The Qualitative Paradigm

The Qualitative Paradigm: An Overview of some basic Concepts, Assumptions, and Theories of Qualitative Research By Lisa Joniak, Ph.D.

 A paradigm may be viewed as a set of  basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview  that defines, for its holder, the nature of the “world,” the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts, as, for  example, cosmologies and theologies do. The beliefs are basic in the sense that they must be accepted simply on faith (however well argued); there is no way to establish their ultimate truthfulness. If there were, the philosophical debates reflected in these pages would have been resolved millennia ago. (Denzin 1994, p. 107)  Author’s Note: This This paper serves serves as the starting starting point point for a course course in qualitative qualitative research. The author provides a general overview of the qualitative paradigm and then goes on to discuss four major theories used in qualitative inquiry. What is Qualitative Research? Over the past few decades a “methodological revolution” has spawned in the social sciences (Denzin 1994). The field of quantitative research has made way for a more interpretative approach—the qualitative approach. As Denzin and Lincoln explain: Where only statistics, experimental designs, and survey research once stood, researchers have opened up to ethnography, unstructured interviewing, textual analysis, and historical studies. Where “We’re doing science” was once the watch-word, scholars are now experimenting with the boundaries of interpretation, linking research to social change, delving into characteristics of race, ethnicity, gender, age and culture to understand more fully the relationship of the researcher to the research. In various disciplines in various guises, this implicit critique of the traditional worldview of science and quantitative methods is taking place. All of these trends have fallen under the rubric of “qualitative research.” (Denzin 1994, p.ix)

This is not to suggest that qualitative research is new, even though it is still learning to fly. Qualitative studies have been traced back to the earlier part of the 20th Century (Lindlof 1995, p. 8). 1 Deemed as “soft scientists,” qualitative researchers fought to have their methodology recognized and appreciated by the social scientific world (Denzin 1994; Lindlof 1995; Silverman 2000). Paving the way for the tremendous development in qualitative inquiry, was the growing dissatisfaction by academics to form a deeper understanding of their subject than mere numbers and statistical models could provide (Lindlof 1995, p. 9).  According  According to Lindlof, Lindlof, unlike unlike quantitative quantitative researchers, researchers, who perform perform tests of  prediction and control, “qualitative inquirers strive to understand their objects of  interest (Lindlof 1995, p. 9). It is through the researcher’s insight that qualitative research achieves its ultimate goal—understanding, or as it is sometimes called, verstehen. That special “something” that qualitative research provides comes out, not only in its product (verstehen), but also in how it was created. Pauly explains: The “something” that qualitative research understands is not some set of  truisms about communication but the awful difficulties groups face in mapping reality. The qualitative researcher is an explorer, not a tourist. Rather than speeding down the interstate, the qualitative researcher  ambles along the circuitous back roads of public discourse and social practice. In reporting on that journey the researcher may conclude that some of those paths were, in fact, wider and more foot-worn than others, that some branched off in myriad directions, some narrowed along the way, some rambled endlessly while others ran straight and long, and some ended at the precipice, in the brambles, or back at their origin. (Pauly 1991, p. 7)

By taking the longer, more scenic path, qualitative researchers open up a colorful, deep, contextual world of interpretations.

Tapping into this kaleidoscopic realm, requires qualitative researchers to become familiar with their participants’ interpretations of reality. Utilizing the emic approach, where one becomes immersed with the data, the qualitative researcher observes, records, and interprets the phenomena from the  participants’ perspectives. Lindlof describes the unique relationship between the

qualitative researcher and participant: Qualitative researchers appear to undertake the very suspect course of  seriously studying the sentiments of their human subjects. Rather than treating people’s utterances about themselves and their world as inaccurate accounts of social reality, or as outcomes determined by environmental forces, or as manifestations of cognitive processes, the qualitative researcher listens carefully to the utterances. The researcher  moves about in the lives of certain people, and subjects and researcher  become familiar to each other: they as something more (knowing, authentic) than human subjects, and he or she as possibly something less (exalted, authoritative) than a researcher. (Lindlof 1995, 9)

Thus, qualitative and quantitative research are not merely different way of  doing  research, but different ways of  thinking . Before moving on to the ontological and epistemological principles and assumptions of qualitative research, some prefatory remarks on how qualitative inquiry is defined are in order.

