The KGB in Kremlin

 

FINAL REPORT T O NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE  

THE KGB IN KREMLIN POLITIC S

AUTHOR : Jeremy R. Azrael

Rand Corporation/UCL A

CONTRACTOR  

Rand/UCL  

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR

 

Jeremy R. Azrael

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 801- 4

DATE

 

September

198  

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b y the National Council for Soviet and East European Research   T h e analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author  

 

                        ONT

PREFACE

AND

EXECUTIVE

NT  

ii i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

THE

SECRET

POLICE

AND

THE

SECRET

POLICE

IN

THE

KGB

AND

THE

KGB

AND

THE

REPLACEMENT

THE

THE

THE

  ANTI

  THE

MALENKOV

PARTY

ZHUKOV

OF

ELIMINATION

OF

BERIA

KHRUSHCHEV

STRUGGLE

GROUP  

1 1

6

AFFAIR  

2

SEROV

CHAIRMAN

SHELEPIN

2 2

THE

FALL

OF

2 7

THE

1967

SETTLEMENT

THE

DOWNFALLS

THE

RISE

THE

KGB

THE

INTERREGNUM

THE

CHEBRIKOV

THE

BREAKDOWN

OF

AND

CONCLUSION

SHELEPIN

OF

3  

AKHUNDOV

AND

3  

SHELEST

ANDROPOV

THE

BREZHNEV

3

SUCCESSION

6

GORBACHEV

OF

ANDROPOV

THE

5

ALLIANCE

CHEBRIKOV

GORBACHEV

ALLIANCE

3

    

BIBLIOGRAPHY

6 5

WORKS

CITED

68

 

PREF

CE

ND

CKNOWLEDGEMENT  

This report has been prepared in fulfillment of a contract betwee

the RAND-UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavi Behavior or an the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . The autho is indebted to both of these organizations for generous financial financial an moral support . Sincere thanks also go to Karasik

 

 

Lilita Dzirkals and Te  

to Julia Julia Azrael Azrael her devoted secretarial services ; to

proofreader and editor ; and to Frank Fukuyama

for her help as

Harry Gelman

to  

and othe

colleagues who gave me the benefit of their critical comments an d suggestions on a draft version of the text . Whatever errors o f commission or omission remain after all these inputs by others shoul d

 

 

 

for their expert research assistance ; to Valerie Bernstein

deservedly be blamed on the author alone

n

r

 

 

EXECUTIVE

SUMM

RY

Despite numerous claims to the contrary, the Soviet secret polic part y

were not politically n neutralized eutralized or brought under non-partisan control

after the death of Stalin . Although

hard

 

data are difficul

t

to come by, the available evidence leaves little doubt that the KGB ha s been an instrument and arena of internecine conflict among Sovie

t

leaders from the moment it was founded in April 1954 . Thanks to thei

r

control of an immense arsenal of politically potent weapons, moreover KGB cadres have clearly played important and sometimes decisive role in the allocation of power and authority in the Kremlin under all o Stalin's successors

 

s

 

 

The first head of the KGB, Ivan Serov, clearly owed his loyalty t Nikita Khrushchev, who had already relied on him to assist in th

o

 

arrest of Lavrentii Beria and was now counting on him to assist in th

 

ouster of other actual and potential rival candidates for suprem e power . On assignment from Khrushchev, Serov and his lieutenants firs t

proceeded to collect evidence implicating Malenkov, Molotov, an d Kaganovich in Beria's and Stalin's crimes and then mobilized the KG

B

against these leaders, when a majority of the Politburo backed the m against Khrushchev . In addition, Serov helped Khrushchev to enginee r the removal of Marshal Zhukov from the Politburo . By rendering thes e signal services, however, Serov created a situation in which h

 

himself became expendable from Khrushchev's point of view   As a result, he was summarily demoted, when the remaining members of th e leadership made this a condition for their acquiescence in Khrushchev' addition of the premiership to his other offices

 

s

 

his own political career

 

Given Andropov's increasingly obvious ambition, it is almos t impossible not to suspect that the KGB may have had a sizeable hand i n the plague of misfortunes that depleted the ranks of Brezhnev's mos t likely successors between

1978

an d

1980

 

Many Moscow

insiders

ha v e

alleged that this was the case, and their reports have the virtu e of being consistent with all the known facts . In any event, by th e early

1980 s,

the contest to succeed Brezhnev had settled down to

a

two-man race between Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, who clearly ha d Brezhnev's backing . Although Chernenko was initially the front-runne r in this race, Andropov's command of the KGB soon enabled him to clos e the gap . In effect, Andropov intimidated Brezhnev into giving him

a

lien on the general secretaryship of the party in return for a promis

 

to defer collection for the remainder of Brezhnev's life and to observ e a truce with the ranking thereafter

Brezhnevites

for a

decent interlude

 

 

As part of his deal with Brezhnev and the

Brezhnevites,

Andropo v

agreed that they would have a major voice in the choice of hi s successor as chairman of the KGB . In consequence, when Andropo v unexpectedly died, after serving only fifteen months as Genera l Secretary, the KGB was not headed by an

Andropov loyalist .

Instead

it was headed by Viktor Chebrikov, who had functioned as one o f Brezhnev's watchdogs in KGB headquarters since

1967

and who had bee n

appointed chairman shortly after Brezhnev's death, when Andropov' s immediate, and clearly interim, replacement, Vitalii Fedorchuk, wa named Minister of the Interior . Given Chebrikov's

vi

Brezhnevite

 

s

 

 

hesitation undoubtedly stems from his fear of provoking Chebrikov an d his conservative allies into yet more militant opposition . But it ma y also reflect a recognition of how much coercion is likely to be neede d in order to preserve political stability, while getting the Sovie t system moving again . If so

the crux of the problem

as Gorbachev see s

it, is almost certainly not to subordinate the KGB to greater part y and/or public control . Rather it is to install one of his ow n followers as chairman so that he can turn the KGB on his opponents i n the leadership and employ it more effectively than he has been able t o employ it heretofore to shake the party and the public out of thei r lethargy

 

Some knowledgeable observers anticipate that the KGB may becom e the dominant political actor on the Soviet scene in the not-too-distan t future . When things have gone so far that Andrei Sakharov

not t o

mention the leadership of Pamyat', is prepared to single the KGB ou t for praise for its

incorruptibility,

this is a possibility that mus t

be taken very seriously . Whatever the future may bring

however

th e

developments over the course of the past thirty-five years have clearl y left the KGB in a position to strongly influence the outcome

viii

 

 

 

ntrodu

tio  

This report analyzes the participation of the KGB in Soviet elit politics . Because

  hard  

e

evidence on this topic is extremely scarce  

many important empirical and analytical questions cannot be conclusivel y answered . Close scrutiny of the information that is available, however  

often makes it possible to sharpen the questions and narrow uncertaint y about their answers . In many cases, moreover, the findings turn out t o be inconsistent with what has come to be accepted as wisdom .

 

  conventiona l

These findings do not always permit a reliable account of wha t

actually occurred in any given instance . But they clearly undermine th

e

validity of some very widely held assumptions . This pertains not onl y to assumptions about the power-political power-political capabilities and activities o

f

the secret police but also to assumptions about the pace and directio n of political change since the death of Stalin

 

With notable exceptions, Western specialists have tended to trea the involvement of the secret police in Soviet elite politics as

matter of purely historical interest .  

t

 

  all  

Like its supposedly

Stalinist predecessors, the KGB is regularly identified as on  

powerfu

l

of the

  pillars  

of the Soviet regime . As such, its activities i n

monitoring public opinion, repressing dissent, and stifling protest ar   often analyzed in great detail

Similarly, its role in combatting

 

economic crime and official corruption receives frequent mention .

