The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century - Barkan

The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the near East Author(s): Omer Lutfi Barkan and Justin McCarthy Reviewed work(s): Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1975), pp. 3-28 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162732 . Accessed: 01/03/2012 11:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 6 (I975),

3-28

Printed in Great Britain

3

Omer Lutfi Barkan THE

PRICE

SIXTEENTH IN THE NEAR

REVOLUTION CENTURY:

ECONOMIC

OF THE A TURNING

HISTORY

POINT

OF THE

EAST

Translated by Justin McCarthy

The sixteenth century came to an end with the countries of the Ottoman Middle East falling into a grave economic and social crisis which presaged a decisive turning point in their history. The most symptomatic sign of what was, in fact, a structural crisis was a series of popular revolts which appeared most prominently among the Muslim Turkish population of Anatolia. Known as the Celali revolts, these uprisings developed into open civil war against the forces of the Ottoman state, and in their first phase lasted approximately fifteen years, from 1595 to i6io. The Ottoman chronicles describe these uprisings as mere bandit actions, organized and led by evil bandit chiefs. More recent studies in Ottoman archival materials, however, indicate that these events were far more complicated and significant, both in their origins and in their manifestations. The first indication of this new view came shortly after the Kemalist revolution in the work of Hiiseyin Husameddin, Amasya Tarihi,I which indicated that the Celali agitation was in fact an open revolt of the Turkish population of Anatolia against the corrupt administration of the Ottoman government, which had fallen totally into the hands of the devqirmeslaves converted for the service of the Sultan. According to him, the nomadic and Turkoman elements of Anatolia had never been comfortable under the financial administration of the Empire. Added to this were new nationalist feelings among the Turkomans, nourished by glorious historic memories of the Turkish past in Central Asia, as well as by the religious propaganda spread by the Safavis, which transformed the general discomfort into a tremendous hatred of the central Ottoman rule. The Husameddin explanation was interesting and attractive, but it ignored the fact that in the major revolt of the period, led by Kara Yazicl, most of those participating were not recruited from the Turkoman elements of Anatolia. The next scholar to examine the problem was the Russian Turkologist A. S. Tveritinova,2 who found in the Celali uprisings a collaboration between the III, 348-75.

I

Istanbul,

2

'Vosstanie Kara Yazlci-Deli Hasan v Turtsii', Izd. Ak. SSSR, pp. 85-93.

I927,

1-2

4

Omer Lutfi Barkan

peasantry and the smaller feudal holders revolting against the larger feudal leaders of the time. Tveritinova, however, presented no documentary evidence to support her theory, aside from the information found in the Ottoman chronicles regarding the specific uprisings, and her article accomplished no more than present the known facts in accordance with Marxist schemas. The general theme regarding the crisis of the Ottoman feudal elements impoverished by a crisis of capitalism and the misery of the exploited peasants did provide subsequent scholars with a useful hypothesis which they could examine by research into the documentary evidence. The most prominent and successful of the Turkish historians who have examined the social and economic background of the Celali revolts is Professor Mustafa Akdag, of the University of Ankara, who has presented his findings in a series of studies based on detailed examination of the archival documents.I According to Akdag the idea of a Turkish nationalist reaction against foreign slave rule cannot be substantiated, since the prestige of the Ottoman dynasty remained quite high throughout Anatolia during this period. The insurgents, for the most part, were not peasants acting in behalf of a definite revolutionary program, but rather cultivators left without land or employment as a result of a tremendous inflation combined with the dissolution of the great military fiefs established previously to support the Ottoman army. My own archival studies into the movements of prices and demography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attempt to shed new understanding on these events. Many causes can be examined, but here I propose to investigate the role of economic factors, as well as that of monetary problems originating outside the Empire.