Defining Qualitative Research

The field of qualitative research resembles a patchwork quilt, built pieceby-piece using perspectives and methods from just about every stop along the social scientific spectrum. According to Denzin and Lincoln, “the field of  qualitative research is defined primarily by a series of essential tensions, contradictions, and hesitations (Denzin 1994, p. ix). It is through these tensions

and contradictions that the essence of qualitative inquiry emerged. Denzin and Lincoln broadly define qualitative research: Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials—case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts—that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives. Accordingly, qualitative research deploys wide range of interconnected methods, hoping always to get a better fix on the subject matter at hand. (Denzin 1994, p. 2)

Thus, qualitative research can be used differently by a multitude of disciplines, studying just about anything. Since qualitative research is made up of complex, context-dependent variables, it may be helpful to examine and compare qualitative inquiry with quantitative (or non-qualitative) study. Treise (Table 1) provides a useful outline comparing many of the qualitative characteristics and assumptions with the non-qualitative approach: TABLE 1-Comparison of Qualitative and Non-Qualitative Approaches Qualitative Approach

1. Assumes multiple and dynamic realities, contextual 2. Seeks “understanding” through “verstehen” 3. Natural setting, uncontrolled observation 4. Data precedes theory 5. Data are “valid, real, rich, deep, thick” 6. Process-oriented 7. Findings not generalizable

Non-Qualitative Approach

1. Assumes single, stable reality, divisible/fragmentable 2. Seeks external facts and causes explanation; systematic association of  variables; prediction 3. Controlled observation, experimentation 4. Theory precedes data 5. Data are “hard, reliable, thin, replicable” 6. Outcome oriented 7. Generalizability claimed

8. Holistic orientation 9. Said to be “grounded, discoveryoriented, exploratory, expansionist, descriptive” [The theory is grounded in the data.] 10. Inductive approach 11. Researcher is the instrument 12. Uses “insight” and sensitized concepts 13. “Meaning” is central concept 14. Works with research “participant” 15. Dynamic nature of research precludes step-by-step instruction

8. Particularistic orientation 9. Said to be “ungrounded, verificationoriented, confirmatory, reductionist”

10. Deductive approach 11. Relies on questionnaires, attitude scales 12. Uses statistical measures and tests 13. Little or no role for interpreted meaning 14. Recruits research “subjects” 15. Research methods are well documented and structured (Treise 1999) 2

Treise’s chart nicely lays out some of the fundamental differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Here we can clearly see sharp differences in ontology and epistemology between the qualitative and nonqualitative camps. In the next section, we will examine the ontological and epistemological assumptions of qualitative research. Qualitative Ontology & Epistemology 

 As Treise’s Treise’s matrix shows, shows, qualitative qualitative researchers researchers assume assume multiple and dynamic realities that are context-dependent. Therefore, qualitative researchers embrace an ontology that denies the existence of (or at least the efficacy of  arguing for the existence of) an external reality. By external reality, we mean one that exists outside and independent of our interpretations of it (Searle 1995, p. 154). As such, qualitative researchers value participant’s own interpretations of  reality. These individual interpretations are deeply embedded in a rich contextual web that cannot be separated and generalized out to some mass population.

Holstein and Gubrium maintain the importance of context when examining a subject, participant or even one’s self: If we are to study lives, including selves in social interaction, we must study them from within the social contexts they unfold, not separate from them. … Human beings don’t settle their affairs with meaning once and for  all. Rather, they continually engage the interpretive process, including the interpretation of what they mean to themselves….The methodological directive here is to document the articulation and emergence of meaning in rich detail as it unfolds, not in lifeless analytic categories and statistical tables. (Holstein 2000, p. 33)

