THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM.pdf

THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE Third Edition

Cavendish Publishing Limited London  Sydney

THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE Third Edition

 A General Survey together with Notes and German Vocabulary Howard D Fisher LLB (Lond) (Hons) Rechtsanwalt

Cavendish Publishing Limited London • Sydney

First published in Great Britain 2002 by Cavendish Publishing Limited, The Glass House, Wharton Street, London WC1X 9PX, United Kingdom Telephone: +44 (0)20 7278 8000 Email: il:

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Fisher, Howard D

2 002

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1 9 96

Second edition

199 9

Third edition

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except under the terms of the Copyrights Designs and Patents Act 1988 or under the terms of a licence issued by the Copyright Licensing Li censing Agency, Agency, 90 Tottenham Tottenham Court Cour t Road, London W1P 9HE, UK, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

Fisher, Howard German legal system and legal language—3rd ed 1 Law—Germany 2 Law—Germany—Terminology Law—Germany—Terminology I Title 349.4'3

ISBN 1 85941 706 X

Printed and bound in Great Britain

In memory of my parents

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION This edition consolidates and broadens the position reached in the previous two editions with revisions and updating. The greater maturity of this edition goes hand in hand with a deeper treatment of  the BGB, which continues to represent the foundation for many areas of civil law in Germany. Germany. Indeed, despite numerous amendments amen dments and refinements,1 the BGB has gone into the new millennium largely unscathed and the special legal language used by German lawyers to describe legal concepts remains intact. I have, therefore, decided to relegate the resolution I set myself in the first edition (viz, to avoid more detailed exposition of the BGB) to the ‘wishful thinking’ department! On the international scene, the expansion of, and pioneering developments in, the European Union continue apace, but, so far, far, national sensibilities sensibili ties have largely shielded existing structures. Thus, for the time being, the thorny subject of an eloquent European Constitution, inevitable in the long term, appears not to be a priority. 2 Moreover, the European Court of Justice is still struggling to free itself from political shackles and find its place in the popular consciousness.3 Since the second edition, I have added new material on a multitude of topics: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

standard bu busin siness te terms; the provi provision sionss of the BGB concern concerning ing damages damages (§§ 249ff 249ff BGB) BGB);; delay (‘Verzug’); contra contracts cts having having protec protectiv tivee effec effectt in favour favour of a thir third d part party; y; tran transa sacti ction onss stipu stipula latin ting g an exact exact time time for for perf perfor orma manc ncee (‘Fixgeschäft’); long long--dist distan ance ce tra tran nsact sactio ions ns (‘Fernabsatz’); contracts of rental (‘Miete’); contracts of loan (‘Darlehen’); the the doc doctr trin inee of of the the duty duty of safe safety ty (‘Verkehrssicherungspflicht’) in tort; the the publ public ic cr creden edence ce of of th thee Land Land Reg Regis iste ter; r; the the tra trans nsfe ferr of of ow owne ners rshi hip p of land land;; mort mo rtga gage gess and and lan land cha charrges; ges; the la law of of su succession; the terms ‘Gesellschaft’, ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Verband’; unin uninco corp rpor orat ated ed ass assoc ocia iati tion ons; s; the the dut duties ies of memb members ers of a civi civill la law w comp compan any y (‘B (‘BGB GB--Gesellscha’); the terms ‘Geschäftsführung’, ‘Vertretung’ ‘Vertretung’ and ‘Haftung’; comp compet etit ition ion by by emplo employe yees es bef befor oree and and afte afterr emplo employm ymen ent; t; the the pri priva vate te limi limite ted d com comp pan any; y; the the im impo port rtan ance ce of § 13 1399 ZPO; PO; the the proh prohib ibiti ition on on rep reprresent esentat ation ion in § 157 ZPO; ZPO; the the specif specifici icity ty prin princip ciple le in civ civil il proce procedu dure re (§ (§ 253 ZPO ZPO); ); object objection ionss to proce procedur dural al defec defects ts (§ 295 295 ZPO) ZPO) and and preclu preclusion sion of submis submission sionss (§ 296 296 ZPO); vii

The German Legal System and Legal Language

• • • • • • •

cond conduct uct of the the pro procee ceedi ding ngss and and clos closur uree of the the hear hearin ing; g; sett settle leme ment nt of disp disput utes es out out of of cou court rt;; empl employ oyee ees’ s’ righ rights ts on inso insolv lven ency cy;; accidents at work; the la law of of se securities; the the juris jurisdi dict ction ion of the the cou courts rts in crim crimin inal al mat matte ters; rs; the the evid eviden enti tial al tre treat atme ment nt of of doc docum umen ents ts..

I have also extensively revised the Notes and draw attention to the following recent German statutory enactments: • • • • • • • • • • •

the proposed proposed Laws to Reform Reform the Law of Obligation Obligationss and and Civil Civil Procedur Proceduree (Pre (Preface face to the Second Edition, Note 11); the the E-Co E-Comm mmer erce ce Law Law (Ch (Chap apte terr X, No Note te 54) 54);; the the Law Law to Accel Accelera erate te Due Due Paym Paymen ents ts (Ch (Chap apte terr X, Note Note 127); 127); the Law Law conce concernin rning g Long-D Long-Dista istance nce Tran Transact saction ionss (Chapt (Chapter er X, Note Note 193) 193);; the the Rent Rental al Law Law Ref Refor orm m Act Act (Ch (Chap apte terr X, §§ 5535f 35fff BGB) BGB);; the Law concer concernin ning g Bank Bank Transfe ransfers rs (Cha (Chapte pterr X, X, N Note ote 216); 216); chan change gess to Book Book 8 of of the the ZPO ZPO (Cha (Chapt pter er XII XIII, I, N Not otee 188) 188);; the Law concer concernin ning g PartPart-T Time Work (Chapt (Chapter er XVIII XVIII,, Note Note 13); 13); the Law concern concerning ing Shar Shares es issued issued in the the Name Name of a Part Particul icular ar Person Person (Chapt (Chapter er XIX, Note 35); the Law to Revise Revise Private Private Internat International ional Law in Respe Respect ct of of Non-C Non-Contr ontractu actual al Obligations (Chapter XX, Note 26); the Law Law regar regardin ding g the Activit Activity y of Euro Europea pean n Lawyers Lawyers in in German Germany y (Chapt (Chapter er XXII, XXII, Note 56).

Finally, I have added and cross-referenced a Table of the Articles from the legal magazine ZAP, to which reference is made in the text (Appendix F). I hope that the changes made will increase the usefulness of the book and improve its reliability.

 Howard D Fisher Frankfurt am Main December 2001

viii

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM Germany has one of the most scientific legal systems anywhere in the world. For a person with English as his or her mother tongue to seek to understand that system sys tem is not easy, even with a legal education. Why is this so? The principal reason lies in the fact that, for historical reasons, the methods and sources of German and English law have developed differently. differently. Another reason is the German language and its seemingly seemi ngly endless supply of formal terminology. terminology. Certainly, Certainly, legal and everyday language are not the same anywhere, but where can this be more so than in Germany? If the linguistic complexities were not enough, the enormous codification of  practically every area of law in Germany will remain a formidable obstacle to comprehension of the German system for a foreigner, even after the dawn of the ‘new’ Europe after 1993. The German legal system remains, generally speaking, a system of (positive) norms, ie, traditional German legal thinking revolves, in the vast majority of cases, around the twin immutable ‘pillars’ of an established system and norms regarded as authoritative.1 This contrasts markedly with the ‘mixed’ system of precedents and statutes and thinking in terms of problems (‘Problemdenken’) prevalent in common law countries. Alternative legal methods have not (yet) made great inroads in Germany. Germany.2 The main tool of the German legal system is the German legal language, which is of a precision unmatched (and perhaps unattainable) in English. 3

THIS BOOK This book contains a general survey in the English language of the structure and concepts of some som e of the main areas of German law la w. My aim has thereby been to provide a basic insight into the German legal system and technical language. The book is based on my understanding and study of German laws and texts and constitutes a summary and introduction only. only. A more more detailed account, for example, of the ‘Grundgesetz’ and the BGB, would have involved lengthy exposition, which I wanted to avoid. Understanding the layout of the various laws is, in my view, the main task for the newcomer (see Chapter X, Note 109). In particular, the book does not deal with banking, competition, insurance, intellectual property, property, planning (building), environmental or tax law nor with wi th many of  the numerous statutes in the fields of private and public law to be found in the handbook collections ‘Schönfelder’ and ‘Sartorius’ (for examples see Chapter XIX A). These areas can be considered at another time. It should also be mentioned that tha t I merely touch upon the Special Part of the Criminal Cr iminal Code (StGB; Chapter XVI B) and that, in the law of criminal procedure, a description of the provisions concerning the main hearing and consequent remedies still needs to  be added (Chapter XVII G). To well versed German lawyers and experts the book will, I am sure, provide opportunity for criticism of misunderstanding, errors and incompleteness. Readers ix

The German Legal System and Legal Language

are, therefore, therefore, advised to consult German laws, authorities and guides in their original versions for the necessary detail or in cases of doubt. Readers with a love for plenty of case-law case-l aw should always remember that it is a fact that the German legal system is almost al most entirely based on codifications. This book only contains references to a handful of cases, most of which stem from Donald Kommers’ The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany  and from the Sourcebook on German Law by Raymond Youngs. They concern the ‘Grundgesetz’,  the first two Books of the BGB and the StGB (Chapters II, V, V, VII, VIII, X and XVI).

THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE For those readers, who wish to compare English and German law, law, I have indicated indic ated in the Index (under ‘English law’) where aspects of English law are referred to in the  book. However, I do not hold the book out as a work wor k on comparative law. law. If that is what is sought, I would draw the reader’s attention to the distinguished treatise in the field of private law by Zweigert and Kötz, to the scholarly analysis by BS Markesinis (The German Law of Obligations: A Comparative Introduction) and to the admirable work  by Raymond Youngs Youngs (English, French and German Comparative Law) . Zweigert and Kötz make the interesting prediction that ‘the day may not be too far distant when the project of a European Civil Code will be undertaken’ (Chapter 14 II). Whatever the chances of such a Code ever being enacted, I would venture to wager that the long established and highly developed concepts contained in the various codifications of German law will remain in use for so long as German is spoken. The vital role of language and the question of popular acceptance should not be underestimated.4 In the light of developments in the European Union,5 it should be pointed out here that some very difficult problems, perhaps ultimately requiring root-and-branch reform, still exist: –

–

–

–

The coordina coordination tion and ‘harmonisa ‘harmonisation tion’’ of of the the various various legal systems systems and procedur procedures es in Europe (‘Rechtsangleichung’) is extremely complex. What should be retained or copied and what is irrelevant or outdated? How much is really necessary?6 Consti Constitut tution ional al issue issuess are are bound, bound, mor moree and mor more, e, to pre preocc occupy upy the the Euro Europea pean n legislatures. Is a federal system a foregone conclusion? What will happen to the monarchies?7 Can the the tradit tradition ionall ally y immovab immovable le nation national al admini administr strati ative ve struct structur ures es be integr integrate ated? d? Should they be streamlined? How can the risk of a usurpation of power be minimised? Can Ca n the the pri princ ncip iple le of lega legall cer certa tain inty ty (‘Rechtssicherheit’) be upheld in a multi-lingual 8 environment?

In theory, theory, these are matters which whic h can be resolved, provided the member states of the European Union have the necessary (political) will and mutual trust and are not deflected by internal frictions and other pressures.9 x

Preface to the Second Edition

For centuries, codified and common law have been opposite poles and have coexisted side by side. Despite some doubters,10 movement has now set in and the debate between the supporters and opponents of   both systems will have to be faced. If, indeed, pan-European law la w should become a 11 reality, lawyers will play an important part in ensuring that accessibility, clarity and flexibility do not suffer. suffer. Whether European law is ultimately nothing more than a mirage, time will tell. Much will depend on the ingredients placed in the European ‘legal crucible’.12 The possible scenario that, unless the quantity of norms is controlled, the mushrooming and overlapping of legal sources (‘bloated law’) in the European member states will, at some stage, result in chaos, may be pessimistic, but it cannot be ignored entirely. The achievement of efficiency and transparency in a jungle of norms must involve some sacrifice.13

PRACTICAL POINTS I hope that, despite such imperfections as it may have, this book will prove useful to those native English speakers who deal with legal matters in Germany, to those who wish to try to ‘grasp the nettle’ of the German legal system and legal language for the first time and to those who aim to qualify as German lawyers. Comments and suggestions regarding the book are welcome. Since the first edition, I have made various additions and corrections, more often than not in the Notes and Appendices. Insertions and reorganisation of information have meant changes in the numbering of Notes. In particular, there are two new Chapters—entitled ‘Business Law’ (Chapter XIX) and ‘International Legal Cooperation’ (Chapter XXI). I have added new sections on ‘Foreign Relations’ (Chapter II H), the ‘Hearing in the Administrative Court’ (Chapter XV D), the ‘Defence Lawyer’ (Chapter XVII C), ‘Personal and Family Matters’ (Chapter XX C), ‘Judicial Administration’ (Chapter XXII C 6) and a ‘Table ‘Table of English Statutes’ (Appendix E). I also draw attention to recent reforms to the Commercial Code (HGB) and controversial changes in employment law and lawyers’ practice rules. The content (and, therefore, size) of the Notes results from the fact that I amend the  book (and insert new Notes) Notes) sporadically sporadically in the course of my experience. experience. I acknowledge acknowledge that, in places, the length of some Notes is out of proportion to detail in the main text and that some users dislike having to locate relevant detail in a lengthy Note. Consequently, a shortening of some Notes and a transfer of information to the text is desirable. However, when one deals with such an intricate subject matter, such an operation is not merely a question of style—it will involve substantial (and time consuming) reorganisation. In the meantime, the Notes now comprise a separate section following the main text, instead of being integrated therein, as in the first edition.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language

I hope that these changes will be considered helpful. Finally, as before, I have endeavoured to maintain correct and consistent translation and to cross-reference the text, Notes and Appendices.

 Howard D Fisher Frankfurt am Main  June 1999

xii

CONTENTS Preface to the Third Edition

vii

Preface to the Second Edition

ix

 Materials

xxiii

Bibliography

xxv

Cross-References

xxxi

I

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

1

II

THE FEDERAL STATE

5

A

The Division of Power

5

B

The Passing of Laws

5

C

The Executive

5

D

The Administration of Justice

6

E

The ‘Rechtsstaat’ Principle

6

F

The Origin, Separation and Binding of State Power

7

G

The ‘Freiheitliche Demokratische Grundordnung’

7

H

Foreign Relations

8

III

THE SUPREME FEDERAL ORGANS

IV

THE SUPREME AND OTHER FEDERAL AUTHORITIES

V

THE

VI

9 11

‘LÄNDER’ 

13

A

Introduction

13

B

State Administration in the ‘Länder’

14

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

VII THE CONSTITUTION

15

(‘GRUNDGESETZ’)

17

A

Introduction

17

B

Rank of the Basic Law and Validity of Norms

17

C

The Federal and State Constitutional Courts

18

xiii

The German Legal System and Legal Language

VIII THE BASIC RIGHTS

IX

X

21

A

Introduction

21

B

Limitation of Basic Rights

21

C

The Actual Rights

22

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW

25

A

Introduction

25

B

Distinguishability of Norms

25

PRIVATE LAW: THE CIVIL CODE (BGB)

27

A

Introduction

27

B

Book I: The ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (§§ 1–240 BGB)

27

1

Terminology to Note

27

2

The Provisions of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ Regarding ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’ (§§ 104–185 BGB) (Section 3) (a) Title 1 (§§ 104–115 BGB) (b) Title 2 (§§ 116–144 BGB) (c) Title 3 (§§ 145–157 BGB) (d) Title 4 (§§ 158–163 BGB) (e) Standard business terms (AGB)

30 30 31 34 36 37

3

The Rest of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (§§ 186–240 BGB) (Sections 4–7)

41

4

Exposé: ‘Verjährung’ (§§ 194–225 BGB) (Section 5)

42

C

D

Book II: The Law of Obligations (§§ 241–853 BGB)

44

1

Introduction

44

2

Points to Note

44

3

Sections 1–7

45

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

45 47 51 52 52 53 53

Section 1 (§§ 241–304 BGB) Section 2 (§§ 305–361 BGB) Section 3 (§§ 362–397 BGB) Section 4 (§§ 398–413 BGB) Section 5 (§§ 414–419 BGB) Section 6 (§§ 420–432 BGB) Section 7 (§§ 433–853 BGB)

Book II: The Law of Property (§§ 854–1296 BGB)

71

1

Introduction

71

2

‘Dingliches Recht’ and ‘Verfügung’

72

xiv

Contents

3

Sections 1–9 (a) Sect Sectio ion n 1 (§§ (§§ 854 854–87 –8722 BGB BGB)) (b) (b) Secti Section on 2 (§§ (§§ 8873 73–90 –9022 BGB BGB)) (c) (c) Secti Section on 3 (§§ (§§ 90 903–1 3–101 0111 BGB BGB)) (d) (d) Secti Section on 4 (§§ (§§ 11012 012–1 –1017 017 BGB) BGB) (e) (e) Secti Section on 5 (§§ (§§ 10 1018– 18–109 10933 BGB BGB)) (f) (f) Sect Sectio ion n 6 ((§§ §§ 1109 094– 4–1110 1044 BGB BGB)) (g) Sectio Section n 7 (§§ 1105–1 105–1112 BGB) BGB) (h) Section Sectionss 8 and and 9 (§§ (§§ 11 1113–1296 13–1296 BGB) BGB)

73 73 74 75 77 77 77 77 78

E

Book Book IV: IV: Fam Famil ily y Law Law (§§ (§§ 129 1297– 7–19 1921 21 BGB) BGB)

80

F

Book Book V: Law Law of Succ Succes essi sion on (§§ (§§ 192 1922– 2–23 2385 85 BGB) BGB)

81

1 2 3

Introduction Constitutional Gu Guarantee The Modes of Inheritance (‘Erbfolge’) (a) (a) By statu statute te (§§ (§§ 192 1924–1 4–1936 936 BGB) BGB) (b) (b) By disp dispos osit ition ion on deat death h (‘Verfügung von Todes wegen’) (c) The will (‘Testament’; §§ 1937, 2064–2086, 2229–2264 BGB) (d) (d) The The joi join nt w wil illl (‘Gemeinschaftliches Testament’; §§ 2265–2273 BGB) (e) (e) The The est estat atee con contr trac actt (‘Erbvertrag’; §§ 1941, 2274–2302 BGB)

81 82 82 82 83 84 86 87

4

The Estate (‘Erbschaft’/‘Nachlaß’) and the Heir(s) 87 (a) (a) Unive Univers rsal al succe successi ssion on (§ (§ 192 19222 BGB) BGB) 87 (b) (b) The The comm commun unit ity y of heir heirss (‘Erbengemeinschaft’; §§ 2032–2063 BGB) 87 (c) (c) App Appoint ointme men nt o off aan n hei heirr (‘Erbeinsetzung’; §§ 1937, 1941, 2087–2099 BGB) 88 (d) Appoin Appointmen tmentt of a subst substitu itute te heir heir (‘Ersatzerbe’; §§ 2096–2099 BGB) 89 (e) (e) Appo Appoin intme tment nt of of a sub subse sequ quen entt heir heir (‘Nacherbe’; §§ 2100–2146 BGB) 89 (f) (f) Excl Exclus usio ion n fr from succ succes essi sion on 90 (g) Entitl Entitleme ement nt to a ccomp ompuls ulsory ory portio portion n (‘Pflichtteil’; §§ 2303–2338 BGB) 91 (h) Lega Legacie ciess and and dir direc ecti tion onss (‘Vermächtnis’/‘Auflage’ ; §§ 1939–1940 2147–2196 BGB) 92 (i) (i) Appo Appoin intm tmen entt of of an an exe execu cuto torr (‘Testamentsvollstrecker’ ; §§ 2197–2228 BGB) 92 Procedural Aspects 93 (a) Acce Accep ptance (‘Annahme’) and disclaimer (‘Ausschlagung’; §§ 1942–1966 BGB) 93 (b) Liab Liabil ilit ity y of the the hei heir( r(s) s) for for deb debts ts (‘Haftung für Nachlaßverbindlichkeiten’ Nachlaßverbindlichkeiten’; §§ 1967–2017, 2058–2063 BGB) 94 (c) Claims Claims again against st thir third d partie partiess (§§ (§§ 2018–20 2018–2031 31 BGB) BGB) 94 (d) The certific certificate ate of inheri inheritan tance ce (‘Erbschein’; §§ 2353–2370 BGB) 94 (e) (e) The The pr probat obatee cour courtt (‘Nachlaßgericht’) 95

5

xv

The German Legal System and Legal Language

XI

PRIV PRIVATE LAW LAW: BGB COMP COMPANY ANY LA LAW AND THE COMMERCIAL CODE (HGB)

97

A

Con Co ntext text an and d Defin efinit itio ion ns

97

B

Duties, Ma Management (‘Geschäftsführung’), Representation (‘Vertretung’) and Liability (‘Haftung’) 99

C

The HGB in Detail

100

1

Introduction

100

2

Book I (§§ 1–104 HGB): ‘Handelsstand’ (a) (a) Sect Sectio ion n 1 (§§ (§§ 1–7 1–7 HGB) HGB) (b) (b) Sect Sectio ions ns 2 an and d 3 (§§ (§§ 8–37 8–37 HGB HGB)) (c) (c) Sect Sectio ion n 5 (§§ (§§ 48– 48–58 58 HGB) HGB) (d) (d) Sect Section ion 6 (§§ (§§ 59 59–83 –83 HGB) HGB) (e) (e) Sect Sectio ions ns 7 an and d 8 (§§ (§§ 84– 84–104 104 HGB) HGB)

101 101 101 101 102 104

3

Book II (§§ 105–237 HGB): ‘Handelsgesellschaften’

104

(a ) (b) (b) (c) (c) (d) (d)

104 104 107 107

Content Sect Section ion 1 (§§ (§§ 105–1 105–160 60 HGB) HGB) Sect Sectio ion n 2 (§§ (§§ 161 161–1 –177 77aa HGB) HGB) Sect Section ion 3 (§§ (§§ 230– 230–237 237 HGB) HGB)

4

Book III (§§ 238–339 HG HGB): ‘Handelsbücher’

107

5

Book IV (§§ 343–460 HGB): ‘Handelsgeschäfte’

108

XII THE PRIV PRIVATE LIMITED LIMITED COMP COMPANY ANY (GMBH) (GMBH)

111 111

A

Introduction

111

B

Establishment

111

C

‘Stammkapital’, ‘Stammeinlage’ and ‘Geschäftsanteil’

112

D

Organs 112

E

Directors (‘Geschäftsführer’)

113

XIII CIVIL CIVIL PROCEDU PROCEDURE RE

115

A

The ‘Zivilprozeßordnung’ (ZPO)

115

B

The The Maxi Maxims ms of Ci Civi vill Proc Proced edur uree

115

C

Points to Note

116

D

The ZPO in Detail

118

1

118 118

Book Book I (§§ (§§ 1– 1–25 2522 ZPO) ZPO):: Gene Genera rall Prov Provis isio ions ns (a) Content xvi

Contents

(b) (b) Sect Sectio ion n 1 (§§ (§§ 1–4 1–499 ZPO) ZPO) (c) (c) Sect Sectio ion n 2 ((§§ §§ 550– 0–12 127a 7a ZPO) ZPO) (d) (d) Secti Section on 3 (§§ (§§ 128–2 128–252 52 ZPO ZPO)) (e) (e) Secti Section on lin deta detail il (§§ (§§ 1–49 1–49 ZPO) ZPO) (f) (f) Sect Section ion 2 in in deta detail il (§§ (§§ 50–1 50–127 27aa Z ZPO PO)) (g) Sectio Section n 3 in deta detail il (§§ (§§ 128–2 128–252 52 ZPO) ZPO) 2 Book Book II (§§ (§§ 253– 253–51 510b 0b ZPO) ZPO):: Pro Proce ceed edin ings gs at 1st 1st Ins Insta tanc ncee (a) Content (b) Sectio Section n 1 (§§ 253–494 253–494 ZPO): ZPO): In the ‘Landgericht’ (c) (c) Secti Section on 11,, Tit Title le 1 (§§ (§§ 253– 253–29 299a 9a ZPO ZPO)) (d) Section Section 2 (§§ (§§ 495–51 495–510b 0b ZPO) ZPO):: In the ‘Amtsgericht’ (e) (e) Alter Alterna nativ tivee settl settlem emen entt of dispu dispute tess 3 Book Book III III (§§ (§§ 51 511– 1–57 5777 ZPO ZPO): ): Reme Remed dies ies (a) ‘Berufung’ (§§ 511–544 ZPO) (b) ‘Revision’ (§§ 545–566a ZPO) (c) ‘Beschwerde’ (§§ 567–577 ZPO) 4 Book IV (§§ 578–591 ZPO): ‘Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens’ 5 Book V (§§ 592–605a ZPO): ‘Urkunden- und Wechselprozeß’ Wechselprozeß’ 6 Book Book VI (§§ (§§ 606 606–6 –644 44 ZPO): PO): Fami Family ly Matte atters rs (a) Content (b) (b) Secti Section on 1 (§§ (§§ 60 606–6 6–638 38 ZPO) ZPO) (c) (c) Secti Section on 3 (§§ (§§ 64 64111– 1–64 6444 ZPO ZPO)) 7 Book VII VII (§§ 68 688–703d ZP ZPO): Th The ‘Mahnverfahren’ 8 Book VI VIII (§ (§§ 70 704–945 ZP ZPO): ‘Zwangsvollstreckung’ (a) Content (b) (b) Secti Section on 1 (§§ (§§ 70 704–6 4–602 02 ZPO) ZPO) (c) (c) Sect Sectio ion n 2 (§§ (§§ 803 803–8 –882 82aa ZPO) ZPO) (d) (d) Secti Section on 3 (§§ (§§ 883– 883–898 898 ZPO) ZPO) (e) (e) Sect Sectio ion n 4 (§§ (§§ 899 899–9 –915 15 ZPO ZPO)) (f) (f) Sect Sectio ion n 5 (§§ (§§ 916 916–9 –945 45 ZPO) ZPO) 9 Book IX(§§ 946– 6–11024 ZP ZPO): Th The ‘Aufgebotsverfahren’ 10 Book Book X (§§ (§§ 10 1025– 25–10 1048 48 ZPO ZPO): ): Arbi Arbitr trati ation on XIV ADMINISTRATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LAW

118 118 118 119 120 125 128 128 128 129 134 135 135 135 137 138 139 139 139 139 139 145 146 146 146 146 150 152 153 154 155 155 157

A

Introduction

157

B

The ‘Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz’

157

1

157

Introduction

xvii

The German Legal System and Legal Language

C

2

Content

158

3

The ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’

158

The‘Verwaltungsakt’  (VA)

159

1

Definition

159

2

Content

159

3

Validity and Legality

160

4

‘Bestandskraft’, ‘Rücknahme’ and ‘Widerruf’

160

5

Types

160

6

Grant of an ‘Erlaubnis’ or ‘Genehmigung’

161

XV ADMINI ADMINISTR STRA ATIVE TIVE PROC PROCEDU EDURE RE

A

Avail vailab able le Reme Remedi dies es.. The The ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung’ (VwGO)

163

B

Types of Writ

163

C

Prel Prelim imin inar ary y Requ Requir irem emen ents ts

163

D

The The Hear Hearin ing g in the the Admi Admini nist stra rati tive ve Cou Court rt

164

XVI CRIMINAL CRIMINAL LAW LAW

167

A

Introduction

167

B

Types of Offence

167

C

Elements of an Offence

168

1

‘Tatbestandsmäßigkeit’  of the ‘Handlung’ (a) Whe When an an act is ‘tatbestandsmäßig’

2

(b) (b) Crim Crimes es by om omis issi sion on (c) (c) Acts Acts by per person sonss repr repres esen enti ting ng othe others rs ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ of the ‘Handlung’ (a) When a ‘Handlung’ is ‘rechtswidrig’ (b) ‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’

3

‘Schuld’ (a ) (b) (c) (d) (d)

D

163

Meaning of of ‘Schuld’

‘Schuldfähigkeit’ Forms of ‘Schuld’ Exclu xclusi sion on of ‘Schuld’

Con onse sequ quen encces of an Off Offence ence

168 168 169 169 170 170 170 170 170 171 171 172 173

‘Strafen’ ‘Maßreglen der Besserung und Sicherung’ xviii

173 173

Contents

XVIICRIMINAL XVIICRIMINAL PROCEDURE

175

A

Introduction

175

B

The ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’

176

C

The‘Verteidiger’

177

D

The Police

178

E

Acti Actio on Fol Follo lowi wing ng In Inve vest stig igat atio ion n

179

F

‘Hauptverhandlungshaft’

179

G

The Main Main Proc Proceed eeding ingss and There Thereaft after er (Book (Book II II (Secti (Section on 6)—Bo 6)—Book ok IV StPO) StPO) 180

H

Invo In volv lvem emen entt of the the Inju Injure red d Part Party y (Boo (Book k V StP StPO) O)

180

I

Spec Specia iall Typ Types es of Proc Procee eedi ding ngss (Bo (Book ok VI StPO StPO))

180

 J

Enfor Enforceme cement nt of Punishm Punishment ent and Costs Costs of the Proce Proceedi edings ngs (Book (Book VII VII StPO) StPO) 180

XVIII EMPL EMPLOY OYME MENT NT LAW

181

A

Introduction

181

B

Form Form an and d Term Termin inat atio ion n of of a Co Cont ntra ract ct of Empl Employ oymen mentt

181

C

The ‘Betrieb’ and ‘Betriebsrat’

183

D

Coop Co oper erat atio ion n bet betwe ween en Empl Employ oyer er an and d ‘Betriebsrat’

184

E

The Rights of the ‘Betriebsrat’

184

F

‘Mitbestimmung’ in Large ‘Unternehmen’

185

G

The Coalitions

186

H

‘Arbeitsschutzrecht’

186

I

Accidents at Work

187

XIX BUSINE BUSINESS SS LAW LAW (‘WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT’)

189

A

Introduction

189

B

Law of Securities (‘Wertpapierrecht’)

190

What is a ‘Wertpapier’?

191

XX PRIVA PRIVATE INTERNA INTERNATIONA TIONAL L LA LAW

195

A

The EGBGB

195

B

Points to Note

195

C

Pers Person onal al an and d Fami Family ly Matt Matter erss

196

xix

The German Legal System and Legal Language

D

The Law of Obligati ations

197

1

Contractual Obligations

197

2

Questions of of Ju Jurisdiction (‘Zuständigkeit’)

198

(a) Special cial ve venues

198

(b) Agr Agreement ents

198

Non-Contractual Obliga igations

199

3 E

Proof of of Foreign Law

199

XXI INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COOPERATION COOPERATION

201

A

Introduction

201

B

Sources of Law

201

C

Extradition (‘Auslieferung’)

202

XXIITHE LEGAL PROFESSION AND COURT SYSTEM

203

A

The Judges

203

B

The ‘Rechtspfleger’

204

C

The Court System

205

1

The ‘Gerichtsbarkeiten’

205

2

The ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’

205

3

The ‘besondere Gerichtsbarkeit’

206

4

The ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’

206

5

‘Rechtspflege’

207

‘Justizverwaltung’ D The ‘Rechtsanwalt’ 6

207 207

1

Introduction

207

2

Status of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’

208

3

Admission as a ‘Rechtsanwalt’

208

4

Relationship of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ to his Client

209

5

Rights and Duties of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’

209

6

The ‘Rechtsanwaltskammer’

211

7

Complaints

212

8

Legal Fees (a) (a) Basi Basiss of calc calcul ulat atio ion n (b) Civil Civil procee proceedin dings gs and nonnon-con conten tentiou tiouss matters matters

213 213 214

xx

Contents

(c) (c) (d) (d) (e) (f) (f) (g) (g) 9 E

Othe Otherr proc procee eedi ding ngss Leve Levell of fees fees Fra Framewo worrk fee feess Lega Legall assi assist stan ance ce and and leg legal al aid aid Futu Futurre refor eform m

The ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’

The ‘Notar’

214 215 215 215 216 216 217

NOTES

221

Preface to the Third Edition

221

Preface to the Second Edition (With Corrections)

221

Chapter I

225

Chapter II

228

Chapter III

233

Chapter IV

234

Chapter V

234

Chapter VI

235

Chapter VII

236

Chapter VIII

239

Chapter IX

244

Chapter X

245

Chapter XI

282

Chapter XII

286

Chapter XIII

287

Chapter XIV

303

Chapter XV

306

Chapter XVI

308

Chapter XVII

314

Chapter XVIII

322

Chapter XIX

328

Chapter XX

330

Chapter XXI

334

Chapter XXII

335 xxi

The German Legal System and Legal Language APPENDIX A

Vocabulary: Selected Sel ected German and Latin Words and Phrases (With (W ith Their English/Legal Meanings)

345

APPENDIX B

Abbreviations Referred to in the Text Text (For English Meanings See Appendix A) 463 APPENDIX C

Paragraph Register

469

APPENDIX D

Table of Cases

533

German Cases

533

European and United Kingdom Cases

540

APPENDIX E

Table of English Statutes

541

APPENDIX F

Table of Articles from ZAP

543 553

Index

xxii

MATERIALS In order to be able to derive use from and follow the explanations in this book, it is essential to have the texts of German (federal) laws l aws (‘Gesetzestexte’) to hand. They are available in various forms, of which very well known are the regularly updated paperback editions published by DTV/Beck and the handbook collections entitled ‘Schönfelder: Deutsche Gesetze’ and ‘Sartorius I: Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgesetze der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ and ‘Sartorius II: Internationale Verträge/Europarecht’ erträge/Europarecht’. I would also particularly recommend: – – –

Creifelds: Rechtswörterbuch, which is a concise German legal dictionary; The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany  by Donald P Kommers, which is an outstanding casebook and treatise on that subject; and Raymond Youngs’ Sourcebook on German Law,  which contains a selection of many m any instructive German texts with English translations tra nslations and commentary. commentary.

Additionally, reference can be made to the numerous textbooks (‘Lehrbücher’) and commentaries (‘Kommentare’) on the various areas of German law, if more detailed advice is required. Included in my bibliography are many standard books for German law students. A multitude of regular magazines, general and specialist, cover every aspect of the German legal scene. I subscribe to the ‘Zeitschrift für die Anwaltspraxis’ (ZAP), which is ‘Verlag für die Rechts- und Anwaltspraxis’ (Beisinger published every two weeks by the ‘Verlag Weg la, D-45657 Recklinghausen; Internet: www.zap-verlag.de) and forms part of a reference work divided into 25 subject-areas (‘Fächer’). It contains (inter alia): – –

an edit editor oria iall colu column mn (Z (ZAP AP-K -Kol olum umne ne); ); a repor reportt on curr current ent deve develop lopmen ments ts (ZAP(ZAP-Aktu Aktuell ell)) and new or or propo proposed sed legis legislat lation ion

–

(‘Gesetzgebungsreport’); urgent news (‘Eilnachrichten’), consecutively numbered by year (eg, ZAP EN-Nr

– – –

402/1996); a crit critic ical al sect sectio ion n on the the judi judici ciar ary y (‘Justizspiegel’); articles (‘Aufsätze’); and case-law su surveys (‘Rechtsprechungsübersichten’) on certain common areas of law (ie, landlord and tenant, construction, road traffic, family, employment, constitutional and administrative and criminal).

References in this book to ZAP are by issue number and year (eg, ZAP 21/1995).

xxiii

BIBLIOGRAPHY Battis/Gusy: Einführung in das Staatsrecht; 4th edn (1999) (CF Müller) Baumann: Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft; 8th edn (1989) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Baumann (ER)’ Baumann: Grundbegriffe und System des Strafrechts;   5th edn (1979) (Kohlhammer); referred to in the Notes as ‘Baumann (GBS)’ Baur/Grunsky: Zivilprozeßrecht; 9th edn (1997) (Luchterhand) Baur/Stürner: Sachenrecht; 17th edn (1998) (CH Beck) Bergerfurth: Der Zivilprozeß; 6th edn (1991) (Rudolf Haufe)

Beck’sches Rechtsanwalts-Handbuch Rechtsanwalts-Handbuch  (2001/2002) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘the Lawyers’ Handbook’ Beitzke/Lüderitz: Familienrecht; 27th edn (1999) (CH Beck) Bleckmann: Staatsrecht II: Die Grundrechte;  4th edn (1997) (Carl Heymanns); referred to in the Notes as ‘Bleckmann II’ Brox: Allgemeiner Teil Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs; Gesetzbuchs; 22nd edn (1998) (Carl Heymanns); referred to in the Notes as ‘Brox (AT)’ (AT)’ Brox:  Allgemeines Schuldrecht; 26th edn (1999) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Brox (AS)’ Brox/Walker: Besonderes Schuldrecht; 25th edn (2000) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Brox (BS)’ Brox/Rüthers: Arbeitsrecht;  Arbeitsrecht; 14th edn (1999) (Kohlhammer); referred to in the Notes as ‘Brox (AR)’ Brox: Erbrecht;  18th edn (2000) (Carl Heymanns); referred to in the Notes as ‘Brox (ER)’ Brox:  Handelsrecht  Handelsrecht und Wertpapierrecht; Wertpapierrecht; 14th edn (1999) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Brox (HR)’

Verwaltungsrecht; 6th edn (2000) (CF Müller) Bull: Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht; Capelle/Canaris: Handelsrecht; 23rd edn (1999) (CH Beck) Charlesworth: Business Law; 16th edn (1997) (Sweet & Maxwell) Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston: Law of Contract;  13th edn (1996) (Butterworths) Coing: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie; 5th edn (1993) (W (Walter alter de Gruyter) Collier: Conflict of Laws; 2nd edn (1994) (Cambridge) Creifelds: Rechtswörterbuch; 16th edn (2000) (CH Beck) Dannemann:  An Introduction to German Civil and Commercial Law  (1993) (The British Institute of International and Comparative Law) d’Entrèves: Natural Law; 2nd edn (1970) (Hutchinson) xxv

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Gefahrenabwehr: Allgemeines Polizeirecht (Ordnungsrecht) (Ordnungsrecht) Drews/Wacke/Vogel/Martens: Gefahrenabwehr: des Bundes und der Länder; 9th edn (1986) (Carl Heymanns) Dulckeit/Schwarz/Waldstein: Römische Rechtsgeschichte;  9th edn (1995) (CH Beck) Eisenhardt: Gesellschaftsrecht; 8th edn (1999) (CH Beck) Engisch: Einführung in das juristische Denken; 9th edn (1997) (Kohlhammer)

Verwaltungsrecht; llth edn (1998) (Walter Erichsen: Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht; (Walter de Gruyter) Fikentscher: Schuldrecht; 9th edn (1997) (1997 ) (Walter (Walter de Gruyter) Flume:  Allgemeiner Teil Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts; Volume 2: Das Rechtsgeschäft;  4th edn (1992) (Springer) Gallwas: Grundrechte; 2nd edn (1995) (Luchterhand) Geimer: Internationales Zivilprozeßrecht; Zivilprozeßrecht; 4th edn (2001) (Dr Otto Schmidt) Gernhuber/Grunewald: Bürgerliches Recht; 4th edn (1998) (CH Beck)

Gesetzestexte: see Materials Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri: Verwaltungsrecht;  6th edn (1998) (Carl Heymanns) Gierke/Sandrock: Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (Walter de Gruyter) Wirtschaftsrecht I; 9th edn (1975) (Walter Gursky: Wertpapierrecht; 2nd edn (1997) (CF Müller) Haft: Aus der Waagschale der der Justitia; 3rd edn (2001) (CH Beck/DTV) Haft: Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil; 8th edn (1998) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Haft (AT)’ Haft: Strafrecht Besonderer Teil;  7th edn (1998) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Haft (BT)’ Hanau/Adomeit: ‘Arbeitsrecht’; 12th edn (2000) (Luchtemand) Hartley: The Foundations of European Community Law; 3rd edn (1994) (Oxford) Hesse: ‘Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’;  20th edn (1999) (CF Müller) Hofmann: Handelsrecht; 9th edn (1996) (Luchterhand) Honsell: Römisches Recht;  4th edn (1997) (Springer) Hubmann/Götting: Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz;  6th edn (1998) (CH Beck) Hueck: Gesellschaftsrecht; 20th edn (1998) (CH Beck)  Jakobs: Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil; 2nd edn (1993) (W (Walter alter de Gruyter)  Jarass/Pieroth:  Jarass/Pieroth: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; 5th edn (2000) (CH Beck)  Jauernig: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB);  9th edn (1999) (CH Beck); referred to in the xxvi

Bibliography

Notes as ‘Jauernig (BGB)’  Jauernig: Zivilprozeßrecht;  26th edn (2000) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Jauernig (ZP)’  Jauernig: Zwangsvollstreckungs- und Insolvenzrecht; 21st edn (1999) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Jauernig (ZVS)’ Kaiser: Bürgerliches Recht; 7th edn (2000) (CF Müller) Kallwass: Privatrecht; 16th edn (2000) (U Thiemonds) Katz: Staatsrecht; 14th edn (1999) (CF Müller) Kegel/Schurig: Internationales Privatrecht; 8th edn (1999) (CH Beck) Klunzinger: Einführung in das Bürgerliches Recht; 9th edn (2000) (Franz Vahlen); referred to in the Notes as ‘Klunzinger (Einführung)’ Klunzinger: Grundzüge des Handelsrechts; 10th edn (1999) (Franz Vahlen); referred to in the Notes as ‘Klunzinger (Grundzüge) (HR)’ Klunzinger: Grundzüge des Gesellschaftsrechts; 11th edn (1999) (Franz Vahlen); referred to in the Notes as ‘Klunzinger (Grundzüge) (GR)’ Köbler: Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte; 5th edn (1996) (Franz Vahlen) Köhler: BGB Allgemeiner Teil; 25th edn (2001) (CH Beck) Kommers: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany,  2nd edn (1997) (Duke UP) Kötz: Deliktsrecht; 8th edn (1998) (Luchterhand) Kötz: Europäisches Vertragsrecht;  1st edn: Volume 1 (1996) (JCB Mohr); referred to in the Notes as ‘Kötz (EVR)’ Kraft/Kreutz: Gesellschaftsrecht; 10th edn (1997) (Luchterhand) Krause/Thoma: Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil; 3rd edn (1985) (Kohlhammer) Kriele: ESJ Grundrechte; 1st edn (1986) (CH Beck) Langenscheidt: Taschenwörterbuch Englisch (pocket German /English dictionary) Laufs: Rechtsentwicklungen in Deutschland; 5th edn (1996) (Walter de Gruyter) Leipold: Erbrecht; 13th edn (2000) (JCB Mohr) Loewenheim: Bereicherungsrecht; 2nd edn (1997) (CH Beck) Loveland: Constitutional Law: A Critical Introduction; 1st edn (1996) (Butterworths) Löwisch: Allgemeiner Teil des BGB; 6th edn (1997) (CH Beck) Maunz/Zippelius: Deutsches Staatsrecht; 30th edn (1998) (CH Beck) xxvii

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Maurer: Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht; 13th edn (2000) (CH Beck) Medicus: Bürgerliches Recht; 18th edn (1999) (Carl Heymanns); referred to in the Notes as ‘Medicus (BR)’ Medicus: Schuldrecht I Allgemeiner Teil; 12th edn (2000) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Medicus (AT)’ Medicus: Schuldrecht II Besonderer Teil; 10th edn (2000) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Medicus (BT)’ Mensler: Der Allgemeine Teil des BGB;  1st edn (1998) (Fortis) Meyer: Wirtschaftsprivatrecht; 3rd edn (2001) (Springer) Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger/Zierl: Staatsbürger-Taschenbuch;   30th edn (2000) (CH Beck) Naucke: Strafrecht; 9th edn (2000) (Luchterhand) Nicholas: An Introduction to Roman Law, (1991) (Oxford) Otto: Grundkurs Strafrecht (Allgemeine Strafrechtslehre);   5th edn (1996) (Walter de Gruyter); referred to in the Notes as ‘Otto (AS)’ Otto: Grundkurs Strafrecht (Die einzelnen Delikte);  5th edn (1998) (Walter de Gruyter); referred to in the Notes as ‘Otto (ED)’ Rehbinder: Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft; 8th edn (1995) (Walter de Gruyter) Reich/Schmitz: Einführung in das Bürgerliche Recht; 1st edn (1996) (Gabler) Rittner: Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht;  6th edn (1999) (CF Müller) Rosenberg/Schwab/Gottwald: Zivilprozeßrecht; 15th edn (1993) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Rosenberg/Schwab’ Roxin: Strafverfahrensrecht; 25th edn (1998) (CH Beck) Rüthers: Allgemeiner Teil des BGB; 10th edn (1997) (CH Beck) Sartorius I and II: see Materials Schack: Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht; 2nd edn (1996) (CH Beck) Schellhammer: Zivilprozeß;  8th edn (1998) (CF Müller); referred to in the Notes as ‘Schellhammer (ZP)’ Schellhammer. Zivilrecht nach Anspruchsgrundlagen; 3rd edn (1999) (CF Müller); referred to in the Notes as ‘Schellhammer (ZR)’ Schlechtriem: Schuldrecht Allgemeiner Teil; 3rd edn (1997) (JCB Mohr); referred to in the Notes as ‘Schlechtriem (AT)’ Schlechtriem: Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil; 4th edn (1995) (JCB Mohr); referred to in the Notes as ‘Schlechtriem (BT)’ xxviii

Bibliography

Schlosshauer-Selbach: Internationales Privatrecht; 1st edn (1989) (CF Müller) Schmidt-Aßmann: Besonderes Verwaltungsrecht; 11th edn (1999) (Walter de Gruyter) Schmitt Glaeser: Verwaltungsprozeßrecht;  14th edn (1997) (Boorberg) Scholler Grundzüge des Kommunalrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland;  4th edn (1990) (CF Müller) Schönfelder: see Materials Schulte: Grundkurs im BGB; 5th edn: Volume 1 (1996); 3rd edn: Volume 2 (1992); 3rd edn: Volume 3 (1999) (CF Müller) Schunck/De Clerck: Allgemeines Staatsrecht und Staatsrecht des Bundes und der Länder; 15th edn (1995) (Reckinger & Co) Schwab/Prütting: Sachenrecht; 29th edn (2000) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Schwab/Prütting’ D Schwab: Einführung in das Zivilrecht; 14th edn (2000) (CF Müller); referred to in the Notes as ‘Schwab (Einführung)’ D Schwab: Familienrecht;   10th edn (1999) (CH Beck); referred to in the Notes as ‘Schwab (F)’ Schwerdtfeger: Öffentliches Recht in der Fallbearbeitung; 10th edn (1997) (CH Beck) Seidl-Hohenveldern: Völkerrecht;  9th edn (1997) (Carl Heymanns) Söllner: Grundriß des Arbeitsrechts; 12th edn (1998) (Franz Vahlen) Stein: Staatsrecht; 17th edn (2000) (JCB Mohr) Stern: Verwaltungsprozessuale Probleme in der öffentlich-rechtlichen Arbeit; 7th edn (1995) (CH Beck) Stober: Kommunalrecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; 3rd edn (1996) (Kohlhammer)

Student Law Review Yearbook  (SLRYB) (Cavendish) Thomas-Putzo: Zivilprozeßordnung; 23rd edn (2001) (CH Beck) Tipke/Lang: Steuerrecht; 16th edn (1998) (Dr Otto Schmidt) Verdross/Simma: Universelles Völkerrecht; 3rd edn (1984) (Duncker & Humblot) Wesel:  Juristische Weltkunde; 6th edn (1992) (Suhrkamp); referred to in the Notes as ‘Wesel (JW)’ Wesel: Fast alles, was Recht ist;  Study edn (1994) (Eichborn); referred to in the Notes as ‘Wesel (FR)’ Westermann: Grundbegriffe des BGB; 15th edn (1999) (Kohlhammer); referred to in the Notes as ‘Westermann (Grundbegriffe)’ xxix

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Westermann: Sachenrecht; 7th edn (1998); previously 6th edn: Volume I: Grundlagen und Recht der beweglichen Sachen (1990) and Volume II: Immobiliarsachenrecht (1988) (CF Müller); referred to in the Notes as ‘Westermann (SR)’ Wolf: Sachenrecht; 16th edn (2000) (CH Beck) Wolff/Bachof /Stober: Verwaltungsrecht I;  11th edn (1999) (CH Beck) Wolff/Bachof/Stober: Verwaltungsrecht II; 6th edn (2000) (CH Beck) Wurm/ Wagner/Zartmann: Das Rechtsformularbuch;  15th edn (2000) (Dr Otto Schmidt) Youngs: English, French and German Comparative Law (1998) (Cavendish); referred to in the Notes as ‘Youngs (CL)’ Youngs: Sourcebook on German Law  (1994) (Cavendish); referred to in the Notes as ‘the Sourcebook’ (2nd edn, forthcoming (2002)) Zöllner/Loritz: Arbeitsrecht; 5th edn (1998) (CH Beck) Zweigert and Kötz: Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiet des Privatrechts; 3rd edn (1996) (JCB Mohr); English title:  An Introduction to Comparative Law; 2nd edn (1987) (translated by Tony Weir; OUP and JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck) References in the Notes to the books listed above are by authors’ surnames unless otherwise stated above and are made with grateful acknowledgement to the relevant authors and publishers.

xxx

CROSS-REFERENCES The Notes and the Vocabulary (Appendix A) provide supplementary information to that in the text. They include cross-references to Chapters in the text, to books listed in the Bibliography (eg, ‘Creifelds: Rechtswörterbuch’ and the Sourcebook on German Law ) and to relevant statutory provisions. The Paragraph Register (Appendix C), the Table of Cases (Appendix D), the Table of English Statutes (Appendix E) and the Table of Articles from ZAP (Appendix F) are also cross-referenced to the text, Notes and Vocabulary. Paragraphs which can be found translated into English in Youngs’ Sourcebook on German Law (the Sourcebook ) are indicated in the Paragraph Register by a ‘T’. In case information sought is not located in the text or in the Index, reference to the Notes, the Vocabulary and the other Appendices should be made.

xxxi

CHAPTER I

I HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 1

The present day German legal system has its roots in Roman law. The first compilation of Roman law was contained in the Twelve Tables, which was published during the Roman Republic in 450 BC. The Twelve Tables provided the  basic legal code of Rome for almost a thousand years.2 The end of the western Roman Empire in 476 AD following the incursion of  Germanic peoples from the east led to a revival of Roman jurisprudence from the classical period (the first and second centuries AD) in the eastern part of the Empire. Between the years 528 and 534 AD the Emperor Justinian initiated a collection of  imperial Roman law from the reign of Hadrian (117–138 AD) onwards in a ‘Codex’ (code) and a collection in fifty books of the writings of numerous classical Roman  jurists in the ‘Digesta’ (digests) or ‘Pandectae’  (pandects). Together with an introductory textbook, the ‘Institutiones’ (institutes)—based on the writings of the jurist Gaius, the ‘Codex’ and ‘Digesta’ are referred to as the ‘Corpus iuris civilis’ (body of civil law) of   Justinian.3 A copy of the ‘Digesta’ was discovered in north Italy in the 11th century and Roman law became the subject of renewed attention by such scholars as Irnerius and his pupils, the ‘Quattuor Doctores’   Bulgarus, Hugo, Jacobus and Martinus in the 12th century. The University of Bologna, the oldest university in Europe, became famous for the study of Roman law and, in the 13th century, Accursius completed his ‘Glossa ordinaria’ (ordinary gloss), which remained authoritative for centuries thereafter.4 In the 14th century, Roman law was further developed in the commentaries of the  jurists Bartolus and Baldus.5 The scholastic revival of Roman law in the Middle Ages spread across continental Europe. In Germany, a multitude of regional legal sources then existed, the most wellknown of which is the ‘Sachsenspiegel’ (Saxon Mirror) of 1221–1224. However, Roman law was gradually taken up: the so-called ‘Rezeption des römischen Rechts’ (reception of Roman law).6 By 1495, the date of the establishment of the highest German court (the ‘Reichskammergericht’ (Imperial Chamber (Court)), Roman law took precedence as the general law (‘das gemeine Recht’ or ‘ius commune’) of the Holy Roman Empire (of the German Nation) (‘Heiliges Römisches Reich (Deutscher Nation)’). 7 However, the fields of criminal procedure and punishment were governed by the ‘Constitutio Criminalis Carolina’ of 1532, which contained a mixture of German and ecclesiatical principles and remained of some influence until the reforms of the 19th century.8 In the 17th century, there was a change. The age of reason brought about a gradual departure from the traditional principles of Roman law and a return to the principles of natural law.9 In Holland, the founder of the modern theory of natural law and pioneer of public international law, Grotius, wrote ‘De jure belli ac pacis libri tres’ (three books on the law 1

The German Legal System and Legal Language

of war and peace) in 1625. His view of law as the product of human reason and man’s inborn ‘appetitus societatis’ (social appetite), where contract forms the binding element (‘pacta sunt servanda’ (agreements must be honoured)), was followed in Germany by Pufendorf, Thomasius and Wolff at the beginning of the 18th century.10 At this time, Germany consisted of numerous absolute principalities. It was the era of the rise of Prussia (under Frederick II) and its struggle with Austria (under Maria Theresa). Intellectually, the hallmarks of the early 18th century—referred to as the Age of  Enlightenment—were a turning away from spiritual dogma, in favour of tolerance and a search for the truth based on secular understanding (‘Verstand’). The irrationality and superstition of the Middle Ages finally gave way to an optimistic view of the world according to logical, mathematical principles (Leibniz). The former preeminence of theology was assumed by philosophy and French ideas, in particular, were held in high esteem (Descartes, Voltaire). The 18th century was also the greatest period of modern German drama and literature (Lessing, Goethe, Schiller).11 At the end of the 18th century, reason (‘Vernunft’) was criticised in the philosophy of Kant, in favour of the general freedom of the individual. Individualism and radical notions of natural rights were the liberating forces underlying the American and French Revolutions.12 Despite this, however, the ideas of natural law and the Enlightenment influenced three important codifications: 13

– – –

the ‘Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten’ (General Law for the Prussian States (ALR)) of 1794; the ‘Code Civil des Francais’ (French Civil Code, also known as the ‘Code Napoleon’ (Napoleonic Code)) of 1804; and the Austrian ‘Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ (General Civil Code (ABGB)) of 1811.

In 1814, a dispute broke out between two German jurists   as to the need for a codification of civil law14 in Germany15 In favour of a uniform, national statute was Professor Thibaut from Heidelberg. Against it was the famous Professor Savigny from Berlin. Savigny was the founder of the so-called ‘Historische Rechtsschule’ (historical school), which regarded law as an organic product of history (‘Geschichte’). According to Savigny, law was not based on ‘Vernunft’ (reason) or ‘Willkür’ (arbitrariness), but was ‘Gewohnheitsrecht’ (customary law) and originated from the ‘Volksgeist’ (spirit of the people).16 Roman law already provided the best available methodic system and the basic principles; an unorganic codification was unnecessary and could be dangerous. During the 19th century, jurists such as Puchta and Windscheid followed Savigny’s views, but changed the emphasis to a scientific approach to law (the so-called ‘Pandektenwissenschaft’ (science of the pandects)). Roman law was taught and refined on a scientific basis throughout Germany. Abstraction was the order of the day: the 2

Chapter I: Historical Introduction

solution to every legal problem lay in the application of formal, abstract legal concepts (‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’ (conceptual jurisprudence)). ‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’ dominated at the time the German Civil Code (BGB) was finally enacted in 1896, but the theory’s positivist dogma was criticised by Jhering (who regarded law as motivated by the protection of human aims (‘Zwecke’) and interests (‘Interessen’): (‘Interessenjurisprudenz’)) and, subsequently, by the so-called ‘free’ (sociological) legal school at the start of the 20th century.17 With the coming into force of the BGB on 1 January 1900 a long period of  development of Roman law ended, but its principles live on.18

3

CHAPTER II

II THE FEDERAL STATE1

A THE DIVISION OF POWER In Germany, state power (‘Staatsgewalt’) is not centralised. Germany is divided into the Federal Republic/Federation (‘Bundesrepublik’ or ‘Bund’) as the main state (‘Zentralstaat’) and its constituent states (‘Länder’).2 Each state (‘Land’) is a member of the whole, but at the same time maintains its own state power; it is not fully independent, as otherwise the Federal Republic would be a confederation of states (‘Staatenbund’). The ‘Bund’ is a federal state (‘Bundesstaat’), a new state created by the joining together of its members.3 B THE PASSING OF LAWS The ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ are each entitled to pass laws (‘Gesetze’)4 and their respective competence to do so (‘Gesetzgebungskompetenz’) is laid down in the (federal) constitution (‘Grundgesetz’/GG/Basic Law).5 Article 70 GG lays down a presumption in favour of the competence of the ‘Länder’,  but the constitution allocates to the ‘Bund’ the right to pass laws in the most important fields; this right is either exclusive (‘ausschließlich’: Article 71 GG) or concurrent (‘konkurrierend’: Article 72 GG) or permits the ‘Bund’ to lay down a general framework (‘Rahmen’) for legislation by the ‘Länder’ (Article 75 GG).6 The law of the ‘Bund’, regardless of rank, takes precedence over that of the ‘Länder’ (Article 31 GG: ‘Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht’).7 C THE EXECUTIVE8 The administration (‘Verwaltung’) of Germany is divided between the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’  as carriers (‘Träger’)  thereof. The key to an understanding of the term ‘Verwaltungsträger’   (carrier of administration) and, thus, of the construction of the executive in Germany is the recognition that ‘Verwaltungsträger’  have specific ‘Organe’ (organs) and (as a subsidiary term) ‘Behörden’ (authorities).9 Executive power (‘vollziehende Gewalt’) is exercised in the following forms: – administration by the ‘Bund’ (‘bundeseigene Verwaltung’); – administration by the ‘Länder’ (‘landeseigene- or Landerverwaltung’); – administration by the ‘Länder’ on instruction by the ‘Bund’ (‘Auftragsverwaltung’).10 The ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ can administer either directly (‘unmittelbar’) or indirectly 5

The German Legal System and Legal Language

(‘mittelbar’) by delegation to other carriers. Such carriers of indirect state administration (‘Staatsverwaltung’)  are the public (‘öffentliche’)   corporations (‘Körperschaften’), institutions (‘Anstalten’) and foundations (‘Stiftungen’).11 The activity of the executive (‘Verwaltungstätigkeit’)  is usually official (‘hoheitlich’). By contrast, however, it can also:

– –

act fiscally (‘fiskalisch’), ie, participate in the economy for commercial purposes (‘erwerbswrtschaftlich’; eg, as the owner or shareholder of an enterprise) or engage in accessory transactions (‘Hilfsgeschäfte’; eg, acquisition of goods); or perform its public functions (‘öffentliche Aufgaben’) in the forms available under private law: so called ‘Verwaltungsprivatrecht’  or ‘Verwaltung in Privatrechtsform’.12

Thus, ‘Anstalten’ are part of the wider term ‘öffentliche Einrichtungen’ (public facilities). In each ‘Land’, the statute governing local authorities (the ‘Gemeindeordnung’)13 lays down a (public legal) right of admission (‘Zulassung’) for its residents (‘Einwohner’). The use (‘Benutzung’) of the relevant amenity itself can, however, be governed by private law.14 Although the executive has freedom of choice (‘Wahlfreiheit’), it remains  bound to observe the restrictions of public law (‘öffentlich-rechtliche Bindungen’) generally (eg, the basic rights).15 This so-called two-tier theory (‘Zweistufentheorie’) has the important procedural consequence that, depending on the party involved on the side of the executive, a dispute may fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts (§ 40 VwGO) or within that of the ordinary courts (§ 13 GVG).16 D THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE The administration of justice in Germany is divided into five branches (‘Zweige’): – – – – –

the ordinary jurisdiction (‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’); the employment jurisdiction (‘Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit’); the (general) administrative jurisdiction (‘allgemeine Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’); the social jurisdiction (‘Sozialgerichtsbarkeit’); the finance jurisdiction (‘Finanzgerichtsbarkeit’).17

The administration of justice is carried by the state, ie, the ‘Bund’ is responsible for the federal courts specified in the Basic Law and the ‘Länder’ for the others (Article 92 GG). E THE ‘RECHTSSTAAT’  PRINCIPLE It is a founding and unalterable principle of the Basic Law that the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ are democratic and social republican states in which the rule of law prevails (‘Rechtsstaaten’) (Articles 20(i), 28(i) and 79(iii) GG).18 The ‘Rechtsstaat’ principle is a general legal principle and is only partially concretised in Article 20(iii) of the Basic Law. It also underlies, for example, Articles 19(iv), 101(i) and 103(i) and is the source of the principle of proportionality (‘Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz’) . 6

Chapter II: The Federal State

Other important elements of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ principle are the requirements of legal certainty (‘Rechtssicherheit’) and the protection of trust (‘Vertrauensschutz’),  ie, reliance on particular laws and the (basic) prohibition of retrospective legislation (‘Rückwirkungsverbot’).19 F THE ORIGIN, SEPARATION AND BINDING OF STATE POWER Article 20(ii) GG sets out other fundamental principles.

First, all state power (‘Staatsgewalt’) in the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ springs from the people (‘Volk’): the principle of the sovereignty (or right of self-determination) of the people (‘Volkssouveranität’) . Secondly, state power is exercised by the people in elections and plebiscites: the principle of representative democracy.20 Thirdly, state power is exercised by separate special organs of the legislature (‘gesetzgebende Gewalt’/‘Gesetzgebung’), executive (‘vollziehende Gewalt’/‘Verwaltung’) and  judicature (‘rechtsprechende Gewalt’/‘Rechtsprechung’):21 the principle of the separation of powers (‘Gewaltenteilung’).22 By Article 20(iii) GG   the legislature is bound to the constitutional order (‘verfassungsmäßige Ordnung’)  and the executive and judicature to statute and law (‘Gesetz und Recht’).23 The binding (‘Bindung’) of the executive to statute is referred to as the ‘Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’ (‘Vorbehalt des Gesetzes’)  and the priority of statute as the ‘Vorrang des Gesetzes’ .24 The Basic Law can be amended by the legislature—subject to approval by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the members of the Federal Parliament (‘Bundestag’) and two-thirds of the votes of the members of the Federal Council (‘Bundesrat’))—but Article 79(iii) GG—the so-called perpetuity clause (‘Ewigkeitsklausel’)—forbids any changes to the federal structure of Germany or to the core constitutional principles set out in Articles 1 and 20 GG. G THE ‘FREIHEITLICHE DEMOKRATISCHE GRUNDORDNUNG’ The ‘freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung’  is the basic order of freedom and democracy upon which, by common consent, Germany is constructed. It includes: – – – –

the ‘Rechtsstaat’ principle; the people’s right of self-determination (‘Selbstbestimmungsrecht’); the separation of powers;25 the binding of the legislature to the constitutional order and of the executive and  judiciary to statute and law; – the multi-party system (‘Mehrparteiensystem’);26 – the independence of the judges (‘Unabhangigkeit der Richter’);27 – the basic rights;28 7

The German Legal System and Legal Language

–

the ‘Rechtsschutzgarantie’.29

The concept of the ‘freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung’ is occasionally used in German statutes, eg, in Article 18 GG (‘Verwirkung von Grundrechten’ (forfeiture of   basic rights)), in Article 21 (ii) GG (‘Verfassungswidrigkeit von Parteien’ (unconstitutionality of political parties), in provisions relating to the protection of the constitution (‘Verfassungsschutz’)   and in criminal provisions concerning treason (‘Verrat’) and similar offences (§§ 86(ii) and 93(ii) StGB).30 H FOREIGN RELATIONS31 Only the ‘Bund’ enjoys unrestricted sovereign authority in foreign relations: Article 32(i) GG. Treaties with foreign states (‘Verträge mit auswärtigen Staaten’)  are concluded in the name of the ‘Bund’ by the Federal President: Article 59(i) GG. The usual stages are as follows:32 –

agreement on and initialling of the draft text(‘Paraphierung’) by (federal) government representatives (‘Unterhändler’) following negotiations (‘Verhandlungen’); – signature (‘Unterzeichnung’), normally by a (federal) government minister; – where the proposed treaty seeks to regulate the political relations of the‘Bund’ or relates to matters of federal legislation, approval (‘Zustimmung’) or participation (‘Mitwirkung’) as necessary by the body/bodies having relevant (federal) legislative competence (ie, the ‘Bundestag’ and ‘Bundesrat’) in the form of a federal statute (‘Bundesgesetz’): Article 59(ii) GG.  This is the so-called ‘Vertragsgesetz’ (treaty law) or ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’ (approval law). The ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’ is also referred to as the ‘Transformationsgesetz’  because it transforms the provisions of the treaty (ie, public international law (‘Völkerrecht’)) into national law.33 After transformation, treaties have the rank of ‘(einfache) Gesetze’  ((simple) statutes) below the Basic Law. Thus, they remain subject to the rule ‘lex posterior derogat legi priori’ (a later law supercedes an earlier one) and can, in so far as national law is concerned, be repealed.34 However, by Article 25 GG, the general rules of public international law—which term includes customary public international law (‘Völkergewohnheitsrecht’)—take precedence over (simple) (federal or state) laws and confer rights and obligations directly on the inhabitants of the (German) federal territory: ‘Sie gehen den Gesetzen vor und erzeugen Rechte und Pflichten unmittelbar für die Bewohner des Bundesgebietes’;35 – ratification (‘Ratifikation’) by the Federal President. The ‘Länder’ are largely free to conclude treaties (‘Staatsverträge’) amongst themselves (see, eg, Article 29(vii) GG). However, a treaty between a ‘Land’ and a foreign state must fall within the legislative competence of the ‘Land’ and requires the approval of  the Federal Government: Article 32(iii) GG. 8

CHAPTER III

III THE SUPREME FEDERAL ORGANS 1

The main supreme organs of the ‘Bund’ (‘oberste Bundesorgane’) are: – – – –

the Federal Parliament (‘Bundestag’); the Federal Council (‘Bundesrat’); the Federal President (‘Bundespräsident’); the Federal Government (‘Bundesregierung’).2

The ‘Bundestag’ is an organ of the legislature, while the ‘Bundesrat’ is an organ through which the ‘Länder’  assist (‘mitwirken’)  in the passing of federal laws and in the administration of the ‘Bund’ (Article 50 GG).3 The ‘Bundespräsident’ (the head of state of the ‘Bund’) and the ‘Bundesregierung’ are organs of the executive. The ‘Bundesregierung’ consists of the Federal Chancellor (‘Bundeskanzler’) and the federal ministers (‘Bundesminister’) (Article 62 GG). The ministeries themselves are supreme federal authorities (‘oberste Bundesbehörden’). Further supreme federal organs are: – – –

the (emergency) Joint Council (‘gemeinsamer Ausschuß’); the Federal Assembly (‘Bundesversammlung’);4 the Federal Constitutional Court (‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’).5

The supreme federal organs are laid down in Articles 38–69 of the Basic Law and in § 1(i) of the Law relating to the Federal Constitutional Court (‘Bundesverfassungs gerichtsgesetz’ (BVerfGG)).

9

CHAPTER IV

IV THE SUPREME AND OTHER FEDERAL AUTHORITIES

The highest executive organs of the ‘Bund’   are the ‘Bundespräsident’  and the ‘Bundesregierung’. Beneath them, the administration (‘Verwaltung’) of the ‘Bund’ is built up on the following levels: – – – –

the supreme federal authorities (‘oberste Bundesbehörden’); the upper federal authorities (‘Bundesoberbehörden’); the (middle) federal authorities (‘Bundesbehörden’); the lower federal authorities (‘Bundesunterbehörden’).

The supreme federal authorities are: – – – – –

the federal ministeries (‘Bundesministerien’); the Federal Presidential Office (‘Bundespräsidialamt’); the Federal Chancellor’s Office or Chancellery (‘Bundeskanzleramt’); the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (‘Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung’); the Federal Accounts Court (‘Bundesrechnungshof’).

The upper federal authorities are usually entitled ‘Bundesamt für…’ (‘Federal Office for/of …’). Another designation is ‘Bundesanstalt für…’ (Federal Institute of…’). Administration by a ‘Bundesamt’ or by a ‘Bundesanstalt’, which has no independent legal capacity (‘nicht rechtsfähig’), is an example of direct (state) administration by the ‘Bund’ (‘bundeseigene Verwaltung’). The relevant authority is incorporated (‘eingegliedert’) into the ‘Bund’.1 To be distinguished are so-called ‘selbständige Bundesoberbehörden’  (independent upper federal authorities) and the ‘(bundesunmittelbare) Körperschaften und Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts’ (public corporations and institutions under the direct control of  the ‘Bund’), which can both be formed under Article 87(iii) GG, as means of indirect state administration (‘mittelbare Staatsverwaltung’), in such areas, in which the ‘Bund’ has (federal) legislative competence.2 Examples of (middle) federal authorities are the various ‘Direktionen’ (directorates), eg, the ‘Bundesbahndirektion’  (Federal Railway Directorate) and (formerly) the ‘Oberpostdirektion’ (Upper Post Directorate). The best examples of lower federal authorities are the ‘Grenzschutzämter’ (border protection offices) and the ‘Zollämter’ (customs offices). The ‘Finanzämter’ (tax offices) are, however, lower authorities of the ‘Länder’; the ‘Oberfinanzdirektion’  (Upper Finance Directorate) is hybrid (ie, it is both a federal authority and one of a ‘Land’). Unlike the middle and lower federal authorities, the competence of the upper federal authorities extends to the whole federal territory (‘Bundesgebiet’).3

11

CHAPTER V

V THE ‘LÄNDER’ 

A INTRODUCTION Before the reunification (‘Wiedervereinigung’) of Germany on 3.10.1990,1 the following eleven ‘Länder’ were constituent member states of the ‘Bund’: – – – – – – – – – – –

Baden-Württemberg;2 Bayern (Bavaria); Berlin; Bremen; Hamburg; Hessen; Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony); Nordrhein-Westfalen (Northrhein-Westphalia); Rheinland-Pfalz (Rheinland-Palatinate); Saarland; Schleswig-Holstein.

Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg are city states (‘Stadtstaaten’). Since reunification, the following (five) states in east Germany (the ‘neue Bundesländer’ (new federal states)) now also form part of the ‘Bund’: – – – – –

Brandenburg; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; Sachsen (Saxony); Sachsen-Anhalt; Thüringen (Thuringia).

Each ‘Land’ has its own constitution (‘Landesverfassung’).3 The Basic Law requires that the constitutional order in the ‘Länder’ must accord with the principles of a republican, democratic and social ‘Rechtsstaat’ (Article 28(i), 1st sentence GG; homogeneity clause) and that the people must have a representative  body (‘Vertretung’) following general, direct, free, equal and secret elections (Article 28(i), 2nd sentence GG).4 Each ‘Land’ has as its organs a parliament (usually known as the ‘Landtag’), a government (usually known as the ‘Landesregierung ’ and usually headed by a ‘Ministerpräsident’ (prime minister)), an accounts court (‘Rechnungshof’) and (except in Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein) a constitutional court (usually known as the ‘Verfassungsgerichtshof’) .5

13

The German Legal System and Legal Language

B STATE ADMINISTRATION IN THE ‘LÄNDER’ In the absence of other provisions in or allowed by the Basic Law, there is a presumption (‘Vermutung’) that state administration in the ‘Länder’ is within their competence (‘Zuständigkeit’; Article 30 GG).6 The ‘Länder’,   therefore, usually carry out the administration of federal laws (‘Bundesgesetze’) as their own matter (‘als eigene Angelegenheit’; Article 83 GG) through their authorities (‘Landesbehörden’; Article 84 GG).7 State administration in the ‘Länder’ is direct and indirect and is usually constructed on the following levels:8 – – –

upper level (‘Oberstufe’); middle level (‘Mittelstufe’); lower level (‘Unterstufe’)

In the ‘Stadtstaaten’, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein, there is no middle level. The upper level is composed of the ministeries and state chancelleries (‘Staatskanzleien’)  acting as ‘oberste Landesbehörden’,   to which the ‘Landesämter’ (‘Landesoberbehörden’) directly report Each ‘Land’  is (usually) divided into governmental areas or districts (‘Regierungsbezirke’) headed by a president (‘Regierungspräsident’). The governments (Regierungen’) of these areas make up the middle level. The lower level is composed of lower administrative authorities or lower authorities of the ‘Länder’ (‘untere Verwaltungsbehörden’ or ‘untere Landesbehörden’;=direct state administration) and local authorities (usually known as ‘(Land-)Kreise’ and ‘Gemeinde’), which can function both as such or as lower authorities of the ‘Länder’ (= indirect state administration), ie, they have a ‘Doppelfunktion’ (double function). The ‘Länder’ are represented at the ‘Bund’ through the ‘Bundesrat’ and by ministers (of the ‘Länder’) responsible for federal matters (‘Bevollmächtigte beim Bund’).9

14

CHAPTER VI

VI LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Beneath the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’, the administrative authorities on the third (lower) level are the communal territorial corporations (‘kommunale Gebietskörperschaften’), usually known as the ‘(Land-)Kreise’ (regional authorities) and the ‘Gemtinden’ (local authorities, ie, the most local communal units).1 ‘Gemeinden’ can either belong to a ‘Kreis’ (‘kreisangehörig’) or be independent thereof  (‘kreisfrei’). The same applies to a city (‘Stadt’), which term is used to describe a municipal ‘Gemeinde’. Once a city reaches a certain size or importance, it can become a ‘kreisfreie Stadt’.2 The relevant local government laws in the ‘Länder’  are the ‘(Land-)Kreis-’ and ‘Gemeinde-’ ‘Ordnungen’.3 The Basic Law guarantees the right of the ‘Gemeinden’ (and the ‘Kreise’) to administer all local matters (‘alle Angelegenheiten der örtlichen Gemeinschaft’) themselves under the auspices (‘Aufsicht’) of the state (‘Recht der Selbstverwaltung’; Article 28(ii) GG).4 The so-called ‘Universalitätsgrundsatz’ (universality principle) applies: within the framework of statute (‘im Rahmen der Gesetze’), ‘Gemeinden’   have full competence (‘Allzuständigkeit’)  in and responsibility (‘Eigenverantwortlichkeit’)  for all matters concerning the local community.5 In particular, ‘Gemeinden’ have a duty to care for the welfare of their residents (‘Wohl der Einwohner’) by way of service provision (‘Daseinsvorsorge’) and to make available the necessary public facilities (‘öffentliche Einrichtungen’). ‘Gemeinden’ create such facilities by way of ‘Widmung’ (dedication).6 The fundamental status of the ‘Gemeinden’   (and the ‘Kreise’ ) is that of  ‘Selbstverwaltungskörperschaften’  (self-governing corporations) having their own sphere of operation (‘eigener Wirkungskreis’).7 The ‘Gemeinden’ are entitled not only to pass bye-laws (‘Satzungen’),8 but can also use the instruments of the ‘Rechtsverordnung’   (regulation) and ‘Verwaltungsakt’ (administrative act). The ‘Gemeindeordnungen’ provide for the ‘Gemeinden’ in the various ‘Länder’ to be composed in different forms.9 Usually, the organs of a ‘Gemeinde’ are known as: – –

the ‘Gemeindevertretung’/‘Stadtverordnetenversammlung’/‘Gemeinderat’/‘Stadtrat’  (the legislative organ); and the ‘(Ober-)Bürgermeister’/‘Magistrat’/‘Gemeindeverwaltung’ (the executive organ).

Local matters extending beyond the capacity of a ‘Gemeinde’ (‘überörtliche  Angelegenheiten’)—subsidiarity principle!—are dealt with by the ‘(Land-)Kreis’, which has the following organs: – –

the ‘Kreis’ Parliament (‘Kreistag’), the ‘Kreis’ Council (‘Kreisausschuß’); 15

The German Legal System and Legal Language

–

the Chief Executive (‘Landrat’ or, in Lower Saxony and Northrhein-Westphalia, the ‘Oberkreisdirektor’).

The members of the ‘Kreistag’ are elected by the local population. The ‘Landrat’ is usually a ‘Kommunal- (not ‘Staats-’) beamter’ (communal civil servant) and is appointed by the ‘Kreistag’ (except in Bavaria, where there is a direct election for the post).10 The ‘Landrat’ has a dual role: he or she performs the administrative matters of the ‘Kreis’ itself (‘Selbstverwaltungsangelegenheiten’/‘eigene Aufgaben’) and, as the lower level of (indirect) administration by the state (‘Land’), matters which the ‘Land’ allocates (‘überträgt’) to the ‘Kreis’ (‘Auftragsangelegenheiten’/‘übertragene Aufgaben’) . In the latter capacity, the office of the Chief Executive (‘Landratsamt’) is, therefore, ‘Staatsbehörde’.11 A ‘kreisangehörige Gemeinde’ is the fourth administrative level, beneath the ‘Landrat’. The ‘Landrat’ is the third level, beneath the ministeries of the ‘Land’ and the governments of the ‘Regierungsbezirke’. A ‘kreisfreie Gemeinde’ is, by definition, not attached to a ‘Kreis’ (ie, it has no ‘Kreis’ above it) and is, therefore, (merely) a substitute for the ‘Landrat’.12

16

CHAPTER VII

VII THE CONSTITUTION (‘GRUNDGESETZ’)

A INTRODUCTION1 The federal constitution of the ‘Bund’ (‘Grundgesetz’/Basic Law) dated 23.5.1949 contains 146 Articles and is divided into 11 main Sections: I The basic rights (‘Grundrechte’): Articles 1–19. II The ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’: Articles 20–37.2 III–VI The supreme federal organs (or constitutional organs (‘Verfassungsorgane’ )):

Articles 38–69: III IV IVa V VI VII VIII IX X XI

The ‘Bundestag’: Articles 38–48; The ‘Bundesrat’: Articles 50–53; The ‘Gemeinsamer Ausschuß’ (Joint Council): Article 53a; The ‘Bundespräsident’: Articles 54–61; The ‘Bundesregierung’: Articles 62–69.

Legislative competence and procedure: Articles 70–82 (entitled ‘Die Gesetzgebung des Bundes’).3 Administration of federal laws: Articles 83–91 (entitled ‘Die Ausführung der Bundesgesetze und die Bundesverwaltung’). The judicature: Articles 92–104 (entitled ‘Die Rechtsprechung’).4 Finances: Articles 104a-115 (entitled ‘Das Finanzwesen’).5 Transitional and final provisions: Articles 116–146.6 B RANK OF THE BASIC LAW AND VALIDITY OF NORMS

The Basic Law ranks higher than other legal norms (‘Rechtsnormen’), which must be interpreted so as to conform with it (‘verfassungskonforme Auslegung’).7 It is often of importance to establish whether a particular norm is valid (‘gültig’)/ constitutional (‘verfassungsgemäß’). The judiciary (which is independent Article 97(i) GG) has the right to check whether this is so (‘richterliches Prüfungsrecht’). Thus, for example, where a ‘Verwaltungsakt’  (administrative act (VA)) is concerned, not only must it be valid, but the (authorising) norm upon which it is based—the ‘Ermächtigungsgrundlage’ (‘Rechtsgrundlage‘)—must also itself be valid.8 The following questions arise: – –

What sort of norm is involved? It may form part of a ‘Gesetz’   (statute), a ‘Rechtsverordnung’ (statutory regulation) or a ‘Satzung’ (bye-law). Is the norm formally or materially invalid /unconstitutional(‘verfassungswidrig’)? 17

The German Legal System and Legal Language

On the formal side, the relevant body must have possessed legislative competence (‘Zuständigkeit’), gone through the correct procedure (‘Verfahren’) and issued the norm in the appropriate form. On the material side, there must be no violation/ contravention of higher-ranking norms (‘kein Verstoß gegen höherrangiges Recht’), eg, no breach of basic rights.9 C THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (i) The competence (‘Zuständigkeit’)  of the Federal Constitutional Court (‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’) is set out in Article 93 GG (and in § 13 BVerfGG);10 or, in the case of the constitutional court of a ‘Land’, in its constitution (and VerfGG). The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court bind the constitutional organs of the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’, as well as all courts and authorities (§ 31(i) BVerfGG). (ii) If a court considers a ‘Gesetz’   upon which its decision depends to be unconstitutional, it is obliged to refer the (legal) question as appropriate to the Federal Constitutional Court or to the constitutional court of the ‘Land’ (‘Landesverfassungsgericht’):11   so-called concrete norm-control ( ‘konkrete Normkontrolle’; Article 100(i) GG).12 Thus, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, to prevent diverging decisions and in order to uphold the authority of the legislature, whenever the preliminary question is raised in legal proceedings whether there is a collision  between a particular (statutory) norm and a higher-ranking (constitutional) norm, the competence to decide the issue (ie, the validity of the lower norm) is centralised/concentrated at the appropriate constitutional court, which is said to have a monopoly power of rejection (‘Verwerfungsmonopol’) . Otherwise, under its ‘richterliches Prüfungsrecht’  ((inherent) right of judicial review) the court hearing the case can decide incidentally (‘inzident’) itself—socalled incidental control (‘Inzidentkontrolle’) —as it anyway can in the case of norms ranking below statutes (eg, ‘Rechtsverordnungen’=statutory regulations).13 (iii) On application by the government of the ‘Bund’ or a ‘Land’ or 1/3 of the members of the ‘Bundestag’, the Federal Constitutional Court can decide whether a norm (including one below a statute) is unconstitutional or whether the law of a ‘Land’ is incompatible with federal law: so-called abstract norm-control (‘abstrakte Normkontrolle’; Article 93(i) No 2 GG). In such proceedings, the Federal Constitutional Court acts as guardian of the constitution (‘Hüter der Verfassung’). If the norm is found to be unconstitutional or the law incompatible, it is declared void (§ 78 BVerfGG). Moreover, if a criminal conviction is based on such a norm, a re-opening of the case (re-trial) is possible (§ 79(i) BVerfGG). These last-mentioned provisions apply correspondingly in cases of concrete norm-control (§ 82(i) BVerfGG). (iv) Any person can apply to the Federal Constitutional Court by way of constitutional complaint (‘Verfassungsbeschwerde’)  (usually only after normal legal channels have 18

Chapter VII: The Constitution (‘Grundgesetz’)

 been exhausted)14 on the basis that one of its basic rights (or those in Articles 20(iv), 33, 38, 101, 103 and 104 GG) has been infringed by the (German) public power (‘öffentliche Gewalt’, ie, by the legislature, executive or the judiciary; Article 93(i) No 4a GG and § 90(i) and § 90(ii) BVerfGG).15 A constitutional complaint directed against a (judicial or administrative) decision must be lodged—and substantiated—within a period of one month from service or informal notification of the decision in full form, as required by the relevant procedural provisions, otherwise within one month from pronouncement of the decision or the date on which the decision is made known: §93(i)BVerfGG. In the case of a constitutional complaint against a statute or other official act, the complaint must be brought within a year from the date the statute came into force or the date the official act was issued: § 93(iii) BVerfGG. In order for the complaint to be admissible (‘zulässig’), the infringement must affect the complainant individually, currently and directly (‘selbst, gegenwärtig und unmittelbar’).16 Local authorities can also apply to the Federal Constitutional Court in the event that a federal statute infringes their right of self-administration (Article 93(i) No 4b GG). If it allows the complaint, the Federal Constitutional Court pinpoints the relevant  breach of the Basic Law. In the case of a court decision, it quashes it and refers it  back to a competent court;17 in the case of a (provision in a) statute, it declares it void (§ 95 BVerfGG).18 (v) The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court regarding a norm has statutory force (‘Gesetzeskraft’; § 31(ii) BVerfGG). (vi) The Federal Constitutional Court can also decide (inter alia) in disputes: – –

between supreme federal organs regarding the interpretation of the Basic Law (Article 93(i) No 1 GG; ‘Organstreit’);19 between the ‘Bund’  and ‘Länder’ regarding their constitutional rights and obligations (Article 93(i) No 3 GG; ‘Bund/Lander Streit’).20

19

CHAPTER VII

VIII THE BASIC RIGHTS

A INTRODUCTION1 The basic rights (‘Grundrechte’) are dealt with at the beginning of the Basic Law (Articles 1–19 GG).2 Certain of the basic rights only benefit Germans (Articles 8(i), 9(i), 11(i) and 12(i) GG). Despite the precedence of federal laws over that of the ‘Länder’ (Article 31 GG; ‘Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht’), those basic rights also contained in constitutions of the ‘Länder’ remain in force so far as they accord with Articles 1–18 GG (Article 142 GG). The basic rights bind (‘binden’) the legislature, executive and judicature as directly applicable law (‘unmittelbar geltendes Recht’; Article 1(iii) GG).3 The main groupings are those of freedom rights (‘Freiheitsrechte’)  and equality rights (‘Gleichheitsrechte’).4 The basic rights are principally regarded as (subjective) defensive rights (‘Abwehrrechte’) against attacks (‘Eingriffe’) by the state. However, they also include certain institutional guarantees and are the expression of an objective value-order (‘Wertordnung’).5 Increasingly, there is a tendency to regard certain of the basic rights as conferring the right to claim positive action from the state (‘Grundrechte’ as ‘Leistungsrechte’).6 The applicability of basic rights in the area of private relations (the so-called ‘Drittwirkung’ of basic rights) is not generally accepted, although they can indirectly (‘mittelbar’) be called in aid in the interpretation of private law.7 It is customary to speak of the adressee (‘Adressat’)  of a ‘Grundrecht’,  its carrier (‘Träger’),   its protected area (‘Schutzbereich’),   its impairment (‘Beeintrachtigung’) or infringement (‘Verletzung’).8 B LIMITATION OF BASIC RIGHTS9 It is possible for basic rights to be limited (‘eingeschrankt’). In many cases, the right for this to be done through or on the basis of a statute (‘durch Gesetz oder aufgrund eines Gesetzes’) is expressly reserved in the various Articles of the Basic Law (so-called ‘Gesetzesvorbehalt’). The limiting statute must apply generally and not only to an individual case and the Article being limited must be cited (Article 19(i) GG: the ‘Zitiergebot’). It is also possible for the limits (‘Schranken’) of a basic right to be implicit (‘immanent’) in the relevant basic right or interpreted by means of a balancing (‘Abwägung’) between conflicting rights.10 The limitation of basic rights is itself limited by so-called (often unwritten) ‘SchrankenSchranken’:11

21

The German Legal System and Legal Language

–

An express limitation of a basic right must itself be interpreted in the light of the  basic right (the so-called ‘Wechselwirkungstheorie’ (theory of reciprocal effect)).12 – In no case can the essence (‘Wesensgehalt’) of a basic right be touched (‘angetastet’; Article 19(ii) GG)).13 – The so-called ‘Übermaßverbot’  (prohibition of excess), which flows from the principle that the executive must act in accordance with statute and law (Article 20(iii) GG: ‘Bindung der Verwaltung an Gesetz und Recht’/‘Gesetzmäßigkeit und Rechtmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’). The measures undertaken by the executive must  be proportionate, ie, suitable (‘geeignet’), necessary (‘erforderlich’) and in fair relation to the intended goal (verhätttnismäßig’).14 – Essential (political) decisions (‘wesentliche Entscheidungen’) must be taken by the legislature and cannot be delegated to the executive (‘Wesentlichkeitsprinzip’).15 An infringement (‘Verletzung’) of a basic right is only legitimate (a so-called‘rechtmäßiger Eingriff’), if there is appropriate statutory authority (‘Ermächtigung’) covered (‘gedeckt’)  by a ‘Gesetzesvorbehalt’, which is itself not limited by a ‘Schranken-Schranken’. C THE ACTUAL RIGHTS16 Article 19(iv) GG guarantees the right of everyone to go to law (usually to the administrative courts), if his rights are infringed by the executive (‘Rechtsschutzgarantie’). This right is supplemented by the right to lodge a constitutional complaint (Article 93(i) No 4aGG).17 In private law matters, a general right of (access to) justice (‘Justizgewährungsanspruch’) is derived from Article 2(i) GG.18 The following basic rights are included in Articles 1–17 of the Basic Law: – – – – – – – – – –

human dignity (Article l(i): ‘Menschenwürde’);19 free development of the personality/freedom of action (Article 2(i): freie ‘ Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit’/‘allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit’);20 the right to life and bodily integrity (Article 2(ii), 1st sentence:‘Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit’);21 freedom of the person (Article 2(ii), 2nd sentence: ‘Freiheit der Person’); equality before the law (Article 3(i): ‘Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz’);22 equal rights of men and women (Article 3(ii): ‘Gleichberechtigung zwischen Mann und Frau’);23 no discrimination or preference due to sex, descent, race, language, home, origin,  belief, religion or political views (Article 3(iii): ‘Benachteiligungs- und Bevorzugungsverbot’); freedom of belief, conscience and confession (Article 4(i): ‘Freiheit des Glaubens, Gewissens und des Bekenntnisses’);24 the right to conscientious objection against military service (Article 4(iii): ‘Recht zur Kriegsdienstverweigerung aus Gewssensgründen’);25 freedom of expression (‘Meinungsfreiheit’), press freedom (‘Pressefreiheit’),  freedom 22

Chapter VIII: The Basic Rights

– – – – – – – – – – – – –

of reporting (‘Freiheit der Berichterstattung’) and freedom of information/access to public sources (‘lnformationsfreiheit’) (Article 5(i));26 freedom of art, science, research and teaching (Article 5(iii): ‘Freiheit der Kunst, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre’);27 protection of marriage and the family (including illegitimate children) (Article 6: ‘Schutz der Ehe und der Familie’);28 state supervision of the school system (‘Schulwesen’); participation in religious instruction (‘Religionsunterricht’) (Article 7);29 freedom of assembly (Article 8(i): ‘Versammlungsfreiheit’ ); freedom of (private) association (Article 9(i): ‘Verein(igung)sfreiheit’ or ‘Vereinsautonomie’) and freedom to form coalitions (‘Koalitionsfreiheit’: Article 9(iii));30 secrecy of communication by letter, post and telephone (Article 10(i): ‘Brief-, Postund Fernmeldegeheimnis’); freedom of movement (‘Freizügigkeit’)   and freedom of establishment (‘Niederlassungsfreiheit’) (Article 11(i)),31 free choice of workplace and occupation (Article 12(i): ‘Freiheit der Arbeitsplatzund Berufswahl’);32 inviolability of the home (Article 13(i): ‘Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung’); guarantee of property and succession (Article 14(i): ‘Garantie des Eigentums und des Erbrechts’);33 prohibition on removal of citizenship and extradition (Article 16: ‘Verbot der  Ausbürgerung und Auslieferung’);34 right of asylum (Article 16a: ‘Asylrecht’);35 right of complaint and petition (Article 17: ‘Petitionsrecht’).36

23

CHAPTER IX

IX PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW

A INTRODUCTION German law divides itself strictly into public law (‘öffentliches Recht’)—dealing with the relationship of the individual to the state and other carriers of public power—and private law (‘Privatrecht’)—dealing with the relationship of citizens amongst each other.1 German private law has two main branches: – –

civil law (‘bürgerliches Recht’),  the main source of which is the ‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ (Civil Code (BGB)); and commercial and company law (‘Handelsrecht’ and ‘Gesellschaftsrecht’).2

It is important to note here, however, that the subject-matter of private law in Germany is dealt with in numerous secondary and special statutes (‘Neben- und Sondergesetze’), apart from the BGB and the statutes relating to commercial and company law, eg, in the fields of property and landlord and tenant law, employment law, traffic and public liability law, insurance and intellectual property law.3 The main branches of German public law are: – – – – – –

state and constitutional law (‘Staats- und Verfassungsrecht’); administrative law (‘Verwaltungsrecht’); tax law (‘Steuerrecht’); criminal law (‘Strafrecht’); procedural law (‘Prozeßrecht’); public international law (‘Völkerrecht’).4

§ 40(i) VwGO gives access to the administrative court in all public law disputes of a non-constitutional nature, unless a federal statute expressly gives another court  jurisdiction. B DISTINGUISHABILITY OF NORMS There are various theories as to how to establish whether a particular norm falls within the area of private or public law, for example: – – –

the ‘interest’ theory, which asks if the norm serves the interests of the state or those of the individual; the ‘subordination’ theory, which asks if the legal relationship between the parties is ‘on equal terms’ (‘auf der Grundlage der Gleichordnung’) or one of dominance and subordination (Über- und Unterordnung’); and the ‘modified subject’ or ‘special rights’ theory (‘Sonderrechtstheorie’), which asks if the norm necessarily only benefits or is directed at a carrier of public power (‘ob eine Norm nur ein Träger öffentlicher Gewalt berechtigt oder verpflichtet’) .5 25

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Norms can also be distinguished according to whether they: –

– –

–

are norms of material or formal law. Formal law (‘formelles Recht’) deals with the application (‘Anwendung’)  and carrying out (‘Durchsetzung’)   of material law (‘materielles Recht’), which contains the substantive provisions. Examples of formal law are procedural law (‘Prozeßrecht’/‘Verfahrensrecht’)  and the law governing the various court jurisdictions (‘Gerichtsbarkeiten’); are norms of federal or state law or norms with only more limited application, ie, those which are set by ‘Körperschaften’ and ‘Anstalten’; are compulsory norms (‘zwingende Normen’: ius cogens)  or dispositive norms (‘nachgiebige Normen’/‘dispositives Recht’: ius dispositivum) . Dispositive norms are referred to as being ‘abdingbar’, ie, they can be derogated from by agreement. They are largely to be found in private law, where the important principles of freedom of contract (‘Vertragsfreiheit’)   and private autonomy (‘Privatautonomie’) prevail. Thus, the contract law of the BGB usually only applies in the absence of an agreement between free contracting parties;6 emanate from statute/statutory instrument (‘Gesetz’) or custom (‘Gewohnheit’).

26

CHAPTER X

X PRIVATE LAW: THE CIVIL CODE (BGB) 1

A INTRODUCTION The Civil Code (‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’) of 18.8.1896 came into force on 1.1.1900.2 It is the most important source (‘Quelle’) of private law in Germany. It consists of  2385 paragraphs divided into five Books:3 Book I: Book II: Book III: Book IV: Book V:

       

‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (general part), §§ 1–240. ‘Schuldrecht’ (law of obligations), §§ 241–853. ‘Sachenrecht’ (law of property), §§ 854–1296. ‘Familienrecht’ (family law), §§ 1297–1921. ‘Erbrecht’ (law of succession), §§ 1922–2385.

Each Book (‘Buch’) is divided into ‘Abschnitte’  (Sections), which are in turn sub-divided into ‘Titel’ (Titles). B BOOK I: THE ‘ALLGEMEINER TEIL’ (§§ 1–240 BGB)4 The key rules contained in Book I of the BGB (the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’); §§ 1–240) are valid for all the other Books of the BGB and are of general application for the whole of  German private law. The ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (AT) is divided into seven Sections. 1 Terminology to Note

A knowledge of the following terminology is essential for an understanding of the BGB: 1 2

‘Die Rechtsfähigkeit’: the capacity to be a carrier of rights and obligations (‘die Fähigkeit, Träger von Rechten und Pflichten zu sein’).5 ‘Die Rechtssubjekte’  (legal subjects or persons).6 Only ‘Rechtssubjekte’  possess ‘Rechtsfähigkeit’ . ‘Rechtssubjekte’   are either natural persons (‘natürliche Personen’=‘Menschen’, ie, humans) or juristic persons (‘juristische Personen’). These concepts are dealt with in Section 1  of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (entitled ‘Personen’; §§ 1–89). Every natural person has a ‘Wohnsitz’ ((place of) residence). A juristic person has a ‘(Haupt)-niederlassung’ ((main) office, place of business) or ‘Sitz’ (seat/(registered) address).7 ‘Wohnsitz’ is a legal term (‘Rechtsbegriff’) and refers to the focal point of a person’s affairs (‘der räumliche Schwerpunkt der Lebensverhältnisse eines Menschen’). Its broad equivalent in the English (legal) language is the term ‘domicile’, although a better translation thereof would be ‘Heimat’ (home). 27

The German Legal System and Legal Language

A person’s ‘Wohnsitz’ is of importance for various purposes, eg, as the place of  performance under § 269(i) BGB and in order to establish which court has local  jurisdiction in civil or criminal proceedings (§§ 13 ZPO and 8(i) StPO).8 One distinguishes a person’s: – – –

3

4

main (‘Haupt-’) and secondary (‘Zweit-’) ‘Wohnsitz’ (§ 7 (ii) BGB), the former usually being the significant one for (public) legal purposes; voluntary (‘gewillkürtes’) and statutory (‘gesetzliches’) ‘Wohnsitz’ (§ 7 and §§ 8– 11 BGB respectively); and (temporary) residence (‘(vorübergehender) Aufenthalt’).

Mere ‘Aufenthalt’ does not suffice to establish a person’s ‘Wohnsitz’, even if it is habitual/usual (‘gewöhnlich’) or continuous (‘dauernd’). The key element of a ‘Wohnsitz’ is constant settlement (‘ständige Niederlassung’) at a particular place, the decisive factor being the desire to establish an intensive connection (‘intensive Bindung’) to that place.9 ‘Die Rechtsobjekte’  (legal objects):10 A ‘Rechtsobjekt’ is any thing/matter (‘Gegenstand’) with which the law can concern itself. If a ‘Gegenstand’ is corporeal/tangible (‘körperlich’), it is known as a ‘Sache’. ‘Sachen’ are dealt with in Section 2 of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (entitled ‘Sachen’; §§ 90–103).11  Other ‘Rechtsobjekte’ are ‘Immaterialrechtsgüter’ (intellectual property) and ‘Rechte’ (rights). Unlike ‘Rechtssubjekte’, ‘Rechtsobjekte’   have no rights and usually belong to ‘Rechtssubjekte’.12 ‘Das subjektive Recht’  (subjective (legal) right).13 A ‘subjektives Recht’ is conferred upon a person by the legal system (‘Rechtsordnung’) to protect his interests. A ‘subjektives Recht’ is the legal power (‘Rechtsmacht’) or legally protected interest (‘rechtlich geschütztes Interesse’)  of the individual, as opposed to the objective law (‘das objektive Recht’),   which is the sum-total of all valid norms. It is to be distinguished from the so-called ‘Rechtsreflex’  (legal reflex), which is the nonenforceable favouring of an individual by the legal system. With certain exceptions, the state has a monopoly regarding the protection of a subjective legal right.14 One speaks of the acquisition (‘Erwerb’) and transfer (‘Übertragung’/‘Übergang’) of  a subjective legal right and of limits (‘Grenzen’) on its exercise.15 Subjective legal rights are divided into the following main types.16 The first two are absolute rights (‘absolute Rechte’), effective against everyone. The others are relative rights (‘relative Rechte’),  as they are only directed against individual persons within a particular legal relationship: –   ‘Herrschaftsrechte’ (rights of dominance): they give power over ‘Gegenstände’ (eg, ‘Sachen’; they are then known as ‘real rights’ (‘dingliche Rechte’)). The most 28

Chapter X: Private Law: The Civil Code (BGB)

comprehensive ‘dingliches (Herrschafts-)recht’ is ‘Eigentum’ (ownership). Power over incorporeal things (eg, ‘Ansprüche’) is known as ‘Inhaberschaft’ (entitlement/ownership). –   ‘Persönlichkeitsrechte’ (personality rights). A general right to one’s personality is based on Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law.17 –   ‘Ansprüche’ (claims). An ‘Anspruch’ is defined in § 194(i) BGB as ‘das Recht, von einem anderen ein Tun oder ein Unterlassen zu verlangen’  (the right to demand an act or omission from another). A contractual ‘Anspruch’ is known as a ‘Forderung’ (§241 BGB). An ‘Anspruch’ must always have an ‘Anspruchsgrundlage’ (basis), the conditions of which must all be fulfilled if the ‘Anspruch’ is to be ‘begründet’ (well founded).18 –   ‘Gestaltungsrechte’ (formulation rights). Their exercise enables their ‘Inhaber’ to influence a particular legal situation (eg, the right of challenge (‘Anfechtung’), the right to give notice (‘Kündigung’), the right of withdrawal/rescission (‘Rücktritt’)).19 –   ‘Gegenrechte’ (counter-rights, defences). These enable a defendant to negate an ‘Anspruch’. They are classified as ‘Einwendungen’ and ‘Einreden’.20 –   ‘Familienrechte’ (family rights), eg, parental rights.

5 6

7

8

Subjective rights exist both in private and public law (a public subjective right is a ‘subjektives öffentliches Recht’).21 ‘Das Rechtsverhältnis’: the legal relationship between ‘Rechtssubjekte’ or between ‘Rechtssubjekte’ and ‘Rechtsobjekte’. It gives rise to (subjective) legal rights and/or duties (‘Rechte und Pflichten’).22 ‘Die Privatautonomie’  (private autonomy (principle)). In accordance with man’s right to self-determination (‘Selbstbestimmung’), it is a  basic principle of the legal order (‘Rechtsordnung’) that the individual is free to enter into and form legal relationships (‘Gestaltungsfreiheit’). It incorporates the individual’s freedom to conclude a legal transaction (such as a contract) on such terms as he wishes: ‘Vertragsfreiheit’ .23 ‘Das Rechtsgeschäft’  (legal transaction).24 A ‘Rechtsgeschäft’  is composed of at least one ‘Willenserklärung’ (declaration of will) and can be unilateral (‘einseitig’, eg, a will, the grant of a ‘Vollmacht’) or multilateral (‘mehrseitig’, eg, a contract). By means of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, a ‘Rechtssubjekt’ can achieve a legal consequence (‘Rechtsfolge’) and create or vary a legal relationship (‘Rechtsbeziehung’) to another ‘Rechtssubjekt’ or to a ‘Rechtsobjekt‘.   ‘Rechtshandlungen’  (legal actions).25 The term ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ is part of the more general term ‘Rechtshandlung’. To be additionally distinguished are: – a ‘Rechtshandlung’ directed to achieving a factual consequence, eg, the setting of a time limit, consent to an operation, establishment of a ‘Wohnsitz’. This is an action similar to a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (‘rechtsgeschäftsähnliche Handlung’) and the provisions concerning ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’ and ‘Willenserklärungen’ are applied analogously. 29

The German Legal System and Legal Language

–

a pure factual act (‘Tathandlung’ or ‘Realakt’). Like a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, it can lead to legal consequence, not because of a ‘Willenserklärung’, but due to the general law, eg, statutory acquisition of ownership. However, it requires no ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’.26

9 ‘Die Geschäftsfähigkeit’  (capacity to undertake a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’). Only natural persons are ‘geschäftsfähig’ and can declare their will by means of a ‘Willenserklärung’. Thus, only natural persons can conclude a‘Rechtsgeschäft’ alone. The statutory representatives of persons not fully ‘geschäftsfähig’ are their ‘gesetzliche Vertreter’. 27 2

The Provisions of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’  Regarding ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’  (§§ 104–185 BGB) (Section 3)

‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’, ‘Willenserklärung’ and ‘Rechtsfolge’ form the main elements of a valid ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’ are dealt with in Section 3 of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (§§ 104–185) . Section 3 is divided into six Titles: Title 1: ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’ (capacity to undertake a ‘Rechtsgeschaft’): §§ 104–115. Title 2: ‘Willenserklärung’ (declaration of will): §§ 116–144. Title 3: ‘Vertrag’ (contract): §§ 145–157. Title 4: ‘Bedingung’ (condition). ‘Zeitbestimmung’ (time provision): §§ 158–163. Title 5: ‘Vertretung’ (representation/agency). ‘Vollmacht’ (power of attorney): §§ 164–181.28 Title 6: ‘Einwilligung’ ((prior) consent). ‘Genehmigung’ (approval): §§ 182–185. (a) Title 1 (§§ 104–115 BGB) Although the BGB contains no specific provision to that effect, it proceeds on the basis that ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’ (the capacity to undertake a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’) commences with the age of majority (‘Volljährigkeit’), which, by § 2, is 18 years. The BGB distinguishes sharply between: – – –

persons who have no ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’ at all, referred to as ‘geschäftsunfähig’; those who enjoy limited ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’, referred to as ‘beschränkt geschäftsfähig’; and those who are fully ‘geschäftsfähig’.29

§ 104 BGB defines those who are ‘geschäftsunfähig’, ie, infants under seven and persons permanently mentally disturbed. The ‘Willenserklärung’ of somebody who is ‘geschäftsunfähig’ is void (‘nichtig’), as is that declared (not received!) by a person in a state of unconsciousness or suffering from a temporary intellectual impairment (§ 105). A child between seven and 18 years of age is a ‘Minderjähriger’  (minor) and is ‘beschränkt geschäftsfähig’ in accordance with §§ 107–113 (§ 106). As a result, to make a

30

Chapter X: Private Law: The Civil Code (BGB)

‘Willenserklärung’ he needs the prior consent (‘Einwilligung’) of his parents, except if  he receives merely a legal (not commercial!) advantage (‘lediglich einen rechtlichen Vorteil’) from the transaction (§§ 107,1629).30 Whilst the entry into a contract (‘Vertrag’) by a minor involves him in obligations, his receipt of property (for example, by way of gift) is regarded as a legal advantage and requires no approval (‘Zustimmung’). §§ 108–110  deal with the position where a contract is concluded by a minor without prior consent. Its validity is then dependant on the subsequent consent (‘Genehmigung’) of his parents, until which time it is referred to as being ‘schwebend unwirksam’, ie, its validity is in abeyance. If consent is refused, the contract is finally void. In the meantime, the other party has certain rights to demand a statement regarding the ‘Genehmigung’ from the parents and to withdraw from the transaction (§§ 108 (ii) and 109).31 A contract concluded by a minor without approval is regarded as valid from the start, if the contractually required ‘Leistung’ (performance) is (immediately) effected (‘bewirkt’) with ‘Mitteln’ (funds) given to him by his parents for that purpose or placed at his free disposal by his parents (or by a third party with their approval): the socalled ‘pocket-money’ (§ 110). Prior consent is deemed to have been granted. A contract with a minor can, therefore, be approved by parents before or after its conclusion. If it turns out to be void, that does not affect the ‘property level’ (‘sachenrechtliche Ebene’) of the transaction, which is abstract.32 However, the minor has been unjustly enriched: he has received something (‘etwas’) without a legal basis (‘ohne rechtlichen Grund’), the return of which (‘Herausgabe’) the other party can claim (§ 812). Although the fact that one is not or no longer enriched (§ 818 (iii)) is usually a defence to such a claim, this does not apply in the event that there is bad faith (‘Bösgläubigkeit’) on the part of the minor and he is unable to return the item due to his own fault (‘Verschulden’):  he is then liable for damages (§§ 818(iv), 819(i), 292, 990, 989: so-called ‘verschärfte Haftung’).33 The approval of the guardianship court (‘Vormundschaftsgericht’)   is required, if  parents or guardians wish to engage in certain property or other transactions for the child (§§ 1643,1821,1822).34 (b) Title 2 (§§ 116–144 BGB) §§ 116–144  contain a mixed-bag of important provisions concerning:

– – – – –

the validity of a ‘Willenserklärung’ (ie, the question of its making (‘Abgabe’) and receipt (‘Zugang’)) (§§ 130–132); the interpretation (‘Auslegung’) of a ‘Willenserklärung’ (§ 133); the challengability (‘Anfechtbarkei’)  and nullity (‘Nichtigkeit’)  of a ‘Willenserklarung’/  ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, ie, vitiating elements (§§ 116–124, 125, 134, 138, 139–144);35 the form of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (§§ 125–129); the content (‘Inhalt’) of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (§§ 134–138).

31

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The term ‘Willenserklärung’

The BGB nowhere contains a definition of a ‘Willenserklärung’. Instead, it contains numerous provisions regulating the ability of a person to make a ‘Willenserklärung’ and the validity, form, interpretation and content of a ‘Willenserklärung’ and ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. Moreover, Section 3 of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (headed ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’) proceeds on the basis that a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, also nowhere defined, consists of one or more ‘Willenserklärungen’; indeed, Title 2 is headed ‘Willenserklärung’.36 But what is a ‘Willenserklärung’? The word itself indicates that a ‘Willenserklärung’ has two components:37 1 2

the (internal) will (‘Wille’) to bring about a legal consequence; and the (external) declaration (‘Erklärung’) showing what legal consequence is desired.

More exactly, one customarily says that the first component comprises the following elements: – – –

the ‘Handlungswille’, ie, the will to act at all; the ‘Rechtsbindungswille’, ie, the will to be legally bound by one’s act; and the ‘Geschäftswille, ie, the will to engage in a particular transaction.38

The second component (the ‘Erklärung’) does not have to consist of a particular formulation. A particular act can (and often does) constitute a ‘Willenserklärung not only when it is expressed, but also when it is implied from conduct (‘schlüssiges Verhalten’).39 Silence (‘Schweigen’) itself, however, does not, as a rule, suffice.40 If one of the two components is missing, there is no ‘Willenserklärung’. If the two components diverge from one another (‘von einander abweichen’), the ‘Willenserklärung’ is either challengable (‘anfechtbar’) or void (’nichtig’).41 Validity of a ‘Willenserklärung’42

At what moment does a ‘Willenserklärung’  become valid? The following rules apply: – –

a ‘Willenserklärung’ made to another person, who is absent, becomes effective from the moment of its communication/receipt (‘Zugang’; § 130(i));43 a ‘Willenserklärung’ made to a person having no or only limited ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit‘ is normally only valid if made to the person’s statutory representative (§ 131).

When a ‘Willenserklärung’ requires to be received by another person it is referred to as  being ‘empfangsbedürftig’. A ‘nichtempfangsbedürftige Willenserklärung’ only has to be placed into circulation (‘abgegeben’), eg, a will (‘Testament’). Interpretation of a ‘Willenserklärung’44

The BGB proceeds on the assumption that a ‘Willenserklärung’   should only be challengable (‘anfechtbar’) by its maker in certain limited cases (§§ 119, 120 and 123) and that the upholding of a ‘Willenserklärung’ (and consequent validity of the legal transaction) is desirable in the interests of legal certainty and clarity (‘Sicherheit und 32

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Klarheit des Rechtsverkehrs’). (Beneficial) interpretation takes precedence over challengability (‘Auslegung geht Anfechtung vor’).45 § 133 sets out the general principle that a ‘Willenserklärung’ should not be interpreted literally, but in accordance with the real will (‘wirkliche Wille’) of its author (‘natürliche  Auslegung’) . Surrounding circumstances can be taken into account as means of  interpretation, but only in so far as the interests of legal certainty and clarity allow. However, where a ‘Willenserklärung’ is ‘empfangsbedürftig’ (ie, whenever a contract is involved) the recipient can only go by what is recognisable to him (‘erkennbar’). It is his point of view that requires protection and counts, if the meaning of a ‘Willenserklärung’ is disputed (‘Auslegung vom Empfängerhorizont’). The aim is then the establishment of the ‘objektiver Erklärungswert’,   ie, the ‘Willenserklärung’  must be interpreted objectively (‘normative Auslegung’).46 Always to be considered together with § 133 is § 157 BGB, which requires contracts to be interpreted in accordance with the principle of trust and good faith (‘Treu und Glauben’) taking account of custom/common practice (‘die Verkehrssitte’).47 Nullity and challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung’

Even if a ‘Willenserklärung’ is clear, it can be void by operation of law (‘nichtig’) or challengable/voidable (‘anfechtbar’) by its maker. One must always ask: are there any reasons for the nullity or challengability of the ‘Willenserklärung’? (Liegen Nichtigkeitsoder Anfechtungsgründe vor?’) The consequence of the challenge (‘Anfechtung’) of a ‘Willenserklärung’ is that the ‘Willenserklärung’ is regarded as void from the start (‘von Anfang an nichtig’; § 142(i)).48 However, ‘Anfechtbarkeit’  and ‘Nichtigkeit’   are not the same: ‘Anfechtung’ is a ‘Gestaltungsrecht’ (formulation right), which must be exercised to be effective. Until then, the ‘Willenserklärung’ is valid. If a ‘Willenserklärung or ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ is ‘nichtig’, it never had any effect. A ‘Willenserklärung’ is ‘nichtig’ (void) in the following cases: – – –

incapacity (‘Geschäftsunfähigkei’: § 105); if the necessary subsequent consent (‘Genehmigung’) to a contract entered into by a minor is not forthcoming (§ 108(i)); if the person making the ‘Willenserklärung’ is conscious of one of the following circumstances:49 • • •

he has a mental reservation (‘geheimer Vorbehalt‘) about what he is declaring and the other party knows this (§ 116);50 he is making the ‘Willenserklärung’ with the agreement of the other party only for the sake of appearance (‘nur zum Schein’) § 117); the ‘Willenserklärung’ is not meant seriously and he expects the other party to realise that (§ 118).

In order to safeguard the interests of legal certainty and clarity, the ‘Anfechtung’ (challenge) of a ‘Willenserklärung’ is subject to various restrictions: –

a ‘Willenserklärung’  can only be challenged on certain statutory grounds (‘Anfechtungsgründe’), which are:51 33

The German Legal System and Legal Language

•

• • – –

–

mistake (‘Irrtum’) : § 119, distinguished by the BGB into three types: ‘Inhaltsirrtum’ (mistake as to content/meaning), ‘Erklärungsirrtum’ (mistake in the declaration itself) and (in § 119 (ii)) ‘Eigenschaftsirrtum’ (mistake as to a particularly important quality of the person or thing concerned); false transmission (‘falsche Übermittlung’) (§ 120); fraudulent deceit (‘arglistige Täuschung’) or illegal threat (‘widerrechtliche Drohung’) of or to the person making the ‘Willenserklärung’: § 123;52

the ‘Anfechtung’ must be declared: § 143(i); the ‘Anfechtung’ must be exercised within a particular time limit (‘Anfechtungsfrist’): §§ 121(i) and 124(i). In the case of §§ 119 and 120, this must be forthwith (‘unverzüglich’), ie, without blameworthy delay (‘ohne schuldhaftes Zögern’) and in the case of § 123, within a year; the bona fide recipient of a ‘Willenserklärung’ challenged under § 119 or § 120 is entitled to compensation for the damage suffered in reliance on the validity of the declaration (§ 122).

Form and nullity of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’

The basic rule is that, unless otherwise required or agreed, neither a ‘Willenserklärung’ nor a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ require a particular form: the principle of ‘Formfreiheit’  (freedom of form).53 This said, the BGB distinguishes various forms for a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’:54 – – – –

writing as prescribed by statute (‘gesetzliche Schriftform’; § 126); writing as desired by the parties to the‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (‘gewillkürte Schriftform’ ‘; § 127); notarial documentation (‘notarielle Beurkundung’; § 128); public certification (‘öffentliche Beglaubigung’; § 129).55

A ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ is ‘nichtig’ (void) – – –

if it lacks the necessary statutory form (§ 125, 1st sentence);56 if it is itself the object of a statutory prohibition (‘gesetzliches Verbot’) and contravenes it (§ 134);57 if it is ‘sittenundrig’, ie, breaches good morals (‘gute Sitten’: § 138(i)).58 (c) Title 3 (§§ 145–157 BGB)

The term ‘Einigung’

If two or more ‘Willenserklärungen’ correspond (‘übereinstimmen’), the parties are said to have reached a consensus or agreement (‘Einigung’).59 The conclusion of a contract (‘Vertrag’) usually depends on an ‘Einigung’ (this is clear from §§ 154 and 155).60 An ‘Einigung’ can be achieved by mere joint statement or, more commonly, by exchange of offer (‘Angebot’) and acceptance (‘Annahme’). It is this means of reaching an ‘Einigung’ that is dealt with in §§ 145–157.61 34

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§§ 145–157  only handle the question of how an ‘Einigung’ is reached by offer and

acceptance (the question of formation). They do not deal with the questions of the content (‘Inhalt’), form or legal consequences (‘Rechtsfolgen’) of an ‘Einigung’, ie: – – –

on what points must the ‘Willenserklärungen’ of the parties correspond?; does the ‘Einigung’ require a particular form?; what duties (‘Pflichten’) result?

The particular provisions of each area of law (contract, property, family, succession, company) contain the replies to these questions.62 Rules governing offer and acceptance 63

It is an unwritten rule that the content of an offer (‘Angebot’)64—ie, the essential contractual points (‘essentialia negotii’)—must be sufficiently specific (‘hinreichend bestimmt’) or at least capable of specification (‘bestimmbar’)65 Moreover, an offer must indicate an intention to be legally binding (‘rechtlich verbindlich’).66 By § 145, an offeror is bound to his offer67 unless, as is commonly done, he excludes his liability by such phrases as ‘freibleibend’ (subject to availability) or ‘ohne Obligo’ (without obligation). An offer expires (‘erlischt’) if it is refused (‘abgelehnt’). If, however, it is desired to accept an offer, the acceptance (‘Annahme’)68 must (a) usually be declared in some form; and (b) reach the offeror in time (‘rechtzeitig’; § 146), ie, immediately (‘sofort’) where both parties are present or within such a period as the offeror can expect under normal circumstances (‘unter regelmäßigen Umständen’) or as he may specify (§§ 147 and 148). If the acceptance is delayed (‘verspätet’) or contains additions, restrictions or other amendments (‘Erweiterungen, Einschränkungen oder sonstige Änderungen’),  it is deemed to be a new offer (in the latter case, together with a refusal of the original offer) from the accepting party (§ 150).69 Exceptionally, it is possible for a contract to be concluded without an acceptance being declared, if such a declaration is not customarily to be expected (‘nach der Verkehrssitte nicht zu erwarten’, eg, booking of an hotel room) or is waived by the offeror (§ 151)70 However, some form of acceptance is always required and silence or inaction (‘Schweigen’; ‘Nichtstun’) does not suffice, unless: – –

it is agreed upon between the parties as having the effect of an acceptance; or the person to whom the offer is made is a businessman (‘Kaufmann’), in which case he must, in certain circumstances, reply forthwith (‘unverzüglich’) if he is not to be bound.71

Failure to reach an ‘Einigung’

The BGB contains two difficult provisions (§§ 154 and 155) dealing with so-called ‘Einigungsmängel’ (‘Dissens’), ie, the situation where the parties do not reach a fully matching consensus (‘Einigung’).72 35

The German Legal System and Legal Language

When considering §§ 154 and 155, one must bear in mind that a contract (‘Vertrag’) can contain both: –

‘wesentliche Bestandteile’ (essential components; ‘essentialia negotii’): if the parties fail to reach agreement on points essential to the particular contract, their relationship is one of ‘Total-dissens’ (total disagreement)—§§ 154 and 155 do not refer to this situation; and –   ‘Nebenpunkte’ (accessory points), ie, those points on which, in accordance with the declared will of at least one party, an ‘Einigung’ is necessary. Here, §§ 154 and 155 lay down certain rules of interpretation (‘Auslegungsregel’) in the event of doubt (‘im Zweifel’, ie, where the situation cannot be clarified):

• •

if an ‘Einigungsmangel’ is ‘offen’  (open), ie, both parties are aware that the outstanding point(s) still require(s) to be agreed, the contract is deemed not to have been concluded: § 154; if an ‘Einigungsmangel’ is ‘versteckt’ (hidden), ie, the parties conclude a contract unaware that the outstanding point(s) is or are still outstanding, the parties are deemed to have agreed the contract as it stands, so far as can be assumed that the contract would also have been concluded without agreement on the outstanding point(s): § 155.

The situation which § 155 has in mind is that where the wording in an agreement is objectively ambiguous and each of the parties attaches a different meaning to it (hidden dissent). It is to be distinguished from the situation where the parties merely use a false description of an item and in fact mean the same thing (falsa demonstratio (non nocet) ).73 (d) Title 4 (§§ 158–163 BGB)

The term ‘Bedingung’ (condition) as contained in §§ 158–163  is used solely in the sense of a future uncertain event (‘zukünftiges ungewisses Ereignis’).74 A ‘Bedingung’ can be either ‘aufschiebend’ (suspensive) or ‘auflösend’ (resolutive) in effect.75 The ‘conditions’ (terms) contained in a contract (‘Vertrags-’ or ‘(Allgemeine) Geschäftsbedingungen’)76 or laid down by law (‘Rechtsbedingungen’) are not ‘Bedingungen’ in the sense of §§ 158–163. Also to be distinguished is the term ‘Zeitbestimmung’ (time provision: § 163), which refers to the specification of a date or time for the start or end of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. The prime example of a suspensive condition is purchase under reservation of title (‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’), where the purchaser only becomes owner on condition of full payment of the purchase price. Until then, he has a so-called ‘Anwartschaftsrecht’ (right of expectancy)77 and is protected against hindering acts by the other party (vendor): – –

if in the meantime the other party frustrates or impairs his future right by his (the other party’s) ‘Verschulden’ (fault), he can claim damages (§ 160); if the other party undertakes a ‘Verfügung’ over the item in the meantime (eg, purports to transfer title again to someone else), the ‘Verfügung’ has no effect against him (§ 161);78 36

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and –

if in bad faith (‘wider Treu und Glauben’) the other party prevents the condition coming into effect, it is deemed to have come into effect (§ 162). (e) Standard business terms (AGB) 79

Introduction

The fact that the norms of the law of obligations are largely dispositive80 does not mean that contracting parties are free to ignore them whenever they please. The risk of abuse of unlimited freedom of contract is particularly acute when there is inequality of bargaining power (‘Machtungleichgewicht’) and the weaker party to a contract is open to exploitation (‘Ausnutzung’). In Germany at the start of the 20th century, case-law was directed against abuses of  freedom of contract in the form of monopolies. At first, the Imperial Court (‘Reichsgericht’) used § 138 BGB as its benchmark, but the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) later replaced this means of control with the concept of trust and good faith (‘Treu und Glauben’) under § 242 BGB. However, it gradually became clear that, despite the formulation of case-law principles in individual cases, statutory intervention was necessary to protect the position of the consumer (‘Verbraucher’)  in the face of sophisticate, small print’ (‘Kleingedrucktes’). Codification was also desirable in the interests of legal certainty. Today, therefore, standard business terms are regulated by the AGBG (‘Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen’)  of 9.12.1976, in force since 1.4.1977. The principal provisions of the AGBG are divided into a substantive part (§§ 1–11), a paragraph dealing with contracts subject to foreign law (§ 12), paragraphs enabling certain organisations to seek restraint and/or withdrawal of terms, which infringe the AGBG’s system of control (§§ 9–11), and setting out the relevant procedure (§§ 13– 22), and two paragraphs laying down substantive and personal exceptions from the scope of the AGBG (§§ 23–24). Definitions

By § l(i), 1st sentence AGBG, standard business terms (‘allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen’ (AGB)) are defined as contract terms (‘Vertragsbedingungen’), which are formulated in advance (‘vorformuliert’) for numerous contracts and which one party presents to the other (‘stellt’) when the contract is entered into; for example, the common situation where the contract is to be concluded using a standard, preprinted, stereotyped form (‘Formularvertrag’). The extent of the relevant clause is irrelevant: § l(i), 2nd sentence AGBG.81 Excluded from the ambit of standard business terms within the meaning of the AGBG are terms, which are individually negotiated by the parties (‘im einzelnen ausgehandelt’): § l(ii) AGBG. An individually negotiated agreement (‘Individualabrede’) is the opposite of a unilaterally-imposed ‘Formularvertrag’; it can be concluded before or after the contract, orally or in writing and can be express or implied.82 37

The German Legal System and Legal Language

An ‘Individualabrede’ takes precedence over standard business terms: § 4 AGBG. Thus, for example, clauses requiring amendments to be made in writing (‘Schriftformklauseln’) are permissible, but can be overriden by an inconsistent oral arrangement.83 Incorporation

For AGB to be binding, they must be made part of the contract (‘Bestandteil des Vertrages’), whether in the contract document itself or separately. By § 2 AGBG,  incorporation of AGB into a contract has three requirements: (i) at the moment of conclusion of the contract (‘bei Vertragsabschluss’),  attention must  be drawn to the AGB in clear fashion by the party wishing to use them (the ‘Verwender’), ie, there must be an express reference (‘ausdrücklicher Hinweis’) to the AGB, or, if this involves disproportionate difficulties, a dearly visible notice (‘Aushang’) at the place of contracting; (ii) at the same moment, the user must provide the other party with the opportunity to acquaint himself with the content of the AGB in an acceptable manner (‘in zumutbarer Weise); and (iii) the other party must agree to the application of the AGB. Actual agreement (‘Einverständnis’)  is necessary and not mere submission (‘Unterwerfung’).84 Interpretation

A common criticism of standard business terms is that they are frequently opaque (‘undurchsichtig’) and involved (‘unübersichtlich’). One of the main aims of the AGBG is, therefore, the production of clear business terms (‘Transparenzgebot’) . This purpose could be wrecked, if, when using standard terms, persons were able to take their business partners by surprise (‘überrumpeln’) and insert provisions that would normally not be expected in the relevant circles (‘beteiligte Personenkreise’). For this reason, surprising clauses (‘überraschende Klauseln’) do not become part of  the contract: § 3 AGBG . A surprising clause is one, which, according to the circumstances, is so unusual (‘ungewöhnlich’) that the other contracting party does not have to reckon with it (‘nicht zu rechnen braucht’). Whether a clause is surprising in this sense must, generally, be assessed objectively from the viewpoint of the average customer (‘Durchschnittskunde’) . However, the individual circumstances can affect the position, eg, if a third party believes he is providing security for a particular loan, but does not realise that the relevant clause contains an extension of his liability (‘Erweiterung der Haftung’) to all other future claims (‘alle sonstige zukünftige Forderungen’).85 Thus, in contrast to the rules of interpretation for individually negotiated agreements (§§ 133,157 BGB), the AGBG proceeds on the basis that standard business terms should  be interpreted objectively, according to the understanding of a typical, innocent contractual partner. If a clause still remains ambiguous (‘mehrdeutig’) or there are doubts (‘Zweifel’), it must be interpreted narrowly against its user (‘contra proferentem’ ; § 5 38

Chapter X: Private Law: The Civil Code (BGB)

AGBG),  ie, in a legal action brought by an individual, the term should be given a

meaning favourable to the customer (‘kundenfreundlich’). Invalidity

Contrary to the normal rule in § 139 BGB, § 6(i) AGBG provides that the validity of  the rest of a contract is not affected, if a standard business term is not (fully or partially) incorporated into the contract or is (fully or partially) ineffective(‘unwirksam’). Whether the term is ineffective because of the AGBG or on other grounds (§§ 134, 138 BGB) is irrelevant. Any resulting gaps in the contract (‘Lücken’) must be filled by the dispositive law (§ 6(ii) AGBG) or, in the absence of specific statutory provisions, by supplementary interpretation (‘ergänzende Auslegung’). However, if terms, as drafted, contravene the AGBG, they cannot be reduced to their essentially valid core (‘Verbot der  geltungserhaltenden Reduktion’). Moreover, saving clauses (‘salvatorische Klauseln’), which merely attempt to replace ineffective terms by such other provisions as are legally permissible, are not sufficient. Exceptionally, the contract is completely void, if, despite any amendments, insistence on its validity would represent an unacceptable hardship (‘unzumutbare Härte’) for one of the parties: § 6(iii) AGBG. Scope

The AGBG does not apply to contracts in the fields of employment law, family law, the law of succession and company law: § 23(i) AGBG. Further specific exceptions are contained in § 23(ii) AGBG, eg, the conditions of carriage (‘Beförderungsbedingungen’) for passengers on buses or trams need not comply with the requirements of § 2. Contracts of public law (‘öffentlich-rechtliche Verträge’) are subject to the AGBG, as are terms in contracts offering public services in private law form. However, bye-laws (‘Satzungen’) and other conditions or tariffs having normative character are excluded. More importantly, by § 24, 1st sentence AGBG, certain provisions of the AGBG (§§ 2, 10, 11 and 12) do not apply vis à vis a businessman (‘Kaufmann’), if a contract is entered into by him for the purposes of his business (not private purposes!), ie, the contract belongs to the businessman’s trading activities (§ 343 HGB). However, by § 24, 2nd sentence AGBG, in such cases, contract terms falling under §§ 10 and 11 AGBG can still be invalid on the basis of § 9 AGBG, although this, in turn, is qualified by the requirement that account must be taken of commercial customs and usages (§ 346 HGB). Where a private consumer in Germany is involved, § 12 AGBG extends the scope of the AGBG to contracts with a foreign element. § 12 states that, even if a contract is governed by foreign law, account is to be taken of the provisions of the AGBG if: 1 2

the contract is concluded on the basis of a public offer, public advertising or a ‘similar business activity’ by the user in Germany; and the other party has his domicile or usual residence in Germany at the time his contractual declaration is made. 39

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Statutory control §§ 9–11 AGBG  constitute a special statutory system of control of the content of standard

 business terms (‘Inhaltskontrolle’). The freedom of the user (‘Verwender’) to design a contract as he pleases (‘Gestaltungsfreiheit’) is thereby significantly restricted. The aim of §§ 9–11 AGBG is to protect the other party to a contract against being unfairly prejudiced by standard business terms. The method adopted by the AGBG is to go from the general (§ 9) to the specific (§§ 10–11), although, in practice, §§ 10–11 are examined first, since § 9 is a mopping-up provision (‘Auffangtatbestand’), which usually only comes into play on a subsidiary basis (at any rate where the other contract party is not a businessman (note § 24)).86 Thus, § 9 lays down a general principle (bench-mark) for establishing the propriety of standard business terms, while §§ 10 and 11 comprises a non-exhaustive catalogue of typical clauses  at particular risk of prohibition. The clauses listed in § 11 are prohibited outright, while those in § 10 are open to evaluation (‘Wertung’) on the basis of the rule in §9. § 9(i) AGBG provides that standard business terms are of no effect (‘unwirksam’), if, contrary to the requirements of trust and good faith (‘Treu und Glauben’), they constitute an inappropriate disadvantage (unangemessene Benachteiligung’) of the other party to a contract by the user. What amounts to an ‘inappropriate disadvantage’? § 9(ii) AGBG states that, in the event of doubt, an inappropriate disadvantage can  be (rebuttably) presumed, if a term either: 1 2

is not compatible with the essential principles (‘wesentliche Grundgedanken’) of the legal provisions, from which it diverges; or so restricts essential rights or obligations arising from the nature of the contract that the achievement of the purpose of the contract (‘Erreichung des Vertragszwecks’) is endangered.

§ 9 AGBG requires a comprehensive balancing of the parties’ respective interests (‘Interessenabwägung’) and, to that end, concretises certain criteria by way of example in subsection § 9(ii), Nos 1 and 2. Under No 1, the question is: is the relevant term out of line with important (written or unwritten) legal principles? The test in No 2, on the other hand, involves an examination of the typical object of the contract (‘Vertragsgegenstand’)  and extends to contracts without a statutory model (‘Leitbild’). In particular, under § 9(ii), No 2 AGBG, it is not permissible for the user of standard  business terms to erode (‘aushöhlen’)   significant rights or cardinal duties (‘Kardinalpflichten’), such as are indispensible (‘unentbehrlich’) to implementation of  the contract (‘Durchführung des Vertrages’), eg, by using a clause excluding liability for  breaches of contract or negligence (‘Freizeichnungsklausel’).87 The individual treatment of standard business terms in particular types of contract under § 9 AGBG is the subject of a vast case-law, which is usually set out alphabetically in the German commentaries. §§ 9–11 AGBG only apply to standard business terms, which diverge from or supplement legal provisions: § 8 AGBG. They are not directed at rectifying imbalances 40

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in the price/performance ratio (‘Preis-/Leistungsverhältnis’), ie, the adequacy of the consideration for a particular transaction. In particular, provisions which merely declare the statutory position (declaratory clauses), which give a description of the main object of performance required by a contract (‘Leistungsbeschreïbung’)  or which lay down the price are not subject to control. (Compare, however, terms which modify ancillary obligations (‘Nebenpflichten’) or collateral agreements concerning the price (‘Preisnebenabreden’),  eg, conditions of  payment (‘Zahlungsbedingungen’).) So far as they apply, §§ 9–11 AGBG take priority over, but do not oust, other statutory provisions, which may give grounds for nullifying contract terms (eg, §§ 134, 138, 242 BGB). Group remedies §§ 13–21 AGBG  provide additional protection for consumers against standard business

terms, which are ineffective under §§ 9–11 AGBG. Thus, by § 13 AGBG, certain associations (‘Verbände’) and chambers (‘Kammern’)—  ie, consumer associations (‘Verbraucherverbände’),  chambers of commerce and industry (‘Industrie und Handelskammern’) and handicraft chambers (‘Handwerkskammern’)— are given power to bring actions in their own right claiming restraint/stoppage (‘Unterlassung’) of the use of ineffective terms and, in the case of a recommendation to use such terms, withdrawal (‘Widerruf’) of the recommendation. The period for the making of claims is two years from knowledge of use or recommendation or, in the absence of such knowledge, four years from the date the relevant term was used or recommended: § 13(iv) AGBG. The effect of a court judgment under § 13 AGBG ordering stoppage (‘Unterlassungsurteil’) is extended by § 21 AGBG. Although, normally, such a judgment does not prevent the user of the relevant standard business term from using it again in a subsequent contract (‘Folgevertrag’), the term is ineffective to the extent that the new contracting party specifically relies on the judgment (by way of defence in a later individual action): § 21, 1st sentence AGBG. However, this does not apply, if the user could bring an action against the judgment under § 19 AGBG (on the ground of  divergence from a subsequent decision of the BGH or the Joint Senate of the Supreme Federal Courts): § 21, 2nd sentence AGBG. The Federal Cartel Office (‘Bundeskartellamt’) keeps a register of actions under §§ 13 and 19 AGBG: § 20 AGBG. Analogously to § 13 AGBG, § 22 AGBG gives various organisations a wide power to restrain infringements of statutory provisions serving the protection of consumers (eg, the HaustürWG, VerbrKrG, FernAbsG and §§ 651 a–1 BGB (travel contracts)). 3 The Rest of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’  (§§ 186–240 BGB) (Sections  4–7)88

The remaining Sections of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ are as follows: Section 4. ‘Fristen’ (time limits). ‘Termine’  (dates): §§ 186–193.

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A ‘Termin’ is a definite date or point in time (‘Zeitpunkt’), while a ‘Frist’ is a limited period of time, which can be set by statute, by the court or by the parties to a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. §§ 187–193 BGB contain general rules of interpretation for the calculation of time periods and for the assessment of certain dates. ‘Fristen’ are distinguished according to whether a failure to observe them results in the relevant right being destroyed or precluded—so-called‘Ausschlußfristen’—or results in realisation of the right being prevented due to limitation (‘Verjährungsfristen’) . Procedural time periods usually fall within the former category.89 If a procedural time limit is missed (‘versäumt’), the remedy is an application for reinstitution of the previous position (‘Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand’).90 Even before expiry of a time limit, a right can be considered forfeited (‘verwirkt’), if, in the circumstances, its exercise would infringe § 242 BGB.91 Section 5. ‘Verjährung’ (limitation): §§ 194–225 (see Exposé). Section 6. ‘Ausübung der Rechte’ (exercise of rights). ‘Selbstverteidigung’ (self-defence). ‘Selbsthilfe’ (self-help): §§ 226–231. Section 7. ‘Sicherheitsleistung’ (provision of (suitable forms of) security): §§ 232–240. 4 Exposé: ‘Verjährung’ (§§ 194–225 BGB) (Section 5) 92

(a) By § 194(i) BGB an ‘Anspruch’ (claim) is subject to ‘Verjährung’ (limitation). Certain claims are, however, not so subject and are ‘unverjährbar’, eg, those relating to the land register (§§ 898, 902). ‘Verjährung’ constitutes a ‘Leistungsverweigerungsrecht’, ie, gives the debtor the right to decline performance (§ 222(i)). However, if the debtor wishes to rely on it in proceedings, it must be raised by him, ie, it is a so-called ‘Einrede’ and not an ‘Einwendung’ (which the court takes into account of its own accord).93 (b) The actual limitation periods (‘Verjährungsfristen’)  are set out in §§ 195–197 BGB. By § 195 the normal ‘Verjährungsfrist’  is 30 years (three years from 1.1.2002). §§ 196–197 lay down a short limitation period (‘kurze Verjährung’) for certain claims. Thus, by § 196(i) No 1, a two year limitation period applies to claims of ‘Kaufleute’ (businessmen), ‘Fabrikanten’ (manufacturers) and ‘Handwerker’ (manual workers) concerning delivery of goods (‘Waren’) and carrying out of work (‘Arbeiten’) or other persons’ business (‘fremde Geschäfte’), unless with regard to the business of  the recipient (in which case a four year period applies: § 196(ii)). Other persons whose claims are subject to the two year limitation period include freight and shipping companies (§ 196(i) No 3), innkeepers (No 4), private employees (No 8), doctors, dentists and lawyers (Nos 14 and 15). Outstanding amounts of interest, rent, and pensions become statute-barred after four years (§ 197).

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The normal limitation period of 30 years begins when the ‘Anspruch’ arises (§ 198, 1st sentence). The ‘kurze Verjährung’ of two or four years begins with the end of  the year in which the ‘Anspruch’ arises (§ 201, 1st sentence). Once a claim has been (finally) legally established (eg, in an ‘Urteil’ (judgment) or ‘vollstreckbare Urkunde’ (enforceable document)), it becomes statute-barred in 30 years, even if the actual limitation period is shorter (§ 218(i)). (c) Other important limitation periods contained in the BGB are as follows: – in the case of a contract of sale (‘Kaufvertrag’) of movables, six months from delivery (‘Ablieferung’), provided that the relevant fault was not fraudulently concealed (‘arglistig verschwiegen’): § 477(i) BGB;94 – in the case of a rental agreement (‘Mietvertrag’),95 six months from: (i)

–

return of the item rented, in respect of claims by the lessor for compensation for alterations or deterioration; (ii) the end of the rental agreement, in respect of claims by the lessee for compensation for expenditure (under § 547 BGB) or removal of fittings (under § 547a BGB): § 558 BGB; in the case of a contract for services (‘Werkvertrag’), six months from acceptance (‘Abnahme’), provided that the relevant fault was not fraudulently concealed: § 638(i) BGB.

Where the ‘Werkvertrag’  involves a piece of land or a building, the period is extended to one year and five years (from acceptance) respectively: – –

in the case of a tort (‘unerlaubte Handlung’), three years from knowledge of the damage and the identity of the tortfeasor, otherwise 30 years from the time the damaging act was committed: § 852(i) BGB;96 in the case of a claim to a compulsory portion of an estate (‘Pflichtteil’), three years from the time the claimant acquires knowledge of the ‘Erbfall’ (the event entitling him or her to inherit, ie, the testator’s death: § 1922(i) BGB) and of  the relevant impairing transaction (‘beeinträchtigende Verfügung’)—eg, a will containing a disinheritance (‘Enterbung’)—otherwise 30 years from the occurrence of the entitling event: § 2332(i) BGB.97

(d) In certain cases, ‘Verjährung’ is temporarily suspended/prevented from running (‘gehemmt’), eg, where a creditor grants a respite (‘Stundung’),98 during marriage in the case of claims between spouses or where faulty work carried out under a ‘Werkvertrag’ (contract for services) needs to be rectified (§§ 202–207 and 639(ii)). Alternatively, ‘Verjährung’ can be interrupted (‘unterbrochen’), eg, by the debtor’s acknowledgement of debt (‘Anerkenntnis’),  by the issue of a writ (‘Klage’) or service of a default notice (‘Mahnbescheid’), by a claim of set-off (‘Aufrechnung’) or issue of  a 3rd party notice (‘Streitverkündung’) in proceedings or by acts of enforcement (‘Vollstreckungshandlungen’): §§ 208–216. The effect of such an interruption (‘Unterbrechung’) is that the period up to it is not taken into account and that after it ends a (full) new ‘Verjährung’ begins: § 217. 43

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(e) A debtor who satisfies an ‘Anspruch’, which has become statute-barred, has no right of reclaim, even if he did not know of the ‘Verjährung’ (§ 222(ii)). However, the ‘Verjährung’ of an ‘Anspruch’ does not prevent a mortgagee or chargee from enforcing his mortgage or charge (§ 223(i)). Whilst by agreement a limitation period can be shortened,99 ‘Verjährung’ cannot  be excluded or rendered more difficult (§ 225). C BOOK II: THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (§§ 241–853 BGB) 100 1 Introduction

Book II of the BGB is entitled ‘Recht der Schuldverhältnisse’ (law of obligations). It consists of  seven Sections, which are traditionally divided into a general part (‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (AT): Sections 1–6, §§ 241–432) and a special part (‘Besonderer Teil’ (BT): Section 7, §§ 433–353). The general part sets out, for example, the principles governing the content, disturbance and termination of contracts, damages and assignment, while the special part sets out in 25 Titles provisions regarding various individual types of contract— which apply in the absence of contrary agreement—and statutory obligations. 2 Points to Note

It is important to understand the following: 1

The main example of a ‘rechtsgeschäftliches Schuldverhältnis’ (obligation (relationship) arising from a legal transaction) is the ‘Vertrag’ (agreement or contract).101 2 German law distinguishes rigidly between the law of obligations (‘Schuldrecht’) and the law of property (‘Sachenrecht’). By means of the abstraction principle (‘Abstraktionsgrundsatz’), the ‘Verpflichtung’ (obligation) of a ‘Rechtssubjekt’ (legal subject or person) is strictly separated from his ‘Verfügung’ (disposition), ie, his transfer, release, burdening or variation of a (subjective) right (‘Übertragung,  Aufhebung, Belastung oder Änderung eines Rechtes’). Both are ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’, but are independent of each other.102 The ‘sale’ of a book, for example, requires not only an obligatory contract, but also the transfer of ownership (‘Übereignung’). Only when the latter (abstract) transaction is concluded, is the former performed (‘erfüllt’).103 By § 433(i), 1st sentence BGB the contract of sale (‘Kaufvertrag’) of a ‘Sache’ obliges the vendor to do two things: (a) transfer physical possession of (ie, hand over) the ‘Sache’=‘Übergabe’; and (b) ensure that ‘Eigentum’ (ownership) over the ‘Sache’ passes to the purchaser = ‘Verschaffung von Eigentum’. The ‘Kaufvertrag’  itself merely creates a ‘Verpflichtung’  (obligation). The actual transfer of ownership (the ‘Übereignung’ (a ‘Verfügung’)) is dealt with separately in Book III of the BGB according to whether movables (§§ 929–984) or immovables (§§ 873 and 925–928) are concerned.104 44

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In this connection, it is vital to understand the construction of the BGB and its norms (the ‘Gesetzesaufbau’): – whether or not a valid ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (eg, a ‘Kaufvertrag’) has been concluded is the domain of the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ (Book I), which supplements the rest of  the BGB and deals with general questions first (such matters are said to be ‘vor die Klammer gezogen’ (drawn before the clasp); – the usual pattern of German legal norms is that, first, the content(‘Tatbestand’) of the norm—a particular ‘Vomussetzung’  ((pre)condition; in § 433(i), 1st sentence the existence of a ‘Kaufvertrag’)—is stated and, second, a particular legal consequence (‘Rechtsfolge’; in § 433(i), 1st sentence the ‘Verpflichtung’ of  the vendor) is laid down.105 3

‘Schuldverhältnisse’ (obligations) can arise either from (‘aus’) a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (socalled ‘rechtsgeschäftliche Schuldverhältnisse’, eg, ‘Vertrag’)106 or from statute. Examples of statutory obligations (‘gesetzliche Schuldverhältnisse’)  are torts (‘unerlaubte  Handlungen’)107 and unjust enrichment (‘ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung’).108

3 Sections 1-7 109

(a) Section 1 (§§ 241–304 BGB)110 Section 1 of Book II (§§ 241–304) deals with the ‘Inhalt’ (content) of ‘Schuldverhältnisse’ (obligations) and is divided into two Titles:

Title 1: ‘Verpflichtung zur Leistung’  (duty (of the ‘Schuldner’  (debtor/obligor)) to perform): §§ 241–292. The term ‘Leistung’ has no equivalent usage in English. In German legal speech it expresses the content of a ‘Schuldverhältnis’ (obligation), ie, what is owed. A ‘Schuldverhältnis’   gives rise to a ‘Leistungsverpflichtung’ or ‘-pflicht’  (duty of  performance) on the part of a ‘Schuldner’.111 The counterpart of the ‘Leistung(-spflicht)’ owed by the ‘Schuldner’ is the right or entitlement (‘das Recht’/‘die Berechtigung’) of the ‘Gläubiger’ (creditor/obligee) to demand (‘fordern’)  it/performance (§ 241). This right is, accordingly, referred to as a (‘schuldrechtliche’) ‘Forderung’ ((contractual) claim or demand). If the ‘Gläubiger’ himself  owes a reciprocal ‘Leistung’, it is referred to as a ‘Gegenleistung (counter-performance), eg, the price payable by a purchaser.112 When using the term ‘Leistung’ it should be borne in mind that it can be used to mean  both the performance (result) owed by the ‘Schuldner’—the ‘Leistungserfolg’—and the act/conduct (‘Verhalten’) or omission (‘Unterlassen’) due from him (the ‘Leistungshandlung). The ‘Leistung referred to in § 241 BGB is the ‘Leistungshandlung’ .113 Moreover, there is a basic difference in legal meaning between the term ‘Leistung’ and the term ‘Erfüllung’ (§ 362(i)), both of which can be translated as ‘performance’. When the BGB refers to ‘Erfüllung’ it has the technical meaning of the (proper) fulfilment (performance) by the ‘Schuldner’ of his ‘Leistungspflicht’,114 as a result of which the individual claim (‘Anspruch’) of the ‘Gläubiger’ against the ‘Schuldner’ is extinguished.115 Title 2: ‘Verzug des Gläubigers’ (delay of the creditor/obligee): §§ 293–304. 45

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 Arrangement of Titles 1 and 2

§§ 241–304 can be arranged into the following groups: Title 1

§§ 241–242: ‘Leistungspflicht’ (duty of performance) §§ 243–245: ‘Leistungsgegenstand’ (object of performance) § 243:   Gattungsschuld’ (generic debt)116 §§ 244–245   ‘Geldschuld’ (money debt)117 §§ 246–248: ‘Zinsen’ (interest (on the debt)) §§ 249–255: ‘Schadensersatz’ (damages)118 Art und Umfang des Schadensersatzes’  (type and extent of  § 249: damages) § 250: Schadensersatz in Geld nach Fristsetzung’ (damages in money after setting a time limit) ‘Schadensersatz in Geld ohne Fristsetzung’ (damages in money § 251: without setting a time limit) ‘Entgangener Gewinn’ (lost profit) § 252: ‘Immaterieller Schaden’ (non-financial loss)119 § 253: § 254:   ‘Mitverschulden’ (contributory fault (on the part of the injured party))120 ‘Abtretung der Ersatzansprüche’ (assignment of compensation § 255: claims) §§ 256–257: ‘Aufwendungsersatz’ (compensation for expenditure)121 ‘Wegnahmerecht (bei Herausgabepflicht)’ (right of removal (from a thing which § 258: has to be returned)) §§ 259–261: ‘Auskunftspflicht’ (duty of information) §§ 262–265: ‘Wahlschuld’ (selectable (alternative) debt)122 § 266:   ‘Teilleistungen’ (partial performance)123 §§ 267–268: ‘Leistung durch Dritte’ (performance by a third party) §§ 269–270: ‘Leistungsort’; ‘Zahlungsort’ (place of performance; place of payment) §§ 271–272: ‘Leistungszeit’ (time of performance)124 §§ 273–274: ‘Zurückbehaltungsrecht’ (right of retention (withholding))125 §§ 275–283: ‘Leistungsstörungen’ (disturbances in performance)126 §§ 284–290:‘Verzug des Schuldners’ (delay on the part of the debtor) §§ 284–285:‘Voraussetzungen’  (preconditions)127 §§ 286–290:‘Rechtsfolgen’ (legal consequences) — replacement of damage resulting from delay(‘Verzugsschaden’): § 286 — extended liability during delay (‘erweiterte Haftung’): § 287 — interest during delay (‘Verzugszinsen’) : §§ 288–290128

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§§ 291–292:‘Lage des Schuldners nach Rechtshängigkeit’ (position of the debtor once a matter is sub judice) Title 2

§§ 293–304:‘Verzug des Gläubigers’ (delay on the part of the creditor) §§ 293–299:‘Voraussetzungen’  (preconditions) §§ 300–304:‘Rechtsfolgen’ (legal consequences)129 (b) Section 2 (§§ 305–361 BGB)130 Section 2 of Book II (§§ 305–361) deals with obligations arising out of‘Verträge’ (contracts) (ie, so-called ‘rechtsgeschäftliche Schuldverhältnisse’) and is divided into five Titles: Title 1:   ‘Begründung’ (establishment (of a ‘rechtsgeschäftliche’ obligation by means

of a ‘Vertrag’); ‘Inhalt’ ((content) of the ‘Vertrag’): §§ 305–319. Title 2: ‘Gegenseitiger Vertrag’  (reciprocal/synallagmatic contract): §§ 320–327.131 Title 3: ‘Versprechen der Leistung an einen Dritten’ (promise of performance for the  benefit of a third party): §§ 328–335. Title 4:   ‘Draufgabe’ (bonus); ‘Vertragsstrafe’  (contractual penalty): §§ 336–345. Title 5:   ‘Rücktritt’ (rescission): §§ 346–361.  Arrangement of Titles 1–5

§§ 305–361 can be arranged into the following groups: Title 1

§ 305:   ‘Begründung’ (establishment)132 §§ 306–307: ‘Anfängliche Unmöglichkeit’; ‘Ersatz des Vertrauensschadens’ (initial (objective) impossibility; compensation for damage suffered due to reliance on the validity of the contract) § 308: ‘Vorübergehende Unmöglichkeit’  (temporary impossibility) ‘Gesetzwidriger Vertrag’  ((corresponding application of §§ 307–308 to a) § 309: contract contrary to statute) §§ 310–312: ‘Verträge über künftiges oder gegenwärtiges Vermögen oder über den Nachlaß eines lebenden Dritten’ (contracts regarding future or present assets or the estate of a living third party) ‘Form der Verpflichtung zur Veräußerung oder zum Erwerb eines Grundstücks’ (form § 313: of an agreement for the sale or purchase of a piece of land) ‘Erstreckung auf Zubehör’ (extension (of a contract) to accessories) § 314: §§ 315–316: ‘Bestimmung der Leistung (Gegenleistung) durch eine Partei’  (specification of  performance (or counter-performance) by one party)133 §§ 317–319: ‘Bestimmung der Leistung durch einen Dritten’ (specification of performance  by a third party)

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Title 2

§ 320:

‘Einrede des nichterfüllten Vertrags’   (objection to (right to decline) performance until counter-performance is effected) § 321:   ‘Vermögensverschlechterung’   (right to decline performance where an obligation to perform in advance (‘Vorleistungspflicht’) exists and there is a deterioration in the other party’s assets) ‘Folgen der Einrede’ (procedural consequences of the objection; judgment § 322: ‘Zug um Zug’ (one against the other)) §§ 323–325: ‘Nachträgliche Unmöglichkeit’   (subsequent impossibility—effect on the ‘Gegenleistung’; position of the other party) ‘Verzug; Fristsetzung mit Ablehnungsandrohung’ (delay; setting of a time limit § 326: with threat of rejection) ‘Anwendbarkeit der §§ 346–356 beim gesetzlichen Rücktritt’ (application of §§ § 327: 346–356 to the statutory right of rescission)134 Title 3

‘Vertrag zugunsten Dritter’  (contract for the benefit of a third party)135 § 328:   ‘Auslegungsregel’ (rules of interpretation) §§ 329–332: § 329:   ‘Erfüllungsübernahme’ ((internal) promise of performance)136 § 330:   ‘Lebensversicherungsvertrag’ (life insurance contract) ‘Leistung nach Todesfall’ (performance after death of the promisee) § 331: §332: ‘Änderung durch Verfügung von Todes wegen bei Vorbehalt’ (substitution of the third party by the promisee is also possible in a ‘Verfügung von Todes wegen’, if the right is reserved) §§ 333–335: Miscellaneous ‘Zurückweisung des Rechts durch den Dritten’ (rejection of the § 333: right by the third party) ‘Einwendungen des Schuldners’  (objections by the promisor § 334: (debtor)) ‘Forderungsrecht des Versprechensempfänger’  (right of the § 335: promisee to demand performance (to the third party)) Title 4

§§ 336–338: ‘Draufgabe’ (bonus) §§ 339–345: ‘Vertragsstrafe’  (contractual penalty)137 Title 5

§§ 346–361:apply directly only in the case of a right of rescission (termination/ withdrawal) being reserved in a contract (‘Rücktrittsvorbehalt’)   eg, in conjunction with a reservation of title (§ 455 BGB). However, their main importance is their corresponding application (‘entsprechende  Anwendung’) to statutory rights of rescission (§§ 327, 440(i), 467, 634(iv); also §§ 280(ii), 286(ii)).138 48

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§§ 346–349: ‘Wirkung’; ‘Haftung’; ‘Erklärung’ (effect of rescission; liability; requirement of an ‘Erklärung’ (declaration)) §§ 350–353: ‘Ausschluß des Rücktritts’ (exclusion of rescission) §§ 354–355: ‘Fristsetzung für Rückgewähr’; ‘Fristsetzung für die Ausübung des Rücktrittsrechts’ (setting of a time limit for return of the relevant item; setting of a time limit for the exercise of the right of rescission) ‘Mehrere Beteiligte’ (exercise of the right of rescission by or against several § 356: persons) §§ 357–361: ‘Rücktritt in besonderen Lagen’ (rescission in special situations): §§ 357–358: (‘wegen Nichterfüllung’ (for non-performance)) § 359: (‘gegen Reugeld’ (on payment)) § 360: (‘Verwirkungsklausel’  (in the case of a forfeiture clause)) § 361: (in the case of a ‘Fixgeschäft’   (a (relative) time-related transaction). § 361 BGB  is a special provision enabling a ‘Gläubiger’ (obligee) to rescind where a ‘gegenseitiger Vertrag’ (reciprocal contract) is involved, according to which performance is to take place exactly (‘genau’) at a certain time (‘zu einer fest bestimmten Zeit’) or within a certain period (‘innerhalb einer fest bestimmten Frisit’ ). In other words, time is of the essence (‘von entscheidender Bedeutung’). The area of operation of § 361 BGB is limited to the narrow concept of the ‘Fixgeschäft’ (time-fixed transaction). It must be carefully distinguished from: (i) the situation where performance can (objectively) only take place at a particular time, ie, the transaction stands and falls (‘steht und fällt’), if performance does not then take place. Later performance would be pointless (‘sinnlos’). That is a case of  (absolute) impossibility and § 361 BGB does not apply; (ii) the (mere) specification of a date for performance (‘Fälligkeitstermin’). Of itself, that is not enough to establish a ‘Fixgeschäft’. Rather, if the date is missed, it is a case of delay (‘Verzug’); (iii) § 326 BGB. Unlike § 326 BGB, § 361 gives no right to claim damages(‘Schadensersatz’) . However, § 361 BGB does not require the setting of a deadline with a threat of  rejection (‘Fristsetzung mit Ablehnungsandrohung’) and a ‘Gläubiger’ can rescind under § 361 BGB even if there is no blame (‘Verschulden’) on the part of the ‘Schuldner’.139 Exposé: particular issues regarding rescission (‘Rücktritt’) Worthy of closer attention are the difficult provisions §§ 347 and 351 BGB.  The former deals with questions of liability in the event of rescission and the latter with one of the situations—dealt with in §§ 350–353 BGB—in which the right of rescission is excluded, (a) By § 347, 1st sentence BGB, in the event of rescission, claims for damages due to the deterioration, loss or other impossibility of return of the relevant item since the time of its receipt (‘von dem Empfange der Leistung an’) are governed by the (strict) rules regarding the relationship between an ‘Eigentümer’  (owner) and ‘Besitzer’ (possessor), ie, by §§ 987ff BGB.140 49

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§ 351 BGB provides that rescission cannot be sought, if the claimant is to blame for a significant deterioration, the loss or other impossibility of return of (a large part of) the item received. When considering §§ 347 and 351 BGB, it must be borne in mind that complex distinctions are made, according to whether contractual or statutory rescission is involved and according to which party is due to return the item concerned (ie, either the person seeking to rescind or the opponent/other party (the ‘Rücktrittsgegner’)). Thus, while § 347 BGB applies to both parties to a contractual rescission and to the liability of the ‘Rücktrittsgegner’ (the party in default) in a statutory rescission, it is ousted in cases of statutory rescission by § 327, 2nd sentence BGB with regard to the question of the liability of the (‘other’) party, who is not to blame for the rescission (the innocent party). § 327, 2nd sentence BGB is regarded as expressing a general principle that an innocent party is only liable under the unjust enrichment provisions (§§ 812ff BGB). The strict rules laid down in §§ 987ff then do not apply. (b) Contractual and statutory rescission also have to be kept distinct for the purpose of the definition of blame (‘Verschulden’) in §§ 347 and 351. In cases of contractual rescission, § 276 BGB applies, but when statutory rescission is concerned, ‘Verschulden’ is understood in a wider, non-technical sense: failure to exercise the degree of care, to which one is accustomed in one’s own affairs (‘die in eigenen  Angelegenheiten gebotene Sorgfalt’ or ‘diligentia quam in suis’)—so-called ‘Verschulden  gegen sich selbst’ (blame against oneself)—is necessary (but also suffices). Moreover, while in cases of contractual rescission the question of knowledge (‘Kenntnis’) of  the grounds for rescission is not a relevant consideration, it is important when statutory rescission is involved, ie, were the relevant acts undertaken with knowledge of the right of rescission (the conduct is then blameworthy) or innocently? In the latter situation, the blameless rescinding party is not prevented from rescinding and is only liable under §§ 812ff BGB. The reason for these differentiations in cases of statutory rescission lies in the fact that the parties reckon with rescission whenever it is provided for in their contract—and have to bear the usual consequences—but not when the right arises from statute. The issue of blame then becomes relevant. (c) The following points regarding the BGB rescission provisions should also be noted: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Sometimes other special mandatory statutory rules concerning rescission exist. They then take precedence over §§ 346ff BGB. Rescission does not affect claims arising from PVV. §§ 350–353 BGB are dispositive, ie, they can be excluded by the parties. §§ 350–353 BGB relate only to the position of the person seeking to rescind, not the other party. §§ 350–353 BGB only apply before the right of rescission is exercised. The exercise of the right of rescission requires a declaration to the other party: § 349 BGB. §§ 350–353 BGB presuppose that the changes (‘Veränderungen’)  which occur in the item received are significant (‘wesentlich’). 50

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7

In the case of events subsequent to the declaration of rescission or changes which are insignificant, § 347 BGB—and not §§ 350–353 BGB—applies. 8 In the event of fortuitous loss, § 350 BGB amends the usual position regarding carriage of risk (§§ 446, 447 BGB) in favour of the person claiming rescission. It is a controversial provision. 9 § 352 BGB excludes rescission, if the item involved is transformed(‘umgestaltet’) into something else. 10 The principle underlying §§ 351 and 352 BGB is that rescission should be excluded whenever the person seeking to exercise the right would thereby act contrary to his own previous conduct (‘venire contra factum proprium’).141 (c) Section 3 (§§ 362–397 BGB) 142 Section 3 of Book II (§§ 362–397) deals with the ‘Erlöschen’ (extinction/discharge/ ending) of obligations and is divided into four Titles:

Title 1: Title 2: Title 3: Title 4:

       

‘Erfüllung’ (fulfilment/performance): §§ 362–371.143 ‘Hinterlegung’ (deposit): §§ 372–386. ‘Aufrechnung’ (set-off): §§ 387–396. ‘Erlaß’ (remission of debt): § 397.

