins( ãlambana-vibhãvas), the contributories ( uddipana-vibhãvas ), and the manifestations( anubhãvas) with their collaborators classed as sättvikabhävas. They are all comradesin a joint operationoriginatingfrom the personhousingthesthãyinand extendingto theperson/objectthe sthãyin hangs on, contributed byconditionsfavourableto thishanging-on,producing physical,visibleeffectson rhepersonhousingthesthãyinwhichmanifestthe invisiblesthãyin. The sthãyins , the vyabhicãrins , thesättvikasand theanubhävas are housed in or emanate fromthe same person; and the two types of vibhãvas are exteriorto him. This operation presentedon the stage in the form of a drama and watched by the spectators(the rasikas)9 resultsin an experience,therasa, whichtherasikasrelishand cherish.Bharata comparesthisprocesswiththatof the preparationof food with ingredients of different tastes- rasas - relishedby theeater,2which,incidentally, indicates the source from which the term rasa is borrowed. While detailing this apparatusof the rasa, Bharata enumerateseight( nine, as viewedby some ) to eight( or nine) sthãyins rasas corresponding and , thirty-three vyabhicãrins He : the sättvikas. also divides as rasas into two four causes eight groups of the remainingfour. What Bharata expounded as relatingto drama is extended to poetryand other arts. The rasa theory,therefore,formsthe nucleusof the aestheticdeliberationsin Sanskritthroughcenturies. From the outlineof Bharata's rasa theory,it is evidentthatit is original in most of the concepts,theirclassificationand the metalanguagehe uses to expound it. No work in the Sanskritliterature, or priorto contemporary the Nãtyasãstra of Bharata, attemptstreatment of similartopicsin a way or 1 8 ít SSRI: ' 3^1?- 3WIí|

I Nãtyasãstra,VI, betweenverse31and 32. loc.CÌ(.

Il [ Annals BORI ]

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by a methodcomparableto thatof Bharata. The creditdoes not, of course, go to Bharata alone but is sharedbyhimwithhis predecessorson the subject whomhe has frequentlyquoted. As a probable source a referencemay be made to workson Ayurvedawhich,while treatingof their materiamedica, speak of the rasa, vírya, vipãka and prabhâva of thematerialdescribed.3 One would expect an analysis of the facultiesof mind in the Yoga System which Bharata mighthave made use of ; but littleis foundin thatsystem whichhas even a remoteresemblancewithwhatBharata has presented. The Sãmkhyasystem,akin to the Yoga, says littledifferentfromits sister-system on thiscount. Even Kãmasutra, havingratias its special field,disappointed me in myattemptsto finda likenessof Bharata's analysisof mentalfaculties. Surprisingly enough,- and it may be a pure coincidence,- thereis a striking resemblancebetween Bharata's theory of rasa and Carvaka's theory of caitanya- consciousness,a qualityof thebody not presentindividuallyin the four elements- theearth, the water, the fireand the air that combine to make thebody but evolvingfromcombinationthereof.4 The same may be said of rasa and its correlatives. detailedso faras its mechanismis concerned, This theory,sufficiently which generationsof critics offeredto solve in theirown presentedproblems are The varied, inter-relatedand so perplexingthat, even right. problems afterlong discussions,the only satisfactionone is likelyto deriveis thatfor almost every question there is a counter-question. And above all, anjr solution has to be reconciled with what Bharata mightor mightnot have said hereor elsewhere. If thecriticsweregiventhe choice of pickingup the bestradical of Bharataand keepingconsistentwithit withoutany responsi^ bilityof defendinghis stand elsewhere,one feels hopeful that something discussionsof the morecoherentwould have come out of the hair-splitting commentators. The problemsstart with the very fundamentalquestionas to where does rasa abide - in the character,in the actor or in the spectator? Every one of thesealternativeshas its own difficulties.This breeds the next question : What is the nature of the experiencethat is called the rasa ? Is it inference or'perceptionor somethingelse ? This questioninevitablyleads to the determinationof the relationof the sthayin withthe rasa. Are they ? And how does Bharata forgetto make a referenceto identicalor different 3 Astahga-hrdaya Sutra.1. 14etc. 4 Cp. 3^ xRčnfi; I ^•4: m lììcTWÌt

I i Sarva-darsana-samgraha , Cãrvãka.