Thus, qualitative inquiry assumes that reality is socially constructed by every unique individual, from within their own unique contextual interpretation. Maintaining an internal, socially-constructed ontology effects the epistemic foundations of qualitative research. Denzin and Lincoln demonstrate how a paradigm’s ontology invariably affects its epistemology: The epistemological question . What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known? The answer that can be given to this question is constrained by the answer  already given to the ontological question; that is, not just any  relationship can now be postulated. (Denzin 1994, p. 108)

That is, one’s views on the nature of reality, in turn, affect how they come to gain knowledge of their reality. Since, qualitative researchers embrace internal reality, they cannot embrace an objective epistemology. Therefore, qualitative researchers, valuing participant’s own interpretations of reality, maintain that knowledge emerges from achieving a deep understanding of the data and the context it is embedded in. But how do we know that what we think we know is

really what we know? Let’s examine the trustworthiness criteria for qualitative research.

Trustworthiness Criteria for Qualitative Inquiry 

Qualitative research endures attacks on its unique and distinct approach to examining the world and seeking understanding from it. The present section looks at alternative paths to producing research that merits attention, respect and acceptance. Lincoln and Guba lay out the charges often thrown against naturalistic studies, including qualitative research: The naturalistic inquirer soon becomes accustomed to hearing charges that naturalistic studies are undisciplined; that he or she is guilty of  “sloppy” research, engaging in “merely subjective” observations, responding indiscriminately to the “loudest bangs or brightest lights.” Rigor, it is asserted, is not the hallmark of naturalism. Is the naturalist inevitable defenseless against such charges? Worse, are they true? (Lincoln 1985, pp 289-290)

Lincoln and Guba give a definitive “no” to both questions posed above. They start by explaining that traditionally in the social sciences there have been four criteria used to evaluate the merit of research: internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity. Critics of qualitative research have long argued that there is no merit to qualitative studies because they do not achieve internal and external validity. Perhaps, some have refuted, that is because validity criteria are inappropriate measures for evaluating qualitative work. Deniz and Lincoln explain the traditional notions of validity and offer up the concept of trustworthiness as a replacement:

Some analysts argue that validity  may be an inappropriate term in a critical research context, as it simply reflects a concern for acceptance within a positivist concept of research rigor. To a critical researcher, validity means much more than the traditional definitions of internal and external validity usually associated with the concept. Traditional research has defined internal validity  as the extent to which a researcher’s observations and measurements are true descriptions of a particular  reality; external validity  has been defined as the degree to which such descriptions can be accurately compared with other groups. Trustworthiness, many have argued, is a more appropriate word to use in the context of critical research. It is helpful because it signifies a different set of assumptions about research purposes than does validity . (Denzin 1994, p. 151)

Lincoln and Guba outline the assumptions of trustworthy qualitative research and contrast them with their non-qualitative counterparts. TABLE 2-Comparison of Trustworthiness and Validity Criteria Qualitative

Non-Qualitative

CREDIBILITY

Internal Validity

TRANSFERABILITY

External Validity

DEPENDABILITY

Reliability

CONFIRMABILITY

Objectivity (Lincoln 1985) 3

Lincoln and Guba discuss each criterion and explicate steps qualitative researchers can take to ensure that they are achieving results that are credible, transferable, dependable, and can be confirmed. Here, we will briefly outline the four criteria for trustworthiness and explain how each is achieved. 4 Credibility, Lincoln and Guba maintain, can be achieved through five activities:

Credibility-5 Activities: 1. Activities that will increase the probability that credible findings will be produced: Prolonged engagement—the investment of sufficient time to achieve certain purposes: learning the culture, testing for misinformation, building trust (Lincoln 1985, p. 301) Persistent observation—identifying and assessing salient factors and crucial atypical occurrences (Lincoln 1985, p. 304) Triangulation—the use of different sources, methods, theories and sometimes investigators to resist easy interpretation of phenomena (Lincoln 1985, p. 305) •

•

•

2. Activity that provides an external check of the inquiry process: Peer debriefing—helps keep the inquirer “honest,” exposing him or her to searching questions by an experience protagonist playing devil’s advocate and tests working hypotheses emerging in the inquirer’s mind (Lincoln 1985, p. 308) •