And  

a great deal is written about its performance in the field of foreig n

 Robert Conquest and Amy Knight are perhaps the most conspicuou exceptions

 

See for example, Barghoorn See, for example, Simis

1976) and Reddaway

1986)

 

1983)

 

s

 

present Soviet political system that the secret police [has been ] I

largely eliminated from the political process within the elite   the same vein, Timothy Colton contends that the KGB has

much independent influence over grand decisions influential enough to be courted by

  warring

 

  never

n

exercise d

and is no longer eve n

groups within the party  

Last, but not least, Jerry Hough has recently put it on record that

 

the secret police [has] as little right to become involved in factiona l politics in the [contemporary] Soviet Union as the  

United States .  1 0 To be fair, many consider

Houghs

  mainstrea

m

 

.FBI [has] in th e

scholars would probabl y

formulation at least slightly hyperbolic . To judge b y

their writings, however, most of them would nonetheless subscribe to th

e

underlying, dismissive assessment of the political significance of th e

KG B

 

Unless it is drastically off the mark, the analysis in th

e

following pages will convincingly demonstrate that reports of the power

 

political demise of the Soviet secret police are not only exaggerate d

t but highly misleading . In comparison with the Stalinist period, secre police participation in the elite political process has certainly becom

e

far less sanguinary -- a change that has both reflected and contribute d to significant modifications in the

 

rules

 

by which Kremlin struggle

s

t are waged . Nevertheless, the secret police has been actively and almos uninterruptedly uninterruptedl y involved in high-level politics throughout the post Stalin period  

ler

 1986 ,

'Colton

 1986 ,

i

Huogh  1985 ,

62 5

p   pp p 

 

 

98 and 128

37

 

 

 

 

The possibility that some senior secret police officers played a n active role in the conspiracy   mainstream  

Beria is rarely even considered b y

against

analysts . It is not, however, a possibility that can b e

excluded on the basis of what Khrushchev reports in the only availabl

e a

account of events by one of the conspirators, not to mention one with considerable reluctance reluctance to admit to the use of

  non-party

methods

 

1

 

It is true that the only conspirators whom Khrushchev identifies by nam e other than fellow members of the leadership are Marshal Georgii Zhuko v and Marshal Kiril Moskalenko of the Soviet army . But it is also tru e that he mentions the participation of nine other, unnamed, generals

 

  marshals

an d

in the final showdown with Beria and implies that Colone l

General Ivan Serov and Colonel General Sergei Kruglov of the secre t police were among them.1 3  

If these veteran

 

Chekists  

had not bee n

involved, it is difficult to understand why Khrushchev would hav proposed that Beria be consigned to Sero v

 

e

s custody after his arrest o r

why, in explaining that his colleagues had preferred Moskalenko to Sero v

because of the latter

 

s institutional affiliation, he would hav e

included Kruglov in the explanation

12

See, Talbott

13

Talbott

14

See, however,

1970), p . 331

1970) pp . 336-338

 

4

 

 

Krasnaia Zvezda,

March 18, 19, and 20, 1988, for

a

three-installment three-installm ent interview with a military officer who participated i n the arrest and subsequent detention of Beria . According to then   Colonel, now-retired-Major General I . Zub, Serov did not participate i n the physical arrest of Beria and was prevented from interrogating Beri a without military observers present during the week Beria spent i n Lefortovo Prison immediately following his arrest

 

 

- 7

-

been considerably smaller than in the first . In light of late r developments, however, however, this could well be a case where appearances ar e deceptive . In any event, it is a misleading oversimplification t o

describe the mid-195 0

 

s as a period in which, with Beria out of the way  

Stalin   s surviving heirs

 

strove to bring the security services unde r

collective control and prevent any one person from ever again using the m Some members of the leadership undoubtedl y

as a private weapon .  1 7

hoped for such an outcome and did what they could to bring it about

I t

 

seems quite likely, for example, that their efforts were instrumental i n persuading Khrushchev to deliver his

  secret

speech  

at the Twentiet h

Party Congress in 1956 . Nevertheless, the evidence leaves little doub

t

that both Malenkov and Khrushchev were much more interested in competin g for factional primacy

within

the secret police than in joining forces t o

subject the latter to non-partisan

 

party control

 

Although it is impossible to provide a precise blow-by-blow accoun

t

of this competition, Malenkov apparently won the first-round with th e appointment of Kruglov as Minister of the Interior -- a post tha

t

entailed command of the secret, as well as the regular, police, thank

s

to the organizational organizational changes that Beria had introduced immediatel y after Stalin   s death . Kruglov was clearly not Khrushchev

 

s candidat e

for the job, and his summary dismissal within a year after Malenkov resignation as premier leaves little doubt that Malenkov was hi

s

Khrushchev quickly overcame this initia

l

principal supporter   18

 7 Hosking

 8

See, Talbott

  s

(1985), p . 317

1970), p . 338, for Khrushche v

did not even know Kruglov at the time of Beria

 

 

s insistence that h

s arrest .

Kruglov wa

e

s

dismissed in early 1956, even though by then his portfolio was no longe of any particular power-political significance significance

 

r

 

9

Khrushchev had infiltrated into the upper reaches of the secret polic e prior to Stalin

 

s death

 

Given this lineup, Khrushchev obviously had little reason to fea r that Malenkov would be able to employ the secret police against him i n ha d

their struggle for power . By the same token, however, Malenkov

every reason to be nervous when the GUBG was transformed into a separat e Committee of of State Security Security

KGB), with Serov as chairman an and d Lunev a s

his first deputy, in March 1954

 

Malenko v

21

 

s nervousness probably cam e

close to panic, if it is true, as was claimed by an exceptionally well

 

connected Soviet source, that, unlike other governmental committees, th KGB took its orders directly from the Khrushchev-dominated Centra

 

Committee rather than the Malenkov-dominated Council of Ministers

 

e

Since this claim cannot be independently verified, it has bee n ignored by Western scholars . Nevertheless, there is collatera

 

information that suggests that it may contain an important element o

f

  Khrushchev   s confidence in Lunev is indicated not only by th   fact that he was appointed first deputy chairman of the KGB in 1954 -- a post he held until 1959 -- but also by the fact that he was appointed t o serve as a judge at Beria

 

s trial

the only

 

Chekist

Ustinov served as first secretary of the Moscow

 

gorkom

thus honored . from 1956-57  

after which he succeeded Yurii Andropov as Soviet Ambassador to Hungary . Mironov joined joined the sec secret ret police in 1951 after servin serving g in the part y apparatus of of Dnepropetr Dnepropetrovsk ovsk Khrushche v

 

s supporters supporters

immediate patron

1959-1964

 

1956 and 1959

Mironov

the Leningrad Affair

served a s

 

on Khrushchev

 

s behalf .

Fro m

he served as chief of the Ad Administrative ministrative Organs Depa Department rtment o f

Ustinov in the

Large Soviet Encyclopedia

publically announced

 I  

suggests that the KGB ma y

actually have begun to operate months before its formation wa

s

 

Politicheskii Dnevnik

Medvedev

 

where he presumably played a k key ey role i n

the Central Committee Secretariat   21 Conquest 1961), p . 222, relying on the biography of V

22

f

until they abandoned him to support t their heir mor

Brezhnev . Between

KGB chief in Leningrad reopening

the point of origin of so ma many ny o

1976), p   40

 

 1972), pp .39-40, R . Medvedev and Zh

 

 

of Lenin in November 1955 and the Order of the Red Banner in Decembe 1954

 

24

Furthermore

in his report to the Twent Twentieth ieth Party Congress  

Khrushchev roundly condemned those who displayed

mistrust of the workers of the state to recognize that officials

 

r

 

incorrect and harmfu

security organ s

and thereby faile d

the overwhelming majority of Chekists are hones

devoted to our common cause

l

t

and deserving of our trust .  2

 

Such gestures of deference to the secret police could have been inspire d by a simple desire to prevent demoralizati demoralization on in the ranks of a n organization that was being being forced to repudiate -- and many former officers

atone

 

in the c case ase o

for -- a great deal of its pas

t

Since they were made in the midst of intense infightin g

behavior . 26

within the leadership

however

one can speculate that they were als

rewards from a grateful Khrushchev for factional services rendered

The KG

and the

 

Anti-Party Group

o

 

 

If Khrushchev owed the KGB a debt of gratitude for helping him t be becom come e pr prim imus us

inter inter pare pares s within within the collec collectiv tive e le leade adersh rship ip i in n the the mi mid d

and ultimately ultimately enhance his position position in June 1957

when a siz sizabl abl e

majority of the party Presidium

Molotov

Kaganovich

genesis

26

led by Malenkov

tried to dislodge him . Before

the June 1957 crisis

25

 

however

Pravda

Pravda

December 26

February 16

The mid-195  

resolution o

something should be said about it

especially since Khrushche v

See,

turning to the

an d

1956

 

1954

1988), p

 3

 

s

s partisan use of the KGB seems t o

and Pravda

November 5

1955 .