I. THE ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE

AND DOCTRINE

OF THE OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

The economic system in effect in the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire was in many ways original and to a certain extent was in harmony with the conditions of its time. While it has been subjected to heavy criticism, one must remember that, during the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire, it permitted the rise of considerable economic prosperity in an area that before the Ottoman conquest had for centuries fallen into decay and impoverishment. The Ottoman system was basically one of imperial self-sufficiency. In order systematically to exploit the vast sources of wealth within the empire and to preserve its political and economic integrity and unity, the Ottomans sought to establish a tightly closed economic order. They saw the need of bringing to an end the economic penetration and exploitation by European powers such as Venice and Genoa. At the same time they attempted to develop means by which the different economic zones of the Empire would complement one another, Celali Isyanlar (Ankara, 943).

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 5 instead of developing the dangerous ruptures and disequilibrium that had brought economic crises and depressions in the past. To a great extent, the Ottomans were successful in these endeavors. The robust constitution and political power of the Empire in its first two centuries enabled it to pursue an economic policy that was highly favorable to it, and as a result to avoid entirely the kind of economic crises that had weakened its predecessors. It was only when Europe began to develop its own political and economic power that the system was breached. The decline of the established Ottoman social and economic order began as the result of developments entirely outside the area dominated by the Porte, and in particular as a consequence of the establishment in Western Europe of an 'Atlantic economy' of tremendous vitality and force. The economic system of the Empire decayed neither through a flaw inherent in its constitution, nor through an organic law, but because of immense historical changes that destroyed its equilibrium, arrested its natural economic evolution, and condemned its institutions to irreparable damage. In the second half of the fifteenth century the major European nations began the intellectual and commercial development that was to eventually bring them to world domination. At that time, the expansion outside of Europe by the countries bordering the Atlantic began to reach a peak, extending first into Africa, and culminating in the discovery of entire new continents. The European nations were attracted to Africa primarily by the highly lucrative commerce in gold and slaves. It was not long before they had drained a substantial portion of the African gold supply. This gold had been the principal source of economic nourishment for the entire Mediterranean world, and by taking it the Europeans laid the foundation for the development of a highly profitable colonial system in the centuries to come. The African experience gave the colonial powers the experience and means to develop new techniques and a powerful economic and financial base which made it inevitable that they would proceed to the discovery of America (I492) and of the Cape of Good Hope (1498). These discoveries led them inevitably to conquest and exploitation in the heart of Asia. The effects of these important geographic discoveries on the economic and social structures of Europe have only begun to be explored; their influence on non-European lands is even less known. The shift of the old international trade in silks and spices to the new all-water route was surely a severe blow to the economies and finances of the lands that controlled those routes. Here I examine less the overt facts of the trade shift and more the consequent 'price revolution' that engulfed Europe as well as the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century. Imperialist organization and colonial commerce produced incredible riches for certain European countries. After the initial phase of conquest and pillage, European powers quickly converted their colonial holdings into agrarian plantations and, perhaps more important, mines. Their rapidly developed

6

Omer Lutfi Barkan

efficient means of exploitation enabled them to bring into Europe tremendous quantities of gold and silver; the amount rose to as much as three, five, or seven times that originally imported in I495. The injection of this tremendous new supply of capital produced new activity in European commerce and industry and put at the Europeans' disposal new products whose profits could only be fully realized if new markets as well as new sources of investment could be found. At the same time, an inevitable result of this situation was an immense inflation throughout Europe, with vast repercussions in its social and political order. While the European economy developed rapidly, with capital accretion, investment, and inflation feeding one another, the Ottoman closed economy, by its very nature, strongly resisted the temptation to follow a similar path. As a result, the economies of Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire moved farther and farther apart. The consequent increase in the prices paid for basic commodities in Europe gradually began a process by which those commodities were sucked out of Ottoman markets. Wheat, copper, wool, and the like, which had been the bases of the Ottoman economic strategy, now came into such short supply in the major centers of the Empire that here also was developed a rapid inflation of prices which soon endangered the equilibrium and security of the closed economic system. While the established system forbade the export of such basic commodities outside its boundaries, the lure of the profits to be found in the highly inflated European markets led Ottoman and foreign merchants alike to adopt all possible measures to smuggle these goods outside Ottoman territory. This situation made it increasingly difficult for the Porte to fulfill its major function of arranging for sufficient supplies for the major cities of the Empire; at the same time the lack of raw materials produced a mounting crisis in Ottoman industry, which in turn led to ever greater discontent among the artisans, whose direct and indirect complaints found voice in the Ottoman administrative documents of the time. Of course, for them the situation was the result of the entry of the 'accursed spirit of speculation and excessive gain' into the empire, the abandonment of the older trade regulations and the corporate traditions among artisans and the indifference and corruption of the administrative authorities. They could not see that the situation was in fact created by economic developments outside the empire, against which the traditional Ottoman administrative system found itself powerless to act. Traditional methods were naturally employed in an effort to counter the threat; controls on the export of 'strategic' grains were augmented, violators were threatened with severe punishment, and goods seized in transit were expropriated by the state, but the profits to be gained from illicit smuggling of grains into the European market were so enormous that this traffic continued to attract participants who were able to find accomplices even among the most highly placed representatives of the state. This contraband commerce became for many persons in the Empire a normal trade and for some social classes a source of far more riches than they had ever been able to amass before. Ottoman agriculture, organized in great tax farms in the areas that were

