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The Enigma of Chess Intuition
Valeri Beim
The Enigma of Chess Intuition Can You Mobilize Hidden Forces in Your Chess?
New In Chess 2012
© 2 0 1 2 New In Chess Published by New In Chess, Alkmaar, The Netherlands www.newinchess.com
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission from the publisher. Cover design: Volken Beck Translation: Steve Giddins Supervisor: Peter Boel Proofreading: Rene Olthof Production: Anton Schermer Have you found any errors in this book? Please send your remarks to editors @newinchess.com. We will collect all relevant corrections on the Errata page of our website www.newinchess.com and implement them in a possible next edition. ISBN: 97 8-90-5 69 1 -3 79-3
Contents
Foreword
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Chapter 1 - First Explorations
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Chapter 2- Successful Use oflntuition Chapter 3
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9
45
The Elements of Chess Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 59 .
Index of Players Bibliography Game List .
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263 265 267
5
Foreword
To the person without whom this manuscript would hardly have seen the light of day.
In this book, as in all my previous ones, I have followed a principle which is well-known to my regular readers. It is as follows : that the majority of chess play ers, regardless of their age, playing strength or ambitions, want not only to learn about the existence of the various different chess principles, but also to learn how to exploit them themselves. Therefore, in my books, articles and training sessions, I work as follows : first, I tell about the fact of the existence of a certain principle or method of play, then I formulate it in the most general way, and after this, I present examples, showing all its possible sides. In this way, I try to show as clearly as possi ble how one can use this principle or method in one's own games, albeit not as well as a great master, but use it, all the same. . . ! I will use the same method in this book, although here, things are a little more complicated, since we are dealing with the most mysterious of all aspects of chess. Since we are concerned only with questions of intuition, albeit in as much detail as possible, I have often left out variations which seem to me to be superfluous, and not bearing on the matter in hand. The subject I am attempting to tackle in this book is not the most specific and concrete of subjects. This is because of the rather mysterious essence of intuition it self Where does it come from, how does it work, is it something concrete, or is it partly taken from the subconscious world? I will try to find answers to these ques tions, but only in relation to chess itself I have not attempted to show exactly how intuition is constructed or how it works, but I try to explain how it comes into ef fect and where it takes us. As always, I ask my readers not to be shy of telling me their opinion of my work. Praise and criticism will be received with equal gratitude. My e-mail address is:
[email protected] Valeri Beim, V ienna, March 2 012
7
Chapter 1- First Explorations
Almost everyone has heard about the ex istence of intuition in daily life, and many adults (I cannot say anything definite about intuition amongst children) have felt its influence in their own lives. But if such a thing exists, it can be manifested in any area of life. Its display will look similar in all cases, adjusted only for the specifics of the area of application. This means that in chess, intuition ought to, and does indeed, occupy its own niche. The question of its role and place has not often been discussed in a serious way in chess literature, although such phrases as 'this decision was taken intuitively' , 'there was practically no time left to think, and it was necessary to trust to in tuition' , and other similar versions, are quite often seen in game commentaries. But as a rule, here the discussion about intuition ends. I do not pretend to be fa miliar with all of the world's chess litera ture, but in those books which I have had cause to pick up, I have only on a few occasions found interesting material about the mechanism of intuition in a game of chess or about the specific char acteristics of those situations where a player should rely on intuition more than other methods. And even in these few cases, the treatment was not very systematic, and has only dealt with the issue partially, based on the specific as pects of the subject which have inter ested the author.
Almost everywhere, we can see exam ples which in varying degrees accord with the topic of this book, and we can come across the names of great players who are regarded as belonging to the so-called intuitive group of players. However, as soon as one gets to the point where it is time to discuss pre cisely what the mechanism of intuition is in the taking of decisions at the board, we encounter a wall of silence. This means that I will have to rely on only a small amount of helpful auxil iary material. But no matter, I will try to deal with the issue myself. In the meantime, let us continue our dis cussion in a logical, step-by-step way, without jumping ahead. First of all, I would point out that a description of the mechanism of how exactly intuition functions is of not merely theoretical in terest to those who play the game regu larly, be they professionals or merely am ateurs who play for pleasure. Nobody can doubt that in a chess player's arsenal, in addition to well-known weapons, such as tactical skill, the ability to calcu late variations, the technique of realising a material or positional advantage, the technique of positional play. plus specific theoretical knowledge of openings and endings, there is also a quality that, so far, has not been given any clear con tours, namely intuition. On the basis of this mysterious, hard to identify quality.