 

s saw a continuing series of trials of

  Beria-ite  

and other ranking secret police officers of the Stalin era . See Golikov

o

he owed it it an even greater obli obligation gation for helping him to retai n

1 95 95 0   s

24

 

 

 

- 13

 

crimes had been presented to the Central Committee as early as Januar y

1955 . According to a confidential circular letter from the CPSU t o fraternal parties, this was when Malenkov was officially charged wit h  and allegedly confessed to) Affair .  3

  co-responsibility  

  Leningra d

for the

 

In fact, it may well have been fear--or knowledge--that Khrushche v was about to go public with some of the results of Serov   s archiva research that prompted the members of the

  anti-party grou p  

l

to confron t

Khrushchev when they did--and sooner than they would have wished .

3 2

There is certainly no doubt that the speech that Khrushchev wa s scheduled to make in Leningrad on the day after his opponents summone d him to battle would have provided an appropriate occasion for a publi c denunciation of Malenkov for complicity in Stali n   s recurrent massacre s of Leningra d

 

a

s elite . The fact that Khrushchev delivered exactly such

denunciation when he finally managed to get to Leningrad almost thre e weeks later obviously does not prove that he would have done somethin g similar if the June crisis had not taken place in the interim

31

See, Pethybridge

 

33

In

1962), pp . 58 and 60, citing a report b y

Seweryn Bialer . See, also, Boffa

1959), p . 2 7 . Beria had bee n as earl y   the Leningrad Affai r

posthumously charged with complicity in as the Spring of 1954 . See, Zimirina

1988), p . 3 .

a minimum, veteran conspirators such as Malenkov, Molotov , Kaganovich, and Bulganin must have been disturbed by the number o f

32At

forseeable contingencies contingencies for which they were not yet fully prepared . According to a later account by Kiril Mazurov,   material s   to indict th e members of the anti-party group for complicity in Stalin

 

s crimes wer e

presented to the Central Committee toward the end of the June crises , when Khrushchev these

 

granted

33

 

s victory was a foregone conclusion . The fact tha t

materials  

(Pravda,

 

See

were available and ready to hand was taken fo r October 20, 1961

July

Pravda

Khrushchev said that

 

7

1957

 

for the Leningrad speech in whic h

all the members of the anti-party group wer

 

profoundly guilty of the crude mistakes and shortcomings which too k place in the p past ast

and Malenkov Malenkov

the so-called so-called Leningrad Affair Leningrad

 

N  M . Shvernik

who w was as one one of the chief chief organizers o

f

was simply afraid to come to yo you u here i n

chairman of the Party Control Committee

 

went even further in a speech that he delivered in Leningrad at the same

 

- 15

 

demanded that the Central Committee rather than the opposition-dominate d party Presidium be allowed to decide Khrushchev   s fate and wh o threatened that any decision that the Presidium took unilaterally woul d

be overridden .

 6

Similarly, Alexander Nekrich and Mark Heller credi

Serov, along with Zhukov, with helping to arrange the special flight

t

s

which enabled Khrushche v   s supporters in the provincial party

apparat

gather in Moscow before the Presidium could present them with

a fai t

t o

This is confirmed, in turn by Ilia Dzhirkvelov, who was hea d

accompli   37

of the first department of the Georgian KGB at the time, and who claim

s

to have seen an order from Serov to the republic KGBs, instructing the m  

to deliver all the members of the Central Committee of the CPSU t o

Moscow . . .to support Khrushchev  

38

Finally, Oleg Penkovskiy, wh o

enjoyed Sero v   s personal confidence, asserts that,

  it

was help from th e

KGB that enabled the members of the Central Committee to rush to Mosco w in 1957

 

and concludes that,

  if it were not for the KGB and Serov,

 

Khrushchev could never have survived to become supreme leader . 3 9 These

 

insider

 

accounts cannot be independently corroborated b y

outside observers observers . On the basis of what we know about the authors   however, it seems almost certain that their information came fro m different sources, with little, if any, possibility of a tainted commo n origin . It does not necessarily follow, of course, that thi s information is correct . In the absence of contradictory evidence   however, there is no valid reason to discount it . 40

36

Dnevnik

Medvedev and Medvedev  1972), p   10 7

On the contrary  

1976), pp . 118-119 ; also Politicheski

i

 

37 Heller and Nekrich (1986), p . 554  

Dzhirkvelov (1987), p . 154 .  

4

Penkovskiy Penkovs kiy

1965), pp . 206 and 282

 

0It may be noteworthy in this connection that Sero v   s deputy, K .F .

Lunev, was awarded the Red Banner of Labor in October, 1957 October 31, 1957) .

  ravda  

 

military officer to attain a seat on the Presidium if this were not th e case of

 

At the same time, however, Khrushchev clearly had a deep fea r

4

  bonapartist  

proclivities within the military high command

 

4

And  

the very fact that he had been forced to solicit the military   s hel p during the June crisis undoubtedly increased his anxiety .

To make mak e

matters worse, Zhukov enjoyed immense respect among his brother officer and was, if anything, even more popular with rank-and-file citizens

s

 

Presumably, it was precisely these traits that made him so valuable t o Khrushchev as a political ally . But, they were highly problematica

 

assets from the point of view of a recently embattled leader who wa s justifiably uncertain uncertain about the scope of his authority not only over hi s colleagues in the Kremlin, but over the country at large .

In

consequence, there there is little question th that at Khrushchev calle called d on Sero v   honest

and his

Chekists

general and against

 

to remain vigilant against

  military

factionalism  

 

factionalism

 

in

in particular .

The high command received what may have been an esoteric publi c warning that it would be held accountable to the secret police fo r efforts to capitalize on its role in the June crisis while the crisi

s

was still winding winding down down . This warning (if such it was) was conveyed in Red Star

notice of a receptio reception n hosted by Marsh Marshal al Zhukov for the Yugosla v

Minister of Defense, who was visiting Moscow at the time

 Zhukov

 

44

What wa s

had been a candidate member of the Presidium since Jun e

1953 . This promotion was also a first for a professional militar y

officer and was presumably bestowed as a reward for the military   assistance in the arrest of Beria

s

 

4 Khrushchev   s mistrust of the military and suspicion of it

s

political ambitions is evident throughout his memoirs . See, especiall y Talbott (1974), pp . 11-28, and pp . 540-542 .  

a

K ra s n ai ai a Z v e z d a

June 26, 1957

 

 

  19

 

Konev, as Penkovskiy reports Khrushchev to have alleged to the part y

aktiv of the Moscow Military District in a speech explaining Zhukov abrupt dismissal from the leadership only four months after hi

promotion

 

48

  s

s

Penkovskiy himself is skeptical about this charge

. But i t a

seems unlikely that Khrushchev would have lied to a group that was in good position to verify what he said, let alone that he would hav invented a story that was almost certain to

e

enhance the fallen Zhuko v

  s

reputation in military circles . Accordingly, one is tempted to conclud e that Khrushchev was probably telling the truth and that Zhukov

  s

insistence on a change of command in the KGB was the basis for th e reports that had surfaced in the weeks

preceding

his ouster about th e

increasing subordination of the secret police to military control

 

4 9

As a member of the Presidium, Zhukov would presumably have bee n well within his rights to propose high-level personnel changes and eve n changes in the existing system of institutional checks and balances

 

B

y

targeting Serov and the KGB, however, he would certainly have failed t o display what Khrushchev considered as Minister of Defense  

 

a correct understanding of his rol

-- the only role to which Khrushchev seems t o

have believed he was really entitled

  5

By proposing Konev as Serov

  s

successor, moreover, Zhukov would have played directly into Khrushche v hands . Khrushchev could cite this proposal as

the sort of

e

  bonapartist  

  s

an example of precisel y

propensity that Serov had been reporting an d

thereby strengthen not only the case for dismissing Zhukov, but also th e

48

Penkovskiy

1965), p . 239

49 See, Lowenthal 50 Talbott

 

1957), p . 2 ; also, Alsop

1970), p . 162

 

1957)

 

 

  21

 

by Khrushchev, who allegedly felt that Serov had outlived his usefulnes s and that Shelepin would make an equally pliant but less disreputabl e

agent

 

53

In fact, however, this seems highly implausible . Althoug h

Khrushchev may have felt fairly secure in December, 1958, he almos certainly anticipated further struggles in which Serov

 

t

s loyalty an d

experience would come in handy . Left to his own devices, moreover   Khrushchev would almost certainly have wanted to replace Serov wit h Lunev, Ustinov, or Mironov, if he had concluded that the KGB shoul d henceforth be headed by a party

apparatchik

rather than a professiona l

secret policeman . Unlike these obvious candidates for the KG B chairmanship, Shelepin was not a long-time client of Khrushchev