3. Activity aimed at refining working hypotheses: Negative case analysis—refining hypothesis until it accounts for all known cases without exception (Lincoln 1985, p. 309) •

4. Activity for checking preliminary findings and interpretations against raw data: •

Referential adequacy—testing archived data against raw data, using external analysts (Lincoln 1985, p. 313)

5. Activity providing for the direct test of findings and interpretations with the sources: •

Member checks—data, analytic categories, interpretations, and conclusions are tested with members of those stakeholding groups from whom the data were originally collected (Lincoln 1985, p. 314)

Covering these five steps is not a necessary condition for achieving credibility, but is a sufficient condition for credibility. Next, let’s look at Lincoln and Guba’s transferability guidelines.

Transferability is very different from it’s conventionalist counterpart external validity. Lincoln and Guba explain: …[T]he naturalist cannot specify the external validity of an inquiry; he or  she can provide only the thick description necessary to enable someone interested in making a transfer to reach a conclusion about whether  transfer can be contemplated as a possibility….Clearly, not just any descriptive data will do, but the criteria that separate relevant from irrelevant descriptors are still largely undefined….The naturalist inquirer is also responsible for providing the widest possible range of information for  inclusion in the thick description…(1985, p. 316) Lincoln and Guba stress that it is not the qualitative researcher’s “responsibility to provide an index of transferability; it is his or her responsibility to provide the data base that makes transferability judgments possible on the part of potential

appliers” (Lincoln 1985, p. 316). In fact, it is impossible for a researcher to know whether or not his or her data is transferable to some other study in the future because he or she is ignorant of the specific context in which the subsequent study is taking place. Therefore, qualitative researchers must provide the tools (data) for future researchers to determine whether or not transferability applies. Dependability and confirmability are primarily achieved through the use of  audit trails. In an inquiry audit, the auditor examines both the dependability of the process and the confirmability of the product (Lincoln 1985, p. 316-318). Finally, Lincoln and Guba wisely note that the procedures they outline for achieving credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability are merely one way of 

achieving trustworthiness, not the way. Thus, researchers should resist regarding these criteria as “prescriptions” of how qualitative inquiry must be done, instead utilize and build on these guides as the context and phenomena require.

Theories of Qualitative Research The theories presented here are by no means the only theories qualitative researchers employ. 5 Producing an exhaustive list of theories qualitative researchers utilize would be a daunting task, perhaps an impossible one given the complexity and multidimensionality of the qualitative process. The present section looks at four theories that mesh well with the basic tenants and assumptions of the qualitative paradigm: symbolic interactionism, semiotics, phenomenology, and ethnomethodology. 6 While examining each of these theories, take note at how each one is interconnected with the others and how all of the theories fit into the qualitative paradigm. Symbolic Interactionism

Simply put, symbolic interactionism is a theory about how meanings are produced by agents through their interactions with symbols. According to Blumer, symbolic interactionism: …does not regard meaning as emanating from the intrinsic makeup of the thing that has meaning, nor does it see meaning as arising through a coalescence of psychological elements in the person. Instead, it sees meaning as arising in the process of interaction between people. The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in which other  persons act toward the person with regard to the thing. Their actions operate to define the thing for the person. Thus, symbolic interactionism sees meanings as social products, as creations that are formed in and

through the defining activities of people as they interact. This point of view gives symbolic interactionism a very distinctive position, with profound implications…(1969, pp. 4-5)

The symbolic interactionist’s view of meanings, namely as socially constructed realities, meshes well with the ontological and epistemological assumptions of  the qualitative paradigm. Symbolic interactionists believe that there are no objective or inherent meanings embedded in a text, but that meanings are socially constructed creations. Through our interactions with texts we create meaning. Thus, like the qualitative researcher, the symbolic interactionist believes that the only knowable world is the one we interpret and interact with. Both the qualitative researcher and the symbolic interactionist embrace internal reality (and deny the existence or the efficacy of arguing for the existence of an external reality) and share understanding (through multiple, creative, and contextual interpretations and insight) as the ultimate goal or product of epistemic inquiries. Holstein and Gubrium recount that there are two branches of symbolic interactionist thought: Over the years, two streams of symbolic interactionist thinking—the socalled Chicago and Iowa schools—took this in different directions. Blumer  (1969), who taught at the University of Chicago, became the central figure of the more process-oriented Chicago school, while Manford Kuhn (1960, 1964) and his associates…at the University of Iowa were the leading proponents of the more structured Iowa school. (2000, p. 32)

