The Evolution of Integral Consciousness and The Paradigm of Complexity - Jackson 1999
Short Description
This is my Master's Thesis from the California Institute of Integral Studies c. 1999. It looks at the work of Rober...
Description
Complex thinking, perceiving, and meaning-making: meaning-making: The evolution of integral consciousness consciousness and the paradigm of complexity
Brian Jackson
Submitted in partial fulfillment of an MA Degree in East-West Psychology The California Institute of Integral Studies San Francisco, California 1999
Committee chair: Sean Kelly, Ph.D.
ii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements Introduction
Contextualization Background of the paradox Making Sense: Thinking-Perceiving-Meaning-making Section 1: Robert Kegan’s subject-object theory
Foundations Order Zero (the incorporative balance) The First Order (the impulsive balance) The Second Order (the imperial balance) The Third Order (the interpersonal balance) A Fourth Order primer The Fourth Order (the institutional balance) The Fifth Order ( the interindividual balance) In Closing Section 2: Jean Gebser’s Integral consciousness
Background The Archaic structure of consciousness The Magical structure of consciousness The Mythical structure of consciousness The Mental structure of consciousness Time and measurement Anxiety about the future Some previous forms of thought The Integral structure of consciousness In Closing Section 3: Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity
Thinking the complex Enter the complex The principles of complex thinking The notion of system In Closing
iii 1
1 4 9 13
13 23 23 24 26 29 31 38 45 46
46 51 52 53 56 68 70 72 78 91 93
93 98 102 111 119
Conclusion
121
References
128
Appendix I Appendix II
132 134
ii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements Introduction
Contextualization Background of the paradox Making Sense: Thinking-Perceiving-Meaning-making Section 1: Robert Kegan’s subject-object theory
Foundations Order Zero (the incorporative balance) The First Order (the impulsive balance) The Second Order (the imperial balance) The Third Order (the interpersonal balance) A Fourth Order primer The Fourth Order (the institutional balance) The Fifth Order ( the interindividual balance) In Closing Section 2: Jean Gebser’s Integral consciousness
Background The Archaic structure of consciousness The Magical structure of consciousness The Mythical structure of consciousness The Mental structure of consciousness Time and measurement Anxiety about the future Some previous forms of thought The Integral structure of consciousness In Closing Section 3: Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity
Thinking the complex Enter the complex The principles of complex thinking The notion of system In Closing
iii 1
1 4 9 13
13 23 23 24 26 29 31 38 45 46
46 51 52 53 56 68 70 72 78 91 93
93 98 102 111 119
Conclusion
121
References
128
Appendix I Appendix II
132 134
iii
Acknowledgements: There are many people that made this thesis and the completion of the related master’s degree possible. First thanks goes to my my family for all of their support and assistance, especially my mom Susan Jackson, my grandparents Blanche and Bob Greenwald, my dad Elliot Jackson, my brother Eric, and long time family friend Bob Bisgeier. I also want to acknowledge my grandmother Freda Jackson, who has left us, for instilling in me at a very young age the importance of knowledge. My fellow classmates and housemates David Arrell and Dave Zeitler not only engaged me in hours of discussion, but were also great proof readers, helping me to make this huge undertaking manageable. Thanks also goes to Carol Whitfield, my advisor while at CIIS and a member of my thesis committee. An extra special thank you goes to Sean Kelly, not only because he encouraged me in my work, chaired my committee, pushed me to do better, and gave me the most feedback on the paper itself, but namely because he introduced me to Edgar Morin’s Morin’s work in the the first place. place. I would also like like the rest of my friends and family, and anyone else that I did not name specifically, to know that I appreciate everything that they’ve done for me, both explicit and implicit, in my adventures through graduate school at the California Institute of Integral Studies. If it were not for for everyone involved my name would not be two letters longer.
Abstract
Complex thinking, perceiving, and meaning m aking: The evolution of integral consciousn ess and th e parad igm of comp lexity Brian Jackson California Institute of Integral Stud ies San Francisco, CA Aug ust 1999
The hu man w orld is und ergoing a major transformation. Struggling to emerge is a needed liberation from the current d ominant w orldview of the West. Having become deficient and destructive, this dominant worldview is founded on prin ciples of separ ation, atom ism, red uctionism, and simp lification. Starting from th is context, this thesis explores the evolution of consciousness, focusing on the
individual/ collective
relationship.
Pivotal
here
is
developm ental
psychologist Robert Kegan’s sub ject-object theory an d his d escription of a “p ostformal” mode of cognition, of making meaning according to a constructive “p ostmod ern” sensibility. Jean Gebser’s brilliant, erud ite explication and review of the evolution of human consciousness, and his insight into an emerging “Integral” consciousn ess, is ju st as central.
Edgar Mor in’s explication of the
notion of a paradigm of simplification and the subsequent need for a paradigm of comp lexity round s out the core of the thesis. This d iscou rse, based on th e works of Kegan, Gebser, and Morin elucidates that there is emerging a novel mod e of making sense of the w orld in non -simplified terms, based on w hat I will be referring to as comp lex TPM -- thinking -perceiving-mean ing-making . This pr ocess of making sense of the wor ld, of coming to kn ow w hat is Self and w hat is “other” in integral/ complex terms, is becoming increasingly n ecessary as w e continue ou r evolution toward s a planetary culture. It is my belief that if we d o not change, the hubris of the current dominant structure of consciousness will certainly overtak e us, and the biosph ere too, as it becomes increasingly deficient.
keywords: consciousness, evolution, complexity, integral, Robert Kegan, Jean Gebser, Edgar Morin, Ken Wilber, thinking, perceiving, meaning, epistemology, developmental psychology, postmodernism, modernism, paradigm, planetary culture.
1 Introduction Contextualization As the next millenniu m a pp roaches one can’t help bu t notice the pervasive excitement an d an xiety. N ever before has the planet been so pop ulated, nor has there been so mu ch wealth w hile, parad oxically, billions live in poverty. Ou r Promethean technology poises us on the verge of altering ph ysical reality in w ays that, u ntil recently, only the most visionary could h ave conceived. The President of the United States has been impeached, 1 the Soviet Union is on th e verge o f anoth er p olitical collapse, Asia is in financial crisis, global weather p atterns hav e become extreme and erratic, and the ecological crisis is worsen ing. In the m idst of this state of affairs, I find my relationship to our wor ld to be very comp lex and am comp elled to make sense of w hat is happ ening. I am comp elled to find m eaning in the complete mad ness and insanity that faces us as we become an increasingly planetary culture. Given this disposition, one might infer that I am on a search for a un iversal hypothesis or definitive theory, one that can explain everything. While there is a ring of truth in this notion, how I am coming to ma ke meaning ou t of our situation is by no means a comforting “theory of everything.” I am referring to a pr ocess of meaning-making th at openly embraces chaos, complexity, relativity, and uncertainty -- including all the benefits and potential hubris that such a process might includ e. It is my curren t belief that if we ar e to surv ive intact -- as ind ividu als, as a species, as a
1
President William Jefferson Clinton w as officially impeached on D ecember 20 th 1998, thoug h h e was not su bsequently removed from office.
2 planet (physically, psychologically, and spiritually) -- then we need a complex epistemology, one that tran scend s our r eliance on singular p erspectives and that does not r eify “the other” 2 as a fixed and static object or entity. Since I am suggesting the n eed for a rad ical reorganization of how we come to u nd erstand an ything at all, then it might seem like comm on sense to ask the following: “how d oes one solve a p roblem of this magnitud e?” Unfortunately, this question, though seemingly reasonable enou gh, is not of the ap pr op riate type. The qu estion itself is characteristic of an attitu d e tha t is stereotypically Western, and especially Am erican. When confronted w ith a “problem” one need simply d o the following to “fix” it: “get in there,” determ ine the natu re of the problem, and then w ork hard to mobilize, app ropriate, and ut ilize the necessary resources. Yet, p hysicist/ p hilosoph er David Bohm (1996) points ou t that “the attemp t to treat ou r current difficulties as ‘problems’ may be one of the m ore imp ortant factors p reventing these d ifficulties from being prop erly brought to an end ” (p. 61). Bohm su ggests that “it wou ld be better to say that one w as confronted by a paradox,” for “as long as a parad ox is treated as a problem, it can never be d issolved” (p. 63). Ou r current situation is much m ore comp licated than simply d iscerning a p roblem and then rationally solving it. Our present challenges are of a different variety than bu ilding th e Panama Can al or the H oover Dam (immense accomp lishmen ts in their own right to say the least). The mo st serious issues needing resolu tion are cultu ral in natu re -- i.e., they are interp ersonal, social-institut ional, and po litical -- and as such, there is an inherent epistemological comp onent to th em. 2
This notion will become clear in the next section. For present p urp oses, “the oth er” is simp ly that w hich w e perceive as “not m e.”
3 At the sam e time, epistemological issues are u ltimately not d eep enou gh to be foun dational to the Modern p redicament. More specifically, w hat w e are tru ly confron ted w ith is essentially a crisis of consciousn ess. But w hat d o I mean by “consciousn ess?” Moreov er, w hat d o I mea n by consciousness as it relates to “global problems,” if “problem” is even a fruitful wa y to think about th is situation in the first place? Considerable discussion is required for an adequ ate explanation to th is question. H owever, I am speaking of consciousness in its deep est, broad est sense and I am assum ing that, wh atever it is, it simultaneously evolves in qu alitatively d iscerna ble stages and on m ultip le scales. To explicate this richly enfolded notion I will take an in-dep th journey throu gh Robert Kegan’s d evelopm ental psy chological “su bject-object theor y,” Jean Gebser’s visionary insights into the evolution of consciousness and culture, and Edgar Morin’s brilliant explication of a “para d igm of comp lexity” and th e principles comp lex thinking that emerges there from. Kegan’s sub ject-object theory is the centra l theory that I will use for discussing how we come to un derstand “reality.” This thesis will be exploring wh at Kegan refers to as th e fifth ord er of consciousness, an equivalent to an un posited Piagetian “p ost-formal” operational mod e of cognition. Next there w ill be a pa rallel exposition of wh at Gebser refers to as “Integral consciousness,” an em erging mod e of consciousness that integrates all the previous m odes of relating to sp ace and time, subjects and objects. Furtherm ore, I w ill add ress how Kegan’s notion of fifth ord er su bject-object relations (post-formal op erationa l cognition) corresponds to Gebser’s Integral consciousness, and how each of these
4 correspond correspond to wha t is is popu larly larly referred referred to as postmod ernism. 3 Finally, I will contextualize this discussion within Morin’s explication of a paradigm of comp comp lexity. lexity. Although all of the topics topics just just m entioned shou ld not be equ ated with each other, there are enough inh erent comm comm onalties onalties as to suggest a new wa y of un derstand ing the w orld. My concern concern here, then, regard regard s how to make meaning of our w orld/ selves selves in in a qualitatively qualitatively novel and helpful manner. What I have set out to d o is no small task, but, as m entioned, neither is it it an attemp t at a “theory of everything.” everything.” Traditionally, Traditionally, w hen one’s one’s goal is is to un dertake a nd accomp accomp lish lish a formid able task, the best ad vice vice to follow follow is simple: start at th e beginning. Yet, the subject subject mat ter at han d -- i.e. i.e.,, fif fifth th ord er/ complex/ omplex/ postmodern/ integral integral consc conscio iousness usness --- has no beginning, beginning, no m iddle, and no end in a trad itional itional sense, since since each each of these can can be show n to imp ly the other s (as (as I shall dem onstr ate). I chose Kegan’s Kegan’s theor y as the grou nd since it is is the m ost readily und erstand able from from a psychological psychological “persp ective, ective,”” and moreover, because because it is a u seful seful m eeting eeting p oint for the d iversity iversity of ideas that I w ill ill be presenting. Background of the parad ox, or “w hy emp hasize complexity?” complexity?” The significance significance of science’ science’ss accomp lishmen ts in our lives, for for b etter or wor se, is hard to d eny. The results results of its its solid solid m arriage to technology technology surrou nd us. Because ecause science science and technology technology surrou nd us in such a ubiquitous m anner, it is easy easy to take them for granted, and therefore, therefore, we m ay fail fail to recognize recognize how w e are shap ed by their influen influen ces. Beyond the obviou s man ifestations ifestations -- e.g., e.g., the
3
As the pap er unfolds it will become become clear clear as to wh at I mean by the p opu lar, and often often vague, term “p ostmod ern.” For an explici explicitt discussion of this topic see Appen dix II. II.
5 automobile, electric light, modern medicine, jet planes, the atomic bomb, refrigerati refrigeration, on, teleco telecomm mm un ications, ications, or comp comp uters, to nam e but a few -- we are influenced influenced by the wh ole environmen t, or or context, context, in in w hich hich w e are situated. situated. In a recursively4 influential influential fashion, fashion, we shape scienc sciencee and scienc sciencee in tu rn shap es us.
Since my p resent interest interest is in in how it is is that w e come come to u nd erstand our w orld, the question becomes: becomes: how are we inter-related inter-related to ou r w orld that allows u s to make mean ing from from m oment to mom ent, day to day, year year to year? As such, the backdr op of a scientifi scientific, c, technologically technologically satu rated w orld serv es as a point of departure. A rud imentary und erstanding erstanding of wh ere we are, or where we are coming from , is is necessary if my focused emp hasis on comp lexity lexity is to mak e sense. As men tioned , we are all familiar, at least on a su per ficial ficial level, level, with science. science. Yet, there is all too often a failure failure to realize that m uch of wh at p asses as science is actually scientism . This d istinction istinction is of ut most im por tan ce if one is to avoid a sp ur ious v ilific ilification ation of science wh ile faili failing ng to n otice that it is scientism scientism that is more likely likely intertw intertw ined w ith many of our our “p roblems.” roblems.” In regards to this distinction, distinction, consider consider th e following following p assage from H uston Smith: With science science there can can be no quar rel. Scientism cientism is another m atter. Whereas science is positive, contenting itself with reporting what it d iscovers, iscovers, scientism scientism is negat ive. It goes beyond th e actu actu al find find ings of scienc sciencee to deny th at other app roaches to knowledge are valid and other truth s true… the trium trium ph s of mod ern science science w ent to man’s head in something of the w ay ru m d oes, causing him to grow loose loose in his logic. logic. H e came came to think th at w hat science science discovers discovers somehow casts casts dou bt on thing s that it does not d iscover; iscover; that the su ccess ccess it it realizes in in its own dom ain throw s into question the reality of the d omains its devices devices cannot tou ch. (quoted in Wilber, 1983 1983// 1996 1996,, p . 21) 21)
4
The term “recur sive” will be discussed discussed at length in section 3 on the wor k of Edg Edg ar Morin. Generally Generally speaking, for for p resent pu rposes, “recursive” “recursive” can be thou ght of as m eaning something like: to feedback on oneself, to fold fold back, to rep eat, or encircle encircle in a self-ref self-referential erential fashion.
6 Based on w hat a nu mber of respected au thors h ave stated (Cook, 197 1977; 7; Tarnas, 1991; 1991; Wilber, 1996 1996), ), as well as a less than cursory examinat ion of d aily life, life, it is is safe safe to say say that scientistic thou ght is endem ic in the mod ern West. On e interp retation of scientism scientism is that, for somethin g to be accepted accepted a s valid or “real,” it mu st be amenable to an em perico-rational perico-rational method ology --- i.e. i.e.,, a method ology of qu ant ities tha t essentially essentially ignores qua lities. lities. Consequ ently, mu ch of ou r experience experience is explained explained aw ay in redu ctionisti ctionisticc terms lacking lacking a ny m eaningful dep th. This This has resulted in a situation situation that is “profound ly unintelligi unintelligible” ble” (Tarn (Tarn as, p. 420 420). ). As Tarnas states: The modern mind has d emand ed a sp ecif ecific ic type of interp interp retation of the w orld: its its scienti scientifi ficc method has requ ired explanations of phenom ena that are concretely predictive, and therefore impersonal, mechanistic, stru ctural. To fulfill fulfill their pu rp oses, these exp exp lanation s of the un iverse have been systematically systematically “cleansed” “cleansed” of all spiritual spiritual and hu man qualities. qualities. (p. (p . 421) 421) Another w ay of app roaching the current status of scienti scientism’ sm’ss relationship relationship to the w orld is sum med up by Kelly Kelly (19 (1998 98)) when he p oints out the following: following: While the ma rriage of science science and technology h as pro ved itself to be a fruitful fruitful alliance, alliance, and thoug h both p artners are pledged to one another, for for better or worse, to all all eternity, eternity, there is is now no d oubt th at the honeym oon is over. H um anity at large, and ind eed th e biosph biosph ere itself itself,, finds finds itself itself in in a state of un p recedent ed crisis. crisis. (p. 52) 52) Unfortuna tely, it may be the case that w hether or n ot someone is actually actually a scientist scientist only indicates the d egree to w hich scienti scientistic stic assump tions may influence an individ u al --- i.e., i.e., one d oes not have to be a scientist scientist in order to hold scientistic scientistic assum pt ions. Thus, at least in the Modern West, even those individu als who ar e not explicitl explicitly y embed ded in a scientisti scientisticc worldview are so surrou nd ed by its man ifestati ifestations ons that some d egree of sci scientisti entisticc thinking is practicall practically y un avoidable. Therefore, Therefore, it it is ofte often n the case that wh at w e un derstand
7 to be real is actu ally a redu ction co-created w ith a scientistic perception of the wor ld. This reduced reality can, and often d oes, lead to pathology. For example, w e migh t consider th e nu clear p roliferation of the 1980’s, wh ich is abou t as pa thological as it gets, as scientistic think ing taken to extremes. Metap horically speaking, scientism m ight be thou ght of as a dis-ease, a mental anemia. This disease of the m odern mind has infected m ost of us to some extent, man ifesting in varying d egrees as simplistic, reductionistic, rationalistic, “either/ or” th inking. This d isease metaph or is app ropriate to th e subject at hand , as scientistic thinking has lead to the assump tion that order d efines health, while pathology resu lts from cha os (e.g., noise and er ror). Yet, withou t a sufficient mixtur e of chaos, it is order tha t m anifests as sickness or pa thology (Combs, 1996; Gleick, 1987; Good w in, 1994). This is clearly illustr ated in biology, wh erein the u ltimate state of ord er, a steady state, is death (Goodw in). H ence, the chaos that man ifests in tan dem w ith complexity is as necessary for health, p sychological and ph ysical, as it is su fficient for d ifficulties and comp lications. Not only are the so-held p athological attributes of noise and error necessary for health, but m oreover, “it is the encou nter betw een ‘noise’ and a principle of self-organization which leads to the constitution of a more complex higher ord er” (Morin, sou rce u nkn ow n, p. 564). Scientism th us fails to recognize fund amental characteristics of the natural w orld w hile simultaneously holding that w hat it does recognize is all tha t is valid. Psychologically spea king, extrem e cases of rep ression usu ally lead to p athology , so if any ep istemology lend s itself towar ds p athology, it is scientism. Therefore, somew here along the line, the healthy and the path ological have been inverted; the dom inant w orldview of the mod ern West is essentially backward s.
8 When order, reduction, and objectification become the only recognized foci of perception, w hile the repressed remaind er is ignored , we as a culture are left with a severely tru ncated v ersion of reality. The consequ ences of this are horribly real, as the su bsequent linearity, ubiquitous quan tification, atomization, and isolation in thou ght/ perception has lead to ramp ant alienation, repression, projection, and isolation. In other w ords, Du rkheim’s notion of “anomie” is now a prima facie fact of modern life, and it is endem ic to mod ern Am erican culture (and elsew here, to be sure). Gebser (1949/ 1985) d irectly add resses this situation wh en he states the following: These consequences of the persp ectivization of the w orld evid ent in th e isolation an d mass-phenom ena of our d ay are p atently characteristic of ou r time. Isolation is visible everyw here: isolation of ind ividu als, of entire nations and continents; isolation in the p hysical realm in the form of tu berculosis, in th e political in the form of id eological or mon op olistic dictatorship, in every-day life in th e form of imm oderate, “bu sy” activity devoid of any sense-direction or relationship to the w orld as a w hole; isolation in thinking in the form of the deceptive dazzle of the prematu re jud gm en ts or hyp ertr op hied abstra ction d evoid of any connection w ith the world. And it is the same w ith mass-ph enomena : overprod uction, inflation, the proliferation of political parties, rampant technology, atom ization of all forms. (p. 95) In sum, if our th ough ts are shaped by a scientistic wor ldview, then by definition we are limited as to how w e conceive/ perceive of ourselves and th e “other.” This opp ressive epistemology coaxes us into a w ay of making meaning that rep resses mu ch of our n atural comp lexity simp ly because it is perceived as noise, error, or anomaly. Redu ctionistic and r ationalistic, this und erstanding of the w orld is one likely imp etus for p atho logy across mu ltiple scales -- i.e., individu al neu rosis, social “anomie,” or global pollution. 5 According to Wilber
5
I do not mean to imply a simple, linear, cause/ effect relationship, as correlation d oes not necessarily imp ly causation.
9 (1995), this redu ctionism leads to p athology w hen a p art is taken to be th e w hole and a cted u pon as such, as the true w hole then becomes opp ressed by the par t. In the cultural/ political sph ere, this can m anifest as fascism, wh ereas in the opp osite situation, when the w hole opp resses the parts it is, analogically speak ing, totalitarian ism. Given scientism ’s ability despo tically to influence knowledge, Tarnas (1992) holds that “it is theoretically possible that the human mind has more cards than it has been playing. The pivot of the mod ern pred icament is epistemological, and it is here th at w e should look for an open ing” (p. 422). The “openin g” that Tarna s refers to is wh at this thesis will be exploring.
Making Sense: Thinking-Perceiving-Meaning-making H ow is it that we (co-)construct our u nd erstand ing of the world ? As we will see, an exploration of this question read ily blurs th e boun dar ies between psychology, ph ilosophy, and science. Stating the qu estion an other w ay, I ask the following: how d o we m ake sense of our w orld? By world I mean all that w e are aware of and in relation to, w hether w e are conscious of it or not. 6 I wou ld like to pu t forward a notion that I will refer to as
TP M
for short . TPM stand s for
“Thinking-Perceiving-Meaning -making .” I offer this notion of TPM as a com plex wh ole, and not simp ly as a synth esis of three separate notions, because, obviously, w e do n ot think in a va cuum -- i.e., our thou ghts are not sep arate from our bod ies, emotions, perceptions, langu age, and thu s our w hole way of being in the world (Abram, 1997). Ou r thou ghts are not separate from our p erceptions,
6
Here I am u sing the terms “aw are” and “conscious” in the broadest sense.
10 since how w e think shapes our perceptions, w hich in turn shap e our though ts, wh ich shap e our perceptions.... Moreover, our m eaning-making process, how we m ake sense of who w e are in relation to the other , is inextricably intertw ined with our thou ghts and p erceptions. Thus, w e do not simply think, and p erceive, and th en happ en to also make meaning. We construct our mental world, the wor ld that w e are conscious of, through thinking-perceiving-meaning-making (TPM). French thinker Edgar Morin h as w ritten extensively on the top ic of comp lex epistem ology. H e po sits “th e necessity of elaborating a meta-system of und erstanding in w hich the system of observation/ perception/ conception is itself observed/ perceived/ conceived w ithin the observation/ perception/ conception system ” (Morin, 1992, p . 379). H e takes this idea even furt her w hen he states that “this, then, sets in motion a series of consequences w hich lead to the complexification of our very mod e of perceiving/ conceiving th e ph enomena l w orld ” (p. 379). Morin h ere is explicating the comp lex nat ur e of the relationsh ip between p erceiving an d conceiving as it relates to any observer. If w e equate wh at he refers to as “conception” with w hat I am referring to as “thinking,” and I believe it is sound to do so, then em erging from this notion is a fun dam ental insight into how w e make sense of the world . Though getting a bit ahead of the discussion, Morin is speaking to complex TPM, the heart of this thesis. Kegan’s (1982, 1994) w ork is strong ly consona nt w ith th e concept of TPM, as he states that the “n otion that w e constitute reality, rather than somehow hap pen u pon it, is most quickly and vividly brought hom e in the area of per ception” (1982, p. 9). An d p erception, accord ing to Merleau-Ponty (1962/ 1995), “is the background from w hich all acts stand ou t, and is
11 presu pp osed by them. The w orld is not an object such that I have in my possession th e law of its making ; it is the n atu ral setting of, and field for, all my thou ghts and all my explicit assum ptions” (p. x). H ence, given Merleau-Ponty’s definition, Kegan’s notion serves to tie TPM into th e crucial un derstand ing that we h ave a co-creative relationship w ith our reality. If there is an autonom ously existing w orld ou t there, w aiting for an objective observer to p erceive it as it is, we can never kn ow it d irectly. At the same time, we are not simp ly isolated subjects living ou t ou r ow n solipsistic existences. So, we think-perceive, but the point is that th is is not separate from meaning-making, for “ it is not that a p erson makes m eaning, as much as that the activity of being a p erson is th e activity of mea ning-m aking” (Kegan, p . 11). Since we cannot separate the thr ee strands of TPM, as they constitute a mu tually influential/ recursive system, if we are to affect a change in ou rselves, then a changing of any one facet should indu ce a transformation in th e wh ole system. Argu ably, “thinking” is what w e are most consciously aware of within the pr ocess of TPM. Therefore, think ing as the m ost accessible po int of entr y into the loop is also the m ost cond ucive for initiating a transformation of the w hole system -- a system tha t contin ua lly feeds back on itself, comp lexifying, growin g in sophistication, and ideally leading to a healthier, more sustainable means of relating to ou rselves, to each other, and to the w orld as a w hole. Explicitly stated , this thesis is abou t comp lex think ing, perceiving, and meaning-making (TPM), a novel, emergent mode of consciousness that is a rad ically new w ay of relating to the w orld. Each of the ideas introdu ced w ill blossom as the th esis un folds. There will be an inherent circularity to much of this process, as I am attemp ting to w ork according to the ideas that I am
12 presenting. The hope is that this thesis will embod y the intellectual m aterial as it pr esents that m aterial, thus itself being an illustrat ion of comp lex TPM in action.
13 Section 1: Robert Kegan ’s su bject-object th eory
Foundations Robert Kegan is a senior lecturer at th e H arvard Gradu ate School of Education and a senior faculty m ember at the Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology. H is theor etical w ork is a constru ctive-d evelopm ental “su bject-object” psychology, w herein h e presen ts five qu alitatively distinct “orders” of cognitive developm ent based on m ore than a d ecad e’s worth of research interview s.1 He also refers to these ord ers as “balances” and “evolutionary truces,” indicating his pr ocess orientation. Draw ing mu ltiple pa rallels to the w orks of Erikson, Kohlberg, Gilligan, Maslow, and Loevinger and building d irectly from Piaget, Kegan br eathes new life into d evelopm ental psychology . H e not only expand s up on Piaget’s four basic stages of intellectu al grow th, but most significantly, he includ es a lengthy d iscussion about a “p ostformal,” fifth ord er of consciousn ess. It is this “fifth order ” that is of interest here. H owever, before an adequ ate und erstand ing of a fifth order is possible there mu st be a groun ding in the first four. It is imp ortan t to note th at I will not be ut ilizing Kegan’s theory strictly in terms of hum an d evelopm ent, but rather in term s of more general principles of the evolut ion of sub ject-object relations. Un like most tra d itional discussions of developmental psychology, I will not be focusing on ages, or specific periods of life, that correspond to the shifts in “ord ers” or “stru ctures” of consciousness
1
For detailed inform ation on th is research see The gu ide to th e subject-object interview , wh ich is available from th e Harv ard school of education. (Also, see references un der Lahey).