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thesthyãyinin his famousrasa-sütra? What relation does rasa have with its correlatives? What is the outcomeof rasa experience: all pleasureand no pain, or pleasure from some rasas and pain from others? If pain is the outcome of some rasa, how is the connoisseur interestedin it? These are the basic questionson which criticshave wrangled for centuries. Not all criticshave attemptedall questions. They probably presumed,as was the examinationsome years back, that they had practicein a higher university to attemptc not more thanthree/four questions' ! We have then no way but to value theiranswers' collectively* as was also the practiceof the examinersthatwenthand in hand withthe ť not more than' allowance. The earliestcandidate on record who appeared for this exam was Lollata who preferedto seek aid from his common sense rather than from any established dogma. For him, rasa, which is substantiallythe sthãyin createdby the vibhãvas,revealedby anubhãvasand nourishedby the vyabhicãrinsyabided primarilyin the characterin the play like Ráma, and secondarilyin the actor who enacted the character.5 His outlook will be clear whenwe imaginea flowerwhicheventuallywithersaway givingrise to a tiny fruitthatdevelopsand ripens underfavorable nutritiveand climatic conditions. This explanation,simpleas it sounds, createsmoreproblems than it • solves. It is not a fact with all sthyãyinsthat they are nourished as the timeadvances. Sthãyins like anger and surprisewane with the time. They would never reach the stage of rasa if we accept Lollata's explanation. Rama is not,then,to any reasonable degree,let alone theprimary,the receptacle of rasa. Nourishmentof a sthãyinlike rati is possiblein the real Rama at the sightof the real Síta, both of whom are no more at the time of the stagingof a play. All talk of the production,revelationand nourishmentof therasa as Lollata visualisesit is, like thatof the fruitof a treebeyondthe reach of a consumer,puerile. For Šankukawho thusfindsfaultwithLollata's view,the actorhimself, of the spectatorsand is not far removed from them is who à contemporary Rama whomhe imitates,is the receptacleof rasa, which as are characterslike is an imitationof the sthãyinin the real character like Rama. This sthãyinin the actoris a matterof inferencearrivedat from his acting. Both the sthãyinand its correlativesare thus unreal and hence are named by 8 ifa

w- 1 i č^Ner; i H Abhinãv abfioration the Rasa-sûtra,Page 124 in Rasa referred to as Kang, bhãvavicãraby Prof.R. P. Kangle,Bombay,1973,hereafter followed bypagenumbers.

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Annals BORI , LXV ( 1984)

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Bharata by artificialtermslike vibhãva .6 How can such an unreal apparatus lead to a real enjoymentof a rasa ? - *As does the pictureof a horse lead to thecognitionof a real horse,' ( citra~turaga-nyãya )7 says Šaňkuka; deems ' and it ' samvadi-bhrama quotes Dharmakirti,the Buddhistphilosopher,as a support.Imaginea personwho sees raysof lightat a distance, thinksthatit is a jewel, rushesto secureit, reachesthe spot and, to his disappointment, finds a lamp there. Imagine also anotherpersonwho sees rays of a jewel ( and not thejewel ifself,it being too small and too farfromhim), thinks that it is a jewel,similarlyreachesthe spot and findsa jewel. In fact, both are mistakeninasmuchas theytake as a jewel somethingotherthan a jewel. But thisfalseknowledge( bhrama) producesa real action in them,withthe only differencethat one of the two is rewarded with what he sought ) whilethe otheris not ( visamvãdi-bhrama ( samvadi-bhrama ).8 This is how Šaňkuka argues, conceding that the inferredsthãyin in the actor and its apparatusare unreal. Personallyhe thinksthatthe cognition of the sthãyinin theactor defiesdefinition,cannot be includedin any of the knownvarietiesof cognition,but, at the same time, cannot be denied as it is a matterof first-hand experienceforeveryrasi/ca.9 It is customaryto deem Šaňkuka a Naiyäyika on the strengthof his view that rasa, thatis the sthãyinimitated,is inferred. I do not subscribe to thisview; for Nyãya is a systemwhich expounds in detail all the four means of knowledge of which inferenceis one, and nothingtypicalof the Nyãya systemis involvedin this view. A farmerdoes not need to study Nyãya to inferthatit would rain beforelong when he sees heavyclouds in is adequate to deemhima Naiyãyika, the sky.If Šaňkuka's theoryof inference 6 3C-ÍIR...