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 7 most conveniently located for participation in this clandestine trade, also began to feel the pressure of the inflated European prices on its own organic structure, and it began to orient itself toward an agrarian regime better adapted to massive commercialization of its products. Archival materials from the time demonstrate that it was impossible to stem the flow resulting from the price differences between the hitherto integrated Ottoman zone and the 'Atlantic economy'. The penetration of the high pressure 'dominant economy' into the Ottoman low tension economy was the inevitable result of the price difference between the two. It was accomplished in spite of all the resistance the Ottoman system could provide. Economic penetration produced a grave inflationary current in the Ottoman Empire which together with other, more internal factors, produced social and political changes that disturbed the social and economic security of the Empire, and in the end proved to be irreversible. The crisis in Ottoman industry As the Empire's price system gradually fell under the influence of the 'dominant economy', Ottoman industry was also undergoing disastrous changes which cannot be explained simply as the effects of European absorption of the reserve stocks of primary materials necessary for industry. In addition to the weapons of the price mechanism and the absorption of goods, the economy of the Atlantic zone threatened as well the traditional production and trade structures of the Empire. In Europe, prodigious commercial expansion had given birth to a new capitalist industry, particularly in textiles and metallurgy, an industry working always for massive exportation. This new industry was concentrated in the hands of capitalist entrepreneurs and merchants - men free of all corporate restraint who worked with a new spirit, inventing new techniques, starting new fashions, and creating new needs. They inaugurated intensive methods of production and opened new markets in order to make their merchandise accessible to an increasingly far-flung clientele. In doing so, they completely changed international trade, giving it a new character - unlimited expansion. The Ottoman craft industry was thus faced in the second half of the sixteenth century with a European industry rapidly evolving toward the conquest of the world's markets. The times had produced a vast change in traditional international commerce. For example, European commerce, represented by a small number of merchants, had previously exported a few luxury and speciality items to the Ottoman Empire. These imports represented no threat to local industry. On the contrary, they produced customs revenues and added to the pleasures of life for those classes privileged enough to afford them. Then again, the Europeans were good clients of the Ottoman luxury industries who bought as much, if not more, than they sold; their trade was actively sought and encouraged. European commerce was an indispensable part of Ottoman prosperity. During the second half of the sixteenth century that picture changed. Euro-