 

s, no r   5  

even, so far as one can tell, a particularly active latter-day backer

Nevertheless, it was Shelepin who was appointed, while Lunev and Ustino v were soon dispatched to outlying posts,

and Mironov was transferred t o

the party secretariat as chief of the Administrativ Administrative e Organs Department   which was supposed to supervise the work of the KGB but had bee n relatively 55 inactive in recen

53

See, for example, Hingley

13 2 ; Levytsky (1972), p . 269

1970), p   23 5 ; R . Medvedev

1983) p

 

 

n   s name does not appear among th e seventeen Central Committee members who are listed in the 1959 editio n 54 It is noteworthy that Shelepi

of

H i s t o ry ry o f t h e

PSU

as having

  acted [particularly quickly and ]

decisively against the anti-party group

103

 

Lunev

 

See, Pethybridge (1962), p

 

was appointed head of the KGB in Kazakhstan, while Ustino v

was removed as Moscow Party secretary and

named ambassador to Hungary

Mironov replaced General Zheltov, former head of the MPA, as chief

 

o f

the Administrative Organs Department, Department, which had been headed by an actin g chief, Gromov, from 1953 until Zheltov   s appointment in the summer o f

o 1957 . Mironov was the first chief under whom this Department began t exercise really significant control over the operations of the secre t police . This was itself a sign of Khrushchev   s early mistrust o f (See, for example, Penkovskiy (1965), p . 284 . Shelepin  

 

- 23

 

ultimately failed, Shelepin was vociferous in demanding that th e

  factionalist s

 

be called to

  strictest accountabilit y  

  direct responsibility for the physical destructio n  

cadres in the past and for their latter-day role as were prepared to take the most extreme purposes .  5 8

corpses

of

of innocent part y

  conspirators [who ]

steps to achieve their filthy

While joining the hue and cry against the

  the anti-party group  

ominous Stalinist epithet

  inner

both for thei r

  politica l

moreover, Shelepin also revived th e

enemy  

in calling for the severes t

punishment, including punishment meted out at

  show

of

trials,  

  bureaucrats . . .who are to blame for the fact that extremely importan t Party and government decisions . . .are not carried out .  59

Such crud e

sabre-rattling was hard to reconcile with Shelepin   s concurrent clai m that the secret police was no longer the

  frightening

Beria . . .sought to make it not very long ago .

60

specter tha t

But it added what wa s

presumably a welcome note of intimidation to Khrushchev   s continuin g efforts to discipline and mobilize the frequently recalcitrant an d sometimes insubordinate

Crimes in which

apparat appa ratchik chiki i

of the pa party rty-sta -state te machine machine .

  plotting with the aim of seizing powe r  

the previously existing list of

  especially

6 1

was added t o

dangerous state crimes  

punishable by fifteen years imprisonment or death .   Saikowski and Gruliow 1962), pp .180-181 -- speech to the 22n d

Party Congress in October 1961 . See, also, Gruliow Shelepin

 

1960), p .177, fo r

s injunction to the delegates of the 21st Party Congres

February, 1959),

  not

[to] forget

behavior of the anti-party group

 

 

 

that the odious and unseeml y

represented a great danger

 

and

involved   a real conspiracy against the party 9 Saikowski and Gruliow 1962), p . 182 -- speech to 22nd Part y  

Congress   60 Saikowski and Gruliow (1962), p . 181 . 61 Saikowski and Gruliow (1962), p .182 - Shelepi n   s speech to th e 22nd Party Congress . See, condemnation of initiative .

ibid

pp .56-57 and 70-72, for Khrushchev   s

  leaders whose work is spiritless and lacking in

 

- 25

 

As a Central Committee secretary and first deputy premier, Shelepi n on the party Presidium . This was a well

was clearly entitled to a seat

 

established precedent, and there is every reason to suppose tha t

Shelepin demanded his due -- of Khrushchev in the first instance .

s

A

1963 went on, however, it gradually became clear that Khrushchev woul d   as

not or could not deliver . Either he preferred to keep Shelepin

hi

s

personal subordinate, outside the discussions of the [countr y   s] highes

t

or he was incapable of overcoming the resistance o

f

policy-making body  

other leaders who feared that

 

Iron Shurik   s

 

further promotion woul d

enable Khrushchev to consolidate dictatorial power . 65

In either case  

Shelepin had good reason to reassess his equities in the month

s

preceding Khrushchev   s overthrow in October, 1964 . And, the evidenc e leaves no doubt that he did so

 

Everyone who has studied the matter agrees that Shelepin and hi KGB acolytes took part in the overthrow

of Khrushchev . Shelepin

promotion to the Presidium and Semichastny

 

s

  s

s promotion to the Centra

Committee in November 1964 make this much virtually indisputable .

l

Ther e

is considerable disagreement, however, about the nature and extent o

f

their participation . On the one hand there are accounts which make i t appear that Shelepin and Semichastny played relatively passive, largel y instrumental roles . They are described, for example, as having bee n

 

approached

 

  neutralized  

by Brezhnev and others in order to make sure that KGB wa and that Khrushchev would be unable to contact hi

s

s

 Lowenthal (1965), p   4 . For Shelepin   s nickname of   Ir o n Shurik,   see, Solzhenitsyn (1976), p   98 . Attentive readers wil

l

recognize, of course, that these are not necessarily mutually exclusiv -- or exhaustive -- alternatives

 

e

 

  27

 

support functions that are emphasized in many accounts would constitut e an exhaustive list . Otherwise, it seems highly unlikely that

Shelepi n

would have ended up on the Presidium, let alone as a full member rathe r

than a candidate . In Shelepin long overdue

 

70

 

s eyes, no doubt, such a promotion wa s

By the same token, however, it was clearly no t

automatic, and it is difficult to identify anyone in the top leadershi p who would have favored it if Shelepin had not been able to negotiat e from a position of considerable strength . Such strength, in turn, coul d only have come from his demonstrated willingness and ability to utiliz e his command and control of the KGB for self-serving, power-politi power-politica ca l purposes

 

The  all of  helepi   That Shelepin was not a welcome presence on the Presidium wa s evident from the way he was treated by his colleagues from the ver y outset of his incumbency Pyotr Shelest

 

 

71

To start with, his name was listed afte r

s in a pointed breach of alphabetical order in th e

announcement of their simultaneous election to the Presidium i n November, 1964 . Any illusion that this might have

been the result of a n

editorial oversight was quickly dispelled when Shelepin was given

a

conspicuously low-level low-level sendoff on an official visit to Egypt only a fe w days later -- a practice that was continued and refined over the cours e of numerous foreign trips that were almost certainly designed, amon g other things, to keep him out of Moscow

See, Page and Burg

 

1966), p . 170

72

To add insult to injury

 

71 This paragraph is borrowed almost in its entirety from Tat u  1967), pp . 503-504

 

72 See, Barghoorn

1971), p . 120 fn ., and Hough

1979), p . 252

 

 

 

 

29

 

The first clear indication that the symbolic attacks on Shelepi n

were destined to have

 

organizational consequences

 

came in Decembe

1965, when Shelepin lost his first deputy premiership and hi

r

s

chairmanship of the Committee of Party-State Control in conjunction wit h the liquidation of the latter as one of Khrushchev   s supposedly brained

 

  hare  

follies . Then, in a far more painful loss, inflicted sometim

between April and December 1966, he was stripped of his secretaria

e

l

responsibility for supervision supervision of the secret police and assigned t o monitor light industry .

76

This switch, in turn, obviously presaged th e

early dismissal of Semichastny, who was duly ousted as KGB chairman i n May 1967, in a move that eliminated any realistic possibility tha Shelepin might be able to stage

a political comeback

 

77

t

It was almos

t

anticlimactic, therefore, when Shelepin was dropped from the Secretaria

t

in June and made the chairman of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions   a position he retained

along with his seat on the Pre Presidium) sidium) unti

1975, at which time he was finally cast into political limbo

l

 

The apparently single-minded determination of Shelepi n   s colleague s in the leadership to disarm him leaves little doubt that they considere d his continued control of the KGB highly inimical to their collectiv e interests . There is no evidence, however, that Shelepin attempted t o

use the KGB to counterattack or even to mount an active self-defense . On the contrary, the fact that he was allowed to retain his seat on th

76 77

of some

See, Tatu

1967), p . 5 0 8

See, however,

 

Politicheskii Dnevnik

  well-informed

Soviet sources

 

 1972), p . 657, for the clai m

that Suslov, Mazurov, an d

Shelepin mounted an attack on Brezhnev as late as 1969--a claim tha t other, presumably equally,

 

e

well-informed sources flatly dismissed .