14 from one individu al to the other. While I will not attempt to avoid th is subject matter, and m ay mention an age or tw o, this otherwise fun dam ental facet of developm ental psychology is not a central concern for an exploration into th e evolution of consciousn ess as it occurs h erein. Before delving into the actual “balances,” “evolutionary truces,” or “ord ers” th emselves, it is necessary to d iscu ss some of Kegan’s centra l concepts, especially as they are relevan t to the other sections of this thesis. It is also importan t to clear up the likely confusion surrou nd ing the various terms Kegan ut ilizes to refer to the sam e concep ts. In The evolving self (1982) he p ut s forwar d a m odel comprised of six “balances,” w hile in h is subsequent book, In over ou r head s (1994), he refers to five “orders.” In the decad e between these pu blished wor ks, Kegan revised and distilled m uch of the theory into a tighter, more coherent, and in spots more accurate, version. It is from th is later work th at the notion of a “fifth order” emerges in explicit fashion, and therefore is most directly relevant to this thesis. Kegan believes that hu man beings are essentially makers of meaning. H e holds that w e constitute reality in our activity of meaning making, as “p eople actively design rath er tha n ‘hap pen up on’ their realities” (1994, p . 201). After quoting Aldou s Hu xley as saying that, “experience is not what hap pens to you, it’s w hat you do w ith w hat h app ens to you ” (in Kegan, 1982, p. 11), he continues to posit that what w e do w ith this experience is to organize it. Within this context d evelopm ent occur s. At each successive stage a new balan ce is established in term s of the individu al’s ever-developing r elationship to w hat is subject and w hat is object. Thus, the fund amental qu estion to ask in su bjectobject theory is: “from w here in t he evolu tion of subject-object relations are th e
15 per son’s mean ings gener ated ” (Lahey, et al., p. 11)? The majority of this section add resses this question. On e of the m ore d ifficult chara cteristics of sub ject-object theory t o gra sp is also the most imp ortant to un derstand . This theory d oes not focus on sp ecific per sonality traits, styles of relating, or any other content oriented d etails. It says nothing abou t how intelligent someone is, but instead abou t how that intelligence (or lack thereof) is employed . Sub ject-object theory, like mo st cognitive-developm ental theories, is u ltimately a theory of organ ization that is concerned w ith the transformation of one discernable pattern into another d iscerna ble patter n of organization . The specifics of an ind ividu al’s life are, of course, necessary for determining an individuals “order” of subject-object relations (e.g., their level of cognitive m atu rity, m orality, etc.). Su bject-object theory is not abou t stylistic ap pr oach, person ality, or issues of m otivation and per sonal pr eference (Lahey, et al.). Deep er explora tions of this typ e of psy chical conten t are left to other p sychological theories. The subjectobject app roach implies that we can kn ow virtually nothing significant abou t the specifics of wha t a per son valu es, cherishes, d islikes, or idealizes simp ly by ascertaining their dev elopm ental stage of subject-object relations. We cann ot know w hether someone is a good, psychologically healthy p erson, or whether they need the services of a dep th p sychology professional, simp ly on the basis of know ing a per son’s attained ord ering of subject-object relations. Moreover , one developm ental stage mu st not be va lued over anoth er in-and-of-itself, as peop le of all dispositions and “w orth” are found at any stage. Also, since this theory does not tell us a bout styles or p references, then it is equally true that there is not a valuation of, for example, whether som eone tends to be more au tonomou s or
16 mor e relational in their inter-person al lives. In short, subject-object theor y is a cognitive developmental th eory concerned w ith pr inciples of organization, and the evolution of that organ ization from one “ord er” to the next. As Kegan (1994) states: [what] …the theory ad dr esses: the forms of meaning-regulation, the tran sformat ion of consciousn ess, the intern al exper ience of these pr ocesses, the role of the en vironm ent in th is activity, are less confused w ith w hat it d oes not: personality types, the preoccup ying concerns or central motivations of a given order of consciousness, personality “style” or “voice.” (p.7) Yet, even thou gh su bject-object theory is not concerned w ith p ersonality traits or stylistic pr eferences, there ar e non etheless some d elicate issues stemming from som e of its imp lications. For, w hile no value jud gement is mad e in discerning stylistic d istinctions, as they are simp ly different orien tations or pr eferences -- no on e is necessarily sup erior to anot her -- there is a hierarchical qu ality to the distinctions mad e by subject-object theor y. Regard ing this point, in reference to ot her theor ies, Kegan (1994) states that “su bject-object distinctions pr esum e to tell a story of increase, of greater comp lexity. They are thus mor e provocative, discomforting, even d angerou s, and ap prop riately evoke greater susp icion” (p. 229). It is cru cial to realize that th ere are tw o main form s of hierarchy, one w hich is simp ly structural and another th at deals with issues of pow er in the socio-cultu ral sph ere -- e.g., sub jug ation, opp ression, or dom ination. So, subject-object theory can be d iscomforting w hen th e tw o types of hierarchy are conflated int o one tha t (incorrectly) imp lies a necessary valuation of “higher” over “lower.” The fact is that there are nu merou s comp lexities (i.e., varieties of ind ividu als in nu mer ou s contexts) that m u st be taken into accoun t before any va luation of one order over an other can be mad e.
17 Therefore, a “higher” stage is only valued over a low er stage w hen it is app ropriate for a given person at a given point in their life developm ent. I will be retu rn ing to th is issue, as it is first n ecessary to exp lore other facets of Kegan’s theory. Each ord er (truce, balance, etc.) ascertains th e extent to w hich a per son is differentiated from, or embed ded in, their internal/ external environment. Kegan (1982) states that , “it wou ld be tru e to say that ev ery evolu tionary t ru ce... is a temp orary solution to th e lifelong tension between yearnings for inclusion and distinctness” (p. 108). 2 Tension is resolved in a d ifferent fashion at each stage, but there is nonetheless a balance to be foun d. Stated anoth er way, this dynam ic follows a definite pattern of “continually moving back and forth between resolving th e tension slightly in favor of au tonomy , at one stage, in favor of inclusion at th e next” (p. 108). Accord ingly, there is a period of stability, an ord er, once the balance or truce is actualized . Yet, this equilibrium is u ltimately temp orary. Instability ensues as the limits of each ord er are reached and thu s it becomes necessary for a new truce at a higher level of organization/ comp lexity. Accord ing to th is view, evolution ary activity is a series of differentiation s and reintegrations, involving th e very creating of the object and our relationship to it (Kegan). As he states, “one pattern is forever repeated in the evolution of our structures of knowing, wh ether w e are looking at mental d evelopm ent in infancy or the highly elaborated ord er of consciousness that un derlies postmodern ism… d ifferentiation alwa ys precedes integr ation” (1994, p. 326). In other w ord s, at
2
See App end ix I for a diagram of “Helix of evolutionary tru ces.”
18 any time we can ask our selves the following qu estions: what are w e subject to and w hat do w e take as object? What are we embedd ed in and w hat are we differentiating from? Repeated answ ers to these questions w ill reveal the pattern Kegan speaks of. 3 I am u tilizing Kegan’s theory as a fram ing tem plate for this th esis, as it beautifully expresses man y of the ideas that are fund amental to this p resentation. In some sense, Kegan’s mod el is the synt hesizing factor betw een all of the oth er elements involved -- the glue, so to speak . Closely pa ralleling Kegan’s mo d el is Gebser’s “developmental” m odel. In light of this, I would n ow like to dr aw ou t aspects of Kegan’s theory that are har mon ically consonant w ith w hat I will later discuss -- namely, relating to not only the actual m odel that Kegan p resents, but also to how his theory shares primary featur es that point to a common discourse on consciousness. For example, I intend to d emonstrate that th e phy logenetic evolution of Gebser’s structu res of consciousn ess are recapitulated in the ontogenetic development of orders of consciousness according to Kegan’s model, with a special focus on the fourth and fifth orders. Gebser (1949/ 1985) employed the term “mu tation” to characterize the shift from one structure of consciousness to another, thou gh “in contrast to biological mu tation, these consciousness m utations d o not a ssume or requ ire the disapp earance of previous p otentialities and prop erties, which are immed iately integrated into the new stru cture and overd etermined” (pg. 39). For Gebser this process is “spiritual,” not biological or historical, and in this way distinguishes his view from su ch mislead ing notions as “p rogress,” “evolution,” or 3
The subject-object interview (Lahey, et al.) is designed to accomplish this very g oal.
19 “developm ent” as they are comm only und erstood. Since the next section w ill consist of a d etailed d iscu ssion of Gebser’s w ork, of imm ediate r elevance is the un derstan ding that, for Gebser, “mu tation” explicitly implies a discontinuou s process. 4 He states that “origin itself comes to aw areness in discontinu ous mutations: consciousness mutations are completions of integration” (p. 39). Interestingly enough, he n otes that, in Germ an, the w ord for “origin” is associated w ith sud d enn ess and d iscontinu ity. Along similar lines, Kegan (1982) states that:
The process of adaption shap ed by the tension between th e assimilation of new experience to the old ... is not on e of continuou s augm entation, but is marked by p eriods of stability or balance follow ed by periods of instability and qualitatively new balance... wh ich am oun t to a kind of evolution ary truce. (p. 43) Leaving aside for now the obvious p arallels with d ynam ical systems an d chaos theories (especially, see Prigogine, 1984), Gebser’s thinking in the 1940’s accoun ts for the same pattern th at Kegan speaks to. As he states: A tru e process alw ays occurs in qu anta, that is, in leaps; or expressed in qu asi-biological and not ph ysical term s, in mu tations. It occur s spontan eously, ind eterminably and , consequently, d iscontinu ously... the app arent continuity is no more than a sequ ence subsequently superimposed onto overlapping events to lend them the reassuring ap pea ran ce of a logically determ inate prog ression. (Gebser, 1949/ 1985, p. 37) Getting back to Kegan, it is imp ortant to u nd erstand that for him a p erson is an activity. What is comm only referred to as “p erson” is not a just n oun , but also a verb. H e says that wh ile “wh at is most fun da mental about life is that it is
4
Gebser’s ideas regarding d iscontinuous m utation foreshadow ed w hat is now referred to as “pu nctuated equilibrium,” w hich is dem onstrated in fossil records (Combs, 1996).
20 motion (rather than merely something in m otion), it remains th at w e are greatly temp ered -- and sedu ced -- by our language into experiencing ourselves and th e world as things [italics ad d ed ] that m ove” (p. 8). Com bs (1996) has sim ilar thou ghts. He states that, “to be hum an is to be a verb. We are not objects, but events. We are process beings…flux is ou r natu re, bu t not rand om flux” (p. 262). At the sam e time, it is essential to remain aw are of a counter-tend ency to totally negate “things,” to insist that th ere is only process and n othing more. This tenden cy wou ld be yet anoth er instance of simplification and redu ctionism. Following u p on the idea that w e are also verbs and not just nou ns, it is crucial to realize that u nlike ma ny ot her lan gu ages -- e.g., Chinese (Chan g, 1971; Cook, 1977) or H opi (Who rf, 1956) -- English ma kes very shar p d istinctions between entities and processes (a quality w ith strong correlations to Kegan’s four th ord er and Gebser’s mental/ rational stru cture of consciousness). This of course is also the most obv ious, albeit sup erficial, d ifference between W estern and Eastern thou ght. Keeping tru e to the best of both of these trad itions, Kegan states the following: There is never “just an individu al”; the very w ord refers only to that side of a person that is ind ividu ated, the side of differentiation. There is always, as well, the side th at is embed ded ; the person is more than an individu al. “Individu al” names a curr ent state of evolution, a stage, a maintained balance or defended differentiations; “person” refers to the fund amental m otion of evolution itself, and is as much abou t that side of the self embed ded in the life-sur roun d as th at w hich is individu ated from it. The person is an “ind ividual” and an “embed du al.” (Kegan, 1982, p. 116)
In other w ords, w e are objects and pr ocesses. H ence, a com plex epistem ology is necessary in ord er to h old th ese seemingly an tagonistic conceptions together.
21 (This last point foreshadow s section 3 on the w ork of Morin and the p rinciples of complex thinking.) So far I hav e yet to mak e explicit wh at is mean t by “su bject” and “object.” If w e strip aw ay the pejorative connotations of the w ord “object,” we find that it imp lies someth ing unexp ected. Etymologically, the wor d “object” is comp osed of the root “-ject,” w hich imp lies d irectional m otion or th row ing (such as in eject, pr ojection, or trajectory), and the p refix “ob-,” which mean s “of,” “from ,” or “to.” Therefore, instead o f referring to some static, fixed “th ing” tha t we can “objectify,” “object” actually suggests “th row ing from” or “th row ing aw ay,” imp lying som ething like “to thr ow from” (Kegan, 1982; Webster’s, 1955/ 1983). Hen ce, subject-object theory is truly abou t the relationship of a person to w hat has been throw n, or projected/ rejected, from them . Und erstanding “object” as referring to “that w hich some m otion has mad e separate or distinct from, or to the m otion itself” (Kegan, p. 76) is centr al to th is thesis. A few last w ords regarding some fund amentals of subject-object theory are called for before turn ing attention to the orders/ balances themselves. First of all, every stage has a d ifferent organ ization relative to wh at is subject and wh at is object. Secondly, at each on e of these ord ers ther e is a subject-object relationship (Lahey et al.). Kegan (1982) states that th e guid ing pr inciple of each ord er or truce, the issue that m ust be renegotiated at each tran sition is: “w hat, from the poin t of view of the organ ism, is comp osed a s ‘object’ and w hat as ‘subject’. The question always is: to what extent does the organism differentiate itself from (and so relate itself to) the world” (p. 44)? In other w ords, w hat is someone epistemologically capable of taking resp onsibility for, taking contr ol of, or taking per spective on (Lahey et al.)? For, by definition, we can only take a persp ective
22 on wh at we perceive as “object.” This notion can be fur ther un derstood given wh at one cannot take a “w ider” p erspective on -- i.e., wh at w e are subject to is that for w hich, in our experience, we cannot create a broad er context. We are in “object territory” wh en we are awar e of w hat w e do not know , but when in “subject territory” we are not awar e of w hat w e do not know . This foun da tional understanding is explicitly addressed in The Guide to the subject-object interview. “Subject” refers to th e basic pr inciple of organ ization; “object” refers to that w hich gets organized. That wh ich gets organized can be reflected up on; we can take it as an object of atten tion ...that w hich gets organ ized is “inter nalized ”; it is an intern al object. The prin ciple of organization cannot be reflected u pon . (Lahey , et al., p . 12)
Finally, as I discuss the five ord ers, the following should be kept in mind . Wha t is sub ject at one ord er becomes object at the next ord er. This occu rs withou t fail and is a crucial pattern u nd erlying this schema. As such, there is norm ally a pha se of repudiation aroun d th e transition from one order to another. That is, while experiencing characteristic transitory instability, w e d eny w hat w e once were so as to allow ou rselves to become acclimatized to, and thu s maintain, a newly emerging equilibrium . For examp le, w hen moving from the fourth order to the fifth order, one m ight become “an ti-individu al” or an “an timod ernist” (e.g., a pur ely d econstru ctive post-mod ernist). Yet, eventu ally, as “a hallmark of every rebalancing,” the past is “not finally rejected but reap pr op riated ” (Kegan, 1982, p . 104). H ence, assu min g that develop men t is not retarded or halted, eventually we integrate man y of the repu diated asp ects into the current conceptions of ourselves (while also letting go of our n ow outd ated “inferior” mod es). The process of comp lexification continu es it cour se.
23
Ord er Zero (the incorporative balance) Correspond ing to Piaget’s “sensorimotor” an d to Gebser’s “archaic” consciou sness, this order is that of a child literally just bor n into th e wor ld, generally un til the “terrible twos.” Like being in th e wom b, nothing is yet taken as object, so in a sense th is is a pre-person al, non-d ua l experience (see Wilber, 1980/ 1996, on “pre/ trans”). The w orld organized at this order is based solely on the subjective exp erience of ph ysical sensation and mov emen t. Try to imagin e that yo u ar e fully sub ject to you r reflexes -- there is no “th inking,” no im agining even, for everyth ing is alread y imagina l, if even th at! The intelligence at w ork here is the genius of the bod y... pu re biology. 5
The first order (the imp u lsive balance) Regard ing Piaget’s stud ies of the first tw o year s of life, Kegan (1982) states that “th e grad ual construction of the ‘perm anence of the object’ amou nt to th e labors w hich lead to the v ery first tru ce of all -- the constitutin g of any ‘objective’ w orld itself, a w orld in d epen d ent of my experience of it” (p. 30). This is Piaget’s “preoperational” stage, and has correlations to Gebser’s “magical” consciou sness. The child is now aw are that it has reflexes, and as such movem ent an d ph ysical sensation are now “objects” of their reality constructing -- the child is no longer su bject to prim al phy sical imp u lses. The child is awar e
5
I am not imp lying a redu ctionistic biology, i.e., that everything can be red uced to a qu antitative biology, wh ich is isolated from other n atur al sciences or disciplines of know ledge. For more details on “alterna tive” app roaches to biology see Goodw in (1994) and Sheldr ake (1988/ 1995).
24 that th ere are objects separate from itself, hence, there is now a ru dim entary other. This order has a p oint-like structure that now is subject to imp ulses and per ceptions. Being su bject to percept ions can be exemp lified in Piaget’s (1952) now famous experiments abou t “object constancy” and the “conservation of volume.” In these experiments, a ball ceases to exist wh en a p arent hid es it un der a table, or if a liquid is pou red from on e shaped container to another th e child w ill think that there is more in the one th at is taller than a slightly shorter, fatter one. As Kegan (1982) states, “if the child’s per ception of the object chan ges, the object itself has chan ged , precisely because she cann ot sepa rate h erself from her p erceptions” (p. 88). It is no w ond er that this ord er of consciousn ess is thou ght of as m agical.
The second order (the imperial balance) Corresponding to Piaget’s “concrete operational”, and Gebser’s “magical” (and ea rly “my thical”) consciou sness, the stereotyp ically selfish second or d er “-jects” per ceptions and im pu lses as object. Thus, these are no longer th e centr al factors for making m eaning of the w orld. “As with every rebalancing, wh at had been ‘sub ject’ is recast to the dom ain of ‘other ’. I am n ot percept ions, rather I hav e percep tions” (Kegan, 1982, p. 32). H ence, the child is now sub ject to personal need s, interests, and w ishes. The second ord er’s “ability to constru ct a concrete world, ind epend ent p oints of view, and a pr operty-bearing self is expressive of a single form of consciousn ess. A comm on organ izing prin ciple or ‘ord er of mind ’ is at wor k, the d u rable category” (Kegan, 1994, p. 23). The d ur able category (an an alog to the concept of object perm anen ce) -- the
25 un derlying stru cture of this order -- allows for a tru e “point of view” to exist for the first time. Epistemologically speaking, a second order w ay of knowing can generally un derstand examples and concrete facts, but not a bstract generalizations such as d efinitions, wh ich are based on sets of d urable categories and are thu s mor e complex than a second order reality (Kegan, 1994). The second order ind ividu al can u nd erstand cause and effect, and simultaneously is able to distinguish their p oint of view from that of another's. Moreover, unlike the first order, there are now end uring (as opp osed to fleeting) d ispositions, such as needs, preferences, and even a self-concept . It is also the beginning of “role concepts” and simple reciprocity, though often nothing beyond “tit-for-tat.” Historically speaking, this might very w ell correspond to the ord er of collective consciousn ess associated w ith the Talion law (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”). A person at th e second order can feel “guilty,” but Kegan (1982) points out th at “w hen w e look into wh at they mean it turns ou t they are talking abou t an anxious anticipation of w hat th e other w ill do” (p. 94). It is imp ortant to recognize that any of the aforementioned characteristics shou ld also be recognized as achievements of the evolutionary p rocess, and n ot simply frown ed u p on as prim itive. For examp le, the notion of tit-for-tat recipr ocity, or the Talion even , were m ajor ad van ces, novel emer gences if you w ill, from the previous mod es of organizing knowledg e.
The third ord er (the interpersonal balance) If all has gone w ell, app roximately after ad olescence, one’s person al need s, interests, and w ishes are cast as object. The ind ividu al is no longer embedd ed, necessarily, in the p redisposed “selfishness” of the second ord er.
26 Now one becomes embed ded in, and is subject to, mutu ality -- the interpersonal wor ld. This order correspond s to Piaget’s early formal op erations and Gebser’s “myth ical” (and early “mental”) consciousness. Inasmuch as p articular results of socialization are visible, this stage corresp ond s to the intern alizing of societal norm s. Kegan (1994) points out th at identification w ith, and ad herence to, the role responsibilities that w e are socialized into mar ks a third order achievement. An examp le of this is the “inter nalizing [of] society’s gener al resp ect for auth ority” (Lahey, et al., p. 27). Another comm on, wid espread example is illustrated by Kegan wh en he states that “th e third order of consciousness amou nts to that time in our lives when w e move from ‘being brought u p in the faith’ to becoming ou rselves spiritu al adh erents to th at faith” (p. 267). Stereotypically, the third order personality can be thou ght of as “nice bu t easily taken ad vantage of,” as being motivated by a “need for affiliation,” and w ould hav e as a theme th at of “relationsh ips” (Lahey , et al., p . 11). 6 In individu al terms, it is around adolescence (or p uberty) that one m akes the d ifficult transition from th e second to the third order. This order’s un d erlying stru cture is cross-categorical (or tran s-categorical) know ing -- w hich is best u nd erstood w hen r eferenced against the second order’s subjectedn ess to categories, nam ely the d ur able category -- and is thus inter-personal (Kegan, 1994). Since poin ts of view, end u ring need s and d ispositions, as w ell as a pr imar ily “concrete” cognitive ma keu p ar e cast as object, the su bjective iden tification is with inn er states, with subjectivity itself. This is similar to
6
“Stereotyp ical” examp les are only illustrations. It is importa nt to rem ember th at subject-object theory is not concerned directly with conten t or stylistic preferences.
27 certain aspects of the first order becau se the “intern al” is the focu s, bu t un like the first ord er there are also others wh o them selves have an “internal” (for at th e first order their has yet to be a conscious d ifferentiation of internal and external). There is not only a role concept as in the second ord er, but now also a “role consciousness… a real understanding of mutual reciprocity” (Kegan, 1994). Abstract thinking is possible and w hat is normatively un derstood as the ability to intellectualize can fully m anifest -- e.g., the cognitive ab ility for inference, generalization, hypoth esis, and p roposition. Moreover, the ind ividual now identifies with values and ideals, emergences that have enormou s significance for adu lt life. Kegan (1994) furth er expou nd s basic third ord er characteristics in the follow ing assertion: “Definition” is minim ally a cross-categorically way of know ing because it takes the concrete examp le as an instance or an element of a bigger principle of know ing that includes all concrete examples. Examp les mu st ther efore be an elemen t or member , not the pr inciple itself. “Inference” is a min imally cross-categorical w ay of know ing because it takes the category of datum or fact as an instance or element. Data mu st therefore be element , not p rinciple. (Kegan, 1994, p .26)
H owever, even after all of the aforementioned accomp lishments, a th ird order ind ividu al cannot yet tru ly “distingu ish the other from his or her intern alized p oints of view” (Lahey, et al., p. 62). This char acteristically third order limitation stems from the fact that an individu al with th is organization of subject-object relations has yet to forge an au tonom ou s self (fou rth or d er) and thu s does not h ave a reference point from w hich to d istingu ish, in a conscious fashion, wh at is one’s own point of view and wh at is that of another (e.g., a pa rent , society, etc.). This is not un like Mead ’s pop u lar notion of the “intern alized oth er” (Schellenber g, 1978). But it is neverth eless at the th ird or d er
28 wh en one can for the first time truly enter into a m eaningful relationship w ith the “other.” It is not un til the third ord er that one can “emp athize” with another’s point of view an d realize that others also have endu ring needs, d ispositions, and p references. This ability to id entify w ith an “other” can also ma ke it d ifficult to discern one’s ow n inner stat es from t hat of the other. There is a lack of interpersonal indep end ence, such that it is possible to develop a dep end ence on the other. This does not say anyth ing about wheth er someone is a stylistically “indep end ent” individu al, preferring to do things their ow n w ay -that is for another theory. This theory holds that a p erson will make m eaning accord ing to third ord er su bject-object relations regard less of w hether or n ot their actions app ear to be auton omou s. Moreover, this does not imp ly that one will necessarily be embedd ed in co-dep end ent relationships, but if they are it will un fold according to wh at they are subject to and w hat they are able to take as object in th e relationship . If w e are composed of d ifferent p arts, then a third order person is not able to “see” all of these parts system atically -- they ar e un able to coord inate them . Metaphor ically speaking, w e wou ld know that w e are a system and that others are other systems. While this opens the w ay for consciously interpersonal relationships, we w ould n ot have a hand le on the par ts of our ow n system, for at the third ord er one is tru ly subject to his or her subjectivity. There has yet to emerge a context allowing further d ifferentiation from “others” beyond a recognition that everyone else also has th eir own needs, d ispositions, or pr eferences. Of cou rse, true to third or d er qua lities, it is often imp ossible to know w hose needs one is really respond ing to while involved in the interpersonal realm. Are these one’s own needs or th e needs of an “internalized
29 other,” a lover, a friend, a paren t, an organization, or the culture at large? At the third ord er there is often no difference, for this is wh at socialization is all about. Kegan (1982) states that, This balance is “interpersonal” bu t it is not “intimate,” because w hat might a pp ear to be intimacy here is the self’s source rather th an its aim. There is no self to share w ith another. Instead, the other is required to bring th e self into being. Fusion is not intim acy. If one can feel man ipulated by the im perial balance [second order], one can feel devou red by the interpersonal one. (p. 96)
A fourth order primer Before continu ing, it is importan t to n ote that following more th an a d ecade of research, Kegan (1994) estimat es that on e-half to tw o third s of the adu lts in th e U.S. do not yet construct them selves at the fourth ord er of consciousness. This is therefore a “widespr ead p henom enon,” and includ es most “r elatively pr ivileged , w ell-ed ucated , mid d le-class adu lt[s]” (p. 188). The importan t p oint here is that these find ings ind icate that socio-econom ic factors, wh ich a re generally considered very d etermining, are insufficient to accoun t for an ind ividu al’s evolution of consciou sness. H ence, it migh t very well be the case that , wh ile a p erson of “lower ” socio-econom ic statu s (SES) might be h ind ered in making th e transition from the third to the fourth ord er, someone of “higher” SES is not, inversely, bolstered in this tran sition. As w e will see in section 2 (the wor k of Jean Gebser), something of much larger m agnitud e is at work th an can be account ed for w ith SES statistics. Kegan (1994) associates the th ird ord er’s cross-categorical know ing w ith trad itionalism. H e furth er correlates the fourth ord er with mod ernism, and the fifth order w ith post-modern ism. As stated, most adu lts are still constructing
30 their w orld, making meaning, accord ing to p rimarily third order subject-object pr inciples. It is imp ortan t to note, how ever, that Kegan’s (1994) ma jor them e is that throu ghou t the cultur e there is a “hidd en curriculu m” tha t is placing fourth order d emand s on the majority of adu lts in the U.S. H e has explored both the private and p ublic spheres, and found fourth ord er mental demand s across the board in “th e literature” relevant to: par enting, partnering, work, d ealing w ith difference, healing, and learning. These fourth ord er dema nd s may ontogenetically “r equire a qua litative transformation in the comp lexity of mind every bit as fund amental as th e transformation from m agical thinking to concrete thinking… [first order to second ord er], or the tran sformation from concrete thinking to abstract thinking… [second order to third order]” (Kegan, 1994, p. 134). Social scientist Pau l Ray (1996), in h is “Integral Cu ltur e Survey,” h as dem onstrated th at there exist three world views currently in the US: trad itionalism, modern ism, and w hat he refers to as “transm odern ism.” As mentioned , Kegan (1994) notes p arallels between h is third order, fourth ord er, and fifth orders of consciousness w ith trad itionalism, m odern ism, and p ostmod ernism, respectively. Kegan is not cited an ywh ere in Ray’s work, and two years prior mad e the following comm ents related to h is ow n w ork: “I would forgive anyone for now asking, about the m ove beyond the fourth ord er, ‘Is this next trip really necessary? Isn’t it enou gh to accom plish the fourth or d er’” (Kegan , 1994, p. 301)? H is answ er to this question is “no,” for he point s out th at three “m entalities,” traditionalism, mod ernism, and postm odern ism, exist simultaneously in the adu lt pop ulation of the mod ern Western w orld. As I move into the d iscussion of the fourth ord er, and subsequent fifth order, it is vital to
31 keep in m ind Kegan’s correlation of the third, fourth, an d fifth orders w ith trad itionalism, mod ernism, and p ost-mod ernism. The central imp lication of these correlations is a “soft” version of the theory th at ontogeny recapitu lates ph ylogeny as consciousn ess evolves. Kegan is also inter ested in this very rich idea, one that has tremend ous potential for allowing u s a deeper und erstand ing of the individu al’s relationship to the w hole, and the w hole to the ind ividual.