Let’s take a look at Blumer’s, Chicago-style symbolic interactionism because, as qualitative researchers, we are primarily interested in the process, the how , of 

meaning creation. Blumer asserts that symbolic interactionism “rests on three simple premises”: 1. Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them.

Whatever those “things” may be, tables, persons, or representations via the television, the meaning we ascribe to those things comes from what those things mean to us, not in the things themselves. 2. The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows.

We are not islands. We do not stand alone in our interactions and meaning creation. An essential component to our meaning creation process is our  interaction not only with the things, but with our social system—friends, family, culture, organizations, work—all play a role in shaping how we act towards things. Mead describes the social self: The unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure of the social process as a whole; and each of the elementary selves of  which it is composed reflects the unity and structure of one of the various aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated. In other  words, the various elementary selves which constitute, or are organized into, a complete self are the various aspects of the structure of that complete self answering to the various aspects of the structure of the social process as a whole; the structure of the complete self is thus a reflection of the complete social process. The organization and unification of a social group is identical with the organization and unification of any one of the selves arising within the social process in which that group is engaged, or which it is carrying on. [Morris, 1967 #140, p. 144]

Thus, if we are to discover how one creates meaning and interacts with different symbols, we must not only examine the individual, but also the social structures

that individual belongs to. Now, on to Mead’s third and final premise for symbolic interactionism: 3. These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer, 1969, p. 2)

This meaning making process is continual. That is, human beings do not simply interpret meaning for a particular thing and move on. Instead, we revisit that thing, our interpretation, and how it fits within our worldview and adjust our  interpretative meanings accordingly. Holstein and Gubrium contend that Blumer  is cautioning us in this third premise: The caution is explicitly directed at those symbolic interactionists who, while they would accept the first two premises, are remiss on the third, employing highly structured methods that don’t permit the interpretive process to continually show through. Blumer urges us to view the human being in social interaction as incessantly involved in meaning-making. The methodological directive here is to document the articulation and emergence of meaning in rich detail as it unfolds, not in lifeless analytic categories and statistical tables. (2000, p 33)

Thus, the meanings we create are not set in stone. Again, this corresponds well with the epistemological assumptions of the qualitative paradigm. Qualitative researchers seek understanding of phenomena, within its unique context. If that context should change, the researcher is obligated to reevaluate his or her notion of the phenomena and adjust her understanding of it accordingly. Semiotics

Symbolic interactionism examines the creation of meaning through interaction with symbols; semiotics takes that examination to the level of science. Semiotics, according to Denzin and Lincoln, “provides a set of assumptions and

concepts that permit systematic analysis of symbolic systems” (Denzin 1994, p. 466). Like symbolic interactionism and the qualitative paradigm, semiotics embraces the view that meaning is not inherent in any sign (or text). Lindlof  explains the ontological assumptions of semiotics: Semiotics, in particular, has encouraged a view of texts as inherently ambiguous and unstable. The meaning of an interpersonal or  technologically mediated text depends on its relationships to other texts, the competencies and interests of its interpreters, and the cultural conditions in which it is produced and read. The notion that meanings are continually constructed lies at the center of interpretive approaches in communication. This argument implies something very important: that how  we describe the world constitutes what we describe. (Lindlof 1995, p. 24)