9
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
a player can sometimes take a decision, which later surprises him, both for its speed and quality, in a complicated situ ation. As we will see, it is not a simple matter, but even so this is the subject I have decided to tackle. It seems to me that I have succeeded in getting to grips with it, and can say what has hitherto not been said; and that what I have to say not only describes the objective reality, but is also readable.
Intuition is the ability to assess a
The wish to identify two contrasting methods of reaching a decision, the intu itive and the logical, already disappeared years ago. The beginning of this can be found in Plato's doctrine of ideas, in which there is a concept of their arising without reasoning. Epicurus consolidated the phenomenon of direct knowledge in the word Em(3oA.11. The translation of this term into the Latin «intuitus» (from the verb intueri, meaning to peer, to gaze penetratingly, or to comprehend immedi ately) was done in the fifth century by Boethius, as you can see from the refer ence to 'Intuitija' on the Russian Wikipedia site1• But here is a more practi cal definition: the famous intellectual A. A. Wasserman, a man of wide knowl edge, characterised intuition in the most general form: 'Intuition is the ability to draw conclusions subconsciously, with out sufficient data'. This definition is very close to various others I have seen in dif ferent languages and sources. But I like still more a passage from the 'old-fashioned' , but my favourite writer, Agatha Christie: 'Women subcon sciously notice thousands of small de tails, subconsciously compare them, and call it intuition' (Agatha Christie, The Murder of Roger Ackroyd) . Right on the money, I think! But the ability described is not only possessed by women. Thus, without exception, all of the sources quoted agree that:
ately ·take the correct decision. An intuitive decision can arise
without a reasoning process. This is the most important thing,
The subject of research
The first essential step in looking into or discussing any subject, is to define it as precisely as possible. This is essential, firstly, to eliminate all kinds of misun derstandings which can arise from dif ferent people using a certain term to mean different things. And secondly, because a successful definition of the term can help those who were not pre viously familiar with the subject, to use their new knowledge in their own activities, which should be one of the most inter esting and important results of working with a book. In order to deal correctly with the im portant matter of definition, we will be gin by looking at what others have said on this topic in which we are interested. ' Intuition' comes from the Latin intuitio - contemplation:
situation, and without reason ing or logical analysis, immedi
either as the result of long thought about the answer to the question, or without it.
10
An intuitive decision is
one taken
which we must never forget.
1) http: //ru.wikipedia.org/wikiMHTYIU\Hll
Chapter 1
Let us remember this at all the key mo ments, and we will see that it is proved right over and over again in relation to chess. At the same time, I must emphasise that my book is not about intuition in its general form. I am concerned only with intuition in chess. In order to complete this transition, we must recall two well-known, but none theless important truths: a) Playing mess consists in a permanent process . of judge ment and calculation. b) In the most general.sense, playing chess is a continual pro cess of choice between different options. and this choice can be made in different ways. .
Now, finally, we can move on to my exposition of my own ideas about how intuition manifests itself in chess. To begin with, I will suggest a formulation, which I ask you for the time being simply to accept , since the requisite proof and justification will become apparent in the later discus sion. Thus: In chess, intuition manifests it self first and . foremost in the ability, in a somewhat uncon scious way. and with a high de
gree of accuracy, to choose be
tween different lines ofplay.
A high degree of accuracy is an important condition, since any of us can easily
-
F i r s t E xplora ti ons
make bad choices, without any special preparation! However, intuition has other areas of use, with which we will become famil iar in the course of this book. Immediately after this, we must make an important point: the factor of intuition should not be either deified, nor de monised! Intuition is not a magic wand, waving which can solve all problems. It is no more than a means to assist one in making a successful choice in compli cated circumstances. It is just another human talent, just like other, more widely-recognised attributes, such as the ability to draw logical conclusions. We all make mistakes in using different methods of reaching decisions, and mis takes also occur with the use of intu ition. In both cases, what is important is the percentage success rate! Thus, the task which we will set our selves in this book can be formulated as follows: We will look seriously at the is sue of making use in chess of subconscious methods of fore seeing
the probable
future
course ofevents..