 Arrangement of Titles 1–4

§§ 362–397 deal with the ‘Beendigung’ (ending) of ‘Schuldverhältnisse’ (and thereby the extinction of the relevant ‘Ansprüche’ (claims)) by the ‘Befriedigung’ (satisfaction) of  the creditor’s interest in performance. Events which, broadly speaking, can also cause a ‘Schuldverhältnis’ (or ‘Anspruch’) to end or which can cause a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ to lose its effect are:144 –   ‘Nichtigkeit’ (nullity (by operation of law));145 – § 142(i): ‘Anfechtung’ (challenge);46 –   ‘Kündigung’ (termination by notice (for the future));147 – § 158(ii): ‘Eintritt einer auflösenden Bedingung’  (occurrence of a resolutive condition);148 – ‘§ 163: ‘Zeitablauf’ (lapse of time); – § 242: ‘Verwirkung’ (forfeiture) or ‘Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage’ (collapse of the  basis of the transaction (frustration));149 – § 305: ‘Aufhebungsvertrag’ (contrary agreement) or ‘Novation’ (novation);150 – §§ 275ff, §§ 323ff: ‘Leistungsstörung’ (disturbance in performance);151 – §§ 346ff: ‘Rücktritt’ (rescission).152 Titles 1–4 can be arranged into the following groups: Title 1‘Erfüllung’ §§ 362–363: ‘Wirkung’ (effect); ‘Beweislast’ (burden of proof) §§ 364–365: ‘Leistung an Erfüllungs Statt’ (performance in lieu)

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§§ 366–367: ‘Anrechnung’ (credit) §§ 368–371: ‘Pflichten des Gläubigers’  (duties of the creditor) §§ 368–370:   ‘Quittung’ (receipt) ‘Rückgabe des Schuldscheins’ return of document confirming § 371: the debt) Title 2 ‘Hinterlegung’ 153 §§ 372–375: ‘Voraussetzungen’  (preconditions); ‘allgemeine Vorschriften’   (general conditions) §§ 376–377: ‘Rücknahmerecht’ (right of reclaim) §§ 378–379: ‘Wirkung der Hinterlegung’ (effect of deposit) §§ 380–382: ‘Nachweis und Erlöschen des Gläubigerrechts; Kosten’  (proof and extinction of the creditor’s right; costs) §§ 383–386: ‘Selbsthilfeverkauf durch Versteigerung; Kosten’ (self-help sale by auction; costs) Title 3 ‘Aufrechnung’154 §§ 387–388: ‘Voraussetzungen’  (preconditions); ‘Erklärung’ (declaration) § 389:   ‘Wirkung’ (effect) §§ 390–395: ‘Ausschluß durch Gesetz’ (exclusion (by statute)) ‘Mehrere Forderungen’ (several claims) § 396: Title 4 ’Erlaß’ § 397:   ‘Wirkung’ (effect) (d) Section 4 (§§ 398–413 BGB) Section 4 of Book II (§§ 398–413) deals with the ‘Übertragung’ (transfer) of a ‘Forderung’

(claim) by means of a contract of ‘Abtretung’ (assignment).155 §§ 398–413 can be arranged into the following groups: § 398:   ‘Begriff’ (definition); ‘Wirkung’ (effect) §§ 399–400: ‘Ausschluß’ (exclusion) §401: ‘Übergang von Neben- und Vorzugsrechte’  (transition of accompanying and preferential rights) §§ 402–403: ‘Pflichten des (bisherigen) Gläubigers’ (duties of the (previous) creditor) §§ 404–411: ‘Schuldnerschutz’ (protection of the debtor) § 412: ‘Gesetzlicher Forderungsübergang’ (assignment by operation of law)156 ‘Übertragung anderer Rechte’ (transfer of other rights) § 413: (e) Section 5 (§§ 414–419 BGB) Section 5 of Book II (§§ 414–419) deals with ‘Schuldübernahme’ (substitution).157

§§ 414–419 can be arranged into the following groups: §§ 414–415: ‘Vereinbarung des Übernehmers entweder mit dem Gläubiger oder mit dem Schuldner’ (agreement between the third party and either the creditor or the debtor) 52

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§ 416: § 417: §418: §419:

 

‘Übernahme einer Hypothekenschuld’ (assumption of a mortgage debt) ‘Einwendungen des Übernehmers’ (objections by the third party) ‘Erlöschen von Sicherungs- und Vorzugsrechten’ (extinction of security and preferential rights) ‘Vermögensübernahme’ (assumption of assets); ‘Haftung des Übernehmers’ (liability of the third party) (f) Section 6 (§§ 420–432 BGB)

Section 6 of Book II (§§ 420–432) is entitled ‘Mehrheit von Schuldnern und Gläubigern’

(multitude of debtors and creditors).158 §§ 420–432 can be arranged into the following groups: ‘Teilbare Leistung’ (divisible performance) § 420: § 421:   ‘Gesamtschuldner’ (joint debtors) §§ 422–425: ‘Wirkung’ (effect) of ‘Erfüllung’ (performance); ‘Erlaß’ (remission of debt); ‘Gläubigerverzug’ (delay on the part of the creditor); and ‘anderer Tatsachen’ (other facts) for or against joint debtors § 426:   ‘Innenverhältnis’ (internal relationship); ‘Ausgleich’ (indemnity) § 427:   ‘Auslegungsregel’ (rule of interpretation) in the case of a ‘teilbaren Leistung’ (divisible performance) §§ 428–430: ‘Gesamtgläubiger’ (joint creditors) §§ 431–432: ‘Unteilbare Leistung’ (indivisible performance); ‘Mitgläubiger’  (co-creditors) (g) Section 7 (§§ 433–853 BGB)159 Section 7 of Book II (§§ 433–853) deals with the typical individual ‘Schuldverhältnisse’ (both ‘rechtsgeschäftliche’ and ‘gesetzliche’) and is arranged into 25 Titles as follows: Title 1:   ‘Kauf’ (purchase); ‘Tausch’ (exchange): §§ 433–515.160 Title 2:   ‘Schenkung’ (gift): §§ 516–534.161 Title 3:   ‘Miete’ (tenancy/lease); ‘Pacht’ (commercial lease): §§ 535–597.162 Title 4:   ‘Leihe’ (gratuitous loan): §§ 598–606.163 Title 5:   ‘Darlehen’ (loan): §§ 607–610.164 Title 6:   ‘Dienstvertrag’ (contract of service): §§ 611–630.165

  ‘Werkvertrag’ (contract for services); ‘Reisevertrag’ (travel contract): §§ 631–651k.166 Title 8:   ‘Maklervertrag’ ((civil) agency contract): §§ 652–656.167 Title 9:   ‘Auslobung’ (public offer of reward): §§ 657–661.168 Title 10:   ‘Auftrag’ ((gratuitous) contract of instruction, mandate): §§ 662–676.169 Title 11: ‘Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag’   (transaction (of a matter) without instruction): §§677–687.170 Title 12:   ‘Verwahrung’ (deposit in custody): §§ 688–700.171 Title 7:

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‘Einbringung von Sachen bei Gastwirten’  (bringing in of things at a ‘Gastwirtschaft’ (inn): §§ 701–704.172 Title 14:   ‘Gesellschaft’ (company): §§ 705–740.173 Title 15:   ‘Gemeinschaft’ (community): §§ 741–758.174 Title 16:   ‘Leibrente’ (annuity, pension for life): §§ 759–761.175 Title 13:

Title 17:   ‘Spiel’ (game); ‘Wette’ (bet): §§ 762–764.176 Title 18:   ‘Bürgschaft’ (contract of surety): §§ 765–778.177 Title 19:   ‘Vergleich’ (settlement): § 779.178

‘Schuldversprechen’ (promise); ‘Schuldanerkenntnis’ (acknowledgement of  debt): §§ 780–782.179 Title 21:   ‘Anweisung’ (documentary instruction): §§ 783–792.180 Title 22: ‘Schuldverschreibung auf den Inhaber’ (bearer bond): §§ 793–808a.181 Title 23: ‘Vorlegung von Sachen’  (presentation for inspection): §§ 809–811. Title 24: ‘Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung’ (unjust enrichment): §§ 812–822.182 Title 25: ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen’ (torts): §§ 823–853.183 Title 20:

 Arrangement of Titles 1–25 Arrangement of Title 1

§§ 433–515 are arranged as follows: I ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften’ (general provisions): §§ 433–458 ‘Grundpflichten des Verkäufers und Käufers’  (basic duties of vendor and §433: purchaser)184 ‘Gewährleistung wegen Rechtsmängel’ (liability for legal faults (title))185 § 434: §§ 435–436: ‘Nicht bestehende Buchbelastungen’; ‘Öffentliche Lasten bei Grundstücken’  (nonexistent registered charges; public charges over land) §§ 437–438: ‘Verkauf einer Forderung oder sonstigen Rechtes’  (sale of a claim or other right) ‘Kenntnis des Käufers vom Rechtsmangel’ (the purchaser’s knowledge of a § 439: legal fault) §§ 440–441: ‘Rechte des Käufers’ (rights of the purchaser) §§ 442–444: ‘Beweislast für Rechtsmängel’; ‘Ausschluß der Gewährleistung (für Rechtsmängel)’; ‘Nebenpflichten des Verkäufers’ (burden of proof of legal faults; exclusion of  liability (for legal faults); the vendor’s (statutory) accessory duties) ‘Ähnliche Verträge’  (similar contracts) § 445: §§ 446–447: ‘Übergang des Preisgefahrs’; ‘Nutzungen’; ‘Lasten’  (transition of (price) risk;  benefit; burden)186 §§ 448–450: ‘Nebenpflichten des Käufers’ (the purchaser’s (statutory) accessory duties) ‘Entsprechende Anwendung von §§ 446–450 bei Rechtskauf’ (corresponding § 451: application of §§ 446–450 to the sale of a right to a thing) 54

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‘Verzinsung des Kaufpreises’ (interest on the purchase price) § 452: § 453:   ‘Marktpreis’ (market price) ‘Ausschluß des Rücktrittsrechts’ (exclusion of the right of rescission) § 454: § 455:   ‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’ (retention of title)187 §§ 456–458: ‘Kaufverbote’ (forbidden purchases) II ‘Gewährleistung wegen Mängel der Sache’ (liability for faulty goods): §§ 459–493188 ‘Haftung für Sachmängel’ (liability for faulty goods)189 § 459: ‘Kenntnis des Käufers’ (knowledge of the purchaser) § 460: § 461:   ‘Pfandverkauf’ (sale on the basis of a lien: vendor’s liability) §§ 462–465: ‘Rechtsfolgen’ (legal consequences) ‘Ausschlußfrist für Wandlung’ (exclusion period for rescission) § 466: ‘Anwendbare Vorschriften bei der Durchführung der Wandlung’ (provisions § 467: applicable to rescission)190 §§ 468–471: ‘Wandlung in besonderen Lagen’ (rescission in particular situations) ‘Berechnung der Minderung’ (calculation of reduction in price) § 472: §§ 473–475: ‘Minderung in besonderen Lagen’ (reduction in price in particular situations)  —‘Sachleistungen als Kaufpreis’ (performance in kind): § 473  —‘Mehrere Beteiligte’ (several parties): § 474  —‘Mehrmalige Gewährleistung’ (repeated liability): § 475 ‘Vertraglicher Ausschluß der Gewährleistung’  (contractual exclusion of  § 476: liability) § 476a: ‘Aufwendungen beim Recht auf Nachbesserung’ (vendor’s liability for costs where a right to request repair is substituted) § 477:   ‘Verjährung’ (limitation period) §§ 478–479: ‘Lage nach Verjährung bei vorheriger Mängelanzeige’ (supervening limitation) § 480:   ‘Gattungskauf’ (generic purchase) §§ 481–492: ‘Viehkauf usw’ (sale of cattle etc) ‘Kaufähnliche Verträge’  (similar contracts) § 493: III ‘Besondere Arten des Kaufes’ (special types of purchase): §§ 494–514191 ‘Kauf nach Probe. Kauf auf Probe’ (purchase by sample; purchase on approval) 1 ‘Kauf nach Probe’ (purchase by sample) § 494: §§ 495–496: ‘Kauf auf Probe’ (purchase on approval) 2   ‘Wiederkauf’ (repurchase) §§ 497–503 3   ‘Vorkauf’ (preemption) §§ 504–514 IV ‘Tausch’ (exchange): § 515192

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Exposé: ‘Fernabsatz’ (Long-Distance Transactions) On 30.6.2000, the Law concerning Long-Distance Transactions (‘Fernabsatzgesetz’; FernAbsG) came into force. The FernAbsG is an attempt to counteract perceived disadvantages of consumers, who conclude transactions (not merely purchases) when not face-to-face with the other party, eg, electronically via the Internet. It also clamps down generally on undesirable  business practices by inserting a new § 22 into the AGBG. The FernAbsG casts the net widely, but, in reality, there are various preconditions for its application and many types of transaction are either expressly excluded from the scope of the Law (eg, long-distance learning (correspondence) courses, agreements involving real estate, time-sharing) or fall within the ambit of other statutes (eg, the Consumer Credit Law), which contain provisions more favourable for the consumer (‘günstigere Regelungen’). Thus, the FernAbsG only applies to long-distance contracts (‘Fernverträge’), which are concluded: (a) between a business(man) (‘Unternehmer’) and a consumer (‘Verbraucher’); (b) by way of the exclusive use of long-distance means of communication (‘Fernkommunikationsmittel’); and (c) within the framework of an organised system for the distribution of products or the provision of services (‘organisiertes Vertriebs- und Dienstleistungssystem’). The FernAbsG has generated a whole series of new supporting norms, which are incorporated into the main body of the civil law: §§ 13, 14, 241a, 361a, 361b, 661a and 676h BGB; § 29a EGBGB.193 Arrangement of Title 2

§§ 516–534 are arranged as follows:194 §§ 516–517:   ‘Begriff’ (definition) §§ 518–520:   ‘Schenkungsversprechen’ (promised gift) ‘Haftung des Schenkers’ (liability of the donor) §§ 521–524: ‘Schenkung unter Auflage’ (direction by the donor) §§ 525–527: ‘Rückforderung; Widerruf der Schenkung’ (claim to return of the gift; §§ 528–534: revocation) Arrangement of Title 3

§§ 535–597 are arranged as follows (Note: new numbering applies after 1.9.2001): I ‘Miete’ (lease/tenancy): §§ 535–580a ‘Begriff; Pflichten der Parteien’ (definition; duties of the parties) §§ 535–536: §§ 537–541: ‘Haftung des Vermieters für Mängel’ (lessor’s liability for faults) §§ 541a-541b: ‘Maßnahmen zur Erhaltung/Verbesserung’   (tenant must tolerate measures of maintenance and improvement) ‘Fristlose Kündigung durch den Mieter’ (termination without notice by §§ 542–544: the lessee) 56

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  § 545: § 546: § 547: § 547a: § 548: § 549:   § 550: § 550a:   § 550b: §§ 551–552a: §§ 553–554b:

‘Mängelanzeige’ (notice of faults) ‘Lasten der Mietsache’ (lessor’s liability for charges) ‘Ersatz von Verwendungen’  (compensation for lessee’s expenditure) ‘Wegnahme von Einrichtungen’ ((lessee’s right of) removal of fixtures) ‘Abnutzung durch vertragsmäßigen Gebrauch’ (wear and tear) ‘Untermiete’ (sub-letting) ‘Vertragswidriger Gebrauch’  (use in breach of agreement) ‘Vertragsstrafe unwirksam’ (invalidity of contractual penalty) ‘Mietkaution’ (deposit (for residential premises)) ‘Entrichtung des Mietzinses’ (payment of rent) ‘Fristlose Kündigung durch den Vermieter’ (termination without notice  by the lessor/landlord) ‘Rückgabe der Mietsache’ (return of the rental object) § 556: §§ 556a-556c: ‘Widerspruch des Mieters; Fortsetzung des Mietverhältnisses’ (objection  by the tenant (to termination of a tenancy of residential premises); continuation of the tenancy) ‘Ansprüche bei verspäteter Rückgabe’ ((lessor’s) rights in the event of  § 557: delayed return of the rental object) § 558:   ‘Verjährung’ (limitation period (for claims)) §§ 559–563:   ‘Vermieterpfandrecht’  (landlord’s lien) § 564: ‘Ende des Mietverhältnisses’ (end of the lease/tenancy) §§ 564a–564b: ‘Form und Voraussetzungen der Kündigung’ (form of and requirements for termination (of tenancy of residential premises))   ‘Fortsetzung’ (continuation (of a tenancy of residential premises)) § 564c: ‘(Ordentliche) Kündigungsfristen’ (time limits for (ordinary) termination § 565: (of tenancy of premises)/lease (of movables)   ‘Verlängerung’ (extension (of tenancy of residential premises)) § 565a: §§ 565b-565e:   ‘Werkunterkünfte’ (works accommodation) ‘Form des Mietvertrags’ (form of tenancy agreement (of more than one § 566: year)) ‘Kündigung bei Verträgen für mehr als 30 Jahre’  (termination of  § 567: agreements for more than 30 years) ‘Stillschweigende Verlängerung’ (tacit extension (of lease)) § 568: § 569: ‘Kündigung bei Tod des Mieters’ (termination following death of tenant) §§569a-569b: ‘Ehegatten; Familienangehörige’ ((position of) married couples/family members (following death of tenant)) ‘Versetzung des Mieters’  (tenant’s job transfer) § 570: ‘Vereinbartes Rücktrittsrecht’ ((corresponding application to) contractual § 570a: right of rescission) 57

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§§571–576:

‘Veräußerung (eines vermieteten Grundstücks)’   (disposal of rented property) ‘Belastung des Mietgrundstücks’ (incumbrances over rented property) § 577: ‘Veräußerung vor Überlassung’ (disposal before rental) § 578: § 579:   ‘Weiterveräußerung’ (further disposal) §§ 580–580a: ‘Zusätzliche Geltung der Vorschriften’  (additional application of the provisions) II ‘Pacht’ (commercial lease): §§ 581–584b §§ 581–584b III ‘Landpacht’ (agricultural lease): §§ 585–597 §§585–597 Exposé: ‘Miete’ (§§ 535–597 BGB) (Section 7, Title 3)

(a) Preliminary points The comparatively large number of paragraphs in the BGB on this subject reflects its practical importance. With effect from 1.9.2001, the Rental Law Reform Act (‘Mietrechtsreformgesetz’) has brought into force detailed changes to the law concerning ‘Miete’. The provisions in the BGB have been extensively reorganised and renumbered. In the following exposé, the paragraph numbers stated are basically those as they existed up to 1.9.2001. I hope to correct and update the numbering in full in a subsequent edition of this  book, but, in the meantime, I have inserted certain of the new paragraph numbers, as they apply from 1.9.2001, in bold print in parentheses. Any resulting confusion is regrettable, but many readers will still possess an old edition of the BGB and new literature on the subject is appearing from day to day. For a recent synopsis of the changes see, for example, Börstinghaus in ZAP, Fach 4, p 691. (b) The object of a ‘Mietvertrag’ In line with the basic classification of the law of property, the object of an agreement of rental (‘die gemietete Sache’) is distinguished according to whether movables (‘bewegliche Sachen’)   or immovables (ie, pieces of land (‘Grundstücke’)) are concerned. In principle, all types of ‘Miete’ are governed by the same rules, whether the rental is one of movables (so-called ‘Fahrnismiete’) or not. However, there are separate provisions in the BGB regarding the rental of land, which also apply to the rental of  residential accommodation (‘Wohnraum’) and other premises (‘Räume’): § 580 BGB. Thus, for the purposes of ‘Miete’, there is a three-fold classification to be borne in mind. An agreement of ‘Miete’ is directed to the grant of use (‘Gebrauchsüberlassung’) of a ‘Sache’ in return for the agreed rent (‘Mietzins’): § 535 BGB. 58

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A collection of ‘Sachen’ (a ‘Sachgesamtheit’) can be the object of a ‘Mietvertrag’, but not a contractual claim (‘Forderung’) or other rights. These can be the object of  ‘Pacht’ (commercial lease § 581 BGB). (c) Distinctions: ‘Pacht’ A contract of ‘Pacht’ can relate not only to corporeal things (eg, a piece of land),  but can also cover incorporeal objects (eg, rights) or both together (eg, a business). By virtue of a contract of ‘Pacht’, the lessee (‘Pächter’) is granted not only the use of  the object (as with ‘Miete), but also and especially the enjoyment of its fruits (‘Genuß der Früchte’), ie, such produce or yield, which is directly or indirectly won from its use.195 The provisions on ‘Miete’ are of corresponding application, in so far as they are not amended in §§ 582–584b BGB. ‘Leihe’ By an agreement of ‘Leihe’—in contrast to ‘Miete’—the borrower (‘Entleiher’) is granted use of a ‘Sache’ gratuitously (‘unentgeltlich’): § 598 BGB. Accordingly, the liability of the lender (‘Verleiher’) is significantly restricted (§§ 599–600 BGB). ‘Leihe’  is a so-called ‘incomplete’ bilateral contract, ie, initially there is only a unilateral obligation on the lender to provide use of the ‘Sache’ 196 The borrower’s general liability for fault in connection with his use of the ‘Sache’ is governed by §§ 276 and 278 BGB. In particular, he has (accessory) duties of  safekeeping and care (‘Obhuts- und Sorgfaltspflichten’) and must bear the costs of  usual maintenance (‘gewöhnliche Erhaltungskosten’;  § 601 BGB). However, the  borrower bears no responsibility, if the object of the loan changes or deteriorates due to normal use (‘vertragsmäßiger Gebrauch’): § 602 BGB. The lender can demand return of the ‘Sache’ at any time (‘jederzeit’), if the period of the loan is neither specified nor apparent from the purpose of the loan: § 604(iii) BGB. Leasing, licence and franchise agreements Leasing is basically a form of ‘Miete’. However, other fields of law can be relevant, eg, if there is an obligation or option to purchase the relevant asset, sale of goods law (§ 445 BGB) and, if the leasing customer (‘Leasingnehmer’) is a consumer, the ‘Verbraucherkreditgesetz’   (Consumer Credit Law). In particular, cash-flow, reservation of title and tax considerations often play a part in financed leasing (‘Finanzierungsleasing’),  which is treated as a mixed contract (‘gemischter Vertrag’).197 Other examples of contracts for the grant of the use of an asset (‘Gebrauchsüberlassungsverträge’) are the licence (‘Lizenzvertrag’) and the franchise. They usually involve a permission to use certain rights (often intellectual property) and can, therefore, be classified as varieties of ‘Pacht’.198 59

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(d) Rights and duties (i) § 536 BGB (§ 535 BGB) lays down a comprehensive duty on the lessor to hand over the object of a rental agreement to the lessee in such a condition (‘Zustand’) as is suitable for the contractually required use (‘vertragsmäßiger Gebrauch’)  and to maintain it in that condition during the rental period (‘Mietzeit’). In other words, the lessor must not only ensure that the rented item is in conformity with the contract (‘vertragsgemäß’) at the moment it is handed over (‘Überlassung’),  but he also has a duty to undertake all such measures as may be necessary to keep it in, and restore it to, such a condition (‘Instandhaltungs- und Instandsetzungspflicht’). The lessee can insist on performance (‘Erfüllung’).199 The statutory rule is frequently departed from in practice, ie, § 536 (§ 535 BGB) is dispositive (‘abdingbar’). Thus, the carrying out of so-called cosmetic repairs (‘Schönheitsreparaturen’), officially the responsibility of the lessor (§ 548 BGB) (§ 538 BGB), are often shifted onto the lessee (‘Abwälzung auf den Mieter’).200 (ii) In the event of a disturbance in performance (‘Leistungsstörung’) by the lessor, §§ 537–538 BGB (§§ 536–536a BGB) contain special additional provisions setting out the position of the lessee and, in certain circumstances, giving him a remedy in damages. Their purpose is the protection of the lessee. By § 537(i) BGB (§ 536 BGB), if, on or after the handing-over of the object of the rental agreement to him, a defect in the object (‘Fehler’/‘Sachmangel’)201 exists or arises, such that the fitness of the rented item for its contractually required use (‘Tauglichkeit zu dem vertragsmäßigen Gebrauch’)   is suspended, the lessee is (automatically) released (‘befreit’) from his obligation to pay rental.202 Similarly, the lessee need only pay a reduced rental, if the fitness is (significantly) reduced. Before ‘Überlassung’, the general provisions of the BGB regarding disturbances in performance (§§ 320ff BGB) apply. Moreover, even after ‘Überlassung’, the lessor’s general duties under § 536 BGB remain separately enforceable. Like § 536 BGB, § 537 BGB (§ 536 BGB) is dispositive, ie, can be departed from by a contrary agreement (‘abweichende Vereinbarung’). However, an agreement which disadvantages a tenant of residential accommodation has no effect: § 537(iii) BGB. (iii) § 538(i) BGB (§ 536a BGB) grants to the lessee the right to claim damages for nonperformance (‘Schadensersatz wegen Nichterfüllung’)   against the lessor in three circumstances: (a) if there is a defect in the object of the agreement of the type described in § 537 BGB at the time of conclusion of the agreement (‘bei Vertragschluß’); or (b) if such a defect arises later due to circumstances, for which the lessor is responsible; or (c) if the lessor delays rectification (‘Beseitigung’) of a defect. The lessor’s liability under (a) arises regardless of fault on his part and is extremely wide; it effectively constitutes a guarantee of the initial condition of the rented item in favour of the tenant. 60

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If rectification is delayed, the lessee has an additional right to rectify the defect himself and to claim reimbursement of his outlay from the lessor: § 538(ii) BGB. (iv) In certain circumstances, it may be unjust to allow a lessee to exercise the rights specified in §§ 537–538 BGB (§§ 536–536a BGB) . Thus, if the lessee is aware of the relevant defect on conclusion of the rental agreement or remains ignorant thereof, due to gross negligence on his part, or accepts a faulty item, despite his contrary knowledge, the lessee’s rights under §§ 537–538 BGB are forfeit, unless the defect was fraudulently concealed (‘arglistig verschwiegen’) by the lessor or the lessee reserves his position: § 539 BGB (§ 536b BGB) . (v) Independently of the lessee’s rights under §§ 537–538 BGB (§§ 536–536a BGB) , the lessee has an extraordinary right to terminate the rental agreement (‘außerordentliches Kündigungsrecht’), if, for whatever reason, the contractually required use is not provided to him (in time (‘rechtzeitig’)) or is withdrawn from him, whether in whole or in part: § 542(i), 1st sentence BGB (§ 543 BGB) . The lessee must first give the lessor a reasonable opportunity to put the matter right, ie, he must set an appropriate deadline (‘angemessene Frist’). If the lessor allows the deadline to pass without taking remedial steps (‘ohne Abhilfe zu schaffen’), the lessee can terminate the agreement without notice (‘fristlos’):   § 542(i), 2nd sentence BGB. Termination is not possible, if the impairment is insignificant (‘unerheblich’, ‘de minimis’), unless the lessee shows a special justifying interest (‘besonderes Interesse’): § 542(ii) BGB. Moreover, termination can be barred under § 242 BGB, if the lessee is to blame for the impairment (‘Verschulden’), if he does not cooperate in its rectification (‘fehlende Mitwirkung’) or if he has forfeited his right (‘Verwirkung’; estoppel). The setting of a time limit for remedial action is not required, if performance of  the contract is (objectively) no longer of interest to the lessee (§ 542(i), 3rd sentence BGB), nor if the lessor ‘seriously and finally’ (‘ernsthaft und endgültig’) refuses to remedy the situation. § 542 BGB (§ 543 BGB)  can be excluded by agreement of the parties, but not in the case of rental of residential accommodation: § 543, 2nd sentence BGB (§ 569 BGB). (vi) Apart from the parties’ primary duties (‘Hauptpflichten’), as laid down in § 535 BGB, both have (unwritten) ancillary duties (‘Nebenpflichten’), which follow from § 242 BGB. Thus, for example, the lessor and the lessee must each show consideration (‘Rücksichtnahme’) for the other. Moreover, the lessee has a general duty to safeguard the rented item (‘allgemeine Obhutspflicht’). In particular, he must notify the lessor without delay (‘unverzüglich’), if a defect in the rented object comes to light during the period of the lease or if  protective measures (‘Schutzvorkehrungen’) need to be taken against an unforeseen danger (‘unvorhergesehene Gefahr’): § 545(i) BGB (§ 536c BGB) . If the lessee fails to do so—even innocently—and, as a result, the lessor is not in a position to take relieving action, the lessee loses his rights under §§ 537–538 BGB: 61

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§ 545(ii) BGB. However, the lessee’s duty of notification (‘Anzeigepflicht’) under § 545 BGB (§ 536c BGB)  can be modified by agreement (vii) Where the rental of premises (‘Räume’)   is concerned, each party has an extraordinary right to end the agreement, if the other infringes his duties in a  blameworthy manner (‘schuldhaft’) to such an extent that the party wishing to terminate cannot be expected to continue with the contract: § 554a BGB (§ 569 BGB). The disturbance must be significant. By § 554b BGB, a lessor of residential accommodation (‘Wohnraum’) is limited to the statutory grounds for extraordinary termination, as set out in the BGB (ie, §§ 553–554a BGB) (§§ 543, 569 BGB), but the general (unwritten) right to terminate for an important reason (§ 242 BGB) remains unaffected. (e) Written form By § 566 BGB (§ 550 BGB), an agreement for rental of a piece of land (‘Grundstück’) for more than one year must be made in writing.203 Written documentation is also required for significant amendments (‘wesentliche Änderungen’) or supplements (‘Ergänzungen’/‘Nachträge’)  to such an agreement. Collateral arrangements (‘Nebenabreden’), on the other hand, require no particular form. § 566 BGB is a compulsory provision (‘zwingende Vorschrift’), its function being to warn the parties of the risks of entering into long term contracts (‘langfristige Verträge’) and to inform successors in title of the lessor of the position (§ 571 BGB) (§ 566 BGB).

Failure to comply with § 566 BGB (§ 550 BGB) results in the agreement being deemed to have been concluded for an indefinite period (‘unbestimmte Zeit’; cf § 125 BGB), although it can be terminated under § 565 BGB (§ 580a BGB).204 Exceptionally, the assertion of an infringement of § 566 (§ 550 BGB) by one of the parties can constitute a breach of trust. (f) Tenants of land and third parties §§ 571–579 BGB (§§ 566–567b, 578 BGB)   are directed to the protection of the interests of a tenant of rented land, who is confronted by transactions concluded  by his landlord involving third parties. Thus, § 571(i) BGB (§ 566 BGB) provides that if the ownership of such rented property—which includes residential accommodation (‘Wohnraum’) —is transferred to a third party after the property has been handed over to the lessee, the third party assumes the rights and obligations of the (former) landlord, ie, steps into the landlord’s legal position vis à vis the tenant. In conjunction with § 571 BGB (§ 566 BGB), the following points should be noted:205 (i) § 571 BGB codifies the maxim ‘Kauf bricht nicht Miete’ (sale does not breach rental) and is an exception to the principle of privity of contract; (ii) only those rights and duties pass to the transferee, as are an inextricable part 62

Chapter X: Private Law: The Civil Code (BGB)

of the rental agreement, ie, the original parties remain contractually bound to each other, insofar as the relevant rights and duties are not typical of a rental agreement (‘miettypisch’), but merely have a commercial connection (‘wirtschaftlicher Zusammenhang’) to it; (iii) the former landlord/owner remains liable to the tenant to fulfil such claims, as arise before the transfer takes place. In addition, the tenant can claim an indemnity against the former landlord for any loss caused by a failure on the part of the new owner to perform his obligations. The former landlord is treated as if he had given a personal surety (‘selbtschuldnerische Bürgschaft’): § 571(ii), 1st sentence BGB. However, if he informs the tenant of the change of ownership, he is released from liability from the first possible date for termination by the tenant after the change: § 571(ii), 2nd sentence BGB. (iv) the transferee is, strictly speaking, not successor in title (‘Rechtsnachfolger’) of the former landlord, but is substituted for him by operation of law (‘kraft Gesetzes’).  Thus, except in certain situations (§§ 573–574 BGB) (§§ 566b-c BGB), he is not bound by transactions effected by the former owner. (g) Termination and security of tenure § 564 BGB (§ 542 BGB) sets out certain of the ways in which a rental agreement ordinarily ends. Thus, § 564(i) BGB lays down the basic rule that a rental agreement entered into for a limited period (a ‘befristeter Vertrag’ ) ends with the expiry of that period (‘Zeitablauf’). Extension (‘Verlängerung’) is possible, also tacitly.206 Otherwise—ie, in the case of a rental agreement with no specific date of expiry (a ‘Vertrag auf unbestimmte Zeit’ or ‘unbefristetes Mietverhältnis’  )—either side can terminate the agreement by way of unilateral cancellation (‘Kündigung’): § 564(ii) BGB. The relevant notice periods—for rental agreements over land, residential accommodation and movables, respectively—are set out in § 565 BGB. Besides the above grounds for the ordinary termination (‘ordentliche Beendigung’) of a rental agreement, the BGB contains various provisions permitting the (extraordinary) termination of a rental agreement without notice (‘fristlose Kündigung’), eg, §§ 544, 553–554b BGB (§§ 543, 569 BGB) . Moreover, in keeping with the status of a rental agreement as an ongoing obligation (‘Dauerschuldverhältnis’), its termination without notice for an important reason (‘aus wichtigem Grand’) always remains possible.207 The protection of a tenant of residential accommodation (‘Wohnraum’)  against ordinary termination (ie, security of tenure) is the subject of numerous, complex provisions in the BGB, as amended—with effect from 1.1.1975—by the second ‘Wohnraumkündigungsschutzgesetz’ (2 WoRKSchG; Law concerning the Protection of Residential Tenancies against Termination) of 18.12.1974 and—with effect from 1.9.2001—by the ‘Mietrechtsreformgesetz’. Thus, broadly:

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(i)

a rental agreement of residential accommodation can only be terminated in writing. The grounds should be stated: § 564a (i) BGB (§ 568 BGB); (ii) a tenant of residential accommodation can object to termination(‘Kündigung widersprechen’)  and demand continuation of the tenancy (‘Fortsetzung des  Mietverhältnisses’),  if normal termination would involve a hardship (‘eine  Härte’) for himself or for his family such as cannot be justified, despite taking into account the proper interests of the landlord: § 556a (i), 1st sentence BGB (the so-called ‘social clause’ (‘Sozialklausl’)) (§ 574 BGB);208 (iii) termination by the landlord for the purpose of increasing rent (so-called ‘Änderungskündigung’) is forbidden: § 1 of the ‘Gesetz zur Regelung der Miethöhe’ (Law to regulate the Level of Rent (MHRG)=Article 3, 2 WoRKSchG) of  18.12.1974 (§§ 557–561 BGB); (iv) a landlord of residential accommodation can only terminate the tenancy, if  he has a justified interest (‘berechtigtes Interesse’) in the termination: § 564b (i) BGB (§ 573 BGB) . Otherwise, the termination is void (§ 134 BGB).209 Arrangement of Title 4

§§ 598–606 are arranged as follows: ‘Begriff ’ (definition) § 598: §§ 599–600: ‘Haftung des Verleihers’ (liability of the lender) §§ 601–604: ‘Rechte und Pflichten des Entleihers’  (rights and duties of the borrower) § 605:   ‘Kündigung’ (termination) § 606: ‘Kurze Verjährung’ (short limitation period) Arrangement of Title 5

§§ 607–610 Exposé: ‘Darlehen’ (§§ 607–610 BGB) (Section 7, Title 5) § 607(i) BGB lays down the basic rule that a person who receives money or other fungibles (‘vertretbare Sachen’) by way of loan (‘als Darlehen’) is obliged to return what he has received to the lender in the form of things of similar type, quality and quantity (‘Sachen von gleicher Art, Güte und Menge’). Thus, unlike ‘Miete’ and ‘Leihe’, where the same object must be returned at the end of  the contract of rental (§ 556(i) BGB) or (gratuitous) loan (§ 604(i) BGB), the borrower under a ‘Darlehen’ (the ‘Darlehensnehmer’) obtains ownership of the object of the ‘Darlehen’. A ‘Darlehen’ must also be distinguished from a contract of custody (‘Verwahrung’; §§ 688–700 BGB). That type of contract is directed to safekeeping of a movable in the interest of the depositor (‘Hinterleger’), rather than to the use of the relevant object by the custodian (‘Verwahrer’).210  If the custodian is intended to obtain ownership of  fungibles, this constitutes a so-called ‘irregular contract of custody’ (‘unregelmässige Verwahrung’), to which the provisions regarding ‘Darlehen’ apply: § 700(i) BGB.211 Being a bilateral contract, a ‘Darlehen’ obliges the lender (the ‘Darlehensgeber’) to obtain the object of the loan, make it available to the borrower and leave it with him for the duration of the loan. Thus, in the case of a loan of money (‘Kredit’), the lender 64

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must effect a payment out (‘Auszahlung’) of the capital to the borrower. The borrower, on his part, must make any relevant payments of interest, if an interest-bearing loan (‘verzinsliches Darlehen’) has been agreed. A separate issue is the question when the duty to return the object of the loan arises, ie, the question of maturity (‘Fälligkeit). If no particular date is set or period (‘Laufzeit’) agreed, ‘Fällgket’ is dependent on termination of the loan (‘Kündigung’) by the lender or borrower: § 609(i) BGB. Like other ongoing obligations (‘Dauerschuldverhältnisse’),   eg, a contract of  employment, ‘Kündigung’  can be ‘ordentlich’  (in ordinary form) or ‘außerordentlich’ (extraordinary/summary) for an important reason (‘aus wichtigem Grund’).212 The statutory notice period (‘Kündigungsfrist’) for ordinary termination is three months for loans of more than 200 Euro and one month for lesser amounts: § 609(ii) BGB. If a loan is interest-free (‘zinslos’), the borrower can effect return at any time without having to terminate the contract: § 609(iii) BGB. There are special, compulsory provisions regarding (ordinary) termination of loans where the interest rate is fixed (‘fest’) or variable (‘variabel’): § 609a BGB. The (binding) promise of a loan can be withdrawn if, before it is fulfilled, there is a significant deterioration (‘wesentliche Verschlechterung’) in the economic circumstances of the other party, such that the claim to repayment would thereby be endangered: § 610 BGB. Arrangement of Title 6

§§ 611–630 are arranged as follows: § 611:   ‘Begriff’ (definition) §§ 611a-611b: ‘Diskriminierung durch einen Arbeitgeber’  ((prohibition of) discrimination (by an employer) § 612:   ‘Vergütung’ (reimbursement, payment) § 612a: ‘Weiteres Benachteiligungsverbot’ (further prohibition of discrimination (by an employer)) ‘Persönliche Rechte und Pflichte im Dienstvertrag’ (personal rights and duties § 613: in a contract of service) ‘Rechte und Pflichte bei Betriebsübergang’ (rights and duties in the event of  § 613a: a transfer of a ‘Betrieb’ (business))213 ‘Fälligkeit der Vergütung’  (time at which payment is due) § 614: §§ 615–616: ‘Vergütung ohne Dienstleistung’ (payment where service is not rendered) §§ 617–619: ‘Schutzpflichten des Dienstherrn’ (duties of protection) ‘Ende des Dienstverhältnisses’ (end of the relationship) § 620: §§ 621–622: ‘Ordentliche Kündigungsfristen’ (time limits for (ordinary) termination) § 623:   ‘Schriftform’ (necessity of written form) ‘Kündigung bei Verträgen von mehr als 5 Jahren’ (termination of contracts § 624: for more than five years) § 625: ‘Stillschweigende Verlängerung’ (tacit extension) §§ 626–628: ‘Fristlose Kündigung’ (termination without notice) §§ 629–630: ‘Rechte und Pflichte nach Beendigung’ (rights and duties after expiry) Arrangement of Title 7 65

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§§ 631–651k are arranged as follows: I ‘Werkvertrag’ (contract for services)

§§ 631–632: ‘Begriff’ (definition); ‘Vergütung’ (reimbursement) § 632a:   ‘Abschlagszahlung’ (payment on account) ‘Leistungspflicht des Herstellers’  (duty of manufacturer); ‘Beseitigung des § 633:  Mangels’ (correction of the defect) §§ 634–636: ‘Sekundäre Rechte bei erfolgloser Nachbesserung’  (secondary rights in the event of unsuccessful repair) ‘Vertraglicher Ausschluß der Haftung’  (contractual exclusion of liability) § 637: §§ 638–639: ‘Kurze Verjährung’ (short limitation period) §§ 640–641: ‘Abnahme des Werkes’ (acceptance of the work) § 641a:   ‘Fertigstellungsbescheinigung’ (certificate of completion) §§ 642–643: ‘Mitwirkung des Bestellers’ (cooperation by the customer) ‘Übergang der Gefahr’ (transition of risk) § 644: § 645:   ‘Teilvergütungsanspruch’ (claim to partial reimbursement) ‘Vollendung statt Abnahme’  (completion instead of acceptance) § 646: §§ 647–648: ‘Sickening des Unternehmers’ (security for the manufacturer) ‘Kündigung durch den Besteller’ (termination by the customer) § 649: ‘Überschreitung eines Kostenanschlags’ (exceeded estimate) § 650: § 651:   ‘Werklieferungsvertrag’ (contract of work and materials)214 II ‘Reisevertrag’ (travel contract) §§ 651a–651b: ‘Begriff’ (definition); ‘Teilnahme eines Dritten’ (participation of a third party) §§ 651c–651g: ‘Rechte des Reisenden’ (rights of the traveller) § 651h:   ‘Haftungsbeschränkung’ (restriction of liability) ‘Rücktritt vor Reisebeginn’ (rescission before commencement of travel) § 651i: ‘Kündigung wegen höherer Gewalt’ (termination due to force majeure) § 651j: § 651k: ‘Abweichende Vereinbarungen’ (divergent agreements) Arrangement of Title 8

§§ 652–656 Arrangement of Title 9

§§ 657–661 Arrangement of Title 10

§§ 662–676 are arranged as follows: § 662:   ‘Begriff’ (definition) ‘Anzeigepflicht bei Ablehnung’ (duty to notify refusal) § 663:

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§§ 664–668: ‘Rechte und Pflichte des Beauftragten’  (rights and duties of the person instructed) §§ 669–670: ‘Aufwendungen’ (disbursements) §§ 671–674: ‘Ende des Auftrags’ (end of the contract of instruction) § 675(i): ‘Entgeltliche Geschäftsbesorgung’ (contract to transact business for reward) §675(ii): ‘Keine Haftung für Rat oder Empfehlung’   (no liability for advice or recommendation)215 § 675(ii) BGB was formerly § 676 BGB. It was renumbered by the Law concerning Bank Transfers (‘Überweisungsgesetz’) of 21.7.1999, which implemented EU Directive 1997/5. The ‘Überweisungsgesetz’ also inserted the following new paragraphs (mainly relating to banking transactions) into the BGB: § 675a:

§ 676:

§ 676a-c: § 676d-e: § 676f-h:

persons, who publicly offer to carry out business for others for reward (‘entgeltliche Geschäftsbesorgung’),   have a duty to provide information (‘Informationspflicht’) in writing and free of charge concerning charges and disbursements (‘Entgelte und Auslagen’) for ‘standard transactions’; credit institutions have a duty to give additional information. termination of a contract concerning the transfer of, or a right to claim, securities (‘Übertragungsvertrag’)   is only effective, if the beneficiary’s account-holding institution is informed in good time (‘rechtzeitig’) before registration (‘Verbuchung’) of the securities on the account. contract to undertake a bank transfer (‘Überweisungsvertrag’). contract to effect a bank transfer via an intermediary credit institution (‘zwischengeschaltetes Kreditinstitut’) (‘Zahlungsvertrag’). contract to maintain a current account (‘Girovertrag’).

The contracts involved in §§ 675a–676h are all sub-types/variations of the ‘Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag’ in § 675(i) BGB.216 Arrangement of Title 11

§§ 677–687 are arranged as follows: ‘Pflichten des Geschäftsführers’ (duties of the person transacting the matter) § 677: §§ 678–679: ‘Unberechtigte Geschäftsführung’ (unjustified transaction of a matter) ‘Haftung bei Notgeschäftsführung’ (liability in the event that a matter is § 680: transacted in an emergency) ‘Nebenpflichten des Geschäftsführers’  (accessory duties of the person § 681: transacting the matter) ‘Haftungsprivileg bei fehlender Geschäftsfähigkeit’ (reduced liability where § 682: there is no ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’) § 683: ‘ Aufwendungsersatzanspruch des berechtigten Geschäftsführers’ (reimbursement of expenditure for a justified transaction)

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§ 684: § 685: § 686: § 687:

   

‘Lage bei nicht berechtigten Geschäftsführung’ (position where transaction is not justified) ‘Schenkungsabsicht’ (intended gift) ‘Irrtum über den Geschäftsherrn’ (mistake as to principal) ‘Eigengeschäftsführung’ (self-transaction)

Arrangement of Title 12

§§ 688–700 Arrangement of Title 13

§§ 701–704 Arrangement of Title 14

§§ 705–740 are arranged as follows: § 705:   ‘Begriff’ (definition) §§ 706–707: ‘Beiträge’ (contributions) § 708: ‘Erleichterte Haftung’ (reduced liability) §§ 709–712: ‘Geschäftsführung’ (management)217 §§ 714–715: ‘Vertretung’ (representation)218 § 716:   ‘Kontrollrecht’ (right of control) § 717: ‘Übertragbarkeit von Rechten’ (transferability of rights) §§ 718–720: ‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’ (company assets) §§ 721–722: ‘Verteilung von Gewinn und Verlust’ (distribution of profit and loss) §§ 723–729: ‘Auflösungsgründe’ (grounds for termination) §§ 730–735:  ‘Auseinandersetzung’ (split-up) §§ 736–740: ‘Gesellschafterwechsel’ (change of members) Arrangement of Title 15

§§ 741–758 are arranged as follows: § 741:   ‘Begriff’ (definition) §§ 742–743: ‘Anteile’ (shares) §§ 744–746: ‘Verwaltung und Benutzung’ (administration and use) §§ 747–748: ‘Rechte und Pflichten’ (rights and duties) §§ 749–751: ‘Aufhebung’ (termination) §§ 752–754: ‘Art der Aufhebung’ (manner of termination) §§ 755–757: ‘Folgeansprüche bei Aufhebung’ (claims consequent on termination) ‘Unverjährbarkeit des Aufhebungsanspruchs’ (the right to claim termination § 758: is not subject to limitation)

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Arrangement of Title 16

§§ 759–761 Arrangement of Title 17

§§ 762–764 Arrangement of Title 18

§§ 765–778 are arranged as follows: §§ 765–766: ‘Begriff’ (definition); ‘Form’ (form) § 767: ‘Umfang der Bürgschaftsschuld’ (extent of the guarantor’s debt) ‘Einreden des Bürgen’ (objections by the guarantor) § 768: § 769:   ‘Mitbürgschaft’ (co-surety) §§ 770–773: ‘Einreden des Bürgen’ (objections by the guarantor) § 774: ‘Gesetzlicher Forderungsübergang’ (transition of claim by operation of law) §§ 775–777: ‘Befreiung des Bürgen’ (release of the guarantor) § 778:   ‘Kreditauftrag’ (instruction to provide credit) Arrangement of Title 19

§ 779 Arrangement of Title 20

§§ 780–782 Arrangement of Title 21

§§ 783–792 are arranged as follows: §§ 783–786: ‘Begriff’ (definition); ‘Verpflichtung’ (obligation) §§ 787–791: ‘Rechtsverhältnisse’ (legal relationships) § 792: ‘Übertragung’ (transfer) Arrangement of Title 22

§§ 793–808a are arranged as follows: §§ 793–797: ‘Begriff; Lage des Ausstellers; Voraussetzungen’  (definition; position of the issuer; preconditions) §§ 798–800: ‘Ersatzurkunde und Kraftloserklärung’   (replacement document and declaration of nullity) §§ 801–802: ‘Verjährung und Vorlegungsfrist’ (limitation and presentation period) §§803–808a: ‘Scheine; Umschreibung auf den Namen; Besondere Arten’  (notes (coupons); alteration in favour of a named person; special types) Arrangement of Title 23

§§ 809–811 Arrangement of Title 24

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§§ 812–822 are arranged as follows: §§ 812–813(i): ‘Grundtatbestände’ (basic (substantive) provisions): ‘Leistungskondiktion’ and ‘Nichtleistungskondiktion’ §§ 813(ii)–815: ‘Ausschluß der Rückforderung’  (exclusion of the claim to return (of  something received due to a ‘Leistung’)) ‘Verpflichtung zur Herausgabe des Erlangten nach Verfügung eines §816: Nichtberechtigten: Besonderer Fall der Eingriffskondiktion’  (liability of an unauthorised person to hand out what he receives following his (valid) ‘Verfügung’: special case of the ‘Eingriffskondiktion’) §§ 817, 1st sentence: ‘Verpflichtung des Empfängers, der gegen Gesetz oder gute Sitten verstößt’ (liability of a recipient who breaches statute or good morals) § 817, 2nd sentence: ‘Ausschluß der Rückforderung, wenn dem Leistenden (gleichfalls) ein solcher Verstoß zur Last fällt’ (exclusion of the claim to return, where the claimant is (similarly) in breach) § 818(i), (ii): ‘Umfang des Anspruchs: Gegenstand der Bereicherung’ (extent of the claim: object of enrichment) § 818(iii): ‘Wegfall der Bereicherung’ ((exclusion of the claim) where the enrichment falls away) § 818(iv)-820: ‘Verschärfte Haftung des Empfängers’ (increased liability of the recipient) § 821: ‘Einrede der Bereicherung’ (objection of unjust enrichment) ‘Dritthaftung’ (liability of third parties) § 822: Arrangement of Title 25

§§ 823–853 are arranged as follows: ‘Grndtatbestände’ (basic (substantive) provisions)219 § 823: §§ 824–826: ‘Weitere Anspruchsgrundlagen’  (further (legal) grounds for claiming (damages))220 §§ 827–829: ‘Deliktsfähigkeit’ (capacity to commit a delict) ‘Beteiligung mehrerer’ (involvement of several persons)221 § 830: §831: ‘Haftung für den Verrichtungsgehilfen’ ((presumed) (vicarious) liability for a person entrusted with a particular task)222 ‘Haftung des Aufsichtspflichtigen’ (liability of the person who supervises) § 832: §§ 833–834: ‘Haftung für Schaden durch Tiere’ (liability for (damage caused by) animals) §§ 836–838: ‘Haftung bei Einsturz eines Gebäudes’ (liability in the event of collapse of a  building)223 ‘Beamtenhaftung’  (civil servant’s liability for breach of his ‘Amtspflicht’ § 839: (official duty))224 §§ 840–841: ‘Haftung mehrerer’ (liability of several persons)225 §§ 842–843: ‘Umfang des Schadensersatzes bei Verletzung einer Person’ (extent of damages in the case of personal injury) §§ 844–846: ‘Ansprüche Dritter bei Tötung oder wegen entgangener Dienste’ (third party claims where a person is killed or was obliged by statute to provide services)226 70

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‘Schmerzensgeld’ (damages for pain and suffering)227 § 847: §§ 848–851: ‘Haftung bei Entziehung einer Sache’ (liability in the event of removal of a thing) §§ 852–853: ‘Verjährung’  (limitation period); ‘Verweigerung der Erfüllung’  (refusal of  performance)228 D BOOK III: THE LAW OF PROPERTY (§§ 854–1296 BGB)229 1

Introduction

(i) Book III of the BGB (‘Sachenrecht’/law of property; §§ 854–1296) is divided into 9 Sections. In the important first 3 Sections of Book III provisions are set out dealing with possession (‘Besitz’; §§ 854–872), rights to land (‘Rechte an Grundstücken’; §§ 873– 902) and ownership (‘Eigentum’; §§ 903–1011). In the BGB, the term ‘Eigentum’  only relates to ownership of corporeal things (‘Sachen’). It is a right ‘in rem’ (over a thing) and not, such as a right based on a ‘Schuldverhältnis’ (obligation), a right ‘in personam’ (over a person).230 Sections 5–9 (§§ 1018–1296) contain a ‘numerus clausus’ (fixed number) of so-called ‘beschränkte dingliche Rechte’ (limited real rights, as opposed to ‘Eigentum’ as the most comprehensive, unlimited real right).231 ‘Beschränkte dingliche Rechte’  are classified as user rights (‘Nutzungsrechte’, eg, servitudes) and disposal or security rights (‘Verwertungs- oder Sicherungsrechte’, eg, mortgages and pledges).232 The common thread running through Sections 5–8 (§§ 1018–1203 BGB) is that they deal with encumbrances (‘Belastungen’) over land, while Section 9 (§§ 1204– 1296 BGB) deals with movables and rights. (ii) Book III distinguishes between movable (‘bewegliche’)  and immovable (‘unbewegliche’) ‘Sachen’. The only ‘unbewegliche Sachen’ are ‘Grundstücke’ ((pieces of) land (‘Immobilien’)).233 Movables are further classified (in Book I) according to whether they are: – fungible (‘vertretbar’); and/or – consumable (‘verbrauchbar’). A ‘vertretbare Sache’ is one which is customarily counted, weighed or measured (§ 91 BGB). It is interchangeable with another of the same class and is not individualised.234 A ‘verbrauchbare Sache’ is one which is intended for consumption or disposal (§ 92 BGB).235 Ordinary parts (‘Bestandteile’)  of a ‘Sache’  are distinguished from substantial components (‘wesentliche Bestandteile’), for which, in the case of land or buildings, the English legal term is ‘fixtures’. Substantial components always share the fate of the main thing (‘Hauptsache’)  to which they are attached and cannot be the subject of separate rights: §§ 93–94 BGB. To be contrasted with ‘Bestandteile’ are ‘Zubehör’ (fittings, accessories), which are legally independent movables: § 97 BGB. 71

The German Legal System and Legal Language

2 ‘Dingliches Recht’  and ‘Verfügung’ 

With regard to the term ‘dingliches Recht’ (real right), it is helpful to note the following: (i)   ‘Besitz’ (possession) is not a ‘dingliches Recht’ (real right) or ‘Recht an der Sache’ (right with regard to a ‘Sache’/right ‘in rem’), but merely ‘tatsächliche Sachherrschaft’ (actual dominance over a ‘Sache’). (ii) ‘Dingliche Rechte’ are absolute, ie, have effect against everyone (‘gegen jedermann’) and, for reasons of certainty, are restricted to the types set out in Sections 5–9 of Book III. To be contrasted therewith are the rights of parties to a ‘Schuldverhältnis’, which are relative, ie, effective only amongst the parties. The principles underlying Book II are the parties’ fundamental freedom of contract (‘Vertragsfreiheit’)  and choice of type of ‘Schuldverhältnis’ (‘Typenfreiheit’, ie, the parties are not limited to the type or form of the ‘Schuldverhältnisse’ listed in §§ 433–811), while in Book III the principle of ‘Typenzwang’ (compulsory choice of type) prevails.236 (iii) Each ‘dingliches Recht’ is ‘spezial’ (special), ie, exists only with reference to a specific, individual ‘Sache’ ( ‘Spezialitätsgrundsatz’   or principle of speciality). A ‘Sachgesamtheit’  (collection of ‘Sachen’) is not one ‘Sache’, but a multitude of ‘Sachen’ (eg, a herd, library or business enterprise (‘Unternehmen’)).237 (iv) An ‘Anwartschaftsrecht’ is a right of expectancy with regard to a ‘dingliches Recht’. It is a concept developed by the judiciary (‘richterliche Rechtsfortbildung’) and, while not being expressly referred to in the BGB, is treated as essentially similar to (the ‘wesensgleiches Minus’ of) the relevant ‘dingliches Recht’. Thus, for example, in the case of an instalment purchase (‘Abzahlungskauf’), it is common for a retention of title (‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’) to be agreed in favour of the vendor. The purchaser acquires an ‘Anwartschaftsrecht’,   which gradually strengthens (‘erstarkt’) into the full right (‘Vollrecht’) of ‘Eigentum’ (ownership) on final payment of the last instalment. Until then, the real agreement between the parties (the so-called ‘Einigung’) is said to be conditional upon (‘bedingt durch’) full payment of the price (§455). 238  Just as his future ‘Eigentum’, the purchaser’s ‘Anwartschaftsrecht’ can be transferred, charged, enjoys the same protection and can also be the subject of  ‘Zwangsvollstreckung’ (enforcement) by a creditor.239 (v) The abstraction principle (‘Abstraktionsgrundsatz’).240 The ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’ of Book III (eg, transfer of ownership) are ‘Verfügungen’ or ‘Verfügungsgeschäfte’  and are abstract from the basic or causal transaction (eg, purchase contract). It is important to understand that, in German legal speech, the term ‘Verfügung’ is used in various contexts. Thus, in court or administrative terminology, a ‘Verfügung’ can refer to the decision of the presiding judge (‘Verfügung des Vorsitzenden’), an injunction (‘einstweilige Verfügung’) or an administrative order or ban (‘Gebot oder Verbot’), eg, from the police (‘polizeiliche Verfügung’). In the BGB, where it is used in the sense of a ‘disposition’, it is important both for Book in (law of property) and Book V (law of succession).241 72

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In Book V, the term ‘Verfügung’   is used to refer to the legal transaction (‘Rechtsgeschäft’) of a person having effect in the event of that person’s death, ie, a so-called ‘Verfügung (Rechtsgeschäft) von Todes wegen’, eg, a will (‘Testament’) or contract of succession (‘Erbvertrag’), including any direction (‘Anordnung’) therein. In Book III, the term ‘Verfügung’ means a legal transaction which, in strict contrast to a ‘Verpflichtung’ (obligation), has direct effect on the constitution of a real right (‘dingliches Recht’) by means of its transfer, release or burdening or a variation of  its content (‘ein Rechtsgeschäft, welches den Bestand eines Rechts unmittelbar beeinflusst durai Übertragung, Aufhebung, Belastung oder inhaltliche Änderung’).242 The use of the term ‘Verfügung’ in this sense is apparent from the provisions of  Book III regarding rights to land, which lay down the necessary components of a ‘Verfügung’ over such rights (§§ 873, 875 and 877). The validity of a ‘Verfügung’ in the Book III (property) sense is dependent not only on the special preconditions laid down in the relevant paragraphs of Book III and on the general requirement of all ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’—‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’—but also on the so-called ‘Verfügungsbefugnis’  (entitlement to undertake a ‘Verfügung’). By means of this important concept, a distinction is drawn between the usual case of a right being held by its owner (who is then referred to as the ‘Berechtigter’ or ‘Inhaber des Rechts’ (owner of the right)) and the case of an unauthorised third party (a so-called ‘Nichtberechtigter’), who purports to undertake a ‘Verfügung’.243 Statutory provisions limiting the ‘Verfügungsbefugnis’ in various circumstances (socalled ‘Verfügungsbeschränkungen’ or ‘Veräusserungsverbote’ ) can be absolute (ie, effective as against all the world, eg, § 1365 BGB or § 81(i) InsO) or relative (§ 135 BGB) in effect. A court order (eg, an ‘einstweilige Verfügung’ (injunction)) forbidding a ‘Verfügung’ is an example of a relative ‘Verfügungsbeschränkung’ : a ‘Verfügung’ undertaken despite the order is effective for all purposes except as against the person in favour of whom the order was granted.244 A person cannot exclude or limit his ‘Verfügungsbefugnis’  by means of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’,  but a purely contractual restriction (abstraction principle!) is possible (§137). A ‘Verfügung’ usually remains valid even if its causal/obligational transaction (‘Verpflichtungsgeschäft’) is void.245 To rectify the position, a claim for unjust enrichment (‘ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung’) can be made (within the Law of Obligations), for which complex provisions are contained in §§ 812–822 BGB.246 3

Sections 1–9 247

(a) Section 1 (§§ 854–872 BGB) Section 1  (§§ 854–872) deal with the acquisition, types and protection of ‘Besitz’

(possession).248 73

The German Legal System and Legal Language

(b) Section 2 (§§ 873–902 BGB)249 Section 2 (§§ 873–902) sets out provisions dealing (inter alia) with:

– – – –

the acquisition, release and variation of rights to land (§§ 873–878); the rank of limited rights to land between themselves (§§ 879–881); the protection of the position of a person claiming a right to land by means of the entry of a so-called ‘Vormerkung’ (priority notice) in the land register (‘Grundbuch’) (§§883–888); the effect of entries (‘Eintragungen’) in the Land Register (‘Grundbuch’; §§ 891– 893);

Of particular importance are §§ 891 and 892 BGB. The underlying rationale of  these provisions is that one must be able to rely on (‘sich verlassen auf’) the Land Register. First, § 891 BGB  lays down a statutory presumption that entries in the Land Register are correct (‘Vermutung der Richtigkeit’), ie, that the person registered as proprietor is so entitled and that any right which has been deleted (‘gelöscht’) no longer exists. § 892 BGB goes further and protects third parties. It establishes the principle of the public credence of the Land Register (‘öffentlicher Glaube des Grundbuchs’)—in favour of anyone who acquires a right to a piece of land by legal transaction (‘Rechtsgeschäft’) the content of the Land Register is deemed to be correct, unless an objection against its accuracy is registered or the acquiring party (‘Erwerber’) (positively) knows that the entries in the Register are incorrect (§ 892(i), 1st sentence BGB).250 Further, any relative limitations on the proprietor’s right to undertake a disposition (‘relative Verfügungsbeschränkungen’)—eg, the seizure (‘Beschlagnahme’) of the land as a measure of enforcement—must appear on the Register or be (positively) known to the acquiring party to be effective against him (§ 892(i), 2nd sentence BGB). Thus, in marked contrast to to the position regarding movables (§ 932 BGB), the ‘bona fide’ acquisition of an unencumbered right to immovables is possible, even if the acquiring party is grossly negligent (‘grob fahrlässig’) as to the situation. The acquiring party is protected not only if there is a favourable registration, but also if an entry on the Register has been omitted or deleted, and regardless of his inspection of the Register. § 892 BGB is of corresponding application, if the proprietor of a right in the Land Register receives some act of performance (‘Leistung’) on the basis of the right or if he engages in a transaction not falling within § 892, but which includes a disposition (‘Verfügung’) over the right: § 893 BGB: – –

the correction of incorrect entries in the Land Register (§§ 894–899); the influence of expiry of time on rights to land (§§ 900–902).

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(c) Section 3 (§§ 903–1011 BGB) Section 3 (§§ 903–1011) is divided into five Titles:

(i) Title 1 (§§ 903–924 BGB) Title 1: ‘Inhalt des Eigentums’ (content of ownership): §§ 903–924

Subject to certain exceptions, the owner of a ‘Sache’ can deal with it as he pleases and exclude others from it (§ 903). However, Article 14(ii) of the Basic Law makes it clear that he also has certain obligations in the public interest (‘Eigentum verpflichtet’). The term ‘Eigentum’ as used in Article 14 GG is wider than that of § 903 BGB (which is limited to ‘Sachen’) and includes all legal positions of value.251 The content (‘Inhalt’) and limits (‘Schranken’) of ‘Eigentum’ are set (‘bestimmt’) by statute and only if ‘Eigentum’ is removed by ‘Enteignung’ (expropriation) or a similar interference (‘Eingriff’) is compensation (‘Entschädigung’) available.252 The owner of land has a duty to tolerate (‘Duldungspflicht’)  nuisances (‘Einwirkungen’),  which emanate from other land253—ie, (incorporeal) emissions/ pollution (‘Immissionen’) (eg, in the form of noise or smell)—in so far as they (only) amount to an insignificant interference (‘unwesentliche Beeinträchtigung’): § 906(i) BGB. The owner of the land affected has such a duty even when the interference is significant, if the use of the other land is normal for the locality (‘ortsüblich’) and preventive measures are not commercially viable (‘wirtschaftlich zumutbar’). However, appropriate compensation in money can be claimed, if the nuisance extends beyond an acceptable level (‘über das zumutbare Maß hinaus’): § 906(ii) BGB.254 (ii)/(iii) Title 2 (§§ 925–928 BGB) and Title 3 (§§ 929–984 BGB) Title 2: ‘Erwerb und Verlust des Eigentums an Grundstücken’  (acquisition and loss of 

ownership to land (immovables)): §§ 925–928. Title 3: ‘Erwerb und Verlust des Eigentums an beweglichen Sachen’  (acquisition and loss of  ownership to movables): §§ 929–984. The components of a transfer of ownership255 The transfer of ownership (‘Übertragung des Eigentums’ or ‘Übereignung’) of a ‘Sache’  by means of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ is composed of 2 elements: – –

the so-called ‘Einigung’ (a real agreement; known as the ‘Auflassung’ (conveyance) in the case of immovables: § 925(i));256 the ‘Übergabe’  (transfer of physical possession (‘Besitz’)) in the case of movables (§ 929) or ‘Eintragung’  (entry in the land register (‘Grundbuch’)) in the case of  immovables (§ 873).

An ‘Übergabe’ (of movables) can in certain circumstances be unnecessary (ie, where the transferee (‘Erwerber’) is already in possession of the ‘Sache’: § 929, 2nd sentence) or replaced (‘ersetzt’): 75

The German Legal System and Legal Language

–

–

by a so-called ‘Besitzkonstitut’   (constructive possession, ie, an arrangement whereby the (original) ‘Eigentümer’ remains in possession of the ‘Sache’, but holds it for the proper (new) owner: § 930. This is the usual technical legal basis for a ‘Sicherungsübereignung’   (transfer of ownership as security, ie, a chattel mortgage);257 or by an ‘Abtretung des Herausgabeanspruchs’ (assignment of the right to claim return of the ‘Sache’: § 931).

Bona fide acquisition of ownership to movables258

Normally, a transfer of ownership (of movables) is from the ‘Eigentümer’ himself (§ 929). If, however, the transferor (‘Veräusserer’) is (a person) not entitled to (transfer) the ‘Sache’ (a so-called ‘Nichtberechtigter’), the bona fide acquisition of ‘Eigentum’ by the transferee (‘gutgläubiger Erwerb’) is possible (§ 932) unless: – –

the ‘Erwerber’ is not in good faith (‘nicht in gutem Glauben’ (‘bösgläubig’),  ie, if he is aware of or grossly negligent as to the situation);259 or the ‘Sache’ has been stolen, lost or has otherwise gone astray (‘abhanden gekommen’: § 935)260

The transfer of physical possession (‘Übergabe’) to the transferee, being a component of a transfer of ownership, must, of course, still take place. Bona fide acquisition of ownership is also possible in the event that a ‘Besitzkonstitut’ or ‘Abtretung des Herausgabeanspruchs’  is entered into/granted by a ‘Nichtberechtigter’. In the former case, however, the transferee must obtain physical possession from the transferor.261 In the event of bona fide  acquisition by the transferee (ie, where the transfer (‘Verfügung’) is effective (‘wirksam’) against the ‘Eigentümer’) the ‘Nichtberechtigter’ has to compensate the original owner.262 Statutory acquisition of ownership to movables263 Ownership of movables can be acquired not only in accordance with §§ 929–936 by means of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, but also by statute (so-called ‘gesetzlicher Erwerb’; dealt with in §§ 937–984), ie, by:  –  –  –  –  –

‘Ersitzung’ (prescription, ie, acquisition of ownership through the passage of time: §§ 937–945). ‘Verbindung. Vermischung. Verarbeitung’ (connection; mixture; processing): §§ 946–952.264 ‘Erwerb von Erzeugnissen und sonstigen Bestandteilen einer Sache’  (acquisition of  produce and other parts of a ‘Sache’): §§ 953–957.265 ‘Aneignung’ (acquisition of ownership to ownerless movables (appropriation): §§ 958–964. ‘Fund’ (finding of lost property: §§ 965–984).

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(iv) Title 4 (§§ 985–1007 BGB) Title 4: ‘Ansprüche aus dem Eigentum’ (claims arising out of ownership): §§ 985–1007.

The owner of a ‘Sache’,  whether movable or immovable, has various ‘dingliche  Ansprüche’ (real claims), eg, to return (‘Herausgabe’) of the ‘Sache’ against a person with no right to possession (‘Recht zum Besitz’) of it (so-called ‘Vindikation’/‘rei vindicatio’ under § 985) and to removal or stoppage of a disturbance (‘Beseitigung oder Unterlassung einer Störung’: § 1004).266 (v) Title 5 (§§ 1008–1011 BGB) Title 5: ‘Miteigentum’ (‘nach Bruchteilen’: joint ownership by shares (as opposed to

‘Gesamthandseigentum’):267

§§ 1008–1011. (d) Section 4 (§§ 1012–1017 BGB)268 Section 4 of Book III (§§ 1012–1017), which formerly dealt with the ‘Erbbaurecht’

(heritable building right), has been replaced by the ‘Verordnung über das Erbbaurecht’ of 15.1.1919. (e) Section 5 (§§ 1018–1093 BGB) Section 5 (§§ 1018–1093) deals with ‘Dienstbarkeiten’ (servitudes) and is divided into three Titles: Title 1:   ‘Grunddienstbarkeiten’ (easements): §§ 1018–1029. Title 2:   ‘Nießbrauch’ (usufruct): §§ 1030–1089. Title 3: ‘Beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit’  (limited personal servitude): §§ 1090–

1093. (f) Section 6 (§§ 1094–1104 BGB) Section 6  (§§ 1094–1104) deals with the ‘Vorkaufsrecht’  (right of preemption). The

‘Vorkaufsrecht’ referred to here is the ‘dingliches Vorkaufsrecht’ (real right of preemption) and not the contractual one (dealt with in §§ 504–514). (g) Section 7 (§§ 1105–1112 BGB) Section 7 (§§ 1105–1112) deals with the ‘Reallast’  (duty of successive supply from land).

The object of a ‘Reallast’ is the successive supply (‘wiederkehrende Leistung’) of goods or services from a piece of land. It can be granted in favour of a particular person or in favour of another property: § 1105 BGB. In contrast to a ‘Rentenschuld’ (rentcharge; § 1199 BGB), the supply does not have to consist of the payment of a sum of money, nor need it be regular. Moreover, in addition to the land itself, the respective owner of the burdened land is personally liable for fulfillment of the supply, ie, a ‘Reallast’ additionally results in a personal covenant § 1108 BGB. 77

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Being a limited real right, a ‘Reallast’ requires registration in the Land Register (§ 873 BGB). It is nowadays of limited practical importance, mainly for retiring farmers, who wish to ensure appropriate provision for themselves and their families after retirement frequently in conjunction with a right to use particular accommodation (‘Wohnungsrecht’; § 1093 BGB; so-called ‘Altenteil’).269 (h) Sections 8 and 9 (§§ 1113–1296 BGB) Sections 8 and 9 of Book III deal with security/disposal rights over immovables and

movables respectively (ie, mortgages and pledges) and are set out as follows: Section 8 (§§ 1113–1203) deals with ‘Grundpfandrechte’ (security rights over land) and is divided into 2 Titles:270 Title 1: ‘Hypothek’ (mortgage): §§ 1113–1190. Title 2: ‘Grundschuld. Rentenschuld’ (land charge; rentcharge): §§ 1191–1203. At this point, it is perhaps useful initially to recall the abstraction principle and the fundamental distinction drawn by German law between a contractual claim (‘Forderung’) and a right ‘in rem’ (‘dingliches Recht’).271 A right ‘in rem’ gives its holder the right to seek satisfaction out of a particular asset. The asset is liable (‘haftet’), ie, can be realised to satisfy the right. A contractual obligation, on the other hand, merely binds the parties (privity of contract). The debtor owes (‘schuldet’) performance. It should also be realised that German law distinguishes between a loan, for which personal security is given (eg, in the form of a personal guarantee (‘Bürgschaft’))—a so-called ‘Personalkredit’ —and a loan, for which the security comprises particular ‘Sachen’ (eg, real estate)—a so-called ‘Realkredit’. Where immovable property is involved, the BGB makes available three different types of security right over land (‘Grundpfandrecht’): – – –

a mortgage (‘Hypothek’); a land charge (‘Grundschuld’), and a rentcharge (‘Rentenschuld’).

A mortgage (‘Hypothek’) is a means of securing the payment of a particular sum of  money due under a contractual obligation, usually a loan (‘Darlehen’, ‘Kredit’). The obligee (creditor (‘Gläubiger’)) must have an existing, future or conditional contractual claim (‘Forderung’) against the obligor (debtor (‘Schuldner’)): § 1113 BGB. Thus, no mortgage can arise, if there is no such claim. The ‘mortgage’ is said to be held by the owner of the land (mortgagor): § 1163 (a so-called ‘Eigentümerhypothek’). Nor can a mortgage arise, if the creditor and owner (debtor) are not different persons. If ownership of the land and the claim belong to one and the same person, the ‘mortgage’ is converted into a land charge: § 1177 (a so-called‘Eigentümergrundschuld’) . The provisions in the BGB regarding mortgages are of corresponding application to land charges—see below—unless (as is the strict legal position) a land charge is not dependent on the existence of a contractual claim: § 1192 BGB. 78

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Attention is drawn to the following provisions: – –

registration (‘Eintragung’): § 1115 BGB. The name of the mortgagee, the amount of  the claim, the rate of interest (‘Zinssatz’)  and any other collateral services (‘Nebenleistungen’) must be entered in the Land Register. types: § 1116 BGB. The grant of a mortgage usually involves the issue of a mortgage certificate (‘Hypothekenbrief’). However, the parties can agree that, instead, a mortgage take the form of an entry in the Land Register (‘Buchhypothek’): § 1116(ii) BGB.

If a mortgage certificate is issued, the mortgagee does not acquire the mortgage before the certificate is handed over: § 1117(i) BGB. Moreover, by § 1160(i) BGB, if it is sought to enforce such a mortgage, the owner of the land can insist on presentation of the mortgage certificate (‘Vorlage des Briefs’) and also—if there has been an assignment of  the mortgage (see §§ 1153, 1154 BGB), but the name of the new creditor does not appear in the Land Register,—presentation of the documents specified in § 1155 BGB, ie, an unbroken chain (‘Kette’) of publicly certified declarations of assignment (‘öffentlich beglaubigte Abtretungserklärungen’) . In such a case, the holder of the certificate is presumed to be the legitimate mortgagee (§§ 891ff BGB): – –

– –

rights of the mortgagee before maturity of the claim(‘Fälligkeit’): §§ 1133–1135 BGB; extension of the provisions concerning the public credence of the Land Register (§§ 891 ff BGB) for the purpose of the mortgage (‘für die Hypothek’) in favour of a ‘bona fide’ transferee of a registered mortgage: § 1138 BGB, ie, such a transferee acquires the mortgage, even if a claim (‘Forderung’) does not exist and despite any objections, which might normally be available to the owner under § 1137 BGB;272 termination by the mortgagee (‘Kündigung’): § 1141 BGB; position of the parties after maturity (viz satisfaction (‘Befriedigung’)): §§ 1142– 1150 BGB.

Satisfaction of the creditor is achieved by means of enforcement in the land (‘Zwangsvollstreckung’): § 1147 BGB. The preconditions for enforcement of a mortgage are: (i) maturity (‘Fälligkeit’) of the contractual claim; (ii) the existence of an enforceable title (‘Vollstreckungstitel’),  either in the form of a judgment (‘Urteil’) or an enforceable document (‘vollstreckbare Urkunde’) (§§ 704, 794 ZPO); and (iii) the issue of an enforceable copy (‘vollstreckbare Ausfertigung’),  upon which an enforcement clause (‘Vollstreckungsklausel’)  has been appended (§§ 724, 725 ZPO). Effect of, and mode of, assignment of the claim; position of the new creditor: §§ 1153–1159 BGB. The distinguishing characteristic of a land charge (‘Grundschuld’)  is that, unlike a mortgage, it is a non-accessory right, ie, it can exist independently of a contractual claim and remains unaffected, whatever the fate of any related contractual claim.273 Thus, a ‘Grundschuld’ can be, and frequently is, registered by an owner for future use (‘Eigentümergrundschuld’): § 1196 BGB.274 However, a ‘Grundschuld’ is rarely granted in isolation; it is usually granted as security for a loan, on the basis of a security agreement (‘Sicherungsvertrag’/‘Sicherungsabrede’).275 79

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Flowing from such an arrangement, on repayment of the contractual claim (‘Forderungstilgung’) the grantor/owner has a personal claim to return of the‘Grundschuld’ (‘Rückgewähranspruch’) and/or its deletion (‘Löschung’) in the Land Register.276 This claim, which is one type of defence (‘Einrede’)  against enforcement by the creditor,277 can be safeguarded by registration of a ‘Vormerkung’ in the Land Register (§ 883 BGB).278 Moreover, by analogy with §§ 1142–1143 BGB, a ‘Grundschuld’ passes back to the owner, and the contractual claim is discharged, on redemption (‘Ablösung’)  of the ‘Grundschuld’ by the owner (‘Leistung auf den Grundschuld’; cf the position, when security is given by a third party (‘Drittsicherung’))279 Section 9 (§§ 1204–1296) deals with the ‘Pfandrecht’ (pledge) and is divided into two Titles:280 Title 1: ‘Pfandrecht an beweglkhen Sachen’ (pledge of movables): §§ 1204–1258. Title 2: ‘Pfandrecht an Rechten’ (pledge of rights): §§ 1273–1296.

E BOOK IV: FAMILY LAW (§§ 1297–1921 BGB)281 Book IV of the BGB (‘Familienrecht’ /  family law); §§ 1297–1921 ) is divided into three Sections (in turn sub-divided into Titles) as follows: Section 1:   ‘Bürgerliche Ehe’ (civil marriage): §§ 1297–1588. Title 1:   ‘Verlöbnis’ (engagement): §§ 1297–1302. *Title 2: ‘Eingehung der Ehe’ (conclusion of marriage): §§ 1303–1322. *Title 3: ‘Nichtigkeit und Anfechtbarkeit der Ehe’ (nullity and voidability of marriage): §§ 1323–1347. *Title 4: ‘Wiederverheiratung im Falle der Todeserklärung’ (remarriage in the event of  declaration of death): §§ 1348–1352. * Titles 2, 3 and 4 above have been repealed (‘aufgehoben’) and are dealt with in the ‘Ehegesetz’ (Marriage Law) of 20.2.1946. Title 5: ‘Wirkungen der Ehe im allgemeinen’ (effects of marriage in general): §§ 1353–1362. Title 6: ‘Eheliches Güterrecht’ (marital property law): §§ 1363–1563.282 Title 7: ‘Sceidung der Ehe’ (divorce): §§ 1564–1587p.283 Title 7 consists of three parts: §§ 1564–1568:   ‘Scheidungsgründe’ (grounds for divorce); §§ 1569–1586: ‘Unterhalt der geschiedenen Ehegatten’ (maintenance of the divorced spouses) or ‘nachehelicher Unterhalt’ (maintenance after divorce); §§ 1587–1587p:   ‘Versorgungsausgleich’   (equalization of pension and disability provision, ie, settlement of expectancies or rights acquired or upheld  by the divorced spouses during their marriage). 80

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‘Kirchliche Verpflichtungen’ (ecdesiastical obligations): §§ 1588. Section 2: ‘Verwandtschaft’ (kinship): §§ 1589–1772. Title 1: ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften’ (general provisions): §§ 1589–1590. Title 2:   ‘Abstammung’ (descent): §§ 1591–1600o. Title 3:   ‘Unterhaltspflicht’ (duty of maintenance): §§ 1601–1615o. Title 4: ‘Rechtsverhältnis zwischen den Eltern und dem Kinde im allgemeinen’ (legal relationship between parents and child in general): §§ 1616–1625. Title 5: ‘Elterliche Sorge für eheliche Kinder’ (parental care for legitimate children): §§ 1626–1704. Title 6: ‘Elterliche Sorge für nichteheliche Kinder’  (parental care for illegitimate children): §§ 1705–1718. Title 7: ‘Legitimation nichtehelicher Kinder’ (legitimation of illegitimate children): §§ 1719–1740g. Title 8: ‘Annahme als Kind’ (adoption): §§ 1741–1772. Section 3:   ‘Vormundschaft’ (guardianship): §§ 1773–1921. Title 1: ‘Vormundschaft über Minderjährige’ (guardianship over minors): §§ 1773– 1895. Title 2:   ‘Betreuung’ (care and attendance over adults suffering from a psychological illness or a physical or mental handicap): §§ 1896–1908i. Title 3:   ‘Pflegschaft’ (appointment of an administrator (‘Pfleger’) in special cases, eg, where parents or a guardian cannot act; where an adult is absent and cannot be located; for a foetus): §§ 1909–1921. Title 8:

F BOOK V: LAW OF SUCCESSION (§§ 1922–2385 BGB)284 1 Introduction

Book V of the BGB (‘Erbrecht’ /law of succession; §§ 1922–2385 ) is divided into nine Sections: Section 1:   ‘Erbfolge’ (mode of inheritance): §§ 1922–1941. Section 2: ‘Rechtliche Stellung des Erben’ (legal position of the heir): §§ 1942–2063. Section 3:   ‘Testament’ (will): §§ 2064–2273. Section 4:   ‘Erbvertrag’ (contract of succession): §§ 2274–2302. Section 5

:‘Pflichtteil’ (compulsory portion (of the estate)): §§ 2303–2338.

Section 6:   ‘Erbunwürdigkeit’ (unworthiness to inherit): §§ 2339–2345. Section 7:   ‘Erbverzicht’ (waiver of inheritance): §§ 2346–2352. Section 8:   ‘Erbschein’ (certificate of inheritance): §§ 2353–2370. Section 9:   ‘Erbschaftskauf’ (estate purchase): §§ 2371–2385. 81

The German Legal System and Legal Language 2 Constitutional Guarantee285

The German law of succession is founded on a recognition of the principles of private property and the freedom of the individual/private autonomy. Thus, Article 14(i), 1st sentence of the Basic Law guarantees both the law of succession as an institution and inheritance as a personal, subjective right, the essence of which must be respected by the state. In particular, the BGB acknowledges the principle of testamentary freedom (‘Testierfreiheit’),  whilst protecting the interests of the nearest family members by appointing them as statutory heirs and by granting a compulsory portion of the estate (‘Pflichtteil’) to those excluded by the testator (‘Erblasser’). 3 The Modes of Inheritance

(‘Erbfolge’)

(a) By statute (§§ 1924–1936 BGB)286 (i) Capacity to inherit (‘Erbfähigkeit’) is dependent on the relevant heir being alive at the time of the death (‘Erbfall’; § 1923 BGB). There are three categories of statutory heirs (‘gesetzliche Erben’): – relatives (‘Verwandte’; §§ 1924–1929 BGB); – the spouse (‘Ehegatte’; § 1931 BGB); and – the State (‘Fiskus’); § 1936 BGB). In family law, the grade of kinship (‘Verwandtschaft’) correlates to the number of  intermediate births, relatives being distinguished according to whether they are direct or collateral (§ 1589 BGB). Kinship is based on (legitimate or illegitimate) descent (‘Abstammung’; §§ 1591–1600o BGB). The law of succession classifies kinship differently. Relatives are distinguished according to various orders (‘Ordnungen’). Thus, the 1st order comprises the issue (‘Abkömmlinge’) of the deceased (§ 1924 BGB), ie, children and childrens’ children. The 2nd order comprises the parents of the deceased and their issue (§ 1925 BGB). The 3rd order comprises the grandparents of the deceased and their issue (§ 1926 BGB) and so on. Closer relatives on one level (ie, in a lower order) exclude (ie, take priority over) more distant ones: § 1930 BGB. Moreover, within the (downward) stem (‘Stamm’) of any one order, more senior relatives displace more junior ones, the share of any predeceased relative passing to his or her issue—the principle of representation (‘Eintrittsprinzip’; § 1924(iii) BGB). Children inherit in equal shares (§ 1924(iv) BGB), ie, the estate is divided between stems equally. In the absence of issue (ie, in the 2nd order), the share of any predeceased parent falls to his or her issue (§ 1925(iii) BGB). One speaks of succession according to the (paternal or maternal) parental line. The distance of a relative from the deceased is no bar to inheritance, but persons related by marriage (in-laws) are not statutory heirs. 82

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(ii) § 1931(i) and (ii) BGB lay down the general position regarding the surviving spouse’s statutory entitlement (ie, the spouse’s statutory part of the estate (‘gesetzlicher Erbteil’)). Thus, in conjunction with relatives of the 1st order (ie, issue), the spouse is entitled to one-quarter of the estate. Together with relatives of the 2nd order, the spouse receives half. § 1931 (iii) and (iv) BGB make certain modifications. These provide that the size of  the spouse’s statutory right of inheritance differs according to the marital property regime, which subsisted between the spouses at the time of the death (the statutory community based on gain (‘Zugewinngemeinschaft’)  or separation of property (‘Gütertrennung’). Thus, in the former case (‘Zugewinngemeinschaft’), the statutory part of the surviving spouse is increased by one-quarter, to one-half of the estate: § 1371(i) BGB. If the surviving spouse does not become heir or legatee (ie, due to disinheritance in a disposition on death or due to disclaimer), he or she can claim settlement of any actual gain (‘Zugewinnausgleich’)—under marital property law—and, in addition, a (‘small’) compulsory portion of the estate (‘kleiner Pflichtteil’)—under the law of  succession—amounting to half in value of the (non-increased) statutory share, ie, 1 / 8 (§§ 1371(ii), (iii), 2303(ii), 2307(i) BGB).287 If there was separation of property (‘Gütertrennung’)  at the time of death, the general position regarding the surviving spouse’s entitlement (§ 1931 (i) and (ii) BGB) governs and § 1371 BGB does not apply. However, if the deceased leaves (as statutory heirs) one or two children besides the spouse, the estate is divided  between the surviving spouse and the child(ren) in equal shares: § 1931(iv) BGB. The surviving spouse’s statutory right of inheritance is excluded if, at the time of  the death, there were grounds for divorce and the deceased had made an application for, or consented to, divorce: § 1933, 1st sentence BGB. (b) By disposition on death (‘Verfügung von Todes wegen’) 288

The wishes of the deceased take precedence over the statutory rules of succession (‘Vorrang der gewillkürten Erbfolge’) . Thus, the statutory rules can be overriden by a will (‘Testament’; § 1937 BGB)—ie, a unilateral disposition on death—or by an estate contract (‘Erbvertrag’; § 1941 BGB)—ie, a binding bilateral agreement.289 The term ‘Verfügung von Todes wegen’ (disposition on death) is understood in a wide sense to include a unilateral disposition (a will (‘Testament’) ), an estate contract (‘Erbvertrag’) and any order (‘Anordnung’) taking effect on death (eg, a legacy, a direction or the appointment of an executor). Although the types of testamentary disposition (‘letztwillige Verfügung’) are statutorily fixed (‘Typenzwang’),290 a person is free to dispose of his property on death as he wishes (‘Testierfreiheit’) . The personal character of this right makes it essential that any disposition is executed personally (‘persönlich’;  §§ 2064, 2274). Moreover, other persons are not permitted to decide on the validity of a disposition, nor can a third party determine a beneficiary or the object of a grant (‘Zuwendung’; § 2065 BGB).291 Contractual restrictions of the right of testamentary freedom are void (§ 2302 BGB).292 83

The German Legal System and Legal Language

(c) The will (‘Testament’; §§ 1937, 2064–2086, 2229–2264 BGB)293 (i) Execution (‘Errichtung’)

Capacity294 A minor only has capacity to execute a will (‘Testierfähigkeit’)  once he or she reaches the age of 16: § 2229(i) BGB. Moreover, a will cannot be made by a person who is unable to appreciate the significance of his or her acts due to pathological mental disorder (‘krankhafte Störung der Geistestätigkeit’),   imbecility (‘Geistesschwäche’) or disturbance of consciousness (‘Bewusstseinsstörung’): § 2229(iv) BGB. Form The BGB distinguishes two types of will—the (normal) will executed in proper form (‘das ordentliche Testament’; §§ 2231–2248 BGB) and the extraordinary or emergency will (‘Nottestament’; §§ 2249–2252 BGB).295 The former can be executed in two different ways: 1 2

as a public will (‘öffentliches Testament’) before a Notary, who makes a written record (‘Niederschrift’) thereof: § 2232 BGB; or by a personally handwritten and signed declaration: § 2247(i) BGB.

(ii) Revocation (‘Widerruf’)296

Revocation of a will or any testamentary disposition (‘letztwillige Verfügung’) is possible at any time (‘jederzeit’; § 2253 BGB) in the following manners: 1 2 3 4

by will (§ 2254 BGB); by destruction (‘Vernichtung’)  or alteration (‘Veränderung’) of the (original) will by the testator with the intention of annulling it (‘Aufhebungsabsicht’;  § 2255, 1st sentence BGB); by withdrawal of the will from official custody, eg, from a Notary(‘Rücknahme aus amtlicher Verwahrung’; § 2256(i) BGB); or by the execution of a later will, in so far as its content is not compatible with that of the earlier one (ie, a will containing contradictory dispositions; § 2258(i) BGB).

If the later will is itself revoked, the earlier will remains valid (ie, is restored), if that was the testator’s intention (§ 2258(ii) BGB). (iii) Interpretation (‘Auslegung’)297 If the meaning (‘Sinn’) of the words used by a testator are clear (‘eindeutig’), no problem of interpretation arises. However, it can happen that, even if a will is valid, a testator expresses himself  unclearly (‘unklar’) or that, for some reason, his motives turn out to have been incorrect and there is a gap (‘Lücke’) in the will. In such cases, the purpose of interpretation is, respectively, to ascertain the true wishes (‘wirklicher Wille’) of the testator (§ 133 BGB) or, by supplementary interpretation (‘ergänzende Auslegung’), to discover the testator’s hypothetical wishes (‘hypothetischer 84

Chapter X: Private Law: The Civil Code (BGB)

Wille’), had he been correctly informed at the time the will was made (‘zum Zeitpunkt der Testamentserrichtung’). Generally, if various interpretations of a disposition on death are possible, the one should be chosen, which gives effect to the disposition—the principle of favourable interpretation (‘wohlwollende Auslegung’):  § 2084 BGB. Interpretation is always preferable to challenge (‘Auslegung geht der Anfechtung vor’).298 To this end, the BGB (§§ 2066–2077) lays down various statutory rules of  interpretation (‘Auslegungsregeln’) for wills, which are of corresponding application to estate contracts (§ 2279 BGB).299 As far as wills are concerned, the literal meaning of the words used (the‘Wortlaut’) does not play as important a role in interpretation today, as it did at the time the BGB was enacted. The text itself is not a limit to interpretation and surrounding circumstances (‘Umstände außerhalb der Testamentsurkunde’) can be taken into account. However, if it is asserted that a particular disposition was intended, it must be possible to find sufficient support (‘hinreichende Stütze’)  for it or at least some reference (‘Andeutung’) to it in the will.300 (iv) Challenge (‘Anfechtung’)301 (i) The challenge of a disposition on death is unnecessary, if, by means of beneficial interpretation (‘Auslegung’), the disposition can be given a meaning, which accords with the true wishes of the deceased. ‘Anfechtung’ comes into play, if there is a divergence between the real wishes of  the deceased and those expressed in the disposition because of a mistake(‘Irrtum’) on the part of the deceased or because the deceased was unduly influenced by an illegal threat (‘widerrechtliche Drohung’). In such a situation, the disposition is voidable (‘anfechtbar’) at the instance of the person, who would directly benefit, if  the disposition were quashed (eg, the statutory heir(s) in the case of a will). The effect of a successful challenge is that the relevant disposition is void ‘ab initio’: § 142(i) BGB. Initially, it is valid (‘wirksam’), unlike a disposition, which contravenes good morals (‘gute Sitten’), which is void by law (§ 138(i) BGB).302 (ii) For the purpose of ‘Anfechtung’, the concept of mistake is wider than in § 119 BGB. Thus, a disposition can be challenged not only: 1

2

because the deceased made a mistake as to the content/meaning of the disposition (‘Inhaltsirrtum’) or in its declaration (‘Erklärungsirrtum’) (§ 2078(i) BGB); but also because the deceased based himself on wrong assumptions (‘falsche Vorstellungen’)  or expectations (‘Erwartungen’),  ie, on the ground that his motives were mistaken (‘Motivirrtum’) (§ 2078(ii) BGB).

An additional requirement is that it must be shown that the disposition was caused  by the mistake, ie, that the deceased would not have made the disposition, had he known the true position (‘bei Kenntnis der Sachlage’). For this purpose, it is only the subjective viewpoint of the deceased that counts—objective considerations are irrelevant. 85

The German Legal System and Legal Language

This is in marked contrast to § 119 BGB, the underlying reason being the overriding importance attached by the law of succession to the principle of testamentary freedom. A will is a unilateral declaration (‘nichtempfangsbedürftige Willenserklärung’), which can be revoked at any time. The interests of business safety (‘Sicherheit des Rechtsverkehrs’)  are irrelevant, since there is no business partner, and the trust of other persons, who rely on the validity of a will, enjoys no protection (ie, there is no ‘schutzwürdiges Vertrauen’). Thus, third parties have no right to compensation, if they suffer loss in reliance on the validity of a will (§ 2078(iii) BGB). (iii) A disposition on death can also be challenged, if a person entitled to a compulsory portion, who was living at the death, but of whose existence the deceased was not aware, was mistakenly bypassed (‘übergangen’)  by the deceased, unless the deceased would have made the disposition anyway, had he known the true position: § 2079 BGB. (iv) The challenge of a disposition appointing an heir, excluding a statutory heir from succession or appointing an executor (or the revocation thereof) must be declared at the probate court (‘Nachlassgericht’): § 2081(i) BGB. Challenge must be claimed within a year of knowledge of the grounds for challenge and, at the latest, within 30 years from the death: § 2082 BGB. (d) The joint will (‘Gemeinschaftliches Testament’; §§ 2265–2273 BGB) 303

The ‘gemeinschaftliches Testament’   equates to the English ‘mutual will’, with the qualification that it can only be concluded by spouses: § 2265 BGB. It is usually a will simultaneously executed by both spouses (ie, personally signed  by each in turn (§ 2267 BGB)) containing either entirely separate dispositions (‘selbständige Verfügungen’)   or ones which are mutually agreed between them (‘untereinander abgestimmt’) and which are interdependent (‘wechselbezüglich’), ie, both dispositions fail, if one of them is void or revoked: § 2270(i) BGB. Interdependent dispositions (‘wechselbezügliche Verfügungen’) are presumed to arise, if spouses appoint each other as heir or make dispositions in favour of (dose) third parties, which are conditional on the other spouse’s survival: § 2270(ii) BGB. Thus, for example, spouses can leave their respective estates to each other, with the proviso that, after the death of the survivor, the relevant estate should pass to a third person (the final heir (‘Schlußerbe’)) eg, a child. In such a case (a so-called ‘Berliner Testament’  (Berlin will)), it can be difficult to tell whether the estate should pass to the third person separately (‘getrennt’) from the survivor’s own estate or together with it, ie, as a unit (‘als Einheit’). Accordingly, it is a rule of interpretation that, if there is any doubt, the third party is presumed to be the heir of the last deceased spouse and entitled to the whole estate of both spouses: § 2269 BGB.304 The importance of interdependent dispositions is that they are only freely revocable (‘frei widerruflich’) during the lifetime of both spouses: § 2271(i) BGB. Once the first spouse dies, they are (usually) irrevocable and binding (‘bindend’) on the survivor: § 2271(ii) BGB.305 86

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(e) The estate contract (‘Erbvertrag’; §§ 1941, 2274–2302 BGB)306

Unlike a will, which is a unilateral transaction, an estate contract is a bilateral agreement  between the deceased and another person, by means of which either or both can make certain binding contractual dispositions (‘vertragmässige Verfügungen’), ie, appoint an heir, leave a legacy or make a direction: §§ 1941, 2278 BGB. It is important to realise that an estate contract is a special type of agreement under the law of succession, the essential feature of which is its binding effect (‘Bindungswirkung’). Apart from the abovementioned contractual dispositions, an estate contract can also contain unilateral dispositions (‘einseitige Verfügungen’; § 2299 BGB), but these are freely revocable. Moreover, an estate contract is frequently accompanied by separate, collateral obligations (‘Verpflichtungen’). An estate contract does not prevent the deceased from disposing of his estate in his lifetime as he pleases: § 2286 BGB. However, any prior or subsequent testamentary disposition is invalidated by an estate contract, insofar as the right of the beneficiary under the estate contract would thereby be impaired: § 2289 BGB. Moreover, a contractual heir (‘Vertragserbe’)  is protected, if the deceased makes a gift (‘Schenkung’) during his or her lifetime with the intention of impairing the heir’s position (‘Beeinträchtigungsabsicht’). The heir can demand return of the gift on the grounds of  unjust enrichment within three years of the death: § 2287 BGB. Similarly, if the object of a contractual legacy is intentionally destroyed, fraudulently removed or damaged (‘zerstört, beiseite geschafft oder beschädigt’)  by the deceased, the contractual legatee can demand its value: § 2288(i) BGB.307 An estate contract must be notarially documented in the presence of both parties: § 2276(i) BGB. 4 The Estate (‘Erbschaft’/‘Nachlaß’) and the Heir(s)

(a) Universal succession (§ 1922 BGB)

The German law of succession proceeds on the basis that on the death of a person (‘Erbfall’) that person’s assets (‘Vermögen’) pass as a whole (‘ungeteilt’) to one or more heirs (‘Erben’)— the principle of universal succession (‘Gesamtrechtsnachfolge’; § 1922 BGB). The estate devolves on the heir(s) directly by operation of law (‘ipso iure’), regardless of the knowledge or wishes of the heir(s) (‘Anfall der Erbschaft’; § 1942(i) BGB). Thus, single items cannot be separated out of the estate with effect ‘in rem’ (‘dingliche Wirkung’). In particular, a legacy (‘Vermächtnis’) or a direction for division of the estate (‘Teilungsanordnung’;  § 2048 BGB) creates no proprietary rights, but merely gives rise to a statutory obligation (‘gesetzliches Schuldverhältnis’),  ie, a claim (‘Anspruch’ /  ‘Forderung’) against the heir(s).308 (b) The community of heirs (‘Erbengemeinschaft’; §§ 2032–2063 BGB)309

(i) A deceased’s estate often passes not to a sole heir (‘Alleinerbe’), but to several persons. Legally, these persons comprise a joint community (‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’), 87

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although, unlike a civil law company (‘BGB-Gesellschaft’), their relationship does not arise by agreement.310 The estate constitutes a separate, special mass (‘Sondervermögen’) belonging to the community. Each heir can dispose of his or her share (‘Anteil’) in the (joint) estate,  but not of his or her share of individual assets: § 2033 BGB. A disposition (‘Verfügung’) of particular assets (‘Nachlaßgegenstände’) always requires the prior approval (‘Einwilligung’)  or subsequent consent (‘Genehmigung’)   of all heirs: § 2040(i) BGB.311 (ii) The relationship between the joint heirs (‘Miterben’) ends on break-up of the estate (‘Auseinandersetzung’), ie, settlement of all debts (‘Nachlaßverbindlichkeiten’) and division of any balance (‘Verteilung des Überschusses’) among them (§§ 2042, 2046, 2047 BGB). Until then, administration of the estate (‘Verwaltung des Nachlasses’)  is the heirs’  joint responsibility. Normally, their cooperation (‘Mitwirkung’) must be unanimous (‘einstimmig’). However, emergency steps directed to preservation of the estate (‘Erhaltung des Nachlasses’)   can be taken by any heir acting alone (so-called ‘Notverwaltung’)  and measures of proper administration (‘ordnungsgemässe Verwaltung’) can be decided upon by a majority, provided no significant change (‘wesentliche Veränderung’) in the estate is made (§§ 2038, 745 BGB).312 In principle, each heir can demand break-up of the estate at any time: § 2042(i) BGB. However, there are exceptions, eg, the testator can direct that break-up be excluded for up to 30 years (§ 2044 BGB) and exclusion can be (expressly or impliedly) agreed upon between the heirs.313 The deceased can direct the mode of break-up: § 2048 BGB. (iii) If children of the deceased, who are statutory heirs, receive an endowment (‘Ausstattung’) from the deceased during the latter’s lifetime, they have a duty to  bring it into account amongst themselves (‘Ausgleichungspflicht’) on break-up of the estate, unless the deceased directed otherwise at the time of the grant: § 2050 BGB. Such a duty also arises, if a child made a special contribution (‘besonderer Beitrag’) to the preservation or increase of the deceased’s assets, eg, by way of financial support or by assistance in the deceased’s household, profession or business: § 2057a BGB. (iv) If an executor (‘Testamentsvollstrecker’)  is appointed, break-up and administration of the estate are undertaken by him: §§ 2204, 2205 BGB. (c) Appointment of an heir (‘Erbeinsetzung’; §§ 1937, 1941, 2087–2099 BGB)

§ 2087 BGB contains a general rule of interpretation to the effect that, if the deceased leaves all his assets (‘sein Vermögen’) or a part thereof (‘Bruchteil’) to a beneficiary, the disposition is presumed to be the appointment of an heir (‘Erbeinsetzung’), even if the  beneficiary is not referred to as ‘heir’.314 However, a testator is not forced to appoint an heir, nor to dispose of his whole estate. Insofar as he does not do so, the statutory rules of succession apply: § 2088 BGB.315 If a testator appoints several heirs, one of whom falls away (‘wegfällt’) before the testator’s death, his or her share does not lapse, but accrues to the others and is shared among them proportionately (the principle of ‘Anwachsung’ (accretion)): § 2094 BGB. 88

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‘Anwachsung’   is a general principle, which applies to all forms of  ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ (joint community) and, therefore, also in company law.316 (d) Appointment of a substitute heir (‘Ersatzerbe’; §§ 2096–2099 BGB)317 ‘Anwachsung’   can be avoided, if the testator appoints a substitute heir. The inheritance does not then pass to the heir, who was originally appointed (‘berufen’) and who, for some reason, is unable or unwilling to be heir, but to the substitute: § 2096 BGB. Appointment of a substitute heir is to be distinguished from rules of  interpretation taking effect in the event of doubt (‘im Zweifel’). Thus, where a testator leaves his estate to his ‘children’, there is a statutory presumption that if any child predeceases the making of the will, his or her issue take: § 2068 BGB. Similarly, if  any issue, who are appointed, fall away after the making of the will, their issue take: § 2069 BGB. (e) Appointment of a subsequent heir (‘Nacherbe’; §§ 2100–2146 BGB)318

(i) Instead of appointing a substitute heir, a testator can dispose of his estate in such a way that a person first becomes heir after someone else, at a particular time (‘Zeitpunkt’)  or on the occurrence of a particular event (‘Ereignis’). The estate passes to the heirs successively (‘nacheinander’), the later one being referred to as the subsequent heir (‘Nacherbe’): § 2100 BGB. If the relevant moment or event is not specified, it is presumed that the testator’s estate passes to the subsequent heir on the death of the prior heir (‘Vorerbe’): § 2106(i) BGB. If the testator fails to specify the prior or subsequent heir, their position is assumed  by his statutory heirs: §§ 2104–2105 BGB. Once the event of succession (‘Nacherbfall’) arises, the prior heir ceases to be heir and the estate passes (directly) to the subsequent heir: § 2139 BGB. Before then, the subsequent heir has a right of expectancy (‘Anwartschaftsrecht’), which is itself  capable of succession (‘vererblich’): § 2108(ii) BGB. However, the appointment of  a subsequent heir generally becomes ineffective 30 years after the testator’s death, if the event of succession does not occur beforehand: § 2109(i)BGB. (ii) The purpose of ‘Vor-’ and ‘Nacherbschaft’ is to keep an inheritance as far as possible intact for future generations. In this respect, the institution is similar to the English ‘settlement’. Thus, the prior heir’s own right to dispose of the items in the estate is subject to restrictions (§§ 2112, 2113–2115 BGB), although bona fide acquisition by a third party is possible: § 2113(iii) BGB. Moreover, the prior heir is obliged to hand over the estate to the subsequent heir in such a condition as accords with proper administration (‘ordnungsmäßige Verwaltung’): § 2130(i) BGB. However, this rule is significantly qualified: (a) the prior heir is only required to exercise the standard of care expected of him in his own affairs (‘diligentia quam in suis’): § 2131 BGB; and 89

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(b) the prior heir has no liability for ordinary wear and tear (‘gewöhnliche  Abnutzung’): § 2132 BGB. The prior heir can be released altogether from all restrictions and obligations, if the testator merely leaves ‘the rest’ of his estate to the subsequent heir (§ 2137(i) BGB) or if  the estate is left to the prior heir’s free disposal (‘zur freien Verfügung’; § 2137(ii) BGB). (f) Exclusion from succession Disinheritance (‘Enterbung’; § 1938 BGB);

A testator can disinherit a relative or spouse without reason at any time by will or by unilateral disposition in an estate contract. Disinheritance covers not only direct exclusion (‘Ausschliessung’),  but also the limitation of an heir to the compulsory portion or the appointment of another person as heir. Unworthiness (‘Erbunwürdigkeit’; §§ 2339–2345 BGB)319

Whether or not a person deserves to become heir or to receive a legacy or compulsory portion is usually irrelevant. However, certain forms of particularly reprehensible conduct (‘verwerfliches Verhalten’) on the part of an heir can justify challenging the devolution of the estate to that heir. The possible grounds are (§ 2339 BGB): 1 2 3 4

murder or attempted murder of the deceased or placing him in a condition, such that he was incapable of making or revoking a disposition before his death; illegally preventing the deceased from making or revoking a disposition; fraudulently deceiving or illegally threatening the deceased, causing him to make or revoke a disposition; or commission of an offence under §§ 267, 271 to 274 StGB, ie, forgery or false documentation of a disposition.

A declaration of un worthiness (‘Erbunwürdigerklärung’) can be sought by means of an action for challenge (‘Anfechtungsklage’) by anyone, who would benefit (even indirectly) if the unworthy person fell away: §§ 2340–2342 BGB. The effect of a successful challenge is that the devolution of the estate to the unworthy heir is retrospectively (‘rückwirkend’) nullified. The estate is dealt with as if the unworthy heir had not been alive at the death of the testator: § 2344 BGB. Challenge of a legatee or a person entitled to a compulsory portion is possible on the same grounds: § 2345 BGB. In such cases, however, a declaration of challenge (‘Anfechtungserklärung’) suffices. Waiver (‘Erbverzicht’; §§ 2346–2352 BGB)

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(g) Entitlement to a compulsory portion (‘Pflichtteil’; §§ 2303–2338 BGB)320

(i) The rationale underlying these provisions is that close dependants of the deceased (‘nahe Angehörige’)—ie, the deceased’s children, parents and spouse—should be entitled to share in the estate, even if they are excluded from inheritance in a disposition on death. By means of the instrument of the compulsory portion, the BGB tempers excessive testamentary freedom. The compulsory portion (‘Pflichtteil’) is not a minimum right of inheritance, but only a pecuniary claim (‘Anspruch’) against the heir(s), which arises on death: § 2317 BGB.321 The claim must be made within three years of (positive) knowledge of the death and the impairing disposition or, without such knowledge, within 30 years of the death: § 2332(i) BGB.322 (ii) The claim amounts to half in value of the statutory share, to which the claimant would have been entitled under the statutory rules: § 2303(i) BGB. The basis for calculating the compulsory portion is the value of the estate (‘Wert des Nachlasses’) at the time of death: § 2311(i) BGB. The person entitled to a compulsory portion can demand information (‘Auskunft’) regarding the estate from the heir(s): § 2314(i) BGB.323 The relevant person must be excluded from inheritance (ie, usually, disinherited). However, ‘exclusion’ does not have to be express, nor need it be complete.324 Thus, a person, who is appointed as heir, but who receives a share of the estate amounting to less than half of his or her statutory entitlement can claim the shortfall as a additional compulsory portion (‘Zusatzpflichtteil’): § 2305 BGB. Moreover, a legatee, who disclaims the legacy, can always claim a compulsory portion: § 2307(i) BGB.325 (iii) Where there is a surviving spouse, who lived with the deceased under the statutory property regime of ‘Zugewinngemeinschaft’ (community based on gain), § 1371 BGB has to be taken into account in the calculation (‘Berechnung’) of the compulsory portion.326 Thus, if the spouse is disinherited or disclaims the estate, the spouse’s compulsory portion is based on her non-increased statutory share (§§ 1931(i), 1371(ii), (iii) BGB)—the so-called ‘small’ compulsory portion (‘kleiner Pflichtteil’). However, if  the spouse becomes heir, the basis for calculation of the spouse’s (additional) compulsory portion is the increased statutory entitlement (§ 1371(i) BGB)—the so-called ‘large’ compulsory portion (‘grosser Pflichtteil’).327 The increased statutory entitlement is also the basis for computation, if there are other persons, apart from the spouse, who wish to claim a compulsory portion (eg, children). (iv) The purpose of the compulsory portion would be thwarted, if the deceased could deplete his estate by grants (‘Zuwendungen’) or gifts (‘Schenkungen’) during his lifetime. Thus, where there is an ‘Ausgleichungspflicht’ between children of the deceased (§ 2050, § 2057a BGB), this must be taken into account when calculating the value of  their statutory shares for the purpose of the compulsory portion: § 2316 BGB.328 91

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Moreover, a claim to supplement the compulsory portion can be made (‘Pflichtteilergänzungsanspruch’), if, within ten years before death, the deceased made a gift (‘Schenkung’) to a third party: § 2325 BGB. Gifts received by the claimant also have to be brought into account § 2327 BGB. However, these provisions do not apply, if the relevant gift was made in accordance with a moral duty (‘sittliche Pflicht’) or in consideration of decency (‘Anstand’): § 2330 BGB.329 (v) Withdrawal of the compulsory portion (‘Entziehung des Pflichtteils’) is only possible on special grounds (§§ 2333–2335 BGB). It must be effected by will, stating the ground for withdrawal (§ 2336 BGB). The testator can forgive the claimant, in which case the right of withdrawal ceases (§ 2337 BGB).330 (h) Legacies and directions (‘Vermächtnis’/‘Auflage’; §§ 1939–2940, 2147–2196 BGB)331

(i) By means of a legacy, a testator can bestow a pecuniary advantage(‘Vermögensvorteil’) on someone (e.g. a sum of money or a particular item), without appointing that person as heir: § 1939 BGB. The grant of a legacy merely has obligational effect (‘verpflichtende Wirkung’), ie, unlike an heir, the legatee (‘Vermächtnisnehmer’)  obtains no proprietary right to the object of the legacy (‘der vermachte Gegenstand’), nor does it pass to him or her directly. The legatee merely acquires a claim (‘Anspruch’) to fulfillment of the legacy (eg, by transfer (‘Übertragung’) of the relevant item): § 2174 BGB. The claim arises on death (‘Anfall des Vermächtnisses’ ; § 2176 BGB) and the  beneficiary (‘der Bedachte’) must then be alive (§ 2160 BGB). The person liable to effect/perform the legacy is referred to as the person charged (‘der Beschwerte’), ie, usually the heir(s), unless the testator otherwise directs: § 2147 BGB. The testator can grant a legacy to an heir in addition to his or her share of the estate: § 2150 BGB (a so-called ‘Vorausvermächtnis’  (advance legacy)). Moreover, the testator can direct that a legacy take effect subject to a suspensive condition (‘aufschiebende Bedingung’) or at a particular time: § 2177 BGB. Such a legacy usually has a 30-year time limit: §2162 BGB. If the object of a legacy does not form part of the estate at death, the legacy is normally invalid (‘unwirksam’): § 2169(i) BGB. However, the person charged is required to obtain the item for the legatee, if it was intended that the legatee should receive it regardless of whether or not it belonged to the estate. Such a legacy is valid (a so-called ‘Verschaffungsvermächtnis’  (procurement legacy); § 2170 BGB). A legacy can be disclaimed by the legatee before acceptance (‘Annahme’; § 2180(i) BGB). (ii) Unlike a legacy, which gives the beneficiary a claim to performance(‘Leistung’), a direction (‘Auflage”) bestows no rights, whilst placing a legal obligation on the person charged: § 1940 BGB. Enforcement is possible: § 2194 BGB. (i) Appointment of an executor (‘Testamentsvollstrecker’; §§ 2197–2228 BGB) 92

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5

Procedural Aspects

(a) Acceptance (‘Annahme’) and disclaimer (‘Ausschlagung’; §§ 1942–1966 BGB)

(i) Despite the automatic devolution of the estate (‘Anfall der Erbschaft’) on the heir(s), the heir(s) retain(s) the right to disclaim the inheritance: § 1942(i) BGB. The right of disclaimer must be exercised within six weeks from the time the heir(s) learn of the death and their status as heir(s) (‘Erbenstellung’): § 1944(i), (ii) BGB. The period for disclaimer (‘Ausschlagungsfrist’) is extended to six months, if the deceased had his or her last domicile (‘Wohnsitz’) abroad or if the heir(s) were abroad at the start of the period: § 1944(iii) BGB. In the meantime, there is a period of suspense (‘Schwebezustand’). Any interim (obligational) transactions concerning the estate (‘erbschaftliche Geschäfte’) undertaken by the provisional heir (‘vorläufiger Erbe’) before disclaimer are treated (internally) as being carried out by him without instructions as a ‘Geschäftsführer ohne Auftrag’:  § 1959(i) BGB.332   Externally, he is liable with his own assets (‘Eigenvermögen’), unless he dearly contracted on behalf of the estate. Dispositions of items belonging to the estate (‘Verfügungen über Nachlaßgegenstände’)  before disclaimer are nullified on disclaimer, unless they were urgent(‘dringlich’): § 1959(ii) BGB. However, ‘bona fide’ acquisition is possible (§ 932 BGB).333 In the event of disclaimer, devolution is retrospectively nullified: § 1953(i) BGB. The estate passes to the person(s), who would have been entitled on the death, had the disclaiming person not then been alive: § 1953(ii) BGB.334 (ii) No disclaimer is possible, if the inheritance is accepted or if the period for disclaimer is missed. In the latter situation (‘Versäumung der Ausschlagungsfrist’), the inheritance is deemed to be accepted: § 1943 BGB.335 Acceptance does not have to be express. It can be implied from conduct (‘konkludentes Verhalten’).336 Thus, if the provisional heir meddles in the estate, this can indicate that the heir wishes to accept the inheritance (‘gestio pro herede’).337 Acceptance is ineffective, if the heir is mistaken as to the reason for succession: §1949(i) BGB. Moreover, the challenge (‘Anfechtung’) of acceptance (or disclaimer) is possible. The successful challenge of an acceptance is deemed to be a disclaimer and vice versa: §1957(i) BGB. Unlike the challenge of a disposition on death, there are no special grounds for challenge (‘Anfechtungsgründe’) . The general provisions in §§ 119, 123 BGB apply.338 Generally, challenge must be effected within six weeks of knowledge of the ground for challenge (§ 1954(i), (ii) BGB) and not later than 30 years after acceptance or disclaimer (§ 1954(iv) BGB). The declaration of challenge must be made at the probate court (§ 1955 BGB).

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(b) Liability of the heir(s) for debts (‘Haftung für Nachlaßverbindlichkeiten’; §§ 1967–2017, 2058–2063 BGB)339

The liability of the heir(s) for debts of the estate—which include not only those of the deceased, but also the duty of the heir(s) to fulfil any compulsory portions, legacies and directions (§ 1967(ii) BGB)—is, in principle, unlimited (‘unbeschränkt’). Thus, it includes the heir’s personal assets (‘Eigenvermögen’). A means of ensuring that the liability of the heir(s) is limited to the assets of the estate and that, as far as possible, these remain available for the satisfaction of estate creditors (‘Befriedigung der Nacrdaßgläubiger’) is to apply to the probate court for an order of estate administration (‘Nachlaßverwaltung’):  § 1975 BGB. Estate administration is a particular form of estate guardianship (‘Nachlaßpflegschaft’).340 Application for estate administration can be made by the heir(s) or by an estate creditor. In the latter case, however, there must be reason to believe that the satisfaction of creditors is endangered by the conduct or commercial position of the heir(s) and the application must be made not more than two years after acceptance of the estate: § 1981(ii) BGB. The effects of estate administration are: 1 2

the assets of the estate and those of the heir(s) are separated retrospectively (‘rückwirkend’) to the date of death (‘Trennung der Vermögensmassen’); and the heir loses the right to administer and dispose of the estate (§ 1984(i) BGB).341 This right passes to an estate administrator (‘Nachlaßverwalter’), who is officially appointed by the probate court and who, like a guardian, is under the supervision (‘Aufsicht’) of the court (§ 1837(i) BGB).

The estate administrator must administer the estate and settle debts out of the estate: § 1985(i) BGB. If the estate is over-indebted (‘überschuldet’)—the estate need not be insolvent (‘zahlungsunfähig’)—application must be made to commence proceedings for estate  bankruptcy (‘Nachlaßkonkurs’):  § 1980(i) BGB. Estate administration then ends: § 1988(i) BGB. (c) Claims against third parties (§§ 2018–2031 BGB) (d) The certificate of inheritance (‘Erbschein’; §§ 2353–2370 BGB)

The ‘Erbschein’ is an official certificate (‘Zeugnis’) of the right of inheritance (‘Erbrecht’), which is issued to the heir(s) by the probate court (‘Nachlaßericht’)  on application (‘Antrag’). It shows the names of the deceased and the heir(s) and, if the heir(s) is/are only entitled to a share of the estate (‘Erbteil’), the size of that share: § 2353 BGB. The ‘Erbschein’ must also give details of any restrictions on the entitlement of  the heir(s) to dispose of the estate (‘Verfügungsbeschränkungen’), ie, the appointment of a subsequent heir (‘Nacherbe’) or an executor (‘Testamentsvollstrecker’):  §§ 2363, 2364 BGB.342

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The competent court for the issue (‘Erteilung’)  of an ‘Erbschein’  is the local ‘Amtsgericht’ (District Court) for the last domicile (‘Wohnsitz’) or residence (‘Aufenthalt’) of the deceased in Germany: § 73(i) FGG.343 An ‘Erbschein’   can only be issued once the facts have been established to the satisfaction of the court (‘Feststellung der Tatsachen’): § 2359 BGB. An ‘Erbschein’ is presumed to be correct (‘Vermutung der Richtigkeit’; § 2365 BGB). If  it transpires that the ‘Erbschein’  is incorrect, the probate court must withdraw it (‘Einziehung’). It is then automatically devoid of legal effect (‘kraftlos’): § 2361(i) BGB. Alternatively, the true heir can require an incorrect ‘Erbschein’ to be returned to the probate court: § 2362(i) BGB. In parallel with § 892 BGB, an ‘Erbschein’ also enjoys public credence (‘öffentlicher Glaube’). Thus, in favour of a third party, who acquires an item out of the estate or a right to, or release from, such a right from the heir, the content of the ‘Erbschein’ is deemed to be accurate, unless the acquiring person (positively) knows that it is incorrect or knows that the probate court has requested return of the ‘Erbschein’ on that ground: § 2366 BGB.344 (e) The probate court (‘Nachlaßgericht’)

Anyone holding a will, which is not in official custody (‘amtliche Verwahrung’), must deliver it to the probate court once he learns of the death of the testator: § 2259(i) BGB. The same applies to any authority, other than a court, holding a will in official custody: §2259(ii) BGB. The probate court is responsible for the setting of a date (‘Termin’) for the opening of a will in its possession (‘Eröffnung des Testament’): § 2260(i) BGB. It must keep a record (‘Niederschrift’) of the proceedings: § 2260(iii) BGB. Before acceptance or disclaimer of the inheritance by the heir(s) or if the heirs are unknown, the probate court must, if necessary, take appropriate steps to safeguard the estate (‘Sicherung des Nachlasses’): § 1960(i) BGB. In particular, it can appoint an estate guardian (‘Nachlaßpfleger’): § 1960(ii) BGB.345 If the proper heirs are not located within a reasonable period, the probate court must confirm that there are no heirs, apart from the State (‘Fiskus’): § 1964(i) BGB. There is then a presumption that the state is statutory heir: § 1964(ii) BGB.

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CHAPTER XI

XI PRIVATE LAW: BGB COMPANY LAW AND THE COMMERCIAL CODE (HGB) 1

A CONTEXT AND DEFINITIONS 1

The German Commercial Code (‘Handelsgesetzbuch’ or HGB) of 10.5.1897 came into force with the BGB on 1.1.1900. It contains the special law (‘Sonderrecht’) of a particular professional class(‘Berufsstand’), namely of the ‘Kaufmann’ (businessman; trader). A person can conduct his business (‘Gewerbe’)2 either alone (in which case, if he is a ‘Kaufmann’, as a so-called ‘Einzelkaufmann’ (sole trader)) or together with others as a ‘Gesellschaft’ (company). A ‘Gesellschaft’ can take one of the following main forms:3 – – – – –

a ‘Gesellschaft des bürgerlichen Rechts’  (GbR=‘BGB-Gesellschaft’:  civil law company or BGB-company, ie, partnership; §§ 705–740 BGB);4 an ‘offene Handelsgesellschaft’ (OHG: open trading company; §§ 105–160 HGB); a ‘Kommanditgesellschaft’ (KG: limited partnership; §§ 161–177a HGB); a ‘Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung’ (GmbH: company with limited liability); an ‘Aktiengesellschaft’ (AG: public limited company).

The last four are also known as ‘Handelsgesellschaften’ (commercial/trading companies), although only the OHG and KG are dealt with in the HGB (§§ 105–177). For the OHG and KG, the HGB builds on the primary provisions for the ‘BGBGesellschaft’ contained in §§ 705–740 BGB (§§ 105(ii) and 161(ii) HGB). Separate statutes govern the GmbH and AG (the GmbHG and AktG).5 2

At this point, it is important to draw attention to the fundamental difference between the terms ‘Gesellschaft’ (company, society) and ‘Gemeinschaft’ (community).6 The term ‘Gesellschaft’ is a concept of private law. It is a sub-category of the term ‘Gemeinschaft’,  which is a much less formal relationship. Thus, in the case of a ‘Gemeinschaft nach Bruchteilen’, every member can require that it be dissolved at any time: § 749(i) BGB.7 A ‘Gesellschaft’  is established by legal transaction (‘Rechtsgeschäft’)—ie, by agreement—for a specific purpose (‘Zweck’). A ‘Gemeinschaft’, on the other hand, can arise by statute (eg, §§ 947–948 BGB)—ie, independently of the intention of  the parties—and does not need to have a particular goal (eg, administration of an asset, married life (‘die eheliche Lebemgemeinschaft’)).8 Moreover, a ‘Gemeinschaft’ can exist in the form of a public corporation (‘Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts’).9 The term ‘Verband’  (association, federation) refers to any vehicle for the advancement of joint interests (‘zur Förderung gemeinsamer Interessen’). In its wide

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sense, it incorporates ‘Gesellschaft’, ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Verein’. It is a sub-term of  the less technical ‘umbrella’ term ‘Vereinigung’ (association, group).10 ‘Verbände’ properly so-called are to be found in private and public law. They cover not only representative bodies in trade and industry (eg, employers’ organisations and trade unions), but also political parties, consumer protection and environmental pressure groups and lobbyists (‘Interessenvertreter’). To be distinguished from a ‘Verband’  is a ‘Kammer’   (chamber), which is an organisation established under public law to represent a particular profession.11 3 The ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ (and the OHG and KG) is a so-called ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ (a joint community), the assets of which (‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’) are the joint property (‘Gesamthandseigentum’ /‘Gesamthandsvermögen’) of the members (‘Gesellschafter’) and can only be disposed of jointly (‘gemeinschaftlich’; §§ 718(i) and 719(i) BGB).12 Other ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaften’ are the ‘Gütergemeinschaft’  (community of property  between spouses) and the ‘Erbengemeinschaft’ (community between heirs).13 The ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ is (the exception and is) to be distinguished from the (principal) ‘Gemeinschaft nach Bruchteilen’ (a community by shares; §§ 741–758 BGB), where each ‘Teilhaber’ (shareholder) can dispose of his ‘Anteil’ ((ideal) share) in the asset(s) of the ‘Gemeinschaft’; the asset(s) as a whole can, however, only be disposed of jointly: § 747 BGB).14 The ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ is also to be strictly distinguished from the ‘juristische Person’ (artificial/juristic person) or ‘Körperschaft’ (corporate body), of which the ‘Verein’ (club (incorporated) association) is the prototype (§§ 21–79 BGB).15 Unlike the ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’, the ‘juristische Person’ or ‘Körperschaft’ – – – 4

is a ‘Rechtssubjekt’   and, once registered, ‘rechtsfähig’  (ie, has separate legal personality); acts through its ‘Organe’ (organs, eg, its ‘Vorstand’ (board of directors)) for whose damaging acts it is liable (§ 31 BGB); can be non-capitalised (‘Verein’)  or capitalised (a ‘Kapitalgesellschaft’  (stock corporation), eg, a GmbH or AG).16

As opposed to a ‘juristische Person’, the ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’, OHG and KG are also examples of a ‘Personengesellschaft’ (a personal company),17 which is characterised  by the personal liability (‘persönliche Haftung’) and personal direction/involvement (‘Selbstorganschaft’) of its ‘Gesellschafter’ /‘Mitglieder’ (members). In a ‘juristische Person’,  the executive organs and the members do not have to be identical (‘Drittorganschaft’ is permitted). An OHG is based on the unlimited liability (‘unbeschränkte Haftung’) of all its members (§ 105(i) HGB), while a KG has two types of member: the member(s) with unlimited liability (the ‘Komplementär(en)’) and the member(s) whose liability is limited to the amount of a particular investment (the ‘Kommanditist(en)’: § 161(i) HGB).18 In turn, a ‘Gesellschaft’ can itself be a member of another ‘Gesellschaft’. Thus, a ‘juristische Person’ (eg, a GmbH) can be a member of an OHG or the ‘Komplementär’ of a KG (so in the ‘GmbH & Co KG’).19 98

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5

All ‘Gesellschaften’ are based on a ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’ (company agreement), which, in the case of a ‘juristische Person’/‘Körperschaft’   is known as the ‘Satzung’ (memorandum/articles of association; § 25 BGB). The ‘Satzung’ of a ‘Verein’ must specify (inter alia) its name, purpose and ‘Sitz’ (seat/(registered) address): §§ 57–58 BGB. Unless the ‘Satzung’ otherwise stipulates, the ‘Sitz’ is the place from which the ‘Verein’ is administered: § 24 BGB.20 The ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’ /‘Satzung’   of a GmbH or AG must be notarially documented (§§ 2 GmbHG and 23(i) AktG)21 6 By § 54, 1st sentence BGB, an unincorporated (ie, unregistered) association (‘nichtrechtsfähiger Verein’)—eg, a political party, student organisation or trade union—is governed by the rules regarding a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ (civil law company/ partnership). Technically, an unincorporated association is a ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’.  Its assets  belong to its members jointly. Those who act in the name of a ‘nichtrechtsfähiger Verein’, whether authorised or not, are personally liable and, if more than one, as  joint debtors: § 54, 2nd sentence BGB.22 However, § 54 BGB is misleading. In practice, a ‘nichtrechtsfähiger Verein’ is treated like an incorporated association. Case-law has resulted in § 54 BGB being honoured less in the observance, than in the breach. Thus, a ‘nichtrechtsfähiger Verein’ can be represented by its ‘Vorstand’ (§ 26 BGB), for whose damaging acts it is liable (§ 31 BGB); a ‘nichtrechtsfähiger Verein’ can be entered in the Land Register; it can (sue and) be sued (§ 50(ii) ZPO); usually (ie, unless the association has commercial aims), the members of a ‘nichtrechtsfähiger Verein’ are not personally liable for its obligations and their liability is limited to the amount of the association’s assets (‘Vereinsvermögen’). 23 7 A special type of juristic person is the ‘rechtsfähige Stiftung’ (foundation with separate legal personality), to which assets (‘Vermögen’) are transferred by a donor (‘Stifler’) for a certain purpose (‘Zweck’). The establishment of a ‘Stiftung’ requires the approval of the ‘Land’, in which the ‘Stiftung is to have its seat: § 80 BGB. B DUTIES, MANAGEMENT (‘GESCHÄFTSFÜHRUNG’), REPRESENTATION (‘VERTRETUNG’) AND LIABILITY (‘HAFTUNG’) 24 1

Unless otherwise agreed, the members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ must make equal contributions (‘gleiche Beiträge’) to the promotion of the object of the company (‘Gesellschaftszweck’): § 706(i) BGB. Moreover, based on § 242 BGB, the members have an unwritten duty of loyalty (‘Treuepflicht’) to further the interests of the company (‘Gesellschaftsinteressen’) and, similarly, to desist from any actions which might conflict with or damage those interests. In their relationship towards each other (ie, internally) the extent of the duty of  care (‘Sorgfaltspflicht’) of the members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ is reduced by statute. The members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ are only expected to observe such a degree of  99

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2

3

care as they would exercise in their own affairs (‘diligentia quam in suis’): § 708 BGB. The test is subjective. § 708 BGB therefore protects against liability for slight negligence (‘leichte Fahrlässigkeit’), but does not release members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ from liability for gross negligence (‘grobe Fahrlässigkeit’): § 277 BGB. § 708 BGB is dispositive and can be derogated from by agreement. The members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’  are entitled to conduct the business of the company jointly (‘gemeinschaftlich’) . Each transaction normally requires the unanimous agreement of all members (‘Einstimmigkeitsprinzip’): § 709(i) BGB. However, the company agreement can provide for majority decisions (‘Mehrheitsprinzip’)   or for a transfer of management to one or more members (‘Einzelgeschäftsführung’): § 710 BGB. If management is so transferred, the relevant members also have the power to represent the ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ towards third parties (‘Vertretungsmacht’), unless the company agreement otherwise provides: § 714 BGB.25 The position in the case of an OHG is somewhat different: usual acts of management (‘gewöhnliche Handlungen’) can be undertaken by any member in the absence of an objection (‘Widerspruch’) from another: §§ 115(i), 116(i) HGB. Each member also has authority to bind the OHG externally, unless otherwise specified in the company agreement: § 125(i) HGB. If this authority is exceeded, §§ 177ff BGB apply. The members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ and an OHG are ‘Gesamthänder’, ie, they are personally liable as joint debtors (‘Gesamtschuldner’), if they assume contractual obligations on behalf of the company (§§ 427, 431 BGB). However, whilst the members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ are liable together because, technically, they each owe performance, the personal liability (‘persönliche Haftung’) of members of an OHG is treated by the HGB as being based on (accessory to) the primary obligation of the company: § 128 HGB. Legally, ‘Schuld’ and ‘Haftung’ are separated. In a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ or OHG, limitation of liability (‘Haftungsbeschränkung’) to particular assets is, theoretically, possible, ie, by express agreement with the other contracting party or by a restriction on the power of representation in the company agreement.26 C THE HGB IN DETAIL

1

Introduction

The HGB is divided into five Books: Book I (§§ 1–104):   ‘Handelsstand’ (classification/trading status)27 Book II (§§ 105–237):   ‘Handelsgesellschaften’ (non-capitalised commercial companies) Book III (§§ 238–339):   ‘Handelsbücher’ (bookkeeping) Book IV (§§ 343–460):   ‘Handelsgeschäfte’ (commercial transactions)28 Book V (§§ 476–905):   ‘Seehandel’ (sea trade)29 100

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2

Book I (§§ 1–104 HGB): ‘Handelsstand’ 

Book I is divided into eight Sections: 1:   ‘Kaufleute’ (businessmen; §§ 1–7). 2:   ‘Handelsregister’  (commercial / trade register; §§ 8–16). 3:   ‘Handelsfirma’ (trade firm; §§ 17–37). 4: (Repealed). 5:   ‘Prokura’ and ‘Handlungsvollmacht’ (procura and authority to trade; §§ 48–58). 6:   ‘Handlungsgehilfen’ and ‘Handlungslehrlinge’ (trading assistants and apprentices; §§ 59–83). 7:   ‘Handelsvertreter’ (commercial / mercantile agents; §§ 84–92c). 8:   ‘Handelsmakler’ ((trade) broker; §§ 93–104). (a) Section 1 (§§ 1–7 HGB)30

A person, who engages in one of the basic trading activities (‘Grundhandelsgewerben’) listed in § l(ii) HGB, is a so-called ‘Mußkaufmann’ (compulsory businessman), whether or not he is registered. Depending on the extent of his business activities, the ‘Mußkaufmann’  can be either a ‘Vollkaufmann’ or ‘Minderkaufmann’   (full or lesser  businessman). Various provisions of the HGB are inapplicable to the ‘Minderkaufmann’ (eg, firm registration, bookkeeping, grant of procura; § 4(i)). A trading company, whether or not capitalised, is a so-called ‘Formkaufmann’ (businessman by reason of its form; § 6 HGB). By § 2 HGB, a so-called ‘Sollkaufmann’ is a person, who does not fall within § l(ii),  but the type and extent of whose activities require a properly organised business(‘dessen Unternehmen nach Art und Umfang einen kaufmännisch eingerichteten Geschäftsbetrieb erfordert’),  eg, a builder or hotelier). A ‘Sollkaufmann’  becomes a ‘Kaufmann’ by registration, which he is obliged to procure.31 (b) Sections 2 and 3 (§§ 8–37 HGB)32

The name under which a ‘Vollkaufmann’  engages in commercial activities is known as the ‘Firma’ (firm) and must be registered in the ‘Handelsregister’ (commercial/trade register), which is kept at the ‘Amtsgericht’ (district court) (§§ 8, 17 and 29 HGB). (c) Section 5 (§§ 48–58 HGB33

The non-independent representatives and assistants (‘unselbstständige Vertreter und  Hilfspersonen’) of a ‘Kaufmann’ are dealt with in §§ 48–83 HGB. The widest power of representation (‘Vertretungsmacht’)  that can be granted by a ‘Vollkaufmann’ is the ‘Prokura’, which enables the procurist effectively to undertake any transactions, which a (not the!) trading activity (‘Handelsgewerbe’) involves.34 The grant of procura (‘Erteilung der Prokura’)  must be registered and is unlimited (‘unbeschränkt’) as far as third parties are concerned (§§ 49(i), 50(i) and 53(i) HGB).35 101

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A ‘Kaufmann’ can, instead, grant a so-called ‘Handlungsvollmacht’ (trading power of  attorney), which is presumed to be limited to those transactions, which are usual (‘gewöhnlich’) for that type of ‘Handelsgewerbe’ (§ 54 HGB). Whereas the extent of a procura is mandatory (‘zwingend’), restrictions having no effect on third parties, (internal) limits on a ‘Handlungsvollmacht’ are possible and only  bind a third party, if he knew or ought to have known of them: § 54(iii) HGB.36 Similarly, a third party is protected when dealing with an employee in a shop or store. The employee is deemed authorised to undertake such sales and receipts as are usual in such a place: § 56 HGB. A ‘Scheinvollmacht’ (apparent authority) is treated as existing, based on the position (‘Stellung’) of the employee. The principal is liable for the ‘Rechtsschein’ (legal appearance) which has been created.37 (d) Section 6 (§§ 59–83 HGB) 38

The staff (‘Personal’) of a ‘Kaufmann’ are his ‘Handlungsgehilfen’ (trading assistants), commonly referred to as ‘kaufmännische Angestellte’ (commercial employees; § 59 HGB). An ‘Auszubildender’ is a trainee. Competition by employees during and after employment

(i) § 60(i) HGB lays down a statutory prohibition of competition (‘gesetzliches Wettbewerbsverbot’) by a ‘Handlungsgehilfe’ (trading assistant) during the period of  employment. Without the principal’s consent, such a person cannot engage in any (other) trading activity or do business in the same branch of trade (‘Handelszweig’) as that of the principal. In the event of breach, § 61 (i) HGB gives the employer (principal) two remedies: – –

the employer can claim damages; or the employer can instead demand that any transaction(s) undertaken by the employee for the employee’s own account be treated as entered into for the account of the principal or that any fees earned by the employee in transactions for third parties be handed over or assigned to the employer.

The employer’s claims under § 61(i) HGB become statute-barred three months after the employer becomes aware of the relevant transaction, otherwise (ie, in the absence of knowledge on the part of the employer) five years after conclusion of the transaction: § 61(ii) HGB. (ii) Clauses restraining competition by commercial employees after the end of their employment (restrictive covenants) were originally freely negotiable. The forerunner of the HGB, the ‘Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch’  (ADHGB; General German Commercial Code), which was gradually implemented throughout Germany after 1861, contained no provisions in this respect. The current rules in the HGB concerning contractual prohibitions against competition by former commercial employees ( ‘Wettbewerbsverbote’/  ‘Konkurrenzktauseln’; §§ 74ff HGB) were originally inserted into the HGB in 1897 102

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and were subsequently amended in 1914. They have since been extended by analogy to all employees. The rules are, in essence, protective norms (‘Schutznormen’), which significantly limit the possibility of oppressive clauses (‘drückende Klauseln’) in the interest of  the freedom of the employee.  Thus, a post-contractual prohibition (‘nachvertragliches Wettbewerbsverbot’)  is only valid and binding, if: – – – – – –

the prohibition is in writing; the prohibition is contained in a document signed by the employer and handed to the employee; the prohibition serves a justified business interest of the employer(‘berechtigtes  geschäftliches Interesse’); the employer agrees to pay compensation to the employee for the duration of  the prohibition (‘Karenzentschädigung’) of an amount of not less than half of  the employee’s last earnings; taking into account the compensation agreed to be paid, the length, geographical extent or object of the prohibition does not unduly hamper the employee’s prospects of advancement; the prohibition does not last for more than two years after the end of the employment;

(§§ 74, 74a(i) HGB). If the employee’s earnings are variable, the amount of compensation has to be assessed according to the average remuneration during the last three years or for such (shorter) period as the contractual remuneration clause applied (§ 74b(ii) HGB). Once the prohibition takes effect and compensation is due, sums which the employee earns elsewhere (or which in bad faith he fails to earn) can be set off against the compensation payable so far as the other earnings, together with the compensation, exceed the last contractual earnings by more than 10% or, if the employee was forced to move home due to the prohibition, by more than 25% (§ 74c (i) HGB). By § 75 HGB, a restrictive covenant loses its effect if: – –

the employee terminates his employment due to the employer’s conduct and within one month of termination states in writing that he does not consider himself bound by the prohibition; or the employer terminates the employment, unless the person of the employee provides significant grounds (‘erheblicher Anlaß’) to do so or unless the employer agrees to continue to pay the employee’s last full salary for the duration of the prohibition.

Moreover, before termination of the employment, an employer can declare in writing that he (unilaterally) waives his rights under the restrictive covenant, in which case the employer is released from his obligation to pay compensation after the expiry of a year from the declaration: § 75a HGB. The employee, on the other hand, is immediately free, but remains bound by the statutory prohibition against competition during the remaining period of employment. 103

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(e) Sections 7 and 8 (§§ 84–104 HGB)39

The ‘Handelsvertreter’  (commercial / mercantile agent) is an independent (ie, selfemployed) ‘Hilfsperson’ of a ‘Kaufmann’.40 As opposed to the ‘Handelsmakler’  (a broker (§ 93 HGB) eg, insurance- or stockbroker),41 the ‘Handelsvertreter’ is constantly (‘ständig’) engaged in the referral (‘Vermittlung’)  or conclusion (‘Abschluß’) of business to or for another entrepreneur (‘Unternehmer’): § 84(i) HGB. The ‘Handelsvertreter’  acts as agent for his principal (‘Geschäftsherr’), unlike the commissioneer (‘Kommissionär’: § 383 HGB), who acts in his own name (‘im eigenen Namen’).42 A ‘Handelsvertreter’ or ‘Kommissionär’ receives commission (‘Provision’; §§ 87 and 396 HGB). A ‘Handelsmakler’ receives a fee (‘Maklerlohn’ / ‘Courtage’). The ‘Handelsvertreter’, ‘Handelsmakler’  and ‘Kommissionär’ are all ‘Kaufleute’ (§ 1(ii) Nos 6 and 7 HGB).43 3

Book II (§§ 105–237 HGB): ‘Handelsgesellschaften’ 

(a) Content

Book II is divided into three Sections: 1 ‘Offene Handelsgesellschaft’ (open trading company; §§ 105–160).44 2   ‘Kommanditgesellschaft’ (limited partnership; §§ 161–177a).45 3 ‘Stille Gesellschaft’ (silent partnership; §§ 230–237).46 (b) Section 1 (§§ 105–160 HGB) 47 Section 1 contains 6 Titles:

1 2 3 4 5 6

‘Errichtung der Gesellschaft’ (formation of the company; §§ 105–108). ‘Rechtsverhältnis der Gesellschafter untereinander’ (legal relationship of the members amongst each other; §§ 109–122). ‘Rechtsverhältnis der Gesellschafter zu Dritten’ (legal relationship of the members towards third parties; §§ 123–130b). ‘Auflösung der Gesellschaft und Ausscheiden von Gesellschaftern’  (termination (dissolution) of the company and departure of members; §§ 131–144). ‘Liquidation der Gesellschaft’ (liquidation of the company; §§ 145–158).   ‘Verjährung’ (limitation period; §§ 159–160).

(i) Title 1 (§§ 105–108 HGB)

§ 105(i) defines the OHG as a company whose purpose (‘Zweck’) is directed to the engagement in (‘Betrieb’) a trading activity (‘Handelsgewerbe’) under a joint firm (name; ‘Firma’), the liability of its members towards company creditors being unlimited (‘unbeschränkt’). The OHG is the trading version of the ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ (civil law company/partnership); thus, unless stated to the contrary in Section 1, the provisions

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of the BGB regarding the ‘Gesellschaft’  (§§ 705–740 BGB) additionally apply to the OHG (§ 105(ii)). By § 106(i) a notification (‘Anmeldung’) to register an OHG must be made to the (district) court (‘Amtsgericht’) for the area in which it has its registered address (‘Sitz’). Any change in its ‘Firma’ (firm name), ‘Sitz’ or the entry of a new member into the company must also be notified (§ 107).48 (ii) Title 2 (§§ 109–122 HGB) § 109 HGB contains the basic rule that, in the first instance (‘zunächst’), the (internal) legal relationship of the ‘Gesellschafter’ (members) of an OHG amongst each other is governed by the ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’ (company agreement) and that §§ 110–122 only apply in so far as the ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’ does not otherwise provide. The company agreement, therefore, has priority (‘Vorrang’). §§ 110–122 contain provisions dealing with: –

compensation for expenditure and losses incurred by a member (‘Ersatz für  Aufwendungen und Verluste’; §§ 110–111); – restraint of competition by a member (‘Wettbewerbsverbot’; §§ 112–113); – the members’ right of management (‘Geschäftsführungsbefugnis’),  its extent (‘Umfang’) and withdrawal (‘Entziehung’) by the court (§§ 114–117). By § 115(i), a member is entitled to act alone, a veto from another member only having internal effect.49 The company agreement can require the members to act together and with mutual consent, but not in a case of urgency (‘Gefahr im Verzug’; § 115(ii)). § 116 provides that, unlike the members’ very extensive external power to represent the OHG (‘Vertretungsmacht’; laid down in § 126), their ‘Geschäftsführungsbefugnis’ only entitles them to engage in usual trading activities (‘Handlungen, die der gewöhnliche Betrieb des Handelsgewerbes der Gesellschaft mit sich bringt’) . Anything beyond that requires a resolution (‘Beschluß’) of all members (§ 116(ii)): – the members’ right of control (‘Kontrollrecht’; § 118); – the passing of resolutions (‘Beschlüsse’; § 119). No particular form is required and majority resolutions can be permitted by the company agreement; – the establishment and division of profit and loss (‘Gewinn und Verlust’; §§ 120–122). (iii) Title 3 (§§ 123–130b HGB) The HGB sharply divides the legal relationship between the members of an OHG internally (‘nach innen’; §§ 109–122) from their relationship to third parties (externally (‘nach außen’; §§ 123–130b). For the protection (‘Schutz’) of its business partners, §§ 123–130b contain essentially compulsory provisions dealing with: – –

the time of effective creation of the OHG (‘Wirksamkeit’; § 123); the legal status of the OHG and enforcement against its property (§ 124);

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– – –

the members’ power to represent the OHG (‘Vertretungsmacht’;  §§ 125–125a), its extent (‘Umfang’; § 126) and its withdrawal by the court (‘Entziehung’; § 127); the personal liability (‘persönliche Haftung’) of the members of the OHG towards creditors (§§ 128–129a) and the liability of new members following entry (‘Eintritt’; § 130); the duty to apply for the opening of bankruptcy or composition proceedings in the event of the insolvency of an OHG having no human members (§§ 130a-130b).

Towards third parties, the OHG becomes effective (‘wirksam’) from the moment of  registration in the ‘Handelsregister’ or from the time it commences business, if this takes place before registration (§ 123(i) and (ii)). Like the ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ (civil law company), an OHG is not ‘rechtsfähig’, ie, it has no separate legal personality. Thus, creditors can only sue some or all of the members of an OHG, if they wish. However, an OHG is ‘parteifähig’, ie, it can also sue and be sued under its own (firm) name: § 124(i) HGB.50 Where a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ is involved, on the other hand, the members must all be sued, otherwise enforcement in the assets of the company (‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’) is not possible: § 736 ZPO.51 (iv) Title 4 (§§ 131–144 HGB) § 131 sets out various grounds for the termination (‘Auflösung’)  of an OHG, eg, commencement of insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings, death, notice (‘Kündigung’) or court decision (so-called ‘Auflösungsklage’: § 133). A member can only apply for termination by court decision, if an important reason exists (‘wenn ein wchtiger Grund vorliegt’), eg, if another member is guilty of a breach of  a fundamental obligation of his under the company agreement (whether deliberately or through his gross negligence) or if the performance of such an obligation becomes impossible (§ 133(i) and (ii)). Instead of applying to the court for termination of the OHG, the remaining members can apply to the court for the exclusion (‘Ausschließung’) of a member if an important reason, as laid down in § 133, exists (§ 140). The company agreement can itself provide for such exclusion in certain circumstances (so-called ‘Hinauskündigungsklausel’). The company agreement can provide for an OHG to be continued among the remaining members on departure (‘Ausscheiden’)   of a member (so-called ‘Fortsetzungsklausel’:  § 138) or with the heirs of a deceased member (so-called ‘Nachfolgeklausel’: § 139). A departing member is entitled to a pay-out (‘Abfindung’) on the same basis as is laid down in the BGB for the composition (‘Auseinandersetzung’)  between the members of a ‘BGB-Gesllschaft’.52 Within three months of knowledge of his inheritance, an heir has a right to request that the other members allow him to remain in the company as a limited partner (‘Kommanditist’) or to declare his departure (§ 139). The termination of an OHG and the departure of a member must be notified to the trade registry (§ 143).

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(v) Title 5 (§§ 145–158 HGB) Unless the members agree a different form of ‘Auseinandersetzung’  or insolvency proceedings are commenced, the liquidation (‘Liquidation’)   of an OHG follows its termination (‘Auflösung’; § 145(i)). The liquidation procedure is set out in §§ 146–155 HGB. After completion of the liquidation, the liquidators have to notify the extinction of the firm (‘Erlöschen der Firma’) to the trade registry (§ 157(i)). (vi) Title 6 (§§ 159–160 HGB) By § 159 HGB, claims against a former member for company obligations expire five years after the termination of the OHG or the departure of the member unless the claim against the company is subject to a shorter period of limitation. The five year period begins with the end of the day on which the termination or departure is registered in the trade register or, if later, from the time at which the claim against the company becomes due (‘fällig’). (c) Section 2 (§§ 161–177a HGB)53

Section 2 of Book II (§§ 161–177a HGB) deals with the ‘Kommanditgesellschaft’ (limited partnership). It contains – – –

– – – –

a definition of the KG and declaration that the OHG provisions of the HGB find supplementary application, except as otherwise provided in Section 2 (§ 161); a paragraph dealing with trade registry notification and publication of the entry (§ 162); certain special norms regarding the relationship of the members amongst each other (in particular the position of the ‘Kommanditist’ (limited partner)), which only apply in the absence of alternative provisions in the company agreement (§§ 163–169); a paragraph forbidding a ‘Kommanditist’ from representing the KG externally (§ 170); provisions dealing with the liability (‘Haftung’) of the ‘Kommanditist’ to creditors of the KG (§§ 171–176); a paragraph stating that the death of a ‘Kommanditist’  does not lead to the termination of a KG (§ 177); and a paragraph regarding obligations to provide details on business letters and the duty of application on insolvency (§ 177a). (d) Section 3 (§§ 230–237 HGB)

Section 3 deals with the ‘stille Gesellschaft’ (silent partnership; §§ 230–237). 4 Book III (§§ 238–339 HGB): ‘Handelsbücher’ 54

Book III is divided into three Sections: 1: ‘Vorschriften für alle Kaufleute’ (provisions for all businessmen; §§ 238–263). 2:   ‘Ergänzende Vorschriften für Kapitalgesellschaften (Aktiengesellschaften,

Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung)’ 107

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(supplementary provisions for capitalised companies (public companies, partnerships limited by shares and limited companies); §§ 264–335). 3: ‘Ergänzende Vorschriften für eingetragene Genossenschaften’ (supplementary provisions for registered cooperative societies; §§ 336–339). 5 Book IV (§§ 343–460 HGB): ‘Handelsgeschäfte’ 55

Book IV is divided into 7 Sections: 1

‘Allgemeine Vorschriften’ (general provisions; §§ 343–372).56 This Section contains the general provisions relating to ‘Handelsgeschäfte’. ‘Handelsgeschäfte’ are defined in § 343(i) HGB as all business belonging to the trading activity of a ‘Kaufmann’ (‘alle Geschäfte…die zum Betriebe seines Handelsgewerbe  gehören’). By § 344(i), in the event of doubt it is (rebuttably) presumed that a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ concluded by a ‘Kaufmann’  is a ‘Handelsgeschäft’.  Moreover, by § 344(ii), it is (irrebuttably) presumed that a ‘Handelsgeschäft’ is involved, if a ‘Kaufmann’ signs a ‘Schuldschein’ (IOU), unless indicated to the contrary in the ‘Schuldschein’.57 § 345 provides that the provisions on ‘Handelsgeschäfte’ in Book IV HGB also apply to transactions where only one party is a ‘Kaufmann’. However, there are various exceptions. Thus, in so-called ‘beiderseitigen Handelsgeschäften’ (ie, where each party is a ‘Kaufmann’): – account must be taken of commercial customs and usages (‘Handelsbräuche’): § 346; 58 – the statutory interest rate is 5% per annum: § 352(i);59 – interest on contractual claims can already be demanded from the due date of  payment (‘Fälligkeit’): § 353;60 – a ‘Kaufmann’ with a due contractual claim against another ‘Kaufmann’ has a right to retain and satisfy himself from movables or securities belonging to the other party in his possession: §§ 369–372.

The HGB also increases the protection of persons dealing with a ‘Kaufmann’, whatever their status: – by § 347(i), the duty of care (‘Sorgfaltspflicht’) of a ‘Kaufmann’ is stricter than in §276(i)BGB; – by § 348, a contractual penalty (‘Vertragsstrafe’)  promised by a ‘Kaufmann’ cannot be reduced;61 – by § 349, a ‘Kaufmann’, who gives a guarantee (‘Bürgschaft’), cannot require the creditor to sue the debtor first; – by § 350, a guarantee, acknowledgement of debt (‘Schuldanerkenntnis’) or promise (‘Schuldversprechen’)   given by a ‘Kaufmann’   does not require a particular form; – by § 366(i), where a ‘Kaufmann’ disposes of a movable not belonging to him, the other party can acquire ownership, if he (the other party) is in good faith 108

Chapter XI: Private Law: BGB Company Law and The Commercial Code (HGB)

regarding the ‘Kaufmann’s  entitlement to undertake the transaction (his ‘Verfügungsbefugnis’): he does not need to regard the ‘Kaufmann’ as the owner.62 2   ‘Handelskauf’ (trade purchase; §§ 373–382).63 3   ‘Kommissionsgeschäft’ (commissioneer business; §§ 383–406).64 4   ‘Speditionsgeschäft’ (forwarding agency business; §§ 407–415).65 5   ‘Lagergeschäft’ (storage business; §§ 416–424).66 6   ‘Frachtgeschäft’ (freight business; §§ 425–452).67 7 ‘Beförderung von Gütern und Personen auf den Eisenbahnen des öffentlichen Verkehrs’ (transport of goods and persons by public railways; §§ 453–460).68 Sections 2 to 7 deal with individual types of ‘Handelsgeschäfte’. §§ 373–382 HGB (which are dispositive!) amend the provisions of the BGB regarding sale of goods in the interests of clarity and speed of trade. Thus, for example, a trader, who purchases goods (‘Waren’)  from another trader, must examine them and notify any apparent faults (‘Mängel’)  without delay (‘unverzüglich’) after delivery, otherwise the goods are regarded as approved and the purchaser loses his guarantee rights (‘Gewährleistungsansprüche’;  §§ 377(i) and 377(ii)).69 Where, however, one of the parties is not a ‘Kaufmann’, the ordinary sale of goods law of the BGB applies and claims only become statute-barred after six months (§ 477 BGB).70 NOTE: Sections 4–7 have been amended and reorganised by the ‘Transportrechtsreformgesetz’  (TRG) dated 25.6.1998. Now, ‘Frachtgeschäft’ is dealt with as Section 4 (§§ 407–452d) ‘spe…’ follows as s 5 (§§ 453–466). Finally, ‘Lagergescaht’ is continued in Section 6 (§§ 467–475). The former s 7 has been deleted.

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CHAPTER XII

XII THE PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY (GMBH)

A INTRODUCTION Despite its name, a private limited company (GmbII), like a public limited company (AG), is technically not a ‘Gesellschaft’ (company) in the narrow sense of the Civil Code (§ 705ff BGB), but a special form of ‘Verein’ (association), ie, it is a juristic person (‘juristische Person’) or corporate body (‘Körperschaft’). Thus, in so far as there are gaps in the relevant statute (‘GmbH-Gesetz’  (GmbHG)) the provisions in the BGB concerning incorporated associations (‘rechtsfähige Vereine’) can be of supplementary application.1 B ESTABLISHMENT Before incorporation (ie, registration (‘Eintragung’)  in the commercial register (‘Handelsregister’) of its seat (‘Sitz’)), a GmbH does not exist: § 11(i) GmbHG. One distinguishes the following stages (‘Stufen’) in the establishment (‘Entstehung’  / ‘Gründung’) of a GmbH:2 1

2

Before the company agreement (‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’) is notarially documented (§ 2 GmbHG), the promoters (‘Gründer’) comprise a so-called ‘Vorgründungsgesellschaft’ (preformation company), ie, a civil law partnership (‘BGB-Gesellschaft’) or, if a trading activity is engaged in under a firm name, an open trading company (OHG). Towards third parties, the promoters are personally liable, as joint debtors (§ 427 BGB) without limitation, for all obligations of the ‘Vorgründungsgesellschaft’ . If a contract is concluded without authority on behalf of the ‘Vorgründungsgesellschaft’, the person acting is liable as an unauthorised agent (‘Vertreter ohne Vertretungsmacht’;  § 179 BGB).3 After notarial documentation of the company agreement (ie, formal creation (‘Errichtung’) of the GmbH), but before incorporation, the interim unit is referred to as a ‘Vorgesellschaft’  (preliminary company). It is a legal entity (‘Rechtsgebilde’) ‘sui generis’, governed by the same provisions as the future juristic person, in so far as they do not specifically require separate legal personality. A ‘Vorgesellschaft’  is represented by its director(s); it can enter into contracts and can acquire property (often the suffix ‘iG’ (‘in Gründung’; in formation) is used). However, legally, the assets of a ‘Vorgesellschaft’ (‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’) belong to the promoters jointly (‘gemeinschaftlich’). The ‘Vorgesellschaft’   constitutes a ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ (joint community).4 Thus, the promoters are personally liable as joint debtors up to the amount of  their respective contribution (‘Einlage’) for all obligations incurred in the name of  the ‘Vorgesellschaft’  (so-called ‘Gründerhaftung’ ). Moreover, anyone acting (as director) on behalf of the future company is personally liable: § 11(ii) GmbHG (socalled ‘Handelndenhaftung’).5 111

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3

On registration (‘Eintragung’)   of the GmbH, all assets and liabilities of the ‘Vorgesellschaft’  pass to the GmbH and all personal liability ceases, except to the extent that there is a difference between the basic capital (‘Stammkapital’)—  consisting of the relevant basic contribution(s) (‘Stammeinlage(n)’; § 5 GmbHG)— and the value of the company’s assets at the moment of incorporation. In such a case, the members (‘Gesellschafter’) are liable to the company for any shortfall (socalled ‘Differenzhaftung’); if there is a shortfall in the value of a contribution in kind (‘Sacheinlage’), it must be made up in money: § 9 GmbHG.6 C ‘STAMMKAPITAL’, ‘STAMMEINLAGE’  AND ‘GESCHÄFTSANTEIL’ 7

The basic capital8 of a GmbH is referred to as the ‘Stammkapital’. By § 5(i) GmbHG, the ‘Stammkapital’ must amount to at least 25,000 Euro.9 The ‘Stammkapital’   is divided into (ie, made up of) basic contributions (‘Stammeinlagen’) from the members. The ‘Stammeinlage’ of each member must amount to at least 100 Euro. ‘Stammeinlagen’ do not have to be equal, but they must be divisible  by 100 and their total must correspond to the total of the‘Stammkapital’: § 5(iii) GmbHG. The total amount of all ‘Stammeinlagen’ paid up (‘eingezahlt’) must amount to at least 12,500 Euro before a GmbH can be notified for registration: § 7(ii) GmbHG. A ‘Stammeinlage’ can be made in money (‘Bareinlage’) or can take the form of a contribution in kind (‘Sacheinlage’).10 The share (membership) of a person in the assets of a GmbH (‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’) is referred to as the ‘Geschäftsanteil’ (share in the business). Its size (not its value or price!) is determined by the relative amount of the relevant member’s ‘Stammeinlage’: § 14 GmbHG.11 In principle, a ‘Geschäftsanteil’   can be freely disposed of or can pass by way of  succession. Disposal (‘Veräußerung’) is effected (abstraction principle!) by an obligational transaction (ie, a contract of purchase/sale (‘Kaufvertrag’)) and a disposition/transfer (‘Verfügung’ /‘Übertragung’) by way of assignment (‘Abtretung’) . Both transactions have to be notarially documented: § 15(iii) and (iv) GmbHG. By the provisions of the company agreement, disposal of a ‘Geschäftsanteil’ can be made dependent on the approval of the company: § 15(v) GmbHG. Moreover, disposal of part of a ‘Geschäftsanteil’ is only possible with the company’s written approval: § 17(i) and (ii) GmbHG. It is a cardinal principle that the ‘Stammkapital’ must be preserved (‘Grundsatz der Kapitalerhaltung’). Thus, the assets of a GmbH cannot be paid out to the members, if  the ‘Stammkapital’ would thereby be diminished: § 30(i) GmbHG. D ORGANS12

(i) Although a personal company (‘Personengesellschaft’)   has no separate legal personality, a GmbH, once registered, is ‘rechtsfähig’, ie, it has the capacity to be an independent carrier of rights and obligations. A GmbH can acquire ownership and other real rights over land and can sue and be sued: § 13(i) GmbHG. 112

Chapter XII: The Private Limited Company (Gmbh)

However, like other juristic persons, a GmbH is not itself capable of entering into a legal transaction (‘Rechtsgeschäft’)—ie, it is not ‘geschäftsfähig’—nor is it even capable of acting (‘handlungsfähig’) alone. For this reason, a GmbH has two principal organs: the totality of i ts members (‘Gesamtheit der Gesellschafter’)   and one or more directors (‘Geschäftsführer’). The totality of the members constitutes the highest organ (‘oberstes Organ’)  of  a GmbH. (ii) The members are competent to decide on much of the most important business of a GmbH by way of resolutions (‘Beschlüsse’) in meetings (‘Versammlungen’). Their rights are governed principally by the terms of the company agreement(‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’). Subject thereto, the functions of the members are set out in § 46 GmbHG. In a GmbH, the majority (‘Mehrheit’) of the votes cast suffices for the passing of a resolution of the members (‘Gesellschafterbeschluss’) : § 47(i) GmbHG. This contrasts with the position in a personal company (eg, a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ or an OHG), where, in principle, unanimity (‘Einstimmigkeit’) is required, unless the company agreement otherwise provides: § 709(i) BGB, § 119(i) HGB. E DIRECTORS (‘GESCHÄFTSFÜHRER’) (i) Every GmbH must have one or more directors (‘Geschäftsführer’): § 6(i) GmbHG. Directors must be natural persons with full legal capacity: § 6(ii), 1st sentence GmbHG. They do not have to be members: § 6(iii) GmbHG. The directors are the statutory representatives (‘gesetzliche Vertreter’)  of the company (§35 GmbHG). (ii) Directors are appointed either in the company agreement(‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’) or by a resolution (‘Beschluss’) of the members (‘Gesellschafter’): § 6(iii), 2nd sentence GmbHG. Two specific restrictions on appointment of directors are contained in § 6(ii), 2nd and 3rd sentences GmbHG. Thus, a person, who has been convicted of certain  bankruptcy offences (‘Konkursstraftaten’), cannot act as a director of a GmbH for five years from the date the judgment becomes legally effective; nor can someone who is subject to a judicial or administrative decision prohibiting the exercise of a particular profession act as a director of a company engaged in the same business while the prohibition is in force. (iii) It is important to realise that the formal (company law) appointment(‘Bestellung’) of a director is to be kept strictly distinct from his or her (internal) contractual engagement (‘Anstellung’), which is governed by the norms of the BGB concerning contracts of service (‘Dienstverträge’; § 611ff BGB). Thus, while the appointment of a director is normally13 revocable (‘widerruflich’) at any time—one speaks of ‘Abberufung’ —termination (‘Kündigung’)  of the director’s underlying service contract (‘Anstellungsvertrag’) must be effected with notice (§ 622 BGB) or summarily for an important reason (§ 626 BGB). 113

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A director usually receives a fixed salary (‘Gehalt’) and a share of profit (‘Tantieme’)  by way of remuneration (‘Vergütung’),  but is not strictly an employee (‘Arbeitnehmer’) for the purposes of employment law.14 (iv) As in the case of other forms of company (‘Gesellschaft’), for a proper understanding of the position of a director of a GmbH one must distinguish the management of  the business of the company (‘Geschäftsführung’) from its representation towards third parties (‘Vertretung’), ie, the so-called ‘Innenverhältnis’ (internal relationship) and the ‘Aussenverhältnis’ (external relationship). In principle, both areas of activity fall within the competence of a director. When conducting the affairs of a GmbH, a ‘Geschäftsführer’ must—in so far as his relationship to the company itself and its members is concerned (ie, internally)— abide by the terms of the company agreement (‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’)  and his service contract and is subject to control by resolutions of the members: § 37(i) GmbHG. In particular, the members can give a ‘Geschäftsführer’   binding directions (‘Weisungen’). However, towards third parties (ie, externally), any legal transactions expressly or impliedly entered into by a ‘Geschäftsführer’ in the name of a GmbH bind the GmbH: § 36 GmbHG. Internal restrictions on a director’s power of representation have no legal effect: § 37(ii) GmbHG.15 In particular, the distinction between the internal and external relationship is relevant when the question of a director’s personal liability(‘Haftung’) arises. Thus, the bases for claims (‘Anspruchsgrundlagen’) can be different according to whether the claimant is the company, members or third parties.16 (v) After every change in the members of the company or in the extent of their shareholding, the directors must file a signed list of members (‘Gesellschafterliste’) at the commercial register, stating the current members’ full names, dates of birth, places of residence and contributions: § 40(i) GmbHG.17

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CHAPTER XIII

XIII CIVIL PROCEDURE

A THE ‘ZIVILPROZEßORDNUNG’  (ZPO) German civil procedure (‘Zivilprozeß’) is based on the ‘Zivilprozeßordnung’ (ZPO; Civil Procedure Order/Code of Civil Procedure) of 30.1.1877, as re-enacted on 12.9.1950 and variously amended since that date. The ZPO is divided into 10 Books: Book I ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften’ (general provisions; §§ 1–252). Book II ‘Verfahren im ersten Rechtszuge’ (first instance proceedings; §§ 253–510b). Book III   ‘Rechtsmittel’ (legal remedies / appeals; §§ 511–577). Book IV ‘Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens’  (resumption of proceedings; §§ 578–591). Book V ‘Urkunden- und Wechselprozeß’ (procedure in the case of documents and  bills of exchange; §§ 592–605a). Book VI ‘Familien-, Kindschaft- und Unterhaltssachen’  (family, children and maintenance matters; §§ 606–644).1 Book VII   ‘Mahnverfahren’ (default notice procedure; §§ 688–703d). Book VIII   ‘Zwangsvollstreckung’ (enforcement; §§ 704–945). Book IX   ‘Aufgebotsverfahren’ (claims notification procedure; §§ 946–1024). Book X ‘Schiedsrichterliches Verfahren’  (arbitration proceedings; §§ 1025–1048). B THE MAXIMS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE2 Civil procedure is governed by certain basic principles or maxims (‘Grundsätze’): 1 2

‘Grundrecht des rechtlichen Gehörs’ (the basic right to be heard). The parties are entitled under the Basic Law to be given an opportunity to be heard in the proceedings (Article 103(i) GG).3 ‘Verhandlungsgrundsatz’ (‘Beibringungsgrundsatz’). It is for the parties to proceedings to introduce facts (‘Tatsachen’)  and applications (‘Anträge’).  The opposite of this principle is the so-called ‘Untersuchungsgrundsatz’ or ‘Inquisitionsprinzip’ (examination maxim or inquisition principle), which applies, for example, in criminal and administrative proceedings.4 The ‘Verhandlungsgrundsatz’  is restricted by:

(a) § 138 ZPO: the parties’ factual statements must be complete (‘vollständig’) and truthful (‘wahrheitsgemäß’);5 (b) § 139 ZPO: the judicial duty to clarify and ask questions (‘die richterliche  Aufklärungs- und Fragepflicht’).6

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3   ‘Dispositionsgrundsatz’ ( ‘Verfügungsgrundsatz’;  disposition principle). The proceedings are at the disposition of the parties; they can settle or acknowledge claims, make or withdraw applications. The opposite of this principle is the ‘Offizialmaxime’ (official principle), which dominates in criminal procedure.7 4   ‘Mündlichkeitsgrundsatz’ (oral principle). The ‘Verhandlung’ (hearing) must be oral. However, by §§ 128(ii) and 128(iii) ZPO, written proceedings are possible in certain cases, eg, if both parties agree. 5 ‘Unmittelbarkeit und Öffentlichkeit’ (directness and publicity). Only those judges, who are present at the oral hearing, can pass judgment (§ 309 ZPO). With certain exceptions, the hearing must take place in public (§ 169 ‘Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz’ (GVG): Constitution of the Courts Law).8 6 ‘Beschleunigung und Konzentration des Verfahrens’ (acceleration and concentration of the proceedings). The dispute must usually be dealt with in one comprehensively prepared hearing (‘in einem umfassend vorbereiteten Termin’),   the so-called ‘Haupttermin’ (main hearing), which must take place as early as possible (§§ 272(i) and 272(iii)). 7 ‘Freie Beweiswürdigung’ (free assessment of evidence). The court must decide as to the truth or otherwise of the facts presented to it according to its own free conviction (‘nach freier Überzeugung’) and only those rules of evidence (‘Beweisregeln’) laid down by statute bind it (§§ 286(i) and 286(ii)). To convince the court, absolute certainty is not required (‘absolute Gewissheit ist nicht erforderlich’); it suffices to establish that the fact in question is almost certainly true (ie, virtual certainty (‘eine an Sicherheit grenzende Wahrscheinlichkeit’)) or is beyond reasonable doubt (‘jenseits vernünftigen Zweifels’), ie, that it possesses such a degree of probability as to silence reasonable doubts (‘einen so hohen Grad von Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß vernünftige Zweifel schweigen’).9 In civil proceedings, the burden of allegation (‘Behauptungslast’ /‘Darlegungslast’) and the burden of proof (‘Beweislast’) are of pivotal importance.10 C POINTS TO NOTE One should be aware of the following: A There is a basic distinction between the so-called ‘Erkenntnisverfahren’ (judgment proceedings), in which the court reaches its decision (‘Entscheidung’)—usually an ‘(End-)Urteil’  ((final) judgment; § 300 ZPO)—and the ‘Vollstreckungsverfahren’ (enforcement proceedings; dealt with in Book VIII), in which enforcement (‘Zwangsvollstreckung’) takes place.11 B Judgment proceedings are the subject of Books II to IV of the ZPO, while special types of proceedings (‘besondere Prozeßarten’) are dealt with in Books V-VII, IX and X. C While the issue of proceedings (‘Klageerhebung’) and the lodging of any appeal (‘Rechtsmitteleinlegung’) are in the hands of the parties (‘Parteibetrieb’), the court is responsible for the progress of the case (‘Fortschritt des Verfahrens’) and the conduct of the proceedings (‘Prozeßleitung’): so-called ‘Amtsbetrieb’.12 116

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D E

F

G

H

I

Thus, service of pleadings and court decisions is normally a matter for the court to carry out of its own motion (‘von Amts wegen’; § 270 ZPO). However, service can also be effected between lawyers direct, unless, at the same time, the party  being served has to be notified of a direction from the court: § 198(i) ZPO.13 A court can decide not only by means of an ‘Urteil’, but also in the form of a ‘Beschluß’ (order) or ‘Verfügung’  (direction). These are normally for decisions during the proceedings. The form of appeal against a ‘Beschluß’ is the ‘Beschwerde’ (complaint).14 After conclusion of the oral hearing, the ‘Urteil’ is pronounced (‘verkündet’; § 310 ZPO). The court is then bound by its decision (§ 318), which becomes ‘formell rechtskräftig’ when it can no longer be challenged (‘angefochten’) by a ‘Rechtsmittel’ (legal remedy/appeal). The ‘formelle Rechtskraft’  of an ‘Urteil’ is a condition of its so-called ‘materielle Rechtskraft’, whereby the inner content of the decision on the claim becomes binding on the parties and the court: ‘res judicata’. The matter in dispute (‘Streitgegenstand’) or procedural claim (‘prozessualer Anspruch’) cannot be decided upon again (§ 322(i) ZPO).15 Despite the fundamental oral principle (§ 128(i) ZPO), an oral hearing (‘mündliche Verhandlung’) is not always necessary to deal with a particular matter (eg, for a ‘Beschluß’). An oral hearing is then at the discretion of the court (‘freigestellt’)16 If an oral hearing is necessary to deal with a particular matter, the court must, of  its own motion (‘von Amts wegen’), set a hearing date (‘Termin’; § 216 ZPO) and issue a summons to attend (‘Ladung’; § 214 ZPO).17 By Articles 97(i) and 20(iii) GG, the judiciary is independent and only bound by statute and law.18 Previous decisions in other cases (‘Präjudizien’: precedents) are not binding on the courts. This principle applies with certain exceptions, eg, among the supreme courts where the interest in maintaining unified decisions prevails.19 The ZPO proceeds on the basis that, regardless of any defects (‘Mängel’), judgments normally remain effective (‘wirksam’). The proper means of challenging them is  by lodging a ‘Rechtsmittel’ (legal remedy).20 Exceptionally, however, the annulment (‘Aufhebung’/‘Kassation’) of a judgment, which has legal effect (‘Rechtskraft’), is possible by way of a ‘Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens’ (re-opening of the proceedings) on the ground of certain procedural or substantive errors. This can only be sought  by way of a separate action.21 Instead of commencing proceedings by writ (‘Klage’), an application (‘Antrag’) can be made to the plaintiff’s local ‘Amtsgericht’ (district court)22 for the issue of a ‘Mahnbescheid’ (default notice) where a specific amount is due in Euros or German Marks (the so-called ‘Mahnverfahren’ (default (warning) procedure)).23 The defendant has two weeks from service (‘Zustellung’) of the ‘Mahnbescheid’ to pay or dispute the claim. In the event of an objection (‘Widerspruch’)  from the defendant, the matter is passed to the appropriate court on application (§ 696(i) ZPO). Otherwise, a so-called ‘Vollstreckungsbescheid’  (enforcement notice) can be issued (§ 699). However, a further two weeks are available to the defendant to lodge an ‘Einspruch’ (objection) against the ‘Vollstreckungsbescheid’  (§§ 338 and 700 ZPO).24 117

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D THE ZPO IN DETAIL25 1

Book I (§§ 1–252 ZPO): General Provisions

(a) Content

Book I of the ZPO (‘Allgemeine Vorschriften’; §§ 1–252) is divided into three Sections: 1:   ‘Gerichte’ (courts; §§ 1–49). 2:   ‘Parteien’ (parties; §§ 50–127a). 3:   ‘Verfahren’ (proceedings; §§ 128–252).

(b) Section 1 (§§ 1–49 ZPO) Section 1 contains four Titles:

‘Sachliche Zuständigkeit der Gerichte und Wertvorschriften’ (substantive jurisdiction and value provisions; §§ 1–11). 2:   ‘Gerichtsstand’ (local jurisdiction; §§ 12–37). 3: ‘Vereinbarung über die Zuständigkeit der Gerichte’ (agreement as to jurisdiction; §§ 38–40). 4: ‘Ausschließung und Ablehnung der Gerichtspersonen’ (exclusion of and objection to court personnel; §§ 41–49). 1:

(c) Section 2 (§§ 50–127a ZPO) Section 2 contains seven Titles: 1: 2:   3: 4: 5:   6:   7:

‘Parteifähigkeit und Prozeßfähigkeit’ (capacity to be a party and to take steps in the proceedings; §§ 50–58). ‘Streitgenossenschaft’ (joinder of parties; §§ 59–63). ‘Beteiligung Dritter am Rechtsstreit’ (involvement of third parties in proceedings; §§ 64–77). ‘Prozeßbevollmächtigte und Beistände’ (authorised persons in proceedings and parties’ assistants; §§ 78–90). ‘Prozeßkosten’ (costs; §§ 91–107). ‘Sicherheitsleistung’ (security for costs; §§ 108–113). ‘Prozeßkostenhilfe und Prozeßkostenvorschuß’ (legal aid and payment on account of  costs; §§ 114–127a).26 (d) Section 3 (§§ 128–252 ZPO)

Section 3 contains five Titles: 1: 2: 3:

‘Mündliche Verhandlung’ (oral hearing; §§ 128–165). ‘Verfahren bei Zustellungen’ (procedure for service of documents; §§ 166–213a). ‘Ladungen, Termine und Fristen’ (summonses to attend, hearing dates and time limits; §§ 214–229). 118

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‘Folgen der Versäumung. Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand’ (consequences of  failure to observe time limits. Reinstitution of the previous position. §§ 230–238). 5: ‘Unterbrechung und Aussetzung des Verfahrens’  (interruption and suspension of the proceedings; §§ 239–252). 4:

(e) Section 1 in detail (§§ 1–49 ZPO)27

It is important to note that the GVG (and not the ZPO) governs the substantive (factual) jurisdiction (‘sachliche Zuständigkeit’) of the courts (§ 1 ZPO). The ZPO only deals with the local jurisdiction of the courts ( ‘örtliche Zuständigkeit’ or ‘Gerichtsstand’: §§ 12–37 ZPO).28   Courts without statutory ‘Zuständigkeit’ are forbidden: Article 101(i) GG. Thus, by § 71 (i) GVG, the ‘Zivilkammer’ (civil chamber) of the ‘Landgericht’ (county court (LG)) has jurisdiction (ie, is ‘zuständig’) in first instance in all civil disputes, which are not within the jurisdiction of the ‘Amtsgericht’ (district court (AG)). In the ‘Amtsgericht’  civil matters are normally dealt with by a single judge (‘Einzelrichter’) sitting alone: § 22(iv) GVG. In criminal proceedings such a judge is referred to as a ‘Strafrichter’: § 25 GVG.29 With various exceptions, non-contentious business in the ‘Amtsgericht’ is usually within the competence of a ‘Rechtspfleger’ (legal executive), who, unlike the judge, is a civil servant (‘Beamter’)  and does not enjoy the same degree of independence (‘Unabhängigkeit’).30 The ‘Amtsgericht’ has (substantive) jurisdiction, for example: – – – – –

in disputes concerning monetary claims (‘vermögensrechtliche Ansprüche’) where the value (‘Streitwert’) does not exceed DM 10.000 (§ 23 No 1 GVG); in disputes between landlord and tenant or regarding rented property, regardless of value (§ 23 No. 2 (a) GVG); in disputes regarding parenthood (‘Kindschaft’) and maintenance (‘Unterhalt’) (§ 23a GVG); in family matters (‘Familiensachen’),   which term includes matrimonial matters (‘Ehesachen’) and various other proceedings (§ 23b GVG);31 in default notice and enforcement proceedings (§§ 689(i) and 764(i) ZPO).32

The ‘Streitwert’ of a dispute is relevant both for the ‘Zuständigkeit’ of the court—the socalled ‘Zuständigkeitsstreitwert’,  which is dealt with in §§ 2–9 ZPO—and for the purpose of court fees and costs—the so-called ‘Gebührenstreitwert’ or ‘Kostenstreitwert’, which is dealt with in §§ 12–34 of the ‘Gerichtskostengesetz’ (GKG: Court Fees Law).33 Regardless of the ‘Streitwert’, the ‘Landgericht’ has exclusive jurisdiction over state liability claims, ie, where it is alleged that a judge or civil servant has acted beyond his powers (‘seine amtlichen Befugnisse überschritten’) or has failed to perform his duties (‘seine Amtspflichten unterlassen’): § 71(ii) No 2 GVG.34 The ‘Kammer für Handelssachen’   (chamber for commercial matters) at the ‘Landgericht’ deals on application, inter alia, with claims between ‘Kaufleute’, actions  between members of a ‘Handelsgesellschaft’ and trade mark and unfair competition matters (§ 95 GVG). 119

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The jurisdiction of the ‘Oberlandesgericht’ (county court of appeal (OLG)) and the ‘Bundesgerichtshof’ (Federal Supreme Court (BGH)) in civil matters is laid down in §§ 119 and 133 GVG. An appeal (‘Rechtsmittel’) to the former is known as a ‘Berufung’, while an appeal (on a point of law) to the latter is a ‘Revision’.35 (f) Section 2 in detail (§§ 50–127a ZPO) (i) Title 1 (§§ 50–58 ZPO)36

A party to civil proceedings is ‘eine Partei’.37 The ZPO distinguishes between the capacity to be a ‘Partei’ —so-called ‘Parteifähigkeit’—and the capacity to take steps in the proceedings (‘Prozeßhandlungen’) — so-called ‘Prozeßfähigkeit’. ‘Parteifähigkeit’ and ‘Prozeßfähigkeit’ are both preconditions for being able to take steps in the proceedings (‘Prozeßhandlungsvoraussetzungen’) and preconditions for a judgment (so-called ‘Sachurteilsvoraussetzungen’; also referred to as ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’, ‘Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen’ or ‘Verfahrensvoraussetzungen’). ‘Prozeßhandlungen’38 ‘Prozeßhandlungen’ (steps in the proceedings) can be taken by the court (‘gerichtliche  Handlungen’) or by the parties (‘Parteihandlungen’). Only the latter are dealt with here. A distinction is drawn between ‘Parteihandlungen’, which require assistance from the court or which seek to influence the court’s decision (so-called ‘Erwirkungshandlungen’) and those which have direct procedural effects (so-called ‘Bewirkungshandlungen’).39 Whether a particular act is classified as a ‘Prozeßhandlung’, rather than a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (legal transaction), is important, because ‘Prozeßhandlungen’ only have effects in regard to the proceedings and within its context, not beyond (‘Sie entfalten ihre Wirkungen nur in bezug auf den Prozeß und allein in seinem Rahmen, nicht darüber hinaus’).40 In particular:

1   ‘Prozeßhandlungen’  are only governed by procedural and not substantive law. However, the principle of ‘Treu und Glauben’ (trust and good faith) must still be observed by the parties. 2   ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’ only have procedural significance, in so far as they are asserted in the proceedings (‘im Prozeß geltend gemacht’). 3   ‘Prozeßhandlungen’ can often be freely withdrawn, corrected or supplemented, but not, if the other party has acquired a particular legal position (‘eine bestimmte Rechtsstellung’). 4   ‘Prozeßhandlungen’ must be undertaken unconditionally and without reservation (‘unbedingt und vorbehaltlos’), ie, it is not permissible that they are dependent on events outside the proceedings.41 5 The reinterpretation (‘Umdeutung’) or cure (‘Heilung’) of ‘Prozeßhandlungen’,  which are faulty (‘fehlerhaft’), is usually possible. The concept of cure (‘Heilung’) of procedural mistakes can be a trap for the unwary. Thus, § 295(i) ZPO provides that a party loses his right to complain of the infringement of a procedural provision (eg, relating to the taking of evidence 120

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(‘Beweisaufnahme’)) or of one concerning the form of a ‘Prozesshandlung’, if the party waives compliance with the relevant provision or fails to raise an objection (‘Rüge’) regarding the procedural defect (‘Verfahrensmangel’)  before the end of the next oral hearing, at which the party appears and knew or should have known of the defect. The omission to make an objection (‘Unterlassen einer Rüge’) at the hearing leads to the loss of the right to complain (‘Verlust des Rügerechts’), which, in turn, ‘cures’ the procedural defect. However, by § 295(ii) ZPO a procedural defect is only curable (‘heilbar’) due to the failure to raise an objection, if the defect is one, which can be effectively waived (‘verzichtbar’), ie, certain (significant) procedural defects are incurable (‘unheilbar’).42 ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’

It is important to note here that, in all jurisdictional branches, the relevant ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’ are checked by the court itself (‘von Amts wegen’) as a preliminary point. Their fulfillment means that the action is ‘zulässig’ (admissible).43 ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’  can be grouped according to whether they relate to the parties, the court or the object of the action (‘Streitgegenstand’)44 and include, for example: – – – – –  – 

the question of the parties being ‘parteifähig’ and ‘prozeßfähig’ and having the right to conduct the action (‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’ or ‘Prozeßführungsrecht’);45 the question of the ‘Rechtsweg’ (legal route, ie, court) chosen for the dispute being ‘zulässig’ (used here in the sense of ‘permissible’);46 the question of the jurisdiction (‘Zuständigkeit’) of the court in the proceedings,  both substantive and local;47 the question of the ‘Streitsache’ (matter in dispute) not already being sub judice (‘rechtshängig’) and not being the subject of a previous decision finally binding  between the parties (‘materiell rechtskräftig’); the question of the plaintiff having a need for legal protection(‘Rechtsschutzbedürfnis’ or ‘Rechtsschutzinteresse’); the question of the writ having been correctly issued (‘Ordnungsmäßigkeit der Klageerhebung’), ie, by the correct (authorised) person and with the correct content.

