The Interpretation of Plato's "Crito" Author(s): David Bostock Source: Phronesis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1-20 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182345 . Accessed: 07/05/2013 03:21 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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The Interpretationof Plato's Crito DAVID BOSTOCK
Socratesgivesas his leadingpremisein the Crito thatone shoulddo nothing wrong (obaCg
bet &6Itxiv,
49b8). (He says, indeed, that he has lived
his whole life in obedience to this premise, 49a-b.) He then proceeds to arguethatit wouldbe wrongfor himto tryto escapefromgaol, thusevading the death penalty he had been sentenced to. But a central problem in interpretingthe dialogueis thatthe argumentshe offersfor this conclusion appearto be designedto establisha verymuchstrongerconclusion:it would always be wrongfor any citizen of Athens to disobey any law of Athens. Such a conclusion is in itself distinctlyunappealing,and apparentlynot consistent with the leading premise, for presumablya law might be an unjust law commandingthe doing of what is wrong. Moreover, in the Apology Socratesapparentlyreportsone suchcase and envisagesanother. At 32c-d he says that he did not obey an order from the ThirtyTyrants because what was ordered was wrong (&6.x6vxt, 32d5); and at 29c-d he saysthathe wouldnot obey a courtorderto cease philosophising,evidently on the same ground(though he does not here use the word 6Lxov, or a synonym). Here, then, it seems to be admittedthat a law, or anyway a legallyauthoritativeorder,1maycommandone to do wrong,andthatif so it shouldnot be obeyed. Thissets ourproblem:is it possibleso to interpretthe Crito thatit does not enjoinobedienceto any andeverylaw?I proposeand criticisethree lines of interpretationwhich attemptto avoid this 'authoritarian'readingof the dialogue.They differfromone anothermost notably
l It may of course be argued whether the orders of the Thirty Tyrants did have the appropriatelegal authority,and it may be observed that the court could not legally make an order that Socrates should cease philosophising unless Socrates himself were to propose this as his altemative to the death penalty. But Socratesdoes not suggest that he did or would disobey these orders on ground of their illegality, but simply on ground of their wrongness.
Phronesis1990. Vol. XXXVII (Accepted July 1989)
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over the questionof how many distinctand separableargumentsthe dialogue contains. I then consider the merits of the authoritarianinterpretation. 1. Thedialoguecontainsbut one argument At 49c-d Socrateselaborateshis leadingpremiseto 'one shouldnot wrong any person', adding to this 'not even if one has been wronged by him'. (&x6LIXvis used transitivelyfrom 49blO, and equated with xaxovQydEv and with xaxog xoet6vat 49c.) At 49e5-7he states a furtherpremise'one should do what one has agreed to do, provided that it is not wrong'. (btxatLa6vca evidentlyhas the force of h6tXa 6v-cac.) He then proposes that it follows from these premisesthat it would be wrong for him to escape (49e9-50a3). Crito requests further elucidation, the personified Laws of Athens are brought upon the stage, and the argumentproper begins. Now it is clearthat the first point that the Lawsmake is this: if Socrates triesto escape, he will be attempting,for his part,to destroythe Laws, and (thereby)the whole city;for a city couldnot surviveif the verdictsreached by the courtswereset asideandrenderedpowerlessby individuals.They go on to add that much could be said on behalf of this particularlaw, that verdictsshouldbe carriedout (50a8-b8).Thisevidentlysuggeststhe following argument: (i) Hence (ii) But
(iii)
So
(iv)
Thus (v)
The lawthatverdictsshouldbe carriedout is fundamentalto the whole systemof laws. Whoeverattemptsto disobeythislaw is attempting(for his part) to destroythe whole systemof laws. It would be wrongfor Socratesto attempt(for his part) to destroythe whole systemof laws. It would be wrong for Socratesto attemptto disobey this law. It would be wrongfor Socratesto attemptto escape.
I shallcall this suggestedargumentargumentA. If we may grantthe (very dubious)step from (i) to (ii), whichreceivesno furtherelaborationin the dialogue, it would seem to be a valid argument(at least if we add, as a furtherand uncontentiouspremise, that in the present context escaping would be disobeyingthis particularlaw). Moreover, it clearly does not generaliseto the conclusionthatSocratesshouldobey anyandeverylaw of 2
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Athens, but confines attention to one law in particular, as specially fundamental.2
It is true that argumentA does not entirelyevade the problemwe began with, since it is surely possible that obeying a verdict reached by a court would involve doing somethingwrong. Indeed one of our cases from the Apology was preciselya case of this sort: if the courthad orderedSocrates to cease philosophising,Socratescould not have obeyed thatorderwithout doing somethingwhichwas (in his eyes) wrong. (Or even if he would not quite have called it wrong(8bmxov)- as I observed, he does not quite say this in so manywords3- at any rate he does very clearlysay that he would not have obeyed the order.) Now one mighttry to distinguishthe cases in thisway. In this particularexample,Socratesimaginesthe courtsaying'We will let you go, but on this condition,that you no longer . . . philosophise. But if you are caughtstilldoingthis, you will die' (29c7-dl). Perhapswe can see this as a kindof disjunctiveorder 'eithercease philosophisingand live, or continueto philosophiseand die'. Then Socrates'proposedresponseis to obey this order by obeying-the second disjunct, for he clearly does envisagethat he wouldindeed be put to death (30cl). By the same reasoning, the order'Do not litter;penalty?10'wouldcount as being 'obeyed'by one who both littered and paid ?10, and similarlywith any law to which some definitepenaltyfor infringementwas attached.But in the case under considerationin the Critothe court will not have attachedany penaltyfor failing to obey its order. The verdict evidently was not put in this way: 'Socratesis to be executed;andif he escapesthis he will be banished'.So in this case we do not have a disjunctiveorder, and there is only one way of obeying it. Clearlythisis veryspecialpleading,andwhollyunconvincing.Moreover, it does not reallyattemptto meet the generalissue, but merelyto sidestep it, by makinguse of incidentalfeaturesof the two cases in the Apology and the Crito.A moreplausiblereconciliationof the two dialogueswouldbe to weaken the Crito'sargumentA by qualifyingstep (ii) - and hence the remainderof the argument- by addinga ceterisparibuscondition.4Then it 2 The point is not always noticed. For example it is ignored by both sides in the debate
between R. Martin, 'Socrates on Disobedience to Law', Review of Metaphysics 24 (1970/1), pp. 21-38 and F. C. Wade, 'In Defense of Socrates', Review of Metaphysics25 (1971/2), pp. 311-25. 3 Putting 29b6-7 together with 29d2-4we can infer that obeying the supposed order, like doing wrong (6bLXEW), would be bad and disgraceful (xax6v xa' atoXQ6v). But we cannot directly infer that it would be doing wrong. 4 This is, in effect, the solution adopted by G. X. Santas, Socrates(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979), pp. 48-51.