The basic introductory matters have been dealt with, we have set up a theoretical base, and now it is time to turn to con crete matters: the chequered board, pieces and pawns. First of all, we will look at some examples, showing the afore mentioned basic components of the game - the operation of judgement and calculation. The best order to examine these is to start with a case of calculation. (see next page) 11
T h e Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on Bednarski,Jacek Giorgadze,TaEnaz Tbilisi Goglidze Memorial, 1 9 7 1
0
It is easy to see that at no point was Black able to change the course of af fairs in any real way. In all of the fairly simple variations, his position is indis putably hopeless, in other words, there was never at any point any doubt as to the assessment of the position. We therefore have before us a crystal clear example of calculation in its pur est form. Now we will look at how assessment of the position works. Here, matters are a little more complicated.
Here, White seized the chance to end the game in his favour, in a rapid and convincing manner, as follows: 25. tbd5-e7+! tbc6xe7 26. �h6xf8+ �g8xf8
Botvinnik,Mikhail Donner,}an Hein Amsterdam GAK, 1 963
Or 26 . . Jhf8 2 7 .fxe7 .l:Xe8 2 8.ii.xb7 l:.d6 (28 . . . .!:f.d7 29.ii.c6) 29.ii.a6 .U.e6 30 . .l:!xe6 fxe6 3 I .ii.c41:f.xe7 3 2.1If6 ; 27. f6xe7+ 28. ii.f3xb7
'iit>f8-e8 .l:lb8xb7
29. l:!.f1 xf7! Now the pawn on e7 will cost Black a rook and so he had to resign. 1-0
12
The further course of this game involves looking at a relatively small number of simple variations. The main difficulty in the search for the right continuation is understanding the char acteristics of the position and its re quirements. In other words, here we are dealing with a situation in which judgement factors will for some time be more important than the calculation of variations. One of the strongest aspects of the sixth world champion, Mikhail Moiseevich
Chapter 1 - First Explorati ons
Botvinnik, was his colossal depth of po sitional understanding, which he will ingly shared with others, through his annotations of his games. I will make full use of these, quoting his notes (in inverted commas) to those moments of the game that are most important for us.
1 6. 'iVd1 -b3! 'An important manoeuvre. In reply to 'ti'c7-b 7 + , White will always have the reply 'ti'b3-f3 , and the endgame is in his favour' . Even so, the course of the game leads one to think that Black should have gone into this ending, since there, Black would have had significant defensive chances. 1 6. 1 7. l:i.f1 -c1 1 8. 'ilb3-f3
Mikhail Botvinnik
14.
tt:Jf3-d4!
'The exchange of light-squared bish ops . . . turns out in White's favour, since the square c6 is weakened and will be more easily seized' . 14. 1 5. \t>g1 xg2
�f8-c8 'i/c7-b7+ tt:Jf6-d5
In the event of the queen exchange, Botvinnik gives the vanatwn 1 8 . . . 'iVxf3 + 1 9.tLl2xf3 \t>f8 20 .tLlc6 l:i.c7 2 1 .l:rc2 .l:!.ac8 2 2 .�ac 1 'with strong pressure' . Even so, it was wrong to avoid the exchange of queens. The middlegame turns out to be lost, prin cipally because of the highly unfortunate position of the black queen. 1 9. e2-e4
tt:Jd5-f6
�b7xg2 'ifd8-c7
20. b4-b5! White gives his opponent the c5 -square, in order to seize the square c6, assessing this as a more important 13
The Enigma of C hess I n t u i t i on
factor, and in the following he will be proved correct. 20. 21 . tt:Jd4-c6
a7-a6 il.e7-f8
Botvinnik recommended bringing the bishop to cS . 22. a3-a4 23. a4xb5 24. �c1 xa1
25. 26. tt:Jd2-c4 27. e4-e5
tt:Jf6-e8 tt:Jd7-c5 .l:i.a8-c8
2 7 . . . ti:Jc7? loses at once: 2 8 . .l::i.d 7 tLlxd7 29.tLle7+.
a6xb5 .:raaxa1 l::tc8-a8
28. J:.d1 -a1 ! .l::rc8-c7
25. .l:i.a1 -d1 ! 'The decisive move of the game. The lone rook on the a-file is not dangerous, whilst on the d-file, the white rook, in contact with his other pieces, will play the main role.' Here, I want to make a small digression, and advise all those who wish to improve their positional play to work more with Botvinnik's games, with his own notes. The small extract just quoted excellently illustrates the correctness of this advice. In two short sentences, the whole essence of the position is summarised. True, just one reading of his comments is not enough. One must read very attentively, sometimes several times, and think very deeply about it. But the benefits of such work can be enormous. 14
Black is killed by the opposition of the queens : 2 8 . . . .l:i.a8 2 9 . .:rxa8 'i¥xa8 3 0 .tLle7+. 29. J:ra1 -a7
'i¥b7xa7
Also hopeless is 29 . . . 'iVc8 3 0 .ti:Jxb6. 30. tt:Jc6xa7 31 . tt:Jc4xb6
.!::!.c 7xa7
There is no hope. 1 -0 It is already clear from this example that playing with the emphasis on assessing the position correctly, and thus cor rectly understanding the future course of events, is far from simple. As a rule, it is more difficult than playing positions where the essence of everything is based on a limited number of varia tions. Therefore, we will look at another instructive example.