 

 

- 31

reapportion Shelepi n

 

s and Semichastn y

 

 

s former responsibilities sugges t

a different different conclusion conclusion . These decisions bear little, if any   resemblance to those one would expect to emerge from collegia

l

deliberations on the best way to accelerate the transformation of th e KGB into a truly non-partisan security s service ervice . Instead they look ver y much like decisions that might have emerged from high-stake negotiation s among adversaries who finally agreed to compromise their differences i n a temporary settlement reflecting the existence of an extremely delicat e balance of underlying underlying power . If this resemblance is

  not

accidental,

the settlement presumably evolved from the following sorts o transactions

•

 

f

:

Brezhne v   s colleagues made it clear that they would not readily consent to the replacement of Semichastny by Sero v  

 

a latter-da y

in the person of Semyon Tsvigun, a long-time Chekist an d

close crony of Brezhnev choice to head the KGB

 

s, who was almost certainly his firs

t

 

Brezhnev was reluctantly persuaded to go along with th

e

appointment of Yurii Andropov as KGB chief, even thoug h Andropov was closely affiliated with Suslov, with whom Brezhne v had a strained and at least intermittently adversari adversaria a l relationship

  7 9

While accepting Andropov, Brezhnev insisted on the appointmen of his crony Tsvigun as first first deputy chairman of the KGB, KGB, an d of his client once-removed, Viktor Chebrikov, as Andropov deputy for cadres

 9

See Tatu

Semichastny

 

  8 0

1967), p   50 8

Tsvigun replaced A

  s

  I

 

. Perepelitsyn

who died shortly afte

r

s dismissal . Chebrikov was a younger member of Brezhnev

 

s

t

 

The Downfalls of

khundov and Sheles  

Whatever the intentions of its architects, the settlement of 196 definitely did not put an end to the KGB

s involvement in the Sovie

 

 

t

elite politics -- even in the short-run . This was dramaticall y demonstrated by developments in Azerbaidzhan, where the late 1960 witnessed a return to the Stalinist police had exercised power in the

status quo ante

 

s

in which the secre

t

name of the party . The man wh o

presided over this process was Geidar Aliev, who was promoted from firs t deputy chairman to chairman of the republic

 

s KGB in June 1967

 

Within a matter of months, months, it became obvious tha that t Aliev had bee n authorized to conduct an

 

anti-corruption  

campaign that was targette d

not only at rank-and-file embezzlers and bribe-takers but at senio

r

officials, including party leaders . Armed with the additional power December 1965) 1965) statute o n

that had been been vested in the K KGB GB by a new   economic

crimes,

 

s

Aliev not only forced the removal of hundreds o

f

cadres who owed fealty to Velia Akhundov, the incumbent first secretar y of the Azerbaidzhanian party, but also succeeded in replacing many o them 83 with

  Ge-bisty,  

f

who continued to take orders directly fro

In consequence, Akhundov became more and more isolated and was powerles to resist when Aliev was ready to attack him directly . By this time

 

moreover, Aliev had managed to persuade his superiors in Moscow that th best way to ensure that party discipline was properly enforced was t o appoint him as Akhundov

8

See Zemtsov Zemtsov

Akhundo v

 

 

s successor . Accordingly, in July 1969, Aliev

1976), for a colorfu colorful, l, but persuasive, account o

s downfall and Alie v

 

s takeover

 

Ge-bist y  

almost never use the more honorific term

  Chekisty  

f

is a widely use  

term for secret policemen among rank-and-file Soviet citizens, wh

 

s

e

 

- 35

 

The political consequences that were implicit in this cadres

 

 

renewal o

in the Ukrainian KGB did not take long to surface . Within a

matter of weeks of Fedorchuk   s appointment, the Ukrainian press wa

inundated with complaints about the lenient treatment of criminal

f

s

and

  bourgeois

nationalists  

  economi

s

c

who should long since have bee n

called to account but who, at least until recently, had continued t o function with near impunity . Needless to say, these complaints provide d Fedorchuk with what was obviously a welcome excuse to conduct a thoroug h investigation investigatio n in which it turned out that a considerable number of part y cadres had displayed

 

insufficient vigilance

committed serious crimes . This evidence

 

and that some ha d

in turn

was duly transmitte d

to Fedorchuk   s superiors in Moscow, where it was used as the basis fo r the removal of a growing number of Ukrainian

apparatchiki

and  

ultimately (in May 1972), for the removal of Shelest himself Although these

  police

occurred after Andropov

 

actions

 

 

in Azerbaidzhan and the Ukrain e

s appointment as chief of the KGB, they wer

almost certainly not launched on his initiative . Indeed

e

he may no t

it

even have played a major part in their design and execution . Thus

seems likely that Aliev took most of his operational orders directl y from his former boss and long-time patron, Semyon Tsvigun, who ha d served as chief of the Azerbaidzhanian KGB immediately prior to hi

s

appointment as Andropov   s first deputy . 87 Similarly, Fedorchuk may hav

See, Deriabin and Bagley 1982), p . 621 . See, Bilinsky 1975), p 250, for the circumstances of Shelest s abrupt transfer to Moscow, i n May 1972 . In Moscow, Shelest served for a year as a deputy premie r  

 

before being forced into retirement s firs t 87 See Voslensky (1984), p . 372 . Aliev had been Tsvigu n   deputy between 1965 and 1967    

e

 

 

  37

his proteges

 

what ultimately ultimately cost t them hem their jobs was t their heir ties wit h

Nikolay Podgorny Podgorny

whom Brezhnev Brezhnev had already ou outmaneuvered tmaneuvered in th e

Politburo but who could not be completely discounted as a rival as lon g

as his power base in the Ukraine was more or less intact cases

in other other words

what one discovers at bo bottom ttom is the the employment employment o

the KGB to strengthen Brezhnev

 

s already strong position

undercutting the power of his colleagues leadership

. In bot h f

whil e

in the ostensibly

 

collectiv

 

 

The Rise of

ndropo  

The intimidating

  demonstration

effects

of his willingness an d

 

ability to employ the KGB as a partisan weapon in consolidating hi power undoubtedly made a significant contributio contribution n to Brezhnev

s

  s

unchallenged domination of Soviet leadership politics in the mid-197 0

  s  

In order to make the threat of KGB muscle-flexing on his behalf eve n more credible

moreover

Brezhnev launched an all-out effort to enlis

Andropov as a factional ally . To

this end

he

abrogated a policy

had been in effect for nearly twenty years : in April 1973 Andropov to full membership in the Politburo In taking this step duress

he promote d

 

Brezhnev obviously obviously knew that he wa was s running a certain risk

something to be desired from a to shove

moreover

tha t

which was almost cert certainly ainly not taken unde

did not need to be reminded that Andropov

 

 

t

r

 

H  

s political pedigree lef t

Brezhnevit e  

perspective . If push cam  

Brezhnev knew that a seat on the Politburo woul d

also remembere remembere d make Andropov harder to command and control . But he also that Khrushchev had paid a heavy price for more generally

for

no t

not

promoting Shelepin and

giving the KGB the political recognition to

 

 

- 39

additional deputy chairmen of the KGB

 

 

90

Although relatively littl e

background information about these new deputies is availabl available e

it seem

s

almost certain that they were nominated for their jobs by Andropov an d that their responsibilities encompassed domestic as well as foreig n operations . The fact that Brezhnev did not exercise his right to vet o

their promotions bears witness to Andropov

 

s success in disarmin g

suspicion that what was involved was an effort to dilute the authorit y of his

 

Brezhnevite

 

deputies and enhance his ability to deploy th e

resources of of the KGB for his ow own n purposes the aging General Secretary

even against the wishes o this was probably wha t

Nevertheless

  91

f

Andropov intended and is certainly what he achieved

 

One use to which Andropov obviously put his growing freedom o f maneuver within the KGB was to probe the extensive links between member of the Soviet underworld and members of Brezhnev extended families

1981

 

Leaks

 