The fourth order (the institutional balance)
H um anity on the whole has, up to this point in history, collectively evolved to the level of formop thin king. (Wilber, 1983/ 1996, p. 268) Phylogenetically, I wou ld p ut it this way: the mental burd en of modern life may be n othing less than th e extraord inary cultural dem and that each person, in ad ulthood , create internally an order of consciousness comp arable to that wh ich ord inarily w ould on ly be foun d at th e level of a comm unity ’s collective intelligence. (Kegan, 1994, p. 134) With each transition, a m ore complex ordering of consciousness su bsum es wh at w as subject, casting it into the realm of object (stated another w ay, wh at w as once context becomes conten t). Corresp ond ing to Piaget’s fu ll formal operational stage (formop ) and to Gebser’s “mental/ persp ectival” structure of consciousness, the fourth ord er recognizes mu tual r ole consciousness (perspectives), that there are relationships regu lating w hat ar e perceived as forms (objects). N ow th ere are not only ideals, but there is also ideology, 7 an un d erstan d ing that there are relations between abstra ctions (Kegan, 1994). The formu lation an d auth oring of one’s ow n “fill in the blank” is central to the fourth
7
In this context, the term "ideology" should n ot be confused w ith its Marxist/ socio-political meanings.
32 order, such that self-regulation, self-formation, psychic administration, identity, individu ation, and au tonomy comprise the subject territory. Kegan (1982) has referred to this ord er as th e “institutional balance,” w herein one is essentially an “adm inistrator” that keeps all of their mu ltitud inous p arts together as a wh ole -an au tonomou s, self-authoring, history-making individu al that is not su sceptible to the potential problems that can arise from th e hyper-emp athic third order. Hen ce, fourth ord er individu als perceive themselves as autonom ous w holes that enter into relationship w ith other w holes to form systems. If the first ord er’s un derlying stru cture is a single point, the second ’s the d urable category, and the third ’s being cross-categorical, then th e fourth ’s is a system (Kegan, 1994). A four th ord er individu al might be pictured as the CEO of their own bu reaucracy, a complex organization of various d epartm ents that requ ire leadership an d adm inistration. This complex organization is none other th an th eir Self. Generally speaking, a fourth order p erson wou ld seem to be motivated by a need for achievement (e.g., a constant focus on career), resulting in an inability to have close intimate relationships. Hen ce, we hav e a basic impr ession of how a fourth order p erson m ay outw ardly app ear in our modern, success-driven culture. Of course, these stereotypes serve as useful examp les and illustrations, but are essentially about content. If w e consider that a th ird ord er constru ction has u s subject to mu tuality, then the fourth ord er’s means of repu diating this can often m anifest in hyp er-ind ividu ality as ind ividu als strive to “auth or” themselves, to create their ow n set of theories about them selves and their relations to “the other.” There are ind ividu alistic and relational p eople at all orders, yet th ere is significance to th e hyp er-ind ividu alistic nature of th e fourth
33 order th at should remain in the foreground , especially when considering th is order’s correspond ence with mod ernism at th e collective level. [The four th or d er’s] …d elicate balance is that in self-govern ance it has rescued the “self” from its captivity by the shared realities, but in having “no self” before w hich it can bring the d eman ds of that govern ment, it risks the excess control that m ay obtain to an y governm ent, not su bject to a w ider context in w hich to root an d ju stify its laws. (Kegan 1982, p. 102)
In the pr evious passage, Kegan is simu ltaneously pointing out the limits of the fourth order w hile tangentially illuminating th e very achievements of four th ord er consciousness. For it is at the fourth order th at one gains the ability to evaluate different persp ectives, that of others and of ourselves. This aptitud e emerges because fourth order individu als have forged for them selves (the illusion of) an auton omou s self capable of generating th eir own set of values. This last point is so significant for Kegan (1994) that he h as gon e so far as to speak of fourth ord er individu als as having a “valu e generator,” that wh ich allows an ind ividu al to auth or their own “fill in the blank.” Moreover, “the streng th of the institu tional self lies in its ability to gener ate and exercise values and stand ard s, its limitation lies in its identification with [italics added] the genera tor” (Lahey, et al., p. 137). It is this genera tor th at m akes it possible to have an internal standard from which to be self-evaluating, self-correcting, and thu s self-au thor ing. In turn , the institut ional self is not comfortable, or even open to having this generator questioned. For w hen open to question, one’s way of thinking, perceiving, and making m eaning stand s challenged, resulting in a loss of hard w on stability. Evolution betw een stage 3 and stage 4 is the story of grad ually separating internalized points of view from their original sources in others and ma king th e self itself a coherent system for th eir generation a nd correlation… we stop m aking others respon sible for our ow n feelings, and
34 experience it as a kind of violation w hen oth er ma ke us r esponsible for theirs. (Lahey et al., p . 51)
What th e previous qu otation ultimately refers to is the dynam ic of repu diation, as the fourth order ind ividu al now comes to realize that each one shou ld be respon sible for their own em otions, feelings, han g-up s, etc. If and wh en som eone expects u s to take r esponsibility for th eir personal issues, it is perceived as an affront, mu ch in the sam e way th at a “mod ernist” might become annoyed and aggravated by a trad itional familial expectation to stay “in” the faith. The modernist “know s better,” so to speak, than to be blindly accepting. A more intimate illustration of this dynam ic is given in th e Guid e to the su bjectobject interview : a mar ried coup le is lying in bed at nigh t talking. The (third order) husband is having problems and wan ts to know w hat his (fourth ord er) wife thinks about the situation. She does not w ant to impose her “theory” on him, so she doesn’t offer anyth ing potentially useful. When p ressed by the hu sband to tell him wh at she thinks, it comes up that she doesn’t wan t to push her p oint of view, but he p resses. This up sets her, for he is questioning her selfauth ored w ay of dealing with interpersonal situations. She has essentially come to the formu lation tha t, since each p erson has his or her own point of view, then she might u nd uly influence his decision. It is her “self-authored” conclusion th at it is better to abstain from expressing her take on it. The guide states that, “she wishes not to impose her standar ds on h is experience, and she is disturbed wh en his question interrup ts her exercising h er stand ard s... she is iden tified w ith this theor y, she is the auth or of it” (p. 136). Kegan (1982) informs u s that, because th e fourth ord er ego is like an ad min istrator, the p erson’s egoic sense of self is derived from the organization that they attend to. H ence, w hat the fourth ord er
35 per son is su bject to -- e.g., self-auth oring, id entity, etc. -- is the ind ividu al’s self, source, or truth (Kegan). Thus, the fourth order is really about coming into one’s own . This may imply becoming successful in th e business w orld or becoming th e best mother one can be, but either of these will be done according to how each ind ividual “auth ors” it for themselves based on their own internal standard s. The fourth order confers a certain kind of freedom and auton omy, the ability to act because one chooses to do so, not because that is simp ly how one w as raised. Not discoun ting the innu merable influen ces of one’s up bringing and broader environmen tal context, the fourth order is in m any w ays about freedom . But th is freedom does not come w ithout costs. This very freedom from being subject to mu tuality presses fourth ord er ind ividu als to dam pen external noise that challenges their theory, their hard w on accomp lishmen t of a forged au tonomou s self. The fourth ord er, as associated w ith Modern ism, can be furth er un derstood w hen contextualized by Gebser’s (1949/ 1985) notion of “persp ectival” consciousness. The fourth order n otion of individu al wh oleness, an au tonomou s self, can be situated in a larger metap hysical framew ork. While the fourth order is a significant accomp lishm ent th at is seemingly necessary for the larger ev olution of consciou sness, it has also led to a n extrem e reification of d ua lism. It is this false sense of w holeness, conclud ing that a single per spective is a totality, tha t man ifests in pr oblemat ic fashion. As Gebser states, “the w hole cannot be approached from a p erspectival attitud e to the world, we m erely sup erimp ose the char acter of w holeness onto th e sector” (p. 18). The sim ilarities between Kegan’s fourth order and Gebser’s “p erspectival” consciousness are
36 rather striking. For instance, Gebser m entions the strengthening of the ego and of self-importan ce, an exact correspond ence and par allel to the fourth order’s auton omy, self-regulation, and self-authorship. On th e positive side, says Gebser, this leads to th e concretion of the hu man and of space, yet, it also leads to fixity, sectorization, amassm ent, and u ltimately to isolation. (On this last point refer back to the lengthy Gebser block citation on p .8 of the Introd uction.) Focusing on the h ubris, wh ile necessary given the current state of hum anity, should n ot lead on e to a negation of the positive accomp lishments. N ot only wou ld th is negation be illustrative of du alistic, redu ctionistic thinking, and a dem onstration of repu diation in the intellectual sph ere, but it w ould also categorically lack com plexity. Kegan (1994) has noted th at most ad ult ind ividuals are not yet at th e four th ord er, wh ile mod ernism is essentially the collective at a fourth order organ ization. So, in essence, the collective is “ah ead ” of the ind ividu al. We could even say that th e culture is like an “attractor” for the ind ividu al, which is a bit pa rad oxical, to say the least. From a constru ctive-d evelopm ental persp ective, one can begin to get a sen se of Gebser’s controversial assertion th at th ere really is no “un conscious.” 8 For Gebser, consciousness can be m anifest or latent, the latter of which refers to wh at has yet to become conscious according to our (limited) linear conception of time. Hen ce, as more ind ividu als make the transition to four th-order consciousness, we shou ld see that our pr oblems and parad oxes are not simply the result of “un conscious” cultur al motivations, but instead arise
8
This wa s major point of contention betw een he and h is colleague/ friend Carl Jun g (See Feuer stein, 1994).
37 from th e lack of a ma nifestation of mor e evolved an d com plex consciousn ess. Thus, it is latent consciou sness, not just u nconsciousn ess, w hich mu st be understood. 9 Kegan (1994) und erstands th is “aheadn ess” of the culture as the d eman ds of the curriculum of mod ern life, and uses this analogy to refer to the individu al/ culture relationship. This leads us into a very interesting situation, for if the cultu re itself is “pu lling” in d ividu als tow ard s “its” collective level of comp lexity, then it is not p ossible for individ ua ls really to be fully “auton omou s.” Yet, there does app ear to be a collective deman d for us to become more au tonomou s -- i.e., fourth ord er. In other word s, a seemingly parad oxical situation is revealed at the edge of the fourth order. I say seemingly for a good reason. In his w ork on hypersp ace and h igher dimensions, Kaku (1994) states that “the law s of nature become simp ler and more elegant w hen expressed in higher d imensions” (p. viii). Likewise, parad ox can be tran scend ed wh en a “lower/ narrower” order of reality is perceived from a “higher/ broader” order; the convoluted becomes simple, the confusing now clear, subject tran sforms into object. It is at the fifth order of consciousn ess wher e these id eas find a comfortable home.
The fifth ord er (the interind ividual balance) Piaget did n ot posit a fifth order, but if he had it wou ld m ost likely be “p ost-form al” (Kegan, 1982). As w e will see, the fifth ord er also corresp ond s to
9
I am by no m eans suggesting w e should ignore all of our kn owledge about “u nconscious” processes, but instead that they may not be as uniquely significant as often assumed.
38 the transcending of “mental/ rational” consciousness with th e realization of the imman ence (Origin) of all “previous” mod es of consciousness in w hat Gebser refers to as “integral/ apersp ectival consciousness.” It mu st be noted, how ever, that th e integral stru cture of consciousn ess is actually a more inclusive context, and thu s allows for ord ers “beyond” the fifth (a notion that w ill be explored later). The fifth ord er of consciou sness is cognitively dialectical, tran s/ po stideological, and thu s can “hold on to” parad ox and contradiction. The fourth order a ccomp lishmen ts of authorship, identity, and ideology have been cast as object. There is no system , id eology, theory, or anythin g, for that m atter, wh ich is not und erstood as existing only in terms of its contextual situatedn ess. While the fourth ord er has an un derlying stru cture of a system, the fifth order’s is tran s-systemic. As Kegan (1994) tells of it, fou rth or d er system ic know ing is subord inated by a more complex order that perceives it as object. Dur ing the transition from the fourth order to th e fifth ord er, ind ividuals may come to reflect on their system/ structure, but w ould still lack the means to situate this new ly broadened self-persp ective. Qu estioning one’s self-auth ored th eory dem onstrates that one is not fully embedd ed in that theory. The possibility of reflecting on “the w ay I even come to d ecid e” ind icates that “th e self is now bigger t han its ‘w ay’; the p ossibility of on e’s ow n ‘w ay’, ‘theor y’, or ‘form ’ becoming object, cap able of being r eflected u pon , is raised” (Lahey et al., p. 150). We come to realize, w heth er explicitly or not, that, wh ile the self has form, it is not that form (Lahey, et a l.).
At the fifth order one is subject to inter-individuality, an interpenetrability of self-systems. As such, a matu re fifth order bord ers on being transp ersonal.
39 10
As the fourth order w as the “institutional balance” this order is inter-
institutional, there is a penetration of the self and oth er such th at the r elationship between forms is pr ior to any au tonomou s forms them selves (wh ich w ould th en enter into relationsh ip as p re-existing wholes). Intra-p ersonally this ord er is iden tified with self-transform ation and inter-ind ividu ation (Kegan 1994). H ence, the individu al can only be wh ole w hen th ey are engaged w ith “others” -- it is not possible to be a comp lete person based solely on one’s (fourth order) au tonomy . Consequently, the fifth ord er person en gages others to “evaluate and possibly tran sform th e wor kings of its system” (Lahey, et al., p. 153). From fifth ord er subject-object relations, one’s self-system is not comp lete, and cannot be comp lete, w ithou t the “other.” This is d ue to a level of epistem ological comp lexity that allows one to take persp ective on their self as a w hole with parts; no longer boun d to the limitations of a falsely p erceived concrete wh ole (a fourth ord er self), one is capable of having free interaction betw een the v ariou s facets of themselves without concern for keeping a forged au tonomou s self together. There is an identification n ot only w ith the four th ord er’s d isposition for form creation, bu t also w ith the processes of interaction betw een these form s. This means th at “the w ays one forms oneself is not exhaustive of who on e is, and the sense of oppositeness or d ifference between p ersons is highly susp ect seen [ sic]as most likely fictive” (Lahe y, et al., p . 162).
10
The term “ transp ersonal” gen erally refers to states, experiences, or structu res of consciousness that are beyond , or “tran s,” the ego of an ind ividu al. For a good introd uction to the field of transp ersonal psychology see Walsh an d Vau ghan (1993), Paths Beyond Ego.
40 To some, the fifth order m ay soun d a lot like the third order, and there is a definite relationship betw een them. Kegan illustrates his theory as being spiral in shape (see App endix I), so that there is not only an “u pw ard ” motion, but also an equally back and forth motion. Again, regarding the dyn amic of his theory, he states that it is “continually moving back and forth between resolving the tension slightly in favor of au tonom y, at one stage, in favor of inclusion at th e next” (p. 108). While both the th ird ord er and the fifth order are concerned w ith inclusion, and construct themselves accord ingly, the third ord er individu al is embedd ed in the interpersonal and has yet to develop a distinct sense of self. On the other h and , fifth ord er individu als have differentiated them selves from the other, embedd ed them selves in an auton omou s, iden tity driven, self-authored reality, only to eventu ally d ifferentiate themselves from the fourth ord er so as to ease the tension on the inclusion side of the fence at the fifth ord er. While the fifth order individu al is most d efinitely embed ded in this “balance,” instead of being involved in a “fused comm ingling” (third order), they can engage in a “comm ingling w hich gua ran tees distinct identities” (Kegan , 1982, p. 105). We are return ed to the very significant d ynam ic of repu diation, wherein w hat is cast off and n egated d ur ing the shift from the third to the four th ord er is “not finally rejected bu t reap p rop riated ” (Kegan, p . 104) at the fifth ord er; the flip side of repu diation is re-integration. We can further u nd erstand th e difference between the fourth ord er and the fifth ord er by an swering th e following qu estion: “do w e take as subject the self-as-form (four th or d er) or d o w e take th e self-as-form a s object (the fifth ord er)” (Kegan, 1994, p. 316)? At th e fifth ord er w e can relativize the conceptions of ourselves as ind ividu als that are au tonomou sly self-regulating an d self-
41 auth oring from a “fixed” p erspective; the floor has fallen out from beneath ou r feet, for th ere is no longer an ything stable to su stain an ideology wh ich doesn’t seem totally arbitrary. When situated in a conflict situation, un like a fourth ord er person th at un derstand s conflict as a result of two p rior viewp oints butting head s, a fifth order p erson is inclined towa rd s an aw areness of their own incomp leteness. From the fifth ord er, conflict is comp rehen d ed as an opp ortun ity to “recover ou r tru er complexity” (p. 319), wh ich stand s in stark contrast to the fourth ord er assum ption th at a conflict is an “after-the-fact inconvenience with w hich th ey mu st contend ” (p. 319). At the fifth ord er, otherwise antagonistic, conflictual, or paradoxical relationships become comp lementary, each being seen as par ts in a larger wh ole instead of complete wh oles vying to m aintain their position. This last point lends itself well to an explanation of wh y the comp lexity of one order m ight be “prized” over an other. Kegan (1994) maintains that comp lexity is not in-and -of itself a virtu e, nor is any ord er necessarily “better” than anoth er. One order may be valued more than anoth er because each successive ordering in the evolution of consciousness provides “protection from the captivation an d d omin ance of other reality constr u ctions” (p. 333). The one issue I have w ith Kegan h ere relates to Gebser’s (1949/ 1985) insight a bou t each structure hav ing both an efficient and d eficient mod e, and as such wh at should be pr ized is not simply a more complex order’s ability for “p rotection,” bu t also the efficient mod es at each su ccessive stage. (Note: the next section includ es a d iscu ssion of efficient and d eficient m od es). In accord ance with a fifth ord er process of thinking-perceiving-meaning-making (complex TPM), it must be noted that contextual characteristics are w hat allow for an ything to be p rized
42 above anything else. The fifth ord er, therefore, may be pr ized above the fourth order because it is necessary to repu diate the n ow deficient mod e that instigated the needed transformation towa rds a m ore comp lex organization, one able to continue existing. Accord ing t o Wilber (1983/ 1996, 1995), at th e stag e of “vision logic” -- his rough equivalent of a fifth ord er -- one w ould say that th e system is sliding, or that the context is slipp ery. These sliding contexts do not stay p ut, but vary from observer to observer, situation to situa tion, and so on. Yet, since the initial emergence into a n ew order of consciousness also mean s a d ifferentiation from wh at one w as, there is a tend ency for w hat w e can call an “early” fifth order to be “against” the fourth ord er. Thus there is the type of postm odern ism that is essentially anti-mod ern (Kegan, 1994). Comb s (1996), wh ile discu ssing how children can get carried aw ay w ith new ly acquired learning, states that “the ru le, or schema, has been over-generalized, m eaning that th e child now uses it in all instances wh en not ap prop riate” (p. 64). Considering this analogously, it makes sense that a repu d iation of the fourth order can result in a pu rely deconstructive postmod ern/ fifth order epistemology that is carried aw ay with relativizing. In other word s, literally everything has become both/ and to the point that everything is seen as completely relative or arbitrary, and th us n othing has an y real value or meaning. Wilber (1995) speaks to this un derstand ing by asserting the following: “that the system is slid ing d oes not m ean tha t m eaning can’t be established, that truth doesn’t exist, or tha t context w on’t h old still long en ough to make a simp le point” (p. 40). Not coincidentally, Kegan p osits that “w hat postm od ernism is ‘post ’ to is the fourth ord er of consciousn ess” (p. 317).
43 It is vital to un derstand that there is an “integrated” fifth ord er/ postmod ern consciousness that is constru ctive in natu re and allows for an un pr ecedented amou nt of creativity. This amou nts to a freedom light-years beyond the accomp lishm ents of the fourth ord er, for the fifth ord er is not limited by such, now seemingly quaint, self-constructions. In a fifth-order/ postm odern reality, “persons exist in a state of continuous construction and reconstruction; it is a world w here anyth ing goes that can be negotiated. Each reality of self gives wa y to r eflexive questioning, irony, and ultimately playful pr obing of yet another reality” (Gergen in Masterpasqu a and Perna, 1994, p. 7). Und er these conditions there are no “real” (i.e., absolute or fixed) boundaries, laws, or rules, as these are all constructions found ed on an ep istemology that w as once the subjective experience of the ind ividu al that ha s now become d ifferentiated ob ject. Every organ ization, school, field, discipline, or genre is seen as h aving fluid and / or perm eable boun da ries w ith all other organizations, schools, fields, d isciplines, or genr es. This state of affairs is ap p aren t in today’s mu lti-med ia wor ld, w here it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain any d istinct sense of bound aries between genres of m usic or film, between styles of architecture across temp oral or geograp hic lines, between local and international business, between mainstream and un dergrou nd cultur e -- the list goes on and on . In terms of w hat this means for us as bio-psycho-socio-spiritual beings, many of us can now r e-create ourselves as we see fit. We mix and m atch the private and pu blic spheres in ou r lives, we ap prop riate spiritual-religious teachings from th e wellsprings of the world’s diverse traditions, we can even shift wh o w e are and wh at we do at the drop of a hat. And , thoug h this epistemology too comes with
44 its own sets of challenges an d issues, noneth eless, for better or w orse, it ap pears to be th e next p hase in th e evolution of Western consciousness. Since the main inten tion of the this section w as to pr esent Kegan’s theory as the grou nd ing for this thesis, focusing on the fifth ord er as central, I have only a few more p oints before moving on -- the framew ork now established. It is crucial to und erstand that the fifth ord er, in contrast to the fourth order as a stru cture of form ation, is a stru cture of trans-formation (Kegan, 1982). From a fifth ord er disp osition, the fifth ord er’s organiza tion is qualitatively different from the previous ord ers, for this par ticular stru cture includ es and su bsequently relativizes all of them. Even thou gh it has been portrayed as a structure that is concerned w ith the p rimacy of the relations betw een forms, it is accurate to say that the fifth ord er’s structure is post-structural. A fifth order ind ividu al is able to take a meta-p osition, to reflect on their org anizing p rinciples, and hen ce is often concerned with the illusion that there are fixed, isolated, reified structures. While Kegan’s theor y is, as a wh ole, a theory of increasing comp lexity, it is not un til the fifth ord er that th ings actually become comp lex in an explicit fashion.
45 In Closing In Kegan’s theory, each ord er of consciousn ess ind icates an ind ividu al’s organ ization of sub ject-object relations. It is abou t wh at they are embed d ed in and d ifferentiated from. It is about a p erson’s reality construction, not the specific content, but h ow th at content is organized, und erstood, and acted u pon . It is of cour se also about th e evolution of consciou sness in term s of the individu al/ culture dyn amic. This sense of “reality” will continu e to exist in this thesis, but it has been subsum ed by a broad er context. For the rest of this work, each ord er also can n ow b e thou ght of as an ad jective -- e.g., a fifth ord er w ay of thinking, or a th ird ord er w ay of relating -- meaning th at the qu alities of each order are descriptive of other phenom ena. Hen ce, someone can app ly w hat might be r eferred to as fifth order thinking w ithout n ecessarily constru cting themselves at the fifth ord er according to Kegan’s theory p roper. In retur ning to the n otion of comp lex thinking-perceiving-meaningma king, I am su ggesting som ething th at is qualitatively similar to Kegan’s fifth order of consciousness. Within a context groun ded by Kegan’s theory, I now turn my attention tow ard s a brief treatment of Gebser’s w ork, sufficient only to flesh ou t his “integra l consciousness” as th e older sibling of Kegan’s fifth ord er and , of course, as an integral foun dation for comp lex TPM.
46 Section 2: Jean Gebser’s Integral consciousness
Every p erson represents and lives the entire mu tational series of man kind thr ou gh his structu res. (Gebser, 1949/ 1985 p. 123) Chance and destiny are m erely the agencies wh ich r elease the intensities in ourselves wh ich are ready for ma nifestation. It is these intensities tha t cause the decisive events to “happ en by chance” or “destine” these events for us. The intensities manage the chance and d estiny so that the possibilities for their own man ifestation occur. In a word , we are our chances and destiny . (Gebser, p. 250)
Background Gebser’s work is soph isticated , involved , idiosyn cratic, and comp lex. N ot only can his w ork be read in “hyp er-text” fashion (e.g., like w ith hyp erlinks on the world w ide web), meaning th at you can start at any chap ter and follow it in nu merou s directions, but moreover, his work crosses the bound aries of philosophy, religion, psychology, history, cultural studies, science, poetry, visual art, lingu istics, politics, mythology, and m usic. Furtherm ore, he developed a new vocabulary for the express pu rpose of facilitating d iscussion of a “new ” consciousness, enabling a discourse not trap ped w ithin the confines of the current structur e of consciousness’ language-thinking. There are many w ays to app roach the w ork of Jean Gebser, and this thesis ultimately is focused on the idea of an emerging consciousness. Thus, it is Gebser’s perception of an “integral consciousness” that m ost interests me. As with Kegan, wh ere I fleshed ou t his theory as a w hole so that his fifth ord er now sits in a meaningful context, I am going to take a similar rou te with Gebser’s w ork. There will be a brief d iscussion of the structures that are integrated in an “integral consciousness,” as w ell as a rather substan tial examination of the curr ent, dominan t structure.
47 We already h ave a sense of wh at consciousness is for Kegan, even thou gh no explicit definition w as offered; so, w hat abou t Gebser? H e states: “consciousness is neither know ledge nor conscience but m ust be u nd erstood… in the bro ad est sense as wa keful pr esence” (1949/ 1985, pg. 42). It is crucial to un derstan d that consciousness is not to be equ ated w ith intelligence or rational facility (the reason s for this will becom e clear in w hat follows). Gebser scholar Georg Feuer stein (1987/ 1995) tells u s tha t, for Gebser, “consciou sness is not merely ‘w akeful p resence’, but w akeful p resence that is structured in a certain wa y and wh ich stru ctures its experienced u niverse” (p. 38). This is more than reminiscent of Kegan’s assertion that we organize our experience according to ord erings of subject-object relations. Also in accord w ith Kegan’s theory is the notion that w e develop throu gh su ccessively more comp lex stages. Following on the previous n otion is Gebser’s un derstand ing that the u nfolding of consciousness shou ld not be u nd erstood as an expan sion of consciousness, but as an “inten sification of consciou sness… a grow th of w akefulness…. [Gebser] un derstan ds this intensification or ‘strengthening’ as an increasing ‘d imen sioning’ of consciou sness” (Feuer stein, 1987/ 1995, p . 37). Further u nd erlying Gebser’s work is the notion of “latency.” The intent of this idea is to characterize how there is a continuou s and simultaneous effectuality of “earlier,” “present,” and “future,” su ch that all structures are everpresent. As a mu tation occurs, the once dom inant structure recedes into the background -- i.e., a momen tous shift of figure and groun d transp ires. As Gebser states, latency is “w hat is concealed -- is the dem onstr able presen ce of the future. It includ es everything that is not yet manifest, as well as everything w hich has again r etur ned to latency” (1949/ 1985, pg. 6). For exam ple, if I look
48 closely at major events in my life, in hin d sight I can see that th ere wer e things “w aiting” to hap pen, that w ere in essence already th ere, but th at were not per ceived u ntil “afterw ard s.” Those events, objects, experiences w ere latent un til they m anifested th emselves as part of the experience, and then r esolved back into latency -- the imp lication being th at everyth ing tha t ever has been, is, or w ill be, is always p resent, but tha t w e are only conscious of the man ifest. This last point w ill make m ore sense after the discussion of integral structure of consciousness. Another fund amen tal “guid ing p rinciple” for Gebser (1949/ 1985) is “transp arency,” w hich he also refers to as “diap han eity.” Transparency, or diap haneity, is “the form of the man ifestation (epiph any) of the spiritual” (Gebser, p. 6). Transparency is the rend ering transparen t of the latent -- our past, present, and futu re. As Gebser states, “w e are shap ed and d etermined not only by today and yesterday, but by tomorrow as well. The author [Gebser] is not interested in ou tlining d iscrete segments, steps, or levels of man , but in disclosing the tran sparency of man as a w hole and th e interplay of the various consciousness structures which constitute him” (p. 7). 1 If, as Gebser posits, periods of major transition m ake evident this transpar ency, then th is diaphan y is not simp ly a m atter of ph ilosophy or yet an other intellectual exercising of the Modern ist mind -- it is a reality that is becoming a part of everyday experience,
1
It is useful to keep in m ind th at gend er specific terminology is ind icative of the over-arching pa triarch al thru st of the last 5000 year s (e.g., see Riane Eisler, 1987, The chalice and t he blad e). I am consciously leaving the term “man ” in the text not only because it was the term inology emp loyed by Gebser w hile writing in th e pre-PC 1940’s, but also because it is archetypally accura te langua ge for the eras being described.