srdtaftw: p-rrät xT íÇf:| Kaiig.129-30 7 Thisexpression, intheAbhinavabhãrati buthinted at bysomeotherwords missing of a horse) usedbyAbhinava on( Kang.145), is first further found ( a cow,instead in hisKãvyaprakãsa( UlläsaIV ), whilerepresenting used by Mammata SaskukaV view. 0/>.cit.p. 134. 8 I Pramana-varttika , 2.57. c view by thewords Thisis alludedto in Sankuka's ' Kang.130. 9 srfôïnicr H éšfét* T i

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his referenceto Dharmakirtican be regardeda sufficient groundto deemhim a Buddhist! I wouldconsiderthesecondclaimas more plausible,as theverse quoted fromDharmakirtiis closelyrelatedto thetheoryof knowledgeof the Buddhistswho denythe existenceof theobjective world. This sortof n'áive taggingon a flimsygroundwould be of littleconsequencein a seriousstudy. Šaňkuka is attackedforholdingthisviewby both BhattaTauta and his ' disciple, Abhinavagupta. You call rasa an imitation; okay. But from whose pointof view ? From thatof the spectatoror of the actor? ' interro* gates Tauta, and bringsout the fallacy in áañkuka's stand fromeach of them. To know somethingas imitation,the audience must know the imitated. (Just as to appreciatea parody,you must know the original.) Bat none has seen a characterlike the real Rãma.10 Aid even if it were not a characterlike Rãma farremovedin time fromthe spectator,cognition of imitationis possibleonlyof thingsperceptible,and not of a sthãyinwhichis beyondthe reach of sense-organsand is onlyinferred. And even as inferred, thesthãyinis cognized as a sthãyinand not as an imitationof a sthãyin.It is ridiculousto believethatan imitationof the hetu( smoke-likemist) leads to the inferenceof an imitationof thesãdhya( fire-like flowerJ.11The imitation theorydoes not hold good even fromthe pointof view of the actor who has not seen the real Rãma; and a sthãyinin anotherperson is as imperceptible to theactor as to the spectator. How can and would an actor imitatethe sorrowof Rãma ? Rãma was sorry; the actor is not. The actor can at his best shed tearsas did Rãma when he was sorry. But shedding tears is not the same as beingsorry. And how can sheddingtears, whichis common to all normalpeople includingtheactor when theyare sorry,be an imitationof Rãma alone ?12 Needless to say that áañkuka's analogy of the horse in a pictureis beside the point, as both the imitationand the imitatedin this case are perceptible. Moreover, a pictureis createdby means of colours; a sthãyin,which already exists, is only revealed,never created. While áañkuka's theorythatthe cognitionof thesthãyinin the actor controverting defies definition,Tauta introducesan importantidea that what we see as Rãma in a play is Rãma the general,and not Rãma the particular; and this is corroboratedwhen an actor enacting Rãma is substitutedby another withoutany problemto the spectator.13 10 ^ ÇKá he introducesthe five interpretationsby Lollata, Šaňkuka, Bhatta Nãyaka, Abhinava and Jagannãtha as representingthe views of Mímãmsã, Nyãya, Sãnkhya, Vyãkarana and Vèdãnta on the Rasa-sütras9and maintainsthat, fora properunderstanding of theviews, a close knowledgeof the basic principlesof these systemsis essential. He furthermaintainsthat, once this stand is taken, what is left forus is to acquaint ourselveswiththe hypothesesof these systems,draw