Chapter 1 Botvinnik,Mikhail Pachman,Ludek Oberhausen Ech-tt, 1 9 6 1
D
Attempting to break Botvinnik's posi tional chains, Black's last move was 2 9 . . . f5, posing his opponent a choice. Botvinnik played 30. tt:ld4xf5! Other continuations gave Black good play, after both 3 0 .exf5 tt:lxd4 3 1 .£lxd4 £lxf5, and 3 0.tt:lxe6 £lxe6. Therefore, in a higher sense, White's decision can be considered forced. 30. 31 . e4xf5 32. g3-g4
g6xf5 ti:Je6-g7
-
F i rs t Explora t i ons
meet the typical King's Indian advance of the black pawn to fS . Thus, Botvinnik writes: 'The white pawns are very strong. The disharmony among his pieces and open position of his king render Black's posi tion critical.' I would draw your attention to the fact that we have before us, in pure form, a very short, but precise summary of a position which is quite complicated, in the sense of the number of pieces on the board and the non-standard out ward appearance of the position. The result of the game now depends on ex actly the correctness of this far from im mediately obvious assessment. Botvinnik convincingly shows that he is right. 32 . ...
l::re 8-e5?!
In Botvinnik's opinion, it was better to go in for the variation 3 2 . . . tt:lxfS 3 3 .gxf5 l:leS . But the silicon friend cor rects this: 34.£lxc5 ! .l::!.x cS (34 . . . £lxf5 ? loses after 3 5 .£le4! £lxe4 3 6 . tt:lxe4 dxcS 3 7 .tt:lf6+ �h8 3 8 Jhe5) 3 S .f6 with an indisputable advantage. Even so, I have left in the dubious mark against the text, suggesting that Black instead try the simple 3 2 . . £le7 . .
33. £le3-d4! Excellently played. The exchange of a pair of rooks is forced, the latter being currently Black's most active piece, re ducing his chances of creating counter play, which Black desperately needs in this position. Botvinnik had aimed for this position at move 3 0 , when considering how to
33. 34. .l:Id1 xe1
.l::!.e5xe1 + I:i.a8-e8 15
T h e Enigma o f Ch ess I n t u i t i on
After 4 1 .. . tt:lxdS White has a nice forced win: 42 . .illxd5 + ! cxdS 43 . .illx g7 Vi'xg7 44.'i¥xd5+ �h8 45 .f6 ! 'i!Yxf6 46.'i¥d8 ! Vi'f3 47 . .l:[d3 . 42. .ille4-f3
35. .l:!.e1 -d1 ! It is interesting that this very strong de cision, based more on assessment than calculation (the importance to White of retaining one rook soon becomes clear) , is not only not commented on by Botvinnik, but he does not even punctuate the move! 35. 36. b3-b4 37. a3xb4
.ill d 7-c8 a5xb4 tt:Jc5-a6
In this position, the game was ad journed and Pachman sealed his move. However, seeing that his position was hopeless, and knowing of Botvinnik's fantastic analytical ability, he resigned without resuming, thereby giving him self and his opponent an extra free day. 1 -0 So, what is interesting for our purposes in what we have seen so far? We can al ready claim with some confidence that the degree of proof (we could also call it the degree of convincingness) is greater when variations predominate over positional considerations. We will speak more of this later, but for now, I will give a simple example of how intuition shows itsel£ Kramnik,Vladimir Anand,Viswanathan Belgrade Investbanka, 1 99 7
•
38. tt:lc3-e4!
ti.e8xe4
Necessary. 3 8 . . Jid8 loses quickly: 3 9.tt:lf6+ �h8 40.'i!Yd2 'i!Y£7 4 l ..ill e4! .ill e 7 42.tt:lxh7 and so on. 39. .illg 2xe4 40. Vi'c2-d2 41 . c4xd5 16
tt:la6xb4 d6-d5 c6xd5
Here too, we give the microphone to the winner:
Chapter 1
Viswanathan Anand
36 . ...
c4-c3!