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maybe saidthatin the situationenvisagedin theApologyotherthingswere not equal, since (a) the courtorderwas countermandedby a divineorder, and (b) Socrates' claim was that in continuingto philosophisehe was attemptingnot to destroythe city (or its laws) but to do it good (30a5-6). But neitherof these considerationswouldapplyto the situationin the Crito. However, it cannotbe maintainedthatanysuchceterisparibusconditionis in fact statedin the Crito,andso one has to admitthaton a naturalreading the two passagesare simplyin conflict. Lookinga little more deeply, the placewherea ceterisparibusconditionwouldbe even morewelcomeis as a condition on the Crito's leading premise that one should never wrong anyone. For it may be that all the availablecoursesof action do involve wrongingsomeone (e.g. either the Laws, if Socratesdisobeys the court order, or the God, if he obeys it), and then the propercourseis to choose the lesser wrong. But again it cannot be said that the Cnitoshows any awarenessof this complication;its argumenthas a naive simplicitythat allows no place for a conflictof obligations. Despite all this, an importantpointremains.OurargumentA does focus on one law in particular,that verdictsshouldbe carriedout, and it claims only that thatlaw ought alwaysto be obeyed (- at least, by one placed as Socratesis placed,on whichwe havemoreto come). Thisis a longwayfrom the fully 'authoritarian'readingof the dialogue,andin fact the claimis not wholly implausible.Many of those who wish to preservea place for the modem phenomenonof 'civildisobedience'would not feel that they were bound to deny it. Perhapseven the Socratesof the Apology might have been led to reconsiderhis position:it is not obviousthatwhatsomeonesees as a commandof God oughtto be acceptedas overridingthisparticularlaw of humans. This brings me, then, to the point of my first suggested interpretation. The first interpretationis that argumentA is the only argumentto be found in the Crito.At 50a7-b8the Laws state premise(i) and proceed to infer(ii). They do not, however,assertthe remainingpremise(iii), thatit is wrongfor Socrates,in his position, to seek to destroythe whole systemof laws, and certainlythey have not yet made any attemptto arguefor it. On the first interpretation,the whole of the rest of their argument(down to 53a) is designedto providesupportfor this premise.They offer two subargumentsfor it: one I shallcall the parent-cityanalogy,and this occupies 50c-51c;the otheris the argumentfromagreement,occupying51d-53a.But both of these are subargumentsto the main argument,and both are designedto show that it is wrongfor Socratesto attemptto subvertthe whole system of laws. (He might, however, be right to disobey this or that 4
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particularlaw, so long as that disobedience does not threaten the whole system.5)In supportof this interpretationI note three points. (a) The ensuing discussionbegins by raisingan objection to the argumentjust suggested:Socratesmightreply 'the city has wrongedus, and the verdictwas not correct'(50c1-2). This reply is best seen as an objection to the suggestedpremise(iii): if Socratesdoes attemptto destroythe laws as a whole, i.e. the city (50bl-2), then this is doing no wrong;it is rathera just retaliationfor a wrong done.6 A good part of the parent-cityanalogy is clearlydesignedas a counterto thisreply:it claimsthatSocratesandthe city (or the country, naTQis) are not on an equal footing; rather, they are so relatedthat it is wrongfor Socratesto retaliatein this way (5Oe4ff). Thus the argumentconcludes'It is impiousto offer violence to one's mother or father,andstill more to one's country ... Considerthen, Socrates,whether we are rightin sayingthat you are tryingto do us wrong (or 8(xaLa)in tryingto do whatyou are now tryingto do' (5lc2-8). Assumingthatwe may identifythe country,the city, and the system of laws as a whole, and that 'destruction'is the extremecase of 'offeringviolence to', this conclusionto the parent-cityanalogyis exactlythe requiredaffirmationof premise (iii). (b) Before the parent-cityanalogygets underway (at 50c9), and immediately after it has been suggested that 'the city has wronged us, and the verdictwas not correct'(50c1-2),the Lawsmake this remark:'Wasthis too agreedbetween you and us, Socrates,or to abide by whateververdictsthe city shoulddeclare?'.Clearlythis introducesthe idea behindthe argument from agreement, which is to be more fully given later. Here at its first introductionthe specific agreementthat the Laws insist upon is an agreement to abide by whateververdictsare declared (and this is contrastedsomewhatelliptically- with a suggested agreementto abide by such verdictsonly when they are correct;the Laws claimthat this latteris not what was agreed). Now it has been claimed that destructionof the law that verdictsbe carriedout is tantamountto destructionof the whole system of laws. Conversely,then, an agreementto abideby the law on verdictsshould 5 This firstinterpretationis to be found in Santas (op.cit.), p. 18: 'Socrates'argument,in all its versions, is an argumentto the conclusion that he must not escape, on the grounds that he would be disobeying this law [that the verdicts reached by the courts shall be supreme] ... We do not know whether Socrateswould make the same argumentagainst disobeyingany law'. (Santas does admit, however, that the argumentsI distinguishas B and C below purport to establish much stronger claims. On this he remarks 'this over-arguingis puzzling, and we are unable to resolve the puzzle', pp. 26-8.) 6 Note that Socrates' remarks at 49b-d do not claim that retaliation is always wrong. Rather, they claim that retaliation is wrong when it involves wronging the person retaliated against.