By § 50 ZPO, a person is ‘parteifähig’ if he is ‘rechtsfähig’, ie, any person, natural or legal, who is capable of being a carrier of rights and obligations.48 On the other hand, a person is only ‘prozeßfähig’ so far as he can bind himself by a ‘Vertrag’  (contract; § 52), ie, so far as he is ‘geschäftsfähig’. Unlike a natural person, a legal person is not itself ‘geschäftsfähig’, but acts through its legal representatives (‘gesetzliche Vertreter’)   and is, therefore, technically ‘prozeßunfähig’. Any procedural fault on the part of a legal representative (which term includes, inter alia, parents of minors49 and company representatives) is equated with that of the party itself (§ 51(ii)). (ii) Title 2 (§§ 59–63 ZPO)50

Parties can sue or be sued jointly (‘gemeinschaftlich’)  and are then known as ‘Streitgenossen’ . 121

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In the case of (normal) so-called ‘einfache Streitgenossenschaft’  (simple joinder of  parties), the ‘Streitgenossen’ are, for procedural purposes, treated individually (‘als einzelne’,   eg, accident victims), whereas in the case of so-called ‘notwendige Streitgenossenschaft’ (necessary joinder of parties) only a united decision (‘einheitliche Entscheidung’) by the court is possible. The members of a ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ are ‘notwendige Streitgenossen’ and the presence at a hearing or observation of a time limit by one of them is effective for all (§§ 61 and 62(i)). (iii) Title 3 (§§ 64–77 ZPO)51

A third party can become involved in proceedings in the following ways: –

by means of so-called ‘Hauptintervention’ (direct intervention) where the third party himself claims the thing or right in dispute (§ 64); – by means of so-called ‘Nebenintervention’ or ‘Streithilfe’ (assistance to one of the parties in the dispute) where the third party has a legal interest(‘rechtliches Interesse’) in the success of one of the main parties (‘Hauptparteien’) (§ 66(i)). The third party (‘Nebenintervenient’ (intervener)) must take the proceedings as he finds them at the time of his accession (‘Beitritt’): § 67. He is entitled to use means of  attack and defence (so-called ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’)52 and generally to take all steps in the proceedings (‘Prozeßhandlungen’) so long as the means used and steps taken do not contradict those of the main party he is assisting. Thus, the third party can plead matters in support of or by way of objection to the action, but he cannot extend, amend or withdraw the ‘Klage’ nor can he acknowledge the ‘Klage’ or lodge a counterclaim (‘Widerklage’). The court’s decision is binding for the purpose of any subsequent proceedings  between the ‘Hauptpartei’ and the ‘Nebenintervenient’ (so-called ‘Interventionswirkung’) and the latter only has a limited right of complaint if he alleges that the‘Hauptpartei’ has improperly conducted the action (§ 68); – by means of so-called ‘Streitverkündung’ (notification of dispute/third party notice) where one of the parties to the dispute believes (‘glaubt’) that, in the event of an outcome unfavourable to him, he can make a claim for guarantee or indemnity against a third party (‘einen Anspruch auf Gewährleistung oder Schadloshaltung gegen einen Dritten’) or fears (‘besorgt’) a claim from a third party (§ 72(i)). If the third party accedes to the party giving the notice (the ‘Streitverkünder’), he has the position of a ‘Nebenintervenient’ and can, in his own interest, assist in the action; otherwise, the proceedings continue without regard to him. However, whether or not the third party accedes to the ‘Streitverkünder’,  the so-called ‘Interventionswirkung’53 takes effect between them (§ 74(iii)); – where the third party alleges that he is the rightful creditor (‘Gläubigerstreit’: dispute  between creditors; § 75) or the defendant alleges that he is in possession of a‘Sache’ not for the plaintiff, but for a third party (‘Urheberbenennung’; § 76). (iv) Title 4 (§§ 78–90 ZPO)54 Generally speaking, parties can either conduct their legal proceedings themselves, give any person, who is ‘prozeßfähig’,  written authority (‘schriftliche Vollmacht’ /  122

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‘Prozeßvollmacht’) to take steps in the proceedings (‘Prozeßhandlungen’) on their behalf  as a ‘Bevollmächtigte’ (authorised person) or allow such a person to appear with them as an assistant (‘Beistand’): a so-called ‘Parteiprozeß’ (party action; §§ 79 and 90 ZPO). However, before certain courts and in certain matters, legal representation (‘Vertretung durch Anwälte’) is required (‘geboten’), in which case the lawyer instructed must be admitted (‘zugelassen’)  at the court involved: a so-called ‘Anwaltsprozeß’ (lawyers’ action). For example, in civil cases before a ‘Landgericht’ (county court) or a higher court, as well as in family matters (‘Familiensachen’), appropriate lawyers have to be instructed (‘Anwaltszwang’): § 78 ZPO.55 These provisions have to be read in conjunction with § 157 ZPO, which, in principle, restricts the right of representation at oral hearings to members of a ‘Rechtsanwaltskammer’ (RAK; Lawyers’ Chamber), the purpose being to uphold standards. Thus, except for members of an RAK:

(a) § 157(i) ZPO contains an absolute prohibition on representation(‘Vertretungsverbot’) at the oral hearing by persons, who on an independent, professional basis and regularly deal with legal affairs for others. Civil servants, employed persons or those, who occasionally handle legal matters for third parties, are not prevented from appearing. (b) § 157(ii) ZPO gives the court a discretionary power to forbid/ stop a party or a party’s representative from making (further) submissions, if the person concerned lacks the ability to present the case properly (‘die Fähigkeit zum geeigneten Vortrag’). The term ‘Vollmacht’ 

When considering the term ‘Vollmacht’ (authority/power of attorney), it is important to realise that it is a technical term of the German law of agency (‘Vertretung’) set out in §§ 164–181 BGB.56 The agent or representative of a person is referred to as a ‘Stellvertreter’ or ‘Vertreter’ and must fulfil two requirements before he can be regarded as such: – –

he must have ‘Vertretungsmacht’ (power to represent / authority); and he must act ‘im Namen des Vertretenen’ (in the name of the person represented) or, as is usually said, ‘im fremdem Namen’ (in someone else’s name).

A ‘Vollmacht’   is defined in § 166(ii) BGB as ‘eine durch Rechtsgeschäft erteilte Vertretungsmacht’   (a power of representation granted by ‘Rechtsgeschäft’  (legal transaction)). A ‘Vollmacht’ is, therefore, a power of representation granted by means of a ‘Willenserklärung’ / on a voluntary basis, as opposed to a power of representation granted by statute, ie, the (‘gesetzliche’) ‘Vertretungsmacht’  ((statutory) authority) of a ‘gesetzlicher Vertreter ’ (statutory representative).57 German law distinguishes strictly between: (a) the so-called ‘Innenverhältnis’ (internal relationship) between the grantor of a ‘Vollmacht’ (the ‘Vollmachtgeber’)  and the grantee / authorised person/attorney (‘Bevollmächtigte’); and (b) the so-called ‘Aussenverhältnis’ (external relationship) between the ‘Bevollmächtigte’ and third parties. 123

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It is vital to understand that a ‘Vollmacht’   only has effect ‘im Aussenverhältnis’, ie, externally and is completely independent from the (underlying) internal legal relationship (usually a contract). Thus, a breach of any internal (contractual) restrictions does not affect the validity of (external) acts under the ‘Vollmacht’. The extent (‘Umfang’)  of a ‘Vollmacht’ in proceedings (‘Prozeßvollmacht’)  is laid down in § 81 ZPO (ie, by statute) and a limitation (‘Beschränkung’)  thereof is only valid externally insofar as it relates to the resolution of the action by means of a settlement (‘Vergleich’),  a renunciation of the matter in dispute (‘Verzichtsleistung auf den Streitgegenstand’ or an acknowledgement of the other party’s claim (‘Anerkennung des von dem Gegner geltend gemachten Anspruch’):   § 83(i). Internal limitations on the ‘Bevollmächtigter’ are, however, always possible.58 The ‘Prozeßhandlungen’ of a ‘Prozeßbevollmächtigter’ are just as binding as if they had  been taken by the party /‘Vollmachtgeber’ himself (the ‘Bevollmächtigter’ is the latter’s alter ego)59 and any ‘Verschulden’ (fault) on the part of the ‘Bevollmächtigten’ is equated with that of the ‘Vollmachtgeber’:  § 85.60 A person who purports to take steps in proceedings without a ‘Vollmacht’ is referred to as a ‘vollmachtloser Vertreter’ or ‘Vertreter ohne Vertretungsmacht’ (unauthorised agent/ representative). There is said to be a ‘Mangel der Vollmacht’ (defect in the ‘Vollmacht’).61 The court is only obliged to check whether a ‘Vollmacht’ exists on objection by the other party, in which case the ‘Vollmacht’ must be lodged at the court (§§ 88 and 80(i)).62 Other relevant terms

It remains necessary to clarify and distinguish the following terms: –   ‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’ or ‘Prozeßführungsrecht’ (permission (or right) to conduct an action (in one’s own name); locus standi). Unlike a ‘Vollmacht’, which is a precondition for being able to take steps in the proceedings (‘Prozeßhandlungsvoraussetzung’), the ‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’ is a precondition of the admissibility of the proceedings (a ‘Prozeßvoraussetzung’). Its absence results in the action being rejected as ‘unzulässig’ (inadmissible). The ‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’  is to be distinguished from the active or passive legitimation (‘Sachlegitimation’) of the person whose right or liability is alleged, the lack of which results in the action being dismissed as ‘unbegründet’ (unfounded). The ‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’ usually belongs to the person actively or passively legitimated (‘sachlich legitimiert’), but it can be transferred to someone who has no ‘Sachlegitimation’  (so-called ‘Prozeßstandschaft’,  where a person is a party to proceedings in his own name although he is not the owner of the right or liability involved). –   ‘Postulationsfähigkeit’. This is the capacity of a person to appear before a particular court and take steps in the proceedings (right of audience). Thus, it is a ‘Prozeßhandlungsvoraussetzung’ and, where ‘Anwaltszwang’ prevails, is restricted to appropriate lawyers.

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(v) Titles 5 to 7 (§§ 91–127a ZPO)

Within Title 5 (§§ 91–107) two separate matters should be distinguished: – –

in §§ 91–101, the court’s decision on costs (‘Kostenentscheidung’), ie, the question of the parties’ liability for costs (‘Kostenhaftung’); and in §§ 103–107, the procedure for the fixing of costs (‘Kostenfestsetzung’), which takes place after the hearing, ie, the question of the actual amount of costs due.

The basic rule is that the unsuccessful party has a ‘Kostenpflicht’, ie, a duty to pay the costs of the dispute (‘Kosten des Rechtsstreits’—both ‘gerichtlich’ (ie, court fees) and ‘außergerichtlich’ (non-court costs)), in so far as they were ‘notwendig (necessary) for the purpose of the case: § 91 (i), 1st sentence ZPO.63 ‘Kostenfestsetzung’ enables the successful party to realise its claim for repayment (‘Kostenerstattungsanspruch’). If the court decides that each side should bear its own costs, the costs are referred to as being ‘gegeneinander aufgehoben’ (cancelling each other out). (g) Section 3 in detail (§§ 128–252 ZPO) (i) Title 1 (§§ 128–165 ZPO)

Apart from the fundamental oral principle (‘Grundsatz der Mündlichkeit’; § 128(i) ZPO), this Title contains provisions regarding: (a)  (‘vorbereitende’) ‘Schriftsätze’ ((preparatory) pleadings), ie, content, enclosures, time limits and additional copies (§§ 129–133).64 Such pleadings are compulsory where lawyers are involved (§ 78 ZPO). (b) Deposit and discovery of documents referred to in the pleadings (§§ 134–135). (c) The course of the oral hearing (‘Gang der mündlichen Verhandlung’) and the duties (‘Pflichten’) of the parties and the presiding judge (‘Vorsitzender’):  §§ 136–140.65$In particular: – – –

–

the parties must give a full and truthful account of the facts (they have a ‘Wahrheitspflicht’; § 138(i));66 the parties’ submissions (‘die Vorträge der Parteien’)— ie, all facts (‘Tatsachen’) and objections (‘Einwendungen’) asserted—must be substantiated (‘substantiiert’);67 each party must declare its position regarding facts (‘Tatsachen’) alleged by the other party (§ 138(ii). Facts are deemed to be admitted unless objected to (‘bestritten’) and a declaration of ignorance (‘Erklärung mit Nichtwissen’) is only permissible in certain circumstances: §§ 138(iii) and (iv); in restriction of the ‘Verhandlungsgrundsatz’  and in modification of the ‘Dispositionsgntndsatz’,68 the presiding judge has a duty to work towards the parties giving a full account of all significant facts and making appropriate applications (‘sachdienliche Anträge’) to the court69

For example, the judge can: –

require the parties to clarify (‘erläutern’) or supplement (‘ergänzen’) their submissions; 125

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– – – –

make suggestions (‘Anregungen’); discuss the facts and law with the parties; ask questions (as can other members of the court); and express any reservations (‘Bedenken’) regarding matters which have to be checked  by the court (eg, whether the action is admissible): § 139.70

(d) The various ‘Anordnungen’  (directions) that can be given by the court, eg, the personal appearance (‘persönliches Erscheinen’)  of the parties, the presentation (‘Vorlegung’) of documents (‘Urkunden’) and files (‘Akten’), the suspension (stay) of the proceedings (‘Aussetzung des Verfahrens’): §§ 141–155.71 (e) The protocol of the hearing (‘Verhandlungsprotokoll’)  that must be kept: §§ 159–165. (ii) Title 2 (§§ 166–213a ZPO)

This Title is sub-divided into two blocks: I

‘Zustellung auf Betreiben der Parteien’ (service at the instance of (and on and between) the parties): §§ 166–207; II ‘Zustellungen von Amts wegen’ (service by the court; also called ‘Amtsbetrieb’ (official conduct (of service)): §§ 208–213a).

By § 208 ZPO, §§ 166–207 have corresponding application to ‘Zustellungen von Amts wegen’, except in so far as §§ 209–213a ZPO otherwise provide. In criminal proceedings, the civil provisions regarding service apply: § 37(i) StPO. However, service by administrative and other public authorities  is governed by special (federal and state) laws (‘Verwaltungszustellungsgesetze’). It is important to understand that ‘Zustellung (service) can relate to an ‘Ausfertigung’ (ie, the official copy of an official document, eg, a court decision) or to an ordinary written item (‘Schriftstück’), eg, a writ (‘Klage’). Whilst the former merely needs to be handed over, service of the latter consists of delivery of a certified copy (‘beglaubigte  Abschrift’): § 170(i) ZPO.72 Service at the instance of the parties is usually carried out by the court bailiff (‘Gerichtsvollzieher’: § 166 ZPO), by post (§§ 193–197 ZPO), between lawyers (‘von Anwalt zu Anwalt’: § 198(i) ZPO) or by the ‘Geschäftsstelle’ (business office of the court: § 211 ZPO). Service can be effected at any place, at which the person to be served is found: § 180 ZPO. For private persons, this is normally their home (‘Wohnung’). In the case of   business persons, it is their place of business (‘Geschäftslokal’)73 Service at nighttime, on Sundays and public holidays requires the permission of a  judge: §188(i) ZPO. The instructing party must receive a certificate of service (‘Zustellungsurkunde’: §§ 190–192 ZPO), unless service is effected between lawyers, in which case a written, dated and signed acknowledgement of receipt (‘Empfangsbekenntnis’) suffices to prove service: §198(ii)ZPO. A party not resident in Germany, who has not yet appointed a ‘Prozeßbevollmächtigter’ resident either at the place of the ‘Prozeßgericht’ (the court due to hear the case) or in the area of the relevant ‘Amtsgericht’,  must name a person authorised to accept service (‘Zustellungsbevollmächtigter’), who is resident in that place or area: §174(ii)ZPO. 126

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Until such a person is named, service is regarded as effected at the time of posting to the party’s home address (‘Wohnort’), even if the item is returned as undeliverable (‘unbestellbar’): § 175(i) ZPO. If the aim of service of a ‘Schriftstück’ by the court is to safeguard a time limit (‘Frist’) or to interrupt a limitation period, the desired effect sets in retrospectively (‘rückwirkend’) from the time of lodging (‘Einreichung’) at the court, provided that service is effected shortly (‘demnächst’): § 270(iii) ZPO. The same applies in the case of an application for a ‘Mahnbescheid’ (default notice): § 693(ii) ZPO.74 (iii) Title 3 (§§ 214–229 ZPO)

To be noted here is that: –

a distinction is drawn between normal time limits (‘Fristen’), time limits set by a  judge (‘richterliche Fristen’), time limits set by statute (‘gesetzliche Fristen’)75 and socalled ‘Notfristen’ (time limits specified as such in the ZPO). ‘Notfristen’ run at all times and cannot be shortened in any event, while the others can in certain circumstances be shortened or extended (§§ 223–224); – on application, a ‘Termin’ (hearing (date)) can be changed or postponed (‘vertagt’) on significant grounds (‘aus erheblichen Gründen’): § 227(i). Where a case is not postponed and neither party appears or makes submissions, the court can either decide the matter on the basis of the file (‘nach Aktenlage’) or direct the resting (‘Ruhen’) of the proceedings: § 251 a. (iv) Title 4 (§§ 230–238 ZPO)76

To be distinguished are the following terms: –

a ‘Versäumung’,77 which refers to a party’s failure to observe (miss) the time limit for or to carry out a ‘Prozeßhandlung’ (step in the proceedings) and generally leads to the party being excluded (‘ausgeschlossen’) with the ‘Prozeßhandlung’;78

and –

a ‘Versäumnis’,79 which refers to a party’s failure to attend a ‘Termin’ (‘Nichterscheinen’) or to make submissions at a ‘Termin’ (‘Nichtverhandeln’),80

and leads to a possible ‘Versäumnisurteil’  (judgment in default) against him (§§ 330 and 331). A defendant who fails to notify his intention to defend (‘Verteidigungsabsicht’) is also open to this risk: § 331(iii).81 (v) Title 5 (§§ 239–252 ZPO) ‘Unterbrechung’  is the interruption of proceedings ipso iure, for example due to the ‘Prozeßunfähigkeit’ of a party, his death or that of his ‘gesetzlicher Vertreter’.  Where, however, a party becomes ‘prozeßunfähig’ or he or his ‘gesetzlicher Vertreter’ dies and the party is represented in the action (by a ‘Prozeßbevollmächtigter’), it is only possible to achieve the suspension of the proceedings (‘Aussetzung des Verfahrens’) on application (§ 246).82 127

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Time limits commence anew (‘von neuem’) after any interruption or suspension (§ 249). Proceedings can not only be interrupted or suspended, but can merely rest. Thus, if   both parties so apply and the court considers it expedient (‘zweckmäßig’) due to pending negotiations for a settlement or for other important reasons, a ‘Ruhen des Verfahrens’ (resting of the proceedings) can be ordered (§ 251).83 2 Book II (§§ 253–510b ZPO): Proceedings at 1st Instance

(a) Content

Book II of the ZPO (‘Verfahren im ersten Rechtszuge’; §§ 253–510b) is divided into two Sections:

‘Verfahren vor den Landgerichten’ (proceedings before the County Courts; §§ 253– 494). 2: ‘Verfahren vor den Amtsgerichten’  (proceedings before the District Courts; §§ 495– 510b). 1:

First instance proceedings can be commenced at an ‘Amtsgericht’ or a ‘Landgericht’ by plaint/writ (‘Klage’). In the absence of any special provisions in Book I, §§ 496–510b or in provisions regarding the constitution of the ‘Amtsgerichte’, the proceedings in both cases are governed by Book II, Section 1 (§§ 253–494; § 495). (b) Section 1 (§§ 253–494 ZPO): In the ‘Landgericht’

Section 1 contains 12 Titles: 1 ‘Verfahren bis zum Urteil’  (proceedings up to judgment; §§ 253–299a). 2   ‘Urteil’ (judgment; §§ 300–329). 3   ‘Versäumnisurteil’ (judgment in default; §§ 330–347). 4 ‘Verfahren vor dem Einzelrichter’  (proceedings before a single judge; §§ 348–350). 5 ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften über die Beweisaufnahme’ (general provisions regarding the taking of evidence; §§ 355–370). 6 ‘Beweis durch Augenschein’ (evidence by inspection; §§ 371–372a). 7   ‘Zeugenbeweis’ (witness evidence; §§ 373–401). 8 ‘Beweis durch Sachverständige’ (expert evidence; §§ 402–414). 9 ‘Beweis durch Urkunden’ (documentary evidence; §§ 415–444). 10 ‘Beweis durch Parteivernehmung’ (evidence by examination of the parties; §§ 445–455). 11 ‘Abnahme von Eiden und Bekräftigungen’ (the taking of oaths and affirmations; §§478–484). 12 ‘Sicherung des Beweises’ (securing of evidence; §§ 485–494).84

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(c) Section 1, Title 1 (§§ 253–299a ZPO) (i) Issue and service of a ‘Klage’ 85

The issue (‘Erhebung’) of a ‘Klage’ requires two acts: –

the lodging (‘Einreichung’)  of a particular form of pleading (‘Schriftsatz’) —the ‘Klageschrift’ (statement of claim)—at the court;86

and – the service (‘Zustellung’) of the ‘Klageschrift’ on the defendant (§ 253(i) ZPO). The correct description of the parties (‘Bezeichnung der Parteien’) is a vital component of the ‘Klageschrift’: § 253(ii) No. 1 ZPO. The parties must be individualised, ie, they must be named, their address (‘Anschrift’) must be stated and their status (‘Stellung’) in the action clarified: § 130 No 1 ZPO.87 When a matter is before the court, it is referred to as being ‘anhängig’ (pending). The proceedings become ‘rechtsängig’ (sub judice) once they are served on the other party. The relevant provisions regarding the procedure of service are contained in: – § 270(i) ZPO, whereby service is usually undertaken by the court(‘von Amts wegen’);  –  § 271 ZPO, whereby service must be carried out ‘unverzüglich’ (forthwith) together with a direction to the defendant to appoint an appropriate lawyer, if he intends to defend himself, and to state via his lawyer (ie, in cases before a ‘Landgericht’), within a time limit of at least two weeks after service, whether there are any reasons why the ‘Zivilkammer’ should not transfer the matter to a single judge (‘Einzelrichter’), ie, if the case involves particular factual or legal difficulties or is of fundamental significance: § 348(i); – §§ 208–213a ZPO (together with § 170 ZPO), whereby the‘Geschäftsstelle’ (business office) of the court is responsible for service of a ‘beglaubigte Abschrift’ (certified copy) of the ‘Klageschrift’ by means of its ‘Übergabe’  (handing-over) by a court  bailiff (‘Gerichtsvollzieher’)88 or through the post (§§ 170 and 211).89 A certificate of service (‘Zustellungsurkunde’) must be returned to the ‘Geschäftsstelle’ although, where the person to be served is a lawyer, notary, court bailiff, authority or public corporation, a written, dated and signed ‘Empfangsbekenntnis’ (acknowledgement of receipt) suffices to prove service (§§ 212 and 212a).90 Where a person has been appointed as a ‘Bevollmächtigter’, he must be served (§§ 173–178); and – § 65(i) GKG, whereby in civil actions the ‘Klage’ can only be served after prepayment (‘Vorauszahlung’)  of the court’s fee (‘Gebühr’) and disbursements (‘Auslagen’).91 A ‘Rechtsanwalt’   can ask his client for a fair payment on account of costs (‘Kostenvorschuß’): § 17 BRAGO.92 (ii) Types of ‘Klage’93

A ‘Klage’ is customarily distinguished according to whether it is a: –   ‘Leistungsklage’, whereby an enforceable judgment requiring a ‘Tun, Unterlassen 129

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oder Dulden’ (act, omission or sufferance=a ‘Leistung’) from the defendant is sought (eg, payment of a debt; restraint of conduct). –   ‘Gestaltungsklage’, whereby a judgment is sought reshaping a legal situation on the basis of particular legal provisions (eg, divorce, company dissolution). The  judgment brings about an automatic rearrangement(‘Umgestaltung’) of the position and requires no enforcement. –   ‘Feststellungsklage’, whereby a judgment establishing/declaring the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship (‘das Bestehen oder Nichtbestehen eines Rechtsverhältnisses’: § 256(i) ZPO) is sought.

A ‘Feststellungsklage’ can be brought to establish/declare absolute rights (eg, ownership, succession, family status, patent or copyrights) and is also useful in accident cases to establish a claim for liability only (‘dem Grunde nach’) when a figure for damages is not yet available.94 (iii) The ‘Streitgegenstand’ 95

(a) The controversial concept of the ‘Streitgegenstand’ (object of the action) is not used directly as such in the ZPO. However, § 253(ii) No 2 ZPO  states that the necessary content of a ‘Klageschrift’ must include ‘the specific statement of the object and ground of the claim raised, as well as a specific application’ (to the court).96 Accordingly, the term ‘Streitgegenstand’ is generally regarded as having the meaning of a procedural as opposed to a merely material ‘Anspruch’ and as consisting of  two elements: – –

a particular ‘Klageantrag’ (application to the court) in the ‘Klage’)’, and a particular ‘Klagegrund’ (factual basis for the ‘Klage’ /cause of action).

When the plaintiff’s ‘Klageantrag’  is justified by the ‘Klagegrund’,  the ‘Klage’ is referred to as being ‘schlüssig’ (apparently well founded/conclusive).97 Whether or not the plaintiff’s ‘Klage’  (and the ‘Anspru(e)ch(e)’   (claim(s)) made therein) is ultimately actually well founded (‘begründet’) is for the court to decide,98 following the defendant’s response (his so-called ‘Einlassung’) and any necessary taking of evidence (‘Beweisaufnahme’).99 The concept of the ‘Streitgegenstand’ is of relevance when the question is raised: – whether the same matter is already sub judice (‘anderweitig rechtshängig’); – whether an amendment of the writ (‘Klageänderung’) has taken place;100 – whether a court judgment has become finally (and not merely formally)  binding on the parties (‘materiell rechtskräftig’), and the court has to consider whether the ‘new’ ‘Streitgegenstand’   is identical (‘gleich’),   in which case it must be rejected, or is an ‘anderer’   (different) ‘Streitgegenstand’, which is permissible.101 (b) A plaintiff is free to make numerous procedural claims against the same defendant in the same action, even if they are based on different grounds, provided the relevant claims all fall within the jurisdiction of the court and are all governed by the same 130

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type of proceedings: § 260 ZPO (so-called ‘objektive Klagenhäufung’ (objective cumulation of claims)).102 The consequence of ‘objektive Klagenhäufung is that there is a joinder (‘Verbindung’) of the claims. The claims are heard together (‘gemeinsame Verhandlung’),  but remain independent and can each be the subject of a partial  judgment (‘Teilurteil’; § 301 ZPO).$By § 145 ZPO, the court can require the claims to  be pursued in separate actions or can, by analogy with § 146 ZPO, deal with them separately (‘Trennung’).$‘Objektive Klagenhäufung’ is to be distinguished from: – – –

–

the situation where various plaintiffs or defendants are parties to an action (so-called ‘subjektive Klagenhäufung’  (subjective cumulation of claims), ie, ‘Streitgenossenschaft’);103 the making of numerous claims on an alternative basis (‘Alternativanträge’), ie, leaving the choice to the court. This is generally not allowed; the situation where one and the same claim is made on various (factual) grounds (‘mehrere Klagegründe’). The court must then examine each ground, to see if it can support the claim. By this is not meant the basing of a claim on several ‘Anspruchsgrundlagen’, which is unobjectionable; the making of cumulative claims, subject to an internal procedural condition (so-called ‘eventuelle Klagenhäufung’ (eventual cumulation of claims)), ie, the (common) situation where an auxiliary application (‘Hilfsantrag’) is made for the event that (‘für den Fall, daß…’) the main application (‘Hauptantrag’) fails. This type of eventual application (‘Eventualantrag’) is permitted.104

The so-called ‘Stufenklage’  (step action; § 254 ZPO) is a special form of action whereby various claims are joined in the same proceedings and are placed before the court for consideration in successive stages, ie, consideration of a subsequent claim depends on the previous one being successful.105 (iv) After the ‘Klage’ is lodged106

The presiding judge (‘Vorsitzender’)  has two means to progress the matter once the writ has been lodged. He can either (§ 272(ii)): (a) set a so-called ‘frühen ersten Termin (zur mündlichen Verhandlung)’   (initial oral hearing) not less than two weeks after service (§§ 275 and 274(iii)). To prepare the initial oral hearing, the presiding judge can require the defendant to lodge a (written) defence (‘Klageerwiderung’) within at least two weeks: §§ 275(i) and 277(iii). If the matter can be disposed of (‘erledigt’) at the initial oral hearing (eg, in the event of  a settlement (§§ 279, 794(i) No 1 ZPO), an acknowledgment of the daim (§ 307(i) ZPO) or a judgment in default (§§ 330, 331(i) ZPO) or if a final judgment is possible (§ 300(i) ZPO)), the proceedings then terminate. Otherwise, the court must give such directions as are still required to prepare the main hearing (‘Haupttermin’): § 275(ii) ZPO; or (b) initiate the so-called ‘schriftliches Vorverfahren’ (preliminary written procedure), which the presiding judge must do, if he does not set an initial oral hearing. In 131

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the event of a ‘schriftliches Vorverfahren’, the presiding judge must (together with service of the writ) require the defendant (‘Beklagte’): – –

to notify the court (within a ‘Notfrist’ of two weeks) in writing if he intends to defend (‘wenn er sich…verteidigen wolle’); and (within at least two further weeks) to lodge his (written) defence (‘Klageerwiderung’): § 276(i).107

It must be drawn to the defendant’s attention that: –

if he intends to defend himself, he must appoint an appropriate lawyer (if  necessary): § 271 (ii). In a ‘schriftliches Vorverfahren’, only such a lawyer can notify the court of the intention to defend (§ 276(ii)); – (in the event of a ‘schriftliches Vorverfahren’) a failure (‘Versäumung’) by the defendant to notify his intention to defend within the ‘Notfrist’ can lead to a  judgment in default against him (§§ 276(ii) and 331(iii));108 – the defence must be lodged by an appropriate lawyer (if necessary) and that, if the time limit set is missed, the defence can be rejected as out of time (‘verspätet’) (§§ 277(ii) and 296(i)). The court can require the plaintiff to give his written comments on the defence within at least two weeks (a so-called ‘Replik’): §§ 275(iv), 276(iii) and 277(iv). (v) The court’s preparation for the hearing109

Whether an initial oral hearing (‘früher erster Termin’)  is set or the main hearing (‘Haupttermin’) is to take place, the court must: – –

at all stages of the proceedings work towards the parties making their submissions in good time and fully (‘rechtzeitig und vollständig’); and take necessary preparatory measures (‘erforderliche vorbereitende Maßnahmen’) in good time (‘rechtzeitig’), eg, require the parties to supplement or explain (points in) their pleadings, obtain official information and summon witnesses and experts (§ 273; so-called ‘prozeßleitende Verfügungen’).

In other words, the court is responsible to ensure that a case progresses without undue delay and to issue appropriate interlocutory orders as early as possible. Moreover, throughout the proceedings, the court must be intent on a friendly settlement of the dispute or of specific points: § 279(i) ZPO. In particular, unless an attempt at settlement (Güteversuch’) is clearly hopeless (§ 278(ii) ZPO), the court must—as from 1.1.2002 —schedule a date for negotiation (‘Gütetermin’) before the main hearing at first instance is held. (vi) The hearing110

Once a hearing date is set (‘bestimmt’) by the court, the parties (and any witnesses and experts) are summoned to attend by means of a ‘Ladung’: § 274(i). The period between service of the ‘Ladung’  and the date of the hearing (the ‘Ladungsfrist’) amounts to at least one week where lawyers are instructed, otherwise at least three days: § 217. 132

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The period between service of the writ and an oral hearing is the so-called ‘Einlassungsfrist’ (period for engagement) and must amount to at least two weeks: § 274(iii)ZPO.111 The main hearing (‘Haupttermin’) proceeds as follows:112 1 2 3

the matter is announced (‘Aufruf der Sache’: § 220(i); the persons present are established (‘Feststellung der Anwesenheit’);113 the court leads the parties into a consideration of the subject-matter (facts) of the case (‘Sachverhalt’), both non-contentious and contentious (‘Sach- und Streitstand’: § 278(i));114 4 the parties are given a preliminary opportunity to be heard(‘Anhörung der Parteien’), so that the facts of the case can be clarified (‘Aufklärung des Sachverhalts’);115 5 the parties make their applications (‘Anträge’)  to the court with (or without) reference to the pleadings (= ‘Stellung der Anträge’: §§ 137(i) and 297(ii));116 6 the parties’ submissions (‘die Vorträge der Parteien’) on the facts and law are made, usually merely by reference to the pleadings (§ 137(ii) and (iii)); 7 if necessary, the court orders the taking of evidence (‘Beweisaufnahme’) by means of a ‘Beweisbeschluß’ (§ 278(ii), 1st sentence and § 284);117 8 both the evidence and (again) the non-contentious and contentious subject-matter is considered (§ 285 and § 278(ii), 2nd sentence);118 9 the lawyer for each party makes final representations (the ‘Plädoyer’); 10 the court reaches its decision (‘Entscheidung’): either in the form of an ‘Urteil’ or ‘Beschluß’. The parties must not delay the proceedings (which they have a duty to further (‘Prozeßförderungspflicht’)). Thus: – –

if the parties do not submit or notify their ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’ (eg, facts, allegations, objections, evidence)119 within a ‘Frist’ (deadline) set by the court or otherwise in time (‘rechtzeitig’); or if an objection from the defendant to the admissibility of the ‘Klage’ (a so-called ‘Rüge’) is not raised in time,

the relevant ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’ or ‘Rüge’ stands at risk of being rejected  by the court as ‘verspätet’ (too late/out of time): §§ 282(i)-(iii)) and 296(i)-(iii). In particular, an ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’,  which is presented late (‘verspätet vorgebracht’),  can be rejected, if, according to the free conviction of the court, its admission would delay the disposal of the dispute (‘die Erledigung des Rechtsstreits’) and the delay is due to gross negligence (‘grobe Nachlässigkeit’): § 296(ii) ZPO120 However, in keeping with Article 103(i) GG and in extension of § 139 ZPO, if the court realises that a party has clearly overlooked (‘erkennbar übersehen’) or has regarded as insignificant (‘unerheblich’) a legal aspect (‘rechtlicher Gesichtspunkt’) upon which the court intends to base its decision, it must first give the party an opportunity to be heard (‘Gelegenheit zur Äußerung’)   thereon unless merely a collateral claim (‘Nebenforderung’) is concerned: § 278(iii) ZPO. 133

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Thus, the court is not permitted to reach a decision by surprise(‘Überraschungsentscheidung’) without drawing attention beforehand to a legal consideration which is significant (‘entscheidungserheblich’). An infringement of § 278(iii) ZPO can justify the reopening of the hearing (‘Wiedereröffnung der Verhandlung’; § 156 ZPO) or a constitutional complaint.121 Alternatively, as from 1.1.2002, a newly inserted § 321a ZPO is intended to provide a means of challenge, if a judgment at first instance is consequent on the infringment of a party’s right to be heard and no appeal is otherwise possible. The party affected can lodge an objection (at the same court!) against the infringement of his right to be heard (‘Rüge der Gehörsverletzung’ or ‘Gehörsrüge’) within two weeks of the judgment being served, on the ground that the denial of a hearing was significant for the court’s decision (‘entscheidungserheblich’) . In other words, it must  be shown that, had a proper hearing been granted to the party concerned, it is possible that the court would have reached a different decision more favourable to the party. If the ‘Gehörsrüge’ is upheld, the original decision has to be quashed and the oral hearing resumed. The court’s decision on the ‘Gehörsrüge’ is final. (vii) Conduct of the proceedings and closure of the hearing 122

The conduct of the proceedings (‘Prozeßleitung’) is in the hands of the presiding judge (‘Vorsitzender’):  § 136(i) ZPO. In particular, at the (main) oral hearing (‘mündliche Verhandlung’), the presiding  judge: – –

is entitled to grant and withdraw the right to speak: § 136(ii) ZPO; is responsible to see to it that the case is exhaustively aired (‘erschöpfend erörtert’) and to ensure that any necessary further session (‘Sitzung’)   is set down immediately: § 136(iii) ZPO. The new hearing date (‘Termin’) must be scheduled to take place as shortly as possible thereafter: § 278(iv) ZPO.

The presiding judge closes the oral hearing when full discussion of the matter has, in the view of the court, taken place: § 136(iv) ZPO. Closure of the oral hearing (‘Verhandlungsschluss’)  is very significant, because, after the oral hearing is terminated, submission of ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’ is no longer possible (absolute preclusion): § 296a ZPO.123 Further, once the case is ripe for final decision (‘zur Endentscheidung reif’), the court has to proceed to pass final judgment (‘Endurteil’): § 300(i) ZPO. Judgment must be pronouced either directly following the close of the oral hearing or on a date for pronoucement (‘Verkündungstermin’) : § 310(i) ZPO.124 (d) Section 2 (§§ 495–510b ZPO): In the ‘Amtsgericht’

Unlike the position before the ‘Landgericht’, writs or applications can be made to an ‘Amtsgericht’  orally. Moreover, where the ‘Streitwert’  (value in dispute) does not exceed DM 1200, the ‘Amtsgericht’ has discretion to decide upon the form of the proceedings itself (‘nach billigem Ermessen’ (in accordance with fair discretion)): an oral hearing is only required if applied for (§§ 495a and 496). 134

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In particular, in the case of a monetary dispute, if: – – –

legal representation is not required; the amount involved is less than DM 1500 at the time the action is commenced; and it cannot be expected of a party to appear at court due to great distance or for another important reason,

the court can order that proceedings take place in writing: § 128(iii), 1st sentence ZPO.125 If an ‘Amtsgericht’  has no substantive or local jurisdiction, it must inform the defendant accordingly, as well as regarding the consequences for the defendant, if  the defendant makes unqualified oral submissions on the main issue at the hearing: § 504 ZP0.126 (e) Alternative settlement of disputes

In the interests of promoting settlement of disputes out of court (‘außergerichtliche Streitbeilegung’), a new paragraph 15a has been inserted into the Introductory Law to the Code of Civil Procedure (EGZPO) with effect from 1.1.2000. The ‘Länder’ can, by statute, require that an initial attempt be made to resolve certain types of dispute amicably (‘einvernehmlich’), before a ‘Klage’ can be issued. A settlement procedure (‘Güteverfahren’) must first take place at an approved ‘Gütestelle’. At the time of writing, the new form of mediation (‘Streitschlichtung’) is compulsory only in the following types of case: – – –

disputes concerning claims valued at less than DM 1500 (750 Euros); disputes between neighbours (‘Nachbarschaftsstreitigkeiten’), and disputes concerning alleged infringements of personal honour (ie, defamation claims), which arise from circumstances outside press and radio.

It does not apply, for example, to – – –

disputes in family matters; claims, which become contentious following the issue of a default notice; actions relating to measures of enforcement,

nor does it come into play, if the parties do not reside in the same ‘Land’. As from 1.1.2002, every hearing at first instance will have to be preceded by an (obligatory) settlement procedure. If it proves unsuccessful or if a party remains absent from the ‘Gütetermin’, the main hearing can take place immediately thereafter. 3 Book III (§§ 511–577 ZPO): Remedies 127

Book III of the ZPO (‘Rechtsmittel’)   (legal remedies/appeals) is divided into three Sections:

(a) ‘Berufung’ (§§ 511–544 ZPO)128

In connection with a ‘Berufung’ (general appeal) in civil proceedings, one should note that: 135

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– –

– –

–

a ‘Berufung’ against a final judgment (‘Endurteil’) of the ‘Amtsgericht’ is dealt with  by the ‘Landgericht’ and a ‘Berufung’ against a final judgment (at first instance) of  a ‘Landgericht’ by the ‘Oberlandesgericht’ (§§ 511 ZPO, 72 and 119(i) GVG); appe appeal alss agai agains nstt de deccisio isions ns by family courts go directly to the ‘Oberlandesgericht’. Moreover, as from 1.1.2002, that court is competent to handle appeals from an ‘Amtsgericht’, if, at the time the case became legally pending at first instance, the general venue of a party was outside Germany or if the ‘Amtsgericht’  applied foreign law and expressly made reference thereto in its decision; the the gener general al prin princi cipl ples es gov gover erni ning ng proc procee eedi ding ngss befo before re the the ‘Landgericht’ (ie, §§ 253– 494 ZPO) apply, except as otherwise provided in §§ 511–544 (§ 523 ZPO). Thus, the ‘Berufung’ is a full, second rehearing of the case (§ 525 ZPO). a ‘Berufung’—as, indeed, every ‘Antrag’ (application) or ‘Rechtsmittel’—must be  both admissible (‘zulässig’) and well-founded (‘begründet’), if it is to succeed. These requirements have to be checked by the court cour t of its own motion (‘von Amts wegen’): § 519b ZPO. In particular, the ‘Berufung’ must, in the first place, be possible (‘statthaft’); it must  be lodged in the correct form and within the relevant time limit (‘Frist’); and the  ju  j u d g m e n t , a g a i n st wh i ch t h e ‘Berufung’   is lodged, must be (legally) disadvantageous (‘nachteilig’)   to the appellant, ie, there must be a ‘Beschwer’ (grievance/gravamen). the ‘Berufungssumme’/‘Beschwerdewert’ (appeal value) must exceed DM 1500 (§ 511a ZPO). As from 1.1.2002, the threshold value is 600 Euros. After 1.1.2002, if the appeal value is not reached, a ‘Berufung’ is only possible, if  the court at first instance grants leave to appeal (so-called ‘Zulassungsberufung’). The court’s decision is final (!). However, leave must be granted, if either: (i) the matter matter has fundam fundament ental al sign signific ificanc ancee (‘grundsätzliche Bedeutung’); or (ii) a decision decision by the appellate appellate court court is necessary necessary in the interest interest of the the development development of the law (‘Fortbildung des Rechts’) or so as to secure the uniformity of caselaw (‘Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung’).

–

the ‘Berufungsfrist’ (time limit for lodging the notice of appeal (‘Berufungsschrift’)) is one month from service of the judgment and, at the latest, 5 months after the  judgment was pronounced pronounced (the ‘Verkündung’ (pronouncement)): § 516 ZPO; – t h e ap ap p e l l a n t (‘Berufungskläger’)  has a further month after lodging his ‘Berufungsschrift’   to lodge his particulars of appeal (‘Berufungsbegründung’, consisting of an appeal application (‘Berufungsantrag’)  and a factual and/or evidential basis for the appeal (‘Berufungsgrund’)), but this period can be extended on application (§ 519 ZPO);129 After 1.1.2002, the grounds for an appeal have  been restricted. It must be shown either that the decision at first instance was  based on a breach of law (‘Rechtsverletzung’), substantive or procedural, or that a different decision is justified, eg, because there is reason to believe that the first instance court proceeded on wrong facts or that certain facts were omitted. Under the new rules, the appeal court is bound by facts established at first instance, 136

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 but only insofar as no concrete indications (‘konkrete Anhaltspunkte’) exist, which give rise to doubts regarding the correctness or completeness of the significant facts ascertained. Thus, there must be definite evidence, evi dence, if factual errors are being asserted on appeal: –   ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’  and ‘Rügen’  (ie, assertions of fact, defences, evidence, objections) not submitted by the appellant or respondent (‘Berufungsbeklagter’)   in time (‘rechtzeitig’)   can be rejected: §§ 527–529 ZPO. In particular, new submissions (‘neues Vorbringen’) which were not brought forward at first instance are subject to rejection on appeal unless their admission would not delay disposal of the dispute or the omission to raise them at first instance was not due to gross negligence (‘grobe Nachlässigkeit’): § 528(ii) ZPO;130 – the judgme judgment nt at first first instanc instancee cannot cannot be amende amended d to the the detrimen detrimentt of the the appellant appellant (‘Verbot der Schlechterstellung’), unless a ‘Berufung’ is also lodged by the other party (so-called ‘Anschlußberufung’): §§ 536, 521 ZPO;131 – as from from 1.1. 1.1.20 2002 02,, a ‘Berufung’ must be rejected, if the appellate court is convinced that the appeal has no prospect of success (‘keine Aussicht auf Erfolg’), that it is not of fundamental significance and that a decision by the appellate court is not necessary in the interest of the development of the law or so as to secure the uniformity of case-law (§ 522(ii) ZPO). The rejection takes the form of a (unanimous) ‘Beschluss’, which does not require an oral hearing heari ng and cannot be challenged (!). (b) ‘Revision’(§§ ‘Revision’(§§ 545–566a ZPO)132

A ‘Revision’ is an appeal on a point of law only to the BGH (Federal Supreme Court) following a final judgment on a ‘Berufung’ to an ‘Oberlandesgericht’ (OLG).133 The concentration of appeals on points of law at the BGH serves to secure the uniformity of case-law (‘Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung’). Thus, (before 1.1.2002 ) a ‘Revision’ can only be lodged (§ 546(i) ZPO): –

in dis dispu pute tess con conce cern rnin ingg mon monet etar aryy cla claim imss (‘vermögensrechtliche Ansprüche’), if the amount at stake exceeds DM 60,000 (so-called ‘appeal on value’ (‘Wertrevision’)); 134

or –

in the the case case of of a disput disputee involv involving ing a lesse lesserr amoun amountt or a nonnon-mon monetar etaryy claim claim (‘nichtvermögensrechtlicher Anspruch’), if the OLG grants leave to do so in its judgment (so-called ‘appeal with leave’ (‘Zulassungsrevision’)) on the ground that either: (i) the matter matter has fundam fundament ental al sign signific ificanc ancee (‘grundsätzliche Bedeutung’); or (ii) (ii) the judgment judgment of the OLG departs departs from from a decision decision of the BGH or of the the ‘Gemeinsamer Senat der obersten Gerichtshöfe des Bundes’  (Joint Senate of the Supreme Federal Courts) and is based on such departure.

As from 1.1.2002,  the possibility of an appeal on value is abolished and the leave of 

the OLG is always required. If a matter is of fundamental significance or a decision by the appellate court is necessary in the interest of the development of the law or so as to secure the uniformity of case-law, case-law, leave must be granted. 137

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The BGH is bound by the leave of the OLG (‘Zulassung’).135 The only grounds for a ‘Revision’ are that the decision in question is based on (‘beruht auf’) a(n) (alleged) breach of federal law or of a provision extending beyond the area of an ‘Oberlandesgericht’ (§ 549(i)). 5 49(i)). A breach consists of the non-application or incorrect application of a particular legal norm (§ 550). In the seven ‘absolute’ situations set out in § 551 ZPO, a court’s decision is always regarded as being based on a breach of the law.136 The ‘Revision’ must be lodged within one month of service of the OLG’s complete  judgment and, at the latest, within within 5 months after the pronouncement pronouncement (‘Verkündung’) of the judgment (§ 552). After the ‘Revisionsschrift’ (notice of appeal; § 553) is lodged, the appellant has another month for the lodging of the particulars of appeal (‘Revisionsbegründung’). The period can be extended on application (§ 554(ii)). The general principles governing proceedings before the ‘Landgericht’ (ie, §§ 253– 494 ZPO) apply, apply, except as otherwise provided in §§ 545–566a 545–5 66a (§ 557 ZPO). In particular: particul ar: – – –

–

the the BGH BGH must must init initia iall llyy che check ck the the adm admis issi sibi bili lity ty (‘Zulässigkeit’) of the appeal: § 554a; the BGH can only only consi consider der thos thosee submi submissi ssions ons appar apparent ent from from the the state statemen mentt of  facts (‘Tatbestand’) contained in the OLG’s judgment or record of the proceedings. New submissions of facts or evidence are excluded: § 561(i), 1st sentence; breac breaches hes of (subs (substan tantiv tive) e) legal legal norm normss can can always always be be found found by the BGH BGH itsel itself. f. The The court is not limited to those alleged by the parties: § 559(ii), 1st sentence. However, procedural errors (‘Verfahrensmängel’)  must be specifically asserted, if  their examination by the BGH is i s sought; assumi assuming ng that that the the appeal appeal is admiss admissible ible,, the possib possible le conte content nt of the BGH’ BGH’ss judgm judgment ent is dealt with in §§ 563–565a ZPO.137

In particular, the BGH must pronounce the annulment (‘Aufhebung’) of the OLG’s decision, insofar as the BGH considers the appeal well-founded (‘begründet’): § 564 ZPO. It must then usually remand the matter for reconsideration to the lower court (‘Zurückverweisung’): § 565 ZPO.138 (c) ‘Beschwerde’ ‘Beschwerde’ (§§ 567–577 ZPO)139

A ‘Beschwerde’ (complaint) is a form of appeal, which cannot be used against judgments (‘Urteile’) or against decisions of an ‘Oberlandesgericht’,  but only in those cases specified in the ZPO, in particular against ‘Beschlüsse’ (decisions /orders) and ‘Verfügungen’ (directions) (§ 567 ZPO; §§ 72, 119, 133 GVG).140 The ‘Beschwerde must be passed to the next higher court (the ‘Beschwerdegericht’), unless the lower court or its presiding judge consider consi der it to be justified and grant gran t redress (‘Abhilfe’; § 571).141 The ‘einfache Beschwerde’ (simple complaint) is to be distinguished from the ‘sofortige Beschwerde’ (immediate complaint), which must be lodged within two weeks (§ 577). It used to be the case that, even if a ‘Beschluss’ was (formally) final, a so-called ‘exceptional complaint’ (‘Ausnahmebeschwerde’)   could still be lodged, if ‘tangible illegality’ (‘greifbare Gesetzeswidrigkeit’) could be shown. 138

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Now, Now, as from 1.1.2002, a special speci al remedy—the so-called so-call ed ‘Rechtsbeschwerde’  (objection on legal grounds)—is available to challenge a ‘Beschluss’, if a matter has fundamental significance or a decision by a higher court is necessary in the interest of the development of the law or so as to secure the uniformity of case-law. The ‘Rechtsbeschwerde’ must be lodged within one month and substantiated within one month thereafter: § 574 ZPO. 4

Book IV (§§ 578–591 ZPO): ‘Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens’ 142

Book IV of the ZPO (‘Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens’;  §§ 578–591) deals with the resumption (reopening) of proceedings after final judgment by means of a so-called ‘Nichtigkeitsklage’ (action for nullity in the case of certain procedural errors) or a socalled ‘Restitutionsklage’ (action for reinstitution in the case of certain material errors): §§ 579 and 580.143 5

Book V (§§ 592–605a ZPO): ‘Urkunden- und Wechselprozeß’ 144

Book V of the ZPO (‘Urkunden- und Wechselprozeß’; §§ 592–605a) provides for particular particular speedy forms of action for claims based on documents, bills of exchange or cheques. 6

Book VI (§§ 606–644 ZPO): Family Matters 145

(a) Content

Book VI of the ZPO (‘Familien-, Kindschafts- und Unterhaltssachen’; §§ 606–644) is divided into three Sections: 1:   ‘Verfahren in Familiensachen’   (proceedings in family matters; §§ 606–638).

‘Familiensachen’  are defined in § 23b GVG, which sets out the substantive  jurisdiction of the family court.146 Family matters include ‘Ehesachen’ (marriage matters): see below. 2: ‘Verfahren ‘Verfahren in Kindschaftssac Kindsc haftssachen’ hen’ (proceedings in parenthood matters; §§ 640–641k). 3:   ‘Verfahren über den Unterhalt Minderjähriger’   (proceedings regarding the maintenance of minors; §§6411–644). The former Section 4 (§§ 645–687) has been repealed.147 (b) Section 1 (§§ 606–638 ZPO) Section 1 contains four Titles:

1: ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften für Ehesachen’ Ehesachen’ (general provisions for marriage matters; §§60–620g). (i) The term ‘Ehesache’ is a sub-term of the term ‘Familiensache’ (family matter). ‘Ehesachen’ are defined in § 606 ZPO as proceedings for: – divorce (‘Scheidung’); 139

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– – –

declaration of of nu nullity (‘Nichtigerklärung einer Ehe’); estab establis lishm hmen entt of the the exis existen tence ce or or non-e non-exis xisten tence ce of of a marri marriage age(‘Feststellung des Bestehens oder Nichtbestehens einer Ehe’);  or esta es tabl blis ishm hmen entt of mari marita tall life life (‘Herstellung des ehelichen Lebens’). In ‘Ehesachen’,  Book I of the ZPO and the provisions of Book II for first instance proceedings before the ‘Landgericht’ (§§ 253–494 ZPO) apply: § 608 ZPO.

(ii) §§ 606–606a ZPO   deal with initial questions of (substantive, local and international) jurisdiction (‘Zuständigkeit’) regarding  regarding ‘Ehesachen’. Thus, § 606 ZPO lays down a hierarchy of jurisdictions, which are all exclusive (‘ausschließlich’). The main ones (in descending order) are as follows: (i) the the fam family ily cour courtt (‘Familiengericht’) for the area in which both spouses have their ‘gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt’ (usual residence); (ii) the family family court for for the area area in which one one of the spouses spouses usually usually reside residess with the parties’ minor children; (iii) the family court for the area area in which the spouses spouses last had their joint usual residence, if one of the parties still has his or her usual residence there when the matter becomes ‘rechtshängig’ (sub judice); (iv) the family court for the area of the defendant’s usual residence residence or, or, if that is outside Germany, Germany, that of the plaintiff’s; (v) failing failing all all else, else, the fami family ly court court at the the ‘Amtsgericht Schoneberg’ in Berlin. § 606a ZPO sets out the circumstances in which the German courts have (nonexclusive) (international) jurisdiction in cases where one or both of the parties are foreign nationals.148 (iii) §§ 607–619 ZPO  contain supplementary provisions regarding, for example, – the the need need for for a spe speci cifi ficc pro proce cedu dura rall powe powerr of atto attorn rney ey (‘Prozeßvollmacht’): § 609 ZPO; – the right right of a claim claimant ant to make make new new subm submiss ission ionss befor beforee the the close close of the the oral oral hearing: § 61 6 11 ZPO; – the person personal al atten attendan dance ce of of the the spous spouses es and and thei theirr right right to to be hear heard: d: § 613 613 ZPO; ZPO; – stay tay of of pr procee oceedi ding ngs: s: § 614 614 ZPO ZPO; – rejec ejecti tion on of late late subm submis issi sion ons: s: § 615 615 ZPO ZPO;; – the ability ability of the the cour courtt to ord order er the the takin takingg of evid evidenc encee on its its own own init initiati iative ve (‘von Amts wegen’)  and to take facts into consideration other than those presented to it by the parties: § 616 6 16 ZPO. In particular, the court can take into account facts, which favour the marriage (‘ehefreundliche Tatsachen’), despite the other spouse’s resistance: § 616(ii) ZPO. However, extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of § 1568 BGB must  be specifically argued by die spouse spouse opposing the divorce: § 616(iii) ZPO. (iv) §§ 620–620g ZPO  contain special procedural provisions enabling the court to issue ‘einstweilige Anordnungen’ (temporary orders) once an ‘Ehesache’ is pending or an application for legal aid has been lodged.149 140

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There must be an urgent need for legal protection (‘dringendes Rechtsschutzbedürfnis’) and an application must be made (§ 620a (ii) ZPO). The order must have a basis in substantive German law (or foreign law, where the EGBGB so directs). There does not have to be an oral hearing (§ 620a (i) ZPO), but an application for a (renewed) oral hearing is possible if a decision is initially reached without one (§ 620b(ii) ZPO). Although application for amendment (‘Abänderung’) of an order can be made (§ 620b(i) ZPO) and a ruling (‘Regelung’) concerning the custody of a joint child or a child’s return to a spouse can be challenged by immediate complaint (‘sofortige Beschwerde’), orders are generally unchallengeable (‘unanfechtbar’; § 620c, 1st and 2nd sentences ZPO). It is, therefore, crucial that the submissions in the application applicati on are conclusive(‘schlüssig’) 150 and credible (‘glaubhft’). The following orders orders can, for example, be made:151 (a) § 620 Nos 1 to 4 ZPO—a ZPO—a tempo temporary rary order order concerning concerning childr children en (eg, for for custody custody or maintenance). (b) § 620 No 5 ZPO—a ZPO—a temporary temporary order order to regulate regulate spousal spousal separati separation on (eg, for for non-molestation). (c) § 620 No 6 ZPO—a ZPO—a temporary temporary order order for for maintenan maintenance ce in favour favour of a spouse. spouse. Such an order only provides minimum or emergency maintenance (‘Notunterhalt’) and is not retrospective. Unless it is limited in time (‘befristet’), the order continues in force until the matter is otherwise finally resolved: § 620f ZPO. A separate action for maintenance (‘Unterhaltsklage’)—eg, during separation, under § 1361 BGB—remains possible and may be necessary, necessary, if arrears exist exi st or the matter is too t oo complex to be dealt with summarily. summarily. In an action under § 1361 BGB, such maintenance maintena nce as is appropriate(‘angemessen’) according to the circumstances of the spouses (‘eheliche Lebensverhältnisse’) can  be claimed for the period since separation. The claimant must be in need (‘bedürftig’)—ie, unable to maintain himself (or herself) from his (or her) income (‘Einkommen’) or assets (‘Vermögen’)—and the other spouse must be able to pay (‘leistungsfähig’).  A claimant, who is out of work, must only take ta ke up employment, if this can be expected of him according to his personal circumstances and the economic circumstances of both spouses: § 1361 (ii) BGB. (d) § 620 Nos 7 and 8 ZPO—a ZPO—a temporary temporary order order relating relating to the the use of the matrimonial matrimonial home and contents. (e) (e) § 620 No 9 ZPO—a ZPO—a temporar temporaryy order order for an advance advance of the the costs costs of the 152 proceedings (‘Prozeßkostenvorschuss’). Temporary orders remain effective effect ive until the issue i ssue in question is otherwise ot herwise resolved (‘anderweitig geregelt’) or the marriage matter is dismissed or withdrawn: § 620f  ZPO. Thus, temporary orders can continue in force beyond and despite the ‘Rechtskraft’ of a divorce. 141

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2

‘Verfahren ‘Verfahren in anderen Familiensachen’  (proceedings in other family matters; §§ 621–621f).

(i)   ‘Ehesachen’   are to be distinguished from other family matters (‘andere Familiensachen’). These are listed in § 621 (i) ZPO : – – – – – – – – –

parental care are / custody (‘elterliche Sorge’); access (‘Umgang’) by the parent not having custody; release (‘Herausgabe’) of a child to the other parent; maintenance (‘Unterhalt’) of a child; maintenance of a spouse (‘Ehegattenunterhalt’); the ‘Versorgungsausgleich’ (equalization of pension and disability expectancies); regu regulat latio ion n of righ rights ts to to the the marit marital al hom homee and and cont conten ents ts;; clai claims ms unde underr mari marita tall prop proper erty ty law law (‘Güterrecht’); appl applic icat ation ionss und under er §§ 1382 1382 and and 1383 1383 BG BGB B (ie (ie,, for for a ‘Stundung’ (respite) of  or ‘Anrechnung’ (set-off) against the ‘Ausgleichsforderung’  (balancing claim) normally due on divorce under § 1378(i) BGB).

If an ‘Ehesache’  is or was pending at first instance, that court has exclusive  jurisdictio  jurisd iction: n: § 621 (ii), 1st sentence sente nce ZPO. Moreover, Moreov er, if an ‘Ehesache’  becomes pending, the court at first instance must transfer the (other family) matter to the court of the ‘Ehesache’. § 621 (iii) ZPO. In other words, there is a concentration of  the proceedings at the court of the ‘Ehesache’. (ii) (ii) In the the abs absen ence ce of an an ‘Ehesache’, (local) jurisdiction and procedure in other (isolated) family matters is governed partly by the ZPO and partly by the FGG, depending on the type of matter involved. The position is complex. Local jurisdiction juri sdiction is determined  by the ‘general ‘general provisions provisions’’ (§ 621(ii), 621(ii), 2nd sentence sentence ZPO), ZPO), eg, for maintenance maintenance claims claims § 12ff ZPO, for custody § 36 FGG, for marital property § 45 FGG. Procedure Procedure in isolated family matters is governed by the FGG and the HausratsVO, HausratsVO, insofar as the ZPO or GVG do not contain special provisions: § 621 a ZPO. In maintenance and marital property disputes, the ZPO applies.153 (iii) The key to the success of a maintenance and/or marital marital property claim is the provision of information (‘Auskunft’) regarding the income (‘Einkommen’) and assets (‘Vermögen’) of the other party. For the purpose of a maintenance claim (‘Unterhaltsanspruch’),   the basic (substantive) provision is § 1605 BGB,  which is of corresponding application: – durin duringg sep separ arat ation ion:: § 1361( 1361(iv iv), ), 4th sent senten ence ce BG BGB; B; and and – after after divorc divorce: e: § 1580 1580 BGB. BGB. § 1605( 1605(i) i) BGB BGB provid provides es that that dir direct ect relativ relatives es(‘Verwandte in gerader Linie’)  must, on demand, provide each other with information regarding their income and assets in so far as it i t is necessary to establish a claim to maintenance or a maintenance obligation. Income must, on request, be evidenced by vouchers (‘Belege’). Moreover, if there is reason to believe that assets are not properly revealed, an assurance in lieu of oath can be demanded. It is very important that the demand (‘Aufforderung’) for information—and any necessary application (‘Antrag’) to the court—exactly specifies: 142

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– the period (‘Zeitraum’), for which information regarding income is sought;154 and – the reference dates (‘Stichtage’), as at which information regarding assets is sought Under the usual German marital property regime (the ‘Zugewinngemeinschaft’ (community based on gain) § 1363ff BGB), these reference dates are: the date of the marriage and the date of service of any divorce petition; otherwise, the Güterstandes’): date, at which the parties’ property status ends (‘Beendigung des Güterstandes’) § 1384 BGB. Following a petition for divorce or other termination of the spouses’ property status, each spouse must (on demand) give the other information regarding his or her final assets (‘Endvermögen’): § 1379 BGB. The gain (‘Zugewinn’), which must be equalized (‘ausgeglichen’) between them, is the excess of the final assets over the initial assets (‘Anfangsvermögen’): § 1373 BGB.155 Unless a schedule (‘Verzeichnis’) of their respective initial assets was concluded  jointl  jointlyy (‘gemeinsam’) by the spouses, it is presumed, unless proved to the contrary that the final assets of a spouse represent his or her gain: § 1377(iii) BGB. However, assets which a spouse acquires during the marriage by way of  succession, succession, gift or dowry (‘Ausstattung’) are left out of account when calculating the gain. They are added to the initial assets: § 1374(ii) BGB. The value of such additions to the initial assets is assessed at the time of acquisition: § 1376(i) BGB. Similarly, if a spouse engages in manipulation by means of  disproportionate gifts, squandering of assets or other deliberate acts to the disadvantage of the other spouse, such ‘reductions in wealth’ (‘Vermögensminderungen’)  increase the final assets, unless the relevant acts took place more than ten years before the end of the spouses’ property status or were undertaken with the consent of the other spouse: § 1375(ii) and (iii) BGB. The value of such ‘reductions’ is assessed at the time they occurred: § 1376(ii) 137 6(ii) BGB. Further, Further, transfers in money’s worth (‘Zuwendungen’), which were received by a spouse from the other ‘inter vivos’ in advance on the basis that they should  be set off against the donee’s claim to equalization equalization(‘Ausgleichsforderung’),  must  be taken into account when calculating that person’s claim (‘Anrechnung von Vorausempfängen’) . In particular, there is a presumption that set-off was intended in the case of unusually large transfers (ie, those which exceed the value of such occasional gifts (‘Gelegenheitsgeschenke’) as are normal according to the circumstances of the spouses): § 1380(i) BGB. (iv) (iv) Although Although maintenance maintenance (also during separation) can be the subject of an agreement between the spouses (‘Unterhaltsvertrag’), a waiver of maintenance for the future (whilst the marriage is in existence) is not possible: § 1614 BGB. Moreover, Moreover, past maintenance obligations (arrears) can normally only be claimed from the time the debtor is placed in delay (‘Verzug’; § 284 BGB) or the claim  becomes legally pending (‘rechtshängig’): § 1613(i) BGB.156 (v)) A step (v step-a -act ctio ion n (‘Stufenklage’,  § 254 ZPO) is appropriate, if, following the 143

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provision of information, it is desired to make an application for payment in the same proceedings.157 3

‘Scheidungs- und Folgesachen’ (divorce and ancillary matters; §§ 622–630 ). §§ 622–630 ZPO contain special procedural rules for divorce and ancillary matters. Precondition for a divorce (‘Scheidung’) is the failure/breakdown of the marriage (‘Scheitern/Zerrüttung der Ehe’): § 1565(i), 1st sentence BGB. (a) (a) Proc Procee eed dings ings for for divorce are commenced by the lodging of a written application (‘Antragsschrift’), the parties being referred to as ‘Antragsteller’ (petitioner) and ‘Antragsgegner’ (respondent). The application has to specify (§ 622 ZPO): – whet whethe herr the there re are are min minor or child childrren of the the fam family ily;; – wheth whether er ther theree is a sugg suggest ested ed arran arrangem gement ent regar regardin dingg cust custody ody;; and and – whet whethe herr othe otherr fami family ly mat matte ters rs ar are pend pendin ing. g. The provisions regarding the ‘Klageschrift’   (§ 253 ZPO) are of corresponding application. By § 630 ZPO, where a divorce after one year’s separation separation (‘Trennung’) with mutual consent (a so-called ‘einverständliche Scheidung’ under § 1566(i) BGB) is sought, the divorce petition must also include: – a state statemen mentt that that the the other other spou spouse se will will cons consent ent or make make a similar similar applic applicatio ation; n; – the spou spouses ses’’ agreed agreed prop propose osed d arrang arrangeme ements nts regar regardin dingg custod custodyy and acce access ss to to 158 their children; – the spouses’ agreement (‘Einigung’) regarding maintenance and rights to the marital home and contents.159 A spouse can only obtain a divorce against the wishes of the other – before before three three years years’’ separ separatio ation, n, if, if, on the the basi basiss of an an objec objective tive assess assessmen mentt and and prognosis, the court concludes that the marital community (‘Lebensgemeinschaft’) between the spouses no longer exists and that there is no chance/prospect of its resumption (‘Wiederherstellung’) by the spouses (ie, such a resumption is ‘aussichtslos’): § 1565(i), 2nd sentence BGB; or – after after thre threee years years’’ separa separatio tion, n, at whic which h time time the irre irretri trieva evable ble bre breakd akdow own n (‘unheilbare Zerrüttung’) of the marriage is irrefutably presumed (‘unwiderlegbar verermutet’): § 1566(ii) BGB. Divorce before one year’s separation is only possible, if, for reasons which lie in the person of the respondent, the continuation of the marriage would represent an unacceptable hardship (‘unzumutbare Härte’) for the applicant: § 1565(ii) BGB.160 By § 1568 BGB, the so-called ‘hardship clause’, despite the fact that a marriage has failed (‘gescheitert ist’), a divorce can be prevented: – if and and so so lon longg as as for for spec specia iall rea reaso sons ns (‘besondere Gründe’) it is exceptionally necessary (‘ausnahmsweise notwendig’) to uphold the marriage in the interest of minor children of the family; or – if and and so so long long as as beca becaus usee of ext extra raor ordi dina nary ry cir circu cums msta tanc nces es (‘außergewöhnliche Umstände’) a divorce would involve such serious hardship (‘schwere Härte’) for the respondent as to make it appear exceptionally necessary to uphold the marriage, even after taking into account the concerns of the petitioner petiti oner.. 144

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4 5

(b) Where Where proceeding proceedingss for divorce divorce are pending, pending, the matters matters listed listed in § 621 (i) ZPO are referred to as ancillary matters ((‘Scheidungs-’) ‘Folgesachen’), ie, they are matters regarding which one of the parties requires a decision in the event of divorce (‘für den Fall der Scheidung’):  § 623(i) ZPO (eg, post-marital maintenance (‘nachehelicher Unterhalt’) ). Apart from issues of custody over a  joint child and the settlement settlement of pension pension expectancie expectanciess (‘Versorgungsausgleich’) — which form part of an official ‘Amtsverbund’ (§ 623(iii) ZPO)—applications concerning ancillary matters are at the disposition di sposition of the parties. They can be made individually or in the form of a step-action (‘Stufenklage’; § 254 ZPO).161 Provided an application regarding an ancillary matter (‘Verbundantrag’) is pending at court (‘anhängig’) before the end of the oral hearing at first instance, insta nce, it must be heard at the same time as, and together with, the divorce application (in a composite ‘Verbund’): § 623(ii) ZPO. Either of the parties can apply for separation (‘Abtrennung’) of ancillary matters relating to children or spousal maintenance, which are then detached (‘herausgelöst’)   from the ‘Verbund’  and continue as isolated family matters outside the ‘Verbund’ (‘außerhalb des Verbundes’). The separation of other ancillary matters is only possible in certain circumstances: § 628 ZPO.162  There is (only) a joint decision (in the form of an ‘Urteil’), if the divorce petition (‘Scheidungsantrag’) is granted (‘stattgegeben’): § 629(i) ZPO. Ancillary matters  become irrelevant irrelevant (‘gegenstandslos’),  if the divorce petition is rejected, although the right to pursue them as isolated family matters can be reserved on application: § 629(iii) ZPO. Once a declaration of divorce (‘Scheidungsausspruch’) is ‘rechtskräftig’ (ie, has final legal force), a decision regarding an ancillary matter also becomes effective: § 629d ZPO. ‘Verfahren ‘Verfahren auf Nichtigerklärung Nichtigerklärung und auf Feststellung Feststellung des Bestehens oder Nichtbestehens einer Ehe’  (proceedings for declaration of nullity and for establishment of the existence or non-existence of a marriage; §§ 631–638 ). The rule ruless on cost costss in marri marriage age matt matters ers (eg, (eg, wher wheree there there is is a comp composi osite te decis decision ion regarding divorce and ancillary matters) are set out in § 93a ZPO. (c) Section 3 (§§ 6411–644 ZPO)

Section 3 contains two Titles: Title 1: Title 2:

‘Vereinfachtes ‘Vereinfachtes Verfahren zur Abänderung Abänderun g von Unterhaltstiteln’ Unterhaltsti teln’  (simplified proceedings for the alteration of maintenance judgments; §§ 641–641t ). ‘Verfahren ‘Verfahren über den Regelunterhalt Regelun terhalt nichtehelicher nichteh elicher Kinder’  (proceedings regarding ‘standard’ maintenance for illegitimate children; §§ 642–644 ).

145

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7

Book VII (§§ 688–703d ZPO): The ‘Mahnverfahren’ 

Book VII of the ZPO (‘Mahnverfahren’;   §§ 688–703d) deals with the default notice procedure, procedure, which is a commonly-used method for collection of undisputed debts.163 8

Book VIII (§§ 704–945 ZPO): ‘Zwangsvollstreckung’ 164

(a) Content

Book VIII of the ZPO (‘Zwangsvollstreckung’; enforcement) is divided into five Sections: Section 1:  ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften’ (general provisions; §§ 704–802). Section 2: ‘Zwangsvollstreckung wegen Geldforderungen’ (enforcement of money claims; §§ 803–882a). Section 3:   ‘Zwangsvollstreckung zur Erwirkung der Herausgabe von Sachen und zur Erwirkung von Handlungen oder Unterlassungen’  (enforcement for the purpose of achieving the release of things and the undertaking of actions or omissions; §§ 883–898). Section 4: ‘Eidesstattliche Versicherung und Haft’ (assurance in lieu of oath and custody; §§ 899–915). Section 5: ‘Arrest und einstweilige Verfügung’ (arrest and injunction; §§ 916–945). The ‘Zwangsvollstreckung’ referred to in Book VIII of the ZPO is an independent part of civil procedure. It also applies to judgments (‘Urteile’) and orders (‘Beschlüsse’) in employment matters (§§ 62, 85 ArbGG). However, However, administrative acts and tax claims are enforced under different different provisions (the (federal or state) ‘Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetz’  (VwVG) and the (federal) ‘Abgabenordnung’ (AO)).165 (b) (b ) Section I (§§ 704–802 ZPO)

Section 1 contains a complex mixture of provisions and terminology of great practical importance. However, However, the scattering of relevant paragraphs makes an understanding of the system difficult. The topics dealt with in Section 1 can be set out in i n the following main groups: (i) (i) Enfo Enforc rcem emen entt of (fina (final) l) judg judgme ment ntss (‘(End)urteile’): § 704. Final judgments are enforceable titles (‘Titel’ /‘Vollstreckungstitel’), if they are ‘rechtskräftig’ (ie, have (formal) legal force) or have been declared ‘vorläufig vollstreckbar’ (provisionally enforceable). (ii) Other titles capable capable of enforcemen enforcement: t: §§ 794–801. These include (§ 794(i)): No 1: No 2: No 4: No 5: 5:

a pr proced ocedu ural ral set settl tlem emen entt (‘Prozeßvergleich’)  reached before a German court; an orde orderr for for the the fix fixin ingg of of cos costs ts (‘Kostenfestsetzungsbeschluß’); an enfo enforrcemen ementt noti noticce (‘Vollstreckungsbescheid’); (‘vollstreckbare Urkunde’). an enf enforce orceab able le doc documen umentt (‘vollstreckbare

(iii) iii) Form Formal al leg legal al for force (‘formelle Rechtskraft’)  of judgments: §§ 705–706.166 (iv) (iv) Prov Provis isio iona nall enfo enforrceab ceabil ilit ityy (‘vorläufige Vollstreckbarkeit’) of judgments: §§ 708–720a:167 146

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(‘Sicherheitsleistung’)  by the creditor: §§ 708–710; Apart deposit of of se security (‘Sicherheitsleistung’)  from certain types of judgment listed in § 708 (eg, judgments in default under § 331 ZPO), the general rule is that judgments are declared provisionally enforceable, subject to the creditor lodging security: § 709. The form and amount of the security (‘Art und Höhe der Sicherheit’) are Sicherheit’) are decided upon by the court: § 108 ZPO. If deposit of security by the creditor is not possible or presents serious difficulties (‘erhebliche Schwierigkeiten’), the Schwierigkeiten’), the creditor can apply for a declaration of provisional enforceability without his having to lodge security: § 710; prot protec ectio tion n of of the the debt debtor or again against st enfo enforrcemen cementt (‘Vollstreckungsschutz’); The ZPO seeks to protect the debtor against enforcement in two ways: by making available certain legal remedies during enforcement (‘Rechtsbehelfe in der Zwangsvollstreckung’; see Zwangsvollstreckung’; see (xi) below) and by laying down various restrictions/ prohibitions on distraint (‘Pfändungsbeschränkungen’ / ‘Pfändungsverbote’) in movable assets and earned income(‘Arbeitseinkommen’), income (‘Arbeitseinkommen’), so-called  so-called ‘Pfändungsschutz’ (protection against distraint). The relevant assets are declared ‘unpfändbar’ (unseizable).168 One must also bear in mind that the question of the debtor’s (‘Vollstreckungsschutz’)  can become relevant in two different places: protection (‘Vollstreckungsschutz’) can (‘Prozeßgericht’): §§ 711–714. In th thee cou court rt hear hearin ing g the the case case (‘Prozeßgericht’): § 711 provides for certain exceptions to § 708, whereby a debtor must be allowed to avoid enforcement enforcement by deposit of security. security. By § 712, even if the creditor has deposited security securi ty,, a debtor can c an make a protective application (‘Schutzantrag’)  (‘Schutzantrag’)  for avoidance of enforcement by deposit of security  if enforcement would (‘Abwendung der Vollstreckung Vollstreckung durch Sicherheitsleistung’), Sicherheitsleistung ’), if cause the debtor irreplaceable damage (‘einen nicht zu ersetzenden Nachteil’). Nachteil’) . If the debtor is not in a position to lodge security (‘nicht dazu in der Lage’), the judgment cannot be declared provisionally enforceable, but preventive enforcement (§ 720a; see below) is possible: § 712(i), 2nd sentence. • In the en enforcement co court (‘Vollstreckungsgericht’) : § 765a. On application by the debtor, debtor, the enforcement court can fully or partially quash, prohibit or temporarily suspend any measure of enforcement, if it would place an immoral burden on the debtor (‘eine Härte…die mit den  guten Sitten nicht vereinbar ist’), full ist’), full account being taken of the creditor’s need for protection: § 765a. ‘Rechtspfleger’,  who, acting as the ‘enforcement The decision is taken by the ‘Rechtspfleger’, who, court’. is the officer responsible for dealing with most enforcement business (§ 20 Nos 12 and 17 RPflG). § 765a only applies in very exceptional circumstances and should be strictly construed. It illustrates the problems involved in trying to achieve a balance (‘Ausgleich’) between (‘Ausgleich’) between the conflicting interests of the creditor and the debtor;169 •

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temp tempor orar ary y sus suspe pens nsio ion n of of enf enfor orce ceme ment nt (‘einstweilige Einstellung’): Einstellung’) : § 707 (§ 719);170 147

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when provisional enforceability ends; liability of the plaintiff: § 717; Provisional enforceability lapses, insofar as the relevant judgment or declaration of  provisional enforceability is quashed or amended by another judgment: § 717(i). In those circumstances, a plaintiff must compensate the defendant, if the latter has suffered damage due to the enforcement of the judgment or because of a measure taken (‘Leistung’) by the defendant to avoid such enforcement: § 717(ii); preventive enforcement (‘Sicherungsvollstreckung’): § 720a (750(iii)).

Enforcement of a judgment dependent on the lodging of security by the creditor can only begin, if the deposit of security is evidenced by a public or publicly certified document and it has been served on the debtor: § 751(ii). However, preventive enforcement of a money judgment can begin without security being lodged, provided the judgment and enforcement clause have been served at least 2 weeks  before: § 750(iii). The creditor can only undertake distraint(‘Pfändung’), but cannot satisfy himself by realisation (‘Verwertung’):  § 720a(i). Preventive enforcement is, therefore, a means of safeguarding a creditor’s position similar to that of an ‘Arrest’  (§ 930ff ZPO). (v) Application for a period to give up possession of residential premises (Räumungsfrist für Wohnraum’): § 721 (794a). (vi) Enforcement of foreign judgments: §§ 722–723.171 (vii) The ‘enforcement duplicate’ (‘vollstreckbare Ausfertigung’) of the judgment and enforcement clause (‘Vollstreckungsklausel’):  §§ 724–734. These are normally issued  by the document officer of the court (‘Urkundsbeamter der Geschäftsstelle’) : §§ 724(ii) and 725.172 Usually, only one ‘vollstreckbare Ausfertigung’ can be issued: § 733. (viii) Enforcement in the assets of particular persons (eg, unregistered associations, partnerships, married and deceased persons): §§ 735–745, 747–749, 778–785. (ix) Commencement of enforcement: title (‘Titel’), clause (‘Klausel’), specification of  the parties (‘Parteibezeichnung’), service (‘Zustellung’)  and fulfillment of other conditions: §§ 750–751. (x) The ‘enforcement organs’ (‘Vollstreckungsorgane’): §§ 753–765, 802. The main enforcement organs are the bailiff (‘Gerichtsvollzieher’) and the enforcement court (‘Vollstreckungsgericht’). 173 Exclusive jurisdiction lies with the district court (‘Amtsgericht’), in whose area a particular act of enforcement is to be /has been undertaken: § 764. (xi) Legal remedies during enforcement (‘Rechtsbehelfe in der Zwangsvollstreckung’): §§ 766–777, 793 ZPO, 11 RPflG.174 Where an objection (‘Einwendung’) is (to be) raised: – against the manner (‘Art und Weise’)  of enforcement (ie, against an act or measure of enforcement (‘Vollstreckungsakt’ / ‘-maßnahme’) by the enforcement court or a bailiff (‘Gerichtsvollzieher’)  or regarding the procedure to be observed 148

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 by the latter), the remedy is the so-called ‘Vollstreckungserinnerung’ (enforcement reminder) to (the judge in) the enforcement court: § 766 ZPO. It is available so long as the relevant enforcement (measure) is still taking place. To be strictly distinguished is the (‘befristete’) ‘Erinnerung’ against a decision by a ‘Rechtspfleger’ under § 11 RPflG, which (initially) goes back to the‘Rechtspfleger’.175 A decision by the judge under § 766 can be (further) challenged by an immediate complaint (‘sofortige Beschwerde’): § 793; – against the enforcement title (‘Vollstreckungstitel’)  (ie, against the (material) claim (‘Anspruch’)  itself, as established by the court hearing the case (‘Prozeßgericht’)), the remedy is the so-called ‘Vollstreckungsgegen-’ or ‘Vollstreckungsabwehrklage’  (enforcement counter- or resistance action) to the court hearing the case at first instance: § 767(i). It is only available, if the grounds upon which the objection is based arose after the end of the last oral hearing and the debtor was (genuinely) not in a position to raise it during the proceedings: § 767(ii) and (iii); – against the grant of the enforcement clause(‘Erteilung der Vollstreckungsklausel’), the remedy (for the debtor) is an action along the lines of the ‘Vollstreckungsgegenklage’  (§ 768) or an ‘Erinnerung’ (reminder; § 732). Similarly, the creditor can bring an action for grant of the enforcement clause (§ 731) or lodge a complaint (‘Beschwerde’) § 567). Both the ‘Prozeßgericht’ and the ‘Vollstreckungsgericht’  can make temporary orders (‘einstweilige Anordnungen’) directing temporary suspension (‘einstweilige Einstellung’)  of enforcement or continuation only against deposit of security (‘Fortsetzung gegen Sicherheitsleistung’): §§ 766(i), 2nd sentence, 732(ii), 769(i) and (ii). Temporary suspension can be ordered with or without security, although the former is the rule: § 707(i), 2nd sentence. Temporary orders are of practical importance, because mere issue of a ‘Vollstreckungsgegenklage’   does not stop enforcement taking place. However, where §§ 767 and 768 are concerned, the enforcement court only has jurisdiction in ‘urgent cases’. To be distinguished from temporary suspension is final suspension (or limitation) of enforcement, which must be ordered (§ 775), if, for example: – the judgment to be enforced has been quashed on appeal; – an application under § 766 or § 767 has been successful; or – the creditor has been satisfied after pronouncement of the judgment to be enforced. Suspension of enforcement does not affect measures already taken. These can only be quashed by means of an order of annulment (‘Aufhebungsanordnung’): §§ 769(i) and 776. (xii) Costs of enforcement and help from other authorities: §§ 788–792. 149

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(c) Section 2 (§§ 803–882a ZPO) (i) What can be enforced Section 2 details the procedure of enforcement of titles directed to the payment of  money claims (‘Geldforderungen’).  To be strictly distinguished therefrom is enforcement of claims to the release of things (‘Herausgabe von Sachen’) or to the undertaking of  actions or omissions (‘Handlungen oder Unterlassungen’), dealt with in Section 3. (ii) Content Section 2 contains four Titles:

‘Zwangsvollstreckung in das bewegliche Vermögen’ (enforcement in movable assets; §§ 803–863). 2: ‘Zwangsvollstreckung in das unbewegliche Vermögen’ (enforcement in immovable assets; §§ 864–371). 3:   ‘Verteilungsverfahren’ (distribution procedure; §§ 872–882). 4: ‘Zwangsvollstreckung gegen juristische Personen des öffentlichen Rechts’ (enforcement against public corporations; § 882a). 1:

(iii) Against what can be enforced Titles 1 and 2 of Section 2 distinguish the manner of enforcement in movable and

immovable assets. The object of enforcement is dependent on the wording of the title to be enforced (‘Vollstreckungstitel’),  although enforcement usually extends to the debtor’s total assets (‘das gesamte Vermögen’)176 Against which particular assets a creditor chooses to enforce is up to him.177 Enforcement against assets of the ‘Bund’, a ‘Land’ or other public corporations or institutions is, however, subject to restrictions: § 882a. (iv) ‘Das bewegliche Vermögen’: movable assets Title 1 (enforcement in movable assets) is divided into three Parts: I: General provisions: §§ 803–807 . II: Enforcement in corporeal things (‘körperliche Sachen’): §§ 808–827 . III: Enforcement in claims (‘Forderungen’)   and other valuable rights (‘andere Vermögensrechte’): §§ 828–863 .

The term ‘bewegliches Vermögen’ (movable assets), accordingly, includes claims and other valuable rights belonging to the debtor. He may, for example, have money claims ( ‘Geldforderungen’,   eg, debts or income) or claims to release of a ‘Sache’ (‘Herausgabeansprüche’), against which claims the creditor can enforce.178 (v) ‘Pfändung’ and ‘Verwertung’

§ 803(i) states that enforcement in movable assets takes place by way of ‘Pfändung’ (distraint). It is a form of compulsory seizure (‘Beschlagnahme’).179 The following points should be noted:

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the term ‘Pfändung’ is used with regard to ‘körperliche Sachen’, ‘Forderungen’ and ‘andere Vermögensrechte’ (ie, throughout Title 1); – while the ‘Pfändung’ of ‘körperliche Sachen’ is undertaken by the ‘Gerichtsvollzieher’ (court bailiff), it is the ‘Amtsgericht’ (district court) acting as enforcement court (‘Vollstreckungsgericht’),  which deals with the ‘Pfändung’  of the debtor’s claims and other valuable rights.180 The responsible officer in the court is the ‘Rechtspfleger’ (§ 20 No 17 RPflG). Applications for enforcement by court bailiff can be made in writing or orally. They are distributed to the appropriate ‘Gerichtsvollzieher’   by the ‘Gerichtsvollzieherver-teilungsstelle’  (bailiffs’ distribution office) of the relevant ‘Amtsgericht’. Possession of the ‘vollstreckbare Ausfertigung’ (enforcement duplicate) empowers the bailiff to carry out acts of enforcement, to receive the relevant ‘Leistung’ from the debtor and to give a receipt (‘Quittung’): § 755 ZPO. A search of premises can be undertaken by the bailiff (§ 758 ZPO), but, in accordance with the constitution (Article 13(ii) GG), a search order from a judge (‘Durchsuchungsanordnung’) is always required if access is refused, unless there is ‘Gefahr in Verzug’, ie, delay would endanger the purpose of the search;181 – enforcement involves not merely ‘Pfändung’,  but also, as a further stage, the ‘Verwertung’  (realisation) of the movable asset. The manner of realisation is distinguished according to whether ‘Sachen’ or ‘Forderungen’ are involved.182 With regard to ‘körperliche Sachen’, ‘Pfändung’ involves the court bailiff taking them into possession: § 808(i) ZPO. Those ‘Sachen’ not being money, valuables or securities must be left in the custody (‘Gewahrsam’) of the debtor, insofar as satisfaction of the creditor is not endangered. The ‘Pfändung’ of such items is then only effective, if it is made visible, for example, by means of the application of seals (‘Siegel’): § 808(ii) ZPO. The effect of ‘Pfändung’  is that the creditor acquires a public law distraint lien (‘Pfändungspfandrecht’)   over the relevant item: § 804(i) ZPO. A prior lien takes precedence over a later one: § 804(iii) ZPO. In principle, ‘Pfändung’ takes place regardless of ownership.183 However, if a third party asserts that he has a (contrary) right preventing disposal (‘ein die Veräußerung hinderndes Recht’) (eg, that he is the rightful owner), he can lodge a so-called ‘Drittwiderspruchsklage’ (third party objection writ) at the court, in whose area enforcement took place: § 771 (i) ZPO. The tenor of the judgment is that enforcement in the relevant ‘Sache’ (not only a movable) or ‘Vermögenswert’ is declared ‘unzulässig’ (ie, is disallowed). While the purpose of § 771 is the protection of a substantive right by means of a ‘Klage’—as under §§ 767 and 768 ZPO (all referred to as ‘prozessuale Gestaltungsklagen’) -the ‘Vollstreckungserinnerung’  under § 766 ZPO involves a complaint against an infringement of the manner or procedure (‘Art und Weise’/‘Verfahren’) of enforcement, ie, against an enforcement measure. The remedies can be pursued concurrently.184 151

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The court order for ‘Pfändung’ of a debtor’s money claims (‘Geldforderungen’) is referred to as a ‘Pfändungsbeschluß’ (attachment order). The ‘Pfändungsbeschluß’ must  be served on the third party debtor (‘Drittschuldner’) by the creditor: § 829(ii) ZPO. By § 840(i) ZPO, the ‘Drittschuldner’ can be required to inform the creditor within two weeks of service of the ‘Pfändungsbeschluß’: – – –

whether and to what extent he acknowledges the claim as well-founded and is prepared to make payment; whether there are other persons who assert rights to the claim and, if so, which; and whether the claim has already been distrained against by other creditors and, if  so, in respect of which demands.

If the ‘Drittschuldner’  fails to make the necessary declarations, he is liable to the creditor for any loss. By § 845 ZPO, as soon as a creditor holds an enforceable judgment (‘vollstreckbarer Schuldtitel’), he can ask the court bailiff to serve a notification (‘Benachrichtigung’) of an imminent ‘Pfändung’ on the third party debtor. This so-called ‘Pfändungsankündigung’/  ‘Vorpfändung (predestraint (warning)) has the effect of a seizure (‘Arrest’) under § 930 ZPO, provided ‘Pfändung’ of the claim follows within one month of service. (vi) ‘Das unbewegliche Vermögen’: immovable assets

A creditor can choose between three means of enforcement in a piece of land (‘Grundstück’): –

registration in the land register of a ‘Sicherungshypothek’ (security mortgage)185 for an amount of more than DM 1.500; –   ‘Zwangsversteigerung’ (compulsory sale by auction); –   ‘Zwangsverwaltung’ (compulsory administration).186 ‘Zwangsversteigerung’  and ‘Zwangsverwaltung’  are dealt with in the ‘Gesetz über die Zwangsversteigerung und Zwangsverwaltung (ZVG) of 24.3.1897.187 (vii) The ‘Verteilungsverfahren’

This is a court procedure for the distribution amongst creditors of an amount of money insufficient to satisfy all of them following enforcement in the debtor’s movable assets. (d) Section 3 (§§ 883–398 ZPO)188 Section 3 details the manner of enforcement necessary to compel a debtor, for example:

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to release movables or give possession of immovables (‘Herausgabe’): §§ 883–886 ZPO; or to undertake acts or omissions (‘Handlungen oder Unterlassungen’) or to tolerate a particular action (‘Duldung’): §§ 887–890 ZPO.

Acts are classified according to whether they can be undertaken by a third party (‘vertretbare Handlungen’; § 887 ZPO) or not (‘unvertretbare Handlungen’) § 888 ZPO).189 If a debtor fails to undertake a ‘vertretbare Handlung’, he can be made to bear the cost of substituted action (‘Ersatzvornahme’). An ‘unvertretbare Handlung’ solely dependent 152

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on the will of the debtor can, on application, be enforced by a compulsory fine (‘Zwangsgeld’)  of up to DM 50.000 or by imprisonment (‘Zwangshaft’)  of up to six months. Actions for restraining orders (‘Unterlassungsklagen’) and for orders to tolerate particular action (‘Duldungsklagen’) can, on application, be enforced by a compulsory fine (‘Ordnungsgeld’) of up to DM 500.000 for each infringement or by imprisonment (‘Ordnungshaft’) of up to six months and not more than two years in total: § 890 ZPO.190 The debtor must be heard before the court reaches a decision under §§ 887–890. § 889 ZPO relates to the making of an assurance in lieu of oath (‘eidesstattliche Versicherung’)   pursuant to an obligation under civil law (eg, §§ 259, 260 BGB).  Jurisdiction lies with the ‘Amtsgericht’ (District Court)—acting as enforcement court— for the debtor’s domicile (‘Wohnsitz’) or place of residence (‘Aufenthaltsort’) in Germany, failing which for the area of the (procedural) court of first instance. If the debtor does not appear or refuses to give the assurance, the same sanction is available as for enforcement of an ‘unvertretbare Handlung’. The ‘eidesstattliche Versicherung’ under civil law is to be strictly distinguished from its procedural use in the ZPO to substantiate an assertion of fact (‘Glaubhaftmachung’; § 294 ZPO), to support an application (eg, for an injunction §§ 936, 920(ii) ZPO) or as a means of facilitating enforcement (§§ 807, 883 ZPO).191 (e) Section 4 (§§ 899–915 ZPO)192

§§ 899–915 ZPO detail the procedure where an application is made by a creditor under § 807 or § 883 ZPO for disclosure of assets (‘Vermögensoffenbarung’)  by a debtor. By § 807 ZPO in conjunction with § 900 ZPO, if, where a claim for payment of  money (‘Geldforderung’) is involved, a creditor cannot obtain complete satisfaction (‘vollständige Befriedigung’)  by means of ‘Pfändung’—either because enforcement is fruitless (‘fruchtlos’) or hopeless (‘aussichtslos’)—the creditor can apply for the debtor to submit a list of assets (‘Vermögensverzeichnis’)  and to provide an assurance of means in lieu of oath (‘eidesstattliche Offenbarungsversicherung’).193 A creditor can make a similar application under § 883 ZPO, if (a) particular movable(s) to be released is/are not found by the bailiff. The debtor must confirm that he does not know the whereabouts of the movable(s). By § 899 ZPO, the application must be made to the ‘Amtsgericht’ (District Court), acting as enforcement court, for the domicile (‘Wohnsitz’; § 13 ZPO) of the debtor or, failing that, of his place of residence (‘Aufenthaltsort’) or last ‘Wohnsitz’ in Germany (§ 16 ZPO). Normally, the bailiff sets a date for the giving of the assurance of means(‘Termin zur  Abgabe der eidesstattlichen Versicherung’). The debtor is summoned to attend the hearing  by a ‘Ladung’ (summons) and the creditor must be informed. Instead, the bailiff can require the assurance to be given immediately (‘sofort’) as soon as the preconditions of § 807 ZPO are fulfilled, unless there are objections from the creditor or the debtor, in which case a hearing must take place: § 900(ii) ZPO. The bailiff can postpone the date for the giving of the assurance, if the debtor credibly asserts that he will satisfy the creditor within six months. A final extension of up to two months is possible, if the debtor proves that he has satisfied at least three-quarters of the claim: § 900(iii) ZPO. 153

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The court can also dismiss an application for the giving of an assurance, if, at the hearing before the bailiff, the debtor makes a well founded objection (‘begründeter Widerspruch’) against his liability to provide it: § 900(iv) ZPO. If the debtor does not appear or without reason refuses to give the assurance, arrest (‘Haft’) and up to 6 months imprisonment can be ordered: §§ 901, 913 ZPO. The enforcement court maintains a (black) list of debtors, who have given the assurance or against whom arrest has been ordered (‘Schuldnerverzeichnis’). The list is open to public inspection. Once the creditor has been satisfied, or 3 years have passed since the end of the year of registration (‘Eintragung’), the debtor can apply for his name to be erased (‘Löschung’; §§ 915, 915a ZPO). Within the first three years after the assurance is given, no further assurance can be demanded, unless the debtor has meantime acquired assets or has lost his employment: § 903 ZPO. (f) Section 5 (§§ 916–945 ZPO)194

(i) The purpose of an ‘Arrest’ (seizure) is limited to securing the enforcement of a money claim (‘Geldforderung’) or of an ‘Anspruch’ that can lead to a money claim: § 916(i) ZPO. Other (individual) claims or the keeping of the peace (‘Rechtsfrieden’) can be the subject of an injunction (‘einstweilige Verfügung’; §§ 935, 940 ZPO), which is a similar form of securing measure (‘Sicherungsmittel’). Thus, § 936 ZPO declares the provisions in the ZPO regarding a seizure order and the relevant procedure correspondingly applicable to that for an injunction, except as modified in subsequent paragraphs. (ii) The normal target of an ‘Arrest’  is a movable or immovable asset. Such an ‘Arrest’ is referred to as a ‘dinglicher Arrest’ (real seizure; § 917 ZPO), in contrast to a personal ‘Arrest’  (§ 918 ZPO), which is a very exceptional remedy. A ‘dinglicher Arrest’ is possible, if there are reasonable grounds for concern that, unless it is ordered, enforcement of the relevant judgment would be thwarted or rendered significantly more difficult: § 917(i) ZPO. An ‘Arrest’  in movable assets is effected by way of distraint (‘Pfändung’) and the same principles apply: § 930(i) ZPO. (iii) An application for a seizure order (‘Arrestbefehl’) can be made to the court having  jurisdiction in the main matter in dispute (‘Gericht der Hauptsache’)  or to the ‘Amtsgericht’ for the district, in which the intended object of the ‘Arrest’  is located: § 919 ZPO. Both courts are referred to as the ‘Arrestgericht’. The applicant must give details of the claim to be secured by the order (the ‘Arrestanspruch’) and substantiate the facts forming the basis for the order (the ‘Arrestgrund’): § 920(ii) ZPO. The court can reach a decision without an oral hearing and can require security to be lodged before an order is made, whether or not the applicant has shown a credible case: § 921 ZPO.

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If no main matter is (yet) pending, the ‘Amtsgericht’, which grants a seizure order to a party can, on application, order the party to lodge a proper writ (‘Klage’) within a specified period, failing which the ‘Arrest’  can be quashed: § 926 ZPO. (iv) Implementation of a seizure order must take place within one month after it is pronounced (in the form of an ‘Urteil’) or (if it is issued in the form of a ‘Beschluss’) within one month of its service on the applicant: § 929(ii) ZPO. 9

Book IX (§§ 946–1024 ZPO): The ‘Aufgebotsverfahren’ 195

Book IX of the ZPO (‘Aufgebotsverfahren’; §§ 946–1024) sets out the procedure for the issue of court notices requesting the notification of claims or rights where their exclusion is sought, eg, in the case of estate creditors (§§ 989ff). 10 Book X (§§ 1025–1048 ZPO): Arbitration 196

Book X of the ZPO (‘Schiedsrichterliches Verfahren’;  §§ 1025–1048) deals with the procedure for arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement (‘Schiedsvertrag’).

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CHAPTER XIV

XIV ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A INTRODUCTION The administration of federal laws is largely in the hands of the ‘Länder’ and administration by the ‘Bund’ (‘bundeseigene Verwaltung’) is the exception (Articles 83 and 86 GG). Federal ministeries normally have no ‘Verwaltungsunterbau’ (administrative sub-construction).1 Thus, by Article 87ff GG, the federal ministeries only have authorities (‘Behörden’)  beneath them in certain limited areas (eg, the ‘Auswärtiger Dienst’ (service of the Foreign Office (‘Auswärtiges Amt’)), the authorities responsible for federal finances and taxes (‘Bundesfinanzverwaltung’; Article 108 GG), national rivers (‘Bundeswasserstraßen’; Article 89 GG), the ‘Bundesgrenzschutz’  (Federal Border Guard), the ‘Bundeskriminalamt’  (Federal Office of Criminal Investigation), the federal military administration ( ‘Bundeswehrverwaltung’;   Article 87b GG) and the air traffic authorities (‘Luftverkehrsverwaltung’, Article 87d GG). Before their conversion into public limited companies, the ‘Bundespost’  (Federal Post Office) and the ‘Bundesbahn (Federal Railway) were both administered by the ‘Bund’. Now, however, only the latter remains under direct federal administration and services must be provided in private law form: Article 87e GG. Administrative law in Germany is complicated by the existence of a hierarchy of  numerous legal sources (‘Rechtsquellen’)  for the activities of the executive (‘Verwaltung’) on federal, state and local level, not to speak of European Community and public international law (‘Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und Völkerrecht’):2 1 ‘Das Grundgesetz’ (Basic Law)/ ‘Verfassung des Landes’ (state constitution); 2 (‘Einfache’) ‘Gesetze’ ((simple) statutes); 3   ‘Rechtsverordnungen’ (statutory instruments); 4   ‘Satzungen’  (bye-laws) of the ‘öffentlich-rechtlichen Körperschaften’   (public corporations); 5   ‘Gewohnheitsrecht’ (customary law); 6 ‘Allgemeine Grundsätze des Verwaltungsrechts’  (general principles of administrative law); 7   ‘Verwaltungsvorschriften’ ((internal) administrative regulations). Federal law always prevails over state law (Article 31 GG).3 B THE ‘VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ’4 1 Introduction

The two main statutes at federal level regarding general administrative law are the ‘Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz’  (VwVfG: Administrative Procedure Law) and the ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung’ (VwGO: Administrative Courts Order). 157

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Before the VwVfG came into force on 1.1.1977, the general principles of  administrative law were largely unwritten. The VwVfG basically applies to the administrative activity (‘Verwaltungstätigkeit’)  of federal authorities (‘Bundesbehörden’; § l(i)). Where federal law is carried out (‘ausgeführt’) by state and local authorities (as is the usual case), the federal VwVfG is displaced by the VwVfGesetze of the ‘Länder’, which are practically mirror images of the VwVfG (§ l(iii) VwVfG). The VwVfG does not apply where the activity of the executive is in the form of  private law (‘Verwaltungsprivatrecht’)  nor, for example, to the activities of the tax authorities (‘Finanzbehörden’, where the ‘Abgabenordnung’ (AO) 1977 applies), to the area of criminal prosecutions and minor offences (where the StPO and the OWiG apply) nor to the foreign activities of the ‘Bund’ (§ 2).5 2

Content

The VwVfG is divided into eight Parts of which the first six are as follows: Teil I: ‘Anwendungsbereich, örtliche Zuständigkeit, Amtshilfe’ (application, local  jurisdiction, official assistance; §§ 1–8). Teil II: ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften über das Verwaltungsverfahren’ (general provisions regarding administrative proceedings; §§ 9–34). Teil III:   ‘Verwaltungsakt’ (administrative act; §§ 35–53). Teil IV: ‘Öffentlich-rechtlicher Vertrag’  (public contract; §§ 54–62). Teil V: ‘Besondere Verfahrensarten’  (special types of administrative proceedings; §§63–78). Teil VI:   ‘Rechtsbehelfsverfahren’ (remedy proceedings; §§ 79–80).6 3 The ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’ 7

The VwVfG applies to ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’  (administrative proceedings), which is defined by § 9 as the activity (‘Tätigkeit’) of a ‘Behörde’ (authority), which – –

has external effect (‘Wirkung nach aussen’); and is directed either (a) to the examination of the conditions for, the preparation and issue of a ‘Verwaltungsakt’  (VA: administrative act; the large majority of cases) or (b) to the conclusion of an ‘öffentlich-rechtlicher Vertrag’ (public contract).

A ‘Behörde’ is defined for the purpose of the VwVfG as every ‘Stelle’ (point), which undertakes functions of public administration (§ l(iv)). A ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’  can be and is, as a rule, conducted informally (‘formlos’; § 10).8 Formal proceedings can, however, be required by statute, in which case certain supplementary provisions apply (§§ 63–71). The parties to (and conduct of) a ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’  are dealt with in §§ 11–30 VwVfG.

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The relevant ‘Behörde’   has discretion whether and when to conduct the ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’  and investigates the facts itself (§§ 22, 1st sentence and 24(i)). The parties are referred to as ‘Beteiligte’ (persons involved) and have rights to: – – – –

information (Auskunft’) as to their rights and duties (§ 25); a hearing (‘Anhörung’; § 28);9 inspection of the file(s) (‘Akteneinsicht’; § 29);10 secrecy (‘Geheimhaltung’; § 30). C THE ‘VERWALTUNGSAKT’ (VA)11

1 Definition

The important concept of the ‘Verwaltungsakt’  is defined in § 35, 1st sentence VwVfG and consists of the following elements:12 (a)  ‘jede Verfügung, Entscheidung oder andere hoheitliche Maßnahme’ (every direction, decision or other official measure); (b)  ‘von einer Behörde’ (by an authority); (c) ‘zur Einzelfallregelung auf dem Gebiet des öffentlichen Rechts’ (to regulate an individual case in the area of public law);13 (d) ‘mit unmittelbarer Rechtswirkung nach aussen’ (with direct external legal effect). Where a VA is addressed to a particular or distinguishable group of persons (‘Personenkreis’) or relates to the public quality of a ‘Sache’ or its use by the general public, it is known as an ‘Allgemeinverfügung’ (general direction; § 35, 2nd sentence). An example of an ‘Allgemeinverfügung’ is the so-called ‘dinglicher Verwaltungsakt’, which is directed to the adoption/dedication (‘Widmung’) of property (eg, a road) as an ‘öffentliche Sache’ (public thing), ie, for a public purpose (‘Zweck’).14 A ‘Justizverwaltungsakt’ is a VA emanating from a judicial authority (‘Justizbehörde’) in the field of judicial administration (‘Justizverwaltung’).15 2

Content

The content of a VA must be sufficiently specific (‘hinreichend bestimmt’). It can be issued orally, in writing or in other form, but, if in writing, reasons (‘Gründe’) must be given.16 A VA can be supplemented or limited by a so-called ‘Nebenbestimmung’ (collateral provision), eg, a ‘Bedingung’ (condition) or ‘Auflage’ (requirement).17 A VA can also: – – –

be provisional (‘vorläufig’); be promised. The promise (‘Zusage’/‘Zusicherung’) must be in writing;18 cover preliminary matters only (eg, building approvals). It is then referred to as a ‘Vorbescheid’).

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3

Validity and Legality

A VA becomes ‘wirksam’ (effective/valid) on its ‘Bekanntgabe’ (notification) to the person to whom it is directed or who is affected by it and remains valid for so long and in so far as it is not withdrawn, revoked, otherwise (i.e. judicially) quashed or settled by lapse of time or otherwise.19 Exceptionally, however, a VA can be ‘nichtig’  (void ab initio), in which case it is ‘unwirksam’.20 A VA is presumed valid, but the executive is bound by Article 20(iii) GG to act in accordance with law (the principle of the ‘Rechtmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’ (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes’) ).21 A VA, which is not ‘rechtmäßig’ (legal), is, therefore, ‘rechtswidrig’ (illegal) or ‘fehlerhaft’ (faulty). Once it has been challenged (‘angefochten’), it can be rescinded (‘aufgehoben’)  by the (administrative) court; until then, the VA is known as being ‘anfechtbar’ (challengable) or ‘aufhebbar’ (voidable).22 With certain exceptions, a ‘Widerspruch’ (formal objection) and ‘Anfechtungsklage’ (writ of challenge) against a VA have suspensive effect (‘aufschiebende Wirkung’): § 80(i) VwGO.23 Accordingly, whether or not a VA is ‘wirksam’ (valid) is a strictly separate question from that of its ‘Rechtmäßigkeit’ (legality).24 The criteria for establishing the legality of a VA are: – –

formal: was the issuing ‘Behörde’ ‘zuständig’ (competent)? Did it conduct the correct procedure (‘Verfahren’)? Was the VA issued in the correct form?; material: did the ‘Behörde’ observe the general principles of administrative law and, in accordance with the principle of the ‘Rechtmäßigkeit der Verwaltung, act on the basis of and properly apply a valid norm?25

‘Bestandskraft’, ‘Rücknahme’ and ‘Widerruf’  A VA becomes ‘bestandskräftig’ (finally binding) when it can no longer be challenged. The parallel of the concept of ‘Bestandskraft’ is, in civil procedure, the concept of the ‘Rechtskraft’ (legal force) of a judgment (‘Urteil’).26 However, unlike the position after judgment in a civil case, the ‘Rücknahme’ (withdrawal) and ‘Widerruf’ (revocation) of a VA or the ‘Wiederaufgreifen des Verfahrens’ (reconsideration of the proceedings) by the ‘Behörde’   are possible in certain circumstances.27 4

5

Types28

Administrative acts (VAs) are distinguished according to whether they: –

are ‘befehlend’ (require or forbid particular action, eg, a police order (‘polizeiliche Verfügung’),   a notice for the payment of fees (‘Gebührenbescheid’)   or taxes (‘Steuerbescheid’));

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– – – – –

6

are ‘rechtsgestaltend’  (create or amend a particular legal relationship, eg, naturalisation (‘Einbürgerung’), appointment to an office (‘Ernennung’)); are ‘feststellend’ (effect a declaration as to particular circumstances, eg, as to status (eg, citizenship (‘Staatsangehörigkeit’)) or rights); are ‘begünstigend’ (favourable/advantageous, eg, grant of a permission (‘Erlaubnis’) or (trading) licence (‘Konzession’)); are ‘belastend’   (burdensome/disadvantageous, eg, refusal or revocation/ withdrawal of a permission or licence); are ‘Verwaltungsakte mit Drittwirkung’  (have effect on third parties, eg, building consent (‘Baugenehmigung’)). Grant of an ‘Erlaubnis’ or ‘Genehmigung’ 

A particular example of a ‘rechtsgestaltende’   and ‘begünstigende’  VA is the (grant (‘Erteilung’) of an) ‘Erlaubnis’ (permission),29 the usual basis for which is a ‘Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt’ ((preventive) prohibition with the right to grant an ‘Erlaubnis’ reserved). The question here is not whether there is an ‘Ermächtigungsgrundlage’ for the action of the executive, but whether there is an ‘Anspruchsgrundlage’  (legal basis) for the citizen’s claim, ie, is there an ‘Anspruch auf Erlaß des begünstigenden Verwaltungsakts’?30 The ‘Erlaubnis’   is to be distinguished from the so-called ‘Ausnahmebewilligung’, ‘Dispens’ or ‘Befreiung’,   which grants the applicant an exception from the normal (repressive) prohibition of particular conduct. The grant of an ‘Erlaubnis’ can either be ‘gebunden’ (compulsory: where terms such as ‘muß’ or ‘ist zu (erteilen)’ are used) or ‘frei’ (free, ie, the authority has ‘Ermessen’ (discretion): where terms such as ‘kann’ or ‘darf’ are used). Decisions of a ‘Behörde’ on the basis of ‘Ermessen’ (‘Ermessensentscheidungen’) can be examined by the administrative court: – – –

if the exercise of the ‘Ermessen’ exceeds the ‘gesetzlichen Grenzen’ (statutory limits; ‘Ermessensüberschreitung’ ); if the ‘Ermessen’   is not (fully) exercised (‘Ermessensnichtgebrauch’ /  ‘Ermessensunterschreitung’); or if its exercise is abused (‘Ermessensmißbrauch’), ie, the authority does not act in conformity with the purpose of the norm (‘Normzweck’).31

‘Ermessen’ must be exercised ‘pflichtgemäß’ (in accordance with (legal) obligation) and ‘fehlerfrei’ (free of faults).32 It is important to contrast ‘Ermessen’, which is part of the consequence (‘Rechtsfolge’) of a norm and can only be controlled by the administrative court in certain circumstances,33 with the concept of the ‘unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff’ (indefinite legal term), which is part of the norm itself, part of its ‘Tatbestand’. The interpretation by a ‘Behörde’ of an ‘unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff’ can always be fully re-examined by the court, except where the ‘Behörde’ has so-called ‘Beurteilungsspielraum’ (room for judgment).34

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A ‘Bekörde’ can sometimes be compelled (‘verpflichtet’) to take action in the event of  a reduction of its ‘Ermessen’ to zero (‘Ermessensreduzierung auf Null’) where there is a particularly intensive threat to individual interests.35 Similarly, there is no room for free decision (‘Entscheidungsspielraum’), if the relevant provision is an empowering norm (‘Befugnisnorm’) rather than one granting discretion (‘Ermessensvorschrift’). One should not always assume that an authority has discretion, even if the provision in question is one in which the word ‘can’ is used (‘Kannbestimmung’).36

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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

A AVAILABLE REMEDIES. THE ‘VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG’  (VWGO) The addressee of a ‘Verwaltungsakt’  can defend himself by informal ‘Rechtsbehelfen’ (namely by a ‘Gegenvorstellung’  (counter-response), by an ‘Aufsichtsbeschwerde’ (complaint to the next higher ‘Behörde’) or even by a parliamentary petition1 or by formal ‘Rechtsmitteln’ (namely by ‘Widerspruch’ (objection)) and, usually thereafter, by proceedings before the ‘Verwaltungsgericht’  (VG: administrative court)).2 Administrative court procedure is governed by the (federal) ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung’  (VwGO: Administrative Court Order) of 21.1.1960. There are three instances: the VG, the ‘Oberverwaltungsgericht’ (OVG; administrative court of  appeal)3 and, on the federal level, the ‘Bundesverwaltungsgericht’  (BVerwG; Federal Administrative Court) in Berlin. Legal representation by a ‘Rechtsanwalt’  is only compulsory before the BVerwG.4 The OVG is not only ‘zuständig’ (competent) on an appeal (‘Berufung’) from the VG,  but also for the so-called ‘Normkontrollverfahren’ (norm control procedure),5 in which, on application, the OVG can examine the validity of norms below a ‘Landesgesetz’ (state statute), eg, local building plans (‘Bebauungspläne’), which are passed by the ‘Gemeinden’ in the form of ‘Satzungen’ (bye-laws).6 B TYPES OF WRIT The main types of ‘Klage’ (writ) issued at the VG are: – – –

the ‘Gestaltungsklagen’  (actions to (re)organise a legal relationship, eg, the ‘Anfechtungsklage’ (directed to the ‘Aufhebung’ (annulment or quashing) of a VA)); the ‘Leistungsklagen’  (actions claiming a ‘Leistung’  (performance), eg, the ‘Verpflichtungsklage’  (directed to the ‘Erlaß’ (issue) of a VA)); and the ‘Feststellungsklagen’ (actions to establish / declare a particular right or legal relationship; a special example is the so-called ‘Fortsetzungsfeststellungsklage’ (an action to establish/declare that, after the event, a particular VA was illegal).7 C PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS

Before an ‘Anfechtungsklage’ or ‘Verpflichtungsklage’  can be lodged, it is usually necessary for a ‘Widerspruchsverfahren’ /‘Vorverfahren’  (objection proceedings/ preliminary proceedings) to have been conducted (on initiation by the complainant) and for a so-called ‘Widerspruchsbescheid’ (objection notice, normally from the next higher ‘Behörde’) to have been issued.8 163

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The ‘Widerspruchsverfahren’   is no judicial proceeding, but part of the ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’,   ie, dealt with internally by the ‘Widerspruchsbehörde’,  which examines not only the ‘Rechtmäßigkeit’ (legality) of the VA (as does the VG), but also its ‘Zweckmäßigkeit’ (expediency).9 The general clause § 40(i) VwGO grants access to the administrative court (‘Verwaltungsrechtsweg’)  in all public law disputes of a non-constitutional nature, so long as jurisdiction is not expressly granted to another court by federal (or state) law.10 The conduct of the ‘Widerspruchsverfahren’   and the availability of the ‘Verwaltungsrechtsweg’   under § 40(i) are only two of the preliminary requirements (conditions) for the admissibility (‘Zulässigkeit’) of a ‘Klage’ to the VG.11 The ‘Kläger’ (plaintiff) must also: –

– –

claim (at least the possibility) that he is injured in his (subjective) rights(‘in seinen Rechten verletzt’) by the VA, its refusal or the failure to grant it, ie, he must have socalled ‘Klagebefugnis’   (authority to sue; ‘locus standi’ ); a popular action (‘Popularklage’) is thereby excluded;12 choose the correct type of ‘Klage’ (‘Klageart’); lodge his ‘Klage’ in the correct form and within the appropriate time limit (‘Frist’; usually one month from service of the ‘Widerspruchsbescheid’).13

The question of the ‘Zulässigkeit’ of a ‘Klage’ must be strictly separated from the question whether it is well founded (its ‘Begründetheit’). An ‘Anfechtungsklage’ or ‘Verpflichtungsklage’  is only ‘begründet’ (well founded), if the VA (or, in the case of a ‘Verpflichtungsklage’,  its refusal or the failure to grant it) is illegal (‘rechtswidrig’) and the plaintiff is thereby injured in his rights (‘in seinen Rechten verletz’) .14 The protection of the administrative court is not only available against VAs, but also against pure administrative action (‘schlichtes Verwaltungshandeln’) in the form of  so-called ‘Realakte’   (real acts). Stoppage (‘Unterlassung’)   or disposal (‘(Folgen)Beseitigung’) can be claimed.15 D THE HEARING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT16 As in criminal procedure, the ‘Untersuchungsgrundsatz’ (inquisition maxim) applies  before theVG.17 The court is responsible for the investigation of the facts of the matter (‘Ermittlung des Sachverhalts’) itself. Thus, the court can require such evidence (‘Beweismittel’) to be introduced into the proceedings as it considers necessary and is not bound / restricted by the parties’ submissions (‘Vorbringen’)  or by the form of their applications (‘Fassung der Anträge’). However, the ‘Verfügungsgrundsatz’  still applies in administrative proceedings (ie, the subject matter of the hearing remains at the disposal of the (private) parties) and the court cannot go beyond (or alter) what is sought by the application or ‘Klage’ (the ‘Klagebegehren’ or ‘Klageziel’).18

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The other maxims of civil procedure also apply, eg, the right to be heard, the publicity of the hearing and the concentration principle. As in civil procedure (§ 299 ZPO), the parties are entitled to inspect the court’s file (‘Gerichtsakte’) and can take copies: § 100 VwGO. The ‘Untersuchungsgrundsatz’ is supplemented by the principle of the free assessment of evidence (‘Grundsatz der freien Beweiswürdigung’). In particular, the court must reach its own (free) conviction from the total result of the proceedings (‘Gesamtergebnis des Verfahrens’): § 108(i) VwGO. Moreover, the court can only base its decision on such facts and evidence upon which the parties were given an opportunity to comment: § 108(ii) VwGO. In contrast to civil procedure, the parties to administrative proceedings have no subjective burden of proof. However, this is subject to an important exception developed by the courts along the lines of civil procedure to deal with the situation where there is a ‘non liquet’, ie, a fact remains in doubt/cannot be proven. In such a case, the objective burden of proof has to be ascertained according to the substantive law. The so-called favourable norm principle (‘Normbegünstigungsprinzip’) is applied, ie, the party seeking to derive a (favourable) legal position or right from particular facts (‘rechtsbegründende Tatsachen’) must prove them. In other words, if an uncertainty cannot be resolved in a party’s favour, that party bears the consequences, unless statute otherwise provides. In the absence of an express provision regarding the burden of  proof, the court takes into account the purpose and wording of the relevant norm and, in particular, policy considerations (including constitutional aspects).19 The administrative court can decide by way of: – –

an ‘Urteil’ (judgment; § 107 VwGO; the normal situation); or a ‘Beschluß’ (decision; § 122 VwGO).

An oral hearing is usually required for an ‘Urteil’,  but not for a ‘Beschluß’: § 101(iii) VwGO. Another form of decision is the ‘Gerichtsbescheid’  (court notice), which is (only) available in first instance proceedings, if the court is of the opinion that the matter does not reveal any particular difficulties of a factual or legal nature and the facts are clear: § 84(i) VwGO. A ‘Gerichtsbescheid’ has the same effect as an ‘Urteil’. It does not require an oral hearing, but there must be a prior ‘Anhörung’ (hearing) of the parties. However, if an application for an (ordinary) oral hearing is made ‘rechtzeitig’ (in time; ie, within one month after service), the ‘Gerichtsbescheid’ is deemed not to have  been issued: § 84(iii) VwGO.

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XVI CRIMINAL LAW

A INTRODUCTION German criminal law is governed by the ‘Strafgesetzbuch’ (StGB: Criminal Code) of  15.5.1871, variously reformed, amended and reissued. Criminal offences are also contained in numerous collateral statutes (‘Nebengesetze’).1 The StGB is divided into two ‘Teile’ (parts):2 1 2

The ‘Allgemeiner Teil’  (AT: General Part; §§ 1-79b ), in turn divided into five ‘Abschnitte’ (Sections). The AT contains general provisions and principles for all offences (‘Straftaten’ or ‘Delikte’). The ‘Besonderer Teil’ (BT: Special Part; §§ 80–358), in turn divided into 29 ‘Abschnitte’. The BT contains a catalogue of individual ‘Straftaten’  and their permissible punishment.

The StGB is based on the principle (‘Grundsatz’) that an act (‘Tat’ or ‘Handlung’) can only be punished, if its punishability (‘Strafbarkeit’) is fixed by statute (‘gesetzlich bestimmt’) before the act is committed, ie, there can be no crime (or punishment) without (written) law: ‘nullum crimen (nulla poena) sine lege (scripta)’.3 This principle of legality (‘Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip’) is laid down in § 1 StGB, which repeats Article 103(ii) GG, and means that: 1 2 3

the conditions for (‘Voraussetzungen’) and consequences (‘Rechtsfolgen’) of offences must be defined (‘bestimmt’)   by the legislature as exactly as possible (‘Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz’); the retrospective application of offences to acts committed before the offence existed is forbidden (‘Rückwirkungsverbot’);4 and an act cannot be punished by analogy to a particular offence (‘Analogieverbot’).5

The strict binding of the legislature and judiciary to statute (‘Bindung an das Gesetz’) reduces the risk of legal uncertainty (‘Rechtsunsicherheit’), in the interest of the protection of the individual against arbitrary state rule (‘Staatswillkür’).6 B TYPES OF OFFENCE7 The offences (‘Straftaten’) of the StGB are divided into two categories (§ 12): 1   ‘Verbrechen’ (felonies), being those offences attracting a minimum punishment of  one year’s imprisonment (‘Freiheitsstrafe’); 2   ‘Vergehen’   (misdemeanours), being those offences attracting a minimum punishment of a lesser period of imprisonment or a fine (‘Geldstrafe’).

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The main importance of the distinction is that an attempted ‘Verbrechen’ is always punishable, whereas an attempted ‘Vergehen’ only if expressly provided for.8 Lesser offences have been removed from the StGB and decriminalised (‘entkriminalisiert’). They are termed ‘Ordnungswidrigkeiten’ (minor offences) and are punishable (merely) by a so-called ‘Geldbuße’ (fine).9 The basis for an understanding of the BT is the concept of ‘Rechtsgüterschutz’ (protection of ‘Rechtsgüter’,  ie, assets of social (literally, legal) importance). It is a central principle that the function of criminal law is to protect ‘Rechtsgüter’ against injury (‘Verletzung’) or threat (‘Gefährdung’). The BT contains three main groups of offences categorised according to the relevant ‘Rechtsgut’ protected:10 1 2 3

offences against the state11 and community values (‘Gemeinschaftswerte’);12 offences against the person;13 offences against property (‘Eigentum’ and ‘Vermögen’).14 C ELEMENTS OF AN OFFENCE15

The construction of norms in German criminal law follows the usual pattern of: –   ‘Tatbestand’ (content); and –   ‘Rechtsfolge’ (legal consequence).16 However, an act, which can be subsumed (‘subsumiert’) under a ‘(Straf-)Tatbestand’  is not of itself punishable. Independently of fulfilling the ‘Tatbestand’, the act must also  be ‘rechtswidrig’  (illegal) and ‘schuldhaft’  (blameworthy). These three elements of  ‘Tatbestandsmäßigkeit’ (‘Tatbestandserfüllung’), ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ and ‘Schuld’ form the crux of German criminal legal theory. The existence of a ‘Straftat’ depends on the fulfillment of each of these elements.17 In English criminal law, the equivalent categories are, broadly,‘actus reus’, illegality and ‘mens rea’ (viz defences). 1 ‘Tatbestandsmäßigkeit’ of the ‘Handlung’ 

(a) When an act is  ‘tatbestandsmäßig’

To be ‘tatbestandsmäßig’, an act must: – – –

be a ‘Handlung’ (ie, ‘vom Willen getragenes menschliches Verhalten’: human conduct carried by (free) will);18 fall within the catalogue of criminal offences in the BT or in a‘Nebengesetz’ (collateral law); fulfill all the ‘Merkmale’ (elements) of the ‘Tatbestand’.19

A ‘Handlung’ can be punishable either according to the activity (‘Tätigkeit’), which is described as forbidden—a so-called ‘schlichtes Tätigkeitsdelikt’—or according to the result (‘Erfolg’) caused (‘verursacht’) by it—a so-called ‘Erfolgsdelikt’.20 168

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In the latter case, there has to be a causal link between the ‘Handlung’ and the ‘Erfolg’. By the dominant theory of causation (‘Kausalität’)—the so-called ‘Äquivalenztheorie’ (equivalence theory)21—every condition without which the ‘Erfolg’ would fall away22 is regarded as (equivalent/) causal for the ‘Erfolg’. (b) Crimes by omission

A ‘Tatbestand’  can be fulfilled not only by a ‘Handlung’ (giving rise to a so-called ‘Begehungsdelikt’ (crime by active conduct/crime of commission)), but also by an ‘Unterlassung’ (omission), which is regarded as the equivalent of a ‘Handlung’. It is important to note here that a German criminal norm may be one of two types: either a norm, which requires certain action to be carried out (a so-called‘Gebotsnorm’)— a failure to act/omission being punishable as such—or, more usually, a norm, which forbids certain action or injury to a particular ‘Rechtsgut’ (a so-called ‘Verbotsnorm’). The breach of a ‘Gebotsnorm’ by omission is called an ‘echtes Unterlassungsdelikt’ (genuine crime by omission), while the breach of a ‘Verbotsnorm’  by omission is referred to as an ‘unechtes Unterlassungsdelikt’ (artificial/qualified crime by omission). An ‘unechtes Unterlassungsdelikt’ is only punishable, if: – – –

the ‘Erfolg’ in a ‘Tatbestand’ has arisen; the ‘Täter’ (perpetrator) omitted to prevent the ‘Erfolg’, although it was possible for him to do so; the ‘Täter’ had a special legal duty to act, a so-called ‘Garantenpflicht’.23

A ‘Garantenpflicht’ can arise in various (unwritten) circumstances, for example: – – – –

‘aus Rechtssatz’ (when it is provided for by law); ‘aus Rechtsgeschäft’  (when a ‘Schutzpflicht’ (duty of protection) is assumed by ‘Vertrag’ (contract)); ‘aus vorangegangenem Tun’ (when it flows from prior conduct); or ‘aus einer Lebensbeziehung’ (when a close personal relationship exists).24

An ‘Unterlassungstäter’ (perpetrator of an artificial/qualified crime by omission) is punishable, as if he had fulfilled the ‘Tatbestand’  of a ‘Begehungsdelikt’,   but the punishment (‘Strafe’) can be reduced.25 (c) Acts by persons representing others

By § 14 StGb, if acts are committed on behalf of others by persons in a position of  authority and a statute requires the existence of certain circumstances or the possession of special personal attributes (‘besondere persönliche Merkmale’)  as a precondition of  punishability and such circumstances or special personal attributes pertain to, or, as appropriate, are possessed by the person represented, but not the person acting, then the statutory provisions also apply to die person acting. In other words, § 14 StGB extends the net of potential criminal liability to persons acting vicariously for others, eg, the organs of a company, persons instructed to perform particular duties for die owner of a business. Even if the person represented does not 169

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act as such, those more directly involved lower down the chain can be the subject of  punishment. 2

‘Rechtswidrigkeit’  of the ‘Handlung’  (a) When a ‘Handlung’ is ‘rechtswidrig’

The mere fact that a ‘Handlung’ fulfills the ‘Tatbestand’ of a criminal norm does not, of  itself, make the ‘Handlung’ ‘rechtswidrig’ (illegal) or, to use English legal terminology, turn it into an ‘actus reus’ (criminal act). However, unless the ‘Handlung’ is justified (‘gerechtfertigt’) by another norm or principle, the fulfillment of the ‘Tatbestand’ is, as a rule, regarded as indicating the illegality of the ‘Handlung’: ‘die Tatbestandserfüllung indiziert die Rechtsuridrigkeit’. (b) ‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’26

Whether or not a person has acted illegally is dependent on a further consideration: the (non-)existence and (non-)fulfillment of so-called ‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’ (justifying reasons). ‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’ supplement (‘ergänzen’) the ‘Tatbestand’; they are socalled ‘negative Tatbestandsmerkmale’  (negative elements of a ‘Tatbestand’) and can be  both written (eg, in the StGB, StPO or BGB) and unwritten.27 The most important ‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’ in practice are: –   ‘Einwilligung’: consent (volenti non fit inuiria);28 – ‘ mutmaßliche Einwilligung’: presumed consent;29 –   ‘Notwehr’: self-defence;30 – ‘defensiver Notstand’: defensive emergency;31 – ‘aggressiver Notstand’: offensive emergency;32 – ‘rechtfertigender Notstand’: justifying emergency;33 – ‘Ausübung von Dienstrechten oder Ausführung von rechtmäßigen Befehlen’: exercise of  official rights or implementation of legal orders;34 – ‘Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen’: pursuit of just interests;35 – ‘soziale Adäquanz’: social adequacy;36 – ‘sonstige Eingriffsrechte’: other intervention rights.37 3

‘Schuld’  (a) Meaning of ‘Schuld’

Although it is dear that a ‘Handlung’ is not a ‘Straftat’ and is not punishable without the ‘Schuld’ (blame/guilt) of the ‘Täter’ (perpetrator), the concept of ‘Schuld’ (‘culpa’) itself is far from simple or clear. It does not fully equate to the similar, but narrower, English legal term ‘mens rea’ (guilty mind). The dominant ‘normative’ definition of ‘Schuld’  regards ‘Schuld’   as such a relationship (‘Beziehung’) of the ‘Täter’ to his ‘Tat’ as can, on evaluation, be deemed

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‘vorwerfbar’ (reproachable), ie, a reprehensible attitude /frame of mind on the part of  the ‘Täter’ (towards the law) (‘verwerfliche (Rechts-)gesinnung’).38 (b) ‘Schuldfähigkeit’

In the normal case, the ‘Täter’ is assumed to be ‘schuldfähig’ (capable of blame). However, children (‘Kinder’)  under 14 are ‘schuldunfähig’39  and youths between 14 and 18 (‘Jugendliche’) are ‘schuldfähig’ depending on their moral and intellectual development.40 Those between the age of majority (18) and 21 are referred to as ‘Heranwachsende’ (young persons) and can be treated as ‘Jugendliche’ or as ‘Erwachsene’ (adults) depending on the circumstances. The absence or reduction in ‘Schuldfähigkeit’ due to physical or emotional defects is dealt with in §§ 20 and 21 StGB.41 Usually, capacity is assessed at the time an offence is committed (‘bei Begehung der Tat’). However, a special exception is the principle of ‘actio libera in causa’ (an act free in origin): the blame /responsibility of a person is brought forward (‘vorverlegt’) to the time of his prior conduct (‘actio praecedens’), if he freely put himself into a condition of  incapacity, foreseeing that he would commit a particular offence in that state. The ‘Täter’ is punishable because he set in motion a course of events culminating in the commission of an offence.42 (c) Forms of ‘Schuld’43 ‘Schuld’ can arise in two forms:

–   ‘Vorsatz’  (intent), the usual form of ‘Schuld’, known as ‘Vorsatzschuld’; –   ‘Fahrlässigkeit’ (negligence). Acts (‘Handlungen’) are usually only punishable, if they are committed with ‘Vorsatz’ (‘vorsätzliches Handeln’), ie, wilfully. The law must expressly say so, if negligent conduct (‘fahrlässiges Handeln’) is punishable.44 ‘Vorsatz’ may be defined as the knowledge of and desire for those (objective and subjective) circumstances /elements, which belong to the ‘Tat’: ‘das Wissen und Wollen der Tatumstände/Tatbestandsmerkmale, die zum gesetzlichen Tatbestand gehören’ . The ‘Täter’ need not know the statutory details of the offence, provided, as a layman, he has evaluated his conduct as wrong (so-called ‘Parallelwertung in der Laiensphäre’).45 ‘Vorsatz’ is classified as either:46 –

–

‘dolus directus’ (‘unmittelbarer Vorsatz’) . This is the usual form of ‘Vorsatz’:  the ‘Täter’ knows that he is committing an offence and wants to do so. It is to be distinguished from ‘Absicht’ (pure intention), which requires more than just ‘Wissen und Wollen der Tatumstände’, ie, where the particular ‘Erfolg’ itself is the prime motive of the ‘Täter’;47 ‘dolus eventualis’ (‘bedingter (eventual) Vorsatz’; the ‘Täter’ does not want to commit an offence, but, for the purpose of his ‘Handlung’, takes such a possibility into account (‘nimmt die Möglichkeit in Kauf’).48

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It is to be distinguished from ‘bewußte Fahrlässigkeit’ (conscious negligence), where the ‘Täter’ hopes that things will go well and relies on (‘vertraut auf’) the possible offence not occurring.49 ‘Fahrlässigkeit’ is the exceptional form of ‘Schuld’. It can be ‘bewußt’ (conscious) or ‘unbewußt’ (unconscious), ‘leicht’ (slight) or ‘grob’ (gross).50 A person is ‘fahrlässig’, if he fails to act with care (‘Sorgfalt’), despite the fact that, due to his personal abilities and qualities, he is in a position (‘in der Lage’) to know that he should do so and that he can avoid the (foreseeable) ‘Erfolg’; he has the capacity of  ‘Wissenkönnen und Vermeidenkönnen’.51 (d) Exclusion of ‘Schuld’ ‘Schuld’ can be excluded if a (written or unwritten) ‘Schuldausschließungsgrund’ (ground for exclusion of ‘Schuld’) exists.52 Thus, if the ‘Täter’ is unaware of one of the ‘Tatumstände’ (§ 16(i) StGB: so-called ‘Tatumstands-’ or ‘Tatbestandsirrtum’), his ‘Vorsatz’   and, therefore, unless there is ‘Fahrlässigkeit’ on his part, his ‘Schuld’ is excluded.53 The same applies, if the ‘Täter’ mistakenly believes that his ‘Handlung’ is justified  by a ‘Rechtfertigungsgrund’ (so-called ‘Putativrechtfertigung’).54 A ‘Putativ-’ or ‘Wahndelikt’ describes the non-punishable conduct of a ‘Täter’, who  believes he is committing an offence, which, in fact, does not exist.55 Where there is a change in the course of events (‘Abweichung im Kausalverlauf’) leading to the ‘Erfolg’, the ‘Handlung’ of the ‘Täter’ remains ‘vorsätzlich’, unless the change is significant (‘erheblich’; aberratio ictus) . However, an error ‘in obiecto’ or ‘in  persona’ has no effect on the ‘Vorsatz’ of the ‘Täter’.56 If the ‘Täter’ had no ‘Unrechtsbewußtsein’  (consciousness of the illegality of his conduct),57 ‘Schuld’ can be excluded. ‘Unrechtsbewußtsein’ is not, however, an element of ‘Vorsatz’: it goes to the question of ‘Schuld’. If a ‘Täter’ has no ‘Unrechtsbewußtsein’ due to an avoidable mistake (eg, he could be expected to inform himself about the illegality), his punishment can be reduced,58 but he has still acted ‘vorsätzlich’. ‘Schuld’ is only excluded, if the mistake was unavoidable. Both types of mistake (avoidable and unavoidable) are cases of so-called ‘Verbotsirrtum’ (§ 17 StGB). The ‘Schuld’ of a ‘Täter’ can also be excluded, if, in an immediate emergency, in which he has no other choice, a person commits an illegal act in order to ward off a danger to the life, limb or freedom of himself or persons near to him; he acts without ‘Schuld’ (§ 35(i) StGB; so-called ‘entschuldigender Notstand’). If he acts mistakenly (socalled ‘Putativnotstand’), he is only punishable, if his mistake (‘Irrtum’) was avoidable (‘vermeidbar’), but his punishment can be reduced (§ 35(ii) StGB).59 To be distinguished from ‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’ and ‘Schuldausschließungsgründe’, the presence of either of which excludes the existence of a ‘Straftat’,60  are the ‘Strafausschließungs-’ or ‘Strafaufhebungsgründe’, which exclude or lift the possibility of  ‘Strafe’ (punishment).61

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D CONSEQUENCES OF AN OFFENCE62 The ‘Rechtsfolgen der Tat’ (legal consequences of the offence) are dealt with in the third Section of the AT (§§ 38–76a StGB) . ‘Strafen’  §§ 38–44 StGB set out the possible ‘Strafen’ (punishments), which can be imposed (‘verhängt’). To be distinguished is the ‘Hauptstrafe’ (a main punishment, which can be imposed by itself) and the ‘Nebenstrafe’ (an accessory punishment).63 ‘Hauptstrafen’ are the ‘Freiheitsstrafe’ (imprisonment)64 and the ‘Geldstrafe’ (fine).65 The ‘Freiheitsstrafe’ can be either ‘lebenslang’ (a life sentence) or ‘zeitig’ (for a particular period between one month and 15 years).66 The ‘Geldstrafe’ is the appropriate punishment for less serious crimes and is imposed in (a minimum of five and maximum of 360) ‘Tagessätzen’ (daily rates) of between DM 2 and DM 10,000.67 A ‘Freiheitsstrafe’  of less than six months is only imposed in exceptional cases (‘Ausnahmefällen’), if essential (‘unerläßlich’) as an ‘ultima ratio’ (final measure) to impress the ‘Täter’ (‘zur Einwirkung auf den Täter’) or to defend the legal system (‘zur Verteidigung der Rechtsordnung’).68 A ‘Geldstrafe’ is the preferred punishment in practice. Where a ‘Freiheitsstrafe’ imposed does not exceed one year, suspension of the sentence is possible for between two and five years (‘Strafaussetzung zur Bewährung’).69 The suspension of the rest of a ‘zeitiger’ or ‘lebenslanger’ ‘Freiheitsstrafe’ is also possible where at least two-thirds of the sentence (or, as appropriate, 15 years) has been served.70 Where a ‘Geldstrafe’ of not more than 180 ‘Tagessätze’ has been imposed, the court can, under certain circumstances (eg, first offence), merely issue a warning and fix the punishment, but reserve actual sentence for a probationary period (‘Bewährungszeit’) of between one and three years (‘Verwarnung mit Strafvorbehalt’).71 The court can also disregard imposing a ‘Strafe’ altogether, if the consequences of  the ‘Tat’ for the ‘Täter’ are so severe as to make the imposition of punishment obviously wrong (‘offensichtlich verfehlt’): so-called ‘Absehen von Strafe’.72 The type and extent of the appropriate ‘Strafe’ is dependent on the ‘Schuld’ of the ‘Täter’: the ‘Strafe’ must be ‘schuldangemessen’ (appropriate to (the) ‘Schud’).73 ‘Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung’  Regardless of his ‘Schuld’, a ‘Täter’ may pose a danger to society or require particular attention. This is the domain of the so-called ‘Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung’ (measures of improvement and security).74 The German criminal legal system is, therefore, ‘zweispurig’ (two-tracked): a ‘Täter’ can be sentenced to a ‘Strafe’ and/or to a ‘Maßregel’.75 The ‘Maßregel’ must be proportionate (‘verhältnismäßig’).76 The possible ‘Maßregel’  are:

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– – – – – –

placement in a psychiatric hospital;77 placement in a rejection institution (‘Entziehungsanstalt’);78 placement in secure custody (‘Sicherungsverwahrung’);79 supervision of conduct (‘Führungsaufsicht’);80 withdrawal of driving licence (‘Entziehung der Fahrerlaubnis’);81 occupational ban (‘Berufsverbot’);82

Apart from the above, the court can also order other ‘Maßnahmen’, ie, ‘Verfall’ (forfeiture of a pecuniary advantage), ‘Einziehung’   (confiscation of ‘Gegenstände’ ) and ‘Unbrauchbarmachung’ (neutralisation (rendering useless) of associated equipment).83

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XVII CRIMINAL PROCEDURE1

A INTRODUCTION Present day German criminal procedure is a mixture between an accusatorial and an inquisitorial system.2 This was not always so. Until the reforms of the 19th century, an inquisitorial approach prevailed.3 Today, German criminal procedure is governed by the ‘Strafprozeßordnung’ (StPO: Criminal Procedure Order) of 1.2.1877, variously amended and reissued. The StPO is supplemented by the provisions of the GVG concerning the criminal courts (§ 1 StPO) and the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ (public prosecutor’s office).4 The StPO is divided into seven Books: Book I: ‘Allgemeine Vorschriften’ (general provisions; §§ 1–150). Book II: ‘Verfahren im ersten Rechtszug’ (proceedings at first instance; §§ 151–295). Book III:   ‘Rechtsmittel’ (legal remedies / appeals; §§ 296–358). Book IV: ‘Wiederaufnahme eines Verfahrens’  (reopening of proceedings; §§ 359–373a). Book V: ‘Beteiligung des Verletzten am Verfahren’  (involvement of the injured party in the proceedings; §§ 374–406h). Book VI: ‘Besondere Arten des Verfahrens’  (special types of proceedings; §§ 407–448). Book VII: ‘Strafvollstreckung und Kosten des Verfahrens’ (enforcement of punishment and costs of the proceedings; §§ 449–473). German criminal procedure is dominated by various maxims or principles (‘Grundsätze’), of which the following should initially be noted: – – – –

the ‘Anklagegrundsatz’ (accusation principle): no judicial investigation (‘gerichtliche Untersuchung’) of a criminal matter can take place without an ‘(öffentliche) Klage’ ((public) complaint/indictment);5 the ‘Unschuldsvermutung’ (presumption of innocence): a person charged with a criminal offence is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty; the ‘Ermittlungsgrundsatz’ (inquisition principle): the court examines (inquires into) the facts of the matter itself; and the right to a fair hearing (‘Anspruch auf ein faires Verfahren’) .6

The parameters of the court’s investigation are set by the ‘Klage’, ie, the court can only investigate and decide upon the alleged offence and person(s) accused in the ‘Klage’: § 155(i)StPO. Unlike the position in civil proceedings, the applications contained in the ‘Klage’ are not binding on the court § 155(ii) StPO.

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The general public can notify the authorities (the court, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ or the police) of a ‘Straftat’ in two ways,7 namely either: –

by means of a ‘(Straf-)Anzeige’   (notice of an offence), which anyone can file (‘erstatten’), orally or in writing (‘mündlich oder schriftlich’); or by means of a ‘(Straf-)Antrag’ (application for prosecution), which can only be lodged by a ‘Verletzten’ (injured party) within three months of his ‘Kenntnis’ (knowledge) of the ‘Tat’ and the identity of the ‘Täter’.8

–

Although prosecution (‘Strafverfolgung’) is usually undertaken (officially) by the state, certain offences must (and others can) be prosecuted on application (so-called ‘Antragsdelikte’).9 A ‘Strafantrag’ must be lodged in writing.10 Prosecution may be statute-barred due to lapse of time (so-called ‘Verfolgungsverjährung’ ).11 B THE ‘STAATSANWALTSCHAFT’ 12 The ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ (state attorney’s office) is the competent prosecution authority (‘Anklagebehörde’) and possesses a so-called ‘Anklagemonopol’ (prosecution monopoly).13 A ‘Privatklage’ (private prosecution) is possible, however, in certain (less serious) cases of, for example, libel, personal injury, trespass and damage to property where the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ does not consider prosecution as being in the public interest (‘im öffentlichen Interesse’).14 The ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’   is independent from the courts15  and has a hierarchical structure. Depending on the court to which they are attached,16 state attornies are variously described as: – – – – –

         

‘Amtsanwälte’ (district public prosecutors) (AG); ‘Staatsanwälte’ (state prosecutors) (AG and LG); ‘Oberstaatsanwälte’  (senior state prosecutors) (LG); ‘Generalstaatsanwälte’  (general state prosecutors) (OLG); and ‘Bundesanwälte’ (federal prosecutors) (BGH).

The most senior officer at the BGH is the ‘Generalbundesanwalt’  (general federal prosecutor). The officers of the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ are civil servants (‘Beamte’) and have a duty to obey the directions of their superiors: § 146 GVG. Supervision (‘Dienstaufsicht’) is exercised by the federal and state justice ministries (§ 147 GVG), but the limits of  political influence over prosecuting authorities remain unclear.17 The ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ is obliged to intervene (‘einzuschreiten’) with regard to all ‘Straftaten’   capable of prosecution, so far as ‘zureichende tatsächliche Anhaltspunkte’ (sufficient factual clues) exist18 (the so-called ‘Legalitätsgrundsatz’ (legality principle),

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as opposed to the ‘Opportunitätsgrundsatz’ (opportunity principle), whereby, in certain cases, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ has a discretion not to pursue the matter).19 As soon as the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ receives notice (‘Kenntnis’) of a suspected ‘Straftat’ whether by ‘Anzeige’ or in another manner, it must investigate the facts (‘den Sachverhalt erforschen’) in order to decide whether to lodge a ‘Klage’ (the so-called ‘Ermittlungsverfahren’ (investigation procedure) or ‘Vorverfahren’ (preliminary procedure)).20 In doing so, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ must take into account not only incriminating,  but also exonerating circumstances.21 The ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’  can require ‘Auskunft’  (information) from all public authorities (‘öffentlichen Behörden’)  and either itself conduct enquiries of any kind (‘Ermittlungen jeder Art’) or arrange for the police to do so.22 The ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ can apply to the local ‘Amtsgericht’  (District Court), if it considers that a particular ‘richterliche Untersuchungshandlung’  (judicially ordered investigative act) is necessary (‘erforderlich’)23 eg, a ‘(körperliche) Untersuchung’ ((bodily) search),24 ‘Beschlagnahme’ (seizure),25 ‘Durchsuchung’ (search (of premises or persons)), or, subject to the issue of a ‘Haftbefehl’ (arrest warrant), ‘Untersuchungshaft’ (remand in (investigative) custody).26 C THE ‘VERTEIDIGER’27 A A suspect is entitled to avail himself of the assistance (‘Beistand’) of a defender (‘Verteidiger’)  at every stage of the proceedings: § 137(i) StPO. He can choose up to three ‘Verteidiger’:  § 137(i), 2nd sentence StPO. Moreover, during the main proceedings, the spouse or statutory representative of  the accused has a right to be heard as a ‘Beistand’ (assistant): § 149 StPO.28 A suspect basically has freedom of choice regarding his ‘Verteidiger’,   although only a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ admitted at a German court or a teacher of law at a German university can be chosen without the permission of the court § 138 StPO. In certain cases, a ‘Verteidiger’ must be excluded: §§ 138a-d StPO. B To be distinguished from free selection of a defender (‘Wahlverteidigung’) is appointment (‘Bestellung’) of a compulsory defender (‘Pflichtverteidiger’) by the presiding judge: §§ 141ff StPO. The ‘Pflichtverteidiger’ is selected by the judge from a list of ‘Rechtsanwälte’, although the lawyer desired by the suspect is usually accepted: § 142(i) StPO. The lawyer appointed must accept the brief: § 49(i) BRAO. An appointment must be withdrawn, if another ‘Verteidiger’ is freely selected: § 143 StPO. C In certain circumstances, the participation of a (freely selected or appointed) defender is necessary (‘notwendig’): § 140(i) StPO. Necessary defence entails the presence of a ‘Verteidiger’ throughout the main proceedings: § 145 StPO.

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In other cases, the presiding judge must appoint a ‘Verteidiger’,  if the latter’s participation is apparently required by: – the seriousness of the offence; or – the difficulty of the facts or law involved; or – if it is clear that the suspect cannot defend himself  (§ 140(ii) StPO).29 A suspect can also apply for appointment of a ‘Verteidiger’, if ‘Untersuchungshaft’ (investigative custody) has lasted for at least three months: § 117(iv) StPO. D A ‘Verteidiger’ cannot, at the same time, represent more than one person accused of the same offence: § 146, 1st sentence StPO. E Apart from his general duties of conduct (eg, not to mislead the authorities (‘Wahrheitspflicht’) and (towards his client) to maintain silence (‘Schweigepflicht’)), a ‘Verteidiger’ has the following main rights and duties in the preliminary procedure (‘Vorverfahren’): –   ‘Anwesenheitsrecht’ (right to be present). During an examination of the suspect  by the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ or the judge a ‘Verteidiger’ has a (statutory) right to  be present: § 168c (i) StPO. –   ‘Akteneinsicht’ (right to inspect the file): § 147 StPO.30 – ‘Verkehr mit dem Beschuldigten’ (communication with the suspect): § 148 StPO.31 F

A ‘Verteidiger’ also has a right to refuse to give evidence (‘Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht’) regarding anything, which is revealed to him by the suspect or which the ‘Verteidiger’ learns of in his professional capacity: § 53(i) No 2 StPO. D THE POLICE32

It is also33 a function of the police to investigate ‘Straftaten’ (not merely on instruction  by the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ ) and take all immediately necessary steps (‘alle keinen Aufschub  gestattenden Anordnungen’) to prevent the obscuring of the matter (‘die Verdunkelung der Sache zu verhüten’).34 The police must then pass its file to the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ without delay or, if it seems that ‘richterliche Untersuchungshandlungen’ need to be carried out speedily, direct to the ‘Amtsgericht’ (district court).35 Without the decision of a judge, the police itself has no right to detain a person in custody (ie, cause a deprivation of freedom (‘Freiheitsentziehung’)) longer than until the end of the day following the person’s seizure (‘Ergreifung’; Article 104(ii) GG). A person suspected of an offence must be brought before the judge (the ‘Vorführung vor den Richter’) at the latest the day after his ‘vorläufige Festnahme’ (provisional arrest; Article 104(iii) GG).36 In the absence of a pre-existing arrest warrant (‘Haftbefehl’),  presentation of  the suspect takes place at the ‘Amtsgericht’  for the area in which he is arrested (§ 128(i) StPO).37 178

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The judge must forthwith (‘unverzüglich’) either issue an arrest warrant or placement order (‘Unterbringungsbefehl’) or otherwise release the suspect (Article 104(iii), 2nd sentence GG and § 128(ii) StPO).38 E ACTION FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION If the of the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’  (or police) provide sufficient cause (‘genügender Anlaß’), the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’  can apply to the competent court by means of an ‘Anklageschrift’ (=‘Anklage’=‘Klage’  (bill of indictment)) for the opening of the main proceedings (‘Eröffnung des Hauptverfahrens’).39 Otherwise, it must terminate the investigation (‘Einstellung des Verfahrens’).40 Alternatively, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’  can apply for the issue of a ‘Strafbefehl’ (punishment order) where a ‘Vergehen’ is involved and a main hearing is not considered necessary.41 Before a ‘Klage’ is lodged, the suspect is known as the ‘Beschuldigter’. Thereafter (and before the main proceedings are opened) he is referred to as the ‘Angeschuldigter’ (person charged).42 If, from the results of the preparatory investigation, the ‘Angeschuldigter’ appears sufficiently suspect of a ‘Straftat’ (‘einer Straftat hinreichend verdächtig’),  the competent court decides to open the ‘Hauptverfahren’.43 The decision (which cannot be challenged by the accused, who is then referred to as the ‘Angeklagter’ (person indicted))44 is known as the ‘Eröffnungsbeschluß’.45 Once the ‘Hauptverfahren’ is opened, the ‘Klage’ cannot be withdrawn.46 If the court rejects the application for ‘Eröffnung’ from the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ or passes the matter to a lower court, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’  can raise immediate objection (‘sofortige Beschwerde’).47 The ‘Angeklagter’ must be notified at least one week before the ‘Hauptverhandlung’ (main hearing (date)) by a ‘Ladung’ (notice to attend).48 The ‘Hauptverhandlung’ is dealt with in Section 6 of Book II (§§ 226–275) StPO. F ‘HAUPTVERHANDLUNGSHAFT’ Provided a ‘Hauptverhandlung’ begins within one week, a person caught in the act (‘auf frischer Tat’) can be taken into ‘Hauptverhandlungshaft’ (main hearing custody), if  a ‘Vergehen’   is involved, ie, the maximum possible punishment is one year’s imprisonment There must be a risk, on the basis of particular facts (‘bestimmte Tatsachen’),  that the person held would otherwise stay away from the ‘Hauptverhandlung’.49

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G THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS AND THEREAFTER (BOOK II (SECTION 6)— BOOK IV STPO)50 H INVOLVEMENT OF THE INJURED PARTY (BOOK V STPO)51 Book V (§§ 374–406h) is divided into four Sections: 1:   ‘Privatklage’ (private prosecution; §§ 374–394).

By § 380(i) StPO, it is a condition precedent to a private prosecution for trespass (‘Hausfriedensbruch’), insult (‘Beleidigung’), infringement of the right of secrecy of  correspondence (‘Briefgeheimnis’), personal injury (‘Körperverletzung’), threatening  behaviour (‘Drohung’) and damage to property (‘Sachbeschädigung’) that an attempt at conciliation (‘Sühneversuch’)  first be undertaken before an official arbitrator (‘Schiedsmann’).52 2:   ‘Nebenklage’ (collateral prosecution; §§ 395–402). 3: ‘Entschädigung des Verletzten’ (compensation for the injured party; §§ 403–406c). 4: ‘Sonstige Befugnisse des Verletzten’ (other powers of the injured party; §§ 406d-406h).

I SPECIAL TYPES OF PROCEEDINGS (BOOK VI STPO)53 Book VI (§§ 407–448) is divided into four Sections: ‘Verfahren bei Strafbefehlen’  (procedure in the case of punishment orders; §§ 407– 412).54 2:   ‘Sicherungsverfahren’ (security proceedings; §§ 413–416). 3: ‘Verfahren bei Einziehungen und Vermögensbeschlagnahmen’ (procedure in the case of  forfeiture and seizure of assets; §§ 430–443). 4:   ‘Verfahren bei Festsetzung von Geldbußen gegen juristische Personen und Personenvereinigungen’ (procedure in the case of fines being set against juristic persons and associations; § 444). 1:

 J ENFORCEMENT OF PUNISHMENT AND COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS (BOOK VII STPO)55 Book VII (§§ 449–473) is divided into two Sections: 1:   ‘Strafvollstreckung’ (enforcement of punishment; §§ 449–463d ). 2: ‘Kosten des Verfahrens’  (costs of the proceedings; §§ 464–473 ).

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CHAPTER XVIII

XVIII EMPLOYMENT LAW

A INTRODUCTION The three main fields of German employment law are ‘Arbeitsvertragsrecht’  (individual employment contract law), ‘kollektives Arbeitsrecht’ (collective employment law) and ‘Arbeitsschutzrecht’ (work protection law). The latter two largely developed after 1900, due to the fact that the BGB only concerned itself with ‘Dienstvertragsrecht’ (law relating to contracts of service).1 An employment relationship (‘Arbeitsverhältnis’) is usually based on a contract of  employment (‘Arbeitsvertrag’) between an ‘Arbeitgeber’ (employer) and an ‘Arbeitnehmer’ (employee). A characteristic feature of a contract of employment is that an employee is personally/socially dependent (‘abhängig’),  ie, he is subject to direction by his employer (‘weisungsgebunden’). Persons who are self-employed (‘selbständig’) are not employees, nor are persons, who provide independent services of a higher, commercial nature (§ 675 BGB).2 An employment relationship gives rise to various rights and duties. Thus, for example, an ‘Arbeitgeber’  (employer) has (largely statutory) duties of protection (‘Schutzpflichten’) and a duty of care (‘Fürsorgepflicht’) towards the employee.3 B FORM AND TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT4 1

An ‘Arbeitsvertrag’ requires no particular form and can end by: –   ‘Zeitablauf’ (effluxion of time); – ‘Tod des Arbeitnehmers’  (death of the employee); –   ‘Aufhebungsvertrag’ (annulment agreement);5 or –   ‘Kündigung’ (termination).6 Like any other ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, an ‘Arbeitsvertrag’ can also be void by operation of  law (‘nichtig’) or challengable (‘anfechtbar’) on the grounds laid down in the BGB.7

2   ‘Kündigung’ is a remedy available to each party to an employment relationship. It can be either ‘ordentlich’   (in proper form)—ie, ‘befristet’   (with notice)—or ‘außerordentlich’ (summary)—ie, ‘fristlos aus wichtigem Grund’  (without notice for an important reason).8 In both cases, a ‘Kündigung’ has to be in writing to be effective: § 623 BGB.9 By § 626(ii) BGB, a ‘Kündigung aus wichtigem Grund’ must be declared within two weeks of knowledge of the facts (upon which the ‘important reason’ is based). These facts must be such that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would be unacceptable (‘unzumutbar’)   for the terminating party, if the employment 181

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relationship were to continue until expiry of the notice period (‘Kündigungsfrist’) or until the agreed contractual termination date: § 626(i) BGB. However, no important reason is required for the termination of a relationship involving the provision of services of a higher nature (‘Dienste höherer Art’) by a self-employed person holding a position of trust (‘Vertrauensstellung’), eg, a doctor, lawyer or accountant: § 627(i) BGB. An employee must, usually, receive a prior warning (‘Abmahnung’) before dismissal.10 The ‘befristete Kündigung’ is the usual means of terminating11 an ‘Arbeitsverhältnis’ with no specific date of expiry (‘auf  eine unbestimmte Zeit geschlossen’). For such contracts of employment, the applicable ‘Kündigungsfristen’ (notice periods) are laid down in § 622 BGB. Thus, the normal minimum notice period is 4 weeks to the 15th or to the end of a calendar month, both for workers (‘Arbeiter’) and for employees (‘Angestellte’): § 622(i) BGB. Once an ‘Arbeitsverhältnis’   has lasted for two years or more, the ‘Kündigungsfristen’  for termination by an employer increase in stages, up to a maximum of seven months to the end of a calendar month in the case of 20 years’ employment: § 622(ii) BGB. During a trial (employment) period (‘Probezeit’) of up to six months, the notice period is reduced to two weeks: § 622(iii) BGB. Tariff  agreements can contain different provisions and longer notice periods are possible  by individual agreement, although the period for termination by an employee cannot be longer than that for an employer.12 3 If an employee has been employed for at least 6 months, he is protected against ‘Kündigung’ by the ‘Kündigungsschutzgesetz’ (KSchG; Employment Protection Law) of 10.8.1951 provided at least five (other) persons are (usually) employed in the relevant business.13 § 1(i) KSchG declares that an ‘(ordentliche) Kündigung’  which is ‘sozial ungerechtfertigt’ (socially unjustified) is ‘rechtsunwirksam’  (of no legal effect). A ‘Kündigung’ is ‘sozial ungerechtfertigt’, if it is not based on (‘bedingt durch’) reasons in the person or conduct of the employee (‘Gründe in der Person oder in dem Verhalten des Arbeitnehmers’) or on urgent requirements of the business (‘dringende betriebliche Erfordernisse’:  the so-called ‘betriebsbedingte Kündigung’):  § 1(ii), 1st sentence KSchG.14 When selecting employees for ‘Kündigung’ due to ‘dringende betriebliche Erfordernisse’, the employer must still give sufficient consideration (‘ausreichende Rücksicht’) to social aspects (‘soziale Gesichtspunkte’),  otherwise the dismissal is socially unjustified.15 If an employee considers his ‘Kündigung’ as socially unjustified, he can lodge an ‘Einspruch’ (objection) within one week at the ‘Betriebsrat’ (works council), which can then attempt to reach a ‘Verständigung’ (understanding) with the employer.16 If this remains unsuccessful, the employee must within three weeks of his receipt of the ‘Kündigung’ issue a ‘Klage’ at the ‘Arbeitsgericht’ (employment court) for a declaration (‘Feststellung’)   that the ‘Arbeitsverhältnis’  was not dissolved by the ‘Kündigung’ (a so-called ‘Kündigungsschutzklage’): § 4(i) KSchG.17 The ‘Kündigung’  becomes effective, if no ‘Klage’ is issued.18 Even if the ‘Arbeitsgericht’ concludes that the ‘Arbeitsverhältnis’ was not dissolved 182

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 by the ‘Kündigung’, the employee (or employer) can apply to the court to dissolve the ‘Arbeitsverhältnis’ and order the employer to pay an appropriate settlement (‘eine angemessene Abfindung’).19 4 An employer’s bankruptcy is governed by the ‘Insolvenzordnung’ (InsO; Insolvency Order) of 5.10.1994 (in force since 1.1.1999).20 It contains provisions facilitating termination of contracts of employment (‘Kündigungserleichterungen’). Thus, by § 80(i) InsO, the employer’s assets pass to the ‘Insolvenzverwalter’  (insolvency administrator), who assumes the employer’s rights and duties. A mandatory, shortened notice period of three months to the end of a calender month applies (§ 113(i) InsO). However, an employee’s statutory rights to protection against ‘Kündigung’ are unaffected (ie, they are ‘insolvenzfest’ (insolvency-proof)). The transfer of a business (‘Betriebsübergang’) is no justification for a ‘Kündigung’ (§ 613a (iv) BGB), but the new owner can carry out any necessary changes (‘Betriebsänderungen’;   § 111ff BetrVG) for the purpose of the reconstruction (‘Sanierung’) of the business.21 5 On termination of a contract of employment, an employer must, on request, supply a reference (‘Zeugnis’) regarding an employee’s conduct and performance during his employment: § 630 BGB. C THE ‘BETRIEB’  AND ‘BETRIEBSRAT’22 The ‘Betriebsrat’ (works council) is the elected representative of the employees of a ‘Betrieb’   and is the most important institution of the constitution of a ‘Betrieb’ (‘Betriebsverfassung’). The applicable law is the ‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’ of 15.1.1972 (BetrVG).23 The equivalent of the ‘Betriebsrat’ in the public sector is the ‘Personalrat’;  the applicable laws being the ‘Personaluertretungsgesetze’ of the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’.24 The term ‘Betrieb’   is to be distinguished from the wider term ‘Unternehmen’ (enterprise) Both describe an organisational business unit and are used interchangeably in daily speech. However, while an ‘Unternehmen’ refers to a ‘business’ in the general sense, a ‘Betrieb’ is technically the individual (operational) business unit, the direct (place of) work/business. An ‘Unternehmen’ can consist of various ‘Betriebe’.25 The involvement (‘Beteiligung’) of employees in a ‘Betrieb’ is commonly referred to as ‘betriebliche Mitbestimmung’,   while their involvement in the organs of an ‘Unternehmen’ as ‘Mitbestimmung in den Unternehmensorganen’.26 A ‘Betriebsrat’   can be elected in all ‘Betrieben’   with at least five permanent ‘Arbeitnehmer’. Usually, only employees, who have belonged to the ‘Betrieb’ for six months, are capable of election (‘wählbar’).27 The number of members of a ‘Betriebsrat’ is dependent on the total number of adult employees in the ‘Betrieb’.28 The BetrVG does not apply to ‘leitende Angestellte’ (leading employees)29 nor to socalled ‘Tendenzbetriebe’, ie, businesses, which directly and predominantly serve political, confessional, charitable, educational, scientific or artistic provisions or purposes of  reporting or the expression of opinion.30 183

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D COOPERATION BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND ‘BETRIEBSRAT’31 By § 2(i) BetrVG, employer and ‘Betriebsrat’ must work together in confidence and in cooperation with the trade unions (‘Gewerkschaften’)  and employer associations (‘Arbeitgebervereinigungen’)  for the benefit of the employees and the ‘Betrieb’  (the ‘Grundsatz der vertrauensvollen Zusammenarbeit’ (confidential cooperation principle)). The employer and ‘Betriebsrat’ are ‘Betriebspartner’ (business partners). Thus: (a) they must negotiate regarding contentious questions with the serious desire (‘mit dem ernsten Willen’) to reach an agreement (‘Einigung’) and must make suggestions (‘Vorschläge’)  to settle differences of opinion (‘Meinungsverschiedenheiten’);32 (b) they are not entitled to take any measures of industrial action (‘Maßnahmen des  Arbeitskampfes’). However, industrial action between ‘tariffähigen Parteien’ (parties capable of reaching a tariff agreement (‘Tarifvertrag’),  ie, trade unions and employer organisations) is still possible;33 (c) they must desist from actions, which interfere with the course of work or the peace of the ‘Betrieb’ (‘Betätigungen…aurai aie der Arbeitsablauf oder der Frieden des Betriebs beeinträchtigt werden’:  the so-called ‘Pflicht zur Wahrung des Betriebsfriedens’ or ‘Friedenspflicht’;34 (d) they must desist from any party-political action (‘jede parteipolitische Betätigung’) in the ‘Betrieb’.35 Employer and ‘Betriebsrat’ can cooperate in various forms. They can reach a written ‘Betriebsvereinbarung’  (business agreement)36 or merely settle the matter by oral consent (‘betriebliche Einigung’, ‘Betriebsabsprache’ or ‘Regelungsabrede’). Differences of opinion (‘Meinungsverschiedenheiten’) can be referred to an internal standing or ad hoc ‘Einigungsstelle’ ((compulsory) conciliation body), usually on the application or with the approval of both parties.37 It consists of equal numbers of representatives from each side, with an impartial chairman.38 The decision (‘Spruch’) of the ‘Einigungsstelle’ is usually only suggestive in nature,  but can in certain cases replace the agreement between employer and ‘Betriebsrat’ and is then binding.39 E THE RIGHTS OF THE ‘BETRIEBSRAT’ 40 The ‘Betriebsrat’ has rights of involvement (‘Beteiligung’) and cooperation (‘Mitwirkung’) in three main areas: in social, personnel and commercial matters (‘sozialen, personellen und wirtschaftlichen Angelegenheiten’). Such rights are commonly classified, in ascending order of intensity, as including: – –

an ‘Informationsrecht’ (information right), ie, the ‘Unterrichtung’ of the ‘Betriebsrat’ is required; a ‘Mitspracherecht’ (right of consultation), ie, the ‘Anhörung’ or ‘Beratung’ of the ‘Betriebsrat’ is required; 184

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– –

a ‘Widerspruchsrecht’ (right of objection) of the ‘Betriebsrat’ (typically in cases of  ‘personellen Einzelmaßnahmen’ (measures regarding individual members of staff); a ‘Mitbestimmungsrecht’ or ‘betriebliche Mitbestimmung’  in the narrow sense (right of co-decision), ie, the positive ‘Zustimmung’ (approval) of the ‘Betriebsrat’ is required.