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conclusionsa priorifromthem and not question them a posteriorion the strengthof our personal experiencesin total ignornace of the scientific method»47 It is perfectly legitimateto say thatone should make an earnesteffort to understandthe view of an interpreter and acquaintoneselfwiththesystem, if necessary,from which he draws his material. But to denythe rightof vis-à-visone's own experienceis not onlydoing questioningthe interpretation to the but also to the spiritof the tradition. The surest injustice questioner confirmation of a hypothesisis considered to be the agreementof its results withactual experience.eWhat AlmightyExperiencedictatesus, we will obey,* proclaims JayantaBhatta,48the learnedauthorof the Nyãya Manjar/, and whatis it, ifnot experience,whichis held as the touchstoneby the traditional critics of the interpretations in refutingviews they do not subscribe to? Could therebe a strongerdefenceof experiencethan that by áamkarãcãrya, the doyenof Indian philosophers,whenhe remarks: 4Even a hundred Šruti passages cannotbe accepted iftheytell us thatthe fireis cool and devoid of light'?49 The most astoundingfactis thatthe Mímãmsakas seek sanction fortheirtenetsfromcommonworldlyexperience,50 and Subhedarshutsdoors to the latterin favourof theformer! Subhedar's argumentsare based on the thatthereis an uninterrupted, uniformtraditionof the interpretapresumption tionsof the Rasa-sütrareachingas faras Jhalkikar,i. e., almost to our own times.Againstthisbackground,it is amusingto findSubhedarsurprisedat the factthat, in a long periodof one and a half millenniasince Bharata, Jagannãtha was thefirstto cite passage from the TaittiriyaUpanisadin support of the so-calledVedãnticview of Rasa-sütra.51 This is equivalentto saying thattherewas no Vedãnta traditionas such of the interpretation of the Rasa sutra, and thatit was Jagannãthafirstto thinkof utilisingVedãnticconcepts and terminologyfor the interpretation of the sütra. And what whenthere the two in tradition itself in to one or the are opinions relatingan interpreter othersystem,52 or whenan interpreter borrowsfrommorethanone systems?58 47 See Natya-darsana(Bombay1981), pp.36-54.See also Rasa-vicara ani Pracina DarsanakãrabyMM. YajñesvaraSãstrIKasture, 1957. Hyderabad 4:8 ïpïï : I Nyaya Manjarì (Benares1936), Pramâna. p. 285. 49 * í| 18.66. l Gltã-bhà.çya Sprat co Cf.Mïmamsa-Nyaya-Prakasa , Introduction : byMM. VasudevaShastriAbhyankar p. 2i. Natya-darsanap. 53. 52 BhattaNãyakaregarded as a Simkhyais blamedby Abhinavaforhavingfounded histheory ontheMlmãmsãconcept ofbhãvanã. See Note20 above. 63 Bhatta Nãyaka,again. Regardedas a Sämkhya, he was the firstto compare rasasvãdato Brahmasvãda of theVedãntins.Whatis hisidentity ? A Samkhya, a Vedãntinora Mimam saka (cf.Note52) ?

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This bringsus to the nextimportantpoint. The so-called Mïmarôsaka etc. viewsof the Rasa-sütraare no more thana utilizationof some Mímãmsã etc. principlesforan issue outside thejurisdictionof the systemconcernedif of the issue. What theyare thoughtto be conduciveto a betterunderstanding a solution to a interestis a philosophical systemlikelyto have in offering in unsurmountable ? land an We may problemit does not considerits own ifwe wereto thinkthata systemhas a viewabout everyingunderthe difficulty sun. If a Mïmâmsaka carrieshis own theorieswhenhe turnsto Rasa-sütra, whatwould he do when he turnsto Vedãntaor Vaišesika? Could therebe anythinglike a Mïmâmsaka view of the Vedãntaor the Vaišesika? What we actuallyfindis thatan author havingcommandover severalsystemsor disciplines( like Vãcaspati Mišra ) is a Sãmkhya whenhe expoundsSãmkhya, a Vedãntin when he expounds Vedãnta and so on. If Sãmkhyatenetsfigure; as a criticof the in theinterpretation of theRasa-sütra, it meansthe interpreter rasa theoryhas borrowedsome Sãmkhya tenetsforhis convenience. The advantagehe derivesby doing so is thatit is the Sãmkhya, and not he, who is answerableforthetenetsreliedupon. More discrepanciesare disclosed when we go into the details of Subhedar'stheory. Lollata is a Mïmâmsaka, he maintains. Why? Because the role the actor plays in a drama is comparableto thatof the sacrificer in the Vedic ritual,suggestsSubhedar. There is nothingin the interpretation of Lollata to provethathe had this in his mind when he propoundedhis theory. Even if we ignorethis, the basic question is how can comparison fromthe Vedic ritualbe regardeda part of the Mímãmsã system which is essentiallythe scienceof interpretation.That this science expoundsits tenets withthe Vedic ritual in view is no reason whythe two should be treatedas one, and Lollata as a Mïmâmsaka. If Subhedar is supposed to bs rightin readingthe mindof Lollata, Lollata can at thebest be regardedas a ritualist, not a Mïmâmsaka. • ' Equally untenable is the view that Šaůkuka is a Naiyãyika on the groundthathe regardsrasa as inferable.Nyãya is a systemthatexpoundsin detail all the four means of knowledge of whichinferenceis one. When áañkuka maintiainsthat rasa is inferred,what typicallyNyãya idea is involved in it which makes him a Naiyãyika? Do I need to be a Naiyãyika when I inferor say that my missingshoes kept outside the house have been stolenby someonewhileI was engagedinside? If áañkuka's theoryof inferenceis adequate to deem him a Naiyãyika, his referenceto Dharmaklrti can be regardeda sufficient groundfordeeminghim a Buddhist! In support of his contentionthat Bhatta Nãyaka was a Sãràkhya, Subhedar quotes