 

s

s immediate an d

to this effect began to proliferate in lat e

and much of the incriminating incriminating e evidence vidence that was uncover uncovered ed ha s

since been published . During the late 1970

 

s

however

Andropov had n o

interest in going public with any of the information he collected abou t the questionable associations and illicit activities of Brezhnev

  s

relativ rela tives es and frie friends nds . If he

shared this information information with anyon e

outside his own inner circle

it was a almost lmost certai certainly nly only w with ith Brezhne v

--

  in order to protect him against potentially embarrassing surprises

A confrontation with Brezhnev was the last thing Andropov needed o

91

 

r

90 Knight 1984), p . 40 That Andropov did not entirely disarm such suspicion is suggeste d

by the fact that in December 1978 Tsvigun and Troop Commander Matroso v were promoted to the rank of general of the army -- a promotion tha t made him superior to Andropov himself in military rank

 

 

s other deputies and equal to Andropo v

 

 

cui bono

not only for Andropov

worried about being

41  

but for Brezhnev

  prematurely  

who was increasingl y

retired and who had developed a

distinct aversion to the presence in the leadership of ambitious younge r me n

 

96

With Mazurov, Kulakov, Kirilenko, and Masherov

th e

hors de combat

contest to succeed Brezhnev quickly settled down to a two-man rac e between Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, who was clearly Brezhnev   s favorite and, for this and other reasons, initially appeared to be th e front-runner . In

  mainstream  

accounts of Andropov   s come-from-behin d

victory in this race, his chairmanship of the KGB is almost alway discounted as a contributing factor .

9

s

In fact, it is usually describe d

as a serious handicap that Andropov had to overcome . Nevertheless   there is a good deal of evidence in support of different conclusions

 

It seems almost certain, for example, that some members of the Sovie t establishment backed Andropov precisely and affiliation . Likewise

because of

his KGB backgroun d

it seems clear that some of Andropov  

s

opponents were persuaded to change their minds or, at least, to hol d their tongues, by familiar KGB techniques and methods . Most of the cadres who supported Andropov because of his KG B background and affiliation were led to do so by their conviction tha t the way to avert what they

and others) perceived as a clear and presen t

danger of economic decline and social unrest was to enforce and restore

  order

.

 

 

disciplin e

This conviction led them to view the KGB as th e

country   s best, and perhaps last, hope of avoiding

 

a Polish outcome

 

The replacement of Kulakov by Gorbachev almost certainly occurre d over Brezhnev s objections . See Zh . Medvedev 1986), pp . 89-90 1986), p . 86 ; Colton 1986) p . 9 8 9 See, for example, Bialer 9

 

 

 

 

- 43

 

however, must also take account of his

use of the KGB to demobilize

an d

disarm his opponents . Here the secret of his success was to demonstrat

e

that the KGB could destroy reputations and ruin careers that bot h

Brezhnev and Chernenko wanted protected . The previously mentione d  

leaks  

of incriminating information about Brezhnev   s relatives an d since they left no doubt whateve r

friends were crucial in this regard, that Andropov could commit

lese majeste

with absolute impunity .

clear, moreover, that much more information could

over  

be collected an d

the progress Andropov had made i n

disseminated in the future thanks to   taking

It wa s

the KGB -- a process that Chernenko, whom no one expecte d

to be a strong leader, would almost certainly not be able to arrest o r reverse, especially without the help of Tsvigun who died, allegedly b y suicide, in January 100

The KGB and the Brezhnev

Andropov Successio  

By the Spring of 1982, Andropov

 

s campaign for the succession ha d

gained such momentum that Brezhnev himself could no longer be confiden of riding it out, let alone of

overriding it on behalf of Chernenko .

consequence, he apparently tried to buy time

explicit agreement .

fairly certain, however, that they resulted

In

by striking a deal wit h

Andropov at Chernenko   s expense . It is impossible to say whether hi efforts culminated in the conclusion of an

t

s

It seem s

in a mutual understandin g

that Andropov would be given a lien on the General Secretaryship i n return for a promise to defer

collection for the remainder of Brezhne v

  s

life -- or, at least, for a decent interlude . Among other things, thi s

s

100 On the multitude of contradictory rumors and mysteriou 1986), pp . 54 57   circumstances surrounding Tsvigu n   s death, see, Doder and Schmidt-Hauer

1986), pp . 72 74

 

 

  45

 

What made these arrangements tolerable to Brezhnev price he might have had to

pay for trying to prevent them

confidence he felt in Vitaly Fedorchuk, Andropo v

of the KGB

 

s successor as chairma n

almost certainly appointed at hi

insistence, with Andropov   s reluctant acquiescence Fedorchuk was reassigned within weeks of

and that he kept faith with

 

was Brezhnev  

 

s candidat e

1

lived longer, he might wel

l

s appointment and utilize the KG

B

well as a shield . However, any attemp

t

Had Brezhnev been in better health and have tried to capitalize on Fedorchu k

to do so before Fedorchuk had

The fact tha t

103

his patron until the end

as a sword against Andropov, as

s

Andropov   s inauguration a s

General Secretary leaves little doubt that he

 

but also th e

. Although Brezhnev might have preferred to see his cron y

Tsinev get the job, Fedorchuk was

Andropo v

e

was not only th

 

had time to counteract the effects o

s sixteen-year-long effort to cultivate the support

f

of his KG B

subordinates would have been completely futile . If Brezhnev seriousl y tried to reverse his fortunes in the weeks before his death, therefore   it was almost certainly by other means . In particular, he may hav e

  3 Following the death of Tsvigun, Tsinev, who it will be recalled   s long-time patron, had been promoted to first deput y chairman of KGB, along with Chebrikov, somewhat later . See, however

 

was Fedorchuk

 

1984), p . 41, who believe tha t 1984), p . 12, and Knight Fedorchuk was Andropov   s nominee . According to other accounts, Andropo v

Zh . Medvedev

nominated Dobrynin as his successor

 

104 Fedorchuk was promoted to the rank of

general of the army an d 1982 . Although som e that Andropov had so muc h

appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in December analysts have cited this appointment as proof confidence in Fedorchuk that he selected him

as point-man in hi

s

likely that Fedorchu k the confidence of the   Brezhnevite s

campaign against corruption, it seems much more owed his survival in high office to in the leadership that he would up that they were no longer

limit the political fallout of a

able completely to prevent

 

clean

 

 

loyalist

Frequent assertions to the contrary notwithstanding  

 

therefore, it seems highly unlikely that Fedorchuk   s successor, Vikto Chebrikov, had betrayed his

 

Brezhnevites

allegiance to Andropov during his long latte r   s principal deputies .   7

 

heritage and switched hi

s

years of service as one of th

In comparison with other

 

r

 

Brezhnevite

in the upper reaches of the KGB, Chebrikov may have performed hi

s

s

watchdog role in a way that led Andropov to believe that he coul d eventually be won over . Given the balance of power in the Politburo however, Chebrikov could not have become chairman had managed to preserve close ties with process .

  8

 

of the KGB unless h

 

the Brezhnev camp in th e

What remained to be seen, of course, was whether and ho w

his promotion would affect the further evolution There are a number of reasons for

of the balance .

suspecting that Andropov may hav

looked on Chebrikov   s chairmanship of the KGB as an interim o

r

probationary appointment . The fact that a year passed before Chebriko v was promoted to the rank of general

of the army and elected a

member of the Politburo is particularly

candidat e

suggestive in this regard .

There are undoubtedly plausible alternative explanations for in Chebrikov   s receipt of what were by now

 

this dela y

generally considered to b e

more or less standard emoluments of his office . But the most persuasiv e explanation is continued doubts about his loyalty on the part o

  7 See, for example, Bialer   8

See, Knight

conclusion 109

f

1986), pp . 86-87 .