The ‘Mitbestimmungsrecht’ is the strongest right of the ‘Betriebsrat’  and exists, for example, in social matters (ie, broadly in the field of collective working conditions) in the absence of a provision in a statute or tariff agreement.41 The rights of the ‘Betriebsrat’ in commercial matters are set out in §§ 106–113 BetrVG. Most important here is the right of the ‘Betriebsrat’ (in a ‘Betrieb’ consisting of more than 20 employees) to be informed regarding any planned ‘Betriebsänderung’ (change in the ‘Betrieb’), which could involve significant disadvantages (‘wesentliche Nachteile’) for staff. The ‘Betriebsrat’ is then entitled to negotiate regarding the practicalities and conclude a so-called ‘Interessenausgleich’ (settlement of interests) and a ‘Sozialplan’ (social plan) for those affected. The rights of the ‘Betriebsrat’ in personnel matters are set out in §§ 92–105 BetrVG: 1 2

In a ‘Betrieb’ with more than 20 adult employees, the ‘Betriebsrat’ can, for example, on certain grounds refuse its approval to a recruitment (‘Einstellung’) or transfer (‘Versetzung’): it has a ‘Widerspruchsrecht’ (right of objection).42 The ‘Betriebsrat’ must be heard before any dismissal (‘Kündigung’) by the employer. A dismissal declared without such hearing (‘Anhörung’)   is ineffective (‘unwirksam’).43

The ‘Betriebsrat’  can inform the employer of its doubts (‘Bedenken’)  regarding an ordinary dismissal within one week and regarding an extraordinary dismissal within three days.44 Further, it has a right of objection (‘Widerspruchsrecht’) on certain grounds against an ordinary dismissal within the same period.45 In the event of a valid objection from the ‘Betriebsrat’ and a ‘Kündigungsschutzklage’ from the employee (within 3 weeks), the employee has a right to continue to be employed (‘Recht auf Weiterbeschäftigung’) on unchanged terms until conclusion of the dispute.46 Apart from ‘Mitwirkung’ by the ‘Betriebsrat’, the individual employee also has rights to be informed and heard (‘Unterrichtungs- und Anhörungsrechte’)  and to lodge a complaint (Beschwerderecht’).47 F ‘MITBESTIMMUNG’  IN LARGE ‘UNTERNEHMEN’

48

There are special provisions in the BetrVG 1952 for ‘Mitbestimmung’  in the ‘Aufsichtsräten’ (supervisory boards) of ‘Unternehmen’ (enterprises) with more than 500 employees.49 The ‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’ 1976 applies to ‘Unternehmen’ having more than 2000 employees. 185

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G THE COALITIONS50 Collective employment law deals not only with organisational questions and rights to ‘Mitbestimmung’ (BetrVG and ‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’), but also with the relationship  between trade unions (‘Gewerkschaften’)   and employer associations (‘Arbeitgeberverbände’),   each of which is referred to as a ‘Koalition’   (coalition). The importance of coalitions in German employment law lies in the fact that only they can conclude a ‘Tarifvertrag’ (tariff agreement) and engage in an ‘Arbeitskampf’ (industrial action).51 Tariff agreements are governed by the ‘Tarifvertragsgesetz’  (TVG) of 25.8.1969. A tariff agreement can contain a normative and contractual part.52 Measures of industrial action (‘Kampfmaßnahmen’) during the currency of a tariff  agreement constitute a breach of the ‘Friedenspflicht’ —which forms part of the contractual part of the agreement—and can give rise to a claim for damages.53 H ‘ARBEITSSCHUTZRECHT’ 54 Various statutory provisions govern safety at work in Germany and give protection against accident (‘Unfallschutz’) and protection of health (‘Gesundheitsschutz’). They are part of the field of employment law known as ‘Arbeitsschutzrecht’ (work protection law) and are of a compulsory, public law nature (‘öffentlich-rechtlich’).55 The observance of the norms of ‘Arbeitsschutzrecht’ is subject to state control by the ‘Gewerbeaufsichtsbehörden’ (business (trade) supervisory authorities) either alone or in conjunction with the police authorities of the relevant ‘Bundesland’ (federal state). The ‘Berufigenossenschaften’ (occupational cooperatives) also have rights of supervision. Provisions of ‘Arbeitsschutzrecht’ include: –

–

§ 120a of the ‘Gewerbeordnung’ (GewO; Business (Trade) Order). This provision obliges ‘Gewerbeunternehmer’ (business (trade) enterprises) to take such steps as are necessary to maintain ‘Betriebssicherheit’ (safety at the workplace). Thus, for example, they must provide and maintain work-rooms, equipment, machines and tools in such a way and generally see to it that employees are protected against dangers to life and health as far as the nature of the business permits. § 120d GewO. The appropriate authorities are empowered to issue ‘(ordnungsbehördliche) Verfügungen’ ((official) directions) ordering such measures as are necessary and appear practicable to be carried out. By way of enforcement, the authorities can resort to various ‘Zwangsmittel’ (compulsory measures),56 which must usually first be threatened (‘angedroht’) in writing.57 Orders from the authorities are administrative law sanctions, which, in the first instance, fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. Additionally, however, a deliberate or negligent contravention of an enforceable order (‘vollziehbare Anordnung’) from the ‘Gewerbeaufsichtsbehörde’  constitutes a minor offence (‘Ordnungswidrigkeit’).58 186

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–

–

–

–

– –

–

A fine of up to DM 10,000 can be imposed.59 § 9 of the ‘Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten’ (OWiG; Minor Offences Law). Organs (representatives) of a company, statutory representatives or persons instructed to direct a business by the owner can also themselves be the subject of regress. § 618(i) of the ‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ (BGB; Civil Code). This provision contains a private law obligation to take measures similar to those mentioned in § 120a GewO to protect the life and health of persons, who have contracted to provide their services under a ‘Dienstvertrag’ (contract of service).60 The person entitled to the services (the ‘Dienstberechtigter’) has a non-excludable duty of protection (‘Schutzpflicht’) and care (‘Fürsorgepflicht’).61 A blameworthy, so-called ‘positive’ breach of contract (‘positive Vertragsverletzung’)  by the ‘Dienstberechtigter’ can give rise to a claim for damages (‘Schadensersatz’).62 The ‘Verordnung über Arbeitsstätten’ (‘Arbeitsstättenverordnung’;  ArbStättVO; (Work Places Order). The ArbStättVO of 20.3.1975 is a ‘Rechtsverordnung’ passed in accordance with § 120e GewO. It contains comprehensive rules regarding the state of work places. § 53(i) ArbStättVO provides that an employer must maintain the work place and ensure that defects, which are established, are rectified, if possible forthwith. If  this cannot be done at once in the case of defects involving immediate danger, the relevant work must be discontinued. § 53(ii) ArbStättVO provides (inter alia) that security installations for the prevention or removal of dangers must be regularly examined and tested. § 5 and § 6 of the ‘Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz’ (ASiG; Work Safety Law). These provisions oblige an employer to appoint qualified work safety personnel (‘Fachkräfte für Arbeitssicherheit’) and set out their functions. § 708 of the ‘Reichsverskherungsordnung’  (RVO; Imperial Insurance Order). The ‘Berufsgenossenschaft’  can issue regulations for the prevention of accidents (‘Unfallverhütungsvorschriften’). § 714(i) RVO. If, on an inspection by officials of a ‘Berufsgenossenschaft’, defects are discovered establishing an immediate threat of danger (‘eine unmittelbar drohende Gefahr’),  they can make immediately enforceable orders for the removal of the danger. Fines can be imposed. § 719 RVO. This provides (inter alia) that in enterprises with more than 20 employees one or more safety officers (‘Sicherheitsbeauftragte’) must be appointed. I ACCIDENTS AT WORK

In the early part of the 20th century, inspired by § 242 BGB, increased importance was attached to employees’ and employers’ respective duties of loyalty (‘Treuepflichten’) 187

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and care (‘Fürsorgepflichten’). Today, one is more inclined to speak of an employer’s  business risk (‘Betriebsrisiko’). In the particular context of an employment relationship, one considered it to be just and reasonable that an employee, who is usually the commercially ‘weaker’ party, should not always be open to unlimited liability for breaches of duty (under the principle of PVV or tort). An employee should not be liable for every carelessness or inadvertence (‘Unachtsamkeit’). A particular case-law development here, which is still of great practical relevance, has, therefore, been the concept of work, which is prone to cause damage (‘schadensgeneigte Arbeit’), ie, activities which, by their nature, involve typical risks. According to the doctrine of ‘schadensgeneigte Arbeit’, employees engaged in this sort of work are entitled to indemnification (‘Freistellung’) against claims / relief from (personal) liability (‘Haftungserleichterung’), if their unintentional acts cause loss to the employer or third parties. Depending on the particular circumstances and the degree of blame (‘Grad des Verschuldens’)63 on the part of the employee, there is a shifting of  liability (‘Schadensverlagerung’) for accidents at work (‘Arbeitsunfälle’/‘Betriebsunfälle’) onto the employer/third parties and, via insurance, onto the community at large.64 Furthermore, by § 636 RVO, the employer himself is not liable for personal injuries (‘Personenschäden’) sustained by an employee due to an (unintentional) accident at work, unless the accident is caused deliberately (‘vorsätzlich’) by the employer or if it arises in the course of the employer’s ‘Teilnahme am allgemeinen Verkehr’  (participation in general traffic), ie, outside the business. Apart from these exceptions, an employee, who suffers personal injury, only has social insurance claims against the ‘Berufsgenossenschaft’. He cannot claim damages directly against the employer.65 The employer’s limitation of liability (‘Haftungsbeschränkung’) also applies vis à vis a colleague of the employee at work, who is injured by the employee in the course of  his employment (‘betriebliche Tätigkeit’): § 637(i) RVO. The ‘Reichsversicherungsordnung’   (RVO) of 19.7.1911 consolidated various social insurance laws introduced during the Bismarck era, which laid the basis for these rules. It came into force on 1.1.1912 and has occasionally been amended since. It is planned to incorporate the law concerning liability for accidents at work in Part VII of  the ‘Sozialgesetzbuch’ (Social Code).

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CHAPTER XIX

XIX BUSINESS LAW (‘WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT’) 1

A INTRODUCTION 1   ‘Wirtschaftsrecht’ is business or commercial law in a general, wide sense, ie, law governing, directing and promoting business activity. The term embraces a diverse range of areas of law,2 some traditionally private and others of a public law nature, for example: – – – – – – –

commercial law (‘Handelsrecht’);3 company law (‘Gesellschaftsrecht’);4 business law in the narrow sense (‘Gewerberecht’);5 employment law (‘Arbeitsrecht’);6 law of banking (‘Bankrecht’);7 business protection (‘gewerblicher Rechtsschutz’), ie, trade mark and patent law (‘Warenzeichen- und Patentrecht’)  and law relating to industrial and other registered designs (‘Gebrauchs- und Geschmacksmuster’);8 competition law (‘Wettbewerbsrecht’).9

‘Wirtschaftsrecht’   includes the law relating to the various trade, industrial, professional and specialist organisations (associations and chambers (‘Verbände und Kammern’)) active in the German economy.10 In a broad, international sense, ‘Wirtschaftsrecht’ also extends to the law of the EEC (‘europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft’ (EWG)).11

2   ‘Wirtschaftsrecht’ is not the only principal term (‘Oberbegriff’) in German business law. Of even more fundamental importance is the term ‘Gewerbe’, which is a subcategory of the term ‘Beruf’ (occupation). A ‘Gewerbe’   customarily means a particular (type of) business in the objective sense.12 The term ‘Gewerbe’ is central to numerous areas of German law, private and public,  but it has no common or, indeed, formal definition. Its elements are usually stated as being: – – –

any legal, outwardly visible (‘nach außen erkennbare’), independent activity (‘selbständige Tätigkeit’); undertaken for a certain duration (‘auf eine gewisse Dauer angelegt’); with a view to profit (‘mit Gewinnerzielungsabsicht’).

For historical reasons, the extraction of natural produce from the land (so-called ‘Urproduktion’)13 and the exercise of a free profession (‘freier Beruf’)—the nature of  which is regarded as being highly personal (‘höchstpersönlich’)—are not considered to be ‘Gewerben’.14 More specifically, one speaks of a ‘Gewerbebetrieb’,15 which means an exercised/ 189

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3

operated business and incorporates trade (‘Handel’),  industry (‘Industrie’), handicraft (‘Handwerk’) and transport (‘Verkehr’).16 The ‘Gewerbeordnung’   (GewO)17  classifies every ‘Gewerbe’  as either a so-called ‘stehendes Gewerbe’ (general business) or a ‘Reisegewerbe’ (travelling business), and contains special provisions for trade fairs (‘Messen’), exhibitions (‘Austellungen’) and markets (‘Märkte’). For a ‘stehendes Gewerbe’, there is a general duty of notification (‘Anzeige-’ or ‘Anmeldepflicht’) to the local ‘Gewerbeaufsichtsamt’ (office of business supervision). Moreover, in the public interest, many types of ‘Gewerbe’ require specific approval (‘Genehmigung’), permission (‘Erlaubnis’) or surveillance (‘Überwachung’).18 In particular, the grant of a business permit (‘Gewerbeerlaubnis’) can depend on personal factors—eg, evidence of ability (‘Befähigungsnachweis’)   or reliability (‘Zuverlässigkeit’) —and/or on business aspects (‘sachliche Gesichtspunkte’). The general freedom to exercise a ‘Gewerbe’ (‘Grundsatz der Gewerbefreiheit’; laid down in § 1 GewO) is, therefore, extensively qualified.19 Two other terms, also descriptive of areas of business law, are:  –  –

4

‘Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht’;20 and ‘Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht’,21

in which, respectively, constitutional provisions play a role and in which the activity of the executive predominates (eg, building law (‘Baurecht’),   cartell law (‘Kartellrecht’), environmental law (‘Umweltrecht’), tax law (‘Steuerrecht’) and the law relating to public subsidies (‘Subventionen’)22 The common factor in ‘Wirtschaftsverfassungrecht’  and ‘Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht’ is that they form part of public law (‘öffentliches Recht’). The designations reflect the increasing interest of the state in the running/regulation and supervision of  the economy (‘Wirtschaftslenkung’/‘Wirtschaftsaufsicht’) and the growing impact (‘Einschlag’) of public law provisions.23 The law relating to commercial (‘white-collar’) crime (‘Wirtschaftsstrafrecht’) is, strictly speaking, part of criminal law.24 In the face of increasingly sophisticated criminal methods, there is a growing tendency to ‘commercialise’ criminal law as an instrument of control (indirect intervention). Thus, auditors (‘Abschlussprüfer’),  board members (‘Vorstände’ /  ‘Aufsichtsräte’) and companies are often targets for criminal investigation.25 B LAW OF SECURITIES (‘WERTPAPIERRECHT’) 26

Securities (‘Wertpapiere’) take a prominent role in the daily world of business and finance. It is, therefore, important to be familiar with the basic terminology. However, it is an area of law bristling with complex distinctions. Initially, it should be understood that one is not dealing here with securities in the sense of (real or personal) means of securing obligations (‘Sicherheiten’), but with a subject, which, in English law, is treated under the heading of ‘Negotiable Instruments’. 190

Chapter XIX: Business Law (‘Wirtschaftsrecht’)

What is a ‘Wertpapier’? 

A ‘Wertpapier’ is customarily defined as a document (‘Urkunde’) which comprises or confirms a private law right, possession and presentation (‘Vorlegung’) of the document  being a precondition for the exercise (‘Geltendmachung’) of the right.27 The underlying rationale is the desire, by documentation of a right (‘Verbriefung eines Rechts’), to facilitate its use in commercial transactions (‘Verkehrsfähigkeit’) and make it as transferable as a (corporeal) thing (‘Sache’).28The type of right, which can  be documented, can be contractual (‘schuldrechtlich’) in origin (eg, a bill of exchange (‘Wechsel’)); it can derive from the law of property (eg, a mortgage); or it can be a right of membership (‘Mitgliedschaftsrecht’; eg, a share in a public company (‘Aktie’)). Where a contractual claim/right (‘Forderung’) is involved, documentation in the form of a ‘Wertpapier’ serves various purposes:29 – – – –

it facilitates fulfilment by the debtor of his obligation; it represents evidence of the creditor’s entitlement (‘Berechtigung’);30 it protects the position of an assignee (‘Zessionar’) of the claim against a transaction undertaken with the assignor/old creditor (‘Zedent’);31 it protects the position of a bona fide transferee (‘gutgläubiger Erwerber’) of the claim.

‘Wertpapiere’ can be classified as follows, according to the person entitled to the relevant right:32

–

bearer securities (‘Inhaberpapiere’), eg, bearer bonds (‘Inhaberschuldverschreibungen’; §§ 793–808a BGB).33 ‘Inhaberpapiere’ are transferable like movables and a transfer (‘Übereignung’) of the document operates to transfer the underlying ‘Forderung’  as well. ‘Bona fide’ acquisition of both is possible, even if an ‘Inhaberpapier’ has been stolen or has otherwise gone astray (‘abhanden gekommen’): § 935(ii) BGB. One says: ‘Das Recht aus dem Papier folgt dem Recht am Papier’  (the right to the document, rather than the right documented, is decisive); – order securities (‘Orderpapiere’). ‘Orderpapiere’ offer a greater degree of safety. They combine the ease of negotiability of ‘Inhaberpapiere’ with the benefits of naming the person entitled to exercise the right documented, by means of a clause enabling that right to be exercised either  by the person named or at his order (‘Orderklausel’). A transfer of an ‘Orderpapier’ requires not only a transfer of the document itself (as in the case of an ‘Inhaberpapier’), but also that an indorsement (‘Indossament’) from the previous holder appears on the document. The categories of possible ‘Orderpapiere’ are limited by statute. Some securities (so-called ‘geborene Orderpapiere’) are automatically regarded as ‘Orderpapiere’, whether or not they contain the order clause (eg, bills of exchange and cheques). Others (so-called ‘gekorene Orderpapiere’) are only considered to be ‘Orderpapiere’, if they contain the clause; otherwise they are regarded as ‘Rektapapiere’.34 191

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Bearer shares in a public company (‘Inhaberaktien’) are bearer securities. However, despite their title, shares issued in the name of a particular person (‘Namensaktien’) are treated as ‘(geborene) Orderpapiere’, not as ‘Namenspapiere’;35 – securities, which document a right belonging only to a specifically named person (‘Rektapapiere’ or ‘Namenspapiere’). Examples of ‘Rektapapiere’ are mortgage and land charge certificates (‘Hypothekenund Grundschuldbriefe’), the civil law documentary instruction (‘Anweisung’; §§ 783–792 BGB) and the so-called ‘qualified legitimatory documents’ (‘qualifizierte Legitimationspapiere’; § 808 BGB) eg, savings books (‘Sparbücher’).36 Whereas bearer and order securities require a disposal (‘Verfügung’)   of the document itself according to property law principles, in the case of a ‘Rektapapier’ the owner of the documented right is the person properly entitled: § 952 BGB. An additional disposal of the document itself is not required for a valid transfer (‘Übertragung’) of the right; the right can be transferred without the document (merely) by assignment (§ 398 BGB). One says: ‘Das Recht am Papier folgt dem Recht aus dem Papier’ (the right documented, rather than the right to the document, is decisive or, to put it another way, the ‘Forderung’, rather than the document itself, is in the forefront).37 The dominant view is that the term ‘Wertpapier’ is to be understood in a wide sense to include ‘Rektapapiere’.38 ‘Wertpapiere’ can further be distinguished according to whether: – they are means of payment (‘Zahlungsmittel’), viz, cheques. Banknotes (‘Banknoten’) are not ‘Wertpapiere’.   They are legal tender (‘gesetzliche Zahlungsmittel’), but document no (extraneous) right; – they are means of obtaining credit (‘Kreditmittel’), viz, bills of exchange; – they are means of raising capital (‘Kapitalaufbringung’)   and of investment (‘Kapitalanlage’), ie, so-called ‘Effekten’ (‘Wertpapiere’ in the banking sense (stock)). Examples are shares (‘Aktien’) and bearer bonds (‘Inhaberschuldverschreibungen’), such as government bonds (‘(öffentliche) Anleihen’)   and bond certificates (‘Pfandbriefe’) issued by mortgage banks (‘Hypothekenbanken’). The common feature of ‘Effekten’ is that they are issued in large quantities and are usually taken into collective deposit (‘Sammelverwahrung’) by banks. The individual customer is not entitled to particular ‘Wertpapiere’,  but has a share in joint ownership (‘Miteigentum nach Bruchteilen’);39 – they are means of facilitating trade with goods in circulation (‘Güterumlauf’) by documenting rights to them, eg, a storage certificate (‘Lagerschein’) and a bill of  lading (‘Konnossement’).  Both of these are so-called ‘Traditionspapiere’,  ie, they represent the goods, their delivery having the same effect as physical delivery of  the goods themselves.40 Documents, which merely evidence a private right (eg, an IOU (‘Schuldschein’))– ‘Beweisurkunden’—and simple legitimatory documents (‘einfache Legitimationspapiere’)— ie, those where the right involved can be proved otherwise than by presentation—(eg, 192

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a cloakroom ticket (‘Garderobenmarke’),  luggage receipt (‘Gepäckschein’)  or repair docket (‘Reparaturschein’)), are not ‘Wertpapiere’ . Nor are so-called bearer signs (‘Inhaberzeichen’), ie, cards (‘Karten’), stamps (‘Marken’) or tickets, which enable the holder to demand performance from the issuer (‘Aussteller’), even if the holder is not the person actually entitled to do so: §§ 807, 793(i), 2nd sentence BGB.41

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XX PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

A THE EGBGB The German rules governing conflicts of laws (private international law) are set out in Articles 3–38 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code (the ‘Einführungsgesetz zum BGB’ (EGBGB)). They specify the applicable legal system (law) where a case has a connection to the law of a foreign state (Article 3(i), 1st sentence). Articles 3–38 are contained in Part I (general provisions) of the EGBGB and are divided into five Sections: References (‘Verweisungen’): Articles 3–6. Law of natural persons and legal transactions (‘Recht der natürlichen Personen und Rechtsgeschäfte’): Articles 7–12. 3: Family law: Articles 13–24. 4: Law of succession: Articles 25–26. 5: Law of obligations: Articles 27–38.1 1: 2:

B POINTS TO NOTE It is important initially to note the following: (i) German private international law was reformed with effect from 1.9.1986. Where events/matters are concerned, which were concluded before that date (‘abgeschlossene Vorgänge’),  the previous German rules remain applicable: Article 220(i) EGBGB. (ii) By Article 3(ii) EGBGB, such provisions of agreements of international public law (ie, international treaties and conventions) as have been transformed into (national) German law take precedence over the provisions of the EGBGB. (iii) Articles 3–38 EGBGB comprise a collection of (national) collision norms (‘Kollisionsnormen’), which assist in ascertaining the relevant applicable law. (iv) The applicable or governing law (‘lex causae’) must be strictly distinguished from the law of the forum (‘lex fori’), ie, the law of the place in which the matter is heard. The applicable law (choice of law) is a matter of substance and is not to be confused with questions of procedure (eg, admissibility of evidence, types of  remedy available).2 (v) In order to determine the appropriate collision norm in a particular case, the legal issue involved must first be categorised. This is the process of characterisation (‘Qualifikation’).3 (vi) The link between the relevant category/collision norm and the applicable law is the province of the connecting factors (‘Anknüpfungspunkte’),  eg, citizenship (‘Staatsangehörigkeit’), habitual or usual residence (‘gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt’), the place of commission of a tort (‘lex loci delicti’) or the location of property (‘situs’).4 195

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(vii) There is a fundamental distinction between the substantive legal provisions (‘Sachvorschriften’) of a legal system and the system (‘die Rechtsordnung’) as a whole (which includes its rules of international private law). The EGBGB can (and does) contain references (‘Verweisungen’) to either.5 Whenever the EGBGB states that a matter is to be determined (alone) according to the ‘Sachvorschriften’ of a (foreign) legal system—eg, maintenance under Article 18(i) EGBGB—there is no reference to that system’s rules of private international law (Article 3(i), 2nd sentence).6 (viii) A reference in the EGBGB to the law (‘Recht’) of another state is (normally) also a reference to that (other) state’s rules of private international law, which, therefore, have to be examined for a possible ‘renvoi’ (‘Rückverweisung’) to German law (Article 4(i)).7

C PERSONAL AND FAMILY MATTERS In fundamental contrast to the law of common law countries—in which the legal concept of ‘domicile’ holds sway—it is a consistent thread of German private international law that nationality (‘Staatsangehörigkeit’) is the principal connecting factor to establish the applicable law in matters relating to natural persons (Section 2 (Articles 7–10 EGBGB)), in matters of family law (Section 3  (Articles 13–24 EGBGB)) and succession (Section 4 (Articles 25–26 EGBGB)).8 Indeed, where a person has more than one nationality, but is also a German, that status takes precedence (Article 5(i), 2nd sentence). In the interest of precision, German private international law avoids the difficulties associated with establishing domicile (viz, proof of intention (‘animus’)) and, instead, places prime importance on a distinguishing element bestowed by the state (ie, citizenship) or, alternatively, the factual reality of usual residence (‘gewöhnlicher  Aufenthalt’).9 Thus, for example, by Article 14(i) EGBGB, the general effects of marriage (‘die allgemeinen Wirkungen der Ehe’) are governed: 1 2 3

by the law of the state to which both spouses belong (‘angehören’) or last belonged, if one of them still belongs to that state; otherwise by the law of the state in which both spouses have, or last had, their usual residence, if one of them still has his or her usual residence there; or finally by the law of the state with which the spouses are otherwise jointly most closely connected (‘am engsten verbunden’).10

In the case of marital property, however, the law to be applied is that, which governed the general effects of marriage at the time of conclusion of the marriage (‘bei der Eheschließung’): Article 15(i) EGBGB.11 Although under German private international law a person’s domicile (‘Wohnsitz’) is not decisive in order to establish the applicable law, it is important for the purposes 196

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of civil procedure (§ 13 ZPO) and in international conventions (eg, the Brussels Convention (EuGVÜ)). D THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS Section 5 (Articles 27–38 EGBGB) deals both with the position regarding contractual

and non-contractual obligations (eg, tort). 1 Contractual Obligations

The position regarding the law applicable to contractual relationships(‘Vertragsstatut’) 12 is, broadly, as follows: By Article 27(i), 1st sentence EGBGB, the parties are free to choose the law applicable to their contract. The choice can be express or, if implication is possible with sufficient certainty, can be implied from the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case: Article 27(i), 2nd sentence.13 Irrespective of the parties’ choice, if the (rest of the) facts point to the law of one particular state, that state’s mandatory pro visions/rules (‘zwngende Bestimmungen’) remain unaffected (ie, must still be applied): Article 27(iii) EGBGB.14 In the absence of a choice, the contract is governed by the law of the state with which it has the closest connections (‘engste Verbindungen’): Article 28(i), 1st sentence EGBGB. By Article 28(ii), 1st sentence, it is presumed that the contract has the closest connections to the state in which: – –

the party having to undertake the characteristic (act of) performance required by the contract (‘die charakteristische Leistung’) usually resides; or if a company, association or juristic person is involved, its centre of administration (‘Hauptverwaltung’) is situated.15

Contracts with private consumers in another state (‘Verbraucherverträge’)  are subject to special rules: Article 29.16 By Article 30(ii) EGBGB, in the absence of a particular choice of law, contracts of  employment and employment relationships are governed either: 1 2

by the law of the state in which the employee usually undertakes his work in performance of the contract, even if he is sent temporarily to another state; or in so far as the employee does not usually perform his duties in one and the same state, by the law of the state in which the employing branch is situated.

If, however, it appears from the totality of the circumstances that the contract of  employment or employment relationship has closer connections to another state, the law of that state applies.17 By Article 32(i) EGBGB, the abovementioned applicable law is, in particular, decisive regarding (inter alia): –

interpretation of the contract; 197

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– –

performance of contractual obligations; and consequences of full or partial non-performance of those obligations.

By Article 32(ii) EGBGB, in considering the manner of performance and the steps to  be taken by a plaintiff in the event of faulty performance, account is to be taken of the law of the state in which performance takes place.18 In the field of contractual obligations, a reference to the law of a particular state is to the substantive provisions of that law (only): Article 35(i) EGBGB. There can, therefore, be no ‘renvoi’. If the formation (‘Zustandekommen’) or material validity (‘Wirksamkeit’) (not form!)19 of a contract or one of its provisions is in dispute, the question must be dealt with according to the law, which would apply, if the contract or the provision were valid (the ‘putative applicable law’): Article 31(i) EGBGB. However, by Article 31(ii) EGBGB, where the question of consent to the contract (‘Zustimmung’) is in issue and it transpires from the circumstances that it would not be  justified (‘nicht gerechtfertigt’) to apply the putative law in the evaluation of the party’s conduct, that party can rely on the law of his or her habitual residence (‘gewöhnlicher  Aufenthalt’).20 2

Questions of Jurisdiction (‘Zuständigkeit’)

When considering the provisions of the EGBGB, it is important, as a preliminary question, to bear in mind the interplay with the jurisdictional provisions of the ZPO. (a) Special venues

For the purpose of contractual disputes, the court for the place of performance (‘Erfüllungsort’/‘Leistungsort’) has (special) local jurisdiction: § 29 ZPO.21 When parties in different countries of the European Union are involved, the place of performance is also decisive to establish which court has (international) jurisdiction: Article 5 No 1 EuGVÜ. (b) Agreements

By § 29(ii) ZPO, an agreement regarding the place of performance only establishes a court’s jurisdiction (‘Zuständigkeit’), if the parties are (full) businessmen (‘Kaufleute’). Moreover, in civil matters, an agreement regarding jurisdiction (‘Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung’, ‘Prorogation’) is, in general, forbidden, unless it is made expressly and in writing after the dispute commences or is only meant to apply, if  problems locating the defendant arise: § 38(iii) ZPO. However, the parties can agree upon a competent court of first instance:22 – –

if they are ‘Kaufleute’: § 38(i) ZPO (this is in line with § 29(ii) ZPO); or if one of the parties has no general venue in Germany (§§ 13–17 ZPO), provided the agreement is at least confirmed in writing: § 38(ii) ZPO.

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In the latter case, for the selection of a court within Germany itself, an existing German general or special venue takes precedence. Where parties in different countries of the European Union are involved, an agreement between the parties regarding (exclusive) jurisdiction (choice of jurisdiction) is possible under Article 17 EuGVÜ. However, to be effective, it must at least be confirmed in writing or, in matters of international commerce, it must accord with (international) trade custom (‘Handelsbrauch’): Article 17(i), 2nd sentence EuGVÜ.23 3

Non-Contractual Obligations

As for the position regarding non-contractual obligations (eg, tort), the EGBGB only deals with torts committed by a German outside Germany. In such cases, the liability of the perpetrator cannot extend beyond the maximum laid down by German law: Article 38 EGBGB.24 Torts committed in Germany, whether by Germans or other persons, fall to be dealt with according to German law, if a plaintiff choses to bring proceedings before the German courts.25 Supplementary provisions are now contained in the ‘Gesetz zum Internationalen Privatrecht für außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse und für Sachen’ of 21.5.1999.26 E PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW In civil proceedings, the court is normally bound by a strict procedure for the taking of evidence (‘Beweisaufnahme’; §§ 355–484 ZPO) and only certain types of evidence (‘Beweismittel’) are permitted: the principle of ‘Strengbeweis’ (strict evidence).27 However, by § 293 ZPO proof of such foreign law (‘ausländisches Recht’)  as is unknown to the court is one area28 in which the judge has a free hand and is not limited to information supplied by the parties: the principle of ‘Freibeweis’  (free evidence).29 The court conducts the investigation (‘Ermittlung’) of its own motion (‘von Amts wegen’), the aim being the establishment (‘Feststellung’) of the relevant foreign law as it is actually applied abroad. The court can, for example, arrange for information to be requested under the European Convention concerning Evidence of Foreign Law of 7.6.1968.30 An appeal on a point of law (‘Revision’) is possible (under § 549(i) ZPO), if § 293 ZPO or the rules of German private international law are breached.31

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CHAPTER XXI

XXI INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COOPERATION

A INTRODUCTION Cooperation in legal affairs is termed ‘Rechtshilfe’. It can be national or international (‘zwschenstaatlich’).1 The conduct and provision of (international) legal assistance with foreign countries (‘Rechtshilfeverkehr mit dem Ausland’)   is a matter of ‘Justizverwaltung’   (judicial administration) and falls within the jurisdiction of the ‘Länder’.2 In civil procedure,3 international ‘Rechtshilfe’ primarily refers to cooperation in the taking of (administrative) measures in the forefront of, or during, legal proceedings (eg, service of documents (‘Zustellung’)   or the taking of evidence abroad (‘Beweisaufnahme im Ausland’)). International ‘Rechtshilfe’  also extends to questions of the recognition and enforcement (‘Anerkennung und Vollstreckung’)   of foreign court decisions (‘Entscheidungen’) or arbitration awards (‘Schiedssprüche’).4 More broadly, international ‘Rechtshilfe’   can be understood in a further, ‘interventionist’ sense. The aim of ensuring effective legal protection (‘Rechtsschutz’) abroad can require the establishment of (alternative) procedures for facilitating the realisation (‘Durchsetzung’) of substantive legal claims.5 For these purposes, there is a complex web of provisions in the ZPO and international treaties (‘Staatsverträge’). The latter can, in turn, be multilateral (eg, the well known Hague Conventions) or bilateral/special (‘Sonderverträge’).  Moreover, quite apart from—and superimposed on—these, are conventions (‘Übereinkommen’) or measures enacted on the level of the Council of Europe, the European Union and the United Nations.6 Thus, in any one case, research can involve a multitude of legal sources. B SOURCES OF LAW It is important to keep the sources of law relating to international civil procedure distinct: (i) The provisions relating to international procedure contained in theZPO: §§ 110–113 (lodging of security by foreigners (‘Sicherheitsleistung durch Ausländer’)); §§ 199–202 (service of documents abroad (‘Zustellung im Ausland’));7 § 328 (recognition of foreign judgments (‘Anerkennung ausländischer Urteile’));8 §§ 363–364 (taking of evidence abroad (‘Beweisaufnahme im Ausland’));9 §§ 722–723 (enforcement of foreign judgments(‘Vollstreckung ausländischer Urteile’));10 § 791 (enforcement of German judgments abroad).

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(ii) Bilateral treaties. (iii) The various Hague Conventions.11 (iv) Those Conventions emanating from supra-national organisations (eg, the United Nations and the European Union).12 Relevant provisions in (ii) to (iv) supercede the ZPO as special law (‘Sonderrecht’), so far as they are ratified. (v) National implementing statutes (‘Ausführungsgesetze’).13 C EXTRADITION (‘AUSLIEFERUNG’) 14 ‘Auslieferung’ (ie, extradition at the request of a foreign state) is a particular form of  international legal cooperation in criminal matters. In principle, it is not possible against Germans.15 ‘Auslieferung’ is usually regulated by international treaties,16 although procedure in Germany is governed by national law.17 Extradition requires reciprocity (‘Gegenseitigkeit’) between the requesting and the requested state. The question is: in the reverse situation, would the requesting state also order it? Certain other requirements must also be fulfilled:

(i)   ‘Auslieferung’ can only be sought for a specific offence (the ‘Grundsatz der Spezialität’ (principle of speciality)). (ii)  ‘Auslieferung’ must be permissible (‘zulässig’)  according to the nature of the alleged offence. In particular, it is not available for a ‘political’ offence, nor if the proposed prosecution is based on race, religion, nationality or political views. (iii) The alleged offence must be punishable with imprisonment of a maximum of at least one year under both the law of the requesting and of the requested state (the ‘Grundsatz der identischen Norm’  (identical norm principle)).18 (iv) The alleged offence must (still) be subject to prosecution(‘verfolgbar’) in both states. (v)   ‘Auslieferung’ must be authorised (‘bewilligt’) by the justice authorities of the relevant ‘Land’ or by the Federal Government. ‘Auslieferung’  must be distinguished from ‘Ausweisung’  (deportation) and from ‘Abschiebung’ (physical removal) under the ‘Ausländergesetz’ (AuslG; Law regarding Foreigners) or under the ‘Asylverfahrensgesetz’  (AsylVfG; Law on Asylum Procedure).19

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CHAPTER XXII

XXII THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND COURT SYSTEM1

A THE JUDGES2 The position of judges in Germany is governed by the ‘Deutsches Richtergesetz’  (DRiG: German Judges Law) of 8.9.1961, which is divided into four Parts: Part I: Part II: Part III: Part IV:

The office of judge in the ‘Bund’ and in the ‘Länder’ (§§ 1-45a).  Judges in service of the ‘Bund’ (§§ 46–70).  Judges in service of a ‘Land’ (§§ 71–84). Transitional and final provisions (§§ 85–126).

 Judges can be either ‘Berufsrichter’ (professional judges) or ‘ehrenamtliche Richter’ (honorary (lay) judges).3 Where honorary judges take part in criminal matters, they are referred to as‘Schöffe’.4 Civil matters are practically only dealt with by ‘Berufsrichter’ . However, in the ‘Handelskammer’ (chamber for commercial matters) in the ‘Landgericht’, a ‘Berufsrichter’ presides with two honorary ‘Handelsrichter’ (commercial judges). In accordance with Article 101(i), 2nd sentence GG (‘Grundsatz des gesetzlichen Richters’), ‘ehrenamtliche Richter’ (honorary judges) can only take part in a court hearing, if and as permitted by statute.5 They are selected on the basis of lists (‘Vorschlagslisten’) 6  and enjoy similar independence to that of the ‘Berufsrichter’.7 While they cannot preside over the hearing,8 they basically have the same rights as a ‘Berufsrichter’.9 The capacity to be a judge (‘Befähigung zum Richteramt’) in the ‘Bund’ and in every German ‘Land’ is acquired simultaneously with qualification as a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ by passing the first state examination (‘erste Staatsprüfung’), serving a ‘Vorbereitungsdienst’ (preparatory period of service) of two and a half years as ‘Referendar’,10 and then passing the second state examination (‘zweite Staatsprüfun’).11 Professors of law at a German university can be judges.12 In his position as a judge (‘Richterverhältnis’), a judge stands in the service of the ‘Bund’ or a ‘Land’;13 he is not a ‘Beamter’ (civil servant). The appointment (‘Ernennung’) of a judge is usually for life (‘auf Lebenszeit’), although an appointment for a particular period or on probation (‘auf Probe’) is possible.14  Judges in the supreme federal courts (‘Bundesrichter’)  are appointed by the ‘Bundespräsident’ on the recommendation of the Federal Minister of Justice or other competent Minister together with a ‘Richterwahlausschuß’ (judicial selection council).15  Judges in the ‘Länder’ are usually appointed merely by the competent Minister of  the relevant ‘Land’.

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In the ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’ (Federal Constitutional Court), the 16 judges are chosen as to half by the ‘Bundesrat’ and half by the ‘Bundestag’.16  Judges are independent (‘unabhängig’) and only subject to the law (‘nur dem Gesetz unterworfen’). 17 The transfer or removal (‘Versetzung’ /‘Amtsenthebung’)  of a judge without his agreement is only possible in certain limited cases.18 Supervisory and disciplinary measures are subject to final decision by a ‘Dienstgericht’.19 B THE ‘RECHTSPFLEGER’ 20 In order to relieve the judges, certain judicial business is transacted by civil servants (‘Beamte’) known as ‘Rechtspfleger’ (legal executives). §§ 3, 20–24a and 29–31 of the ‘Rechtspflegergesetz’ of 5.11.1969 (RPflG) transfer to the ‘Rechtspfleger’ various types of   business (so-called ‘übertragene Geschäfte’), for example: – – – – – – – – – –

matters concerning ‘Vereine’ (‘Vereinssachen’); land register matters (‘Grundbuchsachen’) and proceedings for ‘Zwangsversteigerung’ and ‘Zwangsverwaltung’; the ‘Verteilungsverfahren’  (distribution procedure);21 guardianship, family and care matters (‘Vormundschafts-, Familien- und Betreuungssachen’);*  probate and division matters (‘Nachlaß- und Teilungsssachen’) and official custody of wills and ‘Erbverträgen’;*  commercial matters (‘Handelssachen’);*  bankruptcy and composition proceedings (‘Konkurs- und Vergleichsverfahren’);*  default notice procedure (‘Mahnverfahren’); enforcement of judgments (‘Zwangsvollstreckung’); and fixing of costs (‘Kostenfestsetzung’).22

Certain of the above matters23 are subject to exceptions, which are reserved to be dealt with by the judge (‘dem Richter vorbehaltene Geschäfte’). 24 A ‘Rechtspfleger’ is not empowered to administer an oath, to threaten or order a person’s detention (with certain exceptions) or to decide on an application to amend a decision taken by a clerk of the ‘Geschäftsstelle’ (business office) of the court.25 Moreover, only a judge can order a search of premises.26 The ‘Rechtspfleger’ must submit a matter to the judge: – – – –

if he wishes to deviate from an opinion of the judge of which he is aware; if the conduct of the matter gives rise to legal difficulties; if foreign law is involved; or if a close connection with a matter to be dealt with by a judge makes the submission expedient.27

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The appropriate legal remedy against the decision of a ‘Rechtspfleger’  is the ‘Erinnerung’ (reminder).28 The ‘Rechtspfleger’ has power to correct his decision; otherwise, he must lay the ‘Erinnerung’ before the judge. If the judge takes no action, he must in turn pass it to the next competent court (a so-called ‘Durchgriffserinnerung’ (piercing ‘Erinnerungr’)).29 C THE COURT SYSTEM30 1

The ‘Gerichtsbarkeiten’ 31

The German judicature or judicial power (‘rechtsprechende Gewalt’)  is divided into various branches (‘Zweige’), known as ‘Gerichtsbarkeiten’ (jurisdictions). The types of  ‘Gerichtsbarkeit’ are: – – – –

the ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’  (ordinary jurisdiction); the ‘besondere Gerichtsbarkeit’  (special jurisdiction); the ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’  (administrative jurisdiction); and the ‘Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’  (constitutional jurisdiction).

2

The ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’ 32

The ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’ comprises civil and criminal matters and the so-called ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’  (voluntary jurisdiction) in non-contentious civil matters. A particular example of the ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’   is the activity of the ‘Amtsgericht’ as the court responsible for guardianship, probate and trade and land register matters. The basic statute governing the ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’   is the ‘Gesetz über die  Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit’ (FGG) of 17.5.1898.33 Where a matter of ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’ is involved, the court is responsible for undertaking the necessary investigations itself (‘von Amts wegen’). A decision in a matter of ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’ is pronounced not as an ‘Urteil’ (judgment), but in the form of a ‘Beschluß’ or ‘Verfügung’ (order or direction) and the hearing is not open to the public. An oral hearing is at the discretion of the court.34 The ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’  itself is dealt with in the ‘Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz’ (GVG) of 27.1.1877. Apart from the ‘Bundesgerichtshof’ (BGH; Supreme Federal Court) in Karlsruhe, all other courts of the ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’ (the ‘ordentliche Gerichte’) are courts of  the ‘Lände’. The hierarchy is as follows:35 – – – –

the ‘Amtsgericht’ (district court AG); the ‘Landgerich’ (county court: LG); the ‘Oberlandesgericht’ (county court of appeal: OLG); the ‘Bundesgerichtshof’ (Federal Supreme Court: BGH).

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With the exception of the ‘Amtsgericht’ all the above are, when sitting, collegial courts (‘Kollegialgerichte’), ie, are composed of more than one judge. In Bavaria, above the OLG an ‘Oberstes Landesgerich’ (supreme county court) exists.36 The competence (‘Zuständigkeit’) of the ‘ordentliche Gerichte’ is laid down in § 13 GVG, whereby all civil disputes and criminal matters (‘alle bürgerlichen Rechtsstreitigkeiten und Strafsachen’) belong before the ‘ordentliche Gerichte’.37 3

The ‘besondere Gerichtsbarkeit’ 

Article 101(ii) GG provides that courts for special subject areas (‘besondere Sachgebiete’) can only be formed by statute (‘Gesetz’) The main example of such ‘besondere Gerichte’38 are the ‘Arbeitsgerichte’ (employment courts), where the hierarchy is as follows: – – –

the‘Arbeitsgericht’ (employment court (ArbG)); the‘Landesarbeitsgericht’ (county employment court (LAG)); and the‘Bundesarbeitsgericht’ (Federal Employment Court (BAG)); in Erfurt).39

Special federal courts exist for patent and disciplinary matters.40 To be distinguished from the ‘besondere Gerichte’ are ‘Ausnahmegerichte’ (exceptional courts for particular cases); these are forbidden by Article 101(i) GG and § 16, 1st sentence GVG. 4

The ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ 

The ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’  comprises three main areas: – – –

the‘allgemeine Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ (general administrative jurisdiction, ie, the jurisdiction of the‘Verwaltungsgerichte’  (administrative courts)); the‘Sozialgerichtsbarkeit’ (the jurisdiction of the social (security) courts); the‘Finanzgerichtsbarkeit’ (the jurisdiction of the finance courts).

Apart from the ‘Finanzgerichtsbarkeit’   (which comprises only two instances—the ‘Finanzgericht’ and the ‘Bundesfinanzhof’ (BFH; Federal Finance Court in Munich)), the court hierarchy of the administrative and social (security) courts is three-tiered:41 respectively: – – –

the‘Verwaltungsgericht’  (VG); the‘Oberverwaltungsgericht’ (OVG);42 the‘Bundesverwaltungsgericht’ (BVerwG (in Berlin));

and – – –

the‘Sozialgericht’ (SG); the‘Landessozialgericht’ (LSG); the‘Bundessozialgericht’ (BSG; in Kassel).

The competence of and procedure before the abovementioned administrative, social and finance courts is, respectively, dealt with by the ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung’ (VwGO), the ‘Sozialgenchtsgesetz’ (SGG) and the ‘Finanzgerichtsordnung’ (FGO).43 206

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‘Rechtspflege’ 44 The term ‘Gerichtsbarkeit’ is used not only in an organisational sense to refer to its various branches, but also in a functional sense as meaning the exercise of the administration of justice (‘die Ausübung der Rechtspflege’). ‘Rechtspflege’ is not only the domain of the judiciary (the activity of which is referred to as ‘Rechtsprechung’),45 but includes: 5

– – – – –

the ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’  (voluntary jurisdiction in non-contentious civil matters);46 the activity of the ‘Staatsanwalt’ (public prosecutor);47 the enforcement of judgments (‘Zwangsvollstreckung’);48 the grant of legal advice (‘Rechtsberatung’) under the ‘Beratungshilfegesetz’ (BerHG) of 18.6.1980; the activities of the ‘Notar’ (notary) and the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ (lawyer).49

Another type of activity is ‘Justizverwaltung’. ‘Justizverwaltung’  The term ‘Justiz’ (judicature) covers both ‘Rechtspflege’ and so-called ‘Justizverwaltung’ (judicial administration). In everyday speech, it is also used to refer to the judicial power (‘rechtsprechende Gewalt’/‘Rechtsprechung’). ‘Justizverwaltung’  covers a mixed-bag of residual activities not falling within ‘Rechtspflege’ proper, qualified according to the character of the work involved. Thus, it includes, for example, (official) supervision of conduct in service (‘Dienstaufsicht’) and (international) assistance in legal affairs (‘Rechtshilfe’).50 ‘Justizverwaltung’ is primarily the responsibility of the ‘Länder’—the hierarchy of  the ‘Justizverwaltung’ and the conduct of ‘Dienstaufsicht’ is laid down in §§ 13–18 of the ‘Verordnung zur einheitlichen Regelung der Gerichtsverfassung’ (GVVO) of 20.3.1935. Administrative acts issued by judicial authorities (‘Justizbehörden’) not in the field of ‘Rechtspflege’   (ie, not, for example, contentious court decisions), but by way of  ‘Justizverwaltung’,   are referred to as ‘Justizverwaltungsakte’   (judicial acts of an administrative nature). For this purpose, judicial authorities include the various Justice Ministeries (federal and state), the courts of the ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’, the ‘Staatsanwalt’, the police, the ‘Notar’ and the prison authorities (‘Strafoollzugsbehörden’).51 6

D THE ‘RECHTSANWALT’52 1

sIntroduction

The law relating to German lawyers (‘Rechtsanwälte’)   is set out in the ‘Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung’ (BRAO; Federal Lawyers’ Ordinance) of 1.8.1959, as amended by the ‘Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte und der 207

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Patentanwälte’ (Law to Revise the Professional Rules Governing Lawyers and Patent Lawyers) of 2.9.1994. BRAO is divided into 12 Parts, of which the following are the most important: Part I: The status of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ (§§ 1–3).  The admission (‘Zulassung’) of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ (§§ 4–42). Part II: Part III: The rights (‘Rechte’)  and duties (‘Pflichten’)  of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ (§§ 43–59b). Part IV: The ‘Rechtsanwaltskammern’ (Lawyers’ Chambers) (§§ 60–91). Disciplinary provisions (‘ehrengerichtliche Vorschriften’) (§§ 92–161a). Parts V–VII: Part VIII: The ‘Rechtsanwälte’ at the ‘Bundesgerichtshof’ (Federal Supreme Court) (§§ 162–174). Part IX: The ‘Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer’  (Federal Lawyers’ Chamber) (§§ 175–191). 2

Status of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ 

By § 1 BRAO, the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is an independent organ of the administration of   justice (‘ein unabhängiges Organ der Rechtspflege’). The ‘Rechtsanwalt’ exercises a free profession (‘übt einen freien Beruf aus’) and is not a trader (‘seine Tätigkeit ist kein Gewerbe’). 53 He is the appointed independent adviser and representative in all legal matters (‘der berufene unabhängige Berater und Vertreter in allen Rechtsangelegenheiten’).54 Within the framework of the relevant legal provisions, everyone has the right to be advised and represented by a lawyer of his choice (‘durch einen Rechtsanwalt seiner Wahl’).55 3

Admission as a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ 

The provisions concerning admission (‘Zulassung’) as a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ are set out in §§ 4–42 BRAO. By § 4 BRAO, admission is dependent on the acquisition of the ‘Befähigung zum Richteramt’ (capacity to be a judge), fulfilment of the preconditions for admission as specified in the ‘Gesetz über die Tätigkeit europäischer Rechtsanwälte in Deutschland’ (EuRAG; Law regarding the Activity of European Lawyers in Germany) of 9.3.2000 or the passing of the aptitude test (‘Eignungsprüfung’) for lawyers from other EU countries provided for in that Law.56 The ‘Rechtsanwalt’  enjoys professional freedom of movement (‘Freizügigkeit’) within Germany,57 but must be admitted at a particular court (‘bei einem bestimmten Gericht’) of the ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’.58 Admission is granted (‘erteilt’) on application (‘auf Antrag’) to the Justice Ministry of the relevant ‘Land’.59 A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ must maintain his office (‘Kanzlei’) within the area (‘Bezirk’) of the ‘Oberlandesgericht’ of his admission60 and, if admitted at an OLG, cannot be admitted at another court.61 208

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Usually, therefore, a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is admitted either at an ‘Amtsgericht’ and/or ‘Landgericht’  or at an OLG (the so-called principle of single admission (‘Singularzulassung’)), although, in nine ‘Länder’ (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen), the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is entitled to simultaneous admission (‘Simultanzulassung’) at the OLG after five years’ admission at a court of first instance.62 Admission as a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ at the ‘Bundesgerichtshof’ (Federal Supreme Court) is dependent on selection by a ‘Wahlausschuß’ on the basis of ‘Vorschlagslisten’  (lists). Admission to the BGH restricts practice to that court, the other supreme federal courts and the ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’ (Federal Constitutional Court).63 4

Relationship of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’  to his Client64

The relationship of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ to his client (‘Mandant’ or ‘Auftraggeber’) is a socalled ‘Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag’ within § 675 BGB (an agreement of instruction for reward (‘entgeltlich’), as opposed to a mere ‘Auftrag’ ((contract of) instruction without payment). If a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ does not wish to accept instructions, he must notify his refusal (‘Ablehnung’) forthwith.65 In certain circumstances, he is forbidden from acting, eg, where he would breach his professional duties or in cases of (current or previous) conflicting involvement in the same matter.66 Where a ‘Rechtsanwalt’  is in continuous employment (‘in einem ständigen Dienstverhältnis’) for an employer (in the private sector)—a so-called ‘Syndikusanwalt’— he cannot represent that employer before a court in his capacity as ‘Rechtsanwalt’.67 A ‘Rechtsanwalt’   can be appointed as a compulsory defence lawyer (‘Pflichtverteidiger’).68 A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ can decline to hand out his file (‘Handakte’) until his fees (‘Gebühren’) and disbursements (‘Auslagen’) are paid; he must usually retain his file for five years after completion of the retainer.69 A ‘Rechtsanwalt’   must maintain professional liability insurance (‘Berufshaftpflichtversicherung’) for a minimum amount of DM 500,000. A client’s claim for damages against the ‘Rechtsanwalt’   out of their contractual relationship becomes statute-barred (‘verjährt’) at the latest three years after the end of  the retainer.70 5

Rights and Duties of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ 

§§ 43–59b BRAO deal with the rights and duties (‘Rechte und Pflichten’)  of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’. Of particular importance is § 43 BRAO: § 43  Allgemeine Berufspflicht. Der Rechtsanwalt hat seinen Beruf gewissenhaft auszuüben. Er hat sich innerhalb und ausserhalb des Berufes der Achtung und des Vertrauens, welche die Stellung des Rechtsanwalts erfordert, würdig zu erweisen. 209

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§ 43 General professional duty. The ‘Rechtsanwalt’ must exercise his profession conscientiously. Both within and outside the profession, he must show himself to be worthy of the respect aznd trust which the position of  ‘Rechtsanwalt’ demands. The ‘Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Berufsrechts der Rechtsanwälte’  of 2.9.1994 brought about significant changes to the law concerning the regulation of professional conduct (‘Berufsordnungsrecht’). In particular, three new sub-paragraphs (§§ 43a-c) were added to § 43. § 43a BRAO lays down six basic professional duties (‘Grundpflichten’): – – – – –

–

the duty to maintain professional independence (‘Pflicht zur Wahrung der beruflichen Unabhängigkeit’); the duty of secrecy/silence (‘Pflicht zur Verschwiegenheit’/‘Schweigepflichf’) regarding anything of which the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ becomes aware in the exercise of his profession (‘anlässlich seiner Berufsausübung’); the duty to be relevant (‘Sachlichkeitsgebot’), ie, not to make insulting or degrading remarks or consciously to disseminate untrue statements; the duty not to represent conflicting interests (‘Verbot der Vertretung widerstreitenden Interessen’); 71 the duty to take appropriate care of assets entrusted to the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ (‘Pflicht zur erforderlichen Sorgfalt bei der Behandlung der ihm anvertrauten Vermögenswerte’) and to pass on monies not belonging to him (‘fremde Gelder’) to the person entitled or to pay them into a client’s account (‘Anderkonto’); and the duty of continuing education (‘Fortbildungspflicht’).

§ 43b BRAO deals with the question of lawyers’ publicity (‘Werbung’). The provision

supplements § 43, from which a prohibition of publicity (‘Werbeverbot’) is, in principle, derived. § 43b permits publicity only insofar as it informs factually (‘sachlich’) in form and content regarding the lawyer’s professional activity (ie, ‘Informationswerbung’) and is not directed to the obtaining of instructions in a particular case.72 § 43c BRAO  enables a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ to apply to the local ‘Rechtsanwaltskammer’ for designation as a specialist lawyer (‘Fachanwalt’) in (not more than two of) the following fields: administrative law, criminal law, employment law, family law, social law, tax law. The ‘Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Berufsrechts der Rechtsanwälte’  also set in train an extension of the right of audience (‘Postulationsfähigkeit’) of ‘Rechtsanwälte’, which has resulted in the abolition of the ‘localisation principle’ (§ 78 ZPO).73 Previously, the detailed rules of professional conduct (‘Standesrecht’)   had been contained in ‘Richtlinien’  (Directives) of the Federal Lawyers’ Chamber (‘Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer’ (BRAK)) issued on 21.6.1973. However, following a decision of the BVerfG on 14.7.1987, the ‘Richtlinien’ were considered unconstitutional. They have now been discarded and replaced by a ‘Berufsordnung’ (BerufsO; professional code). The ‘Berufsordnung’ (BORA) was passed on 29.11.1996 by a newly established ‘Satzungsversammlung’   (rule-making assembly) of BRAK and came into force on 210

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11.3.1997, together with a ‘Fachanwaltsordnung’  (specialist lawyers’ code), which details the requirements and procedure for becoming a specialist lawyer (‘Fachanwalt’).74 The ‘Berufsordnung’ supplements §§ 43a-c BRAO and concretises the rights and duties of a ‘Rechtsanwalt’.75 It distinguishes general duties (§§ 2–5 BerufsO) and special duties (§§ 6–33 BerufsO). Thus, for example, a ‘Rechtsanwalt’s duties when handling a  brief (‘Mandat’) are set out in §§ 11–18 BerufsO. The ‘Rechtsanwalt’ must inform his client promptly (‘unverzüglich’)   regarding all developments and items of  correspondence, which are significant (‘wesentlich’): § 11. A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ must not take up contact directly with the other side in circumvention of that party’s lawyer (‘Umgehung des Gegenanwalts’): § 12.776 If a ‘Rechtsanwalt’   receives a file for inspection from a court or authority (‘Akteneinsicht’),  he or she must ensure that unauthorized persons do not obtain knowledge of its contents: § 19. In the case of cross-border activity (‘grenzüberschreitende Tätigkeit’)  within the European Union, the CCBE Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community dated 28.11.1998 has precedence (‘Vorrang’): § 29 BerufsO. The ‘Berufsordnung’ is (only) displaced in the event of a clash.77 Apart from possible disciplinary consequences for breaches of the rules of  professional conduct contained in BRAO and the ‘Berufsordnung’, certain conduct by a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is also penalised by the criminal law: – – –

breach of the duty of professional secrecy (‘Verletzung der beruflichen Geheimhdtungspflicht’; § 203 StGB); overcharging (‘Gebührenüberhebung’; § 352 StGB); and party disloyalty, ie, acting for both sides in a matter in breach of trust (‘Parteiverrat’; § 356StGB).78

Independently of the statutory rules, within the framework of a retainer (‘Anwaltsvertrag’) a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is subject to various implied contractual duties of  care (‘Sorgfaltspflichten’), which have been laid down by case-law. They include: – – – –

–

the duty to provide advice and information (‘Beratungs- und Informationspflicht’); the duty to clarify/explain/warn (‘Aufklärungspflicht’);79 the duty to carefully check the law (‘Pflicht zur sorgfältigen Rechtsprüfung’); the duty to choose the safest route in the interest of the client (‘Pflicht zur Wahl des sichersten Weges’); the duty to follow the instructions of the client (‘Pflicht zur Befolgung der Weisungen des Mandanten’); and the duty to handle the matter quickly (‘Pflicht zur zügigen Bearbeitung’).80

6

The ‘Rechtsaniualtskammer’ 

–

The ‘Rechtsanwälte’   admitted in the ‘Bezirk’   (area) of an OLG comprise a ‘Rechtsanwaltskammer’ (RAK; Lawyers’ Chamber).81

211

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The RAK is a public corporation (‘Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts’)   and is supervised in the observance of law and its rules and in the performance of its duties  by the ministry of justice of the respective ‘Land’.82 Its organs are the ‘Vorstand’ (board, elected by the ‘Kammerversammlung’ (chamber assembly)) and the ‘Präsidium’ (elected by the ‘Vorstand’).83 The ‘Rechtsanwälte’ admitted at the BGH comprise a separate RAK.84 The Lawyers’ Chambers are united in a ‘Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer’ (BRAK; based in Berlin), which is supervised by the Federal Minister of Justice.85 Its organs are the ‘Präsidium’, the ‘Satzungsversammlung’ (rule making assembly) and the ‘Hauptversammlung’ (main assembly), where each RAK is represented by its president.86 Each RAK is responsible for the professional supervision of its members (‘Berufsaufsicht’). 7

Complaints 87

Complaints (‘Beschwerden’) against ‘Rechtsanwälte’ are allocated by the ‘Vorstand’ of  the relevant RAK to various departments (‘Abteilungen’). Where minor breaches of professional rules are involved (or anticipated), the ‘Vorstand’ can, in ascending order of severity: – – –

supply information (‘Auskunft’), give advice (‘Rat’) or issue a recommendation (‘Empfehlung’); issue a (disapproving) caution (‘(mißbilligende) Bekhrung’); or issue a reprimand (‘Rüge’).88

Alternatively, if the case is more serious, the ‘Vorstand’ can apply89 to the ‘Staatsanwalt’ (State Attorney) to initiate proceedings at a special lawyers’ court/court of honour (‘Anwaltsgericht’/‘Ehrengericht’)—consisting of three lawyers—which has power – – – – –

to issue a warning (‘Warnung’); to give a direction (‘Verweis’); to impose a fine (‘Geldbuße’) of up to DM 50,000; to impose an occupational ban (‘Berufsverbot’) in certain fields for between one and five years; or to make an order of exclusion from the bar (‘Ausschliessung’; ‘striking-off’). If such an order is expected, a provisional occupational ban is possible.90

The main hearing is held in private: § 135 BRAO. The imposition of a sanction (‘ehrengerichtliche Maßnahme’)   is dependent on a  blameworthy breach of duty (‘schuldhafte Pflichtverletzung’)  by the ‘Rechtsanwalt’, which can be based on intentional or negligent conduct, both inside and outside the profession. In the latter case (‘außerberufliches Verhalten’), the relevant conduct must, according to the circumstances, be especially suited to impair the respect and trust (‘Achtung und Vertrauen’) required for lawyers’ work or for the reputation of the legal profession 212

Chapter XXII: The Legal Profession and Court System

(‘Ansehen der Rechtsanwaltschaft’)  in a significant way: § 113(ii) BRAO. In other words, the conduct involved must be so contemptible (‘verächtlich’; normally because it is illegal or threatened with a fine) that it is in the public interest that an‘Anwaltsgericht’ should intervene. With the exception of a breach of duty justifying an occupational ban or exclusion from the bar, sanctions in respect of a breach are no longer possible five years after the alleged breach (ie, they are then statute-barred): § 115, 1st sentence BRAO. Moreover, where a punishment or equivalent measure has already been imposed on a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ by another court or authority, an ‘Anwaltsgericht’ must refrain from action with respect to the same conduct (‘wegen desselben Verhaltens’) unless a disciplinary sanction against the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is additionally necessary to ensure the fulfillment of his duties and to safeguard the reputation of the legal profession: § 115b BRAO. Proceedings in an ‘Anwaltsgericht’ must be stayed, if a criminal prosecution for the same conduct is commenced: § 118(i) BRAO. However, proceedings in an ‘Anwaltsgericht’ are still possible, if the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is acquitted: § 118(ii) BRAO. Appeals against judgments are to an ‘Anwaltsgerichtshof’ (a division of the OLG) and, thereafter, to a specialist senate of the BGH (‘Senat für Anwaltssachen’). Admission matters (‘Zulassungssachen’) must initially go to the ‘Anwaltsgerichtshof’. A ‘Rechtsanwalt’,   who desires to draw a colleague’s attention to a breach of  professional duty, must (first) do so in confidence (‘vertraulich’), unless the client’s or the ‘Rechtsanwalt’s own interests demand a different reaction: § 25 BerufsO. 8

Legal Fees

(a) Basis of calculation

German lawyers’ fees (‘Gebühren’) are governed by the ‘Bundesgebührenordnung für Rechtsanwälte’ (BRAGO) of 26.7.1957. Except as otherwise provided in BRAGO, they are calculated according to the value of the matter (‘Gegenstandswert’).91 In civil court proceedings and preparatory work therefore (‘vorgerichtliche Tätigket’), the ‘Gegenstandswert’ follows the value established for court fee purposes (referred to as the ‘Streitwert’).92 To assess the court fee value, the applicable provisions are §§ 12–34 of the ‘Gerichtskostengesetz’ (GKG: Court Fees Law), which refer to §§ 3–9 ZPO. In the absence of an applicable valuation provision in the GKG or ZPO, the ‘Gegenstandswert’ follows (for valuation purposes only) the so-called ‘Geschäftswert’ (business value), which is the principle for calculation of court and notary costs in non-contentious civil matters (under the ‘Kostenordnung’ (KostO), also of 26.7.1957).93 If, in turn, the provisions of the KostO do not assist and BRAGO does not contain a more special provision, the ‘Gegenstandswert’ is to be calculated by the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ according to fair discretion (‘nach billigem Ermessen’). In the absence of sufficient factual points of reference for an estimate (‘Anhaltspunkte für eine Schätzung’) or if non-pecuniary matters (‘nicht vermögensrechtliche Gegenstände’) are involved, the value of the matter 213

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can be assessed by the lawyer at DM 8,000 (or at more or less, according to the circumstances), but not at more than DM 1 million: § 8(ii), 2nd sentence BRAGO. Thus, the value of the matter in civil matters is referred to: –

–

in matters where the GKG or ZPO contain an applicable valuation provision, as ‘Streitwert’. The actual scale fees of lawyers are set out in § 11(i) BRAGO and in the ‘Gebührentabelle’ (fee table) annexed and the fees of the court in § 11(ii) GKG and in the ‘Gebührentabelle’ (fee table) annexed; in matters where the KostO applies, as ‘Geschäftswert’. The actual scale fees of the court in matters of ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’ (voluntary jurisdiction) and the fees of notaries are set out in § 32 KostO and in the ‘Gebührentabelle’ annexed. The fees of lawyers in cases where the KostO applies are based on the ‘Geschäftswert’, but are due in accordance with the BRAGO fee table.

Each individual fee is referred to as ‘eine (volle) Gebühr’ (one (full) fee). It is divided into tenths (‘Zehntel’). (b) Civil proceedings and non-contentious matters

In (contentious) civil proceedings, the fees of a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ can be made up of one or more of several full ‘Gebühren’:94 1 2 3 4

a ‘Prozeßgebühr’ (procedure fee) for dealing with the matter generally; a ‘Verhandlungsgebühr’  (hearing fee) for the oral hearing; a ‘Beweisgebühr’ (evidence fee) if evidence is taken; an ‘Erörterungsgebühr’ for merely raising the matter, eg, where an attempt to reach a settlement is made. This fee and the ‘Verhandlungsgebühr’ are mutually exclusive.

In other (non-contentious) civil matters—ie, non-court activity (‘außergerichtliche Tätigkeit’)—a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ can claim 5–10 ‘Zehntel’ of the following ‘Gebühren’:95 1 2 3

a ‘Geschäftsgebühr’ (business fee) for dealing with the matter generally;96 a ‘Besprechungsgebühr’ (discussion fee) for being involved in certain activities;97 a ‘Beweisaufnahmegebühr’ (taking of evidence fee) for being involved in the taking of evidence required by a court or authority. (c) Other proceedings

The fees before administrative and finance courts follow those for civil proceedings.98 All administrative proceedings preliminary to court proceedings count as one matter.99 In criminal and social security proceedings ‘Rahmengebühren’ (see (e) below) apply, scaled according to the court involved and the length of the hearing. In criminal matters, fees are differentiated according to whether the defence lawyer is privately selected or appointed by the court.100 Where proceedings at an employment court regarding termination of an employment contract are concerned, the value of the matter for fee purposes is 25% of  the employee’s annual salary: § 12(vii) ArbGG. 214

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(d) Level of fees

The fees set out in BRAGO are minimum fees. A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ can (only) demand (ie, enforce) higher fees, if this is agreed in writing.101 An ‘Erfolgshonorar’  (fee based on the success of the matter) or ‘quota litis’ (proportion of any amount recovered) is not permitted.102 Fees can be left to be established at the discretion of the board of the RAK103 or can, on application by the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ or the client, be set by the court.104 The ‘Gebühren’ compensate a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ for the whole of his activity in a particular matter and can only be claimed once in the same matter. In court proceedings, fees can be claimed in every instance.105 The fees set out in § 11(i) BRAGO increase in the event of an appeal (‘Berufung’ or ‘Revision’).106 For verbal or written advice (‘Rat’) or (brief) information (‘Auskunft’) unconnected to another chargeable activity, the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ can charge (in civil matters) between one-tenth and ten-tenths of a full ‘Gebühr’ and, where the matter relates to a fine or criminal matter, between DM 25 and DM 335. The fee for a first consultation (‘Erstberatung’) is limited to not more than DM 350.107 For simple letters (‘einfache Schreiben’), the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is only entitled to twotenths of a fall ‘Gebühr’.108 For the completion of a written opinion with legal reasoning (‘Gutachten mit  juristischer Begründung’), the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is entitled to a fair fee (‘eine angemessene Gebühr’) and the criteria for ‘Rahmengebühren’ (see (e) below) apply.109 (e) Framework fees

The fees set out in BRAGO can be merely banded (so-called ‘Rahmengebühren’ (framework fees)).110 In that case, the fee within the appropriate band is calculated by the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ ‘nach billigem Ermessen’ (at his fair discretion) on consideration of all the circumstances, in particular: – – –

the importance of the matter (‘die Bedeutung der Angelegenheit’); the extent and difficulty of the work involved (‘der Umfang und die Schwierigkeit der anwaltlichen Tätigkeit’); and the capital (‘Vermögen’) and income (‘Einkommen’) of the client. (f) Legal assistance and legal aid

Where no court proceedings are pending, the provision of assisted legal advice and representation (‘Beratungshilfe’)  to persons with a low income is governed by the ‘Beratungshilfegesetz’ (BerHG). Lower ‘Gebühren’ apply.111 Again different scale fees apply where legal aid for court proceedings (‘Prozeßkostenhilfe’) is granted.112

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(g) (g ) Future reform

The complexity of BRAGO has led to demands for a simplification of the law concerning legal fees. Accordingly, Accordingly, in October 2001, 2 001, the Federal Ministry of Justice published a draft law l aw,, which is intended to replace BRAGO and comes into force in 2003. See: Burhoff in ZAP-Aktuell 21/2001, p 1308. The draft law is entitled enti tled ‘Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz’ (RVG, (R VG, Law regarding the Remuneration of Lawyers). The RVG essentially harmonises the fee structure structure in all (non-criminal) jurisdictional  branches and recognises the increased importance of lawyers’ extra-court activity (consultation and mediation). Thus, in future, there will be only two possible types of  fee in court proceedings: a procedure fee (‘Verfahrensgebühr’)  and an attendance fee (‘Terminsgebühr’). On the settlement of a dispute out of court, a resolution fee (‘Einigungsgebühr’) is introduced. The former ‘Beweisgebühr’ and ‘Vergleichsgebühr’  are dispensed with. In criminal matters, fees are increased and in proceedings involving fines (‘Bußgeldverfahren’) remuneration is to reflect the amount of the fine at stake. 9 The ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ 

Partnerschaftsgesellschaften’ (in force since On 10 June 1994, a ‘Gesetz zur Schaffung von Partnerschaftsgesellschaften’ 1 July 1995) was passed, enabling a ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ (partnership (company)) to be registered at the local ‘Amtsgericht’. The ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ is a special type of ‘Personengesellschaft’ for members of the ‘freie Berufe’ (free professions), such as ‘Rechtsanwälte’. The new law is supplemented by the provisions of the BGB regarding civil law partnerships (§§ 705 ff BGB) and contains various references (‘Verweisungen’)  to the HGB. As from 1st July 1997, the name of a professional firm with more than one member (a ‘Sozietät’) can only be supplemented by the words ‘and Partners’, if it is organised as a ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ or if its (other) legal form is clearly shown by means of  a suffix.113 The ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaftsgesetz’ (Part GG) is i s set out, broadly, broadly, as follows:

Definition of the ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’; who can be a partner.114 Name of the partnership. Partnership agreement (‘Partnerschaftsvertrag’). Notification (‘Anmeldung’) for registration. Content of the entry in the register. register. Internal relationship (‘Innenverhältnis’) between the partners. By § 6(ii) individual (but not all) partners can be excluded from (internal) management (‘Geschäftsführung’). § 7 External position (‘Außenverhältnis’) of the partnership. By § 7(i), the partnership (‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’)   arises (‘entsteht’) on registration. Beforehand, it is treated as a GbR. §1 §2 §3 §4 §5 §6

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§ 7(ii) refers to § 124 HGB, meaning that like the OHG, but unlike the GbR, the ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ is a ‘Rechtssubjekt’ and ‘rechtsfähig’, ie, capable of suing and being sued in its own name. The ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ i s a ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ (joint community), but is approximated (‘angenähert’) to a juristic person. By § 7(iii), each partner has an unlimitable right of representation (‘Vertretungsbefugnis’)  in relation to third parties. By § 7 (iv), a ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ can provide legal advice (‘Rechtsberatung’), provided it acts through admitted ‘Rechtsanwälte’. Moreover, a ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’ is ‘postulationsfähig’, ie, it has a right of audience at court. § 8 Liability (‘Haftung’). Where there is a ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’, § 8(ii) Part GG lays down a statutory concentration of liability (‘Haftungskonzentration’) for professional mistakes on the partner with responsibility for the particular matter. In the case of a civil law partnership (GbR or ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’), on the other hand, the basic rule is that all partners are personally liable (ie, with their private assets (‘Privatvermögen’)), as joint debtors, for the obligations of the partnership. However, by § 51a(ii), 2nd sentence BRAO, liability can be concentrated on the member of the firm acting in the matter (also in standard business terms (‘vorformulierte Vertragsbedingung Vertragsbedingungen’) en’)). There must be a signed agreement (§ 51a(ii), 3rd sentence BRAO), which can limit the private assets available, availab le, but which cannot 115 exclude partnership assets (‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’). The limitation of liability (‘Haftungsbeschränkung’)  to a maximum amount (‘Höchstbetrag’) is dealt with in § 51a(i) BRAO. Standard business terms can limit liability for simple negligence (‘einfache Fahrlässigkeit’) to DM 2 million, ie, four times the minimum amount of professional liability insurance (currently DM 500.000). However, liability for gross negligence (‘grobe Fahrlässigkeit’) can only be restricted up to the abovementioned minimum figure by an individual (negotiated) agreement (‘Vereinbarung im Einzelfall’). In both cases, liability can be limited to higher amounts, provided appropriate insurance cover exists. § 9 Termination (‘Auflösung’) of the partnership; departure (‘Ausscheiden’)  of a partner pa rtner.. §10 Liquidation and limitation period for claims (‘Verjährung’).116 E THE ‘NOTAR’117 (i) Notar Notaries ies are are govern governed ed by the the ‘Bundesnotarordnung’   (BNotO; Federal Notaries’ Order) of 24.2.1961. They are appointed by the justice ministeries of the ‘Länder’ and hold an independent public office.118 Appointment is subject to a ‘Bedürfnisprüfung’ (test of need), ie, only so many notaries are appointed as are required for an orderly administration of justice.119 Notaries provide impartial assistance (‘unparteiische Betreuung’) to both sides in the area of so-called ‘vorsorgende Rechtspflege’ (precautionary administration of justice).120 217

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(ii) A ‘Notar’ is competent to undertake the matters set out in §§ 20–24 BNotO. The principal responsibility of the ‘Notar’ is the (public) documentation ((‘öffentliche’) ‘Beurkundung’)   of various transactions involving declarations of will (‘Willenserklärungen’), such as: – –

– – – –

the conclu conclusio sion n of a contr contract act for the sale sale or purcha purchase se of of land land (§ (§ 313 313 BGB); BGB); the making of a ‘Schenkungsversprechen’ ((contractual) promise of a gift (for the future) (§ 518 BGB), other than one conditional on survival after the donor’s death (to which the provisions of the BGB regarding ‘Verfügungen von Todes wegen’ (ie, wills, contracts of succession) apply: § 2301 BGB); the making of an ‘öffentliches Testament’ (public will; § 2232 BGB); the conclusion of an ‘Erbvertrag’ (estate contract; § 2276 BGB); the the ass assuran urance ce in lieu lieu of oath oath (‘eidesstattliche Versicherung’) necessary in order to prove certain particulars required for the grant of an ‘Erbschein’ (certificate of inheritance; § 2356(ii) BGB); the est establ ablish ishmen mentt of a GmbH GmbH (lim (limite ited d compa company) ny) or AG (pub (public lic compan company) y) (§ (§ 2(i) GmbHG and § 23(i) AktG).

(iii (iii)) The The ‘Beurkundungsgesetz’ (BeurkG) of 28.8.1969 contains the procedural rules regarding documentation. A ‘Niederschrift’ (written record) of the proceedings must  be made. The original of the ‘Niederschrift’ is normally kept by the ‘Notar’ and listed in an annual ‘Urkundenrolle’ (roll of documents).121 The copies (‘Ausfertigungen’) are distributed as required. When undertaking a ‘Beurkundung’,  notaries have certain duties  (so-called ‘Prüfungsund Belehrungspflichten’; §§ 17–21 BeurkG), in particular: – to chec checkk the the facts facts and and to to check check that that the the transa transacti ction on is is legal legal and and acco accords rds with with the true will of those involved; – to take take care care that that a pers person on invol involved ved is not not pre prejud judice iced d thro through ugh inexpe inexperien rience; ce; – to advise advise those those involv involved ed of of the the lega legall effec effectt of the transac transaction tion (‘die rechtliche Tragweite des Geschäfts’);  and – to ensu ensure re that that declara declaration tionss are are docume documente nted d clear clearly ly and and in no no uncer uncertain tain terms terms (‘klar und unzweideutig’). (iv) Notaries Notaries can also also provide provide certifications (‘Beglaubigungen’) of signatures and copy documents and certificates (‘Bescheinigungen’) of entries in public registers by means of a ‘Vermerk’  (note under seal): §§ 39–43 BeurkG. The taking of oaths(‘Eide’) and assurances in lieu of oath (‘eidesstattliche Versicherungen’) by a notary is limited, respectively, to cases requiring this abroad and circumstances in which an allegation of fact or a statement needs to be substantiated to a ‘Behörde’ (authority) or ‘sonstige Dienststelle’ (other public office).122 (v) A breach breach of the notary’ notary’ss official official duties (‘Amtspflichtverletzung’) can lead to a claim for damages against him.123 Like the ‘Rechtsanwälte’,  the notaries of a particular ‘Bezirk’  (area) comprise a ‘Notarkammer’ (Notarie’ Chamber).124 218

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(vi) (vi) Notarie Notaries’ s’ costs (fees and disbursements) are dealt with in the ‘Kostenordnung’.125 (vii) The ZPO contains certain statutory rules laying down the evidential force (‘Beweiskraft’)  to be given to documents (‘Urkunden’):  §§ 415–418 ZPO. They extend to public and private documents, as appropriate. The rules are exceptions to the principle of the free assessment of evidence and bind the court: § 286(ii) ZPO. Thus, a public document (‘öffentliche Urkunde’)—ie, a document concerning a declaration made in the presence presence of a public authority (‘öffentliche Behörde’) or a person holding public office (eg, a ‘Notar’) and executed in the prescribed form—provides full evidence—on a formal level—of the event documented (not, however, as to the substantive content of the document, its interpretation or legal significance!): § 415(i) ZPO. If it can be proven that the relevant event was incorrectly incor rectly documented, such counterevidence (‘Gegenbeweis’) is admissible: § 415(ii) ZPO. Further, Further, a public document attesting to/reporting on the existence/occurrence of a particular fact/event, which has been personally perceived by a public authority or officeholder (eg, a certificate, official notification or protocoll)—a so-called ‘Zeugnisurkunde’—provides full evidence—on a formal level—of the relevant fact/ event: § 418(i) ZPO. The notarial certification of a signature to a private document provides full evidence—on a formal level—that the statements contained in the relevant document emanate from the signatory: § 416 ZPO. Here too, however, counter-evidence can be presented, if available, as to the genuineness (‘Echtheit’) of the document, its content, effect or substantive evidential value.126

219

NOTES PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION 1 2 3

See See Preface face to the the Seco Second nd Edi Editio tion, Note ote 11 B. See Pr Preface to to th the Se Second Ed Edition, No Note 7. 7. See See the the arti articl clee by by Gil Gil Carl Carlos os Rodr Rodríg ígue uezz Ing Ingle lesi sias as in the the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  (FAZ) of 3.5.2000: ‘Ein Eckpfeiler der Integration’ . See also Chapter XVI, Note 3 C.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION (WITH CORRECTIONS) 1

2

3

4

5

In Germ German anyy, the the stud studyy of of law law is refe referr rred ed to as a sci scien ence ce (‘Rechtswissenschaft’). The equivalent term in English is usually ‘jurisprudence’, although that properly describes legal philosophy. philosophy. There is still much truth in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law  in so far as it analyses the (national) German legal order. However, it would be going too far to describe German law today merely as an objective science, sapped of all ideological, sociological or natural law content. See this Preface, Note 9; Chapter I, Note 17; Chapter XXII, Note 10. Notabl Notablee Germa Germann juris jurists ts enga engaged ged in the the sear search ch for for ‘new ‘new’’ metho methods ds sinc sincee 1945 1945 are are Vieh Viehwe weg, g, Esse Esserr, Luhm Luhmann ann and Larenz. See Wesel (JW), Chapter XIII. See also: Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Constitutional Interpretation’—‘Background’) Interp retation’—‘Background’) and Chapter 4 (‘Judicial versus Legislative Authority’). It is is perhap perhapss too too ideol ideologi ogical cal to clai claim, m, as as Wese Wesell does, does, that that a pre precis cisee legal legal langu language age is the the prod product uct of gre greate aterr egoism and social injustice (in Germany). I would submit that one of the main reasons for the more precise German legal language is simply si mply the fact that there are cultural (and linguistic) differences differenc es between German and English people. Moreover, the German language generally is characterised chara cterised by a tendency (sometimes overdone) to combine words, thereby giving rise to a rich (and lengthy) vocabulary. See Wesel Wesel (FR), Chapter 1; Coing, Chapter III. See also: this Preface, Note 10; Chapter I, Note 16; Chapter X, Note 62. Nation National al popu popular lar opinio opinionn opens opens the barrie barriers, rs, but also also sets sets the the limi limits ts to to absor absorpti ption on by by a part particu icular lar legal legal system of foreign, ‘supra-national’ ‘supra- national’ or international internat ional rules. Moreover, history teaches what can happen, happe n, when law is allowed to become a vehicle for oppression or a ‘shroud’ for naked political intervention. Zweigert and Kötz (Chapter 3 VI) point to ‘function’ as the start-point and basis of all comparative law. What then of (national) language? Language is the basis of human understanding and an inextricable element of society. society. Despite the occasional occasiona l ‘conflict of languages’, there is no prospect of their abolition, nor, in practice, is there a way around them. To reduce the importance of language is, ultimately, to ignore its role as a means of communication. See the article by Tony Weir in ZEuP 1995, p 368: ‘Die Sprachen des europäischen Rechts. Eine skeptische Betrachtung’ and the article by Pierre Pescatore in ZEuP 1998, p 1: ‘Recht in einem mehrsprachigen Raum . See also Notes 10 and 12 in this Preface. For a com compar parati ative ve asse assessm ssment ent of the the deve develop lopme ment nt of of the Europe European an Union Union,, see the articl articlee by Mart Martfr fred ed Zule Zuleeg eg (a former German judge of the European Court and Professor at the University of Frankfurt) in Am J Comp L 1997, Vol 45, p 505: ‘What holds a nation together? Cohesion and Democracy in the United States of  America and in the European Union’. Zuleeg rightly points out that communication is facilitated by technology. However, culture and human understanding is a much more complex phenomenon (see Note 10, below). Zuleeg is merely scratching the surface. In another article (‘The European Constitution under constitutional constraints: the German scenario’; Eur L Rev 1997, Vol 22, p 19), Zuleeg explores the German Federal Constitutional Court’s thinking on European integration and reviews its case-law case-la w on the subject since 1967. He takes issue with the ‘Maastricht Judgment’ of 12.10.1993 and criticizes the ‘strong political credo and will’ of the Reporting Judge in the case, Paul Kirchhof, who is also Professor at the University of Heidelberg. Heidelberg. In particular, Zuleeg fears a usurpation of  power by national authorities, ie, a ‘snowball effect’, if a national nationa l court were to declare European Community law inapplicable in its territory.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language However, it is revealing that, in his article, Zuleeg states (p 20): ‘The constitution of the European Community…is Community…is rather complex, but it exists.’ Herein lies the hidden question: if the constitution is so complex, that only experts understand it, what is to stop, for example, the so-called ‘fundamental ‘fundament al principle’ of the European Union (viz. ‘subsidiarity’), ‘subsidiarity’) , whereby decisions are to be taken ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’ (‘bürgernah’), from eventually becoming a dead letter? The answer according to Zuleeg is, presumably: spreading the ‘gospel of cohesion’ among the people of  Europe (ie, the ‘ordinary man in me street’). To this, one might respond: people pe ople may have different views on the meaning meani ng of ‘democracy’, ‘democracy ’, but the nature of man is the same everywhere: personal freedom and self-interest are often ultimately the decisive factors and not the supposed common bond of a political or religious doctrine. The following saying springs to mind: ‘Der Mensch denkt an sich selbst zuletzt’. Man thinks of himself last. Or should it read: ‘Der Mensch denkt an sich, selbst zuletzt’. Man thinks of himself, even finally.

6 7

8

9

10

See See th the art artic icle le by Han Hanss-P Peter eter Schn Schneeide ider en entitl titleed ‘Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung in Europa’  in the Frankfurter  Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) of 16.10.2000. At the the Eur Europe opean an Coun Council cil in Nice Nice on 7.12 7.12.20 .2000, 00, a ‘Eur ‘Europe opean an Char Charter ter of Basi Basicc Right Rights’ s’ was was procl proclaim aimed ed alon alongg the lines of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Charter was prepared by a ‘convent’ of 62 persons under the Chairmanship of the former German President, Roman Herzog. ft is intended as a forerunner of a European Constitution. However, However, at the moment, the influence of the Charter is limited, as it only applies directly to the institutions and staff of the European Union (Article 51). Thus, there is a school of thought that it could prove to be a castle in the air. air. See the article by Katja Gelinsky entitled ‘Ein Luftschloss?’, Luftschloss?’, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  (FAZ) of  28.9.1999. See also: the article by Hans-Werner Rengeling in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  (FAZ) of 21.7.1999: ‘Eine Charta der Grundrechte’ ; Note 12 in this Preface. Zweige Zweigert rt and and Kötz Kötz (Chapt (Chapter er 14 14 II) II) praise praise the Swiss Swiss Civi Civill Code Code as as a mode modell for for the the legal legal unific unificati ation on of of Euro Europe. pe. It is much less concerned with legal certainty than the BGB (‘with its demanding, difficult, and pedantic techniques, its precise, disciplined, and artificial language’) and provides judges with greater freedom of  decision. In response, one might argue that, on the contrary, the highly sophisticated nature of German law is a necessary corollary to the complexity of human relationships, that it reflects a desire—in Germany—to create a legal system of high authority and constant quality (‘gleichbleibende (‘gleichbleibende Qualität’) and that, in fact, by  being as far as possible possible predictable (‘vorhersehbar’),  it gives individual members of society soc iety greater flexibility flexibi lity,, since it gives less room to the idiosyncracies of others (judges). If one wants to do things thoroughly (‘gründlich’), there is no short-cut. Altho Althoug ugh, h, for for a vari variet etyy of rea reason sons, s, the the lea leader derss of the the memb member er stat states es are are curr curren entl tlyy hold holding ing back back from from establishing a (super-)state as such, the European Union’s legal order is increasingly asserting itself. The EU may not be innately sovereign, but it has organs (institutions) for the creation, declaration and enforcement of law and is, therefore, arguably arguably already a ‘State’ in Kelsen’s sense, except in name (see The Pure Theory of  Law (1960), translated by Max Knight, pp 286ff). In Germany, the current political debate centres on the need for structural reform of the EU and a more transparent distribution of power (‘Machtverteilung’)  between the EU and the member states. With the expansion of the EU, it will be important to ensure that the organisation does not become unwieldy and remains capable of acting (‘handlungsfähig’). See the article by Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)  (FAZ) of 4.5.1999: 4.5.1999 : ‘Europa braucht einen Verfassungsvertrag’. The desirability of reforming encrusted structures is also one of the recurring themes with regard to the national German legal system, so as to satisfy increasing increasi ng public demand for a quicker and simpler resolution of disputes, whilst retaining the authority of the State and despite the complexities of a ‘globalised’ information society (‘Informationsgesellschaft’). A In the the For Forew ewor ord d to to the the firs firstt issu issuee of of ICL ICLQ Q in in Jan Janua uary ry 1952, 1952, Lord Lord Denn Dennin ingg ref refer erre red d to to ‘th ‘thee clo clock ckwo work rk statutes of the federalists’ and to Germany’s legal structure as ‘a castle in the air’. His comments reveal that, at that time at least, mere was a deep English suspicion of continental methods. Even today, today, the alien nature of codified systems often mystifies common lawyers used to a more fluid approach. See Note 3 in this Preface; Chapter I, Note 13.

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Notes B

See also also the the powerfu powerfull article article by by Pierre Pierre Legrand Legrand in ICLQ 1996, Vol 45, p 52: ‘European ‘European Legal Systems Systems are not Converging’. Legrand makes the following points: (i) The differe difference nce betwee betweenn legal cultu cultures res goes goes much much deeper deeper than the the legal system systemss themselve themselves. s. A legal system is manifested ‘on the surface’ by rules. However, However, these reveal little about a given legal system and its ‘deep structures’. (ii) In reality reality,, rules encode encode (historica (historical) l) experience experiences; s; they embody embody a whole culture culture/vie /view w of the world (‘Weltanschauung’)  and a set of values (‘Werte’). Law is a ‘social subsystem’ and cannot be artificially separated from other human sciences. Habits and customs are equally important, a fact often forgotten by comparative lawyers. Thus: Law simply cannot be captured by a set of neatly organised rules… ‘The law’ and ‘the rules’ do not coexist… There is much ‘law’ to be tound beyond the rules. By adhering to a ‘law-as-rules’ representation of the legal world, much comparative work has effectively become an ‘epistemological barrier’ to legal knowledge. In other words, comparative legal studies leads the lawyer astray by suggesting that to have knowledge of the law is to have knowledge of the rules (and that to have knowledge of the rules is to have knowledge of the law!). In its quest for rationality, foreseeability, certainty, coherence and clarity, much comparative work, therefore, strikes a profoundly anti-humanist note. (iii) (iii) The leeal culture culturess of the common common law and civil civil law systems—thei systems—theirr ‘cognitive ‘cognitive structur structure’ e’ or underlying ‘mentalité’—are ‘mentalité’—are irreducibly different, despite their adjacence within the European Community. In Legrand’s view, European legal systems ‘..have not been converging, are not converging and will not be converging’. Indeed, convergence between them is impossible, notably on account of the following factors: (a) The reasoni reasoning ng of the the common common lawyer lawyer is empirical empirical and inducti inductive ve (ie, (ie, proceeds proceeds from from particular particular facts), while that of the civil lawyer is abstract and institutional. In other words, to the common lawyer, lawyer, law is a pragmatic craft, rather than a science. (b) The common common lawyer lawyer disdains disdains system systematisat atisation ion and is is more conce concerned rned with with the resolu resolution tion of the concrete problem before him (ie, common law is reactive and not, like the civil law, law, proactive or protective). (c) Common Common law ‘rules ‘rules’’ have no no coercive coercive effect effect and and are subject subject to legitima legitimate te change change by judge judgess (ie, by case-law). (d) To the common common lawyer lawyer,, the facts facts of legal legal cases are are much more more importa important nt than conce concepts pts or propositions, ie, legal knowledge emerges not from rules, but from factual situations. (e) Civil lawyers lawyers speak speak as a matter matter of course course of subje subjectiv ctivee rights, rights, whereas whereas the the tradition tradition of of the common law is that one has no ‘rights’, unless one is protected by a cause of action (as disclosed by the facts). (f) Common Common law law has its roots roots in in (past) (past) custom custom and and is not the the product product of a particu particular lar time. time. Because custom is the pre-eminent value underlying the doctrine of precedent, the judge does not ‘decide’ for the community; rather, he remembers the community to itself. On the other hand, reliance on custom nurtures a static approach to law. Legrand’s (pessimistic) analysis is that European legal unity is a chimera, ie, all attempts at convergence between between the European legal systems are doomed to fail. Based on our experiences and knowledge, that may well be so. However, However, one might equally argue that peace, justice and understanding are impossible to achieve. These were, and still are, the real—and even more important—motives behind the European ideal. If we do not accept these, we are depriving future generations of hope and allowing our own (encrusted) views to dictate the future. As Legrand astutely observes, law is a ‘hybrid’ of technical reasoning and political p olitical power. power. This will remain the case, whether or not European legal convergence is achieved.

11 A EU legisl legislati ation on is cont continu inuing ing to to sprout sprout merr merrily ily and and is also also star startin tingg to creat createe unifor uniform m rules rules of civi civill law and and procedure. Recent examples are: (i)

The so-calle so-called d E-Commer E-Commerce ce Law, Law, which which impleme implements nts EU Directiv Directivee 2000/ 31 dated dated 8.6.2000 8.6.2000 and and came into force on 1.8.2001. It modernises the provisions in the BGB and elsewhere concerning the form of legally-effective acts. See Chapter X, Note 54. (ii) The Law Law rega regardi rding ng Long Long-Dis -Distan tance ce Trans Transacti actions ons (‘Fernabsatzgesetz’; FernAbsG), which implements EU Directive 1997/7 and came into force on 30.6.2000. The FernAbsG strengthens the rights of  consumers in transactions concluded by long-distance means of communication. See the Exposé in Chapter X (after § 515 BGB). (iii) (iii) The unifor uniform m guar guarant antee ee period period (‘Gewährleistungsfrist’) of two years for purchasers of new consumer goods (‘Verbrauchsgüter’),  which applies throughout the European Union from 1.1.2002. A purchaser of such goods is able to daim repair or replacement from the vendor or manufacturer, manufacturer, if a contractual infringement (‘Vertragswidrigkeit’)  existed at the time of sale.

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B

C

12

In accordance with the relevant EU Directive (1999/44), there is a (rebuttable) presumption in favour of the purchaser that a contractual infringement existed at the time of sale, if the infringement comes to light within six months thereafter, ie, there is a reversal of the burden of  proof (‘Umkehr der Beweislast’) . The guarantee period for second-hand goods is one year. year. See the reports in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) of 18.4.1999 and a nd 27.4.1999; Albrecht, ZAP, Fach 25, p 93. Cf the guarantee provisions in the BGB (§§ 459ff). (iv) the EU-wide EU-wide provisions provisions whereby whereby divorce divorce/nullit /nullityy decisions decisions and decisions decisions in parental parental care matters matters are reciprocally recognised throughout throughout the EU (EU Regulation 1347/2000). These took effect on 1.3.2001. See Chapter XIII, Note 148. (v) the EU-wide EU-wide provis provisions ions laying laying down down a uniform proced procedure ure for servic servicee of judicial judicial and non-judi non-judicial cial documents (EU Regulation 1348/2000). These took effect on 31.5.2000. See Chapter XXI, Note 7. Other proposed measures are: a re: (vi) the establishment establishment of a pan-European procedure procedure for debt recovery recovery.. See Chapter Chapter XIII, Note 163; (vii) the establishment establishment of a pan-European criminal criminal law system. system. See (1999) Gazette, 96/11, 96/11, p 12. On the the nation national al level, level, too, the enactment enactment of proposal proposalss to modernise modernise the German German law law of obligatio obligations ns is imminent (viz the ‘Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts’,  which is due to come into force on 1.1.2002). See the survey by Henssler in ZAP, Fach 2, pp 291ff. Another significant proposal is the amendment of § 253 BGB and the repeal of § 847 BGB to allow damages for pain and suffering (‘Schmerzensgeld’) to be awarded generally, generally, ie, also in cases of contractual claims and strict liability. liability. Cf Chapter X, Note 227. There is currently enthusiasm for legislative reform on a grand scale, but it is naive to think that, by shaking the foundations of German law—like a bull in a china shop—the key, key, traditional institutions and mechanisms of the system (eg, the German legal language) will thereby simply be exorcized. More importantly, importantly, even if consensus can be reached regarding principles of the law of contract perceived to be common to certain EU member states, it cannot hope hop e to deal with the innumerable and sometimes controversial points of detail, which are often decisive in practice. It may be a starting point, but the road to a European Civil Code will be long and stony. See the articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  (FAZ) of 20.11.2000 (‘Geplante Zivilrechtsreform stößt auf Kritik’), 23.12.2000 (‘Die Schuldrechtsreform Schuldrechtsreform hält Schritt mit internationalem Recht’)  and 2.7.2001 (‘Das BGB vor der Neuordnung’) . See also Chapter X, Note 92. With effec effectt from from 1.1.2002 1.1.2002,, civil civil procedu procedure re in Germany Germany is is also due for for a radical radical shake-up shake-up (viz. (viz. the the ‘Gesetz zur Reform des Zivilprozesses’) . The intention is to strengthen hearings at first instance and limit the possibilities for appeals. Even if the changes succeed in reducing the workload of the judiciary, judiciary, there is a risk that lawyers will ultimately be buried by a mass of detail and lose signt of the larger picture. Ignorance, uncertainty and more injustice may be the result. In particular, par ticular, in the fervour to keep up to date, lawyers (and (a nd their clients) will have to be more wary than ever not to fall foul of procedural stumbling-blocks (‘Stolpersteine’), which invariably slow down progress. The slightest upset in the delicate balance  between ‘transparency’ ‘transparency’ and confusion can make make proceedings proceedings unpredictable. unpredictable. See Schneider, ZAP, Fach 13, p 1063; Scneider, ZAP-Kolumne, 23.1.2002, p 67; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (v) and (vi); Chapter XIII D 2 (e); Chapter XIII D 3.

The Europ European ean Union Union aspires aspires to becoming becoming a lasting lasting legal legal order order.. As As yet, yet, however however,, there there is (still) (still) no no true true ‘basic ‘basic norm’ for the EU, despite the ‘supra-national’ triumphs since 1945. The ultimate roison-d’etre  for the EU (if  it has one at all) can only lie in the defence, rather than the spread, of common interests and values (‘Werte’) . These common interests and values—which have eluded so many previous generations—are necessarily subjective. Even if this (fundamental) criticism is put aside, the EU will have to face questions of substance and continually follow a human and individualist approach, if it is to survive as a legal system. Coordination of  laws, ‘purposive’ interpretation, divisions of sovereignty, the establishment of a bureaucracy, reciprocal recognition of judgments and refinements to the EU’s legal form (viz ‘subsidiarity)—reminiscent or the hierarchical structure (‘Stufenbau’) of Kelsen—are only one, albeit important side of the equation. To put the key issue in the words of the ‘historical’ school—a legal system can only succeed, if it is in harmony with the internal convictions (collective values) of the people to whom it is addressed; it cannot be imposed. Moreover, Moreover, consensus in international relations is notoriously difficult to achieve. See Chapter I, Notes 10, 13 and 16; Chapter XVI, Note 3 C; Chapter XX, Note 12; Chapter XXI; d’Entrèves, Additional Essay A, IV.

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The protection of values is also the bedrock of NATO NATO and the Council of Europe. See the articles by Javier Solana entitled ‘Es geht urn die Verteidigung unserer Werte’  and by Leni Fischer entitled ‘Das demokratische Gewissen’  in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) of, respectively, 24.4.1999 and 5.5.1999. See See Cha Chapt pter er XIII XIII,, Not Notee 18; 18; Chap Chapte terr XX XX Not Notee 12. 12.

CHAPTER I 1

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

See genera generally lly:: Dulck Dulckeit eit/Sc /Schwa hwarz/ rz/ Waldste aldstein; in; Haft; Haft; Hons Honsell ell;; Kaise Kaiserr (Secti (Section on I,I, Chapt Chapter er 1); 1); Köble Köbler; r; Lauf Laufs; s; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part I B (11–25); Schunck/De Clerck, Part I, Chapter 18; Wesel (JW). See also Creifelds under ‘Code civil’, ‘Constitute Criminalis Carolina’, ‘Deutsches Reich’, ‘ Grotius’, ‘Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation’, ‘Historische Rechtsschule’, ‘ Jhering’, ‘ Naturrecht,  ‘Pufendorf’, ‘Reichskammergericht’, ‘Reichsverfassung’, ‘Reichsverfassung’, ‘Römisches Recht’, ‘Rezeption’, ‘Sachsenspiegel’ ‘Sachsenspiegel’  and ‘Savigny’. See Honsell, § 2 II Acco Ac corrding ding to a quot quotat atiion fro from Gai Gaius in the Institutes (160 AD), the division of law was into ‘ius civile’ (civil law, law, ie, the special law of a particular state) and ‘ius gentium’  (law common to all mankind, ie, law observed  by all nations nations (public international law)). law)). Unlike Gaius, who based ‘ius gentium’ on ‘natural reason’, Ulpian distinguished a separate category of ‘ius naturale’ (natural law) as a form of law belonging to all animals and not peculiar to the human race. Ulpian also explained the difference between ‘ius privatum’  privatum’ (private law) and ‘ius publicum’ (public law), a distinction which originated during the Roman Republic and has gradually become more important. See Chapter IX, Note 1; Haft, Part C, 2; Honsell, § 3 II-III; Wesel (JW), Chapter IV. Regarding natural law, see Notes 9 and 10 in this Chapter. It was said: ‘Quidquid non agnoscit glossa, non agnoscit curia’  (what is not acknowledged by the gloss is not acknowledged by the court). It was said: ‘Nemo bonus iurista nisi bartolista’  (noone is a good jurist, if he does not follow Bartolus). In England, where a case-law system (‘Fallrecht’) has dominated since the 13th century, the influence of  Roman law has been limited. The distinction between common law and equity reflects the Roman law honorarium’; under the latter, the magistrate (praetor) was able to distinction between ‘ius civile’ and ‘ius honorarium’; apply ‘aequitas’ (fairness) when reaching his decision. See Haft, Part C, 3 and 5; Honsell, Hon sell, § 2 III-IV; Laufs, Chapter Chapte r III; Wesel Wesel (JW), Chapter Cha pter V; Youngs Youngs (CL), Chapter Cha pter 2, Part I, Sections C and D. The (first (first)) Germa Germann Empir Empiree is regar regarded ded as havi having ng been been founde founded d with with the the cor corona onatio tionn of Otto Otto I in in Rome Rome in in 962 962 AD and was first referred to as the Holy Roman Empire (of the German Nation) towards the end of the 15th century. The Holy Roman Empire ended in 1806 following the establishment of the ‘Rheinbund’ (Rhein Confederation)  between various various German principalities having having allegiance to to France. After the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, the ‘Rheinbund’  was superceded by the ‘Deutscher Bund’ (German Confederation), which was established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The ‘Deutscher Bund’ lasted until 1866, when, following Austria’s defeat by Prussia (under Bismarck) at Königgrätz, Prussia and the other north German states formed the ‘Norddeutscher Bund”   (North GermanConfederation). Following Prussia’s victory over France in the war of 1870/71 and the accession of the south German states, the (second) German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles Versailles on 18.1.1871. It lasted until the declaration of the Weimar Republic on 9.11.1918. See Creifelds under ‘Rheinbund’, ‘Deutscher Bund’  and ‘Norddeutscher Bund’;  Katz, Part II, § 4 VI and § 5 II ; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenber Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger ger,, Part I A (9), I B (12–17). See No Note te 14 14 in this this Chapt Chapter; er; Chapte Chapterr XVII, XVII, Note Note 3. See also also Haft Haft,, Part Part C, 4; Lauf Laufs, s, Chap Chapter ter IV, IV, 4. 4. Natural law (‘ius naturale’/‘Naturrecht’) naturale’/‘Naturrecht’) is effectively a form of law or set of (unwritten) principles based on the nature of man (‘Natur des Menschen’)  and on what is always good and equitable (‘quod semper bonum et aequum est’), in contrast to positive law (statute/‘Gesetz’). The doctrine is intertwined with the search for a definition of law itself (‘ius’/‘Recht’),  bearing in mind its supreme touch-stone, justice (‘iustita’/‘Gerechtigkeit’). According to Cicero, law is ‘right reason in agreement with nature’; it is universal, eternal and immutable (‘De Republica’, III xxii, 33). Or, to quote the famous dictum of Grotius, ‘Natural law retains its validity even if God does not exist’. However, natural law is not a Roman invention, but originated in Greek philosophy. The Sophist teachings of the 5th century BC (Protagoras), with their separation of (antithesis between) law and nature and subjective

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views of the truth (concentration on man—‘Man is the measure of all things’), were followed by the idealist doctrines of Plato and Aristotle in the 4th century BC in their writings on justice, law and the state. Subsequently, Subsequently, it was the notion of the Stoics (picked up by Cicero) that natural law and ‘ius gentium’ (law common to all mankind) were the same. See Creifelds under ‘Naturrecht’;  Coing, Chapter I, I; d’Entrèves, Chapter 2; Haft, Part F, 2; Honsell, § 4; Wesel (JW), Chapter VI. According to Rousseau, the connecting link between natural law and positive law is the ‘social contract’ (‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’). See the following Notes (10 and 11) in this Chapter. It was was also also followed followed,, at the end of the the 18th 18th centur centuryy, in the ‘rationali ‘rationalist’ st’ philos philosophy ophy of Hegel, Hegel, although although Hegel Hegel completely reversed previous thinking on natural law. To him, the highest embodiment of ethical life was the national State. See Chapter II, Note 1. In England, in the wake of the Civil War (1642–1645), there were conflicting views on the position of the state. Whilst for Locke ( ‘Two Treatises on Government’  (1690)) the recognition of human rights (and their protection by government) was crucial, Hobbes presented a different view in his work ‘Leviathan’ (1651): protection by the state was necessary for man’s own good, because man’s natural condition was anti-social, wolf-like (‘homo homini lupus’)  and belligerent (‘bellum omnium contra ones’). The state was the supreme monster, born of humans’ natural fear. The positive law of the state was justified by its authority and required to be obeyed (‘auctoritas non veritasfacit legem’) . Hobbes’ theory flourished most successfully in France during the reign of Louis XIV (1661–1 (1661–1715). 715). Indeed, it can still be said to be the justification for f or the concept of the unrestricted sovereignty of Parliament in England, where there is no written constitution. However, However, positive law (ie, according to the imperative definition, a ‘command from a sovereign’ (Austin)) is not the only form of law. Natural law can have a ‘radiating effect (‘Ausstrahlungsivirkung’) on the positive law of a particular particula r legal system. It serves to underpin underp in me requirement that law should correspond to nature, equity and justice. justice . To To use the imagery of d’Entrèves, natural natura l law is the attempt to bridge the chasm between is and ought (Hume), between ‘fact’ and ‘value’ (ie, a moral or normative rule). In particular, particular, natural law is the unwritten source of human rights and (still) performs a vital role whenever it is necessary to justify resistance against abuses of state power (ie, natural law can establish limits to the normal duty of obedience towards the state). Unlike positive law, the principles of natural law a re ageless. It is important to note here that, in most European languages (but not in English), the Latin word ‘ius’ Although Hobbes appreciated that (‘Recht’) can have two meanings, objective and subjective, law and right. Although there was a difference, difference, to him ‘ius’ (which he translated as ‘right’, ie, liberty) was not a precondition for law (‘lex’). Modern civilisation generally takes a different view. See Coing, Chapter I, IV and Chapter V; d’Entrèves, Chapters 4 and 5 and Additional Essay A, III; Haft, Part D, 4 to 6,8; Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Verfassungen’). See also: Chapter X Note 22. In Germa Germann drama, drama, the the classi classical cal Frenc Frenchh theatr theatree of the the 17th cent century ury was was initi initiall allyy the yard yardsti stick ck (Gott (Gottsch sched) ed).. However, by the middle of the 18th century, English theatre was considered the more appropriate example to follow (Lessing). In France at this time, the philosophy of Rosseau, with its view of man as fundamentally good and its attacks on social institutions, was gathering hold. According to Rousseau, man should strive proximity to nature and not be guided by reason. Rousseau’s ideas influenced the German authors of the ‘Sturm und Drang’  (storm and stress) movement (Herder, (Herder, Goethe), who reacted against discipline and modelled their creativity on Shakespeare. Schiller’s early plays were also works of social protest. The French Revolution threw up the problem of freedom and Schiller’s later tragedies focussed on the conflict between human instinct (free will) and moral duty. duty. In German literature, this period (1785–1805) (1785– 1805) is referred to as Classicism. In the quest for moral rectitude (or at least a harmonious balance between feeling and reason), art acquired an educational function and the achievement of beauty was considered of  paramount importance. The period of Classicism, with Weimar Weimar as its cultural centre, merged into that of Romanticism, which flowered  briefly in the early years of the 19th century (Brentano, Eichendorff, Eichendorff, Kleist). Its view of the world was no longer founded on universal ideals; it was one of personal imagination, of yearning (‘Sehnsucht’). Patriotic and national feeling were stimulated by folk poetry (‘Volkslieder’) . Later in the 19th century, century, the Romantic School lost its appeal and German literature followed the European trend to realism (Balzac, Dickens, Tolstoy), Tolstoy), albeit on a more regional level (‘Poetic Realism’), in the particularly German genre of the ‘Novelle’ (Ludwig, Stifter, Storm). Accor Acc ordin dingg to Kant Kant,, law is ‘the ‘the emb embodi odime ment nt of of the the condi conditio tions ns unde underr which which the arbitr arbitrary ary will will (‘Willkür’) of  one (person) can be united with that of another according to the general law of freedom’. See Haft, Part D, 7; Wesel (FR), Chapter 8.

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To

15

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Rega Regard rdin ingg the these se see see Haft Haft,, Par Partt C, C, 6 and and 7; Lau Laufs fs,, Chap Chapte terr VI, VI, 1 and and 2. 2. Codes (ie, systematic presentation of law according to principles) are typical for continental European countries. By this method, as Savigny taught, legal relationships are allocated to particular legal institutions institutions (‘Rechtsinstitute’)—the ‘system’—which in turn find their expression in (positive) norms. Despite occasional views to the contrary, contrary, it remains a characteristic of German law that it is a system designed for lawyers (‘Juristenrecht’). German law attaches very little importance to judge-made law (‘Richterrecht’)— in marked contrast to the situation in common law countries. This perhaps accounts for the adversarial nature of legal proceedings in England. In Europe as a whole, the extent to which the many diverse legal systems and fundamentally different cultures (values) can be ‘cross-fertilised’ remains to be seen. Although, at present, it (still) appears doubtful, the establishment of a common legal order via the European Union is not beyond contemplation. It will then be of paramount importance that the bridge over the culture gap’ is built as stably as possible and that the attendant complexities are weathered in a spirit of good will. Certainly, Certainly, however, however, Germany’s participation in the European Union (Article 23 GG) will have a vitalising effect on legal thought and on the existing approach to the creation and application of law. See ‘Preface to Second Edition’; Chapter I, Note 6; Coing, Chapter III, 16, Chapter III, IV 3 and Chapter VI, VI. In the the field of crimi criminal nal law, law, Feuer Feuerbach bach laid the foundation foundation for modern modern crimin criminal al legisla legislation. tion. He drafted drafted the the Bavarian Criminal Code of 1813 and coined the phrase ‘Nulla poena sine lege’ : there can be no punishment without law, law, ie, punishability depends on the strict text of criminal legislation, which, therefore, requires exact drafting. Feuerbach, Feuerbach, the purpose purpose of punishmen punishmentt was general general preve prevention ntion of crime. crime. In contra contrast, st, von von Liszt Liszt later developed developed the theory of the special prevention of the particular criminal, for whom the Criminal Code was the ‘Magna Charta’. See Haft, Part E, 2 and 9; Wesel (JW), Chapter X; Creifelds under ‘Strafzweck’. In keepi keeping ng with with the the status status of the the ‘Deuts ‘Deutsche cherr Bund’ Bund’ as a mere mere ‘Staat ‘Staatenb enbund und’’ (confed (confedera eratio tionn of (indep (independ endent ent)) states), there were numerous regional laws in force in Germany at the time. Although a customs union (‘Zollverein’) was created between German states in 1834, the unification of  German law first only really set in with the establishment of the (second) German Empire in 1871 (eg, the ‘Strafgesetzbuch’ and ‘Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch’  (ADHGB) of 1861 and the ‘Zivilprozeßordnung’, ‘Strafprozeßordnung’, ‘Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz’  and ‘Konkursordnung’  of 1877). See Köbler, Köbler, § 7 B I 2 and Laufs, Chapter VII, 3 To Savigny Savigny,, law, law, like like languag language, e, exists exists from from time immemori immemorial. al. It It is the expressio expressionn of a particula particularr cultur culturee and point of view (‘Anschauung’). An English forerunner of Savigny on the political level was Edmund Burke, whose ‘Reflections on the French Revolution’ (1790) stress the importance of history and national traditions on constitutional development see Coing, Chapter IV 3 and 4. Regarding Savigny and the historical school see LB Curzon, SLRY (1998) p 142; Haft, Part E, 1; Laufs, Chapter VII, 2; Wesel (JW), Chapter VII. A n o th er c r i ti c o f ‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’  and positivism was Otto von Gierke (1841–1921), whose s ocial (cooperative) component. ‘Genossenschaftstheorie’ stressed the importance to German law of the social To the members of the ‘free’ school (Ehrlich, Weber), law depends not on words, but on social acceptance and social facts (sociology of law). la w). This empirical view (‘living law’) was further developed in the ‘functional’ approach of the American realists (Pound). In contrast, it was the positivist Pure Theory of Law  of Kelsen that the legal system is based on norms (and ultimately on a ‘Grundnorm’ ) and that these are open to judicial j udicial interpretation. That such interpretation interpretation can  be ‘unlimited’ was demonstrated by Rüthers in his book ‘Die Unbegrenzte Auslegung’  (1968,5th Edition (1997)) following the perversion of positivism during the Nazi tyranny. tyranny. Regarding Jhering, von Gierke, Weber and Kelsen, see Haft, Part E, respectively 3, 5, 7 and 8. See also: Creifelds under ‘Gierke, Otto von’ and ‘Weber, Max’; Köbler, § 7 B13; Laufs, Chapter IX 2; Wesel (FR), Chapters 8. Regarding positivism see Creifelds under ‘Rechtspositivismus’; Coing, Chapter I, VIII; d’Entrèves:  Additional Pa rt F, F, 8; Kommers, Part I, Chapter Cha pter Essays; Haft, Part F, 6. Regarding ‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’  see Creifelds; Haft, Part 2 (‘Constitutional Interpretation’—‘Background’). Interpretation’—‘Background’). Regarding ‘Interessenjurisprudenz’  see Engisch, Chapter VIII; Haft, Part F, 9. Regarding the ‘free’ school, see Haft Part F, 10; Chapter II Note 23, below. Regarding the perversion of law under the Nazis see Laufs, Chapter XI See also Note 10 in this Chapter. Chapter. The origins of ‘Interessenjurisprudenz’  can be traced to the (English) theory of ‘utilitarianism’ of Jeremy Bentham: see Coing, Chapter I VI.

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Coing (Chapter III, II) points out that the purpose of law is to provide a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts of interest (viz ‘Interessenjurisprudenz’)  and to satisfy the human desire for legal certainty (‘Rechtssicherheit’)  and the maintenance of traditions (viz the historical school/common law). However, Coing makes the valid (and topical) criticism that, when it comes to the realisation of legal rights, the historical school is too idealistic and ignores the real forces at work:  –  arguments concerning new laws (‘Auseinandersetzungen mn neue Gesetze’);  –  historical upheavals (‘Umbüche in der Geschicht’);  and  –  the creative contribution of great personalities (‘das schöpfer ische Element großer Persönlichkeiten’) . In this connection, Coing draws attention to Jhering’s monograph ‘Der Kampf ums Recht’  (The Struggle for Law (1872)). See Honsell, § 1.

CHAPTER II 1

At the end of the 19th century, the German jurist Jellinek identified two meanings of the term ‘state’—the legal (public law/state law) sense and the sociological sense. According to the former, which is still dominant in German state doctrine (‘Staatslehre’),  a state is the highest form of territorial corporation (‘Gebietskörperschaft’)  and consists of three elements: a state territory (‘Staatsgebiet’), a state people (‘Staatsvolk’) and state power (‘Staatsgewalt’). The latter meaning is well explained by Kommers (Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Structure and Principles’—‘State and Morality’): The German ‘Staat’ and the English ‘state’ are not equivalent terms. ‘Der Staat’ is more than the body politic. It represents, in Kant, the perfect synthesis between individual freedom and the objective authority of law, and, in Hegel, a moral organism in which individual liberty finds perfect realization in the unified will of the people: not arbitrary will, but rather ‘the power of reason actualizing itself in will’. In  brief, the ‘Staat’ is considered to be a superior form of human association, a uniting of individuals and society in a higher synthesis, a reality ‘in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom, (albeit) on condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the whole’.

2

3

The justification for the state is the subject of various theories (‘Staatstheorien’). See Creifelds under ‘Staat’; Katz, Part II, § 3; Schunck/De Clerck, Part I (Chapters 1–3 and 5–7) and Part II, Section A (Chapter 3). The ‘Bund’ and its member states (‘Gliedstaaten’) together form the ‘Gesamtstaat’ (whole state). Each has a duty of friendly cooperation and consideration for the other in the interest of the whole (‘Bundestreue’) . If a ‘Land’  does not perform its federal duties (‘Bundespflichten’), the Federal Government can, with the consent of the ‘Bundesrat’, take the necessary action to secure the loyalty of the ‘Land’ (Article 37 GG: ‘Bundeszwang’). See Battis/Gusy, Part A, § 4 1; Baumann (ER), Part IV, § 13 II 2 (a); Creifelds under ‘Bundesstaat’, ‘Bundestreue’ and ‘Bundeszwang’;  Katz, Part II, § 4; Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (‘Territorial Organization’—‘The Nature of German Federalism’; ‘Doctrine of Federal Comity’ ( The Television I Case  (1961)); Schunck/De Clerck, Part I, Chapters 8 and 9; Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Part IV 3. Regarding the duty of the authorities of the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ to give each other legal and official assistance, see Chapter XXI, Note 1. A An essential characteristic of a federal state is the decentralisation (distribution (‘Verteilung’)) of power. The likelihood of a single body becoming omnipotent is thereby reduced. In Germany, the key principle is contained in Article 30 GG: ‘Die Ausübung der staatlichen Befugnisse und die Erfüllung der staatlichen Aufgaben ist Sache der Länder, soweit dieses Grundgesetz keine andere Regdung trifft oder zuläßt’. The exercise of state authority and the fulfilment of state functions is a matter for (the responsibility of) the ‘Länder’, so far as this Basic Law does not make or allow for any other provision. Apart from a ‘horizontal’ separation of powers by means of provisions regarding the respective competences (‘Zuständigkeiten’)  of the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ in the fields of legislation ( ‘Gesetzgebung’: Articles 70ff GG), administration ( ‘Verwaltung’: Articles 83ff GG) and judicature ( ‘Rechtsprechung’: Articles 92ff GG), the Basic Law also achieves a ‘vertical’ separation (balance) of powers between the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’  by the vehicle of the ‘Bundesrat’ (Federal Council).

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9

10 11

See Battis/Gusy, Part A, § 4 1; Creifelds under ‘Bundesrat’;  Katz, Part III, § 10 ( ‘Schaubild 6’ (flowchart 6)); Maunz/Zippelius, Section 3, §§ 15–16; Chapters III and V B. B The individual (sovereign) powers exercisable by the ‘Bund’   and the ‘Länder’  are referred to as ‘Hoheitsrechte’  or ‘staatliche Befugnisse’. See Creifelds under ‘Hoheitsrechte’ . C Regarding the transfer of sovereign powers to international organisations (such as the European Union) see Articles 23 and 24 GG; Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (‘German Federalism and the European Union’ (3.10 The Maastricht Case  (1993)). See also Creifelds under ‘Internationale Organisations’. See Schunck/ De Clerck, Part II, Section A, Chapter 16; Youngs (CL), Chapter 2, Part IB (I) and (II). The immediate precursors of the ‘Grundgeseté  were the constitution of the (unified) German Empire of  16.4.1871 and the constitution of the Weimar Republic (the ‘Weimare (Reichs-)Verfassung’ ) of 11.8.1919. The latter lasted until the ‘Ermachtigungsgesetz’  (Enablement Law) of 243.1933 empowered Hitler to override it. The constitution of the Weimar Republic had, for the first time, enacted (in its second part) a catalogue of  ‘Grundrechte’  (Basic Rights). However, many of these were ‘leerlaufend’ (ie, had no practical effect) and they were later suspended by Hitler. At a meeting of the National Assembly in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt am Main in 1848 a catalogue of  ‘Grundrechte’  had been formulated and a national constitution agreed upon, but they never came into force. See Creifelds under ‘Reichsverfassung’  and ‘Leerlaufende Grundrechte’,  Katz, Part H, § 5 II. Regarding the Paulskirche assembly see also: Creifelds under ‘Nationalversammlung’ and Laufs, Chapter VIII, 2. Regarding the federal legislative procedure see, for example: Battis/Gusy, Part A, § 7 III 2; Katz, Part IV, § 20III; Chapter VII, Note 3. Regarding the exclusive and concurrent legislative powers of the ‘Bund’ and its authority to pass ‘framework laws’, see Kommers, Part It, Chapter 3 (‘Division of Powers’—‘National Powers’ and ‘Cooperative Federalism—Framework Laws’). See also Chapter V, Note 6. For a review of the relationship between the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ see Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (Der Bund und die Lande’). Wesel points out that in the field of legislation, the ‘Länder’  are merely left with residual areas ( ‘Restbestande’; eg, police and building law) and that decisions of the (federal) courts of the ‘Bund’ have a significant influence on the judicature in the courts of die ‘Länder’. Only in the area of administration do the ‘Länder’ remain predominant. See Chapter II C, below; Creifelds under ‘Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht’; Katz,  Part IV, § 20 II; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part I D n (54– 57); and the comments under Article 31 GG and Articles 70–78 GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 2. However, it should not be forgotten that the ‘Länder’  are states vested with their own sovereign powers. The Federal Constitutional Court has no authority to review a state government decision, if there is no infringement of the Basic Law: see Kommers, Part n, Chapter 3 ( The Startbahn West Case  (1982)). In cultural affairs and education matters (‘Bildungswesen’), the ‘Länder’ have primary authority (‘Kulturhoheit’). Broadcasting also falls outside the jurisdiction of the ‘Bund’. See Creifelds under ‘Kulturhoheit der Länder’; Kommers, Part H, Chapter 3 (3.2 The Television I Case (1961)). The ‘executive’ is a term describing one function of a state. In English, the German words ‘Verwaltung’ (a function of state) and ‘Regierung’  (an organ of state) can both  be translated as ‘government’. However, the terms ‘state’ and ‘government’ are not synonymous. See Note 1 in this Chapter; Creifelds under ‘Regierung’;  Schunck/De Clerck, Part I (Chapter 15) and Part H, Section A (Chapter 17). For didactic purposes, this sequence is followed in Chapters III and IV. A part of a ‘Behorde’ (or, indeed, a ‘Behorde’ itself) is frequently described as an ‘Amt’ (office). See Bull, Section L § 3 and § 4; Erichsen, Part VII, § 56; Maurer, Part 6, § 21. Regarding the term ‘Verwaltung’, its forms and functions see Bull, Section I, § 1 and § 2 7; Erichsen, Part I, §§ 1–2; Katz, Part IV, § 21; Maurer, Part 1, § 1. Administration by the ‘Länder’ is the norm: see Creifelds under ‘Verwaltungskompetenz’,  Chapter V B and Chapter XIV A. The authorities (‘Behbrden’)  involved in administration by the ‘Bund’ are described in Chapter IV. See Creifelds under ‘Mittelbare Staatsverwaltung’; Erichsen, Part VII, § 57; Maurer, Part 6, §§ 22–23; Scholler, § 2 VI (diagram 2). See also Chapter IV, below.

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12

13 14 15

16

Public ‘Körperschaften’, ‘Anstalten’ and ‘Stiftungen’ are all ‘juristische Personen des öffentlichen Rechts’  (juristic persons of public law). Rehbinder (Chapter II, § 17 III) defines them as follows:  –  ‘Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts’  are ‘Verbände mit Rechtspersönlichkeit’  (associations with legal personality);  – ‘Anstalten’ are organisationally independent ‘Verwaltungseinheiten’  (administrative units);  – ‘Stiftungen’ are ‘mit Rechtspersönlichkeit ausgestattete Vermögensmassen’  (accumulations of assets endowed with legal personality). They are dedicated to a particular purpose (‘Zweck’). ‘Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts’  have members ( ‘Mitglieder’ ). According to the criteria governing membership, they can be ‘Gebietskörperschaften’  (territorial corporations; eg, the ‘Gemeinden’   (local communities)) or ‘Personalkörperschaften’ (personal corporations; eg, the various professional and commercial chambers (‘Kammern’) and high schools (‘Hochschulen’). See Creifelds under ‘Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts’ and ‘Selbstoerwaltung’. The ‘Bundesbank’  (Federal Bank (in Frankfurt am Main)) is a ‘bundesunmittelbare juristische Person des öffentlichen Rechts’ (a public corporation under the direct control of the ‘Bund’). See Creifelds under ‘Bundesbank’; Chapter IV, Note 2. ‘Anstalten’ have users (‘Benutzer’). Depending on their degree of independence, ‘Anstalten’ can have full, partial or no legal capacity ie, they can be ‘(voll)rechtsfahig’ (eg, the radio and television stations (‘Rundfunkund Fernsehanstalten’);  the ‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’  (Federal Office of Employment)), ‘teilrechtsfahig’ or ‘nichtrechtsfähig’ (eg, schools, hospitals, museums). See Creifelds under ‘Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts’ . Regarding juristic persons of private law see Chapter XIA 3. In private law, apart from the ‘Stiftung’ (foundation; §§ 80–88 BGB), the main types of juristic person are all corporately organised and have members. Indirect state administration can also take the form of the secondment (‘Beleihung’)   or instruction (‘Beauftragung’) of private persons (natural or juristic). Usually, however, the (initial) decision whether such persons wish to participate or undertake public functions is their own. See Maurer, Part 6, § 23 V. A related distinction is that between ‘Eingriffsverwaltung’   (intervention administration) and ‘Leistungsverwaltung’ (service administration). ‘Eingriffsverwaltung’ is a type of ‘hoheitliche Verwaltungstättigkeit’, the prime example being the activity of the police. ‘Leistungsverwaltung’ today covers wide areas of state supply and support, for example in the field of social security, health, education and transport. Its common purpose is the provision of services for the welfare of  members of the public (‘Daseinsvorsorge’). ‘Leistungsverwaltung’  can be exercised both ‘hoheitlich’ (eg, the grant of a state benefit) and ‘fiskalisch’ (eg, the grant of a loan). See Chapter VIII, Note 6; Chapter X, Notes 21 and 224; Chapter XVII, Note 32. See also: Creifelds under ‘Eingriffsverwaltung’, ‘Fiskus’, ‘Hoheitsaufgaben’, ‘Leistungsverwaltung’  and ‘Verwaltungsprivatrecht’;  Erichsen, Part I, § 2 and Part III Section 4 (§§ 31–32); Giemulla/Jaworsky/ Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 3 A. In the EU, there is an increasing tendency to regulate the provision of public services on a centralised, panEuropean basis. This will have an effect on the structures and institutions of ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ in Germany, which will inevitably have to adapt. However, such issues should not upset the social order in the memberstates, despite occasional unrest in the ‘Länder’. See the report in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  (FAZ), 27.3.2000 (p 2). See Chapter VI, Note 3. See Stober, § 6 IV. There can be no ‘Flucht in das Privatrech’. The executive is also bound to observe the basic rights, if it acts fiscally. See Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 10 II; Hesse, Part III, Section 1, § 111. A recent example of fiscal activity by the executive is the ‘Postneuordnungsgesetz’ of 14.9.1994, whereby the German Federal Post (‘Deutsche Bundespost’) was (organisationally) privatised and split into three separate public companies: the ‘Deutsche Post AG’, ‘Deutsche Postbank AG’  and ‘Deutsche Telekom AG’. The assets of these three companies are held by a newly created Federal Institute for Post and Telecommunication (‘ZBundesanstalt für Post und Telekommunikatio’). By the ‘Telekommunikationsgesetz’ (TKG) of 25.7.1996, telecommunication and post services are now regulated  by a new (upper federal) authority, which also remains under the supervision of the relevant Federal Ministry (‘Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft’) . See Creifelds under ‘Postwesen und Telekommunikation’, ‘Bundespost’, ‘Postneuordnung’, ‘Post’, ‘Postbank’, ‘Telekom’, ‘Telekommunikationsgesetz’  and ‘Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post’ . See Chapters VII, Note 10, IX A, XIII, Note 46 and XV C; Bull, Section II, § 6 7; Maurer, Part 1, § 1 II 4, § 3 II

230

Notes

17 18

19

20

21 22

23

3, § 3 III 4 (d); Part 4, 17 I, Part 6, 23 II 2 (e) and Part 7, 25 VI Erichsen, Part III, 31–32 and Part V, § 44; SchmidtAßmann, uv ParII H, 1II; Stober, § 6 V. Regarding the judicature see Schunck / De Clerck, Part II, Section A, Chapter 19. See also: Chapter VII, Note 4 and Chapter XXII C Article 20(iii) GG describes certain elements of a ‘Rechtsstaat’. However, the term itself (which dates from the 19th century) is not defined in the Basic Law and, indeed, is only mentioned in Article 28(i) GG. See Wesel (JW), Chapter DC and Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Die Staatsfundamentalnorm des Artikels 20’) and Chapter 5 (‘Das Privatrecht als Modell ’). Wesel points out that the opposite of a ‘Rechtsstaat’ is a ‘Polizeistaat’ (police state) and that the primary function of administrative law is the protection of the (assets of the) individual against the state (‘Individual(guter)schutz’). Regarding Articles 20, 28 and 79(iii) GG see the comments under those Articles in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 2. See also: Battis/Gusy, Part A, §§ 2–7; Creifelds under ‘Verfassungsänderung’;  Erichsen, Part I, § 3 I; Hesse, Part II (§§ 4–8); Katz, Part III, §§ 7–12; Maunz/Zippelius, Section 3, § 13; Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Parts III and VIII. Proportionality and legal certainty are two general principles of law, which are recognised by the European Court of Justice as a source of Community law. See Hartley, Part II, Chapter 5; Jarass/ Pieroth, Article 20, D IV and V. Hartley points out that the European Court would apply such general principles, even if the EC Treaty did not exist. This is reminiscent of the famous dictum of Grotius (see Chapter I, Note 9). ‘Vertrauensschutz’  is also of particular importance where administrative acts are concerned (for example, in the field of social security law (‘Sozialrecht’); see the article by Klaus Louven in ZAP 4/99, Fach 18, p 545). See Kommers, Part II, Chapter 5 (‘Political Representation and Democracy’). The Basic Law only provides for plebiscites (‘Abstimmungen’ /‘Volksentscheide’)  in the case of a new division of the federal territory ( ‘Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes’   (Article 29 GG)). See Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Volksabstimmungen’) . Regarding the reorganisation of the former states of Baden and Württemberg in 1952, see Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (3.1 The Southwest State Case  (1951)). Regarding the (wider) term ‘Justiz’ (which also means ‘judicature’) see Chapter XXII C 6. This is the ‘horizontal’ separation of powers. See Chapter II, Note 3. The principle of the separation of  powers was first expounded by Montesquieu in his famous work ‘De l’Esprit des Lois’  (1748). In keeping with Montesquieu, Sieyes later drew a distinction between the constituted organs of state power (‘pouvoirs constitues’) and the people as the ‘pouvoir constituant’, ie, having the power to decide upon the constitution. In Germany,—despite occasional authoritarian/centralist fixations to the contrary—the rank of the constitutional organs is (officially) equal. The concept of the ‘supremacy of Parliament’, as in England, is unknown. See Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Die Rangordnung der drei Staatsgewalten’) . ‘Law’ includes the Basic Law (see generally Battis/Gusy, Chapter 6 and Chapters VH B and XIV A). The significance of the words ‘und Recht’ in Article 20(iii) GG is that they make dear that the judiciary (and the executive) must not only apply (positive) norms (‘Gesetze’),  but must also observe (overriding) principles of law (justice). Article 20(iii) represents, on the one hand, a binding of the judiciary (and executive) to the system (rules), but also an acknowledgement that no system can be complete (‘vollständig’), no ‘Gesetz’ (statute) can cover all eventualities. Thus, where political/legislative excesses are put in question, the courts sometimes fall back on die dichotomy  between ‘Gesetz’ and ‘Recht’ as a ‘safety valve’. Article 20(iii) GG enables a judge, in a particular case, to solve the problem of gaps in the system (‘Lücken im Gesetz’) —which so occupied the free’ school (Kantorowicz)—by further development of the law (‘richterliche Rechtsfortbildung’). See The Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case  (Sourcebook,  Chapter 7); the discussion in Wesel (FR), Chapter 8 (at the end). However, the words ‘Gesetz und Recht’ conceal wider problems:  –  In what circumstances can a ‘Gesetz’ be treated as invalid (‘ungültig’)?  –  In what circumstances can gaps (‘Lücken’) in a ‘Gesetz’ be filled / corrected?  –  What amounts to a (permissible) correction (‘Berichtigung’) of a ‘Gesetz’? When is such a decision illegal (‘contra legem’)? Regarding these questions see Coing, Chapter VI, V; Engisch, Chapters VII and VIII; Kommers, Part II, Chapter 4 (‘Judicial versus Legislative Authority’). See also Chapter XIII, Note 18, below.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 24

25 26

27 28 29 30

31

32 33 34

Regarding the principle of the ‘Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’  see Bull, Section II, § 6 1 to 3; Erichsen, Part I § 3 II 1; Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I Chapter 3 B; Maurer, Part 2, § 6; Chapter VIII, Note 14; Chapter XIV, Notes 21 and 25. Hesse (Part II, § 6 II 1) distinguishes between the ‘Vorrang des Gesetzes’ and the ‘Vorrang der Verfassung’ priority of the constitution), both being part of the wider principle of the primacy of law (‘Primat des Rechts’) . See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part I D IV (63); Hesse, Part III, Section 2 (§§ 13–14); Kommers, Part E, Chapter 4; Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Parts V and VIII. Certain fundamental principles regarding the political parties are set out in Article 21 GG. For further information see Creifelds under ‘Parteien’; Hesse, Part II, § 5 II 6; Katz, Part III, § 13, Kommers, Part II, Chapter 5 (‘Political Parties and the Party State’); Maunz/Zippelius, Section 3, § 12; Schunck/De Clerck, Part II, Section A, Chapter 3 VII; the comments under Article 21 GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 2; Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Part XV. Regarding the German electoral system, see also: The All Germany Election Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 2); Creifelds under ‘Wahlrecht (öffentliches)’;  Katz, Part III, § 14; Kommers, Part II, Chapter 5 (‘Elections and Voting’); Maunz/Zippelius, Section 5, § 31; Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Part X. See Creifelds under ‘Unabhängigkeit des Richters’ and Chapter XXII A. See Chapter VIII. See Chapter VIII C See Hesse, Part III, Section 4 (§ 22); Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Structure and Principles’—‘The Nature of  the Polity’) and Part II, Chapter 5 (‘Militant Democracy’); the comments under Article 21 GG in the Sourcebook, Chapter 2; Chapter XVII, Note 32. For a useful summary of constitutional principles, which are regarded as fundamental in Germany, see § 92(ii) StGB. Regarding the current international position of the ‘Bund’ and, in particular, the relationship between German, European Community and (other) public international law see Stein, Part IX, §§ 38–39; Katz, Part II, § 6 IV; Articles 23–27 GG; the comments under Article 23 GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 2; Note 34, below. See also: Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (‘German Federalism and the European Union’ (3.10 The Maastricht Case (1993)) and Part II, Chapter 4 (‘Executive-Legislative Tensions in Foreign and Military Affairs’). Regarding competence and procedure in the conclusion of treaties see Seidl-Hohenveldern, Section II, Chapter 2 (§§16–17). The ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’  is sometimes also called the ‘Ratifizierungsgesetz’  (ratification law): see Battis/Gusy, Part A, § 2 II (42–43). Cf an implementing law (see next Note). A In this respect, the position in Germany and England is the same. In theory, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (‘Europäische  Menschenrechtskonvention’) of 4.11.1950, the EEC Treaty of 27.3.1957 and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (‘Maastricht-Vertrag’)  of 7.2.1992 could all be repealed. However, there remain vital differences: – In Germany, treaties are incorporated into the German legal order in their original form ie, they are integrated (‘eingeordnet’) as such in the hierarchy of norms. To use Hartley’s phrase (Chapter 7, page 198), there is ‘assent (as distinct from enactment)’. Implementing laws (‘Ausführungsgesetze’)  only deal with ancillary matters (eg, questions of procedure) and thereby ensure the smooth functioning of the treaty. – In England, treaties only become valid (and applicable) within the (national) legal order in so far as a special, incorporating Act of Parliament permits (sovereignty of Parliament!). International norms are replaced by national ones. Whatever system is adopted, it is crucial that a treaty is incorporated in its agreed, authentic text and that the will of its authors is reflected accurately. ‘Linguistic tampering’ must be kept to a minimum. Under the English method, there is additionally always the risk that, quite apart from the treaty itself, the words of the incorporating Act of Parliament can give rise to ambiguity and uncertainty. See Seidl-Hohenveldern, Section II, Chapter 8, § 41 C III; Verdross/Simma, Part III, Chapter 5, Sections 1–3. B The English judiciary’s orthodox (‘dualist’) position towards international treaties was stated as recently as 1990 by Lord Oliver in the House of Lords ( The International Tin Council Case  [1990] 2 AC 418, p 500): A treaty is not part of English law until it has been incorporated into the law by legislation… It is outside the purview of the court (ie, unenforceable) not only because it is made in the conduct of 

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35

foreign relations, which are a prerogative of the Crown, but also because as a source of rights and obligations, it is irrelevant. C In the United Kingdom, (‘supra-national’) European Community law always prevails until such time as an ‘intentional and express’ repudiation of the EEC Treaty is passed by Parliament:  MacCarthys Ltd v Smith ([1979] 3 All ER 325, p 329,  per Lord Denning MR). Moreover, despite the (apparently insurmountable) difficulties in entrenching legislation in Britain, the incorporation or the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law is evidence of a shift of  position in the United Kingdom towards European legal principles. It is to be welcomed as a further step in assuaging opposition to, and facilitating, European cooperation. Similar ‘tactical’ factors played a part in the framing of the 10 Amendments to the US Constitution (the US ‘Bill of Rights’) in 1791. See Hartley, Part III, Chapter 8 (‘The National Reaction’); Loveland, Chapters 1, 2 and 14 IV; Chapter XVI, Note 3; Chapter XXI. Article 25 GG only grants precedence to the general rules of public international law (ie, those observed by the majority of states in the world), not supra-national or regional law. For examples, see Jarass/Pieroth, Art. 25,2(b). If a court has any doubt whether a rule of public international law forms part of federal law, it must refer the question to the federal constitutional court: Article 100(ii) GG. Regarding the relationship of public international law and national law and the primacy ( ‘Vorrang’) of the former (ie, the ‘monism’ / ‘dualism’ debate) see Seidl-Hohenveldern, Section II, Chapter 8 (§§ 40–41); Hartley, Part III, Chapter 7 (‘The First Requirement’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Part VII.

CHAPTER III 1

2

3

4 5

See Baumann (ER), Part IV, § 13 II 2; Creifelds under ‘Organe der BRep’, ‘Verfassungsorgane’ and ‘Zweikammersystem’; Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Die Obersten Staatsorgane’);  Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part I D III (58–62); Hesse, Part III, Section 3 (§§ 15–19); Katz, Part IV, §§ 15–19; Maunz/Zippelius, Section 5, §§ 30–34; Schunck/De Clerck; Part II, Section A, Chapters 11–15. In Germany, the Federal Government is appointed by the Federal Parliament (parliamentary democracy). Cf USA (presidential democracy). See Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Parlamentarische Demokratie’). See also: Creifelds under ‘Gesetzgebende Gewalt’, ‘PräZsidialdemokratie’ and ‘Staatsoberhaupt’; Kommers, Part II, Chapter 5 (‘Parliamentary Democracy’). The ‘Bundesrat’ is a (perpetual) organ of the ‘Bund’ (ie, a federal organ) and not a joint organ of the ‘Länder’: see Battis/Gusy, Part A, § 4 2. Unlike the ‘Bundestag’,  the ‘Bundesrat’ is not directly elected and has no set term of office. The constitution of the ‘Bundesrat ’ is dealt with in Article 51 GG:  –  the members of the ‘Bundesrat’ are appointed by the governments (not parliaments!) of the ‘Länder’;  –  each ‘Land’  has a certain number of votes (‘Stimmen’) in the ‘Bundesrat’, depending on the number of its inhabitants (‘Einiwhner’) ;  –  the votes of each ‘Land’ must be cast unanimously ( ‘einheitlich’). By Article 53 GG, the Federal Government is entitled (and, on request, obliged) to take part in the meetings of the ‘Bundesrat’ and its committees (‘Ausschüsse’). The Federal Government has a right to be heard at all times (‘jederzeit’) and must keep the ‘Bundesrat’ regularly informed regarding its business. Similarly, the Federal Government (and members of the ‘Bundesrat’) also have access to all meetings of the ‘Bundestag’ and its committees: Article 43(ii) GG. The rights of involvement of the ‘Bundesrat’ in the federal legislative procedure place the ‘Bundesrat’ in a strong and influential position. See Articles 76–78 GG; Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (‘Powers of the Bundesrat’—3.8 The Bundesrat Case  (1975)); ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’ . The Federal Assembly is responsible for the election of the Federal President every five years: Article 54 GG. See Chapter VII C, below; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 1 (‘The Federal Constitutional Court’); Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Der Hitter der Verfassung’);  the comments above Article 93 GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 2.

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CHAPTER IV 1 2

3

See Katz, Part IV, § 21 V; Chapter II C; Chapter XIV A. Eg, the ‘Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen’  (Federal Supervisory Office for the Credit System), the ‘Bundesbank’   (Federal Bank), the ‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’   (Federal Office of Employment), the ‘Bundeskartellamt’ (Federal Cartel Office) and the ‘Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt’ (Federal Motor Vehicle Office). The status of the ‘Bundesbank as a ‘bundesunmittelbare juristische Person des öffentlichen Rechts’  is something of  a misnomer, since it is an independent body and not subject to control/direction by the Federal Government in the exercise of its functions. However, the ‘Bundesbank’  must support the general economic policy of the Government and it has a duty of consultation. See §§ 12–13 BBankG. A list of the most important ‘Bundesoberbehorden’ was formerly printed as an appendix to the GG in ‘Sartorius I’. They have varying degrees of (legal) independence. See also: Creifelds under ‘Bundesanstalt’, ‘Bundesoberbehorden  and ‘Mittelbare Staatsverwaltung’. ‘Bundesauftragsverwaltung’ is also indirect state administration. See Chapter V, Note 7. For the structure of federal authorities see Creifelds under ‘Verwaltungsbehörden’  1: ‘Bundesbehörden’.  See also: Katz, Part IV, § 21; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part I E (91–110).

CHAPTER V 1

2 3 4 5 6

The steps on the route to reunification between 9.11.1989 and 3.10.1990 are set out chronologically in Katz, Part II, § 6 III. Amongst the various treaties (of public international law) signed during that period, the following should  be mentioned here:  –  the ‘Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währunvs- Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion’  (Treaty regarding the creation of a currency, economic and social union), the so-called ‘Staatsvertrag’ (State Treaty) of 18.5.1990;  –  the ‘Vertrag über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands’  (Treaty regarding the establishment of the unity of Germany), the so-called ‘Einigungsvertrag’  (Treaty of Union) of 31.8.1990. The main purpose of the ‘Einigungsvertrag’  was to achieve the harmonisation of law (‘Rechtsangleichung’)  between East and West German;  –  the ‘Vertrag über die Abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland’  (Treaty of final settlement regarding Germany’), the so-called ‘Two-Plus-Four Treaty’ of 12.9.1990. The Two-Plus-Four Treaty dealt with the public international law aspects of reunification and was signed in Moscow by East and West Germany, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. It terminated the rights of the four powers over Germany and thereby superceded the former so-called ‘Deutschlandvertrag’ (Germany Treaty) of 26.5.1952 between West Germany and the three allies. The TwoPlus-Four Treaty restored full sovereignty to Germany as a whole (Article 7). See Creifelds under ‘Abschließtende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland’  and ‘Einigungsvertrag’; ChapterII H. See Chapter II, Note 20. Regarding the constitutions of the ‘Länder ’, see Schunck / De Clerck, Part II, Section B. Despite the homogeneity clause, the ‘Länder’ have a significant degree of procedural flexibility. See Kommers, Part II. Chapter 3 (‘Division of Powers’—‘State Government and the Principle of Homogeneity’ ( The Startbahn West Case (1982)). See Chapter VII C. The presumption in favour of the competence of the ‘Länder’  also extends to the passing of laws (legislation; Article 70 GG). See Chapter II B. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle ( ‘Subsidiaritätsprinzip’), the presumption comes into play whenever, in the subject-area/matter ( ‘Sachgebiet’ /‘Materie’ ) concerned, there is no express allocation (‘Zuweisung’ ) in the Basic Law itself of the relevant function to the ‘Bund’. Even if the ‘Bund’ has (federal) legislative competence, the ‘Länder’ are presumed to remain responsible for administration. Thus, although the ‘Bund’ has (federal) power to grant the ‘Länder’ financial aid (‘Finanzhilfe’) for particular investments (Article 104a (iv) GG), this cannot impair the freedom of decision of the ‘Länder’ regarding the carrying out of their own duties. See Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (3.7 The Financial Subsidies Case (1975)). In certain limited situations, the ‘Bund’  has unwritten (implied) legislative power ( ‘ungeschriebene Gesetzgebungszuständigkeit’) ie:

234

Notes

7

8

 –  where there is a substantive connection ( ‘Sachzusammenhang’ ) between the matters to be regulated;  –  where there is a so-called annexe competence (‘Annexkompetenz’); or  –  because of the (intrinsic) nature of the matter (‘kraft Natur der Sache’) . See Chapter II, Note 3; Hesse, Part II, § 7 II; Katz, Part III, § 12 III; Part IV, § 20 II and § 21 II. See Chapter II C and Chapter XIV A. Implementation of federal laws ‘im Auftrage des Bundes’  (on instruction by (on behalf of) the ‘Bund’) is dealt with in Article 85 GG. The supreme federal authorities then have a right of direction (‘Weisungsrecht’)  vis à vis the authorities of the ‘Länder’ . The ‘Weisungsrecht’  is also of importance in the context of state supervision (‘Staatsaufsicht’) over local authorities and other public corporations and institutions. See Creifelds under ‘Weisungsrecht’;  Chapter VI, Note 11; Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (3.5 The Kalkar II Case (1990)). See Scholler, § 2 VI (diagrams 6 and 7). 9 For further information regarding the ‘Länder’, their respective organs and authorities, see Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part I, Sections F and G (114–140); Creifelds under ‘Länder’ and under ‘Verwaltungsbehörden’ 2: ‘Landesbehorden’ .

CHAPTER VI 1

2 3 4 5

6

See Creifelds under ‘Kreis’  and ‘Gemeinde’ . Scholler (§ 2 II) defines ‘Kreise’ as ‘Zusammenschlüsse der im Kreisgebiet bestehenden (kreisangehörigen) Gemeinden’ . A ‘Gemeindebezirk’  is part of a ‘Gemeinde’ . In England, its counterpart is a borough. See Creifelds under ‘Gemeindebezirk’ . The term ‘Gemeindeverband’ (‘Gemeinde’ association) is used to describe a conglomeration of territorial corporations above ‘Gemeinden’,  eg, ‘Kreise’  and so-called ‘Gesamtgemeinden’ . See Creifelds under ‘Kommunalverbände’ . Cf ‘Zweckverband’ . Katz (§ 4 VI) defines the EU (EEC) as a ‘Zweckverband souveräner Nationalstaaten’ . See Maurer, Part 6, § 2315; Schmidt-Aßmann, Section I; Stober, § 7 III (c). See Creifelds under ‘kreisfreie Städte’. They are ‘Landesgesetze’:  see Creifelds under ‘Landkreisordnungen’  and ‘Gemeindeordnungen’ . This institutional autonomy is protected by the right of local authorities to lodge a constitutional complaint (Article 93(i) No 4b GG). The state is not allowed to infringe the essence (‘Wesensgehalt’)  of communal autonomy—local government retains an area of core functions (‘Kernbereich’) . See Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (‘Local Self-Government’); Stober, § 3 II and IV. Such functions include:  –  town planning (‘Stadtplanung’);  –  promotion of the local economy (‘Wirtschaftsförderung’);  –  Zmaintenance of public savings banks (‘Sparkassen’);  –  provision of social support (‘Sozialhilfe’);  –  responsibility for youth welfare (‘Jugendhilfe’);  –  local transport (‘Verkehr’);  –  supply of energy (‘Versorgung mit Energie’);  –  disposal of refuse (‘Entsorgung von Abfall’);  –  protection of the environment (‘ZUmweltschutz’);  –  service of local needs in the fields of education (‘Bildung’), culture (‘Kultur’) and sport. See Stober, § 6 II. Private firms in competition with ‘Gemeinden’, which engage in commercial activity (‘wirtschaftliche Betätigung’), are traditionally in a weak position: see Stober, § 11IV. The ‘Gemeinden’  are free to decide upon the form of ‘öffentliche Einrichtungen’. A particular sub-category is the ‘Anstalt’ (institution). See Stober (§ 6 III), who refers to ‘öffentliche Einrichtungen’  as a key concept (Schlüsselbegriff)  of local ‘Daseinsvorsorge’. See also Chapter II C.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 7 8 9 10 11

12

In reality, however, the functions of the ‘Gemeinden’  (and the ‘Kreise’ ) are not only voluntary ( ‘freiwillige  Aufgaben’), but often compulsory ( ‘Pflichtaufgaben’): see Maurer, Part 6, § 23 I 3 and 5 (a). Functions may also be allocated to them: see below. See Creifelds under ‘Satzung’ and ‘Satzungsgewalt (-befugnis)’; Erichsen, Part II, § 7 VI; Scholler, § 6; Stober, § 8. Cf ‘Gesetz’. Regarding the possible types of local government constitution in Germany (eg, the ‘Norddeutsche Ratsverfassung’,   the ‘Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung’   and the ‘Magistratsverfassung’ ),  see Creifelds under ‘Gemeindeverfossung’;  Stober, § 2. See Creifelds under ‘Kreistag’  and ‘Landrat’. If functions are allocated to a local authority, the state’s power of supervision extends not only to questions of the legality ( ‘Gesetzmäßigkeit’) of particular actions (so-called ‘Rechtsaufsicht’), but also to questions of  their appropriateness (ie, to the exercise of the local authority’s discretion; so-called ‘Fachaufsicht’). See Creifelds under ‘Staatsaufsicht’; Scholler, § 12; Chapter V, Note 7; Stober, § 12. See generally: Creifelds under ‘Kommunen’  and ‘Kommunalrecht’;  Maurer, Part 6, § 22 II and § 23 I; Scholler, § 2 II, § 2 VI (diagrams 6 and 7) and § 3 VI.

CHAPTER VII 1 2

3

4

5 6

Regarding the ‘Grundgesetz’  generally see, for example: Battis/Gusy, § 1 II; Hesse, Part I, § 3; Katz, Part II, § 6; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Structure and Principles’); Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Das Banner Grundgesetz’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 1. These Articles are arranged in the Sourcebook  (Chapter 2) as follows:  –  Article 20.  –  Political parties (Article 21).  –  Flag (Article 22).  –  International relations (Articles 23–27).  –  The states (Articles 28–31).  –  External relations (Article 32).  –  Citizens’ rights (Article 33).  –  Officials and authorities (Articles 34–36).  –  Coercion by the ‘Bund’ (Article 37). These Articles are arranged in the Sourcebook  (Chapter 2) as follows:  –  Legislative powers and procedure (Articles 70–78).  –  Altering the constitution (Article 79).  –  Regulations (Article 80).  –  Special cases (Articles 80a-81).  –  Coming into force (Article 82). These Articles are arranged in the Sourcebook  (Chapter 2) as follows:  –  The courts (Article 92).  –  The Federal Constitutional Court (Articles 93–94).  –  The federal courts (Articles 95–96).  –  Judges (Articles 97–98).  –  Constitutional issues (Articles 99–100).  –  Special courts (Article 101).  –  Criminal law and the right to be heard (Articles 102–103).  –  Freedom (Article 104). Regarding the judicature see, for example, Katz, Part IV, § 23; Maunz/Zippelius, Section 5, § 35. For a survey of the financial order (‘Finanzordnung’) in Germany see Katz (Part IV, § 22), who describes it as a cornerstone of the federal system (‘Ecksetein des föderativen Systems’);  Maunz/Zippelius, Section 6, § 42; Schunck/De Clerck, Part II, Section A, Chapter 20. Sections VIIIa (Articles 91a-91b) and Xa (Articles 115a–l) of the Basic Law deal with, respectively, ‘joint matters’ (‘Gemeinschaftsaufgaben’) in which there is cooperation (‘Mitwirkung’) by the ‘Bund’ and matters of  national defence (the ‘ Verteidigungsfall’  (defence situation)).

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Notes 7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

Regarding the hierarchy of norms in Germany see Battis/ Gusy, Part A, § 6 II 3; Katz, Part I, § 1 III; Chapter XIV A. Regarding constitutional interpretation, its limits and the principle of ‘verfassungskonforme Auslegung’  see Hesse, Part I, § 2; Katz, Part II, § 5IV; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Constitutional Interpretation’). Regarding (specifically) interpretation of the basic rights see Bleckmann II, § 8; Katz, Part V, § 24 IV. Regarding the validity and legality of a VA, see Chapter XIV C 3. Unless and until it is withdrawn, revoked, annulled or has otherwise been dealt with, a VA remains valid, even if it is illegal (§ 43(ii) VwVfG). However, an illegal norm is usually void: see Schwerdtfeger, Part 2, § 5 II 3(c). Regarding the validity of norms, see generally Schwerdtfeger, Part 5 (§§ 23–28). Regarding the various methods of norm-control, see Section C, below and Maunz/Zippelius, Section 6, § 41 IV Norm-control forms part of the broader right of judicial review (the ‘richterliches Prüfungsrecht’ ). Its historical antecedent in Germany is constitutional review. See Kommers, Part I, Chapter 1 (‘Origin’). In England, ‘judicial review’ is a particular remedy in administrative law and has no constitutional connotation (although this may change, following incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into English law). Whereas access to the administrative courts is available pursuant to a general clause (§ 40(i) VwGO), the categories of case in which the constitutional courts have jurisdiction are precisely specified (‘Enumerationsprinzip’ (enumeration principle)); a matter not falling within a particular category is ‘unzulässig’ (inadmissible). Cf Chapter XV C (Note 10) and see Creifelds under ‘Verfassungsstreitigkeiten’  (a)–(n); Kommers, Part I, Chapter 1 (‘Jurisdiction’); Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part I D IV (72–74). In Baden-Württemberg, Bremen, Hessen and Niedersachsen, the constitutional court of the ‘Land’ is called the ‘Staatsgerichtshof’. See also Creifelds under ‘Verfassungswidrigkeit von Gesetzen’. Another name for the ‘konkrete Normkontrolle’ is the ‘Vorlageverfahren’  (reference procedure). It is a form of  compulsory judicial review. The court must only refer, if:  –  it is convinced that the relevant norm is unconstitutional (ie, void or incompatible with the relevant constitution);  –  no ‘verfassungskonforme Auslegung’  of the norm is possible (ie, it cannot be interpreted in conformity with the relevant constitution); and  –  the validity (‘Gültigkeit’) of the relevant norm is vital to the court’s decision (‘entscheidungserheblich’) . If the matter is referred to the constitutional court, the proceedings must be stayed. See Jarass/Pieroth, Article 100, I; Chapter XIII, Note 71. The incidental decision of a court is merely binding on the parties: cf § 121 VwGO and § 322 ZPO. A norm below a ‘Landesgesetz’  (state statute) can also be challenged in the OVG under § 47 VwGO (the socalled norm-control procedure (‘Normkontrollverfahren’):  see Chapter XV A. If the OVG declares the norm void, its decision is of general effect (‘ allgemein verbindlich’:  §47(vi), 2nd sentence VwGO). See Gallwas, Chapter 12 (12.1.3 and 12.1.4). Similarly, to avoid duplication of proceedings (‘Doppelprozess’), courts of all jurisdictions can decide (other, non-constitutional) preliminary questions (‘Vorfragen’)— eg, the interpretation of European Union law— incidentally themselves. See Schmitt Glaeser, Part I, § 2 II C 5; Chapter XIII, Note 70. § 90(ii), 2nd sentence BVerfGG contains an exception to the usual requirement of the exhaustion of normal legal channels (‘Erschöpfung des Rechtswegs’): …the Federal Constitutional Court can hear a constitutional complaint immediately, if it is of general importance or if a severe and unavoidable disadvantage would accrue to the complainant, if the complainant were referred in the first instance to ordinary legal proceedings. See The Investment Aid Act Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 3). See Maunz/Zippelius, Section 6, § 41 V; the comments under Article 93 GG in die Sourcebook,  Chapter 2. A constitutional complaint is an extraordinary, final and subsidiary legal remedy (‘Rechtsbehelf’). It is not a substitute for any appellate remedies (‘Rechtsmittel’), which might be available under the relevant procedural code. See the article by Holger Zuck in ZAP 8/95, Fach 19, p 305 .

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The German Legal System and Legal Language Where a court decision is involved, Zuck recommends that, if it is uncertain whether a particula r procedural ‘Rechtsmittel’ is absolutely hopeless (‘völlig aussichtslos’) or is clearly inadmissible (‘offensichtlich unzulässig’), one should lodge a constitutional complaint on a precautionary basis (‘vorsorglich’)  parallel to the relevant procedural remedy. If the procedural remedy proves unsuccessful, a further complaint can later DC lodged against that (second) decision. The address of the Federal Constitutional Court is: ‘Bundesverfussungsgericht’, Schloßbezirk 3, 76133 Karlsruhe. 16

17 18

19

A

Not every wrong decision by a court or wrong application of the law justifies a constitutional complaint. There must be an element of arbitrariness (‘Willkür’), ie, the court must have fundamentally failed to appreciate or deliberately ignored the importance and influence of the basic rights in the relevant case. B Before accepting a constitutional complaint for decision, the Federal Constitutional Court conducts a preliminary examination (‘Vorprüfungsverfahren’).  Most complaints founder at this hurdle. There are only two grounds for acceptance (§ 93a (ii) BVerfGG): either (a) the complaint concerns a matter of fundamental constitutional importance; or (b) acceptance is expedient in order to give effect to one of the (basic) rights within § 90(i) BVerfGG, eg, the complainant would suffer a particularly serious disadvantage (besonders schwerer Nachtein),  if the court declined to decide the matter. In other words, the relevant infringement of basic rights must be weighty (‘gewichtig’)  or affect the complainant detrimentally in an existential manner. See the article by Holger Zuck in ZAP 8/95, Fach 19, p 305. C Where a provision in a statute (‘Gesetz’) requires a particular act of implementation ( Vollzugsakt’)  by the executive, a complaint against the statutory provision itself can only be brought before the Federal Constitutional Court exceptionally (‘ausnahmsweise’). The complainant must usually wait for the implementing measure and then—in accordance with the subsidiarity principle (‘Subsidiaritätsprinzip’)— (first) challenge it in the administrative court, since it is only at the stage of the implementing act that the complainant can allege that he is directly affected (‘unmittelbar betroffen’) and that the implementing act amounts to an attack (‘Eingriff) on his legal sphere (‘Rechtssphäre’). See Kriele, Fall 19 (the ‘Voikszählung’  (public census) decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of  15.12.1983; ‘Aus den Gründen:  B’); the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 21.6.1996 regarding ‘Rechtschreibreform’  (reform of written German) (ZAP-Aktuell, 10.7.1996, p 632). Within the context of the European Community, the subsidiarity principle has been elevated by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (and subsequently by Article 23 GG) to the level of a binding legal principle’. See Kommers, Part II, Chapter 3 (‘German Federalism and the European Union’ (3.10 The Maastricht Case  (1993)). As, for example, in Kriele, Fall 3 (the ‘Lüth/Harlan’ decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 15.1.1958; also referred to in Chapter VIII, Notes 7 and 12, below). As, for example, in Kriele, Fall 4 (the ‘Apotheken’  (chemists) decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 11.6.1958). See the comments in connection with that case under Article 12 GG in the Sourcebook, Chapter 3. Alternatively, the Federal Constitutional Court can declare the (provision in the) statute compatible (‘vereinbar’)  or incompatible (‘unvereinbar’)  with the Basic Law. See § 31(ii) BVerfGG; Battis/Gusy, § 7 V (305); Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Judicial Review in Operation’—‘Form and Effect of Decisions’); and the following cases:  –  Kriele, Fall 18 ( ‘Naßauskiesung’ (wet gravelling)). In connection with that decision, also referred to as The Groundwater Case (1981) (Kommers 6.4), see the comments on expropriation (‘Enteignung’) under Article 14(iii) GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 3.  –  Kriele, Fall 11 (‘Numerus clausus’). A ‘numerus clausus’  (fixed number) of university admissions may be incompatible with the Basic Law. Training (‘Ausbildung’) is the first stage to the exercise of a profession (‘Beru/sausübung’) under Article 12(i) GG. See also Chapter VIII, Note 6.  – The Housework Day Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 3). An ‘Organstreit’  can also be initiated by a parliamentary grouping (‘Fraktion’) or political party. See Hesse, Part III, Section 3, § 19 II 2. For the application to be admissible, the applicant must allege that a measure or omission of the other party injures its rights and obligations under the Basic Law or that it is directly endangered by it: § 64(i) BVerfGG.

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Notes

20

A ‘measure’ includes a Federal Government decision (‘Beschluß der Bundesregierung’):  see The Bosnia Flight Exclusion Zone Case  (Sourcebook,  Chapter 2). See Maunz/Zippelius, Section 6, § 41 III; Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Part XVI3.

CHAPTER VIII 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

Regarding the nature of the basic rights, the entitlement to claim them and their effect see the Sourcebook, Chapter 3 (‘Introduction’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part I, Sections A-C In the Basic Law, the structural principles of state follow the basic rights and commence in Article 20. This is a reaction to the crimes of the Nazi period and should be compared with the position under the constitution of the Weimar Republic and the so-called ‘Paulskirche Verfassung’. See Wesel (FR), Chapter 2 (‘Menschenrechte’) and Chapter II, Note 5, above. Basic rights must be distinguished from statutory provisions, which merely set out a state programme or aim (so-called ‘Programmätze’  or ‘Staatszielbestimmunge’). In turn, these are also to be distinguished from one another: the former are informal statements of intention, while the latter are legally binding. Both, however, are a form of political signpost. See Katz, Part III, § 7 and Part V, § 251: Freedom rights typically comprise the following elements: – a guaranteed area (‘Gewährleistungsbereich’); – an area setting out limits (‘Vorbehaltsbereich’) . Such limits can be: – general (eg, Articles 2(i) and 8(ii) GG); – qualified / specific (eg, Articles 5(ii) and 9(ii) GG); or – omitted (eg, Articles 4(i),5(iii) and 8(i)GG); rules themselves laying down limits to those limits (‘SchrankenSchranken’). See Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 12 II; Bleckmann II, § 5; Gallwas, Chapters 3 and 4; Katz, Part V, § 26; ‘Limitation of Basic Rights’, below. The legislature can concretise institutional guarantees, provided their essential structure (‘wesentliche Struktur’/  ‘Wesensgehalt’)  is not infringed. However, institutional guarantees do not bestow individual rights as such. They provide less protection. There is a school of thought that institutional guarantees should be used as a means of dealing with social problems (viz asylum). Whether this will be successful is doubtful. See Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 9; Bleckmann II, § 11 (‘Die Funktionen der Grundrechte’);  Katz, Part V, § 25 II; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Constitutional Interpretation’—‘An Objective Order of Values’); The Film Director Case (‘Lüth/Harlan’) (Sourcebook,  Chapter 6). This is achieved by an ‘Umdeutung’  (fresh interpretation) of the basic rights, eg, of Article 3(i) GG. See Bleckmann II, § 11 II. ‘Leistungsrechte’  can be enforced by the administrative courts, ie, they are ‘einklagbaf.  See Wesel (FR), Chapter 5, which deals with the distinction between ‘Eingnffsverwaltung’ and ‘Leistungsverwaltung’ (‘Daseinsvorsorge’), a distinction first drawn in 1938 by Ernst Forsthoff in his book ‘Die Verwaltung als Leistungsträger’ . By way of  example, Wesel draws attention to a case decided by the Federal Administrative Court in 1954 (BVerwGE 1,159; ‘Fürsorgeunterstützung’  (welfare support)). See also Chapter II, Note 12 and Chapter X, Note 21. In the ‘Numerus clausus’ case ‘Leistungsrechte’  were referred to as ‘Teilhaberechte’ (rights to participate (in state services)). See Chapter VII, Note 18. A See Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 10 II; Hesse, Part II, Section 1, § 11 II; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Constitutional Interpretation’—‘Theory of Basic Rights’); Kriele, Fall 3 (‘Lüth/Harlan’; ‘Aus den Gründen:  BII1–4’). Particularly instructive is Gallwas (Chapter 6): (i) The process of balancing (‘Abwägung’; see Notes 10 and 20 B, below) enables a collision between (private) interests to be resolved. (ii) The starting point in the process is the state’s duty of care and protection (‘Achtungs- und Schutzpflicht’)  not only for the interests of society as a whole, out also for those of each individual. (iii) Even though a dispute between private persons may be influenced by basic rights, it remains (materially and procedurally) a civil law dispute (‘bürgerlicher Rechtsstreit’) .

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8 9 10

11 12 13

(iv) A person entitled to a basic right may be the target of a private law daim (‘privatrechtlicher  Anspruch’) or he may (in the first instance) want to use private law as a sword to protect himself  against an infringement. B For examples of the indirect (secondary) effect of basic rights in cases involving claims for tort see the Sourcebook,  Chapter 6: – The Publication of a Letter Case; – The Newspaper Delivery Obstruction Case;  and – The Film Director Case. In the first case, Articles 1 and 2 GG played a part; in the second, Articles 5 and 8 GG were considered, whilst in the third, Article 5 was decisive. In The Film Director Case  the basic rights were vividly described as having an ‘Ausstrahlungswirkung’ (radiation effect) on private law. However, their influence extends to all areas of law. See the Sourcebook,  pages 440 and 444; Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part I, Section C 3. Thus, for example, Article 5(i) GG (freedom of speech) can be invoked not only in the context of civil law provisions (eg, §§ 823, 826 and 1004 BGB), but also against administrative acts and criminal convictions (eg, §§ 130,185ff StGB). See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 8 (‘Freedom of  Expression: Guiding Principles’) and the following cases: – The Film Director (Lüth) Case (1958) (Kommers 8.1); – The Schmid-Spiegel Case (1961)  (Kommers 8.2); – The Blinkfüer Case (1969) (Kommers 8.3); – The Campaign Slur Case (1982) (Kommers 8.4); – The Holocaust Denial Case (1994) (Kommers 8.5); – The Tucholsky Cases  (I/II) (1994/5) (Kommers 8.6). The ‘Tucholsky’ cases demonstrate the particular difficulty which Germans seem to have in handling ambiguous phraseology (‘soldiers are murderers’)—ie, should it be classified as (protected) opinion/ criticism, insult or fact?—and the need to keep everyday German and German legal language distinct. See Notes 20 and 26 in this Chapter; Chapter XVI, Note 35; Kommers, Part III, Chapter 8 (‘The seminal character of Lüth’). See Bleckmann II, § 9 and § 10; Katz, Part V, § 27. The carrier of a basic right is a person entitled to claim its benefit, while the addressee of a basic right is a person bound by it. See Note 4, above; Bleckmann II, § 12; the Sourcebook,  Chapter 3 (‘Limitations on the Basic Rights’); Katz, Part V, §§ 28–29; Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part I, Section D. As in Kriele, Fall 8 (the ‘Mephisto (Gründgens/Mann)’ decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of  24.2.1971; ‘Aus den Gründen C IV’ ). See Battis/Gusy Part B, § 12 II 4. Regarding the process of ‘Abwägung’  (balancing), which had to be carried out by the Federal Constitutional Court in the context of an application for an ‘einstweilige Anordnung’  (temporary order) under § 32 BVerfGG, see The Bosnia Flight Exclusion Zone Case  and The East German Politicians Trial Publicity Cases  in the Sourcebook, Chapters 2 and 3. The question of a conflict (collision) between the basic rights of different ‘Grundrechtsträger’ (= ‘Grundrechtskollision’) is to be distinguished from the situation where there is concurrence of various basic rights (=‘Grundrechtskonkurrenz’),  ie, where the conduct of one and the same person falls within the ambit of  more than one basic right. The issue in both cases is the same: Which basic right takes precedence (is stronger)? However, the problem is resolved in different ways: in the former situation, there is a ‘Güterabwägung, while in the latter the principle of the maximum efficiency of (all) basic rights (‘Grundsatz der maximalen Grundrechtseffektivität’) is applied. See Bleckmann II, § 14; Katz, Part V, § 24 IV. See Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 12 III; Gallwas, Chapter 3 (3.4). As in The Film Director Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 6; Kriele, Fall 3 (‘Lüth/Harlan’; ‘Aus den Gründen: B II  2’)). Together with Article 19(i) GG, Article 19(ii) GG protects basic rights against inner erosion (‘Aushöhlung’) through ‘Gesetzesvorbehalte’. See Hesse, Part III, Section 1, § 10 IV 1. In the context of die development of the European Union, the possible emptying (‘Entleerung’) of basic

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Notes

14

15

16 17 18

19 20

rights was a preliminary issue in The Maastricht Case . It remains a potential danger and should be taken seriously. The status and content of the ‘Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz’  (principle of proportionality) are explained in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 3. Application of the principle is also illustrated by The Arrested Admiral Case  (rules about arrest) and The Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case  (law of the former DDR; Sourcebook,  Chapter 7). See also: Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 12 III 3 and 4; Creifelds under ‘Übermaßverbo’;  Chapter II, Note 24; Chapter XIV, Note 31; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Constitutional Interpretation’—‘Proportionality’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part I, Section E. The legislature can, by ‘Gesetz’, empower the executive (government or ministers) to issue a ‘Rechtsverordnung’ (statutory instrument). However, in accordance with the ‘Rechtsstaat’  principle (‘Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’), the ‘Gesetz’ must specify the content, purpose and extent of the authorisation (‘Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß der Ermächtigung’)  and it must be stated in the ‘Rechtsverordnung’  itself upon what legal basis (‘Rechtsgrundlage’) it is being issued: Article 80(i) GG. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsverordnung  and ‘Wesentlichkeitsvrinzip’;  Katz, Part IV, § 20 IV; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 4 (‘Delegation of Legislative Power’). See also the comments under Article 80 GG in the Sourcebook, Chapter 2 and ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’ . See, for example, Katz, Part V,§ 30. See also the Sourcebook,  Chapter 3 (‘The Basic Rights Themselves’), where, successively, Articles 1–3, 6–14 and 15–19 GG are treated. Although Article 93(i) No 4a GG refers to specific (basic) rights and is in this respect narrower than the ‘Rechtsschutzgarantie’, it includes acts of the legislature and the judiciary. The term ‘öffentliche Gewalt’ in Article 93(i) No 4a GG is, therefore, wider than in Article 19(iv) GG. The ‘Justizgewährungsanspruch’  includes a right to effective legal protection (effektiver Rechtsschutz’),  a fair hearing (‘faires Verfahren’)  and a right to be heard (‘rechthches GehöZ”) : Article 103(i) GG and Article 6 EuMRK. Although by § 184 GVG the court language is German, § 185 GVG obliges the court to provide an interpreter (‘Dolmetscher’), if a person, who does not have command of German (‘der deutschen Sprache nicht mächtig’), is involved in a hearing. In criminal proceedings, a person charged has the right to receive a translation (‘Übersetzung’) of the bill of  indictment (‘Anklageschrift’): Article 6(iii)a EuMRK. Moreover, the final submissions and applications of the prosecution and defence must be explained to the accused by the interpreter: §259(i)StPO. In civil matters, the submission of a translation of an ‘Urkunde’  (document) by an authorised translator (‘ermächtigter Übersetzer’)   can be ordered: § 142(iii) ZPO. Indeed, the fundamental prohibition of  discrimination on linguistic grounds codified in Article 14 EuMRK and Article 3(iii) GG should justify the provision of a translation of important written items into or out of a foreign language (‘Fremdsprache’)  by a court of its own motion (‘von Amts wegen’)—ie, from public funds—if a foreigner can show that his financial plight (‘finanzielle Notlage’)  is such that he is unable to provide them himself. See Geimer, Part 5 and Part 10 X; Jarass/Pieroth, Article 20, D VI and Article 103, AIV 2; Katz, Part V, § 25 II 5; Schack, § 12 VIII (‘Sprachprobleme’);  Note 36 in this Chapter; Chapter XVII, Note 29. See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 7 (‘The Dignity of Persons’). A Article 2(i) GG guarantees a comprehensive basic right of general freedom of action (allgemeine  Handlungsfreiheit’). It has three limits (‘Schranken’): – the rights of others (‘die Rechte anderer’); – the constitutional order (‘Zdie verfassungsmafiige Ordnung’); – the moral code (das Sittengesetz’). The constitutional order is, for practical purposes, the most important limit. It comprises every statute (‘Gesetz’), which is formally and materially in conformity with the constitution. Article 2(i) GG is an ‘Auffanggrundrecht’  ie, it springs in on a subsidiary basis, if there is no ascertainable infringement of the protected area of another (more) specific freedom right (‘Spezialfreuieitsrecht’). B The judiciary has derived a general right of personality (‘allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht’) (privacy) from the rights enshrined in Articles 1(i) and 2(i) GG. It provides protection to valuable aspects / qualities/ attributes (‘Eigenschaften’)   of the human personality (‘Persönlichkeitsgüter’)   not already protected elsewhere (eg, by § 823(i) BGB) and forms a final barrier against the erosion/penetration of  privacy in the personal domain. The right has constitutional rank and includes a right to informational self-determination (‘informationelle Selbstbestimmung’).