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equally be implied by an agreementto abide by the system of laws as a whole. That, then, shouldbe whatthe longerargumentfromagreementat 51d-53a is arguingfor, and we should interpretit in that light if at all possible.Thismakesit apartof the argumentgiveninitially:as Socrateshas agreedto abideby the systemas a whole, it is wrongfor himto tryto destroy it. (c) On this interpretation,the basic charge againstSocratesis always that he is aiming(for his part) to destroythe laws, and that this is doing wrong, because in fact it is doing themwrong. In the concludingpassage (53a8-54dl) the Laws are arguingthat escape will bringnone of the advantagesthat Critoapparentlysees in it (44e-46a),andin the courseof this they twicerecurto thischarge.Any well-governedcitythatSocratesmayfly to will reject him as a destroyerof the laws (53b6-cl), and for the same reasonhe will not be welcomedby the laws of Hades (54c6-8).They refer also to the two bases for this charge, that Socrateswill not have kept his agreements,and that he will have done harmto those whomhe least ought to harm,in retaliation(54c2-5).But they treatthe two coordinately,andas the second clearlyis partof an argumentto show that he is wrongto try to destroythe laws, we shouldsee the first in the same way. 2. Thedialoguecontainstwo distinctarguments The obvious weaknessin the first interpretationis that there really is no connection between argumentA and the argumentfrom agreement at 5ld-53a. The considerationsadvanced in (b) and (c) above are wholly programmatic:they enjoin us to see the argumentfromagreementas part of argumentA if we can, since there are some (not verystrong)pointersto suggestthis. But thereis an equallystrongpointerin the oppositedirection, namelythat beforethe Lawsare broughtuponthe scene at all Socrateshas introducedtwo clearlydistinctpremises.One is the premisethatone ought not to wronganother,not even in requitalfor a wrongdone to oneself, and this premiseclearlyis put to use in argumentA. The other is the premise that one shouldkeep one's agreements,providedthatwhatis agreedis not wrong, and this premise is of course employed in the argumentfrom agreement. These being two quite distinctpremises, is it not naturalto supposethateach will be the mainpremiseof two quitedistinctarguments? Indeed Socrateshimselfseems to implythis, as soon as he has introduced his two premises,for he then says:'If we go awayfromhere, withouthaving persuadedthe city, shallwe or shallwe not be wrongingcertainpeople, and indeed those whom we least ought to? And shall we or shall we not be 6
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abidingby what we have agreed, it not being wrong?'(49e9-50a3).This passagevery clearlysuggeststhat two distinctargumentsare to come. The firstof them is (perhaps)argumentA, as outlinedearlier,andthe secondis evidentlythe argumentfrom agreement. Moreover,when we do look in detail at the argumentfrom agreement, we see that it cannot be broughtunderthe wing of argumentA. Its main claimis simplythat Socrateshas agreedto obey the laws, and therefore(in accordancewith the premiseon agreements)it wouldbe wrongof him not to do so. There is no hint that he has agreed only to obey 'the systemas a whole', thus leaving room for disobedienceto one or anotherparticular memberof thatsystem.On the contrarythe Lawsclaimthat anyfullcitizen who remainsin the city 'hasagreedwith us, in so doing, to do whateverwe command'(51e3-4, cf. 52al-2). Nor do they suggest in this passage (i.e. 5ld-53a) that a failureto obey would amountto an attemptat destruction, and in fact the destructionof the laws is mentioned only once in this passage,whereit seemsto me clearthatit is a referencebackto the previous argumentand not a partof the presentone. (At 52c3 the Lawsdigressto a special ad hominemargument:at his trial Socratescould have proposed exile as an alternativeto the death penalty, and so achieved with the consentof the city whathe is now proposingto effect withoutit. But he had then saidthathe wouldpreferdeathto exile. Thenthey continue'Butas it is you do not respectwhat you said then, nor do you show regardfor us, the laws, whom you are tryingto destroy, and you are behavinglike the most worthlessslave, tryingto run away in contraventionof the compactsand agreementsby whichyou have promisedus that you will live as a citizen' (52c8-d3).Here thefirst point (not respectingwhatyou said then) sumsup the newly introducedad hominem charge, the second point (trying to destroyus) refersbackto the accusationof argumentA, andthe thirdpoint revertsonce more to the theme of agreement,which is then continuedto 53a7. It is not beingsuggestedthat breakingagreementsand runningaway is itself an attempt to destroy.) I conclude that the attempt to see this argumentfrom agreementas merelypart of argumentA will not do, and there are (at least) two distinctand separateargumentsin the Crito.7 This, then, introducesthe secondinterpretation.On thisview, one of the argumentsis argumentA, construedas before, and this is not fully authoritarianbecauseit only claimsof one particularlaw thatit oughtalwaysto be obeyed. But we now construeargumentA as runningfrom the beginning So, for example, G. Vlastos, 'Socrateson PoliticalObedience and Disobedience', Yale Review 63 (1974), pp. 517-34, and J. Dybikowski, 'Socrates, Obedience, and the Law: Plato's Crto', Dialogue 13 (1974), pp. 519-35.