8

Omer Lutfi Barkan

pean commerce, sustained by strong commercial organization and encouraged by powerful nation-states, began to be a threat to local industry, a prime factor in economic decline. The new European national commerce intended to sell the greatest possible quantity of goods abroad, while restricting imports of any finished products. Thus it provided no market for local Ottoman export industry. The commerce of the Levant changed to a 'colonial commerce', turning Turkey into a client for the European industry which was itself to furnish only primary materials, no longer to export finished goods. An example of this pattern is the silk industry of Bursa: Until the latter half of the sixteenth century, this city produced huge quantities of high quality silk cloth, most of it intended for the export market. Once the European silk industry was perfected, however, European merchants no longer bought anything from Bursa but silk thread, eagerly awaiting the day when they would only have to buy the cocoons.' The same industrial evolution characterized the mohair (sof) industry of Ankara. Ankara had been renowned for its export-quality woven mohair cloth, but by the end of the sixteenth century it had fallen to the level of a thread center, a simple market for the hair of Ankara goats. Like Bursa, it had become a supplier of primary material from which others now drew riches.z One can clearly see that the advent of the new European commerce began the stagnation of the Ottoman craft industry. Certainly the craft industry continued in many places to exist, but it never advanced or evolved. Faced with the continuously evolving European industry, Ottoman industry could not find the dynamism necessary to adapt to the new conditions of the world economy. As an ever wider gap between it and European industry opened, the Ottoman system was condemned to degeneration. The new European commerce must be included as one of the main causes of the sixteenth-century Ottoman economic stagnation. The shock produced by this commerce on local industry is one of the principal reasons for the progressive decline in the balance of trade. This in turn not only caused the loss of gold and silver, but made it impossible to redress the loss. It is thus that, well before the use of steam as a source of energy in industry and transport and long before the Industrial Revolution, other, smaller economic revolutions in world commerce and industrial production had already given European commerce a crushing superiority in its drive for the conquest of world markets.

II. WAS THERE A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY PARALLEL

OTTOMAN

PRICE

INCREASE

TO THAT OF EUROPE?

During the last quarter of the sixteenth century, prices in Europe for goods and services rose to three or four times those at the start of the century. This I 2

Fahri Dalsar, Bursada Ipekfilik (Istanbul, 1960). Mustafa Akdag, ' Osmanli Imparatorlugunun Kurulu? ve inki?af devrinde Tiirkiyenin

lktisadi vaziyeti',

Belleten (Istanbul,

I949, x950),

51, 55.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 9 tremendous increase began in Western Europe, then spread to Italy and Central Europe. Braudel states that, even though the Ottoman Empire had always been viewed as an entirely separate economic, as well as political and social, system, this movement reached Turkey soon afterward.' One of the purposes of my research has been to examine this hypothesis by systematic study of the Ottoman sources, and I have published the results in articles on the official Ottoman price lists (narh),2 on the estates of deceased Ottoman soldiers in Edirne,3 and on the prices paid for labor and materials during the construction of the Siileymaniye mosque and adjacent buildings,4 as well as on the operations of several Imarets, hospices maintained for the free lodging and feeding of travelers and students.5 Table I demonstrates the type of information which can be gained from these sources, for example, the increases of food prices toward the end of the sixteenth century. Part i of the table shows the actual prices, amounts purchased, and total costs of the major food items and other supplies purchased for the Siileymaniye hospice in 1585/6. For comparative purposes, since similar accounts for the same foundation are lacking for earlier and later times, accounts of similar foundations have been used, that of the Fatih Imaret for I489-90 in part 2, and that of the Bayezid II Imaret for 1603-4 in part 3. In parts z and 3, the actual unit prices as shown in their accounts are presented, together with what would have been paid at those prices had the same quantities been purchased as at the Siileymaniye Imaret in 1585-6. These figures demonstrate the changes in total purchase cost for the same items over approximately one century. Items that cost 615,I94 akfes in the late fifteenth century, cost I,I22,635 akfes in the late sixteenth century, and 2,908,618 akfes in the early seventeenth century. Where several prices were given for individual items in an account book, the average price paid for the bulk of purchases of that item was used. Since all three imarets purchased the goods at the same markets in Istanbul, valid comparisons can be made to demonstrate the tremendous price increase that occurred. If the 1489-90 price is assigned the price index of Ioo, it means that the prices of 1585-6 reached 182z49 and those of 1604-5 reached 472-79. An even more detailed demonstration of the price increase is presented in I F. Braudel, La Mediterrande et le Monde Mediterraneen a I'Epoque de Philippe II (Paris, 1966), vol. I, part 2, 'Mtaux precieux: Monnaies et prix', pp. 448, 488. 2 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'XV. asrln sonunda bazi biiyik ?ehirlerde e?ya ve yiyecek fiyatlari', Tarih Vesikalari, nos. 5, 7, 9 (I942). 3 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'Edirne Askeri Kassamina ait Tereke Defterleri', Belgeler, III (1966), I-479. 4 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'L'organisation du travail, dans le chantier d'une grande mosquee a Istanbul au XVIe siecle', Annales (Economie, Societes, Civilisation), no. 6 (1962), 1093- 06; idem, 'Edirne ve givarlndaki bazi Imaret Tesislerinin Yillhk Muhasebe