49 that is, the way th at the w orld is perceived. Yet, as the skep tic says, “we’ll ju st have to w ait and see.” Accord ing to Com bs (1996) there a re th ree hierar chically fashion ed “levels” to our experiential lives: states of mind , states of consciousn ess, and stru ctures of consciousn ess. Within this thesis it is the latter that is und er d iscu ssion (Kegan’s ord ers and Gebser’s stru ctures). H ow ever, it is questionable w heth er these thr ee “levels” are actually so different except as the intensity of time var ies greatly in each, e.g., similar pa ttern s seem to exist across d ifferent time frames -- states of mind pass w ith m oments, states of consciousness change within hou rs and d ays, w hile structures evolve over longer intervals. Of course, we p erceive and experience them very d ifferently. Hen ce, since structures of consciousness “evolve” or “m utate,” and since structures “exist” both for the collective and the ind ividual, it is not on ly reasonable, but also ap prop riate to speak of collective and ind ividu al structures in the same m anner a s pertaining to this thesis. This pa ralleling is based on a recognition of pa ttern th at cu ts across scales -- i.e., size, length , weight, etc., are no t an issu e. This kind of pa ttern recognition directly parallels Mandelbrot’s discovery of fractal geometry, wh erein th ere are highly similar patterns foun d at scales that are infinitely far ap art (at least math ema tically) (Briggs, and Peat, 1989). This phen omen on is known as self-similarity and , while not the focus of the current w ork, it u nd erlies man y of the ideas herein. Found ational to th is thesis is Gebser’s (1949/ 1985) insigh t tha t ther e is a “qualitative reduction of wholeness, that correspond s to the qu antitative augm entation of consciousness w hich, by d imensioning creates its own system of interrelation ships” (p. 119). This system of interrelationsh ips can be analogized
50 to Kegan’s su bject-object r elations, w herein at each differentiation/ embedd ing there is a loss and a gain -- “a decrease in the relationship to the wh ole… an increase of the p ow ers of consciousn ess” (Gebser, p. 140). Gebser stresses the interdep enden ce of consciousness to a space/ time world , such that at each order/ stage/ structure of the unfolding of consciousness there is also a correspond ing unfolding of dim ensioning. Each successive order’s/ structure’s organization includ es more d imensions than previous ord ers/ structures and therefore is more complex than its pred ecessors. Moreover, this unfoldingdim ensioning m anifests in tand em w ith an increased reification and ma terialization of the w orld (Gebser). In sup por t of Gebser’s assertion, I refer to Kegan’s theory, as at each successive balance/ ord er there is simultaneously a casting of w hat w as subject into the objective realm and an increasing dim ensioning of complexity. It is also critical to accentu ate Gebser’s position on the comm on n otions of progress and developm ent, as “progress is not a positive concept, even w hen mind lessly constru ed to be one; progress is also a p rogression aw ay, a d istancing and w ithdraw al from someth ing, nam ely, from origin” (p. 41). Gebser held th at wh at is actually occurring is a restructuration w ithin a unity, that the seeming decrease of “our relationship to the w hole… is comp ensated… by the increase of conscious relationship p artaking in w holeness; there is a transp osition from the so-called objective sph ere into t he so-called subjective” (p. 140). Again, it is vital to realize that all of the structures are p resent, latent or man ifest, in v arying w ays -- some creative, other s d estru ctive. Regard ing Gebser’s stru ctures, Combs (1996) states tha t th ey “are n ot simp ly archeological relics that hav e no relevan ce to mod ern life. They continue to exist beneath, or behind, the new er dom inant
51 stru ctures and exert a lively influen ce even tod ay” (p. 101). We are thus constituted by all that has been, is, and w ill be. The issue then becomes: “w hat are we conscious of?” Or, even more imp ortantly, “w hat does wh at w e are consciou s of mea n to u s?”
The Archaic structu re of consciousn ess Using a spatial metaph or is not totally app ropr iate for d escribing th is structure, yet the Archaic structure can be thou ght of as being “closest” to Origin. Kegan’s order zero correspon ds to this structure, and thu s consciousness has yet d ifferentiated subject and object -- there is only subject. This is the age of our early ancestors. Although w e now kn ow th at these close cousins of ours w ere not simp ly barbarian cavemen, nonetheless, we still have mu ch to learn abou t this age. 2 Yet, there are historical allusions to and rogynou s figures an d the like that in d icate an u n-d ifferentiated subject-object consciousn ess (Gebser, 1949/ 1985). Gebser posits that this structu re has zero dimen sions, yet it is spa tial and temp oral (thou gh not in th e way w e perceive space-time). Likewise, Kegan (1982) assigns no d imension s to his corresp ond ing “incorp orative balan ce,” as it is not until the subsequ ent ord er that th ere is a one-dim ensional point-like structure. Since we w ere comp letely non-differentiated from the w hole of the un iverse, in a state of “non-consciou sness,” Gebser likens th is stru cture to a state of deep sleep. This is not to say that there w as no ability to p erceive and act up on perceptions, as mamm als mu ch simp ler than hu man s are “conscious” in
2
Even given recent archeological find ings, any d iscussion of this era is highly sp eculative, as the significance of the evidence is highly dispu ted even amon g the “experts” in th e field.
52 the sense that there is an aw areness of a world, hence there w as most likely a minimal proto-differentiation that allowed for basic survival (e.g., finding food and shelter, etc.). In short, this stru cture is pr imord ial consciousn ess, the initial step toward s consciousness as we und erstand (or misund erstand) it.
The Magical stru cture of consciousn ess As hu man ity begins to emerge from comp lete iden tification w ith the w hole, the Magic consciousn ess structu re ma nifests. Both Kegan (1994) and Gebser, respective to their own scale of research, credit a one-dim ensional p ointlike un ity to magical consciousn ess. This stru cture can be likened to a sleep-like state, such th at there is not yet an experience of an individu alized ego. Consequ ently, magical experience is both spaceless and timeless. At this jun ctu re, human ity, no longer fu sed in th e arch aic u nity , is m ergin g w ith nature -- struggling against this merger and gaining pow er, hu man s become “makers.” We know this pow er, this “making,” as magic, and it manifests when consciou sness ha s been sacrificed to (or abid es in) a point -like un ity, a tran ce-like state, wh ere it is in “the natu ral vital egoless, spa celess, and timeless spher e” (Gebser, p. 48). The pow ers of telepath y, clairvoyan ce, and d ivination are a natu ral extension of this merger w ith natu re. 3 For examp le, it is comm on know ledge that animals become agitated hou rs, or even d ays, before a storm or earth qu ake. Likew ise, these experiences are aspects of everyd ay life in magic consciousness. N ow, as we no longer consider ourselves to be animals, and have
3
So-called psychic abilities are actually expected/ norm al given a close connection to na tur e.
53 essentially sep arated ourselves (physically and lingu istically) from natu re, w e now think of these aptitu des as “extra” sensory. Accord ing to Gebser (1949/ 1985), “every w ord is, after all, not only a concept or fixed equ ivalent in w riting; it is also an image an d thu s myth ical, a sound and thu s magic, a root and thu s archaic, and thu s, by virtue of this root mean ing, still present from origin” (p. 123). Kram er and Mickun as (1992) p oint out that the w ord “m agic” shares a comm on root with the English w ords “m ake” and “machine,” and with the German w ords for “pow er” (macht) and “to want” (moegen). The world of the magical structure m ay seem distant, but it is more than latently pr esent, for Gebser convincingly traces our mod ern d ay man ipu lations back to this epoch. From our “merging” w ith nature arises the struggle to survive natu re -- “our m achines and technology, even our pr esent day p ower p olitics, arise from th ese magic roots: N ature, the surrou nd ing world , other hu man beings must be ruled so that m an is not ruled by them” (Gebser, p. 51). Som e migh t equate this latent ma gical consciou sness with “p rimitive” emotion s, the rep tilian brain stem, or just “instinct.” Regard less of the chosen description, w hat rem ains the same is that this something is par t of us all. H ence, “all ‘m aking’, w heth er in the form of spell-casting or the rea soned technical constru ction of a ma chine, is an externalization of inner p ow ers or cond itions and as such their visible, outw ard form” (Gebser, p. 132). What w e w ere once sub ject to becom es object, tha t wh ich is throw n from u s. But , eventually, each structure m ust be re-integrated.
54 The Mythical structure of consciousness As the m utation from th e Magical to the Mythical occurs, hum anity enters a d ream-like reality. Although this structure is still distant from sp atialized consciou sness, time is on the horizon . While the magic stru cture iden tifies everything in terms of p oint-for-point identification, the m ythical structure does so polarly. Correspond ing to Kegan’s second order, this polarity, in tand em w ith an ability to perceive d ur able categories, is the first fully matu red un derstand ing of self and other . Of cour se, this polarity is not d u ality, as the poles are of the wh ole. Only menta l consciousness transforms polarity into du ality -- the w hole fragmenting in consciousness. Based u pon an examination of visual art from th e magical and myth ical eras, Gebser (1949/ 1985) points out that m agic man emana ted an aura aroun d the head , often w ith no mou th even d epicted. Later, these auric representations are replaced by m ythical man’s mouth , for myth s mu st be spoken. In an intriguing p assage, Gebser states that as “a silent, inw ard -directed contemplation it renders the sou l visible so that it may be v isualized, represented , heard, and mad e aud ible… myth is this representing and m aking aud ible” (p.67). Myths are the dr eam s of the collective pu t into word s (Gebser). It is shar ed consciousness dispersed throu ghou t th e collective, and obviously, still very active in contemp orary pop ular culture (most notably, with H ollyw ood). As stated, th e early myth ical structure correspond s to Kegan’s second ord er. Yet, as the m ythical structur e man ifests in increasingly deficient form, it begins to share characteristics w ith Kegan’s third or der. Gebser holds that it is not u ntil the deficient m ode of myth ical consciousness that w e find Myth in th e
55 rigid hierar chical fashion as exemplified in later Greek myth ology. This mod e of the Mythic is w hat m ost mod ern p eople think of as myth, for not on ly is it historically nearest, but m ainly because th is form of myth teeters on the verge of our current stru cture, the mental stru cture of consciousness. Before moving on to th e mental structure, a few w ords are in ord er to clarify some necessary distinctions. First, I am n ot equat ing Kegan’s third ord er with anything “deficient,” even th ough there are correspond ing characteristics between asp ects of the deficient mod e of the Mythical structure an d late second / early third ord er consciousness. “Deficient” should not be un derstood as “bad” or “negative,” an easy value jud gement to make w hen p laced along side “efficient.” For examp le, w hile d iscussing th e deficient form of thou ght from the m ental structure, Gebser states that, “we are in n o w ay against this form of thinking, although w e do regard its more extreme forms and man ifestations as dam aging. At the same time w e see them as the involun tary pred ecessors of the leap towar d a new and not m erely p ossible, but n ecessary mu tation” (p. 259). The deficient mod e may be thu s though t of as the necessary breakdow n of a stru cture so that it can tra nsform itself. In this sense, the efficient mod e can be likened to the n on-fragmen ting aspects of any structure, w hereas the d eficient mod e seems to occur du ring d ecline, or decay. We might consider this is in terms of anabolic and catabolic forces, building u p an d br eaking dow n; each is as necessary as the other . Finally, efficient and d eficient m od es need not follow each oth er according to some linearly u nfolding d evelopm ental pattern, for they can and d o manifest side by side and at the same time.
56 The Mental -- p erspectival/ rational -- stru cture of consciousness
We act like someone attemp ting to fly a sup ersonic aircraft in a room , that is we attemp t to emp loy a four-dim ensional creation (the sup ersonic aircraft) w ithin a three-dim ensional wo rld (the room). (Gebser, p. 291)
The mental stru cture of consciousness correspond s to Kegan’s third ord er and , in its current perspectival/ rational mod e, the fourth ord er. In the same w ay that I sketched out Kegan’s wh ole theory so that the fourth and fifth orders abide in a m eaningful context, the discussion of the pr evious structures serve to facilitate a similar contextualization of the men tal and integra l structu res in relation to the w hole evolutionary sequence as described by Gebser. The mental structure correspond s to both third ord er and fourth ord er subject-object relations. While I hav e tended to focus on the interp ersona l aspects of third order consciousness, I wou ld n ow like to highlight some oth er characteristics. Third ord er consciousn ess takes the concrete (e.g., cause and effect, d ata) and “p oints of view” a s object, and is subject to abstr actions, e.g., inference, hyp othesis, ideals, values (Kegan, 1994). Kegan refers to th e ability to “abstract” information a bout the “oth er” based on on e’s ow n su bjectivity, concurren t w ith the recognition th at ther e are other su bjectivities, as crosscategorical know ing. Gebser (1949/ 1985) notes that men tal abstractions rep laced myth ical images, essentially tran smu ting gods into the idols of “anthr opocentrism, du alism, rationalism, finalism, u tilitarianism, m aterialism -in other w ords the rational componen ts of the persp ectival consciousness” (p. 77). Yet, in third ord er terms, this transmutation is but a p roto-du alism, wh ereas the “idols” Gebser speaks of are mu ch more fourth ord er. There is a recognition of others separate from ou rselves, or in more gen eral terms, a recognition of
57 others’ points of view. The third ord er, correspond ing to traditionalism, though subject to abstraction, has n ot yet become comp letely split or fragm ented (i.e., it is not yet fourth ord er). Since the third ord er is subject to the inter per sonal it exhibits char acteristics of both polarity (myth ical) and du ality (mental). Third order consciousness is d ifferentiated from my thical consciousn ess as Gebser describes it, bu t has yet to become fully embed ded in perspectival/ mental consciousness (wh ich I will be discussing m omentarily). Likewise, Gebser holds that “du ality d iffers in one essential resp ect from polarity: in polarity, corresp ond ences are valid. Every correspon d ence is a com plem ent, a com pletion of the wh ole” (p . 85). For myth ical consciousness, self and other are poles, as are life and death , wh ereas, in fully mental term s, self is not other as life is opp osite to death . As Gebser states, “du ality is the mental splitting and tearing apar t of polarity, and from the correspond ences of polarity, du ality abstracts and quan tifies the opp ositions or antith esis” (p. 86). This seeming ly subtle difference ma nifests in rad ically d ifferent p erceptions of reality, for th e wh ole process of TPM dra stically, and fund amentally, shifts from an u nd erstanding based on comp lementarity to one of antagonism. Before moving on to fourth order/ persp ectival/ mental consciousness, I mu st note the following: though I have been d iscussing corresponden ces betw een Kegan’s ord ers and Gebser’s stru ctures of consciousn ess, it is imperative to realize that this w hole discussion, and the entire context surrou nd ing me, is embedd ed in the mental structure of consciousness. Even thou gh w e appar ently evolve throu gh “stages” correspond ing to magical and myth ical consciousness, we do th is situated in a culture d ominated by mental
58 abstraction, perspectival thinking, and thu s these correspon den ces are only app roximations pr ejud iced by th e colorations of a mental/ persp ectival lens. Psychologically speaking, repudiation of mythical consciousness is end emic -- e.g., nu minosity has been rationalized ou t of myth . Furtherm ore, myth is wid ely und erstood according to r ational psychologisms (e.g., similar to Freud’s reduction of the religious urge to psychological mechanisms), while mu ch of ma gical consciousn ess has been reintegrated . This reintegr ation is exemp lified in ou r “m akings” and profoun d “harn essing of natu re,” -- e.g., nu clear, solar, or hyd roelectric pow er, etc. Finally, wh ile I have been pr actically equating p ersonal ontogeny w ith collective phy logeny, like Kegan I am emp hasizing pattern and stru cture, and th us the content may vary greatly withou t comp romising the integrity of a structure. So, while it may seem th at I am occasionally forcing a fit betw een the tw o theories, and I very w ell may be, the d isparity is more on the content side of the fence than on the stru cture side. This is not to say that content and structure are separ ate, or that content is not as significant as structure, bu t that (the content of) this paper is simp ly more concerned w ith structure than w ith content. The previous paragrap h -- better yet, this whole stud y -- is predicated on a consciousness that is “w akeful.” This w ork could n ot emerge from a consciou sness th at is like deep sleep (archaic), sleep -like (magic), or d ream like (mythical). Right now I am dem onstrating directed th ough t, mental abstraction focused tow ard s a specific goal. I am d oing this from m y perceived center of consciousness -- my h ead -- where my m ind is, the home of the ego. I have been show ing how th ings are the same or d ifferent, analyzing them , demonstrating a discriminating capacity found ed on abstraction. I can u se these abilities to then
59 direct my actions tow ard s a w orld th at I wan t to effect. These capacities are all accomplishments of mental consciousness. Both Kegan an d Gebser add ress the oscillating n atur e of the dyn amics of the evolution of consciousness, e.g., inw ard directed, outw ard directed, inward directed, etc. As such, fourth ord er/ mental consciousness is most definitely outw ard d irected. With this outw ard d irectedn ess comes the discovery of, and pr eoccup ation w ith, spa ce. As Gebser (1949/ 1985) states: When comp ared to th e mythical structure, with its temporal-psychic emp hasis, the transition to the mental structure suggests a fall from tim e int o space. Man steps ou t of the sheltering, two-dimen sional circle and its confines into three-dimen sional space. H ere he no longer exists within polar complementarity: here he is in confrontation with an alien world -a du alism that m ust be abridged by a synth esis in thou ght, a mental form of trinity. Here w e can no longer speak of unity, correspond ence, or comp lement arity, not to mention integr ality. (Gebser, p. 77)
“Duality,” “man,” “ratio,” “persp ective,” “measu rement,” and “thinking” are the key w ords of the m ental consciousness structure. Gebser (1949/ 1987) gives the following examples, illustrations par excellence, as centra l to the fund amentally tacit assum ptions of ou r ep och: Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum,” Paramenid es’ “thinking and being is one and the same,” as w ell as Protagoras’ “man is the measure of all things.” Thus the mental structure is a world w here man “thinks and directs this thought… the world wh ich he m easures, to wh ich he aspires, is a material world -- a w orld of objects outside h imself w ith w hich he is confronted (Gebser, p. 77).” H erein is an examp le of the philosopheme, as distinct from th e mythologeme of myth ical consciou sness, wh ich, essentially, has resu lted in a ghett oizing of mythical elemen ts into the realm of fantasy, folklore, and legend (Gebser). If magic operates on an emotional tie with n atur e, the
60 myth ical on the imagination of the psyche, then the m ental fun ctions on th e abstraction of space and th e world . Third ord er m ental consciousness is subject to abstraction, bu t fourth ord er men tal consciousn ess is able systemat ically to reflect on this abstraction. While both are m entally oriented -- a similarity between tra ditionalism an d mod ernism -- the fourth ord er capacity to take as object, and thu s reflect u pon , abstraction translates into an enormou s amoun t of pow er. The single-pointed un ity experienced in magical consciousness is now man ipulated, albeit in deficient and diluted form, within a fragmentary m ental world of abstract reasoning. Ou r mod ern w orld is a direct result of this abstraction taken to a logical extreme. This connection between th e men tal and the ma gical (the fourth/ third order to the second/ first order) is demonstrated by the close kinship of the word s “magic,” “making,” “might,” “mechanism,” and “machine” (Gebser, p . 46).4 Subsequ ently, the inherently p olar and imagistic symbolic consciousness of the m ythical has been red uced to allegory and formula by mental consciousness. Generally speaking, symbols now hav e a solely pragmatic meaning -- whether mathematical formulas, letters, formal logic, or even street signs and restaurant m enus -- symbol has become sign , the num inous has become functional. This red uction of sym bol to sign is sym pt oma tic of how “explana tions of the un iverse hav e been system atically ‘cleansed ’ of all spiritu al and hu ma n q ua lities” (Tarn as, 1991, p. 421).
4
All of these word s stem from same the Indo-Europ ean root: mag(h) (Gebser, 1949/ 1985).
61 Before moving on to a discussion of integral/ fifth order/ post-mod ern consciousness, three major facets of the mental structure must be made explicit -they are: 1) persp ective/ over-emp hasis on space, 2) ratio and m easurement, and 3) fragmentation of the wh ole. While I have already touched on each of these, the necessity of a comp lex orientat ion w ill become clear only w hen th ese are understood. The quintessential hallmark of Mental consciousness is its over-emphasis on space, w hich Gebser holds is both its greatness and m ajor w eakness. While there is not sufficient “space” in th is pap er to go into d epth on Gebser’s research and argu ment for this assertion, for illustration I w ill “point ou t” a few characteristic examp les from mo d ern life. Given John Glenn ’s recent retu rn to “sp ace” aboard the “sp ace” shut tle (October 29, 1998), it is no sur pr ise that I mention the “sp ace race” of the Cold War. We have “space” for rent everyw here, e.g., billboards, apar tm ents, or store fronts. A brief look into an y American history textbook will withou t fail mention “Man ifest Destiny,” the belief that it w as ou r n ation’s d estiny to explore, traverse, and ultimately possess all of the land betw een the Atlan tic and Pacific Oceans. 5 What is often not mentioned is that this “space” was already “filled” by other cultur es. This discussion could n ot be comp lete w ithout a fur ther interlud e into langu age. As Kramer et al. (1992) assert, “our m od ern m ental consciou sness is constituted fund amen tally on a spatial metaph or” (p. xxi). Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in their now classic Metaphors we live by, demonstrate how almost
5
On CN N , at the time of the John G lenn m ission, I witnessed a N ASA official state that our continued space exploration was like a “manifest destiny” for the next millennium .
62 everything we say is actually metaph orical. If w e are embed ded in mental/ persp ectival consciousness then our langu age shou ld reflect this. Here are but a few of the nu merou s examp les, of orient ational metaphors, that they present: “my sp irits rose; I fell into a d epression; get up ; he’s under hyp nosis; he came down w ith the flu; I have control over her; he is under my control; she h as high stand ard s; or he is high minded ” (p. 15). Interestingly enou gh, they point out
that r ational is up , wh ile emotion al is down , e.g., “he fell to the emotional level, …we p ut ou r feelings aside and had a high-level intellectu al discussion” (p. 17). It should also come as n o surp rise that Gebser has explored the etymological roots of w ords common ly used in mod ern language. Risking tediu m, I present the following p assage as supp ort for this claim abou t our pr eoccupation w ith space: Perspectival thinking spatializes and then em ploys w hat it has sp atialized. All inferences or d edu ctions are expressed in language by spatial concepts. Language speaks of “transcending” or “overriding” or “exceeding,” and ph ilosophic though t of this kind “represents, conceives of” (vorstellen, literally “p laces before”); it “p roves” (nachw eisen, literally “points to”); it “grasps” an d “com-preh end s”; it “grasps conceptu ally” (auffassen, literally “catches”); it “considers” (überlegen, literally “tu rns over”); it imputes (unterstellen, literally “places under”); it “debates” and “argu es” (au seinand ersetzen, literally “takes ap art”). (Gebser, p . 258)
Notice the similarity to Kegan’s fourth order, as inference and ded uction (form s of abstra ction) hav e been cast in the realm of object and thu s are emp loyed in a d irected fashion (whereas at the th ird ord er one is subject to abstraction). Getting back to th e point , Kram er et al. (1992) tell us tha t this prejudice in mod ern th inking leads to “the reification of time as an indifferent measu re of the linear m otion of spat ially located objects... all events an d
63 ph enomena , in ord er to be real, mu st be redu ced to spacio-temp oral positionality and t hu s to per spectival fragm entat ion” (p. xxi). Menta l consciou sness, then , is preoccup ied with space. But w hat does this mean? What are the imp lications? It is difficult to imagine a w orld that is not foun ded on p erspective. Gebser gives us the exact mom ent in history that th e seemingly simp le idea of persp ective became the defining ph enomenon of our epoch. It w as the ascent of Moun t Ventoux in France, in 1336, by Petrarch, and w as none oth er than the discovery of “the landscape.” It is here that sp ace irru pts into consciousness and per spective is born . Later, in the fifteenth centu ry CE, Leonard o Da Vinci established laws of perspective, paving the w ay for technical drafting, and thu s ma king p ossible our technological age-- a logical extreme of persp ectivity. Accord ing to Feuerstein (1987/ 95), Gebser has tra ced the roots of the path ological elements from ou r p resent civilization back to the introd uction of per spectivity. In this resp ect, per spective “executed th e alignm ents of asp ects to a pred etermined p oint and th ereby effected a d istortion of reality. For the part is to a certain d egree alw ays a betrayal of the whole, for w hich reason th e sum of the p arts also only yields a fictitious bu t not efficacious w hole” (Feuerst ein, p. 128). This last point shou ld be kept is mind a s it foreshad ow s the next section. This emp hasis on space, in tand em w ith a men tal-persp ectival orientation, has no doubt “expand ed the horizons” of hum ankind. Perspectival/ mental consciousness has allow ed u s to do tru ly amazing things, and at the same time we are tearing ourselves apart from the resulting hubr is. As we have expan ded our h orizons at the expense of the wh ole, blinded by the narrow ing quality of persp ective, that w hich h as been ignored, rep ressed, or projected is now closing
64 back in on u s. It is precisely this mental/ persp ectival consciousness that correspond s to mod ernism and to Kegan’s fourth ord er. Gebser speaks to this; [This] over-emp hasis on the “ob jectively” external, a consequ ence of an excessively visua l orientation, leads not on ly to rationalization an d hap tification but to an unavoid able hyp ertroph y of the “I”… [which] amou nts to wh at we m ay call an ego-hypertrop hy: the “I” must be increasingly emp hasized, indeed over-emp hasized in ord er for it to be ad equ ate to the ever-expand ing discovery of spa ce. (Gebser, p . 22)
H erein is a succinct macro-view of the fourth ord er, that w hich u nd erlies Kegan’s (1994) “d ema nd s of the curr iculu m of mod ern d ay life.” Kram er et al. (1992) distill four essential characteristics of this structure: 1) it is dualistic, 2) min d is a function of directedn ess, orientat ion, and linear ity, 3) orientat ion is centered in the ego “w ith a p ropensity to lend th e ego a spatial position from w hich per spectives becom e constitu ted to w ard s the ‘object out there’” (p. xxi), and 4) this orientational ego-subject constitutes linear time with the “material” (object) representing space. Thus, even d eeper and more fund amental to fourth order consciousness than m odern ism is the mental/ persp ectival structure of consciousness. Taking th is last notion even fur ther is Gebser’s comment that “as to the persp ectival attitud e, it is possible to m aintain that th e d omination of space wh ich resu lts from an extreme p erspectivization u psets and un balances the ‘I’” (p. 22). This, he believes, resu lts in a neglect of time, as “the on e-sid ed em ph asis on sp ace, wh ich h as its extreme expression in m aterialism and natu ralism, gives rise to an ever-greater u nconscious feeling of guilt about tim e” (p. 22). I will be return ing to this last point. In the meantime, recall that the un derlying the fourth order is a system structure, wh ich takes mu tuality, the complementarity of my thical po larity, as object. Polarity ripp ed in half is d ua lism. This p lays itself
65 out v ery d ifferently, in th e d etails, depend ing on w hich “level” is the focus. Dualism at th e cultural level has lead to our environmen tal crisis, while du alism at the p ersonal level is a characteristic un derlying the ind ividual am bition an d career orientated obsession th at is strongly related to the w idespread alienation, depression, and interpersonal confusion that surrounds us. It is vital, at the same time, to keep in m ind th e key role that repu diation has in this process. While acknow ledging the d amaging m anifestations of this deficient form of m ental consciousness, we m ust also realize that th is need be accept ed inasm u ch as it is a necessary ph ase of the evolution ary pr ocess. Yet, Feuerstein (1987/ 1995) stresses that w e mu st not rep eat H egel’s mistake of concluding that the history of consciousness is the self-actu alization of w orld reason (Weltvernu nft). Moreover, while the present is part of a larger pr ocess, it should not n ecessarily be construed as a fated, d eterministic, unavoidable reality, and especially not as the culmination of progress. N onetheless, w e are where w e are. Closely tied to p ersp ectival consciousn ess is the pr e-eminent p osition of ratio. The word “r ationale” of course stems directly form th is root word .