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C

D E

F

G

In the event of a conflict between a person’s own sphere of personality igensphäre der Persönlichkei’) and the legitimate interests of others, it must (again) be resolved by balancing (‘Abwägung’). Thus, for example, the ‘allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht  affords protection against the unauthorized transmission of confidential data and the distorted reproduction of private correspondence: see The Publication of a Letter Case (Sourcebook, Chapter 6; the right was first recognized in this case (1954)). It also covers a damaging comment (‘schädigende Bemerkung’)  or statement of opinion (‘Meinungsäußerung’). . Intentional defamation can be the subject of criminal prosecution for ‘Beleidigung’  (insult; § 185 StGB). The ‘allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht’ is treated as a ‘sonstiges Recht’ (other (absolute) right) under § 823(i) BGB. It is a framework right (‘Rahmenrecht’) and supplements the special personality rights (‘besondere Persönlichkeitsrechte’)  expressly mentioned in § 823(i) BGB ana in other statutory provisions (eg, the right to one’s name (§ 12 BGB) and the right to one’s picture (§§ 22ff KUG)). The following remedies can be claimed for an unlawful and blameworthy infringement (‘Verletzung’) of the ‘allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht’: – damages (‘Schadensersatz’) for financial loss (§ 823(i)/ (ii) or § 826 BGB); – damages for (immaterial) pain and suffering (‘Schmerzensgeld’), if the breach is particularly serious (§ 847 BGB analogously); – disposal of the impairment (‘Beseitigung der Bedntrachtigung’)  as appropriate, eg, by way of retraction (‘Widerruf’)  (§ 1004 BGB analogously); – restraint (‘Unterlassung’) for the future (§1004 BGB analogously). Provisional legal protection (‘vorläufiger Rechtsschutz’)  by way of injunction (‘einstweilige Verfügung’) is possible. See Schuschke, ZAP 9/2000, Fach 14, p 361. Apart from these (civil) remedies, a defamatory statement of opinion or fact can also be the subject of  a criminal prosecution as ‘Beleidigung’ (insult): § 185ff StGB. However, an application for prosecution (‘Strafantrag’) must usually be lodged: § 194 StGB. See Chapter XVI, Note 35. If a statement of fact in a printed publication (‘Druckschrift’) is involved, the press laws (‘Pressegesetze’) of the ‘Länder’  provide for a right to the printing of a response/correction (‘Gegendarstellung’/  ‘Berichtigun’). The civil and criminal law also make available sanctions for dissemination of certain types of untrue factual statements: see § 824 BGB (‘Kreditgefährdung’  (harm to financial status)), § 164 StGB (‘falsche Verdächtigung’ (false suspicion)) and §§ 186–187 StGB (‘Üzble Nachrede’  (offensive gossip) and ‘Verkumdung’ ((malicious) defamation)). See Creifelds under ‘Persönlichkeitsrecht’, ‘Unterlassungsanspruch’, ‘Presserecht’ and ‘Gegendarstellung’; Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 12 II 2 and 4 and § 12 III 3 (at 466); Brox (BS), Chapter 8, § 37 A I 3 and III; Fikentscher, Section 16, Part 1, § 103 II 2; Gallwas, Chapters 5 and 10; Hesse, Part III, Section 1, § 121 (at 428); Kötz, Part E; Chapter X Note 23; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part II, Sections G and H and Chapter 6, Part VI, Section B (6). Regarding the term ‘sonstiges Recht’ under § 823(i) BGB see The Newspaper Delivery Obstruction Case and The Air Traffic Controllers’ Strike Case . Regarding Article 2(i) GG, see also: Kommers, Part III, Chapter 7 (‘The Right to Personality’ and ‘Privacy and Physical Integrity’) and the following cases: – The ‘Mephisto’ Case (1971) (Kommers 7.2); – The Elfes Case (1957) (Kommers 7.4); – The ‘Volkszählung (public census) Case’  (1983) (Kommers 7.6); – The Soraya Case (1973) (Kommers 4.2). To be distinguished from infringements of the honour/reputation (‘Ehre’I‘Ruf’) of another person are false statements regarding a person’s property or business interests. The English tort of malicious falsehood (‘slander of title’/‘slander of goods’; cf defamation) has no single equivalent in German law. In such cases, protection is provided primarily by § 823(i) BGB— which also treats the ‘Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Gewerbebetrieb’  (right to an established and exercised business) as a ‘sonstiges Recht’—by § 824 BGB and by § 826 BGB. The Law against Unfair Competition (UWG) also provides protection against unfair business practices for which, in English law, remedies are often provided by the general law of torts (eg, inducing breach of contract interference with trade, passing off). By § 1 UWG, the principal general clause, anyone who, for the purpose of competition (‘zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbes’),  undertakes actions which contravene good morals (‘gute Sitten’) is open to claims for stoppage (‘Unterlassung’) and damages (‘Schadensersatz’). Stoppage is also available, if misleading representations (‘irreführende Angaben’)   are made regarding business conditions (‘geschäftliche Verhältnisse’): § 3 UWG.

242

Notes

21 22

23 24 25 26

27

The right to daim stoppage under §§ 1 and 3 UWG is available not only to business competitors, but also to trade and consumer associations (‘Verbände’) and chambers of commerce: § 13(ii) UWG. Attacks on the reputation of a business are covered by other provisions in the UWG. Thus, the making of a damaging factual statement regarding (inter alia) the business or goods of another for the purpose of competition gives rise to claims for damages and stoppage, if the statement is not demonstrably true (‘nicht erweislich wahr’): § 14(i) UWG (so-called ‘Anschwarzung’  (blackening (of the name) or a  business)). If an untrue statement is made contrary to better knowledge (‘wider besseres Wissen’),  criminal penalties result § 15(i) UWG. §§ 14 and 15 UWG are the business equivalents of §§ 186–187 StGB. Procedurally, the usual method to obtain stoppage is to apply for an injunction (‘einstweilige Verfügung’) under §§ 935ff ZPO. When such an application threatens, the party potentially affected can file a socalled ‘Schutzschrift’ (protective pleading) at court as a precautionary measure, to ensure that the matter is not decided without an oral hearing (see § 937(ii) ZPO). By § 21 (i) UWG, the basic limitation period for claims for damages and stoppage is six months from the time at which the claimant has knowledge of the conduct in question and of the identity of the person responsible. In the case of a claim for damages, however, the period does not begin to run  before damage (‘Schaden’) has occurred (§ 21(ii) UWG). Claims in tort can sometimes become relevant because of the longer limitation period (§ 852 BGB). However, the general rule is that the protection of individual interests afforded by the law of tort (eg, the right to an established and exercised business) is overriden by the UWG, in so far as the UWG contains special provisions. In other words, §§ 823ff BGB only come into play on a subsidiary basis. See Creifelds under ‘Ehre’, ‘Unerlaubte Handlung’, ‘Unlauterer Wettbewerb’, ‘Anschwärzung’, ‘Einstweilige Verfügung’ and ‘Schutzschrift’; Dannemann, Section V, 3; Meyer, Part 6, § 13; Rittner, Part 1, § 1 C I; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part II, Section L rs, Part III, Chapter 7 (‘The Right to Life’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part II A. This basic right incorporates the principles—binding on the legislature, executive and judiciary—that:  –  persons are entitled to equal treatment (‘Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz’); and that  –  when reaching a decision, it is forbidden to take into account aspects (‘Gesichtspunkte’) or considerations (‘Erwägungen’)  which are arbitrary (‘willkürlich’) or irrelevant (‘sachfremd’) . See Creifelds under ‘Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz’, ‘Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz’  and ‘Willkürverbot’;  Chapter XIII, Note 18; Chapter XIV, Note 34. The question whether unequal treatment (‘Ungleichbehandlung’)  is justified in a particular case is linked to the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness (‘Willkürverbot’). The issue within Article 3(i) GG therefore boils down to the age-old problem of (social) justice (‘(soziale) Gerechtigkeit’)—or, as is more elegantly formulated, of the ‘right; to equality of opportunity (‘Chancengleichheit’)—and, ultimately, to the question of the role of the welfare state (‘Sozialstaat’). See Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 13 III and IV; Bleckmann II, § 11 II; Hesse, Part III, Section 1, § 12 II; Kommer s, Part III, Chapter 6 (‘Equality and the Social Economy’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part V, Sections. Article 3(ii) GG was the appropriate ‘Prüfungsmaftstab’ (standard against which the statutory provision in question was examined) in The Housework Day Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 3). See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 9 (‘The Free Exercise of Religion’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part VI, Section C. Conscription is dealt with in Article 12a GG. See Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part XI3. One of the limits to Article 5(i) GG are the ‘allgemeine Gesetze’  (general laws). Whether such laws (which can include norms of civil law) take precedence in a particular case is difficult to establish. For guidelines (‘Abwägungsfaktoren’)  see Battis/Gusy, Part B, § 12 II 3 where relevant excerpts from The Film Director Case  are also quoted. ‘Informationsfreiheit’  (freedom of information) is a corollary to the basic right of ‘Meinungsaufterung’  (freedom of expression). Changes in technology will create new areas of work for the legislature and the courts (balancing of freedom of information against the position (interests) of information providers). See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 8 (‘Freedom of Expression: Guiding Principles’ and ‘Speech, Pereonhood, and Social Morality’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part VI, Section B. See also Note 7 in this Chapter. See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 8 (‘Artistic and Academic Freedom’).

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28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36

Artistic freedom is not unlimited and must be balanced against human dignity, which does not end with death: The ‘Mephisto’Case(Kommers 8.12). See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 9 (‘Marriage and Family Rights’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part VI, Section A. See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 9 (‘Establishment’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part IX, Section A. See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 6 (‘Occupational Liberties’—‘Freedom of Economic Association and the Rights of Labor’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part VII, Section B. See The Elfes Case  (1957) (Kommers 7.4). See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 6 (‘Occupational Liberties’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part IX, Section B. See Kommers, Part III, Chapter 6 (‘The Right to Property ’); Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part VIIL In October 2000, Article 16 GG was amended to enable German citizens to be extradited to an international (criminal) court and to other member states of the EU, subject to there being statutory grounds therefore and provided fundamental principles (rule of law) are safeguarded. See Chapter XXIC. See Chapter XXI, Note 19. In addition to the basic rights listed in Articles 1–17 GG, the Basic Law also contains the following rights:  —  the (ultimate) right of all Germans to resist anyone attempting to overturn the constitutional order (Article 20(iv) GG: the ‘Widerstandsrecht’);  —  the right of persons involved in legal proceedings to a proper judge as laid down by statute (Article 101(i), 2nd sentence GG: the ‘Anspruch aufeinen gesetzlichen Richter’ ) ;  —  the right of persons involved in legal or administrative proceedings to a proper hearing in accordance with law (Article 103(i) GG: the ‘Anspruch aufrecntliches Gehör’ ) ;  —  the right of the perpetrator of a crime only to be punished, if punishability is fixed by statute before the act is committed (Article 103(ii) GG: ‘nulla poena sine lege’ ) ;  —  the right of the perpetrator of a crime not to be prosecuted or punished more than once for the same crime (Article 103(iii) GG: ‘ne bis in idem’ ) ;  —  the right of a person not to be deprived of his or her freedom except on the basis of and in the manner prescribed by a formal statute (Article 104(i) GG: the ‘formelle Freiheitsgarantie’ (formal guarantee of  freedom), which supplements Article 2(ii), 2nd sentence GG). Regarding these specific rights (apart from the ‘Widerstandsrecht’), sometimes referred to as ‘justizielle Grundrechte’  (judicial basic rights), see Chapter XXII A; Chapter XIII B I; Chapter XIV B 3 (§ 28 VwVfG); Chapter XVIA (Notes 3,4 and 5); Chapter XIII C D (Note 15); and Chapter XVII D. See also: Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part IV. For further information regarding the basic rights generally see, for example: Battis/Gusy, Part B (§§ 8–14); Baumann (ER), Part IV, § 13 II 3; Hesse, Part III, Section I (§§ 9–12); Katz, Part V (§§ 24–30); Kommers, Part III (Chapters 6–9); Maunz/Zippelius, Section 4 (§§ 17–29) and Section 6 (§ 40 II); Schunck/De Clerck, Part II, Section A (Chapter 2)); Model/Creif elds/Lichtenberger, Part I, Section DI (46–53); Creifelds under ‘Grundrechte’;  Gallwas; Jarass/Pieroth; Kriele.

CHAPTER IX 1

2 3 4

‘Publicum ius est, quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, prmatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem’  (attributed to Ulpian). See Chapter I, Note 3; Baumann (ER), Part I, § 2 II 1; Katz, Part I, § 2; Köhler, Part 1, § 2; Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 131-III and Chapter IV, § 26, where codified law and case law are compared. See Chapter XIX A. See Schwab (Einführung), Part I, Chapter 2 A. The various branches and statutes of public and private law are listed in the Appendix to Creifelds. See also: Baumann (ER), Part I, § 2 II; Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 13 V and VI; Schwab (Einführung), Part I, Chapter 4.

244

Notes 5 6

A critique of the various theories is contained in Maurer, § 3 III. See also: Bull, Section I, § 2 6; Creifelds under Verwaltungsprivatrecht’;  Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 13 IV; Wesel (FR), Chapter 5 (‘Von der Vertikalen zur  Horizontalen’); Chapter II C (Note 16) and Chapter XXII C 2. The characteristic feature of compulsory norms is that they lay down restrictions on freedom of contract for policy reasons. They are common in public law and in fields where, in the interest of legal certainty, the choice of legal form or type has to be limited (eg, in the law of property and the law of succession), or where  business fairness requires that avoidance and exploitation should be prevented (eg, in consumer credit law and employment law). Other examples are § 138 BGB, the AGBG and the FernAbsG. See Creifelds under ‘Vertrag’ II; Löwisch, § 1; Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 33, Chapter 4 2; Schwab (Einführung),  Part I, Chapter 2 D; Chapter X B 1 6; Youngs (CL), Chapter 2, Part II ((‘Classification of  Law’). In the field of private international law, contractual obligations remain subject to compulsory norms of  German law, whatever the law actually applicable to the contract: Article 34 EGBGB. The applicability of  ‘mandatory rules’ is also expressly preserved by the Rome Convention 1980: see Chapter XX, Note 14.

CHAPTER X 1

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

General summaries for initial reading can be found in Baumann, Part II (§§ 3–8); Köhler, Part 1, § 3; Model /Creifelds /Lichtenberger, Part 3 F (302–362); Schwab (Einführung), Part I, Chapter 2 A-B; Westermann (Grundbegriffe). See also Creifelds under ‘Bürgerliches Recht’. Regarding the term ‘Rechtsquelle’ see Katz, Part I, § 1 II; Köhler, Part 1, § 1 E; Chapter XIV A. For the historical background see Chapter I; Köbler, § 7 B III; Laufs, Chapter IX, 2; Wesel (JW), Chapter VII. To be recommended is also the article by Ernest Schuster in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation (Vol 1, 1896–7, p 191)—the forerunner of ICLQ—where the (draft) German Civil Code is described in English. See Baumann (ER), Part II, § 3; Kallwass, Section 1 (§§ 2–4); see also the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part I (§ 2, Section I; ‘Die im BGB geregelten Sachgebiete’ ). See generally: Brox (AT); Creifelds; Kaiser, Part I; Kallwass, Section 1, § 8; Klunzinger (Einführung), Part II (§§ 4–20); Köhler; Löwisch; Mensler; Meyer, Part 1, § 2 A II; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 F (303– 310); Reich/Schmitz, Chapter 2 A-F; Rüthers; Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3 (Parts 33–43); Westermann (Grundbegriffe), Chapters 1–7. See Baumann (ER), Part II, § 51; Rüthers, Chapter 4, §§ 13–15; and the comments on the legal capacity of  persons and the right to (use of) a name (§ 12 BGB) in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 4 (following The Injured Foetus Case). ‘Rechtsfähigkeit’ is to be distinguished from ‘Handlungsfähigkeit’ (capacity to act), ie:  – ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’ (capacity to undertake a ‘Rechtsgeschäft; see below);  – ‘Deliktsfähigkeit’ (capacity to commit a delict (tort); §§ 827, 828 BGB) (in criminal law: ‘Schuldfähigkeit’; §§ 19, 20 StGB); and  – ‘Verschuldensfähigkeit’ (capacity for fault; § 276(i), 3rd sentence BGB). See Creifelds, eg, under ‘Handlungsfdhigkeit’; Note 126 D in this Chapter; Chapter XVI, Note 39; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part III, Section A. See the diagrams in Baumann (ER), Part II (§ 5, Section V) and Klunzinger (Einführung), Part II, Chapter 1 (§4, Section I). See also: Köhler, Part 3, §§ 8–9; Meyer, Part I, § 3 A; Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 141; Schwab (Einführung), Part II, Chapters 1–3. A natural person can acquire rights before birth: see The Injured Foetus Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 4). A ‘Kaufmann’ has a ‘Handels-’ or ‘Haupt-’ fniederlassung’, while a ‘Handelsgesellschaft’ (eg, an OHG, KG or a GmbH) has a ‘Sitz’: see §§ 29 and 106(i) HGB; Chapter XIA 5, below. A ‘Zweigniederlassung’  is a branch (office). See §§ 13,13a-c HGB; Gierke/Sandrock, Section 1, Chapter 3 (§14). The ‘Sitz’ of an OHG (or KG) must be at its principal place of management (‘Ort der Geschäftsführung’). This contrasts with § 24 BGB, under which the ‘Sitz’ of a ‘Verein’ can be freely selected. The terms ‘Wohnsitz’ and ‘Sitz’ are also of fundamental importance in the Brussels Convention (EuGVÜ) 1968 ie, for the purpose of the (international) jurisdiction of the German courts in civil and commercial matters (and thus for the recognition or enforcement of a foreign (European) judgment).

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9

10 11

12 13 14 15 16

17 18

See Chapter XIII, Notes 28 C and 171; Creifelds under ‘Wohnsitz’; Dannemann, Part VI 1(a); the article by  Johannes Schmidt in ZAP 14/95, Fach 13, p 343; Collier, Part II, Chapter 10 (e) (ii), where the position in the UK (ie, under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982) is explained. Regarding the ‘Sitz’ of a ‘Handelsgesellschaft’, see the previous Note and Chapter XI A. In English private international law, a person has a domicile (of origin) from birth. The term domicile is usually synonymous with ‘permanent home’. A new domicile—a so-called ‘domicile of choice’—can be acquired by actual (physical) presence in a place with the intention to stay there permanently (or at least indefinitely). If the domicile of choice is lost, the domicile of origin revives. However, it is not possible to have more than one domicile at the same time. See Collier, Part I, Chapter 5. In German law, by contrast, a person can have several ‘Wohnsitze’  or be without a ‘Wohnsitz’ (‘wohnsitzlos’) . In the latter situation, his (habitual) residence is normally decisive for legal purposes (see, for example, § 132 BGB and § 16 ZPO). See Baumann (ER), Part E, § 6, Köhler, Part 4, §§ 10–11 and Rüthers, Chapter 3, §§ 10–12. See also the diagram in Kaiser, Section I, Chapter 8. In English law, the fundamental classification of property generally (‘Gegenstände ’ /‘Rechtsobjekte’) is between real property (land/real estate) and personal property. The term ‘chattel’ covers all (personal) property other than a freehold interest in land. The further common law classification of personal property as either ‘choses in possession’  or ‘choses in action’ corresponds with the basic German law distinction between ‘Sachen’  and ‘Rechte’ (ie, corporeal and incorporeal property). In German law, the distinction between movables and immovables is made within the term ‘Sachen’. See Note 233 in this Chapter. The ‘Rechtsobjekte’ belonging to a ‘Rechtssubjekt’ constitute its ‘Vermögen’ (assets). Subject to certain exceptions (§§ 850ff ZPO), the ‘Vermögen’  is available for creditors. See Rüthers, Chapter 3, § 12, where the similarly vague (commercial) term ‘Unternehmen’  (enterprise, business) is also explained. Regarding the term ‘subjektives Recht’, see Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 14 II-IV, §§ 15–16; Rüthers, Chapter 2, §4. See Köhler, Part 2, § 7 and Rüthers, Chapter 2, § 8. Regarding the former two, see Rüthers, Chapter 2, § 6 and Note 255 in this Chapter; regarding the latter, see Rüthers, Chapter 2, § 7 and Note 47 C in this Chapter. See Baumann (ER), Part II, § 8 II; Köhler, Part 2, § 5 II; Rüthers, Chapter 2, § 5; Schwab (Einführung), Part III, Chapters 1–6. See also the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part II, Chapter 1 (§ 5, Section II; ‘Subjektive Rechte’). Rehbinder (Chapter II, § 15) explains the distinction between an ‘Anspruch’ (cause of action) and a subjective legal right. Whilst today the former (ie, the remedy) is treated as flowing from the right— ‘ubi ius, ibi remedium’—historically an ‘Anspruch’ was the precursor of a subjective legal right. As a present-day example of the ‘Schluß vom Anspruch aufdas Recnt’,  Rehbinder refers to § 823(i) BGB. The position in Scotland is similar. Despite English influence, civil law in Scotland rests more on generalised rights than in England and the remedy depends on die right rather than, as in English tradition, the right on the remedy See The legal system of Scotland’, in ‘Britain’s Legal Systems’  ((1993) (HMSO)); ‘Preface to the Second Edition’, Note 10 B; Note 18 in this Chapter. See Chapter VIII, Note 20. Very many civil claims are based on ‘Anspruchsgrundlagen’   contained in the norms (referred to as ‘Anspruchsnormen’ ) of the BGB. However, the great majority of the norms of the BGB (indeed, all those in the ‘Allgemeiner Teil’)  themselves do not form the basis for claims. They are merely accessory norms (‘Hilfsnormen’), which supplement or modify the ‘Anspruchsnormen’.  See Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 11. An ‘Anspruchsnorm’  can often be recognised by its formulation: usually, ‘kann verlangen…’  (can demand…) or—as the counterpart of a right is an obligation (‘Verpflichtung’)—‘ist verpflichtet..’  (is obliged) or ‘haftet  für…’ (is liable for…). An ‘Anspruch’  can be distinguished according to whether it is:  —  contractual (‘schuldrechtlich’);  —  real (‘sachenrechtlich’  or ‘dinglich’);  —   based on family law (‘familienrechtlich’); or  —   based on the law of succession (‘erbrechtlich’). Apart from originating from an ‘Anspruchsnorm’,  an ‘Anspruch’  can also arise out of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (legal transaction) directly or be based on a supplementary principle developed outside the BGB (eg, the principle

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Notes of ‘culpa in contrahendo’ ((cic)  blame during (in the course of) (preliminary) negotiations (quasi-contract)) or ‘positive Vertragsverletzung’  ((PVV) positive breach of contract)). A lawyer, who has to check (‘prüfen’) whether a person has an ‘Anspruch’  (claim) against another person, must always ask himself: ‘Wer will was, von wem, und woraus?’  (Who wants something, from whom, and based on what?). See Brox (AT), Part III, § 30 II and III; Creifelds under ‘Anspruch’  (and ‘actio’); Fikentscher, Introduction, § 1 I; Köhler, Part II, § 6 I; Klunzinger (Einführung), Part I (§ 3, Section IV); Reich/Schmitz, Chapter 2 A; and the appendix to Schwab (Einführung), where tables of important ‘Anspruchsgrundlagen’  in the BGB are set out. See also: Notes 47 C, 126 C and 135 in this Chapter post; Wesel (FR), Chapter 3 (‘Allgemeine Begriffe’):  Wesel explains that before Windscheid coined the term ‘Anspruch’  in 1851, the prevalent thinking was in terms of  particular procedural actions. He compares this with the present day situation: today, an ‘Anspruch’ is something which exists ‘außerhalb’ der Gerichte’  (outside the courts) ‘von Mensch zu Mensch’  (from person to person). In English law, too, the ‘forms of action’ (ie, choice of the correct type of writ) remained important until the 19th century. See Note 16 in this Chapter. 19   ‘Gestaltungsrechte’   can arise from statute or contract and are often subject to exclusion periods (‘Ausschlußfristen’)  ie, they can only be exercised within certain statutory or contractually agreed time limits. For the avoidance of uncertainty, they must be exercised unconditionally (‘bedingungslos’) . See Löwisch, § 18; Rüthers, Chapter 2, § 9 III. 20   ‘Einwendungen’ are legal objections, which must be taken into account by a court of its own motion (‘von  Amts wegen’). ‘Einwendungen’ are distinguished according to whether they are ‘rechtshindernd’— ie, negate the very existence of an ‘Anspruch’  (eg, nullity of a contract)—or ‘rechtsvernichtend’ —ie, destroy an ‘Anspruch’,   which is acknowledged to exist (eg, performance of a contract; set-off). ‘Einreden’,  on the other hand, do not attack the ‘Anspruch’  as such, but allege facts preventing it from being realised (‘rechtshemmend’)—ie, an ‘Einrede’  provides the debtor with a right to decline performance (‘Leistungsvenoeigerungsrecht’)  either temporarily (eg, due to a respite (‘Stundung’)) or permanently (eg,  because of limitation (‘Verjährung’)). To make matters more complicated, the ZPO refers to both ‘Einwendungen’ and ‘Einreden’ as merely ‘Einreden’. An ‘Einrede’  is an allegation of fact, rather than an objection made on procedural grounds, ie, the assertion of an obstacle to the proceedings (‘Prozeßhindernis’). See Creifelds under ‘Einrede’, Klunzinger (Einführung), Part I, § 3 (Section IV), where the types (and examples) of ‘Einwendungen’  and ‘Einreden’  are set out; Köhler, Part 2, § 6; Medicus (BR), Section VI, § 29. See also: Note 93 in this Chapter; Chapter XIII, Note 107. 21 See Chapter VIII, Note 6, above and Maurer, Part 2, § 81. Maurer describes the ‘Fürsorgeunterstützung’  case as a ‘fundamental decision’ and refers to the problem of basic rights as ‘Leistungsrechte’ . 22 Strictly speaking, ‘Rechte und Pflichten’ (rights and duties) are the ‘Rechtsfolgen’ (legal consequences) arising from a ‘Rechtssatz’ (legal provision, ie, one laid down in a ‘Gesetz’ (statute)). A ‘Rechtsverhältnis’  is, more correctly, (merely) a ‘ Lebensbeziehung’  (an actual relationship in everyday life). The typical structure of a ‘Rechtssatz’ is that particular ‘Rechtsfolgen’ are attached (‘geknüpft’) to and conditional on the fulfillment of a specific ‘Tatbestand’ (substantive part/ content (of a norm)). One speaks of the (preconditions (‘Voraussetzungen’)  for the applicability of a legal provision and of the elements (‘Merkmale’) of a particular ‘Tatbestand’. For a proper understanding of German law, the (abstract) concepts of ‘Tatbestand” and ‘Rechtsfolge’ are fundamentally important. For further details, see the discussion in Engisch, Chapter II Engisch points out that a ‘Rechtssatz’ lays down what ought to occur—it is a ‘ Sollenssatz’ and is usually expressed as an imperative (ie, leads to ‘Pflichten’). A different type of ‘Rechtssatz’ is one which consists of the grant (‘Gewahrung’) of a ‘subjektives Recht’ . See also: Creifelds under ‘Rechtsverhältnis’;  Meyer, Part I, § 3 C; Schwab (Einfühnmg),  Part III, Chapter 5 E; Chapter X C 2 2 (Note 105) and Chapter XVIC (Note 16). 23   ‘Vertragsfreiheit’ is guaranteed by Article 2(i) of the Basic Law (as part of the basic right of general freedom of action (‘allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit’)). It is also presupposed by § 305 BGB. However, ‘Vertragsfreiheit’ is not unlimited (‘schrankenlos’); it is subject to the same limits as set out in Article 2(i) GG. Thus, for example, a marriage contract (‘Ehevertrag’) which is unfairly burdensome to one party only (‘einseitig belastend’),   which exploits that party’s inferiority (‘Unterlegenheit’)   and which infringes constitutional norms can be subjected to judicial control (‘richterliche Inhaltskontrolle’): ZAP-Aktuell 5/01, p 246; ZAP EN-Nr 170/01.

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24

25 26 27

28 29 30 31

Indeed, in recent times the reality is that the area remaining for private autonomy has been continually restricted by statutory encroachments (eg, in the field of employment law). Moreover, agreements. See Flume, Chapter I, § 1; Rüthers, Chapter 1, § 3; Kallwass, Section 2, Chapter 1 (§§ 9–12); Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 8; Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 33, Chapters 1 and 2. See also: Chapter VIII, Note 20; Chapter IX B; Chapter X, Note 80 and D 2 (ii). For a critique of the ‘problem’ of ‘Vertragsfreiheit’,  see Wesel (FR), Chapter 3 (‘Vertrag’). Other terms to be distinguished are: Apart from originating from an ‘Anspruchsnorm’,  an ‘Anspruch’  can also arise out of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’  — ‘Abschlußfreiheit’, ie , the right to conclude a ‘V ertrag’ with whomever one pleases; and, as its opposite;  —  the principle of ‘Kontrahierungszwng’ (compulsory contracting), whereby, very exceptionally, a monopoly or other dominant organisation can be compelled to enter into a contract with an applicant. See Köhler, Part 5, § 12 I and II, § 15 V and § 20; Medicus (AT), Part 2, §§ 10 and 11; Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 33, Chapter 3. See generally: Baumann (ER), Part II, § 7 II-III; Brox (AT), Part II, §§ 4–27; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 1; Köhler, Part 5, §§ 12–22; Reich/Schmitz, Chapter 2 B; Rüthers, Chapter 7; Schwab (Einführung, Part V. See also the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part II, Chapter 2 (§ 7, Section IV; ‘Menschliches Handeln’)  and the Sourcebook,  Chapter 4 (‘Legal Transactions’). For a discussion of the history and ‘Problematik’  of the terms ‘Rechtsgeschäft’  and ‘Willenserklärung’  see Flume, Chapter I, § 2 4 and 5. Schuster (see Note 2 in this Chapter) defines ‘Rechtsgeschäfte’ as ‘manifestations of human volition which intend to create, alter, transfer or release rights and, following the term used by Sir Frederick Pollock, translates ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ as ‘act in the law’. Wesel describes the most important ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (the ‘Vertrag’ (contract)) as ‘die Verwandlung des Willens in Recht’ (the transformation of will into law). See Wesel (FR), Chapter 3 (‘Vertrag’). See also: Notes 62,101,106 and 132 in this Chapter; Chapter XX, Note 19. See Baumann (ER), Part II, § 7 I; Flume, Chapter I, § 9. The concepts of ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ and ‘Rechtshandlung’ can also be translated as ‘juristic act’ and ‘legal act’ (as in Zweigert and Kötz, Part II A I (Chapter 311). See Baumann, Part II § 6 III 2 (a). Examples of ‘gesetzliche Vertreter’  are: parents of minors, guardians and members of an OHG. The organs of  a ‘juristische Person’ (juristic person) are not, strictly speaking, ‘gesetzliche Vertreter’: they act for the ‘juristische Person’ itself and are not its representatives. However, the ‘Vorstand’ (board of directors) of a ‘Verein’ is treated as a ‘gesetzlicher Vertreter’  (§ 26(ii) BGB) and the ‘Geschäftsführer’  (director(s)) of a GmbH hold(s) a corresponding position (§ 35 GmbHG). See Creifelds under ‘Stellvertretung (Vertretungsmacht)’;  see also Chapters XI A, XI B and XI C 3 (b) (ii) and (iii); Note 30 in this Chapter and Chapter XIII, Notes 49 and 56. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) (§§ 78–90 ZPO). The German law of representation and the position where there is an undisclosed principal is discussed by Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 39IV-VI). See Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 6; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part X 3; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 32 (entitled ‘Contractual Capacity’)). See Flume, Chapter XI, § 54; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 39 III); Chapter XIII, Notes 48 and 55,  below. Like a contract concluded by a minor without prior consent, a contract concluded by an unauthorised agent (‘Vertreter ohne Vertretungsmacht’/‘Falsus procurator’)  is ‘schwebend unwirksam’  (in abeyance), ie, its validity is dependant on the subsequent consent (‘Genehmigung’)  of the ‘principal’: § 177(i) BGB. Identically to § 108(ii) BGB, § 177(ii) BGB entitles the other party to demand a statement from the ‘principal’ regarding the latter’s ‘Genehmigung’ . If it is not declared within two weeks, consent is deemed to be refused and the contract is void. Under the HGB, this rule is modified, in order to protect the other party in a commercial transaction. If a contract is concluded by a trading assistant (‘Handlungsgehilfe’) or mercantile agent (‘Handelsvertreter’) without authority to do so, the principal’s refusal of consent must be declared forthwith (‘unverzüglich’) after being informed of the transaction. Otherwise, the principal’s silence (‘Schweigen’) is regarded as consent. See §§ 75h and 91a HGB; Notes 40 and 71 in this Chapter; Chapter XI, Note 37; Chapter XIII, Notes 77 and 61. Regarding the liability of an unauthorised agent to the other party, if consent is refused, see § 179 BGB. Regarding unauthorised agency where a unilateral transaction (‘einseitiges Rechtsgeschäft’) is involved, see §180 BGB.

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Notes 32 33 34 35

36 37 38

39

40 41 42 43

44

45 46

See Note 245 in this Chapter. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 24) and Note 246 in this Chapter. See Chapter XIII, Notes 31 and 32. Whilst §§ 116–124 BGB refer to the nullity and challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung’, § § 125,134,138 and 139–144 BGB refer to the nullity of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. See also Notes 45,50 and 51 in this Chapter. A ‘Rechtseeschäft’, which is ‘nichtig’ ((null and) void), is referred to as being ‘absolut unzwirksam’ (absolutely ineffective). To be distinguished therefrom is a ‘R echtsgeschäft’, which is ‘schwebend unwirksam’  (in suspense (pending the consent (‘Genehmigung’) of another person or authority), or a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, which is ‘relativ unwirksam’ (relatively ineffective). See Creifelds under ‘Umvirksamkeit eines Rechtsgeschäfts’;  Flume, Chapter VII, § 30; Köhler, Part 5, § 22. For a table of the norms in the AT underlying ‘Unwirksamkeit’ and ‘Anfechtbarkeit’ setting out their different effects see Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 3 VI. References in Title 2 are sometimes to a ‘Willenserklärung’ and sometimes to a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (see the  breakdown of §§ 116–144 at the beginning of Chapter X B 2 (b). See Rüthers, Chapter 6, § 18; Creifelds under ‘Willenserklärung I’; Kallwass, Section 2, Chapters 2 and 3 (§§13–22). In English law, this is referred to as the ‘intention to create legal relations’. See the comments under ‘Declaration of Will’ (The concept) in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 4; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part IV 3. An additional element is sometimes said to be the so-called ‘Erklärungsbewußtsein’ (consciousness of the declaration), but the dominant school of thought does not regard this as essential. However, Köhler (Part 5, § 14 II and § 15 III 2) is of the view that a declaration made without ‘Erklärungsbewußtsein’ is either not binding or challengable by analogy with § 119 (i), 2nd alternative BGB. Such a ‘Willenserklärung’  is a so-called ‘stillschweigende Willenserklärung’  (ie, a ‘Willenserklärung durch schlüssiges, konkludentes Handeln’)  and is to be distinguished from pure (conscious) silence. See Creifelds under ‘Willenserklärung’  12; Flume, § 5 2–4; Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 2 C II Thus, a ‘Willenserklärung’  exists, if a person making a declaration, acting with appropriate care and in accordance with business custom, could have perceived it as such and it was so understood by the recipient: see The Unintended Declaration of Will Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 4). See Notes 31 and 71 in this Chapter; the exceptions listed under ‘Declaration of Will’ (the concept) in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 4. See Creifelds under ‘Willensmängel’ and below under ‘Nullity and challengability of a ‘ Willenserklärung’. See Meyer, Part II, § 412; Rüthers, Chapter 6, § 20; Kallwass, Section 2, Chapter 4 (§§ 23–24). A preliminary requirement is that the person making the ‘Willenserklärung’  could and did reckon with it reaching the correct recipient: see The Misdirected Withdrawal Declaration Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 4). Actual knowledge on the part of the recipient is not required. It suffices, if the ‘Willenserklärung’  is in the area of control of the recipient (‘Machtbereich des Empfàngers’)  and the recipient can fairly be expected to  become aware of it. See Brox (AT), Part II, § 61; Köhler, Part V, § 16; Rüthers, Chapter 6, § 19; Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 35; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 37 III); the comments under § 133 BGB and § 157 BGB in the Sourcebook, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. We are here concerned with the interpretation of a ‘Willenserklärung’ (‘Rechtsgeschäft’).  To be distinguished is the question (methods) of statutory interpretation (‘Gesetzesauslegung’ (‘Methodenlehre’)),  which is an entirely different complex. See Notes 47 E and 105 in this Chapter; Creifelds under ‘Auslegung’; Köhler, Part 1, § 4 III; Schwab (Einführung), Part I, Chapter 5; Youngs (CL), Chapter 2, Part I, Section B (III) and Chapter 6, Part XIII, Section B. See Köhler, Part V, § 14 IV 1: challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung’  under §§ 119, 120 BGB is not available, if  there is no (unconscious) divergence between ‘Wille’ and ‘Erklärung’ and (prior) interpretation leads to an acceptable result. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is no room for interpretation, if the joint will of the parties (‘der übereinstimmende Wille der Parteien’)  can be established or if the wording or the text is dear (‘eindeutig’). An important aspect here is the principle of the protection of trust (‘Vertrauensschutz’). See Schneider, ZAP 3/00, Fach 13, p 943ff (§ 24 V). Moreover, what the parties have stated can stand, even if (objectively) wrongly expressed, if the parties understand what is meant: ‘falsa demonstratio non nocet’  (cf § 155 BGB post).

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 47

A

B

C

D

The principle of ‘Treu und Glauben’  forms the basis for implying terms into contracts by means of  ‘ergänzende Auslegung’ (supplementary interpretation). The question is: what is the hypothetical will of the parties (‘hypothetische Parteiwille’), ie, what would they have agreed in the circumstances? In matters of interpretation, straddled by §§ 133 and 157 BGB, German law proceeds from the concept of  the ‘Willenserklärung’ . The content of an obligation is a particular ‘Leistung’. The approach of English law is different: contracts are analysed as comprising ‘terms’, which are then distinguished as being either express or implied. Precontractual statements are referred to as ‘representations’; in German law, in the absence of other special statutory provisions, these fall within the principle of ‘culpa in contrahendo’ or are dealt with under §§ 119–123 BGB. See Notes 75 and 135 in this Chapter; Chapter X C 3 (a); Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XIII, Section D. The phrase ‘Treu und Glauben’ is also used in § 242 BGB: Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern. The debtor is obliged to effect performance in such a manner as trust and good faith require, taking custom /common practice into account. § 242 is one of the best known paragraphs of the BGB. See the comments under § 242 BGB in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 5. Although, strictly, § 242 is a norm of the law of obligations and, in terms, only refers to the ‘Schuldner’ (debtor/obligor), it is acknowledged to express a general leeal principle (‘allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz’) of ‘bona fides’ (good faith) of application throughout the German legal system: persons must conduct themselves fairly when exercising their rights and performing their duties. § 242 is a general clause (‘Generalklausel’), which can supplement, limit or amend the content of a claim (‘Anspruch’). It does not itself constitute the basis for a claim (‘Anspruchsgrundlage’) . § 242 has three functions, as follows: 1 to supplement the duties (‘Pflichten’) of parties to a ‘Schuldverhältnis’ (the ‘Ergânzungsfunktion’ (supplementary function)); 2 to control and limit (‘beschrânken’) the exercise of rights (the ‘Kontrollfunktion’ (control function)); and 3 exceptionally, to enable a correction and adaptation (‘Anpassung’) of legal relationships and even the development of the law by the judiciary (‘richterliche Rechtsfortbildung’) (the ‘Korrekturfunktion (corrective function)). Thus, under 1, parties to a contractual relationship have certain accessory or supplementary duties (‘Nebenpflichten’), for example: — a duty of consideration (Rücksichtspflicht’) towards the other party; — a duty of protection (‘Schutzpflicht’) towards each other; — a duty to give the other party necessary clarification (‘Aufklärungspflicht’)   and information (‘Auskunftspflicht’); — a duty of cooperation (‘Mitwirkungspflicht’); and — a general duty of faithful performance (‘Leistungstreuepflicht’). A breach of a ‘Nebenpfticht’ is one of the main grounds for a claim for positive breach of contract (‘positive Vertragsverletzung’  (PVV)) and ‘culpa in contrahendo’ (etc). See, respectively, in this Chapter, Note 126 C and Note 135. See also The Allergy to Hair Tonic Case  in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 5. Under 2, it constitutes a prohibited exercise of a right (‘unzulässige Rechtsausübung’;  also referred to as an abuse of a right (‘Rechtsmißbrauch’)). — if the exercise of the right is disproportionate (‘unverhältnismäßig’),  excessive (‘übermäßig’)  or grossly unjust (‘grab unbillig’); — if the person seeking to exercise the right would thereby benefit from his own prior dishonest conduct (‘unredlichesfrüheres Verhalten’); or — if the person seeking to exercise the right would thereby place himself in conflict with his prior conduct (‘venire contra factum proprium’) . The equivalent rule in English law is estoppel’. A sub-category here is the legal institute of ‘Verwirkung’ (the forfeiture of a right (of the claimant)). Under 3, § 242 has been used to permit a flexible reaction in abnormal situations (the German hyperinflation in 1923), in cases or the ‘Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage’  (falling-away (collapse) of the  basis of the transaction (frustration)) and in times of legal emergency (‘Rechtsnotstand’). The doctrine of the ‘Geschäftsgrundlage’ (‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’) is a development of the judiciary and can come into play as a supplement to § 119 BGB, if:

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Notes

48

49

50 51

52 53 54

– at the time the transaction was concluded, the parties proceeded on the basis of certain (in the event, wrong) conceptions (‘Vorstellungen’)  or important considerations; – the conceptions or considerations turn out to have been absent/missing or have meantime changed, collapsed or disappeared (ie, there is a ‘Fehlen’, ‘Änderung’  or ‘Wegfall’ of the ‘Geschäftsgrundtage’); and – it would be unacceptable (‘unzumutbar’) to enforce the transaction as it stands. The primary relief available is adaptation (‘Anpassung’) of the transaction to the actual (unforseen) situation by way of supplementary interpretation (‘ergànzende Auslegung’  (§ 157 BGB)) or, if that fails, its termination (by means of ‘Rücktritt’ or ‘Kündigung’ ). However, the doctrine is not lightly invoked and is subject to: – the overriding principle of die sanctity of contract ie, that agreements must be kept (‘pacta sunt servanda’); – the rule that mistaken motives (‘Motivirr tümer’) are normally irrelevant (exception: § 119(ii) BGB); and – any statutory or contractual provisions or customs concerning the distribution of risk (‘Verteilung des Risikos’) between the parties. See Klunzinger (Einführung), Part III, § 24 I; Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 6; Fikentscher, Section 3, § 27; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 2 (§ 13) and Part 3 (§ 20); Medicus (AT), Part 3, § 16. See also: Creifelds under ‘Geschäftsgrundlage’; Medicus (BR), Chapter 1, § 7; Schwab (Einführung), Part III, Chapter 6 B and Part V, Chapter 6 H; Note 126 C in this Chapter. E Regarding the wide field of ‘ergänzende Auslegung’  ie, the filling of gaps (‘Lücken’) in a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, see Brox (AT), Part E, § 6 E; Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 7 V; Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 35, Chapter 4. To be strictly distinguished is so-called ‘Rechtsfortbildung’  (development of (the) law (by the judiciary)), ie, the filling of gaps in a statute (‘Lücken im Gesetz’),  eg, by analogy (‘Analogie’) or opposite conclusion (‘Umkehrschluß’/‘argumentum e contrario’). See Note 44 in this Chapter; Chapter E, Note 22; Köhler, Part 1, § 4IV. The effect of ‘Anfechtung’ is retrospective (‘rückwirkend’/‘ex tunc’). The wording of § 142 BGB (which refers to an ‘anfechtbares Rechtsgeschäft’)   is incorrect, as only a ‘Willertserklärung’ is challengable (see §§ 119,120 and 123 BGB). Because of the abstraction principle, ‘Anfechtung’   usually only affects the validity of the obligational transaction (the ‘Verpflichtungsgeschäft’ ) ; the property level remains abstract. Restitution is effected via the law of unjust enrichment (§§ 812ff BGB). See, in this Chapter, Notes 33,35,102,138 and 245. Regarding the difference between the terms ‘Anfechtbarkeit’ and ‘Nichtigkeit’ in administrative law, see Chapter XIV C 3. §§ 116–124 BGB detail various situations in which a ‘Willenserklärung’  is defective (‘fehlerhaft’) due to defects of will (‘Willensmängel’) . Such defects can arise consciously (§§ 116–118) or unconsciously (§§119,120). See Creifelds under ‘Willensmängel’;  Flume, Chapter VI (§§ 19–29); Klunzinger (Einführung), Part II, § 14; Köhler, Part V, § 14 I; Medicus (BR), Chapter 1, § 6; Meyer, Part E, § 5 A III; Rüthers, Chapter 7, §24. A reservation (‘Vorbehalt’, protestatio) must be declared to be effective. No account is taken of it if it does not accord with the external circumstances:  protestatio facto contraria (non valet) . See Creifelds under ‘Willenserklärung’  and The Bus Station Case  (Sourcebook,  Chapter 5). See Creifelds under ‘Anfechtung von Willenserklàrungen’ . See also: Dannemann, Section E, 9; Flume, Chapter VII, § 31; Kötz (EVR), Part A, §§ 10 and 11; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 38 (entitled ‘Mistake, Deceit, and Duress’)); Meyer, Part E, § 5 AIV; the comments under §§ 119–123 BGB in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 4; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XII, Sections C-F. See Notes 47 A, 58 C and 135 B in this Chapter. See Fikentscher, Section 2, § 22. The following new forms have been added by the Law to adapt the Provisions of Private Law concerning Form dated 13.7.2001 (the so-called E-Commerce Law), which implements EU Directive 2000/31 dated 8.6.2000:  –  electronic form (§§ 126(iii) and 126a BGB);  –  text form (§ 126b BGB). These categories of form represent alternatives to strict written form (‘Schriftform’) where statutory provisions so prescribe/allow. Electronic form requires that a special electronic signature be appended to an

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57 58

59 60

61 62

electronically-transmitted document. Text form merely describes a (paper or electronic) document in legible written characters. In future, therefore, originating characteristics other than a personal, human signature (‘Unterschrift’) will apparently suffice to prove the origin of a document and to fulfil the formal requirements for a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. Where cross-border electronic transactions are concerned, the so-called ‘country of origin principle’ (‘Herkunftslandprinzip’) applies and electronic transactions emanating from Germany apparently only need to fulfill formal (and substantive!) German law. See ZAP-Aktuell, 22/00, p 1327; ZAP-Aktuell, 5/01, p 244 and p 251; ZAP EN-Nr 457/2001; Chapter XX, Note 19. 55 See Creifelds under ‘Form(erfordernisse, -vorschriften)’ . The requirement of a particular form (‘Formzwang’) in a statute serves various purposes; see Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 5; Rüthers, Chapter 7, § 23 I–V. 56 This is the rule; exceptions are very limited. See Meyer, Part II, § 5 A I; Rüthers, Chapter 7, § 23 VII; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 34 (entitled ‘Formal Requirements’)); and the comments under § § 125–127 BGB in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 4. See Flume, Chapter V, § 17; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XII, Section B (I) 3. A A ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ is ‘sittenwidrig’ (immoral), if, on a comprehensive assessment (‘Gesamtwürdigung’) of  its content, motive or purpose (‘Inhalt, Motiv oder Zweck’),  it violates the feeling of propriety of all fair and right thinking persons (das Anstandsgefühl aller billig und gerecht Denkenden’) . This can cover a wide range of cases eg, abuse of a dominant commercial position (‘Ausnutzung einer wirtsdiaftlichen Machtstellung’), unduly fettering/restraining contracts (‘Knebelungsverträge’), exorbitant loans (‘Darlehen’) and the taking of excessive security (‘Übersicherung’) . Thus, if a spouse or close relative acts as surety or accepts joint liability and is subject to crassly excessive financial strain (‘krasse finanzielle Überforderung’),  there is an actual presumption (‘tatsächliche Vermutung’) that the lender has exploited that person’s emotional relationship to the debtor. The burden of rebutting the presumption is then on the lender. See ZAP EN-Nr 136/01; ZAP EN-Nr 497/01; Chapter XIII, Note 10. Cf Barclays Bank v O’Brien  [1994] 1 AC 340 (HL). B Where the exploitation/unfair advantage is particularly marked (ie, there is an ‘ auffälliges Mißverhältnis’ (conspicuous imbalance/incongruity)), such a transaction constitutes ‘ Wucher’ (extortion; § 138(ii) BGB), which can also be punished as a criminal offence (§ 302a StGB). See Creifelds under ‘Sittenitridrigkeit’ and ‘Wucher’; N ote 245 in this Chapter; the comments under § 138 BGB in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 4; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XII, Section B (2) and Section E. See also: Flume, Chapter V, § 18; Köhler, Part 5, § 20; Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 9; Meyer, Part II, § 5 A II; Rüthers, Chapter 7, § 251 and III; Zweigert and Kötz, Part IIAI (Chapter 35 (entitled ‘Illegality and Immorality’)). C The equivalent doctrines in English (contract) law are ‘(economic) duress’ and ‘undue influence’. However, in German legal terminology, ‘Nötigung’ only refers to the criminal offence of coercion/ duress (§ 240 StGB). Cf also the terms ‘Drohung’  (threat; § 123 BGB) and ‘Notstand’ (emergency; §§ 228, 904 BGB; §§ 34, 35 StGB). D Loss caused by intentional immoral injury (vorsätzliche sittenwidrige Schädigung’)  can be recovered in tort (§ 826 BGB). See Note 220 in this Chapter. The term ‘Willensübereinstimmung’  (correspondence of ‘Willenserklärungen’ ) is also used. Exceptionally, a contract can be concluded in certain cases of so-called ‘alternative conduct’ (‘sonstiges Verhalten’), eg, where an expired contract is merely continued (‘fortgesetzt’) or where the conclusion of the contract is effected by silence. See Chapter X B 2 (c): ‘Rules governing offer and acceptance’. For an example in English law, see Clarke v Dunraven  [1897] AC 59 (HL). See Rüthers, Chapter 8, § 27. Thus, in German leeal language, the term ‘Vertrag’ has a wider meaning than the term ‘contract’ in English law, even though it is equivalent in translation. It is a sub-category of the general term ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. The contractual version (ie, that within Book II BGB) is only one type of ‘Vertrag’. See Flume, § 331–3; Notes 24,101,106 and 132 in this Chapter.  Just as the English law of contract is dominated (‘beherrscht’)  by the doctrine of consideration, so is German civil law the product of highly developed, systematic, scientific and logical thought patterns. Even if one puts linguistic differences aside for the moment (and these are significant enough), it is extremely questionable whether a constituent element of a particular system of law (such as the doctrine of 

252

Notes

63 64 65 66

67

68

69 70

71

72 73 74

consideration), which has evolved organically, should, at a stroke, be excised or a continental legal concept such as ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ implanted into the English legal order. This would mean, at the very least, that other formal terminology would also have to be introduced. A ‘contract’ in England is, technically, simply not the same as a ‘Vertrag’ in Germany. To quote Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston: The common law has long stressed the commercial flavour of its contract. An Englishman is liable, not  because he has made a promise, but because he has made a bargain.’ (Chapter 3, Part 1). Further: The underlying assumption of English law is that a contract is a bargain. If a person furnishes no consideration, he takes no part in a bargain: if he takes no part in a bargain, he takes no part in a contract. (Chapter 4, Part 3). Thus, in England, the doctrine of consideration (ie, some value in the eyes of the law) as a test of enforceability is inextricably intertwined with the concept of a ‘bargain’. In German law, a ‘ Vertrag is a purer concept. In German legal language, the closest equivalent to the English concept of a ‘bargain’ is the ‘gegenseitiger Vertrag’, which is but one variety of a ‘Vertrag’. See Note 106 in this Chapter. For a comparative survey regarding the requirements for binding contracts in English law and on the continent (including a critique of the English doctrine of consideration) see Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 4 (‘Seriositätsindizien’). See also: Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part VI. See generally: Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part III, Sections A, B and D. This also applies to the content of a ‘Leistung’. See Creifelds under ‘ Leistung’;  §§ 315–319 BGB. An ‘Angebot’ is referred to in §§ 145–153 BGB as an ‘Antrag’. See Köhler, Part 5, § 15 II; Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 2 BI and § 3; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part VIII3. This rule corresponds to the requirement of certainty in English contract law. To be distinguished is a statement made in the course of contractual negotiations (‘Vertragsverhandlungen’) or (pure) information (eg, in brochures or advertisements), ie, a so-called invitation to treat (‘Aufforderung zur Abgabe eines Angebots’=‘invitatio ad offerendum’) . See Note 38 in this Chapter; the comments under § 145 BGB in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 5. Regarding liability for breach of duty in the precontractual phase (‘Vertragsanbahnung’)  see Note 135 in this Chapter. This is not the case in English law. See Dickinson v Dodds  (1876) 2 Ch D 463 (CA). See Dannemann, Section II, 2; Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 2 B IV; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II A I (Chapter 33 (entitled ‘Offer and Acceptance’) IV and V). A withdrawal (‘Widerruf’)  must reach the other party before or at the same time (as the offer): § 130(i) BGB. Like an offer, it is an ‘empfangsbedürftige Willenserklärung’ . ‘Zugang’ (communication/receipt) is, therefore, normally required. There is no ‘postal rule’, whereby an acceptance is (already) treated as effective when put in the post (cf English law). See Note 43 in this Chapter. See Kötz (EVR), PartA, § 2 C III and IV. Thus, relationships can be construed as contracts on the basis of pure factual conduct (‘tatsàchliches Verhalten’) or socio-typical behaviour (‘sozialtypisches Verhalten’),  even in the absence of an express declaration (of  acceptance): see The Hamburg Parking Case  and ‘The Bus Station Case ’ (Sourcebook,  Chapters). However, this doctrine (established in 1941 by Haupt) is open to the criticism that it runs contrary to the principle that persons who are not ‘geschäftsfähig’ require protection (‘Schutz des Nichtgeschäftsfähigen’). See Brox (AS), Chapter 3, § 4 III; Creifelds under ‘Faktischer Vertrag’ and ‘Schuldverhältnis’;  Flume, § 8; Rüthers, Chapter 8, § 27IV. For an English case, in which the creation of a contract by conduct was recognised, see Brogden v Metropolitan Railway (1876) 2 App Cas 666 (HL). This is the case in the circumstances laid down in § 362 HGB and where a ‘Kaufmann’  receives a commercial ‘ letter of confirmation (‘kaufmànnisches Bestätigungsschreiben’) . However, an  Auftragsbestätisung’  (confirmation of order) is merely the same as an acceptance. See Creifelds under ‘Bestätigungsschreiben’ and ‘Vertrag’ I; Meyer, Part II, § 4 B; Note 40 in this Chapter. See also Chapter XXII, Note 74. See Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part III, Section E. See Note 46 in this Chapter; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part VIII.   ‘Bedingung’ is a legal term, which here forms part of the ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ doctrine. In other legal fields, ‘Bedingung can have a different meaning (eg, in criminal law, cause).

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75

76

77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84

85 86 87

88

See Chapter XVI, Note 22; Flume, Chapter IX (§§ 38–42). Regarding the different types of ‘Bedingung’  and their legal consequences see Rüthers, Chapter 8, § 28 II and IV. See also Note 245 in this Chapter. In English law, such a condition is called, respectively, a ‘condition precedent’ or a ‘condition subsequent’. The word ‘condition’ is traditionally used in English contract law in the sense of a vital term of the contract (or, as is sometimes said, a term, which ‘goes to the root of the contract’), as opposed to a ‘warranty’, which is a less important term, breach of which only gives rise to a right to damages. The resultant problems of  classification sometimes occupy the English courts. In English law, however, the word ‘condition’ is also applied in its orthodox (continental) sense, for example when agreements are expressed to be made ‘subject to’ some future (external) event. See Note 47 A in this Chapter; Charlesworth, Part 1, Chapter 3; Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Chapter 6, Part 3 (The relative importance of contractual terms); Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XIII, Section A. See below (Chapter XB 2 (e)). Regarding ‘Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen’  see Dannemann, Part II, 5; Klunzinger (Einführung), Part II, § 10 III; Köhler, Part 5, § 23; Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 4; Schwab (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 5; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II A I (Chapter 31 III). See also: Creifelds under ‘Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen’;  the comments regarding the AGBG under § 242 BGB in the Sourcebook,   Chapter 5; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XIII, Section C. See Chapter XD 2 (iv). Aliter in the event of bonafide acquisition. See Note 76 in this Chapter, above. See also: Brox (AS), Chapter 3 (§ 4 II); Brox (AT), Part 2, Chapter 2 (§ 9); Fikentscher, Section 3, § 26 VI; Medicus (BR), § 4IV; Rüthers, § 3 II 3. See Chapter IX B. Terms can qualify as AGB regardless of the type of contract and even if they simply comprise a standardform confirmation (formularmässige Bestätigung’) . However, formula clauses (‘formelhafte Klauseln’) or (notarial) precedents do not normally fall under the AGBG, unless mass transactions (‘Massenverträge’) are involved. It suffices, if the user is earnestly prepared to negotiate (‘verhandlungsbereit’)  and the other party actually makes use of the possibility of influencing the content of the contract. Inconsistent oral arrangements entered into by a representative are binding, unless it is apparent (‘erkennbar’) to the other party that the representative lacks appropriate authority (‘Vertretungsmacht’),  in which case §§ 177ff BGB apply. The necessity for agreement is significantly reduced where a businessman (‘Kaufmann’) is concerned, who knows or ought to be aware of particular AGB (eg, due to a previous course of dealing (‘dauernde Geschäftsbeziehung’)) or who accepts them without objection. In particular, AGB are deemed to be incorporated even without specific agreement, if they are usual in the relevant line of business (‘branchenüblich’) or accord with commercial custom (‘Handelsbrauch’). Clauses in notarially documented agreements can be surprising, if the Notary fails to give a sufficient caution (‘Belehrung’) regarding their legal effect (§ 17(i) BeurkG). One can fall back on § 9 AGBG, if a clause is not caught by §§ 10–11. The following are specifically prohibited in § 11 AGBG: (a) Clauses which exclude or limit liability for loss due to an intentional or grossly negligent breach of  contract by the user, his statutory representative or assistant (including loss arising from conduct during contractual negotiations): § 11 No 7 AGBG. § 11 No 7 AGBG applies by analogy to clauses excluding liability for tort (ie, claims for damages under §§823,831 BGB). See also §276(ii) BGB. (b) Clauses which exclude or limit the right of the other party to rescind the contract or claim damages in the event of delay or impossibility of performance caused by the user: § 11 No 8 AGBG. (c) Clauses which exclude or limit guarantee rights (‘Gewährleistungsansprüche’)  of the other party in respect of things or services, which are newly manufactured or supplied: § 11 No 10 AGBG. (d) Clauses which exclude or limit the user’s liability for damages under §§ 463, 480(ii), 635 BGB in a contract of sale, for services or for work and materials, where the user has given an assurance regarding a particular quality (‘Eigenschaftszusicherung’): § 11 No 11 AGBG. See Schuster (Note 2 in this Chapter), Section I (4)–(7).

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Notes 89 90 91 92

93 94 95 96 97 98

99 100

101

102

103 104

105

See Creifelds under ‘Frist’. In criminal proceedings, such an application is also possible, if a hearing date is missed. See Creifelds under ‘Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand’;  Chapter XIII, Note 76. See Löwisch,§ 19; Note 47 C in this Chapter. See Dannemann, Section II, 13; Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10 XI; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XVI3. In German law, limitation of actions (‘Verjährung’) is not a procedural rule. The subject is contained in the BGB and is, therefore, part of the substantive law. This classification is now recognised in England by the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984. See Collier, Part I, Chapter 6. Changes to this area of law (in particular, a reduction of the normal limitation period to three years) are due to come into effect on 1.1.2002. See Reinelt, ZAP-Kolumne 15/01, p 931; Bereska, ZAP, Fach 2, p305. See Note 20 in this Chapter. See Dannemann, Section II, 13 and Section III 3 (h). See also: Preface to Second Edition, Note 11; Chapter XIC 5. See Neuhaus, ZAP, Fach 4, p 669. Regarding a gratuitous loan (‘Leihe’) see § 606 BGB. See Dannemann, Section II, 13; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part VII 3. See Chapter XF 4 (g)(i). In the absence of contrary arrangement or provision regarding the time for performance (‘Leistungszeit’), performance can be required by the creditor or undertaken by the debtor immediately (‘sofort’ ): § 271(i) BGB. If the debtor has an immediate duty to perform (‘Leistungspflicht’), the ‘Leistung’ is referred to as being ‘fällig’ (due). By means of a ‘Stundung’, the ‘Fâlligkeit’ (time at which the ‘Leistung’ is due) of the Leistung can  be postponed. See Klunzinger (Einführung), Part III, Chapter 2 (§ 261); Creifelds under ‘ Leistungszeit’; Note 124 in this Chapter. But see § 11 No 10(f) AGBG. For further information, see generally Creifelds; Kaiser, Parts II-IV; Klunzinger (Einführung), Parts III and IV (§§ 21–57); Brox (AS) and (BS); Medicus (AT) and (BT); Model/Creifelds/Licntenberger, Part 3 F (311– 332a); Fikentscher; Schellhammer (ZR), Books 1 and 2 (Parts 1–32); Reich /Schmitz, Chapters 3 and 4; Schlechtriem (AT) and (BT); Westermann (Grundbegriffe), Chapters 8–13. In common parlance the term ‘Vertrag’ usually only refers to the establishment of ‘Verpflichtungen’  (in a ‘Vervflichtungsgeschäft’) . However, its main constituent element is an ‘Einigung’ (‘Willensubereinstimmung’) : in German legal language it includes ‘Verfügungen’. See Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 211; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II A I (Chapter 31 II); Note 62 in this Chapter 3, below. See the diagrams in Klunzinger (Einführung),   Part II, Chapter 2 (§ 9, Section II; ‘Kausale und abstrakte Rechtsgeschäfte’ and ‘Abstraktionsprinzip’) and Chapter X D 2 (v) post. See also: Kallwass, Section 2, Chapter 5 (§ 25); Reich/Schmitz, Chapter 2 C; Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 34, Chapter 2; Schwab (Einjükrung), Part V, Chapter 2. The difference between a ‘Verpflichtung’  and a ‘Verfügung’ is succinctly put by Medicus (BR), § 3 I 3: ‘Die Verpflichtung bindet, die Verfügung wirkt’  (the obligation binds, the disposition takes effect). See Meyer, Part E, § 4 III. See Fikentscher, Section 9, § 66 III; Wesel (FR), Chapter 3 (Kauf). See also: Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii)/(iii) ‘The components of a transfer of ownership’. A ‘Verpflichtung zur Übereignung’  can be based not only on a contract of purchase (‘Kaufoertrag’), but also on other types of ‘Vertrag’ (eg, a contract for services (‘Werkvertrag’:  § 631 BGB) or a contract of work and materials (‘Werkli/erungsvertrag’:  § 651 BGB). Regarding these, see, respectively, Notes 166 and 234 in this Chapter. See also Meyer, Part II, § 6 A. A transfer of ownership is only one type of ‘Verfügung’: see Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 1 V. In order to assess whether the application (‘Anwendung’) of a legal provision (‘Rechtssatz’) or norm is possible in a particular case, one must interpret the relevant provision/norm (‘Auslegung’)  and establish whether the ‘Sachverhalt’ (set of facts) involved can be subsumed under it (so-called ‘Subsumtion’). The process of ‘Subsumtion’  is part of German lawyers’ daily work or, in the words of Wesel, their ‘ABC’— see Wesel (JW), Chapter I (‘Dos Arbeitsfeld des Juristen’) .

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The German Legal System and Legal Language See also: Chapter X B 1 4 (Note 18); Chapter X B 1 5 (Note 22); Chapter X B 2 (b) (Note 44); Chapter XIII, Note 67; Chapter XVI C (Note 16); Creifelds under ‘Auslegung (Interpretation)’ I and ‘Rechtsanwendung’;  Baumann (ER), Part I, § 4; Engisch, Chapters III-V; Honsell, § 2 III; Klunzinger (Einführung), Part I, § 3 I-II; Löwisch, §§ 4 and 5, pages 9–15; Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 12; Schwab (Einführung), Part I, Chapter 1 D and Chapter 2 C. 106 A ‘Schuldverhàltnis aus Rechtsgeschäft’  (obligation created by legal transaction) can be ‘einseitig begründet’ (based on the declaration of (only) one participant)—examples being Auslobung’ (public offer of reward; § 657 BGB) and ‘Vermächtnis’ (legacy; § 1939 BGB)—or, usually, ‘zwei- oder mehrseitig begründet’  (based on the declarations of two or more participants) - as in the case of a ‘Vertrag’ (see §305 BGB). A   ‘Vertrag’ can be distinguished according to whether it is: — contractual (‘schuldrechtlich’). Such a ‘Vertrag’ can be: •   ‘einseitig verpflichtend’   (unilaterally obliging)—the sole example being a ‘Schenkungsversprechen’ (promised gift; § 518 BGB); • for examples of unilateral contracts in English law, see Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co  (1893) 1 Q.B. 256 (CA); Errington v Errington and Woods  [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA). • usually, ‘zwei- oder mehrseitig verpflichtend’  (bilaterally or multilaterally obliging). The latter type of ‘Vertrag’ is, in turn, classified as either: °  ‘gewöhnlich’ (usual) or ‘unvollkommen’ (incomplete); or °  ‘gegenseitig’ (mutual / reciprocal) or ‘synallagmatisch’ (synallagmatic).

§§

107 108

109

110 111

Many very common contracts dealt with in the BGB are ‘gegenseitige Vertràge’  eg, ‘Kauf’, ‘Tausch’, ‘Miete’, ‘Pacht’, ‘Dienst-’ and ‘Werkvertrag’ . There is a ‘synallagma’, ie, the (reciprocal) ‘Leistung’ of each party is dependent on that of the other party. The rationale of such contracts (of exchange (‘Austauschvertrage’)) is  best expressed by the Latin phrase ‘Do ut des’ (I give, so that you give). See Creifelds under ‘Gegenseitiger Vertrag’;  Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 3 (§ 17); Medicus (BR), Section I, Chapter 2 (§12). 323–325 and § 326 BGB contain special provisions where there is a ‘Leistungsstörung’   (disturbance in performance) in a ‘gegenseitiger Vertrag’  (ie, ‘Unmöglichkeit’ or ‘Verzug’, respectively). See Note 126 E and F in this Chapter:  —   based on the law of property (‘sachenrechtlich’ or ‘dinglich’);  —   based on family law (‘familienrechtlich’);  —   based on the law of succession (‘erbrechtlich’);  or  —   based on public law (‘öffentlich-rechtlich’), rather than on private law (‘privatrechtlich’). Regarding the fields in which a ‘Vertrag’  can be found and the types of ‘Vertrag’, see Creifelds under ‘Vertrag’ III, IV and V. See also Note 62 in this Chapter. Whereas a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’   requires ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’, the parties to a ‘Schuldverhàltnis’   need only be ‘rechtsfähig’:  see Creifelds under ‘Schuldverhàltnis’ . ‘Schuldverhältnisse’  are classified in detail in Fikentscher, Section 1, Subsection 2, §§ 10–13 and in Section 8, Introduction, § 64. Dealt with in §§ 823–853 BGB. A detailed comparative study of the German law of tort is contained in Zweigert and Kötz, Part II C (Chapters 47-50). Dealt with in §§ 812–822 BGB. A detailed comparative study of the German law of unjust enrichment is contained in Zweigert and Kötz, Part II B (Chapters 45 and 46; see also Chapter 36IV). The characteristic of a ‘gesetzliches Schuldverhàltnis’  is that, in the absence of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, there is an infringement of another person’s interests and statute has to intervene: see Klunzinger (Einführung), Part IV, Introduction before § 55. The following description of the arrangement of Sections 1–7 of Book II of the BGB is broad and cursory. It is intended as a framework for the English-speaking ‘beginner’, for whose purposes I consider that it suffices . In order to understand the system of Sections 1–7, the reader is recommended to compare my (inofficial) groupings of §§ 241–853 BGB with the text of the BGB itself. A study of each individual paragraph (in conjunction, if required, with a German textbook and /or commentary) is unavoidable, if further explanation is desired. The content of this Note is similarly applicable not only to my coverage of the other parts of the BGB, but also to my treatment of other German statutes in this book. See Klunzinger (Einführung), Part III, Chapter 2 (§§ 24–426); Meyer, Part 1, § 2 A III 1; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Parts XIII-XV. A ‘Leistung’ (and the relevant ‘Leistungspuidnt’) can be classified according to whether it is main (ie, a ‘Hauptleistung(-spflicht)’)   or accessory (ie, a ‘Nebenleistung(-spflicht)’),   Both are so-called ‘primare Leistungspflichte’ (primary duties of performance).

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112 113 114 115

116

Performance of a ‘Nebenleistungspflicht’ can be independently enforced by court action (ie, it is ‘selbständig einJdagbar’). To be distinguished from ‘Hauptleistungspflichten’ and ‘Nebenleistungspflichten’ are:  —  so-called secondary duties of performance ( ‘sekundäre Leistungspflichten’,  eg, the payment of damages), which arise following breach of a primary duty of performance;  — ‘Nebenpflichten’ (accessory duties), which cannot be independently enforced; and  — ‘Obliegenheiten’ (informal duties), which the person concerned should observe in his own interest (‘im eigenen Interesse’),  but which cannot normally found a claim for the other party. See Jauernig (BGB), § 241, Note 4; Kaiser, Part II, 3 and 13 (at the end); Creifelds under ‘Obliegenheit’; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 3 (§ 16); Medicus (BR), Section I, Chapter 2 (§ 11); Notes 47 C, 126 F and 159 in this Chapter; ‘Leistung’. See Note 106 in this Chapter. A useful aid to understanding the term ‘Gegenleistung’ (‘quid pro quo’)  is the phrase ‘als Gegenleistung (für)..’, the English translation of which is ‘in return (for)…’. See Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 5 III 1. As § 362(i) BGB puts it, the ‘Bewirkung’ (effecting) of the ‘Leistung’ ie, the ‘Leistungserfolg’. Conversely, ‘Nichterfüllung’ is the failure to effect the ‘Leistung’/fulfil the ‘Leistungspflicht’, ie, failure to perform / non-performance / breach. In § 362(i) BGB the word ‘Schuldverhältnis’  is meant in this (narrow) sense: see Fikentscher, Section 4, §3813. Regarding the meaning of the term ‘Schuldverhältnis’, see eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 2, § 2 and Fikentscher, Section 1, Subsection 1 (§ 71). A ‘Schuldverhältnis’  is to be distinguished from a ‘G efälligkeitsverhältnis’ (a relationship of grace and favour), which is merely socially, but not legally, binding. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (‘The term ‘Willenserklärung”) . Regarding the meaning of the term ‘Leistung’, see Fikentscher, Section 1, Subsection 1 (§ 8). Regarding the special meaning of the term ‘Leistung’ in §§ 812ff BGB and its meaning in § 326 BGB, see under ‘Leistun’ in Appendix A. A check-list for determining the content of a ‘Schuldverhältnis’  (‘aus Rechtsgeschäft’) is set out in Fikentscher, Section 3, § 26 V and X. Where the object of performance (‘Leistungsgegenstand’)  is generically characterised (‘der Gattung nach bestimmt’)  it is referred to as a ‘Gattungsscnuld’  (generic debt) in contrast to a ‘Stuckschuld’ (specific or individual debt). A ‘Gattungsschuld’  is defined in § 243(i) BGB: the obligation of the ‘Schuldner’ is to supply a ‘Sache’ of ‘mittlerer  Art und Güte’  (medium type and quality). The ‘Schuldner’  is said to have a ‘Beschaffungspflicht’ (duty of  acquisition). The distinction between a ‘Gattungsschuld’ and a ‘Stückschuld’ has important consequences. Where there is a ‘Stückschuld’, the ‘Gläubiger’ carries the risk of performance. It there is a ‘Gattungsschuld’, by § 279 BGB the ‘Schuldner’  remains liable to deliver the object owed until exhaustion of the ‘Gattung’, even if he is not responsible for the (post-contractual, subjective) impossibility of performance. This is an exception to § 275(i) BGB (see Note 126 F in this Chapter). However, once the ‘Schuldner’  has done what is necessary to concretise the object of performance (‘das zur Leistung einer solchen Sache seinerseits Erforderliche getan’)  his obligation is limited to that (particular) ‘Sache’: § 243(ii) BGB. The risk of performance (‘Leistungsgefahr’)  then passes to the ‘Gläubiger’. See Note 234 B in this Chapter. Three remaining points should be noted:  —  where there is a ‘Gattungsschuld’, the ‘Leistungsgefahr’ also passes to the ‘Gläubiger’, if he delays acceptance: § 300(ii) BGB;  —  where there is a ‘Geldschuld’  (money debt), the ‘Schuldner ’ must ensure that the money owed actually reaches the creditor § 270 BGB (there is a ‘Schickschuld’);  —  where there is a generic purchase (‘Gattungskauf) and the ‘Sache’ is defective, the purchaser does not have to make use of his rights to claim rescission (‘Wandlung’)  or a reduction in price (‘Minderung’) under § 462 BGB. Instead, he can insist on proper contractual performance and demand further delivery (‘Nachliejerung’) of a thing free of defects (‘mangelfreie Sache’) : § 480 BGB. See Creifelds under ‘Gattungsschuld’; Baumann (ER), Part II, § 6 II 2 (b); Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 71; Gernhuber/ Grunewald, Part 5 (§ 241); Kaiser, Part III, Section 1, 6; Klunzinger (Einführung), Part III, Chapter 2, § 25 I; Medicus (AT), Part 3, § 19; Medicus (BR), Section I, Chapter 2, § 13 II 3; Schwab (Einführung), Part V, Chapter II E (c).

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 117 118

119

120 121 122 123 124

125 126

See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 81; Medicus (AT), Part 3, § 18. The BGB draws a fundamental distinction between loss which relates to a person’s assets (‘Vermögen’)— ie, material loss (‘materieller Schaden’)— and loss which is merely immaterial or ideal (‘ideel’).  §253 BGB excludes claims for immaterial loss, except in cases laid down by statute. Thus, German law generally only compensates material loss. See eg, Creifelds under ‘Schadensersatz’; Brox (AS), Chapter 7, §§ 24–27; Medicus (AT), Part 7 (§§52–60). §§ 249ff BGB only govern the extent and type of compensation for loss (‘Schaden’). The provisions say nothing about the basis of liability—ie, the duty to compensate (‘Verpflichtung zum Schadensersatz’) - which can arise from contract or statute. Moreover, it is an unwritten precondition of liability for damages under §§ 249ff BGB that the relevant loss must be attributable (‘zurechenbar’)  to the other party, ie, mere is a duty to compensate only if and so far as the loss is caused (‘verursacht’) by an event (‘Ereignis’), for which the other party is responsible (‘haftet’). There must be a causal connexion (’Kausalzusammenhang’) between the two. See Note 227 in this Chapter. See Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part IV C 3 and Chapter 6, Part XV B 3. See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 9. See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 7 II. See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 11 and § 121; Medicus (AT), Part 3, § 17. § 271(i) BGB lays down no hard and fast rule for the time of performance. If the parties do not agree on a time for performance or it cannot be determined by statute, it must be gleaned from the circumstances (‘aus den Umständen’). See Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 1 VII; Note 98 in this Chapter. See eg, Medicus (AT), Part 3, § 22. A A ‘Schuldverhältnis’  gives rise to a ‘Leistungsverpflichtung’ on the part of the ‘Schuldner’  (§ 241 BGB; see above). B The BGB only deals with two types of ‘Leistungsstörung’: If the ‘Schuldner’  does not carry out the ‘Leistung’ (performance) required of him—ie, in the event of ‘Nichterfüllung’ (non-performance)— there is a ‘Leistungsstörung’  (disturbance/irregularity in performance).  —   ‘Unmöglichkeit’  (impossibility); the BGB distinguishes between ‘anfàngliche’  (initial) and ‘nachträgliche’ (subsequent) ‘Unmöglichkeit’; and —   ‘Verzug’ (delay); the BGB distinguishes between ‘Verzug des Schuldners’  (delay on the part of the debtor) and ‘Verzug des Glàubigers’  (delay on the part of the creditor). C Outside the BGB, the principle of ‘positive Vertragsverktzung’  (PVV; positive breach of contract) and the doctrine of the ‘(Wegfall der) Geschäftsgrundlage’  ((falling away (collapse) of the) basis of the transaction (frustration) were developed to handle situations requiring relief not falling within impossibility or delay A claim seeking a remedy for positive breach of contract (PVV) requires an existing ‘Schuldverhältnis’ (obligation)—‘rechtsgeschäftlich’  or ‘gesetzlich’— and is mainly used in cases of ‘Schlechtleistung’ (bad performance) and ‘Verletzung einer Nebenpflicht’  (breach of an accessory duty). PVV is excluded, to the extent that a claim under a ‘G ewahrleistungsvorschrift’  (guarantee provision) of the BGB is available, as, eg, in a contract of sale (‘Kauf’) or rental (‘Miete’). See Jauernig (BGB), § 276 V; Notes 47 C and 188 in this Chapter. D The liability (‘Einstehenmüssen’ /‘Haftung’) of a ‘Schuldner’  for a ‘Leistungsstörung’ usually depends on the ‘Schuldner’s ‘Verschulden’  ((blame) also referred to as ‘Vertretenmiissen’).  The question is: is the ‘Leistungsstörung’  the fault of (due to) the ‘Schuldner ’ (‘von ihm zu vertreten’) ? The civil law concept of ‘Verschulden’ is defined in § 276 BGB: in so far as there is no different provision, a ‘Schuldner’  is liable for ‘Vorsatz’ (intent) and for ‘ Fahrlässigkeit’  (negligence). A person acts negligently, if he does not observe the (normal) degree of care which social contact requires (‘die im Verkehr erfbrderliche Sorgfalt’). Apart from being a component of most ‘Leistungsstorungen’, ‘Verschulden’  is a condition for liability under the (unwritten) principle of ‘culpa in contrahendo’ (etc;  see Notes 18 and 135 in this Chapter), for PVV and also a requirement for a claim in tort (‘unerlaubte Handlung’; §§ 823 ff BGB). However, while, as a rule, both in contract and in tort there can be no responsibility without blame (‘keine Verantwortlichkeit ohne Verschulden’),  liability independent of blame (‘verschuldensunabhàngige Haftung’)  can arise by agreement of the parties or by statute (‘Garantiehaftung’; Medicus (AT), Part 5, Section 1, § 29 and § 31 II). In particular, in certain cases, there is, exceptionally, ‘Haftung ohne Verschulden’  (ie, the ‘Schuldner ’ is

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E

F

G

liable without ‘Verschulden’/in any event), eg, for faulty goods (under §§ 459 ff BGB)—so-called ‘Erfolgshaftung’ (liability for the result)—or for the various situations in which ‘Gefahrdungshaftung’ (strict liability) is laid down by statute (eg, in the case of road and rail traffic accidents (‘Verkehrsunfälle’) and where the keeper of an animal (‘Tierhalter’)  is liable for damage caused by it (§ 833 BGB)). Thus, in the German law of obligations, there are two major branches/principles of liability -liability for fault (‘Verschuldenshaftung’)  and strict liability (‘Gefährdungshaftung’). See Fikentscher, Section 5, § 53 and Section 16, § 109. For a list of common ‘Anspruchsgrundlagen’  in traffic accident cases, see Grüneberg, ZAP 12/00, Fach 9, p 567 (Section I). See also Note 222 E in this Chapter. Regarding capacity, see Note 5 in this Chapter. The BGB distinguishes between a ‘Leistungsstörung   in the case of an ‘einseitiges Schuldverhältnis’ (unilateral obligation; §§ 275–304, 306–309 BGB) and a ‘Leistungsstörung’ in the case of a ‘gegenseitiger Vertrag’  (mutual/reciprocal/synallagmatic contract; §§ 320–327 BGB). Regarding the former, the question that arises is (apparently) simple: ‘Wie veràndert sich die Pflicht zur Leistung durch die Leistungsstörung?’ How is the duty of performance altered (affected) by the ‘Leistungsstörung’? (Medicus (AT), Part 5, Section 2, before § 33). Thus, if, at the time the contract is concluded, performance is objectively (initially) impossible (‘anfânglich unmöglich’), the contract is void: § 306 BGB. However, § 306 BGB does not apply, if performance is only (subjectively) impossible for the ‘Schuldner’.  In such a case, the contract is completely valid and the ‘Schuldner’  cannot avoid liability (so-called ‘Garantiehaftung für anfängliches Unvermögen’). The BGB contains complex rules setting out the consequences for the ‘Schuldner’  of a ‘Leistungsstörung and the effect of a ‘Leistungsstörung’  in the case of a ‘gegenseitiger Vertrag,  ie, the position (and rights) of  the ‘Gläubiger ’ (creditor) and the fate of his Gegenteistung’ (counter-performance). Thus, for example, if, after conclusion of a contract, a ‘Leistung’ (subsequently) becomes -objectively or subjectively—impossible (‘nachträglich unmöglich’)  without blame on the part of the ‘Schuldner’, he is freed from the obligation to perform (‘von der Verpflichtung zur Leistung frei’):  § 275(i) BGB. The ‘Gläubiger’ carries the risk of performance (‘Leistungsgefahr’). Regarding the position in the case of a ‘Gattungsschuld’, see Note 116 in this Chapter. If neither party is to blame for the impossibility (ie, it is fortuitous (‘zufâllig’)), the ‘Schuldner ’ loses his claim to the ‘Gegenleistung’:  § 323(i) BGB; he carries die price risk (‘Preisgefahr’). To be contrasted with the situation—in a ‘gegenseitiger Vertrag’— where the ‘Leistung’ is irnpossible, is the position where there is delay (‘V erzug’) on the part of die ‘ Schuldner’. By § 326 BGB, die ‘Gläubiger’ has various (alternative) remedies: • subject to the setting of an appropriate deadline (‘angemessene Frist’), the ‘Gläubiger’  can claim damages or rescission. Both result in the contract being transformed into a winding-up relationship (‘ AbwickLungsverhältnis’). No deadline is required, if performance of the contract is (objectively) no longer of interest to the ‘Gläubiger’:  § 326(ii) BGB. By § 327 BGB, §§ 346–356 BGB are of corresponding application to the (statutory) right of rescission in § 326 BGB; • the ‘Gläubiger’ can, instead, opt to uphold die contract, demand performance (‘Erfüllung’) and claim recovery of the loss due to the delay (‘Verzugsschaden’): § 286(i) BGB. ‘Verzug’ is defined in §§ 284–285 BGB. ‘Verschulden’ (blame) is necessary. Moreover, for die purpose of § 326 BGB, the delay must relate to the performance of a main obligation (‘Hauptpflicht’) See Notes 111 and 127 in this Chapter. See generally Fikentscher, Section 5 (§ 45). Cf § 361 BGB. The ‘Schuldner’  usually carries the risk of (receipt of) the price (‘Preisgefahr’) until he has completely performed (ie, until ‘Erfüllung’). Regarding the time of transition of (price) risk (‘Gefahrübergang’)  in die case of a ‘Kaufoertrag’ see §§ 446, 447 BGB; in die case of a ‘Werkvertrag’  see §§644–646 BGB. It is important to understand that these are special provisions (‘Sonderregeln’)/  exceptions to § 323 BGB and only deal with die situation where there is a fortuitous destruction or deterioration (‘zufälliger Untergang oder Verschlechterung’)  of the ‘Sache’ or ‘WerK after conclusion of die contract. In such circumstances, there is a transition of (price) risk to the purchaser or customer usually from the moment of ‘Übergabe’  (delivery; § 446 BGB) or ‘Abnahme’  (acceptance; § 644 BGB), as appropriate. If, however, one of the parties is responsible for the destruction or deterioration (ie, the subsequent impossibility is his fault (‘von ihm zu vertreten’)),  the normal rules regarding the ‘Preisgefahr’ in §§ 324 and 325 BGB apply.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language

H

I

 J

See Creifelds under ‘Gefahr(tragung)’;  Brox (BS), Chapter 1, § 4 and Chapter 3, § 22; Fikentscher, Section 9, § 67 and Section 11, § 80; Medicus (BR), Section I, Chapter 1, § 13 IV; Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 5IV and VI and Vol 2, Chapter 6 III; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XIV, Section C 3. Whenever there is no proper performance (‘Leistung’) of an existing (contractual) obligation (‘Schuldverhältnis’), the following questions, therefore, become important: — What type of disturbance in performance (‘Leistungsstörung’) is involved? — Who is responsible for it? The obligee (‘Schuldner’)  or his assistant (‘Erfüllungsgehilfe’;  § 278 BGB)? — Does that person’s conduct fall within the définition of ‘fault’ (‘Verschulden’) in § 276(i) BGB? — Who bears the burden of proof (‘Beweislast’)? — Are any special statutory provisions relevant? — What remedies can be claimed? The question of the burden of proof is now dealt with in more detail. The general principle regarding the (reversal of the) burden of proof (‘Beweislastumkehr’) in cases of  (subsequent) impossibility ‘(nachträgliche) Unmödglichkei’ ana delay (‘Verzug’) is laid down in § 282 and § 285 BGB, respectively It is also of corresponding application to cases of PVV and ‘culpa in contrahendo’ ie, it applies to all types of obligation, other than tort. Under these provisions, contrary to the general rule that all preconditions for a particular ‘Anspruch’ (claim) must be established by the claimant, the ‘Schuldner ’ carries the burden of proving that he was not at fault within the meaning of §§ 276, 278 BGB, ie, that the Leistungsstörung  was not caused by circumstances for whicn he was responsible. In other words, once a ‘Leistungsstörung’  is established, the ‘Schuldner’s  fault (‘Verschulden’) is (rebuttably) presumed and it is for him to present exonerating evidence (‘Entlastungsbeweis’). The rule in § 282 BGB applies both if performance (‘Erfüllung’) is being claimed (and the ‘Schuldner’ relies on § 275(i) BGB as a defence) and if damages for non-performance ( ‘Schadensersatz wegen Nichterfüllung’; §§ 280,325 BGB) are being sought. In the latter situation, the ‘Gläubiger’ has to prove  both the impossibility (of performance) itself and the causation (‘Kausalität’) between the impossibility and the damage suffered. Prima facie evidence (‘Anscheinsbeweis’) can ease the burden of proof, both for the ‘Schuldner’ and ‘Gläubiger’. However, the ‘Schuldner’ bears the burden of any remaining doubt, if the cause of a ‘Leistungsstörung’  is unclear, but falls within his area of responsibility (‘Veraniwortungsbereich’) . The  burden cannot be shifted onto the other party by standard business terms: § 11 No 15 (a) AGBG. By § 283 BGB, if the ‘Gläubiger’  obtains a finally binding judgment for performance and sets an appropriate time limit (Frist), damages for non-performance can be claimed without having to prove impossibility. After expiry of the time limit—which can be set by the court on application (§ 255 ZPO)—the claim to performance (‘Leistungsanspruch’)  is converted into one for damages (‘Schadensersatzanspruch’). § 325(ii) BGB extends § 283 BGB, where a ‘gegenseitiger Vertrag’ is concerned. See Fikentscher, Section 5, § 44 II, 3; Jauernig (BGB), §§ 282,283; Chapter XIII, Note 10. § 282 BGB does not apply to employees engaged in risky activities (‘schadensgeneigte Arbeit’) . See Chapter XVIII I. In the case of tort claims, on the other hand, the injured plaintiff usually carries the burden of proof of  fault although a ‘Beweislastumkehr’ (reversal of the burden of proof) has been established by the courts in medical negligence actions (for a ‘grober Behandlungsfihler’  (gross medical error)) and in cases involving product liability (eg, in ‘The Fowl Pest’ case; see Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part I, Section G). However, under the ‘Produkthaftungsgesetz’ (Product Liability Law; ProdHaftG), proof of blame is not required. By § 1 ProdHaftG, subject to certain exceptions, the manufacturer (‘Hersteller’) of a faulty product (‘fihlerhaftes Produkt’) is (strictly) liable for damages, if the fault causes death or injury to body or health, even if the manufacturer is not to blame for the fault (ie, even if he discharges the (reversed)  burden of proof (‘sich entlastet’) for a claim under § 823 BGB). The claimant need usually only prove the fault (‘Fehler’), the damage (‘Schaden’) and the causal link (‘ursächlicher Zusammenhang’)  between them (§ l(iv) ProdHaftG). The manufacturer is also liable, if the faulty product causes damage to (other) property (‘Sachbeschädigung’),  provided such (other) item of property was intended for private use or consumption and was mainly so used. However, the claimant must bear the first DM 1125 of the damage himself (§ 11 ProdHaftG). In accordance with § 3 ProdHaftG a product is faulty, if it does not provide the safety (‘Sicherheit’) which can justifiably be expected of it bearing in mind all the circumstances, in particular:

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127

128

129 130 131

(a) its presentation; (b) the use which can fairly be reckoned with; and (c) the time at which it was placed into circulation (‘in den Verkehr gebracht’). A product is not faulty merely because an improved product (verbessertes Produkt’) was later placed into circulation (§ 3(ii) ProdHaftG). Moreover, liability can be reduced in the event of contributory negligence (§ 6(i) ProdHaftG) and no damages for pain and suffering (‘Schmerzensgeld’)  can be recovered. See Note 227 in this Chapter. The limitation period for a claim under § 1 ProdHaftG is three years from the time knowledge of the damage, the fault and the identity of the manufacturer was, or should have been, obtained. The limitation period is prevented from running so long as negotiations regarding the damages payable remain pending (§ 12 ProdHaftG). Claims under § 1 ProdHaftG basically expire 10 years after the faulty product was placed into circulation (§ 13 ProdHaftG). Liability under other provisions (eg, § 823 BGB) is unaffected by the ProdHaftG (§ 15(ii)). In so far as it applies, the ProdHaftG provides a claimant with additional protection. In English law, Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 imposes strict liability for personal injury and damage to property caused by defective products. Like the ProdHaftG, it was enacted pursuant to an EC Council Directive (of 25.7.1985). See Creifelds under ‘Produkthaftung’; Chapter XIII, Note 10 4; Dannemann, Section IV, 4(b); Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part II, Section F; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II C, Chapter 491 and V. K See generally: §§ 275–304, 306–309 and 320–327 BGB; Creifelds under ‘Leistungsstörungen’, ‘Unmöglichkeit der Leistung’, ‘Schuldnerverzug’, ‘Gläubigerverzug’, ‘Verschulden’, ‘Haftung’, ‘Positive Vertragsverletzung’, ‘Geschäftsgrundkge’, ‘Gefährdungshaftung’ a nd ‘Gegenseitiger Vertrag’. See also the very detailed coverage of the topic of ‘L eistungsstörungen’ in Zweigert and Kötz, Part II A I (Chapter 43 (entitled ‘Breach of Contract’) and Chapter 44 (entitled ‘The Effect of Supervening Events’)) and the innumerous German textbooks and commentaries on ‘Schuldrecht (Allgemeiner Teil)’  eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 6, §§ 18–23; Fikentscher, Section 5 (§§ 41–48); Kallwass, Section 3, Chapter 2 (§§ 41–45); Medicus (AT), Part 5 (§§ 28–46); Meyer, Part E, § 5 B and D; Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 1. L Regarding strict liability in tort (‘Gefährdungshaftung’)  see the comments under ‘Strict Liability and Animals’ in the Sourcebook,   Chapter 6; Dannemann, Section IV, 4; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part I, Section D; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II C, Chapter 49 II. On 1.5.2000, the ‘Gesetz zur Beschleunigung fälliger Zahlungen’  (Law to Accelerate Due Payments) brought into force changes to §§ 284 and288 BGB. By the new § 284(iii) BGB, once a money debt has become due (‘fälling’) ‘Verzug’ (delay) (only) arises automatically (ie, by operation of law) 30 days after receipt of a bill (‘Zugang einer Rechnung’)  or an equivalent demand for payment (‘Zahlungsaufforderung’). A prior warning (‘Mahnung’) is no longer necessary nor sufficient to establish delay. The rule in § 284(iii) BGB is dispositive, but it cannot be derogated from in a consumer contract (‘Verbrauchervertrag’)  to the disadvantage of a consumer. In an individual contract (‘Individualvertrag’), however, it can, eg, be agreed that the 30 day (grace) period for payment (‘Zahlungsfris’) be shortened or that a ‘Mahnung’  (still) be permitted. Maturity (‘Fälligkeit’) alone does not always suffice to establish delay. According to § 284(ii) BGB, only in respect of payments recurring on particular fixed dates (‘wiederkehrende Geldleistungen’) —ie, where an ongoing obligation (‘Dauerschuldverhältnis’)  exists—does delay arise when the payments become due (‘fällig’). The provision does not extend to one-off payments (‘Einmalzahlungen’), even if these are owed on a certain date (‘kalendermäßig bestimmt’). See Hertel, ZAP 10/00, Fach 2, p 275. Hertel criticizes that the new provisions have turned the previous law on its head (‘aufden Kopf’)  and diverge from a draft EU Directive to combat delays in payment (dated 3.12.1998). In particular, Hertel points out that the new § 284(iii) BGB is meant to be exhaustive (‘abschließend’),  but its wording is too broad and requires teleological reduction. See also: Stollenwerk, ZAP-Aktuell 3/01, p 125. After 1.5.2000, the statutory rate of interest during delay is 5% over the base rate (‘Basiszinssatz’). of the German Federal Bank (§ 1 ‘Diskont-Überleitungs-Gesetz’). This rate applies correspondingly to interest on money debts, which are the subject of court proceedings (‘Prozeßzinsen’), from the time the proceedings are legally pending: § 291 BGB. See Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part XIV, Section D. See Meyer, Part 1, § 2 A III 2. See Note 106 in this Chapter.

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133 134 135

§ 305 BGB presupposes the principle of freedom of contract (‘Vertragsfreiheit’) . It lays down the basic rule that, unless statute otherwise provides, an obligation created by legal transaction can only be established or amended by way of a contract (‘Vertrag’) between the parties. § 305 thus forms the basis for all types of  contractual obligation. See Notes 23, 106 and 159 in this Chapter; Brox (AS), Chapter 3, § 31 and § 4 I; Jauernig (BGB), § 305; Medicus (AT), Part 2, §9. See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 5 II; Medicus (AT), Part 3, § 21. See below, Title 5. A See Creifelds under ‘Vertrag zugunsten Dritter’ . See also: Brox (AS), Chapter 8, § 28; Fikentscher, Section 3, § 371-VI; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 3 (§ 18); Kötz (EVR), Part B, § 13; Medicus (AT), Part 9, § 66; Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10 VII; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 41 (entitled ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties’)). A variation of the ‘Vertrag zugunsten Dritter’  is the concept of the ‘Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter’ (contract with protective effect in favour of a third party), which derives from § 242 BGB and has been developed by case-law. In The Fall in the Supermarket Case  (Sourcebook,  Chapter 5) the defendant would have been liable (for damages) under the principle of ‘culpa in contrahendo’  to the mother of the plaintiff child, had the mother herself been injured. As it was, the plaintiff was able to base her (contractual) claim for breach of accessory duties (‘Zvertragliche Nebenpflichten’)  on her mother’s (precontractual) position: there was a ‘Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter’ . The motivation for this outcome lay in the different limitation periods for claims in contract and tort (§ 195 as against § 852 BGB) and the reversal of the burden of proof (§ 282 BGB). By means of the concept of the ‘Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter ’, the protective duties/ duties of care (‘Schutzpflichten’) emanating from a contract are extended to a person outside the direct contractual relationship in circumstances, in which it is apparent to (‘erkennbar’), or foreseeable by (‘voraussehbar’), the obligor that the obligee typically has an interest in the inclusion (‘Einbeziehung’) of  such a person in the protective sphere of the contract (‘Schutzbereich des Vertrages’) . One speaks of the proximity of the third party to the act of performance (‘Leistungsnähe’). The consequence is that the third party has a personal claim for damages (PVV / cic) against the obligor, if the relevant duties are breached. The extent of the ‘Schutzpflichten’ of an obligor in a particular case is unclear, but one criterion is whether it is acceptable (‘zumutbar’) for the obligor to bear (increased) liability. Moreover, the third party’s claim can be affected by exclusion clauses (see the AGBG) and can be reduced due to contributory fault on the part of the obligee: § 254 BGB. The concept has been applied to contracts of all kinds, eg, building contracts, contracts for services, tenancy agreements, travel contracts and contracts with professional advisers. In particular, the concept makes up for the deficiencies of tort law. Thus, claims for vicarious liability can be brought on a contractual basis in conjunction with § 278 BGB—which imputes the fault of an ‘Erfüllungsgehilfe’  to the obligor—instead of seeking to rely on § 831 BGB, which provides an imperfect cause of action, because it is possible for the target principal to supply exonerating evidence (‘Entlastungsbeweis’). See Notes 215 and 222 in this Chapter; Fikentscher, Section 3, § 37 VII; Medicus (AT), Part 9, § 67; Schulte, Vol 3, Case 28 (‘Elektrogeräte’). B The Termination of Negotiations Case  (Sourcebook,  Chapter 5) is an illustration of the application of the principle of ‘culpa in contrahendo’ where precontractual negotiations are broken off without good reason. In that case, the plaintiff’s justified expectation that a licence would be granted to it was disappointed. Similarly, wasted costs can be claimed on the basis of ‘culpa in contrahendo’, if a property purchase falls through (ZAP EN-Nr 708/99) or if significant disputes concerning the property are not revealed (ZAP EN-Nr 37/00). Other fruitful areas for claims based on ‘culpa in contrahendo’ are the failure (omission) to fulfil a duty of disclosure (‘Aujklärungspflicht’, eg, on the sale of a business (ZAP EN-Nr 472/01)) and negligent misrepresentation (‘fahrlässige Tàuschung’) . The equivalent German concept for fraudulent misrepresentation (deception) is ‘arglistige Tàuschung’ (§ 123 BGB). The principle of ‘culpa in contrahendo’  was established by Jhering in 1861. Its underlying rationale is that entry into precontractual negotiations (‘Vertragsverhandlungen’)  gives rise to a quasi-contractual relationship of trust (‘vertragsähnliches Vertranensverhältnis’)  between the parties. This in turn results in duties of care (‘Sorgfaltspflichten’) and of consideration (‘Rücksichtnahme’) towards each other, which exist even if the negotiations ultimately fail (‘scheitern’) and there is no preliminary contract (‘Vorvertrag’) or other express agreement. A blameworthy breach (schuldhafte Verletzung’)  by one of the parties of 

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Notes

136 137 138

139

140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

these duties will entitle the other to compensation (‘Schadensersatz’) . The blameless party (‘vertragstreue Partei’) may, eg, have made other arrangements (‘Dtspositionen’) in reliance on the negotiations. See Notes 18, 47 A, 66 and 126 D in this Chapter; Creifelds under ‘Vertrag’ III; Dannemann, Section II, 11; Kötz (EVR), Part A, § 1 III and § 2 D; Medicus (AT), Part 2, § 14; Youngs (CL), Chapter 6, Part III C, Part V and Part XIIF and G. C ‘Culpa in contrahendo’ is available quite apart from claims for mistake, deception or threat (§§ 119–123 BGB) or tort (§ 823ff BGB). However, like PVV, cic only applies in the absence of special statutory provisions. Thus, for example, false information specifically regarding the object of a contract of sale or rental falls under § 459ff BGB and § 538 BGB, respectively. One of the reasons for cic is that vicarious liability in tort can often be avoided under § 831 BGB, ie, where injury is caused not by the defendant, but by his servants or employees, the plaintiff would otherwise be left without a remedy. See Jauernig (BGB), § 276 VI; Schulte, Vol I, Chapter 5 XI; Note 222 in this Chapter. D ‘Culpa in contrahendo’ is accepted as a principle of customary law (‘Gewohnheitsrecht’),  although it can also be regarded as flowing from § 242 BGB. See Fikentscher, Section 2, § 20IV. By § 329 BGB, in the event of doubt, an ‘Erfüllungsubernahme’  (ie, a (merely internal) promise of performance  between an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ debtor) does not give the creditor a right to demand performance. It is therefore not a ‘genuine’ contract for the benefit of a third party. Cf ‘Schuldübernahme’ . See Note 157 in this Chapter. See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 10. The effect of rescission (‘Rücktritt’) is that for the future (‘ex nunc’) the contract is converted into/replaced  by a so-called ‘Rückgewahrschuldverhaltnis’,  ie, an obligation on each side to return what was received, or, in the case of services or the use of a thing, their value (‘Werf’): § 346 BGB. Rescission itself leaves the property law consequences of the transaction unaffected. The effect of ‘Anfechtung’ (challenge), on the other hand, is that the contract is nullified (ie, destroyed, not converted) ab initio (‘ex tunc’) . Retrospective winding-up (‘Ruckaburicklung’)   is effected via the unjust enrichment provisions (§§ 812ff BGB). See Creifelds under ‘Rücktritt vom Vertrag’;  Notes 48,147 and 245 in this Chapter; Brox (AS), Chapter 5, § 17; Fikentscher, Section 5, § 48 II; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 5 (§ 25); Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10 IX. Regarding the position in English law ie, the right of an innocent party to terminate a contract for ‘anticipatory’ (repudiatory) or actual (‘fundamental’) breach/default, see Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Chapter 18, Parts 6 and 7. In English law, the term ‘rescission’ is commonly used to refer to one of the remedies for misrepresentation. See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Chapter 9, Part 1 D. See Creifelds under ‘Fixgeschäft’; Fikentscher, Section 5, § 45IV. If the transaction is a ‘Fixhandelskauf   (fixed time trade purchase), rescission or damages can be claimed. However, if damages are sought blame must be shown. See § 376(i) HGB; Capelle / Canaris, Part E, Section 5, § 29IV. See Note 266 in this Chapter. See generally Jauernig (BGB), §§ 346ff; Kaiser, Part II, Chapter 20; Medicus (AT), Part 6, §§ 48–49. See Klunzinger (Einführung), Part III, Chapter 3 (§§ 32–33); Brox (AS), Chapter 5, §§ 13–16; Fikentscher, Section 4 (§§ 38–40); Gernhuber / Grunewald, Part 5 (§ 26); Medicus (AT), Part 4 (§§ 23–27). Regarding the difference in meaning between ‘Erfüllung’ and ‘Leistung’ see this Chapter at Note 114. See Medicus (AT), Part 6 (§§ 47–51); Schwab (Einführung), Part V, Chapters 6–8. See ‘Nullity and Challengability of a ‘Wzzlenserttarung’ and ‘Form and nullity of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ in this Chapter. See ‘Nullity and Challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung”  in this Chapter. ‘Kündigung’ only operates for the future (‘ex nunc’). There is no retrospective exchange of ‘Leistungen’ (‘Rückaustausch’) as in the case of rescission (‘Rücktritt’). See Medicus (AT), Part 6, § 50; Chapter XVIII, Notes 6 and 7; Note 138 in this Chapter. See Note 75 in this Chapter. See Note 47 in this Chapter. An ‘Aufhebungsvertrag’  is often used as a means of terminating a contract of employment. See Chapter XVIII, Note 5. Novation is the replacement of one debt by another (‘Schuldersetzung’).

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 A

158 159

160 161 162 163 164

See Note 126 in this Chapter. See the previous page in this Chapter (Title 5). See Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10 VI. See Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10IV. See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 8, § 29; Medicus (AT), Part 8 (§§ 61–65); Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10 II. See also Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 40 (entitled ‘Assignment’)). The provisions regarding contractual assignment are of corresponding application to assignment of a claim  by operation of law (‘cessio legis’), eg, under § 774 BGB, § 67 VVG, § 116 SGB (Book X). See Fikentscher, Section 6, § 58. Under a ‘Schuldübernahme’,  there is an exchange of debtors (substitution). ‘Schuldbeitritt’ or ‘Schuldmitubernahme’—not dealt with in the BGB—describes the situation where a new (additional) debtor joins the old one. It results in a ‘Gesamtschuld’ (joint debt) and can arise by agreement or, in certain cases, by statute. Neither a ‘Schuldübemahme’ or ‘Schuldbeitritt’ require a particular form. See Creifelds under ‘Schuldübernahme’ and ‘Schuldmitübernahme’; Brox (AS), Chapter 8, § 30; Meyer, Part III, § 7 B II; Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10 III; Notes 136,177 and 238 in this Chapter. See eg, Brox (AS), Chapter 9, §§ 31–33; Medicus (AT), Part 9 (§§ 68–69); Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 10 X. See generally Creifelds; Fikentscher, Sections 8–16 (§§ 64–114); Kaiser, Parts III and IV; Klunzinger (Eirrfuhrung), Part IV (§§ 43–57); Brox (BS); Medicus (BT); Meyer, Part 1, § 2 A IV; Model/Creitelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 3 F (315–332); Reich/Schmitz, Chapter 4. When referring to the special part of Book II of  the BGB, the following points must always be borne in mind: — The various different types of ‘rechtsgeschäftliche Schuldverhältnisse ’ set out in §§ 433–808a BGB are only examples. They are not comprehensive; others (‘atypical’ or mixed contracts) are possible: § 305 BGB. They often develop independently of the BGB—see Chapter XI, Note 42. — Regardless of how a ‘rechtsgeschäftliches Schuldverhältnis’  is described by the parties, the question of now it is to be classified for legal purposes is dependent solely on what they agree are their ‘Hauptpflichten’ (main obligations). See Note 111 in this Chapter. — For the purposes of the BGB, the following types of contract (ie, obligational relationships arising from a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’) are commonly distinguished: • contracts for the disposal of an asset (‘Veräußerungsverträge’)  ie, ‘Kauf’, ‘Tausch’ and ‘Schenkung’; • contracts for the grant of the use of an asset (‘Gebrauchsüberlassungsverträge’),  ie, ‘Miete’, ‘Pacht’, ‘Leihe’ and ‘Darlehen’; • contracts involving the undertaking of an activity (‘Tätigkeit’) for someone else, ie, ‘Dienstoertrag’, ‘Werkvertrag’, ‘Reisevertrag’, ‘Maklervertrag’, ‘Auftrag’, ‘Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag’  and ‘Verwahrung’. It is important to note here that, in Roman law, contracts of service (‘Diensiverträge’) and contracts for services (‘Werkverträge’)  were classified as forms of a group of contracts described as ‘locatio conductio’ (hire). ‘Locatio conductio’ (lit the placing of something at the disposal of another) was treated as a unified concept along the lines or a contract of sale, but was given much less attention. See Fikentscher, Section II, § 78; Honsell, § 48; Nicholas, Chapter IV, 1,2 (b) 2. Similarly, in German law, the law relating to contracts of service was given sparse treatment in the BGB, with the result that the law of employment (‘Arbeitsrech’) has largely developed outside the Civil Code. See Chapter XVIII, below: • contracts for the advancement of a common purpose (‘gemeinsamer Zweck’) in the form of a company (‘Gesellschaft’); and • contracts comprising special promises (‘besondere Versprechen’),  ie, promising a certain ‘Leistung’ (ie, ‘Leibrente’, ‘Spiel’  and ‘Wette’ ) or entered into in order to settle, establish or secure certain obligations (eg, ‘Vergleich’, ‘Schuldversprechen’, ‘Anweisung’, ‘Burgschaft’, ‘Garantievertrag’ and’Sicherungsvertrag’ ). See Creifelds under ‘Vertrag’ 2; Fikentscher, Section 8 (§§ 64–65); Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 33, Chapter 4 2 and Book 1, Parts 1–21. See Brox (BS), Chapter 1, §§ 1–7; Fikentscher, Section 9, §§ 66–72; Meyer, Part II, §§ 4–5; Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 5. See Brox (BS), Chapter 1, § 8; Fikentscher, Section 9, § 73. See Brox (BS), Chapter 2, §§ 9–13; Fikentscher, Section 10, §§ 74–75; Meyer, Part II, § 6 D. See Brox (BS), Chapter 2, § 15; Fikentscher, Section 10, § 76. See Brox (BS), Chapter 2, § 16; Fikentscher, Section 10, § 77; Meyer, Part III, § 7 A.

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Notes 165 166

See Brox (BS), Chapter 3, §§ 17–19; Fikentscher, Section 11, § 79; Meyer, Part II, § 6 B; Chapter XVIII H (Note 60). Conclusion of a ‘Werkvertrag’. Apart from the general requirements of §§ 104ff and §§ 145ff BGB, § 631(i) BGB makes it dear tha t conclusion of a ‘Werkvertrag’  depends on agreement between the parties regarding the particular ‘Werk’ (work) to be produced/supplied and the fee (‘Vergütung’) to be paid by the customer (‘Besteller’) to the manufacturer/ producer (‘Unternehmer’). If no specific (or specifiable) fee is agreed, but one is to be expected in the circumstances, a fee is deemed to  be implied: § 632(i) BGB. The fee is assessed at the official rate for the particular work (‘Taxe’), or, if none, at the usual level in the relevant business: § 632(ii) BGB. (Cf English law, which allows ‘reasonable remuneration’ to be claimed on a ‘quantum meruit’.  See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Chapter 22, Part 2 A 6.) Object of a ‘Werkvertrag’  The object of a ‘Werkvertrag’  is defined in § 631(ii) BGB. It includes not only the production or alteration of  a thing (‘die Herstellung oder Veränderung einer Sache),  but also the achievement of a (particular) (successful) result by means of work or the provision of service (‘ein…durch Arbeit oder Dienstleistung herbeizuführender Erfolg’). Thus, a ‘Werkvertrag’  can include a wide range of agreements, which, at first sight, might not be considered as a homogeneous group. The linking factor, however, is the concept of an ‘Erfolg’. Classification Although it is easy to state that the provision of services (‘Dienstleistung’) is the dominant element of a ‘Dienstvertrag’ and that the achievement of an ‘Erfolg’ is characteristic of a ‘Werkvertrag’,  classification of a particular contract as a ‘Dienst-’ or ‘Werkvertrag’  can prove difficult. The real distinction lies in the fact that, in the case of a ‘Werkvertrag’,  payment is only due in the event of an ‘Erfolg’, ie, the producer bears the commercial risk (‘Unternehmerrisiko’ or ‘Erfolgsrisiko’). In a ‘Dienstvertrag’, no ‘Erfolg’  is (technically) required (eg, normally, in the case of a contract (of treatment) with a doctor (‘Arztvertrag’ /‘Benandlungsvertrag’) or lawyer (‘Anwaltsvertrag’)). Certain types of ‘Werkvertrag’  are the subject of special rules (eg, those listed in §§ 407–460 HGB (concerning shipment (‘Spedition’), storage (‘Lagerung’) or transport (‘Beförderung’) of goods), the ‘Reisevertrag’  (travel contract; §§ 651a-651k BGB) and the ‘Bauvertrag’ (building contract; see below). If die producer has to supply his own materials for production of the ‘Werk, the contract is one of work and materials (‘Werklieferungsvertrag’),  which is normally governed by the provisions relating to sale of goods: § 651 (i) BGB. On the other hand, the provisions regarding contracts for services (§§ 631ff BGB) apply, if an individualised ‘Sache’ is to be produced. The same is the case, if the materials involved are only accessory ingredients (‘Zutaten’) and their supply is not a significant element of the contract: § 651(ii) BGB. The element of reward It is important to note that both a ‘Dienstvertrag’ and a ‘Werkvertrag’  are undertaken in return for reward (‘entgeltlich’), while an ‘Auftrag’ (gratuitous contract of instruction) is not remunerated. All three are examples of a contract for me carrying out of an activity (‘Tätigkeit’) for another person. Thus, an ‘Auftrag’ requires an intention to create legal relations—it is a ‘Gefälligkeitsvertrag’, not a ‘Gefälligkeitsverhältnis’ (relationship of  grace and favour). In turn, an ‘Auftrag’ must be distinguished from a ‘Geschäftsbesorgungsuertrag’  (commercial mandate; § 675(i) BGB)—this involves the independent undertaking of a transaction (‘Geschäft’) for another person in return for reward, on the basis of a ‘Dienst-’ or ‘Werkvertrag’.  The relevant activity must relate to that other person’s economic interests (‘Vermögensinteressen’)   and be undertaken by someone in a position of trust (‘Vertrauensstellung’),  eg, a lawyer, accountant, bank or trustee. Assuming that a contract can be classified as a ‘Werkvertrag’,  what are the duties of the parties? What is their position before and after acceptance and what remedies are available, if there is a breach of contract? On whom is the burden of proof? Duties of the parties The producer (‘Unternehmer’)  has two main duties:  —  manufacture of the ‘W erk’ (= ‘Herstellung’); an d  —  delivery of the completed ‘Werk’ to the customer (= ‘Ablieferung’). In particular, by § 633(i) BGB, the producer must manufacture the ‘Werk’ in such a way that it has any relevant guaranteed qualities (‘zugesicherte Eigenschaften’) and does not have any faults (‘Mängel’), such that the value or fitness for normal use of the ‘Werk’ (or its contractually presumed use) are not suspended or reduced.

265

The German Legal System and Legal Language The customer’s main duties are to pay the agreed price (‘die vereinbarte Vergütung’)  and to accept the work. Importance of acceptance Acceptance (‘Abnahme’) is of crucial importance. The customer is only obliged to accept the ‘Werk’, if the producer has manufactured it in accordance with the contract (‘vertragsmässig’): § 640(i) BGB. Until then, the customer can refuse acceptance (§ 320(i) BGB), but not if detects are minor /insignificant (‘geringfügig’/  ‘unwesentlich’). On acceptance, the customer is liable to pay the price: § 641(i) BGB. The producer can request part payments on account (‘Abschlagszahlungen’/‘Teilzahlungen’) : § 632a BGB. Meaning of acceptance Acceptance is considered as usually consisting of two elements—the acquisition of physical possession of  the ‘Werk’ and the express or implied approval of it by the customer as being essentially in conformity with the contract (‘Billigung’). For this purpose, it suffices, if the customer, by his conduct, acknowledges that the condition of the ‘Werk’ is to his satisfaction. If physical acceptance is not possible, due to the nature of the ‘Werk’, its function is taken by the moment of  actual completion (‘Vollendung’): § 646 BGB. Breaches of contract Before acceptance, the general rules in the BGB regarding disturbances in performance (‘Leistungsstörungen’)—ie, §§ 323ff BGB—apply. Thus, if the producer is responsible for impossibility of  performance or a delay in delivery, the customer can claim damages under § 325 or § 326 BGB, respectively The general limitation period of 30 years applies. After acceptance, the general rules are ousted. The customer’s principal and secondary rights, if there is a fault in the ‘Werk’, are laid down in §§ 633ff BGB. Much shorter limitation periods then apply: §638(i)BGB. In appropriate circumstances, other remedies remain possible, eg, claims for damages under the principles of ‘culpa in contrahendo’  and PVV for breach of accessory duties (‘Nebenpflichten’) in the pre-and postcontractual phases. Rights of the customer What rights does the customer have, if a ‘Werk’ does not conform to the contract? Before acceptance, the customer can claim performance /renewed manufacture (‘Neuherstellung’)  under § 631 BGB. Alternatively, he can request removal of the defect (‘Beseitigung des Mangels’) —ie, repair (‘Nachbesserung’) —under § 633(ii) BGB or, if this is overdue, carry out the repair himself: §633(iii)BGB. If attempts at repair fail, the rights of the customer before acceptance are those set out in §§ 325, 326 BGB. Additionally, the customer can rescind the contract in the event of delayed manufacture, even without  blame (‘Verschulden’) on die part of the producer: § 636(i) BGB. After acceptance, the customer’s (secondary) rights—his guarantee claims (‘Gewährleistungsansprüche’) — are set out in §§ 634, 635 BGB. By § 634 BGB, generally after expiry of an appropriate time limit (‘angemessene Frist’), the customer can daim rescission of the contract (so-called ‘Wandlung’) or reduction of the price (so-called ‘Minderung’ ). §§ 465–467 and §§ 469–475 BGB, which relate to contracts of sale, are of corresponding application. By § 635 BGB, if the producer was responsible for the relevant defect, the customer can, instead of seeking ‘Wandlung’  or ‘Minderung’,  claim damages against the producer. § 635 BGB covers loss directly or closely related to the fault (so-called ‘Mangelscnaden’), but more distant, consequential loss (so-called ‘Mangelfolgeschaden’) falls under PvV. The distinction is important, because while ‘Mangelschaden’  is subject to the (short) limitation periods in § 638 BGB, a claim for ‘Mangelfolgeschaden’ only becomes time-barred after 30 years. By § 640(ii) BGB, if, despite knowing of a defect, the customer unreservedly accepts the ‘Werk’, he loses his rights under §§ 633, 634 BGB. However, claims under § 635 BGB, PVV, tort or product liability remain possible. Burden of proof Before acceptance, the customer must prove the content of the contract. The producer must move proper performance—ie, that the ‘Werk’ is free of faults (‘mangelfrei’)—and that the ‘Werk’ was manufactured in time (‘rechtzeitig’) . This can be established by means of a certificate of completion (‘Fertigstellungsbescheimgung’):  § 641a BGB.

266

Notes

167 168 169 170

After acceptance, the customer has the burden of proving divergences from the contract and any faults in the ‘Werk’. ^ The producer has the burden of proving that acceptance has taken place, if it is disputed. See Brox (BS), Chapter 3, § 17 III and §§ 20–25; Fikentscher, Section 11, §§ 79–82; Meyer, Part II, § 6 A; Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 6; Notes 126,189 and 234 in this Chapter; Chapter XVIII, Note 60. BGBorVOB? In the building industry, an important role is played by the ‘Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen’  (VOB), which contains (internal) administrative regulations for the award of building contracts by the public sector. Part B of the VOB sets out standard terms of business, which can, by agreement, govern a private contract for building work. In such a case, the provisions in the BGB concerning contracts for services (§§ 631ff BGB) are ousted. See Creifelds under ‘Verdingungsordnungen’. Regarding building contracts, see further: Lepp, ZAP 14/89, Fach 5, p 17 (performance and guarantee); Lepp, ZAP 3/90, Fach 5, p 47 (consequential loss); Neuhaus, ZAP 17/00, Fach 5R, p 223 (recent developments). See Fikentscher, Section 11, § 84. See Fikentscher, Section 11, § 85. See Brox (BS), Chapter 4, § 26; Fikentscher, Section 11, §§ 81–82; Meyer, Part E, § 6 CI–II See also: Note 166 in this Chapter; ‘Auftrag’. The rationale behind ‘Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag’  (GoA). The rationale underlying §§ 677ff BGB is that, although, generally, persons are not altruistic and have e  business of others without authorisation, it ca no right to interfere with the business of others without authorisation, it can happen that, despite the absence of a formal legal relationship or a pre-existing, express permission, action in another person’s interest is desirable or necessary in circumstances in which, normally, someone else would be responsible to undertake it. If so, it is right and proper that those who honourably intervene on behalf of other persons and thereby incur expenditure be granted relief/ reimbursement. Within the German law of obligations, the subject of GoA is traditionally dealt with after the law of contract,  but before tort and unjust enrichment. It is a distinct basis of equitable, quasi-contractual liability. When §§ 677ff BGB apply. Action taken for someone else is only governed by §§ 677ff BGB, if the following elements are fulfilled: (i) other (contractual or statutory) authority for the action must be lacking; (ii) the relevant matter must objectively fall within the competence of another person, ie, it must fall within someone else’s area of interest/ responsibility (there must be a ‘fremdes Geschäft’ ) ; (iii)there must be an intention to undertake the matter for the other person ( ‘Fremdgeschäftsführungswille’ ). §§ 677ff BGB do not apply, if the person conducting the matter (the ‘Geschäftsführer’) does so under a mistaken  belief that he is thereby looking after his own business: § 687(i) BGB. In particular, the provisions are not intended to encourage busy-bodies or know-alls (‘Besserwisser’), nor are they meant to benefit someone, who realises that he is not entitled to act at all, ie, who usurps his position (‘Geschäftsanmaßung’; § 687(ii) BGB). These cases of ‘Eigengeschaftsjuhrung’ (self-transaction) are not protected. Position of the parties When §§ 677ff BGB apply, the primary duty of the ‘ Geschäftsführer’ i s laid down in § 677 BGB: a person, who undertakes a matter for someone else without authority, owes proper execution of the matter (‘ordnungsgemäße  Ausführung’). He must observe the interests of the principal (the ‘Geschäftsherr’) and must take into account that person’s real or presumed wishes (‘wrklicher oder mutmaßlicher Wille’). The ‘Geschäftsführer’  also has various secondary duties—eg, to notify the ‘Geschäftsherr’ as soon as possible, to await instructions (except in an emergency) and to hand over to the ‘Geschäftsherr’ anything he recovers in the course of the GoA: § 681 BGB. Blameworthy breach of these duties can give rise to a claim for damages under general principles (§§ 280ff, 284ff, 823ff BGB; PVV). However, if the purpose of the GoA is to avert an imminent danger (‘dringende Gefahr’), the ‘Geschäfisführer’ is only liable for intent or gross negligence: § 680 BGB. If the assumption of the matter by the ‘Geschäftsführer’ accords with the wishes of the ‘Geschäftsherr’, the GoA is regarded as justified (‘berechtirt’)  ana the ‘Geschaftsfuhrer’  can claim reimbursement of his expenses (‘Ersatz seiner Aufwendungen’) from the ‘Geschäftsherr’:  §§ 683, 670 BGB. He can also claim typical consequential losses. GoA is normally justified in rescue cases. However, whether action by a public authority can be deemed GoA, thereby allowing reimbursement of costs, is controversial, as is the application of GoA in circumstances where the ‘Geschäftsführer’  has an existing contract with a third party.

267

The German Legal System and Legal Language

171 172 173 174 175 176 177

178 179 180 181 182 183

184

If, on the other hand, the Go A is unjustified (ie, the action was undertaken against the principal’s wishes and this was apparent to the ‘Geschäftsführer’ ), damages can be claimed against the ‘Geschäftsführer ’ by the ‘Geschäftsherr’: § 678 BGB. The claim is regardless of whether or not the ‘Geschäftsführer’ was otherwise at fault; it supplements other possible claims for damages based on tort or unjust enrichment. The only exception is laid down in § 679 BGB: the contrary wishes of the ‘Geschäftsherr’ are irrelevant, if the ‘Geschäftsherr’ has a duty in the public interest or a statutory duty of maintenance, which would not be fulfilled in time, if the relevant action were not taken. Go A would then be justified. A ‘Geschäftsherr’, who has been enriched by an unjustified Go A, must return everything received because of the GoA: § 684,1st sentence BGB. However, the ‘Geschäftsherr’ can subsequently approve the GoA, in which case the GoA then becomes justified: § 684,2nd sentence BGB. See Brox (BS), Chapter 6, § 31; Fikentscher, Section 11, § 83; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 6 (§ 27); Medicus (BR), Section E, § 17; Meyer, Part E, § 6 C III. See Brox (BS), Chapter 4, § 27; Fikentscher, Section 11, § 86. The equivalent concept to ‘Verwahrung’ in English law is die contract of bailment. See Charlesworth, Part 7, Chapter 24. See Fikentscher, Section 11, § 87. See Chapter XI A; Fikentscher, Section 12, § 88; Meyer, Part IV, § 9 B I. See Chapter XI A; Fikentscher, Section 12, § 89. See Fikentscher, Section 13, § 90. See Brox (BS), Chapter 5, § 30; Fikentscher, Section 13, § 91. A The purpose of a ‘Burgschaft’  is to secure performance of a main obligation (‘Hauptverbindlichkeit’) by a (third party) debtor: § 765(i) BGB. The declaration of surety (‘ Bürgschaftserklärung’) must be given in writing by the guarantor: § 766, 1st sentence BGB. However, cf § 350 HGB. A contract of guarantee (‘Garantievertrag’; ie, indemnity) is not dealt with in the BGB and creates a separate, new obligation beyond (mere) performance of the main obligation. It need not be in writing. Liability under a ‘Garantievertrag’ is strict and does not depend on fault. See Creifelds under ‘Burgschaft’ and ‘Garantievertrag’; Brox (BS), Chapter 5, § 28; Fikentscher, Section 13, § 92; Lauer, ZAP, Fach 8, p 257; Meyer, Part III, § 7 BI and III; Notes 157 and 159 in this Chapter. B In English law, by the Statute of Frauds 1677, Section 4, a contract of guarantee (ie, ‘any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person’=the equivalent of a Bürgschaft’) is unenforceable (not invalid!), unless it is evidenced by a note or memorandum in writing, signed by the person to be charged or his authorised agent. By a similar provision (Section 40, Law of Property Act 1925), a contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land was unenforceable, unless there was such evidence. Such a contract must now be ‘made’ in writing: Section 2, Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. Regarding the contract of guarantee in English law, see Charlesworth, Part 7, Chapter 25. See Brox (BS), Chapter 5, § 29; Fikentscher, Section 13, § 93. See Fikentscher, Section 13, § 94. See Fikentscher, Section 13, § 95; Meyer, Part III, § 8 B E. See Fikentscher, Section 13, §96. See Brox (BS), Chapter 7, §§ 32–35; Fikentscher, Section 15 (§§ 98–101); Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 6 (§§ 29–31); Loewenheim; Medicus (BR), Section V, §§ 26–28. Regarding the law of torts, see generally: Notes 219–224 in this Chapter; the comments under § 823 BGB in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 6; Brox (BS), Chapter 8, §§ 36–42; Dannemann, Part IV; Fikentscher, Section 16 (§§ 102–114); Kaiser, Part IV, 1–6; Kötz; Schwab (Einführung), Part IV, Chapters 2–8; Kallwass, Section 3 (§§ 34– 38); Medicus (BT), Part 10, §§ 135–148; Medicus (BR), Section IV (§§ 24–25); Meyer, Part 5, § 11 B and C; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5; Zweigert and Kötz, Part E C, Chapter 47. Regarding contributory negligence (‘Mitverschulden’) see § 254 BGB. In a road traffic accident, § 254 BGB normally applies: § 9 StVG. However, if damage is caused by several vehicles, § 254 BGB is ousted by § 17(i) StVG. See Grüneberg, ZAP 3/01, Fach 9, p 605 (Section I) and ZAP 8/01, Fach 9, p 615. Regarding defamation and business-related conduct, see Chapter VIII, Note 20. Regarding the burden of proof of fault, see Note 126 J in this Chapter. See Chapter X, Note 104; Fikentscher, Section 9, § 66 VII; Meyer, Part E, § 4 A II.

268

Notes 185

186 187 188

189

A

A ‘Rechtsmangel’ (defect in title) must be distinguished from a ‘Sachmangel’ (fault in a ‘Sache’). Regarding the latter, see Notes 188 and 189 in this Chapter. §§ 434–438 and §§ 439–443 BGB deal with ‘Rechtsmängel’, ie, the situation where the vendor fails to supply the full, unencumbered right to the relevant ‘Sache’ or ‘Recht’ sold or, as is also said, fails to fulfill his duty to procure title (‘Rechtsverschaffungspflicht’) in accordance with § 433(i) BGB. See Fikentscher, Section 9, § 69; Jauernig (BGB), §§ 434ff. B A ‘Sachmangel’ must, in turn, also be distinguished from a ‘Falschlieferung’ (wrong delivery or ‘aliud’), since the normal 30 year limitation period (only) applies to the latter. See Dannemann, Part in 3 (b); Chapter XI, Note 69. C In the English law concerning sale of goods, the purchaser is protected against both kinds of defect (defects in title and defects of quality or fitness for purpose) by the mechanism of (statutorily) implied terms. However, terms regarding quality and fitness are only implied by s 14(2) and s 14(3) Sale of  Goods Act, if the vendor sells the goods in the course of a business. In a private transaction, therefore, a buyer of goods must exercise (more) care ie, in such a situation, English law continues to adhere to the principle of ‘caveat emptor’ (let the buyer beware). See Note 47 A in this Chapter; Charlesworth, Part 3, Chapter 15. See Chapter X, Note 126 G; Fikentscher, Section 9, § 67 IV. See Note 238 in this Chapter. These guarantee provisions (‘Gewährleistungsvorschriften’) are special rules (‘Sonderregeln’),  which largely replace the general provisions of the BGB regarding ‘Leistungsstörungen’  (§§ 320ff) from the moment of  transition of risk (‘Gefahrübergang’) . The guarantee provisions extend to both movables and immovables (ie, ‘Sachen’ generally), so that the translation, which derives from the equivalent field of English law,—‘sale of  goods’—is not strictly correct. The provisions apply regardless of blame (‘Verschulden’) on the part of the vendor. See the following Note. See also: Brox (BS), Chapter 1, § 5; Creifelds under ‘Gewährleistung’;   Fikentscher, Section 9, §§ 68–70; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 2 (§ 14); Jauernig (BGB), §§ 434ff, §§ 459ff; Meyer, Part II, § 5 C. Regarding the relationship between the ‘Gewährleistungsvorschriften’ and other remedies (the question of  concurrence (‘Konkurrenz’)), ie:  —  the principle of ‘culpa in contrahendo’  (Note 135 in this Chapter);  —  PVV (Notes 47 C and 126 C in this Chapter);  —  the provisions concerning ‘Anfechtung’ (challenge) (§§ 119–123 BGB);  —  claims in tort (Notes 183 and 219 in this Chapter);  —  product liability (‘Produkthaftung’), ie, the liability of the manufacturer (‘Hersteller’) of a movable (Notes 126 J and 222 in this Chapter); See Brox (BS), Chapter 1, § 5 VI; Fikentscher, Section 9, § 70 IX; Jauernig (BGB), § 459 IV. A Pursuant to § 459 BGB, the principal norm, the vendor of a ‘Sache’ (movable or immovable) has a twofold liability—he not only guarantees to the purchaser that, at the time of transition of risk, the ‘Sache’ is not affected by faults (‘Fenler ’), such that the value or the fitness for normal use of the ‘Sache’ (or its contractually presumed use) are not suspended or (significantly) reduced. The vendor is also liable for guaranteed qualities (‘zugesicherte Eigenschaften’)  of the relevant ‘Sache’. A ‘Sache’ is faulty (‘fehlerhaft’), if there is a deviation (‘Abweichung’) between the actual and usual (or contractually presumed) condition of the ‘Sache’, to the detriment of the purchaser. The test is subjective. See Medicus (BR), Section I, Chapter 2 (§ 15). B If a ‘Sache’ is faulty and the vendor is not relieved from liability under § 460 BGB, the purchaser can claim either rescission of the purchase ( ‘Rückgängigmachung des Kaufes’,   so-called ‘Wandlung’) or reduction of the purchase price ( ‘Herabsetzung des Kaufpreises’,  so-called ‘Minderung’ ): § 462 BGB. If a ‘Sache’ lacks a guaranteed quality (‘zugesicherte Eigenschaft’)  at the time of sale, or if a fault was fraudulently concealed (‘arglistig verschwiegen’)  by the vendor, the purchaser has an alternative remedy. Instead of seeking ‘Wandlung’ or ‘Minderung’,  he can claim damages (‘Schadensersatz’): § 463 BGB. However, § 463 BGB only enables damages to be recovered for loss directly involving the ‘Sache’ itself  (so-called ‘Mangelscnaden’); other consequential loss (‘Mangelfolgeschaden’) can fall within PVV, if it was caused by the fault (‘Verschulden’) of the vendor. C A vendor can exclude or limit his liability for faulty ‘Sachen’ by way of (express or implied) agreement  but such an agreement is void, if the relevant fault is fraudulently concealed by the vendor: § 476 BGB. Moreover, the parties can agree that the vendor (first) be allowed to attempt correction/repair of the defect (‘Nachbesserung’). Such a remedy is available to a customer as of right in the case of a ‘Werkvertrag’ (contract for services), as a means of achieving the removal of the defect (‘Beseitigung des Mangels’) : § 633(ii) BGB. See also §11 No 10 AGBG.

269

The German Legal System and Legal Language

190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208

209

Liability can also be extended by an (independent) contract of guarantee (‘Garantievertrag’) . See Notes 126 D and 177 in this Chapter; Jauernig (BGB), § 4591. D Regarding ‘Wandlung’,  see § 467 BGB; —the limitation period for claims, see § 477 BGB; Preface to Second Edition, Note 11; Note 185 in this Chapter; —the special position of a purchaser in a generic purchase, see § 480 BGB and Note 116 in this Chapter. See Chapter X C 3 (b) Title 5. See Fikentscher, Section 9, § 71. See Fikentscher, Section 9, § 72. See Thorsten Vehslage, ZAP, Fach 3, p 169; ZAP-Aktuell, 15/00, p 938. See Fikentscher, Section 9, § 73. See Note 265 in this Chapter. Ownership of the fruits is acquired by the lessee under §§ 956–957 BGB. See Note 106 in this Chapter. See Creifelds under ‘Leasingvertrag ’ and ‘Mietkauf; Fikentscher, Section 9, § 71 V 7; Meyer, § 6 D IV; Note 238 in this Chapter. Regarding the different types of licence, see Creifelds under ‘Lizenzvertrag’. See also: Meyer, § 6 D V; Chapter XI, Note 42. Regarding the remedies available to the lessor, if the lessee does not comply with the contractually required use, see §§ 550 and 553 BGB (§§ 541,543 BGB). Regarding the position of the borrower under a contract of ‘Leihe’,  see §§ 603(i) and 605 No 2 BGB. SeeGather, ZAP 5/95, Fach4, p 339. Whether the condition of the rented item is defective is assessed subjectively. ‘Fehler’  is a wide term. The same applies, if the object of the rental agreement lacks a particular guaranteed quality (‘zugesicherte Eigenschaft’) or if such a characteristic later falls away: § 537(ii) BGB. § 566 BGB (§ 550 BGB) extends to residential accommodation (‘Wohnraum’)  and other premises (‘Räume’). Note, in these cases, §§ 564a-564b BGB (§§ 568,573 BGB). The first possible termination date is the end of the first year: § 566, 2nd sentence BGB. See Medicus (BT), Part 2  § 89 II. , If the lessee continues to use the rented item after expiry, the rental agreement is deemed to continue for an unspecified period, unless the lessor or the lessee express a contrary intention within two weeks: § 568 BGB (§ 545 BGB). See Fikentscher, Section 10, § 74 III; Medicus (BT), Part 2, § 88V. The same used to apply, if the rental agreement was entered into for a limited period (‘Zeitmietvertrag’): § 556b (i) BGB (repealed). The tenant could request continuation of such a tenancy for an indefinite period, if  he did so in writing not later than two months before expiry of the agreement. In future, however, the tenancy renews itself automatically until terminated by one of the parties, unless there is a written reciprocal waiver of termination (‘wechselseitiger Kündigungsverzicht’): § 564c (i) BGB. A See Fikentscher, Section 10, § 74IV; Medicus (BT), Part 2, § 90. The purpose of § 564b BGB (§ 573 BGB) is to protect a tenant, who abides by the contract (ie, is ‘vertragstreu’) . Thus, a contrary agreement, which disadvantages the tenant, has no effect: § 564b (vi) BGB. Moreover, the landlorabears the burden of proof of his ‘justified interest ’ and cannot usually  bring forward grounds not stated in the written ‘Kündigung’ : § 564b (iii) BGB. § 564b BGB (§ 573 BGB) does not apply: (1)to short-term accommodation (ie, let out for temporary use (‘zu vorübergehendem Gebrauch’); (2)to accommodation in a building also occupied by the landlord, unless the accommodation is intended for permanent use by a family; and (3)to accommodation in a student or youth hostel. (§ 564b (vii) BGB) (§ 549 BGB). B A tenant of residential accommodation is also not protected against termination, if the rental agreement is entered into for a limited period and, at the time of conclusion of the agreement, the landlord declares in writing that, after expiry of the tenancy, he intends either to use the premises for himself or his family, to do away with the premises or carry out significant conversion or renovation work thereto or to re-let the accommodation to members of staff (a so-called ‘qualified tenancy for a limited period

270

Notes

210 211

212 213 214 215

See 216 217 218 219

without security’V The tenancy ends, if the landlord then confirms the position at the tenant’s request three months before expiry of the term: § 564c (ii) BGB (§ 575 BGB). The landlord bears the burden of proof that the relevant grounds exist. See Horst, ZAP 11 / 95, Fach 4, p 359; ZAP Mandanten-lnformation 1 / 2001, p 4. C By § 5 ‘Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz’ (WiStG) 1954, which makes sundry business infringements punishable, the overcharging of rent (‘Mietyreisüberhöhung’)  for residential premises constitutes a minor offence (‘Ordnungswidrigkeit’). A fine of up to DM 100,000 can be imposed. There is overcharging within § 5 WiStG, if the relevant rent is disproportionately high (‘unangemessen hoch), ie, broadly, 20§ or more above the comparable local rent (‘ortsubliche Vergleichsmiete’) . If § 5 WiStG is infringed, the rental agreement is void for civil law purposes (§ 134 BGB) and a claim for repayment of overpaid rent can be made on the ground of unjust enrichment (§§ 812ff BGB). See Kossmann, ZAP 21 / 00, Fach 4, p 615. Where the custodian is a public authority, one speaks of an ‘öffentlich-rechtliche Verwahrung’. The provisions in the BGB apply analogously, with the exception of § 690. Sums held in a current bank or post office account (‘Girokonto’) are normally classified as irregular contracts of custody. Savings accounts (‘Sparkonten’), on the other hand, are deemed to be loans. Deposit of securities (‘Wertpapierverwahrung ’) with banks is governed by the ‘Depotgesetz’ (Deposit Law) of  4.2.1937, unless it is expressly agreed that they should be held under an irregular contract of custody: §700(ii) BGB. Both the deposit of money (‘Einlagengeschäft’) and the deposit of securities (‘Depotgeschäft’) at credit institutions (‘Kreditinstitute’) are banking transactions (‘Bankgeschäfte’), to which the Law concerning the Credit System (‘Kreditwesengesetz’  (KWG)) of 11.7.1985 applies. See Creifelds under ‘Bankeinlagen’, ‘Bankgeschäfte’, ‘Depotgeschäft’  and ‘Kreditinstitute’. See Chapter XVIII B. See the article by Heil and Scherer, ZAP, Fach 17, p 363. See Notes 104 and 234 in this Chapter. The general rule is that the giving of advice or recommendation is regarded merely as a non-committal social favour (‘unverbindliche Gefälligkeit’),  which is not intended to create legal relations. However, the provision of information (‘Auskunft’)  by persons having particular expertise (‘Sachkunde’)  within the context of their profession or business is, usually, binding. To establish Liability, there does not have to be an express contract; liability can be based on an accessory duty (‘Nebenpflicht’),   a relationship of trust (‘Vertrauensverhältnis’),  a contract with protective effect (if a third party is involved), or tort (§ 826 BGB). Thus, eg, a bank must be careful to ensure that any information or advice it gives regarding investments is correct (‘richtig’) and complete (‘vollständig’). Depending on the circumstances, there can be a duty on a  bank to draw attention to significant risks (wesentlicne Risiken’) involved in a particular transaction or even to reveal its own existing knowledge, which gives the bank an informed advantage (‘Wissensvorsprung’) . Note 135 in this Chapter; Jauernig (BGB), § 676; Lauer, ZAP, Fach 8, p 335; ZAP EN-Nr 722/ 2000. See ZAP-Aktuell, 25.8.1999, p 812; Note 166 in this Chapter. See Chapter XIB. See Chapter XI B. It is important initially to understand that the German law of torts is principally directed at the protection of certain ‘legal assets’ (‘Rechtsgüter’; ie, assets/rights considered by the legal system as worthy of protection) against infringement and that negligence ( ‘Fahrlässigkeit’; defined in § 276 BGB) is merely a possible form of  such an infringement. In English law, on the other hand, ‘negligence’ is a separate tort constructed around the concept of a duty (of care). See Note 183, above. § 823 BGB contains two heads of liability: one general (§ 823(i)) and the other based on breach of a protective statute (‘Schutzgesetz’) (§ 823(ii)). § 823(i) BGB provides a remedy for injury to particular ‘Rechtsgüter’. It covers not only active conduct, but also omissions (‘Unterlassen’). See Note 222 B, below. Liability under § 823(i) was successfully established in:  — The Fowl Pest Case;  — The Publication of a Letter Case; and  — The Newspaper Delivery Obstruction Case . (See the Sourcebook,  Chapter 6). Under § 823(ii) BGB, a plaintiff can claim damages against another person for deliberate or negligent  breach of a provision in a ‘Schutzgesetz’ (protective statute) if:

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220

221 222

 –  the provision has as its purpose the protection of individual persons (‘Individualschutz’);  –  the plaintiff belongs to the protected class (‘geschiztzter Personenkreis’); and  –  the plaintiff’s interest (eg, his bodily health) is protected by the norm. § 823(ii) BGB is not limited to specific, subjective rights, but covers any individual interests. See Brox (BS), Chapter 8, § 37 B; Fikentscher, Section 16, § 104; Medicus (BT), Part 10, Section 1, §142. These further ‘Anspruchsgrundlagen’  are directed towards compensation for:  –  harm to financial status (§ 824 BGB); and  –  harm contrary to morality (§§ 825–826 BGB). ( Sourcebook,  Chapter 6). § 826 BGB provides protection against ‘vorsàtzliche sittenwidrige Schädigung’ (intentional immoral injury). § 826 is a general clause—a mopping-up provision (‘Auffangtatbesiand’)—which can come into play in conjunction with norms both inside and outside the BGB (eg, unfair competition rules). However, the dominant view is that it is ousted by § 839 BGB. § 826 BGB requires damage (‘Schaden’) to another person, caused intentionally (‘vorsàtzlich’)  and (objectively) in breach of good morals (‘gegen die guten Sitten’). Unlike § 823(i) BGB, no injury to a particular legal asset (‘Rechtsgut’) is necessary and § 826 protects a person’s wealth (‘Vermogen’) as such. The same remedies are available under both provisions. The relevant conduct, which falls within § 826, can be objectionable (‘verwerflich’) according to its form or purpose (‘Zweck’) and can be directed either against a business partner or a third party (eg, an authority). Due to continual changes in social values (‘Werte’),  the categories of situations covered by § 826 are not closed, although § 82b is predominantly applied in the commercial field, if claims on other grounds fail. Thus, for example, § 826 can cover.  –  fraudulent deception (‘arglistige Täuschung’ / ‘Irreführung’);  –   breach of trust by a trustee (‘Vertrauensbruch eines Treuhänders’);  –  inducement to breach of contract (‘Verleiten zum Vertragsbruch’);  –  payment of slush money (‘S chmiergeld’);  –  abuse of position (‘Ausnutzung einer Stellung’);  –  fraud on creditors (‘Gläubigerbenachteiligung’). See Brox (BS), Chapter 8, § 37 C; Fikentscher, Section 16, Part 1, § 105; Jauernig (BGB), § 826; Medicus (BT), Part 10, Section 1, § 143; Dannemann, Section IV, 3; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part II, Section I. See Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part III, Section B. A Vicarious liability for acts of directors or persons employed can be alleged both in conjunction with a contract (§ 31 BGB; § 278 BGB) and in tort (§ 831 BGB). The contractual remedy is stronger, as under § 831 BGB an employer can be relieved from liability, if he observes the necessary degree of care (although he still has a general duty of supervision (‘Aufsichtspflidit’). Moreover, for § 831 BGB to apply, the employer must have a right of direction (‘Weisungsrecht’)  over the person concerned. The acts of  independent contractors are, therefore, not covered. See Note 135 A in this Chapter. B Regardless of relief from liability under § 831 BGB, an employer can be open to a direct claim for damages in tort under § 823(i) BGB for failure to observe a duty of safety (‘Verkehrssicherungspfticht’) or a duty of supervision (‘Aufsichtspflicht’). In this connection, it is important to appreciate that a claim under § 823(i) BGB has four distinct components: (a) there must be injury to one of the legal assets/rights protected by that paragraph (‘Rechtsgutsverletzung’); (b) the damage must be attributable (‘zurechenbar’)  to the defendant; (c) the conduct of the defendant must be unlawful (‘rechtswidrig’); and (d) the conduct of the defendant must be blameworthy (‘schuldhaft’), ie, intentional or negligent. Components (a) and (b) constitute the ‘Tatbestand’ of the norm, while (c) relates to ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ and (d) raises the issue of ‘Schuld’. (It is useful to compare the similar construction of the norms of  criminal law; see Chapter XVI C.) Whether damage is due to the breach of a ‘Verkehrssicherungspflicht’ falls within component (b) ie, it goes to the question of causation. The underlying rationale of the doctrine of the ‘Verkehrssicherungspflicht’  is that anyone who creates a source of danger (‘Gefahrenquelle’)  or allows one to persist must take appropriate precautionary steps (‘Vorkehrungen’)  to ensure that third parties come to no harm (cf the ‘Garantenpftich’ in criminal law, Chapter XVIC 1 (b)). For example, persons who are in charge of premises (eg, a building (site) or children’s playground) or who organize sporting events (‘Sportveranstaltungen’) have a duty to act to prevent/ward off danger (‘Gefahrabwendungspflicht’) (to visitors/spectators).

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Notes

223 224

225

Members of a profession (eg, an architect or doctor) can also be exposed to liability in tort, if they fail to maintain the standards to be expected of them (‘Berufspflichten’) and cause harm to others. Generally, any place, thing or activity, at which members of the public are present, with which they come into contact or upon which they rely can be a potential hazard. Adequate protective measures must be taken. The Fallen Telegraph Pole Case  ( Sourcebook,  Chapter 6) is instructive. In that case, a motorcyclist was seriously injured when he drove into a telegraph pole lying across a road at night. The pole belonged to the defendant Post Office and the question was whether there had been a blameworthy omission by the defendant to observe a ‘Verkehrssicherungspflicht’ . The plaintiff alleged both delayed removal and defective maintenance of the fallen telegraph pole. In the context of the first limb (delayed removal), the exception to § 831 BGB was successfully invoked. A claim under § 823 BGB on that ground was also rejected, because there was no apparent organisational fault (‘Organisationsverscnulden’), ie, no failure to observe a duty of supervision. On the question of defective maintenance, however, the facts still required to be clarified. It was possible that defective maintenance was a contributory cause of the accident. The matter was, therefore, referred  back (to the lower court) and the burden of proof reversed. See Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part IF 3, Part II E 3 and Part III C 3. The burden of proof can also be eased. Thus, if a tree on a roadside is rotten and a passer-by is injured  by falling branches, there is prima facie evidence (‘Anscheinsbeweis’) that the accident was caused by the  breach of a ‘Verkehrssicherungspflicht’ . See Chapter XIII, Note 10; ZAPEN-Nr 462/2001. C Where a juristic person is represented by a person holding the position of an organ (‘Organstellung’),  blameworthy conduct by the relevant individual is attributed to the body represented, which is regarded as having a duty of safety (‘Verkehrs(sicherungs)pfticht’)  or duty of organisation (‘Organisationspflicht’). The claim against the juristic person is founded on §§ 823(i), 31, 30, 89(i) BGB, thereby avoiding § 831 BGB. See Kaiser, Part IV, 3. D The concept of the ‘Verkehrs(sicherungs)pflicht’  also plays a central role in the German law of product liability, where it is broken down into various sub-duties. See Dannemann, Section IV, l(c) and 4(b);  Jauernig, § 823, Section VIII E. E Road traffic (‘Straßenverkehr’)  is governed by special norms (StVG, StVO, StVZO). If harm is caused, persons involved can be subject to strict liability (‘Gefährdungshaftung’) —as, for example, the keeper (‘Halter’) or driver (‘Führer’)  of a motor vehicle (‘Kraftfahrzeug’) under § 7 and § 18 StVG, respectively—and/or, provided fault (‘Verschulden’) can be shown, to a claim in tort. Additional rights are expressly preserved by § 16 StVG. The basis for liability in tort is § 823(i) BGB, where there is a failure to observe a ‘Verkehrssicherungspflicht’ or, as appropriate, § 823(ii) BGB in conjunction with the relevant norm of road traffic law, provided it can DC classified as a ‘Schutzgesetz’ (protective statute). See Grüneberg, ZAP 12/00, Fach 9, p 583 (Section II 3); Medicus (BT), Part 10, Section 2, § 146. F Regarding ‘Verkehrs(sicherungs)pflichten’  generally, see Jauernig, § 823, Section IIB 4. See Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part II E 3. Whereas liability for the official activity (‘hoheitliches Handeln’)  of a civil servant is assumed—as a matter of  public law—by the State on the basis of Article 34 GG (in conjunction with § 839 BGB; ‘Staatshaftung’), the  breach of an official duty (Amtspflicht’) by a civil servant acting fiscally or in private law form can result in his personal (private) liability (‘Eigenhaftung’) § 839(i) BGB. However, a civil servant can only be held personally liable for negligence (‘Fahrtässigkeit’), if there is no alternative means of obtaining redress (‘Keine anderweitige Ersatzmöglichkeit’)—§ 839(i), 2nd sentence BGB— eg, under §§ 8230), 31/ 89(i) BGB against his employer/master (‘Dienstherr’), ie, where the civil servant has acted as an organ (in a representative capacity). § 839 and § 823 (or § 831) BGB are mutually exclusive, ie, where § 839 applies, a claim cannot also be based on those other provisions. See Chapter II C and Chapter XIII D1 (e); Creifelds under ‘Staatshaftung’; Fikentscher, Section 16, § 106 IV; Kaiser, Part IV, 6; Jauernig (BGB), § 839 I-III; Medicus (BT), Part 10, Section 3, § 150; Note 222 in this Chapter. Liability under Article 34 GG (in conjunction with § 839 BGB) was established in The Air Traffic Controllers’ Strike Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 6). See Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part III, Section B.

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227

228 229

230 231

232 233 234

Usually, only a person, whose ‘Rechtsgüter’ (legal assets) have been infringed can sue in tort. §§ 844 and 845 BGB contain limited exceptions to this principle for a particular group of persons ie, those who had a right to maintenance (‘Recht auf Unterhalt’)  against the deceased (§ 844 BGB) or to whom the deceased owed services (§ 845 BGB). See Jauernig (BGB), §§ 844–846 (preliminary comments); Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part VI, Section B (5) (a) In principle, damages (‘Schadensersatz’) can be claimed under the BGB (§§ 249ff) regardless of whether the loss involved is pecuniary loss ( ‘Vermögensschaden’,  ie, loss which can be expressed in terms of  money) or non-pecuniary loss (‘Nichtvermögensschaden’).   However, general damage to wealth (‘allgemeiner Vermögensschaden’) —pure economic loss—is not protected. Moreover and more importantly, compensation in money for immaterial loss (immaterieller Schaden’I ‘Nichtvermögensschaden’ in the narrow sense) is limited; it is only available in those cases prescribed by statute: § 253 BGB. (b) A major exception to the exclusion of immaterial loss is contained in § 847(i) BGB (ie, the law of tort): a person, whose body or health has been injured or who has been deprived of his freedom can claim an equitable amount in money (‘eine billige Entschädigung in Geld’) —ie, damages for pain and suffering (‘Schmerzensgeld’) —for his immaterial, non-pecuniary loss. Further, damages for pain and suffering can also be awarded, if there is a (serious) infringement of the ‘allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht’. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 C. § 847(i) BGB only applies to injuries resulting from a tort within §§ 823ff BGB. It does not apply to contractual claims nor to cases of strict liability (eg, under the ‘Straßenverkehrsgesetz’  (Road Traffic Law) or the ‘Produkthaftungsgesetz’ (Product Liability Law); regarding the latter, see Note 126 J in this Chapter). See also Preface to Second Edition, Note 11 B. In the case of road traffic accidents giving rise to a claim for ‘Schmerzensgeld’, tables have been developed to help calculate the proper amount, based on court decisions. See Schneider and Biebrach, ZAP 21/95, Fach 9, p 389; ZAP ‘Justizspiegel’, 6/01, p 301; Chapter XIII, Note 96. In German law, third parties (eg, dependants who suffer nervous shock) have no claim to damages for pain and suffering in their own right. See Jauernig (BGB), § 847; Creifelds under ‘Schmerzensgeld’  and ‘Produkthaftung’;  Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part VI, Section B (4). (c) Regarding the meaning of the term ‘Vermögensschaden’, the extent of the loss recoverable (the so-called ‘Interesse’  (interest)) and its calculation, see Creifelds under ‘Schaden’, ‘Schadensersatz’  2; Fikentscher, Section 5, §§ 49, 50 and 55 and Section 16, §§ 111 and 113; Jauernig (BGB), vor §§249–253. Regarding (pure) economic loss, see Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part VI, Section B (3). See Note 96 in this Chapter. For further information, see generally Creifelds; Kaiser, Part V; Kallwass, Section 4, Chapters 1–6 (§§ 58–79); Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V (§§ 58–66); Medicus (BR), Section III (§ 19); Meyer, Part 1, § 2 A V; Model/ Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 F (333–340); Reich/Schmitz, Chapter 5; Westermann (Grundbeeriffe), Chapters 14–18; Westermann (SR), Vol I (General Principles and Movables) and Vol II (Immovables); other textbooks eg, Schwab/Prütting; Wolf. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (i), below; Nicholas, Chapter III 1 (Fundamental Distinctions). The equivalent terms to ‘Besitz’ and ‘Eigentum’ in Roman law are ‘possessio’ and ‘dominium’. See the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 1 (§ 58, Section III; ‘Regelungsbereiche des Sachenrechts’) . ‘Eigentum’ can exist in two main forms: sole ownership (‘Alleineigentum’) or joint ownership, which, in turn, exists as either ‘Miteigentum (nach Bruchteilen)’  (§91008–1011 BGB) or as ‘Gesamihandseigentum’ . A further category is the ‘eigentumsähnliches Recht’  (quasi-proprietary right)—ie, a real right treated as though it were the equivalent of ownership. The main example is me ‘Erbbaurecht’  (heritable building right). It can  be disposed of and encumbered like a piece of land (‘Grundstück’) and is therefore also referred to as a ‘grundstücksgleiches Recht . See Baur/Stümer, § 3 II, § 15 III 3; Chapter XI A. See the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 3 (§ 64, Section II; ‘Sonstige dingliche Rechte ’). Regarding the various types of security over movables and immovables, see also: Kallwass, Section 4, Chapter 3 (§ 65); Wolf, Chapter 5 (‘Sicherungsrechte’;  §§ 28–35). See Creifelds under ‘Grundstück’ and ‘Grundstücksrechte’. ‘Bewegliche Sachen’  (movables) are commonly translated into English as ‘goods’, although they can also be referred to as ‘chattels’. See Notes 11 and 234 in this Chapter. See also ‘Waren’. A To be distinguished is the (subjective) term ‘Gattungsschuld’  (generic debt; § 243 BGB), which describes a particular obligation. It usually involves a ‘vertretbare Sache’, but this does not have to be so: see Rüthers, Chapter 3, § 10 III.

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Notes Whether a ‘Sache’ is ‘vertretbar’ or not is important for the distinction between a ‘Lieferungskauf  (delivery sale) and a ‘Werklieferungsvertrag’  (contract of work and materials). Thus, if a ‘vertretbare Sache’ is to be produced and delivered (eg, one which is catalogued or normed in some way), the sale of goods provisions (§§ 433ff BGB) apply, whereas a contract for delivery of a ‘Sache’  with particular individualised characteristics is treated as a ‘Werkvertrag’ (contract for services) and §§633ff BGB apply. See § 651(i) BGB; Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 6 II. B In English law, too, there is a fundamental distinction between a contract of sale of goods, which is governed by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA), and a contract, the substance of which is the provision of services (with goods supplied)—a contract for work and materials—which is governed by the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. A contract for the sale of goods is ‘a contract by which the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration called the price’ (s 2(i) SGA). The term ‘goods’ includes all chattels personal, other than things in action and money (s 61 SGA). In a contract for the sale of goods, risk normally passes with property (ownership) and depends on whether the goods are classified as specific goods or unascertained goods. Moreover, the seller can only sue for the price, if property has passed to the buyer (cf § 446 BGB, under which the moment of  ‘Übergabe’  (delivery) is decisive). Otherwise—unless the price is payable on a specified date—the seller is limited to a claim for damages for non-acceptance. See Charlesworth, Part 3, Chapter 15. C In England, contracts for the sale of land are governed by the Law of Property Act 1925, as amended. A transfer of ownership of (real) property is called a ‘conveyance’. When land is sold, the conveyance includes the land, but (normally) not the chattels. See the previous Note. 235 An example of a ‘verbrauchbare’ (and ‘vertretbare’) ‘Sache’ is money, which, if given by way of loan (‘Darlehen’), must be returned in equivalent form: § 607(i) BGB. 236   ‘Ansprüche’ (claims) are relative rights, even if they have no obligational basis and serve to protect a real right, from which they flow (so-called ‘dingliche Ansprüche’). However, provisions of Books I and II of the BGB (eg, §§ 194, 242, 249, 273, 281) can be of analogous, ancillary or supplementary application to relationships governed by Book in. See Note 266 in this Chapter; Schwab (Einführung), Part IV, Chapter 4 E; Westermann (SR), § 2 III, § 5; Wolf, Chapter 3 (§13). 237 The principle of speciality does not apply in Book II (law of obligations). Thus, eg, a ‘S achgesamtheit’ can be the subject of a contract of sale. However, a transfer of ownership (‘Übereignung’)  can only take place in respect of each individual ‘Sache’ and in the appropriate form. The ‘Sache’ in question must be (sufficiently) specified (bestimmt’) and not merely capable of specification (‘bestimmbar). See Baumann (ER), Part II, § 6 II 3 (b); Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V, § 591 and Part IV, § 44 II 4. 238 In English law, this type of arrangement is referred to as a ‘conditional sale agreement’. A ‘conditional sale agreement’ falls under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, when it is a (regulated) consumer credit agreement. See Charlesworth, Part 3, Chapters 16 and 17. In Germany, the equivalent statute is the ‘Verbraucherkreditgesetz’   (VerbrKrG; Consumer Credit Law) of  17.12.1990. The VerbrKrG is more comprehensive than the previous law relating to instalment business (‘Abzahlungsgeschäft’, ‘Teilzahlungsgeschäft’). Th e VerbrKrG also covers hire-purchase (‘Mietkauf’) and leasing arrangements. See Creifelds under ‘Eigentumsuorbehalt’, ‘Kreditvertrag’, ‘Mietkauf  and ‘Leasingvertrag’, The VerbrKG extends by analogy to an accession by an additional debtor (‘S chuldbeitritt’), but not to a guarantee (‘Burgschaft’) by a consumer of a commercial loan. See Scherer/Mayer, ZAP 13/98, Fach 8, p299. Regarding the different forms of ‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’, see Schwab /Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 3, § 30. Regarding the financing of instalment business, see Creifelds under ‘Teilzahlungskredite’. See also Notes 77,239 and 245 in this Chapter. 239 See Creifelds under ‘Anwrtschaft’ and ‘Anwartschaftsrecht’; Rüthers, Chapter 2, § 5 IV. Rüthers points out that an ‘Anwartschaftsrecht can be directed not only to the acquisition of a ‘dingliches Recht’, but also to the acquisition of a relative right. Regarding ‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’ see generally: Brox (BS), Chapter 1, § 61; Fikentscher, Section 9, § 71 V 1–4; Schulte, Vol 2, Chapter 5 VII; Wolf, Chapter 5, Section 1 (§ 29). 240 See Chapter XC 22. 241 The BGB also provides for two types of ‘schuldrechtliche Verfügungen’  in Book II (law of obligations):

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242 243 244

245

246

247 248

249 250 251 252 253

 – ‘Abtretung’  (assignment; § 398); and  – ‘Erlaf? (remission of debt; § 397). See Schellhammer (ZR), Book 3, Part 33, Chapter 4 3. The transfer of a right is also referred to as a ‘Veräufterung’ (disposal). See §§ 185 and 816 BGB. See also: Note 262 in this Chapter; Creifelds under ‘Verfügung eines Nichtberechtigten’, ‘Ermächtigung’ and ‘Unwirksamkeit eines Rechtsgeschäfts’; W olf, Chapter 4, § 17 IV. An order for the compulsory sale of land by auction (‘Zwangsversteigerung’)  or compulsory administration (‘Zuwngsverwaltung’) constitutes a seizure (‘Beschlagnahme’) ofthe land: §§ 20,148 ZVG. Like the distraint lien (‘Pfündungspfandrecht’)  over movables, it results in the object of enforcement being taken under public control (‘Verstrickung’). See Chapter XIII, Note 179. This is the normal position. However, a ‘Verfügung’   can be made subject to a condition (‘Bedingunsf).  Thus, in the case of an ‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’, the condition under which property is transferred is full payment of the purchase price. If it is not paid or instalments are not paid on time, the property transfer (‘Übereignung’)  is void and the owner can claim return of the ‘Sache under § 985 BGB. The vendor can extricate himself from the contract of sale by claiming rescission (‘Rücktritt’): § 455 BGB. Until the right of rescission is exercised, the contract of  sale itself (= ‘Verpflichtungsgeschäft’  ) is completely valid. To be distinguished is the situation where a transfer of property is subject to the validity of the contract of  sale. Such a (resolutive) condition (‘auflösende Bedingung’),  whilst theoretically permissible (under § 158(ii) BGB; only for movables: § 925(ii) BGB), would amount to a breach of the abstraction principle. The only other situations in which, exceptionally, the abstraction principle is breached are:  –  where the same defect nullifies both the ‘Verpflichtungsgeschft’  and the ‘Verfugungsgeschaft’   (so-called ‘Fehleridentität’ (identical defect)), ie, in a case of:  – ‘Geschäftsunfähigkeit’ (§ 105 BGB);  – ‘arglistige Täuschung’ or ‘widerrechtliche Drohung  (§ 123 BGB); or  – ‘Wucher’ (usury) (§ 138(ii) BGB). In such cases, the property transfer is also void and return of the ‘Sache’ can be claimed under § 985 BGB (ie, apart from a claim under § 812(i), 1st sentence, 1st alternative BGB).  –  where the parties agree that the ‘Verpflichtungsyeschaft’  and the ‘Verfugungsgeschaft’  are to be a unified transaction (so-called ‘Geschäftseinheit’, falling under § 139 BGB). See Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 1, § 59 III; Löwisch, Part 3, § 14, Case 76; Meyer, Part II, § 5 A V; Schwab (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 8 D b; Westermann (SR), Vol I, Book I, § 4IV. See Chapters X B 2 (a) and X C 3 (g) (Title 24); Appendix A under ‘Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung’, ‘Leistungskondiktion’ and ‘Nichtleistungskondiktion’. See also Wolf, Chapter 4 (§ 17); Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 36 IV) and Wesel (FR), Chapter 3 (‘Eigentum’). Wesel points out that the abstraction principle is the creation of the 19th century jurist Savigny. Wesel describes it as ‘a high point of juristic acrobatics’. See Note 109 in this Chapter. Regarding ‘Besitz’ see generally: Creifelds; Kaiser, Part V, 5; Klunzinger (Emführuns),  Part V, Chapter 2, § 60; Nicholas, Chapter III, 2; Rehbinder, Chapter II, § 16; Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 1 (§§ 3–11); Westermann (Grundbegriffe), Chapter 14; Westermann (SR), Vol I, Book II (§§ 8–27); Wolf, Chapter 2, § 8. See also Note 266 D in this Chapter. Regarding real property law and the Land Register, see generally Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 2 (§§12–21). The transaction must be a ‘Verkehrsgeschäft’,  ie, at arm’s length between different persons. See Westermann (SR), Vol II, Book VI, § 101; Wolf, Chapter 4, § 20 II. However, Article 14 GG does not protect a person’s ‘Vermögen’  (wealth) as such: see The Investment Aid Act Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 3). See the comments under Article 14 GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 3; Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 1, § 24. The pieces of land do not have to be neighbouring properties (‘Nachbargrundstücke’). Cf §§ 907–924 BGB. See Schwab /Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 1, § 25; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part E, Section B.

276

Notes 254

255

256

257

Other provisions which play a central role in the protection of neighbours against nuisances are: §§ 859,862,910 and 1004 BGB. Claims under § 823 BGB are also possible. See die article by Hans Reinold Horst in ZAP 3/99, Fach 7, p 159, which contains a survey of the specific types of nuisance mentioned in § 906 BGB. See also: Note 266 in this Chapter; Creifelds under ‘Immissionen’, ‘Nachbarrecht’  and ‘Aufopferungsans pruch’. See the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung),   Part V, Chapter 2 (§ 62, Section I; ‘rechtsgeschäftlicher Eigentumserwerb’ ). See also: Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 8 (§§ 36–37); Kaiser, Part V, 7; Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 3 (§§ 26 and 29); Westermann (Grundbegriffe), Chapter 15; Wolf, Chapter 4, Section 1 (§ 18) and Section 2 (§ 22). A transferee can usually only acquire the same legal position as that of the transferor: Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse habet (nemo dat, quod non habet) . The right of the transferee is said to be ‘abgeleitet’ (derived) from his predecessor (‘Rechtsvorgänger’).  A transfer of ownership is an example of a ‘Rechtsnachfolge’ or ‘Sukzession’ (succession). See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsnachfolge’, ‘Rechtserwerb’  and ‘Nemo  plus iuris…’ and the discussion of § 929 BGB and the abstraction principle in Wesel (FR), Chapter 3 (‘Eigentum’). See also Kallwass, Section 4, Chapter 5 (§74). The ‘nemo dat’ rule also applies in Fjiglish law. See Note 260 in this Chapter. A The ‘Auflassung’ (conveyance) of a piece of land (‘Grundstück’) is independent of, and must be strictly distinguished from, the underlying obligational transaction (eg, a contract of sale (‘Grundstückskaujvertrag’)). That transaction must normally (also) be notarially documented: § 313 BGB. An ‘Auflassung’ must be declared before a competent authority (eg, any German notary) in the presence of both parties: § 925(i), 1st sentence BGB. The notary must draw up a written record of the proceedings (‘Niederschrift’ über die Verhandlung’),  which must be read out to the participants in the presence of the notary, be approved by the parties, signed by them personally and finally by the notary: § 13 BeurkG. The ‘Niederschrift’ thereby becomes a public document (‘öffentliche Urkunde’). An ‘Auflassung’ cannot be conditional or limited in time: § 925(ii) BGB (cf English conveyancing practice, which allows execution of a deed as an ‘escrow’). Thus, a retention of title (‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’), as in the case of movables, is not possible. However, the grant of a (revocable) power of attorney (‘Vollmacht’) is permitted and does not require notarial form: §167(ii)BGB. Once the ‘Auflassung’  has been notarially documented, the parties are bound (ie, the real agreement is not freely revocable): § 873(ii) BGB. The effect of ‘Auflassung’ is that the purchaser acquires a (real) right of expectancy (dingliches Anwartschaftsrechf),  but it does not operate as a restriction on die vendor’s right of disposal of the property (‘Verfügungsbeschränkung’). The purchaser can secure his (obligational) right to change of ownership by means of a priority notice (‘Vormerkung’) in the land register: § 883(i) BGB. If a participant has insufficient command of German or the relevant language of die proceedings, this should be stated in the ‘Niederschrift’, which must then be translated (orally) instead of being read out. A written translation can be supplied on request: § 16(ii) BeurkG. The ‘Urkunde’ itself is usually prepared in German, but it can be drawn up in a different language, if the parties so desire and the notary has the necessary capability: § 5 BeurkG. See Chapter XXII E. B An ‘Einigung’ under § 929,1st sentence BGB (ie, over movables) requires no form and need not be express. In practice, it is frequently effected together with the (underlying) obligational contract by implied conduct (‘schlüssiges Verhalten’) . However, it must be clear from the parties’ agreement that ownership is intended to pass. This, in turn, hinges on an interpretation of the actions/declarations of will of the parties and the classification/ nature of die (obligational) contract (ie, is the transfer of ownership one of die main duties of  performance (‘Hauptleistungspflichten’)?). In particular, despatch and receipt of goods (‘Versendung und Entgegennahme von Waren’)  of itself does not, as a rule, suffice, unless an offer and acceptance of  transfer of ownership can be established. See Notes 104, 111 and 159 in this Chapter. Another name for a ‘Besitzkonstitut’ is ‘Besitzmittlungsverhältnis’ (possession mediation relationship), whereby the new owner is placed in indirect possession (‘mittelbarer Besitz’): § 868 BGB. As part of a ‘Verfügung’, the ‘Besitzkonstitut’ / ‘Sicherungsubereignung’ is strictly abstract and separate from the underlying, causal ‘Sicherungsvertrag’ / ‘Sicherungsabrede’  (security agreement). Regarding ‘Sicherungsubereignung’  see generally: Jauernig (BGB), § 930, 5; Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 4IV; Schwab/ Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 3 (§ 31); Westermann (SR), Vol I, Book IV (§ 44); Wolf, Chapter 5, Section 1 (§ 30). See also Note 280 D in this Chapter.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language

258 259

260

261 262 263 264

265

266

The equivalents of ‘Übergabe’  and ‘Besitzkonstitut’ in Roman law are, respectively, ‘traditio’ and ‘constitution  possessorium’. See Nicholas, Chapter III, 3–4. In English law, the equivalent institution to a ‘Sicherungsubereignung’  is a conditional bill of sale. Under the Bills of Sale Act 1882, it requires registration and must be in a particular form. See Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 3 (§ 32). Failure to make proper enquiries can amount to gross negligence (‘grobe Fahrlässigkeit’),   if there is a ‘Nachforschungspflicht’: see Schulte, Vol 3, Case 22 (‘Taxi ohne Brief’). § 932 BGB (only) protects a bona fide belief as to ownership, not (as to) other circumstances: see Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 4 VII Exceptions: money, bearer securities and things sold at public auction. See Kallwass, Section 4, Chapter 4 (§ 70 I-III); Westermann (SR), Vol I, Book IV (§§ 45–50); Wolf, Chapter 4, Section 2 (§ 23). Wesel (FR), Chapter 3 (‘Eigentum’) is of the opinion that, due to the enactment of § 932 BGB on 1 January 1900, the abstraction principle underlying § 929 BGB has become superfluous. However, merely because the interests of trade must sometimes outweigh legal certainty (‘Rechtssicherheit’)  does not mean that legal certainty—which the abstraction principle seeks to achieve—should be abandoned. Similarly, in English law the basic rule of ‘nemo dat, quod non habet’  is enacted in s 21 SGA, ie, the ‘sale’ of  goods by a person, who is not the owner (or is not authorised by the owner) does not pass title (ownership) to the buyer. However, the rule is subject to various exceptions ( inter alia, in ss 23–25 SGA), which protect the position of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. See Charlesworth, Part 3, Chapter 15. See the complex provisions in §§ 933 and 934 BGB. See also: Kallwass, Section 4, Chapter 4 (§ 71 I); Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 4 VII See Note 243 in this Chapter and Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 4 VIII. See the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V Chapter 2 (§ 63, Section I; ‘gesetzlicher Eigentumserwerb’). See also Kallwass, Section 4, Chapter 2 (§§ 63–64); Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 3 (§§ 33–43); Westermann (SR), Vol I, Book IV (§§ 51–60). In English law, as under § 946 BGB, chattels can become part of the land (ie, fixtures), if they are affixed to the land. See Note 11 and Section D1 in this Chapter. By § 950(i), 1st sentence BGB, where materials are processed or remodelled into a new movable, the manufacturer (‘Hersteller’) becomes owner of the new ‘Sache’, unless its value is significantly less than the value of the original materials (‘Ausgangsstoffe’), ie, if the original materials are worth significantly more, their owner becomes owner of the new ‘Sache’. Although § 950 BGB is not really dispositive and lays down an objective test, case-law allows the parties to agree, by means of a processing clause (‘Verarbeitungsklausel’),  that the supplier of materials (‘Stofflieferanf’)  becomes owner of the new ‘Sache’. This is important where a sale under retention of title (‘Kauf unter Eigentumsvorbehalt’) is concerned. If materials are processed in the context of a contract for services (‘Werkvertrag’),  the customer (‘Besteller’) is regarded as the manufacturer and acquires ownership, but not if the producer has to supply the materials (ie, in the case of a contract for work and materials (‘Werklieferungsvertrag’;  § 651 BGB)). See Creifelds under ‘ Verarbeitung’. The fruits (‘Früchte’) of a ‘Sache’ are defined as its produce (‘Erzeugnisse’) and output (‘Ausbeute’), while the fruits of a ‘Recht’ are its ‘Ertrag’ (yield): § 99 BGB. The term ‘Nutzungen’ (benefits, profits) refers to both the fruits of a ‘Sache’ or ‘Recht’ and to such advantages (‘Vorteile’) as use of the ‘Sache’ or ‘Recht’ brings: § 100 BGB. See Creifelds under ‘Früchte’. A The claim under § 985 BGB applies to both movables and immovables. In the former situation, it is directed to ‘Herausgabe  (return), in the latter to ‘Räumung’  (eviction). B §§ 987–1003 BGB deal with the so-called ‘Eigentümer-Besitzer-Verhältnis’  (the relationship between the owner and the person in possession of a ‘Sache’). Apart from the owner’s claim to return of the ‘Sache’ under § 985 (the ‘Herausgabeanspruch’ ), a person in illegal possession (an ‘unrechtmäßiger Besitzer’) can also—unless he is in good faith (‘gutgläubig’)—  be subject to accessory claims (‘Nebenansprüche’)  from the owner for release of benefits (‘Nutzungsherausgabe’) and damages (‘Schadensersatz’): §§ 987–993. A person in possession (‘Besitzer’), who has incurred expenditure (‘Verwendungen’) on a ‘Sache, can counter-claim against the owner for reimbursement ( ‘Verwendungsersatz’: § 994) and has a right of  retention (‘Zurückbehaltungsrecht’)  until he is satisfied (§ 1000).