Bilan;olari',

Belgeler, I (i963),

235-377.

5 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'Tiirkiye ?ehirlerinin tesekkiil ve inkiSaf tarihi bakimlndan, Imaret Sitelerinin Kuruluy ve tIleyis tarzma ait Arastirmalar', Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasz

xxiII (1963), 239-398.

TABLE I

Yearly totals of kitchen expenses,taking as a base the ratio of goods and amoun of the Siileymaniye Imaret for i585/6 and applying them to the prices listedf I. Sileymaniye Imaret (Istanbul, 1585/6)

Lamb Wheat Flour Rice Clarified butter Honey Almonds Black plums Starchd Red grapes Saffron Chickpeas Black pepper Onions Cumin Firewood Salt

Unit Okkaa Kileb Kile Kile Kantarc Kantar Kantar Kantar Kantar Kantar Dirheme Kile Okka Okka Okka Cekif Kile

Price (akfes)

Amount of goods used

3-00 23'38 25'54 33'00 525'41

77,61500oo 4,482-50

40I.10

462-20

11,521

II. Fatih Imar (Istanbul,

Total expenditure (akfes) 232,845 104,784 294,246 143,154 109,495 117,330 I0,326 1,978

00

4,338oo00 208-40 292'52 22-34

II73

17'70

173'70

12,420

87-99

71I50 50-20

i 66

7,423-00

12,322

30-00 119'61 0-92

8-9I 12'12 I I00

4,417 5,760

192-00

66-30

7,934

3,762-00 124-50 4,683'00

56,758

390-50

4,295

Totals Index

3,46I I,IIO

I,122,635 I82-49

Price (akfes)

1489/

To expen (ak

I 43

110,9

13'50

50, 209, 73, 55, 52,

18-22

16'93 264-00 18o-40 I67-20 79'20 128-28

33'00 0-24

16-25 25'17 0-41 4-00 5-00 12'00

3

1,

9,0

I, 1, 3, 1, I,5

23,4

4,

615,

a 1285 grams (figures taken from Viqueinel's Voyage dans la Turqulie d'Europe (P b The Istanbul wheat kile: 20 okkas or 25-7 kilograms (35 liters); rice kile: 0ook

c 44 okkas or 56-5 kilograms.

d Edible starch, made from wheat, etc. e 3-212 grams.

f A ceki of firewood: 18o okkas or 231 kilograms.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 1I TAB L E 2

Table, by dates, of the foodstuff and kitchen expenses, taking as a base

the ratio of goods and amountsfound in the balance sheet of the Siileymaniye Imaret for I585/6 and applying these to the prices listed for other dates (I) In akfes

No.