Thus, semiotics maintains that the construction of meanings depends, in part, on the context of the sign in relation to the interpreter and the culture in which both are situated. Visually, the process looks like the following:

meaning

Agent/ Interpreter 

context

Culture/ Society

Sign

which, in turn affects context

Here we see a sign (a smiley face), which “is essentially incomplete” until it has an “interpretant” or a context that an agent (or interpreter) creates meaning (or  content from the sign (embedded in its interpretant) (Denzin 1994, p. 466). Now,

 just as we we learned learned in symbolic symbolic interactionism, interactionism, agents agents are not islands; islands; they do do not stand alone. Interpreters work, live and create meaning within a particular culture or society. In fact, many individuals create meaning in several different societies. For example, one agent who belongs to the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the Catholic Church may view the text of abortion differently within the two distinct contexts. Thus, the culture one is immersed in affects the context in which an agent creates meaning about the sign. The creation of meaning by the agent is a mental activity, which, as we shall see in the next section, depends on a “primitive phenomenology” (Denzin 1994, p. 467). Phenomenology 

The philosophy of phenomenology seeks to define the basic nature of the signs we interpret (Lindlof 1995, p. 32). Many report that the work of Husserl served as cornerstone for the interpretative theory of phenomenology (Moustakas 1994); (Lindlof 1995). Husserl argues that “human consciousness orders the ways by which we apprehend the physical nature of the world” (Lindlof  1995, p. 32). Moustakas elaborates: Husserl’s phenomenology is a Transcendental Phenomenology. It emphasizes subjectivity and discovery of the essences of experience and provides a systematic and disciplined methodology for derivation of  knowledge. Husserl’s approach is called “phenomenology” because it utilizes only  the data available to consciousness—the appearance of  objects. …It is logical in its assertion that the only thing we know for  certain is that which appears before us in consciousness, and that very fact is a guarantee of its objectivity. (1994, p. 45)

Here, we see a slight ontological shift from reality being completely loose and interpretative to phenomenological assumptions of objectivity. By carefully

following the systematic strategies, phenomenologists contend that agents can scientifically comprehend “the essence of lived experience” (Lindlof 1995, p. 236). Lindlof delineates the three steps need for reaching understanding of  human experience. First, the analyst must become aware ”of all the preconceptions (including biases, prejudices, and other prior personal conceptions) he or she holds about the object of study” (Lindlof 1995, p. 236). Owning up to one’s subjective baggage aids in the deconstruction of the text (Lindlof 1995, p. 236). Next, the researcher must “bracket” the text, confronting it without his or her preconceived notions, only on its own terms (Lindlof 1995, p. 236). This step allows the analyst to view the object in its reduced state. Finally, the researcher builds data clusters about the text and synthesizes these groups into a cohesive structure (Lindlof 1995, p. 236). By grouping and synthesizing, phenomenologists contend that essence of an object is brought to the surface (Lindlof 1995, p. 236). 7 Lindlof notes that the three-step strategy employed by the phenomenological studies can also be utilized in ethnomodological research, which leads us to our final theory. Ethnomethodology 

The field of ethnomethodology grew out of the seeds of phenomenology (Denzin 1994, p. 264). Both ethnomethodology and phenomenology are built on the principles of eidetic science. According to Lindlof, an eidetic science defines essential objects and relationships of society not through consensual meanings, but through the things themselves (Lindlof 1995, p. 35). For example, if 

ethnomethodologists want to understand the true essence of “beauty” they might begin by conducting interviews with people on what constitutes beauty, but ultimately would strip these interpretations away to examine the essence of  “beauty” itself in order “to account for their existence as” and entity “in human discourse” (Lindlof 1995, p. 35). Lindlof explains the basis of ethnomethodology: In simple terms, ethnomethodology seeks to understand how the takenfor-granted character of everyday life is accomplished. The methodology  in the term refers not to scientific methodology, but to the methods people use to construct sensible, orderly ways of doing things ….Ethnomethodologists are fascinated with how “appearances” are able to sustain participants’ complete belief in their reality. (Lindlof 1995, p. 36).