278

Notes

D

267 268 269 270

271 272 273 274 275

276 277

See Notes 18 and 245 in this Chapter; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 6 (§ 28); the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 2 (§ 61, Section II; ‘Schutz des Eigentums’ ); Kaiser, Part V, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6; Kallwass, Section 4, Chapter 6 (§§ 78–79); Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 4 (§§ 44–47); Wolf, Chapter 3 (§§ 10–14). C The claim under § 1004 BGB (also referred to as the ‘actio negatoria’ (negatory action) or ‘Abwehrklage’ (defensive counter-action)) is directed against any interference (‘Beeintrachtigung’) with ownership, short of removal or withholding. Unlike a claim (for damages) in tort, it does not require proof of fault (‘Verschulden’). Strictly, § 1004 BGB only protects ‘Eigentum’ (ownership). However, it extends, eg, to easements (§ 1027 BGB) and pledges of movables (§ 1227 BGB), and similar statutory provisions exist in commercial law with regard to business protection, competition and copyright (‘Urheberrecht’) . Most importantly, § 1004 BGB is of corresponding application to the various (absolute) rights/legal assets (‘Rechtsgüter’) other than ‘Eigentum’ specified in § 823(i) BGB, to the general right of personality (‘allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht’) and to the right to an established and exercised business (‘Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Ge werbebetrieb’ ) . In these cases, the claim is referred to as an ‘actio auasinegatoria’ (quasinegatory action). See Chapter VIII, Note 20 C; Fikentscher, Section 16, § 114; Gernhuber/Grunewald, Part 4 (§§ 22–23);  Jauernig (BGB), § 1004; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part VIA 3. Equivalent proprietary remedies in English law to § 985 and § 1004 BGB (where chattels are involved) are specific restitution—enforceable by so-called ‘Writ of Delivery’—and (damages for the tort of) conversion. The former is a discretionary remedy and can only be granted, if the chattel concerned is of special value and not merely an ‘ordinary article of commerce’. The English tort of ‘trespass to chattels’ (interference with goods) involves an interference with possession of chattels, rather than ownership. In German law, possession is protected primarily by the law of property (Book in of the BGB). Under § 858(i) BGB, withdrawal or disturbance of possession, if not permitted by statute, constitutes ‘verbotene Eigenmacht’ (illegal self-assumption). Under § 861 (i) BGB, if possession is withdrawn, the person dispossessed can claim restoration (‘Wiedereinräumung’) . Under § 862(i) BGB, if possession is disturbed, removal of the disturbance (‘Beseitigung’) and/or restraint of further disturbances (‘Unterlassung’) can be claimed. The remedies in §§ 861–862 correspond to those available to the owner of a ‘Sache’ under § 985 and § 1004 BGB. A person in legitimate possession or who acquired it bona fide and for value is also protected by the German law of torts. Such forms of possession (ie, the rights themselves) are regarded as ‘sonstige Rechte’  within § 823(i) BGB; interference can give rise to a claim to damages. See Creifelds under ‘Besitz’ and ‘Besitzschutz’; Note 248 in this Chapter; Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part II, Section B. See §§ 741ff BGB, Creifelds under ‘Miteigentum’; Note 231 in this Chapter; Chapter XI A. A particular form of ‘Miteigentum nach Bruchteilen’   is the ownership of an apartment/flat (‘Wohnungseigentum’) . See Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 5 (§§ 72-SO). See Baur / Stümer, Part III, Chapter 4, § 35. Regarding ‘Grundpfandrechte’  see Creifelds under ‘Grundpfandrechte’, ‘Hypothek’  and ‘Grundschuld’ ; Kaiser, Part V, 9; Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 3 (§ 66 II); Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 4, Section 1 (§§ 51– 65); Westermann (Grundbegriffe),  Chapter 17; Westennann (SR), Vol H Book VI Part IV (§§ 107–136); Wolf, Chapter 5, Section 2 (§§ 32–35). See Chapter X D 2. In other words, the legal aura (‘Rechtsschein’) of the Land Register is fictitiously extended to the claim, since a mortgage is an accessory real right. See Jauernig (BGB), § 1138; Westermann (SR), § 122. See Westermann (SR), § 130. See Westermann (SR), § 1351. The ‘Sicherungsabrede’  constitutes the legal basis (‘causa’) for the grant of security and must be strictly distinguished from the credit and property levels of the transaction. It sets out the terms of the deal and the rights and obligations of the parties. See Westermann (SR), § 131. See Westermann (SR), § 132 III See Westermann (SR), § 133 II.

279

The German Legal System and Legal Language 278 279 280

281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295

If no security arrangement is reached, or no claim comes into existence, a claim to return of the ‘Grundschuld’ can be made under § 812 BGB. See Westermann (SR), §§ 130 II, 131 III. See Westermann (SR), § 133 III–V. A Section 9, Title 1 distinguishes between a ‘Pfandrecht’ created (‘bestellt’) by ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ ((contract) a so-called ‘Faustpfandrecht’ ) and a statutory ‘Pfandrecht’ (‘gesetzliches Pfandrecht) . The provisions regarding a ‘Pfandrecht’  created by ‘Rechtsgeschàft’   (§§ 1205–1256 BGB) are of  corresponding application (‘entsprechende Anwendung’)  to a ‘Pfandrecht’, which has arisen by statute (‘ein kraft Gesetzes entstandenes Pfandrecht’): § 1257 BGB. Examples of statutory ‘Pfandrechte’ are:  –  in the BGB, the liens of the landlord (§ 559), the manufacturer (§ 647) and the innkeeper (§ 704);  –  in the HGB, the liens of the ‘Spediteur’  (carrier (forwarder): § 410) and the ‘Frachtfuhrer’  (freighter: §440). B A ‘Pfandrecht’ over movables is defined in § 1204(i) BGB as securing a contractual claim (‘Forderung’) and entitling the creditor (‘(Pfand)gläubiger’)  to seek satisfaction (‘Befriedigung’) out of the thing pledged (‘aus aer Sache’). Satisfaction is achieved by means of sale (‘(Pfand)verkauf) once the contractual claim is due (‘fallig’): §§ 1228ff. A ‘Pfandrecht’  is strictly accessory (linked) to the contractual claim, which it secures (so-called ‘Akzessorietät’). Thus, it can only be transferred with the ‘Forderung’ and ends (is discharged: ‘erlischt’) with it: § 1250(i) and § 1252. C Another type of lien is the ‘Pfändungspfandrecht’  (distraint lien), which arises (under public law) where enforcement (‘Zwangsvollstreckung’) in movable assets takes place: § 804(i) ZPÔ. See Note 244 in this Chapter. D Where movables are concerned, the creation of a ‘Pfandrecht’ usually requires actual delivery (‘Übergabe’) of the ‘Sache’ to the creditor. This has resulted in the institute of the ‘Pfandrecht’  largely being displaced as a form of security by the more practical ‘Sicherungsübertignung’,  where the debtor need not part with possession. See Note 257 in this Chapter. However, the contractual ‘Pfandrecht’  is still of commercial significance in Lombard transactions (‘Lombardgeschäft’) and pawnbroking (‘Pfandleihe’). See generally: Creifelds under ‘Lombardgeschäft’, ‘Pfandrecht’, ‘Pfandleiher’, ‘Pfändung’ and ‘Pfändungspfandrecht’;  the diagram in Klunzinger (Einführung), Part V, Chapter 3 (§ 66 I (‘Pfandrechte’) and § 66 III-IV); Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 4, Section 2 (§§ 66–71); Westermann (SR), Vol I Book V (§§ 61–73); Wolf, Chapter 5, Section 1 (§ 31). E The equivalent concepts to a contractual and statutory ‘Pfandrecht’ in English law are pawn and lien. See Charlesworth, Part 7, Chapter 24. For further information, see generally: Creifelds; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 F (341–352); Westermann (Grundbegriffe), Chapter 19; various textbooks, eg, Beitzke/Lüderitz; Schwab (F). See ‘Güterrecht’ . See Chapter XIII D 6 and ‘Unterhalt’ For further information, see generally Creifelds; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 F (353–362); Westermann (Grundbegriffe), Chapter 20; various textbooks eg, Brox (ER); Leipold. See also Chapter XXII E. See Brox (ER), Section L § 2 II. See generally: Brox (ER), Section II, Chapter 1, §§ 4–7; Leipold, Part 2, §§ 4–8. For a surviving spouse, who is statutory heir, it can be advantageous to claim the actual gain and the small compulsory portion instead of the increased statutory entitlement. See Leipold, Part 2, § 6 III 5. See generally: Brox (ER), Section II, Chapter 1, § 3 and Chapter 2, § 8; Leipold, Part 3, § 9ff. However, the claims of dose dependants exduded from inheritance to a compulsory portion of the estate (‘Pflichtteil’) remain unaffected. See Section 4 (g), below. For a list of possible ‘letztwillige Verfügungen’,  see Leipold, Part 3, § 121. However, the performance (‘Leistung’) required pursuant to a legacy (‘Vermächtnis’)  can be left to the fair discretion of a third party, provided the testator specifies the purpose (‘Zweck’) of the legacy: § 2156 BGB. See Leipold, Part 3, § 91 and § 10 E. See generally: Brox (ER), Section E, Chapter 2, §§ 9–13; Leipold, Part 3, §§ 10–13. See Brox (ER), Section E, Chapter 2, § 9; Leipold, Part 3, § 101. See Brox (ER), Section E, Chapter 2, §§ 10–12; Leipold, Part 3, § 111-IV.

280

Notes 296 297 298 299 300 301 302

303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335

See Brox (ER), Section E, Chapter 2, § 13; Leipold, Part 3, § 11 V. See Brox (ER), Section E, Chapter 2, § 16 I-II. See Leipold, Part 3, § 12 IV. See Leipold, Part 3, § 12 III 2. See also § 2087 BGB, referred to in Section 4 (c), below. See Leipold, Part 3, § 12 II. See Leipold, Part 3, § 13 E. A disposition can, for example, infringe § 138(i) BGB if its sole or dominant purpose (‘Zweck’)  is the advancement of or reward for extra-marital sexual relations (‘ehebrecherische Beziehungen’) . Thus, the appointment of a lover as heir can be void (a so-called ‘Geliebten-Testament’),  unless, in the particular circumstances, the disposition was (also) based, at least partially, on honourable motives (‘ehrenwerte Motive’) . See Brox (ER), Section II, Chapter 2, § 18 IV; Leipold, Part 3, § 9 II and § 131. See Leipold, Part 3, § 14 I–V. See Creifelds under ‘Berliner Testament’. The inflexibility of a ‘Berlin will’ can be disadvantageous for tax purposes. See Leipold, Part 3, § 151–III. See Leipold Part 3, § 15V. See Leipold, Part1, §2 VI and Part 4, §211. See generally: Brox (ER), Section IV, §§ 29–31; Leipold, Part 4, § 21. See Chapter XI A; Brox (ER), Section IV, § 291–II. Both the obligation to dispose (‘Verpflichtung’)  and the disposition itself (‘Verfügung’) must be notarially documented: §§ 2033,2371 BGB. See Brox (ER), Section IV, § 29 III. See Brox (ER), Section IV, § 30. See Brox (ER), Section IV, § 31 II. See Brox (ER), Section III, Chapter 1, § 231; Leipold, Part 3, § 12 III 1. See Leipold, Part 3, § 12 III3. See Creifelds under ‘Anwachsung’; Brox (ER), Section III, Chapter 1, § 23 III. See Brox (ER), Section III, Chapter 1, § 24; Leipold, Part 4, § 191. See Brox (ER), Section III, Chapter 2, § 25; Leipold, Part 4, § 19 II. See Brox (ER), Section II, Chapter 3, § 20; Leipold, Part 4, § 18 II. See Brox (ER), Section V, § 32. See Leipold, Part 4, § 24 II1. Regarding the possible defences available to an heir against a claim to a compulsory portion, see Rinsche, ZAP 23/00, Fach 12, p 101. See Chapter X B 4 (c). See Brox (ER), Section V, § 32 VI. See Brox (ER), Section V, § 32 II. See Leipold, Part 4, § 2412 and 3. See Brox (ER), Section V, § 32IV. See Section 3 (a) (ii) above; Leipold, Part 4, § 24 II 2. See Leipold, Part 4, § 24 II 3. See Leipold, Part 4, § 24 II 4. See Brox (ER), Section V, § 32 VII; Leipold, Part 4, § 24 III. See Brox (ER), Section III, Chapter 3, §§ 27–28; Leipold, Part 4, § 22. If estate administration (‘Nachlaßvenvaltung’)  has been ordered, similar treatment is accorded to transactions undertaken by the heir before acceptance: § 1978(i) BGB. See Brox (ER), Section II, Chapter 3, § 22 VII; Leipold, § 1815. Instead of giving up his rights to the estate entirely, the disclaiming person can, by agreement, disclaim against payment of a lump sum (‘Abfindung’). However, challenge is possible: § 1956 BGB.

281

The German Legal System and Legal Language 336 337 338

339 340 341 342 343 344 345

See Chapter X, Note 39. A similar concept in English law is the ‘executor de son tort’,  although that relates to an executor, not an heir. An application for a certificate of inheritance is regarded as acceptance of the inheritance. See Brox (ER), Section II, Chapter 3, § 22 V. Challenge is possible, if acceptance or disclaimer is caused by mistake (‘Irrtum’) or threat (‘Drohung’) . The same applies, for example, if the heir misses the period for disclaimer (§ 1956 BGB), because he does not realise that the estate is over-indebted (‘überschuldet’). This constitutes a mistake as to quality (‘Eigenschaftsirrtum’). See Brox (ER), Section II, Chapter 3, § 22 VI. See generally Brox (ER), Section VII, §§ 37–42; Leipold, Part 4, § 20 and § 21 IV. See Section 5 (e), below. Regarding acts of prior administration by the heir(s) see Note 332 in this Chapter. The executor can also himself apply for a certificate of appointment (‘Testamentsvollstreckerzeugnis’) : §2368 BGB. Regarding the ‘Erbschein’, its grant (‘Erteilung’) and revocation (‘Einziehung’), see the article by Hartwig Sprau in ZAP 21 / 97, Fach 12, p 53. See Brox (ER), Section VI, § 35; Leipold, Part 4, § 18IV. The provisions regarding guardianship (‘Vormundschaft’ ; §§ 1773ff BGB) are of corresponding application: § 1915(i) BGB.

CHAPTER XI 1

2 3 4

5

6 7 8 9 10 11

On ‘Handelsrecht’  (commercial law) see generally: Baumann (ER), Part III, § 9; Capelle/Canaris; Hofmann; Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (HR); Meyer, Part 1, § 2 B; Model/Creifelds/lichtenberger, Part III G (363–379). On ‘Gesellschaftsrecht’  (company law) see generally: Eisenhardt, Chapters 1–6; Hueck, Sections 1 and 2 (§§ 1–19); Klunzinger (Grundziige) (GR), Chapters 1,2 and 4; Kraft/Kreutz, Parts A-G. See Chapter XIX A 2. See Eisenhardt, Chapter 1, § 2 I; Kallwass, Section 7 (§ 107). See also: die diagrams in Klunzineer (Einführung), Part II, Chapter 1 (§ 4, Section I; ‘Personenzusammenschlüsse’ ) and in Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 9 I (‘Personenvereinigungen des Privatrechts’) ; Chapter XXH D 9. The distinguishing factors of a ‘Gesellschaft des bürgerlichen Rechts’  are:  –  it is established by agreement (‘Vertrag’);  –  it is aimed at the achievement of a particular joint purpose ( ‘Erreichung eines gemeinsamen Zwecks’ : §705 BGB);  –  it has no separate legal personality (ie, it is not ‘rechtsjuhig’ ). See Section B 3 and Note 51 in this Chapter. Not dealt with in this Chapter. Another type of ‘Gesellschaft,   also governed by a separate statute, is the ‘Genossenschaft’   (cooperative (association/ society)), which is a form of trading ‘Verein’  established for one of the purposes set out in § l(i) of the ‘Genossenschaftsgesetz’ (GenG; Law relating to ‘Genossenschaften’, eg, acquisition, production and/or sale of agricultural and/or other products; banking. Its function is the advancement (‘Forderung’)  of the livelihood or commercial interests (‘Erwerb oder Wirtsdutft’) of its members (‘Genossen’) by means of a communal business (‘gemeinschaftlicher Geschäftsbetrieb’) . A ‘Genossensdwft’ requires registration in the ‘Genossensdiaftsregister’ (register of ‘Genossenschaften’) -kept at the ‘Amtsgericht’ (District Court; § 10 GenG)—and is then referred to as a registered cooperative ( ‘eingetragene Genossenschaft’ (eG)). See Kraft/Kreutz, Part AIV. Restrictions on the right to terminate (‘Aufhebungsrecht’)  have limited effect: §§ 749(ii)-751 BGB. See Eisenhardt, Chapter 3, § 9; Hueck, Section 1, § 1. Regarding juristic persons of public law see Chapter IIC (Note 11). For an interesting historical comparison of the different forms of ‘Personenvereinigung’ in Roman and German law see Hueck, Section 1, § 2 VI. See Creifelds under ‘Verbände’, ‘Kammer’  and ‘Lobbyismus’ .

282

Notes 12

13 14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

A

A member’s share of the assets (‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’) of a ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ (or a GmbH – see Chapter XII C) is known as the ‘Geschaftsanteil’ or ‘Vermdgensanteil’ . To be distinguished from the ‘Geschäftsanteil’ is the ‘Kapitalanteil’,  which is a bookkeeping term referring to the (arithmetic) capital value of a member’s share of the assets of an OHG or KG. B If the members agree, a member’s share in a ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’  as a whole (‘im Ganzen’) -the ‘Gesellschaftsanteir—can be transferred together with his or her share of the assets. However, asset disposal isolated from disposal of membership is not possible (§ 719 BGB). A member’s share in the ‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’ is available to his or her creditors. See Creifelds under ‘Geschäftsanteil’ and ‘Kapitalanteil’; Hueck, Section 1, § 3 II; § 725 BGB; § 859(i) ZPO. The relationship between the owners of flats (‘Wohnungseigentümer’)  is a ‘Gemeinschaft’, but not a ‘Gesam thandsgemeinschaft’ . See Creifelds under ‘Wohnungseigentum’ ; § 10(i) WEG; Schwab/Prütting, Chapter 3, Section 5, § 49. The provisions regarding the ‘Gemeinschaft (nach Bruchteilen)’  apply to all cases of ‘Rechtsgemeinschaft’ ie, whenever a right is owned ‘gemeinschaftlich’ by various persons: § 741 BGB. This can include a ‘Gesellschaft’ with a ‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’. However, §§ 742–758 BGB only have subsidiary application in the absence of  other (statutory (or contractual)) provisions. See Eisenhardt, Chapter 3, § 9; Hueck, Section 1, § 1 II; Kraft/Kreutz, Part D12 (c). Regarding ‘Miteigentum (nach Bruchteilen)’ see Creifelds under ‘Miteigentum’ and the (special) provisions in §§ 1008–1011 BGB. Only a non-commercial association (a so-called ‘Idealverein’) can be registered in the ‘Vereinsregister’ at the ‘Amtsgericht’: § 21 BGB. See generally Meyer, Part 4, §§ 9 and 10. The assets of a ‘juristische Person’  are regarded as belonging not to its members, but to the ‘juristische Person’ itself and it is only that ‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’ —not the private assets of the members—which is available to creditors for the satisfaction of the obligations of the company (the principle of separate corpor ate personality or separation principle (‘Trennungsprinzip’)). See § 13(ii) GmbHG; § l(i), 2nd sentence AktG; cf ‘Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd’  [1897] AC 22. Exceptionally, however, the members of a ‘juristische Person’  can be held personally liable for obligations of  the company on the basis of § 242 or § 826 BGB. The ‘veil of incorporation’ is lifted (so-called ‘Durchgriffshaftung’) . See Creifelds under ‘Durchgriffshaftung’ ; Eisenhardt, Chapter 9, § 41 II; Hueck, Section 3, § 36 II 5. A ‘Stille Gesellschaft’ (silent partnership) is also a ‘Personengesellschaft’, but not a ‘Handelsgesellschaft’. Regarding ‘Personengesellschaften’, see Hueck, Section 2, Chapters 1–4 (§§ 5–19); Klunzinger (Grundzüge) (GR), Chapter 2 (§§ 4–7); Kraft/Kreutz, Parts D-G; Meyer, Part I, § 3 AI and Part 4, § 9 B. Regarding ‘Kapitalgesellschaften’, see Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (GR), Chapter 3 (§§ 8 and 11); Kraft/Kreutz, Parts J and L; Meyer, Part 4, § 10 A. Regarding the fundamental distinction ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’/‘Verein’  see Eisenhardt, Chapter 2 (§§ 4–5); Hueck, Section 1, § 1 III and § 2; Kallwass, Section 7, Chapter 1 (§ 108); Kraft/Kreutz, Part A III 1. The relationship between members of a ‘Personengesellschaft’   can be purely internal (a so-called ‘Innengesellschaft’ (internal company)), eg, the ‘stille Gesellschaft’ and the so-called ‘Gelegenheitsgesellschaft’ (ie, where a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ is formed for a casual or short-term purpose). See, in particular, Hueck, Section 1, § 2 III. The ‘Komplementär’ has the same position as the ‘Gesellschafter’ of an OHG and is usually responsible -to the exclusion of the ‘Kommanditist’—for managing the KG and representing it towards third parties. However, exceptions are possible. See Eisenhardt, Chapter 5 (§ 19). See Eisenhardt, Chapter 5 (§ 20); Klunzinger (Grundzüge) (GR), Chapter 4 (§ 13). In the case of a private limited company (GmbH), the ‘Sitz’ of the company must usually be at the place, where the company has an operational business unit ( ‘Betrieb’; see Chapter XVIII C), where its management (‘Geschäftsleitung’) is situated or where its administration (‘Verwaltung’) is located: § 4a(ii) GmbHG. Regarding the ‘Wohnsitz’  ((place of) residence) of a natural person, see Chapter X B12. Regarding the parties to a ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’, its form, content and interpretation, see Kraft/Kreutz, PartCIl. See also Chapter XII B, below.

283

The German Legal System and Legal Language 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30 31

32

Note the parallel to § ll(ii) GmbHG (see Chapter XII B, below). See Eisenhardt, Chapter 3 (§ 6). See generally Hueck, Section 2, Chapter 1, §§ 7–9. In other words, the extent (‘Umfang’) of the power of representation of members can be limited in the company agreement. Any such limitation (‘Beschrankung’) must be made apparent (‘erkennbar’) to the relevant third party. However, in the case of a private limited company (‘GmbH’), restrictions in the company agreement on a director’s power of representation have no external effect: § 37(ii) GmbHG. Frequently, therefore, to safeguard the interests of a ‘GmbH’, the involvement of two persons is required as signatories for a particular transaction (the ‘four-eye principle’ (‘Vier-Augen Prinzip’) . However, liability cannot be limited by tampering with the firm name. See Nothoff, ZAP, Fach 15, p 333; ZAP EN-Nr 729/99; Notthoff, ZAP, Fach 15, p 303. See generally Baumann (ER), Part III, § 9 and Capelle / Canaris, Part 1. See generally Capelle / Canaris, Part 2. Not dealt with in this text. See Capelle/Canaris, Part 1, Section 1 (§§ 2–3); Gierke/Sandrock, Section 1, Chapter 1 (§§ 6–8, 10); Hofmann, Part B; Kallwass, Section 5 (§§ 83–86); Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (HR), Chapter 2, § 6; Meyer, Part I, § 3 A II– VI. With effect from 1.7.1998, the HGB has been reformed by the ‘Handelsrechtsreformgesetz’  (Commercial Law Reform Act). As before, § l(i) HGB provides that a ‘Kaufmann’ is a person who engages in a ‘Handelsgewerbe’  (trading  business). However, in the amended § l(ii) HGB, there is no longer a list of basic trading activities—a ‘Handelsgewerbe’  is now defined as every exercised business (‘Gewerbebetrieb’), unless, according to the type and extent of the enterprise (‘Unternehmen’),  a properly organised business (‘ein in kaufmännischer Weise eingerichteter Gewerbebetrieb’)  is not required. The term ‘Handelsgewerbe’   is thus much broader than before—it covers the service sector (‘Dienstleistungsunternehmen’)  and so-called ‘Urproduktion’. § 4 HGB (concerning the ‘Minderkaufmann’ ) has been repealed and the former distinction between a ‘Mußkaufmann’ and a ‘Sollkaufmann’ has become obsolete. Instead, the new § 2 HGB provides that a small  businessman (‘Kleingeiverbetreibender’)  can voluntarily register as a ‘Kaufinann’ (‘Kannkaufmann’). The term ‘Gewerbe’  and its type and extent (‘Art und Umfang’)  remain central to the establishing whether a  business falls within the HGB. However, classification is difficult, since there are no standard criteria. Once there is a ‘Gewerbebetrieb’, a ‘Handelsvewerbe’  is (rebuttably) presumed to exist; the burden of disproving this falls on the (non-registered) businessman. There have also been changes for civil law companies (‘BGB-Gesellschaften’) exercising a ‘Gewerbe’  and for personal trading companies (OHG/KG). See Chapter XIX A 2; the article by Torsten Schöne in ZAP 23/98, Fach 15, p 267. See Capelle/Canaris, Part 1, Section 2 (§ 4) and Section 4 (§ 10 I); Gierke/Sandrock, Section 1, Chapters 2 and 3 (§ 17); Hofmann, Parts C and D; Klunzinger (Grundzüge) (HR), Chapter 3, § 11 and §13. § 15 HGB sets out certain important rules regarding the effect (or lack) of an ‘Eintragung’ (registration) and ‘Bekanntmachung’ (publication) of a particular fact, which requires registration (an ‘einzutragende Tatsache’ ) in the ‘Handelsregister’, and of an incorrect publication (‘unrichtige Bekanntmachung’)  in the necessary journals (see § 10 HGB):  –   by § 15 (ii) HGB a third party is bound by the (proper) registration and publication of a (correct) fact (except within 15 days of publication, provided the third party proves that he neither knew nor should have known the fact);  –   by § 15 (i) HGB a fact which is not registered and published cannot be held against a third party acting in good faith (so-called ‘negative Publizität’  (negative publicity): one can rely on the silence of the ‘Handelsregister’) ;  –   by § 15 (iii) HGB a fact which is ‘unrichtig bekanntgemacht’ (incorrectly published) can be relied upon in the form of its publication by a third party acting in good faith (so-called ‘positive Publizität’ (positive publicity): one can rely on the information as published in the relevant journal(s) unless one knows it is incorrect). See Creifelds under ‘Handelsregister’ ; Capelle/Canaris, Section 2, § 5; Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (HR), Chapter 3, §13 III and IV.

284

Notes

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

Besides the details which have to be filed at the ‘Handelsregister’  for registration purposes, every business must notify its business address (‘Geschäftsanschrift’) and any subsequent changes. See Schumacher, ZAP, Fach 15, p 335 (at p 339). See Capelle/Canaris, Part 1, Section 6 (§§ 14–15); Gierke/Sandrock, Section 1, Chapters 4 and 5 (§§ 21–25); Hofmann, Part F; Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (HR), Chapter 2, § 8. A procurist cannot dispose of, or charge, real property, unless specifically authorised: § 49(ii) HGB. A procurist must indicate his status when signing on behalf of a firm: § 51 HGB. The name of a procurist is commonly preceded by ‘ppa’ or ‘pp’ ( ‘per procura’  or ‘per proxy’). Like a procurist, a ‘Handlungsbevollmächtigte’ must indicate his status when signing on behalf of a firm (eg,  by using the abbreviations ‘iA’ (‘im Auftrag’) or ‘i.V’ (‘in Vertretung’). However, he must desist from using any designation indicating a procura: § 57 HGB. Regarding the protection of a third party against unauthorised transactions, see also Chapter X, Note 31. These provisions should systematically belong to the law of employment. SeeChapter XVIII, Note 2(a); Capelle/Canaris, § 111 (c); Hofmann, Part F III. See Capelle/Canaris, Part 1, Section 7 (§ 17 and § 19); Gierke/Sandrock, Section 1, Chapter 6 (§§ 26,27 and 29); Hofmann, Part G; Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (HR), Chapter 2, § 9. If a ‘Handelsvertreter’   is not genuinely self-employed (ie, his self-employment is pretended (‘Scheinselbstândigkeit’)), he is treated as an ‘Angestellter’ (employee). See ZAP EN-Nr 558/98. See also: Chapter XVIII, Note 2(b). A ‘Handelsmakler’   normally holds a neutral position between the parties. He is involved full-time/ professionally (‘gewerbsmäßig’)  in the negotiation/referral of commercial contracts (‘…die Vermittlung von Verträgen…über…Gegenstânde des Handelsverkehrs’ ) for others (§ 93(i) HGB). See Creifelds under ‘Handelsmakler’. An estate agent (‘Grundstücksmakler’) is not a ‘Handelsmakler’, but a so-called ‘Zivilmakler’ (under § 652 BGB). An insurance broker (‘Versicherungsmakler’)  is a ‘Handelsmakler’,  but an insurance agent (‘Versicherungsagent’ or ‘Versicherungsvertreter’)  is a ‘Handelsvertreter’ . See Creifelds under ‘Versicherungsmakler’, ‘Versicherungsvertreter’  and ‘Makler’. Though not mentioned in the HGB, the following persons have evolved from business practice and are also engaged in the marketing (‘Absatz’) of products:  –  the ‘Eigen-’ or ‘Vertragshändler’ (authorised dealer/distributor), who distributes (‘vertreibt’)  goods (‘Waren’) for a particular manufacturer (‘Hersteller’) or supplier (‘Lieferant’) in his own name and for his own account (‘auf eigene Rechnung’) . The ‘Vertragshändler’  is integrated (‘eingegliedert’) to a greater or lesser degree in the manufacturer’s or supplier’s organisation;  –  the franchisee (‘Franchisenehmer’), who, within the framework of an ongoing contractual relationship (‘Dauerschuldverhältnis’), is granted a licence (‘Lizenz’) to market particular branded goods (‘Markenwaren’) or services (‘Dienstleistungen’) using the name of the franchisor (‘Franchisegeber’). See Creifelds under ‘Vertragshändler’, ‘Franchisevertrag’  and ‘Lizenzvertrag’; Capelle/Canaris, Part I, Section 7 (§ 18); Hofmann, Part G II. Regarding the international position of ‘Handelsvertreter’  and ‘Vertragshändler’  and the effect of EEC law, see the Lawyers’ Handbook,  Part B XIII, 1,3. See generally Eisenhardt Chapter 4 (§§ 10–17). See generally Eisenhardt Chapter 5 (§§18–23). See Note 17 in this Chapter. See Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (GR), Chapter 2, § 5; Kraft/Kreutz, Part E. See also §§29 and 31 HGB. However, the vetoing member can sue for a restraining order (‘Unterlassung’). Creditors should be careful to sue the members as well: § 129(iv) HGB. Following a judgment of the BGH on 29.1.2001, this rule now appears to be obsolete. The procedural distinctions between a ‘BGB-Geseuschaft’ and an OHG have been wiped away and a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ is now treated in the same way as an OHG. However, a judgment against particular members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ is still required, if enforcement in their private assets (‘Privaivermögen’)  for obligations of the company contracted during their membership is sought. See ZAP-Aktuell, 3/01, p 122; Sieg, ZAP, Fach 15, p 355.

285

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52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

See also: Section B 3 in this Chapter; Chapter XXII, Notes 115 and 116. See §§105(ii)HGB and 730–740 BGB. See Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (GR), Chapter 2, § 6; Kraft/Kreutz, Part F. See Capelle/Canaris, Part 1, Section 5 (§§ 12–13); Hofmann, Part E; Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (HR), Chapter 3, § 10. See Creifelds under ‘Handelsgeschaft’; Hofmann, Parts H and J; Kallwass, Section 5, Chapter 2 (§§ 87–88); Klunzinger (Grundzüge)  (HR), Chapter 4, §§ 14–17. See Capelle/Canaris, Part 2, Sections 1–4 (§§20–28). The term ‘Schuldschein’ in § 344(ii) HGB includes any type of document, which confirms or evidences an obligation on the part of a ‘Kaufmann’, eg, bills of exchange, guarantees and commercial securities (listed in §363 HGB). These include trade terms (‘Handelsklauseln’),  eg, ‘Incoterms’ . See Creifelds under ‘Handelsbrauch’ and ‘Handelsklauseln’. Cf§246BGB. Cf § 288 BGB. Normally, a ‘Zahlungsaufforderung’  (demand for payment) and ‘Verschulden’ (fault) on the part of the debtor are also necessary. See Chapter X, Note 127. Cf § 343(i) BGB. Cf § 932 BGB. See Capelle/ Canaris, Part 2, Section 5 (§ 29). See Capelle/ Canaris, Part 2, Section 5 (§ 30). See Capelle / Canaris, Part 2, Section 5 (§ 31). See Capelle/ Canaris, Part 2, Section 5 (§ 32). See Capelle/Canaris, Part2, Section 5 (§33). See Capelle/Canaris, Part 2, Section 5 (§ 34). This also applies in the event of a wrong delivery (‘Falschlieferung), unless the difference is obviously (‘offensichtlich’) so significant that the vendor must have realised that the purchaser could not possibly accept the goods: § 378 HGB. See Creifelds under ‘Mängelrüge’  and ‘Untersudiungspflicht’. The undertaking of remedial works (‘Nachbesserungsarbeiten’)  by the vendor does not relieve a purchaser from his duty to examine the goods promptly thereafter. ZAP, Fach 3, p 177 (computer software).

CHAPTER XII 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

By § 31 BGB, for example, if the conduct of an organ of a ‘Verein’  causes loss, the ‘Verein’ is liable. See Eisenhardt, Chapter 7, § 31 II; Meyer, § 10 A15. See generally: Eisenhardt, Chapter 9, § 37; Hueck, Section 3, § 351-II; Kraft / Kreutz, Part CI5. See Hueck, Section 3, § 35 II 1. See Hueck, Section 3, § 35 II 2. See Creifelds under ‘Gründungsgesellschaft’ ; Eisenhardt, Chapter 9, § 37 II 3. § 11 (ii) GmbHG also applies, if the person acting exceeds his authority ie, it takes precedence over § 179 BGB. See Hueck, Section 3, § 35 II 3. See Hueck, Section 3, § 35 II 4. See generally Kraft/ Kreutz, Part L III. Authorised capital (‘genehmigtes Kapital’) is not a term known to German law. The equivalent in the case of a public limited company (AG) is the ‘Grundkapital’ (basic capital), the minimum nominal amount of which (‘Nennbetrag’) is Euro 50.000 ( ): § 7 AktG. See Creifelds under ‘Einlage’. In the case of a public limited company (AG), the word ‘Aktie’ represents both a person’s membership (‘Mitgliedschaft’) and that person’s share (‘Bruchteil’) of the ‘Grundkapital’. Before the ‘Stückaktiengesetz’ of 25.3.1998, ‘Aktien’ had to be issued for a particular nominal value (‘Nennwert’). However, this is no longer necessary and so-called ‘Quotenaktien’ or ‘Stuckaktien’ (single shares, which participate proportionately in the basic capital) are now permitted: § 6 AktG.

286

Notes 12 13 14

15 16 17

See generally Kraft/ Kreutz, Part LIV. The company agreement can limit the right to revoke a director’s appointment to an important reason: § 38(ii) GmbHG. See Hueck, Section 3, §23IV See also Chapter XVIII, Note 2. A director of a GmbH is usually regarded as an employee for tax purposes, so that wages tax (‘Lohnsteuer’) has to be deducted from his remuneration. See Braun, ZAP, Fach 20, p 281. The external power of representation of a director is unlimited and unlimitable (‘unbeschränkt und unbeschränkbar’). See Chapter XI, Note 25. See Kerkhoff, ZAP, Fach 15, p 227; ZAPEN-Nr 175/2001. See Schumacher, ZAP, Fach 15, p 335 (at p 341).

CHAPTER XIII 1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8

9

As from 1.1.1992, §§ 645–687 ZPO, which formerly dealt with matters relating to ‘Entmundigung’  (tutelage), have been repealed, as has § 6 BGB in which ‘Entmundigung’  was defined. Adults can now be placed under ‘Betreuung’ (care and attendance/companionship). See §§ 1896–1908i BGB. See Baumann (ER), Part VI, § 18 II; Baur/Grunsky, § 4; Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 4 (§§ 24–29); Model/ Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part III C (234). This includes the right to make legal submissions (‘Rechtsausführungen’)  and to state one’s legal opinion (Rechtsauffassung). However, there is no entitlement to a legal discussion (‘Rechtsgespräch’)—the court is assumed to know the law (‘iura novit curia’). In accordance with the principle of the rule of law (‘Rechtsstaatsprinzip’), civil procedure must be conducted fairly and in conformity with basic rights. Effective legal protection (‘effektiver Rechtsschutz’) must be available, there must be a level playing-field ( ‘Waffengleichheit’  (equality of arms)) and the parties must be given an opportunity to state their case (‘Gelegenheit zur btellungnahme’) . Surprise decisions (‘Übenaschungsentscheidungen’)  are forbidden. See Schneider, ZAP 2/00, Fach 13, p 911; Schneider, ZAP 4/01, Fach 13, p 995; Schneider, ZAP 5/01, Fach 13, p 1025. See also: Creifelds under ‘Faires Verfahren’ ; Note 69 in this Chapter. See Chapters XV D and XVII A; §§ 24 VwVfG, 86(i) VwGO; § 155 StPO. The accused has no duty to tell the truth in criminal proceedings. See Creifelds under ‘Wahrheitspflicht’ ; Note 66 in this Chapter. See Note 69 in this Chapter. See Creifelds under ‘Offizialprinzip’; Note 96 in this Chapter; Chapter XVII, Note 13. By § 169, 2nd sentence GVG, the recording and televising of court proceedings is forbidden. A challenge to this prohibition was rejected by the BVerfG on 24.1.2001. See ZAP-Aktuell, 3/ 01, p 123. Currently, therefore, publicity is (still) limited to the confines of the courtroom. However, with effect from 1.1.2002, the transmission of pictures and sound during a hearing in the form of  a simultaneous video link can be allowed. See ZAP-Aktuell, 13/01, p 788. 1 Whether or not a particular alleged fact (‘Tatsachenbehauptung’)  is true can be assessed freely by the court. It can consider the proceedings as a whole and (not only) any evidence presented to it. See  Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 8, § 49 V1. See also Chapter XXII E. 2 The taking of evidence (‘Beweisaufnahme’) only requires a formal order of the court (‘Beweisbeschluß’), if special proceedings are necessary for this purpose (§ 358 ZPO) eg, because evidence is not immediately available or if it is desired that a party should give evidence (§ 450 ZPO). 3 To be distinguished from the (normal) requirement of the (full) conviction (‘(volle) Überzeugung’) of  the court is the ‘Glaubhaftmachung’ (substantiation) of a particular alleged fact. This applies only if required/permitted by statute (eg, in ‘Arrest’ or injunction proceedings: §§ 920, 936 ZPO) and means that a lesser degree of proof—namely, the mere good possibility (‘gute Möglichkeit’) of the truth of a particular assertion—suffices. Any ‘Beweismittel’ (means by which evidence is presented) can be used (also a declaration in lieu of oath by a party or a third person), provided it is immediately available (§ 294 ZPO).

287

The German Legal System and Legal Language 4

10

11 12 13

The court has a duty to exhaust die evidence preferred (‘Erschöpfung der Beweise’) . Failure to do so  breaches § 286 ZPO and can infringe the right to be heard (Article 103(i) GG). An application for the taking of evidence (‘Beweisantrag’) can only exceptionally be refused (cf § 244(iii) StPO). See, in Appendix A, ‘Beweisaufnahme’, ‘Beweismittel’ and ‘Beweisverfahren’ . 1 In civil procedure, it is a basic rule (‘Grundregel’)  that the party alleging that the factual conditions for a particular ‘Anspruchsgrundlage’  or ‘Gegennorm’  (counter-norm) are fulfilled must allege and prove them (the ‘Behauptungslast’ (‘Darkgungslast’) and, respectively, the (subjective) ‘Beweislast’ (burden of  proof)). The evidence of that party (the ‘beweisbelastete Partei’) is referred to as the ‘Hauptbeweis’ (main evidence), while that of the other party is the ‘Gegenbeweis’ (counter-evidence). 2 If, following the ‘Beweiswürdigung  (assessment of the evidence), there is a ‘non liquet’ (ie, something remains unclear) and the court is not convinced of the truth or otherwise of a particular ‘Tatsache’ (fact), the question is then: who (still) has the (objective) ‘Beweislast’? That person is referred to as remaining ‘beweisfallig’  (liable to supply proof) and bears the consequences (‘Folgen’) of the failure of proof (‘Beweislosigkeit’). 3 The ‘Beweislast’  can be eased by ‘prima facie’ evidence ( ‘Beweis des ersten Anscheins’  or ‘Anscheinsbeweis’ ), eg, by a rule of experience (‘Erfahrungssatz’). The equivalent in English law is the rule of ‘res ipsa loquitur’ (the thing speaks for itself). ‘Anscheinsbeweis’  is a special type of circumstantial evidence (‘Indizienbeweis’). Both are so-called ‘tatsächliche Vermutungen’  (actual presumptions (not to be confused with the term ‘Tatsachenvermutung’ (presumption of fact)). However, unlike ‘Indizienbeweis’, ‘Anscheinsbeweis’  is merely provisional (‘vorlàufig’) and can be destroyed (‘zerstört’) or shaken (‘erschüttert’) by facts indicating the serious possibility of a different course of events (‘die ernsthafte Möglichkeit eines anderen Geschehensablaufes). 4 The ‘Beweislast’ can also be regulated or reversed (‘Umkehr der Beweislast’) in cases where statutory presumptions (‘gesetzliche Vermutungen’)  apply (eg, § 1006 BGB) or where presumptions have been developed by the courts (for example, in (tort) actions involving alleged medical negligence (‘Arzthaftung’) or product liability (‘Produkthaftung’), eg, in The Allergy to Hair Tonic Case  (Sourcebook, Chapter 5) and The Fowl Pest Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 6). However, statutory presumptions as to facts or rights can be refuted (‘entkräftet’) by contrary evidence (‘Beweis des Gegenteils’) : § 292 ZPO. See also § 282 BGB. See generally Creifelds under ‘Behauptungslast’, ‘Beweis’, ‘Beweislast’, ‘Glaubhaftmachung’, ‘Non liquet’, ‘Anscheinsbeweis’, ‘Indizienbeweis’  and ‘Produzentenhaftung’. ‘Anscheinsbeweis’ is of particular practical relevance in the field of road traffic accidents. See the article  by Grüneberg, ZAP 12/00, Fach 9, p 567 (Section II 1 (m)). See also: Notes 67, 84 and 97 in this Chapter; Chapter X, Note 126 I; Chapter X, Note 222 E; Chapter XV D; Bergerfurth, Part 3 (15–18); Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 8 (§§ 49–50); Rosenberg/Schwab, Book II, Section 1 (§ 118); Schellhammer (ZP), Book 1, Part 3, Chapter 7; Schneider, ZAP 2/00, Fach 13, §§ 22–23 (p 897–938); Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part I, Section G. (Note: the numbering in Schellhammer (ZP) has changed since I consulted the 3rd Edition (1987), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter 7, Sections 6,9 and 10.3–10.6). Doctors have a duty to enlighten the patient (‘Aufklärungspflicht’)   and a duty to keep proper documentation (‘Dokumentationspfiicht’). They can be liable for a defect in treatment (‘Behandlungsfehler’) in criminal and/ or civil law (contract and/or tort); see Schafer, ZAP, Fach 2, p 159; Uhlenbruck, ZAP, Fach 2, p 171; Marburger, ZAP, Fach 18, p 693; Creifelds under ‘Arzt’ and ‘Arztliche Kunstfehler’ ; Chapter X, Notes 126 J, 166 (‘Classification’) and 222 B. 5 In criminal proceedings, where the inquisition principle (‘Inquisitionsprinzip’) applies, the term ‘Beweislast’ is not used in the above manner. The consequence of a ‘non liquet’ is that the accused always has the benefit of any remaining doubt the unwritten principle ‘in dubio pro reo’  (in case of  doubt, for the accused (on issues of fact)). The principle of ‘freie Beweiswürdigung’  again applies and the court must be convinced (of the guilt of the accused) on the basis of the totality of the hearing: § 261 StPO. All facts and means of evidence (‘Tatsachen und Beweismittel’),  which are in some way significant for the decision, must be proven: § 244(ii) StPO. There are no presumptions of guilt (‘Schuldvermutungen’) . See Creifelds under ‘non liquet’ and ‘in dubio pro reo’ ; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 5 (§ 24 C). See D 8 in this Chapter, below. See Rosenberg-Schwab, Book I, Section 3, §62 and Section 4, §77. Regarding the mechanics of service, see Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii), below.

288

Notes 14 15

16 17 18

19 20 21 22

23

A ‘Beschluß’ or ‘Verfügung’ requires no particular form, but if there has been an oral hearing, it must be pronounced (‘verkündet’): § 329(i) ZPO. See Creifelds under ‘Beschlußverfahren’ ; Chapter XIII D 3 (c). Bis de eadem re ne sit actio  (no action lies twice in the same matter; ne bis in idem  is the equivalent expression in the field of criminal law). See Baur, § 13 A and § 17; Bergerfurth, Part 4 (24); Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 9 (§§ 61–65); Rosenberg/Schwab, Book II, Section 3 (§§ 150–163). See also Chapter XIV C (Note 26). The ‘Rechtskraft’ of a judgment also extends to the parties’ successors in title: § 325 ZPO. Exceptionally, the ‘Rechtskraf’ of a decision can be ‘beseitigt’ (disposed of, overturned) by means of:  –  an application for ‘Wiedereinsetzung’ in den vorigen Stand’  (reinstitution of the previous position): §§233– 238 ZPO;  –  an ‘Ab Under ungsklage’  (writ to adjust a judgment for the payment of regular sums (eg, maintenance) due to a change of circumstances): § 323 ZPO;  –  a ‘Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens’  (resumption of proceedings): §§ 578–591 ZPO. The ‘Rechtskraft’ of a decision can also be ‘durchbrochen’  (breached), if grounds for a claim under § 826 BGB can be proven. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtskraft’, ‘Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand”, ‘Abànderungsklage’ and ‘Wiederaufnahmeverfahren’ . Regarding the ‘Abànderungsklage’, see also the article by Schellhammer in ZAP 9/98, Fach 11, p 445. See Rosenberg-Schwab, Book I, Section 4 (§§ 81–82); Thomas-Putzo, § 128 II. See also: Chapter XIII D 2 (d). See Note 113 in this Chapter. Regarding the independence of the judiciary, see Chapter XXI A. Regarding the principle of the binding of the judiciary to statute and law, see Chapter II, Note 23.  Jauernig (ZP, Book I, Chapter 2 (§ 8 V) points out that the principle protects the subject from judicial ‘Willkür’ (arbitrariness). This is correct, but Jauemig then takes the view that this function can only be performed, if  a ‘Gesetz’ contains sufficient norms. One can then beg the question: How many norms are enough? Is a particular ‘Gesetz’ really necessary? Does not an increase in quantity lead to a decrease in quality? See Preface to Second Edition at Note 13; Chapter VIII, Note 22; Chapter XVI, Note 6. See Creifelds under ‘Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung’, ‘Präjudizien’, ‘Divergenz gerichtlicher Entscheidungen’, ‘Bindungswirkung’; Article 100(iii) GG; §§ 132,136–138 GVG; §§ 11–12 VwGO. See also: Chapter I, Note 6. See Section D 3 in this Chapter. See Note 15 and Section D 4 in this Chapter; Jauernig (ZP), Book II, Chapters 9 (§ 60) and 11. Reopening of the hearing is possible, if a court reaches a surprise decision on the basis of a point of law which a party has overlooked or not considered to be significant. See Note 121 in this Chapter. The district court for the place at which an applicant (‘Antragsteller’) has a general venue has exclusive local  jurisdiction: § 689(ii), 1st sentence ZPO. A foreign plaintiff (ie, one without a general venue in Germany) must apply to the ‘Amtsgericht’ Schöneberg’ in Berlin: § 689(ii), 2nd sentence ZPO. Thus, for die purpose of the ‘Mahnverfahren’  (and the local jurisdiction of German courts), the general venue of the defendant is, in principle, irrelevant. However, this is subject to the qualification that if there is a special (but no general) venue for the defendant in Germany, the matter falls within the local jurisdiction of  the ‘Amtsgericht’, which would—hypothetically—have (local) jurisdiction over the main dispute, were the district courts competent to deal with it § 703d ZPO. Apart from local jurisdiction, German courts can have (cross-border) international jurisdiction (also with respect to a ‘Mahnverfahren’ ) on the basis of international treaties. Procedure is then governed by the Law to Implement International Conventions on Recognition and Enforcement ( ‘Anerkennungsund Vollstreckungsausführungsgesetz’ ; AVAG) of 30.5.1988 and the ZPO rules are ousted. See Michael Johannes Schmidt in ZAP 24/95, Fach 14, p 195; Note 163 in this Chapter; Chapter XXI, Note 13. The effect of lodging an application for a ‘Mahnbescheid’  is that ‘Verjährung’ (prescription) is interrupted: § 693(ii) ZPO. However, the application must sufficiently individualise the claims being made. See Schneider, ZAP, Fach 13, p 391; ZAP EN-Nr 43/01.

289

The German Legal System and Legal Language 24 25 26

27 28

29 30 31

See Baur/Grunsky, § 18 B; Bergerfurth, Part 6 (34); Jauernig (ZP), Book 3, Chapter 14 (§ 90); Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenbeiger, Part III C (249). Books of the ZPO and, as appropriate, their Sections are not subdivided into Sections or, as appropriate, into Titles except where stated in this text. It would extend beyond this text to consider Book I, Section 2, Titles 5–7 ZPO (§§ 91–127a ZPO) in detail. For further information, see Baur/Grunsky, § 20; Bergerfurth, Part 4 (22); Jauernig (ZP), Book 4, Chapter 16 (§ 95); Fischer in ZAP 1/01, Fach 13, p 975. See also: Chapter XIII D 8 (b), Chapter XXII B (Note 22) and XXII D 8 (Note 111) post. See Baur/Grunsky, § 5; Jauernig (ZP), Book 1, Chapter 2 (§§ 9–12); Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 C (236–237). A Questions of international jurisdiction (‘internationale Zuständigkeit’) in civil matters are fundamentally governed by the rules on local jurisdiction contained in the ZPO. However, if other special procedural provisions for cases with an international element exist (eg, in international conventions, such as EuGVÜ), these have priority (in so far as they are applicable). See Jauernig (ZP), Introduction, Chapter 1, § 6; Thomas-Putzo, § 1 Vorbem II 4; Geimer, Part 4. B International jurisdiction is a ‘Prozeßvoraussetzung’ (precondition for a judgment) and must be considered by the court of its own motion (‘von Amts wegen’). See Notes 47 and 136 in this Chapter. C In the ZPO, the basic rule is that, in the absence of an exclusive venue, the court of a person’s general venue has local (and, therefore, international) jurisdiction in all (civil) actions against that person: § 12 ZPO. In other words, for a court in Germany to have jurisdiction in a civil matter, a general venue for the defendant must first be established. The general venue of a natural person is his ‘Wohnsitz’  (§ 13 ZPO); that of a company, its ‘Sitz’ (§17 ZPO). Special venues are (alternative) venues laid down for particular types of action (eg, the location of the branch (‘Niederlassung’/‘Filiale’) of a business (‘Gewerbe’), where the activities of that branch are concerned: § 21(i) ZPO; the place of performance, where contractual obligations are involved: § 29 ZPO). See also, in this connection, Article 5, Nos 5 and 1 EuGVÜ. Unless there is a (local/international) exclusive venue, the plaintiff can choose between available venues: § 35 ZPO. With the same qualification, German international jurisdiction can exist concurrently with that of a foreign court, although, under Articles 21–23 EuGVÜ, once a matter is pending in more than one country (‘anderweitige Rechtshàngigkeit’ = ‘lis alibi pendens’) , the later court must (or can), in certain circumstances, decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised of the case (‘das zuerst angerufene Gericht’). D The location of a natural person’s general venue—or, indeed, of any other venue—must, if disputed,  be determined according to the law of the forum (‘lex fori’). The position under the EuGVÜ is similar: – in order to determine a natural person’s general venue, the national law of the forum must initially  be applied. However, foreign law can (secondarily) become relevant, if no general venue is established under national law: Article 52 EuGVÜ. – where the issue is the location of the ‘Sitz’ (seat) of a ‘ Gesellschaft’ or ‘juristische Person’ (company), the private international law of the forum is decisive: Article 53 EuGVÜ. E For a survey of the circumstances in which a German court has (local) jurisdiction under §§ 12–37 ZPO, ie, the: – ‘allgemeine Gerichtsstände’ (general venues; §§ 12–19 ZPO); –   ‘besondere Gerichtsstände’  (special venues; §§ 20–23a, 27–29,30–34 ZPO); and – ‘ausschliefiliche Gerichtsstände’ (exclusive venues; §§ 24–26, 29a, 606, 802 ZPO), and the interrelationship between those norms and the Brussels Convention (EuGVÜ) 1968, see Dannemann, Part VI1 (a)-(c). See also: Chapter X Note 8; Chapter XX Note 2 and D 2. F Regarding local jurisdiction: – in marriage matters (‘Ehesachen’) and other family matters, see Chapter XIII D 6 (b); – in criminal matters (Strajsachen’), see Chapter XVII, Note 37; – in administrative matters, see § 52 VwGO. See Chapter XVII, Note 4. See Chapter XIII C G; Chapter XXII B; Jauernig (ZP), Book I, Chapter 2 (§ 15 II and § 8 V). Family matters (‘Familiensachen’) are dealt with by the family court (‘Familiengerichlt’), which, like the guardianship court (‘Vormundschaftsgericht’),  is a division of me ‘Amtsgericht’. The hearing in ‘Familiensachen’ and ‘Kindschaftssachen’ is held in private: § 170 GVG. See Creifelds under ‘Familiensachen’, ‘Familiengericht’  and ‘Vormundschaftsgericht‘,  Chapter X B 2 (a); Chapter XIII D 6 (a), below; Bergerfurth, Part 6 (30); Jauernig (ZP), Book III, Chapter 14, §§ 91–92.

290

Notes 32

The ‘Amtsgericht’ also acts as:  –  land registry (office) (‘Grundbuchamt’): § 1 GBO;  –   bankruptcy court (‘Konkursgericht’): § 2 InsO;  –  enforcement court (‘Vollstreckungsgericht’):  § 764 ZPO;  –  guardianship court (‘Vormundschaftsgericht’):  § 35 FGG;  –  probate court (‘Nachlaßgericht’): § 72 FGG;  –  registration court (‘Registergericht’) responsible, for example, for the ‘Handelsregister’ (commercial register): §125 FGG. See Chapter XXII, Note 33. 33 See Chapter XXII D 8. 34 See Chapter X Note 224. 35 See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) and (b), below. 36 See Bergerfurth, Part 1 (3); Jauernig (ZP), Book 1, Chapter 3 (§§ 18–20) and generally Baur/Grunsky, §6. 37 A party in non-contentious matters (‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’) and in administrative, social and finance proceedings (see Chapter XXII C 4) is referred to as ‘ein Beteiligter’ (a person involved). 38 For examples of ‘Prozeßhandlungen’, with information regarding their characteristics and form, see generally:  Jauernig (ZP), Book II. Chapter 4, § 30; Baur/Grunsky, § 6 F; Schellhammer (ZP), Book 4, Part 16, Chapter 11. 39   ‘Erwirkungshandlungen’  are classified as:  –  applications (‘Anträge’);  –  assertions (‘Behauptungen’, which term includes ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’ —see Note 119 in this Chapter); and  –  offers of evidence (‘Beweisangebote’). See Rosenberg/Schwab, Book I, Section 3, Chapter 2 (§ 64). See also: Note 64 in this Chapter; Jauernig (ZP), Book II, Chapter 4, § 30 III. 40 See Jauernig (ZP), Book II, Chapter 4, § 30 IV. 41 However, once proceedings have begun, an internal procedural condition (‘innerprozessuale Bedingung’)  is permissible. Thus, eventual applications (ie, for/in die event that…( für den Fall, daß  …’)) are, in general, allowed. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii), below. 42   ‘Heilung’ is also possible, if a faulty ‘Prozeßhandlung’ is approved retrospectively (‘rückwirkende Genehmigung’) or if it is carried out anew in the correct manner (‘erneute Vornahme’). 43 See Baur/Grunsky, § 10; Bergerfurth, Part 1 (7); Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 5 (§ 33); Creifelds under ‘Zulässigkeit’; Note 44 in this Chapter. 44 See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’;  Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii); Chapter XV C (Note 11); Chapter XVI (Note 17). 45 See Chapter XIII D1 (f) (iv). 46 The basic provision governing the ‘Rechtsweg’ in civil and criminal proceedings is § 13 GVG: see Chapter XXII C 2. 47 Once the defendant makes unqualified oral submissions on the main issue at first instance (ie, without challenging the court’s jurisdiction), he is bound to the court and can make no further objection to its  jurisdiction: § 39 ZPO. However, in proceedings before the ‘Amtsgericht’, this does not apply, if the court fails to advise the defendant of its lack of (substantive or local) jurisdiction: § 504 ZPO. A plaintiff faced with his action being rejected as inadmissible (unzulässig) on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction (ie, is ‘unzuständig’) should apply for a transfer (‘verweisung’)  of the matter to the competent court under § 281 ZPO. See Jauernig (ZP), Book 1, Chapter 2 (§ 12); preceding subsection in this Chapter (D I  (e)). 48 There is currently a thorny legal debate in Germany as to whether a company without a ‘Site’ in Germany has the capacity to sue in Germany, ie, as to the procedural status of foreign companies in the eyes of  German law. German courts still cling to the view that the legal capacity of a company is determined not by the home law (‘Heimatrecht’) of its place of incorporation (‘Gründung’), but by the law of its actual (administrative) seat (‘Verwaltungssitz’) .

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49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56

57

58

One says that this rule is necessary to counteract evasion of local rules by businesses, which form a ‘sham’ mail-box company (‘Briefkastenfirma’) in another jurisdiction and then ‘relocate’ their centre of administration to that place. Whatever the merits of this argument, such an approach is, in reality, discriminatory and hampers the smooth resolution of international disputes. Moreover, it is incompatible with the spirit of the EEC Treaty (which guarantees the right of establishment for companies (‘Niederlassungsfreiheit’)— see the ‘Centros’ decision of the ECJ (93.1999)). The issue shows how difficult it is to reconcile different legal standpoints (cultures). See ZAP, Fach 25, p 91; ZAP EN Nr 511 /00; Article 7 EGBGB. See Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 39 III) on the different position of minors in English and German law. See also: Chapter X, Notes 27 and 30; Note 56 in this Chapter. See Bergerfurth, Part 1 (8); Jauernig (ZP), Book 3, Chapter 13 (§§ 81–82). See Jauernig (ZP), Book 3, Chapter 13 (§§ 83–85) and Baur/Grunsky, § 9. See Note 39 in this Chapter. See also §§ 146, 282 and 296 ZPO. See the previous paragraph in the text. See Jauernig (ZP), Book 1, Chapter 3 (§§21 and 22). But not in proceedings before an ‘Amtsgericht’ (§§ 495–510b ZPO). In a civil matter subject to legal aid (‘Prozeßkostenhilfe’), the aided party has a right (in an ‘Anwaltsprozeß’ (lawyers’ action)) to the appointment (‘Beiordnung’) by the court of the lawyer selected by him or her: § 121(i) ZPO. If no such lawyer can be found, the presiding judge appoints one on application: § 121(iv) ZPO. An outside lawyer instructed to take steps in court proceedings elsewhere in Germany (or abroad) is referred to as me principal authorised representative (‘Haupt- or Prozeßbevollmächtigter’),  while the local (instructing) lawyer, who maintains (direct) contact with the client, is called a ‘Korrespondenzanwalt’/‘Verkehrsanwalt’ (correspondence lawyer). Fee arrangements (eg, sharing) can be made, but the ‘Verkehrsanwalt’ is entitled at least to one full ‘Gebühr’ (§ 52 BRAGO). Usually, all statutory fees are halved without regard to their recoverability: § 22 BerufsO. A ‘Verkehrsanwalt’  can be appointed on application under legal aid, if special circumstances (‘besondere Umstände’) so require: § 121(iii) ZPO. See Kindermann, ZAP, Fach 24, p 613; Note 63 in this Chapter; Chapter XXII, Notes 73 and 101. See Creifelds under ‘Vollmacht’ (cf ‘Ermächtigung’ and ‘Treuhandeigentum’), Kaiser, Part I (17); Köhler, Part 5 (§ 18); Klunzinger (Einführung), Part II (§§18-20); Kötz (EVR), Part B, § 12; Lowisch, Part 2, § 8; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II AI (Chapter 39 (entitled ‘Representation’)); see Chapter X, Note 28. For the position regarding minors, see Chapter X Notes 27 and 30 and Note 49 in this Chapter. The appointment of a ‘Vertreter’ (agent) generally requires no particular form: § 167(ii) BGB (exception: an irrevocable ‘Vollmacht’ f or a real estate transaction). Moreover, the grant of a ‘ Vollmacht’ can be express or can be implied from the principal’s conduct (‘schlüssiges Verhalten’). In two situations, by analogy with §§ 170–173 BGB, case-law has constructed a ‘Vollmacht’ where none actually exists (ie, the ‘agent’ is unauthorised):  – ‘Duldungsvollmacht’ (allowed authority): the principal knowingly tolerates the actions of the agent;  – ‘Anscheinsvollmacht’ (ostensible authority): the principal is not aware of the agent’s activities, but could, with appropriate care, have discovered them. The rationale underlying both situations is the need to protect the trust of the innocent third party (‘Vertrauensschutz’); the principal must bear the consequences for the ‘Rechtsschein’  (legal appearance) which has been created. In commercial law, the doctrine of the (unregistered) ‘Scheinkaufmann’ (apparent businessman) is based on similar considerations: a person, whose appearance (‘Auftreten’) in a business environment gives an innocent third party the false impression (‘Eindruck’) that he is a businessman, is treated as such. In particular, it suffices for personal liability, if a firm name is used without an appropriate suffix (eg, contrary to § 4(ii) GmbHG). See Creifelds under ‘Vollmacht’ and ‘Scheinkaufmann’, Capelle/Canaris, Part 1, Section 6 (§ 16); Hofmann, Part B IV 2; Köhler, Part 5, § 18IV; Schneider, Fach 15, p 245; Schulte, Vol 1, Chapter 8IX; Chapter X, Notes 27 and 31; Chapter XI at Note 37; Chapter XVIII, Note 7. German lawyers always insist on a written ‘Vollmacht’ before taking on a case, but rarely agree to limitations. Thus, a ‘Vollmacht’ is potentially a very dangerous instrument for unwitting clients.

292

Notes

59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67

68

If an internal limitation is desired, it is important—so as to safeguard possible claims for damages against the lawyer appointed—that it be spelt out in writing, preferably in advance of the retainer. Such external limitations as are accepted and are permitted should be contained in the ‘Vollmacht’ itself. However, the ‘Vollmachtgeber’  can immediately withdraw or correct admissions or factual statements made  by the ‘Bevollmächtigten’ in his presence. See also §164(i)BGB. See Chapter X, Note 31. In a party action (‘Parteiprozeß’), the court must take account of a defect in a ‘Vollmacht’ of its own motion, unless a lawyer appears. The costs of a ‘Verkehrsanwal’ are normally considered as unnecessary and not recoverable. See Notes 26 and 55 in this Chapter. Types of pleading: ‘Vorbereitende Schriftsätze’  (preparatory pleadings) summarize the proposed submissions and applications in the forthcoming hearing. To be distinguished are ‘bestimmende Schriftsätze’  (definitive pleadings), which are intended to procure action  by the court, eg, a writ (‘Klage’). See Note 39 in this Chapter. If a party is unable to respond to an opponent’s submissions because they were not notified in time before the hearing in a preparatory pleading (ie, the party is surprised after conclusion of the hearing), application can be made to the court to allow the lodging of a pleading in response (so-called ‘nachgereichte’ (or ‘nachgelassene’) Schriftsätze’): § 283 ZPO. Reference to Documents (‘Bezugnahme’) Preparatory pleadings can be supplemented by means of reference to documents (Urkunden’)  in the possession of the party. They must then be attached in original or copy: § 131 (i) ZPO. All written items (‘Schriftstücke’) can be, and usually are, referred to by way of reference (‘Bezugnahm”) at the hearing: § 137(iii) ZPO. Documents can be referred to in the preparatory pleadings as means of evidence (‘Beweismittel’), in which case the provisions regarding the taking or evidence (‘Beweisaufnahme’, §§ 355ff ZPO) apply. However, a prerequisite is the making of sufficient factual submissions. See Creifelds under ‘Mündliche Verhandlung’  and Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi). See also §§ 272 and 278 ZPO See Chapter XIII B 2. The ‘Wahrheitspflicht’  was introduced by an amendment (‘Novelle’) to the ZPO in 1933. See Jauernig (ZP), Book E, Chapter 4 (§ 25 VIII and § 26). Substantiation (‘Substantiierung’) serves the process of ‘Subsumtion’ and is important for the purpose of the ‘Schlüssigkeitsprüfung’. It is more than just ‘Glaubhaftmachung’. The presentation of the facts (‘Darstellung des Sachverhalts’) must go into detail (‘in Einzelheiten gehen’)  and be complete (‘lückenlos’) ie, they must be concretised as far as possible. The parties have a burden of allegation (‘Darkgungslast’). If the parties cannot discharge their ‘Darlegungslast’ (eg, if they allege too few or unfavourable facts), the parties run the risk of their submissions being dismissed as ‘unschlüssig’  (inconclusive) or ‘unerheblich’ (insignificant). In particular, the court can reject:  –  statements which are known to be untrue (‘bewußt unwahres Vorbringen’);  –  assertions which are based on an arbitrary presumption (‘willkürliche Vermutung’),  ie, which are made into the blue (‘ins Blaue hinein’) without tangible proof (‘ohne greifbare Anhaltspunkte’);  and  –  applications for evidence, which are only made in order to obtain additional, possibly significant information intended to form the basis for further investigations, ie, fishing expeditions (‘Ausforschungsanträge’) . The extent of a plaintiff’s duty to substantiate in a particular case depends on the norm sought to be invoked (ie, the provisions of the substantive law (‘materielles Recht’)) and on the defendant’s expected reaction to the ‘Klage’. No further substantiation is required, if a particular legal term (‘Rechtsbegriff’) used by a plaintiff is not disputed by the defendant (ie, both parties are in agreement). If the court considers the substantiation supplied to be insufficient, it has a duty (under § 139 ZPO) to indicate this (‘Hinweispflicht’). However, courts often overstretch the degree of substantiation required so as to avoid the need for the taking of evidence (‘Beweisaufnahme’). See Chapter X, Note 105; Notes 10, 97 and 107 in this Chapter; Jauernig (ZP), Book II, Chapter 5, § 37 II 4; Nicknig, ZAP 7/97, Fach 13, p 501; Schneider, ZAP 2/00, Fach 13, p 897. See Chapter XIII B 2 and 3.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 69

70 71

72 73 74 75 76 77 78

79 80 81 82 83 84

§ 139 ZPO is a central norm of civil procedure, which places an obligation on the presiding judge to take an active role in the conduct of the proceedings (‘Prozeßleitung’), the purpose being to elicit the material at issue (‘Prozeßstoff’). However, the extent of the judge’s duty is disputed; § 139 ZPO merely sets out the minimum requirements. Thus, although the judge must do what is necessary to advance the case to an appropriate decision (‘sachgerechte Entscheidung’)— he has a ‘Förderungspflicht’— he must remain neutral between the parties (‘unparteiisch’). A breach of § 139 ZPO constitutes a procedural defect (‘Verfahrensmangel’).  On objection by a party that a direction by the presiding judge or a question from a member of the court is inadmissible (‘unzulässig’), the full court must decide: § 140 ZPO. Moreover, an appeal and other remedies are possible: see Chapter XXII, Note 19. The court also has a general procedural duty of care (‘prozessuale Fürsorgepflicht’) derived from the constitution (Articles 2(i), 19(iv) GG), infringement of which can give grounds for a constitutional complaint. See Creifelds under ‘ Aufklärungspflicht des Richters’; Ja uernig (ZP), Book II, Chapter 4, § 25 VII; Schneider, ZAP, Fach 13, p 731; ZAP-Report: Justizspiegel 6/01, p 307. See also §§ 273, 278(iii), 295 and 504 ZPO; Note 3 in this Chapter. In administrative court proceedings, the counterpart of § 139 ZPO is § 86(iii) VwGO. In criminal proceedings, the counterpart of § 140 ZPO is § 238(ii) StPO. By § 279(i) ZPO the court must, at all stages of the proceedings, consider a possible amicable settlement of  the dispute in whole or in part. The court can, for example, stay the proceedings, if its decision depends on the existence or non-existence of  a legal relationship (‘Rechtsverhältnis’), which is the subject of other proceedings (§ 148 ZPO), or if, during the proceedings, it transpires that the investigation of a possible crime could influence the courts decision (§ 149 ZPO). Other examples of preliminary questions (‘Vorfragen’),  which can also require a stay of proceedings, are concrete norm-control references (to the Constitutional Court) and references to the European Court of   Justice regarding European Union law (under Article 234 EC Treaty (formerly Article 177 EEC Treaty)). See § 94 VwGO; Article 100(i) GG; §§ 246ff, 261(iii) and 614 ZPO; Chapter VII, Notes 12 and 13. The provisions relevant to the issue of a ‘Klage’ (writ) are dealt with in Chapter XIID 2 (c). See also Note 89 in this Chapter. See also § 207 ZPO. For example, the notice periods for termination of a contract of employment (‘Kündigungsfristen’; § 622 BGB). See Baur/Grunsky, § 13; Chapter XIII, Note 15. Dealt with here: §§ 230–231 ZPO. However, a party, who fails to observe (inter alia) a ‘Notfrist’ or the time limit for lodging particulars of  appeal, can apply for ‘Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand’  (reinstitution of the previous position), if:  –  the failure arose without blame (‘ohne Verschulden’) on his part;  –  a substantiated application for reinstitution is made within two weeks of the date on which the impediment is remedied (‘der Tag, an dem das Hindernis behoben ist’),  ie, the date, after which further nonobservance of the time limit by the party is blameworthy.  –  the ‘Prozeßhandlung’  is carried out anew (‘nachgeholt’) within the two week period;  –  the application for reinstitution is made, at the latest, within one year of the expiry of the missed time limit. See §§ 233, 234, 236(ii) and 294 ZPO. Substantiation (‘Glaubhaftmachung’) usually takes the form of an assurance in lieu of oath (‘eidesstattliche Versicherung’). A grant of reinstitution is final: § 238(iii) ZPO. Dealt with in Book II of the ZPO (§§253ff). See§333ZPO. See Note 107 in this Chapter. See also §§148–155 ZPO. See also §251a ZPO. A more detailed consideration of Titles 2–12 (§§ 300–494 ZPO) would extend beyond the scope of this text.

294

Notes

85 86 87 88 89 90

91 92 93 94 95 96

However, for information regarding:  –  Title 2, see ‘Prozefiurteil’, ‘Sachurteil’ and ‘Urteil’ in Appendix A;  –  Title 3, see Chapter XIII D1 (g) (iv);  –  Title 4, see Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i);  –  Titles 5–12, see Chapter XIII B 7, Chapter III D 2 (c) (iii) and the entries between ‘Beweis’ and ‘Beweiswürdigung’  in Appendix A. See Baur / Grunsky, § 7; Bergerfurth, Part 1 (2 and 6) and Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 6 (§§ 38–401); Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 C (240). See Schneider, ZAP 18/98, Fach 13, p 741 (‘Formfragen’); Note 64 in this Chapter. Thus, for example, the ‘Klageschrift’ must make dear whether defendants are being sued as joint debtors (‘Gesamtschuldner’). See Schneider, ZAP 1 /00, Fach 13, p 845 (§ 18); Chapter XIIID 1 (f) above. For the bailiff’s involvement in enforcement proceedings, see Chapter XIII D 8 C (v). Other forms of ‘Zustellung’ are available where the circumstances require: ‘Ersatzzustellung’ (substituted service: §§ 181–185 ZPO); ‘öffentliche Zustellung’  (service by public notice: §§ 203–206 ZPO). Return of the acknowledgement of receipt is a precondition for service to be valid (‘wirksam’). However, a date of receipt stamp (‘Eingangsstempel’)  is sometimes not itself conclusive of the date of service. Moreover, a lawyer must take care to calculate and note any relevant time period (‘Frist’) for the lodging of  an appeal (‘Rechtsmittel’). See the article by Brigitte Borgmann in ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 6/98, p 270. Certain exceptions are set out in § 65(vii) GKG. See also Chapter XXII D 8. See Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 5 (§ 34) and Creifelds under ‘Klagearten’. See § 304(i) ZPO, Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 5 (§ 34) and Creifelds under ‘Leistungsklage’, ‘Gestaltungsklage’ and ‘Feststellungsklage’. See also Chapter XV B (Note 7). See Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 5 (§ 37); Rosenberg / Schwab, Book II, § 96. ‘Die bestimmte Angabe des Gegenstandes und des Grundes des erhobenen Anspruchs, sowie einen bestimmten Antrag’. It is a strict rule that it must be made dear to the court what claim is being made and what decision is being sought, otherwise the ‘Klage’ has to be dismissed as inadmissible (‘unzulässig’). The relevant application (‘Klageantrag’/‘Sachantrag’) must be sufficiently specific (‘hinreichend bestimmt’),  ie, it must have an enforceable content (‘vollstreckungsfähiger Inhalt’), such that the defendant is able to perceive his risk and defend himself  fully accordingly. The wording of an application is, therefore, of critical importance in German civil procedure. Clarity (‘Klarheit’) is vital. The following are examples of the specificity principle (‘Bestimmiheitsgrundsatz’):  –  The first stage of a ‘Stufenklage’ (step action; § 254 ZPO)—ie, the application for information (‘Auskunft’). This must exactly specify (‘genau bezeichnen’) what is desired. Following the supply of supporting documents/certificates (‘Unterlagen’/‘Belege’),  the second stage then consists of the defendant providing; confirmation of their completeness in the form of an assurance in lieu of oath (‘eidesstattliche Versicherung’) . The final stage—ie, the application for the relevant act of performance (‘Leistung’) being sought (eg, payment (‘ahlung’))—need not (initially) be specific, however, as the ‘Stufenklage’ is an exception to § 253 ZPO. See Note 105 in this Chapter. See also § 259 BGB; § 889 ZPO.  –  Claims for money / damages must be stated in figures (‘beziffert’) and be broken down (‘aufgeteilt’). However, the giving of figures (‘Bezifferung’)  is not necessary if, for special reasons, it cannot be expected of the plaintiff (‘nicht zumutbar’). Thus, on a claim for damages for pain and suffering (‘Schmerzensgeld’) an appropriate sum (‘angemessener Betrag’)   can be demanded, provided its approximate size (‘Größenordnung’)  or a minimum amount (‘Mindestbetrag’) is stated or its ascertainment (‘Ermittlung’) by the court is made possible. See Chapter X, Note 227 (b).  –  Claims arising from an accident must be scheduled under separate headings eg, damage to property (‘Sachschaden’),   damages for pain and suffering, medical expenses and costs of cure (‘Arzt- und  Heilungskosten’), loss of earnings (‘Verdienstausfall’),  additional needs (‘vermehrte Bedurfnisse’) .  –  If part of a larger sum is daimed (‘Teilklage’), the relevant items being daimed (‘Positionen’) must be listed.

295

The German Legal System and Legal Language

97

 –  In an ‘Unterlassungsklage’ (action for a restraining order), the particular conduct complained of and sought to be restrained must be dearly formulated.  –  If the release (‘Herausgabe’)  of a thing (‘Sache’) is sought, the thing must be described in detail.  –  If acts of repair (‘Mängelbeseitigung’) under a contract for services (‘Werkvertrag’)  are claimed, they must  be identified. ‘Statement…of the ground of the claim’ means that it is necessary to distinguish (‘kennzeichnen’) the particular claim by me supply of facts (‘Angabe von Tatsachen’) ; merely to individualise the relevant legal relationship is not sufficient. The court cannot go beyond (ie, is bound by) what is applied for: § 308(i) ZPO. This follows from the principle that civil proceedings are at the disposition of the parties (‘Dispositions grundsatz’) . The application therefore sets the boundaries for the court’s examination (‘Grenzen des Prüfungsumfangs’) . On the other hand, it should really suffice if, as far as possible, an application is understandable (‘verständlich’). In particular, under § 139 ZPO the court has a duty to promote the making of suitable applications (‘sachdienliche Anträge’). Moreover, if an application is unclear, interpretation (‘Auslegung’) can be resorted to. The term ‘Streitgegenstand’  is also used in administrative procedure: § 90(i) VwGO. However, in administrative proceedings, the actual wording of the application to the court (‘Klageantrag’) is not so important, provided the matter (‘Angelegenheit’) involved and the aim of the action (‘Klageziel’) is sufficiently apparent: § 82(i) VwGO (‘…soll einen bestimmten Antrag enthalten.’) . Clarification of the facts is a matter for the court, although the parties have a duty of cooperation (‘Mitwirkungspflicht’): §86(i)VwGO. See Creifelds under ‘Klageschrift’, ‘Streitgegenstand’; Schneider, ZAP 1/00, Fach 13, p 861 (§ 19 I-IV); Chapter XV D, below. 1 The court compares the submissions in the ‘Klage’   (the ‘Klagevortrag’ ) and defence (the ‘Verteidigungsvortrag’) with the requirements of die relevant ‘Anspruchsgrundlage’ or ‘Gegennorm’ (counter-norm): the so-called ‘doppelte Schlüssigkeitsprüfung’   (double check of apparent well foundedness). Thus, a plaintiff must take care to ensure that his submissions satisfy all conditions for the claim being made (‘Anspruchsvoraussetzungen’)  and dispose of any foreseeable objections (‘Einwendungen’). The ‘Klage’ has to be dismissed as unfounded (‘ist als unbegründet abzuweisen’),  if it is not ‘schlüssig’ (conclusive) or if the defence (‘Verteidigung’ /‘Einlassung’)  is ‘erheblich’  (substantial). For example, the ‘Klage’ of a plaintiff, who applies for a judgment in default (‘Versäumnisurteil’),  must be ‘schlüssig’:§ 331(ii) ZPO. Moreover, the ‘Klagebegründung’  (ie, the facts presented in support of the ‘Klage’) must be substantiated (‘substantiiert’). See Chapter XIII, Note 67 ante; Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 4, § 25 V; Creifelds under ‘Schlüssigkeit’; Schellhammer (ZP), Book 1, Part 3, Chapter 6 (Note: the numbering in Schellhammer (ZP) has changed since I consulted the 3rd Edition (1987), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter 6). 2 If both the ‘Klage’ is ‘schlüssig’  and the defence ‘erheblich’,  this can only mean that one or other ‘Tatsache’ is ‘streitig’ (disputed/contentious). Facts which are disputed are ‘beweisbedürftig’  (ie, require evidence) and form the ‘Beweisgegenstand’ (subject of evidence; also referred to as the ‘Beweisthema’ (evidence theme)). Facts, which are admitted at court or which are ‘offenkundig’ ((patently) obvious) are not ‘beweisbedürftig’:  §§ 288, 291 ZPO. The equivalent doctrine in English law is ‘judicial notice’. See Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 4, § 25IV and Chapter 8, § 49 VII; Rosenberg/Schwab, Book II, Section 1 (§§ 116–117). 3 The ‘Schlüssigkeitsprüfung’,  therefore, enables the court to establish whether it is necessary to take evidence and if so, on what points (the ‘Beweisgegenstand’ or ‘Beweisthema’). It is a judicial test, a procedural filter. 4 Whether the submission of a party (the ‘Parteivortrag’ ) is regarded by the court as ‘schlüssig’  must  be distinguished from the ‘Behauptungslast’  (and ‘Beweislast’ ), ie, the question of which party has the burden of alleging (and proving) that the factual conditions for a particular ‘Anspruchsgrundlage’ or ‘Gegennorm’  are fulfilled. It is not a judicial test, but a basic principle of procedure for the parties. See Chapter XIII, Notes 10 and 67; Schellhammer (ZP), Book 1, Part 3, Chapter 7 (Note: the numbering in Schellhammer (ZP) has changed since I consulted the 3rd Edition (1987), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter 7, Section 8).

296

Notes 5

98

99

100

101

102 103 104

105 106 107

There is no ‘Schlüssigkeitsprüfung’   in proceedings where the ‘Untersuchungsgrundsatz’ (‘Inquisitionsprinzip’ (inquisition principle)) applies: see Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 4, § 25 V. In that case it is die court which alone decides the ‘Beweisbedurftigkeit’: see Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 8, § 49 VII 1; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 5 (§ 24 C). lura novit curia: the court knows the law. A German judge is assumed to have knowledge of all law applicable in the Federal Republic. If foreign law is applicable, the court has a duty to familiarize itself with it. § 293 ZPO. See Chapter XX E. 1 By § 355(i) ZPO, the ‘Beweisaufnahme’   must take place before the court hearing the case (the ‘Prozeßgericht’): the principle of ‘Unmittelbarketi’? (directness). ‘Beweisaufnahme’ can only be placed in the hands of a member of the court—the ‘beauftragter Richter’ (appointed judge)—in certain (exceptional) cases. See Creifelds under ‘Beweis’ and ‘Beauftragter Richtef’. 2 By § 357(i) ZPO, the parties have the right to be present during the ‘Beweisaufnahm7e’: the principle of  ‘Parteiöffentlichkeit’ (party openness). See Creifelds under ‘Beweis’ and Chapter XIII B 7 ante. Normally, an amendment of the writ (‘Klageänderung’) is only possible if the defendant agrees or the court considers it helpful to the matter (‘sachdienlich’): § 263 ZPO. However, provided there is no significant change in the cause of action (‘Klagegrund’),  submissions of fact or law can be supplemented (‘ergänzt’) or corrected (‘berichtigt’) and applications to the court can be extended or limited (‘Klageeriveiterung’/‘Klagebeschrankung’):  § 264 ZPO. See also §256(ii) ZPO. See §§ 261(iii) No 1,263,264 and 322(i) ZPO. A proper demarcation (‘Abgrenzung’)  of the object of the action can be problematical. This is particularly the case where the same application (‘Klageantrag’) is made to the court in a second action, but on different grounds. The question is then: do the new grounds introduce a new ‘Streitgegenstand’  or do they merely supplement the earlier set of facts (‘Sachverhalt’)? The question is resolved with the help of the civil law doctrine of concurrence (‘Konkurrenzlehre’) . According to this doctrine, if the norms relied on in the second action are different, but form the basis for a single (substantive) claim, the ‘Streitgegenstand’ is regarded as being the same ( ‘Gesetzeskonkurrenz’ (statutory concurrence)); on the other hand, if the norms found more than one (substantive) claim (‘mehrere Ansvriiche’), the ‘Streitgegenstand’  is deemed to be different ( ‘Anspruchskonkurrenz’  (concurrence of claims)). Thus, the doctrine of concurrence is an attempt to determine the ‘Streitgegenstand’  and to achieve a demarcation of the facts in issue (‘Sachverhaltsabgrenzung’)  by means of identifying and comparing the ‘Anspruchsnormen’  involved. Although this is a norm-based test, there is a tendency to take a real life approach when trying to demarcate the ‘Streitgegenstand’,  so as to satisfy the conflicting interests at stake in civil procedure which are not only legal, but also political. See Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 5 (§ 37), Chapter 6 (§§ 40 II and 41) and Chapter 9 (§ 62 III); Dannemann, Part VI1 (e) (‘Lis Alibi Pendens’). The concept is also used in other jurisdictional branches: see Creifelds under ‘Streitgegenstand’. Regarding the staying of English actions on the basis of the doctrine of ‘forum non conveniens’ (the forum is not appropriate) and the position under the Brussels Convention (Articles 21–23) if there is a suit pending elsewhere (‘lis alibi pendens’),  see Collier, Part II, Chapter 8 (a) and Chapter 10 (e) (viii). ‘Forum non convenient’  can be relied on by plaintiffs and defendants. See, respectively: Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex  [1987] AC 860 and Berezovsky v Forbes  (1999), Gazette 96/03, p 30. See generally: Jauernig (ZP), § 88; Thomas-Putzo, § 260; Rosenberg/Schwab, Book II, Part 1, § 100. See Chapter XIII D1 (f) (ii). Eventual applications are also possible on the part of the defendant, eg, an eventual counter-claim (‘Eventualwtderklage’) or eventual set-off (Eventualaufrechnung’). See Note 41 in this Chapter; Rosenberg/Schwab, Book I, Section 3, § 65 IV; Baur/Grunsky, § 11 I 3; ‘Vorbehaltsurteil’ . See Creifelds under ‘Klagenverbindung’, ‘Hilfsantrag’ and ‘Stufenklage’; Note 96 in this Chapter. The ‘Stufenklage’ is of particular importance in family law (for maintenance and marital property claims). See Bergerfurth, Part 2 (10); Jauernig (ZP), Book 2 (§ 23). Cf§275(i)ZPO. A defendant can react to a ‘Klage’ in various ways, all of which come under the general heading of the defendant’s ‘Einlassung’ (engagement (in the action)).

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The German Legal System and Legal Language

108 109 110 111 112 113

114 115 116

The defendant can:  –  acknowledge the claim ( ‘Anerkenntnis’; see §§ 307(i) and 93 ZPO);  –  take no action at all, possibly resulting in a judgment in default (‘Versaumnisurteil’)  against him;  –  assert that the ‘Klage’ is inadmissible (‘unzulässig’) on the ground that one or more ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’ (preconditions for a judgment) are not fulfilled or because certain ‘Prozeßhindernisse’  (obstacles to the proceedings) exist; dispute the plaintiff’s factual submissions (‘Bestreiten’ / ‘Klageleugnen’);  –  admit the plaintiff’s factual submissions (Gestândnis’; see §§ 288–290 ZPO), but submit that they are not ‘schlüssig’ (apparently well founded);  –  assert the existence of objections to the claim (Einwendungen’ or ‘Einreden’);  –  lodge a counterclaim (‘Widerklage’). In all but the first two situations, the defendant’s (main) application (‘Antrag’)  is for dismissal (‘Abweisung’) of the ‘Klage’. See respectively:  –  regarding a ‘Versaumnisurteil’:  Chapter XIII D1 (g) (iv) (at Note 80);  –  regarding ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’:  Chapter XIIID 1 (f) (i) (Note 44);  –  regarding ‘Schlussigkeit’: Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 97);  –  regarding ‘Einwendungen’  and ‘Einreden’:  Chapter X B 1 4 (Note 20);  –  regarding a ‘Widerklage’:  §§ 33,530(1), 610(ii) ZPO. See also: Baur/Grunsky, § 11; Bergerfurth, Part 1 (9); Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 7 (§§ 43–48); Model/ Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 C (241). See also Chapter XIII D1 (g) (iv). See Bergerfurth, Part 2 (10). See Bergerfurth, Part 2 (11); Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 12 (§ 78). It can be longer, if service is to be effected abroad. See Note 65 in this Chapter; Rosenberg/Schwab, Book II, Section 1 (§ 107); Schellhammer (ZP), Book 1, Part 5, Chapter 2 (Note: the numbering in Schellhammer (ZP) has changed since I consulted the 3rd edn (1987), Book 2, Part 5, Chapter 2). The personal appearance (‘persönliches Erscheinen’)  of both parties should normally be ordered, if this seems necessary in order to clarify the facts of the case: § 141(i), 1st sentence ZPO. However, if it cannot be expected of a party to appear at court due to great dista nce or for another important reason, the court must refrain from ordering personal appearance: § 141(i), 2nd sentence ZPO. There is a similar rule in marriage matters: § 613 ZPO. If personal appearance is ordered, the relevant party must be officially summoned by a ‘Ladung’: § 141(ii) ZPO. The ‘Ladung’  must state for what purpose the personal appearance has been ordered and indicate that failure to appear can result in a fine being imposed, unless the party sends an authorised representative to the hearing: § 141 (iii) ZPO. However, if personal appearance is ordered in an attempt to reach a settlement (§ 279(ii) ZPO) such a sanction is not permitted. See Krügermeyer-Kalthoff, ZAP-Aktuell, 16/00, p 989. This is the ‘Verhandlung zur Hauptsache’  (see eg, §§ 39,333 ZPO). See § 278(i), 2nd sentence ZPO; § 613 ZPO. To be distinguished from an ‘Arihörung’  is the examination of the parties (‘Parteivernehmung’)  as a means of  evidence (’Beweismittel’). This requires a ‘Beweisbeschluß’ : § 450 ZPO. This is the start of the ‘streitige Verhandlung’  (contentious proceedings) proper. § 137(i) ZPO does not require express reference to the pleadings. The provisions regarding judgments in default (§§ 330–347 ZPO) only bite, if an appropriate person (§ 157 ZPO) fails to apper at the hearing (‘nicht Auftreten’) or if there is a complete lack of involvement ( ‘völliges Nichtverhandeln’ ; § 333 ZPO), ie, there is an absence (‘Säumnis’). Thus, they do not apply:  –  if there is some degree of active participation at the hearing;  –  if (and once) a substantive application (‘Sachantrag’) is made; or  –  if a party makes submissions, but remains silent regarding particular facts or documents (§ 334 ZPO). See Chapter XII D 1 (f) (iv) and (g) (iv). At the start of a hearing, judges frequently rush into requesting the parties to make their applications immediately, without giving appropriate directions concerning the action (‘Hinweise’)  beforehand (ie, in advance of the hearing). This infringes §§ 139, 273 and 278(iii) ZPO and is a trap for the unwary. The remedy

298

Notes

117 118 119

120

121 122 123

124 125 126 127 128 129 130

131 132 133

is, initially, to insist on such directions and then to apply for an adjournment (‘Vertagung’) under §227(i) ZPO. See Schneider, ZAP-Kolumne, 21 /00, p 1269. See Chapter XIIID 2 (c) (iii). See Chapter XIII B 7. See §§ 146 and 282(i) ZPO for a definition of ‘Angriffs und Verteidigungsmittel’  (means of attack and defence). ‘Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel’  include any type of factual or legal submissions in support of procedural claims or applications (not the applications themselves). A ‘Klage’ (writ) is not an ‘Angriffsmittel’, but itself an ‘Angriff’ (attack). See Note 39 in this Chapter. If a party is not responsible for a delay (‘Verzögerung’), over-zealous application of the preclusion provisions (§ 296 ZPO) can clash with constitutional law (Article 103(i) GG). Certainly, however, there is a judicial duty to give reasons (‘Begründungszwang’), if the court rejects or does not consider essentially relevant submissions. See Schneider, ZAP, Fach 13, pp 1026ff. A ‘Rüge’  can only be admitted, if the defendant sufficiently apologises for the delay (‘wenn der Beklagte die Verspätung genügend entschuldigt’):  § 296(iii) ZPO. In marriage matters, § 296 ZPO is replaced by § 615 ZPO. See Note 3 in this Chapter; Creifelds under ‘Rechtliches Gehör’ . See Note 69 in this Chapter. This is without prejudice to an application to reopen the proceedings (§ 156 ZPO). See also § 283 ZPO (Note 64 in this Chapter) and § 611 ZPO. In view of the consequences, a lawyer should stay eagle-eyed at all times against the danger of a premature closure of the oral hearing. Regarding possible remedies, see Chapter XXII, Note 19. The same applies, if, following an oral hearing, the court decides by way of a ‘Beschluß’. See Note 14 in this Chapter. Such an order must be quashed, if the party in whose favour it is granted so applies or if it seems that the personal appearance of the parties is unavoidable (‘unumgänglich’): § 128(iii), 4th sentence ZPO. See Krugermeyer-Kalthoff, ZAP-Aktuell, 16/00, p 989. See Note 47 in this Chapter. See Section C H in this Chapter; Baur/Grunsky, § 16; Bergerfurth, Part 5; Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 11 (§§ 72–75); Model/Creifelds/Lichteriberger, Part 3 C (245); Rosenberg/Schwab, Book II, Section 2 (§§135– 149). See Creifelds under ‘Berufung’ . Refusal of this application (‘Fristverlängerungsantrag’) can be challenged by an application for reinstitution (‘Wiedereinsetzung’)  and/or a constitutional complaint. See the article by Brigitte Borgmann in ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 1 /99, p 24. The normal rule is that, on appeal, new submissions can be made until the dose of the oral hearing: § 525 ZPO. §§ 527–529 ZPO are exceptions to this principle. They are predusionary provisions, which serve the same purpose as § 296 ZPO at first instance (ie, acceleration and concentration of the proceedings). §§ 527–528 ZPO are not applicable in marriage matters: § 615(ii) ZPO. This principle also applies on a ‘Revision’: § 559(i) ZPO. As to the position in criminal proceedings and in other jurisdictions, see Creifelds under ‘reformatio in peius’ . See Creifelds under ‘Revision’. If an OLG refuses to allow a ‘Berufung’, a ‘Revision’ is always possible: § 547 ZPO. A ‘Berufung’ to an OLG can be bypassed (‘übergangen’),  if, following a final judgment of a ‘Landgericht’,  the other party to the proceedings consents to a leap-frog appeal (‘Sprungrevision’),  ie, a direct appeal (on a point of law) to the BGH (§ 566a ZPO). Such a ‘Sprungrevision’  cannot be based on procedural defects and the BGH can decline to accept it, if the matter has no fundamental significance (‘grundsätzliche Bedeutung’; § 566a(iii) ZPO). In criminal proceedings:

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The German Legal System and Legal Language  –   jurisdiction to hear and decide a ‘Revision’ is split between the BGH and the OLG (§§ 135, 121 GVG). No leave to appeal is required;  –  a ‘Revision’ is possible against the judgment of a ‘Landgerichf  (sitting in the form of a ‘Strajkammer’ (criminal chamber) or ‘Schwurgericht’  (jury court; the ‘große Strafkammer’  (large criminal chamber) is referred to as such when it deals with particular more serious offences: § 74(ii) GVG)) and against the judgment of an OLG at first instance (§ 333 StPO; § 120 GVG);  –  a ‘Sprungrevision’  is also possible against the judgment of an ‘Amtsgericht’ (§ 335 StPO). 134 Such an appeal must be dealt with by the BGH unless:  –  the matter has no fundamental significance; or  –  the BGH comes to the view, on a preliminary assessment, that the appeal (ultimately) has no chance of  success (‘Aussicht aufErfolg’). In such a case the court can refuse to accept the appeal (‘die Annahme der Revision ablehnen’)  by a qualified two-thirds majority vote: § 554b ZPO. A matter having no fundamental significance, but which has a chance of success, does not require ‘Annahme’ in the first place: see Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 11, § 74 II 2. 135 If leave to appeal is refused by the OLG, no further complaint can be made (in civil proceedings). However, where a ‘Revision’ is sought in administrative, finance, social or employment proceedings, the refusal of  leave can be challenged by a so-called ‘Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde’. As from 1.1.2002, a ‘Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde’  is also possible in civil proceedings (§ 544 ZPO). See Creifelds under ‘Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde’. 136 The situations in § 551 ZPO are: 1 if the court was not properly composed (‘nicht vorschriftsmäßig besetzt’); 2 if a judge took part in die decision, despite being excluded by statute from exercising the office of judge (except in so far as a motion of challenge (‘Ablehnungsgesuch’)  on that ground was dismissed) (§§ 41ff  ZPO); 3 if a judge took part in the decision, although he was rejected due to risk of bias (‘Besorgnis der Befangenheit’) and a motion of challenge on that ground was successful (§ 46(ii) ZPO); 4 if the court wrongly assumed or declined (functional or international) jurisdiction (substantive or local  jurisdiction cannot be re-examined on appeal: § 549(ii) ZPO); 5 if a party in the proceedings was not properly represented (eg, § 51 (i) ZPO) (and there was no express or implied approval by the party to their conduct); 6 if the decision was based on an oral hearing, at which provisions regarding publicity of the proceedings (‘Öffentlichkeit des Verfahrens’;  § 169 GVG) were breached; 7 if no reasons for the decision were given. 137 See Baur/ Grunsky, § 16 C; Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 11, § 74 IV-VIII. 138 See Creifelds under ‘Zurückverweisung’. A ‘Zurückverweisung’  (remand) must be distinguished from the term ‘zurückweisen’, which refers to the rejection of an appeal (or, indeed, of any application) as unfounded (‘unbegründet’). When an appeal is rejected as inadmissible (‘unzulàssig’), the verb ‘verwerfen’  (to dismiss) is used. See Rosenberg/Schwab, Book II, Part 1, Section 2 (§ 137). 139 See Creifelds under ‘Beschwerde’. 140   ‘Verfügungen’ (directions) of a court at first instance can be challenged by a ‘Beschwerde’  to the ‘Landgericht’ and, thereafter, by a further ‘Beschwerde’  to the OLG: §§ 568 ZPO, 19–30 FGG. A ‘Beschwerde’  is possible not only in civil proceedings, but also in all the other main jurisdictional branches. See Creifelds under ‘Beschwerde’;  Schneider, ZAP, Fach 13, p 373; Chapter XXII, Note 19. 141 To be distinguished from a ‘Beschwerde’  is the ‘Erinnerung’ (reminder), where the matter (initially) remains in the same instance. An ‘Erinnerung’  is available, for example, against the decision of an officer of the business office of the court (‘Urkundsbeamter der Geschäftsstelle’;  § 576(i) ZPO) or of a legal executive ( ‘Rechtspfleger’;  § 11 RPflG). In the latter case, the ‘Erinnerung’  is ‘befristet’ (time limited), ie, it must be lodged within die same period as a ‘sofortige Beschwerde’ (usually two weeks from service: § 577 ZPO). See also Chapter XXII Note 29. 142 See Note 15 and Section C H in this Chapter; Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 11 (§ 76); Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 3 C (246). 143 Such actions breach the ‘Rechtskraft’ of the judgment. See Chapter XIII, Note 15. 144 SeeModel/Creifelds/Lichtenberger,Part3C(247). 145 See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 C (248).

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Notes 146 147 148

149

150 150 151 151 152 153 154

155 155 156 156 157 157 158 158

159

160 161 161 162 162 163

164 164

See See Chapt hapter er XII XIII, Note 31. 31. See See Chapt hapter er XIII III at Note ote 1. Foreign decisio sions in ‘Ehesachen’ (eg, divorces obtained abroad) require formal recognition (‘Anerkennung’)  by the relevant relevant state Justice Ministry in Germany: Article 7 ‘Familienrechtsänderungsgesetz’  (FamRÄndG). However, However, by EU Regulation 1347/2000, with effect from 1.3.2001, divorce/nullity divorce/nullity decisions and decisions in proceedings concerning parental care over joint children of the spouses are recognised automatically throughout all other member states of the EU (except Denmark). See Zerdick, ZAP-Aktuell 19/00, p 1173. Regarding recognition of decisions in (other) civil and commercial matters within the EU (including maintenance decisions) see Note 171 in this Chapter. The recognition of foreign decisions can, in certain circumstances, be precluded by § 328 ZPO or § 16a FGG. See also: Article 6 EGBGB. A temporary order (‘einstweilige Anordnung’) maintenance Anordnung’) is also the appropriate remedy to obtain current maintenance provisionally (‘vorläufig’), if a maintenance action (‘Ünterhaltsklage’) or proceedings to establish paternity (‘Vaterschaft’)  are pending. An injunction (‘einstweilige Verfügung’)  for emergency maintenance—under maintenance—under §§ 935, 940 ZPO analogously— remains possible in other situations. See the article by Kurt Schellhammer in ZAP 4/99, Fach 11, p 495. See See Not Notes es 9 and and 97 in this this Chap Chapte terr. See See Frie Friede deri rici ci,, ZAP ZAP 9/00 9/00,, Fach Fach 11, 11, p 555 555 (Se (Sect ctio ionn V). V). See ‘Unterhalt’ . See See § 621a 621a-f -f ZPO, §§ 49–6 49–644 FG FGG. The duty duty to to provide provide informati information on in § 1605 BGB only only exten extends ds so far far as is necessar necessaryy to establish establish a claim claim to maintenance. Thus, it can be limited, if the person seeking maintenance has income of his (or her) own. Employees usually have to supply details of their income (only) for the 12 months before proceedings proceedings are issued. A longer period—usually three years—is required required from self-employed persons. Non-fulfilment of the duty under § 1605 BGB can give rise to a claim for damages. Regard Regarding ing the meanin meaningg of init initial ial and and final final asse assets ts and and their their valua valuatio tionn (‘Wertermittlung’), see, respectively: §§ 1374–1375 BGB and § 1376 BGB. See also: ‘Güterrecht’ and Schellhammer, ZAP, Fach 11, p 347. For For the the posi positi tion on aft after er div divor orce ce,, see see §§ 158 1585b 5b and and c BGB. BGB. Regarding the maintenance of a child during the separation of the spouses or while a marriage matter is pending, see § 1629(ii), 2nd sentence BGB. See See Not Notes es 96 and and 105 105 in this this Chap Chapte terr. The cour courtt can onl onlyy devia deviate te from from a joint joint pro propos posal al rega regard rding ing cust custody ody (‘elterliche Sorge’), if the welfare of the child (‘Wohl des Kindes’)  so requires: § 1671(iii) BGB. If the court proposes to do so, it must decide the question first, before it deals with any other matters: § 627 ZPO Unless Unless the agree agreement ment is documen documented ted in in the form form of of an enforce enforceable able title, title, no divorce divorce can be granted: granted: § 630(iii 630(iii)) ZPO. However, However, even if the spouses fail to reach agreement, the court can still grant a divorce under § 1565(1), 2nd sentence BGB or § 1566(ii) 1566 (ii) BGB: see below. below. The agreement does not extend to (other) marital property and the ‘Versorgungsausgleich’:  see Schwab (F), Part I Chapter 6, § 35 V. Seri Seriou ouss mari marita tall fail failin inggs (‘schwere Eheverfehlungen’)  can suffice. See Jauernig (BGB), § 1565,3. See Friede Friederic rici,i, ZAP 9/00, 9/00, Fach Fach 11, 11, p 555 555 (Secti (Section on 1,5). 1,5). See Friede Friederic rici,i, ZAP 9/00, 9/00, Fach Fach 11, 11, p 555 555 (Secti (Section on IV). IV). See Ch Chapter XI XIII CI CI. In the European Union, the ‘Mahnverfahren’  seems to be a model for a pan-European effort to speed up and simplify procedures for debt recovery. However, the underlying complexities are substantial. See Heike Lörcher in ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 6/98, p 275; Michael Johannes Schmidt in ZAP 24/95, Fach 14, p 195. The subjec subjectt of enforc enforcemen ementt is fully fully covered covered in in Jauernig Jauernig (ZVS) (ZVS),, Part I. See also: Cre Creifel ifelds ds under under

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165 165 166 167 168 169 169 170 170 171

172 173 173 174 174

175 175 176 176 177 177 178 179 180 180 181

182

Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger ger,, Part 3 C (250–255 and ‘Zwangsvollstreckung’ ; Kallwass, Section 8 (§ 120); Model/Creifelds/Lichtenber 260–261). See Jaue Jauerni rnigg (ZVS) (ZVS),, Part Part 1, § 1 II; Chapte Chapterr XVIII XVIII,, Notes Notes 56 56 and 57, 57, belo below w. See Ch Chapter XI XIIIC E. E. See See Cha Chapt pter er XIV C 3 (N (Note 23 A). A). See § 8llff 8llff and § 850ff 850ff ZPO; ZPO; Jauernig Jauernig (ZVS), (ZVS), Part Part 1, 1, Chapte Chapterr 7, §§ §§ 32–33; 32–33; Crei Creifeld feldss under under ‘Vollstreckungsschutz’, ‘Lohnpfandung’, ‘Lohnpfandung’, ‘Pfändungsschutz’, ‘Pfändungsschutz’, ‘Pfandungsverbote’ ‘Pfandungsverbote’  and ‘Unpfëndbarkeit’ . See Jauern Jauernig ig (ZVS), (ZVS), Part Part 1, 1, § 1 X and also also (xi) (xi),, belo below w. See See Cha Chapt pter er XIV XIV,, Not Notee 23 A and and (xi (xi), ), bel below ow.. Where Where court court decision decisionss from an EU (EEC) (EEC) country country in civil civil or comme commerci rcial al matters matters are are to be be enforce enforced, d, applicati application on can be made for an enforcement clause (‘Vollstreckungsklausel’)  to be appended to the decision. It is a simplified procedure (by way of ‘Beschluß’), recognition recognition (‘Anerkennung’)  of the decision usually being granted (by the LG) as a matter of course. See Articles 26, 27, 28, 31ff EuGVÜ and the ‘Ausfuhrungsgesetz’  thereto (AV (AVAG) in ‘Sartorius ‘Sa rtorius IT Nos No s 160 and 160a; Chapter X, Note 8; Note 148 in this Chapter; Chapter XXI, Note 13. To be distinguished from such cases is enforcement by means of a ‘Vollstreckungsurteil’ (§§ 722–723 ZPO) or by means of a ‘Vollstreckbarerklärung’ . The basic rule (§§ 722–723 ZPO) is that foreign judgments (eg, from non-EU countries) require a (German) ‘Vollstreckungsurteil’  (enforcement judgment) for their enforcement. However, under various international conventions a mere ‘Vollstreckbarerklärung’  (declaration of  enforceability) is sometimes provided provided for, eg, for those areas of law where the EuGVÜ is not applicable (see Article 56 EuGVÜ), for foreign decisions on costs (‘Kostenentscheidungen’ ; under the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure of 1.3.1954) and for claims to maintenance ( ‘Unterhalt’; under die Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Maintenance Decisions of 2.10.1973). Declaration of enforceability is also the appropriate method of enforcement for decisions under arbitration agreements (‘Schiedsverträge’ ; § 1042ff ZPO) and, in particular, for foreign arbitration a wards/decisions (‘ausländische Schiedssprüche’),  in so far as international treaties do not otherwise provide (eg, the UN Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Arbitration Decisions of 10.6.1958). See Chapter XXI; Thomas-Putzo, § 723 ZPO Annex. Annex. In certain cases, the ‘Rechtspfleger’  is responsible: § 20 No 12 RPflG. Regarding the issue of ‘vollstreckbare Ausfertigungen’  of other (including notarial) documents (‘Urkunden’) see § 797 ZPO. See See Jau Jauer erni nigg (ZV (ZVS) S),, Par Partt 1, 1, Cha Chapt pter er 2, §§ 8–9. 8–9. See Jauern Jauernig ig (ZV (ZVS), S), Part Part 1, §§ §§ 10–14; 10–14; Gottwa Gottwald, ld, ZAP, ZAP, Fach Fach 14, 14, p 375. 375. Regarding § 771 ZPO see Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v), below. below. After enforcement is completed, the debtor may have remedies under §§ 812ff and 823ff BGB. See Jauernig (ZVS), Part 1, § 12 VI. See See Cha Chapt pter er XXII XXII,, Not Notes es 28 and and 29. 29. See See Jau Jauer erni nigg (ZV (ZVS) S),, Par Partt 1, 1, § 1 VI. VI. The The onl onlyy exc excep epti tion on is cont contai aine ned d in in § 777 ZPO ZPO See §§ 829–845 and 846–849 846–849 ZPO. ZPO. See See also: also: Note Note 168 in in this Chapter; Chapter; Model/ Model/Crei Creifelds felds/Lich /Lichtenb tenberge ergerr, Part 3 C (251–254). The effect effect of of an official official seizure— seizure—of of movables movables or immovab immovables les (see (see Chapter Chapter X Note 244)—is 244)—is that the object object of  enforcement is taken under public control (‘Verstrickung’) . Any infringement of this status (eg, tampering with the item) is punishable as ‘Verstrickungsbruch’  (§ 136 StGB). See See §§8 §§808 08 and and 828 828 ZPO ZPO and and also also §§ 753 and and 764 764 ZPO. ZPO. The activities of the ‘Gerichtsvollzieher’ (court bailiff) are regulated by the ‘Geschäftsanweisung für Gerichtsvollzieher’ (GVGA; Business Order for Court Bailiffs). Such special urgency (‘Dringlichkeit’/‘Eilbedürftigkeit’) is presumed to exist where a creditor is granted a seizure order (‘Arrestbefehl’),  but, if an injunction (‘einstweilige Verfügung’)  directed to the payment of money is concerned, the creditor must usually wait until there has been an unsuccessful attempt at enforcement (‘erfolgloser Vollstreckungsversuch’)  before taking further steps. See Gleußner, ZAP, Fach 14, p 213; Chapter XXII, Note 26. See See §§ §§ 814 814–8 –825 25 and and 835 835–8 –839 39 ZPO. PO. In the case of a ‘Forderung’,  the court orders its ‘Überweisung’  ((bank) transfer) to the creditor.

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Notes 183 184 185 186 187 188 188 189 189 190 190 191 192 192 193

194 195 195 196 196

See Th Thomas-P s-Putzo, § 80 808. SeeT SeeTho hom mas-P as-Pu utzo, zo,§771 §771.. Also referred to as a ‘Zwangshypothetk’ (compulsory mortgage). See Model /Creifelds /Lichtenberger, /Lichtenberger, Part 3 C (255). See § 866 ZPO. See § 869 ZPO. See Model/ Model/Cr Creif eifeld elds/L s/Lich ichten tenber berger ger,, Part Part 3 C (256–2 (256–257). 57). For For exam exampl ples es,, see see Thom Thomasas-Pu Putz tzo, o, §§ §§ 887, 887, 888 888,, Note Note 1. 1. Thes Thesee coe coerc rciv ivee mea measu sure ress are are ref refer erre red d to to as as ‘Beugemittel’ or ‘Ordnungsmittel’ . See Chapter XVIII, Note 56. By § 890(ii) ZPO, action under that paragraph must be preceded by an appropriate threat (‘Androhung’). See Creifelds under ‘Offenbarungs(eid)versicherung’ ; (e), below. The making of a false assurance before a competent authority is punishable, if made intentionally or negligently: §§ 256, 263 StGB. See Creifelds under ‘Eidesstattliche Versicherung’ . See See Gott Gottwa wald ld in ZAP ZAP 20/00 20/00,, Fac Fachh 14, 14, p 391 391.. Amendmen Amendments ts to the law law with with effect effect fro from m 1.1.1999 1.1.1999 have have exten extended ded the the ground groundss on which which an applicat application ion can can  be made. Now,, a debtor can also be compelled to make a declaration, if he has refused to allow the bailiff to carry out Now a search (‘Durchsuchung’)  of his home or if the debtor has repeatedly not been found there by the bailiff bailiff after prior notice of at least two weeks: § 807(i), Nos 3 and 4 ZPO. See Model/C Model/Crei reifelds felds/Lich /Lichtenb tenberge ergerr, Part 3 C (258–259); (258–259); Chapte Chapterr XIII, XIII, Note Note 181; 181; Chapter Chapter XIV XIV,, Note Note 23 SeeMod SeeModel/ el/Cr Creif eifeld elds/L s/Lich ichten tenber berger ger,, Part Part 3C (262). (262). Book Book X has has been been ref refor orme med d with with eff effec ectt from from 1.1 1.1.1 .199 998. 8. See Bosch in ZAP 21/98, Fach 13, p 787; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 C (263); Note 171 in this Chapter.

CHAPTER XIV 1

2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

See See Chap Chapte terr IV; IV; Mod Model el/C /Cre reif ifel elds ds/L /Lic icht hten enbe berg rger er,, Part Part I,I, Sect Sectio ionn D II II (561 (561). ). The ‘Bundeswehr’  is the (federal) defence organisation of the ‘Bund’. It consists of the armed forces (‘Streitkräfte’) and the military administrative service (‘Bundeswehrverwdtung) : Articles 87a-b GG. See Creifelds under ‘Bundeswehr’  and ‘Bundeswehrverwaltung’ . Whether ‘Richterrecht’  (judge-made law) is (also) a ‘Rechtsquelle’ is questionable. See Giemulla/Jaworsky/ Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 1; Kommers, Part I, Chapter 4 (‘Judicial versus Legislative Authority’); Authority’); Maurer, Maurer, Part 1, § 4 and Erichsen, Part II, §§ 6–9; Wolff/Bachof/Stober, Part 3, Section 2, §§ 24 ff; Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Part VI3. Regarding the history and development of administrative law see Bull, Section I, § 2 1–5 and § 5; Maurer, Part 1, § 2 and § 31. For a general summary of administrative law see Baumann (ER), Part IV, IV, § 14. See Chapter II B (Note 7). See Maurer, Part 1, § 5. The VwVfG VwVfG onl onlyy appl applies ies to the activi activity ty of author authoriti ities es involv involved ed in judici judicial al admini administr strati ation on (‘Behörden der  Justizverwaltung’)  Justizverwaltung’) insofar as such activity is subject to control by the administrative courts. See § 2(iii) No 1 VwVfG and Chapter XV, Note 2. Teil VI VII con conttain ains pr provisio sions re regard arding ing ‘Ausschüsse’  (committees/boards) and honorary activity in die ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’ . Teil VIII contains final provisions. See Bull, Bull, Sectio Sectionn II, II, § 8; Maurer Maurer,, Part Part 5, § 19; 19; gen genera erally lly Erichs Erichsen, en, Part Part IV IV, §§ §§ 36–4 36–42. 2. The ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’  must be conducted simply and expediently ( ‘einfach und zweckmäßig’: § 10, 2nd sentence VwVfG) in German (§ 23(i) VwVfG). The The rig righht to to a hear hearin ingg flo flow ws fr from Art Articl icle 103 103(i (i)) GG. GG. Regarding the position in social security proceedings proceed ings (under § 24 SGB X), see the article by Horst Marburger in ZAP 17/99, Fach 18, p 613.

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10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22

23

For a survey of the procedural rules in social security matters, see the article by Hans-Peter Jung in ZAP 23/ 99, Fach 18, p 627. Regard Regarding ing the the right right of of inspec inspectio tionn of the the file file in socia sociall securi security ty proce proceedi edings ngs (un (under der § 25 SGB SGB X), X), see the the artic article le  by Horst Marburger Marburger in ZAP 15/96, Fach 18, p 445. See Giem Giemul ulla/ la/Jaw Jawors orsky/ ky/Mü Mülle llerr-Uri Uri,, Book Book I, Chapt Chapters ers 4–6; 4–6; Erichs Erichsen, en, Part Part III, III, Sect Section ion I,I, §§ 11–20 11–20;; Maurer, Part 3, §§ 9–12; Schwerdtfeger, Part 2, §§ 4–14; Stern, Part 1, § 4 IV 2; Wolff/Bachof/Stober, Part 5, Section 2, § 45. See See Gie Giemu mull lla/ a/Ja Jawo wors rsky ky/M /Mül ülle lerr-Ur Uri,i, Book Book I, Chap Chapte terr 4 B-G. B-G. A ‘Verwaltungsakt’  is frequently designated as a ‘Bescheid’  (official notice). To be distinguished from the formal ‘Verwaltungsakt’   is the pure administrative order (‘schlichtes Verwaltungsgebot’),  which can be issued by the executive in the case of civil servants (‘Beamté) and other persons, wno are subject to direction (‘weisungsabhangig’,  eg, schoolchildren and soldiers): see Bull, Section III, § 10. For a classification of the various types of administrative legal relationships (‘Verwaltungsrechtsverhältnisse’) see Bull, Section IV, § 14. See also Creifelds under ‘Gewaltverhältnis, ‘Gewaltverhältnis, öffentlich-rechtliches’ öffentlich-rechtliches’. The enforceability (and enforcement) of a ‘Verwaltungsakt’  is a separate matter. matter. See Note 23 in this Chapter; Chapter XVIII, Note 56. Prelim liminar inaryy proc proced edur ural al acti actioons (‘Verfahrenshandlungen’)  by an authority, which merely serve to prepare a final decision (‘Zabschliessende Regelun’)  are not ‘Verwaltungsakte’  and are not separately challengable: § 44a VwGO. While one speaks of access (‘Zugang’) to an ‘öffentliche Sache’, the use of an ‘Anstalt’ is subject to admission (‘Zulassung’). See Erichsen, Part V, § 43; Chapter II C. See Creifelds under ‘Justizverwaltungsakte’; Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 4 C II 2; Chapter XV A (Note 2). Cf ‘Rechtspflege’; Chapter XXII C 6. See §§ 37and 39 VwVfG. See § 36 VwVfG. VwVfG. See See also: also: Giemulla/ Giemulla/Jawor Jaworsky/M sky/Mülle üller-Ur r-Uri,i, Book Book I, Chapte Chapterr 7; Maurer Maurer,, Part Part 3, 3, § 12; Wolff/ Wolff/ Bachof/Stober, Bachof/Stober, Part 5, Section 2, § 47. See § 38(i)VwVfG. See § 43(ii) VwVfG: ‘Ein Verwaltungsakt Verwaltungsakt bleibt blei bt wirksam, solange und soweit er nicht zurückgenommen, zurückgeno mmen, widerrufen, anderweitig aufgehoben oder durch Zeitablauf oder aufandere Weise erledigt ist.’ See also: Chapter VII, Note 8; Bull, Section III, §§ 11 and 12; Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 6 A I. See §§ §§ 43(iii) 43(iii),, 44(i) 44(i) and and 44(ii) 44(ii) VwV VwVfG. fG. See See also: also: Giem Giemull ulla/J a/Jawo aworsk rsky/M y/Müll üller er-Ur -Uri,i, Book Book I, Chap Chapter ter 5 C I.I. See Chapter II, Note 24. See Giemu Giemulla lla/Ja /Jawor worsky sky/Mü /Mülle llerr-Uri Uri,, Book Book I, Chapte Chapterr 5 C II II and and the diagra diagram m (‘Prüfungsschema (Fehlerlehre)’) in Book I, Chapter 5 F. Regarding the difference between the terms ‘Anfechtbarkeit’ and ‘Nichtigkeit’ in civil law, see Chapter X B 2 (b) (‘Nullity and Challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung’ ). A Once one of these ‘Rechtsmittel’ (legal remedies) is lodged, no steps can be taken to enforce the VA.  (enforcement ) of the th e VA VA is ‘gehemmt  (prevented from proceeding). If the VA VA has already ‘Vollziehung’  (enforcement)  been (prematurely) (prematurely) enforced, the administrative court can order enforcement enforcement to be reversed (so-called sentence VwGO. This is unlike the position in civil civil proceedings, proceedings, ‘Folgenbeseitigung’): § 113(i), 2nd sentence where the lodging of a ‘Rechtsmittel’   does not usually prevent a judgment from being declared provisionally enforceable (‘vorläufig vollstreckbar’) . An application for temporary suspension (einstweilige Éinstellung’) of enforcement has to be made: § 719 ZPO. B By § 80( 80(ii ii)) VwG VwGO O the the sus suspe pens nsiv ivee effe effect ct (‘ufschiebende Wirkung’)  of a ‘Widerspruch’ and ‘Anfechtungsklage’ is inapplicable: 1 where where public public levies levies and costs costs are are demanded demanded;; 2 wh wher eree orde orders rs (‘Anordnungen’)   and measures (‘Maßnahmen’)   are given or taken by ‘Polizeivollzugsbeamten’   ((executive) police officers), which are ‘unaufschiebbar’  (ie, cannot be postponed); 3 in (other) (other) cases cases prescrib prescribed ed by federal federal law; law; 4 where th the ‘Behörde’ orders immediate enforcement (‘sofortige Vollziehung’)  of the VA.

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In the case of No 4, above: enforcement must be in the public interest or in the overwhelming interest interest of   –  immediate enforcement one of the parties (‘im öffentlichen Intéresse oder im überwältigenden überwältigenden Intéresse tines Beteiligten’);  –  the ‘Behördé’ must give written reasons for the particular interest (‘das besondere Intéresse’) in immediate enforcement unless there is ‘Gefahr im Verzug’  (danger in delay): § 80(iii) VwGO; C Provisi vision onal al leg legal al pr protect tectio ionn (‘vorläufiger Rechtsschutz’)  is possible under § 80(v) VwGO. By § 80(v), 1st sentence VwGO, an application can be made to the administrative court for the suspensive effect of a ‘Widerspruch’  or ‘Anfechtungsklage’ (‘aufschiebende Wirkung’)  to be fully or partially ordered (‘angeordnet’) or fully or partially restored (‘wiederhergestellt’) . The former remedy comes into play in cases based on statute (ie, § 80(ii) 80 (ii) Nos 1–3 VwGO), while the latter relates to § 80(ii) 8 0(ii) No 4 (ie, where an order for immediate enforcement from a ‘Behörde’  is involved). The common feature of an application under § 80(v), 1st sentence VwGO is that it is directed to the suspension of enforcement (Aussetzung der Vollziehung)  by the court. Such an application can be made without having to involve the ‘Widerspruchsbehorde’  (next higher authority) and before lodging an ‘Anfechtungsklage’. By analogy with § 42(ii) VwGO, an application for suspension is only admissible (‘zulässig’), if it appears that the applicant is injured in his rights by the VA, VA, ie, the applicant must have ‘ Antragsbefugnis’ (authority to make the application). To be contrasted with an application applic ation for suspension of enforcement enfo rcement is the (additional) remedy available under § 80(v), 3rd sentence VwGO—if enforcement has already commenced, the court can order it to  be quashed (Aufhebung der Vollziehung) . This prohibits not only the repeating of any measures of  enforcement for the future (‘ex nunc’), but includes the (provisional) reversal (‘Rückgângigmachung’) of  any (past) direct consequences of enforcement (‘Folgenbeseitigung’). It also covers cases of so-called factual enforcement (‘faktische Vollziehung’) , ie, where the ‘Behorde’ just goes ahead with enforcement, regardless of the requirements of § 80(ii) VwGO. When it deals with an application under § 80(v) VwGO, the administrative court has discretion (‘AufAntrag kann das Gericht…’) . Unless the VA is dearly legal or illegal, the court must weigh the public interest in enforcement enfo rcement of the VA VA against the applicant’s applicant’ s interest in its suspension suspens ion or annulment (‘Abwägung der Interessen’) . The court should normally order or restore suspensive effect, by analogy with § 80(iv), 3rd sentence VwGO, if there are serious doubts as to the legality of a VA (‘ernsthafte Zweifel an der Rechtmäßigkeit would result in an unacceptable hardship (‘unbillige Härte’). See Schmitt eines VA’) or if its enforcement would Glaeser, Glaeser, Appendix to § 3, Section D. The administrative court reaches its decision in the form of a ‘Beschluss’, which can be altered or revoked at any time: § 80(vi) VwGO. In particular, suspension can be ordered subject to conditions (‘Auflagen’) or be limited in time (‘befristet’): § 80(v), 4th and 5th sentences. Moreover, unlike § 123 VwGO (see E, below), there is no duty to compensate the other party, if it later transpires that the decision was unjustified (cf § 945 ZPO). D Once a ‘Widerspruch’  has been lodged, enforcement of the VA can be suspended by the ‘Behördé or the ‘Widerspruchsbehörde’  itself, either on its own motion or on application: § 80(iv) VwGO. E If a matter is urgent (‘dringend’), ‘vorläufiger Rechtsschutz’  (provisional legal protection) is also available under § 123 VwGO. It is a form of injunctive relief modelled on the provisions in the ZPO (note, in particular, §§ 920 and 945 ZPO) and directed towards the grant of a temporary order (‘einstweilige  Anordnung’)  Anordnung’) ie, it can come into play in the forefront of a ‘Leistungsklage’ or ‘Feststellungsklage’. §§ 80(v) and 123 VwGO are mutually exclusive: exclusive: § 123(v) VwGO. Thus, § 123 VwGO does not apply where a prospective ‘Anfechtungsklage’ against a VA is involved (ie, where it is sought to challenge a VA): the remedy is then an application under § 80(v). F See See Bul Bull,l, Sect Sectio ionn VI, VI, § 19 8; Cr Creife eifeld ldss und under er ‘Aufschiebende Wirkung’, ‘Vollziehung sofortige’  I, ‘Vorläufige Vollstreckbarkeit’  and ‘einstweilige Anordnung’ ; Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müfler-Üri, Book III, Chapter 4; Schmitt Glaeser, Glaeser, Part 2, Appendices to §§ 3 and 4; Stern, Part 1, § 6. See also Chapter XIII D 8 (a) (Note 167), Chapter XV C and Chapter XVIII H (Note 56), below. below. The term ‘Gültigkeit’ covers both ‘Wirksamkeit’  and ‘Rechtmäßigkeit’. It is normally translated as ‘validity’,  but is often (confusingly) used used in both senses in everyday everyday speech. ‘Gültigkeit’ properly refers (only) to the validity of norms ie, one should not really speak of the ‘Gültigkeit’ of  a VA. See Chapter VII B and, for example, § 47(i) VwGO.

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26

27

28 29 30 31 32

33 34

35

36

le, was there a ‘gesetzliche Grundlage’  (statutory basis) for the issue of the VA? See Chapter II F, Chapter VII B and Chapter XV, Note 14. See also: Erichsen, Part III, Section I, § 15; Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 5 B III; Schwerdtfeger, Part 2, § 5 II 1–2; Wolff /Bachof /Stober, Part 5, Section 2, §§ 48–49. See Chapter XIII C E. As in civil procedure, one distinguishes the ‘formelle Bestandskraft’ (formal authority) or ‘Unanfechtbarkei’ (non-challengability) of a VA and its ‘materielle Bestandskraff  (material  (material authority), which arises only insofar as the VA is not withdrawn or revoked by the issuing ‘Behörde’. Once a VA becomes ‘formell und materiell bestandskräftig’ bestandskräftig’ , it becomes ‘vollziehbar’ (enforceable). See Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 6 A II; Maurer, Part 3, § 11 I 3 and 4; Wolff/Bachof/ Stober, Part 5, Section 2, § 50. See §§48–51 VwVfG. See also: Erichsen, Part III, Section I, §§ 16–19; Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 6 B to E; Maurer, Part 3, § 11 II-VII; Wolff/Bachof/Stober, Part 5, Section 2, § 51. ‘Rücknahme’ and ‘Widerruf  are subsidiary terms to ‘Aufhebung’ (annulment).  (annulment ). When a VA is ‘rechtswidrig’  (illegal) one speaks of ‘Rücknahme’ (§ 48 VwVfG), whereas when a VA is ‘rechtmäßig’  (legal) one speaks of ‘Widerruf’  (§ 49 VwVfG). See Giemu Giemulla/J lla/Jawor aworsky sky /Müll /Müller-U er-Uri, ri, Book I, Chapte Chapterr 4 K; Maurer Maurer,, Part Part 3, § 9 V; V; Wolff Wolff/Bach /Bachof/St of/Stober ober,, Part Part 5, Section 2, § 46. A ls o ref er red to a s a ‘Genehmigung’   (approval). See Creifelds under ‘Erlaubnis (behördliche)’ and ‘Gewerbezulassung’ . See Sc Schwerdtfeger, Par Partt 2, 2, § 91. The purpose purpose of of a norm norm (and, therefor therefore, e, the the exten extentt of any discretion discretion)) have have to be ascert ascertained ained by inter interpre pretatio tationn (‘Auslegung’) . See Schwer Schwerdtf dtfege egerr, Part Part 2, 2, § 5 II4; II4; Stern, Stern, Part Part 2, §1712– §1712–3; 3; §40 §40 VwVfG VwVfG;; § 114 114 VwGO VwGO.. The executive must observe the principles of appropriateness/expediency (‘Zweckmâftigkeit’) and proportionality (‘Verhältnismäßigkeit’) . See also: Creifelds under ‘Ermessen’, ‘Zweckmäßigkeitsgrundsatz’ ‘Zweckmäßigkeitsgrundsatz’ and ‘VerhMtnismaftigkeit(sgrundsatz)’ ; Chapter VIII, Note 14. See See the the pre previou viouss par parag agra raph ph in the text text.. This This is only only the case case in cert certain ain limi limited ted are areas as when when inter internal nal valu value-j e-judg udgmen ments ts are are involv involved ed eg, eg, decisi decisions ons regarding exams or civil service matters. See Creifelds under ‘Ermessen’ ; Schwerdtfeger, Part 2, § 5 II 3 (b); Stern, Part 2, § 1714. In the case of an exam decision, the matter can only be brought to court, if ‘Bezvertungsfehler’ or procedure) can be proven. The disappointed candidate can then ‘Verfahrensfehler’ (mistakes in evaluation or procedure) apply (to the administrative court) under § 123 VwGO for a temporary order (‘einstweilige (‘einstweilige Anordnung’) Anordnung’)  for (re-)admission to the exam (‘Zulassung zur Prüfung’)  or, as appropriate, for restoration of the ‘aujschiebende Wirkung’ of a ‘Widerspruch’ . See Kuhla in ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 5/1996, p 197; Louven, ZAP 9/01, Fach 18, p 699 (Section II 4); Note 23 E in this Chapter. If th the ex executive ex exercises itits ‘Ermessen’   in a particular way, it can become bound (‘Selbstbindung (‘Selbstbindung der Verwaltung’). In a similar subsequent case, it cannot then depart from its existing practice without a substantial reason (‘ohne sachlichen Grund’) . See Creifelds under ‘Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz’  and ‘Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz’ . See also: Bull, Section II, § 7 7; 7 ; Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 2 D; Maurer, Maurer, Part 2, §7. See See Lou Louve verv rv ZAP ZAP 9/0 9/01, 1, Fach Fach 18, 18, p 699 (Sec (Secti tion on III III 5 and and 6). 6).

CHAPTER XV 1 2

See Creifelds under ‘Beschwerde- und Petitionsrecht’  and ‘Gegenvorstellungen’; § 79 VwVfG. The addressee of a ‘Justizverwaltungsakt’ usually has to follow special procedures, if he wishes to challenge it (eg, §§ 18ff FGG). In the absence of such provisions, he must apply to the OLG (ie, a court of the ‘ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’ Gerichtsbarkeit’) for the legality of a ‘Justizverwaltungsakt’ to be examined: §§ 23–30 EGGVG. See Chapter XIVC 1; Stem, Part 1, § 313b (ee).

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Notes 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10

11

12

13 14 15

16 17 18 19

The OVG is is so sometimes ca called th the ‘Verwaltungsgerichtshof’  (VGH). See § 67 VwGO. See § 47(i) VwGO. The nor norm-c m-cont ontro roll appli applicat cation ion must must be be made made with within in two two year yearss of public publicati ation on of of the the rele relevan vantt norm norm.. See See Schmitt Glaeser, Part 2, § 9. See also: Bull, Section VI, § 19 9; Stern, Part 1, § 5; Chapter VII, Note 13; Chapter XIV, XIV, Note 24. See § 42(i) 42(i) VwGO VwGO,, § 43(i) 43(i) VwGO VwGO and and § 113( 113(i), i), 4th sente sentence nce VwGO. VwGO. See also: also: Bull Bull,, Secti Section on VI, VI, § 19 6; Creif Creifeld eldss under ‘Verwaltungsstreitverfahren’  1 (a)-(c) and 5; Schmitt Glaeser, Glaeser, Part 2, §§ 3–7; 3–7 ; Schwerdtfeger, Schwerdtfeger, Part 2, § 51. Regarding ‘vorläufiger Rechtsschutz’  (provisional legal protection), see Chapter XIV, XIV, Notes 23 and 33. See §§ 68 and 73 VwGO. See § 68(i) VwGO. A ‘Widerspruch’ must be lodged within one month of the ‘Bekanntgabe’  (notification) of the VA: VA: § 70(i) VwGO. If the issuing ‘Behörde’ considers the ‘Widerspruch’ to be justified (begründef)—  because, eg, the VA was ‘rechtswidrig’  (illegal)—the ‘Behörde’ must remedy the situation (so-called ‘Abhilfe’ (redress)) and decide on costs: § 72 VwGO. Otherwise, a ‘Widerspruchsbescheid’  must be issued: § 73(i) VwGO. The The oth other er cour courts ts to wh whic ichh the there re is an expr expres esss assi assign gnme ment nt (‘ausdrückliche (‘ausdrückliche Zuweisung’) of public law disputes are listed in Schmitt Glaeser, Glaeser, Part I, § 2 II B. See also: Chapter VII C (Note 10) and Chapter XVII (Note 33); Creifelds under ‘Enumerationsprinzip’, ‘Öffentlich-rechtliche ‘Öffentlich-rechtliche Strtitigkeiten’ and ‘Ordentlicher Rechtsweg’ ; Bull, Section VI, § 19 2. Such co conditions ar are kn known as as th the ‘Sachurteilsvoraussetzungen’ (conditions for a substantive judgment). judgment). See Stern, Part I, §§ 2–16; 2– 16; Giemulla/Jaworsky/M Giemulla/Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, üller-Uri, Book III, Chapters 2 and 3; Bull, Section VI, § 194. Schmitt Glaeser distinguishes (general) conditions common to all actions (‘allgemeine Sachentscheidungsvoraussetzungen’)   and conditions specific to each type of ‘Klage’ (‘besondere Glaeser, Parts 1 and 2 (§§ 2–9). Sachentscheidungsvoraussetzungen’) : see Schmitt Glaeser, Regarding the (substantially similar) ‘Sachurteilsvoraussetzungen’ in civil proceedings, see Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i). See § 42(ii) VwGO. The plaintiff’s assertions must be plausible (‘plausibel’): see Schmitt Glaeser, Part 2, § 31B, § 4, Sections 1 and 2,1B and § 6, Section 2,1B. To be distinguished from a ‘Popularklage’ is the action by a federation (‘Verbandsklage’),  which, eg, in issues concerning environmental law (‘Umweltrecht’),  has the right to sue  before the administrative administr ative court in certain ‘Länder’ . See Creifelds under ‘Popularklage’, ‘Verbànde’ and ‘Verbandsklage’. On the question of ‘Klagebefugnis’,  see also the good example given in Wesel (JW), Chapter DC and Wesel (FR), Chapter 5 (a neighbour’s ‘Anfechtungsklage’ against a ‘Baugenehmigung’  (planning permission)). See also Bull, Section VI, § 19 5 and 7. See §§ 74, 81 and 82 VwGO. See § 113(i) and § 113(iv) 113(iv) VwGO. VwGO. A VA is illegal illegal,, if itit is not not ‘recht ‘rechtmafii mafiig’ g’ (lawful (lawful): ): see see Chapter Chapter XIV C 3. § 10 1004 BG BGB analogously. This type of writ is called an ‘allgemeine Leistungsklage’ . It can also be directed to the undertaking (‘Vornahme’) of (individual) measures of pure administrative action by the executive. However, However, it only springs in on a subsidiary basis to a ‘Verpftichtungsklage’ . See Schmitt Glaeser, Glaeser, Part 2, § 6, Section 2. See Creifelds under ‘Verwaltungsstreitverfahren  4–5’; Schmitt Glaeser, Glaeser, Part 4, §§ 12–15; 12–1 5; Stern, Part 2, §§ 17–18. See See § 86(i 86(i)) Vw VwGO; GO; Ch Chapte apterr XI XIII, II, Not Notee 96. 96. In so far as no court proceedings are pending (ie, while a matter is still in the hands of an administrative authority (‘Behdrde’)), the equivalent of § 86(i) VwGO is § 24(i) VwVfG. See See § 88 VwGO VwGO;; Sch Schmi mitt tt Glae Glaese serr, Par Partt 4, 4, §15 §151. 1. See See Cha Chapt pter er XIII XIII,, Not Notee 10; 10; Schm Schmit ittt Gla Glaes eser er,, Par Partt 4, 4, § 15II 15II.. See also Chapter XIII, Note 69.

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CHAPTER XVI 1

2 3

4

For For exa examp mple less of stat statut utes es cont contai aini ning ng such such supp supple leme ment ntar aryy nor norms ms (‘Nebenstrafrecht’), see Creifelds under ‘Strafrecht I2’ . See also: Baumann (ER), Part V, V, § 16 II 1; Model /Creifelds /Lichtenberger /Lichtenberger,, Part H (393–394, 404); Naucke, § 4 II. See Naucke, §6. A See Ba Baumann (G (GBS), Ch Chapter 3 II; Cr Creifelds un under ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ ; Naucke, § 2 II. See also: Chapter I (Note 14); Chapter VIII C (Note 36). In German criminal law, the role of customary law (‘Gewohnheitsrecht’)  is minimal. B When considering Article 103(ii) GG, the fact that an act is committed on state instructions (‘im staatlichen Auftrag) or by order (‘aufBefehl’) can give rise to problems. Generally, an act can only be punished, if, at the time it is committed, it is regarded as punishable (‘strafbar’) by statute, ie, punishment must be laid down/fixed by statute before the act is committed. The act must, therefore, be illegal according to law, ie, there must be no justification for the relevant conduct. Sometimes, however, a justifying ground (‘Rechtfertigungsgrund’) can infringe higher legal principles. In The Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case  (Sourcebook,  Chapter 7), the court concluded that: It is not arbitrary treatment, if the accused, so far as the unlawfulness of his action is concerned, is  judged in the way in which he ought to have been treated treated on the correct correct interpretation interpretation of DDR law at the time of the act. Following superior orders, which were barbaric according to recognised standards of international human rights, did not properly constitute a justification, even if a different view was taken in actual state practice. Thus, Article 103(ii) GG was no defence. See Notes 4, 23 and 34 3 4 in this Chapter; Jarass/ Pieroth, Article 103, B 3 (c), particularly at (cc). C This type type of (creative (creative)) judicial judicial reason reasoning ing is reminisc reminiscent ent of the ‘purpo ‘purposive’ sive’ method method of interpr interpretat etation ion of  domestic law, law, which national courts are required (by the European Court of Justice) to adopt to give effect to Directives enacted by the European Community (so-called ‘indirect effect: Von Colson v Land Nordrhein Westfalen ((1984) ECR1891)). Whenever problems arise regarding the compatibility of (domestic) laws passed to implement EC Directives, the national court’s duty is, to use Loveland’s words, simply to ask: What would Parliament had done if it had realised that the literal meaning of the words it wished to use was incompatible with a new EC law? and to answer: Parliament would have used the words which we are now implying into the Act. In truth, this is a pretentious, revolutionary and unsophisticated approach to interpretation, which puts words into Parliament’s mouth and discards traditional principles of literal construction. Insofar as it enables the courts to deal with exceptional situations, it is laudable. However, will it by itself be firm enough in the long term to extricate the European Community from an era of political and legal instability and to relax the tension between inter-nationalism and supra-nationalism? Where is the dividing-line between creative jurisprudence and political decision-making? What will be the consequences of sacrificing (national) positivism to the ideal of a United Europe? See Loveland, Chapters 12 and 13; Preface to the Second Edition, Note 10; Preface to the Third Edition, Note 2; Chapter E, Note 34; Note 6 in this Chapter. Regarding the important role of policy in the European Court see Hartley, Hartley, Part I, Chapter 2 (‘Policy’). D Apart from the controvers controversial ial prosec prosecutio utionn of the former former East German German border border guards guards and and ‘Politbüro’ members (see also Notes 23 and 34 in this Chapter), the German criminal system can assume substitute  jurisdiction  jurisdiction (‘stettvertretende Strafrechtspflege) Strafrechtspflege)  where alleged offences committed abroad (‘Auslandstaten’) are involved (eg, crimes in former Yugoslavia) Yugoslavia) and extradition (‘Auslieferung) does not take place: § 7(ii) No 2 StGB. This This pro prohi hibi biti tion on is norm normall allyy a castcast-ir iron on rule, rule, found founded ed on the the pro prote tecti ction on of trust trust (‘Vertrauenssckutz’). However, in exceptional cases, it must give way (‘zurücktreten’) to general principles of law (attgemeine Recktscrundsätze’) as recognised by civilised nations where national laws (‘Gesetze’) are perverted by those in positions of  power to ‘exclude’ punishability for serious abuses of human rights (eg, the shootings along the former East German border). Thus, despite Germany’s reservation to Article 7(ii) of the European Convention on Human Rights on ratification in 1952, the prohibition provides no shelter for persons who are responsible. See Notes 3, 23 and 34 in this Chapter.

308

Notes 5

6

7 8 9

10

11 12 13

14

15

Mult Multip iple le pun punis ishm hmen entt for for the the same same off offen ence ce is is also also pro prohi hibi bite ted: d: Arti Articl clee 103( 103(ii iii) i) GG. GG. However, However, a re-opening of a case (re-trial) following a binding judgment (‘Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens’)  is possible on certain statutory grounds. See §§ 359–373a StPO; Creifelds under ‘Wiederaufnahmeuerfahren ’; Chapter XVII, Note 40 C; Youngs (CL), Chapter 4, Part IV, Sections B and D. The con conten tentt and and lim limits its of crimi criminal nal legal legal provi provisio sions ns must must be calcul calculabl able/p e/pre redic dictab table le (‘berechenbar’ /  ‘vorhersehbar’) . In criminal law, the filling of gaps (‘Lücken’) on the basis of indefinitely formulated general clauses (‘Generalklauseln’) —as in civil law—ie, creative jurisprudence (‘Rechtschöpfung’)  extending beyond objective statutory interpretation interpretation (‘objektive Auslegung’) —is not permitted. See Note 3 in this Chapter; Chapter X, Notes 44 and 47 E; Chapter XIII, Note 18. See Creifelds under ‘Straftat’ II; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part II (395, 403); Naucke, § 6 III and IV; Otto (AS), Part 1 (§§ 1–4). See § 23(i) 23(i) StGB. StGB. The punish punishme ment nt for an atte attempt mpted ed offe offence nce can be reduc reduced: ed: see § 23(ii 23(ii)) StGB StGB (§ (§ 49 StGB). StGB). See the ‘Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten’  (OWiG; Minor Offences Law) of 24.5.1968 as amended and reissued from time to time. See also: Creifelds under ‘Bußgeld, -verfahren’, ‘Geldbuße’  and ‘Ordnungswidrigkeiten’ ; Baumann (ER), ( ER), Part V, § 16 II 2; Jakobs, Book 1, Chapter 1 (Section 31); Naucke, § 4 V. Most traffic offences under the ‘Straßenverkehrsgesetz’  (Road Traffic Law) are ‘ Ordnungswidrigkeiten’ . Prosecution is the responsibility of the administrative authority (‘Verwaltungsbehörde’),   unless there are indications (Anhaltspunkte’) that a criminal offence (‘Straftat’) has been committed, in which case the matter must be passed to the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’: § 41(i) OWiG. In the ‘Bußgeldverfahren’  (fine proceedings), the provisions regarding criminal proceedings apply (ie, the StPO, GVG and JGG) and the prosecuting authority has the same sa me rights and duties as the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ : § 46(i) and (ii) OWiG. The prosecution of an ‘Ordnungswidrigkeit’  is at the discretion of the relevant authority, which can decide merely to give a warning (‘Verwarnung’) together with a ‘Verwarnungsgeld’ (penalty): § 47(i) and § 56 OWiG. OWiG. If a ‘Bußgeldbescheid’  (notice of fine) is issued, an objection (‘Einspruch’) can be lodged within two weeks, in which case the matter has to be dealt with by the ‘Amtsvericht’ (district court): § 67(i) and § 68(i) OWiG. A classi classific ficati ation on of of the the most most impo importa rtant nt offe offence ncess in the BT acco accord rding ing to the the rele relevan vantt ‘Rechtsgut’ protected can  be found in Naucke, Naucke, § 6 III3. Recent changes to the BT (in force since 1.4.1998) give greater weight to the protection protection of highly personal ‘Rechtsgüter’, as against material ‘Rechtsgüter’. See Wimmer, ZAP 15/98, Fach 21, p 173. See §§ 80–165 StGB. Regarding ‘Delikte gegen staatliche Rechtsgüter’ see Otto (ED), Part 3, Chapter 2 (§§ 83– 100). See See §§ 166 166–1 –184 84 StG StGB. B. Reg Regar ardi ding ng off offen ence cess agai agains nstt (oth (other er)) ‘Rechtsgüter der Gesamtheit’ (‘nichtstaatliche überindividuelle Rechtsgüter’)  see Otto (ED), Part 3, Chapter 1 (§§ 60–82). See See §§ §§ 185 185–2 –241 41 StGB StGB;; Ott Ottoo (ED (ED), ), Part Part 2, Chap Chapte terr 1 (§§ (§§ 2–3 2–37) 7).. Four cases involving offences within this category are contained in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 7:  – The Insult of of Soldiers Case Case § 185 StGB ‘Ehre’ (honour).  – The Base Motive Motive Case § 211 StGB ‘Leben’  (life).  – The Shootings Shootings at the Berlin Berlin Wall Case §§ 212, 213 StGB.  – The Rough Ill-Treatment Ill-Treatment Case Case § 223b StGB ‘Korperliche Unversehrtheit’  (bodily integrity). See See §§ §§ 242–3 242–358 58 StG StGB B (Sec (Secti tion onss 19–2 19–29) 9).. Sect Sectio ionn 27 cove covers rs cer certa tain in ‘gemeingefährliche ‘gemeingefährliche Straftaten’ (offences involving danger to the public) and includes § 323c. In The Neglected Assistance Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 7) there was a subsequent prosecution under what is now § 323c StGB. The court passed a guilty verdict (‘Schuldspruch’), but could not, due to the ‘Verbot der reformatio in peius’  rule, impose a punishment: see § 358 (ii) StPO. See also Otto (ED), Part 2, Chapter 2 (§§ 38–59). ‘Rechtsgüterschutz’ as the legitimate function of criminal law is criticised by Jakobs (Book 1, Chapter 1 (Section 2)). See See Bau Bauma mann nn (GBS (GBS), ), Chap Chapte terr 2 2; Crei Creife feld ldss und under er ‘Straftat’ I, ‘Schuld’ and ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’; Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger Lichtenberger,, Part II (397, (39 7, 401); Naucke, § 7; Otto (AS), Part 2 (§§ 5–17); Wesel Wesel (FR), Chapter 4 (‘Rechtswidrigkeit Wesel points poi nts out that ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ and ‘Schuld’ were first distinguished as separate elements und Schuld’): Wesel 100 years ago.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 16 17

18

19

20

21

22 23

See See Cha Chapt pter er X B1 B1 5 (Not (Notee 22) 22) and and Cha Chapt pter er X C 2 2 (Not (Notee 105 105). ). These These elem element entss form form part part of the the German German syst system em of crim crimina inall offen offences ces and and must must be exam examine ined d indivi individua dually lly in in each case. In particular, particular, in German criminal law there can be no punishment without ‘Schuld’ (‘nulla poena sine culpa’), whereas in civil law liability is not always dependent on blame (‘Verschulden’; eg, cases of  ‘Gefährdungshaftung’ (strict liability)) ‘Tatbestand’ and ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’  are objective elements; ‘Schuld’ is subjective. In certain special cases, the following additional elements can also become relevant:  – ‘Objektive Bedingungen Bedingungen der Strafbarkeit’ Strafbarkeit’  (objective conditions of punishability);  – ‘Persönliche StrafausschließungsStrafausschl ießungs- und Strafaufhebungsgriinde’ Strafaufhebun gsgriinde’  (personal grounds for the exclusion of  punishment and personal grounds for the lifting of punishment);  – ‘Prozefivoraussetzungen’ ‘Prozefivoraussetzungen’ (preconditions for a hearing). See Baumann (ER), Part V, § 15 I; Baumann (GBS), Chapter 1 II 2 b; Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 1 (Sections 7–10); Otto (AS), Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 1 (§ 5); Naucke, § 7 (‘Das Straftatsystem’); Creifelds under ‘Bedingungen der Strafbarkeit’ ; Note 61 in this Chapter. To what extent a ‘Handlung’  incorporates a subjective element is disputed. The classic (objective) theory is the so-called ‘kausale (‘normative’) Handlungslehre’,  which regards conduct as relevant for the purposes of criminal law, law, if it is caught by the provisions of a criminal norm and causes a particular consequence. The perpetrator’s will causes his conduct, but is not part of it. ‘Schuld’ is an entirely separate, subjective, psychological issue. Baumann understands the term ‘Handlung’ in this sense. However, not all authors follow the same ‘Straftatsystem’ (system for defining what constitutes a criminal act), ie, there is disagreement between the criminal law theorists as to what amounts to a (criminal) ‘Handlung’ . The ‘finale Handlungslehre’  (developed by Welzel) regards a ‘Handlung’  as ‘final’, ie, directed to a particular aim (‘Ziei’). The perpetrator’s will (ie, his ‘vorsatz’) is incorporated as a subjective element in his conduct. This (so-called neo-classical’) theory, theory, therefore, incorporates a subjective s ubjective element in the ‘Tatbestand’. The ‘soziale Handlungslehre’  (supported by Wessels) Wessels) takes the view that only acts which are socially significant s ignificant (‘sozialerheblich’) can fall within the criminal law. See Baumann (ER), Part V, § 15 11 b; Baumann (GBS), Chapter 4 I; Creifelds under ‘ Handlungsbegriff   and  Handlungsbegriff  and Wesel (JW), Chapter Cha pter X and Wesel (FR), Chapter 4 (‘Tat und Tatbestand’) . ‘Finale Handlungslehre’ ; Naucke, § 7 V; Wesel Accord Acc ording ing to moder modern, n, neo-c neo-clas lassic sical al doctr doctrine ine (see the preced preceding ing Note Note), ), these these elem element entss can be be not onl onlyy descriptive/objective, but also subjective. Thus, Haft, for example, explains that ‘Vorsatz’ (intent) and ‘Fahrlässigkeit’ (negligence) have a double function. They are not only forms of ‘Schuld’ (‘Schuldfor men’),  but are also subjective ‘Tatbestandsmerkmale’  ie, forms of conduct (‘Verhaltensformen’) . See Haft (AT), Part 3, § 3 and § 7. See See Krau Krause se / Thom Thoma, a, Part art 2, Sect Sectio ionn 3. An offence for which there is a heavier punishment in the event of particular consequences is referred to as ‘erfolgsqualifiziertes Delikt’: § 18 StGB. an ‘erfolgsqualifiziertes See Creifelds under ‘erfolgsqualifiziertes ‘erfolgsqualifiziertes Delikt’; Note 50 in this Chapter. This This theory theory domi dominat nates es in crimi criminal nal law law,, but not not in civi civill law, law, where where the the theory theory of of forese foreseeab eabili ility ty ( ‘Adäquanztheorie’ (adequacy theory)) applies. See Creifelds under ‘Schadensersatz’ I (a); Dannemann, Part IV, 6; Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 1 (Section 7); Kallwass, Section 3, Chapter 1 (§ 39); Youngs Youngs (CL), Chapter 5, Part IV A 3. ‘Jede Bedingung, Bedingung, die die nicht hiniveggedacht hiniveggedacht werden werden kann, ohne daß der Erfolg entfiele’: ‘conditio sine sine qua non’. A See § 13 StGB, which states that the ‘Täter’ must ‘legally have to answer for’ (‘rechtlich einstehen für’) preventive action. An ‘echtes Unterlassungsdelikt’ Unterlassungsdelikt’ is subsidiary to an intentional (but not negligent!) ‘Begehungsdelikt’ or ‘unechtes Unterlassungsdelikt’. Unterlassungsdelikt’. Thus, in The Neglected Assistance Case  (Sourcebook,  Chapter 7) the court considered and distinguished the position where a crime is committed by means of an ‘unechte Unterlassung’  from § 323c StGB, which penalises a genuine omission. Another ‘echtes Unterlassungsdelikt’ Unterlassungsdelikt’ is § 142 StGB (‘Unerlaubtes ‘Unerlaubtes Entfernen vom Unfallort’ (unauthorized withdrawal from the scene of an accident (without leaving particulars)). See Creifelds under ‘Hilfeleistung, unterlassene’, ‘Unerlaubtes Entfernen vom Unfallort’ ; Haft (BT) (§§ 323c and 142 StGB); Ludovisy, ZAP, Fach 9 R, p 201; Note 73 in this Chapter. B The The con convi vict ctio ionn (in (in Augu August st 199 1997) 7) of of mem membe bers rs of of the the ‘Politbüro’ for aiding and abetting manslaughter manslaughter (‘Beihilfe zum Totschlag’)  was based on the failure to observe a ‘Garantenpflicht’ ie, they omitted to prevent the shootings along the former East German border, border, although they could have done so.

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24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34

35

The case shows that organs of state are not immune from the law and must observe elementary human rights, even if this means constructing a ‘Garantenpflicht’ towards individual citizens.  Justification for the decision can be found in the so-called ‘Radbruch formulât: if the contradiction  between positive (national) law and principles of justice (‘Gerechtigkeit’)   becomes so intolerable (‘unerträglich’)—eg, because the relevant (national) norms fly in the face of (internationally accepted) standaras of civilised behaviour—the positive law is illegal non-law (‘Unrecht’) and must give way to  justice. See Notes 3 and 34 in this Chapter; Creifelds under ‘Radbruch’sche Formel’ ; Wesel (FR), Chapter 8 (at the end). Regarding crimes by omission see Creifelds under ‘Garantenstellung’ and ‘Unterlassungsdelikt’; Jakobs, Book 2, Title 2, Chapter 6 (Sections 28–30); Naucke, § 7 VIII; Otto (AS), Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 3 (§ 9). Elem Elemen enta tary ry duti duties es to help help,, of safe safeke keep epin ingg and and care care (‘Hilfe- Obhut- und Fürsorgepflichten’)  can also arise in civil law (tort) on the basis of a ‘Garantenstellung’. See Flume, §7 4. See§§13(ii)and49(i)StGB. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’; Otto (AS), Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 2 (§ 8). In English law, ‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’  would be classified as general (justifying) defences, in contrast to ‘affirmative’ (excusatory) defences, which seek to exclude/negate the ‘mens rea’ of a crime, eg, mistake (in the form of ‘Tatbestandsirrtum’  or ‘Verbotsirrtum’) or duress and necessity, which, in German law, fall under below. ‘entschuldigender ‘entschuldigender Notstand’ (§ 35(i) StGB). See 3 (d), below. See See Bau Bauma mann nn (GBS (GBS), ), Chap Chapte terr 51 511 and and Chap Chapte terr 5 IV IV. For exampl example, e, § 228 StGB. StGB. See See also also Jakobs Jakobs,, Book Book 2, Titl Titlee 1, Chapte Chapterr 2 (Sec (Sectio tionn 14). 14). See See Jak Jakob obs, s, Book Book 2, Title itle 1, Chap Chapte terr 2 (Sec (Secti tion on 15 IV). IV). See See § 32 StG StGB; B; Jako Jakobs bs,, Boo Bookk 2, 2, Tit Title le 1, Chap Chapte terr 2 (Se (Sect ctio ionn 12) 12).. See § 228 BGB. See § 904 BGB. See § 34 StGB. By § 34 StGB, where there is a state of emergency (‘Notstandslage’), such that life, limb, freedom, honour, property or another legal asset is under immediate danger, danger, emergency action (‘Notstandshandlung’) is justified as a last resort (‘ultima ratio’) to avert the danger from oneself or from another person, it, on a balancing (‘Abwägung’)  of all intereste concerned, the interest protected ‘significantly outweighs’ the interest impaired. The measure taken must be appropriate (‘angemessen’). However, the area of application of § 35 StGB is much more ‘Notstand’ can also exclude ‘Schuld’ (§ 35 StGB). However, restricted. See 3 (d), below and cf § 35 StGB. See also Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 2 (Section 13). See See Jak Jakob obs, s, Book Book 2, Title itle 1, Chap Chapte terr 2 (Sec (Secti tion on 16 II). II). In The Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 7) the ‘Grenzgesetz’  (Border Act) of the former DDR did not, in the final analysis, amount to a justifying reason. Moreover, Moreover, the argument that they acted either. ‘aufBefehl’ (on orders) did not help the accused either. However, on the issue of ‘Schuld’, § 5(i) Wehrstrafgesetz  (Military Crime Law) was applied analogously in favour of the accused, enabling the court to assess a milder punishment. See also Notes 3 and 23 2 3 in this Chapter. Thus Thus,, in in the the case case of a cri crimi mina nall pro prose secu cuti tion on for for ‘Beleidigung’ (insult), die utterance (‘Äußerung’)  must be illegal (‘rechtsuridrig’)  and intentional (‘vorsätzlich’). By § 193 StGB, it is not illegal, for example, if it is:  –  a critical review in the field of science, art or business;  –  a judgment at work (‘dienstliche Beurteilung’)  by a superior; or  –  made in pursuit of just interests (‘berechtigte Interessen’). However, However, this is subject to the principle of proportionality (‘Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz’),  the balancing of  competing interests (‘Abwägung’) and the duty, as far as possible, to check (‘nachprüfen’) the correctness of  the statement. Moreover, me utterance can amount to a ‘Beleidigung’,   depending on its form and the circumstances. It is important to understand that die principal term (‘Oberbegriff’) (‘Oberbegriff’) ‘Beleidigung’ ‘Beleidigung’ embraces three different forms, which can all be written or oral:  –  simple insult (§ 185 StGB), ie, ‘Beleidigung’ in die narrow sense;

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The German Legal System and Legal Language defamation/slander/offensive gossip (‘uble Nachrede’): § 186 StGB; and  –  defamation/slander/offensive  –  malicious defamation / calumny (‘Verleumdung’): § 187 StGB. Simple insult covers a derogatory statement of opinion (‘Werturteil’) to the person insulted or to a third party about him. It includes an assertion of fact (‘Tatsachenbehauptung’),  if the assertion is untrue and is uttered to the person himself. Other assertions of fact (ie, those referring to the person insulted, but made to third parties) fall within ‘üble Nachrede’  or ‘Verleumdung’. See Creifelds under ‘Beleidigung’; Chapter VIII, Note 7 (The Tucholsky Cases)  and Note 20 D. 36 Social Social adequa adequacy cy or acceptab acceptabilit ilityy is also also rele relevant vant in employ employmen mentt law as a crite criterion rion for estab establish lishing ing the the legali legality ty of industrial action (for the purposes of § 823(i) BGB). See Creifelds under ‘Soziale Adäquanz’; Chapter XVIII, Note 53. 37 See § 127 StPO and §1631 BGB. 38 This This is to be be compa compare red d with with the the (for (former merly ly domi dominan nant) t) ‘psy ‘psycho cholog logica ical’l’ defi definit nition ion of ‘Schuld’; see Note 18 in this Chapter; Baumann (GBS), Chapter 6 11; Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 3 (Section 17 II); Otto (AS), Part 2, Chapter 2 (§ 12). Another (subjective) definition of ‘Schuld’  (formulated by Stratenwerth) is: ‘persönliche Verantwortung’ (personal responsibility). See Creifelds under ‘Schuld’ and Wesel Wesel (FR), Chapter Chap ter 4 (‘Rechtswidrigkeit (‘Rechtswidrigkeit und Schuld’). 39 See § 19 StGB; Creifelds under ‘Strafmündigkeit’; Chapter X, Note 5. 40 Juvenile offences (‘Jugendstraftaten’)— also also referred to as ‘Verfehlungen’ (transgressions)—are governed by the Juvenile Courts Law ( ‘Jugendgerichtsgesetz’; JGG) of 11.12.1974. The JGG ousts the general criminal law, except insofar as the JGG otherwise provides: § 2 JGG.  Jurisdiction over over juvenile juvenile ‘Verfehlungen’ lies with special youth courts (‘Jugendgerichte’), the composition of  which varies according to the expected punishment and the nature of the offence: §§ 33, 39–41 JGG. If a youth is not sufficiently mature (‘nicht reif genug’)  to be criminally responsible responsible (ie, is unable to appreciate that what was done was wrong), the youth court has the same powers as the guardianship court (‘Vormundschaftsgericht’) : § 3 JGG (§ 1773ff BGB). However, if criminal capacity is not in question and a juvenile offence is established, the ordering of  educational measures (‘Erziehungsmafiregeln’) takes precedence. Disciplinary measures (‘Zuchtmittelz) or  juvenile punishment (‘Jugendstrafe’) are possible, but only if educational measures do not suffice: § 5(ii)  JGG. The preliminary procedure (‘Vorverfahren’)  is dealt with by a youth prosecutor ( ‘Jugendstaatsanwalt’; § 36  JGG), who must undertake extensive inquiries inquiries (‘Ermittlungen’) into the background of the accused youth and all other circumstances: § 43 JGG. The prosecutor can refrain from bringing the matter to court—without the consent of the judge—if judicial involvement can be dispensed with by an (less incisive) educational measure, or if § 153 StPO applies: §45(ii) JGG. See Creifelds under ‘Jugendliche und Heranwachsende’, ‘Jugendstrafe’  and ‘Jugendstrafrecht’ . 41 See Ba Baumann (G (GBS), Ch Chapter 61 614 a. a. 42 See Creifelds under ‘actio libera in causa’ . 43 See See Not Notee 18 18 in in thi thiss Cha Chapt pter er;; Cre Creif ifel elds ds unde underr ‘Schuld’; Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 1 (Sections 8 and 9); Otto (AS), Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 2 (§ 7); Model/ Creifelds/Lichtenberger Creifelds/Lichtenberger,, Part H (397). 44 See See § 15 15 StGB StGB;; Bau Bauma mann nn (GBS (GBS), ), Cha Chapt pter er 6 II1 II1 a; Nauc Naucke ke § 6IV 6IV 5 (a) (a) (§ (§ 15). 15). 45 See See Baum aumann ann (GBS (GBS), ), Chapt hapter er 6 II 1b. 1b. 46 See See Baum aumann ann (GBS (GBS), ), Chapt hapter er 6 II 1 c. 47   ‘Absichf’ and ‘sonstige spezielle subjektive Merkmale’  (other special subjective elements (of a ‘Straftat’)) form a separate, differentiated sub-category under the general heading of ‘Schuld’. See Naucke, § 7IV. 48 In othe otherr word words, s, the the perp perpetr etrato atorr is indiff indiffer erent ent to the the risk risk of an an offen offence ce occu occurri rring. ng. 49 See the Sourcebook,  Chapter 7, Footnote 5. 50 Gros Grosss neg negli lige genc ncee is is als alsoo ref refer erre red d to to as as rec reckl kles esss con condu duct ct (‘leichtfertiges Handeln’). Such a degree of negligence is a prerequisite in the case of an ‘erfolgsqualifiziertes Delikt’  punishable by more than five years’ imprisonment. See Wimmer, ZAP 15/98, Fach 21, p 175. 51 See Bauman Baumannn (GBS) (GBS),, Chapt Chapter er 6 III; III; Otto Otto (AS), (AS), Part Part 2, Chapte Chapterr 1, Sectio Sectionn 4 (§ 10). 10). 52 Creifelds lists five ‘Schuldausschließungsgründe’  (grounds for the exclusion of ‘Schuld’ ):  – ‘Tatbestandsirr ‘Tatbestandsirrtum’ tum’ (§ 16 StGB);  – ‘Entschuldigter ‘Entschuldigter (unvermeidbarer (unvermeidbarer)) Verbotsirrtum Verbotsirrtum’’  (§ 17 StGB);

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53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

 – ‘Schuldunfdhigkeit’ (§ 19, § 20 StGB);  – ‘Überschreitung der Notwehr’  (§ 33 StGB; so-called ‘Notwehrexzeß’ ); and  – ‘Entschuldigender Notstand’ (§ 35 StGB). Even if ‘Schuld’  is excluded, the ‘Handlung’  of the ‘Tàter’ remains ‘rechtswidrig’ . See Creifelds under ‘Schuldausschließungsgründe’;  Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part H (401). Regarding ‘Verbotsirrtum’, see Baumann (GBS), Chapter 6 II 3. Regarding ‘Schuldunfähigkeit’ and ‘Notwehrexzeß’  see Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 3 (respectively Sections 18 II and 20 III). See also Otto (AS), Part 2, Chapter 2 (§§ 13–14). See Creifelds under ‘Irrtum’ II. To be distinguished is the situation where the ‘Täter’ knows that what he is doing is wrong, but makes a mistake as to its punishability (‘Irrtum über die Strafbarkeit’). That is a ‘Rechtsfolgeirrtum’ (mistake as to the legal consequence), which is always irrelevant Eg, ‘Putativnotwehr’: see Creifelds under ‘Notwehr’ I 3. For ‘Putativnotstand’ see below and Creifelds under ‘Notstand’ 12. See Creifelds under ‘Wahndelikt’ . See Creifelds under ‘Irrtum’ II. Referred to in § 17 StGB as ‘die Einsicht Unrecht zu tun’ . Regarding ‘Unrechtseinsicht’  and ‘Verbotsirrtum’ see Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 3 (Section 19). See also: Engisch, Chapter VIII, Note 246a; Naucke, § 7 VII. See § 17,2nd sentence StGB. Punishment was reduced on this ground in The Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 7). Regarding the exclusion of ‘Schuld’ in cases of ‘unvermeidbarer Verbotsirrtum’  (§ 17 StGB) and ‘entschuldigender Notstand’ (§ 35 StGB), see Wesel (FR), Chapter 4 (‘Rechtsmdrigkeit und Schuld’) . See also Jakobs, Book 2, Title 1, Chapter 3, (Section 201). An act is not ‘rechtswidrig’  (illegal) in the former case and is carried out without ‘Schuld’ (guilt) in the latter. Due to personal circumstances existing at the time of, or arising after, the ‘Tat’ . See Creifelds under ‘Strafausschließungs (aufhebungs)—griinde’. See Creifelds under ‘Strafen’ and ‘Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung’ ; Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part II (396); Wesel (FR), Chapter 4 (‘Dogmatik und Strafe’) . The main example of a ‘Nebenstrafe’ is the ‘Fahrverbot’  (driving ban) in § 44 StGB. See Creifelds under ‘Nebenstrafen’ and Note 81 in this Chapter, below. See also Baumann (ER), Part V, § 15IV 3. See §§38–39 StGB. See §§ 40–43 StGB. The ‘Geldstrafe’ is to be strictly distinguished from the term ‘Geldbuße’,  which is the sanction for a minor offence (‘Ordnungswidrigkeit’). See Note 9 in this Chapter. See § 38 StGB. See § 40 StGB. See § 47(i) StGB. See § 56 StGB. See §§ 57 and 57a StGB. See §§ 59(i) and 59a(i) StGB. See § 60 StGB. See § 46(i) StGB. Assessment of punishment (‘Strafbemessung’) is distinguished according to whether one and the same act infringes various criminal provisions (so-called ideal concurrence ( ‘Idealkonkurrenz’ I ‘Tateinheit’  (unity of  act))—eg, §§ 142 and 323c StGB—or whether various offences are committed (so-called real concurrence (‘Realkonkurrenz’ / ‘Tatmehrheit’  (plurality of acts))—eg, a road accident involving § 222, § 230 and/or § 315c (iii) StGB is followed by the offence of § 142 and/or 323c StGB. While the former leads to only one punishment (§ 52(i) StGB), the consequence of the latter is a ‘Gesamtstrafe’ (combined punishment; § 53(i) StGB). ‘Gesetzeskonkurrenz’ (concurrence of statutory provisions) refers to the situation where one statutory provision is displaced (‘verdrängt’) by another.