Feuerstein (1987/ 1995, p. 119) points ou t that “ Gebser never t ires of emp hasizing the d ivisive, atom izing force of ratio wh ich, as he sees it, is inh erently antagonistic towa rd s wholeness.” In Gebser’s ow n w ords:
Ratio or rationality… mu st not be interpreted in a p erspectivistic sense as “und erstanding” or “common sense”; ratio implies calculation and, in particular, division, an aspect expressed by th e concept of “rational nu mbers” w hich is u sed to designate fractions and decimals, i.e., divided w hole num bers or parts of a wh ole. This dividing aspect inherent in ratio and Rationalism -- an aspect which has come to be the only v alid one -- is consistent ly overlooked although it is of decisive importance to an assessment of our epoch. (Gebser, p. 95)
66
Thus, not only is our current m ode of m ental consciousness p erspectivally oriented w ith an em ph asis on space, but it is also fixated on “ratio.” Rationalism generally has been u nd erstood as the p innacle of Western thou ght for the last few centur ies, essentially dating from th e Enlighten m ent (Tarn as, 1991). This era, the Enlight enm ent, is a qu intessential exam ple of a misnom er. Feuerstein (1987/ 1995) points ou t that, “far from constituting th e pinn acle of hu man evolution, or the ultimate flowering of ‘progress’, the attitude of rationalism is an evolution ary d ead en d ” (p . 119). The most tragic asp ect of the deficient men tal stru cture is that “rea son, reversing itself met abolistically to an exaggerated rationalism, becomes a kind of plaything of the psyche, neither noticing nor even susp ecting the connection” (Gebser, p. 97). Fortun ately, in recent d ecades man y people have come to similar conclusions, recognizing the inherent limitations of this completely abstracted, overly-masculine, form of thinking an d perception. As a stru cture fragments an d becomes d eficient, it reverts to a “ previous” mod e, and n ot necessarily that m ode’s efficient form. On th is point Kramer et al. (1992) state that the “other m odes n ot only reflect it but also may p rovide th e mom ent of integrat ion. Thus, deficient (mean ing ineffectu al) rationa lization reverts to m agical consciousness in ord er to m aintain its pow er” (p. xxi). Followin g on t his is Gebser’s belief tha t extreme r ationalization is a v iolation of the p syche, a violation per petr ated b y a negatively m agic element -- i.e., ratio. Thus, the dan ger that th ere is a doubly d eficient mod e in operation arises. Gebser un derstand s “ratio” to be the most d eficient form of men tal consciousness, having been “p erverted into its opp osite, to the disadvan tage of the ego that h as become blind th rough isolation” (p. 97). To bring ou t an imp lied
67 point, I wou ld like to stress that the m ental structure of consciousness is now genera lly exper ienced in its deficient m od e not solely becau se of its persp ectival, spatial orientation, but because of the extremes to w hich these have gone in accord w ith “ratio.” Gebser hold s us that w e can su spect the presence of this deficient, rationalistic mental m ode “w herever w e are caught u p in the labrynthine netw ork of mere concepts, or meet up with a on e-sided em ph asis on willful or voluntaristic man ifestations or attemp ts at sp asmod ic synthesis (trinitary, trip artite, d ialectical), isolation, or m ass-phen om ena” (p. 154). This emph asis on ratio, in tand em w ith an outw ard ly directed per spectival orientation, also ma nifests as excessive measu rem ent. This is d irectly related t o scientistic thoug ht, or better yet, scientistic thou ght is best un d erstood in th e context of d eficient men tal consciousn ess. There is no room for qualities in ratio, only for the qu ant itative. There is no room for comp lexity and un certainty, only for ideal types rep resenting simp le, and thu s controllable, red uctions. H op efully rem iniscent of d iscussion in the Introd uction is Gebser’s un derstan ding of this extremely persp ectival, rational, and ultimately du alistic form of thin king. This think ing only recognizes “tw o antithetical and irreconcilable constituents of the w orld: measurable, d emonstrable things, the rational comp onents of science… and th e non-measur able phenom ena, the irrationa l non-compo nen ts” (Gebser, 1949/ 1985, p. 285). In short, rational comp onents are valid, w hile irrational, non-measu rable phenom ena are invalid (Gebser) -- recall, rational is up w hile emotional is down (Lakoff et al., 1980). Therefore, we should not take for granted the d egree to which our d aily norm alities are saturated w ith an emp hasis on ratio, and the rational, over th e irrationa l (e.g., emot ions, intuition, d ream s, etc.).
68
Time and measurement What is peculiar about a su personic jet in a room? It is that w e are faced with a four d imensional creation in a three dimen sional space -- sup ersonic jets move in time as w ell as in the other th ree dimensions (Gebser). A sup ersonic jet is a four d imensional creation. Time is the fourth dimen sion of our experience, but given ou r p reoccupation w ith space it has essentially been forced into th e other thr ee d imension s. This issue is central to Gebser’s w ork. Feuerstein states that Gebser has dem onstrated h ow “the regnan t mental-rational structure of consciousness h as been challenged by a new mood or style of consciousness w hich is associated w ith wh at he calls the ‘irru pt ion of time’ -- time as an intensity or qu ality” (p. 130). Given the un derlying p erspectival, ration-alistic structur ing of ou r r eality, it is no w ond er that time is thou ght of in machine-like terms. Time is measured in pa rtitions: nan oseconds, second s, min u tes, hou rs, d ays, years, millennia. Ju st like everything else, time has been fully spatialized, another intensity erron eously converted in to a spa tial extensity (Gebser). Wha t, then , is time for Gebser? Simp ly stated , it is an “intensity.” Integrally speaking, time cannot be red uced t o (persp ectival) clock time, but it is more than a (mental) concept. Moreover, time is not divisive, nor should it be equated w ith the timelessness or “tem po ricity” of the ma gical or myth ical stru ctures. Time, is integral time, the achronon (time freedom). Achronicity does not imply freedom from time, but
instead freedom in time (Feuer stein). It is freed om for all time form s -- in oth er w ord s, time is not limited to m agical timelessness, myth ical temp oricity, or
69 men tal clock time. Achron icity is integr al time, wh ich mean s that all time forms exist in a m ut ua lly co-arising fashion; ther e is freed om for all time forms. One h as only to reflect a m oment on ou r culturally ever-present an xiety about time. Not only is time money, but we can also spend our time wisely. We are not only runn ing out of time, but w e also wish that there w as more time at the end of the day. The manu facturing an d sale of daily planners is a lucrative indu stry, as it allows bu sy, ind ustrious, fourth order ind ividu als to par tition their days dow n to the minute, ensuring that time is bud geted correctly. Also, time is for sale, as it is comm only reported that a 30-second slot d ur ing the Super Bow l is wor th m illions of d ollars to large corpo rations for ad vertising th eir products. I’ve yet to p oint out the m ost obvious current sou rce of anxiety abou t time, or more accurat ely, the lack of it -- the Millenn ium . H ere we have a specific measuremen t of time th at has h alf of the planet w orried abou t impend ing doom and destru ction; this is also referred to as the apocalypse. While the rationalist in each of us can attemp t to explain aw ay any prop hecy of ap ocalypse, we still have to face “Y2K.” This acron ym sta nd s for “the Year 2000 problem,” w hich refers to the very real fact that m ost of the comp uters th at ru n our mod ern, post-ind ustrial, information society are not able to distinguish between the year 2000 and the year 1900 (http :/ / ww w .y2k.com). There is major concern that a few of the following ind ustries’ comp uter systems w ill cause d irely serious errors as th e clock strikes mid nigh t on th e eve of the year 2000: defense, transp ortation, pow er (includ ing nu clear), man ufacturing, global and local financial systems, telecommunications, government, education, and health care, not to m ention the millions of (non-Macintosh) personal comp uters sitting
70 on ou r d esktop s at wor k and at hom e (Peterson, Whea tley, Kellner-Rogers, 1998). Whether som ething ap ocalyptic actually occurs or not is not w hat is at issue here. Regardless of fut ur e outcom es, it is safe to say that , at least in th e West, there is currently a lot of anxiety about time.
Anxiety about the futu re Anxiety is a futur e oriented bio-psycho-emotional response. We are never anxious about the past, or the present, but abou t the futu re. We are of course anxious in the p resent, often as a r esult of past experience, but an xiety is wh at w e feel when w e are unsur e of w hat is to come. Anxiety arises w hen things are un stable or u ncertain, wh en ou r reality may shift all of a sud den, resulting in consequences that may be ou tside of our ability to cope. Anxiety is an imp ortant message from th e futu re, though not n ecessarily a predetermined future, and its ramp ant expression is justified in our p resent-day w orld. Consider the following statement: Anxiety is always the sign that a m utation is coming to th e end of its expressive and effective possibilities, causing new powers to accumulate w hich, because they are thw arted, create a “narrow s” or constriction. At the culmination p oint of anxiety these pow ers liberate themselves, and this liberation is always synonym ous w ith a new mu tation. In this sense, anxiety is the great birth-giver. (Gebser p. 134)
To follow u p on this last point I wou ld like to take a brief detour. There are currently a n um ber of significant thinkers that believe that ou r current crisis can be interpreted as a global scale death-rebirth, a “dark night of the sou l” for th e species (e.g., Bache, 1997; Elgin , 1993; Grof 1997; Tarna s 1997). Thu s, the se dar k times can be un derstood as p art of a meaningful evolutionary process. So, instead of apocalyptic gloom and doom , our current situation might also be
71 un derstood as an imp etus for “rebirth” or awakening -- thou gh, as w ith any birth, there is the very real p ossibility of comp lications or even d eath. Transp ersona l psychology pion eer Stan Grof (1985, 1993) presen ts a cartography of consciousness that elucidates this d eath-rebirth an alogy. This cartography is comprised of four basic perinatal matrices (BPMs) that correspond to the major ph ases of the birth p rocess. The second ma trix in this four-fold framew ork, BPM II, correlates to the stage in the birth pr ocess w hen contr actions are forcing the fetus out of the w omb bu t the cervix has yet to d ilate. This results in an anxiety-ridd en “n o escape” situation, for the w alls are closing in but there is no w here to go. Grof’s “matrices” are archetyp al, hologra ph ic “realm s” of experience, so they cannot be reduced to the biological birth experience, though actual birth is our first exposure to them . These archetypal matrices are experienced in countless situations and numerous states of consciousness -- i.e., the p rinciple char acteristics are relevant t o all levels, ind ividu al and collective alike -- and they d emonstrate self-similarity. The following passage from Du ane Elgin (1993), w hich is also cited by Bache (1997), exqu isitely illustr ates glob al scale BPM II themes. We are m oving into a t ime of steel-gripp ed n ecessity -- a time of intense, planetary compr ession. Within a generation, the world w ill become a sup erheated p ressure cooker in w hich the hum an family is crushed by th e combined and un relenting forces of an expand ing world pop ulation, a dr amatically destabilized global climate, d wind ling sup plies of nonrenew able energy, and mou nting environmen tal pollution. The circle has closed, and t here is now here to escap e. These forces are so uny ielding, and the stresses they w ill place on our w orld are so extreme, that hu man civilization will either descend into chaos or ascend into a spiraling pr ocess of pr ofoun d tran sformat ion. (Elgin, p. 120)
Though it is Feuerstein speaking of Gebser, Kegan m ight have m ade th e assertion that “consciousness is not merely ‘wakeful presence’, but wakeful
72 presence that is structured in a certain w ay and w hich stru ctures its experienced un iverse” (p. 38). Thus, consciousn ess is mo re than a w itness, it is also active and d irective. We mu st then consider “the p ossibility of consciousness being the co-initiator of the different ‘mu tations’ or stru ctura l chan ges” (Feuer stein, 1987/ 1995, p. 38). This id ea shed s furth er light on th e significance of the mu tually complementary, integral natu re of the efficient and the d eficient mod es of each structure (Feuerstein). Our anxiety about time and the closing in of the hu bris of persp ectival/ rational consciousness is indicative of an end ing. As Gebser states:
Like the arrow on a string, our epoch mu st find th e point wh ere the target is already latently p resent: the equilibrium between an xiety and delight, isolation and collectivization. On ly then can it liberate itself from d eficient un persp ectivity and persp ectivity, and achieve w hat w e shall call, all because of its liberating character, the aper spectival wor ld. (Gebser, p. 23)
Some p revious forms of thought Before an excursion into integra l/ ap ersp ectival consciousn ess itself, it will be useful to “spend a few minu tes” summ ing up some of the more significant ma nifestations of thou ght to the pr esent. This subsection w ill also serve as a bridge to th e w ork of Morin and a d iscussion of his principles of comp lex thinking. It will be also be helpful to situate our current m odes of thou ght and w hat I hav e been referring to as TPM -- especially as it will help r eveal the imp ortan ce of com plex (i.e., fifth ord er) TPM. Only m ental consciousness “thinks” in a w ay w ith wh ich w e are familiar. This notion is especially relevant w hen d iscussin g mag ical consciousn ess, as there is no form al, rational thinkin g in m agical consciousn ess, so, in this sense, its form of realization is vital experience -- a visceral, omn i-pr esent, experiencing of
73 vital forces, (e.g., natu re). Accord ing to Gebser, an ind ividu al emb edd ed in magical consciousness interprets things as follows: From within in his own m erging with events he immed iately places any occur rence, event, or object that for him has th e natu re of a vital experience into a u nifying context. Su ch a mod e of establishing a context of relationships by exp eriencing, a vital nexus as w e have called it, is not only pre-rational and pre-causal as befits the spaceless-timeless magic w orld ; it elicits above an d b eyond this a still sleep-like consciousn ess of being interwoven w ith event an d is recognized by its associative, analogizing, and symp tomatic treatment of things that cannot be considered “t hink ing”. (Gebser, p. 251)
Since the part can repr esent the w hole in m agical consciousness, the individual is able literally to experience the w orld, and as such, “every vital experience is the un beknow n realization of unity, and th e emph asis on u nity suggests that such experiencing is a form of realization of the m agic structure” (Gebser, p . 251). Mythical consciousness’ psychic emphasis is on polarity and is irrational/ pre-rational (Gebser, 1949/ 1985). When d iscussing myth ical consciousness, Gebser sp eaks of “und ergone” experience as opp osed to th e poin t-like vitalism of the magical. H e states that, “each experience is a par tially know n realization of polar comp lementarity. And inasm uch as the polar mom ent is accentuated , every un dergon e experience is a mythical form of realization, and as such a prefiguration of mental u nd erstand ing” (p. 251). Moreover, und ergone experience, as the interp lay between the sou l’s poles, is ambivalent in nature and thu s two-dimensional (Gebser). It is not until a three dim ensional world is experienced (consciously recognized) that a “conceptual form of realization, appropriate to the mental structure” (Gebser, p. 252) man ifests as thinking as we know it. Here, within the fram ework of the mental
74 structure, there are three p rimary forms of thinking: oceanic/ circular, per spectival, and pa rad oxical. Wha t follows is a brief examinat ion of each thought form. Oceanic thinking retains a strong m ythical element, an d its name is chosen to reflect this ima gistically. Accord ing to Gebser, “the myt hical ima ge of Oceanus as th e flowing river that encircles the earth and return s un to itself is a vivid im age of the active circle as well as being a sym bol expressive of the tend ency of all terrestr ial striving tow ard consciousn ess” (p. 252). Althou gh it is in close proximity to the m ythic, as formal th ough t, it belongs m ore to m ental consciou sness. For examp le, Gebser notes the nu mer ous examp les of oceanic thinking in the writings of Heraclitus. While indeed circular and somew hat polar, these writings are also directed, and thu s mental. The examp le given is as follows; “for souls it is dea th to become w ater; for w ater it is death to become earth. But from the earth comes water and from water, soul” (H eraclitus as tran slated by Diels-Kranz in Gebser, p. 252). Foreshad ow ing the next section’s d iscu ssion of com plex thinkin g is Morin’s (1992) statem ent th at, “one m ust invoke a w ay of thinking th at flow s in a circle… between tw o m utu ally-exclusive explanat ory principles” (p. 373). Morin dem onstr ates a tran s-rational un derstan ding of the need for circularity, so Oceanic thinking shares essential featur es with th e forthcoming d iscussion -- thou gh th e two ar e not to be d irectly equated . Most importan tly, it should be clear that oceanic thinking is very different from tru ly directed mental-rational thinking, w hich is fully premised on an “either/ or” d ichotomy , as the oceanic form allow s “not-only-but-also” to be true (Gebser).
75 “Either/ or” thinking w as allud ed to as early as 500 CE by Dionysus Areopagita, wh om Gebser qu otes as saying: “to the soul circular m ovement means its entry from th e outside to the inn er self… the linear movemen t ultimately belongs to the soul w hen it d oes not enter into itself and moves in single-mind ed intellectuality” (p. 254). In other w ords, herein is draw n th e distinction between polar oceanic thinking an d singular, directed persp ectival think ing (Gebser). In sum : This un persp ectival flux of thoughts an d images is still the strength as w ell as the wea kness of this form of thou ght. It is strong because it is still intact, weak because it is inad equate to the d emand s of the men tal structure. It is irrational wh ere the other is rational; un persp ectival where the oth er is persp ectival; it circum scribes w here th e other d escribes; it is (am)bivalent w here th e other is trivalent… the m ental-rationalpersp ectival though t form is directed, w hereas oceanic thinking is a selfcontained and enclosing self-complementation w hich was red uced to ru bble by p erspectivity. (Gebser, p. 254)
It is useful to keep in m ind th at the “shap e” of mental consciousness is the triangle, w hereas that of the m ythical is a circle, and that of the magical a point. The inception of mental consciousness was necessary because of the psychic fragmentation that ensu ed from th e deficient myth ical tendency toward s qu antification. Gebser points out tha t Platon ic ideas essentially stabilized “the increasing m asses of psychic manifestations an d pr ojections” (Gebser, p. 256). As a result, to “save” ou rselves from deficient, fragmen ting m ythical consciousness, polarity becomes men tally “u nited” as the th ird comp onent in a synth esis tha t sits atop t he polar ten sion (Gebser). The efficient form of mental consciousness is p yramid al thinking, w hile the d eficient form is p erspectival thinking. In order to get a feel for the d ifference betw een these two thou ght forms, picture th e following: imagine a trian gle stand ing vertically, the base
76 representing the poles to be synthesized into a “third” th at sits at the top. N ext, imagine the pyramid in terms of depth, wh erein w hat w as the top, the synthesis, is now a p oint disapp earing at the horizon -- for example, the way a p ainting of a road d isappearing into the horizon looks like a triangle. While both forms are characteristic of “either/ or” thinking, stemm ing from Plato’s method of diaresis (“taking ap art” ) and sub ject to the ru les of Aristotelian logic, persp ectival thinking leads to a wh ole new wor ld of accomp lishmen ts and repercussions -for, w hat w as a “synth esis,” taking p art in a p rocess of becoming, became a fixed point, a static, reified object in space that could be quantitatively measured. The essential difference between p yramid al thinking and persp ectival thinking is the degree to w hich abstraction can be pu t into man ifest action. This distinction can be un derstood according to Kegan’s schema, w herein the th ird order is embedd ed in, and subject to, abstraction (e.g., inference and ded uction), w hile at the four th ord er abstra ction has been cast as object -- it can be formally reflected up on. Accord ingly, per spectival thinking “coincides to a great extent w ith th e directed , sectorial vision; it fixes the object to be grasp ed; and tw o identical lines of vision take in the objects as a th ird item in the sam e man ner th at tw o equat ions result in a third ” (Gebser, 1949/ 1985, p . 258). Persp ectival thinking is tightly knit to the d iscovery of space, and subsequent over-emp hasis there-u p on. In this sense, since abstraction is now an object of consciou sness, persp ectival thinking allows for a sp atialization of anything, an d enabling a capacity to act on w hat h as been spa tialized -- i.e., to control, manip ulate, or harn ess that very same object of though-perception. It is this form of thinking taken to a logical extreme -- the d eficient m od e of men tal consciousn ess -- tha t seems to be most w idespread in our culture (e.g., scientism, d ualism, and
77 nationalism, to name a few “isms”). As already d iscussed, our language is so thorou ghly saturated w ith spatial metaphor th at it is difficult for many to imagine the world otherw ise. This perspectival thinking has in many w ays “made thinking itself spatial and static, permitting the materialization of ‘spirit’ and even th e spatializing of time” (Gebser, p. 259). If w e are to cease man y of our culture’s d estructive behaviors, w e m ust become conscious of perspectival/ men tal think ing, that is, actively reflect up on it as object. While oceanic thinking is irrational, and persp ectival thinking rational, parad oxical thinking is both. Parad oxical thinking is highly consonant w ith comp lex TPM, as it “establishes the bon d or religio to the irrationality and p rerationality of the mythical and th e magic structures… [it] mediates between oceanic and persp ectival thinking an d contains both r ational and irrational elements” (Gebser, p. 259). Gebser point s out that w hile it is p rima rily foun d in the w ritings of religious thin kers from th e ment al structu re, he also specifically notes Aristotle’s “un moved mover,” the w ritings of Oscar Wild , and the “silent mu sic” of Spa nish m ystic St. John of the Cross. Moreover , he notes the parad oxical quality of the find ings in quantu m p hysics, such as the app arent polarity in the principle of complementarity. Gebser holds Kierkegaard to be the mod ern p arad oxical thinker p ar excellence even th ough his “Either-Or” correspond s to the rational/ mental structure, as its synthesis is “a third form of thou ght in w hich there is a (consistently u nsatisfactory) effort to un ify op posites” (p. 260). Thus, even thou gh p arad oxical thinking is w rap ped up in the conceptualization of the m ental structure, its expression u ltimately cannot be thou ght, but mu st be “w ared” thr ough “verition” (Gebser). As Gebser states,
78 The actual effectu ality does not tak e place in th e concept ua l and representational spatio-temp oral world, nor in th e two-dimensional, nor in the one-dimen sional w orld. Only wh ere the w orld is space-free and time-free, where “w aring” gains validity, wh ere the world an d w e ourselves -- the whole -- become transparent, and where the diaphanous and w hat is rend ered d iaphan ous become the verition of the world , does the wo rld become concrete and integr al. (p. 263)
The Integr al -- ap ersp ectival -- stru cture of consciousn ess Toda y too many p eople are un comfortable w henever they are remind ed of transitoriness and change. But it is un dou btedly necessary to point out that this firm-w alled three-dimensional wor ld is subject to the p ossibility of chan ge. (Gebser, p. 249)
As I move into a d iscu ssion of Integr al consciousn ess, I wou ld like to poin t ou t some va luable relations to Kegan’s notion of a fifth ord er of subjectobject relations. Recall that the fourth order h as as its und erlying stru cture that of a system, able fu lly to recognize that ind ividu als are interacting systems, each with th eir own n eeds and disposition, each w ith their own su bjectivity, inner states, and sense of self-consciousn ess. In resonan ce w ith persp ectival consciousness, fourth order individu als are fully cognitive of their self-authored persp ective. Each individu al can be und erstood as being a whole with their parts u nd er control -- the CEO and adm inistrator of their institutional selfsystem. Culturally, this correspond s to Modernism, wherein the culture itself operates according to fourth order subject-object principles that are highly consonan t with the perspectival/ rational mental structure of consciousness. But for fifth or d er consciousn ess all of these fou rth o rd er characteristics are relativized, and the w hole notion of ind ividu al perspective is no longer a mean ingful w ay of ma king sense of one’s self or the w orld . Moreov er, since each per spective is recognized a s being, by definition, necessarily incomp lete, then b y
79 implication the notion of a w hole emerges that surp asses any individu al in comp lexity and in tensity. As Feuer stein (1987/ 1995) states: Each stru cture coincides with a par ticu lar readin g of reality… [Gebser] un derstand s these different read ings as projections. Since the arationalintegral consciousness ren ders all structures of consciousness transp arent, w e mu st assum e that it also retracts all kinds of p rojections or singlechoice interpretations of, and exclusive modes of participation in, reality. (p. 47n9)
This last poin t leads u s to Gebser’s (1949/ 1985) intu ition and per ception of an emer ging “integr al consciousn ess.” This stru cture of consciou sness, as it is currently emerging, correlates to Kegan’s fifth ord er and to p ost-mod ernism. Yet, in fully realized form , integr al consciousn ess is a broad er, more inten se, context, and th erefore also correspond s to a sixth ord er. 6 I will return to the notion of a sixth ord er at the end of this section. For now I would like to discuss the following cha racteristics of integr al consciousn ess, as they are cru cial elements of comp lex TPM: the ap erspectival, the acategorical, the atem po ral (the “achronon”), the arational, systasis and synairesis, and verition. 7 Som e backgroun d on w hat Gebser (1949/ 1985) explicitly consid ers as fund amental to integral/ apersp ectival consciousness is called for: 1) all stru ctures constitu te us, 2) to live an integral life all stru ctures m u st be lived accord ing to th eir constitutive values, 3) no stru cture can be n egated, as n egation indicates an over-accentu ation, and thu s d eficient, emph asis, and 4) “certain designations, ascriptions, and characteristic concepts attributed to the individu al
6
Kegan d oes not posit a sixth order in h is own th eory, thou gh h e (1994) does refer read ers to Wilber wh o does posit the equivalent of a sixth ord er (and a seventh and eighth, too). 7
Gebser employs the prefix “a-” to den ote “free from” an d not as “negation of.”