Date

Year's Defter total number expenditure

(II) In grams-silver Year's total expenditure

Index

Ioo'oo I42-26 I79-97

472,469 639,759 755,092

Ioo0oo I35'41 I59-82

Index

I 2 3

1489/90 1555/6 1573

o'9I 7098 6278

615,194 875,184 I,I07,173

4

1585/6

I954

I,I22,965

I82'48

765,862

I62-I0

5 6 7 8 9

I954 5833 5832 5039 5039 5039 5039

1,649,975 1,959,381 2,248,665 2,716,593 3,273,274 2,572,694 2,83I,I30

268-20 318-50 365-52 441-58 532'07 4I8-20 460-20

633,590 752,402 863,487 1,043,I72 1,256,937 987,914 914,455

I34-10

1I

1586/7 1587/8 1588/9 1595/6 1596/7 1599/I600 I6oo/I

159'25 I82-76 220-80 266-20 209-10 193'55

10 I2

I6o0

5039

2,966,493

482-20

958,I77

202-80

13 14 I5 I6 17 I8 I9 20

I602/3 I605 I6o5/6 I623/5 I628/9 I629 I632/3 I634/5

5039 5039 5039 5039 6019 5813 632 682

2,908,618 3,788,575 3,879,814 3,650,75I 2,635,718 2,603,42I 3,103,609 2,957,876

472'79 6I5'83 630-66 593'43 428-44 423'-9 504-50 480-80

939,483 I,223,709 1,253,I79 1,I79,132 806,529 796,646 949,704 905,I10

I98-85 259-00 265-24 249'57 I70-70 i68-6i

21

i635/6

682

I,986,904

486-52

913,992

193'45

22

I636/7

682

2,96I,130

48I-30

906,106

191-78

23

I648/9

580

2,892,179

470-I2

885,007

I87-3I

24

I655/6

989

2,84I,328

46i-86

869,446

I84-02

20I00oo

I9157

((I) The totals, in akfes, which one would have paid in those years and an index based on 1489/90. (II) Totals and index, calculated by the amount of gram-silver in the akfe at the time.)

Table 2, which is based on various annual accounts of different imperial imarets located in Istanbul. Number i represents the same Fatih Imaret account; numbers 4-7 come from the Suileymaniye Imaret; numbers 8-I6 and I8-23 represent the Bayezid II Imaret; number I7 that of Selim I; and number 24 that of Sultan Ahmet.' The price indexes continue to be computed using the total of 6I5,194 I The figures in these registers are from the annual account registers of the Imperial

imarets (Sultanin Imaretlerinin YzllzkMuhasebe Bilanfolarz), with the exceptions of nos. 2 and 3, which come from the kitchen accounts of the imperial palaces. Some of the registers cover the solar year and some the lunar year, so some discrepancies are inevitable due to seasonal differences. In addition, the accounts in nos. 9, i2, 15, and 19 covered only six months or even less in the years mentioned, while that of I6 covered an eight-month period. In all cases, where several prices appeared for individual items, average prices paid for them have been used.

I2

Omer Lutfi Barkan

akfes for 1489-90 as the base index figure of 0oo. Because of the change in value of the akfe coin during this time, owing not only to price changes but also to the debasement of the coin by the state and by counterfeiters, I have reduced the total values of food purchases given in each budget to a constant silver-gram value to find the real cost of the items and thus arrive at an accurate comparison. For this purpose, it was necessary to determine the actual weight and purity of the silver coins (akfes) in use at the time of each account, and to determine its value in relation to gold.' During the first half of the sixteenth century, from I491 to 1566, Ioo dirhems of silver were cut into 420 akfes, giving each akfe a weight of 0-73 I grams of silver. Fifty-two of these akfes equaled the value of one Ottoman Gold Coin (altun) between i49I and I516, 55 equaled one altun from I517 to I549, and 60 equaled an altun from I550 to I566. According to this count, I gram of gold equaled io064 grams of silver in I49I, and 1142 grams of silver in I560.2 The akfe's stability, however, fell rapidly during the next half century. Following the accession of Selim II in 1566, 450 akfes were cut from Ioo dirhems of silver instead of 420, and the amount of silver in each akfe fell from 0-73I grams to 0-682. Despite this, the government continued to try to compel the exchange of 60 akfes for one altun gold piece. The value of silver coinage fell rapidly as counterfeiters and money cutters reduced the amount of silver remaining in akfes in circulation. As a result, the actual market price of silver fell to between 80 and Ioo akfes per gold piece, and inflation followed, causing multiple economic and financial problems. The government tried at various times to restore the value of the akfe, but without success. In an order issued sometime between 1584 and 1586, the Ottoman government established a new akfe with 800 cut from ioo dirhemsof silver, each akfe weighing only 0-384 grams. One hundred and twenty of the new akfes were supposed to equal the Ottoman gold piece of 3-517 grams of gold. Thus, in place of the old silver coin, where 60 akfes weighing 40-92 grams of silver equaled one gold piece, a coin was created worth I20 akfes weighing 46-08 grams purchased the same gold piece. The actual price of gold thus rose from I I-52 grams of silver to I3- I0. As a result the prices of food and other materials soared, black marketeers prospered, and those on fixed incomes suffered. In Istanbul, a general popular uprising occurred against the administration responsible for the new coin, and the Beylerbey Mehmed Papa and the Treasurer (Defterdar), the officials most The figures presented here are based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of Docent Dr Halil Sahillioglu, ' Kurulu?undan XVIIe asrin sonlarina kadar Osmanli Para tarihi hakkinda bir deneme' (Istanbul, 1958). 2 These figures are based on Sahillioglu's study, which is based on the Tebrizi dirhem (drachma), weighing 3-072 grams, which he states was used in the Ottoman Empire used after that time, called Rumi, toward the end of the seventeenth century. The dirhemn weighed 3-207 grams. Sahillioglu states that the Ottoman gold goin called sultani contained 3-572 grams of pure gold in 1552, compared with a Venetian ducat of that time of 3'559 grams. The sultani gold piece weighed 3-544 grams between I552 and I56o, and 3-517