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(SOa8)only to 51c8. The new sentencebeginningon thatline beginswith a recapitulationof the salient points of argumentA, but then moves on (at 6tW; in 5ldl) to introducea new line of argument,whichwe maynow call argumentB. This, however, is equallynot a fully authoritarianargument. Tlhoughit may indeed seem so, from its main expositionin 5ld-53a, we should rememberthat its leadingpremiseis introducedat 49e5-7 with an importantproviso:one shouldkeep one's agreements,providedthat what is agreedis not wrong.Thus even if Socrateshas, by remainingin the city, agreedto obey each and every one of its laws, it does not follow that he is obligedto do so. On the contrary,if obedienceto a lawwouldinvolvedoing somethingwrong,thenby the provisohe is not obligedto obey it, andby the premisestatedrightat the beginninghe is obligednot to obey it. Plainly,if thisprovisois regardedas governingeveryclaimmadein argumentB, then this argumentcannotconflictwith the majorinjunction'do no wrong'. It is difficultto give an accurateformulationof argumentB, so I shallnot try to set one out. For one thing, it is not quite clear when Socrates is supposedto have agreedto obey the laws of Athens. At 51d3, it appears that he made the agreement- presumablyan agreementto obey the laws for so long as he was a resident of Athens - at the time when he was admittedto full citizenship.On the other hand one might take 52e3 as indicatingthat the agreementwas continuallybeing remadeeach day that he remainedin Athens as a free man, andhence thathe had agreed,at the startof the trial, to abide by its verdict.Thus he was bound, not just by a promisemade long ago, when this particularoutcomecouldnot have been foreseen, but by a very recent promise, made in full knowledge of the dangersinherentin it. Anotherdoubtis overjustwhichof Socrates''deeds' (ratherthan 'words')constitutethe agreement.Up to 52a4it appearsto be simply his choosing to remain in Athens as a citizen of that city, but thereafterthe Lawsincreasinglystresshis satisfactionwith the city (and its institutions),as if thiswerehighlyrelevant.Clearytherecouldbe citizensof Athens who remainin the city while exhibitingconsiderabledissatifaction with its institutions,and there could be non-citizenswho remainbecause they are well-satisfied.Would either of these types of people be held to have agreed to obey its laws? A much more seriousdifficultyis over just whatSocrateshas agreed to do. For most of the passage, it is naturalto suppose that what he has agreed to do is simplyto obey the laws, but at 51e4-52a3it is said that there is anotheralternativeopen to him: he must either obey or persuade.I shallconsiderhow this is to be interpretedin the next section. 8
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But a genuineproblemfor the presentinterpretationis this. Accordingto this interpretation,the provisoon keepingagreements,thatwhatis agreed shouldnot be wrong,is to be takenas applyingto thiswhole argument.But in thatcase the Lawsmustshow, somewhereduringthis argument,thatit is not wrongfor Socratesto do whatthe laws now requireof him (namelyto remainin prisonuntilhe is executed). It is clearthat they make no attempt to show any such thing - the topic is simply never mentioned- and their argumentthereforecontainsa very notablegap. Nor are we permitted,on this interpretation,to repairthe gap by referringbackto argumentA (e.g. by claimingthat argumentA has alreadyshown that escaping would be wrong, and inferringfrom this that not escapingwould not be wrong, and hence inferringonce more, by argumentB, that Socratesis obliged not to escape).8 For the present interpretationis that argumentsA and B are wholly independentarguments.Insteadof the claimthat what is agreed is not wrong, what we find in argumentB are several indicationsthat the agreementwas fairlyenteredinto. Thus Socrateswas free to agree or not, andwas not in anywayforcedto agree,for he couldinsteadhavedecidedto live elsewhere,with no financialpenalty(5ld4-e5, 52e1). Again, there was no kindof trickeryinvolved,since Socratesknewwhathe was agreeingto, and had plenty of time to observe how the Laws of Athens did operate (51e1-2, 52e2-3). These, one mightsay, are considerationstendingto show that the agreementwas not wronglymade (was made 8xa(os), but this by no means ensures that what was agreed was not wrong (was bicxaLov). Thus it appearsthat argumentB, as developed by the Laws themselves, does not satisfythe provisoon keepingagreementsintroducedat 49e5-7. Thereis only one passagein argumentB whichone mighttake to contain a reference to the proviso, and that is at 52e4-5. The Laws have been summingup theirclaimthatthe agreementwas fairlyenteredinto, andthat Socratescould at any time have chosento emigrate,and to this they add 'if we did not please you, and if the agreementsseemed to you to be wrong' (Et Rh ... b&xatacipaCvov[6 sol al 6.o0XOylaLEIvaL).Now the impliedclaimthat the agreementwas not wrongcouldbe taken as claiming that whatwas agreed was not wrong, though it also, of course, could be taken as claimingthat the agreementwas fairlystruck.It may be that the Laws are suggesting, in this ambiguousphrase, that the first (relevant) interpretationfollows from the second. But in that case one can only say that they are mistaken:a perfectlyfairagreementmayyet be an agreement ' This, if I understand him rightly, is how Santas proposes to fill the apparent gap (op.cit., pp. 21-5).
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to do whatis wrong.Howeverit maybe thatwe shouldsee them as arguing in this way:the factthatSocrateshas remainedin the city showsthathe has agreed to obey its laws, and the furtherfact that he is especiallysatisfied with the city - that its laws 'pleasehim'- showsfurtherthat in his opinion what he has agreed to do is not wrong. So this is an argumentumad hominem: Socrates, at any rate, is bound to accept that the proviso is satisfiedbecausethe Lawsdo in fact please him, andif he had agreedto do something wrong he would not be pleased. On this account, then, the crucialprovisois mentioned,andit is argued,not exactlythatit is satisfied, but that Socratesmust thinkthat it is. Now this may be how Platointendedhis argumentto be taken, thoughif so one can only say that the reasoningis wholly specious. For the sake of argument,let us supposethatuntilthe time of his trialSocrateswas indeed verysatisfiedwiththe lawsof Athens, andwiththe decisionsreachedin the courts, applyingthose laws. It evidently cannotfollow that he was also pleased with the verdictthat convictedhim of impietyand corruptingthe young, andpresumablyhe was not at all pleasedwith thisverdict.Equally, it cannotfollow that he is now pleasedto submitto the deathpenalty, and he is in no wayboundto thinkthatwhatthe agreementhasled to in thiscase is not wrong. More generally, the initial agreement is no doubt to be conceivedof as a generalagreement,to do whateverthe lawscommand.But the proviso, that one should keep this agreement only where what is commandedis not wrong, must be shownto be satisfiedin eachparticular case. It is clearthat the Lawsmake no attemptto show that it is satisfiedin thiscase, and thus argumentB, as stated, pays no attentionto the relevant form of the proviso.9In fact, I thinkit is more naturalto say that it ignores this provisoaltogether,in effect replacingit with the differentprovisothat the agreementbe fairlymade. It thus appearsto be of a fully authoritarian bent, requiringobedience to any and every law from every citizen who chooses to remainin the city, knowingwhat its laws are. Unless, perhaps, we can save the situationby requiringeitherobedienceor persuasion? I
No doubt the proviso is, in Socrates' own opinion, satisfied in this case. In his view, submittingto the death penalty will no doubt be sufferinga wrong, but not doing wrong. (The suggestion that it is doing wrong to his friends, his children, or - we may add - his wife, is one to which he pays no serious attention. Similarlywith other suggestions that one might make, e.g. that it will harm the reputationof Athenian democracyif such a miscarriageof justice is not prevented, and the people given no opportunityto repent.) But although Socrates may indeed think that acceptingdeath would not be wrong, still this point is not argued, or even mentioned, duringargumentB. And argumentB would apparentlyhave applied even if Socrates had taken a quite different view of his obligations to other people (and to himself). 10