80 stru ctures ren d er their effectuality effectuality eviden t” (p. 155 155). ). Gebser (194 (1949/ 9/ 1985 1985)) also lists lists the following following as them es or m otifs otifs of the ap erspectival erspectival w orld: The wh ole, transp arency (diaphan eity), eity), the su percession percession of the ego, the realization of timelessness, the realization of temp oricity, oricity, the realization of the concept of time, the realization of time-freedom (the achronon), the disrup tion of the merely systematic, systematic, the incursion of dynam ics, ics, the recognition recognition of energy, the mastery of movem ent, the fourth fourth dim ension, the sup ercessi ercession on of patriarchy, the renu nciation nciation of dom inance and p ower, the acqu isition isition of inten inten sity, clarity clarity (instead (instead of mere w akefulness), and the tran sformat ion of the creative inceptu al basis. (p. (p. 361) 361)
Moreover, Gebser Gebser (194 (1949/ 9/ 1985 1985)) stresses stresses that w e shou ld n ot m istake the arational for for the irrational or pre-rational. Just because both are n ot rational does not m ean th at they are the sam e. Gebser’s Gebser’s point her e, I believe, is the d irect fallacy, wh ich, pr ecursor to Wilber’s Wilber’s (1983 (1983// 1996 1996)) pre/trans fallacy ich, essentially, in mor e
explici explicitt and detailed form, form, spells out this necessary necessary distinctio distinction. n. The pre/ trans fallac fallacy y m ust be kept in mind throu ghou t the rest of this discussion, discussion, as any acategoric acategorical, al, atemp atemp oral, aperspectival, aperspectival, or other “trans” n otion mu st not be confused confused w ith their “pre-,” “pre-,” “ir-,” “ir-,” or “un-“ coun coun terparts. As Gebser Gebser states, “w e can show th e arational nature of the aperspectival aperspectival world on ly if if we take particular precautions to prevent ap erspectivity erspectivity from from being u nd erstood as a mere regression to irrationality irrationality (or to an un persp ectival ectival world), or as a furth er progression tow ard rationality rationality (toward a p erspectival erspectival wor ld)” (p. 29) 29).. Integral consciousn consciousn ess is sym bolized by a sphere. This follow follow s from from th e aw areness of “increased “increased d imensioning,” imensioning,” as th e mag ical ical point is one-dimen sional, sional, myth ical ical polarity tw o-dimensional, the the m ental triangle three-dimensional, and thu s the integral sph sph ere is four-dimensional. (The (The sph ere is four four -dimensional
81 because it is in in m otion, and thu s explicitly explicitly inv inv olves time). As Kram er et al. (19 (1992 92)) state, “integral consciousn consciousn ess is a concretization of time in su ch a way th at spa ce is d yna mized ” (p. (p. xxvi). xxvi). This speak s to w hat Gebser, 194 1949/ 9/ 1985 1985)) mea ns by time as an intensity int ensity , that time is p erceived erceived ap erspectivally erspectivally as a quality, not as a
quan tity as in mental/ persp ectival ectival consci consciousness. ousness. Time Time as a quantity is a mental abstraction, i.e., i.e., clock clock time time is an abstra ction. The abstract cann cann ot be integrated , only the concrete can, can, and thu s time concretion concretion is a necessary necessary “p recond recond ition” ition” for integral consciousn consciousn ess (Gebser). (Gebser). This m eans tha t it is necessary necessary to integrate the past an d the futu re in ord er to realize realize the ever-present -- the integral. Gebser holds that, “by integration we m ean a fully comp comp leted leted and realized realized wh oleness oleness --the --the bringing about of an integru m, i.e., i.e., the re-establ re-establishment ishment of the inviolate inviolate and pristine state of origin origin by incorporating th e w ealth of all all subseq uen t achievement ” (p. 99). 99). In other w ord s, it is, is, at least in in p art, the fifth fifth ord er ability to integra te all that h as been cast as object, object, ma d e concrete, concrete, throu gh the evolutionary process thus far -- e.g., e.g., movement, p erceptions, erceptions, points of view, abstractions, abstract system ideology, or self-auth self-auth orsh ip. As Gebser states, “th e wh ole can can be p erceived erceived only apersp ectival ectivally; ly; w hen w e view things in a per spectival way w e can can only see segments” (p. 289) 289).. We can perceive the world apersp ectival ectivally ly only thou gh integral consciousness, consciousness, and th is is is pr edicated edicated by an intensified consciousness of time-freedom. Emp hasis on qu alities, or intensities, has enorm ou s signific significance ance in integral consci consciousness. ousness. An integral/ apersp ectival ectival perception of time time is only possible possible w hen tim e is u nd erstood q ua litatively. Yet this, in and of itself, itself, is sufficient sufficient only for for a proto-aperspectival perception, perception, not tru ly integral “waring” (Wahren). Waring, acategorical perception, is possible when the ego is no longer
82 per spectivally blind blind ed, and thu s is not bou nd by time or locale locale (Comb (Comb s, 199 1996) 6).. Yet, atemporality is necessary for aperspectivity, as the world is now perceived accord accord ing to four four d imensions, not three spatial and one spatialized spatialized temp oral. In other wor ds, aperspectivity aperspectivity and a temp orality orality are only separate separate in mental consciou consciou sness. According to an integr integr al consciousn consciousn ess, that is just how thin gs are. I mu st also stress stress the rather literal literal nam ing of the “integral” “integral” structure, as all other forms of experienci experiencing ng time are integrated . So, when Gebser Gebser speaks of achronicity , or time-freedom time-freedom , he is not referring referring to a tran scending scending of time. time.
Instead , he tells tells us that on ly by recognizing all of the form form s wh ich ich co-constitu co-constitu te us can we d etach etach ourselves ourselves enough from mental/ rational/ rational/ perspectiva perspectivall time time perception and integrate them. This implies that w e must not only acce accept pt the per spectival time-concept time-concept of the men tal structu re, but also the effic efficacy acy of the p rerational, the timelessness timelessness and irrationality irrationality of the ma gical, gical, and myth ical ical temp oricity oricity if w e are to make th e necessary leap leap to ar ational achron icity icity --freedom for all time forms (Gebser, 194 1949/ 9/ 1985 1985). ). This integr integr ation cann ot be accomp accomp lished lished by expanding consci consciousness ousness -- a spatialized, spatialized, quan tified, tified, and th us illusor illusor y notion -- bu t instead instead thou gh an inten sific sification ation of consciousn consciousn ess, an increased dimensioning (Gebser). Categories Categories are fixed fixed concepts, concepts, they sepa rate the wh ole into into p arts, and wh ile ile useful, they cloud cloud a perception of the whole. Metaph oricall orically y speaking, acategoric acategorical al und erstanding is in the same chord as atem porality and ap ersp ectivity. ectivity. Feuerstein (198 (1987/ 7/ 1992 1992)) states that, “the categories of a concept concept ua l system are necessaril necessarily y fixed. fixed. But… [when] w e can und erstand or relate to reality reality also in in acategorical terms… time becomes becomes tra nsp aren t” (p. 133 133). ). Acategorical perception is another way of talking talking abou t wh at Gebser Gebser refers to as “waring” or
83 “verition,” w hich becomes only tru ly possible w hen “the fixed point of the ego, as the center of all perspectival perception and thou ght, is transcend ed” (Feuerstein, p. 133). I wou ld like to clarify the last statement, as it m ight be m isleading. Feuerstein and Gebser are not imp lying the n ecessity of a fully realized mystical notion of transcend ing the ego -- on the contrary, Gebser stresses that h e is not referring to mystical ability as such. Yet, fully matu red in tegral consciousn ess migh t be likened to certain stat es, e.g., Zen Satori, or to certain “rea lized” ind ividu als, e.g., Meister Eckhart, Gebser’s prim e exam ples. Wha t is also being sug gested is som ething a long th e lines of Kegan’s fifth or d er (as well as a yet to be discussed sixth ord er), as it is not tha t the ego itself is transcend ed, d issolved into a un itary samad hi-like state, but that th e ego as the center of perception has been relativized by a m ore comp lex, and thu s more inclusive, ordering of consciousness. Along with aperspectival-atemporal-acategorical consciousness comes aration ality. Jun g’s notion s of “syn chronicity” and “ archetyp e” are fine examp les of the ara tional, and G ebser cites each of these. I also believe that Gebser’s notion of the arationa l helps to mak e a conn ection betw een certain ph enom ena th at hav e been explained in “fringe” scientific terms -- i.e., the current trend in the last few d ecad es to explain Psi-ph enomena, synchronicity, and qua ntu m p hysics in terms of each other. 8 An u nderstanding of the notion of
8
For exam ple, see Koestler (1972) or Peat (1988), an d espe cially Wilber (1982), the latter o f wh om prov ides a sup erb critique regard ing this very issue. Each of these explore par apsychology in terms of quantum ph ysics, mysticism, divination, and/ or synchronicity. They are all very wor thw hile reads, having in com mon , imp licitly, Gebser’s notion of arationality.
84 “arational” serves to avoid conflating the p re-rational w ith the trans-rational, or in other w ords, to commit the p re/ trans fallacy (Wilber, 1983/ 1996) Let u s again recall that the four th ord er’s un derlying stru cture is that of a system an d th at the fifth ord er’s is tran s-system. This reveals a significant difference between perspectival consciousness and aperspectival consciousness, as systems are actually concepts frozen in spa tialized time. In the case of an individu al at the fourth order, they are their system, and it is the major task of four th ord er ind ividu als to maintain th eir self-auth ored, value-generating selves -- to keep th eir system “frozen .” This notion of the self is relativized at th e fifth order, by being “opened ” to the environm ental context. So, in some w ays, it migh t be more accurate d iaretically to state that the d ifference is not necessarily between system or non -system, but rather betw een closed system or op en system. Op en systems are dynam ic and fluctuating, ultimately inseparable from the environm ent, wh ereas the notion of a closed system im plies something th at is separ ate, fixed, and static. According to Gebser (1949/ 1985), “because systems are static abstractions of only p assing or m omentar y validity, every system is lifted out of its isolation an d concretized w hen w e become aw are that th e pr inciple of tran sformation r end ers illu sionary all so-called ‘id eal quan tities’ and destroys all fixities” (p. 310). Kramer et al. (1992) state tha t, “atemp orality integra tes spat ial perception of perspectives, allowing an aw areness of something from all sides w ithout a succession of mental functions” (p. xxvi). Ultimately, integral aw aren ess is not visualizable, e.g., it is not p ossible to visualize the actua l parad oxes in qu antu m ph ysics. Since the ment al structu re is so explicitly spatial-visual in orientation, it is easy to assume that because w e cannot p icture it in our m inds, that w e cannot
85 under-stand it. Yet we are able to per ceive it as we d irectly par ticipate in it,
integrally. Feuerstein (1987/ 1995) posits that “such participation [italics added] rend ers self and w orld diap hanou s so that their spiritual foun dation becomes obviou s” (p. 150). Participation, as su ch, is centr al to integral consciou sness Kegan (1994) holds th at “if one p osition is actually less comp lex tha n th e other, it should n ot even be able to und erstand th e other on terms that allow th e other to feel that it is being adequ ately und erstood” (p. 334). A key point h ere, one w hich can help reveal the extent to w hich one is still embedd ed in perspectival/ mental/ fourth consciousness, is that, even thou gh w e may n ot be able to visualize it, or wra p a concept ar oun d it, or describe it logocentrically, w e can and d o participate in it. H ow m uch does “participation” or “verition” resonate with som eone? While it is imp ortant to keep Kegan’s insightful statement in mind , I also hold th at any d espair that might be felt at this point is du e only to a lack of epistemological resources. In other w ords, as mental/ perspectival/ fourth order (or even third ord er) adu lts, we have most likely yet to develop w hat w e need so that th e above situation is not troublesome. Return ing to th e notion of system for a mom ent, Gebser (1949/ 1985) holds that “ by recognizing th e effectu ality of… acategorical systasis with in every system, we are able to rep lace m ere men tal synthesis by integral synairesis” (p. 310). Gebser coined th ese terms, systasis an d synairesis, given th e necessity for new word s not trapp ed w ithin the confines of rational/ perspectival consciou sness. In correlation to the magical, my thical, and m ental structu res, systasis and synairesis “retain the efficient co-validity of symbiosis, symbol, and system [respectively]” (p. 312). Systasis comes from th e Greek for “p ut together”
86 or “conn ection,” and also connotes “origin” and “form ing” (Gebser). Gebser uses th e term systasis “to circum scribe the efficacy of all acategorical elements… all types of man ifestation an d a spects of ‘time’ w hich, becau se of their n onspa tial char acter, cann ot be th e object of categorical systema tization, as they are not ‘givens’ or data bu t in a certain sense ‘givings’ or imp artat ions” (p. 310). In this way, systasis is to the integral what systematization is to the mental. Thus, dep end ing on the structure un der d iscussion, one could sp eak of systatic elements or of systematic elements. Synairesis, rooted in th e Greek “syna ireo,” mean s “to synth esize, collect,”
and implies “everything being seized or grasp ed on all sides, particularly by min d or sp irit” (Meng e-Güth ling, in Gebser, p. 312). It is to integra l consciou sness wh at synth esis is to menta l consciou sness (Gebser). Synt hesis deals with th rees -- two opp osites whose tension mu st be resolved in a “third” that is placed in opp osition to an other, subsequently requiring furth er synthesis into even another “third,” ad infinitum . Parad oxical thinking’s attempts to synthesize the rational and th e irrational, often resulting in am azing w ritten, visual, and sonic exp ressions, is an examp le of an efficient form . Yet, integr al consciou sness is defined by the integr ation of all of the structu res w hich coconstitute u s -- archaic, magical, mythical, mental/ persp ectival, and apersp ectival -- and as such, synthesis is, by d efinition, not u p to the task. To facilitate a further un derstand ing of wh at Gebser means by synairesis, consider the following passage: Syna iresis fulfills the ap ersp ectival, integrative p erception of systasis and system. This synairetic perception is a precond ition for diaph any, wh ich is able to be realized w hen, in ad dition to systasis and system, the symbol -- w ith its myth ical effectivity -- and ma gic sym biosis are includ ed, th at is to say, present. The task wh ich the new mu tation poses for us can be
87 resolved on ly if we sup ercede th e pu rely mental, spatial world of systematic thoug ht. We achieve this by recognizing the validity of systasis in mo ving th e efficacy of the non -categorical elements into t he sphere of perception. Systasis is the mean s wh ereby we are able to open up our consolidated spatial consciousness to th e integrating consciousness of the w hole. This integra ting consciou sness enables us to per ceive and pr esentiate the integrity or integr ality of the w hole. (Gebser, 1949/ 1985, p. 310)
In a very fifth ord er fashion, via synairesis, the systatic quality of the relationship of “w hole” to “parts” is that n either is comp lete w ithout th e other, there is a mutu al interpen etrability for all involved. A key to un derstand ing wh at is meant by systatic quality is being aw are of this interdepend ence (Kramer et al., 1992). Accord ing to Kegan (1994), this quality w ould relate to th e fifth order recognition that relationships are p rior to the p arts them selves, e.g., wh oleness is prior to “partn ess” -- it is the case that there are n o par ts, but that the p arts’ identities are p recond itioned by the r elationships w ithin the context that they are embedd ed w ithin. 9 Kramer thus points out that to und erstand this interd epen d ence, or systatic integr ality, it is necessary “to become integrally aw are of the vital role d ifference play s in iden tity” (p. xxv). Thus, I am on ly me because of you , you are only you because of the ocean. This is not to say that th e aforementioned examples are only an illusion, though that m ay w ell be the case, but that systatically speaking each is d epend ent on the “w holeness” of reality for existence. Accordingly, “meaning p oints to other mean ings that are d ifferent from and y et related to one another as different. Meanings integrate in their
9
Gebser’s explication of “synairesis” and “ systasis” foreshad ows m any of the ideas to be covered in the next section, particularly those ideas relating to the w hole/ part relationship and the n otion of emergen t pr operties -- i.e., systems thinking, comp lexity science, etc.
88 mu tual call for each oth er and in their m utu al differentiation” (Kramer et al., 1992, p. xxv). While synth esis and sy nairesis seem to fulfill the sam e roles for their respective structure of consciousness, it w ould be a mistake to equate them . This is especially so as, since we are p redom inantly embed ded in the m ental structure of consciousn ess, ou r frame of reference is synth esis -- a spatialized tem por al thinking w herein w e can actually visualize, abstractly, the coming together of an anta gonistic p olarity into a synthesized “th ird.” Syna iresis is an act of apersp ectival perception, an “integral act of completion encomp assing all sides” (Gebser, p. 312). The inten sities, or qualities, pr eviously m entioned can only be held together by syn airesis, as this form of perception is presup posed by the acategorical, the ap erspectival, the arational, and the atemp oral. In this way, synairetic perception leads to w hat Gebser refers to as transpa rency, or diap hany. N o longer limited by a fixed, spatialized, quan tified, reduced, fragmented, systematized p erception of the w hole, it is an integral w ay of thinking, perceiving, and m aking meaning of our w orlds. As Gebser states, “the parts mu st be heard or experienced, intuited or endu red, seen or though t in accord w ith their very essence” (p. 286). In other word s, the part/ w hole relationship can only be un derstood via “war ing,” or through “ verition” (from the root “ ver,” imp lying tru th, e.g., verity, verify) -- thu s it is too comp lex for a d ialectical synth esis. Before continuing, the following needs to be u nd erstood: integral consciousness can neither be redu ced nor limited to Kegan’s fifth order of consciou sness. It is cru cial that I d o not imp ly a direct one to one equa tion here, regardless of the nu merou s similarities. Most importan t is that “verition,” the
89 active TPM p rocess of integra l consciousn ess, is able to take th e w hole sub jectobject d ua lity as “object.” H ow ever, even this d oes not seem comp letely accu rate, as su bject-object taken as object form s a feed back loop, essen tially tran slating into a “tran scendin g” of sub ject-object d u ality all togeth er. In other w ord s, as Gebser states, “to be free of ego… [w hich] means n ot ju st free of subject, but free of object” (p. 309). This is in man y w ays th e prim ary characteristic of sixth or d er consciousness, w hich Wilber (1980/ 1996, 1983/ 1996) refers to as the “p sychic” stage. For the most p art, Wilber’s mod el ru ns a very close par allel to Kegan’s, as he dr aw s on m any of the sam e theorists, especially Piaget. Moreover , Wilber also draw s on Gebser for his mod el, so wh ile Kegan d oes not posit a sixth ord er, Wilber’s “psychic” stage is high ly conson ant w ith all that has been d iscussed h erein. Keeping in m ind th e intermeshed associations of “fourth ord er/ mental/ modernism” and “fifth order/ early integral/ post-modern,” I wou ld like to spend a m inute on Wilber’s version of these as to facilitate a good groun ding in w hat a sixth ord er is like, i.e., w hat in tegral consciousness is accord ing to a d evelopm ental per spective. Wilber’s correlate to Kegan ’s fifth ord er is the centauric (vision-logic) stage. Very briefly, Wilber’s “fifth o rd er” can b e
un d erstood as follows: “wh ile this level is trans-verbal, it is not trans-personal. That is, while it transcend s langua ge, gross concepts, and the gross ego, it d oes not tr anscend existence, personal orientation, or w aking p sychop hysiological aw areness. It is the last stage dom inated by norm al forms of space and time” (Wilber, 1980/ 1996, p. 70). H e also refers to this stage as th e Bod y-mind stage, as it involves the integration of the formal-verbal mind with th e emotional body. It is thus “centau ric” (Wilber, 1983/ 1996). This “centau ric” integr ation is
90 reminiscent of how Kegan’s fifth ord er re-integrates the th ird ord ers intersubjectivity and emp athy, and th us emotional pred isposition. Wher eas full-blow n integr al consciousn ess transcend s subject-object d ua lity, in strictly fifth ord er man ifestation it is not yet trans-per sonal. The fifth order/ centau r is subject to inter-individu ality, and thu s, wh ile fully aware that ind ividu als can on ly be comp lete in relation to ot hers, ther e is still an exp licit perception of an other. While a sixth order/ psychic mod e not only is no longer subject to inter-ind ividu ality, the relationship of subject-object relations has un dergon e a rad ical shift. Thus, the “psychic” is the first stage that can be considered tr ans-p ersona l (Wilber, 1983/ 1996). As “transcend ” is a spatialized/ persp ectival term, in Gebserian non -perspectival language, w e might instead say that th e “psychic” is the first stage wh erein consciou sness is intense enough to “w are” the subject-object d uality and rend er it transparen t. Wilber correlates the psychic w ith an entr y into the trans-rational (or arational) and w ith early aw areness of the archetypal. Of course, Gebser also mentions both of these as key characteristic of integra l consciou sness. In some w orks Wilber actu ally presents the p sychic stage as includ ing both the centaur ic and the low-subtle, and thu s can be thou ght of as Wilber’s d irect equivalent of an integral consciousness, paralleling Kegan’s fifth and un posited sixth orders. In regard to this m ore inclusive form of th e psychic, Wilber (1983/ 1996) states that t his stage “refers to ‘psyche’ as a h igher level of development than the rational m ind per se (e.g., Aurobindo, Free John) (p. 247).”
91 In Closing The spirit of this section is eloquently captured in the open ing w ords to the Preface of Gebser’s (1949/ 1985) ma gnu m op u s The ever-p resent origin: Origin is ever-presen t. It is not a beginn ing, since all beginn ing is linked w ith time. And the present is not just the “now ,” today, the momen t or a un it of time. It is ever-originating, an achievemen t of full integra tion and continu ou s renew al. Any one able to “concretize,” i.e., to realize and effect the reality of origin an d the p resent in their entirety, sup ercedes “beginning” and “end ” and the mere here and n ow. (p. xxvii) Gebser’s work allows u s an un precedented insight into the natu re of our evolution of consciousn ess. N ot only does his explication of the historically previous structures of consciousness reveal a spectacular v iew, but most importan tly it lays the found ation up on w hich ou r current structure rests -- i.e., the context in wh ich the mental/ rational/ persp ectival structure of consciousness is situated . Given the d iscussion of Kegan ’s subject-object theory an d th e subsequent p arallels that have been draw n to Gebser’s work it shou ld be app arent that fourth ord er-mental/ rational consciousness is the order of the day. But most imp ortantly, for the p urp oses of this thesis, is the notion that th ere is an emerging stru cture -- the integral structure -- and that th is stru cture transcends our reliance on singular, fixed, reified views of who w e are and w hat w e assume our w orld to be. At this p oint, it is app ropriate to take w hat Kegan refers to as the fifth order of consciousness, and what Gebser calls Integral consciousness, and to situate them in tandem w ith the work of Edgar Morin and his revolutionary notion of a parad igm of comp lexity. As w e will see, whereas Kegan’s framework sets the stage for the general d evelopm ental schema for the individu al (and to some extent society at large), and whereas Gebser’s discourse encompasses the
92 evolution of the Western mind from inception to present, wh at w e find in Morin, as I shall present in the following section, is a mid dle grou nd -- a grou nd ed mid dle that allows for the w idespread emergence of a complex TPM pr ocess to seem not only possible, but likely. For Morin can teach us how to think in a wh ole new w ay.
93 Section 3: Edgar Mor in’s para d igm of com plexity
Up to th is point, I have discussed h ow we d evelop th rough successively mor e comp lex ord ers of sub ject-object relations. I hav e also d iscussed how the four th ord er correspond s to mod ernism and persp ectival thinking -- that is, to a necessary, though n ecessarily limited, und erstanding of ourselves and our wor ld. I then carried out an in-depth exploration of the curr ent dom inant structure of consciousness, the m ental-persp ectival, and introdu ced the emergent mod e, the integral structure of consciousness. The picture th us far presented is rich, full, involved , and comp lex, bu t it is still lacking a cru cial element -- the wor k of French thinker Edgar M orin.
Thinking th e complex In the beginning was complexity: genesis is the other side of disintegration. (Morin , 1977/ 1992, p. 148) Never before in the h istory of hu man ity have the responsibilities of think ing w eighed so crush ingly on us. (Morin, 1998, p. 131) Edgar Morin, like many Europ eans, was incalculably influenced by th e horr or and chaos of WWII. Born in Fran ce in 1921, he joined th e Comm u nist Party in 1942, leaving it in 1951. Morin is a tru e transd isciplinarian , having wr itten over forty books and dozens of articles. In add ition to num erous autobiograph ical accoun ts, his w riting has a dd ressed film, politics, history, science, “the tw entieth century,” systems thinking, complexity, and comp lex thinking. Stand ing out from this imp ressive body of work is his mu lti-volum e masterwork, La Méthode, which explicitly seeks to articulate principles of organization and complexity.
94 Like Gebser, Morin is widely know n in Europ e and is even famou s in intellectual circles, but remains essentially unknown in the English speaking w orld . Gebser lived from 1905 un til 1973, thu s passing aw ay before many of his ideas came into vogue, so it seems somewh at more u nd erstanda ble that his work has not received su fficient attention. Morin, on the other hand , is alive and w ell -- still w riting, traveling, and actively engag ed in th e intellectual w orld (as of Au g. 1999). It is very likely that his early ties with Com mu nism ar e in p art resp onsible for this tragic anon ym ity, as w e are all too w ell aw are of the English speaking world ’s relationship to comm un ism. At the same time, regard less of any decades-old communist affiliations, his ideas radically challenge the intellectual status qu o in such a w ay that he h as, to pu t it mildly, not w on any pop ularity contests in the m ainstream currents of mod ernist thought. Fortunately, this is changing, as complexity is currently one of the hottest topics in contem po rary intellectu al (scientific, artistic, philosoph ical) discourses. As w ith Gebser, I will explore Morin ’s w ork for its relevance to the core notion of comp lex thin king, per ceiving, an d m eaning -making (TPM) -- fifth order/ integral consciousness. As such, the central theme draw n from Morin is that of a “para d igm of com plexity.” Since it will take the better p art of this section for an adequ ate un packing of the notion of a paradigm of complexity, for present pu rposes, “parad igm” can be thou ght of as a master context that informs and shap es epistemological activity according to w idespread cultural assumptions.1
1
In recent years the significance of the w ord “parad igm” has been d iluted by its rampan t use. For the pu rposes of this paper it shou ld be un d erstood closer to Kuhn s’ (1970) original meaning.
95 Morin’s parad igm of complexity is in full accord w ith Kegan’s fifth ord er and Gebser’s Integr al consciousn ess. As such, it is no acciden t that, wh ile I hav e mentioned complexity throu ghou t this thesis, I have not definitively stated w hat comp lexity is. The reason for this pr ocrastination is that comp lexity is comp lex. Accordingly, I have ded icated th is whole section to a d irect engagemen t w ith the notion of comp lexity. Bu t before doin g so, how ever, I w ill first d iscuss w hat h as instigated Morin to call for a para d igm of comp lexity in the first place. Now here hav e I seen Kegan, Gebser, or Morin reference each other in an y w ay, shap e, or form. Given this fact, I believe tha t the coherence between each theory lends furth er credibility to each of these theorists ind ividu ally. It should thu s come as n o surp rise that Morin (1977/ 1992) has thorough ly critiqued w hat he refers to as th e “pa rad igm of simplification,” wh ich correspond s d irectly to deficient fourth order/ mental-perspectival-rational/ mod ernist consciousness. The need for a complex disposition in tod ay’s w orld ar ises out of the context in wh ich w e find ou rselves situated . Mental/ persp ectival consciousness, in its d eficient r ationalistic mod e, is man ifesting itself in scientistic, fragmen ting, simplifying, reductionistic thinking. Given that our curr ent structure of consciousness has so a ptly been d escribed as th e “men tal” structure, then it is of the u tm ost significance that w e learn to th ink in a com plex fashion . In one of his mor e recent books, Mor in (1998) states the following : The Planetary Era deman ds that w e situate everything in the planetary context. Knowledge of the world as wor ld h as become an intellectual as w ell as vital necessity. It is the universa l problem of every citizen; how to gain access to global informa tion, and how to acquire the p ossibility of linking together and organizing it. To do so, and thereby recognize, acknowledge, and kn ow th e problems of the w orld, we need a reform in thinking. (p. 123)
96 This “reform in thinking” is an other w ay of stating the central, essential challenge that w e are confronted w ith epistemologically as the dom inant stru cture of consciou sness becomes increasingly d eficient. To facilitate a clear explication of this in creasing d eficiency, from a Morinian pre-disposition, there mu st be an acknow ledgment of our culture’s foun dational assum ptions. Associated w ith the overtly perspectival, mechanical, and linear conceptions of space and time is the fund amen tal belief in “d evelopm ent.” Morin (1998, p. 59) states that “at th e base of this master id ea of developm ent stands the great Western parad igm of progress. Developm ent is sup posed to insure progress, which in tur n is sup posed to insure developm ent.” Recall that Gebser stresses how w e mu st not construe “p rogress” and “developm ent” as n ecessarily positive terms, that quite the contrary, ou r “progress myth” is dan gerously like a runaw ay train. Morin also un derstan ds the destru ctive natur e of “progress” and “developm ent” taken to the extremes that w e find th em tod ay. Morin (1998) asks, “is not our civilization, the very mod el of d evelopm ent, itself sick because of d evelopm ent” (p. 63)? Morin, like Gebser, points out that ou r mod ern civilization is foun ded on “m ental” notions that are insu fficient to meet the need s of our current challenges. Of course, central to these found ations is our cherished, an d stereotypically Western, belief in progress and d evelopm ent. More than reminiscent of the Gebser discussion is Morin’s (1998) following statem ent: Developm ent has perm itted individu al unfolding, intimacy in love and friend ship, comm un ication between “you” and “me,” and telecommu nication between all and su nd ry. Yet this same developm ent also brings the atom ization of ind ividuals, wh o lose their solidarities w ithout acquiring new ones, except for those of an an onym ous and adm inistrative nature. (p. 63)
97 Not on ly is the previous qu otation comp letely resonant w ith the discussion of m ental/ persp ectival consciousness, but also with characteristics of Kegan’s fourth order -- Morin even u ses the term “adm inistrative.” We have increased ou r stand ard of living immeasur ably, yet this has occurr ed at great cost to our q ua lity of life (Morin, 1998). We have va stly increased ou r mea ns of comm un ication and are in the m idst of a so-called “ comm un ications revolution,” yet we su ffer from an “im poverishm ent of personal comm un ication” (Morin, 1998, p. 65). Again , I am d iscussing ou r qu and ary -- the p arad oxical, comp lex reality that simultaneously is man ifesting th rough a m ode of consciousness that has brou ght forth so m uch p ositive “pr ogress,” but is also leading u s to the brink of d estruction. In some ways, at this point, I am reha shing wh at I have already d iscu ssed -- i.e., the da ma ging effects of a linear, red uctionistic, ration alistic epistemology -- yet, I do this as it is key to u nd erstanding a parad igm of comp lexity. In other wor ds, to pu t it succinctly, “w e mu st recognize that our consciousness has been shap ed by the p arad igm of simp lification an d the concepts w e have at ou r d isposal are atomistic rather th an m olar, chemical rather than organismic, isolated and static rather th an coprod uctive, recursive, and interd epen d ent” (Morin, 1992, p. 376). Gebser stresses the significance of “ratio,” and un folding ou t of this seed notion are p arallel key word s for the p arad igm of simplification: fragmentation, mechan ism, and d isjun ction. Spea king directly, albeit u nkn ow ingly, to deficient four th order/ mental-perspectival-rational consciousness, Morin (1998) holds that, “intelligence th at is fragmented, comp artmen talized, m echanistic, disjunctive, and reductionistic breaks the complexity of the world into disjointed pieces, splits up p roblems, separates that w hich is linked together, and r end ers
98 un idimensional the mu ltidim ensional” (p. 128). I am concentrating so mu ch time and effort to write about w hat I have been referring to as deficient mental/ persp ectival, simp listic thinking, because, as Morin states, “mu tilated thinking that considers itself expert and blind intelligence that considers itself rationa l are still the or d er of the d ay” (p . 128).