'I considered playing 3 6 .. Jlb7 ?? but smelt a rat and decided to stick with 3 6 . . . c3 . In fact 3 6 . . . .!::i.b 7?? loses to 3 7 .�xe6+ ! .' 37. �h3xe6!? 'I thanked my intuition for choosing 3 6 . . . c3 over 3 6 . . . .!:i.b7 ? ? and contin ued . . . '
37.
�d5xe6
(Vishy Anand, My Best Games of Chess, Gambit Publications Ltd, 200 1 ) 38. d4-d5 39. g2xf3
.l:f.f7xf3
3 9 ..!hf3 loses even more quickly: 3 9 . . . c2 40.'iVfl 'iYxf3 ! etc. 39. 40. 'iVb5-c4 41 . 'iVc4-g4+ 42. e5-e6
�e6-h3 �h3xf1 �g8-h7 tt::lf8-g6 0-1
-
F i rs t Explorati ons
The sense of what Anand says is easily understood, his words are few, but I be lieve there is much in it that is useful for our subject. Let us try to extract this. I particularly like the first phrase: 'I smelt a rat'. It is also interesting that he mentions intuition, without the slightest explana tion of what made him 'switch on' the intuition at this moment. Let us for the moment just make a note of these two important points, and defer a more de tailed discussion until later on. For now, I will just point out that such a high au thority as the world champion should confirm the operation of intuition in his own games. But now let us compare the examples we have looked at. We will compare them in terms of the parameters of proof (convincingness) . What I mean by this will become clear. Thus, the first example: Bednarski Giorgadze. In this, White's actions
were based on calculation and the argu ment over the degree of convincingness is also easy to answer in such cases: there are either mistakes in the calcula tion or there are not. In this case, the play was forced, and so the degree of convincingness, given that the winner was correct, was high. Now the game Botvinnik-Donner. . Here, proving that the winner's actions were fully correct is less easy. After all, the winner's whole play was predicated on the expectation that the likely end game would be in his favour. And if this ending had arisen, winning it would 17
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i on
have been a long process, and one can not be sure that Black would not have found a defence. But does it follow from this that Botvinnik's play deserves criticism? I do not think it does. He tried to extract from the position the maximum that it contained. 'The most beautiful woman cannot give more than she has '.
despite their lesser degree of proof com pared with decisions reached on the ba sis of the calculation ofvariations, Decisions taken on the basis of positional
considerations
should also be considered to be based on firm and tangible foundations, because positional
matter ofsubstance. A positional judge ment can be tested by reference
considerations are a real
The
'judgement' game, Botvinnik-Pachman, was sharper, there were more variations, but most of the variations were subject to assessment, unlike in Bednarski-Giorgadze. I mean that, to begin with, on the basis of his assessment of the results of calculating a few, simple variations, Botvinnik came to the conclusion that he was obliged to fol low a different path, even if it meant sac rificing material and playing with mate rial down for some time thereafter; there was no forcing play to be foreseen. That is, he had to sacrifice material for no more than positional advantages. It is pre cisely in this that the most important and difficult part of the choice consisted. The terms 'degree of convincingness' or simply 'proof of a choice made on the basis of positional considerations' , which we introduced earlier, should be understood as follows: no matter who assesses a position, even the greatest player ever, if it is not possible to prove the assessment by concrete variations, then the game in question, and his an notations, will always remain subject to a certain amount of doubt. A high de gree of proof is only possible with vari ations, especially in our computer days. But at the same time, the following con clusion is important for our purposes: 18
other
to many well-known positional
principles and typical positional assessments.
But with intuition, this is not so: Intuition comes into play in situ ations where there are
insuffi
cient concrete factors by which the player can
orientate himself,
be those factors calculation or
positional considerations.
For this reason, the principal difference between intuition and other compo nents of chess skill is that it is more formless. Unlike calculation and assess ment, it is hard to get a grip on, and slips through one's fingers! What I have in mind is this: a strong player, looking at a game played by someone else, can always say: in this fragment of the game, the player took his decision based on calculation of variations, and he can even suggest what those varia tions were; and, by contrast, in this po sition, it is not possible to calculate a great deal, only a few short lines, and in such a position, decisions must be made on the basis of judgement.
Chapter I - F i rs t Explor a t i ons
But how can one determine and demonstrate that the decision was made on the basis of intuition? A difficult question. I believe that there is no simple answer at all! But a long and diverse answer is possible. One of my tasks in this book is to pro vide the reader with such an answer. And now it is time to turn to this sub j ect. To begin with, we will take a posi tion from a classical game.
tion which is clearly satisfactory or clearly not satisfactory.