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3. Thedialoguecontainsthreedistinctarguments Since the alternativeof either obeying or persuadingalso occurs within what we are at present calling argumentA, let us first reconsiderthis argumenta little more thoroughly.Again, there are too many difficulties over the detailsfor it to be sensibleto attempta preciseformulation. At 50c9 the Lawsask Socrates'Whataccusationdo you bringagainstus and the city, that you shouldattemptour destruction?'.They then get him to admitthat he has no fault to find with the laws on marriage,and on the careandeducationof children.Moreover,sincethese mattersareregulated by laws, they the Lawsclaimto be his parents,andto have been responsible for his care and educationas a child; he is their offspring,and their slave (50dl-e4). Fromthis they infer that they and Socratesare not on an equal footing. Just as a slave would be wrong to retaliate in kind against his master,and just as Socrateswouldhave been wrongto retaliateagainsthis father, so equally Socrateswould be wrongto retaliateagainstthe Laws; they areindeedtryingto destroyhim, butit is neverthelesswrongfor himto try to destroythem in turn(50e4-51a7).So far, the discussioncan easily be seen to be focusedtowardsargumentA as set out:whatis at issueis whether Socrateshas the rightto (try, for his part, to) destroythe Laws,in his own self-defence, and the Lawsclaimthat he has no such right. Again, it is not quiteclearwhatexactlyis the basisof thisclaim.It maybe suggestedthat, on orthodoxGreekmorality,a son is wrongto tryto kill his biological parents, even in self-defence. Thus Oedipus should not have killed Laius when he met him at the crossroads,even if it was in selfdefence, and even though Oedipus owed nothing to Laius for his upbringingand education(and did not know who he was). Of course, when the matter is put in this way, then the claim of the Laws to be Socrates' parentslooks verythin indeed:they cannotreasonablysay that theirblood runsin his veins, or that withoutthem he literallycould not have existed. Besides, this makes it irrelevantthat Socrateshas no fault to find with the laws on marriage,upbringing,and education.Perhapsit is better, then, to supposethat the Lawsare claimingmuchthe samestatusas a foster-parent or guardian,to whom the child owes some debt of gratitudefor benefits received. But in that case, of course, the analogy looks him thin in a differentway. If your guardianis murderouslyattackingyou, surely you may kill in self-defence, if there is no other way of surviving?But I leave these issues unsettled, since my concern is not so much to criticise the argumentas to determinewhat it is supposedto be. Up to the presentpoint (51a7), we can quite easily see the argumentas 11
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concernedwith the specific point of destroyingthe Laws, as argumentA requires.We can also see the concludinglines (51c2-8, quoted above p. 5) as equally concerned with this point. But already a different theme has creptin. At 50e9-51a2,leadingup to theirclaimthat Socrateshas no rightto retaliatein kind on this question of destruction,the Laws have also mentioned that childrenand slaves ought not to answerback, or to hit back. This apparentlyleads them into makingmuchgreaterclaimsfor the rights of parents, and still more of the state. They claim that in all mattersone should reverence, soothe, and yield to the state even more than to one's parents,and in fact one should do or submitto whateverit commands,no matterwhat the consequencesto oneself (51a7-cl). This goes far beyond the previous claim that no one who has been born, brought up, and educatedin Athens should seek to destroyits laws, and it really cannot be countedas partof ouroriginalargumentA at all. It apparentlyclaimsfor all laws the unquestioningobedience that argumentA claims only for one particularlaw. Let us dignify this passage with the name 'argumentC' (thoughreallyit does not deserveto be called an argument,but is simplya claim). We may regardargumentC as slotted into the middle of argument A, or - perhaps better - we may regard argument C as following A, and
developed out of it by pressing the parent-cityanalogy to further and strongerconclusions.In that case the concludingpassage51c2-8,whichwe previouslytook as the conclusionto A alone, may be seen rather as the conclusionto A and C together; it is ellipticalenough to be taken in this way. My thirdinterpretation,then, recognisesthreedistinctargumentsin the Crito:-A, C, andB .10As before, A is not fullyauthoritarian,becauseit only claims obedience for one particularlaw, the law that verdicts should be carriedout. (And it claims this obedience either from all who have been bornin Athens, underits laws, or fromallwho havebeen born,broughtup, and educated in Athens, and have no fault to find with its laws on these matters.Perhapswe oughtto addhere, in view of 5lc9-dl, thatit is not only these lawsthat arerelevant,but also anyfurtherlawsconferringbenefitson the citizens. But it may be better to suppose that this mention of further benefits that the laws confer is more relevant to argumentC (enjoining think this is now the most common interpretation. See e.g. the debate between Martin and Wade (opp.citt., n. 2), and between G. Young, 'Socrates and Obedience', Phronesis 19 (1974), pp. 1-29, and R. J. McLaughlin,'Socrateson Disobedience; a reply to G. Young', Phronesis 21 (1976), pp. 185-97. Also R. Kraut, Socrates and the State, Princeton 1984. 10I
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obedience to al laws) than to argumentA (forbiddingdestructionof the laws).) Both C andB appearat firstsightto be fullyauthoritarian,requiring obedience to any and every law. But, as this interpretationhas it, they are not, for both are protected by includingthe alternative'either obey or persuade'.We have alreadynoted that this alternativeis explicit in argument B; we now note thatit is also presentin argumentC (at 51b3-4,and at 51c1). How, then, is this alternativeto be interpreted? One thing that is clear is that the 'persuasion'alternativeconcems persuasionas to the rightnessor wrongnessof the commandin question('or to persuade (the city) where x6 b&xaLovlies' (51c1), 'or to persuade us (the Laws)if there is somethingwe do [djxaczg' (51e7) ). The traditional interpretationhas been this. In the case of a law whicha citizenregardsas unjust, he is at libertyto persuadethe assemblythat it is unjust, and thus obtain its repeal. Similarlywith a parental command regarded as unreasonable:the parentmay be persuadedto rescindthat command.It has recentlybeen objected"1 thatthis accountin effect neverdoes allowdisobedience, since it does not envisage one disobeyingfirst and persuading afterwards.But we can readilyextend the traditionalaccountto allow for this, if we wish. In a Greekcourtof law (thoughnot, of course,in an English one) it was permissibleto plead that though one had broken the existing law, stillone oughtnot to be condemned,becausethe law in questionwas a bad one. And such a plea is of course equally in order with a parental command.So we may certainlyallow this much:one has done no wrongif one disobeys an existinglaw (or parentalcommand),but afterwardssucceeds in persuadingthe city (or the parent)thatthe disobediencewas in this case justified. But, accordingto the traditionalaccount, one has done wrongif one both disobeysand also does not succeedin persuadingthe city or parent- eitherbeforeor afterthe event- thatdisobediencewasor would be justified. In this case one has neither obeyed nor persuaded, and is thereforeat fault. However, my thirdsuggestedinterpretation(which is in effect Kraut's interpretation)12will not rest contentwith this, for it clearlyallowsfor the possibilityof there being a commandwhichit wouldbe wrongto obey and yet one which the relevant authoritycould not be persuadedto see as wrong. That is, the authoritycould not be persuadedbeforehandto withdrawit or afterwardsto pardoninfringementsof it. So, accordingto this interpretation,the alternativeshould be construedin this way: one must " E.g. Kraut, op.cit., ch. 3 (passim). 12 Op.cit.,n.