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74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

See Creifelds under ‘Konkurrenz (Zusammentreffen) von Straftaten’ ; Haft (BT); Note 23 in this Chapter. See §§ 61–72 StGB. A ‘Maßregel’  is also a ‘Mafinahme’ (measure) as defined in § ll(i) No 8 StGB. Regarding ‘Maßregel’  see Baumann (ER), Part V, § 15IV 4; Jakobs, Book 1, Chapter 1 (Section 1 VI). See Baumann (ER), Part V, § 15IV; Naucke, § 3; Creifelds under ‘ Zzveispurigkeit im Strafrecht’. See § 62 StGB. See § 63 StGB. See § 64 StGB. See § 66 StGB. See § 68 StGB. See § 69 StGB; to be distinguished from the ‘Fahrverbot’ of § 44 StGB: see Note 63 in this Chapter ante. See §70 StGB. Under certain provisions of the StPO some ‘Maßregel’  can be imposed provisionally (‘vorläufig’), ie, even  before judgment is passed. See Roxin, Book I, chapter 6, § 36. See §§73–76 StGB.

CHAPTER XVII 1 2 3

4

5 6 7

8 9

See generally: Creifelds under ‘Strafprozeß(recht)’; Baumann (ER), Part VI (§ 19); Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (267–292); Naucke, § 5; Roxin. Regarding the differences between the continental European (German) system of criminal procedure and that in England, see Roxin, Book I, Chapter 3, § 17 B and C and Book E, Chapter 16, § 73 A. Regarding the roots of German criminal procedure, see the diagram in Roxin, Book II, Chapter 15 (‘Zur Geschichte’) . Regarding the ‘Constitutio Criminalis Carolina’ (‘Peinliche Gerichtsordnung’), see Chapter I, Note 8, above and Roxin, Book II, Chapter 15, § 69. Despite the Enlightenment of the 18th century, changes in Germany were only gradual. Thus, eg, until the Paulskirche assembly in 1848 there was no provision for a ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’. After 1848, reforms were introduced in Germany on a state by state basis. See Roxin, Book II, Chapter 15, § 70 C. The relevant §§ of the GVG are: – in accordance with their respective ‘(sachliche) Zuständigkeit’  ((substantive) competence/jurisdiction) in criminal matters (‘Strafsachen’): • for the AG: § 24 GVG; • for the ‘Strafrichter’ (single criminal judge): § 25 GVG; • for the ‘Schöffengerichte’: § 28 GVG; • for the LG:§§ 73–74 GVG; • for the OLG: §§ 120–121 GVG; • for the BGH:§ 135 GVG; and – for the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’: §§ 141–152 GVG. See Naucke, § 5 II-IV; Chapter XXII, Note 37. Regarding the sources of the law of criminal procedure, see Roxin, Introduction (§ 3). See § 151 StPO; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 2, § 13. See also Note 23 in this Chapter. The maxims of criminal procedure are set out in Baumann (ER), Part VI, § 19 II and in Roxin, Book I, Chapter 2 (§§11–16). See also: Chapter VIII, Notes 18 and 36; Article 6 EuMRK. See § 158 StPO. Regarding the German criminal courts, their jurisdiction and composition (‘Besetzung’) see Roxin, Book I, Chapter 1 (§§ 7–6). See also: Creifelds under ‘Einzelrichter’, ‘Schöffengericht’, ‘Strafkammer’  and ‘Strafsenat’, Model/ Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (270 and 277). See §§77 and 77b StGB. Eg, trespass to land (‘Hausfriedensbruch’): § 123 StGB; insult (‘Beleidigung’): § 185 StGB; breach of the duty of 

314

Notes

10 11

12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22

23

professional secrecy (‘berufliche Geheimhaltungspflicnt’): § 203 StGB; bodily harm (‘Körperverletzung’) : § 223 StGB. See Creifelds under ‘Antragsdelikte’, ‘Hausfriedensbruch’, ‘Beleidigung’  and ‘Berujsgeheimnis’ ; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 2, § 12 B. Cf private prosecution (‘Privatklage’). See § 158(ii) StPO. See Creifelds under ‘Strafverfolgungsverjährung’ ; §§ 78–78c StGB. The relevant limitation periods are set out in § 78(iii) StGB. The minimum period—for an offence carrying a sentence of less than one year’s imprisonment—is three years. Prosecutions for murder (‘Mord’) or genocide (‘Völkermord’) can never become statute-barred. ‘Veriährung’ begins on completion of the relevant offence or, if a particular result (‘Erfolg’) is required by the ‘Tatbestand’, on its occurrence: § 78a StGB. Regarding the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’, its structure, functions and position see Roxin, Book I, Chapter 1, §10 A. This is the ‘Offizialprinzip’ (official principle). See § 152 StPO; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 2, § 12; Chapter XIII B 3. See § 374 and § 376 StPO; Model / Creifelds / Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (2841). Such offences (‘Privatldagedelikte’) are a separate category to ‘Antragsdelikte’. See Note 9 in this Chapter and Chapter XVII H, below. See § 150 GVG. The relevant courts are shown in brackets. See the article by Werner Roth entitled ‘Ein klassischer Fall von Befangenheit’  in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) of 20.3.2000. See § 152(ii) StPO. See § 153ff StPO and, in this Chapter, Note 40 A. See § 160(i) StPO. An initial suspicion (‘Anfangsverdacht’) is necessary. The ‘Ermittlungsverfahren’/‘Varverfahren’  (in the hands of the ‘Staatsamwltschaft’) precedes the issue of the indictment (‘Anklageerhebung’) a nd is the first stage of criminal proceedings. It is followed by:  –  the interim proceedings (‘Zwischenverfahren’),  in which the court decides whether to open the main proceedings (§§ 199ff StPO);  –  the main proceedings (‘Hauptverfahren’),  in which the main hearing (‘Hauptverhandlung’)  is prepared and held (§§ 213ff StPO). The ‘Erkenntnisverfahren’  (proceedings leading to a judgment) is another term for all proceedings up to enforcement (ie, within Books II-VI StPO). See Note 43 in this Chapter and Chapter XVII G. See also: Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (278); Roxin, Introduction (§ 5), Book I, Chapter 7 (§ 37, § 40) and Chapter 8 (§§ 41–45). See §160(ii) StPO. See §161 StPO. Those police officers authorised to assist the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’   are referred to as ‘Hilfsbeamten der Staatsanwaltschaft’: § 152 GVG. Regarding their position see Roxin, Book I, Chapter 1, § 10 B I. Regarding the interrogation (‘Vernehmung’/‘Verhor’) of the suspect in the ‘Ermittlungsverfahren’  see Note 38 H in this Chapter. Witnesses (‘Zeugen’) and experts (‘Sachverständige’) can also be questioned by the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ and police: § 161a, § 163a (v) StPO. Certain persons (eg, close relatives) have a right to refuse to give evidence (‘Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht’) : §§ 52–53 StPO. Moreover, a witness can refuse to answer particular questions (‘Auskunftsverweigerungsrecht’) , if to do so would expose the witness or a member of the witness’s family to a risk of prosecution: § 55(i) StPO (‘self-incrimination’). Witnesses must be cautioned regarding their above rights before being examined: §§ 52(iii), 55(ii) StPO. A suspect must appear, if summoned by the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’: § 163a (iii) StPO. However, unlike witnesses and experts, the suspect does not have to make a statement (‘aussagen’). See §162(i) StPO. Various points should be noted here:

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The German Legal System and Legal Language

24

25

 –  The ‘Staatsanwaltscnaft’ is in full control of the ‘Ermittlungsverfahren’ : it is ‘Herr des Ermittlungs¬ verfahren’ (master of the investigation procedure).  –  During the ‘Ermittlungsverjahren’  the judge is referred to as the ‘Ermittlungsrichter’ (investigative judge). When dealing with an application for an investigative act the judge’s function is merely executive, ie, to check whether the act applied for is ‘zulässig’ (admissible) in the circumstances. See Roxin, Book I, Chapter 1, § 10 B II and § 162(iii) StPO.  –  The order (‘Anordnung’) for an investigative act must usually be made by the judge. However, if there is ‘Gefahr im Verzug’  (danger in delay) the order can be made by me ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ or police.  –  The strict rule is that a judicial investigation can never be started by a court on its own initiative: see Note 6 in this Chapter. Thus, there must either be a ‘Klage’ or an application (‘Antrag’) for a ‘richterliche Untersuchungshandlung’ . However, by § 165 StPO, necessary ‘Untersuchungshandlungen’  can be undertaken by a judge alone (acting as a so-called ‘Notstaatsanwalt’ (emergency prosecutor)), if a ‘Staatsanwalt’ is not available (‘erreichbar’) . § 165 is a very exceptional provision, the application of which can result in a conflict of functions. See the instructive discussion in Wesel (FR), Chapter 1 (at the end) of the political scandal, which ensued the seizure (at the 1967 Frankfurt Book Fair) of a book containing allegations against the former Federal President Heinrich Lübke. See also: Creifelds under ‘Ermittlungsrichter’; Roxin (Book I, Chapter 2, § 13), who refers to § 165 as an ‘apparent exception’ to the principle ‘Wo kein Kläger, da kein Richter’  (there is no judge without a claimant). See § 81a StPO; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 6, § 33. § 81 a StPO dispenses with the permission of the suspect for any risk-free physical examination, eg, the taking of blood samples (‘Entnahme von Blutoroben’) or a DNA test. It can be carried out on the orders of the ‘Staatsanwaltsdmft’ or police, if any delay would endanger the success of the investigation: § 81a (ii) StPO. Measures to ascertain the identity of a suspect ( ‘erkennungsdienstliche Maßnahmeri’;  eg, photos, fingerprints) do not require the sanction of a judge: §§ 81b, 163b StPO. For identification purposes, where a person is suspected or convicted of a particularly serious crime, body cells can be extracted and subjected to genetic examination, if there is reason to believe that fresh criminal proceedings will be necessary against the same person for such an offence in future: § 81g StPO. The storage of such a genetic fingerprint (‘DNA-Identifizierungsmuster’) in a data bank is not unconstitutional. See ZAP-Aktuell, 4/01, p 192. A more modern expression for ‘Beschlagnahme’ is ‘Sicherstellung’ (safekeeping). To be distinguished are §§ 94–101 StPO, which deal with the seizure of items of possible significance as evidence and §§ lllb-p StPO, which relate to safekeeping for the purpose of facilitating forfeiture (‘Verfall’) or confiscation (‘Einziehung’). In principle, the seizure of items, which may be of significance as evidence, can only be ordered by a judge: § 98(i) StPO. However, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ and their auxiliary officials can (exceptionally) make such an order, if there is ‘Gefahr im Verzug’ (danger in delay). Cf Chapter XXII, Note 26. Certain items are excluded from seizure (eg, written communications between a suspect and his ‘Verteidiger’; documents and information in the possession of persons working in the media field, who require such for editorial purposes: §§ 97(i), 97(v) StPO). By § 98(ii), 1st sentence StPO, officials who seize items without a judge’s order should seek judicial confirmation within three days:  –  if neither the person affected nor an adult family member was present at the seizure; or  –  if the person affected or, in that person’s absence, an adult family member expressly objected to the seizure. Regarding the following measures see the appropriate §§:  –  data comparison and transmission (‘Abgleich und Übermittlung von Daten’) : §§ 98a-c StPO; Where certain very serious offences are involved and there is ‘Gefahr im Verzug’  (danger in delay), the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ can—subject to judicial confirmation within three days—order the use of special computer-assisted search methods to trace and enmesh the perpetrator(s), ie, a comparison of personal data (‘personenbezogene Daten’)  based on particular search criteria (so-called ‘Rasterfahndung’ (grid search); § 98a StPO) and the storage of personal information obtained at borders or other control points (socalled ‘Schleppnetzfahndung’ (dragnet search); § 163d StPO).  –  seizure of post (‘Postbesdilagnahme’): §§ 99–100 StPO;  –  surveillance (monitoring) of telecommunications (‘Überwachung des Fernmeldeverkehrs’) : §§ 100a–b StPO;

316

Notes

26

 –  observation and bugging: §§ 100c-d StPO;  –  search (‘Durchsuchung’)  of the person or premises of the suspect: § 102 StPO;  –  search of other premises: § 103 StPO;  –  search of premises at nighttime: § 104 StPO;  –  use of undercover agents (‘verdeckte Ermittler’): §§ 110a-e StPO;  –  establishment of control points (‘Kontrollstellen’) in public places: § 111 StPO. See generally: Creifelds under ‘Beschlagnahme’, ‘Datenschutz’ and ‘Sicherstellung’; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 6, §34. See Creifelds under ‘Untersuchungshaft’ ; §§ 112ff StPO; Note 38 in this Chapter, below. ‘Untersuchuncshaft’ must be based on a judge’s written arrest warrant (§ 114(i) StPO) specifying the suspect, details of the alleged offence, the ground for detaining the suspect in custody (‘Haftgrund’) and (in so far as state security is not thereby endangered) the facts establishing a high suspicion that the suspect committed the offence (‘dringender Tatuerdacht’):  § 114(ii) StPO. A In accordance with the principle of proportionality (‘Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz’), ‘Untersuchungshaft’ (investigative custody) cannot be ordered, if it is out of proportion to the importance of the matter and to the expected ‘Strafe’ or ‘Maßregel’ : § 112(i), 2nd sentence StPO. Thus:  –  three preconditions must be fulfilled before ‘ Untersuchungshaft’ can be ordered: there must be a ‘dringender Tatverdachft’ ; there must be a ‘Haftgrund’ ; and it must be proportionate to order ‘Untersuchungshaft’.  – ‘Untersuchungshaft’ can only exceptionally be ordered on the basis of ‘Verdunkelungsgefahr’  (see Note 38 B in this Chapter) where the possible punishment for the offence is less than six months’ imprisonment or not more than 180 ‘Tagessätze’ (daily rates): § 113(i) StPO.  –  an arrest warrant must be quashed as soon as the preconditions for ‘Untersuchungshaft’  no longer exist or if it transpires that further ‘Untersuchungshaft’ would be out of proportion to the importance of the matter and to the expected ‘Strafe’ or ‘Maßregel’ : § 120(i), 1st sentence StPO. B A suspect has various means of challenging an order for ‘Untersuchungshaft’. He can make an application to the court at any time under § 117(i) StPO for so-called  Haftprüfung’ (review of custody)—eg, for the order to be quashed. Alternatively, on a subsidiary basis, a suspect can—even if he is not actually in custody—lodge a custody complaint (‘Haftbeschwerde’)  against a decision by the court. If no relief is granted, the complaint passes for decision to the next higher court §§ 117(ii), 304 StPO. Once a suspect has been in custody for three months, ‘Haftprüfung’ must be undertaken by the court of its own motion (‘von Amts wegen’), unless the suspect is legally represented: § 117(v) StPO. Otherwise, the suspect is entitled to a defence lawyer (‘Verteidiger’) after three months in custody, if he or she does not already have one: § 117(iv) StPO. On application, an oral hearing (‘mündliche Verhandlung’)  regarding ‘Haftprüfung’ must take place: § 118 StPO. See Creifelds under ‘Haftprüfungsverfahren’ ; Schäfer, ZAP 24/97, Fach 22, p 281; Schleicher, ZAP 3/01, Fach 22, p 329. C § 116 StPO enables the judge to suspend execution of an arrest warrant based on ‘Fluchtgefahr’ (see Note 38 B in this Chapter)—ie, grant bail—if the purpose of ‘Untersuchungshaft’ can be achieved by less incisive measures (eg, regular reporting, restrictions on movement, deposit of security): ‘Aussetzung (des Vollzugs) des Haftbefehls’/‘Haftverschonung’. In The Arrested Admiral Case (Sourcebook,  Chapter 3), on the basis of the ‘Verhältnismäßigkeitssrundsatz ’, the possible ‘Haftverschonung’ (exemption from custody) under § 116 StPO was applied by analogy to a warrant based on § 112(iv) (now § 112(iii)) StPO, ie, in a case alleging murder. D So long as there is no judgment imposing a sentence of imprisonment (or a ‘Maßregel’  involving detention), a person can only be kept in ‘Untersuchungshaft’ for the same offence for more than six months, if a judgment is not yet possible due to, and the continuation of custody (‘Fortdauer der Haft) is justified by, the particular difficulty or extent of the investigation or another important reason (‘die besondere Scnwierigkeit oder der besondere Umfang der Ermittlungen oder ein anderer wichtiger  Grund’): § 121(i) StPO. Thus, once ‘Untersuchungshaft’ has lasted for 6 months, the arrest warrant must be quashed unless – there is ‘Haftverschonung under § 116 StPO; or – the OLG (on request by the competent court or the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’) orders ‘Untersuchungshaft’ to be continued: §§ 121(ii), 122 StPO.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language E

27 28 29

30

31 32

The maximum period for ‘Untersuchungshaft’ based on the ‘Haftgrurd’  of § 112a StPO (see Note 38 C in this Chapter) is one year: § 122a StPO. F   ‘Untersuchungshaft’  is only one of numerous compulsory measures (‘Zwangsmaflnahmen’) available in criminal proceedings, all of which involve an (authorised) infringement of a basic right (‘Grundrechtseingriff).  Its purpose is to ensure the effective conduct of the criminal process (prosecution and enforcement). See Roxin, Book I, Chapter 6 (§§ 29–36). See generally: Creifelds under ‘Verteidiger’; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 3 (§ 19). Regarding the liability of a ‘Verteidiger’ to his client see Köllner in ZAP 24/97, Fach 23, p 303. In civil proceedings, a ‘Beistand’ can appear with a party, but has no ‘Prozeßvollmacht’. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv); § 90 ZPO. If, during the preliminary investigative proceedings (‘Ermittlungsverfahren’) , it is proposed to examine a central incriminating witness (zentraler Belastungszeuge’) in the absence of the suspect, the court must appoint a ‘Verteidiger’. The judicial discretion to appoint a defender during the ‘Ermittlungsverfahren’  (§ 141(iii) StPO) is reduced to a duty to do so because Art 6(iii)d EuMRK gives an accused the right to question an incriminating witness and expresses a general principle requiring a fair hearing. See ZAP 24/00, EN-Nr 802/2000. Moreover, whether or not a defender is appointed, an accused can insist on the attendance of an interpreter (‘Dolmetscher’) at court, if there are language difficulties (Article 6(iii)e EuMRK). See Chapter VIII, Note 18. The ‘Verteidiger’ is also entitled to inspect any items of evidence (‘Beweisstücke’) in the possession of the authorities. The right of inspection of the file (‘Ermittlungsakte’) and items of evidence can be curtailed, if investigations are still pending and the purpose of the investigation (‘Untersuchungszweck’)  would be endangered: § 147(ii) StPO. However, a ‘Verteidiger’ must always be allowed access to the official record of the examination of the suspect and any expert opinion (‘Sachverständigengutachten’): § 147(iii) StPO. See generally Burhoff, ZAP, Fach 22, p 345. In certain situations (involving a criminal or terrorist group (‘kriminelle oder terroristische Vereinigung’) ), a complete contact ban (‘Kontaktsperre’) can be imposed: §§31–38 EGGVG. In Germany, police law is governed by separate statutes in each of the ‘Länder’. Although there is no general federal police force in Germany, various federal authorities engage (broadly speaking) in police activities. Well known are the ‘Bundesgrenzschutz’   (federal border guard.). the ‘Bundeskriminnalamt’ (federal office of criminal investigation; located in Wiesbaden) and the ‘Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’  (federal office of constitutional protection; located in Cologne). It is important to understand that the German term ‘Polizei’ is used in two senses. The function (‘Aufgabe’) of  the police in the classic, so-called ‘material’ sense is ‘die Abwehr von Gefahren für die öffenniche Sicherheit und Ordnung’  (the warding-off of dangers for public security and order) or just ‘Gefahrenabwehr’,  ie, the preservation of law and order. In the so-called ‘formal’ or ‘institutional’ sense, the term ‘Polizei’ is understood according to whether it acts as ‘Verwaltungspolizei’  (administrative police)—in which case the authorities involved are referred to as ‘Polizeibehörden’ (police authorities) or ‘Ordnungsbehörden’ ( order authorities)—or as ‘Vollzugspolizei’  (executive police)—also referred to as the ‘Polizeivollzugsdienst’ (executive police service) or just ‘Polizei’. The prevention and detection/investigation of crime is the domain of separate branches of the ‘Vollzugspolizei’, known respectively as the ‘Schutzpolizei’ (protective police) and ‘Kriminalpolizei’ (criminal police). Drews /Wacke/Vogel/ Martens broadly describe the difference between the ‘Verwaltungspolizei’  and the ‘Vollzugspolizei’  as follows: ‘Vollzugspolizei ist Gefahrenabwehr ‘vor Ort’, ‘Verwaltungspolizei Gefahrenabwehr’ ‘vom Schreibtisch aus’ (‘Voltzugspolizei’  is the warding-off of dangers locally, ‘Verwaltungspolizei’  the warding-off of dangers from the desk; see Drews/Wacke/Vogel/Martens, Part 2, § 4 No 3). Thus, the ‘Vollzugspolizei’ usually becomes involved in situations where action needs to be taken immediately (‘sofort’). Although the ‘Verwaltungspolizei’  is no longer generally referred to as the ‘police’ in everyday speech, the same legal principles apply to the ‘Verwaltungspolizei’  and the ‘Vollzugspolizei’  and they are often governed  by one and the same law in the various ‘Länder’. The strict terminological distinction must, however, be  borne in mind when one refers to these laws. See generally Drews/Wacke/Vogel/Martens, Part 1, §§ 1–3 and Part 2, §§ 4–6; Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 2 C (158279177); Schmidt-Afimann, Section 2. See also Creifelds under ‘Polizei’ ,

318

Notes

33

34

35 36

37

38

‘Polizeirecht’, ‘Ordnungsbehörden’, ‘Kriminalpolizei’, ‘Bundesgrenzschutz’ , ‘Bundeskriminalamt’ and ‘Verfassungsschutz’. The police has a double function (‘Doppetfunktion’). It is competent both to deal, on a preventive basis, with ‘Gefahrenabwehr’  (the warding-off or dangers, including crime) and to act in ‘Strafuerfolgung’ (the pursuit of  crime). While the authority of the police in the former case is the police law of the relevant ‘Land’ , in the latter case federal law (the StPO) applies. Moreover, it is important to note that while measures of ‘Gefahrenabwehr’  taken by the police are subject to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts under § 40(i) VwGO, measures of ‘Strafverfolgung’ are ‘Justizverwaltungsakte’, open to examination by the OLG acting as a criminal court. See Drews/Wacke/Vogel/Martens, Part 3, § 9; Schmitt Glaeser, Part I, § 2 II B 2; Wesel (FR), Chapter 5 (‘Polizeirecht’); Chapter XV, Note 2. See § 163(i) StPO. Similarly, the police is also responsible for the investigation of ‘Ordnungswidrigkeiten’  (minor offences): § 53 OWiG. See also Chapter XVI, Note 9. See § 163(ii) StPO. A person caught in the act or being pursued (‘auffrischer Tat betroffen oder verfolgt’)  can be provisionally arrested by ‘jedermann’ (anyone), provided the person is suspected of being on the run (‘der Flucht verdächtig’) and cannot be immediately identified: § 127 (i) StPO. Usually, however, where there is ‘Gefahr im Verzug’  (ie, the situation is urgent and delay would be prejudicial), a ‘vorlâufige Festnahme’  is undertaken by the ‘Staatsanwaltschapft’ or police, provided the preconditions for a ‘Haftbefehl’ or ‘Unterbringungsbefehl’  are fulfilled: § 127 (ii) StPO. See Note 49 in this Chapter. Which court has local jurisdiction (‘Gerichtsstand’)  is ascertained by reference to §§ 7–21 StPO. The ‘Gerichtsstand’ can be based (inter alia) on:  –  the place of commission of the offence (‘Tatort’): § 7(i) StPO;  –  the residence (‘Wohnsitz’) of the person to be prosecuted: § 8(i) StPO;  –  the place of seizure of the suspect (‘Ergreifungsort’) : § 9 StPO. The court which opens the investigation ( ‘Untersuchung’, ie, the main proceedings) first takes priority: § 12(i) StPO. See Roxin, Book I, Chapter 1 (§ 8). A A ‘Staatsanwalt’ usually applies for issue of a (written) ‘Haftbefehl’ to the judge at the ‘Amtsgericht’ (district court) in whose area there is a ‘Gerichtsstand’ or in which the suspect is present § 125(i) StPO. That judge is referred to as the competent judge (‘der zuständige Richte’) . There are two preconditions (‘Voraussetzungen’)  for the issue of a ‘Haftbefehl’: (i) there must be a high suspicion that the suspect (‘Beschuldigter’) committed the offence (‘dringender Taiverdachit’); and (ii)there must be a ‘Haftgrund’ ((factual) ground for detaining the suspect in custody. B There are four main ‘Haftgründe’: ‘Flucht’ (ie, the suspect is fugitive); ‘Fluchtgefahr’ (ie, there is a danger of the suspect absconding (fleeing)); ‘Verdunkelungsgefahr’  (ie, there is a danger of an obstruction of   justice (eg, possible tampering with evidence or collusion)); ‘Wiederholungsgefahr’  (ie, there is a danger of repetition (in the case of certain serious crimes)). See § 112 StPO and this Note below. Additionally, ‘Untersuchungshaft’ may be ordered under § 112(iii) StPO for the seriousness of the offence (‘Scnwere der Tat’). This is the case where there is a high suspicion (see this Note, above) that the suspect has:  –  established or participated in a terrorist organisation (‘Bildung/Beteiligung an einer terroristischen Vereinigung’; § 129a(i) StGB); or has committed:  –  murder (‘Mord’ ; § 211 StGB);  –  manslaughter (‘Totschlag’; § 212 StGB); or  –  genocide (‘Völkermord’; § 220a (i) No 1 StGB), or has caused an explosion (‘Sprengstoffexplosion’) thereby endangering life or limb of others (§ 311 (i)(iii) StGB). C The ‘Haftgrund’ of ‘Wiederholungsgefahr’  is dealt with in § 112a (i) StPO. By the first sentence of that

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– – – – – – – –

paragraph, a suspect can be taken into/kept in custody, if there is a high suspicion (see this Note, above) that either: 1 the suspect has committed certain sexual offences (eg, rape (‘Vergewaltigung’); § 177 StGB); or 2 has repeatedly or continuously (‘wiederholt oder fortgesetzt’) committed a particular, very grave offence (‘eine die Rechtsordnung schwerwiegend beeintrachtigende Straftat’)  as follows:  –   breach of the peace (‘Landfriedensbruch’,  § 125a StGB); bodily harm (‘Korperverletzung’;  §§ 224–227 StGB); theft (Diebstahz;  § 243 StGB); robbery (Raub’,  §§ 249–255 StGB); blackmail (‘Erpressung’;  § 253 StGB); ancillary aggression against a driver or passenger (Rauberischer Angriff auf Kraftfohrzeugführer oder einen  Mitfahrer’; § 316a StGB); handling ÇHehlerez;  § 260 StGB); fraud (‘Betrug’; § 263 StGB); arson (‘Brandstiftung’; §§ 306–306c StGB); breach of certain provisions of the Narcotic Drugs Law (‘Betâubungsmittelgesetz’; §§ 29–30 BtMG);

and: (a) particular facts (‘bestimmte Tatsachen’) establish the danger (‘Gefahr’) that, before the suspect is finally sentenced (‘vor rechtskräftiger Aburteilung’),  the suspect will commit similar serious offences (‘weitere erhebliche Straftaten gleicher Art’)  or continue the commission of the offence; (b) custody is necessary to avert the threatening danger (zur Abwendung der drohenden Gefahr erforderlich’); and (c) in cases under No 2, above, a sentence of more than one year’s imprisonment is to be expected. By § 112a (i), 2nd sentence StPO, one can, as a rule, assume a danger for the purpose of cases under No 2, if, within the last 5 years, the suspect was convicted of, and sentenced to imprisonment for, a similar offence. The ‘Haftgrund’ in § 112a (i) StPO is subsidiary to those in § 112: § 112a (ii) StPO. See also §§ 114,116–126 StPO and Note 26 in this Chapter, above. Regarding ‘Untersuchungshaft’— including, in particular, a critique of § 112 (iii) and § 112a StPO -see Roxin, Book I, Chapter 6 (§ 30). D A person arrested ‘auf Grund eines Haftbefehls’  (on the basis of an arrest warrant) must ‘unverzüglich’ (without delay):  –  receive details of the warrant (§ 114a StPO);  –   be brought before the competent judge (§ 115(i) StPO; ‘Vorfiihrung’  (presentation)); and–  –   be examined by the judge, at the latest the day after the ‘ Vorfuhrung’ (§ 115(ii) StPO). At the examination (‘Vernehmung’), the suspect must  –   be informed of the incriminating circumstances;  –   be informed of his right to make a statement or to remain silent (‘Aussageverweigerungsrecht’);  –   be given an opportunity to refute the grounds for suspicion and custody and to put forward facts in his favour: § 115(iii) StPO. If the suspect  –  cannot be presented to the competent judge within a day after his seizure, he must be brought  before a judge at the nearest ‘Amtsgericht’ within that time: § 115a (i) StPO;  –  is not released by the judge (ie, the ‘Haftbefehl’ is confirmed), he must be advised of his right to lodge a ‘Beschwerae’ (complaint) or to apply for a review (re-examination) of custody (‘Haftprüfung’): §§ 115(iv), 117, 118 StPO. Such an application is possible at any time ( ‘jederzeit’; § 117(i) StPO) and can be heard orally (§ 118(i) StPO): see Note 26 B in this Chapter. E If an arrest warrant or placement order already exists, a ‘Steckbrief  (warrant of apprehension) can be issued (§131 StPO). F If there is no arrest warrant and a suspect fails to attend a ‘Vernehmung’, despite having received a written summons (‘Ladung’) to do so, the judge or ‘StMtsanutâtschafrcan compel the appearance of the suspect by means of a ‘Vorführungsbefehl’  (presentation order): § 133 StPO. However, on the basis of a ‘Vorfühningsbefehl’,  a suspect cannot be held longer than until the end of the day following the ‘Vorführung’: § 135 StPO. G A suspect must be examined before conclusion of the investigations (‘Abschluß der Ermittlungen’) at the latest, unless the investigation is terminated: § 163a (i) StPO.

320

Notes

39

40

41

If it intends to issue proceedings, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ must note conclusion of the investigations in the file: § 169a StPO. H Where there is a first examination (‘erste Vernehmung’)  of the suspect by the judge, ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ or police special requirements apply: §§ 136,163a (iii)/(iv) StPO. At the first examination, the suspect must be told what he is alleged to have done: § 163(a) (iv) StPO. He must be informed (in clear language) of his right to make a statement or to remain silent (‘Aussageverweigerungsrecht’)  and that he can at any time consult a defender of his choice (also before the examination): § 136(i), 2nd sentence StPO (‘Recht auf Konsultation’). The suspect must be given an opportunity to dispel any grounds of suspicion existing against him and to assert any facts in his favour: § 136(ii) StPO. In particular, he must be advised that he can ask for exonerating evidence (‘Entlastungsbeweis’)  to be taken, eg, a medical test or identity parade (‘Gegenüberstellung’):  § 136(i), 3rd sentence StPO. Certain methods of questioning are forbidden: § 136a StPO. If there is reason to doubt the admissibility (‘Verwertbarkeit’) of statements obtained from the suspect during the investigative proceddings, the defender must expressly make objection (‘Widerspruch’) at the main hearing (‘Hauptverhandlung’). See Burhoff, ZAP, Fach 22R, p 207. I Regarding ‘Vorläufige Festnahme’ and ‘Vorführung’  see Roxin, Book I, Chapter 6 (§ 31). Regarding ‘Vernehmung’ see Creifelds under ‘Vernehmungen im Strafverfahren’ ; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 5 (§ 25 III). See also Creifelds under ‘Festnahme’, ‘Haftbefehl’, ‘Steckbrief’  and ‘Vorführungsbefehl’ . In accordance with the ‘Legalitätsgrundsatz’ (legality principle), the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ has a duty to do so: see Creifelds under ‘Anklageernebung und -zulassung’ ; §§ 170(i) and 199(ii) StPO. The ‘Anklageschrift’ must specify the accused, the alleged offence, the time and place of its commission, the statutory elements of the offence and the applicable legal provisions: § 200(i) StPO. See § 170(ii) StPO. A In various types of case the ‘Legalitâtsgrundsatz’ gives way and the ‘Opportunitätsgrundsatz’ applies, enabling a prosecution to be dropped or, where proceedings have begun, for these to be terminated  by the court (‘eingestellt’). Thus, with the consent of the court, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ can refrain from a prosecution (von der Verfolgung absehen’)  on grounds of insignificance (‘Geringfügigkeit’) where a ‘Vergehen’  is involved, the perpetrator’s ‘Schuld’ is negligible and there is no public interest involved in the matter: § 153(i) StPO. Further, with the consent of the court, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ can provisionally disregard raising an indictment (‘vorläufig von der Erhebung der öffentlichen Klage absehen’),  if imposition of ‘Auflagen und Weisungen’  (conditions and directions) on the perpetrator would be appropriate, the perpetrator s ‘Schuld’ is negligible and the public interest in a prosecution can thereby be disposed of: § 153a(i) StPO. ‘Absehen von Strafoerfolgung’  and ‘Einstellung’ are also possible, for example, where crimes with a foreign element are involved, where state security takes precedence or where the accused has already  been (or is expected to be) sentenced for another offence and the relevant ‘Strafe’ or ‘Maßregel’ he could receive, if prosecuted, would not be of such significance by comparison. See §§ 153c, 153d and 154(i) StPO. See generally: Creifelds under ‘Bagatellstrafsachen’, ‘Geringfügigkeit’, ‘Legalitätsprinzip’ and ‘Opportunitätsprinzip’; Note 19 in this Chapter; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 2 (§14) and Chapter 7 (§38). B If, despite the ‘Legalitätsgrundsatz’, the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ declines to prosecute or terminates the investigation, the injured party can either:  –  within two weeks of the refusal initiate a special ‘Klageerzwingungsverfahren’  (procedure to compel prosecution) by means of a complaint (‘Beschwerde’) to the superior Staatsanwalt’ and, thereafter, to the OLG; or  –  lodge a ‘Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde’  (supervisory complaint) (also to the next superior ‘Staatsanwalt’). See §§ 171–177 StPO; Creifelds under ‘Anklageerzwingung’ and ‘Ermittlungsverfahren in Strafsachen  II’. C Termination of an investigation does not prevent it being taken up again (re-opened) at any time. See Chapter XVI, Note 5. However, if, in the ‘Klageerzwingungsverfahren’ , the OLG rejects the application for prosecution, a new prosecution is only possible on the basis of new facts or evidence (§ 174(ii) StPO). D Persons who suffer financial loss due to prosecution measures can claim compensation under the ‘Gesetz über die Entschädigung für Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen’  (StrEG) of 8.3.1971. See Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (278 and 283). See §§ 407ff StPO.

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42 43

44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51

52 53 54 55

The application is equivalent to the lodging of a ‘Klage’: § 407(1), 4th sentence StPO. The ‘Strafbefehlsverfahren’  is a special summary written procedure where the accused is not heard before the  judge reaches his decision: §§ 407(iii), 408 StPO. The only types of punishment available are set out in § 407(ii) StPO. Imprisonment is not possible. The accused can lodge objection (‘Einspruch’) against a ‘Strafbefehl’ within two weeks of service, in which case a main hearing must be held: §§ 410(i), 411(i) StPO. See Creifelds under ‘Strafbefehl’; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 14 (§ 66); Chapter XVII I, below. See § 157 StPO. See § 203 StPO. This is the so-called ‘Eröffnungsverfahren’  or ‘Zwischenverfahren’  (interim proceedings). See Creifelds under ‘Anklageerhebung und -zulassung’  and ‘Eröffnungsverfahren’ ; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (279); Roxin, Book I, Chapter 7 (§ 40). Before deciding whether to open the main proceedings, the judge must give the accused an opportunity to request the taking of evidence and to make objections: § 201(i) StPO. An ‘Eröffnungsverfahren’  and a written indictment (‘Anklageschrift’)  are unnecessary, if the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’ applies for judgment in the so-called ‘ beschleunigtes Verfahren’  (accelerated procedure). The facts must be simple and an immediate judgment possible: §§ 212, 212a StPO. The maximum possible punishments in the accelerated procedure are one year’s imprisonment or a ‘Maßregel’ der Besserung und Sicherung’ : § 212b(i) StPO. See Creifelds under ‘Beschleunigtes Verfahren’ ; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (281); Roxin, Book I, Chapter 12 (§59). See §§ 210(i) and 157 StPO. See § 207 StPO. See § 156 StPO. See § 210(ii) StPO. See §§ 214 and 217 StPO. In the ‘beschleunigtes Verfahren’  the notice period (‘Ladungsfrist’) is shortened to 24 hours, if the suspect does not attend voluntarily or is not brought before the court: § 212(a)(iii) StPO. See Note 43 in this Chapter. § 127b StPO. This measure forms part of the accelerated procedure. See Burhoff, ZAP 16/97, Fach 22, p 263; Notes 36 and 43 in this Chapter. Exposition planned. See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (280–283); Roxin, Book I, Chapter 8 (§§ 41–45). A ‘Privatklage’ takes the place of a public prosecution, whereas a ‘Nebenklage’ enables the party injured to  join it. See Note 14 in this Chapter; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (284); Roxin, Book I, Chapter 13 (§§ 61–63). See Creifelds under ‘Sühneverfahren’ . See also: § 279 ZPO; ‘Güteverhandlung’ . See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (285–287); Roxin, Book I, Chapter 14 (§§ 64–66). See Note 41 in this Chapter. See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 D (288–289); Roxin, Book I, Chapter 11 (§§ 56–57).

CHAPTER XVIII 1

An ‘Arbeitsvertrag’ is an example of a ‘Dienstvertrag’ and the provisions in the BGB regarding ‘Dienstverträge’ (§§ 611–630) are of subsidiary application. A ‘Dienstvertrag’  involves the provision of services for others, but usually on an individual basis, ie, without the element of social dependency, which is characteristic of an ‘Arbeitsvertrag’ . See Note 60 in this Chapter; Baumann (ER), Part III, § 12; Fikentscher, § 79 I; Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 6 A (601–637); Söllner, Part 1, § 2 and § 5II. Relevant statutes in the field of employment law are listed in Hanau/Adomeit, Part BIV; Söllner, Part 1, §6.

322

Notes 2

(a) The term ‘Arbeitnehmer’ includes ‘Arbeiter’ (workers) and ‘Angestellte’ (employees). Specialized categories include:  – ‘gewerbliche Arbeitnehmer’ (industrial/trade employees eg, ‘Werkmeister’  (foremen), ‘Techniker’ (technicians) and ‘Fabrikarbeiter’ (factory workers) ie, skilled and unskilled ‘blue-collar’ staff), governed by §§ 105– 139m, ‘Gewerbeordnung’  (GewO; Business Order);  – ‘kaufmännische Angestellte’   ((lower-ranking) commercial employees; (junior) ‘white-collar’ staff) eg, ‘Gehilfen’ (assistants), governed by §§ 59–83 ‘Handelsgesetzbuch’  (HGB; Commercial Code);  –  persons undergoing vocational training (‘Berufsausbildung’)—ie, trainees and apprentices—, who are referred to by a variety of titles, eg, ‘Auszubildende’, (Handwerks-) ‘Lehrlinge’, ‘Praktikanten’, ‘Volontäre’ ; and  –  public service employees (‘Angestellte des öffentlichen Dienstes’), eg, civil servants (‘Beamte’). The authorised representatives of personal companies or corporate bodies (eg, directors of a GmbH or members of the board of an AG) are not employees for the purposes of employment protection law and the employment courts have no jurisdiction in matters concerning them: §§ 14(i) KSchG, 5(i) ArbGG. See Creifelds under ‘Angestellte’, ‘Arbeitsverhältnis’, ‘Arbeitsvertrag’, ‘Arbeitnehmer’, ‘Berufsbildung’, ‘Handlungsgehilfe’ and ‘Offentlicher Dienst’. Hanau/Adomeit, Part E; Hofmann, Part F III; Söllner, Part 1, § 31–III, § 4 and Part 4, § 28. (b) It is sometimes difficult to establish whether or not a person is an ‘Arbeitnehmer’ . A person is not an ‘Arbeitnehmer’,  if he or she is self-employed (‘selbständig’)  or similar to an employee (a so-called ‘arbeitnehmerähnliche Person’), ie, someone who is not subject to direction (‘weisungsgebunden’) nor personally dependent (‘persönlich abhängig’),  but only commercially dependent (‘wirtschaftlich abhängig’). A person predominantly working for and paid by one employer can be regarded as an ‘arbeitnehmerähnliche Person’,  although the question ultimately depends on the individual circumstances and market opinion (‘Verkehrsanschauung’) . A particular criterion is the extent to which the relevant person is incorporated (‘eingegliedert’) into the other party’s organisation (§ 7(i), 2nd sentence SGB (Book IV)). The effect of a person being considered an ‘arbeitnehmerähnliche Person’ is that, in principle, German employment law does not apply. However  –  individual statutes can provide that they apply to ‘arbeitnehmerähnliche Personen’  (eg, § 5(i) ArbGG; § 2 ‘Bundesurlaubsgesetz’  (Federal Holiday Law));  – ‘Arbeitsschutzrecht’ (work protection law: see Chapter XVIII H, below) remains applicable, as it places obligations on employers, even if no formal, but merely a factual, employment relationship (a ‘faktisches Arbeitsverhältnis’) exists. See ‘Handbuch des Fachanwalts—Arbeitsrecht’,  2nd Edition (1994); Part A, Notes 37 and 38; ‘Arbeitsrecht’  by Ernst Ruppert, 2nd Edition (1992), Lektion 9, 1.2; Zöllner/Loritz, § 4 VI 2. See also: Chapter XI, Note 40. (c) By the ‘Gesetz zu Korrekture in der Sozialversicherung und zur Sicherung der Arbeitnehmerrechte’ —the socalled ‘Korrekturgesetz’  (Law to correct Social Insurance and to Secure Employees’ Rights)—of 19.12.1998, as amended by the ‘Gesetz zur Förderung der Selbständigkeit’  (Law to Promote Self-Employment) of  20.12.1999, measures have been introduced with effect from 1.1.1999 to bring persons, who are, in reality, employees within the scope of the social security system. The intention is to combat avoidance (‘Umgehung’)   by those in ostensible self-employment (‘Scheinselbständigkeit’)—disguised employees—and by persons with various jobs, each paying less than DM 630 per month, under which level no national insurance contributions are due. Persons similar to employees, but formally self-employed, (‘arbeitnehmerähnliche Selbständige’)  must also now contribute to the state pension scheme (‘Rentenversicherung’), even if they do not fall within the social insurance criteria. There is an exception for persons starting up in business (‘Existenzgründer’). By § 7(iv) SGB (Book IV), for social insurance purposes, a person is presumed to be employed, if three of the following five criteria are fulfilled:  –  the person has no employees earning more than DM 630 per month;  –  the person usually and mainly works for one principal (‘Auftraggeber’);  –  the person provides services typical of an employee (‘typische Arbeitsleistungen’), is subject to direction  by the principal and is incorporated into the principal’s organisation;  –  the person does not independently engage in business in the market;  –  the person leaves the employment of a principal and then undertakes apparently the same work for that principal. Groups affected by the measures include manual workers (‘Handwerker’),  freelance assistants (‘freie  Mitarbeiter’), home workers (‘Heimarbetier’)  and commercial agents (‘Handelsvertreter’) .

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3 4 5 6

7

8 9 10

A new enquiry procedure (‘Anfrageverfahren’)  has been introduced, by which applications for clearance can  be made to the ‘Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte’  (BfA; Federal Institute of Insurance for Employees) in Berlin: § 7a SGB (Book IV). There is great concern that the measures will disencourage free enterprise and cause difficulty in finding staff. See Marschner in ZAP 1/99, Fach 17, p 465; Söllner, Part 2, Section 1 (§§ 7–8); Creifelds under ‘Sozialversicherung’; Note 13 in this Chapter. See Note 61 in this Chapter. See Brox (AR), Chapter 3 I, Chapter 7 A I–III and Chapter 7 B I–IV; Hanau/Adomeit, Parts E and J; Söllner, Part 4 (§§ 28,34–36); Creifelds under ‘Kündigung’  and ‘Kündigungsschutzfür Arbeitnehmer’ . See Schuldt in ZAP 23/97, Fach 17, p 369. Usually, contracts are discharged by performance (‘Erfüllung’). However, the BGB allows for the unilateral cancellation (‘Kündigung’)   or certain types of contract which create an ongoing obligation (‘Dauerschuldverhältnis’),  ie, in the case of:  –  a lease/tenancy (‘Mietvertrag’; see §§ 542–544,553–554b, 564–565, 569, 584 and 594a BGB);  –  a loan (‘Darlehen’; see §§ 609,609a BGB);  –  a contract of employment (‘Arbeitsvertrag’; see below); and  –  a company (‘Gesllschaft’; see §§ 723–725 BGB). Moreover, the BGB contains provisions for termination of:  –  a contract of service (‘Dienstvertrag’) which is not a contract of employment: §§ 621, 627 BGB; and of   –  a contract for services (‘Werkvertrag’)  (only) by the customer: § 649 BGB. A See Chapter X B 2 (b) (‘Nullity and challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung”  and ‘Form and nullity of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’) . The usual rule is that the effect of the challenge (‘Anfechtung’) of a ‘Rechtsgeschaft’ is that it is void from the start (‘ab initio’; § 142(i) BGB). However, for an employee, who has already commenced work, this would be unfair—his contractual rights (eg, to pay) would be wiped out and he would be left to make a claim for unjust enrichment. To overcome this situation, the concept of the ‘faktisches Arbeitsverhältnis’  (factual (‘de facto’) employment relationship) was developed by the judiciary—an ‘Anfechtung’  usually only results in a contract of  employment being void (‘nichtig’) for the future. Parties’ rights, which existed up to that point, are not destroyed. This is in keeping with the status of an ‘Arbeitsvertrag’ as a ‘Dauerschuldverhältnis’  (ongoing obligation). See Brox (AR), Chapter 3 II; Hanau/Adomeit, Part F III 2 and 5; Creifelds under ‘Dauerschuldverhältnis’ ; Chapter X, Note 146. B Similarly, it would be intolerable, if a personal company (‘Personengesellschaft’)—eg, a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’, an OHG or a KG—which has started operating or commenced business, could be challenged or nullified retrospectively (‘rückwirkend’) according to civil law rules due to a legal defect. To prevent such a result, the judiciary has developed the concept of the factual or faulty company (‘fehlerhafte Gesellschaft’)—the company usually remains fully effective until such time as the relevant defect (‘Mangel’) is pleaded, ie, the company can only be dissolved for the future. Not to be confused with this concept is the doctrine of the ostensible company (‘Scheingesellschaft’). According to this doctrine (of customary law), a person, who is responsible for creating or maintaining the legal aura (‘Rechtsschein’) of a company where none exists, is liable for the consequences of such action. See Creifelds under ‘Faktische Gesellschaft’; Eisenhardt, Chapter 4, § 17; Kraft/Kreutz, Part E V; Hueck, Section 2, § 13 III; Chapter XIII, Note 57. The right to declare an ‘außerordentliche Kündigung’  is based on § 242 BGB and cannot be excluded by contract. Similarly, the limitation of a contract of employment to a particular period (‘Befristung’) is only valid, if it is in writing. See Brox (AR), Chapter 7 II 2 and Söllner, Part4, § 35 III 2. There has to be a prior warning before a dismissal based on the employee’s conduct (‘verhaltensbedingte Kündigung’) unless the conduct in question is especially grave (‘besonders schwerwiegend’) . An ‘Abmahnung’ is also a preliminary step to an action for unfair competition. See Wurm/Wagner/ Zartmann, Section C, Part 6, Chapter 142; the Lawyers’ Handbook  (Beck), Part B XI, III.

324

Notes 11

12 13

14

15

16 17

Instead of (merely) terminating an ‘Arbeitsverhàltnis’, an employer can issue a so-called ‘Änderungskündigung’: the ‘Kündigung’  is linked to (an offer by the employer of) an alteration in the terms of employment (‘Arbeitsbedingungen’) . An ‘Änderungskündigung’  is a proper ‘Kündigung’  for all purposes. An ‘Ànderungskündigung’  is to be distinguished from a ‘Versetzung’ (transfer), ie, the allocation (‘Zuweisung’) to an employee by an employer of other work, in the context of the (permissible) exercise of an employer s right of direction (‘Direktionsrecht’). See Langer, ZAP 11/91, Fach 17, p 139; Heil, ZAP 13/98, Fach 17, p 417; Rölz and Weber in ‘Welt am Sonntag’, 15.12.1996, p 60. See § 622 (iv)–(vi) BGB. § 23(i) KSchG. The ‘Arbeitsrechtliches Beschäftigungsforderungsgesetz’  (ArbBeschFG; Promotion of Employment Law) increased the threshhold figure (‘Schwellenwert’) from five to 10 employees with effect from 1.10.1996. However, following the change of government in October 1998, this has again been reduced to five with effect from 1.1.1999 by the ‘Korrekturgesetz’  (see Note 2 in this Chapter). The ArbBeschFG also made controversial changes to the law regarding the rights of employees to continued pay in case of illness (‘Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall’),  as contained in the ‘Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz’ (EFZG) 1994 (viz a reduction from 100§ of salary to 80%). Again, these were reversed by the ‘Korrekturgesetz’ . By § 3(i) EFZG, an employee has a claim to continued pay for up to six weeks, if he or she becomes incapable of working (‘arbeitsunfähig’)  due to illness without fault on his or her part. The claim arises once the employee has been employed for four weeks: § 3(iii) EFZG. The incapacity for work must be notified to the employer without delay ( ‘unverzüglich’; § 5(i), 1st sentence EFZG) and, after 3 days’ illness, a medical certificate (‘ärztliches Attest’) must be presented to the employer on the next working day at the latest (§ 5(i), 2nd sentence EFZG). However, the certificate constitutes only ‘prima facie’ evidence (‘Anscheinbeweis’) and its evidential value (‘Beweiswert’) can be shaken, if serious doubts (‘ernsthafte Zweifel’)  regarding the alleged incapacity exist. See Creifelds under ‘Entgeltfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall’ ; Langer, ZAP 2/1997, Fach 17, p 317; Haupt/Welslau, ZAP 6/97, Fach 17, p 339 and ZAP 16/98, Fach 17, p 437; Sartorius/Kremp, ZAP 7/00, Fach 17R, p 268. Under the ArbBeschFG—provisionally until 31.12.2000—(unprotected) contracts for a limited, temporary period (‘befristete Arbeitsverhäàltnisse’)  were permitted, it they did not exceed two years and were not renewed more than three times. Workers over 60 years of age were excepted from the two year res triction. With effect from 1.1.2001, such contracts and part-time work (‘Teilzeitarbeit’)   are now governed by the ‘Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverhältnisse’  (TzBfG). See Creifelds under ‘Zeitarbeitsverhältnis’; Rambach and Sartorius, ZAP 7/01, Fach 17, p 599. Internal business reasons (‘innerbetriebliche Gründe’) —eg, the commercial decision of an employer (‘Unternehmerentscheidung’),  a lack of orders (‘Auftragsmangel’)  or a decline in turnover (‘Umsatzrückgang’) — are, in principle, not normally reviewable by a court (‘nicht gerichtlich überprüfbar’),  unless they are arbitrary (‘willkürlich’). However, the court can examine the underlying facts (‘Tatsachen’) and the employer’s submissions must be sufficiently substantiated (‘ausreichend substantiiert’). In other words, an employer must be prepared to  justify his decision and be careful not to take a ‘broad-brush’ approach (no ‘pauschales Vorbringen’! ). Thus, an employer, who asserts that the need for staff (‘Beschäftigungsbedürfnis’) has reduced because of  external circumstances (‘außerbetriebliche Umstände’), bears the burden of proof, ie, he must explain die effect of such circumstances on the level of employment in the particular ‘Betrieb’ and specifically show why the relevant job is no longer required (‘Wegfall des Arbeitsplatzes’)  or a closure (‘Stillegung’) is necessary: § l(ii), 4th sentence KSchG. See Langer, ZAP 11/1989, Fach 17, p 29, Part II; Sartorius/Kremp, ZAP 7/00, Fach 17R, p 271–272. See § 1 (iii) KSchG. A common form of ‘personenbedingte Kündigung’ is termination due to illness (‘krankheitsbedingte Kündigung’). See Sartorius/Rambach, ZAP 9/01, Fach 17, p 621. See § 3 KSchG. By § 5(i) KSchG, an application can, exceptionally, be made for a ‘Klage’   to be admitted out of time (‘nachträgliche Zulassung’),  if the employee was prevented from issuing proceedings within the three week period, despite exercising the full measure of care, which could be expected of him in the circumstances. See Becker-Schaffner, ZAP 20/99, Fach 17, p 481.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

See § 7 KSchG. The alleged invalidity of an ‘außerdentliche Kündigung’  must be claimed in the same way:§ 13(i) KSchG. See §§ 9 and 10 KSchG. Regarding the ‘Arbeitsgericht’, its jurisdiction and procedure see Brox (AR), Chapter 12; Hanau/ Adomeit, Part K and Söllner, Part 5 (§§ 39–40). The InsO replaces the former ‘Konkursordnung’  (Bankruptcy Order) and ‘Vergleichsordnung’ (Composition Order) and establishes a uniform insolvency procedure for personal and business debtors. See Creifelds under ‘Konkurs’. See Haupt, ZAP 24 / 99, Fach 17, p 499. See Brox (AR), Chapter 11AI–II; Hanau / Adomeit, Part D I; Söllner, Part 2, Section 4 (§§ 19–20). By § 5(ii) BetrVG, certain persons are deemed not to be employees within the meaning of the BetrVG, ie, the statutory representatives of juristic persons; members of a personal company (‘Personengesellscnaft’); persons, whose activities primarily serve charitable or religious purposes; persons, who are occupied largely for their own good (eg, patiente, prisoners); dose family members, who live in the same household. See Söllner, Part 2, Section 4 (§23). See also §130 BetrVG. See Söllner, Part1, § 3 IV. For the ‘Mitbestimmungsrecht’  (right of co-decision) of the ‘Betriebsrat’ see Chapter XVIII E. See also Hanau/ Adomeit, Part D III and IV and Söllner, Part 2, Section 4 (§§ 19–24). See § 8 BetrVG. See § 9 BetrVG. See § 5(iii) BetrVG. ‘Betriebe, die unmittelbar und überwiegend 1 politischen…konfessionellen, karitativen, erzieherischen, wissenschaftlichen oder künstlerischen Bestimmungen oder 2 Zwecken der Berichterstattung oder  Meinungsäußerung…dienen’. See § 118(i) BetrVG. See Brox (AR), Chapter 11AIV; Hanau / Adomeit, Part D II; Söllner, Part 2, Section 4 (§ 211). See § 74(i), 2nd sentence BetrVG. See § 74(ii), 1st sentence BetrVG. See §74(ii), 2nd sentence BetrVG. See § 74(ii), 3rd sentence BetrVG. See Creifelds under ‘Betriebsvereinbarung’ ; Hanau/Adomeit, Part D II 3; Söllner, Part 2, Section 4 (§ 22); § 77 BetrVG. A ‘Betriebsvereinbarung’  is only applicable on the level of the ‘Betrieb’. It is of direct and compulsory effect (‘gilt unmittelbar und zwingend’). Like a ‘Tarifvertrag’, a ‘Betriebsvereinbarung’  is a so-called ‘ Gesamtvereinbarung’  (general agreement). It can contain a normative and contractual part (see Note 52 in this Chapter). However, in the event of a conflict with a ‘Betriebsvereinbarung’,  a tariff agreement usually takes precedence (‘Vorrang des Tarifvertrags’) . See Hanau/ Adomeit, Part D II 4 and § 76(vi) BetrVG. The ‘Einigungsstelle’ is competent to deal with regulatory questions (‘Regelungsfragen’) between employer and ‘Betriebsrat’, whereas the ‘Arbeitsgericht’ (employment court) handles legal questions (‘Rechtsfragen’). See § 76(ii) BetrVG. See § 76(v), 1st sentence and § 87 BetrVG. See Brox (AR), Chapter 11A III; Hanau / Adomeit Part D III; Creifelds under ‘Mitbestimmung’. See Söllner, Part 2, Section 4 (§ 21 III-VI); § 87(i) BetrVG. See § 99(i) and (ii) BetrVG. See § 102(i) BetrVG. See § 102(ii) BetrVG. See § 102(iii) BetrVG. See § 102(v) BetrVG. The employee must expressly claim this right before expiry of the notice period (‘Kündigungsfrist’), if he seeks to rely on it See §§ 81–66 BetrVG. See Hanau/ Adomeit, Part DIV; Söllner, Part 2, Section 4 (§ 24) and Chapter XVIII C.

326

Notes 49 50 51 52

53

54 55 56

See § 129(i) BetrVG 1952. See Brox (AR), Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 I–II; Hanau/Adomeit, Part C I; Söllner, Part 2, Section 2 (§§9–10). The main means by which an ‘Arbeitskampf’ (industrial action) can be conducted are ‘StreiK’ (strike) and ‘Aussperrung’  (lock-out). See Brox (AR), Chapter 10; Hanau/Adomeit, Part CIII; Söllner, Part 2, Section 2 (§§11–13). The normative part of a tariff agreement contains legal norms (‘Rechtsnormen’) concerning the content, conclusion and termination of contracts of employment and such business-related matters, as are not usually the subject of a ‘Betriebsvereinbarung’:  § l(i) TVG, § 77(iii) BetrVG. The norms apply directly and compulsorily (‘unmittelbar und zwingend’)  to those persons, who are bound  by the tariff agreement (‘tarifgebunden’ ie, the various members of the coalitions): § 4(i) TVG. Their effect on individual employment contracts is essentially that of a statute. The contractual part of a tariff agreement creates rights and duties only for the signatories to the agreement. On application by one of the parties to a tariff agreement, the Federal Minister of Employment can declare a tariff agreement to be generally binding (‘allgemeinverbindlich’), if not less than 50% of all employees in the area covered by the agreement are employed by the employers’ side and such a declaration appears necessary in the public interest: § 5(i) TVG. In this way, employers and employees, who were previously not ‘tarifgebunden’ are incorporated into the tariff agreement: § 5 (iv) TVG. Disputes regarding tariff agreements are dealt with by the employment courts: § 2(i) Nr 1 ArbGG. See Brox (AR), Chapter 9 III–IV; Hanau/ Adomeit, Part C E; Söllner, Part 2, Section 3; Creifelds under ‘Koalitionsfreiheit’, ‘Tarifvertrag’  and ‘Allgemeinverbindlichkeit’. See Brox (AR), Chapter 10 III 1 (b); Hanau / Adomeit, Part C III; Söllner, Part 2, Section 2, § 12II3. Industrial action can also found a claim for damages in tort (under § 823(i) BGB) for infringement of the right to an established and exercised business (‘Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Gewerbebetrieb’) . See Söllner, Part 2, Section 2, § 12 II 5; Chapter XVI, Note 36. See Söllner, Part 3, §25. For other examples of compulsory norms in employment law, see Brox (AR), Chapter 111. A   ‘Zwangsmittel’ are set out in the ‘Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetz’  (Administrative Enforcement Law (VwVG)) of the ‘Bund’ (BVwVG) or of the relevant ‘Land’ and are distinguished according to whether 1 money is claimed; or 2 something is required to be done, tolerated or omitted (ie, the administrative act (VA) is directed to a ‘Handlung, Duldung oder Unterlassung’ ). Where a VA in category 2 is to be enforced, ‘Zwangsmittel’ usually comprise:  – ‘Ersatzvornahme’ (substituted execution (of the measure) by the authority); or  – ‘Zwangsgeld’  ((compulsory) fine). A ‘Zwangsgeld’ is an example of a so-called ‘Beugemittel’ (coercive measure). When used by a court procedurally, a ‘Beugemittel’ is referred to as an ‘Ordnungsmittel’. See Chapter XIII, Note 190; Creifelds under ‘Beugemittel’ and ‘Ordnungsmittel’. Another ‘Zwangsmittel’,  restricted largely to the police, is the exercise of so-called ‘unmittelbarer Zwang’ (direct force). B Administrative acts are normally only enforceable (‘vollstreckbar’) if:  –  they are ‘befehlend’  (require or forbid particular action); and  –  they have become ‘unanfechtbar’ (unchallengable (before an administrative court)); or  –  immediate enforcement (‘sofortige Vollziehung’)  has been ordered; or  –  in other cases where a legal remedy would not have any suspensive effect (‘aufschiebende Wirkung’) . However, even if there is no preceding administrative act, in a case of urgency (‘Eilfall’) administrative force (‘Verwaltungszwang’)  can be exercised, if immediate enforcement (‘sofortige Volliehung’/‘sofortiger Vollzug’) is necessary (‘notwendig’):  –  to prevent an act, which is illegal and falls within the ‘Tatbestand’ (content) of a crime or minor offence (‘zur Verhinderung einer mit Strafe oder Bußgeld bedrohten Handlung’);  or  –  to avert a danger, which is (directly) threatening (‘zur Abwendung einer (unmittelbar) drchenden Gefahr’); and the authority acts within its statutory powers (‘innerhalb ihrer gesetzlichen Befugnisse’): § 6(ii) BVwVG. See Creifelds under ‘Verwaltungsoollstreckungsgesetz’ and ‘Verwaltungszwang’;  Chapter XIII, Note 164; Chapter XIV C 3 (Note 23) and XIV C 5. See also: Bull, Section V, § 17; Erichsen, Part 3, Section 1, § 20; Giemulla/  Jaworsky/Müller-Uri, Book I, Chapter 8; Maurer, Part 5, § 20; Roxin, Book I, Chapter 6, § 31 A III.

327

The German Legal System and Legal Language 57

58 59 60

61

62 63

64

65

Both the threat of a ‘Zwangsmittel’ and the basic order (‘Grundverfügung’) it is meant to carry out are ‘Verwaltungsakte’  (administrative acts) and can be challenged before an administrative court The threatened ‘Zwangsmittel’ must be specifically stated. A mere warning (‘Ermahnung’) is not sufficient. If immediate enforcement is ordered or legal remedies have no suspensive effect, the threat of a ‘Zwangsmittel’ can be linked to the basic VA: § 13(ii) BVwVG. However, the ‘Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz’  (principle of proportionality) applies and more than one ‘Zwangsmittel’ cannot be threatened at the same time: § 9(ii) and § 13(iii) BVwVG. See Creifelds under ‘Zwangsmittel’; Mampel in ZAP 23/97, Fach 19, p 377. See § 147(i) No 1 GewO. See § 147(iv) GewO. A ‘Dienstvertrag’ (contract of service) is to be distinguished from a ‘Werkvertrag’  (contract for services) and, indeed, from an ‘Arbeitsvertrag’  (contract of employment), to which the provisions in the BGB regarding the ‘Dienstvertrag’ (§§ 611 ff) have only subsidiary application (‘hilfsweise Anwendung’). See Creifelds under ‘Arbeitsvertrag’, ‘Dienstvertrag’, ‘Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag’  and ‘Werkvertrag’; Chapter X C 3 (g) Title 6; Chapter X, Note 165. An employer has a similar ‘Fürsorgepflicht’  towards his ‘Handlungsgehilfen’  (trading assistants) / ‘kaufmännische  Angestellte’ (commercial employees) and ‘Handlungslehrlinge’  (trainees): § 62 HGB. Corresponding with an employer’s ‘Fürsorgepflicht’  is the employee’s duty of loyalty/fidelity (‘Treuepflicht’). See Creifelds under ‘Fürsorgepflicht’  and ‘Treuepflicht’; Hanau/Adomeit, Part E 10 (f); Söllner, Part 4 § 29 II and § 31 II. See § 618(iii) BGB, which fixes die extent of the employer’s liability by reference to §§ 842–846 BGB. Three degrees of fault (‘Verschulden’; § 276 BGB) are distinguished:  –  slight negligence (‘leichte Fahrlässigkeit’); the employee is released from liability;  –  a medium degree of negligence (‘mittlere Fahrlässigkeit’) ; the loss is shared between employer and employee;  –  intent (‘Vorsatz’) or gross negligence (‘grobe Fahrlässigkeit’); the employee bears the loss in full. ‘Schadensgeneigte Arbeit’  is a principle, which only operates internally between employer and employee, ie, it is a form of internal loss settlement (‘innerbetrieblicher Schadensausgleich’). Thus, third parties not having a direct claim against an employer (eg, because of § 831 BGB) must first obtain an assignment of the indemnity from the employee, before they can claim against the employer. Moreover, ‘schadensgeneigte Arbeit’  is a principle of employment law. Thus, insurers providing (compulsory) public liability cover (Haftpflichtversicherung) for motor vehicles cannot avoid liability to third parties by reference to the principle. See Creifelds under ‘Innerbetrieblicher Schadensausgleich’ ; Fikentscher, § 79 II. Persons, whose liability is limited under §§ 636,637 RVO, must reimburse the ‘Berufsgenossenschaft’ for all sums expended by it, if they acted deliberately or were grossly negligent: § 640 RVO.

CHAPTER XIX 1

2

3 4

See generally: Baumann (ER), Part III, § 11; Meyer, Part I, § 1A and B. The ‘Bund’ has concurrent legislative competence in the field of ‘Wirtschaftsrecht’ : Article 74 Nos 11 and 16 GG. However, in the fields of business protection (‘gewerblicher Rechtschutz’),  copyright (‘Urheberrecht’) and publishing law (‘Verlagsrecht’), the legislative competence of the ‘Bund’ is exclusive: Article 73 No 9 GG. For definitions of the controversial term ‘Wirtschaftsrecht’  see Creifelds under ‘Wirtschaftsrecht’ ; Model/ Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 8 A (801). As an area of law, ‘Wirtschaftsrecht’  has its origins in the 20th century: see Schmidt-Aßmann, Section 4, Chapter 11. To be distinguished are the related terms:  – ‘Wirtschaftswissenschaften’ (economics); and  – ‘Wirtschaftsprüfer’ (chartered accountant). See Creifelds under ‘Wirtschaftsprüfer’. See Chapter XI. See Chapter XI.

328

Notes 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13

14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

The primary law in this field is the ‘Gewerbeordnung’  (Business Order (GewO)) 1869, variously amended and reissued (last in 1987). See Baumann (ER), Part III, § 11 II; Chapter XVIII H. See Chapter XVIII. The law governing credit institutions is the ‘Gesetz über das Kreditwesen’  (KWG) 1976. See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 8 B (§§ 851ff). See Hubmann/ Getting, Sections 2–4; Meyer, Part 5, § 12; Rittner, Part 1, § 1 C II; Note 1 in this Chapter The main German statutes in this field are:  –  the ‘Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb’  (Law against unfair competition (UWG)) 1909; and  –  the ‘Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen’  (Law against restraints on competition (GWB)) 1957, reissued in 1980. The UWG forms part of the law of competition in the narrow, private law, sense (‘Unlauterkeitsrecht’). See Rittner, Introduction I and Part 1, § 1 A. See also: Baumann (ER), Part III, § 11 III; Hubmann/ Getting, Section 5; Meyer, Part 6, § 13; Chapter VIII, Note 20 G. See Baumann (ER), Part III, § 11 II 2; Creifelds under ‘Verbände’. See, eg, Creifelds under ‘Gemeinschaftsrecht,  europäisches’; Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 8 A (813). Regarding the meaning of the term ‘Gewerbe’  for the purpose of the Commercial Code (HGB), see Gierke/ Sandrock, Section I, Chapter 1, § 6. See also: Capelle/ Canaris, Part I, Section 1, § 21; Hofmann, Part B, Section 11. The following examples of ‘Urproduktion’  are given in Creifelds:  – ‘Bergbau’ (mining);  – ‘Landurirtschaft’ (agriculture);  – ‘Forstwirtschaft’ (forestry);  – ‘Garten—und Weinbau’ (horticulture and wine-growing);  – ‘Tierzucht’ (animal breeding);  – ‘Fischerei’ (fishing); and  – ‘Jagd’ (hunting). The profession of lawyer is not a ‘Gewerbe’:  § 2(ii) BRAO. Cf the wider term ‘Unternehmen’— see Chapter XVIII C. See Creifelds under ‘Gewerbe’  and ‘Gewerbebetrieb’. The law relating to persons engaged in handicraft (‘Handwerker’) is governed by the GewO, in so far as the ‘Handwerksordnung’  (Handicraft Order (HandwO)) 1965 does not contain special provisions. Regarding the difference between ‘HandwerK’  and ‘Industrie’, see Creifelds under the respective terms. See also Creifelds under ‘Handwerkskammer’ and ‘Industrie—und Handelskammer’. See Note 5 in this Chapter. See §§ 24–34c GewO. See Creifelds under ‘Gewerbefreiheit’, ‘Stehendes Gewerbe’, ‘Gewerbeaufsicht’, ‘Gewerbeordnung’ and ‘Gewerbezulassung’. See Baumann (ER), Part III, § 111; Schmidt-Aßmann, Section 4, Chapter II 2. See Schmidt-Aßmann, Section 4. See Creifelds under ‘Baurecht’, ‘Kartell’, ‘Umweltschutz’, ‘Steuern’  and ‘Subventionen’; Meyer, Part 6, § 14. Regarding tax law generally, see Tipke/Lang. See Creifelds under ‘Wirtschaftslenkung’. Particular measures in this field are the ‘Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz’ (Commercial Crime Law (WiStG)) 1954 and the ‘Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität’  (Law to combat business crime (WiKG); No 1:1976; No 2:1986). See Creifelds under ‘Wirtschaftskriminalität’ and ‘Wirtschaftsstrafrecht’. This is a potentially dangerous development. See the article entitled ‘Manager im Visier der Staatsanwälte’, i n the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ( FAZ) of  24.3.2000 (p 22). See generally: Brox (HR), Part B (§§ 27–48); Gursky; Medicus (BT), Part 6, § 1171. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 1, § 27 II.

329

The German Legal System and Legal Language 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36

37 38 39 40

41

See Meyer, Part 3, § 8 BI. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 1, § 2712; Gursky, Part I, Section 1 II B. As under § 1006 BGB, there is a rebuttable presumption that the person in possession of a ‘Wertpapier’  is the rightful owner. See § 407 BGB. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 1, § 28; Gursky, Part I, Section 1 III B. Bearer bonds for a sum of money issued in Germany can only be brought into circulation with state approval: § 795 BGB. The objections available to the issuer of a bearer bond against a holder are limited: § 796 BGB. Moreover, a cumbersome claims notification procedure (‘Aufgebotsverfahren’)  is necessary before a bearer bond can be declared void: § 799 BGB. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 4, § 45; Fikentscher, Section 13, § 96. See § 363 HGB. See § 10(i) AktG. See also the ‘Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung’ (‘Namensaktiengesetz’)  of  18.1.2001. A cheque (‘Scheck’) and a bill of exchange (‘Wechsel’), which is drawn on a person other than the issuer (‘Aussteller’) – a so-called ‘Tratte’ – are special forms of ‘Anweisung’. An ‘Anweisung’  becomes effective on its delivery (‘Aushändigung’ /‘Begebung’) to the third party payee/ recipient (‘Anweisungsempfänger’) . Unlike a transfer from a bank account (‘Überweisung’) – which is a mandate (‘Auftrag’) in the context of a giro agreement (‘Girovertrag’)  – an ‘Anweisung’  is abstract and itself creates no contractual relationship between the parties, but merely gives rise to a double authorisation (‘Doppelermächtigung’), ie, the third party is empowered to demand performance from the drawee (‘Angewiesener’)  and the drawee to effect performance to the third party: § 783 BGB. The underlying relationship between the issuer and the third party is referred to as the ‘Valutaverhältnis’ and that between the issuer and the drawee as the ‘Deckungsverhältnis’ . See Creifelds under ‘Anweisung’, ‘Scheck’, ‘Tratte’  and ‘Wechsel’ . Regarding ‘qualifizierte Legitimationspapiere’ or so-called ‘lame bearer securities’ (‘hinkende Inhaberpapiere’),  see Brox (HR), Part B, Section 4, § 46. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 1, § 28 III. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 1, § 27 II 2. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 1, § 27 III; Creifelds under ‘Depotgeschäft’ and ‘Effekten’; Gursky, Part I, Section 1 III E. See also: Chapter X, Note 211. Delivery of ‘Traditionspapiere’ only takes the place of delivery (‘Übergabe’) of the goods. Transfer of ownership also requires a real agreement ( ‘dingliche Einigung’) between the parties. Moreover, a transfer of ownership is not possible, if the transferor no longer has possession of the goods (‘Besitz am Gut’) or if the goods have meantime gone astray (‘abhanden gekommen’) . See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 4, § 47 II 2. It can be difficult to distinguish between an ‘Inhaberzeichen’ (§ 807 BGB) and a (qualified) legitimatory document (§ 808 BGB). The difference is that, in the case of a (qualified) legitimatory document, the holder is not entitled to demand performance: § 808(i), 2nd sentence BGB. 5, however, on presentation, the issuer decides to perform vis à vis the holder, the issuer is released from liability (except for gross negligence): § 808(i), 1st sentence BGB. See Brox (HR), Part B, Section 4, § 45 VI and § 46 III.

CHAPTER XX 1 2

See generally: Creifelds under ‘Internationales Privatrecht’; Fikentscher, Section 17, § 115; Schlosshauer-Selbach, Part 2, Section 31. See Collier, Part I, Chapter 6. The question of jurisdiction is not a procedural matter in this sense, but an independent, preliminary issue.

330

Notes

3 4 5 6

7

8 9

10 11

Thus, it can be governed not only by the law of the forum, but can also be regulated by an international convention (eg, the Brussels Convention (EuGVÜ)). See this Chapter, Section C 2, below; Chapter XIII, Note 28. Similarly, questions of the form of a legal transaction must be carefully separated from content (‘Inhalt’) and procedural aspects. See Note 19 in this Chapter. The process by which different (sub-)issues arising in the same case are split according to the laws of different states (‘Rechtsspaltung’) is called ‘dépeçage’ (or the ‘mosaic method’). The prevailing view is that this must be undertaken according to the ‘lex fori’. See Schlosshauer-Selbach, Part 2, Section I; Collier, Part I, Chapter 3. Legal residence (‘Wohnsitz’)  is no longer a connecting factor in German private international law. Called, respectively, ‘Sachnormverweisung’  or ‘Gesamtverweisung’ . In such a case, there can, therefore, be no ‘renvoi’ to German law. On the other hand, if German law is the substantive law to be applied, but particular assets are subject to special provisions in their state of location (eg, real property), these are governed by foreign substantive law: Article 3(iii) EGBGB. In this situation, the specific foreign governing law (‘Einzelstatut’) prevails over the general German one (‘Gesamtstatut’). Moreover: (a) an indirect (so-called ‘hidden’) ‘renvoi’  to German law can arise via the jurisdictional provisions of the foreign law, if that law contains no express provision specifying the applicable law; (b) by Article 6 EGBGB, foreign substantive law is not to be applied, if its application leads to a result clearly incompatible with significant principles of German law (‘mit wesentlichen Grundsätzen des deutschen Rechts offensichtlich unvereinbar’),  ie, if its application infringes German public policy (‘ordre public’) ; (c) a similar function to ‘ordre public’ is played by the (unwritten) concept of the illegitimate avoidance (‘Umgehung’)  or a particular substantive law, the intention being to cut out (‘ausschalten’) certain norms considered as undesirable ( ‘fraus legis’; cf ‘forum shopping’). However, it is invariably extremely difficult to pinpoint and prove the existence of a fraudulent motive (‘Arglist’); (d) if the application of various substantive laws leads to contradictions between the collision norms of  different states (‘Normwidersprüche’), resulting problems can be resolved by adaptation (‘Anpassung’). The German view is, therefore, that ‘law’ means the foreign rules of private international law and ‘renvoi’. The question is: how would the matter be treated under the law of the other state? However, if there is a ‘renvoi’  to German law, the German substantive provisions (‘Sachvorschriften’) must be applied by the German court: Article 4(i), 2nd sentence EGBGB. Thus, there is no ‘double renvoi’  as in England. See Collier, Part I, Chapter 3 (Re Annesley [1926] Ch 692). Domicile and nationality are used as different connecting factors for historical reasons, the root lying in a different understanding of the concept of ‘home’ (‘Heimat’) in common law and civil law countries. Usual residence is a more transitory/weaker bond than domicile. It involves a search for the ‘Daseinsmittelpunkt’ or ‘faktischer Lebensmittelpunkt’ (actual focal point of a person’s affairs), as evidenced by objective elements, such as the degree of social integration. Usual residence is an attempt to approximate (but not equate!) the continental concept of ‘Wohnsitz’ with domicile as understood in common law countries. Article 14 EGBGB is the centre-piece of the German conflict of laws provisions. It lays down a ‘ladder’ (‘Later’) of connecting factors for choice of law (not jurisdiction!), one of which is habitual residence. Domicile is not among them. A Article 15 EGBGB is the gateway to the relevant applicable law for marital property purposes (‘Güterstatut’),  which is determined (‘bestimmt’)  by the law applicable to the general effects of marriage (‘Ehewirkungsstatut’ or ‘Familienstatut’) at the time of conclusion of the marriage. Thus, if, when a marriage is entered into, the law governing the general effects of the marriage is foreign, the German marital property provisions (§ 1363ff BGB) are displaced/ ousted (‘verdrängt’) in favour of the relevant foreign law by Article 15. Unlike the law applicable to marital property, which is fixed once and for all at the moment the marriage is entered into (‘bei der Eheschließung’),  the law governing the general effects of marriage is mutable (‘wandelbar’),  ie, it can change during the marriage, if both spouses later jointly change their nati onality or usual residence or if the country, to which the spouses have their closest connection, changes. German law classifies claims to information (‘Auskunft’) under Article 15 EGBGB as substantive. However, the exact classification of claims to return of household items (‘Haushaltsgegenstände’) is disputed; the better view is that it is a question of marital property governed by Article 15, rather than the law of the forum (§ 1361a BGB).

331

The German Legal System and Legal Language B

12

13 14

15

16 17 18 19

20 21

Another provision in the EGBGB, which refers to the general effects of marriage, is Article 17. Article 17 specifies the applicable law concerning the preconditions (‘Voraussetzungen’)  and implementation (‘Durchführung’)  of a divorce as such – ie, the procedural ‘mechanics’ – and certain ancillary matters (‘Scheidungsfolgen’) as are not dealt with in other provisions (eg, Article 15). By Article 17 EGBGB, the law governing a divorce is that which applies to the general effects of the relevant marriage at the time the divorce petition becomes legally pending. If divorce is not possible according to that law, but one of the spouses was German at the time of the marriage or is German at the time of the divorce, German law applies. This was unified in the states of the EEC by the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (the Rome Convention) 1980. See the article by Mohrbutter in ZAP 18/90, Fach 2, p 59. In England, the Convention was implemented by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. See Collier, Part III, Chapter 12. To be contrasted with international conventions relating to private international law, such as the Rome Convention and the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations of 2.10.1973, are those which seek to establish uniform substantive rules of law (‘Einheitsrecht’) in particular fields, the intention  being to try to avoid the need for reference to rules of private international law. One such convention is the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 11.4.1980 (CISG; the Vienna Convention). Regarding the Vienna Convention, see Dannemann, Part in 4; Zweigert and Kötz, Part II, Chapter 43 V. See also: Charlesworth, Part 4, Chapter 18. With the ‘globalisation’ of commerce, international conventions will increasingly be concluded. They can have positive, practical benefits. However, it should not be forgotten that remote encroachments on domestic law usually only last so long as the political mood is favourable. Moreover, instead of simplifying international legal affairs for the majority of the population, the multitude of legal sources can have the opposite effect. See Preface to Second Edition; Chapter XXI. Article 27 EGBGB enacts Article 3 of the Rome Convention. For examples of factors which English courts sometimes consider as giving rise to an implied choice of law, see Collier, Part III, Chapter 12 (e) (ii). The counterpart of Article 27(iii) EGBGB is Article 3(iii) of the Rome Convention. Regarding the distinction between compulsory norms (= mandatory provisions) and dispositive norms, see Chapter IX B. See also Article 6 EGBGB (exception on grounds of public policy). Article 28 EGBGB enacts Article 4 of the Rome Convention. Collier (Part III, Chapter 12 (e) (vii) (a)) criticizes the need for this statutory presumption and its complexity. He points out that, in the past, the English courts have made use or other presumptions to determine the proper law of a contract, eg: • the law of the place of contracting (‘lex loci contractus’); • the law of the place of performance (‘lex loci solutionis’);  and • (in maritime contracts) the law of the flag. Preference is given to the law of the consumer’s usual residence. Article 29 EGBGB enacts Article 5 of the Rome Convention. Article 30 EGBGB enacts Article 6 of the Rome Convention. Article 32 EGBGB enacts Article 10 of the Rome Convention. The general rule regarding form in German private international law (Article ll(i) EGBGB) is that a legal transaction (‘Rechtsgeschäft’) – Note: a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ includes, but is wider than, a contract (‘Vertrag’) – is formally valid (‘formgültig’), if it fulfills the formal requirements of the law, which applies to such a transaction (the so-called ‘Geschäftsform’  (business form)) – ie, the applicable law, as determined by the German conflicts rules – or the law of the place where the transaction is undertaken (the ‘Ortsform’ (local form)). The rest of Article 11 EGBGB comprises special rules, which enact Article 9 of the Rome Convention. What amounts to a question of form, as opposed to one of the substance (‘Inhalt’) of a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ or of  procedure (‘Verfahren’), has to be established by way of characterisation (‘Qualifikation’) on the basis of  German law as the ‘lexfori’. Article 31 EGBGB enacts Article 8 of the Rome Convention. See the article by Michael Jefferson in the 1993 Student Law Review Yearbook  (Cavendish), p 27. See Chapter XIII, Note 28; Thomas-Putzo, § 29.

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Notes

22 23

24 25

26 27 28

29

30 31

The question which law is applicable to locate the ‘Erfüllungsort’ is one for the private international law of  the forum. See Creifelds under ‘Zuständigkeitsvereinbarung’ ; Thomas-Putzo, § 38. The relevant custom must be known to the parties or be one, of which they must be deemed to be aware. A usage exists, if operators in the relevant branch of trade or commerce generally and regularly follow die same practice: see Transporti Castelletti v Hugo Trumpy,  ECJ, reported in (1999) Gazette, 96 / 26, p 29. See also Chapter XXII, Note 74. Article 38 EGBGB is a protectionist clause of questionable validity: see Schlosshauer-Selbach, Part 2, Section 3 II 1. A In respect of torts with a foreign element, the applicable law is that of the place of commission of the tort (the ‘lex loci delicti commissi’/‘Tatort’ ). A tort is regarded as committed (‘begangen’) in either:  –  the place at which the defendant acts (the ‘Handlungsort’ ); or  –  the place at which the plaintiff suffers injury or damage (the ‘Erfolgsort’). This (unwritten) rule is reflected by Article 5 No 3 EuGVÜ, whereby the court of the place at which the harmful event occurred has (special) jurisdiction where a tort is committed by a person domiciled in another member state of the European Union. The equivalent jurisdictional provision in the national (German) context is § 32 ZPO. Before 30.5.1999, the rule was subject to the following exception: …where the tort was committed abroad (ie, outside Germany) and both parties were Germans, having their usual residence (‘gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt’) in Germany, German law always applied: § 1 ‘Rechtsanwendungsverordnung’  of 7.12.1942. Since 1.6.1999 (under the ‘Gesetz zum Internationalen Privatrecht für außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse’ ), too, the law of die ‘Tutort’ (Article 40 EGBGB) is ousted by the law of the joint habitual residence of the parties unless there is a ‘significantly closer connection’ (wesentlich engere Verbindung’)  to the law of  another state. See Grüneberg, ZAP 13/00, Fach 9, p 567 (Section III). B The English position is, in effect, similar: Before the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, English law only applied to torts committed abroad (ie, outside England), if the conduct was actionable as a tort in England and the defendant was (civilly) liable to damages under the foreign law: so-called ‘double actionability’. However, if there was an English connection (‘nexus’) between the parties prior to commission of the tort, the law of the place of commission (‘lex loci’) could be ignored in favour of English law as the law of the forum (‘lex fori’): Johnson v Coventry Churchill International Ltd ([1992] 3 All ER14)). Since the 1995 Act, the requirement of ‘double actionability’ has been abolished, except for ‘defamation claims’ (s 13). The general English rule now is that the applicable law is that of the country in which the ‘events constituting the tort’ occur (s 11=the ‘lex loci’), but this can be displaced, if it is ‘substantially more appropriate’ for the law of another country to be applied, due, for example, to (significant) ‘factors relating to the parties’ (s 12). This new test clearly leaves room for interpretation, but it can safely be said that under both German and English law, the (normally applicable) ‘lex loci’ will bow to the home law (‘Heimatrecht’) of me parties, where it is the same for both of them. See Schlosshauer-Selbach, Part 2, Section 3 II 1; Collier, Part II Chapter 10 (e) (iii) and Part III, Chapter 13 (b). See ZAP-Aktuell No 16,25.8.1999, p 811; Grüneberg, ZAP 13/00, Fach 9, p 567 (Section III). See the entries under ‘Beweisaufnahme’ in Appendix A. The others are:  –  rules of practical experience (‘Erfahrungssätze’);  –  customary law (‘Gewohnheitsrecht’) ;  –  norms/bye-laws laid down by autonomous (public) bodies (‘Statuten’). See Chapter XIII, Note 98. Foreign law – which does not include such public international law or European Union law as has been transformed into national law – is treated not as a fact, but as a legal norm. The court has a duty to ascertain the applicable law and its content, proof of which can be obtained by way of an expert opinion (‘Gutachten’). However, the parties are required to provide assistance (‘Mithilfe’) to the court as far as they can. See Schellhammer (ZP) (3rd edn (1987)), Book 2, Part 6, Chapter 5. Regarding the application of foreign law by the German courts, see Geimer, Part 9.

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CHAPTER XXI 1

2 3 4

5

6 7

  ‘Rechtshilfe’ refers to cooperation between courts (ie, judicial cooperation), whereas official (administrative) assistance between authorities (‘Behörden’) is called ‘Amtshilfe’. ‘Amtshtife’ is the wider term, although both are directed to the carrying out of official acts (‘Amtshandlungen’) . Thus, for example, within Germany:  –  the authorities of the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Länder’ have a constitutional duty to provide reciprocal  – ‘Rechtshilfe’ and ‘Amtshilfe’: Article 35(i) GG;  –  the courts are obliged to cooperate with each other in civil and criminal matters: § 156 GVG;  –  a request for ‘Rechtshilfe’ from a superior (civil or criminal) court cannot be declined: § 158(i) GVG;  –  the enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment against an offender outside the area of a particular ‘Landgericht’ can be sought from the local ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’: §§ 162–163 GVG;  –  a (civil or criminal) court can carry out official activities outside its own area: § 166 GVG;  –  police officers can pursue and seize a fugitive in another ‘Land’: § 167 GVG;  –  in an emergency (‘Notfall’), police and other forces can be brought in from outside a particular ‘Land’ : Article 35(ii) and (iii) GG. ‘Amtshilfe’ between German authorities is governed by §§ 4–8 VwVfG. In particular, ‘Amtshilfe’ is only supplementary assistance (‘ergänzende Hilfe’)  and is not meant to relieve the authority receiving the request of its own functions: § 4 VwVfG. The requesting authority bears sole responsibility for the legality of the measure to be taken, whereas the recipient authority only has to carry it out: § 7(ii) VwVfG. If the permissibility of the measure is queried, this must be assessed according to the law applicable to the requesting authority: § 7(i) VwVfG. In relation to other member states of the European Union, the ‘EG-Amtshilfegesetz’ of 19.12.1985 authorises exchange of tax information. The establishment of Europol in The Hague in 1999 will facilitate cooperation  between European police forces. The ‘Eurojust’ network will encourage liaison between national prosecuting authorities. With the expansion of the EU, a corresponding increase in cross-border ‘Amtshilfe’ / sharing of  data in other fields (eg, environmental matters) is likely. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtshilfe’ and ‘Amtshilfe’; Chapter II, Note 2; Rosenberg/Schwab, Book I, Section 1, § 21. See Chapter XXII C 6. See generally: Geimer; Schack. Of particular importance within the European Union is the EuGVÜ (Brussels Convention) 1968, where the relevant provisions on recognition and enforcement of court decisions between the member states are contained in Title III (Articles 25–49). See Notes 8, 10 and 13 in this Chapter. The recognition and enforcement of court decisions is also the subject-matter of numerous bilateral treaties (‘Sonderverträgé’)  with non-member states and various (multilateral) Hague Conventions on particular areas of law (eg, that of 2.10.1973 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Maintenance Decisions – see Chapter XIII, Note 171; not to be confused with the Hague Convention of the same date on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations (see Chapter XX, Note 12) – and that of 25.10.1980 concerning the International Kidnapping of Children (‘Kindesentführung’) ). In both England and Germany, the latter Convention was implemented in tandem with the Council of  Europe Convention of 20.5.1980 regarding Recognition and Enforcement of Custody Decisions concerning Children (and the restoration of custody);—in England, by the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985; in Germany, by the ‘Ausführungsgesetz’ of 5.4.1990. The ‘central authority’ in Germany to which applications are to be made is the ‘Generalbundesanwalt’ (General Federal Attorney) at the BGH (located in Bonn). Local jurisdiction lies with the relevant ‘Familiengericht’ (family court). The scope and provisions of both Conventions are discussed by Collier, Part V, Chapter 20, p 338–343. So the UN Convention on the Making of Maintenance Claims Abroad of 20.6.1956, which is supplemented in Germany by the Foreign Maintenance Law ( ‘Auslandsunterhaltsgesetz’  (AUG)) of 19.12.1986. Within the European Union, Article 65 EC Treaty refers to the smooth functioning of the internal market (‘das reibungslose Funkionieren des Binnenmarktes’)  as the justification for measures of judicial cooperation in cross-border civil matters (‘justitielle Zusammenarbeit in Zivilsachen mit grenzüberschreitenden Bezüzgen), which also includes the promotion of compatibility between the procedural (and conflict) rules of the various member states (‘Förderung der Vereinbarkeit der Verfahrensvoschriften’) . Common to all such treaties or conventions is that they are measures of public international law. Regarding their (growing) impact on English domestic law, see Collier, Part VII, Chapter 23 (c). The presiding judge must send an outgoing request (‘Ersuchen’)   to the competent (foreign) authority

334

Notes

8 9

10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19

(‘zuständige Behörde’)  or to the competent (German) federal envoy (diplomatic representative) in accordance with the ‘Rechtshilfeordnung in Zivilsachen’  (ZRHO) of 19.10.1956 (reissued in 1976). However, with effect from 31.5.2001, service of judicial and non-judicial documents in civil or commercial matters in other member states of the EU is governed by EU Regulation 1348/2000, which requires a request for service to be made to central (transmitting) authorities (‘Zentralstellen’) on a standard form in the (or a) language of the recipient state. In so far as it applies, EU Regulation 1348/2000 overrides the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of   Judicial and Extra-judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (‘Haager Zustellungsübereinkommen’) of 15.11.1965. See ZAP-Aktuell, 19/00, p 1173. If a ‘Klage’ (writ) is to be served abroad, the period for response (‘Einlassungsfrist’) must be set by the judge, together with the (initial or main) hearing date (‘Termin’): § 274(iii) ZPO. See Chapter XIII, Note 144. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (‘Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland’)  of 18.3.1970 takes precedence. Under the Convention, a request for legal assistance (‘Rechtshilfeersuchen’)  must be sent to a central authority (‘zentrale Behörde’), which, in Germany, is usually the Ministry of Justice in the relevant ‘Land’ . It must be in German or accompanied by a German translation. The request is then dealt with by the local ‘Amtsgericht’. See Chapter XIII, Note 171. See Notes 4, 7 and 9 in this Chapter. See also: Chapter XIII, Note 171. Bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions are listed chronologically in an appendix to Schack. Of particular practical importance is the Law to Implement International Conventions on Recognition and Enforcement (‘Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsausführungsgesetz’,  AVAG) of 30.5.1988. AVAG applies, for example, whenever recognition or enforcement of a decision in a civil or commercial matter is sought under EuGVÜ or where recognition or enforcement of a maintenance decision is sought under the Hague Convention of 2.10.1973. AVAG also extends the German default notice procedure (‘Mahnverfahren’)  to claims in foreign currency: § 688(iii) ZPO, § 34(i) AVAG. See Michael Johannes Schmidt in ZAP 24/95, Fach 14, p 195; Chapter XIII, Note 22. See generally Creif elds under ‘Auslieferung’ . See Chapter VIIL Note 34. These are usually bilateral, but within Europe a multilateral European Convention on Extradition (of  13.12.1957) is in force. The ‘Gesetz über die Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen’  (Law concerning International Legal Cooperation in Criminal Matters) of 27.6.1994. In the United Kingdom, the principal statute is the Extradition Act 1989. In England, this is called the ‘double criminality rule’. See Creifelds under ‘Auslànder’  5 and ‘Asylrecht und Asylverfahren’ ; Andrick, ZAP, Fach 19, p 265.

CHAPTER XXII 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

See generally Baur, § 2. See Article 98 GG; Jauernig (ZP), Book 1, Chapter 2 (§ 8); Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 A (209); Youngs (CL), Chapter 1, Part XVII See § 1 DRiG. See § 45a DRiG. See also Chapter XVII A (Note 4). See § 44(i) DRiG. See also Chapter VIIIC (Note 36). Selection of judges must be governed by rules laid down in advance. Ad hoc selection is arbitrary (‘willkürlich’) and unconstitutional. See ZAP-Kolumne 17/95, p 881. See §§ 36 and 108 GVG. See §§ 44(ii) and 45 DRiG. See § 28(ii) DRiG.

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The German Legal System and Legal Language 9 10

11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23

See §§ 30 and 112 GVG. See also Creifelds under ‘Ehrenamtliche Richter’ . A ‘Referendar’  can be entrusted with the functions of an ‘Amtsanwalt’  or, exceptionally, with those of a ‘Staatsanwalt’ (in the latter case under supervision): § 142 (iii) GVG. Together with reforms to German university education, it is planned to replace the State funding of the ‘Referendarzeit’ by the self-regulation (‘Selbstregulierung’) of practical training (‘Praxisausbildung’). In particular, a reduction of theoretical learning at university and an attendant sacrifice of basic historical, philosophical and sociological subjects are intended to produce less academic jurists. However, whether in the long term this will improve the quality of training, rather than just save money, is questionable. See the following articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  (FAZ): ‘Grundlage ist eine solide theoretische  Ausbildung’ (Wolfgang Ernst; 2.11.1999); ‘Amputierte’ (Michael Stolleis; 12.6.2001); ‘Dr jur ing. (FH)’ Jürgen Kaube; 13.6.2001). See §§ 5(i) and 9 DRiG. Lawyers from other EU (EEC) countries do not have the ‘Befähigung zum Richteramt’, even if they pass the ‘Eignungsprüfung’. Moreover, passing the ‘Eignungsprüfung does not enable such lawyers to become a notary (‘Notar’). See Chapter XXII D 3 and E (Note 119). A ‘Rechtsanwat’ in spe,  who has passed the second state examination, is entitled to carry the title ‘Assessor’ . See § 7 DRiG. See § 3 DRiG. See §§ 10–13 DRiG. See Article 95(ii) GG; § 1 ‘Richterwahlgesetz’. See Article 94(i) GG; § 5 BVerfGG; Creifelds under ‘Richterwahl’. See also the comments above Article 93 GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 2. See § 25 DRiG and Article 97(i) GG. Withdrawal of appointment (‘Rücknahme der Ernennung’)  is also possible on certain grounds: § 19 DRiG. See § 30 DRiG. See §§ 61 and 77 DRiG. Apart from a possible appeal (‘Rechtsmitte’), as laid down in the relevant procedural code – and the ultimate remedy of a constitutional complaint (‘Verfassungsbeschwerde’)  – a person dissatisfied with the conduct of a  judge or a particular decision can pursue the following remedies (‘Rechtsbehelfe’):  – ‘Ablehnungsgesuch’ (application for rejection) (eg, under § 42ff ZPO);  – ‘Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde’ (supervisory complaint) pursuant to § 26 DRiG and § 14 of the ‘Verordnung zur einheitlichen Regelung der Gerichtsverfassung’  (GVVO) of 20.3.1935;  –  a so-called ‘Untàtigkeitsbeschwerde’ (complaint of inactivity), which some courts exceptionally allow;  –  an informal request to the court to reconsider its decision (‘Gegenvorstellung’)’,  –  failing other remedies and provided damage (‘Schaden’) due to the judgment can be shown, a claim for state liability (‘Staatshaftung’), if, when passing judgment (‘bei dem Urteil’),  a judge neglects his official duty to such an extent that the infringement constitutes a crime: § 839(ii), 1st sentence BGB (in conjunction with Article 34 GG). However, § 839(ii), 2nd sentence BGB expressly excludes from state liability a refusal or delay by a judge in the exercise of his office, even if it is contrary to duty (‘pflichtwidrig’). See Schneider, ZAP 9/94, Fach 13, p 279; ZAP 19/95, Fach 13, p 373; ZAP 18/96, Fach 13, p 447; ZAP‘Justizspiegel’, 10/98, p 474. In ZAP-‘Justizspiegel’ 10/00, p 638, Schneider revisits the topic of wrongful conduct (‘Fehlverhalten’) by  judges. He draws attention to the theory of the ‘core area’ (‘Kernbereich’)  of judges’ activities, which is occasionally relied on to counteract attempts to limit judicial independence (‘richterliche Unabhängigkeit’), thereby eroding the possibility of a warning (‘Ermahnung’) to a judge under § 26(ii) DRiG to fulfill his  judicial functions properly. According to Schneider, serious mistakes in the handling of cases by judges are the order of the day in Germany and the proposed law to reform the ZPO (‘Zivilzprozessreformgesetz’) will merely worsen the situation (see ZAP-Kolumne 10/00, p 626). Due to resistance from practising lawyers and judges, however, the implementation of a ZPO reform has largely failed: see ZAP-Aktuell, 7/01, p 363. See Jauernig (ZP), Book 1, Chapter 2 (§ 15); Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 A (210); Creifelds under ‘Rechtspfleger’ . See Chapter XIII D 8 (c)(vii). And the remuneration of a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ under § 19 BRAGO. See also Chapter XIII D1 (f) (v). Those marked with an * above.

336

Notes 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

See §§ 14–19b RPflG. See § 4(ii) RPflG. See Article 13(ii) GG; § 105(i) StPO. In the event of ‘Gefahr im Verzug’ (danger in delay), searches of premises can (exceptionally) be ordered by other authorities, but not without prior notification to a judge. See Chapter XVII, Note 25; ZAP-Aktuell, 5/01, p 247; ZAP EN-Nr 184/2001. See § 5(i) RPflG. Whilst a judge can effectively carry out a matter transferred to a ‘Rechtspfleger’,  a judge’s matter undertaken by a ‘Rechtspfleger’  contrary to the RPflG is invalid (see § 8(i) and (iv) RPflG). See Chapter XIII, Note 141. To be distinguished is the so-called ‘Vollstreckungserinnerung’  under § 766 ZPO against a measure (‘Maßnahme’) taken by a ‘Rechtspfleger’  or judge in enforcement proceedings. This is decided upon by the judge. See § ll(i) and (ii) RPflG. A decision by the judge to allow the ‘Erinnerung’ can be (further) challenged by an immediate complaint (‘sofortige Beschwerde’) under § 793 ZPO: § ll(iii) RPflG. See generally Youngs (CL), Chapter 3. See Article 95(i) GG; Baumann (ER), Part VI, § 17II; Chapter E, Note 16. See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 B (215–229). See Jauernig (ZP), Chapter 1, § 3 IV; Chapter XIII, Note 32; the ‘Grundbuchordnung’  (GBO) regarding land registration matters. See Creifelds under ‘freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit’; Jauernig (ZP), Book I, Chapter 4, § 27IV; cf § 169 GVG. See § 12 GVG. See § 8 EGGVG. In criminal matters, the jurisdiction of the courts is, broadly, as follows: A single judge (‘Einzelrichter’) at the district court (‘Amtsgericht’) can deal with misdemeanours (‘Vergehen’), which are pursued privately or for which a punishment not exceeding two years imprisonment is to be expected (§ 25 GVG). Other misdemeanours and all felonies (‘Verbrechen’) are handled by the ‘Amtsgericht’ itself (§ 24(i) GVG) sitting as a lay magistrates’ court (‘Schöffengericht’ ; § 28 GVG) composed of a district court judge and two lay magistrates (§ 29(i) GVG) unless: • certain very serious felonies (usually involving death) are involved, in which case the regional court (‘Landgericht’) – sitting as a so-called ‘Schwurgericht  composed of three judges and two lay magistrates (§ 76(i) GVG)-has jurisdiction at first instance (§ 74(ii) GVG); • particular matters involving state security or extremely serious crimes having constitutional implications are concerned, in which case jurisdiction is split between the ‘Landgericht’ (§ 74a GVG) and the upper regional court ( Oberlandesgericht’ ; § 120 GVG); • the punishment to be expected is imprisonment (‘Freiheitsstrafe’) for more than four years or placement in a psychiatric hospital or in secure custody (‘Sicherungsverwahrung’) ; • due to the particular importance of the case, the state attorney (‘Staatsanwalt’) lodges the indictment (‘Anklage’) at the ‘Landgericht’. The maximum punishment, which can be imposed by a district court (‘Amtsgericht’),   is four years imprisonment. It has no power to order placement in a psychiatric hospital or in secure custody (§ 24(ii) GVG). In the regional court (‘Landgericht’), there are two main criminal divisions: • the small criminal chamber (‘kleine Strafkammer’), composed of a presiding judge and two lay magistrates; and • the grand criminal chamber (‘grosse Strafkammer’)  composed of three judges and two lay magistrates (§ 76(i) GVG). The ‘Strafkammern’ at the ‘Landgericht’ are competent to handle: • felonies (‘Verbrechen’) not falling within the jurisdiction of the district or upper regional courts (§ 74(i), 1st sentence GVG); • cases in which the punishment to be expected is imprisonment for more than four years or placement in a psychiatric hospital or in secure custody or in which, due to the particular importance of the case, the state attorney lodges the indictment at the ‘Landgericht’ (§ 74(i), 2nd sentence GVG); • complaints (‘Beschwerden’) against directions by a judge at first instance or against first instance decisions other than judgments (§ 73(i) GVG);

337

The German Legal System and Legal Language • appeals (‘Berufungen’) against judgments at first instance (§ 74(iii) GVG). A commercial criminal chamber (‘Wirtschaftsstrafkammer’) at the ‘Landgericht’ exists to deal with certain ‘white-collar’ offences (§ 74c GVG). See Creifelds under ‘Schöffengericht’, ‘Schwurgericht’, ‘Strafkammer’  and ‘Wirtschaftsstrafsachen’ ; Chapter XVII, Note 4. 38 A further example is the (disciplinary) jurisdiction of the ‘Anwaltsgerichte’ (lawyers’ courts). See Chapter XXIID 7, below. The European Court of Justice also appears to have the status of such a court see the comments under Article 101(ii) GG in the Sourcebook,  Chapter 2. 39 See § 1 ‘Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz’ (ArbGG); Article 95(i) GG; Youngs (CL), Chapter 3, Part X. See also: Chapter XVIII (Note 19) ante. 40 See Article 96(i) and (iv)GG. 41 See Youngs (CL), Chapter 3, Parts VII and IX. 42 An OVG is sometimes known as a ‘Verwaltungsgerichtshof  (VGH). 43 Regarding the VwGO, see Chapter XV A ante. 44 See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 A (204). 45   ‘Rechtsprechung’  can also just mean ‘case-law’, the proper term for which is, however, ‘Fallrecht’ . See Honsell, § 2 III 46 See Chapter XXII C 2. 47 See Chapter XVII B. 48 See Chapter XIII D 8. 49 See Chapter XXIID and E. 50 See Chapter XXII A. 51 See Creifelds under ‘Rechtspflege’, ‘Justiz’, ‘Justizverwaltung’ and ‘Justizverwaltungsakte’; Chapter XV, Note 2. The police is not a judicial authority when it acts in the warding-off of disturbances of, or threats to, public security or order (‘Gefahrenabwehr’) . See Chapter XVII, Note 33. 52 See generally: Creifelds under ‘Rechtsanwalt’; Jauernig (ZP), Book 1, Chapter 2 (§ 16); Model/Creifelds/ Lichtenberger, Part 3 A (211); the Lawyers’ Handbook, Parts E-J. 53 See § 2 BRAO. 54 See § 3(i) BRAO. For a critique of §§ 1–3 BRAO as giving an antiquated professional image (‘Berufsbild’) of the ‘Rechtsanwalt’, see the Lawyers’ Handbook, Part H I, Section II 1 (c). 55 See § 3(iii) BRAO. 56 The EuRAG is (superficially) a welcome relief for EU lawyers from other member states, who seek to establish themselves as lawyers outside their state of origin (‘Herkunftsstaat’). It is a faithful product of the current liberal regime. However, there are uncertainties in the detail and tricky bureacratic hurdles remain. See Clausnitzer, ZAP 24/00, Fach 25, p 97. 57 See § 5 BRAO. 58 See § 18(i) BRAO. This is the so-called ‘localisation principle’ (‘Lokalisationsprinzip’). It has become much disputed and has  been abolished after the year 2000. See Note 73 in this Chapter. 59 See § 19(i) BRAO. Admission must be refused (‘ist zu versagen’), if one of the (11) grounds listed in § 7 BRAO exists. Admission can also subsequently be withdrawn or revoked on similar grounds under § 14 BRAO. § 7 Nos 1–6 BRAO deal with the applicant’s personality and character, § 7 No 7 with his medical condition and § 7 No 8 with the question of when (ie, under what circumstances) the exercise of a second occupation (‘Zweitberuf’)   is, exceptionally, incompatible with the profession of lawyer (‘unvereinbar mit dem  Anwaltsberuf’). § 7 No 8 BRAO is an unclear provision and open to substantial interpretation. Each case of ‘nebenberufliche Tätigkeit’  (extra-professional activity) must be considered on its particular facts. Relevant criteria include:  –  The ‘Funktionsfähigkeit der Rechtspflege’  (the smooth functioning of the administration of justice). This is paramount, although it must be balanced with the basic right of freedom to exercise one’s profession (Berufsausüzbungsfreiheit’ ; Article 12 GG).  –  A possible conflict of interests (‘Interessenkollision’). Any risk of such a conflict must be distinct and real:

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Notes see ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 2/01, p 90.  –  Whether the applicant retains the ability to exercise the profession (‘Ausübungsmöglichkeit’)  to an appreciable extent and not just occasionally (‘in einem nennenswerten Umfang und jedenfalls mehr als  gelegentlich’). The question of the right of admission of public service employees (ie, their dependence on the state (‘Staatsnähe’)) and of lawyers employed by private organisations (‘Syndikusanwälte’) occasionally poses problems. Regarding the various grounds upon which admission can be refused (‘Versagungsgründe’)  see the Lawyers ‘Handbook, Part H I, Section II 3, 4, 6 and 7 (d). 60 See § 27(i) BRAO. 61 See § 25 BRAO. By judgment of the BVerfG dated 13.12.2000, the principle of exclusive (single) admission has been declared incompatible with Article 12(i) GG. The principle continues to apply for a transitional period until 30.6.2002, out lawyers admitted at an OLG can apply for simultaneous admission to the courts of first instance within its area already as from 1.1.2002. 62 See § 226 BRAO. This right of simultaneous admission extends to all ‘Länder’ as from 1.7.2002. See ZAP-Aktuell, 1 /01, p 2; Reinelt, ZAP 1/01, Fach 23, p 517. 63 See § 172(i) BRAO. 64 See the Lawyers’ Handbook, Part E. 65 See § 44 BRAO. 66 See § 45 BRAO. The aim of § 45 is the separation of a lawyer’s activity from other professions (‘Trennung von Rechtsanwaltstätigkeit und anderem Beruf). Thus, a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is prohibited from dealing with a matter later as a ‘Rechtsanwalt’, if he has previously dealt with it in another professional capacity (and vice versa), unless the professional activity has already ended: § 45(i) No 4 and § 45(ii) No 2 BRAO. Firms with offices in more than one place (‘überörtliche Sozietäten’) and multi-disciplinary practices will have to be particularly vigilant to comply with these restrictions. See the Lawyers’ Handbook,  Part H I, Section III 4 (f). 67 See §46 BRAO. A   ‘Syndikusanwalt’ is also prevented from handling the same matter in another professional capacity. 68 See § 49(i) BRAO; Chapter XVII C. 69 See § 50(i) and (ii) BRAO. See also § 17 BerufsO. 70 See § 51 BRAO. A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ must account to his client (and/or the person liable for his fees) when the retainer ends, at the latest: § 23 BerufsO. 71 A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is forbidden from acting, if he/she has already advised or represented the other (opposing) party in the same legal matter (‘in der selben Rechtssache’) . Representation is understood in a wide sense and includes serving a party (‘dienen’) by advice or support (‘Rat oder Beistand’)  of any kind. The prohibition also prevents a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ from acting, if he has already been professionally involved (‘beruflich befaßt’) with the same matter in another way (‘in sonstiger Weise’) : § 3 BerufsO. Indeed, on 6.11.2000, the BGH held that, if there is a change of firm (‘Kanzleiwechsel’)  by an employed lawyer, whose name is shown on the firm’s notepaper, the new firm must lay down instructions in any matter in which the old firm acts for the other side, even if the relevant lawyer did not and does not handle the matter himself. See ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 2/01, p 82. 72 Lawyers are currently making use of the very liberal regulatory environment to extend the limits of publicity all the time. Thus, for example, the courts have approved despatch of glossy brochures, publicity by way of sponsoring, stands at trade fairs and the invitation to an hotel for an ‘information meeting’. See ZAP EN-Nr 425/00,456/00,459/00 and 485/01. 73 A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ admitted at a particular ‘Landgerichf’ is now entitled to appear (throughout Germany)

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74

75 76

77

78 79 80 81 82

 before the civil chamber of any other ‘Landgerich’ and before all ‘Familiengerichte’ (Family Courts; these are divisions of the ‘Amtsgerichte’: see § 23b GVG). The new rule applies as from 1 January 2000 in the ‘Länder’ of former West Germany and will come into force in the new ‘Länder’ on 1st January 2005. For further details, see the articles by Jörn Loewer in ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 4/94, p 186 at p 192 and Wilhelm Feuerich in ZAP 20/94, Fach 23, p 183. On 5 December 1995, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the extension of § 78 ZPO to the new ‘Länder’ breaches Article 12(i) GG. The court ordered that, until 31 December 2004, it suffices, if a lawyer instructed in an ‘Anwaltsprozeß’  in former East Germany is admitted at a ‘Landsgericht’ or ‘Amtsgericht’ in any one of the new ‘Länder’. See ZAP EN-Nr 402/96. The codes are set out in ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 6/96, p 241–252 and 3/99, p 123–134. Regarding the ‘Berufsordnung’,  see the article by Wolfgang Hartung in ZAP 1/98, Fach 23, p 311. Regarding the liability of a ‘Rechtsanwalt when acting in conjunction with a foreign lawyer (ad hoc or continously) and the standard of care required when dealing with foreign law, see the articles by Oliver Sieg in ZAP 4/98, Fach 23, p 341 and ZAP 24/96, Fach 23, p 239. Being an independent contractor, a lawyer normally has no duty to advise on foreign law (cf private international law). However, a lawyer s liability to the client depends on the scope of the retainer (‘Anwaltsvertrag’). Its interpretation can give rise to a (contractual) duty of supervision or even to a duty to check foreign law ( ‘Prüfungspflicht’; §§ 157,242 BGB). The risk of a claim (under PVV and/or § 278 BGB) can be reduced, if there is a separate contractual relationship  between the client and the foreign lawyer. For an instructive recent English case, see Gregory v Shepherds,  Ch D, reported in (1999), Gazette, 96/08, p 29 and (2000), Gazette 97/26, p 39 (CA). See also the judgment of the ECJ in  MSG v Les Gravières Rhénanes,  which is discussed in ‘BRAK Mitteilungen’ 1/98, p 14. The case concerned Articles 5 No 1 and 17(i), 2nd sentence EuGVÜ. The court held that, in accordance with Article 17(i), an agreement on jurisdiction (‘Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung’)  can be concluded  between commercial parties on the basis of an (international) trade custom (‘Handelsbrauch’), provided the agreement complies with the appropriate form. However, a mere fictitious agreement regarding the place of performance (‘Erfüllungsortvereinbarung’),  the real purpose of which is purely to lay down a particular  jurisdiction is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Article 5 No 1 EuGVÜ. Such an agreement must comply with Article 17(i). The case shows how careful lawyers need to be when dealing with a matter involving an international element and when interpreting an international convention. It should not be automatically assumed that a rule of national customary law (here, the German rule regarding the ‘kaufmännisches Bestätigungsschreiben’ ) has been adopted internationally See Chapter X, Note 71; Chapter XX D 2. A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ who acts as intermediary (‘Vermittler’), arbitrator (‘Schiedsrichter’) or mediator (‘Schlichter’) is also subject to the ‘Berufsordnung’ : § 18 BerufsO. The ‘Berufsordnung’  extends to all forms of professional cooperation: §§ 30, 33 BerufsO. If the other side is legally represented, § 13 BerufsO requires a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ to notify the other side’s lawyer in advance before obtaining a judgment in default. However, this provision has been declared unconstitutional. See ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 1 /00, p 36 and 5/00, p 210. The national ‘Berufsordnung’ is of corresponding application to European lawyers and other (foreign) persons, who are members of a RAK and who carry out activities in Germany (§ 34 BerufsO). Differences in the CCBE and the national rules can give rise to misunderstandings. Eg, English lawyers must be careful to clarify the position beforehand, if they wish communications with German lawyers to remain confidential or ‘without prejudice’ or if they wish to exclude or limit their personal liability for fees (see Rules 53 and 5.7, CCBE Code). The German version of the CCBE Code is annexed to § 29 BerufsO. See Creifelds under ‘Berufsgeheimnis’, ‘Gebührenüberhebung’  and ‘Parteiverrat’. This is a mutual obligation: it requires that full information is given by die client and that proper questions are put by the ‘Rechtsanwalt’. See Borgmann, ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 2/01, p 72. See Rinsche, ZAP 7/97, Fach 23, p 249; Reinelt, ZAP 11/00, Fach 23, p 493. See also: Grams, ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 1/0l, p 28 and 2/01, p 76. See § 60(i) BRAO. See § 62(ii) BRAO.

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Notes 83 84 85

86 87 88

89 90 91 92 93 94 95

96 97

98 99 100

101

102

See §§ 63 and 78 BRAO. See § 174 BRAO. See §§ 175–176 BRAO. The offices of BRAK are at Littenstrasse 9, D-10179 Berlin. The offices of the German Lawyers’ Association ( ‘Deutscher Anwaltverein’  (DAV)) are two doors away at Littenstrasse 11, D-10179 Berlin. See §§ 179 and 187 BRAO. See generally: the Lawyers’ Handbook,  Part H I, Section III 6; Feuerich, ZAP 20/94, Fach 23, at p 191; KleineCosack, ZAP 13/00, Fach 23, p 507. See §§ 73(ii) and 74 BRAO. Within a month of the service of the notice of reprimand (‘Rügebescheid’), a ‘Rechtsanwalt’  can lodge objection (‘Einspruch’) with the ‘Vorstand’ of the RAK. If the ‘Vorstand’ rejects the objection, the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ can make a (private) application for decision to the ‘Anwaltsgericht’: § 74a BRAO. On such an application, the decision of the ‘Anwaltsgericht’ is final. The application is made in the form of an ‘Anschuldigungsschrift’ (bill of accusation). Application for the initiation of proceedings can also be made to the ‘Staatsanwalt’ by a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ directly, in order to cleanse himself from the suspicion of a breach of duty: § 123(i) BRAO. See §§ 114 and 150 BRAO. See § 7(i) BRAGO. See § 8(i), 1st and 2nd sentences BRAGO and §§ ll(i) and (ii) ‘Gerichtskostengesetz’ (GKG). See § 8(i), 3rd sentence and § 8(ii) BRAGO and § 18 KostO. See § 31(i) BRAGO. See § 118(i) BRAGO. If proceedings before a court or authority follow, the ‘Geschäftsgebühr’ is credited towards the ‘Gebühren’  then due: § 118(ii) BRAGO. For a survey of fees, which can be charged for ‘außergerichtliche Tätigkeit’ in landlord/tenant matters, see the article by Heinz Hansens in ZAP 5/00, Fach 24, p 549 (Section I). This includes information to the client, the drafting, lodging or signing of pleadings (‘Schriftsätze’) or letters (‘Schreiben’)  and the drafting of documents (‘Urkunden’). Such as: negotiations or discussions before a court or authority or with the other side or a third party; the drafting of a ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’ (company agreement/articles of association). If a ‘Rechtsanwal’ is involved in the reaching of a settlement ( ‘Vergleich’; for meaning see § 779 BGB), he can (also) charge a ‘Vergleichsgebühr’. The ‘Vergleichsgebühr’ amounts to fifteen-tenths of a ‘Gebühr’  where no court proceedings are pending. See § 23(i) BRAGO. See § 114(i) BRAGO. See § 119(i) and § 119(ii) BRAGO. See §§ 83–108 and § 116 BRAGO. A defence lawyer appointed by the court (‘Pflichtverteidiger’) is usually entitled to a fee amounting to 4 times the minimum statutory scale figure for a privately selected attorney (‘Wahlverteidiger’),  but not more than half the possible maximum sum: § 97(i) BRAGO. The fee is payable out of public funds, ie, from the state treasury (‘Staatskasse’). If the matter is particularly extensive or complex, the lawyer can apply for lump sum remuneration (‘Pauschvergütung’)  going beyond the fee limit in § 97 (§ 99 BRAGO). See Burhoff, ZAP 14/01, Fach 24, p 625. See § 49b (i) BRAO and § 3(i) BRAGO. A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ can conclude an oral or written fee agreement ( ‘Gebühren-’  or ‘Honorarvereinbarung’ ) with his client in any field of activity. The client remains liable to pay the ‘Rechtsanwalt’ any difference over and above the statutory (BRAGO) rate—it is not reimbursable (‘erstattungsfähig’) from third parties. Regarding the various forms of fee agreement which are possible in practice, see Wagner, ZAP 7/99, Fach 24, p 459. See also: Chapter XIII, Note 55; Note 101 in this Chapter. See § 49b(ii) BRAO. The usual rule is that German lawyers’ fees for (civil) court work or work preparatory thereto are fixed (‘fest’) according to BRAGO and compensate the lawyer for the whole of his activity in the matter until its conclusion (§ 13 BRAGO). One speaks of the statutory fees (‘gesetzliche Gebühren’) .

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103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111

112 113 114 115

However, in principle, § 3 BRAGO allows a fee agreement (‘Honorarvereinbarung’)  to be reached (eg, on the  basis of an hourly rate (‘Stundensatz’),   a fixed fee (‘Pauschalvergütung’)   or an additional amount (‘Zusatzhonorar’)). The relevant fee can be demanded by the lawyer, if the agreement is in writing and contained in a separate document. Otherwise (ie, if it is oral), it only binds the client, if the client has paid monies voluntarily and without reservation (‘freiwillig und ohne Vorbehalt’) . Instead, the lawyer and client can leave the fee to be set at the discretion of die RAK, but, whichever method is chosen, the fee can, by way of court action, be reduced to the statutory level, if it is unreasonably high (‘unangemessen hoch’) . On the other hand, a fee agreement, which is dependant (conditional) on the outcome or success of  proceedings (‘vom Ausgang oder vom Erfolg abhängig’)  – ‘Erfolgshonorar’ – or which provides for a proportion (percentage) of the amount in dispute – ‘quota litis’ – to be due, is forbidden. This rule used to be contained in § 52 of the (meantime defunct) ‘Grundsätze des anwaltlichen Standesrechts’   (Principles of Lawyers’ Professional Ethics/BRAK Directives (‘Richtlinien’)  of 21.7.1973). It has now been reissued in § 49b (ii) BRAO. Any difference between a fee provided for in a fee agreement and the statutory level is not reimbursable (‘erstattungsfähig’) from third parties ie, the client is left to pay it himself and can only recover his legal costs from the other side at the BRAGO rate, if he wins. Once a lawyer has become active in a matter and is then instructed to take further steps in the same matter, he receives no more fees than he would receive, if he had been instructed to do so from the start: § 13(v) BRAGO. In other words, there can be no double-charging (‘Doppelhonorierung’), nor may a lawyer conclude a fee agreement mid-way through a case started on a BRAGO basis; he is locked in (‘once BRAGO, always BRAGO’). A lawyer, who has grounds to believe that his client might be in need of legal aid (‘Prozesskostenhilfe’) must  be particularly careful. Firstly, he has a duty to draw the possibility of PKH to the attention of the client: § 16 BerufsO. Secondly, it is unethical for a lawyer, who has applied for PKH or who knows that his client wishes to seek it, to conclude a fee agreement with die client, even if it is before his appointment (‘Beiordnung’). The undercutting of BRAGO fees (‘Gebührenunterschreitung’)  is forbidden, except for out of court activity: § 49b (i) BRAO, § 3(v) BRAGO. See also § 21(i) BerufsO. See Wagner, ZAP 7/99, Fach 24, p 459 (Section III). See § 3(ii) BRAGO. See § 19(i) BRAGO. See § 13(i) and (ii) BRAGO. Fees are due in accordance with § 16 BRAGO and can only be demanded following the delivery of a signed ‘Berechnung’ (bill of costs): § 18 BRAGO. For VAT (‘MwSt’) and disbursements (‘Auslagen’ : postage, typing, travel expenses) see §§ 25–30 BRAGO. See § ll(i), sentences 2 and 3 BRAGO. See § 20(i) BRAGO. See § 120(i) BRAGO. See § 21 BRAGO. See § 12(i) BRAGO. See § 132 BRAGO. Application for an entitlement voucher (‘Berechtigungsschdn’)  must be made to the local ‘Amtsgericht’: § 4 BerHG. A fee agreement between a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ and a person seeking ‘Beratungshilfe’ is void: § 8(ii) BerHG. See § 123 BRAGO and §§ 114–127a ZPO (Chapter XIII, Note 26 ante). See also Jauernig (ZP), Book 4, Chapter 17 (§96). See ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 5/00, p 260. Although called a partner, a member of a ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’  basically has the status of a ‘Gesellschafter’ within §§ 705ff BGB. The ‘Gesellschaftsoermögen’ therefore remains available as a safety net. Moreover, § 735 BGB imposes a statutory obligation on members of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’ to replenish the assets of a ‘BGB-Gesellschaft’, if they are insufficient to cover losses. However, this duty (‘Nachschußpflicht’) can be excluded in the company agreement Towards third parties, members of a civil law partnership are at the greatest risk of personal liability. Anv limitation is a matter of contract (eg, by way of the specific instruction of an individual partner (‘Einzelmandat’)). The privileged position of members of a ‘Partnerschaftsgesellschaft’, who take no active part in a particular

342

Notes

116

117 118 119 120

121 122 123 124 125 126

matter – which is accorded to them by § 8(ii) Part GG – is not justified. In truth, it makes a mockery of the  basic principle of joint (personal) responsibility for partnership obligations, as codified in § 8(i) Part GG. See Chapter XI, Note 51. (a) For further details, see the article by Dr Fritz Kempter in ‘BRAK-Mitteilungen’ 3/1994, p 122. Regarding ‘Haftungsbeschränkung’   and ‘Haftungskonzentration’,   see the article by Oliver Sieg and Katharina Holtmann in ZAP 9/99, Fach 23, p 387, Section V. (b) Lawyers can also now practise in the form of a limited company (GmbH). The BRAO has been amended to permit this with effect from 1.3.1999 (§§ 59c-m BRAO). The name of the company must include the word ‘Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft’ in its title and only persons professionally active in the company can  be shareholders. Lawyers must hold the majority of the shares and must predominate in the management of the company. They must be free from influence by shareholders in the carrying out of  their professional activities. The minimum professional liability insurance required is DM 5 million per incident and DM 20 million per year. Applications for registration must first be submitted to the ‘Rechtsanwaltskammer’. See Frank Johnigk, ZAP 20/98, Fach 23, p 375; Ralf Büring and Stefan Peitscher, ZAP 3/00, Fach 23, p 447. Legal practice in the form of a public limited company ( ‘Aktiengesellschaft’ (AG)) is only a matter of  time. Indeed, the Supreme Regional Court of Bavaria (‘Bayrisches Oberstes Landgericht’)  has already reached a decision in favour of this. See ZAP-Aktuell, 12/00, p 768; Römermann, ZAP, Fach 23, p 461. (c) For a useful résumé of the possible forms of cooperation/union (‘Zusammenschluss’)  between lawyers see Eberhard Assmann in ZAP 18/99, Fach 20, p 362 (Section II). See also: Mario Axmann in ‘BRAK Mitteilungen’ 4/2000, p 189. Note the difference between a ‘Sozietät’ or ‘Anwalts-/Notargemeinschaft’, which practises under a common firm name and is, in reality, a full civil law partnership (‘BGB-Gesellschaft’)  and the mere ‘Bürogemeinschaft’,  where lawyers share office facilities and overheads (internally) whilst remaining professionally independent insofar as the outside world is concerned. With regard to the liability of lawyers practising in the form of a ‘Sozietät’, what is normally decisive is how the relevant lawyers appear/present themselves to the public (their ‘Auftreten im Rechtsverkehr’ ) rather than the internal organisation of the practice. See Sieg, ZAP, Fach 23, p 535, Section III, Part 6 (p 548); Grunewald, ZAP, Fach 23, p 551. See Model/Creifelds/Lichtenberger, Part 3 A (213) and Creifelds under ‘Notar’, ‘Anwaltsnotar’ and ‘Form’ 12 and 3. See §§ 1 and 12 BNotO. See § 4 BNotO. See § 14 BNotO. Only persons, who are German citizens and have the ‘Befähigung zum Richteramt’,  may be appointed: § 5 BNotO. This is a fundamental barrier to full provision of legal services by lawyers from other EU countries. The chances of reform are slim. See Note 11 in this Chapter. See §§ 8, 36 and 45 BeurkG and § 25 BNotO. See also Chapter X, Note 256. See §§ 20–22 BNotO. See § 19 BNotO. On the basic principles of notarial liability see the article by Franz-Josef Rinsche in ZAP 16/97, Fach 23, p 273. See §§ 65–91 BNotO. See Chapter XXII D 8 and §§ 140–157 KostO. See §§ 437–440 ZPO.

343

APPENDIX A VOCABULARY: SELECTED GERMAN AND LATIN WORDS AND PHRASES (WITH THEIR ENGLISH/LEGAL MEANINGS)  Abänderungsklage

 Aberratio ictus  Abdingbar  Abfall  Abfindung

 Abgabe  Abgabenordnung (AO)  Abgeben  Abgrenzen  Abgrenzung  Abhanden kommen  Abhilfe

 Ab initio  Abkömmling  Ablehnen  Ablehnung(sgesuch)  Ablösung  Abmahnung

writ claiming the adjustment/amendment of a judgment for payment of a regular sum (eg, maintenance). See Creifelds under ‘Abänderungsklage’ and Chapter XIII C E (Note 15) (significant) aberration in a criminal act, ie, it goes seriously wrong; it excludes ‘Vorsatz’; cf ‘Error in persona’  and ‘Error in obiecto’. See Chapter XVI C 3 (d) dispositive norms are ‘abdingbar’,  ie, can be derogated (departed) from by agreement. See Creifelds under ‘Abdingbar’ and Chapter IX B refuse, rubbish, waste. See Chapter VI Note 5 pay-off; one-off payment, (lump-sum) settlement, severance payment (on redundancy). See Creifelds under ‘Abfindung’ and ‘Abfindungsguthaben’; Chapter X, Note 334; Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv); Chapter XVIII B 3 the giving away of something, delivery; placement into circulation (of a ‘Willenserklärung’); casting (of a vote); levy, tax. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Federal) Collection of Taxes Order. See Creifelds under ‘Abgabenordnung’; Chapter XIII D 8 (a); Chapter XIV B 1 to give something away, deliver; to place into circulation (eg, a ‘Willenserklärung’); to cast (a vote) to separate, demarcate separation, demarcation. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 101) to go astray. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (iii) (bonafide acquisition of ownership to movables); Chapter XIX B; Chapter XIX, Note 40 remedial action, redress (eg, where a ‘Behörde’ regards a ‘Widerspruch’ against a VA as justified). See Creifelds under ‘Abhilfe’, Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé; Chapter XIII D 3 (c) and Chapter XV C (Note 9) from the beginning/start. Also ‘von Anfang an’. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (iv); Chapter XVIII, Note 7 issue, offspring, ie, (legitimate or illegitimate) children. See Chapter X F 3 (a) (i) to decline, refuse, object to, reject refusal (of), (motion of) objection, challenge (to). See Chapter XIII, Note 134; Chapter XXII, Note 19; ‘Besorgnis der Befangenheit’. Cf ‘Aufsichtsbeschwerde’ see ‘Tilgung’ prior warning (eg, before summary dismissal of an employee). See Chapter XVIII B 345

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Abnahme  Abnutzung  Absatz  Abschiebung  Absduagszahlung  Abschluß  Abschlußfreiheit  Abschnitt  Abschrift  Absehen von (Strafoerfolgung/Strafe)  Absicht  Absichtlich  Absolutes Recht  Abstammen  Abstammung  Abstimmung  Abstrakt  Abstrakte Normkontrolle  Abstraktionsgrundsatz  Abteilung  Abtretung  Abtretungserklärung  Abwägung  Abwälzen  Abwehr  Abweheklage  Abwehrrecht(e)

acceptance (of a ‘Werk’ by the customer). See Chapter X, Note 125 G wear and tear. See Chapter X F 4 (e) marketing, sales. See Chapter XII, Note 42 (physical) removal (of a person on deportation). See Chapter XXI C payment on account. See § 632a BGB conclusion (of a matter or contract). See Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter XI C 2 (e); Chapter XVII, Note 38 G freedom to conclude a contract with whomever one pleases. See Chapter X, Note 23 section (part of statute). Cf ‘Vorschrift’: an individual provision in a statute, which incorporates the terms ‘Paragraph’ (§) and ‘Artikel’ (eg, in theGG) copy. Can be ‘einfach’   (normal, simple) or ‘beglaubigt’ (certified). See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii) and D 2 (c) (i) and cf  ‘Ausfertigung’ to disregard (refrain from) eg, prosecution, imposing (nonimposition of) a ‘Strafe’. See Creifelds under ‘Absehen von Strafe’; Chapter XVI D; Chapter XVII, Note 40 (pure) intent. See Chapter XVI C 3 (c) deliberately absolute right. Cf ‘Relatives Recht’ and see Chapter X B 1 4 to descend from descent (from), extraction. See Chapter X E; Chapter X F 3 (a) (i) vote, ballot; plebiscite. See Chapter II F (Note 20) and also ‘Volksabstimmung’ abstract see ‘Normkontrolle’ abstraction principle. See Chapter X C 2 2 and X D 2 (v) department. See Chapter XXII D 7 assignment. See Creifelds under ‘Abtretung’   and cf  ‘Schuldübernahme’. See also Chapter X C 3 (d) and (e) and Chapter X, Note 241 declaration of assignment. See Chapter X D 3 (h)  balancing. See Creifelds under ‘Abwägungsgebot’; Chapter VIII, Notes 7, 10 and 20; Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter XIV, Note 23 C; Chapter XVI, Notes 33 and 35 to shift onto (someone else). See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c) warding-off, repulsion defensive counter-action. Also ‘actio negatoria’ defensive right(s). See Chapter VIII A 346

Appendix A: Vocabulary

 Abweichung  Abweisen  Abweisung  Abwenden  Abwicklungsverhältnis  Abzahlungskauf   Actio libera in causa  Actio negatoria  Adäquanztheorie  Adressat  Aequitas  Akte  Akteneinsicht

 Aktie  Aktiengesellschaft (A.G.)  Aktiengesetz (AktG)  Akzessorietät  Alle Angelegenheiten der örtlichen Gemeinschaft  Alleineigentum  Allgemein  Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen  Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze  Allgemeiner Teil (AT)  Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (AGBGB)  Allgemeines Landrecht für die  preußischen Staaten (ALR)  Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht

deviation, divergence (from). See Chapter X, Note 189 to dismiss, reject (an application or ‘Klage’) dismissal, rejection (of an application or ‘Klage’). See Chapter XIII, Note 107 to avert. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C winding-up relationship. See Chapter X, Note 126 F instalment purchase. In English law, an instalment purchase can be either a ‘credit sale agreement’ or a ‘conditional sale agreement’. See Chapter X D 2 (iv) act free in origin. See Chapter XVI C 3 (b) negatory action. See § 1004 BGB theory of foreseeability (adequacy theory). It is the dominant theory of causation in civil law. See Chapter XVI C 1 (a) (Note 21) and cf ‘Äquivalenztheorie’ addressee. See Chapter VIII A fairness; equity. See Chapter I (Note 6) file inspection of the file(s). See Chapter XIV B 3; Chapter XVII C; Chapter XXII D 5. Regarding the various rights of  inspection in civil, criminal and administrative matters, see Creifelds under ‘Akteneinsicht’ share (in an AG). See Chapter XII, Note 10; Chapter XIX B public limited company. See ‘Gesellschaft’ and ‘Vorstand’ Law relating to public limited companies. See Chapter XI A accessory relationship. See Creifelds under ‘Akzessorietät’ I; Chapter X D 3 (h) (Note 280); Chapter XI B 3 all local matters. See Chapter VI sole ownership. See Chapter X, Note 231 general general terms, (standard) conditions of business; also ‘Vertragsbedingungen’ . See Chapter X B 2 (d) and (e), Creifelds under ‘Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen’ and the AGBG general principles of law. See Chapter XVI, Note 4 general part. See Chapter X B General Civil Code (for Austria; 1811). See Chapter I (after Note 13) General Law for the Prussian States (1794). See Creifelds under ‘Allgemeines Landrecht’ and Chapter I (after Note 13) general right of personality (privacy). See Chapter VIII, Note 20 B; Chapter X, Note 266 C

347

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Allgemein verbindlich  Allgemeinverfügung  Alleinerbe  Als eigene Angelegenheit  Amt  Amtlich  Amtliche Verwahrung  Amtsanwalt  Amtsbetrieb  Amtsenthebung  Amtsgericht (AG)  Amtshandlung  Amtshilfe  Amtspflicht  Analog  Analogie  Änderung  Änderungskündigung

 Andeutung  Androhung  Aneignung  Anerkenntnis  Anerkennung  Anfall der Erbschaft  Anfangsverdacht

 Anfechtbar(keit)  Anfechten

of general effect; generally binding. See Chapter VII C, Note 13; Chapter XVIII, Note 52 (a VA giving a) general direction. See Chapter XIV C 1 sole heir. See Chapter X F 4 (a) as one’s (its) own matter. See Chapter V B office (usually part of a ‘Behörde’), position. See Creifelds under ‘Amt’; Chapter II, Note 9 official (adj) official custody. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (ii) and 5 (e) district public prosecutor (at the AG). See Chapter XVII B conduct of a matter by the court (rather than by the parties: ‘Parteibetrieb’). See Chapter XIII C C; Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii) removal from office. See Chapter XXII A (Note 18) district court. See Creifelds under ‘Amtsgericht’; Chapter XIII D 2 (d) and Chapter XXII C 2 official act. See Chapter XXI, Note 1 official assistance (between ‘Behörden’). See Chapter XXI, Note 1. Cf ‘Rechtshilfe’ official duty. See Chapter X, Note 224; Chapter XXII E analogously analogy. See Creifelds under ‘Analogie’; Chapter X, Notes 38 and 47 E; Chapter XVI A; ‘entsprechende Anwendung’ variation, amendment. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (d). See also ‘Veränderung’ a ‘Kündigung’ coupled with a proposed alteration in terms of employment or in a tenancy agreement (‘Mietvertrag’). See Creifelds under ‘Änderungskundigung’; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé; Chapter XVIII, Note 11 indication, hint. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (iii) prior threat/warning (of a particular measure). See Chapter XIII, Note 190 acquisition of ownership to ownerless movables (appropriation). See Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii) acknowledgement (of a claim). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) acknowledgement; recognition. See Chapter XXI A devolution of the estate (on the heir(s)). See Chapter X F 4 (a) initial suspicion (of the commission of an offence). Such a suspicion is necessary for the commencement of a criminal investigation (‘Ermittlungsverfahren’). See Chapter XVII, Note 20 voidable, challengable; voidability, challengability See Chapter XIV C 3. See also ‘Anfechtung’ to challenge, contest, impugn 348

Appendix A: Vocabulary

 Anfechtung  Anfechtungsgrund  Anfechtungsklage  Angedroht  Angebot  Angehöriger  Angeklagter  Angelegenheit  Angemessen  Angeschuldigter  Angestellter  Angriffs-und Verteidigungsmittel  Anhängig  Anhaltspunkt  Anhörung  Anklage  Anklagebehörde  Anklagegrundsatz  Anklagemonopol  Anklagen  Anklageschrift  Anknüpfungspunkt  Anlage  Anlagevermögen  Anlaß  Anleihe  Anmelden  Anmeldepflicht

challenge, contestation. See Creifelds under ‘Anfechtung von Willenserklärungen’; Chapter X B 2 (b); Chapter X F 3 (c) (iv); Chapter X F 4 (f); Chapter X F 5 (a) (ii) ground for challenge. See Chapter X F 5 (a) (ii) writ of challenge (eg, against a VA). See Chapter X F 4 (f); Chapter XIV C 3; Chapter XV B and C; Creifelds under ‘Verwaltungsstreitverfahren’  I (a) threatened. See Chapter XVIII H (Note 57) offer. See Chapter X B 2 (c) dependant (of a person). See Chapter X F 4 (g) (i) defendant, accused (after the opening of proceedings), person indicted. Cf ‘Beschuldigter’ and see Chapter XVII E matter. See Chapter XIII, Note 96 fair; appropriate. See Chapter X, Note 126 F; Chapter XVI D; Chapter XVIII B 3 person charged. Cf ‘Beschuldigter’ and see Chapter XVII E employee. See ‘Arbeitnehmer’ means of attack and defence. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) pending (before a court). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) and cf  ‘Rechtshängig clue, indication. See Chapter XIII, Note 67; Chapter XVI, Note 9; Chapter XVIIB hearing, listening. See Creifelds under ‘Anhörung’, Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi); Chapter XIV B 3; Chapter XV D. Cf  ‘Vernehmung’ see ‘Anklageschrift’ prosecution authority. See Chapter XVII B principle that a public prosecution is necessary before a  judicial investigation of an alleged crime can take place. See Chapter XVII A prosecution monopoly. See Chapter XVII B to prosecute, accuse; cf ‘Beschuldigen’ and ‘Vorwerfen’ (bill of) indictment. See Creifelds under ‘Anklageschrift’ . See also ‘Angeschuldigter’, ‘Angeklagter’ and Chapter XVII E connecting factor. See Chapter XX B investment fixed assets. See Creifelds under ‘Anlagevermögen’ cause, reason, occasion, opportunity (for). See Chapter XVII D (government) bond, (gilt-edged) debenture stock. See Chapter XIX B to notify, report Also to announce or register (oneself or something). see ‘Anzeigepflicht’ 349

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Anmeldung  Annähern  Annahme  Annahme als Kind  Anordnung  Anpassung  Anrechnen  Anschauung  Anscheinsbeweis  Anscheinsvollmacht  Anschlussberufung  Anschuldigen  Anschwärzung  Anspruch  Anspruch auf einen gesetzlichen Richter  Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör  Anspruchsgrundlage  Anspruchsnorm  Ansprucksvoraussetzung  Anstalt  Anstand  Anstellen  Anstiftung

 Anteil  Antrag  Antragsdelikt

notification, report. See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (i) to become dose (approximate) to. See Chapter XXII D 9 acceptance. See Chapter X B 2 (c); Chapter X F 5 (a) adoption. See Chapter X E and Creifelds under ‘Adoption’ order (direction) eg, of a court during proceedings. See Chapter VIII B (Note 10); Chapter X D 2 (v); Chapter X F 3 (b); Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (i); Chapter XIV, Notes 23 and 33 adaptation. See Chapter X, Note 47 D to credit, set-off  opinion, point of view. See Chapter I, Note 16 ‘prima facie’   evidence. It can ease the burden of proof  (‘Beweislasit’). See Chapter X, Note 222; Chapter XIII, Note 10. Cf ‘Indizienbeweis’ ostensible authority. See Chapter XIII, Note 57 connected (cross-) appeal. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) to charge (in an indictment (‘Anklage’))  blackening (of the name) of a business. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 G claim; right (to); cause of action. See Chapter X B 14 and B 4 Exposé right to a proper (statutory) judge. See Creifelds under ‘Gesetzlicher Richter’ and Chapter VIII C (Note 36) right to be heard; right to a proper hearing (in accordance with law), due process. Also ‘audi alteram partem’. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtliches Gehör’ and Chapter VIII C (Note 36) (legal) basis (substantive ground) for an ‘Anspruch’. See Chapter X B 1 4 a norm containing an ‘Anspruchsgrundlage’. Cf ‘Hilfsnorm’ (pre)condition for a claim, ie, a preliminary requirement for the applicability of a particular ‘Anspruchsgrundlage’. See Chapter X B 1 4 and 5; Chapter XIII, Note 97 institution. See Chapter II C; Chapter XIV, Note 14 decency, good manners. See Chapter X F 4 (g) (iv) to employ incitement, instigation. A person, who intentionally induces another to commit an offence, which that other then intentionally commits, is punishable as a perpetrator, ie, in the same way as the principal offender. See Creifelds under ‘Anstiftung’; § 26 StGB. Cf ‘Beihlfe’, ‘Mittäterschaft’ part; share. See Chapter X F 4 (b); Chapter XI A 3 application (for), motion. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) and (iv) (Note 107) offence requiring an application for prosecution. See Chapter XVII Note 9 350

Appendix A: Vocabulary

 Antragsteller  Antragsgegner  Anwachsung  Anwalt  Anwaltsgericht  Anwaltsprozeß  Anwaltsvertrag  Anwaltszwang  Anwartschaft(srecht)  Anweisung  Anweisungsempfänger  Anwendung  Anwendungsbereich  Anwesenheit(srecht)  Anzahlung  Anzeige  Anzeigepflicht  Apostille  Äquivalenztheorie  Arbeit  Arbeiter  Arbeitgeber  Arbeitgebervereinigung (-verband)  Arbeitnehmer  Arbeitsbedingungen  Arbeitsgericht (ArbG)  Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit  Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (ArbGG)  Arbeitskampf 

applicant, petitioner. See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 3 respondent. See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 3 accretion. See Chapter X F 4 (c) see ‘Rechtsanwalt’ lawyers’ court. See Creifelds under ‘Ehrengerichtsbarkeit’; Chapter XXII D 7 lawyers’ action. Cf ‘Parteiprozeß’. See Chapter XIIID 1 (f) (iv) contract with a lawyer, retainer. See Chapter X, Note 166; Chapter XXII, Note 74. See also ‘Mandat’ compulsory instruction of lawyer. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) and Chapter XXII, Note 73 (right of) expectancy. See Chapter X B 2 (d); Chapter X D 2 (iv); Chapter X Note 256; Chapter X F 4(e) documentary instruction; direction. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 21); Chapter XIX, Note 36 recipient of an ‘Anweisung’, payee (practical) application. See Chapter X C 2 2 (Note 105) area of application presence, attendance; right to be present. See Chapter XVII C deposit (on a transaction). Cf ‘Hinterkgung’ (criminal) complaint, information, notice, report; advertisement. See ‘Strafanzeige’ duty of notification, duty to report. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c); Chapter XIX A 2 attestation/authenticity/legalisation clause equivalence theory (of causation); dominant in criminal,  but not in civil law, where the theory of foreseeability (‘Adäquanztheorie’) applies. See Chapter XVI C 1 (a) work (manual) worker. See ‘Arbeitnehmer’ employer. See Chapter XVIII A employer association, federation. See Chapter XVIII D employee; can be ‘Arbeiter’ or ‘Angestellter’. See Chapter XVIII A terms of employment. See Chapter XVIII, Note 11 employment court. See Chapter XVIII B employment jurisdiction. See Creifelds under ‘Arbeitsgenchtsbarkeit’ and Chapter XXII C 3 Law relating to the Employment Courts. See Chapter XXII C 3 industrial action. Conducted in two main forms: ‘Streik’ and ‘Aussperrung’. See Creifelds under ‘Arbeitskampf’ and Chapter XVIII D (b) and G 351

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Arbeitsplatz  Arbeitsschutzrecht  Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz (ASiG)  Arbeitsstätte  Arbeitsstättenverordnung (ArbStättVO)  Arbeitsunfähigkeit  Arbeitsunfall  Arbeitsverhältnis  Arbeitsvertrag  Arglist  Arglistige Täuschung

 Argumentum e contrario  Arrest

 Arzthaftung  Arztuertrag  Asylrecht  Asylverfahrensgesdz (AsylVfG)  Auctoritas non ventes facit legem  Audi alteram partem  Auf Befehl  Auf eigene Gefahr  Auf eigene Rechnung  Aufenfhalt

 Aufenthaltserlaubnis

workplace; job work protection law. See Creifelds under ‘Arbeitsschutz’ and Chapter XVIII H Work Safety Law. See Chapter XVIII H work place. See Chapter XVIII H Work Places Order. See Chapter XVIII H incapacity for work. See Chapter XVIII, Note 13 accident at work. See Chapter XVIII H employment relationship. Also ‘Dienstoerhältnis’ contract of employment. See Chapter XVIII A and B and also ‘Dienstuertrag’ craftiness; fraud. See ‘Arglistige Täuschung’ fraudulent deception, fraudulent misrepresentation. An ‘arglistige Täuschung’ exists, if an ‘Irrtum’ (error, mistake) is intentionally caused or upheld by – a ‘Vorspiegeln falscher Tatsachen’ (pretence of false facts); or – a ‘Verschweigen wahrer Tatsachen’ (concealment of true facts) and there is a duty to give the other party the necessary clarification (‘ Aufklärungspflicht’; § 242 BGB). See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Nullity and challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung’); Chapter X, Notes 189 and 220. Cf ‘Betrug’ see ‘Umkehrschluß’ summary means of securing the enforcement of a ‘Geldforderung’ by seizure of assets. It can be personal. See Creifelds under ‘Arrest’, §§ 916–945 ZPO; Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v) and D 8 (f). a ‘Festnahme’ medical liability (negligence). See Chapter X, Note 222 B; Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10 4); ‘grober Behandlungsfehler’ contract (of medical treatment) with a doctor. See Chapter X, Note 166; ‘Behandlungsvertrag’ right of asylum. See Creifelds under ‘Asylrecht und  Asylverfahren’ and Chapter VIII C (Article 16a GG) Law on Asylum Procedure. See Chapter XXI C authority, not die truth, makes law. See Chapter I (Note 10) see ‘Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör’ on orders. See Chapter XVI C 2 (b) (Note 34) at one’s own risk for one’s own account. See Chapter XI, Note 42 residence, stay. It can be ‘vorüber gehend’  (temporary), ‘gewöhnlich’  (habitual, usual) or ‘dauernd’ (continuous, permanent). Cf ‘Wohnsitz’. See Chapter X B 12; Chapter XX C (Note 9) and Note 25 residence permit. Also ‘Aufenthaltsgenehmigung’ 352

Appendix A: Vocabulary

 Aufenthaltsort  Aufällig  Auffangtatbestand  Auffassung  Auf freiem Fuß  Aufgabe  Aufgebot  Aufgrund  Aufheben  Aufhebung

 Aufhebungsvertrag  Aufklärung  Aufklärungspflicht  Auflage  Auflassung  Auflösung  Auflösungsklage  Aufrechnung  Aufruf der Sache  Aufschiebende Wirkung  Aufsicht  Aufsichtsbeschwerde

 Aufsichtspflicht  Aufsichtsrat

place of residence, location. See Chapter XIIID 8 (d) and (e) conspicuous. See Chapter X, Note 58 B mopping-up provision. See Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter X, Note 220 opinion at large/liberty (criminal law sense) function, job. See Chapter XVII D (Note 32) public notification of a claim. See Chapter XIII D 9 on the basis of, due to. See Chapter VIII B to repeal, quash, annul, terminate quashing, annulment; termination (eg, of a ‘Gemeinschaft nach Bruchteilen’). See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 15); Chapter X F 3 (c) (ii); Chapter XI A 3; Chapter XIII C H; Chapter XIII D 3 (b); Chapter XTV C 3; Chapter XV B; Chapter XVIII B annulment agreement. See Chapter X, Note 150; Chapter XVIII, Note 5 clarification; enlightenment. See Chapter I (Note 13); Chapter XIII B 2 (b); Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) duty to clarify, duty of disclosure. See Chapter X, Note 135 B, Chapter XXII D 5  binding condition, direction, requirement (laid down by a person or ‘Behörde’); also edition (of book). See Chapter X F 4 (h); Chapter XIV, Note 23C conveyance (of a piece of land), ie, ‘Einigung’ in the case of  immovables. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii) (Note 256) and § 925(i) BGB termination (dissolution) (of a company) eg, through ‘Kündigung’ writ claiming ‘Auflösung by court decision. See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv) set-off. See Chapter X B 4 and C 3 (c) (Title 3). See also ‘Vorbehaltsurteil’ announcement of the matter (in court). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) suspensive effect. See Chapter XIV C 3 supervision. See Chapter VI; Chapter X F 5 (b); Chapter XXII D 6. See also ‘Staatsaufsicht’ complaint to the next higher (supervisory) ‘Behörde’ (‘Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde’). It can relate to conduct of a ‘Beamter’ or, indeed, of a judge. See Chapter XV A; Chapter XVII, Note 40 B; Chapter XXII, Note 19 duty of supervision. See Chapter X, Note 222 B supervisory board. It is a compulsory organ of an AG, ‘Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien’ and ‘Genossenschaft’; in a 353

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Aufteilen  Auftrag

 Auftraggeber  Auftragsangelegenhetien  Auftragsbestätigung  Auftragsmangel  Auftragsverwaltung  Auftreten  Aufwenden  Aufwendung  Augenschein  Ausbildung  Ausdrücklich  Aus erheblichen Gründen  Aus wichtigem Grund  Ausbürgerung  Auseinandersetzung  Ausfertigen  Ausfertigung

GmbH it is voluntary, except when there are more than 500 employees. See Creifelds under ‘Aufsichtsrat’ and Chapter XVIII F to break up/down, split. See Chapter XIII, Note 96 (gratuitous) (contract of) instruction (without payment); assignment; brief; commission; job; mandate; order. See Creifelds under ‘Auftrag’, ‘Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag’ and cf ‘Vertretung’; Chapter X, Note 166; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 10). See also ‘Beauftragte’. An ‘Auftrag’  is usually the (internal) legal relationship underlying a ‘Vollmacht’. instructing person, mandatary, principal. In a non-technical sense, the equivalent of ‘Kunde’ (customer). See Chapter XVIII, Note 2 (c). See also ‘Mandant’ matters to be carried out on behalf of the mandatary. Also ‘Übertragene Aufgaben’,   See Creifelds under ‘Auftragsangelegenheiten’ and Chapter VI confirmation (acceptance) of order. See Chapter X B 2 (c): ‘Rules governing offer and acceptance’ (Note 71) lack of orders. See Chapter XVIII, Note 14 administration by a/the ‘Land’/‘Länder’ on instruction by the ‘Bund’. See Chapter II C appearance, behaviour. See Chapter XIII, Note 57; Chapter XXII, Note 116 to expend (for), spend (on) expenditure, disbursement. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 10) and Creifelds under ‘Aufwendungen’. Cf ‘Verwendung’ (evidence by) inspection. See ‘Beweis’ training, education. See Chapter VII C (Note 18); Chapter XXII, Note 10 express(ly) on significant grounds. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (iii) for (an) important reason. See Chapter XVIII B removal of citizenship (against one’s will). It is forbidden  by Article 16(i) GG. See Creifelds under ‘Entlassung aus der Staatsangehörigkeit’ and Chapter VIIIC composition, division (among), split-up, severance, partitioning (between); argument. See Chapters X C 3 (g) (Title 14); Chapter X F 4 (b); Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv) and (v) to draw up, issue (a document) drawing-up, issue; duplicate, (official) copy of an official document (eg, a court decision). It bears an official seal (‘Dienstsiegel’) and replaces the original (‘Urschrift’) for legal purposes. See Creifelds under ‘Ausfertigung einer Urkunde; §§ 47 and 49(i) BeurkG; Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii); Chapter XXII E. Cf ‘Abschrift’ 354

Appendix A: Vocabulary

 Ausforschungsantrag  Ausführung  Ausführungsgesetz  Ausgeben  Ausgleichen  Ausgleichsforderung  Ausgleichung  Aushandeln  Aushändigung  Aushang  Aushöhlen  Aushöhlung  Auskunft  Auslage(n)  Ausland  Ausländergesetz (AuslG)  Ausländisches Recht  Auslandsunterhaltsgesetz (AUG)  Auslegen  Auslegung  Auslegung geht Anfechtung vor  Auslegungsregel  Auslieferung  Auslobung  Ausnahme  Ausnahmebemlligung  Ausnahmefall  Ausnahmegericht

application (for evidence) made only to fish for possible information. See Chapter XIII, Note 67 the administration, carrying out, execution, implementation (of); version. See Creifelds under ‘Ausführung von Gesetzen’ and Chapters V B and VII A executing, implementing law. See Chapter II, Note 34; Chapter XIII, Note 171; Chapter XXI, Note 4 and Section B. to spend (money), issue (shares) to equalize, settle (a debt) claim to equalization, balancing claim. See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 2 equalization (between heirs). See Chapter X F 4 (b) and (g) (iv) to negotiate. See Chapter X B 2 (e) hand-over, delivery (of). See Chapter XIX, Note 36 notice. See Chapter X B 2 (e) to erode. See Chapter X B 2 (e) (inner) erosion, hollowing out. See Chapter VIII, Note 13 information. See Creifelds under ‘Auskunft, behördliche’; Chapter X, Note 215; Chapter X F 4 (g); Chapter XIII, Note 96; Chapter XIV B 3; Chapter XX, Note 11; ‘Unterhalt’ disbursement(s). See Chapter XXII D 8 (d) (Note 104) abroad; foreign country. See Chapter XXI A. Cf ‘Inland’ Law regarding Foreigners. See Chapter XXI C foreign law. See Chapter XX E Foreign Maintenance Law. See Chapter XXI, Note 5. to interpret (a meaning); to advance (money) interpretation (of a meaning). See Chapter X C 2 2 (Note 105); Chapter X F 3 (c)(iii) interpretation has priority over challenge. See Chapter X, at Note 45; Chapter X F 3(c) (iii) rule of interpretation/construction. See Chapter X B 2 (c) (Failure to reach an ‘Einigung’); Chapter X F 3 (c) (iii) extradition. See Creifelds under ‘Auslieferung’; Chapter VIII C (Article 16(ii) GG); Chapter XVI, Note 3 D; Chapter XXI C public offer of reward. See Creifelds under ‘Auslobung’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 9) exception (special) approval by way of exception. See also ‘Befreiung’ and ‘Dispens’ exceptional case exceptional court (for a particular case). See Creifelds under ‘Ausnahmegeridite’ and ‘Sondergeridit’ and Chapter XXII C 3 355

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Ausnahmsweise  Ausnutzen  Ausnutzung  Ausreichend  Aussage

 Aussageverweigerungsrecht  Ausscheiden  Ausschlagung  Ausschlagungsfrist  Ausschließlich  Ausschließung

Ausschuß  Außenprüfung  Außenverhältnis  Außenwirkung  Außergerichtlich  Außerordentlich  Äußerung  Aussetzen  Aussetzung

 Aussicht auf Erfolg  Aussichtslos  Aussperrung  Ausstottung  Aussteller  Ausstrahlungswirkung

 by way of exception, exceptionally. See Chapter VII C (Note 16) to abuse, exploit. See Chapter X, Notes 58 and 220. See also ‘Mißbrauchen’ exploitation. See Chapter X B 2 (e) sufficient(ly). See Chapter XVIII, Note 14 statement, declaration. In criminal proceedings, a suspect has no duty to make a statement (‘Aussagepflicht’). Cf the position of a witness. See Creifelds under ‘Aussagepflicht’ and ‘Zeugnisvenveigerungsrecht’. See also ‘Erklärung’ right to refuse to make a statement. See ‘Aussage’; Chapter XVII, Note 38 D and H to leave; departure of member from a company. See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv); Chapter XXII D 9 disclaimer (of an inheritance). See Chapter X F 5 (a) period for disclaimer. See Chapter X F 5 (a) exclusively), sole(ly). See Creifelds under ‘Ausschließliche Gesetzgebung’ and Chapter II B exclusion. See Chapter X F 4 (f); Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv); Chapter XXII D 7 committee; board. See Chapter III, Note 3 external audit (by a tax office). See Creifelds under ‘Außenprüfung’ external relationship. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) (the term ‘Vollmacht’) external effect. Also ‘Wirkung nach außen’ extrajudicial(ly). See Chapter XXII D 8 (b); ‘Prozeßkosten’ extraordinar(il)y; summary. See ‘Kündigung’ statement, remark, utterance. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 B; Chapter XIII, Note 3; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi); Chapter XVI, Note 35. See also ‘Bemerkung’, ‘Erklärung’, ‘Stellungnahme’ to suspend, stay (proceedings) suspension, stay (eg, of proceedings, of enforcement, of  an arrest warrant). See Creifelds under ‘Aussetzung eines Verfahrens’; Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (i); Chapter XIV, Note 23 C; Chapter XVII, Note 26 C chance (prospect) of success. See Chapter XIII, Note 134 without prospect See Chapter XIIID 6 (b) 3 lock-out. See ‘Arbeitskampf’ endowment, dowry. See Chapter X F 4 (b); Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 2 issuer, drawer (eg, of a bill of exchange). See Chapter XIX Note 36 and at Note 41 radiation effect (of basic rights on private law). See Chapter VIII, Note 7. See also Chapter I, Note 10. 356

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Ausüben  Ausübung  Auswärtiges Amt  Ausweis  Ausweisung  Auswirkung  Auszahlung  Auszubildender Bankgeschäfte Bankrecht Bauantrag Baubetreuer Baugenehmigung Bauherr Baurecht Baustelle Bauträger Bauunternehmer Bayern Beamtenhaftung Beamter Bearbeiter Beauftragen Beauftragte

Bebauungsplan Bedachte Bedenken Bedeutung Bedingt durch

to exercise. See Chapter XXII D 2 and Note 59 exercise (of). See Chapter XXII, Note 59 Foreign Office. See Chapter XIV A identity card/document, pass deportation. See Chapter XXI C effect (on), repercussion. See ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’ payment out. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (‘Darlehen’) trainee. See Creifelds under ‘Berufsbildung’; Chapter XI C 2 (d); Chapter XVIII, Note 2 (a)  banking business, transactions. See Chapter X, Note 211 law of banking. See Chapter XIX application for permission to build project manager, consultant. See Creifelds under ‘Baubetreuung(svertrag)’  building consent, planning permission. See Chapter XIV C 5 the person, who commissions a particular building project, ie, the building owner, proprietor (for whom the work is undertaken)  building law. See Chapter XIX A 3  building site property developer. Like a ‘Makler’, a ‘Bauträger’ is subject to the ‘Makler-und Bauträger Verordnung’ . See Creifelds under ‘Baubetreuung(svertrag)’ and ‘Makler’  building contractor Bavaria. See Chapter V A and Chapter XXII C 2 (at Note 36) liability of civil servants. See Chapter X, Note 224 civil servant officer. See Chapter XIV C 1 (Note 12); Chapter XVII, Note 22; Chapter XXII A person dealing with/handling/responsible for a matter to appoint, instruct a person instructed/charged with doing something; an envoy. See Chapter II, Note 11; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 10). A ‘Beauftragter’ acts  on the basis of an ‘Auftrag’  and is thereby subject to comprehensive rights and obligations (§ 662ff BGB). Cf a ‘Vertreter’ (agent), who also usually acts on the basis of an ‘Auftrag’, but (additionally) in the name of the principal. (local) building plan. See Chapter XV A  beneficiary. See Chapter X F 4 (h) reservation (regarding) importance, meaning conditional on; due to. See Chapter X D 2 (iv) 357

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Bedingung Bedürfnis(prüfung) Beeinträchtigen Beeinträchtigung Befähigung Befähigungsnachweis Befangenheit Befehl Befehlend Beforderung Befreiung Befriedigung Befristet Befugnis Begehungsdelikt Beglaubigen Beglaubigte Abschrift Beglaubigung Begriff  Begriffsjurisprudenz Begründet(heit) Begründung Begründungszwang Begünstigen Begünstigend Begünstigter Behandlungsvertrag Behauptung Behauptungslast

condition (future uncertain event); can be ‘aufschiebend’ (suspensive) or ‘auflösend’ (resolutive). See Creifelds under ‘Bedingung’ and Chapter X B 2 (d) (test of) need. See Chapter XXII E to hamper, impair impairment, interference. See Chapter VIII A; Chapter VIII, Note 20 C; Chapter X, Note 266 C; Chapter X F 3 (e) capacity (to hold an office or exercise a profession), qualification. See Chapter XXII A (Note 11) and Creifelds under ‘Befähigung’ evidence of ability/capacity, certificate of qualification. See Chapter XIX A 2  bias, prejudice. See ‘Besorgnis der Befangenheit’ order. See Chapter XVI C 2 (b) (Note 34) (a VA) requiring or forbidding particular action. See Chapter XVIII H (Note 56 B) carriage, transport(ation); promotion. See Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter X, Note 166 exemption, release. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c); ‘Dispens’ satisfaction. See Chapter X D 3 (h); Chapter X F 5 (b) limited to a particular period. See ‘Kündigung’ authority, power. See Chapter II, Note 3 A crime by active conduct. See Chapter XVI C 1 (b) to certify certified copy. See ‘Abschrift’ certification. See Chapter XXII E term, concept. conceptual jurisprudence. Cf ‘Interessenjurisprudenz’ and see Chapter I (actually) well-founded(ness). Cf ‘Zulässig(keit)’, ‘Schlüssig(keit)’ and see Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) establishment (of); reasoning, reasons for duty of a court to give reasons for a decision. See Chapter XIII, Note 120 and Creifelds under ‘Begründung von Entscheidungen’ to favour favourable, advantageous. See Chapter XIV C 5  beneficiary See ‘Arztvertrag’ allegation. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 E (the) burden of allegation (‘Darlegungslast’). See Chapter XIII, Notes 10 and 67 358

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Beheben Beherrschen Behörde Beibringungsgrundsatz Beihilfe Beihtife Beiseite schaffen Beistand Beitrag Beitritt Bekanntgabe Bekanntmachung Bekenntnis Beklagter Bekräftigen Bekräftigung Belasten Belastend Belastungszeuge Beleg Belegen Belehren Belehrung Beleidigung

Beleihung Bellum omnium contra omnes Bemerkung Benachrichtigung Benachteiligung Benennen Beraten

to remedy, repair (a defect). Also ‘Beseitigen’, ‘Nachbessern’ to dominate, control, command authority. See Chapter II C and Creifelds under ‘Behörden’ see ‘Verhandlungsgrundsatz’ aiding and abetting (the commission of an offence); participation as an accessory (‘Gehilfe’) . See Creifelds under ‘Beihilfe’; § 27 StGB. Cf ‘Anstiftung’, ‘Mittäterschaft’ advisory committee, consultative council to fraudulently remove (something), ie, to place it aside with the intention of concealing it. See Chapter X F 3 (e) party’s assistant; aid, support. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv); Chapter XVII, Note 28 contribution. See Chapter X F 4 (b), Chapter XI B 1 accession. See Chapter V A. See also‘Schuldbeitritt’ notification. See Chapter XIV C 3 and cf ‘Bekanntmachung’ publication, announcement, notification. See Chapter XI C 2 (b) (Note 32). See also ‘Verkündung’, ‘Veröffentlichung’ and Creifelds under ‘Bekanntmachung’ confession, creed. See Chapter VIII C (Article 4(i) GG) defendant. See Chapter XIII (at Note 107) to affirm, confirm, corroborate, endorse (a statement) affirmation (in lieu of oath). See § 484 ZPO to burden, encumber; incriminate; debit. See Chapter X D 2 (v)  burdensome, disadvantageous. See Chapter XIV C 5 incriminating witness. See Chapter XVII, Note 29 voucher, receipt to substantiate, verify (by means of documentation) to advise, instruct, caution advice, instruction, caution. See Chapter XXII E insult (§ 185 StGB). It can consist of a ‘Werturteil’ (value judgment, opinion) and be oral or written. See Creifelds under ‘Beleidigung’; Chapters VIII, (Note 20 D), XVI B (Note 13), XVI C 2 (b) (Note 35) and XVII (Note 9) loan, secondment See Chapter II, Note 11 (a) war of all against all. See Chapter I, Note 10 comment, remark. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 B notification. See Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v) disadvantage, discrimination. See Chapter X B 2 (e); §§ 611a-612a BGB to name to advise 359

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Beratung Beratungshilfe Beratungshilfegesetz (BerHG) Berechtigter Berechtigung Berechtigungsschein Berichterstatter Berichtigung Beruf  Berufsausübung

Berufsgenossenschaft Berufshaftpflichtversicherung Berufsordnung Berufsordnungsrecht Berufspflicht Berufsrichter Berufsstand Berufsverbot Berufung Berufungsantrag Berufungsbegründung Berufungsbeklagter Berufungsfrist Berufungsgrund Berufungskläger Berufungsschrift Berufungssumme Beschädigen Bescheid Beschlagnahme

consultation. See Chapter XXII D 8 assisted legal advice (support) (for less well-off persons). Cf ‘Prozeßkostenhilfe’ Law relating to (the grant of) assisted legal advice. See Chapter XXII C 5 and D 8 person entitled; also ‘Inhaber des Rechts’ (owner of the right). See Chapter X D 2 (v) and ‘Verfügungsbefugnis’ entitlement. See Chapter XIX B (at Note 30). See also ‘Inhaberschaft’ entitlement voucher. See Chapter XXII, Note 110 (court) rapporteur correction. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 E occupation, profession. See Creifelds under ‘Beruf (freie Wahl und Ausübung)’;  Chapter VIII C; Chapter XIX A; Chapter XXII D 2 exercise of a profession. See Chapter VII C (Note 18); Chapter XXII, Note 59 occupational cooperative. See Chapter XVIII H professional liability insurance. See Chapter XXII D 4 professional code. See Chapter XXII D 5 law concerning the regulation of professional conduct. See Chapter XXII D 5 professional duty. See Chapter X, Note 222 B; Chapter XXII D 5 professional judge. See Chapter XXII A professional class. See Chapter XI A occupational ban. See Creifelds under ‘Berufsverbot’ and ‘Rechtsamvalt’ IV; Chapter XXII D 7 (general) appeal. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) appeal application. See Chapter XIIID 3 (a) particulars of appeal. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) respondent. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) time limit for lodging ‘Berufungsschrift’. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) factual and/or evidential basis for a ‘Berufung’. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) appellant. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) notice of appeal. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) appeal value, amount. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) to damage. See Chapter X F 3 (e) official notice, decision, notification (from a ‘Behörde’). See Chapter XIV, Note 12; § 113(iv) VwGO seizure (in the public law sense). See Chapter XVII B. See also ‘Einziehung’. Cf ‘Arrest’ 360

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Beschlagnahmen Beschleunigung Beschluß