Enter the comp lex If there w as only one thing to say abou t complexity is wou ld be that it is comp lex. At first glance, to say that comp lexity is comp lex is noth ing but a meaningless tautology, yet, this is only the case w ithin the framew ork of the parad igm of simp lification. Comp lexity is not a hom ogenous concept su ch that there is a comp lexity, as comp lexity, by definition, cannot be simp lified. Although it is often considered to be a n oun , “comp lexity” might be best though t of as a verb. Comp lexity is dyn amic and changing; it is confusing an d obscuring; it is challenging an d in stigating, and mo st of all, comp lexity is literally everywh ere, always. If there w ere only tw o things I could say about comp lexity, the second wou ld be that complexity is not complication (Morin 1977/ 1992). As Morin (sou rce un know n) states, “it would be too simp le to reduce comp lexity to comp lication” (p. 558). What is recognized as complex is m ost often th e complicated, the entangled, and th e confused, and thu s something that cannot be described, given the astronom ical num ber of measuremen ts, operations, comp utations, and so forth such a description wou ld require. (Morin, 1992, p. 380) An occurr ence of many step s, stages, calculations, or measu rements, no matter how convolu ted , does not n ecessarily imp ly complexity -- i.e., comp lexity can be
99 convoluted , but the convoluted is not necessarily complex. To disentang le the man y comm on misconceptions about complexity one mu st take the previous point to heart. I have said a lot abou t wh at comp lexity is not. Morin (in Kelly, 1996; source unkn own ) refers to this as the “negative mod e” of speaking about someth ing, for he states that, “comp lexity is a concept of w hich the first d efinition can only be negat ive” (sour ce un know n, p. 556). I emp loy this negative mod e to reveal common misconceptions, thereby enabling a d iscussion of comp lexity to be m ore lucid and m eanin gful. So, w hat is comp lexity? Morin (1977/ 1992) posits th e follow ing: Comp lexity asserts itself first of all as an imp ossibility to sim plify; it arises w hen comp lex un ity prod uces its emergences, where d istinction and clarities in identities are lost, where d isord er and un certainty d isturb ph enomena, w here the su bject/ object surp rises his own face in the object of his observation, where an tinomies make the cour se of reasoning go astray. (p. 386)
H erein arises perhap s the most crucial element of the parad igm of comp lexity, a chara cteristic that in -and -of itself is almost solely capab le of making th e distinction from the p arad igm of simp lification. This element is the inclusion of th e su bject in all observat ion. H ence, there is no decisive separ ation between su bject and object, between th e observer and the observed -- neither is there between cause and effect, or ord er and chaos -- a point that could not be more subtle and , simu ltaneously, revolutionary. Comp lexity is very m uch a fifth ord er concept. Central to fifth ord er subject-object relations is the u nd erstand ing that an individu al is not complete withou t the “other.” Everything is what it is in relation to a context, wh ich itself is contingen t on the subject’s participating in that very sam e context. Comp lexity
100 is fifth order in th e sense that w hat is comp lex is subject to slid ing contexts. For example, in the interp ersonal realm, I am d efined by my cultural/ interpersonal surrou nd ings, but simu ltaneously I am an active agent w ithin this context, and thu s have the capacity to influence the very same p eople that I am in relationship with an d w ho influen ce me. The point is that comp lexity simply cannot be conflated w ith a four th order/ persp ectival, system-like, interaction of objective things, w hether ph ysical or conceptual. Accord ing to the parad igm of complexity, whatever is isolated, disjoined, or fragmented cannot be, as Morin wou ld say, the real. As a qu intessential illustration of a fifth order th inker, Morin h as demonstrated how that w hich h as been “transcend ed” and ultimately recognized as incomp lete and partial cannot, and should not, be un derstood as an accura te reading of the w orld -- hence, the need for a par adigm of comp lexity. If the n atu re of comp lexity is not completely lucid at this p oint, there shou ld be no concern. Comp lexity is not imm ed iately clear. This is not to say that sense cannot be m ad e from complexity -- i.e., that there cannot be enough precision for it to have instru mental value -- but instead, that w e mu st not expect the intellect fully to compreh end the complex. Moreover, given the n ature of this ma terial, it is necessary to circle arou nd the sam e ideas from d ifferent angles, from w ithin d ifferent contexts, at d ifferent times, in varying inten sities. This app roach is in m any w ays necessary in order to avoid falling into yet another persp ectival trap, to avoid the inherently p roblematic linear p resentation of nonlinear ideas, especially w ithin th e context of an already linear form of comm un ication. Most importan tly, “complexity d oes not lend itself readily to conceptu alization” (Morin, source unkn ow n, p. 566). Stated in Gebserian term s, Morinian com plexity is ap ersp ectival, achro nic, acategorical, and ultim ately,
101 arational. Comp lexity is systatic, and can truly only be un derstood w ith an integral d isposition. As I am correlating Mor inian comp lexity w ith Kegan’s fifth ord er, it is crucial to remem ber that the fifth ord er, unlike all previous orders, has th e capacity to tak e a m eta-position, to fold b ack on itself -- e.g., to reflect on th e very process of theory construction or to critique on e’s own “value generator.” While the shift from on e ord er of subject-object relations to anoth er is always monu mental an d significant, the shift from fourth ord er to fifth order cognition is no less than a tran sition of epochal proportions. As such, the fifth order is itself ind icative of com plexity as com plexity is minimally fifth or d er. Fourth order/ perspectival thinking is based on “ratio” and quantitative measur ement, w hich enables us to p redict the consequences of our a ctions, and further allows us to manipu late and control our environment. This has more than served its purp ose as we now have the technical capacity to solve many of our r emaining p hysical challenges (e.g., hu nger an d man y common diseases), 2 but somehow w e are in m any w ays in w orse shape than w e were prior to our technological-scientific successes -- e.g., our meth od s of food an d energy prod uction are the most advanced they hav e ever been, yet more peop le are starving than ever before. Morin points out that, for decades, “supp osedly rational solutions, pu t forw ard by experts convinced that th ey were w orking for reason and p rogress… have imp overished as mu ch as they have enriched and hav e destro yed a s mu ch as they hav e created ” (Morin, 1998, p . 127). This
2
That we are not resolving these challenges is another issue, at the same time, that we h ave the technology and the resources and are not better ad dressing these “problems” is relevant here.
102 situation can be und erstood in the context of fourth ord er/ persp ectival consciou sness. The “su pp osedly rational solut ions” Morin speaks of arise from the p arad igm of simplification, they are fruit from the poisonous tree. Simp lification, the h ub ris of redu ctionistic rationalism, believes in its ow n comp leteness, its own au tonom ou s and objective self-sufficiency. In contr ast, a fifth ord er pro cess of TPM recognizes incomp leteness at the core. With resp ect to comp lexity and comp lex thin king, Morin ma kes the characteristically fifth order assertion that “w e need a thinking that recognizes its incomp leteness and can deal w ith un certainty, the un foreseen, interd epend encies, and inter-retroactions” (1998, p. 131). To facilitate the tran sition to a new mod e of thinking, Morin presents w hat he refers to as pr inciples of comp lex think ing. There are three such principles, and they all are inextricably intertwined in comp lex, fifth ord er, and synairetic fashion. The pr inciples them selves are the principle of the dialogic, the p rinciple of recursivity, and the hologrammatic principle. These principles are fun dam ental to a whole way of thinking about everything. They are not intended as simply intellectually stimu lating food for thou ght, thoug h they d o indeed satiate that need. Finally, these principles must n either be considered as separate, isolated principles, nor as some sort of law s.
The Principles of Complex Thinking Kofma n (1996) describes Morin’s par ad igm of comp lexity an d p rinciples of comp lex thinking as “a m ethod w hich is not m ethodology, but a trav eler’s guid e. Its rules are not prescriptive but an aid or w ay of thinking about comp lexity” (p. 59). This very sam e attitud e inform s wh at Morin (1977/ 1992)
103 means by “en-cyclo-ped ic” know ledge, the form of know ledge that these pr inciples exemp lify -- that is, not an exhau stive dep ository of data, definitions, and facts, but instead a m eans by w hich literally to “circle aroun d” know ledge as a whole. Morin’s method, wh ich is more an app roach and an attitude than a specific, limited , persp ectival meth od ology, is informed by these p rinciples. Kelly (1988) hold s tha t Mor in is H egel’s legitimate h eir, and as su ch it is no coincid ence that Morin ’s notion of the dialogic imm ed iately brings to mind Hegel’s dialectic. In order to d raw the m ajor d istinction betw een the d ialogic and the d ialectic, I men tion Gebser’s notion of syna iresis. Recall that syna iresis is necessary to integrate mu ltiple mod es, as synthesis is only up to task w hen dealing w ith tw o antagonistic poles that are inevitably “synthesized” into a tension-releasing “third pr inciple.” In this w ay, the dialogic is similar to synairesis in that it includes, and transcends, the dialectic. The most sign ificant qu ality of the d ialogic is its ability to m aintain an association betw een two or mor e principles that are simu ltaneously comp lementary, concurrent, and antagonistic. As Morin states, “the qu ality of antagonism stresses the fact th at th e p rinciples associated retain their relative auton omy… and therefore resist being redu ced to the other, or being resolved in som e fina l ‘syn th esis’” (Morin in Kelly, 1991, p. 33). For examp le, w hen considering th e relationship of a cultu re or society to the ind ividu als that comp oses it, there is always tension between the ind ividu al and the collective -e.g., freedom and auton omy versu s order an d th e collective good. Yet, each of these principles retains an au tonomy in va rying degrees w hile simultaneously comp lementing each other. The relationship betw een the ind ividual and collective is irredu cible, and ther efore com plex.
104 The dialogic is pred icated by an acategorical effectu ality. The dialogic, given its aptitud e for holding the tension of appar ent p arad ox, is “ill at ease in the rigid frameworks an d p rinciples of our logic” (Morin, source unknow n, p. 573). A good exam ple of the d ialogic at w ork, albeit now somew hat cliché, is the principle of complementarity from qu antu m p hysics. The most comm on w ay to un derstan d the p rinciple of complementarity is w ith regard to the “waveparticle” du ality. It was once believed (not that long ago) that light m ust be comp osed of either w aves or particles. Eventu ally it was confirmed th at light wa s both w ave and particle, yet these qualities could not be p erceived at the same time. Depend ing on how one chooses to set up an experiment, light d emon strates either a w ave-like reality or a p article-like reality (Wolf, 1989). In this sense, we can th ink of each of these p ossible out comes as “logics,” and as such, the only w ay to u nd erstand light is d ialogically, that is, the wav e-like natu re and the p article-like natu re of light are at once comp lementary, concurrent, an d antagonistic. Another w ay to und erstand th e dialogic is illustrated by something that all of us have some experience with in varying d egrees. The emotions of love and hate are comm only considered to be opp osites, but one d oes not preclud e the other in ou r experience. If not d irectly from ou r p ersonal experience, everyone has at least vicariously experienced, throu gh a friend or loved on e, how someone can simultaneously love and hate another. How is this possible? The fact of the matter is that life, reality -- everything that sur roun ds u s and that w e are embedd ed in -- is complex. Another w ay to consider this love/ hate examp le is not in term s of how they are d ifferent, but how they are the same. The dialogic allows u s to realize that opp ositions and p arad oxes may in fact stem from the
105 same u nd erlying p rinciple, a principle that u nifies them (this unification should not be equated w ith synthesis). Love and h ate are only opposite when categorized as emotions, but w hen th e context is shifted w e can see that the opp osite of either of these is apathy, that love and hate are in fact m ore like each other than like something not involving emotion at all. As Morin states, “w e may w onder w hether what w e conceive as complementarity/ competition/ antagonism -- and wh ich d oes not represent either/ or alternatives but ambigu ous aspects of one and the same reality -- does not constitu te the oscillatory, un certain and varied facets of a single selforgan izational prin ciple” (Morin, sour ce un know n, p. 575-6). To take this illustration one step further, love/ hate and ap athy can also be un derstood as being similar in th e sense that th ey are all in h um an experience, such that, even wh at is comp lementary or antagonistic is not fixed, but instead oscillates through un certainty, ambiguity, and stability. It shou ld be immed iately app arent that comp lex thinking is dynam ic in natu re. As already d iscussed, love and hate are the same, and then th ey are different, but no negation has occurr ed. This dyn amic nature of comp lex thinking is most eloquently illustrated by the second principle, the p rinciple of recursivity, wh ich arose after Morin’s exposu re to cybern etics. The principle of recursivity can be thou ght of as the ever-present d ance of the relationship between tw o antagonistic principles, such that an ything that is app roached d ialogically involves a circular, recursive dy nam ic. For examp le, let us consid er the so-called “mind/ brain problem.” There is no doubt that our minds d epend on our brains, but does this mean th at we can reduce the mind to the brain? At the same time, the “brain” w ould n ot exist withou t mind s that map ou t territory
106 and give names, but does that mean that there are no brains without mind s? The problem w ith approaching the m ind/ brain p aradox in this fashion is that, in the parad igm of simp lification, the term s involved a re d isjoined, they h ave become isolated fragments somehow existing autonom ously as if they needed nothing bu t them selves to be real. The recur sive natu re of this relationship is clearly demonstrated in the following diagram:
In terms of comp lex thinking, then, we mu st notice that the mind and the brain have a complex relationship -- w e cannot tru ly separa te them, but yet w e mu st not, on the other had, assum e that they are the same and can thu s be redu ced to a singu larity. As Morin (1992) states, one mu st invoke a way of thinking th at flows in a circle… between tw o mu tually-exclusive explanatory principles: on the on e han d, th e un ifying w ay of thinking becomes increasingly homogenizing and loses d iversity; on the oth er han d, the d ifferentiating way of thinking becomes mere catalogue and loses un ity. (p. 373). It is only by a d isjoining injun ction, by breaking t he circle, that w e can arrive at the illusion of absolute know ledge (Morin, 1977/ 1992). By absolute know ledge I am referring to characteristically fourth ord er/ persp ectival notions of total aut onom y or objectivity. As with th e principle of the d ialogic, the principle of recursivity points to th e natu ral world , to a world that is pred ominantly comprised of open systems -- a world that is itself, metap horically speaking, to say the least, minimally fifth order. As such, everything that w e know , or might know , is significantly predicated by th e principle of recursivity in one w ay or an other.
107 Recursivity can also be considered as a process wherein each element is the cause of the other, and therefore also the effect, leadin g to a situation w hich makes th e final state and the initial state almost ind istingu ishable (Morin, source un know n). A prime examp le of this is know n as autopoesis, which m eans “selfma king” (Capra , 1996). N atu ral systems (e.g., eco-systems, the nervou s system) are, for the most part, autopoetic systems. Autop oetic means that the wh ole netw ork pr odu ces and maintains itself through comp lex reactions and interactions, revealing that n o one part h as absolute p riority over the others. The Gaia Hy po thesis (Lovelock, 1979), one of the most p op ular n atu ral systems theor ies in recent decad es, essentially claims that th e biospher e as a who le is a comp lexly interacting autop oetic system. At the core of the pr inciple of recursivity is the fun dam ental notion of interd epend ence. Preserving circularity, by maintaining the association of the two prop ositions both ind epend ently recognized as true but w hich no sooner in contact negate each oth er, is open to the p ossibility of conceiving th ese truth s as the tw o faces of one comp lex truth ; it is to un veil the p rincipal reality, wh ich is the r elation of interdep end ence, between n otions wh ich d isjun ction isolates or opp oses; it is, therefore to open th e door to sear ching for this relation . (Morin , 1977, p. 13)
By considering th e diagram that show s the recursive natu re of the relationship betw een sub ject and object, and realizing tha t the sub ject is “in” the object as the object is “in” t he su bject (recall that “ob ject” imp lies throw n from ), we are thu s lead to the third p rinciple. The hologramm atic principle emerges from the rich analogical description of the u niverse as being like a hologram, wh erein the wh ole is encoded in each par t. In other word s, the wh ole is in the
108 part as the p art is in the w hole -- e.g., a culture is comp osed of individu als, but each ind ividual also has th e culture (i.e., values, mores, or nor ms) in them as well. The hologramm atic principle returns us to th e fractal-like und erstanding that similar patterns exist at multiple scales, and therefore, to the recognition of self-similarity. In fact, both fractal geom etry and h ologram s are d emon strative of self-similarity -- e.g., take a br anch o ff a bu nd le of broccoli and it w ill resemble in pattern/ structure the w hole broccoli plant, just as if you smash a h olographic plate into many p ieces the whole picture w ill appear in each piece. N ot only mu st w e take into account th e d ialogical and recursive characteristic of our wor ld, but also how an y of the principles, elements, or par ts that w e are engaged with in ou r p rocess of TPM are also hologramm atic in natu re. The hologramm atic principle, therefore, ties the p revious tw o p rinciples together, and in turn im plies that there is a recursive relationship betw een wh ole and part.
Since the wh ole/ part relationship is not only complementary and concurr ent, but an tagonistic as w ell, determining wh at is a “w hole” and w hat is a “part,” wh en h ologrammatically contextualized, becomes a very slippery issue. The “H olographic par adigm ,” 3 as it is sometim es referred to, earn s its current n amesake from th e hologram, a p hoto-optical techniqu e mad e feasible only w ith mod ern laser light technology, though, th e same basic idea exists throu ghou t ancient spiritual, metaph ysical, religious, and mystical literatu re.
3
The notion of a “Holograp hic Paradigm ,” as such, primarily stems from the wor ks of ph ysicist David Bohm, neu ro-psychologist Karl Pribram, and transp ersonal psychologist Stanislav Grof. For a d edicated wor k on this sub ject see Talbot (1991).
109 Argu ably the prim e examp le, pred ating our holography by at least 1500 years, arises from th e Hu a Yen school of Bud dh ism and the story of Ind ra’s net. As the story goes, an artificer han gs a net stretching to infinity in all d irections in ord er to demon strate their devotion to the deity Ind ra. At every nexus is placed a per fect jew el tha t reflects every oth er jew el. Thus, there are an infinite num ber of jewels, each reflecting the en tir e in finite w eb -- i.e., ea ch ind ivid u al g em is a reflection of the w hole (Cook, 1977). A mu nd ane examp le of this idea is illustrated by a room full of mirrors th at are all pointing at each oth er from slightly different a ngles. Unfortuna tely, man y have over-extend ed th e notion of a holograph ic parad igm, often confusing wh at is analogous and w hat is hom ologous. Though we can say that the un iverse is like a hologram, it is importan t to maintain an aw areness of the fact that this does not m ean that th e universe is actually a hologra m -- to do this is a gross simp lification. Moreover , meta ph ors and ana logies, w hile helpfu l, can b e very m islead ing -- e.g., it is actually mor e accur ate to say that a hologram is like the un iverse, as the u niverse is more encompassing than a specific man ifestation th erein, such as th e mu ch more limited p henom enon of a hologram. So, in ord er to comm un icate the essence of this principle I am going to focus, instead, on parts/ w holes, or holons (see next pa ragr ap h). As such, I w ill be using th e terms holon, holonom ic (i.e., of, or to do with, holons), and hologramm atic interchangeably. I am not negating the holographic metaph or/ analogy, as it is rich, beautiful, inspiring, and th ough t provoking. I am, instead , attemp ting to steer away from some potential “new paradigm” hu bris.
110 Arth ur Koestler (1978/ 1983) coined the term holon to elucid ate common epistemological and categorical errors as pertaining to the whole/ par t relationship. H e describes the term “holon” in the following p assage: [each m ember in a hierar chy] …is a sub-wh ole or ‘holon’ in its ow n righ t - a stable, integrated stru cture, equipped w ith self-regulatory d evices and enjoying a considerable d egree of auton omy or self-governm ent… [parts and w holes]…are Janu s-faced. The face turned u pw ard , towar d the higher levels, is that of a depend ent part; the face turn ed d own w ard , towar ds its own constituents, is that of a w hole of remarkable selfsu fficiency. (Koestler, 1978/ 1983, p . 27)
At the fourth order one is aware of the parts and / or the wh oles, or that there are in fact parts and w holes that are in relationship to each other. But at th e fifth order on e is aware of holons, the w ay in w hich every wh ole is comp osed of “Janu s-faced” p arts, and that every p art is a “Janu s-faced” w hole unto its ow n. Thus, a holonomic und erstand ing allows on e to recognize that, ultimately, there are no discrete parts or wholes, only part/ w holes, or holons. Or, as Wilber (1995) states, “there is no ‘Whole’, only Emp tiness and w hole/ pa rts forever” (p. 142). H olons must not be reified as things or un derstood simply as an abstract concept -- holonomics m ust be un derstood in a comp lex fashion, aperspectivally, acategorically, and achronically. Holons are interdep end ent and interpenetrating, their relationships are alwa ys recursive and usu ally d ialogical. Finally, und ergird ing the n otion of holons is relativity -- i.e., someth ing is wh at it is given its context and , simultaneously, given the comp lex relationship of that context to an observin g sub ject.