10.
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If one disobeys,but does tryto persuadeeither obey or tryto persuade."3 either before or after the event -then one is not at fault, even though the attemptat persuasionmaynot be successful.No doubt,if whatis commanded is not wrong,thenone shouldobey the command,whetherit comesfrom the state or from a parent. But where what is commandedis wrong, then one should not obey it, but try to persuade. In the case of a parental commandaddressedto an adultson or daughter,if the persuasiondoes not succeedthen that, presumably,is the end of the matter.In the caseof a law, if the persuasiondoes not succeed, then no doubt the appropriatepenalty will be suffered.But in each case one hascommittedno wrong.That,at any rate, is whatthisthirdinterpretationproposes.In its favouris the factthatit removes the authoritariansting from argumentsB and C. But what else may be said for it? Krautargues (pp. 91-103) that the analogybetween parentsand cities mustbe takenas drawinga parallelbetweenon the one handcitiesandtheir citizensandon the otherhandparentsandtheiradultoffspring.If this is so, then indeedhis interpretationof 'persuadeor obey' seemspreferable,since Greek society wouldhardlysupposethat a fully adultmanshouldobey his ageingfatheron all matterson whichhe did not succeedin persuadinghim otherwise.The consequenceis no doubtfairlydrawn,butthe premiseupon whichit rests is insecure.The text nowheresays that the relationshipit is concemedwithis specificallythatbetweenparentsandadultoffspring,and there is a strongindicationthat it is not, since this same relationis held to obtain between mastersand slaves (5Oe4,e8). It clearlycannotbe said of slavesthattheydo no wrongby disobeyingtheirmaster'scommand,so long as they have at leasttried(butfailed)to dissuadehimfromit. Krautreplies, if I understandhim rightly,that the master-slaverelationshipis relevant only to argumentA (concemingthe destructionof the superiorparty),and not to argumentC (concemingobedience to it) (pp. 105-8). But the two argumentscannotbe so clearlyseparated,since it is undeniablethat argumentC growsout of, anddevelops,the considerationdeployedin argument A. It is certainlyopen to us to hold that the thoughtin argumentC, as in argumentA, is that the relationshipof a citizento his city is comparableto the relationshipof a youngchildto its parents,or a slaveto his master:thus if persuasionfails, obedienceis required. Moreoverthis readingis very stronglysupportedby a point in the text that Krautappearsto overlook. At 51b2-3it is said that one shouldrever13 It is well known that dFetIv can mean 'try to persuade'. Success is not automatically implied (as it is with the English verb).
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ence (oaj3EoftaL)and yield to (oF&'E(xFLv) the state even more than to one's
parents. On Kraut's account of 'persuading'- i.e. trying, but perhaps failing,to persuade- this maypossiblybe viewed as a way of 'reverencing' one's parents or one's state, but it can hardlybe described as a way of yieldingto them. As he himselfexplains,a fatherwho has not been obeyed by his adultson, andwho has not been convincedby the persuasionoffered (either before or after), will generallydo nothingfurtherand expect nothing further.Thereis no penaltyhe can impose (save the extremepenaltyof disinheritance,which anywayhe can only impose once), and the son has entirelyfulfilledhis obligations.But a fatherin such a situationwill hardly think 'he has yielded to me'. I concludethat Kraut'spositive argumentin favourof his interpretationis unconvincing:it is muchmore probablethat the relationshipbetween the citizen and the city is being compared (in argumentC) to the relationshipbetween a young child and its parents, whichis in factsimilarto the relationshipbetweena slaveandhis master.In their case, obedience is expected, and disobedienceis set down as wrong, unless it is justifiedby a successfulattemptat persuasion. There are two furtherargumentsagainstKraut'sinterpretation.One is that it is of course the personifiedLaws themselves who propoundthe alternative'either obey or persuade',meaningpresumablythat they the Lawswill be satisfiedif eitherdisjunctis fulfilled.But very clearlythelaw is not satisfied by an unsuccessfulattempt at persuasion,14 and what Kraut means to suggest is that the demandsof moralityare satisfiedby this, at leastwhenit wouldbe wrongto obey, but not the demandsof the law. Thus, as he sees it, the personifiedLawshave a doublerole: they both represent the actual laws of the city, and yet can keep a distance from them and represent moralityinstead (as when they admit that the verdict against Socrateswas not a correct verdict, 54b8). However, where the 'obey or persuade'alternativeoccursin argumentB (at 51e7-52a3), it is surely as part of an account of what the actual laws of the city require, as is the permissionto emigratewith no financialpenalty,just above (51d-el). So there seems to me to be no escape from the objectionthis way: the actual laws evidently would not be satisfied by unsuccessful attempts at persuasion.