1988a), p . 93, who seems to have reached the sam e

 

See, Knight

1988a), p   93 . Knight also notes the fact tha

Chebrikov only received the Order of Lenin rather than the mor e prestigious Order of the October Revolution on his 60th birthday i n April 1983

 

 

 

 

- 49

Although the timing of Chebrikov

-

 

s promotions may not clinch th e

case for the formation (or reconfirmation) of a Chernenko-Chebriko v alliance, it does provide something that

 

mainstream

: it provides at least

vehemently insist is lacking

that warring groups within the party courted 1980

  s  

1

 

 

analyst

 

s

a whit of evidenc

e

in the earl y

.the polic e  

Furthermore, additional evidence to the same general effec t

is provided by the great lengths to which Chernenko went, both befor e and after his selection as Andropov

 

s successor, to publicize his ow n

status as a former Chekist, albeit if only by virtue of his youthfu     11

service in the border guards

Despite such overtures, many

 

Ge-bist y   undoubtedly took a dim vie w

of Chernenko   s candidacy and may have lobbied on behalf of th  

Andropovite

 

l

e

Gorbachev in the unusually protracted consultations an d

deliberations preceding Chernenko

 

s eventual selection . However

whe n

one adds Chebriko v   s name to a list of KGB heavyweights that undoubtedl y included first deputy chairman Tsinev and former chairman Fedorchuk, an d probably also included Geidar Aliyev, the former head of th

e

Azerbaidzhanian KGB, who had become a full member of the Politburo unde r Andropov but whose promotion had reportedly been put in the works b y Brezhnev, it is hard to see why

  it is absurd to think

took office with a significant amount of KGB support

 

 

11 3

that Chernenk o Indeed, i

t

Colton (1986), p . 98   n 11 2 Chernenko first adopted this tactic in May 1981, when he put i what may have been a first-ever appearance by a top leader at a ceremon y for the KGB border guards . See Pravda, May 27, 1987   11 1

11 3

Colton (1986), p .98

 

 

- 51

considerable doubt on Hough

 

 

  outside  

s thesis that the

support tha t

really mattered came from the party apparatus to the exclusion of th e

KG B

If anything, Ligachev lent additional credibility to Ro y

. 117

Medvede v

 

r

s earlier report that it was not until Chebrikov made it clea

that the KGB was firmly on Gorbachev   s side and was prepared to pla y political hardball on his behalf that Gorbachev

 

s opponents withdrew

their support for the rival candidacy of the longtime Moscow part y secretary, Viktor Grishin . 118 cross his

  t   s  

  mainstream  

that

Since Ligachev did not dot his

analysts who insist that there is not to Gorbachev

Nevertheless, it will be harder to argue that claims

 

s

an d

it is probably safe to predict that there will still b e

.the KGB played kingmaker  

 

 i  

or to dismiss Chebrikov as a

  mere  

 

 

anything to sugges

t

11 9 s benefit .   events  

.refute [such ]

intelligence and securit y

expert, with little, if any, power-political clout . During Gorbache v

 

12  

s first year or so as General Secretary, it looke d

as if his alliance with Chebrikov might prove relatively long-lasting

 

For his part, Gorbachev seemed comfortable enough with the relationshi p to assign Chebrikov a number of high-profile assignments on behalf o

f

the regime and to allow the KGB as such to bask in a great deal o f 121 favorable publicity .

Chebrikov, in turn, seemed quite willing no

 'Hough (1987) (1987), , pp . 157 and 164 . 118 For Zhores Medvede v   s version of his brothe

r  

t

s report, which wa s

directly delivered to many Westerners in Moscow, see Zh . Medvede v (1986), p . 172 . 119 Colton (1986), p . 9 8 . '''Colton (1986), p . 98, and Bialer (1986), p . 87 . 121 See, Knight (1987) . Chebrikov was selected to speak for th e

regime at the October Revolution anniversary celebration in 1985 and t o address the 26th Party Congress (March 1986), which thereby became th first party congress since 1961 to hear from a chairman of the KGB . addition, Chebrikov was selected to lead a number of well-publicize d Soviet missions to Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Vietnam .

e

In

 

for the timely implementation of the reform and innovation that ar e called for  

12 6

And, he was quick to remind everyone

to their state security functions,

  Chekists  

participated in the resolution of a social problems  

12

that, in additio n

had always

 

activel y

multitude of serious economic an d

7

The Breakdown of the Chebrikov

Gorbachev Allianc  

It is unclear precisely when Chebrikov first began to have second thoughts about his support for Gorbachev . It seems virtually certain however, that his disillusionment has deepened

go in encouraging

pluralism,  

  democratization  

 

transparency,

 

and

 

socia

in so strongly on behalf of someone who, since early 1987, has

 

rehabilitated  

l

In

have prompted him to weig h

particular, Chebrikov must wonder what could

personally

 

as he has discovered th e

lengths to which Gorbachev is prepared to

political

 

Andrei Sakharov and

:

  prematurely  

released hundreds of other victims of the KGB   s crackdown o n the

 

dissident movement

  ;

for the KG B  

forced Chebrikov himself to apologize publically

s

harassment and arrest of a muckraking journalist ; permitted the publication of dozens of articles misconduct and calling for the strengthening

criticizing KG

 

of juridical an d

public controls over its activities ;

 26

Pravda

November 7

1987 . This appears to have been the firs

occasion on which an authoritative spokesman for the Gorbachev regim espoused the need for system

 

refor m

 

rather than

 

127 Chebrikov

1985), p . 48  

 

improvemen t

t

 

of the existin g

 

- 55

push

 

individuals

from the new

 

appeared on the scene hostile activity  

 

 

 

independent associations

that ha d

 

into anti-social positions and onto a path o

and to push

 

individual representatives representatives of th e

artistic intelligentsia into positions of carping

demagogy

the blackening of certain stages of our society   s historica development culture . .

nihilism    

and the abandonment of the main purp purpose ose of socialis Expanding democracy and transparency were

 

he conceded

necessary  

but it was essential

 

citizens  

  natural

 13 the interests of socialism .

within the framework o of f socialism an d

2

misunderstood

Chebrikov

repeated it

in less

  specia  

aesopian term s

in another major speech a few months later--a speech in which agitators  

figured much less prominently . In this speech he

the fact that the

 

 

was still unsatisfactory . 133

Pravda

deplore d

In particular  

the detriment of the state an d

Using a formula that was traditionally reserved for intra-

party polemics activities of

outsid e

  attempts . . : to take advantage of the growth in th e

peopl e   s social and political activism to

society .  1 34

 

state of affairs in the sphere of strengthening orde r

and discipline everywhere he criticized

c

autonomy an an d

Lest the real message of this diatribe against Western be

an d

rights and duties . . .restructuring [and] th e

leadership of the Communist Communist party

service s  

t

not to forget the organi

combination of socialist socialist democra democracy cy and discipline responsibility

f

he warned against  

certain individuals

  any underestimation underestimation  

 

September

11

1987 .

132 Pravda

September

11

1987 .

  33Pravda

April

14

1988 .

134 Pravda

April

14

1988 .

who  

of th

e

 

- 57

 

leadership, including other former Gorbachev supporters such as Ligache v and Gromyko, to do everything possible to try to hold Gorbachev i n check . As part of this struggle, moreover, Chebrikov seems to hav e

relied on his subordinates in the KGB for a considerable amount o f assistance and support . Most importantly, the KGB appears to hav e played a significant behind-the-scenes behind-the-scenes role both in the efforts of th e   conservatives  

to protect Voldimar Shcherbitskii, from Gorbachev

 

s

campaign to drop him from the Politburo, and in their efforts t o discredit Gorbache v   s supporter, Boris Yeltsin, and force him out of th e leadership

 

There is little question that the

Ukrainian KGB played an activ e

part in defending Shcherbitskii against Gorbachev his local power base in late 1986 and early 1987

 

 

s frontal assault o n

139

This much seem s

clear from the extraordinary extraordinary letter from Ch Chebrikov ebrikov that appear appeared ed i n

Pravda

on January January 8, 19 1987 87 . In this letter, Chebrikov implicitly bu t

unmistakably censured S .N . Mukha, the chairman of the Ukrainian KGB, fo r his failure to punish local KGB officers for

  coordinating  

efforts t o

frame journalists seeking to expose corruption within the Ukrainia n

ruling elite   140 so-called

 

Although the only case which Chebrikov cited was th e

Berkhin Affair  

in Voroshilovgrad, Voroshilovgrad, his letter stro strongl ngl y

implied that he was addressing a republic-wide phenomenon . It wa s somewhat anticlimactic, therefore, when it was subsequently announce d that similar

 

had occurred in Dnepropetrovsk and Lvov and tha t

affair s

Mukha had been dismissed and assigned

  to the reserve

 

14

1

13 9 See, for example, Solchanyk (1987) 14

 

efforts   141

See,

Pravda,

January 4, 1987, for a detailed account of thes e

See, Solchanyk

1987) and

Pravda Ukrainy,

successor was N .M . Golushko, who was reported to

May 26, 1987 . have have

several years working at KGB headquarters in Moscow

 

Mukh a

spen spent t t the he pas pas t

 

s

 

- 59

 

Although Gorbachev seemed to have Chebrikov on the ropes in lat e 1986 and early 1987, he was unable to deliver a knockout blow . Indeed   he did not even manage to teach Chebrikov much of a lesson . Unlik e Shcherbitskii, Shcherbitski i, who also weathered Gorbachev   s attack, but whos e subsequent speeches have echoed the Gorbachev line, Chebrikov, as w e have seen, has not been afraid to publicize his critical views . Furthermore, he has almost certainly been willing to put his money wher

e

his mouth is by continuing to tap the resources of the KGB for what h e and his fellow

 

conservative

s

in the leadership consider worthy causes .