grams in I563.

It fell to 3-490 in I64I

and afterward to 3-464 grams. Between 1560

and I641, the Venetian ducat fell to 3-426 grams.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 13 immediately responsible for ordering the new coin, were beheaded.' It was not until 1589-90 that the government was able to issue new coins to replace the old and thus restore financial stability. Despite this, the akfe continued to lose value and prices continued to rise owing to international movements in precious metals, changes in trade patterns, the tremendous expenditures of the Ottoman government for various wars undertaken at the time,2 and a great population increase which took place in most of Europe, as well as in the remainder of the Mediterranean world, during the sixteenth century.3 It was just as difficult to maintain the akfe during this period as it would be later. Turkey, in spite of every precaution, vacillating and floundering, found itself firmly within the cycle of a sweeping international inflation. According to the preface to a price schedule (Narh Defteri) dated 15 November i6oo,4 some time after the devaluation and price regulation of 1584-6, the fineness and value of coins again began to drop and the prices of goods and food began haphazardly to rise. Attempting to restore order in the Empire's economic life, the state seized the depreciated coinage and brought out new akfes, standardized and fixed in their rate of exchange. It declared that it was about to apply in the bazaars and markets a new price list, the stipulations of which would cause a return to the old, normal prices, recently driven out of their traditional bounds.5 In addition to the work of Sahillioglu cited above, see Istanbul Belediye Kitapligi, Muallem Cevdet MS no. B/9, as cited in Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', p. 447. 2 Braudel, op. cit. p. 490, shows that a similar devaluation occurred in Iran at the same time, and that (p. 480) the money of account in most European countries also underwent devaluation during the same period. 3 Ibid. pp. 361-83. My own research in two Ottoman censuses taken in 1520-35 and 1570-80 confirms Braudel's hypothesis regarding the Ottoman Empire in this regard. The provinces of Anatolia increased by 56 per cent, those of Rumelia by 71 per cent, and the 12 largest cities of the empire, excluding Istanbul, Aleppo, and Damascus, increased by 90oper cent during the sixteenth century (0. L. Barkan, ' Essai sur les donnees statistiques des registres de recensements dans l'empire Ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siecles', Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, I (1957); idem, 'Defter-i Khakani', EI.2 At this time, it is not possible to prove a direct connection between the population increase and that of prices. It seems to me that the former was not a cause of the latter, but that it did make the resulting crisis more severe and dangerous. 4 Istanbul Belediye Kitapliki, Muallem Cevdet MS no. B/9 and Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', p. 447. 5 As is seen in the records of the Narh Defters, the value of the akfe had fallen so much that, while it was theoretically 120 to the altun, the official price, it really became necessary to pay i8o akfes for one altun gold piece. In comparison, prices of goods increased as much or even more. Now, with the coinage regulation, the akfe was returned to 120 to one, a one-third drop, and prices of goods were caused to drop in a similar manner. Some goods went to two-thirds of the old price. Official price lists fixed the new amounts to be paid: bread which had been sold at I I5 dirhemsto the akfe was now to be sold at possibly 200 for one akfe; one akfe now brought 120 dirhemsof fine bread, not 8o. A kile of flour, which had been i20 akfes, was now 8o; less acceptable flour went from 75 to 50 a kile, rice from 56 to 39 a kile, honey from 20 to I3 an okka, an okka of butter from 26 akfes to 19. An even greater comparison is to be seen in the fall in price of imported luxury goods. For example, a cubit of fine French velvet could fall from i ,200 to 550, a cubit of Genevese velvet from 88o to 400, a cubit of ' newly produced' (nev-peyda) broadcloth from 300 to I20. In the records of the Bayezid II Imaret in Istanbul (number I2 in the table), prepared