Finally,the Lawssay that if Socratesescapes he will have both failed to obey andfailedto persuade(52a3-4).Now quitea naturalwayof takingthis chargewould be to supposethat it claimsthat Socrateshas not obeyed the 14
By contrast, the law may be satisfied by a sincere but unsuccessfulattempt to obey, as Kraut urges on pp. 69-70.
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law againstimpietyand corruptingthe young, and also has not persuaded the jury that he should not be condemnedon this account. If that is the correct way of taking it, then our proposed third interpretationmust certainlybe rejected, since Socratesevidentlydid tryto persuadethe jury that he should not be condemned. However, it may well be that this 'natural'way of takingthe remarkis mistaken,for afterall our personified Lawsdo admitthatthe verdictwasincorrect,andso apparentlytheyshould concede that Socrateshas obeyed the Law againstimpietyand corrupting the young. So perhapswhat they meanis this: havingbeen foundguiltyon this charge, Socrates (if he escapes) will not be obeying the subsequent decision that he should thereforebe executed, and equallywill not have persuadedthe jurythat a differentpenaltywouldbe moreappropriate.But then again we can reply that he did try to persuadethe jury to impose a differentpenalty.(It maywell be saidthathe did not tryveryhard.Though the alternativethat was in the end proposed may not have been too unreasonable,15 the maintenorof his secondspeechin the Apologycanhardly be describedas a seriousplea for leniency;it is more naturallyseen simply as defiance. But this does not alter the fact that he did make an attemptat persuasion.)In response to this objection, Krautclaims that in order to count as 'persuading'the juryon this issue, Socratesshouldhave urged,in his secondspeech, that his escapefromgaol wouldbe justified(p. 89). But thatis evidentlyquiteunreasonable.It is surelyenoughthathe shouldhave tried to persuadethe jury that the death penaltywas not an appropriate penalty, and that indeed he did (37a-b). I concludethat there are too manyindicationsthat, in the Crito,merely trying (but failing) to persuadedoes not count as fulfillingthe command eitherto obey or to persuade,andthatourthirdinterpretationmustalso be rejected. Let us take stock. On all interpretations,the dialoguecontainsargumentA. Thisis not afully authoritarianargument,since it claimsonly that thereis one particularlaw that ought alwaysto be obeyed. Neverthelessit is authoritarianenoughto producea potentialconflictwiththe leadinginjunctionto do no wrong.It is not plausible, however, to see argumentA as the only argumentin the dialogue;at least we mustadmitthatargumentB is presentedas a different and independentargument.
IS This question is discussed in T. C. Brickhouseand N. D. Smith, 'Socrates'proposed penalty in Plato's Apology', Archivfir Geschichteder Philosophie64 (1982), pp. 1-18.
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Argument B should be preventedfrom reachinga fully authoritarian conclusionby the fact that, when its premiseis firstintroduced,an importantprovisois attached:one shouldkeep agreements,providedthatwhatis agreedis not wrong.However,whenargumentB is actuallydeveloped,this provisodoes not appear.In its place, two otherprovisosaresuggested- one (by implication) is that the agreement should be fairly made, with no duress, ignorance,or trickery;and the other is that persuadingthe other party to alter the agreementis an acceptable alternativeto keeping it. Neither of these provisospreventthe argumentfrom conflictingwith the leadinginjunctionto do no wrong.Concerningthe firstof them, thispointis uncontroversial;and I have just been arguingthat the same point should also be admitted concerningthe second, since what is intended is that disobedienceis permittedonlywhenthereis a successfulattemptat persuasion. ArgumentB, then, mayfairlybe characterisedas a fullyauthoritarian argument,for its concessionsfall far shortof what we actuallyrequire. Finally, there is also argumentC. This is no less authoritarianthan argumentB, and it seems in fact to be a furtherand separateargument. Although it evidently grows out of a considerationthat is relevant to argumentA, it buildsupon anddevelopsthatconsiderationso as to lead to a muchmore authoritarianresultthan A does by itself. As my finalquestion,I ask:wasthiswhatPlatointended?Did he meanto be arguingfor the authoritarianconclusionthatone shouldalwaysobey any and every law (failingpersuasion)?Or was it a mistakeon his partthat he allowedhimselfto use argumentsthat do (purportto) establishthis strong conclusion,when all that he actuallywishedto arguefor was a muchmore limited result? 4. Theauthoritarianinterpretation There are three points which may suggest that Plato did indeed mean to arguefor the strongconclusionthat one shouldalwaysobey any and every law. Of these the firsttwo would carrylittle weight by themselves,but the third is - it seems to me - of some significance.
In the concludingsectionof the dialogue,whenthe Lawsturnto consider the disadvantagesof escaping,one of the pertinentquestionsthat they ask is this: when you are livingin exile, Socrates,whatwill you say? 'Willyou saythe sameas you saidhere, thatvirtueandjustice,andcustomsandlaws, are of most value to men?' (53c6-8). We of course expect to be told that Socrates,while in Athens, had praisedvirtueand justice above all else (i 4L)nQxa'l h bLxaLoauv?). But is it not a little surprising to be told that he
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had accordedthe same praise also to customsand laws (Ta' v6tLpaxacioi v6lioL)?The implicationmust be that Socrates had supposed that the demandsof the law andthe demandsof moralityneverwouldconflictwith one another.t6No doubt this is difficultto reconcilewith Apology 32c-d, whereSocratesappearsexplicitlyto allowthatmoralitymayconflictwitha legally authoritativeorder. But here we may turnto the second point. Later in the same concludingpassage the laws themselves are distinguished from their applicationby men. Socrates, admittedly,has been wronged, but he has been wronged 'not by us, the Laws, but by men' (54b8-cl).7 In a similarvein it maybe urgedthatthe commandof the Thirty Tyrants,though(perhaps)legallyauthoritative,was not a commandof the laws themselves, but should rather be regardedas a commandof men wronglyapplyingthe law. Clearly,anyonewho wishesto maintainthatthe laws are never morally in the wrong will need just such a distinction between the laws themselves and their applicationby particularmen at particulartimes. It may be no accidentthat the Critodoes indeed insist upon it. These two points are perhaps suggestive, but equally they could not unreasonablybe discounted, as reading too great a significanceinto a coupleof strayremarkswhichsurelywerenot intendedto revealthe overall strategyof the dialogue.But my thirdpoint evidentlyis of importancefor the interpretationof the dialogue as a whole. It goes back to the introductorysection, where Socratesis setting the terms for the debate to come. When Crito first pleads that Socrates should accept his offer of an arrangedescape, he several times refers to 'whatmost people will think' (44b9-c5,44dl-5, 45d6-46al).Fromthe first,Socratesrejectsthisappealto the majorityopinion (44c6-7), and he begins his reply by arguingfor its worthlessness(46c6-8).He proposes,as an alternative,thatone shouldpay attentiononly to the opinionsof the one manwho knowsaboutwhateveris 47alO; 6 Ot&arT xat Ana(WV, at issue, the expert (6 wQ6vL&Log, 47blO-11). This, he says, applies equally where morals are concerned (47c9-10),for heretoo we shouldpayattentiononlyto 'he who understands about right and wrong, this one person and the truth itself (6 itat(ov nEQL TWV 6LxaLLv xaci &&xwv, 6 Ed5 xai acu'r'iA dXVsta, 48a6-7). Quite how we are to understand'customs' in this context is unclear. But perhaps it would not be unreasonable to take the reference to be to written laws (v6tol) and to 16
unwritten laws (v6Rtpa).