One cause to which Chebrikov and his conservative allie s undoubtedly attached a high priority was the punishment of Bori s Y e l t s in in , w h o h a d b e e n a pp pp o i n t ed ed f i r s t s e c r re etary of the Mo os scow gor rk k o m an d made a candidate member of the Politburo at Ligachev   s instigation, bu t who had subsequently become an outspoken champion of radical economi c and political reform and a conservative bete noire .

 4 4

Hence, there i s

no reason whatever to think that Yeltsin was being paranoid when h e insinuated to the February 1987 plenum of the Moscow October 1987 1987 plenum of the C Central entral Comm Committee ittee that he

gorkom and th e and othe

r

Gorbachev supporters) had been targeted for hostile action by the KGB . On the contrary, his thinly veiled charges that the KGB was seeking t o sabotage his reform efforts and undermine his position by failing t o keep him informed about

 

negative trends and occurrences

 

in Moscow  

while simultaneously providing his opponents with derogatory informatio n

 4 4 Ligachev confirmed earlier reports that he had sponsore d Yeltsi n   s cooptation into the top leadership i in n his speech to the 19t h

Party Conference . See

Pravda,

July 2, 1988 .

 

- 61

 

himself hims elf . By the time things things came to a head in the fall of of 1987 true

it i s

there was reason to suspect tha that t a shift had occurred in th e

balance of power within the leadership . Gorbachev had only recentl y

reappeared in public after a prolonged and unexplained absence that ha d given Chebrikov and his allies time to regroup their forces and lay th groundwork for the counteroffensive counteroffensive .148

Nevertheless

 

the Gorbache v

forces did not appear to have lost so much ground that Chebrikov woul d be able to walk away from Yeltsin the event

however

 

s charges with complete impunity .

In

it was Yeltsin who was expelled from the leadership  

to the accompaniment

among other humiliations

of a vitrioli

 

denunciation by Chebrikov of his arrogance in presuming to meddle i n Lest anyone doub t

police matters that were none of his business . 149 what had happened

moreover

this unprecedented assertion of th

 

autonomy of the KGB was promptly followed by a ceremonial appearance o

f

the leadership in which Chebrikov stood third or fourth in the officia

 

pecking order order instead of his usu usual al fifth o or r sixth

and by Gor Gorbachev bachev

highly publicized attendance at a celebration of the 70th the founding of the Cheka

  s

anniversary o f

 

148 Gorbachev was out of public view from August 7 to September 29 149 Lo s Angeles Times November 1 1987 . The immediate target o f Chebrikov

 

s denunciation was Yeltsin   s acknowledgement to a group o

 

f

foreign interlocutors that the Soviet Union had more political prisoner than any other country in the world   150 May 1 1987 November 7 See Pravda

Service

December 18

1987 .

1987

and TASS-Englis h

Gorbachev   s attendance at the Chek a

anniversary celebration celebration was the more noteworthy noteworthy because he had be bee en conspicuously absent from the celebration of the 110th anniversary o the Cheka

 

s founding-fathe founding-father r

Feliks Dzerzhinsky

two months before

 

f

s

 

  63

decentralization decentralizatio n and demokratizatsiia

 

 

Given the deep animositie

s

between the Azeri and Armenian communities, it was almost inevitabl e that inter-communal tensions would escalate as rank-and-file citizen

s

acquired greater greater control control over their their own des destinies tinies . In consequence,

a

properly vigilant KGB would have taken steps to forestall or contai n what might otherwise become an explosive confrontation . According t o authoritative spokesman for the Armenian community, however, this i definitely not what what happened happened . Instead, the KGB reportedly made

s

a

concerted effort to spread disorder and panic and to incite racia

l

violence, thereby transforming an intractable but potentially manageabl e problem into an urgent crisis

 

153

Once again, there is no way fo

r

outsiders outsi ders to verif verify y this report report . But it comes from a trustworthy sourc e in a good position to know

 

Given the opposition and resistance that Gorbachev has encountere d from the Chebrikov-led KGB, it is not surprising that a number of hi supporters have taken advantage of the increasing relaxation o censorship

s

f

and self-censorship) self-censorship) to questio question n the continuing need for

powerful secret police  15 4

a

To say the very least, however, Gorbache v

himself has been considerably more cautious . In his June 28, 198

8

report to the Nineteenth Party Conference, for example, he pointedl y identified the KGB as one of the few agencies that was functioning accord with the spirit of the tim e

153 See,

Liberation,

 

rather than

 

  in

fighting tooth and nai

March 12-13, 1988, reporting a Moscow pres

s

conference of Sergei Grigoryants, who had just returned from Yereva n with a

  white

paper  

Organizing Committee 154 S e e

for

Nuikin

1988)

prepared by the 1,000-member-strong 1,000-member-strong Yereva n  

example  

0gonyok,

No . 12

1987), pp . 4-5 and 18-2 18-20 0

 

l

 

- 65

 

on his opponents in the leadership and employ it more effectively tha n he has been able to employ it heretofore to shake the party and th public out of their lethargy, to bring the

of the syste m

  peripheries  

f

back under central control, to speed the removal and punishment o officials, and to ensure that

 

corrupt

 

transparency   do not give rise to

 

  democratization  

  excess  

an d

 

license

e

an d

 

Whethe

r

Gorbachev is actually thinking and planning along these lines remains t o be seen . Unless he is, however, it seems highly unlikely that he wil

be able to fulfill his ambition of leading the Soviet Union into th twenty-first century in what he considers to be great power

 

 

l

e

a manner worthy of

a

In a few years, in fact, he would probably not be leadin g

at all, having been replaced by a challenger who owed at least some o his success to services rendered by the KGB

f

 

Conclusio n Some knowledgeable observers think that KGB may become the dominan

t

political actor on the Soviet scene in the not-too-dist not-too-distant ant future   Ke n Jowitt, for example, envisions a significant KG B   and the emergence of a regime in which prominent

political

role

 

158

  political   Ge-bisty  

upgrading of th e play

 

a ver y

Similarly, Michel Tatu anticipates a

Polish-style crisis in which the KGB and/or the armed forces wil

l

displace the incumbent leadership and keep the reins of power in thei r own hands

 

15 9

Given the depth of the malaise afflicting the Sovie t

system, and the politically destabilizing effects of Gorbache v   s effort s to overcome it, this is certainly not a possibility that should b

  8

159

e

Jowitt 1983), pp . 290 and 2 292 92 -- two o of f three italics added T at at u 1 98 98 5) 5) , p p . 2 7 7-3 34 4, es sp p . p p . 31-33  

 

 

  67

interpretations . Furthermore

 

there are many important

questions t o

it

which it cannot provide even a tentative answer . Nevertheless

leaves very little doubt that reports of the political neutralizat neutralization ion o

 

the secret police and of its strict subordination to non-partisan control

 

are not only greatly exaggerated but seriously misleading

What it suggests

in fact fact

f

part y

 

is that that the the KGB has been an arena arena an an d

instrument of factional conflict from the day it was founded and tha t KGB cadres have played extremely important and sometimes decisive power political roles under all of Stalin

 

s successors

 

According to some academically fashionable theories of politica plot-development plot-developm ent

l

the time has long-s long-since ince passe passed d for Soviet secre secre t

policemen to perform as anything other than sword-bearers and shield holders for the ruling elite as a whole . As the actual plot ha unfolded

 

 

s

it has become clear that these roles have continue d

however

to be part of a much broader repertoire . Although modern

 

Ge-bisty

longer play all of the parts for which their Chekist and othe predecessors became infamous infamous supernumeraries . If anything

no

r

they hav have e definite definitely ly not become mer

e

they may recently have move d

in fact

considerably closer to center stage . In any case continued to appear as grave-diggers

 

they have clearly

power-brokers

king-makers

an d

throne-seekers in a long-running political spectacle that has remained tragedy for millions of Soviet citizens citizens overtones of farce

 

even as it it has acqu acquire ire d

a

 

- 68

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