111 The notion of system - or how the w hole is not the wh ole We can further ap proach the notion of parts/ w holes in terms of the notion of “system .” Morin’s pr inciples of comp lex think ing, wh ich are obviously very fifth order, correspond rather w ell to the mod es of thou ght sp elled ou t by Gebser -- the p rinciples of recursivity an d th e dialogic, in par ticular, can be likened to a form of para d oxical thou ght th at combines efficient forms of circular and pyram idal thinking. Yet, a though t form n ot add ressed by Gebser, since his wr iting p redated it, is systems thinking. Systems thinking is a significant step in the right d irection toward s recursive, hologramm atic/ holonomic principles as it consciously attemp ts to h old everything together in term s of interconnectivity and relationship. Yet, systems thinking generally suffers from som e rather serious flaws. “System” carries with it the sense of du alism, basically of space and time. These can be expr essed a t oth er levels as object-subject, inner-ou ter, chaosorder, and even divine-worldly. It conjures abstract flow charts, and organizational plots that real people are comp elled to live ‘up to’ as implements. Such iconograp hy assum es not only that imagery (a plan) facilitates security and control, but also the value of a man aged, rational w orld ord er. In brief, a system can be bu ilt only on the basis of a static meta p hor of space and tim e and on r eification. (Kram er et al, 1992,p. xv)
If w e look take a close look at the na tu re of Koestler’s holons w e find tha t the imp lications of the “Janu s-facedn ess” are less than expected. Man y are now familiar with th e idea of emergent pr operties, the idea tha t the w hole is more than the sum of its parts. While this is an accur ate assessment , it is also acutely incomp lete. Morin points out that n ot only is the whole more than th e sum of its parts, but it is also less than the su m of its parts, that th e part is more than the part, and even, moreover, that the w hole is not even the wh ole! I will return to these seemingly absur d prop ositions, but first it is more pertinent to p resent
112 Morin’s notion of unitas multiplex , a comp lex un ity that mak es it impossible to “give a system a su bstan tial, clear, simp le, iden tity” (1977/ 1982, p. 89). Morin asserts that system, as u nitas mu ltiplex, “is the most simp le comp lex concept” (p. 148) -- w hich of course is not simp le at all! Therefore, “system ” mu st not be constru ed to m ean sheer “totality” -- i.e., though system is the p innacle of the parad igm of simplification, it is but foun dation to the p arad igm of complexity. In a complex holism, the p arts have a Janu s-faced d ouble identity, making the w hole a macro-un ity (Morin, 1992). Of cou rse, this only makes sense given the p rinciples of comp lex thinking -- the recursive and dialogical natu re of the part/ wh ole relationship, in tand em with hologrammatic/ holonomic characteristics. The notion of un itas mu ltiplex simu ltaneou sly involves an ap plication of p rinciples of comp lex think ing w hile illustratin g a core quality of the p arad igm of comp lexity. This can be seen by considering the following passage as it sits within the context of this paper. The idea of comp lex un ity is going to take on d ensity if w e vagu ely sense that w e can red uce neither the w hole to its parts nor th e parts to the w hole, neither the one to the mu ltiple nor the m ultiple to the one, but w e mu st try to conceive together, in a w ay simultaneou sly comp lementary and antagonistic, the notions of the w hole and th e parts, of one and d iverse. (Morin, 1977/ 1992. p. 102) In true h ologrammatic and recursive fashion, an explanation of unitas mu ltiplex points to key notions of complexity, wh ile simultaneou sly being a key characteristic (a part ) of an exp lication of the p arad igm of comp lexity itself. Bu t w hat is it tha t integrates these pr inciples, if not th e subject? As allud ed to earlier, the ubiqu itous inclusion of the subject is possibly the most crucial und erpinning of comp lexity as parad igm, and hence not a simp le explanatory p rinciple. Therefore, it is vital to accentu ate the role of the observ er/ sub ject, as the very act
113 of p erceiving a system is also the creating of the system . Again w e find th e comp lex situation, which mu st be held d ialogically, of a subject/ observer in relationship to an object/ observed. From fifth order/ apersp ectival TPM there is no great d ivide, there is no separation (thou gh, this is not to say th at there is no difference). To fully grasp the essence of the par ad igm of comp lexity, as it is symbiotic with fifth ord er/ apersp ectival-integral TPM, it is necessary to und erstand that for th ere to be a system, un itas mu ltiplex or otherw ise, there mu st be a su bject wh o can make d istinctions, wh o isolates the “poly-systemic swarm , cuts it u p, qu alifies it, and hierar chizes it” (Morin, 1977/ 1992, p. 139). Any notion of system, if it is to be com plex, mu st in its definition allow for flu x, d yna mism , and un certainty “as to th e determ ination of system in its context and its polysystemic context” (Morin, p. 139). A system/ un itas multiplex can be thought of as a holon nested w ithin holons nested w ithin holons. All of these systems are networked , sometimes in “ha rd w ired” fashion -- e.g., the nervous system is contained within the hum an organism -- and som etimes in full-on slippery, sliding, d yna mically-allocating, “soft-wired ” fashion -- e.g., social roles and p ow er d yna mics. Especially, thou gh not exclusively, in the “soft-wired ” sense, w herein we are n ot directly ad dr essing p hysical systems, but instead the cultural and intellectual sp heres, can w e consider system according to the following pr inciple. This principle, according to Morin, is a principle of art, such that “the systematic sensibility w ill be like that of a mu sician’s ear w hich p erceives the comp etitions, symbioses, interferences, overlapp ings of the them es in the same sym ph onic flow, w here the brutish mind w ill recognize only one theme surr oun ded by noise” (p. 140). H ence, system as u nitas m u ltiplex is anti-systemic in the fixed ,
114 spa tially reified , per spectival sense. Stated a noth er way , system as it is to be un derstood herein is a fifth order, not fourth ord er, cognition of complexity. The form of systems thinking, the systems th eory, that Morin p roposes is actually anti-systemic (in fourth order term s). He m akes the interesting assertion that the m ore insufficient systems th eory/ thinking is, the m ore necessary it becomes. As he poetically states, “w hat terr ifying p overty to p erceive, in a living being, only a system! But w hat foolishness not to see also a system” (1977/ 1992, p. 150)! The reason for this distinction, wh ich cuts to the h eart of the hu bris I mentioned at th e outset of d escribing the h ologrammatic principle, is as follows: We mu st clearly un derstand that m y aim, though integrally systemic, is opp osed to th e majority of systemist positions wh ich, believing they h ave overcome th e par adigm of simp lification by refusing to redu ce the system to its componen ts, succum b to the parad igm by redu cing all things and all beings to th e notion of system. (Morin, 1977/ 1992, p. 150) The hologramm atic principle ad dr esses, in a m ore explicit fashion th an the other p rinciples, the notion of “wholeness” or “holism.” But to ensu re that the p rinciples of comp lex thinking are u tilized as intend ed, from a m inimally fifth ord er d isposition, it is vital to recognize th at ho lism itself is often a simplified and redu ced n otion. It is the flip side, the shadow of the fragmenting, isolating, disjoining elements of the paradigm of simplification, which means that h olism is not necessarily any more comp lex than other forms of reductionism and is thus what Wilber (1995) refers to as subtle reductionism. Likew ise, Morin (1992) posits th at, H olism is a p artial, one-dimensional, and simplifying vision of the w hole. It redu ces all other system-related ideas to th e idea of totality, whereas it should be a qu estion of confluence. H olism thu s arises from th e parad igm of simp lification (or red uction of the comp lex to a m aster-concept or master-category). (p. 372)
115 Morin even goes so far as to state that we need a “non -holistic principle of know ledge” (1992, p. 372). For those of u s that are concerned w ith “w holeness” and the rampant tendency towards fragmented thought-perception, Morin’s position m ay seem regressive. Yet, given the preceding pa ges it should be obvious that this may seem regressive because it is actually highly pr ogressive -he h as sp iraled from a p re-holistic to a tr ans-holistic position (i.e., from fragmentation to integralism, perhap s). In order to unfold w hy Morin takes issue w ith the notion of w holeness, or holism, let me finally explain the seemingly absurd assertion that th e wh ole is not the wh ole. Fund amental to any system-focused discussion of parts/ w holes are the central notions of constraints an d emergences. As stated earlier, w e are familiar with the saying that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. This statem ent is illustrative of the notion of emergence, that is, that the whole exhibits emergent characteristics that the p arts themselves do not d isplay. It is only wh en the interactions between the p arts reach a threshold th at new abilities, pr operties, characteristics, or qu alities emer ge. For exam ple, water can be thou ght of as an emergent p roperty of the comp lex interactions between a specific prop ortion of hyd rogen a nd oxygen, as neither of them in isolation resemb les water at all -- i.e., oxygen and hyd rogen in gaseous form are flamm able and combustible, and m ost significantly, not d rinkable. We might also consider w hat Burr ough s and Gysin (1978) refer to as “the th ird m ind ,” a form of intelligence and creativity that emerg es from t he close collabora tion of two artists, thinker s, or musicians. At the same time, how ever, the whole is less than the sum of its parts (Morin, 1992). Based on th e constr aints of the system ic relationsh ip, certain qu alities, pr oper ties, abilities, or characteristics are sup pr essed or inhibited (Morin). To
116 illust illust rate this constrainin g pr inciple, consider th e individ ua l’s l’s loss of creative creative expression expression w ithin a bur eaucracy, such that th ere are talents talents or skills skills that one m ay possess that are inhibited inhibited by the rigid rigid frameworks of the system itself, itself, even thou gh the system exhibits emer emer gent characteristics. Moreover , Morin (199 (1992) 2) w hole is greater greater than t han the t he whole. To explain this beau tifully also posits that the whole
parad oxical oxical statement he tells us that, “the w hole as a w hole affec affects ts the p arts retroactivel retroactively, y, wh ile ile the p arts in tu rn retroactively retroactively affec affectt the w hole” (Morin, (Morin, p . 374) 374).. In other word s, the whole is more than a global entity as it it has a d ynam ic organization. Given the h olonom ic comp lexities lexities of “th e wh ole,” it follows follows tha t “the pa rts” shou ld likewise d emon strate a similar similar comp comp lex character. Morin (199 (1992) 2) also posits that “ the parts are at once less less and greater greater t han t he parts parts” (p (p . 374). 374). N ot only do constraints limit the part’s potentialities, but the inter-retro-actions of the part/ w hole relationship relationship also allow allow for global emergences to app ear in the parts themselves. This is illustrated illustrated in the individu al/ societ society y relationship, relationship, w herein it it is the in d ividu al, not th e society, that is self-consci self-conscious ous -- i.e. i.e.,, a society is only consci conscious ous thr ough its parts (Morin). (Morin). Moreover, “ the parts are sometime greater than the whole” (Morin, p. 374 374). ). This last last notion ar ises from th e realization that a
system can evolve in in su ch a w ay that, instead of further p rogressing rogressing th e cause of the whole, the parts/ individu individu als continually ontinually gain gain autonomy and freedom. freedom. In this sense, the system itself sacrific sacrifices es some of its global/ holistic au tonom y so that the p arts can maintain an active diversity (Morin). (Morin). It is also also the case tha t “ the whole is less than the whole” (Morin, 1977/ 1977/ 1992 1992,, p. 124) 124).. As Morin states, states, “w ithin every every wh ole there are penum bras and m utu al incomp incomp rehensions --- ind ind eed schisms schisms an d rifts rifts -- between th e repressed an d the
117 expressed, expressed, the submerged and the emergent, the generative and the ph enom enal” (199 (1992, 2, p. 375) 375).. Emerging from th is notion is the idea tha t the whole is insufficient (Morin). (Morin). Hen ce, ce, and m oreover, the whole contains uncertainty
(Morin). In other word s, given the contextu contextu al, polysystem ic, ic, holonom ic, ic, and comp comp lex reality reality of whole/ par ts, there is no certainty certainty as to what is “a w hole” in in any absolu te sense. Finally, Finally, following following on th e basis basis established established b y the principle of the dialogic, the w hole cont cont ains conflict (Morin). As Morin states, “every system contains contains forces forces that are antagonistic to its ow ow n p erpetu ation. These antagonisms are either either virtualize virtualized/ d/ neutralized, neutralized, constantly constantly controll controlled/ ed/ repressed repressed (through regulation and negative feedback) feedback),, or mad e use of and incorpora incorpora ted” (p. 375) 375).. In other word s, the the w hole (the (the w hole/ hole/ part) must be considered considered as unitas mu ltiple ltiplex. x. In the context context of a parad igm of comp comp lexity, lexity, found ed on thinking that is dialogical, dialogical, recursive, recursive, and hologramm atic/ atic/ holonomic, it it is p erfectl erfectly y reasonable that there is such a diverse, seemingly par adoxical adoxical reality reality to the part/ wh ole relationship. relationship. It is is importan t to realize realize that all of the above notions about the wh ole ole or the parts are not mutually exclusive, as these characteristics co-exist in a mu tually interpenetrating, aperspectival, aperspectival, atemporal, systatic systatic fashion. fashion. In other wor ds, since since we are d ealing ealing w ith holons, “par t” and “w hole” are relative relative terms, terms, dep end ent on a subject subject for their context, context, and reliant reliant on a p rinciple rinciple of art that discerns discerns and combines. As each each par t is a wh ole un to its own , while each each whole is also also a part, w e are thu s lead to the realization realization that “holism” “holism” is also also “partism.” Thus, the whole notion notion of ind ind epend ent parts an d w holes, distinct from a comp comp lex holonomic holonomic disposition, is is in fact foun foun ded on a persp ectival ectival,, du alistic alistic epistemology. Morin is presenting an ap erspectival erspectival epistemology, a m inimally inimally
118 fifth fifth order means of making sense out of our w orld. Given this un derstand ing, it is perfectly perfectly reasonab le for for Morin to assert th at the whole is not the whole. Since it not safe to assum e that the w hole is is even the w hole, then w hat does “holism” “holism” really mean? As already mentioned , “holism,” “holism,” including including m ost systems theories, theories, is stil stilll primarily ground ed w ithin the parad igm of simp lific lification ation -- i.e. i.e.,, four four th or d er, persp ectival consciousn consciousn ess. Yet, in all fairness, fairness, a move tow ard s a “holist” perspective perspective is usually a step in the right direction. direction. 4 I am n o dou bt un fairly fairly lum lum ping m any th eories eories together, yet, generally generally speaking, speaking, since the level of focus focus is para d igmat ic, ic, it it is not inaccurate to say th at “h olism” is a simp simp lific lification. ation. There is is no dou bt that m ore holistic thin king is necessary and that we mu st cease cease w ith rampan t reductionism reductionism and rationalizing. rationalizing. We must recognize recognize relationships relationships as p rior to the illusion illusion of ind ind epend ently operating p arts. We need, in no uncertain term s, an ecological ecological “w orld view” on all fron fron ts. Yet, w e mu st not see only the w hole, only the relationship, relationship, only the netw ork, only the context, only the em ergen ces. To do this is to simp lify lify (albeit (albeit in a fashion fashion th at fosters hop e of a bright er futu re), and ther efore ultimately fails sufficiently sufficiently to transform transform ou r fund amental und erstandings erstandings of the world so as to m eet our challenges. Most importan tly, keeping Gebser’s Gebser’s wise wor ds in m ind, spatial un derstan dings them selves selves are limited limited and limiting, limiting, and th erefore erefore are inherently trun cating, cating, fragmenting, and simplifying. simplifying. Just by d iscussing iscussing “system,” one is lured into spatial language, into spatial conceptualizati conceptualizations, ons, and further into
4
Practically Practically speaking, if the w orst epistemological problem w e faced faced w ere the red uction to the wh ole, then w e most likely likely w ould not be facing facing th e current ecological ecological crisis. crisis. Thoug h, politically politically and socially, socially, fascism fascism and totalitarianism wou ld be m ore likely. likely.
119 per spectival consciousn ess. A para d igm of comp lexity is not limited to persp ectival perception of space and time, as comp lexity can only be tru ly comp lex when “w ared” transp arently -- aperspectivally, acategorically, aration ally, achron ically -- i.e., integrally. Thus, w e should not limit our th inking in terms of “broaden ing our perspective” or “d eepening our und erstand ing.” I am n ot simp ly presenting more theory or explanatory p rinciples, but fund amental characteristics of a par adigm . It is at the level of the p arad igm th at the v ision of reality, the reality of vision, the face of action chan ge, that reality in shor t chan ges. We d iscover, therefore, that comp lexity is situated , not only at the level of the observation of phenom ena and of the elaboration of theory, but at th e level of principle or par ad igm. (Morin, 1977/ 1992, p. 391)
In Closing A parad igm of complexity is one way in w hich to un derstand complex thinking, perceiving, and meaning-making. The point of stressing a paradigm of comp lexity is that our b asic d ispositions, at least epistem ologically, mu st become mor e comp lex. Yet, it is not necessary to take these prin ciples to extremes in every situation at all times, as this wou ld not be balanced or healthy. Maintaining an aw areness of the dyn amics of transformation (e.g., repu diation), in tand em w ith common epistemological errors (e.g., the p re/ trans fallacy), is a first step in attaining m uch n eeded clarity. In the search for liberation from the restrictive bonds of the p arad igm of simplification, it w ould be w ise to ensure that w e do not simp ly blindly react against that w hich w e are differentiating our selves from . As Bélanger stat es, “com plexity is not the rejection of the less comp lex by the m ore comp lex; it is on contrary t he integra tion of the less comp lex in the diver sity” (in Morin, 1977/ 1992, p . xxx). Repud iation is a natu ral
120 part of the process, but simp ly to polarize oneself against a deficient mod e of consciousness just breeds m ore pathology. Op ening ourselves to the comp lex wor ld aroun d u s will enable us to embra ce un certainty, chaos, and d isord er as partn ers in the adventu re of life. Those initiated into a p arad igm of comp lexity not only see the prov erbial grain of sand in the w orld, but simu ltaneously, like Blake, see the w orld in a grain of sand .
121 Conclusion
The early voyagers, from th eir perspective, risked their very lives when they sailed near to what they regarded as the edge of the universe. Neither the world as they knew it nor their very way of know ing wou ld be the same after the voyage as before it. Likewise, a change in ou r ord er of consciousness is not just a chan ge in the figures of our attention, it is a change in the very gro un d from w hich we attend . (Kegan, 1994, p. 266) Acceptance and elucidation of the “new” always meets with strong opposition, since it requires us to overcome our traditional, our acquired and secured ways an d p ossessions. This means pain, suffering, struggle, uncertainty, and similar concomitants w hich everyone seeks to avoid w henev er possible. (Gebser, 1949/ 1985, p.36) Our thou ght mu st lay siege to the unthou ght wh ich command s and controls it. We use our structure of thought to th ink. It will also be necessary to use our though t to rethink our structure of though t. Our thou ght mu st return to its source in an interrogative and critical loop. Otherw ise, the dead structu re will continue to secrete petrifying thou ghts. (Morin, 1977/ 1992, p. 16)
Wheth er considerin g Kegan’s fifth ord er, Gebser’s Integral consciou sness, or Morin’s paradigm of complexity, it is the process of thinking-perceivingmeaning-making that has been un der d iscussion. In other wor ds, ultimately, I have been exploring the found ations of comp lex TPM. Given the d iscussion to this po int, the follow ing shou ld be clear: 1) consciou sness evolves, both in th e ind ividu al and collectively, 2) ind ividu als recapitulate m uch of the collective’s ph ylogeny in th eir ontogen y -- e.g., in th e wa y that Kegan ’s first ord er correspond s to Gebser’s m agical consciousness, 3) the d ominant mod e of consciou sness, collectively, is the d eficient form of four th ord er/ men talpersp ectival-rational consciousness, wh ich correspond s to m odern ism and Morin’s notion of a paradigm of simplification, 4) there is emerging what is referred to as fifth order/ postm odern / integral/ comp lex consciousness, 5) it is this mod e of consciousness th at requ ires our a ttention if we are, to u se Gebser’s ph rasing, to make the necessary leap over th e abyss to the new mod e, 6) this new
122 mod e of consciousn ess offers the prom ise of a necessary healthy r elationship t o ourselves and the world, and finally, 7) fifth ord er/ postmodern/ integral/ comp lex consciousness is the constitu tion of comp lex TPM -- i.e., how it is that we come to relate to our wor ld/ reality in a non-simplifying mann er. Though not exclusively, comp lex TPM is fifth ord er/ integral/ postmod ern “para digm of comp lexity” consciousness. Making meaning of the wor ld, of what w e commonly refer to as “reality,” in term s of comp lex TPM is the rad ical shift in grou nd of our Self/ culture from the fourth ord er to the fifth order, from m odernism to p ost-mod ernism, from perspectival/ mental consciousness to ap erspectival/ integral consciousness, from th e parad igm of simp lification to th e par ad igm of comp lexity. As Wilber (1995) states, “all knowledge of other is simply a different degree of self-knowledge, since self and other are of the same fabric, and speak softly to each other at any mom ent that one listens” (p. 110). In other w ord s, it is of central imp ortan ce to be awar e that the boun da ries between self and other, or any boun dar ies for that m atter, are relative and slipp ery. Contexts are not fixed and cannot be reified. Therefore, given Kegan ’s d escription of the sh ifts in su bject-object relations, we m u st conclude that not only is “the world” other than w hat w e think it is, but th at most importan tly, w e are not wh at we think w e are either. Everything is always more th an w e think it is, thou gh th is is less so if we tru ly are able to take to heart, and aw aken to, the em erging Integr al structu re of consciousn ess -- i.e., the aw areness of, and participation in, apersp ectival, achronic, arational, and acategorical verition, or in other w ords, the “tr anspar ent” m odes of TPM. Comp lex TPM is pred icated n ot only up on the realization that an y boun dar ies between self and other are fluid and shifting, nor solely on the
123 “transp arent” integral m odes of verition, but also on an explicit recognition of comp lexity. Epistemologically speaking , to live in accorda nce with the pr inciples of comp lex thinking is crucial to TPM -- i.e., the p rinciple of the d ialogic, the maintaining of a comp lex relationship that is simu ltaneously comp lementary, concurren t, and a nta gonistic; the p rinciple of recursivity -- the verition of the comp lex circular relationship between tw o p rinciples, normally seen as d isjoined , but that are u ltimately insepar able, e.g., subject/ object; the hologramm atic principle -- that the w hole is “in” the p art as the p art is in the wh ole, and that the p art/ wh ole relationship is complex and is to be und erstood in holonomic terms as un itas multiplex. The necessity of the emergence of a new mod e should be obvious given the following: 1) w e are living in a time of great up heaval and transformation -i.e., the end of the West’s Mod ern Persp ectival worldv iew, 2) we as ind ividu als recapitulate w hat has collectively p receded us (present context accoun ted for), and 3) this process is developm ental. TPM that is foun ded on persp ectival simplification cannot continu e its course and avoid disaster (intrapersonally, interp ersona lly, cultur ally, ecologically, etc). A mor e comp lex, mor e inten se, “higher” ord er context is evolving even as w e speak, and we m ust recognize it if we are to survive. This means that we mu st relinqu ish many of the fun dam ental assump tions that w e hold so dear, that w e, in fact, tacitly hold as p rimary to ou r existential foundations. As d iscussed , centr al to Kegan’s (1994) w ork is his insight into th e fact tha t there is a definite pattern un derlying the evolution of our stru ctures of meaning making -- i.e., differentiation always pr ecedes integration. And wh ile we ar e always “embed -duals” as m uch as w e are “indivi-du als,” complex TPM is a
124 liberation from the crushing weight that our collective psyche is experiencing as the enorm ous shift to a planetary culture tran spires. The freedom that I refer to here is different than the freedom th at comes with th e hard w on auton omy of the four th ord er or rational/ mental consciousness, as both of these modes correspond to a parad igm of simplification. The freedom that co-emerges with the m anifestation of a comp lex TPM process is well expr essed in th e followin g passage: Freedom is a developm ent of the ability of a self-organizing being to u se un certainty and chance occurrences in a w ay that is itself aleatory an d un certain but leads to autonom y. Freedom th erefore appears as a consequ ence of comp lexification... (Morin, sour ce u nkn ow n, p. 566)
At the same time, to avoid fur ther d eficient mental gropings tow ard s persp ectival and r ational manifestations, we m ust also realize that w e cannot force this shift. Since comp lex TPM is a natu ral emerg ence of the d yna mics of the evolut ion of consciousn ess, w e can on ly foster it. On th is poin t Gebser (1949/ 1985) states th e follow ing: The new consciousness structure has nothing to d o with m ight, rule, and overpow ering. Thus it cannot be striven for, only elicited or aw akened. Anyone w ho strives for it, intend ing to attain it mentally, is cond emned to failure at the ou tset… what is needed is care; a great d eal of patience; and the laying aside of many p reconceived op inions, w ishful d reams, and the blind sway of deman ds. (p. 300)
Since w e cannot mentally reach for it (to use a sp atial/ persp ectival metap hor), then how can we actualize this new consciousness? If, as Kegan holds, we are in subject territory when w e do not know wh at we d o not know, then it should be no surp rise that we do n ot truly know how to “awaken” to the new consciousn ess, as to some extent th at w ou ld m ean casting it as “object.” Yet,
125 there is a way for us to garner some insight into this new emergence and our relationship to it. As Kegan (1994) insight fully states: Those wh o long for mor e fifth ord er consciou sness -- for the recognition of ou r m ultip le selves, for the capacity to see conflict as a signa l of ou r overidentification with a single system, for the sense of our relationships and connections as prior to an d constitutive of the individu al self, for an identification w ith the transformative pr ocess of our being rath er than the prod ucts of our becoming -- let them take heart. The aspiration for more fifth ord er consciousness has on e extraordinarily robust asset on its side, thou gh odd ly enough , it is hard ly ever remarked up on. (p. 351) What is hard ly ever remarked up on is a simple fact: people live longer than they u sed to! Kegan (1994) po sits tha t, given an ad d ed gen eration of life from a hu nd red years ago, there is likely to emerge “a qualitatively new or der of consciou sness” (p. 352). This order of consciousn ess is non e other th an th e fifth order on a w idespread collective level. The evolution of hu man consciousness requires long pr eparation. We may grad ually become ever more ready to engage the curriculum of the fifth order because we hav e foun d w ays to increase the num ber of years w e live. And wh y are w e increasing the num ber of years we live? Are we living longer as a species so that w e might evolve to the fifth order? (Kegan, 1994, p. 352) Wagn er (1999) rep orts th at, as of 1998, the wo rld p opu lation of centenar ians (peop le age 100 or high er) was ar ou nd 135,000 and it is estimated that by th e year 2050, there w ill be 2.2 million p eople over the ag e of 100. The U.S. Census Bu reau has estim ated that in the year 1900 there w ere 3,500 centenar ians and tha t now , in 1999, ther e are nearly 66,000 (Wagner). Assu min g that w e do not d estroy ourselves or our ecosystems, and given the adva nces in mod ern m edicine and the integration of “alternative” med icine into the mainstream, w e can expect m ore peop le to live even longer. 1
1
Russell (1995) persu asively argues tha t a wor ld p opu lation of 10 10 is necessary for the em ergence of the “global brain,” and that, moreov er, we are steadily headin g in that direction.
126 We are thus confronted w ith a parad ox, as fourth order, persp ectival/ mental consciousness has m ad e it possible for so many peop le to live such a long time, and for m ore com plex mod es of consciousn ess to evolve. Yet, this very same ph enomenon -- i.e., peop le living longer and increasing the pop ulation -- is d irectly related to th e grow ing ecological crisis. If so man y peop le are still functioning a ccord ing to a rat ionalistic, du alistic, persp ectival TPM process, then our futu re is rather grim. Yet, this very same phenom enon is forcing the transformation, the mu tation, to a new m ode of consciousness that is sustainable. Recall that Gebser (1949/ 1985) holds th at consciousness is not sim ply an aw areness, but th at it is also an active agent in its own evolution, and in th is way we can see that the fourth order/ perspectival manner of relating to the w orld not only brough t forth ou r condition, but inh erently includ es the genesis of its transformation in latent form. In short, we are living in exciting times. There is mu ch uncertaint y and we can only guess what w ill transpire in the years to come. My intent here was to explore, and present, w hat I see as a positive potential in our futu re -- that pot ential being the emer gence of a new mo d e of consciou sness: fifth order/ postmodern/ integral/ comp lex TPM, wh ich will sublate the current dom inant m ode th at has become deficient. According to Gebser (1949/ 1985), we mu st “achieve the new integral structure w ithout forfeiting th e efficient forms of the p reviou s structu res” (p. 299). This last point is wh ere Morin’s vision becomes crucial, as we mu st develop the ability to be aware of our comp lex surrou nd ings in all of their comp lexity. We mu st recognize wha t is and is not w orking, to repu diate that w hich w e mu st differentiate ourselves from, and to reintegrate the efficient forms of that w hich w e have repu diated -- that wh ich w e have
127 pr ojected, or “th row n from ” ourselves, and cast off as “object.” We mu st realize that holism and atomism are both forms of simp lification, and that any on e point of view is limited by its very d efinition, and is therefore an incomp lete and distorted perception of reality. If w e are able to accomplish this “mu tation,” as ind ividu als and as a collective -- epistemologically, p sychologically, spiritua lly -- then w e not only have a good chance of survival. There is also the likelihood of a tru ly planetary culture. As a d iverse, dialogically interconnected planetary cultur e we can look to the stars an d realize that w e are galactic citizens living in a vast an d my sterious u niverse. Finally, as Gebser states, “if w e do not overcom e the crisis it will overcome u s; and only someone w ho h as overcome himself is truly able to overcome. Either w e will be disintegrated an d d ispersed, or we mu st resolve and effect integr ality” (1949/ 1985, p. xxvii). Persona lly, I prefer integra lity.
128 References
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132 App endix I
Below is a chart that shows the basic correspondences between Kegan’s (1994) subject-object mo d el an d Gebser’s (1949/ 1985) stru ctures of consciou sness.
Kegan’s ord ers
Gebser’s structu res
Zero
Archaic
First
Magic (early Mythic)
Second
Mythical (early Mental)
Third
Mental (resid u al Mythic)
Fourth
Mental-Perspectival/ Rational
Fifth
(early) Integral
(Sixth) 1
Integral
?
Integral ?
Following a re three d iagrams, wh ich in tan dem succinctly show th e stru ctures of Kegan’s and Gebser’s theories as discu ssed herein . The sou rces are listed below for the interested reader.
1) "The Five O rd ers o f Cons ciousn ess" -- Kegan , 1994, p . 314-5. 2) “A h elix of evolu tionary tr uces" -- Kegan , 1982, p. 109. 3) “Space and Tim e Relations hip ” -- Gebser , 1949/ 1985, p.117-8
1
Just as Piaget does not p osit a fifth ord er, Kegan d oes not posit a sixth ord er. For in-dep th discussion of a sixth order, see Wilber as referenced.
133
insert charts h ere
134 App end ix II: A few word s on “postmodernism
When I use the term “postm odern ” I am p urp osely and consciously painting with an extremely broad brush . I am not concerned w ith defining sharp boun dar ies of what is or is not “p ostmod ern.” Eagleton (1996) makes the u seful distinction betw een “p ostmod ernity,” a sp ecific historical period, a nd “p ostm od ernism ,” a style of cultu re that is reflective of post mod ernity. For present p ur poses this distinction sits in the backgroun d, so wh en I use the term “postm odern ” I am p urp osely ignoring this otherw ise importan t differentiation. In this sense, for this pap er, postmod ernism can be considered in light of the following passage:
Postmodernity is a style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth , reason, id entity, and objectivity, of the id ea of u niversal p rogress or eman cipation, of single frameworks, grand narratives or u ltimate groun ds of explanation. Against these Enlightenm ent norm s, it sees the w orld as contingent, un groun ded , diverse, un stable, ind eterminate, a set of disunified cultur es or interpretations wh ich breed a d egree of skepticism about the objectivity of truth , history and norm s, the givenness of natures and the coherence of identities…. Postmod ernism is a style of culture w hich reflects something of this epochal chan ge, in a d epthless, d ecentered , ung rou nd ed , self-reflexive, playful, derivative, eclectic, plur alistic art w hich blur s the boun da ries betw een ‘high’ and ‘pop ular’ cultur e, as well as between ar t and ever yd ay experience. (Eagleton, 1996, p. vii) Postmodern ism should not be red uced or limited to its specific ma nifestations -- e.g., critical theory , relativity, com plem entar ity, surr ealism, dad a, existentialism, transp ersonal p sychology, cultures of ap prop riation (e.g., DJ culture), musique concréte, global media, syncretic new age religion, quantum ph ysics, chaos th eory, politicization of the private sp here, gender or cultural stud ies, feminisms, counter -cu ltur al movem ents, issues of race, sexuality, or gender, or any of the numerous other realms, fields, disciplines, forms, schools, genres, movements, or discourses stemm ing there from.
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