Anderssen,Adolf Zukertort,Johannes Barmen WSB- 8. Kongress, 1 8 69
•
.i
� .i i.� i i .t � i �i � � i liL tbbi: � 'if � � a: � tv
_
_
This game is widely known, thanks to its striking finish. However, I consider that another moment in the game is far more interesting and full of content, and I now wish to bring this to your at tention. It is easy to see that in the very near fu ture, the two sides' forces are going to get into hand-to-hand combat. This will mean that the number of possible variations will grow sharply and will require continual calculation. In espe cially complicated positions, of which this is perhaps one, it is sometimes not possible to calculate lines out to a posi-
Johannes Zukertort
It is Zukertort's move. He already has an extra pawn and can take another; this he indeed did with 24. ...
'ifd8xd5
And this seemingly reasonable decision I consider to be a serious mistake, in fact even the decisive mistake of the game! What is wrong with it, and what should he play instead? As we will soon see, it is not easy to find the correct an swer. To begin with, let us look in more detail at the diagram position. In general terms, it looks like this: White is looking with all his forces at the black kingside, whilst the latter has a clear advantage on the queenside, and the clear prospect of seizing the centre. In such situations, it is always extremely important who first manages to exploit his advantage, it is always a battle of speed. And the sooner the slower side realises that he is losing this foot-race, 19
T h e Enigma of C hess In t u i t i on
the better his chances of defending suc cessfully. So, we have completed the first stage of our examination of the po sition - a general look at the situation. In simple positions, this is sometimes sufficient to determine the further course of the play. But not in our case, where we have to identify a mass of dif ferent details. The fact of the matter is that with such a large number of de tails, and with such extreme tension in the position, as always arises when it is a race to exploit one's trumps, the slightest inaccuracy can prove to be the decisive mistake. In such situations, general considerations alone are not enough. One must either calculate everything to the end, or . . . What this 'or' means will become clear from what follows. But first, a small observation: our first impression of the position is only part of the assessment of it.
I have omitted below not only part of the variations, but certain whole lines out of those that are possible, leaving only the two that seem the most sensi ble and promising. Thus, if we accept that Black's last move leads to inevitable defeat, then this means we have to test other possibili ties. How and where should we look? Our attention should first of all be on the fact that in taking the d5 pawn, Black loses a tempo, which could have been used to speed up his own play on the queenside and in the centre, where Black has a clear predominance. This aim is best met by the move I. 24... c4. The best reply White has is 25.�e4!; then the most appropriate reply seems to be 25 ...c3 After 25 . . . �c5 2 6.g6! gives White a decisive attack; and after 2 5 . . . l:i.c7 2 6.d6 l:!.c5 2 7 .gxf6 'iYxf6 2 8 . .l:lcg l his attack is also unstoppable. 26.'ti'e2
In situatiom of great
complex
ity. an accurate assessment of the position also requires the calcu lation ofvariations. And now about calculation in this posi tion. Below. there follows an absolutely huge number of variations, but believe me, it represents only a small part of the whole forest that we have to go through, in order to reach the truth. Incidentally, I have not worked alone, but have also used the program Fritz 1 0, and my computer has a very fast proces sor. Even with this, the work took a number of hours, and we both had to sweat blood! 20
And now Black has a choice between three continuations, two of which turn out to be insufficient: A) 26 4Jb7 Returning this knight from the edge of the board to the centre is an important defensive idea for Black, •••
Chapter 1
and runs like a thread through all of the variations. But it does not work in all cases, though! 2 7.g6 ! l:!.c7 2 8.gxh7+ 'it>xh7 29.ti:Jxe5! ti:Jd6 3 0.ti:Jg6 'it>g8
-
F i rs t Explo rati ons
White then appears to be 2S.gxf6 'iVxf6 26.ti:JgS I would remind you that we are looking only at a small part of the possi ble variations.