Beschlussfähig Beschränken Beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit Beschränkung Beschuldigen Beschuldigter Beschwer Beschwerde Beschwerdeführer Beschwerte Beseitigen Beseitigung Besetzung Besitz Besitzkonstitut Besitzmittlungsverhältnis Besoldung Besonderer Teil (BT) Besorgnis der Befangenheit

to seize, confiscate, impound acceleration. See Creifelds under ‘Mündliche Verhandlung’ and Chapter XIII B 6 (company) resolution; (court) order, decision. See Creifelds under ‘Beschluß’, ‘Beschlußverfahreri; Chapter XI C 3 (b) (ii); Chapter XII D; Chapter XIII C D; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi); Chapter XV D competent to reach a decision, pass a resolution, constituting a quorum to limit, restrict. limited personal servitude. See Chapter X D 3 (e) limitation, restriction. See Chapter XI, Note 25; Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) (The term ‘Vollmacht’) to accuse, charge (with), incriminate. See Chapter XVII E; cf ‘Anklagen’ and ‘Vorwerfen’ suspect, person accused (of). See also ‘Verdachtigter’ and Chapter XVII E. After an ‘Anklageschrift’   is lodged: ‘Angeschuldigter’; after proceedings opened: ‘Angeklagter’ grievance, gravamen. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) complaint; can be ‘einfache Beschwerde’ (simple complaint) or ‘sofortige Beschwerde’ (immediate complaint). See Chapter XIII D 3 (c) and D 8 (b) (xi); Chapter XVII, Note 26 B complainant a person charged (to effect a disposition in a will). See Chapter X F 4 (h) to remove, dispose of, overturn. See Chapter XIII C E (Note 15). Also ‘Beheben’, ‘Nachbessern’ disposal, removal, rectification. See Chapter VIII (Note 20 C); Chapter X, Note 189 C; Chapter X D 3 (c) (iv); Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c); Chapter XV C (at Note 15) occupation, composition, constitution (eg, of a court). See Chapter XIII, Note 136; Chapter XXII, Note 5 possession(s). See Chapter X D 2 (i) and cf ‘Recht zum Besitz’. See also Chapter X, Notes 248 and 266 constructive possession (arrangement). See Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii) and ‘Sicherungsubereignung’ possession mediation relationship. See Chapter X, Note 257 see ‘Gehalt’ special part. See Chapters X C 1 and XVI A apprehension/concern/ fear /risk of bias (prejudice). A  judge or official of the business office of the court can be rejected for suspicion of bias (‘Besorgnis der Befangenheit’), if a reason exists, suitable to justify mistrust against that person’s impartiality: § 42(ii) ZPO. The rejection 361

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Besprechung Bestandskraft Bestandskräftig Bestandteil Bestätigen Bestehen Bestellen Besteller Bestellung Bestimmbar Bestimmen Bestimmt Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz Bestimmung Bestreiten Betäubungsmittelgesetz (BtMG) Beteiligter Beteiligung Beteiligungskapital Betreiben Betreuen

application/motion of challenge (‘Ablehnungsgesuch’)  must  be substantiated (§ 44(ii) ZPO). It can no longer be made once the party seeking the rejection has submitted to a hearing or has made applications (§ 43 ZPO), unless the grounds arose or became known later (§ 44(iv) ZPO). A district court judge sitting alone can grant the motion himself, if he considers it well founded. Otherwise the motion passes for decision to the ‘Landgericht’,  or, in children or family matters, to the OLG (§ 45(ii) ZPO). While the motion is pending, a judge can only undertake such procedural steps as are incapable of postponement (‘unaufschiebbar’;  § 47 ZPO). See Chapter XIII, Note 136; Chapter XXII, Note 19. discussion, meeting. See Chapter XXII D 8 (b) finally binding nature, legal force (authority) of a VA. See Chapter XIV C 4 and cf ‘Rechtskraft’ possessing ‘Bestandskraft’. See Chapter XIV C 4 part (of a ‘Sache’); component. See Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter X D 1; Creifelds under ‘Bestandteil’. Cf ‘Zubehör’ to confirm. See Chapter X B 2 (c) (Rules governing offer and acceptance) (Note 71) to exist, existence; to pass (test); insist (on) to order person who orders something, client, customer. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 7) order, appointment. See Chapter XVII C capable of specification, ascertainable. See Chapter X, Notes 65 and 237 to specify specific; definite(ly), certain(ly). See Chapter X B 2 (c) (Rules governing offer and acceptance’); Chapter X, Note 237; Chapter XIII, Note 96; Chapter XIV C 2 principle that a matter must be defined as exactly as possible. See ‘Spezialitätsgrundsatz’,  Chapter X D 2 and Chapter XVIA provision, term; specification, setting (of). See Chapter X C 3 (b) (Title 1) to dispute (facts). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) Narcotic Drugs Law. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C person involved; participant. See Chapter XIII (Note 37), Chapter XIV B 3 and Creifelds under ‘Beteiligter’ involvement, participation, shareholding), interest (in) private equity (finance) to engage in, run (a business). See Chapter XI A to look after, care for, attend to; to deal with, be in charge of  362

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Betreuer Betreuung Betrieb Betriebsänderung Betriebsbedingt Betriebspartner Betriebsrat Betriebssicherheit Betriebsübergang Betriebsoereinbarung Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) Betrug

Beugemittel Beurkunden Beurkundung Beurkundungsgesetz (BeurkG) Beurteilungsspielraum Bevollmächtigte beim Bund Bevollmächtigter Bevorzugung Bewährung Bewährungszeit

attendant, companion, guardian (of an adult). See Chapter X E (Section 3) care (and attendance), companionship. It replaced ‘Entmündigung’ after 1.1.1992. See Chapter XIII A (Note 1) actual business unit (trading or manufacturing); workplace, office, firm. See Chapter XVIII C and cf ‘Unternehmen’ change in a business. See Chapter XVIII B 4 due to circumstances in the ‘Betrieb’. See Chapter XVIII B  business partner. See Chapter XVIII D works council. See Creifelds under ‘Betriebsrat’, Chapter XVIII C and cf ‘Personalrat’ safety at the workplace. See Chapter XVIII H transfer of a business. See Creifelds under ‘Betriebsübergang’; Chapter XVIII B 4 (written) business agreement (relating to a ‘Betrieb’). See Chapter XVIII D Law relating to the constitution of a ‘Betrieb’  (1952 and 1972). See Chapter XVIIIC deceit, fraud. A person is punishable for ‘Betrug’ under § 263 StGB, if he intentionally (‘vorsätzlich’):  –  causes or upholds another person’s error/mistake (‘Irrtum’);  –  by means of deception (‘Täuschung’);  –  with the intention of obtaining an illegal pecuniary advantage (‘rechtswidrigen Vermögensvorteil’) for himself  or a third person (‘Bereicherungsabsichf’); and  –  thereby causes damage to the assets (‘Vermögen’) of the person deceived or a third person in the form of a disposition over such assets (‘Vermögensverfügung’). See Creifelds under ‘Betrug’; ‘arglistige Täuschung’; Chapter XVII, Note 38 C (officially imposed) coercive measure. See Chapter XIII, Note 190; Chapter XVIII, Note 56 A to document, authenticate, legalize. See Chapter XXII E documentation, authentication, legalization. See Chapter XXII E Law relating to ‘Beurkundungen’. See Chapter XXII E room for judgment. See Chapter XIV C 6 minister of a ‘Land’  responsible for federal matters. See Chapter V B authorised person; attorney. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) preference. See Chapter VIII C probation. See Chapter XVI D period of probation. See Chapter XVI D 363

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Beweglich Bewegliche Sache Beweis

Beweisaufnahme

Beweisbedürftig(keit) Beweisbeschluß Beweis des ersten Anscheins Beweiserhebung Beweisfällig Beweisführer Beweisgebühr Beweisgegenstand Beweiskraft Beweislast Beweislastumkehr Beweislosigkeit Beweismittel

movable (adj), mobile. See Chapter X D 1 movable (noun). Old expression: ‘Fahrnis’. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (a) evidence. It can be direct (‘unmittelbar’)   or indirect (‘mittelbar’). See Baur/Grunsky, § 14 A 1 2, Creifelds under ‘Beweis’ and ‘Indizienbeweis’. See also Chapter XIII B 7 and Chapter XIII D 2 (b) (the) taking of evidence. Also referred to as ‘Beweiserhebung’. If immediate evidence is available, the ‘Beweisaufnahme’ is ordered (‘angeordnet’) informally. Otherwise, it requires a formal ‘Beweisbeschluß’ (§ 358 ZPO). See Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 8, § 51 and, in this text, Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 9), Chapter XIII D 2 (b) and Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 99). Regarding the procedure in criminal proceedings, see §§ 244–257 StPO requiring (to be proved by) evidence (requirement). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 97) (formal) order directing the taking of evidence (‘Beweisaufnahme’) . By § 359 ZPO, it must indicate the ‘Beweisthema’, the ‘Beweismittel’ and the ‘Beweisführer’ see ‘Anscheinsbeweis’ see ‘Beweisaufnahme’ liable to supply proof. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) the party bringing evidence (‘beweisführende Partei’) evidence fee. See Chapter XXII D 8 subject of evidence. Also ‘Beweisthema’ evidential force/strength. See Chapter XXII E the burden of evidence (proof). See Chapter X, Note 126 I and J; Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) See ‘Umkehr der Beweislast’ lack (failure) of proof. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) the means by which evidence can be brought; item of  evidence. In civil proceedings, the ZPO lays down (§§ 371 – 455 ZPO) five different types of ‘Beweismittel’:  – ‘Augenscheinsbeweis’ (visual evidence);  – ‘Zeugenbeweis’ (witness evidence);  – ‘Sachuerständigenbeweis’ (expert evidence);  – ‘Urkundenbeweis’ (documentary evidence); and  –  ‘Parteivemehmung’   (examination of a party). The ‘Beweismittel’ can be introduced  –  in accordance with the principle of ‘Strengbeweis’ (strict evidence)  –  into the part of the proceedings known as the ‘Beweisverfahren’. To be compared with the principle of  ‘Strengbeweis’   is the principle of ‘Freibeweis’   (free evidence), where the court is not bound to particular ‘Beweismittel’. 364

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Beweisregel Beweisstück Beweisthema Beweisverfahren

Beweiswürdigung Bewertung Bewilligung Bewirkung Bewußt Bewusstseinsstörung Beziffern Bezirk Bezugnahme (auf) Bezugsrecht Bildung(swesen) Billig(keit) Binden Bindung Bis de eadem re ne sit actio Blutprobe Bonität Börsengang

See Creifelds under ‘Freibeweis’ and Jauernig (ZP), Book 2, Chapter 8, § 49 III and §§ 51–56. In criminal proceedings, the suspect (‘Beschuldigter’)   can make a statement (‘Aussage’), but is not a ‘Beweismittel’. See Roxin, Book I, Chapter 5, § 25 rule of evidence. See Chapter XIII B 7 item of evidence. See Chapter XVII, Note 30 see ‘Beweisgegenstand’ proceedings for the taking of evidence (by means of which a party introduces a particular ‘Beweismittel’   into the proceedings). In civil proceedings, the ‘Beweisverfahren’ commences with a ‘Beweisantritt’ (‘Beweisangebot’),  also referred to as a ‘Beweisantrag’  (application to present evidence). A ‘Beweisantrag’   can only exceptionally be refused: see Baur/Grunsky,§ 14 A III 3; § 86(ii) VwGO. Regarding the treatment of such an application in criminal proceedings see Creifelds under ‘Beweisantrag im Strafprozeß’ assessment of evidence. See Chapter XIII B 7 evaluation. See Chapter XIV, Note 33 allowance, approval, consent, licence. See Chapter XIV C 6; Chapter XXI C the effecting of. See Chapter X C 3 (Note 114); Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i) conscious. See Chapter XVI C 3 (c) disturbance of consciousness. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (i) to state in figures. See Chapter XIII, Note 96 area, district. See Chapter V B reference (to) (documents). See Chapter XIII, Note 64 drawing right (to new shares) (of a shareholder in an AG). See Creifelds under ‘Bezugsrecht’ education (system). See Chapter II, Note 7; Chapter VI, Note 5 cheap(ness); equitable, fair; equity, fairness. See Chapter X, Notes 58 A and 227 (b); Chapter XXII D 8 (e). See also ‘Unbillig’ to bind. Cf ‘Beschränken’ and ‘Knebeln’  binding, tie. See Chapter II F; Chapter X F 3 (e); Chapter XIII C G; Chapter XIV (Note 34) no action lies twice in the same matter. See Chapter XIII C E (Note 15). In criminal law: ‘Ne bis in idem’  blood sample. See Chapter XVII, Note 24 credit-rating, credit-worthiness floatation (on the Stock Market) 365

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Börsennotierung Bösgläubig(keit) Brandstiftung Briefgrundschuld Briefhypothek Bruchteil Buch Buchhypothek Bund Bundesamt für… Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz Bundesanstalt für… Bundesanstalt für Arbeit Bundesanwalt Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen Bundesbahn

Bundesbahndirektion Bundesbank

Bundesbehörde Bundeseigene Verwaltung Bundesfinanzhof (BFH) Bundesgebiet Bundesgebührenordnung für Rechtsanwälte (BRAGO) Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)

Stock Market listing, quotation (in) bad faith. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (iii) (bona fide acquisition of ownership to movables); Creifelds under ‘Böser Glaube’ arson. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C certificated land charge a mortgage, for which a mortgage certificate (‘Hypothekenbrief’) has been issued fraction, part. See Chapter X F 4 (c) Book (of a law). See eg, Chapter X A a mortgage, which takes the form of an entry in the Land Register. See Chapter X D 3 (h). Cf ‘Briefttypothek’ confederacy, federation, league. See ‘Bundesrepublik’ Federal Office for/of…See ‘Bundesoberbehörde’ Federal Office of Constitutional Protection; in Cologne. See Chapter XVII D (Note 32) Federal Institute for/of…See ‘Bundesoberbehorde’; Chapter IV Federal Institute of Employment (in Nürnberg). See Chapter II C (Note 11); Chapter IV (Note 2) federal prosecutor (at the BGH). See Chapter XVII B Federal Employment Court. See Chapter XXII C 3. The address of the court is: Hugo-Preuß-Platz 1, 99084 Erfurt. Federal Supervisory Office for the Credit System; in Berlin. See Chapter IV, Note 2 Federal Railway(s). Since 1.1.1994 a public limited company: ‘Deutsche Bahn AG’ . See Creifelds under ‘Bundesbahn’ and ‘Deutsche Bahn AG’; Chapter II, Note 15; Chapter XIV A Federal Railway Directorate. See Chapter IV Federal Bank (in Frankfurt am Main). Its activities will be phased out in the course of the establishment of the European Central Bank. See Chapter II, Note 11; Chapter IV, Note 2 (middle) federal authority eg, ‘Direktion’. See Chapter IV (own) administration by the ‘Bund’. See Chapter II C; Chapter IV; Chapter XIVA Federal Finance (Tax) Court. See Chapter XXII C 4. The address of the court is: Ismaninger Straße 109, 81675 München federal territory. See Chapter II F (Note 20); Chapter IV Federal Lawyers’ Fee Order. See Chapter XXII D 8 Federal Supreme Court. See Chapter XXII C 2. The address of the court is: Herrenstraße 45a, 76133 Karlsruhe 366

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Bundesgesetz Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS) Bundeskanzler Bundeskanzleramt Bundeskartellamt Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) Bundesminister Bundesministerium Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)

Bundesnotarordnung (BNotO) Bundesoberbehorde Bundespost Bundespräsident Bundespräsidialamt Bundesrat Bundesrechnungshof  Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht Bundesrechtsanuxiltskammer (BRAK) Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (BRAO) Bundesregierung Bundesrepublik (Deutschland) Bundesrichter Bundessozialgericht (BSG) Bundesstaat Bundestag Bundestreue

federal statute. Cf ‘Landesgesetz’ Federal Border Guard. See Chapter XVII D Federal Chancellor. See Chapter in Federal Chancellor’s Office; Chancellery; in Berlin. See Chapter IV Federal Cartel Office; in Bonn. See Chapter IV, Note 2; Chapter XIX A Federal Office of Criminal Investigation; in Wiesbaden. See Chapter XIV A; Chapter XVII D (Note 32) federal ministers). See Chapter III federal ministry. See Chapter IV; Chapter XIV A Federal Intelligence Service. It is responsible for the collection of information and data (‘Nachnchtenbeschaffung’/  ‘Datenerhebung’) regarding foreign countries. It is an upper federal authority (‘Bundesoberbehörde’)  under the control of the Federal Chancellor’s Office (‘Bundeskanzleramt’). See Creifelds under ‘Bundesnachrichtendienst’ . See also ‘Datenerhebung’ Federal Notaries Order. See Chapter XXII E upper federal authority. See Chapter IV; ‘Bundesamt für…’, ‘Bundesanstalt für…’ Federal Post Office. (Now a public limited company: ‘Deutsche Post AG’). See Chapter E, Note 15; Chapter XIV A Federal President See Chapter III Federal Presidential Office; in Berlin. See Chapter IV Federal Council. See Chapter III (Note 3) Federal Accounts Court; in Bonn. See Chapter IV federal law takes precedence (lit. breaks) the law of a ‘Land’ (Article 31 GG). See Chapters E B, VIII A and XIV A Federal Lawyers’ Chamber. It issues a magazine (the ‘BRAK   Mittettungen’) containing professional information, which is sent quarterly to members of the (regional) ‘Rechtsanwaltskammern’. See also Chapter XXII D 6 Federal Lawyers’ Order. See Chapter XXII D 1 Federal Government. See Chapter III Federal Republic (of Germany). See Chapter II A  judge of one of the supreme federal courts (see Article 95 GG) Federal Social (Security) Court. See Chapter XXII C 4. The address of the court is: Graf-Bernadotte-Platz 5, 34119 Kassel. federal state. See Chapter II A Federal Parliament. See Chapter III (duty of) federal loyalty. See Chapter II, Note 2 367

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Bundesunterbehörde Bundesverfassungsgericht Bundesverfassungs gerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG) Bundesversammlung Bundesversicherungsanstalt  für Angestellte (BfA) Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG) Bundeswehr Bundeswehrverwaltung Bundeszentralregister

Bundeszwang Bürge Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Bürgerliches Recht Bürgermeister Bürgschaft Bürgschaftserklarung Bußgeldbescheid Bußgeldverfahren Caveat emptor Cessio legis Chancengleichheit Clausula rebus sic stantibus Conditio sine qua non Constitutum possessorium Contra proferentem Corpus iuris civilis

(lower) federal authority. See Chapter IV Federal Constitutional Court. See Chapter in and Chapter VII C Law relating to the Federal Constitutional Court. See Chapter in and Chapter VII C Federal Assembly. See Chapter III Federal Institute of Insurance for Employees. See Chapter XVIII, Note 2 Federal Administrative Court. See Chapter XXII C 4. The address of the court is: Haidenbergstraße 31, 10623 Berlin (Federal) Defence Service. See Chapter XIV, Note 1 federal military administration. See Chapter XIV A Central Federal Register. It is kept by the General Federal Prosecutor (‘Generalbundesanwalt’) and contains details of  final criminal convictions and certain administrative decisions. It is located in Bonn. Information from the register can be supplied in the form of a certificate of  conduct (‘Führungszeugnis’) on personal application coercion by the ‘Bund’. See Chapter II, Note 2 and Chapter VII, Note 2 guarantor. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 18) Civil Code. See Chapter X civil law. See Chapter IX A Mayor. See also ‘Oberbürgermeister’ contract of surety, guaranty. See Creifelds under ‘Bürgschaft; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 18) and Exposé. Cf ‘Garantievertrag’ . See also ‘Selbstschuldnerische Bürgschaft’ declaration of surety. See Chapter X, Note 177 notice of (a) fine. See ‘Geldbuße’ fine proceedings. See Chapter XVI, Note 9 let the buyer beware. See Chapter X, Note 185 see ‘gesetzlicher Forderüngsubergang’ equality of opportunity. See Chapter VIII, Note 22 an (implied) clause to the effect that matters are to remain as they are. See ‘Geschäftsgrundlage’. See also SeidlHohenveldern, Part II, Chapter 2, § 22 an essential condition (for); lit a condition without which (the result is) not (possible). See ‘Äcfuivalenztheone’ see ‘Besitzkonstitut’ a principle of interpretation to the effect that a standard  business term, which is unclear, is to be construed narrowly against the person relying on it See Chapter X B 2 (e)  body (collection) of civil law. See Chapter I 368

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Culpa in contrahendo (cic)

Da mihi factun, dabo tibi ius Darlegung Darkgungslast Darlehen Darlehensgeber Darlehensnehmer Darstellung Daseinsvorsorge Daten Datenerhebung Datenschutz Dauer Dauerschuldverhältnis Deckungsverhältnis Delikt Deliktsfähigkeit Dem Grunde nach De minimis (non curat lex) Demnächst Depositengeschäft Depotgeschäft Deutscher Bund Deutsches Richtergesetz (DRiG) Diebstahl

fault/blame during (in the course of (preliminary)) negotiations. It is an (unwritten) principle developed outside the BGB and provides a remedy for fault up to the time of conclusion of a contract. Also called ‘Verschulden bei Vertragsschluß’. See Chapter X B 1 4 (Note 18) and Chapter X C 3 (a) (Note 126 D) and (b) (Note 135) see ‘Verhandlungsgrundsatz’ exposition, statement, submission see ‘Behauptungslast’ loan. See Creifelds under ‘Darlehen’; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 5) and Exposé; Chapter X, Note 235 lender. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé  borrower. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé presentation, version (of facts). See Chapter XIII, Note 67 (future) welfare provision (for members of the public). See ‘Leistungsverwaltung’ data; factual information. See Chapter XVII, Note 25 collection of data. See ‘Bundesnachrichtendienst’. Collection and processing of data is also the domain of the police— see Creifelds under ‘Datenerhebung und-verarbeitung’ data protection. See Chapter XVII, Note 25 duration. See Chapter XIX A 2 continuing/ongoing obligation. See Chapter X Note 127; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (f); Chapter XI, Note 42; Chapter XVIII, Notes 6 and 7 primary (covering) relationship. See Creifelds under ‘Deckungsverhältnis’  and cf ‘Valutaverhältnis’,   See also ‘Anweisung’ delict (civil or criminal). See Creifelds under ‘Delikt’ capacity to commit a delict. See Creifelds under ‘Deliktsfähigkeit’  and, for the position in criminal law, Chapter XVI C 3 (b) (claim) on the basic question, issue (of liability). See ‘Zwischenurteil’ the law does not bother itself with trifling matter. See ‘Unerheblich’ shortly, soon. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii) see ‘Einlagengeschaft’ a transaction of custody of securities by a bank. See Chapter X, Note 211 German Confederation. See Chapter I (Note 7) German Judges Law. See Chapter XXII A theft. Where there are no aggravating circumstances, the possible punishment is a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine: § 242 StGB. Cf ‘Unterschlagung’. See also Chapter XVII, Note 38 C 369

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Dienen Dienstaufsicht Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde Dienstbarkeit Dienstberechtigter Dienstherr Dienstleistung Dienstleistungsunternehmen Dienstsiegel Dienstvertrag Diligentia quam in suis Dinglicher Anspruch Dingliches Recht Dinglicher Verwaltungsakt Direktion Direktionsrecht Dispens Disposition Dispositionsgrundsatz Dispositiv Dissens Dolmetscher Dolus directus Dolus eventualis Dominium Doppelfunktion Do ut des Draufgabe Dringender Tatverdacht Dringlich Dritter

to serve. See Chapter XXII, Note 71 (official) supervision of conduct during service. See Chapter XXII C 6 see ‘Aufsichtsbeschwerde’ servitude. See Chapter X D 3 (e) person entitled to (the) services. See Chapter XVIII H master. Also ‘Dienstberechtigter’. See Chapter X, Note 224 service, provision/supply of a service. See Chapter X, Note 166; Chapter XI, Note 42 service enterprise/industry. See Chapter XI, Note 31 official seal. See ‘Ausfertigung’ contract of service. Cf ‘Werkvertrag’ (contract for services), ‘Arbeitsvertrag’ (contract of employment) and see Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 6) and Chapter XVIII H see ‘Sorgfalt in eigenen Angelegenheiten’ real claim. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (iv) real right, right ‘in rem’. See Chapter X D 2; Chapter X D 3 (h) real VA. See Chapter XIV C 1 directorate. See ‘Bundesbehörde’ (employer’s) right of direction. See Creifelds under ‘Direktionsrecht’; Chapter XVIII, Note 11 dispensation. See Chapter XIV C 6 and also ‘Ausnahmebewilligung’ and ‘Befreiung’ arrangement, disposition. See Chapter X, Note 135 B principle that the parties are masters of the proceedings; also ‘Verfügungsgrundsatz’ . See Chapter XIII B 3; Chapter XV D dispositive. See Chapter IX B see ‘Einigungsmangel’ interpreter. See Chapter VIII, Note 18 direct intent. See Chapter XVI C 3 (c) eventual intent. See Chapter XVI C 3 (c) see ‘Eigentum’ double (dual) function. See Chapter V B and Creifelds under ‘Doppelfunktion von Verwaltungsbehörden’. See also Chapter XVII (Note 33) I give, so that you give. See Chapter X Note 106  bonus. See Chapter X C 3 (b) (Title 4) high (urgent) suspicion that the suspect committed the offence. See Chapter XVII D (Note 38 A) urgent. See Chapter X F 5 (a) (i) third party. See, for example, Chapter X C 3 (a) and (b) 370

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Drittorganschaft Drittschuldner Drittsicherung Drittwirkung Drohung Druckschrift Dulden Duldung Duldungspflicht Duldungsvollmacht Durch Durchbrechen Durchführung Durchgriffserinnerung Durchgriffshaftung Durchschnittskunde Durchsetzung Durchsuchung Echt Echtheit Effekten Ehe Ehegatte Ehegesetz Ehelich Eheliche Lebensgemeinschaft Ehesache

(principle of the) direction (of a company) by a third party. See Chapter XI A third party debtor. See Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v) (grant of) security by a third party. See Chapter X D 3 (h) effectiveness in third party relations; effect on third parties. See Chapter VIII A threat. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (‘Nullity and challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung’); Chapter X, Note 58 C; Chapter X F 3 (c (iv) (type of) print, printed publication. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 E to allow, suffer to happen; can also mean ‘sufferance’ (noun). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (ii); Chapter XIII D 8 (d) tolerance, leave duty of toleration. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (i) allowed authority. See Chapter XIII, Note 57 through. See Chapter VIII B to break through pierce, breach. See Chapter X, Note 245; Chapter XIII C E (Note 15) implementation. See Chapter X B 2 (e) piercing ‘Erinnerung’, ie, one passed by the judge to the court. See Chapter XXII B the exceptional personal liability of members of a juristic person. See Chapter XI, Note 16 average customer. See Chapter X B 2 (e) the carrying out, enforcement realisation (of). See Chapter IX B; Chapter XXI B search (of premises or persons). See Creifelds under ‘Durchsuchung’; Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v); Chapter XVII B; Chapter XXII B. Cf ‘Untersuchung’ genuine. See Chapter XVI C 1 (b) genuineness. See Chapter XXII E securities (banking sense), stock. See Chapter XIX B (state of) marriage. See Creifelds under ‘Ehe’, Chapter VIII C and Chapter X E spouse. See Chapter X F 3 (a) (i) Marriage Law (20.2.1946). See Chapter X E legitimate (child). See Chapter X E and Creifelds under ‘Eheliche Kinder’ (community of) married life. See Chapter XI A 2. Also ‘Lebensgemeinschaft der Ehegatten’ marriage/matrimonial matter (eg, ‘Scheidung’ ). See ‘Familiensache’ and Creifelds under ‘Ehesachen’ 371

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Ehevertrag Ehre Ehrenamtlich Eid Eidesstattliche Offenbarungsversicherung Eidesstattliche Versicherung Eigenkapital Eigenschaft Eigentum

Eigentumsähnliches Recht Eigentum verpflichtet Eigentumsvorbehalt Eigentümer-Besitzer-Verhältnis Eigentümergrundschuld Eigentümerhypothek Eigenvermögen Eignungsprüfung Einberufen Einbeziehen Einbringung Einbürgerung Eindeutig Einfach Einführungsgesetz zum BGB (EGBGB) Einführungsgesetz zum GVG (EGGVG) Eingangsstempel

(matrimonial) agreement (by which spouses can regulate their property status). See ‘Güterrecht’; Chapter X, Note 23 honour. See ‘Beleidigung’; Chapter VIII, Note 20 F; Chapter XVI, Note 13 honorary, lay. See Chapter XXII A oath. See Chapter XXII B and E assurance of means in lieu of oath. See Chapter XIII D 8 (e) assurance, declaration in lieu of oath. See Creifelds under ‘Eidesstattliche Versicherung’; Chapter XIII D 8 (a) and (d); Chapter XXII E own capital (resources); equity share capital (of a company) characteristic, quality. See ‘zugesicherte Eigenschaft’ ownership; property. See Article 14(i) GG; Creifelds under ‘Eigentum’, ‘Eigentumserwerb’, ‘Eigentumsgarantie’, ‘Eigentumsherausgabeanspruch’, ‘Eigentumsstörungen’ and ‘Eigentumsübertragung’; Chapter VIII C and Chapter X D 1 and D 3 (c) quasi-proprietary right. See Chapter X, Note 231 ownership obliges (Article 14(ii) GG). See Chapter VIII C and Chapter X D 3 (c) (i) reservation of title (clause). See Creifelds under ‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’; Chapter X D 2 (iv); Chapter X Notes 245 and 264 relationship between the owner and person in possession of a ‘Sache’. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (iv) (Note 266) owner’s land charge. See Chapter X D 3 (h) owner’s mortgage. See Chapter X D 3 (h) personal assets (eg, of an heir). See Chapter X F 5 (a) and (b) aptitude test (for lawyers from other EC countries enabling admission as a ‘Rechtsanwalt’). See Chapter XXII D 3 to convene (a meeting). See ‘Vermittlungsausschuß’ to cover, include. See Chapter X, Note 135 A  bringing in. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 13) naturalisation. See Creifelds under ‘Einbürgerung’; Chapter XIV C 5 dear, definite, unequivocal. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (iii) simple; simply See ‘Gesetz’ Introductory Law to the BGB. See Chapter XX Introductory Law to the GVG. See Chapter XXII C (Note 36) date-of-receipt stamp. See Chapter XIII, Note 90 372

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Eingehen Eingetragener Verein (e.V.) Eingliedern Eingriff(e) Eingriffsbefugnis Eingriffskondiktion Eingriffsverwaltung Einheitlich Einheitsrecht Einigung Einigungsmangel Einigungsstelle Einigungsvertrag Einkommen Einlage

Einlagengeschäft

Einlassen Einlassung Einlassungsfrist Einrede Einreichung Einrichtung

to enter, go into, conclude (a matter or relationship) see ‘Verein’ to incorporate (into). See Chapter IV attack(s); interference; infringement; intervention. See Chapters VII C and VIII A see ‘Gesetzesvorbehalt’ type of ‘Nichtleistungskondiktion’,  where the recipient obtains a benefit by infringing the claimant’s rights. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 24) intervention administration. See Chapter II C (Note 12) and cf ‘Leistungsverwaltung’ uniform, united, unanimous(ly). See Creifelds under ‘Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung’; Chapter III, Note 3 and Chapter XIII D 3 (b) uniform law. See Chapter XX, Note 12 consensus, (real) agreement. See Creifelds under ‘Einigung’ and see also ‘Auflassung’, ‘Willensübereinstimmung’. See Chapter X B 2 (c) failure to reach an ‘Einigung’ (on ‘Nebenpunkt’). It can be ‘offen’ or ‘versteckt’. See Creifelds under ‘Vertrag’ I (§§ 154– 155 BGB) and Chapter X B 2 (c) conciliation body (dealing with problems in a ‘Betrieb’). See Chapter XVIII D Treaty of Union. See Chapter V, Note 1 income deposit (banking sense). Company law sense: contribution of a member to a company, stake. It can be a contribution in cash (‘Bareinlage’) or a contribution in kind (‘Sacheinlage’). It is the basis for the ‘Geschäftsanteil’ or ‘Kapitalanteil’ deposit business, ie, the acceptance of monies belonging to others (‘fremde Gelder’)   by way of deposit. Also ‘Depositengeschäft’ . It is a type of banking transaction (‘Bankgeschäft’)  undertaken by a credit institution (‘Kreditinstitut’) and is governed by the ‘Kreditwesengesetz’ to engage (in an action); to enter appearance; to respond to a writ (as defendant) engagement (in an action); entry of appearance; response to a writ (by a defendant). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) period during which an ‘Einlassung’ is possible, period for engagement (in an action). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi); Chapter XXI, Note 7 objection. See also ‘Einwendung’; Chapter X B 1 4; Chapter X B 4 Exposé; Chapter X D 3 (h); Creifelds under ‘Einrede’ lodging (of a writ). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) (public) facility, institution, amenity, establishment. See Chapter II C 373

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Einschränken Einschränkung Einschreiten Einseitig Einspruch Einspruchsgesetz Einstellen Einstellung Einstehenmüssen (für) Einstimmig Einstimmigkeitsprinzip Einstweilige Anordnung Einstweilige Verfügung Eintragung Eintritt Eintrittsprinzip Einvernehmen Einverständnis Einwanderer Einwanderung Einwendung Einwilligung Einwirkung Einwohner Einzelfall Einzelgeschäftsführung Einzelkaufmann Einzelrichter

to limit, restrict. See Chapter VIII B restriction, limitation to intervene (normally a ‘Behörde’). See Chapter XVII B one-sided, unilateral. See Chapter X B 1 7; Chapter X F 3 (e); Chapter X, Notes 31, 106 and 126 E objection, protest. See Creifelds under ‘Einspruch’. See also ‘Einwendung’, ‘Einrede’, ‘Widerspruch’ and ‘Rüge’ a proposed ‘Gesetz’, against which the ‘Bundesrat’ can object under Article 77(iii) GG, but which does not have to be approved by it. Cf ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’ to recruit, take into employment. Also to cease, stop, drop (a matter, investigation, enforcement) recruitment; cessation, suspension; attitude. See Chapters XIII D 8 (b), XVII E, XVIII E to take responsibility (be liable) (for). Also ‘Haften (für)’ and ‘Haftung’ unanimous(ly). See Chapter X F 4 (b) unanimity principle. See Chapter XI B 2; Chapter XII D temporary order. See Creifelds under ‘Einstweilige  Anordnung’; Chapter VIII B (Note 10); Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 1; Chapter XIV, Notes 23 E and 33 injunction. See Creifelds under ‘Einstweilige Verfügung’; §§ 916–945 ZPO; Chapter XIII, Note 149; Chapter XIII D 8 (d) and (f) entry (in a register); registration. See Chapter XIII D 8 (e) entry. See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iii) principle of representation (in the law of succession). See Chapter X F 3 (a) (i) see ‘Einverständnis’ agreement, consent. Also ‘Zustimmung’. See Chapter X B 2 (e) immigrant. See also ‘Siedler’ immigration. Cf ‘Zuwanderung’ objection. See Creifelds under and cf ‘Einrede’.   See also Chapter XIII, Note 97; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) (Note 107) (prior) consent. See ‘Rechtfertigungsgrund’ effect, influence, nuisance. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (i) inhabitant, resident (of a local authority). See Chapter II C; Chapter VI (specific, particular) individual case individual management (ie, by particular persons). See Chapter XI B sole trader. See Chapter XI A single judge. See Creifelds under ‘Einzelrichter’; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i); Chapter XXII, Note 37. See also ‘Strafrichter’ 374

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Einziehung Elterliche Sorge Eltern Empfänger Empfängerhorizont Empfangsbedürftig Empfangsbekenntnis Endgültig Endurteil Engste Verbindung Enteignung Enterbung

Entfaltung Entgelt(lich) Entlassung Entlastungsbeweis Entschädigung Entscheidung Entscheidungserheblich (Sich) Entschuldigen Entsorgung Entsprechen Entsprechende Anwendung Entwurf  Entziehung

confiscation; forfeiture (of a ‘Gegenstand’); revocation, withdrawal. See Chapter X, Note 343; Chapter X F 5 (d); Chapter XVI D. See also ‘Beschlagnahme’ parental care. See Creifelds under ‘Elterliche Sorge’ and Chapter X E parents. See Chapter X B 2 (a) recipient the recipient’s point of view. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Interpretation of a ‘Willenserklärung’) requiring receipt. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Validity of a ‘Willenserklärung’) acknowledgement of receipt. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii) and D 2 (i) final(ly) final judgment. See ‘Urteil’ closest connection. See Chapter XX D expropriation, dispossession, compulsory acquisition. See Creifelds under ‘Enteignung’;  Chapter VII C (Note 18); Article 14(iii) GG disinheritance. See Creifelds under ‘Enterbung’; Chapter X B 4 (c); Chapter X F 4 (f); § 1938 BGB. Cf ‘Entziehung des Pflichtteils’ (withdrawal of compulsory portion): §§ 2333– 2336 BGB development, unfolding. See Chapter VIII C charge, remuneration; for money, reward. See Chapter X, Note 166; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 10) dismissal (of an employee), lay-off, redundancy. See ‘Kündigung’ exonerating evidence. See Chapter X, Notes 126 I and 135 A; Chapter XVII, Note 38 H compensation (eg, for ‘Enteignung’; for other examples see Creifelds under ‘Entschädigung’). Cf ‘Schadensersatz’ decision. See Creifelds under ‘Entscheidung’, ‘Bescheid’; Chapter XIII C A; Chapter XXI A significant for/vital to a decision. See Chapter VII, Note 12; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) to apologise, excuse (oneself) disposal. See Chapter VI, Note 4 to correspond (to), be commensurate (with) corresponding (analogous) application, application by analogy. See ‘Analogie’ draft (of a document) withdrawal (of a right or licence to do something). See Chapter X F 4 (g) (v); Chapter XVI D. Cf ‘Enterbung’ 375

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Entziehungsanstalt Enumerationsprinzip Erbbaurecht

Erbe Erbeinsetzung Erbengemeinschaft Erbfähigkeit Erbfall Erbfolge Erblasser Erbrecht Erbschaft Erbschaftskauf  Erbschein Erbteil Erbunwürdig(keit) Erbvertrag Erbverzicht Erfolg Erfolgreich Erfolgsdelikt Erfolgshaftung Erfolgshonorar Erfolgsort Erfolgsqualifiziertes Delikt Erforderlich Erforschen Erfüllung

(drug) rejection institution. See Chapter XVI D enumeration principle. See Chapter VII C (Note 10) heritable building right It is an heritable right to erect/keep a building on a piece of land and is granted to a person for a certain period. An ‘Erbbaurecht’ is treated as a real right. It is comparable to a legal (building) easement in English law. See Creifelds under ‘Erbbaurecht’ and Chapter X D 3 (d) heir, beneficiary. See Creifelds under ‘Erbe’ and Chapter X F appointment as heir. See Chapter X F 4 (c) community between heirs. See Chapter X F 4 (b); Chapter XI A 3; Creifelds under ‘Erbengemeinschaft’ capacity to inherit. See Chapter X F 3 (a) (i) event of succession, death. See also ‘Tod’ succession. See Creifelds under ‘Erbfolge’ and Chapter X F. See also ‘Rechtsnachfolge’ testator. See Creifelds under ‘Erblasser’; Chapter X F 2 law of succession; right of inheritance. See Creifelds under ‘Erbrecht’, Chapter X F and Article 14(i) GG estate, inheritance. See ‘Nachlaß’   and Creifelds under ‘Erbschaft’ purchase of an ‘Erbschaft’. See Chapter X F certificate of inheritance, probate. See Creifelds under ‘Erbschein’; Chapter X F 1 and 5 (d); Chapter XXII E part, share of an estate. See Chapter X F 3 (a) (ii) and 5 (d) unworthy(iness) to inherit. See Chapter X F 4 (f) contract of succession, estate contract. See Creifelds under ‘Erbvertrag’; Chapter X F 3 (b) and (e); Chapter XXII B and E waiver of inheritance. See Creifelds under ‘Erbverzicht’; Chapter X F 4 (f) success; (particular) result. See Chapter X, Note 166 and Chapter XVI C 1 (a) successful crime requiring a particular result. See Chapter XVI C 1 (a) liability for the result success fee. See Chapter XXII, Note 97 the place at which the (particular) result occurs. See Chapter XX, Note 24 a (qualified) offence, which attracts a heavier punishment in the event of certain consequences. See Chapter XVI, Note 19 necessary. See Chapter VIII B to investigate, explore. See Chapter XVII D performance, fulfilment. See Creifelds under ‘Erfüllung’ and Chapter X C 3 (a) and (c) (Title 1) 376

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Erfüllungsgehilfe

Erfüllungsort Erfüllungsortvereinbarung Erfüllungsübernahme Ergänzende Auslegung Ergänzung Ergreifungsort Erheblich Erhebung Erinnerung

Erkennbar Erkenntnisverfahren Erkennungsdienstliche  Maßnahmen Erklären Erklärung Erklärung mit Nichtwissen Erklärungsbewußtsein Erklärung über persönliche und wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse Erlaß Erlaubnis Erlaubnisvorbehalt

completion assistant, ie, a person who assists in the performance of an obligation (§ 278 BGB). An independent sub-contractor can be an ‘Erfüllungsgehilfe’. See Chapter X, Notes 126 H and 135 A; Chapter XXII, Note 74; Creifelds under ‘Erfüllungsgehilfe’. Cf ‘Verrichtungsgehilfe’ see ‘Leistungsort’ agreement regarding the ‘Erfüllungsort’. See Chapter XXII Note 74 (internal) promise of performance (between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ debtor). See Chapter X, Note 136 supplementary interpretation. See Chapter X, Note 47; Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter X F 3 (c) (iii) supplement. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (d) place of seizure (of a suspect). See Chapter XVII, Note 37 substantial, considerable. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 97) making, raising (of a complaint); issue (of a writ); levying (eg, of taxes). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) legal remedy eg, against decision of a ‘Rechtspfleger’ . It goes initially back to the ‘Rechtspfleger’ and then to the judge. See § 11 RPflG; Chapter XIII, Note 141. Cf  ‘Durchgriffserinnerung’ and ‘Vollstreckungserinnerung’. See also Creifelds under ‘Erinnerung’ apparent, recognisable. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Interpretation of a ‘Willenserklärung’); Chapter X, Note 135 A; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) proceedings leading to a judgment, judgment proceedings. See Chapter XIII C A, Chapter XVII (Note 20) and cf  ‘Vollstreckungsverfahren’ measures to ascertain identity (of a suspect). See Chapter XVII, Note 24 to declare; explain declaration, statement; explanation. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (The term ‘Willenserklärung’ ). See also ‘Aussage’, ‘Äußerung’ declaration of ignorance. See Chapter XIII D1 (g) (i) consciousness of (making) a declaration. See Chapter X (Note 38) declaration regarding personal and economic circumstances (for the purposes of an application for legal aid (‘Prozesskostenhilfe’)) remission (of debt); decree; issue (of a VA). See Chapter X C 3 (c) (Title 4), Chapter X, Note 241 and Chapter XV B permission, allowance, leave, authority. See Creifelds under ‘Erlaubnis (behördliche)’; Chapter XIV C 6; Chapter XIX A 2. See also ‘Ermessen’ reservation of the right to grant an ‘Erlaubnis’ 377

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Erledigen Erlöschen Ermächtigung

Ermächtigungsgesetz Ermächtigungsgrundlage Ermessen Ermessensfehler Ermessensmißbrauch Ermessensnichtgebrauch Ermessensreduzierung (auf Null) Ermessensüberschreitung Ermessensunterschreitung Ermittlung Ermittlungsrichter Ernennung Ernsthaft Eröffnen Eröffnung Eröffnungsverfahren Erörterungsgebühr Erpressung Errichten Errichtung Error in obiecto

to complete, conclude, finish (off), settle, sort out. See Chapter XIV, Note 19 to become extinct, discharged, end; extinction, discharge, end (of). See Chapter X C 3 (c) authorisation; authority (to exercise a particular right); empowerment. See Creifelds under ‘Ermächtigung’, Chapter VIII B and Chapter X, Note 243. See also ‘Vollmacht’ and ‘Zustimmung’ Enablement Law. See Chapter II (Note 5) see ‘Gesetzesvorbehalt’ discretion. Can be ‘gebunden’ or ‘frei’. See Creifelds under ‘Ermessen (Verwaltungsermessen)’ and Chapter XIV C 6. Cf  ‘Unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff’ faulty exercise of ‘Ermessen’ . ‘Ermessensfehler’   by the executive can be checked by the VG (§ 114 VwGO). See Chapter XIV C 6 abuse of ‘Ermessen’. See Chapter XIV C 6 non-use of ‘Ermessen’. See Chapter XIV C 6 reduction of ‘Ermessen’ (to zero). See Chapter XIV C 6 excess of ‘Ermessen’. See Chapter XIV C 6 under-use of ‘Ermessen’; also called ‘Ermessensnichtgebrauch’ investigation, inquiry. See Creifelds under ‘Ermittlungsverfahren in Strafsachen’; Chapter XVI, Note 40; Chapter XVII B investigative judge. See Chapter XVII, Note 23 appointment, nomination (as a ‘Beamter’  or to a public office). See Creifelds under ‘Ernennung’; Chapter XIV C 5; Chapter XXII A serious(ly) to open (proceedings) opening (eg, of a will by the Probate Court). See Chapter X F 5 (e) (interim) proceedings dealing with the opening of main (criminal) proceedings. Also called ‘Zwischenverfahren’ . See Chapter XVII E (Note 43) (lawyer’s) fee for (merely) raising a matter. See Chapter XXII D8  blackmail, extortion. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C to set up, form establishment, formation, execution (of a will). See Chapter X F 3 (c) (i); Chapter XI B 3 (b) an error regarding the object of a criminal act; it has no effect on the ‘Schuld’ of the ‘Täter’. Cf ‘Aberratio ictus’ 378

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Error in persona Ersatzerbe Ersatzvornahme Ersatzzustellung Erscheinen Erschöpfung des Rechtswegs Ersetzen Ersitzung Erstarken Erstatten Erteilen Erteilung Ertrag Erwachsener Erwägung Erwartung Erweiterung Erwerb Erwerber Erwirkung Erzeugnis Erziehungsmaßregel Essentialia negotii Europäische Gemeinschaft(en) (EG) Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (EuMRK) Europäisches Übereinkommen über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die Vollstreckung gerichtlicher Entscheidungen in Zivil—und  Handelssachen (EuGVÜ)

an error regarding the person against whom a criminal act is committed; it has no effect on the ‘Schuld’ of the ‘Täter’. Cf ‘Aberratio ictus’ substitute heir. See Chapter X F 4 (d) substituted execution (of a measure by an authority). See Chapter XVIII H substituted service. See Creifelds under ‘Ersatzzustellung’ and Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) (Note 89) to appear, appearance exhaustion of normal legal channels. See Chapter VII C (Note 14) to replace acquisition of ownership to movables through the passage of time, prescription. See Creifelds under ‘Ersitzung’ and Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii) to strengthen (into). See Chapter X D 2 (iv) to refund, replace. Also to file (an ‘Anzeige’). See Chapter XVII A to grant (a licence or permission). See Chapter X, Note 343; Chapter XIV C 6 grant, issue. See Chapter X F 5 (d) yield, output, return (on investment). Also ‘Rendite’ adult, grown-up consideration. See Chapter VIII, Note 22 expectation. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (iv) addition; extension. See Chapter X B 2 (e) acquisition. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii) and (iii) transferee; acquiror procurement, obtaining (of). See Chapter XIII, Note 39 product, produce. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (iii) (Statutory acquisition of ownership to movables) educational measure. See Chapter XVI, Note 40 see ‘Wesentliche Bestandteile’ European Community(ies). Established in parallel with the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 7.2.1992 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See Chapter II, Note 34; Chapter VIII, Note 18 European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters (the Brussels Convention 1968; amended by conventions signed in San Sebastian and Lugano in 1988 and 1989). It was incorporated into UK law by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (and 1991). In Germany, it is implemented by AVAG. 379

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Europäische Union (EU)

Europäisches Übereinkommen über das auf vertragliche Schuldver hältnisse anzuwendende Recht (EVÜ) Europäische Wirtschafts gemeinschaft (EWG) Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) Eventualantrag Existenzgründer Ex nunc Ex tunc Fabrikant Fachanwalt Fachkräfte für Arbeitssicherheit Fahrerlaubnis Fahrlässigkeit Fahrnis Fahrverbot Faktisches Arbeitsverhältnis Faktischer Vertrag Faktische Vollziehung Fall Fällig Fälligkeit Fallrecht Falsa demonstratio (non nocet)

See Chapter X, Note 8; Chapter XIII, Notes 28,148 and 171; Chapter XXI, Note 13; Chapter XXII, Note 74 European Union. Established by the Maastricht Treaty of  7.2.1992 (as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty of  2.10.1997) and based on the European Community. See Preface; Chapter XIV A; Chapter XXI European Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (the Rome Convention). See Chapter XX, Note 12 European Economic Community (EEC). Originally established by the EEC Treaty of 27.3.1957. Now known as the European Community. See Chapter XIX European Central Bank (in Frankfurt am Main). Its forerunner was the European Monetary Institute. See Creifelds under ‘Europäisches Währungsinstitut’. See also ‘Bundesbank’ See ‘Hilfsantrag’ person starting up in business. See Chapter XVIII, Note 2 from now on, for the future. See Chapter X, Note 138; Chapter XIV, Note 23 C Cf ‘Ex tunc’ from then, from the start, retrospectively. See Chapter X, Note 48. See also ‘Rückwirkend’ manufacturer. See also ‘Hersteller’ specialist lawyer. See Chapter XXII D 5 qualified work safety personnel. See Creifelds under ‘Fachkräfte für Arbeitssicherheit’ and Chapter XVIII H driving licence. See Creifelds under ‘Fahrerlaubnis’; Chapter XVI D; ‘Führerschein’ negligence. See Chapter X, Note 219; ‘Verschulden’; ‘Schuld’ see ‘Bewegliche Sache’ driving ban. See Creifelds under ‘Fahrverbot’ and Chapter XVI (Note 63) factual (de facto) employment relationship. See Chapter XVIII, Note 7 factual (de facto) contract. See Chapter X, Note 70 factual enforcement. See Chapter XIV, Note 23 C case; matter due (for performance, payment) time at which a ‘Leistung’ (debt, payment) is due; maturity. See Chapter X (Note 98); Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé ‘Darlehen’; ‘Leistungszeit’; ‘Verzug’ case-law (system). See Chapter I, Note 6; Chapter XXII, Note 45; Creifelds under ‘Fallrecht’ and cf ‘Präjudizien’ a false description of an item (does not harm). See Creifelds under ‘falsa demonstratio non nocet’; Chapter X, Note 46; cf  § 155 BGB 380

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Falsche Verdächtigung Falschlieferung Fälschung Falsus procurator Familie Familiengericht Familienrecht Familiensache Fehler(haft) Fehlerfrei Fernabsatzgesetz (FernAbsG) Fernmeldegeheimnis Fernmeldeverkehr Fertigstellungsbescheinigung Fest Festnahme Festsetzen Feststellen Feststellend Feststellung Feststellungsklage Filiale Finanzamt Finanzbehörde Finanzgerichtsbarkeit Finanzgerichtsordnung (FGO) Finanzhilfe Finanzierungsleasing Finanzwesen

false suspicion. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 E wrong delivery See Chapter X, Note 185 B. Cf ‘Sachmangel’ forgery See ‘Vertreter ohne Vertretungsmacht’ family. See Creifelds under ‘Familie’ and Chapter VIII C Family Court. See Creifelds under ‘Familiengericht’; Chapter XXI, Note 4; Chapter XXII (Note 73) family law, right. See Chapter X B 1 4 and E family matter (dealt with by the ‘Familiengericht’ (Family Court): § 23b GVG). See Creifelds under ‘Familiensachen’ and Chapter XIII D 1 (e) fault(y), mistake. Also ‘Mangel(haft)’. See §§ 459, 537–538 and 633 BGB; Chapter X, Notes 126 J and 189; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c); Chapter XIV C 3 free of faults, perfect. See Chapter XIV B 6 Law concerning Long-Distance Transactions. See Chapter X, Exposé (after § 515 BGB) telecommunication secrecy. See Article 10(i) GG and Creifelds under ‘Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis’ telecommunications (traffic). See Chapter XVII, Note 25 certificate of completion. See § 641a BGB fixed; tight. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé ‘Darlehen’ (physical) arrest; also ‘Verhaftung’. Cf ‘Arrest. See Chapter XVII D to determine, fix, stipulate to ascertain, conclude, establish, declare ascertaining, establishing, effecting a declaration (as to particular circumstances). See Chapter XIV C 5 ascertainment, conclusion, finding, establishment, declaration (of). See Chapter XX E writ claiming the ‘Feststellung’  of a legal relationship or particular rights. See Creifelds under ‘Feststellungsklage’ and Chapters XIII D 2 (c) (ii) and XV B see ‘Niederlassung’ tax office. It is a lower authority of a ‘Land’. See Creifelds under ‘Finanzamt’ and Chapter IV tax authority finance jurisdiction. See Chapter XXII C 4 and Creifelds under ‘Finanzgerichtsbarkeit’ Finance Courts Order. See Chapter XXII C 4 financial aid, subsidy, grant See Chapter V, Note 6 financed leasing. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (b) finance system. See Chapter VII A and Creifelds under ‘Finanzwesen’

381

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Firma Fiskalisch Fiskus Fixgeschäft Fluchtgefahr Folge Folgenbeseitigung Folgesache Forderung Förderung Formell Formelles Recht Formkaufmann Formlos Formularvertrag Fortdauer der Haft Fortsetzungsfeststellungsklage Fortsetzungsklausel Forum non conveniens

Fracht Frachtführer Fragen Fraktion Franchisegeber Franchisenehmer Freibeweis

(trade) firm (name); also called ‘Handelsfirma’. See Chapter XI B 2 (b) and Creifelds under ‘Firma’ fiscal(ly). See Chapter II C and cf ‘hoheitlich’ the state (as a fiscal entity). See Chapter X F 3 (a) (i) and X F 5 (e) time-fixed transaction. See Chapter X C 3 (b) danger of flight, absconding (by the suspect). See Chapter XVII D (Note 38 B) consequence, result disposal of consequences. See Chapter XIV, Note 23 C; Chapter XV C ancillary matter. See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) demand, (contractual) claim. See Chapter X C 3 (a); Chapter X D 3 (h) advancement, promotion formal(ly) formal law. See Chapter IX B  businessman by reason of form. See Chapter XI B 2 (a) informal(ly). See Chapter XIV B 3 standard-form contract. See Chapter X B 2 (e) continuation of custody. See Chapter XVII, Note 26 D type of ‘Feststellungsklage’ to establish or declare that a past VA was illegal. See Chapter XV B continuation clause (in company agreement). See Chapter XI B 3 (b) (iv) the forum is not appropriate, ie, another forum is more suitable. The doctrine is of importance in English law (inter alia, to discourage ‘forum shopping’ by plaintiffs) when an application is made to stay an action in England or for permission to serve proceedings outside the jurisdiction of the English courts (formerly, under RSC, Order 11, now under the CPR). In Germany, the doctrine is only very rarely invoked, as an exception to German (international)  jurisdiction. See Rosenberg/Schwab, § 20 III; Chapter XIII, Notes 28 and 101 freight. See Chapter XI B 5 freighter. See Creifelds under ‘Frachtführer’ and Chapter X D 3(h) (Note 280) to ask; questions parliamentary grouping. See Chapter VII C (Note 19) franchisor. See Chapter XI, Note 42 franchisee. See Chapter XI, Note 42 (the principle of) free evidence. See Chapter XX E. Cf  ‘Strengbeweis’ and see ‘Beweismittel’ 382

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Freibleibend Freier Beruf  Freier Mitarbeiter Freiheit Freiheit der Kunst, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre Freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung Freiheitsentziehung Freiheitsrecht(e) Freiheitsstrafe Freiwillig Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit Freizeichnungsklausel Freizügigkeit Fremd Fremde Geschäfte Fremdsprache Friedenspflicht Frist Fristlos Fristsetzung mit  Ablehnungsandrohung Fristverlängerung Früchte Früher erster Termin Führerschein Führungsaufsicht Führungszeugnis Fund

subject to availability, subject remaining unsold. See Chapter X B 2 (c) free profession; eg, a ‘Rechtsanwalt’. See Chapter XIX A 2; Chapter XXII D 2; Creifelds under ‘Freie Berufe’ freelance assistant. See Chapter XVIII, Note 2 freedom. See Creifelds under ‘Freiheit, persönliche’ and Chapter VIII C freedom of art, science, research and teaching. See Creifelds under ‘Kunst, Freiheit der’, ‘Wissenschaft, Freiheit der’ and ‘Lehrfreiheit’; Chapter VIII C  basic order of freedom and democracy. See Creifelds under ‘Grundordnung, freiheitliche demokratische’ and Chapter II G deprivation of freedom, detention (in custody). See Creifelds under ‘Freiheitsentziehung’, Chapter VIII C (Note 36) and Chapter XVII D freedom right(s). See Chapter VIII A imprisonment; can be ‘zeitig’ or ‘Iebenslang’. See Chapter XVI B and D; Chapter XXI, Note 1 voluntarily. See Chapter XXII, Note 101 non-contentious (voluntary) civil jurisdiction. See Chapter XIII, Notes 32 and 37; Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 2; Chapter XXII C 2 exclusion clause. See Chapter X B 2 (e) freedom of movement. See Creifelds under ‘Freizügigkeit’; Article 11(i) GG; ‘Verkehr’ foreign, alien, belonging to others. other persons’ business. See Chapter X B 4 foreign language. See Chapter VIII, Note 18 duty of employer and ‘Betriebsrat’ to maintain peace in the ‘Betrieb’. See Creifelds under ‘Friedenspflicht’  and see Chapter XVIII D (c) and G time-period; notice period; deadline; time limit. See Creifelds under ‘Frist’; Chapter X B 3; Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (iii); Chapter XIII, Note 90; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) without notice. See ‘Kündigung’ setting of a deadline with a threat of rejection (if the deadline is not observed). See § 326 BGB extension of time (period). See Chapter XIII, Note 129 fruits. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (b) initial (oral) hearing. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) driving licence (ie, the actual document). Also ‘Fahrerlaubnis’ supervision of conduct. See Chapter XVI D (Note 80) certificate of conduct. See ‘Bundeszentralregister’ finding of lost property. See Creifelds under ‘Fund’ and 383

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Für Recht erkennen

Fürsorgepflicht Fusion Garantenpflicht Garantievertrag Gastwirt(schaft) Gattungsschuld Gebietskörperschaft Gebotsnorm Gebrauch Gebrauchsmuster Gebrauchsüberlassung Gebühr(en) Gebührenstreitwert Gebührenüberhebung Gebührenunterschreitung Geeignet Gefahr Gefahrenabwehr Gefahr im Verzug

Gefahrenquelle

Chapter X D 3 (c) (iii) (statutory acquisition of ownership to movables) to adjudge as law, to find to be right. The judgment of a court is always preceded by the statement that the court finds a particular decision to be right. The phrase is part of  the heading of the judgment (‘Urteilskopf’). It is followed  by the actual tenor of the decision (‘Urteilsspruch’ or ‘Urteilstenor’). See ‘Urteil’. duty of care (towards someone). See Chapter XIII, Note 69; Chapter XVIII, Notes 3 and 61 amalgamation, fusion, merger. Also ‘ Verschmelzung’, ‘Zusammenschluß’ a special legal duty to act to prevent an ‘Unterlassungsdelikt’. See Chapter XVI C 1 (b) contract of guarantee, indemnity. Cf ‘Bürgschaft’. See Chapter X Note 177; ‘Schadloshalten’ inn (keeper). See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 13) generic debt. See Creifelds under ‘Gattungsschuld’ and Chapter X, Notes 116, 126 F and 234 territorial corporation. See Chapter II (Notes 1 and 11) (criminal) norm commanding that (requiring) certain action (to) be carried out. See Chapter XVI C 1 (b) use. industrial/technical design. Like a patent, it must be a ‘new Erfindung’ (new invention) to be registrable. See Creifelds under ‘Gebrauchsmuster’ and ‘Erfindung’; Chapter XIX A grant of use. See Chapter X, Note 159; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (a) fee(s). See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsanwaltsgebühr’  and see also ‘Gerichtskosten’ and Chapter XXII D 8 ‘Streitwert’ for the purpose of court fees. See Chapter XIII D 1 (e) overcharging. See Chapter XXII D 5 undercutting (of fees). See Chapter XXII, Note 101 suitable. See Chapter VIII B danger, threat risk. Also ‘Gefährdung’ (the) warding-off of dangers. See Creifelds under ‘Gefahrenabwehr’; Chapter XVII D (Note 32); Chapter XXII (Note 50) in a case of urgency; lit. danger in delay. ‘Gefahr im Verzug’  justifies immediate intervention where the purpose of the measure (‘Zweck der Maßnahme’)   would be thwarted (‘vereitelt’) by waiting. See Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v); Chapter XIV C 3 (Note 23 B); Chapter XVII, Notes 23 and 36; Chapter XXII, Note 26 source of danger. See Chapter X Note 222 B 384

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Gefahrtragung Gefahrübergang Gefährden Gefährdungshaftung Gefälligkeit(sverhältnis) Gegenbeweis Gegendarstellung Gegenleistung Gegennorm Gegenrecht Gegenseitiger Vertrag Gegenseitigkeit Gegenstand Gegenstandswert Gegenüberstellung Gegenvorstellung Gegenwärtig Gehalt Geheimhaltung Geheimhaltungspflicht Gehemmt Geistesschwäche Geldbuße Geldforderung Geldschuld Geldstrafe Geltend machen Gemeinde

carriage of risk. See Chapter X, Note 126 G transition of risk. See Chapter X, Note 126 G to endanger, threaten strict liability. See Chapter X C 3 (a) (Note 126 D); Chapter X, Note 222 E; Chapter XVI C (Note 17) (relationship of grace and) favour. See Chapter X C 3 (a) (Note 115) and (g) (Note 166) counter-evidence. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10); Chapter XXII E. Cf ‘Hauptbeweis’ response. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 E counter-performance. See Chapter X C 3 (a) counter-norm. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) counter-right, defence. See Chapter X B 1 4 mutual, reciprocal (synallagmatic) contract. See Chapter X (Notes 106 and 126 F). See also Creifelds under ‘Gegenseitiger Vertrag’ and Chapter X C 3 (b) (Title 2) reciprocity. See Chapter XXI C thing; matter. See Creifelds under ‘Gegenstand’ and Chapter XB13 value of the matter (for the fees of a ‘Rechtsanwalt’; can follow the ‘Streitwert’ or ‘Geschäftswert’). See Creifelds under ‘Gegenstandswert’ and Chapter XXII D 8 identity parade. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 H counter-response. See Chapter XV A; Chapter XXII, Note 19 present(ly), current(ly). See Chapter VII C salary. Of public officials: ‘Besoldung’ (maintenance of) secrecy. See Chapter XIV B 3 duty of secrecy. See Creifelds under ‘Berufsgeheimnis’; Chapter XXII D 5 prevented from taking effect/running. See ‘Verjährung’ and ‘Aufschiebende Wirkung’ imbecility. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (i) fine (punishment for ‘Ordnungswidrigkeit’ ). See Chapter XVI B (Note 9) money claim. See Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (i) money debt. See Chapter X, Note 116; Creifelds under ‘Geldschuld’. See also ‘Leistungsort’ fine (punishment for ‘Straftat’). See Chapter XVI B and D and cf ‘Geldbuße’ to assert, exercise (a claim, right). See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i); Chapter XIX B (at Note 27) local authority (below a ‘Kreis’), commune. See Creifelds under ‘Gemeinde’ and Chapter VI 385

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Gemeindebezirk Gemeindeordnung Gemeinderat Gemeindeverband Gemeindevertretung

Gemeindeverwaltung Gemeingefährliche Straftaten Gemeinsam Gemeinsamer Ausschuß Gemeinsamer Senat der obersten Gerichtshöfe des Bundes Gemeinschaft nach Bruchteilen Gemeinschaft(lich) Gemeinschaftsaufgabe

Gemeinschaftsunternehmen Gemeinschaftswert Genau Genehmigen Genehmigung Generalbundesanwalt Generalklausel Generalstaatsanwalt Genossenschaft Gerecht(igkeit) Gericht

 borough. See Chapter VI, Note 1 local government law governing the ‘Gemeinden’ in a ‘Land’. See Chapter VI see ‘Gemeindevertretung’ ‘Gemeinde’   association. See Creifelds under ‘Kommunalverbände’ 1nd Chapter VI (Note 1) legislative organ of a ‘Gemeinde’, assembly of ‘Gemeinde’, (municipal) assembly of ‘Gemeinde’ representatives, (town) council/parliament. See also ‘Gemeinderat’, ‘Stadtverordnetenversammlung’ and Chapter VI administration, executive of a ‘Gemeinde’. See ‘Oberbürgermeister’ offences involving danger to the public (at large). See Chapter XVI B (Note 14)  joint(ly). See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 2. (emergency) joint council. See Chapters III and VII A  Joint Senate of the Supreme Federal Courts. See ‘Einheitlich’ community by shares (§ 741ff BGB). See Creifelds under ‘Gemeinschaft’, Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 15) and Chapter XI A 2. See also ‘Miteigentum nach Bruchteilen’ community; jointly. Can be ‘zur gesamten Hand’ (‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’) or ‘nach Bruchteilen’. See Chapter XI A and B  joint matter, (community) task. The ‘Bund’ can cooperate in the fulfilment of certain ‘Gemeinschaftsaufgaben’, where this is necessary to improve living conditions. See Creifelds under ‘Gemeinschaftsaufgaben’ and Chapter VII A (Note 6)  joint venture. See Eisenhardt, Chapter 12 (§ 52). See also ‘Unternehmensvertrag’ community value. See Chapter XVI B exact(ly). See Chapter XIII, Note 96 to approve, allow approval, permission. See Chapter X B 2 (a) and (b) (Note 35); Chapter XIV C 6; Chapter XIX A 2 general federal prosecutor (at the BGH); federal attorneygeneral. See Chapter XVII B general clause (eg, § 40(i) VwGO). See Creifelds under ‘Generalklausel’ general state prosecutor (at the OLG). See Chapter XVII B cooperative (association/society). See Creifelds under ‘Genossenschaft’ and Chapter XI, Note 5. See also ‘Vorstand’  just(ice). See Creifelds under ‘Gerechtigkeit’. Cf ‘Recht’ court. See Creifelds under ‘Gericht’ and Chapter XXII C 386

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Gerichtlich Gerichtsbarkeit

Gerichtsbescheid Gerichtskosten Gerichtskostengesetz (GKG) Gerichtsperson Gerichtsstand Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung Gerichtsverfassung Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) Gerichtsvollzieher Gerichtszahlstelle Geringfügig(keit) Gesamthänder Gesamthandseigentum Gesamthandsgemeinschaft Gesamthandsvermögen Gesamtrechtsnachfolge Gesamtschuld Gesamtschuldner Gesamtstaat Gesamtstrafe Geschäft Geschäftsanteil

Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag

Geschäftsfähig(keit)

 judicial(ly), by the court particular (court) jurisdiction (according to branch (‘Zweig’)); also (functionally) the exercise (‘Ausübung’)  of the administration of justice (‘Rechtspflege’). See Creifelds under ‘Gerichtsbarkeit’ and Chapter XXII C. Cf ‘Zuständigkeit’ see Chapter XV D court fees. Part of the ‘Prozeßkosten’. See Creifelds under ‘Gerichtskosten’ and Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) Court Fees Law. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) and Chapter XXII D 8 member of court personnel. See Chapter XIII D 1 (b) (place of) local jurisdiction (‘örtliche Zuständigkeit’), venue. See ‘Zuständigkeit’ agreement on jurisdiction. See Chapter XX D 2; Chapter XXII, Note 74 constitution of the court(s). See Creifelds under ‘Gerichtsverfassung’ Law relating to the Constitution of the Courts. See Chapter XIII D 1 (e) and Chapter XXII C 2 (court) bailiff. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii), Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) and D 8 (c) (v) and Creifelds under ‘Gerichtsvollzieher’ court cashier’s office insignificant; insignificance. See Chapter XVII E (Note 40 A) member(s) of a ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’. See Chapter XI A 3 see ‘Gesamthandsvermögen’  joint community. See Creifelds under ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’; Chapter X F 4 (b); Chapter XI B 3  joint property, assets. See also ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’ universal succession (principle). See Chapter X F 4 (a)  joint debt. See Chapter X, Note 157 and § 421ff BGB  joint debtor(s). See Chapter XI B 3 whole state. See Chapter II A combined punishment. See Chapter XVI, Note 73  business; shop; transaction, bargain, deal share in the assets of a company (‘Gesellschaftsvermögen’). Cf ‘Gesellschaftsanteil’. Its size is dependent on the amount of a person’s contribution to the business (‘Einlage’). See Chapter XI, Note 12; Chapter XII C.Cf ‘Kapitalanteil’ agreement of instruction for reward, contract to transact  business for reward, commercial mandate. Cf ‘Auftrag’. See Creifelds under ‘Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag’; Chapters X C 3 (g) (Note 166 and Title 10) and XXII D 4 capable of undertaking (capacity to undertake) a 387

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Geschäftsführer Geschäftsführung Geschäftsführung ohne  Auftrag (GoA) Geschäftsführungsbefugnis Geschäftsgebühr Geschäftsgrundlage Geschäftsherr Geschäftslokal Geschäftsordnung Geschäftsstelle Geschäftswert Geschäftswille Geschmacksmuster Geselle Gesellschaft

Gesellschafter Gesellschafterversammlung Gesellschaft mit beschränkter  Haftung(GmbH) Gesellschaftsanteil Gesellschaftsrecht Gesellschaftsvermögen Gesellschaftsvertrag

‘Rechtsgeschäft’   (legal transaction). See Creifelds under ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’ and Chapter X B 1 9 and B 2 (a) director (of a company) (internal) management; direction (of a company). See Chapter XI B 2 and C 3 (b) (ii). Cf ‘Vertretung’. See also Kallwass, Section 7, Chapter 2 (§ 112) transaction (of a matter) without instruction/without a mandate. See Creifelds under ‘Geschäftsführung ohne  Auftrag’; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 11); Chapter X F 5 (a) right of company member(s) to manage the company. See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (ii)  business fee. See Chapter XXII D 8  basis of the transaction. See Chapter X, Note 47 D and ‘Leistungsstörung’ principal. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 11) place of business. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii)  business code, rules (of procedure), standing orders. See Creifelds under ‘Geschäftsordnung’ and see also ‘Satzung’  business office (eg, of a court). See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (ii) and D 2 (c) (i)  business value (for fees of the court and lawyers in noncontentious matters and for the fees of the ‘Notar’). See Creifelds under ‘Geschäftswert’ and Chapter XXII D 8 will to engage in a particular transaction. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (The term ‘Willenserklärung’) (registrable) pattern (or model) of aesthetic content. It must  be novel and original (‘eigentümlich’). See Creifelds under ‘Geschmacksmuster’. apprentice company, society (G); as used in: GbR, BGB-G=civil law company, BGB company; OHG=open trading company; KG=limited partnership; GmbH=(private) company with limited liability; AG=public limited company; HandelsG=commercial/trading company (OHG, KG, GmbH or AG). See Creifelds under the respective types; Chapters X C 3 (g) (Note 159 and Title 14) and XI A. See also Chapter XVIII, Note 6; Chapter XXII D 9 member of a company, shareholder. Also ‘Mitglied’ members’ meeting (private) company with limited liability. See Chapter XII and ‘Gesellschaft’ share of a member in a company. Cf ‘Geschäftsanteil’ company law. See Chapter XI assets of a ‘Gesellschaft’. See Chapter XI A 3 company agreement, articles of association; sometimes 388

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Gesetz

Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter  Haftung (GmbHG) Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (FGG) Gesetz über die Tätigkeit europäischer Rechtsanwälte in Deutschland (EuRAG) Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGBG) Gesetzesaufbau Gesetzeskonkurrenz Gesetzeskraft Gesetzesvorbehalt

Gesetzgebende Gewalt Gesetzgebung Gesetzgebungskompetenz Gesetzliche Frist Gesetzlicher Erwerb Gesetzlicher Forderungsübergang Gesetzlicher Richter

called ‘Satzung’. See Creifelds under ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’; Chapter XI A 5; Chapter XII B (statutory) law; statute. The ‘Grundgesetz’  is a ‘Gesetz’ subject to a more difficult procedure of amendment. If  passed in accordance with the relevant constitutional procedure, a ‘Gesetz’ is referred to as a(n) ‘(einfaches) Gesetz im formellen Sinne’ (a (simple) law in the formal sense). The term can also be used in a wider, material sense to refer to any legal norm containing generally binding provisions (including ‘Rechtsverordnungen’ (statutory instruments) and ‘Satzungen’  (bye-laws)). Cf ‘Verwaltungsvorschriften’ ((internal) administrative regulations) and ‘Verwaltungsakte’ (administrative acts). See Creifelds under ‘Gesetz’. See also Chapter II H, Chapter XIV A and ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’. Cf  ‘Recht’ Law relating to (private) companies with limited liability. See Chapter XI A1 and Chapter XII A Law relating to matters within the non-contentious (voluntary) civil jurisdiction. See Chapter XXII C 2 Law regarding the activity of european lawyers in Germany. See Chapter XXII D 3 Law to regulate the law of general contract terms. See Chapter X B 2 (d) construction of a law, statute. See Chapter X C 2 2 concurrence of statutory provisions. See Chapter XVI, Note 73 force of law, statutory force. See Chapter VII C the right to limit basic rights by means of a ‘Gesetz’; can also  be used in the sense of ‘Vorbehalt des Gesetzes’, ie, to refer to the need for die executive to act in accordance with law (‘Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’), to have a legal basis for their action (‘Ermächtigungsgrundlage’ or ‘Eingriffsbefugnis’). See Chapters II F, VII B, VIII B and XIV C 3 and 6 legislative power. Also ‘Gesetzgebung’. See Creifelds under ‘Gesetzgebende Gewalt’ and Chapter II F legislature; legislation. See Creifelds under ‘Gesetzgebung’ and Chapter II F competence to pass laws; legislative competence. See Chapter II B ‘Frist’ set by statute. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (iii) statutory acquisition (of ownership). See Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii) assignment by operation of law. See Chapter X, Note 156 the judge appointed by statute, ie, it is a basic principle 389

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Gesetzlicher Vertreter Gesetzliches Schuldverhältnis Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung Gesichtspunkt Gestaltungsfreiheit Gestaltungsklage Gestaltungsrecht Geständnis Gestio pro herede Gesundheitsschutz Gewährleistung(srecht) Gewalt(tätigkeit) Gewaltenteilung Gewerbe

Gewerbeaufsichtsbehörde Gewerbebetrieb Gewerbeordnung (GewO) Gewerberecht Gewerbeunternehmer Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz Gewerbsmäßig Gewerkschaft

(‘Grundsatz’)  and basic right (‘justizielles Grundrecht’)  that everyone is entitled to a hearing before him (see Article 101(i) GG). See Chapter VIII C (Note 36) and Chapter XXII A legal (statutory) representative. See Chapters X B 1 9 and XIII D 1 (f) (i) obligation arising from statute. See Chapter X C 2 3 duty of the executive to act in accordance with statute, law; also ‘Rechtmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’. See Chapters II F, VIII (Note 15) and XIV C 3 aspect. See Chapter VIII, Note 22; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi); Chapter XIX A 2 freedom to form (ie, arrange, design, shape) legal relationships. See Chapter X B 1 6; Chapter X B 2 (e) writ claiming the ‘Umgestaltung’ (rearrangement) of a legal situation, position. See Creifelds under ‘Gestaltungsklage’; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (ii) and Chapter XV B formulation right. See Creifelds under ‘Gestaltungsrecht’ and Chapter X B 1 4 confession; admission (of facts by a party). See Creifelds under ‘Geständnis’ and Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) (Note 107) conducting oneself like an heir, ie, meddling in an estate. See Chapter X F 5 (a) (ii) protection of health. See Chapter XVIII H guarantee (right). See, regarding a ‘Kaufvertrag’,  §§ 434, 437, 443, 459ff BGB and, regarding a ‘Werkvertrag’, 634ff BGB and Creifelds under ‘Gewährleistung’ force, violence. See ‘Landfriedensbruch’ separation of powers. See Creifelds under ‘Gewaltentrennung’ and Chapter II F  business, trade. It does not include a ‘freier Beruf’. See Chapter XI, Note 31; Chapter XIX A 2; Creifelds under ‘Gewerbe’ . See also ‘Geschäft’, ‘Grundhandelsgewerbe’ and ‘Unternehmen’  business (trade) supervisory authority. See Creifelds under ‘Gewerbeaufsicht’; Chapter XVIII H; Chapter XIX A 2 a specific business (as exercised/operated). See Chapter XI, Note 31; Chapter XIX A 2; ‘Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Gewerbebetrieb’ Business (Trade) Order. See Creifelds under ‘Gewerbeordnung’;  Chapter XVIII H; Chapter XIX A 2; ‘Konzession’  business law. See Chapter XIX A2 a person, who engages in a business (trade) enterprise; an entrepreneur  business protection. See Chapter XIX A 1 full-time, professional(ly). See Chapter XI, Note 41 trade union. See Creifelds under ‘Gewerkschaft, 390

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Gewinn Gewissen Gewissenhaft Gewohnheit Gewohnheitsrecht Gewöhnlich Girokonto Girovertrag Glauben Glaubhaft Glaubhaftmachen Glaubhaftmachung Gläubiger Gläubigerbenachteiligung Gläubigerstreit Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz Gleichberechtigung Gleichheit (vor dem Gesetz) Gleichheitsrecht(e) Gleichordnung Gliedstaat Gratis Greifbar Grenze Grenzschutzamt Grenzüberschreitende Tätigkeit Grob Grobe Fahrlässigkeit Grober Behandlungsfehler Grund Grundbuch Grundbuchamt

arbeitsrechtliche’ and Chapter XVIII D and G profit, gain. See Chapter XI B 3 (b) (ii); Chapter XIX A 2 conscience. See Creifelds under ‘Glaubens- u. Gewissensfreiheit’ and Chapter VIII C (Article 4(i) GG) conscientious(ly). See Chapter XXII D 5 custom, habit. See Chapter IX B customary law. See Chapter I; Chapter X, Note 135 D; Chapter XIV A usual(ly). See Chapter XI B 2 current (giro) account contract to set up/maintain a current (giro) account at a  bank. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 10); Chapter XIX, Note 36 to believe; belief. See Chapter VIII C (Article 4(i) GG) credible. See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 1 to make credible, substantiate substantiation. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 9). Cf  ‘Substantiierung’ creditor, obligee. See Creifelds under ‘Gläubiger’ and Chapter X C 3 (a) fraud on creditors. See Chapter X, Note 220 dispute between creditors. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iii) equal treatment principle. See Chapter VIII, Note 22 equal entitlement, right(s) (of). See Creifelds under ‘Gleichberechtigung’ and Chapter VIII C (Article 3(ii) GG) equality (before the law). See Creifelds under ‘Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz’ and Chapter VIII C (Article 3(i) GG) equality right(s). See Chapter VIII A equal level, basis. See Chapter IX B member state. See Chapter II A free of charge. Also ‘Unentgeltlich’ capable of seizure, tangible. See Chapter XIII, Note 67  border, boundary, limit  border protection office. Is a ‘Bundesunterbehörde’. See Chapter IV cross-border activity (eg, of lawyers) gross. See Chapter X, Note 259 and Chapter XVI C 3 (c) gross negligence. See Chapter XI B 1 gross medical error (in treatment). See Chapter X, Note 126 J ground, basis, reason land register. See Creifelds under ‘Grundbuch’ and Chapter X D 3 (b) land registry (office). See Chapter XIII, Note 32 391

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Grunddienstbarkeit Gründer Grundgesetz (GG) Grundhandelsgewerbe Grundkapital Grundnorm Grundpfandrecht Grundrecht(e) Grundregel Grundsätzlich Grundschuld Grundschuldbrief  Grundstück(e) Grundstücksgleiches Recht Grundstückskaufvertrag Gründung Grundverfügung Gültig(keit) Gutachten Gütergemeinschaft Güterrecht

easement (over land). See Creifelds under ‘Grunddienstbarkeit’ and Chapter X D 3 (e) founder, promoter Basic Law, federal constitution. See Creifelds under ‘Grundgesetz’ and Chapter VII  basic commercial trade, trading activity. See Chapter XI C 2 (a)  basic (share) capital of an ‘Aktiengesellschaft’ . Called ‘Stammkapital’ in the case of a GmbH. See Chapter XII C.  basic norm. See Preface to Second Edition, Note 12; Chapter I, Note 17 security right (charge) over land. See Chapter X D 3 (h)  basic right(s). See Creifelds under ‘Grundrechte’ and Chapter VIII  basic rule. See Chapter XIII, Note 10  basically, fundamentally, essentially, in principle land charge. See Chapter X D 3 (h) land charge certificate. See Chapter XIX B piece(s) of land. See Chapter X D 1. Also ‘Immobilie(n)’; ‘Liegenschaft(en)’ a right equivalent to land. See ‘Eigentumsähnliches Recht’ contract for the purchase/sale of land. See Chapter X, Note 256 creation, establishment, formation, foundation  basic VA (administrative act (order)). See Chapter XVIII H valid(ity). See Chapter VII B; Chapter VII, Note 12; Chapter XIV, Note 24 written opinion, expertise. See Chapter XXII D 8 community of property between spouses. See Creifelds under ‘Gütergemeinschaft’, Chapter XI A 3 and ‘Güterrecht’ below (marital) property law. By § 1363(i) BGB, the (statutory) property status (‘Güterstand’)   of spouses during their marriage is the so-called ‘Zugewinngemeinschaft’ ((deferred) community of gain). During the marriage, the assets of each of the spouses remain under their respective, individual control. However, when the marriage ends (otherwise than  by death), the amount of any ‘Zugewinn’ (gain) is equalized  between the former spouses (§ 1372 BGB), ie, settlement (‘Ausgleich’) is deferred. Thus, the spouse whose assets at the end of the marriage (‘Endvermögen’ (final assets)) exceed those owned by him or her at the beginning of the marriage (the ‘Anfangsvermögen’  (initial assets)) must share the difference with his or her (former) partner, who has an ‘Ausgleichsforderung’  (balancing claim): § 1378(i). Other forms of ‘Güterstand’  are ‘Gütertrennung’  ((entire) separation of assets) and ‘Gütergemeinschaft’ (community of property). These can be established by ‘Ehevertrag’ (agreement between the spouses), which must be notarially documented and registered in the ‘Güterrechtsregister’ at the ‘Amtsgericht’. See §§ 1363–1390, 1408–1415 and 1558– 392

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Güterstand Gütertrennung Güterumlauf  Gute Sitten Güteverhandlung Güteversuch Gutgläubiger Erwerb  Haftbefehl  Haften (für)

 Haftgrund  Haftpflichtversicherung  Haftprüfung  Haftung  Haftungsbeschränkung  Haftverschonung  Haltung  Handakte  Handel  Handelsauskunft  Handelsbrauch  Handelsbücher  Handelsfirma  Handelsgeschäft  Handelsgesellschaft  Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)  Handelsgewerbe

1563 BGB; Chapter X E; Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 2; Creifelds under ‘Ehevertrag’, ‘Gütergemeinschaft’, ‘Güterrecht, eheliches’, ‘Güterrechtsregister’, ‘Güterstände’, ‘Gütertrennung’, ‘Zugewinn’, ‘Zugewinnausgleich’ and ‘Zugewinngemeinschaft’ property status (relationship) between spouses. See ‘Güterrecht’ separation of assets/property. See ‘Güterrecht’; Chapter X F 3 (a) (ii) circulation of goods. See Chapter XIX B good morals. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (iv). See also ‘Sittenwidrig(keit)’ conciliation proceedings. See also ‘Einigungsstelle’ attempt to reach a settlement. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (v); ‘Vergleich’ bona fide acquisition (of ownership). See Creifelds under ‘Gutgläubiger Erwerb’; Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii); Chapter XIX B arrest warrant. See Chapter XVII B and Creifelds under ‘Haftbefehl’ to be liable (for). It usually means the same as ‘schulden’ (to owe), ie, ‘wer schuldet, der haftet’ (he who owes is liable). The term can also refer to the extent of liability. See ‘Haftung’. Also ‘Einstehenmüssen (für)’ ground (based on fact) for detaining a suspect in custody. See Chapter XVII C (Note 38) public liability insurance reexamination/review of custody. See Chapter XVII, Notes 26 B and 38 D liability. See Chapter X C 3 (a) (Title 1) (Note 126 D); Chapter XI B; Creifelds under ‘Haftung’; Brox (AS), Chapter 2, § 2 III; Schwab (Einführung), Part III, Chapter 5 I (a) limitation of liability. See Chapter XI B; Chapter XXII D 9 exemption from custody, ie, suspension of an arrest warrant, bail. See Chapter XVII, Note 26 C point of view, position, stance. See also ‘Stellungnahme’ (lawyer’s) file. See Chapter XXII D 4 and also ‘Akte’ trade, commerce. See Chapter XIX A 2 trade information, credit reference commercial (trade) custom, usage. See Chapter XI B 5 (Note 58); Chapter XXII, Note 74 (trade) books. See Chapter XI C 4 (trade) firm (name). Also ‘Firma’ commercial transaction. It can mean a trading enterprise (‘Unternehmen’). See Chapter XI C 5 see ‘Gesellschaft’ and Chapter XI A Commercial Code. See Chapter XI trading activity. See Chapter XI, Note 31; Chapter XI C 2 (a) 393

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Handelskammer  Handelskauf   Handelsmakler  Handelsrecht  Handelsregister  Handelsrichter  Handelssache  Handelsstand  Handelsvertreter  Handlung  Handlungsfähigkeit  Handlungsfreiheit  Handlungsgehilfe  Handlungslehrling  Handlungsort  Handlungsvollmacht  Handlungswille  Handwerk  Handwerker  Handwerksmeister  Handwerksordnung (HandwO)  Handwerksrolle  Hauptbeweis  Hauptintervention  Hauptpartei  Hauptpflicht  Hauptstrafe  Haupttermin  Hauptverbindlichkeit  Hauptverfahren

see ‘Kammer für Handelssachen’ trade purchase. See Chapter XI C 5 (trade) broker. See Chapter XI C 2 (e) and cf ‘Makler’ commercial law. See Creifelds under ‘Handelsrecht’; Chapters XI and XIX A commercial (trade) register. See Creifelds under ‘Handelsregister’ and Chapter XI C 2 (b) (honorary) commercial judge. See Creifelds under ‘Handelsrichter’ and Chapter XXII A commercial matter. See Creifelds under ‘Handelssache’ trade class(ification). See Chapter XI C 1 and 2 commercial/mercantile agent, factor, trade representative. See Chapter X, Note 31; Chapter XI C 2 (e) act(ion). See ‘Rechtshandlung’; ‘Unerlaubte Handlung’; Chapter XVI C 1 (a) capacity to act. See Chapter X, Note 5 freedom of action. See Chapter VIII C (Article 2(i) GG) trading assistant; also referred to as ‘kaufmännische(r)  Angestellte(r)’ . See Creifelds under ‘Handlungsgehilfe’; Chapter X, Note 31; Chapter XI C 2 (d) see ‘Lehrling’ place at which an act is carried out. See Chapter XX, Note 25 authority to trade; trading power of attorney. See Creifelds under ‘Handlungsvollmacht’  and Chapter XI C 2 (c). Cf  ‘Prokura’ will to act (at all). See Chapter X B 2 (b) (The term ‘Willenserklärung’) handicraft, manual activity. See Chapter XIX A 2 craftsman, handiman, manual worker. See Chapter XVIII, Note 2; Chapter XIX, Note 16 master craftsman Handicraft Order. See Chapter XIX, Note 16 Register of Craftsmen, Handicraft Register main evidence. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) and cf  ‘Gegenbeweis’ direct intervention. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iii) main party. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iii) main/prime obligation. Also ‘Hauptverbindlichkeit’ . See Chapter X, Notes 126 F and 159; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c) main punishment. See Chapter XVI D (main) hearing (in civil proceedings). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv), (v) and (vi) main obligation. Also ‘Hauptpflicht’. See Chapter X Note 159 main (criminal) proceedings. See Chapter XVII E and Creifelds under ‘Hauptverfahren’ 394

Appendix A: Vocabulary

 Hauptverhandlung  Hauptverhandlungshaft  Hauptversammlung  Hausfriedensbruch  Hausratsverordnung (HausratsVO)  Haustürwiderrufsgesetz (HaustürWG)  Hehlerei  Heiliges Römisches Reich (Deutscher Nation)  Heilen  Heilung  Heimarbeiter  Heimat(recht)  Hemmen  Heranwachsender  Herausgabe(anspruch)  Herrschaftsrecht  Hersteller  Herstellung  Hilfsantrag  Hilfsbeamter  Hilfsnorm  Hilfsperson  Hilfsweise  Hilfsweise Anwendung  Hinauskündigungsklausel  Hindern  Hinreichend  Hinterleger  Hinterlegung

main (criminal) hearing. See Chapter XVII E and Creifelds under ‘Hauptverhandlung’ main hearing custody. See Chapter XVII F main assembly, (annual) general meeting (of shareholders in a public company). See Creifelds under ‘Hauptversammlung’ (criminal) trespass to land. See Chapter XVII, Note 9 Regulation regarding the treatment of the matrimonial home and contents (1944). See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 2 Law regarding the Revocation of Doorstep Transactions. See Chapter X B 2 (e) (Group remedies) handling (illegally acquired goods). See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C Holy Roman Empire (of the German Nation). See Chapter I (Note 7) to cure, make good, rectify cure, remedy. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i); Chapter XIII, Note 96 home worker. See Chapter XVIII, Note 2 home (law). See Chapter XX, Note 25 to impede, suspend, temporarily stop (the running of a limitation period) young person (between 18 and 21); adolescent. Cf  ‘Jugendlicher’ (right to claim) the return, release of a ‘Sache’. See ‘Vindikation’; Chapter XIII D 8 (d) right of dominance. See Chapter X B 1 4 manufacturer, producer. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (§§ 631–651 BGB); Chapter X, Note 126 J; Chapter XI, Note 42; ‘Fabrikant; ‘Unternehmer’ manufacture, production auxiliary application. See Chapter XIII, Note 41; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) auxiliary officer. See Chapter XVII, Note 22 accessory norm. See Chapter X B 1 4 (Note 18) assistant. See Chapter XI C 2 (c) to (e) on an auxiliary basis subsidiary application. See Chapter XVIII A (Note 1) clause in a company agreement enabling a member to be excluded by the others. See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv) to hinder, impede, prevent obstruct, stop sufficient(ly). See Chapter X B 2 (c) (‘Rules governing offer and acceptance’); Chapter XIII, Note 96; Chapter XIV C depositor. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé ‘Darlehen’ deposit (of property). Cf ‘Anzahlung’. See Chapter X C 3 (c) (Title 2) 395

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Hinweis  Hinweisen (auf)  Historische Rechtsschule  Hochschule  Höchstpersönlich  Hoheitlich  Hoheitsrecht  Holschuld  Homo homini lupus  Honorar  Honorarvereiribarung  Hypothek  Hypothekenbank  Hypothekenbrief  Idealkonkurrenz Im eigenen Namen Im Falle (von) Immanent Immaterialrechtsgut Immaterieller Schaden Immobilie(n) Im öffentlichen Interesse Im staatlichen Auftrag Im Zweifel Individualabrede Indizienbeweis

Indossament In dubio pro reo Industrie Informationsfreiheit Informationsgesellschaft In fremdem Namen In gutem Glauben

reference (to). See Chapter X B 2 (e) to point out, refer to historical school (of law). See Chapter I high school. See Chapter II C (Note 11) highly/most personal. See Chapter XIX A 2 official(ly); based on/endowed with/supported by formal/public legal authority/command. See Chapter II C and cf ‘fiskalisch’ (individual) sovereign (state) power/right. See Chapter II, Note 3 see ‘Leistungsort’ man is the wolf of man. See Chapter I (Note 10) (professional) fee. See Chapter XXII D 8 fee agreement. See Chapter XXII, Note 100 mortgage; cf ‘Grundschuld’. See Chapter X D 3 (h) mortgage bank. See Chapter XIX B mortgage certificate. See Chapter X D 3 (h); Chapter XIX B see ‘Tateinheit’ in (one’s, his, her, its) own name. See ‘Kommissionär’ in the event (of) implicit in. See Chapter VIII B intellectual property. See Chapter X B 1 3 immaterial loss. See Chapter X, Note 118 see ‘Grundstück(e)’ in the public interest. See Chapter XVII at Note 14 on state instructions. See Chapter XVI A (Note 3) in the event of doubt. See Chapter X F 4 (d) individually negotiated agreement. See Chapter X B 2 (e) circumstantial (or indirect) evidence (by means of  ‘Hilfstatsachen’ (auxiliary facts)). It can assist in establishing (concluding the truth of) a particular fact. Not to be confused with its sub-type ‘Anscheinsbeweis’. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) and Baur/Grunsky, § 14 A 1 2 indorsement. See Chapter XIX B in case of doubt: for the accused. See Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) and Creifelds under ‘In dubio pro reo’ . Cf ‘Üble Nachrede’ industry. See Chapter XIX A 2 freedom of information (access to public sources). See Creifelds under ‘Informationsfreiheit’; Chapter VIII C; ‘Verkehr’ information(-based) society. See Preface to Second Edition, Note 9 in someone else’s name. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) (The term ‘Vollmacht’) in good faith. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (iii) (Bona fide acquisition 396

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Inhaber(schaft) Inhaberpapier Inhaberzeichen Inhalt Inhaltskontrolle Inland Innengesellschaft Innenverhältnis Innerbetriebliche Gründe Inquisitionsprinzip

Insolvenz Insolvenzfest Insolvenzordnung Insolvenzverwalter Instandhalten Instandsetzen Interesse Interessenjurisprudenz Interessenvertreter Internationales Privatrecht Interventionswirkung Invitatio ad offerendum Inzidentkontrolle Ipso iure Irreführen Irrtum Iura novit curia

of ownership to movables). See also Chapter XI (Note 62) person entitled, holder, ‘owner’, proprietor; entitlement, ownership. See Chapter X B 1 4  bearer security (‘Wertpapier’). See Chapter XIX B. Cf  ‘Orderpapier’  bearer sign. See Chapter XIX B content. See Chapter X C 3 (a); Chapter XIII, Note 96 (system of) control of content (of contract terms). See Chapter X, Note 23; Chapter X B 2 (e) inland, domestic territory, (within) national boundaries (ie, Germany). Cf ‘Ausland’ internal company. See Chapter XI, Note 17 internal relationship. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) internal business reasons. See Chapter XVIII, Note 14 inquisition principle (also referred to as the ‘Ermittlungsgrundsatz’ or ‘Untersuchungsgrundsatz’) . It applies in proceedings before criminal, administrative, finance and social courts and in FGG matters. Its opposite is the ‘Verhandlungsgrundsatz’. See Chapter XIII B 2, Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) and Creifelds under ‘Inquisitionsprinzip’ insolvency. See also ‘Zahlungsunfähig’ insolvency-proof. See Chapter XVIII B 4 Insolvency Order. Supercedes the ‘Konkursordnung’  from 1.1.1999 insolvency administrator. See Chapter XVIII B 4 to maintain (in proper condition). See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c) to repair, restore. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c) interest (in). See Chapter I  jurisprudence based on (a balancing of) interests. Cf  ‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’ and see Chapter I representative of particular interests, lobbyist. See Chapter XI A 2 private international law. See Chapter XX effect of ‘Nebenintervention’ invitation to treat (make offers). See Chapter X Note 66 incidental control (of a norm). See Chapter VII C  by operation of law. See Chapter X F 4 (a) to deceive, mislead. See Chapter X, Note 220. Also ‘Täuschen’ mistake. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (‘nullity and challengability of a ‘Willenserklärung’; Chapter X F 3 (c (iv) the court knows the law. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 397

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Ius Ius civile Ius cogens Ius dispositivum Ius gentium Ius honorarium Ius naturale Ius privatum Ius publicum  Jahresabschluss  Jahreshauptversammlung  Jederzeit  Jenseits vernünftigen Zweifels  Jugendamt  Jugendgericht  Jugendgerichtsgesetz (JGG)  Jugendhilfe  Jugendlicher  Jugendstaatsanwalt  Jugendstrafe  Juristische Person

 Juristische Person des öffentlichen Rechts  Justiz  Justizangestellte(r)  Justizgewährungsanspruch  Justizielles Grundrecht  Justizverwaltung  Justizverwaltungsakt Kammer Kammer für Handelssachen Kannkaufmann

98) and Creifelds under ‘iura novit curia’ law, right. See Chapter I, Note 10 civil law. See Chapter I (Notes 3 and 6) compulsory law. See Chapter IX B dispositive law. See Chapter IX B law common to all mankind; public international law. See Chapter I, Notes 3 and 9 and ‘Völkerrecht’ honorary law (of the magistrate or praetor). See Chapter I (Note 6) natural law. See Chapter I, Notes 3, 9 and 10 private law. See Chapter I, Note 3 and ‘P rivatrecht’ public law. See Chapter I, Note 3 and ‘Öffentliches Recht’ annual statement (of a company) see ‘Hauptversammlung’ at any time. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (b); Chapter X F 3 (c) (ii); Chapter XVII, Note 38 D  beyond reasonable doubt. See Chapter XIV B 7 Youth Office youth court, juvenile court. See Chapter XVI, Note 40  Juvenile Courts Law. See Chapter XVI, Note 40 youth welfare. See Creifelds under ‘Kinder- und Jugendhilfe’; Chapter VI, Note 4 youth (between 14 and 18). See Chapter XVI, Note 40 youth prosecutor. See Chapter XVI, Note 40  juvenile punishment. See Chapter XVI, Note 40 artificial/juristic person (of private or public law), legal entity. It can be (and often is) a corporate body. See Creifelds under ‘Juristische Person’, Chapter II C (Note 11), Chapter XI A 3 and ‘Verein’ see ‘Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts’  judicature. See Chapter XXII C 6  judicial clerk (general) right of (access to) justice. See Chapter VIII C. Cf  ‘Rechtsschutzbedürfnis’ (so-called) judicial basic right. See Chapter VIII, Note 36  judicial administration. See Chapter XXI A; Chapter XXII C 6. Cf ‘Rechtspflege’ administrative act issued by a judicial authority in the field of ‘Justizverwaltung’. See Chapter XIV C 1 chamber (of a court; or of a professional or commercial  body). See Creifelds under ‘Kammer’ chamber for commercial matters. See Chapter XIII D 1 (e) voluntary businessman. See Chapter XI, Note 31 398

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Kapitalanlage Knpitalanteil Kapitalaufbringung Kapitalgesellschaft Kardinalpflicht Karenzentschädigung Kassation Kauf  Käufer Kaufmann Kaufmännische(r) Angestellte(r) Kaufmännisches Bestätigungsschreiben Kaufvertrag Kausalität Kausalzusammenhang Kenntnis Kenntnis der Sachlage Kennpzeichen Kennzeichnen Kette Kind Kindschaftssache Kirchlich Klage Klageänderung Klageantrag Klageart

investment. See Chapter XIX B (arithmetical) share in the assets (capital) of an OHG or KG. See Creifelds under ‘Kapitalanteil’; Chapter XI, Note 12. Cf ‘Geschäftsanteil’ raising of capital. See Chapter XIX B capital(ised) company, stock corporation. See Creifelds under ‘Kapitalgesellschaft’,  Chapter XI A 2 and cf  ‘Personengesellschaft’ cardinal duty. See Chapter X B 2 (e) compensation during the period of restriction (under a ‘Wettbewerbsverbot’ ). See Chapter XI C (Competition by employees during and after employment) see ‘Aufhebung’ purchase. See Creifelds under ‘Kauf’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 1) (§§ 433–514 BGB) purchaser. See also ‘Erwerber’  businessman, merchant, trader. See Creifelds under ‘Kaufmann’  and see ‘Formkaufmann’, ‘Mußkaufmann’, ‘Scheinkaufmann’ and ‘Sollkaufmann’. Cf ‘Händler’ (dealer) (trade) employee. See ‘Handlungsgehilfe’ commercial letter of confirmation. See Creifelds under ‘Bestätigungsschreiben’ and Chapter X B 2 (c) purchase contract, contract of sale. See Chapter X C 2 2 and ‘Kauf’ causation; also ‘Ursächlichkeit’. See Chapter X, Notes 119 and 126 I; Chapter XVI C 1 (a); Creifelds under ‘Kausalität im Strafrecht’ causal connexion. See Chapter X Note 119 knowledge. See Chapter XVII B knowledge of the position. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (iv) (distinguishing) sign, (reference) number, badge. See ‘Marke’ to characterize, distinguish, mark. See Chapter XIII, Note 96 chain. See Chapter X D 3 (h) child. See Chapter X E parenthood matter. It includes questions of paternity (‘Vaterschaft’). See Chapter XIII D 6 (a) and § 640(ii) ZPO ecclesiastical. See Chapter X E writ; (criminal) complaint, indictment; action; suit. See Creifelds under ‘Klage’ and Chapters XIII C I, XIII D 2 (c), XV B and XVII E amendment of a writ. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) application (to the court) in a writ. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) type of writ. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (ii) and Chapter XV B 399

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Klagebefugnis

Klagebegründung Kläger Klageerwiderung Klageerzwingungsverfahren Klagegrund Klagenhäufung Klageschrift Klagevortrag Klageziel Klar Klausel Kleingedrucktes Kleingewerbetreibender Knebeln Koalition Koditionsfreiheit Kollisionsnorm Kommanditgesellschaft (KG) Kommanditgesellschaft auf   Aktien (KGaA) Kommmditist Kommissionär Kommune Komplementär Konkludentes Verhalten Konkret Konkrete Normkontrolle Konkurrenz

(term of administrative procedure) authority to sue, ‘locus standi’;  used analogously in relation to the lodging of a ‘Widerspruch’ (‘Widerspruchsbefugnis’). See Chapter XV C. See also ‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’ see ‘Klagegrund’ plaintiff  defence to a writ. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) procedure to compel a criminal prosecution by the ‘Staatsanwaltschaft’. See Chapter XVII, Note 40 B factual basis for a writ (ie, such facts asserted by the plaintiff  as entitling him to sue), cause of action. Also called ‘Klagebegründung’. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) cumulation of claims. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) statement of claim, writ See Chapter XIIID 2 (c) (i) submission(s) in the ‘Klage’ (of the ‘Kläger’). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) aim of the action. See Chapter XIII, Note 96; Chapter XV D dead(ly) clause (in an agreement). See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv) small print See Chapter X B 2 (e) small businessman. See Chapter XI, Note 31 to fetter, restrain. See Chapter X Note 58 coalition (ie, trade union or employer association). See Chapter XVIII G freedom to form coalitions. See Creifelds under ‘Koalitionsfreiheit’ and Chapter VIII C (Article 9(iii) GG) collision norm. See Chapter XX B limited partnership. See ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’, ‘Gesellschaft’, ‘Personengesellschaft’ and §§ 161–177a HGB. See also Creifelds under ‘Kommanditgesellschaft’ a limited partnership (KG) capitalised by shaes, ie, organised along similar lines to a public limited company (‘Aktiengesellschaft’) . See §§ 278–290 AktG, ‘Aufsichtsrat’ and Creifelds under ‘Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien’ member of a KG with limited liability. See Chapter XI C 3 (c) commissioneer. See Chapter XI C 2 (e) communal body, local authority (‘Kreis’ or ‘Gemeinde’). See Creifelds under ‘Kommunen’ and Chapter VI member of a KG with unlimited liability. See Chapter XI C 3 (c) see ‘Schlüssiges Verhalten’ concrete (adj) see ‘Normkontrolle’ concurrence. See Chapter VIII, Note 10 and Chapter X, Note 188 400

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Konkurrierend Konkursgericht Konkursordnung (KO) Konnossement Kontaktsperre Kontrahierungszwang Kontrollrecht Kontrollstelle Konzentration Konzern Konzession

Körperschaft Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts Körperverletzung Korrespondenzanwalt Kostenerstattung Kostenfestsetzung Kostenfestsetzungsbeschluß Kostenordnung (KostO) Kostenpflicht

Kostenstreitwert Kostenvorschuß Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt

concurrent. See Chapter II B  bankruptcy court. See Chapter XIII, Note 32 Bankruptcy Order (a statute). Since 1.1.1999 superceded  by the ‘Insolvenzordnung’  bill of lading. See Chapter XIX B contact ban. See Chapter XVII, Note 31 (the principle of) compulsory contracting. See Chapter X, Note 23 right of control. See Chapter XI C 3 b (ii) control point. See Chapter XVII, Note 25 concentration. See Chapter XIII B 6 see ‘Unternehmensvertrag’ licence (for business purposes), trading licence. It is a particular type of permission (‘Erlaubnis’). Admission to a particular business (‘Gewerbezulassung’)  is frequently dependent on fulfillment of conditions laid down in the ‘Gewerbeordnung’  or in more specialized laws. See Creifelds under ‘Gewerbe’ and ‘Gewerbezulassung’; Chapter XIV C 5 corporation. See ‘Juristische Person’ public corporation. See Creifelds under ‘Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts’ and ‘Juristische Person’  bodily harm, injury. See Chapter XVII, Notes 9 and 38 C. See also ‘Personenschaden’ correspondence lawyer. See Chapter XIII, Note 55 repayment/reimbursement of costs. See ‘Kostenpflicht’. fixing (taxation) of (procedural) costs. See Creifelds under ‘Kostenentscheidung’  and ‘Kostenfestsetzung’;  Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (v) and Chapter XXI B order for the fixing of costs. See Chapter XIII D 8 (b) (ii) Costs Order (for court and notary fees in non-contentious civil matters). See Chapter XXII D 8 and E duty to bear costs (of a dispute). The normal rule is that the unsuccessful party must reimburse them to the winner. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (v). However, in employment court proceedings a claim for repayment (‘Kostenerstattungsanspruch’) is usually excluded (§ 12a ArbGG) and in criminal proceedings costs must be borne by the person convicted (§ 465 StPO). Court costs are not charged in social court proceedings (§ 183 SGG). See Creifelds under ‘Kostenpflicht’ and ‘Kostenerstattungsanspruch’ see ‘Gebührenstreitwert’ (advance) payment on account of costs. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i). See also ‘Prozeßkostenvorschuß’ Federal Motor Vehicle Office; in Flensburg. See Chapter IV, Note 2 401

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Kraftfahrzeug Kraftfahrzeugführer Kraftfahrzeughalter Kraftlos Kredit Kreditgefährdung Kreditinstitut Kreditmittel Kreditwesengesetz (KWG) Kreis Kreisangehörig Kreisausschuß Kreisfrei Kreisordnung Kreistag Kriegsdienstverweigerung Kriminalpolizei Kulturhoheit Kundenfreundlich Kündigen Kündigung

Kündigungsfrist Kündigungsschutz Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG) Kunsturhebergesetz (KUG) Ladung

motor vehicle. See Chapter X Note 222 driver. See Chapter X, Note 222; Chapter XVII, Note 38 C keeper of a motor vehicle. See Chapter X Note 222 devoid of (legal) effect. See Chapter X F 5 (d) loan, credit. Also ‘Darlehen’. For the types of ‘Kredit’, see Chapter X D 3 (h) endangering of credit, harm to financial status. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 E credit institution. See Chapter X Note 211; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 10) means of obtaining credit. See Chapter XIX B Law concerning the Credit System. See ‘Depotgeschäft’, ‘Einlagengeschäft’ regional authority (above a ‘Gemeinde’); also ‘Landkreis’; lit. circle (of a ‘Land’). See Chapter VI; ‘Kommune’; Creifelds under ‘Kreis’  belonging to a ‘Kreis’. See Chapter VI (administrative) council of a ‘Kreis’. See Chapter VI free, independent of a ‘Kreis’. See Chapter VI and Creifelds under ‘Kreisfreie Städte’ local government law governing the ‘Kreise’  in a ‘Land’. See Chapter VI parliament of a ‘Kreis’. See Chapter VI objection to military service. See Chapter VIII C and Creifelds under ‘Kriegsdienstverweigerer’ criminal police. See Chapter XVII D authority in cultural affairs. See Chapter II, Note 7 favourable to the customer. See Chapter X B 2 (e) to give notice (of termination), cancel (notice of) termination; notice; dismissal; (unilateral) cancellation (of a contract). In respect of an employee, it can be ‘ordentlich’ ( ‘befristet’  (with notice)) or ‘außerordentlich’ (‘fristlos’  (without notice)). See Creifelds under ‘Kündigung’ and ‘Entlassung des Arbeitnehmers’. See also ‘Auflösung’, ‘Gestaltungsrecht’; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (f); Chapter XVIII B notice period. See Chapter XVIII B (employment) protection against ‘Kündigung’. See Chapter XVIII B and Creifelds under ‘Kündigungsschutz für Arbeitnehmer’ Employment Protection Law. See Chapter XVIII B Law regarding Copyright in Works of the Fine Arts and Photography (9.1.1907). See Chapter VIII, Note 20 C summons (for attendance), subpoena (of a person to a 402

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Lager Lagerschein Lagerung Land, Länder Länderverwaltung Landesarbeitsgericht (LAG) Landesbehörde Landeseigene Verwaltung Landesgesetz Landesoberbehörde Landesregierung Landessozialgericht (LSG) Landesverfassung Landesverfassungsgericht Landeszentralbank Landfriedensbruch Landgericht (LG) Landkreis Landrat Landratsamt Landtag Langfristig Laufzeit Leasingnehmer Leben Lebensgemeinschaft der Ehegatten

hearing, to attend court). See Creifelds under ‘Ladung’; Chapter XIII C F; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi); Chapter XVII, Note 38 F store, stock, depot. See Chapter XI C 5 storage certificate. See Chapter XIX B storage. See Chapter X, Note 166 (individual) state(s) (of Germany). See Chapter V (own) administration by the ‘Länder’. See ‘Landeseigene Verwaltung’, Chapter II C and V B county employment court. See Creifelds under ‘Landesarbeitsgericht’ and Chapter XXII C 3 authority of a ‘Land’. See Chapter V B (own) administration by a ‘Land’. See ‘Länderverwaltung’ and Chapter II C statute of a ‘Land’, state statute. Cf ‘Bundesgesetz’ . See Chapters II B and VII C upper authority of a ‘Land’. See Chapter V B government of a ‘Land’. See Chapter V A county social (security) court. See Creifelds under ‘Landessozialgericht’ and Chapter XXII C 4 constitution of a ‘Land’. See Chapter V A constitutional court of a ‘Land’. See Chapter VII C central (state) bank (of a ‘Land’)  breach of the peace. The offence requires the use or threat of  violence (‘Gewalttätigkeit’) by a mob (‘Menschenmenge’). See § 125 StGB; Chapter XVII, Note 38 C. Cf ‘Hausfriedensbruch’ county court; regional court; lit. court of a ‘Land’. See Creifelds under ‘Landgericht’ and Chapters XIII D 1 (e), XIII D 2 (a) and XXII C 2 see ‘Kreis’ chief executive of a ‘Kreis’;   in Niedersachsen and Nordrhein-Westfalen: the ‘Oberkreisdirektor’. See Creifelds under ‘Landrat’ and Chapter VI office of the chief executive. See Chapter VI parliament of a ‘Land’. See Creifelds under ‘Landtag’ and Chapter V A long-term. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (d) period, term (eg, of a loan). See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé ‘Darlehen’ leasing customer. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (b) life. See Chapter VIII C (Article 2(ii), 1st sentence GG) marital fellowship, community (of life). See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 3. Also ‘eheliche Lebensgemeinschaft’ 403

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Lebenspartnerschaft

Leerlaufen Legalitätsgrundsatz

Legitimationspapier Lehrling Leibrente Leichte Fahrlässigkeit Leichtfertig Leihe Leistung

Leistungsbeschreibung Leistungserfolg Leistungsgefahr Leistungshandlung Leistungsklage Leistungskondiktion

lifetime partnership (arrangement/relationship) (between persons of the same sex). Since 1.8.2001, it can be registered  before a competent authority and creates a status largely equivalent to marriage. See Burhoff, ZAP, Fach 11, p 603 to run empty, have no practical effect. The term is mainly used with reference to basic rights. See Chapter II, Note 5 legality principle; obliges official intervention by a prosecuting authority. See Creifelds under ‘Legalitätsprinzip’; Chapter XVII B; Chapter XVII E, Notes 39 and 40; cf  ‘Opportunitätsgrundsatz’ legitimately document, ie, one that has legitimately effect. A ‘Legitimationspapier’  can be ‘einfach’   (simple) or ‘qualifiziert’ (qualified). See Chapter XIX B (craftsman’s) apprentice. See Creifelds under ‘Handwerkslehrling’ annuity, pension for life. See Creifelds under ‘Leibrente’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 16) slight negligence. See Chapter XI B reckless(ly). See Chapter XVI, Note 50 gratuitous loan. See Creifelds under ‘Leihe’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 4) performance (owed or carried out); achievement; accomplishment; service. In §§ 812ff BGB, the term ‘Leistung’  is used to mean ‘eine Vermögenszuwendung’ (a grant of a financial benefit or advantage) or, as is often said, ‘eine bewußte und zweckgerichtete Mehrung fremden Vermögens’   (a conscious and purposeful increase in someone else’s assets). For the purpose of § 326 BGB, the term ‘Leistung’  means a ‘Hauptleistung’  rather than a ‘Nebenleistung’. See Creifelds under ‘Leistung’, ‘Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung’  and ‘Gegenseitiger Vertrag’ II 2. See also Chapters X C 3 (a), X C 3 (b) and X C 3 (g) description of the act/object of performance (required by a contract). See Chapter X B 2 (e) (successful) performance. See Chapter X C 3 (a) and ‘Leistungsort’ risk of performance. See Chapter X Notes 116 and 126 F (act of) performance carried out. See Chapter X C 3 (a) and ‘Leistungsort’ writ claiming a ‘Leistung’. See Chapters XIII D 2 (c) (ii), XIV (Note 23 E) and XV B ground of action (condiction) under § 812(i), 1st sentence, 1st alternative BGB to recover something (‘etwas’=a financial advantage) from someone, who receives it without a legal  basis (‘ohne rechtlichen Grund’) due to me ‘Leistung’ of the claimant. See Creifelds under ‘Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 24) 404

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Leistungsnähe Leistungsort

Leistungspflicht Leistungsrecht(e) Leistungsstörung Leistungsverpflichtung Leistungsverwaltung Leistungsverweigerungsrecht Leistungszeit Leitbild Leitender Angestellter Lex causae Lex fori Lex loci delicti commissi Lex posterior derogat legi priori Lex specialis (derogat legi generali) Lieferant Lieferungskauf 

proximity to an act of performance. See Chapter X, Note 135 A place of performance, ie, the place at which the ‘Leistungshandlung’  must be carried out. It is sometimes referred to as the ‘Erfüllungsort’. Usually, the ‘Leistung’ has to be collected by the creditor from the debtor (a ‘Holschuld’) and the place of the ‘Leistungshandlung’ and ‘Leistungserfolg’ coincide: they are both at the ‘Wohnsitz’ ((place of) residence) of the debtor (§ 269(i) BGB). However, the ‘Leistungsort’ and ‘Erfolgsort’  can diverge—as where the ‘Schuldner’ has to send his ‘Leistung’ (a ‘Schickschuld’ eg, a ‘Geldschuld’). In that case, the ‘Leistungsort’  is at the ‘Schuldner’s  address, but the ‘Leistungserfolg’ occurs at the address of the creditor (as under § 270 and § 447 BGB). The ‘Leistungsort’ is of importance in private international law in order to ascertain the applicable law and the legal venue (‘Gerichtsstand’)  in contractual disputes. See Creifelds under ‘Leistungsort’; Brox (AS), Chapter 4, § 11 IV; Fikentscher, Section 3 (§ 35); Klunzinger (Einführung), Part III, Chapter 2 (§ 26 II); Chapter X C 3 (a) (Title 1); Chapter XX D 2 duty of performance. See Chapter X C 3 (a) right(s) to a ‘Leistung’; right(s) to a service (performance). See Chapter VIII A disruption, disturbance, irregularity of/in performance. See Chapter X C 3 (a) and (b) Titles 1 and 2 and Note 126 see ‘Leistungspflicht’ service administration. See Chapter II C (Note 12); Chapter VI. Cf ‘Eingriffsverwaltung’ right to decline performance. See Chapter X B 4 Exposé time for performance. See Chapter X (Note 98) and ‘Fälligkeit’ model, example. See Chapter X B 2 (e) leading employee. See Creifelds under ‘Leitende Angestellte’ and Chapter XVIII C the applicable law, governing law. See Chapter XX B the law of the forum (ie, the law applicable in the place where the case is heard). See Chapter XIII, Note 28 D, Chapter XX B and Note 25 B the law of the place of commission of die tort. See Chapter XX, Note 25 A a later law supercedes an earlier one. See Chapter II H a special law (takes precedence over a general one). See ‘Sonderregel’ supplier. See Chapter XI, Note 42 delivery sale (ie, a contract to produce a ‘vertretbare Sache’ and to obtain die necessary materials to do so). See Chapter X, Note 234 405

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Liegenschaft Lis alibi pendens Lizenz(vertrag) Locus standi Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall Lohnpfändung Lohnsteuer Lokalisierungsprinzip Lombardgeschäft Löschen Löschung Lücke Lückenlos  Macht  Machtbereich (des Empfängers)  Machtungleichgewicht  Magistrat  Mahnbescheid

 Mahnung  Mahnverfahren  Makler  Maklerlohn  Mätdervertrag  Mandant  Mandat

see ‘Grundstück’ proceedings/suit pending elsewhere (concurrently). See Chapter XIII, Note 101 licence (agreement). See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (b); Chapter XI, Note 42. Cf ‘Erlaubnis’; ‘Führerschein’; ‘Konzession’ see ‘Klagebefugnis’ continued pay in case of illness. See Creifelds under ‘Entgeltfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall’; Chapter XVIII, Note 13 attachment of earnings. See Chapter XIII, Note 168 wages tax. See Chapter XII, Note 13 localisation principle. See Chapter XXII, Note 58 Lombard transaction, ie, grant of a loan by a bank against creation of a ‘Pfandrecht’ (lien). See Chapter X D 3 (h) (Note 280 D) to delete (from a list/register), to cross/strike off, erase, extinguish deletion, erasure, cancellation, discharge. See Chapter X D 3 (h); Chapter XIII D 8 (e) gap. See Chapter II, Note 22; Chapter X, Note 47; Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter X F 3 (c) (iii) free of gaps, complete, seamless. See Chapter XIII, Note 67 power area of control (of the recipient). See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Validity of a ‘Willenserklärung’) (Note 43) imbalance/inequality of (bargaining) power. See Chapter X B 2 (e) (collective) magistrate; executive organ of a ‘Gemeinde’. See also ‘Oberbürgermeister’  and Creifelds under ‘Magistratsverfassung’ default notice. See Chapter XIII C I, D 1 (g) (ii) and ‘Mahnverfahren’. A similar English term (which has a certain function in the English law of bankruptcy) is: ‘statutory demand’ warning. See ‘Leistungsstörung’ and ‘Verzug’ default notice procedure. See Creifelds under ‘Mahnverfahren’ and Chapter XIII D 7 (civil law) agent, broker. See Creifelds under ‘Makler’ and cf ‘Handelsmakler’  broker’s fee; also called ‘Courtage’ (civil) agency contract. See Creifelds under ‘Mäklervertrag’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 8) client (of a lawyer); also ‘Auftraggeber’. See Chapter XXII D 4  brief, case. See Chapter XXII D 5. See also ‘Anwaltsvertrag’ 406

Appendix A: Vocabulary

 Mangel  Mangels Masse  Mantelgesellschaft  Manteltarifvertrag  Marke  Markenwaren  Maßnahme  Maßregel der Besserung und Sicherung  Materiell  Materielles Recht  Mehrdeutig  Mehrheit  Mehrheitsprinzip  Mehrparteiensystem  Mehrseitig  Mehrwertsteuer  Meinung  Meinungsfreiheit  Meinungsverschiedenheit  Menschenrecht(e)  Menschenwürde  Merkmal  Miete  Mietkauf   Mietvertrag  Mietzins  Mildernde Umstände  Minderjährig  Minderjähriger  Minderkaufmann

fault; defect. See ‘Fehler(haft)’; ‘Gewährleistung’; Chapter X, Notes 126 J, 166, 185, 189; Chapter XIII, at Notes 20 and 61 due to lack of assets/ substance (a term of insolvency law) a ‘shell’/‘skeleton’ company, ie, one which previously traded, but which has meantime suspended its business activities. Cf ‘Vorratsgesellschaft’ principal (general) tariff agreement (regulating working conditions for a longer term) mark, stamp; brand, emblem, logo. See Creifelds under ‘Marken’. See also ‘Kennzeichen’  brand name/brand ed goods. See Creifelds under ‘ Markenwaren’; Chapter XI, Note 42 measure. See Chapter XIV C 1 and Chapter XVI D measure of improvement and security. See Creifelds under ‘Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung’ and Chapter XVI D material(ly) material law. See Chapter IX B ambiguous. See Chapter X B 2 (e) majority; multitude. See Chapter X C 3 (f); Chapter XIB 2; Chapter XII D majority principle. See Chapter XI B multi-party system. See Chapter II G multilateral. See Chapter X B 17 and X C 2 3 value-added tax. Also ‘Umsatzsteuer’ opinion. See also ‘Stellungnahme’ freedom of expression (opinion). See Creifelds under ‘Meinungsfreiheit’ and Chapter VIII C difference of opinion. See Chapter XVIII D human right(s). See Chapter II, Note 34 human dignity. See Creifelds under ‘Menschenwürde’ and Chapter VIII C element, characteristic (of). See Chapter X, Note 22; Chapter XVI, Note 17 rent(al). See Creifelds under ‘Miete’;  Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé. Rental payment also called ‘Mietzins’ hire-purchase. See Chapter X, Note 238 rental agreement, lease, tenancy. See ‘Mietvertrag’; Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 3); Chapter XVIII, Note 6 (amount of) rent, ie, rental payment Also called ‘Miete’ mitigating circumstances under the age of majority. Cf ‘Volljährig’ minor. See Chapter X B 2 (a) lesser businessman. See Chapter XI D 2 (a), ‘Mußkaufmann’ and Creifelds under ‘Minderkaufmann’ 407

The German Legal System and Legal Language

 Minderung  Ministerpräsident  Mißachten  Mißbrauchen  Mitbestimmung(srecht)  Miteigentum nach Bruchteilen  Miterbe  Mitfahrer  Mitgliedschaftsrecht  Mitspracherecht  Mittäter  Mittelbar  Mittelstufe  Mitverschulden  Mitwirken  Mitwirkung  Mord  Motivirrtum  Mündlichkeitsgrundsatz  Mußkaufmann  Mutmaßlich Nachbar Nachbessern Nachbesserung Nach billigem Ermessen

abatement, reduction (in the price). See Chapter X, Note 189 prime minister; head of a ‘Landesregierung’. See Chapter V A to disregard, ignore to abuse. See Chapter X, Notes 47 C and 220; Chapter XIV C 6. See also ‘Ausnutzen’ (right of) co-decision, co-determination; stronger than ‘Mitspracherecht’. see Creifelds under ‘Mitbestimmung’ and Chapter XVIII C and F  joint ownership by shares (§ 1008ff BGB). It is a subcategory of the ‘Gemeinschaft nach Bruchteilen’. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (v)  joint heir. See Chapter X F 4 (b) passenger. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C right of membership. See Chapter XIX B right of co-determination, consultation. See Chapter XVIII E and cf ‘Mitbestimmungsrecht’  joint perpetrators), accomplice. See ‘Täter’; Creifelds under ‘Mittäterschaft’   (joint perpetration); § 25(ii) StGB. Cf  ‘Anstiftung’, ‘Beihilfe’ indirect(ly). See Chapter II C, Chapter IV, Chapter VIII A and Chapter X, Note 257 middle level. See Chapter V B contributory fault, contributory negligence. See Chapter X C 3 (a) (§ 254 BGB); Chapter X, Note 183; Creifelds under ‘Mitverschulden’ to assist (by way of cooperation). See Chapter III cooperation . Also ‘Zusammenarbeit’. See Chapter II H; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c); Chapter X F 4 (b); Chapter XIII, Note 96; Chapter XVIII E murder. See Chapter XVII, Notes 11, 26 C and 38 B mistaken motive. See Chapter X, Note 47 D; Chapter X F 3 (c) (iv) oral principle. See Creifelds under ‘Mündlichkeitsgrundsatz’ and Chapter XIII B 4 compulsory businessman; two types: ‘Vollkaufmann’ (full  businessman) or ‘Minderkaufmann’ (lesser businessman). See Chapter XI C 2 (a) presumable, supposed(ly). Also ‘Vermutlich’. See Chapter XVI C 2 (b) neighbour. See Chapter X, Note 253 to correct, repair (a defect). Also ‘Beheben’, ‘Beseitigen’ (subsequent) correction/ repair (of a defect). See Chapter X, Note 189 C in accordance with fair discretion. See Chapter XIII D 2 (d) 408

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Nacherbe Nachfolgeklausel Nachforschungspflicht Nachgiebig Nachholen Nach Lage der Akten (Aktenlage) Nachlaß Nachlaßgericht Nachlaßkonkurs Nachlaßpfleger Nachlaßsache Nachlaßverbindlichkeit Nachlaßverwaltung Nachlieferung Nachteilig Nachtrag Nachverfahren Nachweisen Namensaktie Namenspapier Nebenabrede Nebenanspruch Nebenbestimmung Nebenforderung Nebengesetz Nebenintervenient Nebenintervention Nebenklage Nebenleistung Nebenpflicht

subsequent heir. See Chapter X F 4 (e) succession clause (in company agreement). See Chapter XI C 3 (b) (iv) duty of investigation. See Chapter X, Note 259 yielding, indulgent. See ‘Dispositiv’ to carry out anew, make up for. See Chapter XIII, Note 78 on die basis of the file(s). See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (iii) See Chapter X F 4; Chapter XXII B; ‘Erbschaft’ probate court. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (iv); Chapter X F 5 (d) and (e); Chapter XIII, Note 32 estate bankruptcy. See Chapter X F 5 (b) estate guardian, curator. See Chapter X F 5 (e) matter relating to a ‘Nachlaß’, probate matter. See Chapter XXII B debt of the estate. See Chapter X F 4 (b) and 5 (b) estate guardian, curator. See Chapter X F 5(b) further/subsequent delivery. See Chapter X, Note 116 disadvantageous, detrimental. See Chapter XIII D 3 (a) addendum, supplement; codicil. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (d) see ‘Vorbehaltsurteil’ to prove, show, verify, demonstrate share (in a public company) issued in the name of a particular person. See Chapter XIX B see ‘Rektapapier’ collateral agreement. See Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (d) accessory/collateral claim. See Chapter X, Note 266 B; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) collateral provision (to a VA). See Chapter XIV C 2 see ‘Nebenanspruch’ secondary, accessory, collateral statute. See Chapter XVI A intervener. See ‘Nebenintervention’ assistance to a party in the dispute as intervener; also called ‘Streithilfe’. See Creifelds under ‘Nebenintervention’, Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iii) and ‘Interventionswirkung’ collateral prosecution. See Creifelds under ‘Nebenklage’ and Chapter XVII H collateral service. See ‘Leistung’; Chapter X D 3 (h) accessory duty. Breach can found a claim for ‘positive Vertragsverletzung’   (PVV). See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Interpretation of a ‘Willenserklärung’) (Note 47); Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c) 409

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Nebenpunkt Nebenstrafe Ne bis in idem

Nemo bonus iurista nisi bartolista Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse habet (Nemo dat, quod non habet) Nennbetragsaktie Neugliederung Nichtberechtigter Nichtbestehen Nichtehelich Nichterfüllung Nichterscheinen Nichtig(keit)

Nichtigerklärung Nichtigkeitsklage Nichtleistungskondiktion

Nichtrechtsfähig

accessory (collateral, subordinate) point. See Chapter X B 2 (c) ‘Failure to reach an ‘Einigung’ accessory punishment. See Creifelds under ‘Nebenstrafen’ and Chapter XVI D not twice in the same matter. No prosecution or punishment is possible again for the same crime. The equivalent principle in English law is the ‘double jeopardy’ rule. See Creifelds under ‘Ne bis in idem’ (‘Strafklageverbrauch’); Chapter VIII C (Note 35); Chapter XVI, Note 5. Cf Chapter XIII C D (Note 15) noone is a good jurist, if he does not follow Bartolus. See Chapter I (Note 5) nobody can transfer to another person a greater right than he himself has. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (ii)/(iii), Notes 255 and 260 a share issued for a particular nominal value (‘Nennwert’). Cf ‘Stückaktie’ new division. See Creifelds under ‘Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes’ and Chapter II F (Note 20) unauthorised (third) person. See Chapter X D 2 (v) and D 3 (c) (ii) (‘Bona fide acquisition of ownership to movables’) non-existence, not to exist. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (ii) illegitimate (child). See Chapter X E and Creifelds under ‘Nichteheliche Kinder’ failure to perform, non-performance, breach. See Chapter X, Notes 114 and 126 A non-appearance; a party’s failure to attend a ‘Termin’. See Chapter XIII D1 (g) (iv) and ‘Versäumnis’ void; nullity. Can relate to a court decision, a ‘Gesetz’, a ‘Willenserklärung’, a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’  or a VA. See, respectively, Chapters VII C X B 2 (b) and XIV C 3. See also Creifelds under ‘Nichtigkeit gerichtlicher Entscheidungen’, ‘Nichtigkeit von Gesetzen’, ‘Nichtigkeit von Rechtsgeschäften’ and ‘Nichtigkeit von Verwaltungsakten’ declaration of nullity (of marriage). See Chapter XIII D 6 (b) type of writ seeking ‘Wiederaufnahme’. See Chapter XIII D 4 (subsidiary) ground of action (conduction) under § 812(i), 1st sentence, 2nd alternative BGB to recover something (‘etwas’=a financial advantage) from someone, who obtains it without a legal basis (‘ohne rechtlichen Grund’), not due to the ‘Leistung’ of the claimant, but ‘in sonstiger Weise’ (in another way). There are 3 types of ‘Nichtleistungskondiktion’: ‘Eingriffskondiktion’, ‘Verwendungskondiktion’ and ‘Rückgriffskondiktion’. Cf ‘Leistungskondiktion’  and see Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 24) incapable of carrying rights and obligations (not possessing legal capacity). See Chapter II C (Note 11). Cf ‘Rechtsfähig(keit)’ 410

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Nichtstun Nichtverhandeln Nichtvermögensrechtlich Nichtvermögensschaden Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde Niederlassung Niederlassungsfreiheit Niedersachsen Niederschrift Nießbrauch Non liquet Norddeutscher Bund Nordrhein-Westfalen Norm Normkontrolle

Normkontrollverfahren Normzweck Notar Notarkammer Notfall Notfrist Nötigung Notstand

Nottestament Notwehr

inaction, idleness. See Chapter X B 2 (c) a party’s failure to make submissions at a ‘Termin’; equivalent to ‘Nichterscheinen’  (§ 333 ZPO). See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (iv) non-monetary. See Chapter XIII D 3 (b) non-pecuniary loss. See Chapter X, Note 227 type of ‘Beschwerde  available in administrative, finance, social and employment proceedings against refusal of leave to appeal. See Chapter XIII, Note 135 See ‘Sitz’; Creifelds under ‘Niederlassung’. See also ‘Filiale’, ‘Zweigniederlassung’ (branch office) freedom of establishment. See Chapter VIII C; ‘Verkehr’ Lower Saxony. See Chapter V A written record. See Chapter X, Note 256; Chapter X F 3 (c) (i) and 5 (e); Chapter XXII E usufruct. See Creifelds under ‘Nießbrauch’ and Chapter X D 3 (e) (the matter is) not dear. See Chapter XIII B 7 North German Confederation. See Chapter I (Note 7) Northrhein-Westphalia. See Chapter V A norm, legal provision. Also ‘Rechtssatz’. See Preface to Second Edition, at Note 1; Chapter IX B norm-control (by a court); a norm-control reference to the BVerfG can be ‘konkret’ (concrete: within particular proceedings) or ‘abstrakt’ (abstract: on application). See Creifelds under ‘Normenkontrolle’ and Chapters VII C and XV A norm-control procedure (eg, under § 47 VwGO). See ‘Normkontrolle’ purpose of a norm. See Chapter X, Note 219; Chapter XIII C 6 notary. See Creifelds under ‘Notar’ and Chapter XXII E Notaries’ Chamber. See Chapter XXII E emergency. See Chapter XXI, Note 1 a ‘Frist’ described as such in a statute and which cannot be extended or shortened. See Creifelds under ‘Notfrist’ and Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (iii) duress. See Chapter X, Note 58 C (state of) emergency; can be a ‘Rechtfertigungsgrund’ (§ 34 StGB) or a ‘Schuldausschließungsgrund’. An illegal act can be excused if it is carried out in an emergency (‘entschuldigender Notstand’), although not if this was on the basis of an (avoidable) mistake (‘Putativnotstand’) (§ 35 StGB). See Creifelds under ‘Notstand’ I; Chapter X, Note 58 C; Chapter XVI C 2 (b) and 3 (d) emergency will. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (i) self-defence; a person acting in ‘Notwehr’  has a ‘Rechtfertigungsgrund’  (§ 32 StGB). If the appropriate 411

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Notwendig Novelle Nulla poena sine culpa Nulla poena sine lege Nullum crimen sine lege Numerus clausus Nutzung Nutzungsherausgabe Nutzungsrecht Oberbegriff  Oberbürgermeister Oberfinanzdirektion Oberkreisdirektor Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Oberpostdirektion Oberstaatsanwalt Oberste Bundesbehörde Oberste Bundesorgan(e) Oberste Landesbehörde Oberstes Landesgericht Oberstufe Oberverwaltungsgericht (OVG) Obhut Objektive Bedingungen der Strafbarkeit Objektives Recht

‘Notwehr’  is exceeded (‘Notwehrexzeß’), ‘Schuld’  can be excluded. See Creifelds under ‘Notwehr’ I and Chapter XVI C 2 (b) (Note 30) and 3 (d) (Note 50) necessary. See Chapter XIII D1 (f) (ii) and (v); Chapter XVII C (statutory) amendment supplement no punishment without blame. See Chapter XVI C (Note 16) no punishment without law. See Chapter VIII C (Note 36) and Chapter XVI A no crime without law. See Creifelds under ‘Nullum crimen (nulla poena) sine lege’ and Chapter XVI A (Note 3) closed (fixed) number. See Creifelds under ‘numerus clausus’; Chapter VII C (Note 18); Chapter X D 1  benefit, profit. See Chapter X, Note 265 release/return of benefits). See Chapter X, Note 266 right of user; (copyright) licence. See Creifelds under ‘Nutzungsrecht’ and Chapter X D 1 principal/upper term. See Chapter XVI, Note 35; Chapter XIX A 2 senior Mayor; executive organ of a larger ‘Gemeinde’. See also ‘Bürgermeister’ ; ‘Magistrat’; ‘Gemeindeverwaltung’; Chapter VI; Creifelds under ‘Oberbürgermeister’ Upper Finance Directorate. It is both a ‘Bundesbehörde’ and a ‘Landesbehörde’. See Chapter IV see ‘Landrat’,   Chapter VI and Creifelds under ‘Oberkreisdirektor’ county court of appeal; superior (county) court (of a ‘Land’); upper regional court. See Creifelds under ‘Oberlandesgericht’ and Chapters XIII D 3 (a) and XXII C 2 Upper Post Directorate. It used to be a ‘Bundesbehörde’. See Chapter IV senior state prosecutor (at the LG). See Chapter XVII B supreme federal authority. See Chapter IV and Creifelds under ‘Oberste Bundesbehörden’ supreme organ(s) of the ‘Bund’. See Chapter in supreme authority of a ‘Land’. See Chapter V B Supreme County/State Court (in Bavaria). See Chapter XXII C 2 upper level. See Chapter V B administrative court of appeal; sometimes called ‘Verwaltungsgerichtshof’  (VGH). See Creifelds under ‘Oberverwaltungsgericht’ and Chapters XV A and XXII C 4 safekeeping, gaurd, care. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c); Chapter XVI, Note 24 objective conditions of punishability. See Chapter XVI C (Note 17) objective law. See Chapter X B 1 4 412

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Obliegenheit Offene Handelsgesellschaft (OHG) Offenkundig Offensichtlich Öffentlich Öffentliche Einrichtung Öffentliche Gewalt Öffentlicher Glaube Öffentlich-rechtlicher Vertrag Öffentliches Recht Öffentliche Sache Öffentliche Urkunde Öffentlichkeit Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatz Offizialprinzip Ohne Obligo Ohne rechtlichen Grund Ohne sachlichen Grund Opportunitätsgrundsatz Ordentlich Ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit Orderpapier Ordnung Ordnungsbehörde Ordnungsgeld Ordnungsgemäß

informal duty (ie, one falling short of a legal obligation). See Chapter X, Note 111; § 43(ii) GmbHG open trading company. See Creifelds under ‘Offene  Handelsgesellschaft’, Chapter XI A and ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft’, ‘Gesellschaft’ and ‘Personengesellschaft’ (patently) obvious(ly), well known. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 97 2) evidently), obvious(ly). See Chapter XI, Note 69; Chapter XX, Note 6 (in) public public facility, amenity, establishment. See Chapter II C; Chapter VI (the) public power. See Chapter VII C public credence (eg, of the Land Register or a certificate of  inheritance). See Chapter X D 3 (b); Chapter X F 5 (d) contract governed by public law, public contract. See Creifelds under ‘Öffentlich-rechtliche Verträge’; Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter XIV B 3 public law. See Chapter IX and Creifelds under ‘Recht’ II See also ‘ius publicum’ public property. See Creifelds under ‘Öffentliche Sachen’; Chapter XIV C 1 public document. See Chapter XXII E (the) publicity). See Chapter XIII, Note 136 the principle that a hearing (usually) takes place in public. See Creifelds under ‘Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatz’ and Chapter XIII B 5 official principle. See Chapter XVII, Note 13 without obligation. See Chapter X B 2 (c) without (a) legal basis. See Chapter X B 2 (a); Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 24); Chapter X (Note 246); ‘Leistungskondiktion’ without (a) substantial reason. See Chapter XIV C 6 (Note 34) opportunity principle; gives a ‘Behörde’ discretion as to whether to intervene. See Creifelds under ‘Opportunitätsprinzip’,  Chapter XVII B and cf ‘Legalitätsgrundsatz’ ordinary, (in) proper (form). See ‘Kündtgung’ ordinary jurisdiction; deals with civil, criminal and FGG matters. See Creifelds under ‘Ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit’ and Chapter XXII C 2 order security ie, in the name of a particular person or order. See Chapter XIX B; Creifelds under ‘Orderpapier’. Cf  ‘Innaberpapier’ order. See Chapter XVII D (Note 32) order authority. See ‘Verwaltungspolizei’ see ‘Ordnungsmittel’ proper. See Chapter X F 4 (b) 413

The German Legal System and Legal Language

see ‘Ordnungsmittel’ correct(ly), proper(ty). See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i) measure to compel particular conduct or to punish for contempt of court. Can consist of a fine (‘Ordnungsgeld’) or detention (‘Ordnungshaft’). See ‘Beugemittel’. Cf  ‘Zwangsmittel’ minor offence punishable by a fine (‘Geldbuße’) . See Ordnungswidrigkeit Creifelds under ‘Ordnungswidrigkeiten’ and Chapter XVI B Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OWiG) Minor Offences Law. See Chapter XVI B (Note 9) organ (of a corporate body); eg, of the ‘Bund’ or a ‘Land’: see Organ Creifelds under ‘Organe der BRep’ and Chapters II C, III and V A. See also Chapter XI A 3. The term includes a constitutionally appointed representative (‘verfassungsmäßig berufener Vertreter’)   under § 31 BGB and a special representative (‘besonderer Vertreter’)  under § 30 BGB. A ‘Rechtsanwalt’ is an ‘Organ der Rechtspflege’ (organ of the administration of justice). See Chapter XXII D 2 organisational fault. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Note 222) Organisationsverschulden position/status of an ‘Organ’; position of responsibility, Organstellung representative position. See ‘Organ’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Note 222 C) dispute between (supreme) constitutional organs. See Organstreit(igkeit) Creifelds under ‘Organstreitigkeiten’ and Chapter VII C local. See ‘Zuständigkeit’ Örtlich normal in the (local) area, locality. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (i) Ortsüblich (commercial) lease. See Creifelds under ‘Pacht’; Chapter X Pacht C 3 (g) (Title 3) contracts are to (must) be observed (performed). See Pacta sunt servanda Creifelds under ‘pacta sunt servanda’, Chapter I and Chapter X Note 47 D (commercial) lessee. See Chapter X C 3(g) Exposé (b) Pächter science of the pandects. See Chapter I Pandektenwissenschaft agreement on the draft text of a treaty by way of initialling. Paraphierung See Chapter II H parliamentary democracy. See Chapter III (Note 2) and cf  Parlamentarische Demokratie ‘Präsidialdemokratie’ party (to civil proceedings). See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i) Partei conduct of proceedings by the parties. See Chapter XIII C Parteibetrieb C. Cf ‘Amtsbetrieb’ capable of being (capacity to be) a party. See Creifelds under Parteifähig(keit) ‘Parteifähigkeit’ and Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i) See ‘Prozeßhandlung’ Parteihandlung party openness (principle). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) Parteiöffentlichkeit party action. See Creifelds under ‘Parteiprozeß’, Chapter XIII Parteiprozeß D 1 (f) (iv) and cf ‘Anwaltsprozeß’ Ordnungshaft Ordnungsmäßig Ordnungsmittel

414

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Parteivernehmung Parteiverrat Parteivortrag Partnerschaftsgesellschaft Partnerschaftsvertrag Pausch(al)vergütung Personal Personalausweis Personalkörperschaft Personalrat Personengesellschaft

Personenkreis Personenschaden Personenzusammenschluß Persönlich Persönlichkeit Persönlichkeitsrecht Petitionsrecht Pfandbrief  Pfandleihe Pfandrecht Pfändung Pfändungsbeschluß Pfändungspfandrecht Pfleger(in) Pflegschaft

examination of a party (in a civil court). See Creifelds under ‘Parteivernehmung’ party disloyalty, acting for both sides in a matter in breach of trust. See Chapter XXII D 5 submission(s) of a party. See ‘Darstellung’; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iii) (Note 97 4) partnership (company). See Chapter XXII D 9 partnership agreement. See Chapter XXII D 9 lump-sum (fixed) fee. See Chapter XXII, Notes 100 and 102 staff. See Chapter XI C 2 (d) see ‘Ausweis’ personal corporation. See Chapter II C (Note 11) and cf  ‘Gebietskörperschaft’ personnel council (in public sector). See Creifelds under ‘Personalvertretung’ (representation of personnel), Chapter XVIII C and cf ‘Betriebsrat’ a personal company; as opposed to a ‘Kapitalgesellschaft’. See Creifelds under ‘Personengesellschaft’. Examples: ‘BGBGesellschaft’,  OHG and KG. See Chapter XI (Note 17), Chapter XXII D 9 group of persons. See Chapter X B 2 (e); Chapter XIV C 1 personal injury. See Chapter X, Notes 126 J and 227. See also ‘Körperverletzung’ alliance (group, union) of persons. See Chapter XI (Note 3) personal personality personality right. See Creifelds under ‘Persönlichkeitsrecht’ and Chapter VIII C (Note 20) right of petition. See Chapter XV A mortgage bond (certificate). See Chapter XIX B pawnbroking. See Chapter X D 3 (h) (Note 280 D) pledge, lien. See Chapter X D 3 (h) (Note 280) distraint, seizure. See Creifelds under ‘Pfändung’ and Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v) court order for ‘Pfändung’  of a debtor’s money claims, attachment order, garnishee order. See Chapter XIII D 8 (c) (v) distraint lien. See Chapter X D 3 (h) (Note 280 C) attendant, administrator, executive; nurse. See Chapter X E and also ‘Rechtspfleger’ administration (over a person unable to deal with his or her affairs in the cases specified in §§ 1909–1921 BGB). See Creifelds under ‘Pflegschaft’ and Chapter X E 415

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Pflicht Pflichtgemäß Pflichtteil Pflichtteilergänzungsanspruch Pflichtverteidiger Plädoyer Platzverweisung Plausibel Polizei Polizeibehörde Polizeipräsident Polizeipräsidium Polizeivollzugsbeamter Polizeivollzugsdienst Popularklage Position Positive Vertragsverletzung (PVV) Postulationsfähig(keit) Präjudiz Präsidialdemokratie Preisgefahr Preis-/Leistungsverhältnis Pressegesetz Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Prinzip Privatautonomie Privatklage

duty, obligation. See Chapter X C 3 in accordance with legal obligation, dutifully. See Chapter XIV C 6 compulsory portion (of an estate). See Creifelds under ‘Pflichtteil’; Chapter X B 4 (c); Chapter X F 1, 2 and 4 (g) a claim to supplement the compulsory portion (of an estate). See Chapter X F 4 (g) (iv) compulsory defender, compulsory defence lawyer. See Creifelds under ‘Pflichtverteidiger’; Chapter XVII C; Chapter XXII D 4; Chapter XXII, Note 100 final representations in a case by a lawyer in court. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) see ‘Verweisung’ plausible. See Chapter XV, Note 12 police. See Chapter XIV C 3 and Chapter XVII D police authority. See ‘Verwaltungspolizei’ Police Chief/Commissioner/President, ie, head of the municipal/ regional police force police headquarters (executive) police officer, constable executive police service. See Chapter XVII D (Note 32) popular action. See Chapter XV C and Creifelds under ‘Popularklage’ point, item (in a list or schedule); position. See Chapter XIII, Note 96 positive breach of contract. See Chapter X B 1 4 (Note 18), Chapter X B 2 (b) (Note 47), Chapter X C 3 (a) (Note 126 C); Chapter XVIII H; Chapter XXII, Note 74 capable of appearing (capacity to appear) (before a particular court), right of audience. See Creifelds under ‘Postulationsfähigkeit’ and Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) (case) precedent. See Chapter XIII C G. Cf ‘Fallrecht’ presidential democracy. See Chapter in (Note 2) and cf  ‘parlamentarische Demokratie’ risk of (receipt of) the price. See Chapter X, Note 126 G price/performance ratio. See Chapter X B 2 (e) law governing the press. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 E press and information office of the federal government. See Chapter IV principle private autonomy (principle). See Chapter X B 6 private prosecution. See Creifelds under ‘Privatklage’ ; Chapter XVII B and H 416

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Privatrecht Probezeit Produkthaftung Prokura Protestatio (facto contraria) non valet Protokoll Provision Prozeß Prozeßbevollmächtigter Prozeßfähig(keit) Prozeßförderungspflicht Prozeßfüzhrungsbefugnis Prozeßführungsrecht Prozeßgebühr Prozeßgericht Prozeßhandlung Prozeßhandlungsvoraussetzung Prozeßhindernis Prozeßkosten

Prozeßkostenhilfe Prozeßkostenvorschuß Prozeßleitende Verfügung Prozeßleitung

private law. See Creifelds under ‘Privatrecht’ and Chapter IX. See also ‘ius privatum’ trial (employment) period. See Chapter XVIII B product liability. See Chapter X, Notes 126 J, 188 and 227; Chapter XIII B 7 (Note 10) procura. See Creifelds under ‘Prokura’ and Chapter XI C 2 (c) a reservation (which does not accord with the external circumstances) is ineffective. Also ‘Vorbehalt’. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (Note 50) protocol, minute (entry), deposition. Also ‘Verhandlungsprotokoll’ commission, fee. See Chapter XI C 2 (e) case, action, proceedings person possessing a ‘Prozeßvollmacht’ capable of taking (capacity to take) steps in the proceedings. See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßfähigkeit’ and Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i) duty of the parties to further the proceedings. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi) right to conduct an action. See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’ and see Chapter XIII D1 (f) (iv). See also ‘Klagebefugnis’ right to conduct an action. Also called ‘Prozeßführungsbefugnis’ procedure fee. See Chapter XXII D 8 court hearing the case, action. See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßgericht’ and cf ‘Vollstreckungsgericht’ step in the proceedings. A ‘Prozeßhandlung’ taken by a party is a ‘Parteihandlung’. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i) and (iv) and Creifelds under ‘Prozeßhandlung’ precondition for a ‘Prozeßhandlung’   (eg, ‘Parteifähigkeit’, ‘Prozeßfähigkeit’, ‘Prozeßvollmacht’ and ‘Postulationsfähigkeit’) obstacle to the proceedings. See Chapter X Note 20 costs (in (of) the proceedings). They comprise the ‘Gerichtskosten’ and ‘außergerichtliche Kosten’. See Chapter XIII D 1 (c) and D 1 (f) (v). See also Creifelds under ‘Prozeßkosten’ legal aid. See Chapter XIII, Note 53; Chapter XXII D 8 (Notes 101 and 110); Creifelds under ‘Prozeßkostenhilfe’; §§ 114–127a ZPO advance/payment on account of costs. See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßkostenvorchuß’, Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i); ‘Unterhalt’ (interlocutory) direction from the court in the course of  proceedings. See Chapters X D 2 (v) and XIII D 2 (c) (v) conduct/ direction of proceedings (by the court). See Chapter XIII C C; Chapter XIII, Note 69; Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vii) 417

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Prozeßrecht Prozeßstandschaft Prozeßstoff  Prozeßunfähig Prozeßurteil

Prozeßvollmacht Prozeßvoraussetzung Prüfen Prüfung Prüfungsmaßstab Prüfungspflicht Publicum ins est, quod ad statum rei Romanae special, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem Putativnotstand Putativnotwehr Qualifikation Quelle Quidquid non agnoscit glossa, non agnoscit curia Quota litis Rahmen Rasterfahndung

Rat Rate Ratifikation

procedural law. See Chapter IX B transfer of ‘Prozeßfüzhrungsrecht’ to someone who has no ‘Sachlegitimation’ . See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßstandschaft’ and ‘Ermächtigung’; Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) material at issue (in a dispute). See Chapter XIII, Note 69 not ‘prozeßfähig’ procedural judgment. It deals with (preliminary) procedural questions (eg, ‘Zulässigkeit der Klage’ ). See Creifelds under’ ‘Prozeßurteil’ and ‘Zurückverweisung’. Cf  ‘Sachurteil’. See also ‘Urteil’ and ‘Zwischenurteil’ authority to act, power of attorney in proceedings. See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßvollmacht’ and Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) precondition for the proceedings. See Creifelds under ‘Prozeßvoraussetzungen’ and Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i). See also ‘Sachurteilsvoraussetzung’ to examine, test, check. See Chapter X B 1 4 (Note 18) examination, test, check. See Chapter XXII A and D 3 standard against which an examination is (to be) made (measured). See Chapter VIII C (Note 23) duty of examination, duty to check. See Chapter XXII, Note 74 public law looks to the situation of the Roman state, private (law) to the advantage of single persons (ie, public law serves the interests of the state, private law the interests of  the individual) (Ulpian). See Chapter IX A (Note 1) see ‘Notstand’ where a person mistakenly believes he is acting in selfdefence. See Chapter XVI C 3 (d) (Note 54) characterisation. See Chapter XX B source. See ‘Rechtsquelle’ what is not acknowledged by the gloss is not acknowledged by the court. See Chapter I (Note 4) proportion of (the amount recovered in) an action. It is forbidden for a ‘Rechtsanwalt’ to agree (in advance) that he should receive it as his fee. See Chapter XXII D 8 frame(work). See Chapter II B and Chapter XXII D 8 grid search, ie, a computer-assisted search method based on a comparison of personal data according to certain criteria. It can be ordered to trace the perpetrator(s) of  certain serious offences. See Chapter XVII Note 25 and Creifelds under ‘Rasterfahndung’ advice; council. See Chapter X Note 215; Chapter XXII, Note 71 instalment (eg, on repayment (‘Zurückzahlung’) of a loan (‘Darlehen’)), rate ratification (of a treaty). See Chapter II H 418

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Raub Räuberischer Angriff  Räume Räumung Realakt Realkonkurrenz Reallast Rechnen mit (etwas) Rechnung Rechnungshof  Recht Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Gewerbebetrieb Recht auf Konsultation Recht der Selbstuerwaltung Recht zum Besitz Rechtfertigen Rechtfertigung Rechtfertigungsgrund Rechtliches Gehör Rechtlich geschütztes Interesse Rechtlich verbindlich Rechtmäßig(keit) Rechtmäßiger Eingriff  Rechtsangleichung Rechtsanwalt Rechtsanwaltskammer (RAK) Rechtsauffassung Rechtsausführung Rechtsbegriff  Rechtsbehelf  Rechtsbeziehung

robbery. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C aggression (assault) in the course of a robbery. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 C rooms, premises. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (a) eviction. See Chapter X Note 266 pure factual act. See Chapter X B 1 8 and Chapter XV C see ‘Tatmehrheit’ successive duty of supply from a property. See Chapter X D 3 (g) and Creifelds under ‘Reallast’ to reckon with (something). See Chapter X B 2 (e)  bill, invoice, statement. See Chapter X, Note 127 accounts court. See Chapter IV law; right. Can be understood in an objective or subjective sense. See ‘Ius’; Chapter IX B; Chapter X B 4; Creifelds under ‘Recht’. Cf ‘Gesetz’ and ‘Gerecht(igkeit)’ right to an established and exercised business. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 F; Chapter X, Note 266 C; Chapter XVIII, Note 53 right to consultation. See Chapter XVII, Note 38 H right of self-administration; autonomy. See Chapter VI right to possession. See Chapter X D 3 (c) (iv) and cf ‘Besitz’ to justify  justification  justifying reason. See Chapter XVI C 2 and ‘Einwilligung’, ‘Notwehr’, ‘Notstand’ see ‘Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör’ legally protected interest. See Chapter X B 1 4 legally binding. See Chapter X, Note 66 legal(ity). See Chapter XIV C 3 and ‘Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung’ legitimate infringement (of a basic right). See Chapter VIII B harmonisation of law(s). See Preface to Second Edition; Chapter V, Note 1 lawyer. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsanwalt’ and Chapter XXII D Lawyers’ Chamber. See Chapter XXII D 6 legal opinion, view. Also ‘Rechtsansicht’. See Chapter XIII, Note 3 legal submission. See Chapter XIII, Note 3 legal term. See ‘Unbestimmt’ (every form of) legal remedy, formal or informal; includes ‘Rechtsmittel’. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsbehelf  and Chapter XV A legal relationship. See ‘Rechtsverhältnis’ 419

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Rechtsbindungswille Rechtsfähig(keit) Rechtsfolge Rechtsfolgeirrtum Rechtsfortbildung Rechtsfrage Rechtsgeschäft Rechtsgeschäftliches Schuldverhältnis Rechtsgeschäftsähnlich Rechtsgestaltend Rechtsgrundlage Rechtsgut Rechtshandlung Rechtshängig(keit) Rechtshilfe Rechtshilfeordnung in Zivilsachen (ZRHO) Rechtsinstitut Rechtskraft

Rechtskräftig Rechtsmacht Rechtsmangel Rechtsmittel Rechtsnachfolge

will to be legally bound by one’s act. See Chapter X B 2 (b) (the term ‘Willenserklärung’) capable of carrying (capacity to be a carrier of) rights and obligations; legally capable (legal capacity). See Chapter X B 1 1 and Creifelds under ‘Rechtsfähigkeit’. Cf ‘Nichtrechtsfähig’ legal consequence. See Chapter X B 1 5; Chapter X B 1 7 and Chapter X C 22 mistake as to the legal consequence. See Chapter XVI C 3 (d) development of (the) law (by the judiciary). See Chapter X Note 47 E legal question; question of law. See Chapter XVIII D (Note 37) legal transaction; juristic act. In Latin: ‘negotium’. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ and Chapter X B 1 7 obligation arising from a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. See Chapter X C 2 3 similar to a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. See Chapter X B 1 7 creating or amending a legal relationship or situation. See Chapter XIV C 5 legal basis. See Chapters VII B and VIII, Note 15 asset of legal (social) importance. See Chapter X, Notes 219, 222 B, 266 C; Chapter XVI B legal action; legal act. See Chapter X B 1 8 (the fact that a matter is) sub judice, legally pending. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtshängigkeit’ and Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (i) and (iii). Cf ‘ Anhängig’ legal assistance, cooperation. See Chapter XXI A. Cf  ‘Amtshilfe’ Order for Legal Assistance in Civil Matters. See Chapter XXI, Note 7 legal institution. See Chapter I, Note 13 legal force, legally binding nature (of a court decision); a decision has ‘formelle Rechtskraft’ (formal legal force) when it can no longer be Challenged. This is a condition for the decision having ‘materielle Rechtskraft’ (material legal force), ie, being final for the court and parties: ‘res judicata’. See Creifields under ‘Rechtskraft’; Chapter XIII C E and C H possessing ‘Rechtskraft’ legal power. See ‘Subjektives Recht’ defect in title. See Chapter X, Note 185. Cf ‘Sachmangel’ (devolutive) legal remedy, appeal. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsmittel’; Chapter XIII C H and D 3; Chapter XIII, Note 90. Cf ‘Rechtsbehelf’ succession (to the right/interest/title of another person). Also ‘Sukzession’. It can be based on a ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ (eg, transfer 420

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Rechtsnorm Rechtsobjekt Rechtsordnung Rechtspflege Rechtspfleger Rechtspflegergesetz (RPflG) Rechtsprechende Gewalt Rechtsprechung Rechtsquelle Rechtsreflex Rechtssatz Rechtsschein Rechtsschutz Rechtsschutzbedürfnis Rechtsschutzgarantie Rechtsschutzinteresse Rechtssicherheit Rechtssphäre Rechtsstaat Rechtsstreit Rechtssubjekt Rechtsunwirksam Rechtsverhältnis Rechtsverordnung

of ownership) or arise from statute (eg, ‘gesetzliche Erbfolge’). See Chapter X, Note 255. See also ‘Gesamtrechtsnachfolge’ legal norm. See Chapter VII B; Chapter IX B; Chapter XVIII, Note 52 legal object. See Chapter X B 1 3 legal system. See Chapter X B 1 4; Chapter XX B administration of justice. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtspflege and Chapter XXII C 5 legal executive, ie, a civil servant who can conduct various  judicial matters which are not entrusted to a judge. See Chapter XXII B and Creifelds under ‘Rechtspfleger’ Law relating to the ‘Rechtspfleger’. See Chapter XXII B  judicative power. Also ‘Rechtsprechung’. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsprechende Gewalt’ and Chapter II F  judicature; case-law. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsprechung’ and Chapter II F legal source. See Chapters X A and XIV A legal reflex. Cf ‘Subjektives Recht’ legal provision. Also ‘Norm’. See Chapter X B 1 5 (Note 22); Chapter X C 2 2 (Note 105) legal appearance, aura. See Chapter XI C 2 (c); Chapter XIII, Note 57; Chapter XVIII, Note 7 legal protection. See Chapter XXI A need for legal protection; also called ‘Rechtsschutzinteresse’. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i); Chapter XIII D 6 (b) 1. See also Creifelds under ‘Rechtsschutzbedürfnis’; Stern, Part I, § 12 right of everyone to protection of the courts (Article 19(iv) GG). See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsweggarantie’ and Chapter VIII C see ‘Rechtsschutzbedürfnis’ legal certainty. See Preface to Second Edition; Chapter II E; Chapter X, Note 260 legal sphere. See Chapter VII C state in which the (rule of) law prevails. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsstaat’ and Chapter II E legal dispute. Also ‘Streit’; ‘Streitigkeit’ legal subject, person. See Creifelds under ‘Rechtssubjekt’ and Chapter X B 1 2 legally ineffective, of no legal effect. Also ‘Unwirksam’ legal relationship. See Chapter X B 1 5 statutory instrument, regulation, ordinance, edict. It is a legal provision (‘Rechtssatz’) issued by the executive on the basis of a ‘Gesetz’. See Chapters VI, VII C, VIII B (Note 15) and XIV A. See also ‘Gesetz’ and ‘Zustimmungsgesetz’ 421

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Rechtsweg Rechtswidrig(keit) Rechtswissenschaft Rechtszug Rechtzeitig Referendar Reforrnatio in peius Regeln Regelung Regelunterhalt Regelungsfrage Regierung Regierungsbezirk Regierungspräsident Registergericht Regreß Reichsgericht Reichskammergericht Reichsversicherungsordnung (RVO) Reif  Reisegewerbe Reisevertrag Rei vindicatio Rektapapier Relatives Recht Religionsunterricht Rendite

legal route (to a particular court). See Creifelds under ‘Rechtsweg’ and Chapters XIII D 1 (f) (i) and XV C illegal(ity). Also ‘Widerrechtlich’ legal science, jurisprudence. See Preface to Second Edition, Note 1 (court) instance. See Chapter XIII A and D 2 in (good) time. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c); Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (v) a prospective ‘Rechtsanwalt’ between the first and second ‘Staatsprüfung’; after the second: ‘Assessor’ . See Chapter XXII A and D 3. See also Creifelds under ‘Referendar’ it is not permitted, on appeal, to amend a decision to the detriment of the appellant. See Creifelds under ‘reformatio in peius’; Chapter XIII, Note 131; Chapter XVI B (Note 14) to regulate, govern, settle (a matter) (legal) provision, rule, arrangement standard maintenance (for an illegitimate child). See Chapter XIII D 6 (c) and Creifelds under ‘Unterhaltsprozeß’ regulatory question; question of regulation. See Chapter XVIII D (Note 37) government. See Chapter II, Note 8 governmental area, district. See Creifelds under ‘Regierungsbezirk’ and Chapter V B president of the government (of a ‘Regierungsbezirk’). See Chapter V B court of registration. See Chapter XIII, Note 32 regress. Also ‘Rückgriff’ Imperial Court. See Chapter X B 2 (e) Imperial Chamber (Court). See Chapter I Imperial Insurance Order. See Chapter XVIII H mature. See Chapter XVI, Note 40 travelling business/trade. See Chapter XIX B; Creifelds under ‘Reisegewerbe’ travel contract. See Creifelds under ‘Reisevertrag’ and Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 7) see ‘Vindikation’ security issued in favour of a specifically named person. Also ‘Namenspapier’. See Chapter XIX B relative right. Cf ‘Absolutes Recht’ and see Chapter X B 1 4 religious instruction. See Chapter VIII C (Article 7 GG) and Creifelds under ‘Religionsunterricht’ see ‘Ertrag’ 422

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Rentenschuld Renvoi Replik Res judicata Restitutionsklage Revision

Rezeption des römischen Rechts Rheinbund Rheinland-Pfalz Richter Richterliche Frist Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung Richterliches Prüfungsrecht Richterrecht Richterwahlausschuß Richtlinie Rückgewähr Rückgriff  Rückgriffskondiktion Rücknakme Rücksicht(nehmen) Rücktritt Rückverweisung

regular land charge, ie, a property is charged not for a fixed amount, but as security for regular, successive payments. See Chapter X D 3 (h) and Creifelds under ‘Rentenschuld’ see ‘Rückverweisung’ the plaintiff’s reply to a ‘Klageerwiderung’. See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (iv) the matter has (already) been decided. See Chapter XIII C E type of writ seeking ‘Wiederaufnahme’. See also ‘Nichtigkeitsklage’ appeal (on point of law). In civil proceedings, it can be of  three types: – a ‘Wertrevision’ (appeal on value); – a ‘Zulassungsrevision’ (appeal with leave); or – a ‘Sprungrevision’ (leap-frog appeal). See Creifelds under ‘Revision’, ‘Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung’ and Chapter XIII D 3 (b) reception of Roman law (in Germany in the Middle Ages). See Chapter I (Note 6) Rhein Confederation. See Chapter I (Note 7) Rheinland-Palatinate. See Chapter V A  judge. See Creifelds under ‘Richter’ and ‘Richtergesetze’ and Chapter XXII A ‘Frist’ set by a judge. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (iii) development of the law by the judiciary. Also ‘Richterrecht’ the judiciary’s (inherent) right to check the validity and constitutionality of a ‘Rechtsnorm’. See Creifelds under ‘Richterliches Prüfungsrecht’ and Chapter VII B and C  judge-made law. See Chapter I, Note 13; Chapter II, Note 23; Chapter X, Note 47 E; Chapter XIV A, Note 2. Also ‘Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung’  judicial selection council. See Chapter XXII A directive. See Chapter XXII D 5; Creifelds under ‘Richtlinien’; ‘Verwaltungsvorschrift’ return. See Chapter X, Note 138; Chapter X D 3 (h) regress. See Creifelds under ‘Regreß’ type of ‘Nichtkistungskondiktion’, where the claimant takes regress against a person, who has obtained a benefit at the former’s expense withdrawal, taking back. Can refer to a ‘Klage’, ‘Rechtsmittel’ or VA. See Chapter X F 3 (c) (ii); Chapter XIV C 4. Cf ‘Rücktritt’ (to take into) consideration, account. See Chapter X, Notes 47 C and 135 B withdrawal, rescission, termination. See Creifelds under ‘Rücktritt vom Vertrag’; Chapter X C 3 (b) (Title 5); Chapter X Note 245 reference back, ‘renvoi’ . See Chapter XX B 423

The German Legal System and Legal Language

Rückwirkend Rückwirkung

Ruf  Rüge Ruhen Rundfunk- und Fernsehanstalt

Sachbearbeiter Sachdienlich Sache Sachenrecht Sachgebiet Sachgerecht Sachgesamtheit Sachherrschaft Sachkunde Sachlegitimation Sachlich Sachlichkeitsgebot Sachmangel Sach– und Streitstand Sachurteil Sachurteilsvoraussetzung

retrospectively. See Chapter X F 4 (f) and 5 (b). See also ‘Ex tunc’ retrospective effect, application. See Creifelds under ‘Rückwirkung von Gesetzen’; Chapter II E; Chapter XVI A. Retrospective criminal legislation is absolutely forbidden (Article 103(ii) GG; but see Chapter XVI, Note 4) reputation. See Chapter VIII, Note 20 F objection, censure. See ‘Einspruch’, ‘Einwendung’ and ‘Einrede’. The word can also mean a (disciplinary) reprimand. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i); Chapter XXII D 7 to rest; the resting of. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (v) radio and television station; broadcasting institution. See Chapter II C (Notes 7 and 11). The first German television channel (the ‘ARD’ (‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands’)) has no legal personality itself, but is merely an ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft’  (working group) (ie, a ‘BGBGesellschaft’) established by the various regional broadcasting stations. The respective regional producing station therefore has responsibility for particular programmes case manager, person in charge of/responsible for dealing with a matter conducive, helpful (to the matter), relevant. See Chapter XIII D 1 (g) (i) (corporeal) thing; matter. In Latin: ‘res’. See Creifelds under ‘Sache’;  Chapter X B 1 3 and Chapter X D 1. See also ‘Bestandteil’ and ‘Zubehör’ law of property. See Chapter X D subject area. See Chapter V, Note 6; Chapter X A (Note 3) appropriate, proper. See Chapter XIII, Note 69 collection of ‘Sachen’. See Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (a); Chapter X D 2 (iii) dominance over a ‘Sache’. See Chapter X D 2 (i) expertise, expert knowledge. See Chapter X, Note 215 legitimation (in proceedings); can be active or passive. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iv) factual; pertinent; to the point; substantive duty to be relevant. See Chapter XXII D 5 defect/fault in a ‘Sache’. See Chapter X, Note 185; Chapter X C 3 (g) Exposé (c). Cf ‘Rechtsmangel’ and ‘Falschlieferung’ (the) non-contentious and contentious subject-matter, position (in the case). See Chapter XIII D 2 (c) (vi)  judgment on the substantive matter, point. It deals with the ‘Streitgegenstand’  and decides whether a ‘Klage’ is ‘begründet’ or not. Cf ‘Prozeßurteil’ (pre)condition for a (substantive) judgment in the proceedings. Also called ‘Prozeßvoraussetzung’ and ‘Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzung’. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (i) 424

Appendix A: Vocabulary

Sachverhalt Sachverständiger Sachvorschrift Salvatorische Klausel Sammelverwahrung Sanierung Satzung

Satzungsänderung Satzungsversammlung Schadensersatz

Schadensersatz wegen Nichterfüllung Schadloshalten Scheidung Scheinkaufmann Scheinselbstständigkeit Scheinvollmacht Scheitern Schenkung Schenkungsversprechen Schickschuld Schiedsgericht Schiedsmann Schiedsrichterliches Verfahren Schiedsspruch Schiedsvertrag Schlechtleistung

set of facts, position (in a particular case) expert. See ‘Beweismittel’; Chapter XVII, Notes 22 and 30 substantive legal provision. See Chapter XX B saving clause (eg, in an agreement, to protect against the risk of invalid provisions). See Chapter X B 2 (e) collective deposit. See Chapter XIX B reconstruction, rescue (of a business/company). See Chapter XVIII B 4  bye-law; company agreement, statute, memorandum/ articles (of association) of a ‘Verein’ or ‘Juristische Person’. See Chapters VI, X B 2 (e), XI A 5 and XIV A. See Creifelds under ‘Satzung’. See also ‘Gesetz’. The ‘Geschäftsordnung’ of  federal, state and local parliaments can be issued in this form. amendment of the articles (of a company) rule making assembly (of BRAK). See Chapter XXII D 5 damages, compensation. See Creifelds under ‘Schadensersatz’ and cf ‘Entschädigung’. See also Chapter VIII, Note 20; Chapter X C 3 (a) (Title 1); Chapter X, Notes 119 and 227 damages for non-performance. See Chapter X, Note 126 I to indemnify. See Chapter XIII D 1 (f) (iii); ‘Garantievertrag’ divorce. See Creifelds under ‘Ehescheidung’; Chapter X E; Chapter XIII D 6 (b) apparent businessman. See Chapter XIII, Note 57 pretended/feigned/ostensible self-employment. See Chapter XI, Note 40; Chapter XVIII, Note 2 (c) apparent (ostensible) authority. See Chapter XI C 2 (c) to fail. See Chapter X, Note 135 B gift, donation. See Chapter X C 3 (g) (Title 2); Chapter X F 3 (e) and 4 (g) (iv). Cf ‘Zuwendung’ promise of a gift (for the future). See Creifelds under ‘Schenkung’; Chapter XXII E see ‘Leistungsort’ court of arbitration. See Chapter XIII D 10 (official) arbitrator, who presides over the ‘Sühneverfahren’ and neighbour disputes. See Creifelds under ‘Schiedsmann’ arbitration procedure. See Chapter XIII A and Chapter XIII D 10 arbitration award/decision. See Chapter XIII, Note 171; Chapter XXI A arbitration agreement. See Chapter XIII D 10  bad performance. Can found a claim for ‘positive Vertragsverletzung’  (PVV) 425

The German Legal System and Legal Language