Thus, ethnomethodology looks at both participants’ and the essence of the phenomena under study in constructing understanding into how agents engage in a text and create meaning from that object.  All four theories theories stress stress the importance importance of context context in meaning meaning creation creation and interpretation. As such, symbolic interactionism, semiotics and phenomenology and ethnomethodology embrace an internal ontology, which assumes the only reality that exists is the one we interpret through our interactions with symbols, culture and ourselves. Finally, all four theories accept a similar epistemic stance of knowledge creation. Knowledge is not gained through discovery of objective truths, but created through understanding of a phenomena/text/object within a particular context. Moreover, understanding is not immutable, but rather fluid in nature. Conclusion

The goal of the present analysis was to outline the major tenants, assumptions, and theories of the qualitative paradigm. Qualitative research has endured many criticisms from the conventional, non-qualitative camp and has clawed its way to the status it currently enjoys, though resistance and complete acceptance have yet to be achieved. In recent years there has been a surge in qualitative studies, as more and more researchers turn an interpretative ear to the ideas and ways of qualitative science (Denzin 1994; Lindlof 1995). Future trends in qualitative research are interdisciplinary in nature. Qualitative researchers are teaming up with other disciplines, methodologies and theorists, exemplifying the dynamic, complex nature of reality through their investigations of it. In fact, there is a growing acceptance of multi-paradigmatic research, combining both qualitative and quantitative elements. One can conclude that it is indeed an exciting time to be a qualitative researcher.

Denzin, N. K. a. Y. S. L., Ed. (1994). Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.

Holstein, J. a. J. G. (2000). The Self We Live By: Narrative Identity in a Postmodern World. New York, Oxford University Press.

Lincoln, Y. a. E. G. (1985). Establishing Trustworthiness. Naturalist Inquiry. Newbury Park, CA, Sage.

Lindlof, T. R. (1995). Qualitative Communication Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, Sage.

Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.

Pauly, J. (1991). “A Beginner's Guide to Doing Qualitative Research.” Journalism Monographs 125.

Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York, The Free Press.

Silverman, D. (2000). Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.

Treise, D. (1999). A Slightly Exaggerated Comprison of Some Characteristics and Assumptions of Qualitative and Non-qualitative Approaches to the World.

1

Denzin and Lincoln outline five developmental stages of qualitative inquiry. See

their  Handbook of Qualitative Research, pages 1-3. 2

This chart served as a handout in a graduate seminar the author took with Dr.

Debbie Treise in spring 1999. The author continues to use this helpful and simple handout as a guide to the principles and assumptions of qualitative research and here shares it with other qualitative enthusiasts. 3

Lincoln and Guba do not present these criteria in a chart; however, the author 

finds comparison tables useful guides and has taken the liberty to construct one here. 4

For a more detailed discussion please see Lincoln and Guba’s chapter on

“Establishing Trustworthiness” in Naturalistic Inquiry . 5

Denzin and Lincoln list several other theories (they call them research

strategies) including: ethnography, life history, oral history, case study, participant observation, field research/study, naturalistic study, ecological descriptive study, descriptive study, microethnography, interpretive research, action research, narrative research, historiography, and literary criticism. Again, even this list, the authors note, is not exhaustive.

6

One might wonder why the author chose to examine these four theories in this

particular order. The theories work from the general to the specific, but, in a way, also work from the specific to the general. First, symbolic interactionism looks at meaning creation, semiotics does the same thing but from a more detailed, scientific way. Phenomenology looks at the mental connections that can be made when we create meanings and ethnomethodology provides a structured view for  examining these connections. Thus, from one perspective, these theories move from the general to the specific. On the other hand, symbolic interactionism is interested in generally specific meanings, while semiotics usually looks at how those meanings, in general, are created. Phenomenology examines specific mental connections agents make in their meaning creation process, while ethnomethodology tackles questions dealing with the interaction process in meaning creation (which, of course brings it full circle with symbolic interactionism). The four theories presented here weave through the qualitative paradigm like a web. There are very few areas of black and white and many grays. 7

To be honest, the author thinks the phenomenological strategy is unattainable.

It is dubious to think that one can simply make a list of one’s prejudices and then cut them away (like a chunk of fat) from his or her interpretations. Since this essay serves merely as a report and not as a critical piece, the author will not delve further into this epistemic can of worms.