3 1 ..ic2 'iVe8 3 2.'iVe6 + ! ti:Jfl 3 3 .J::!.h 3 'iVxe6 34.fxe6 winning;
B) Also, after 26 .. Jlc7 2 7.gxf6 'iVxf6 2s.tt:Jgs ti:Jb7 29.'i¥hs 'i¥h6 ! 3 0.'i¥xh6 gxh6 3 1 .ti:Je6+ 'it>h8 (after 3 1 . . .'it>f7
3 2 . .l:!.g7+ etc. White has a significant advantage) 3 2.ti:Jxc7 .ixc7 3 3.f6 ti:Jd6 34 .ic2 e4 3S .J:!.g7 .ib6 36.Rd7 White has every chance of winning; C) Better chances of resistance are of fered by 26 ... J::!.d 7. Then after 2 7.gxf6 ! •
'i¥xf6 2 8.ti:Jgs ti:Jb7 29.ti:Jxh7 ! 'it>xh7
(29 . . . 'iVh6 ? 3 0.l:!.cg 1 ti:Jd6 3 1 .f6 J:!.bb7 3 2 .tLlgS ! 'ifxf6 3 3 .'ifhs 'i'Vh6 3 4.'ti'xh6 gxh6 3 S .ti:Je6+ winning) 30.'iih 5 + 'it>g8 (30 . . . 'iVh6 loses after 3 1J hg 7 + !) 3 1 ..l:!.g6 Black sacrifices his queen by means of 3 1 . .. .id8 ! (3 l . . .'ti'f7 ? loses immediately to 3 2 .f6 ! ; and 3 1 .. J:!.f7 ? loses after 3 2 .d6! tLlxd6 3 3 Jhf6 l:Ixf6 34 . .idS + ti:Jf7 3 S .'iVh4! and the result ing position is winning for White, as is clear from the following variations: 3 S .. Jhfs 3 6J:I:g 1 .ixf2 3 7 .'iVg4; or 3 S . . J:!:d8 3 6 . .l:.g 1 .ll dd6 3 7 . .ie6 'iit>f8 3 8 . .ixf7 llxf7 3 9 .'i¥xb4 J::!.d 7 40.llg6 c2 4 1 .Rxd6 c1 'iV + 4 2 .l:!.d 1 + 'iV cS 4 3 . 1WxcS + .ixcS 44.l:hd7 ) . After 32Jhf6 .ixf6 3 3 ..ic2 ti:Jd6 the assess ment of the position is as follows: the result of the game remains unclear, but it is clear that only White can play for a win. My suggestion is the move II. 24.. Jk7 ! . We have already seen how this move cropped up a number of times in the previous variations. It appears that in fact it should be played here. Best for
It seems to me that, in this position, Black even has two reasonable continu ations: A) 26 ... c4! ? 2 7. .ie4! 2 7 .tLle4? does not work: 2 7 . . .'ti'xfS 2 8 .d6 .l:lf7 . Now, once again, Black faces a difficult choice: A 1 ) 2 7 ... ti:Jb7? is bad because of 2 8 .d6 ! ti:Jxd6 ( 2 8 . . . 'ti'xd6 lose s : 2 9 . .idS + 'it>h8 3 0.l:rxc4 .J::!.d 7 3 1 .llh4 h6 3 2 .f6! 'i¥xf6 3 3 . 'i!fd3) 29 ..idS + 'iit>h 8
3 0 .ti:Jxh 7
'i!Vh6
3 1 .ti:Jgs
c3
3 2 .'iVe2 tt:JxfS 3 3 .II:h3 ti:Jh4 3 4.'i¥xe5 .l::!.f8 3 S ."iVg3 .ix£'2 36JHI! and here
White wins, for example: 3 6 . . . c2 3 7 .l:Ixh4; A2) 2 7 ... c 3 ? is also insufficient: 2 8.'i¥e2 b3 29.ti:Je6 b2 30 .l:i.cgl and White's attack decides; A3) But 2 7 ..Jid7! looks very good: •
28.ti:Je6 tt:lb7 29.Ucgl 'it>h8 3 0.'i¥e2!