14 Omer Lutfi Barkan The newly minted akFes would be the legal tender, accepted at 120 to the gold altun. This time, however, the state did not settle the problem by replacing the seized akfes at the old rate, making good the loss from the Treasury. Instead it decided to further devalue the akfe and took advantage of the situation to lessen its financial straits. The old akfe of 0-384 grams, already dropped to that weight in 1586 by cutting 950 akfes instead of the traditional 800 from Ioo dirhems of silver, now fell further to 0o323grams. Thus one gold altun, which had previously equaled 46-08 grams of silver (that is, i20 akfes at 0o384 grams each), would now be expected to equal only 38-76 grams (12o akfes at 0-323 grams). Or, in another interpretation, previously one gram of gold yielded I 3I0 grams of silver, now it was I I-o grams, thus increasing the official value of silver. We know that after this reform, between the years 161i and 61 8, the price of gold fluctuated between I20 and 130 akfes at the free rate of exchange,' but toward the end of i618 the gold price began to rise. It rose because the government had once again changed the silver value of the akfe. It now cut ,000o akfes, not 950, from Ioo dirhemsof silver, while still keeping the official rate of 120 to the altun. Though the akfe had been debased to 0o306 grams of silver the official rate was the same as it had been when the akfe's silver content was 0-384 grams. Ignoring for a while the causes, we have seen that the Ottoman Empire, caught up in the current of a great international inflation, tried ineffectually to counter its difficulties with devaluation. Devaluation, however, led to even greater dislocation of prices, and the empire was dragged from one financial crisis to another, unable to move against the strong current that held it. Rather than develop a well-thought-out economic plan, one that would consider the financial contingencies and possibilities and have a chance of success, the government allowed the devaluation operation to drag on. State policies were ineffectual and hopeless in the face of crises that every day became more severe. Recognizing that the devaluation policies were one of the important causes of the increases that had brought them to poverty, the people rioted and killed the officials who had initiated them. An adjustment in the coinage was made in the beginning of I6I9. From 1620 on, however, the price of gold once again began to rise - to 200 and 240 akfes in the first months of 1623, later to 275 and 3Io akfes, finally, in the first months of I624, approaching 400. Once again it was necessary for the state to intervene. The workings of the coinage regulation are demonstrated in a Narh Defteri from Bursa.2 According to this defter, an order which came from Istanbul on a year after the officiallyfixed price went into effect, we find the following: the average price of a kileof wheat,73'14 akfes; a kileof rice, 88 akfes; an okkaof butter,26; an okka of honey i6; and an okkaof lamb io akfes. Halil Sahillioglu,'XVII'nci asrinilk yarlsmdaIstanbul'daTedaviildeki Sikkelerin Rayici', Belgeler Dergisi, vol. 2

2 (I964),

pp. 223-8.

AhmedRefik,Osmanliimparatorlugunda Meskukat,TurkTarihEnciimeniMecmuasi,

nos. 6, 7, 8, and Io (Istanbul, 1330-40).

The price revolution of the sixteenth century I5 GRAPH I

solid lines in

Price Indexes of foodstuffs from imaret records, I490-I655; akCes,broken lines in grams-silver 700 . 650 600550 500 r.

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