17 By contrast, at 51a3-4 it is apparentlythe Lawsthemselveswho are seeking to destroy Socrates.
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Thusthe methodthatSocratessuggests,for the properconsiderationof the questionbefore us, is that we shouldconsultthe moralexpert.Moreover, since it is nowhere suggestedthat the method cannot be followed in the present case, we should presumablysee the dialogue as pursuing this method. But who, then, is the expertwho is consulted? Well, the obvioussuggestionis thatit is the Lawsthemselves:the personified Laws are taken to be those who know about right and wrong, and whose opinionsthereforeshouldbe listenedto. If thisis not the implication of the introductorysection, then who else mightbe suggestedas the moral expertwhose adviceis sought?Thereseem to be just two alternatives.One is that it is Socrateswho is the expert, since after all the argumentthat is rhetoricallyput into the mouthof the Lawsis presumablyto be understood as being in fact Socrates'own reasoning.But (a) it wouldbe distinctlyodd, to say the least, if we aresupposedto take Socratesas here implyingthathe himselfis the moralexpert,since everywhereelse in Plato'sdialogueshe is consistentlyportrayedas disclaimingthisstatus.Besides, (b) thereseems to me to be altogethertoo much'irony'in Socratessaying'we mustconsultthe expert'and meaning'I mustwork it out myself, for I am the expert'. And finally(c) as the dialogueends Socratestells us thathe hearswhatthe Laws have been saying,as if it is indeednot his voice but another's(54d2-5),so as to preservethe impressionthat he has been listeningnot to his own advice but to someone else's. On the otherside, one mustof courseagreethat the Laws are presented as arguingfrom premises that Socrates himself has introducedat 49a-e (even if they do misrepresenthis premiseon keeping agreements).Thus it may be that we should understandSocratesas here claimingto be himselfthe expert,howeverimprobablethatmayseem in the light of the other dialogues.But it seems to me rathermore probablethat the presumedexpertis the Laws, who clearlycan be regardedas a further and differentsource, availablefor consultation. The other alternativeis that the 'expert' who is consulted duringthe dialogueis neitherSocratesnor the Lawsbut simply'the truthitself , as the wordingof 48a6-7(quotedabove) may perhapssuggest. If this was indeed Plato's intention, then (a) one can only say that the 'method'being proposed is a sham, and not in any way parallelto the method of consulting expertsover bodilyhealth and fitness (47al3-b3, 47d7-el). In moralquestions, there is no practicalway of setting out to 'consultthe truth itself', unlessone can firstassumesome genuineexpertwho does knowthis truth. Moreover(b) the wordingof 48a6-7('the expertandthe truth')is surelynot best understoodas implyingthat the only expert in this area simplyis the truth;rather,if one does consulta properexpert,then one willtherebyhave 19
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consulted the truth, because by hypothesisthe expert knows the truth. Moregencrally,the implicationthatthereis an expertto be consultedis not satisfiedmerelyby the suppositionthatthereis a truthto be discovered,and I am unwillingto believe that Plato thoughtotherwise. It mustbe admittedthatthe Critois uniqueamongPlato'searlydialogues in implyingthat there is such a thing as the moralexpert. Elsewhereit is explicitlyclaimed that there is no such thing (e.g. Protagoras319b-320b, Meno 89e-96c). But at the same time the Critois unique in attributinga seriousmoralargumentnot to Socratesnorto one of his interlocutorsbutto a personified abstraction,the Laws of Athens. It seems to me a very reasonableconjecturethatthese two featuresarerelated,andthatthe Crito does meanto implythat the lawsare the experts- or, at any rate, thatthey are the best approximationto expertsthat is availableto us. (The idea is perhapsthis:the lawsandcustomsof the city, thoughfallible- for they can sometimesbe 'persuaded'thatthey are in the wrong- are neverthelessthe only repositorywe have of 'the wisdomof the ages' in moralmatters.)For that reason, their advicemust alwaysbe treatedwith the greatestrespect. No doubt the argumentsof the Critodo push this line of thought.too far, andthe moralsupremacythatthey claimfor the lawsis not endorsedin any other early dialogue. PresumablyPlato came to see that the implications, when strictlycarriedthrough,are unacceptable,andthat thereis a need to distinguish,muchmore firmlythanthe Critodoes, betweenwhatis legally But I suspectthathe didquiteseriously wrongandwhatis morallywrong."8 mean, in the Critoitself, to arguethatthe good manwillneverintentionally disobeythe law. MertonCollege, Oxford
18 For all we know, the Crito may have been his first dialogue, preceding even the Apology. (R. Hackforth,in his The Compositionof Plato'sApology (Cambridge,1933), argues that there is reason to believe that the Apology was not composed until six years after the speeches it purportsto relate.)
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