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the Sãmkhyaterminology he employs,conveniently ignoringthe comparison of the rasa experiencehe makes with the experienceof the Brahman. I do not know of a Sãmkhya systemwhich shares the Vedäntic concept of Brahman and its experience. If Bhatta Nãyaka is a Sãmkhya because he employssome Sãmkhyaconceptsin expoundingthe Rasa-siitra, whyis he not a Vedäntistbecause he employssome Vedänticconcepts? And Mïmamsaka, too, because, as interpreted by Abhinava, he impliesthe bhãvanãconcept of the Mimãmsakas whenhe talksof the bhãvakatvaprocess? Subhedar's stand becomes all the more unconvincingwhen he introducesalamkãraview of the Rasa-sutraas the view of the grammarianson the strengthof thecliché thatpoeticsis the ťtail ' of thegrammar,' ' Puccham' here means, forhim, a respectableor dignifiedsequel as ' But unlike Marathi, illustratedin the Vedic passage, ' srfêfàT ' in thissense. Pratisthãin Sanskrit Sanskrit does not use the word ' srfàgT means *position,support,basis Nowherein his exposition,Subhedarseems to be aware of this. This is funbased on a confusion. as one representing Subhedarhas introducedAbhinava'sinterpretation the view of the grammar- he means the Pãninian school, and Jagannatha's as one of the Vedãntins. Elsewhere in his exposition of thistopic, he has attemptedto show how the two schools are veryclose in theirview of the creationof the world. What is Brahmanto the the Vedãntins,the ultimate cause and reality,is the šabda-Brahmanto Grammarians,says he, and takes the conceptas farback as Panini and Patañjali. Now, thereis no evidenceto provethatPaniniand Patañjali had thisconceptin theirmind. The firstwork that expounds this concept is the Vãkyapadíya of Bhartrhari( 6thc.A.D. ); and thereare reasonsto believethathe, too, meantit in a metaphorical,rather thana metaphysical,sense. Nãgoji Bhatta ( 18thcent. A.D. ), therenowned exponentof the Pãninian school, understandsthe Šabda-Brahmanas producť ' ed, and hence the apara % and not the para ' Brahman.54 If, however, Subhedar believes that the two systemsare almost identicalin theirmetaphysicalview,it is not easy to understandwhyhe treatsthemseparatelyin theirviewsof the Rasa-sütra, whichare weddedto theirmetaphysicalviews, as Subhedarmaintains. Subhedar believes that it is the influenceof the monisticidea of the Brahmanthat led Jagannãthadefinepoetryas ť Šabda * in preferenceto the conventional ' áabdãrthau' which involves dualism. See Vaiyakarana-Siddhanta-Laghu-Manjusat ... (Chowkharaba edition, p. 172)

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Annals BORI, LXV ( 19S4 )

Jagannãthadoes not seemto be aware of this; forhe justifieshis definition by to such commomexpressionsas « thepoetryis recitedaloud 'M a reference We have no means to guess what Subhedar thinksof Bhoja's interpretationof rasa. Is Bhoja a Sãmkhyaor a Vedãntin? Tneitheralternative, how is Subhedargoingto account formore thanone interpretations fromthe same school and reconcilethis situationwithhis beliefthatthe various interpretationsof therasa theoryhave come downto us througha uniform,unbroken tradition? We are, therefore,forcedto conclude thatthereis no such of theRasa-sUtraby philosophicalsystemslike thingas oficial interpretations Mimãmsã; thatall those who offeredto interpretthe Rasa-süíra did so as criticsof drama and/orpoery; thattheysought aid from the philosophical systemsin varyingdegreesin the hope of solvingproblemsrelatedto the issue at hand; and, last but not the least, theydid so with an eye on the actual experienceof theconnoisseuras a touchstoneforthecorrectnessor otherwise of thetheory. Abhinava has succeeded in drawingthe best fromhis predewhich is least susceptibleto inconsiscessorsto formulatean interpretation own limitations. has its but tency

i ' 3^5^: ifRr+rrcft. ^(Í^JSRÍ^^itRd: Sčjfl •íjčisqi ^ fTRT:,' ofthekãvya. , definition Rasa-gahgãdhara

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