3 0 .l:rxg 7 ? does not work here : 3 0 . . Jhg7 3 1 . .l::r x g7 tLlcS ! 3 2 . l:!.g4 ti:Jxe4 3 3 .l:rxe4 'i'VxfS and wins; but it is worth considering 3 0. 'i!Vxb4 ti:Jd6 3 1 . .ib 1 with a small advantage to White. 30 ...ti:Jd6 3 1 .1:Ih3 After 3 1 Jhg7 21
T h e Enigma of C hess I n t u i t i on
l:Ixg7 3 2 .lhg7 l:!.g8 3 3 Jhg8+ �xg8 34.'iVg4+ Wh8 Black has the advantage. 3 1 . �g8 ! 3 2.'iVhS h6 3 3.llg6 tt:lxe4 ••
34.'ifxh6 ? loses after 3 4 . . . tt:lxf2+ 3 5 .\t>g2 tt:lxh3 3 6.'iVxh3 .itd8 ! etc. 34 ...tt:lxf2+ 3S.g2 .itd8! 36 . .!::l.xf6 3 6 .'ifxh6? 'ifxg6+ 3 7 .'iVxg6 .itxh4. 36 ....itxf6 3 7.l:lxc4 3 7 .Wxf2 ? is bad because of 3 7 . . ..itxh4+ 3 8 . 'iVxh4 b3 3 9 .axb3 cxb3 40.'ifa4 .l:lf7 and Black wins. 3 7 ti:ld3 38.l:i.g4 h7 ! 39.'>t>gl ti:lf4 and White cannot break through. Draw. B) There is also 26 ...tt:lb7!? which should lead to the same result. But here too, after 2 7.tt:le6 we are confronted with what we have already seen many times: in the search for salvation, Black must balance on a narrow path along the precipice. 3 4.l:!h4!
•..
B 3 ) Only 2 7...e4! i s correct. Then af ter 2 8 . .itxe4 ti:ld6 29.ltc2 ! ? l:!.f7 ! 3 0.I:l.cgl l:!.bb7 3 1 Jlh3 c4 3 2 . .l:lh6 (if 3 2 . 'ifxb4 'iVeS Black develops consid erable activity) 32 .. .'ifb2 3 3.f6 tt:le4! 3 4.I:l.h4! (34.fxg7 ? fails to 34 .. ..l:hg 7 ! 3 5 . tbxg 7 tbxf2 +-+ ; also bad is 3 4.'iVf4? 'i¥xc2 3 5 . .!:lxg 7 + lhg 7 3 6.fxg7 tt:lx£'2+-+) 34 ... ti:lxd2 (here there is another trick: 3 4 . . . tbxf2 + 3 S .�g2 'ifxf6 3 6 . .itxh7+ �h8 3 7 .tt:lg5 c3 forces White to seek a draw in the variation 3 8 .l::!.e l ! cxd2 3 9.l:l.e8 + .llf8 40 .ltg6+ '>t>g8 4 1 ..ith7 + with a repeti tion) 3S .itxh7+ hs 36 ..itfS+ gS 3 7.lth7+ White is again saved by per petual check. But all this would have happened only if Black had not erred by taking on dS. •
In the game, by playing Thus: B l ) 2 7 ... l:i.e8? loses after 2 8.I:l.cgl I:!.ee 7 29.d6! tt:lxd6 30 ..itc4! etc. For ex ample, 3 0 . . . .l:!.cd7 3 1 .tbxg7 + ; B 2 ) Whilst after 2 7 ... h8? 2 8.l:i.cg l l::!.g8 29 .l:lh3 ! Black is also unable to hold: 29 ...e4 30 ..itxe4 tt:ld6 3 1 ..itbl .l:le8 3 1 . . . l::!. cc8 does not help either: 3 2 .tt:lgs h6 3 3 .tt:le6 tt:lc4 34.'iVf4 tt:les 3 S..l::tg 6 tbxg6 3 6 .l::!.xh6+. 32.tt:lgs h6 •
3 3 .tt:le6+-;
22
25. g5xf6! Adolf Anderssen turned down the chance to win the exchange by 2 5 .ltc4?. In this case, after 2S . . . 'iVxd2 2 6 .ltxf7 + Wxf7 2 7 .tt:lxd2 fxgS ! 2 8 . .!::!.x g5 .itd8 2 9 . .llh 5 lte7 ! ? the ad vantage is with Black. Perhaps this naive variation was one of the things which dissuaded Zukertort from looking more deeply into the position? I suspect that
Chapter 1
Anderssen did not even look at this line seriously. 25 . ...
:C:b8-d8?
But maybe Zukertort saw significantly more than the line with the exchange sacrifice, and based his hopes on the possibility we will see later. For this rea son, he missed his last chance, which consisted in 25 . . . c4! ?. Even so, the end game after 26.itxc4 �xd2 2 7 .ikxf7 + Wx£ 7 2 8 .tt::lxd2 �xf6 2 9 . .1:rf3 is clearly in White's favour.
-
F i rs t Explora tions
3 l.. �g 8 ! ) 3 1 .fxg6 Wxg7 32.gxh7+ Wxh7 33.ite4+ Wh6 34.fxe3 is cur-
tains. 27. f6xg7+ 28. 'ti'd2-h6
�h8-g8 �d5-d6
This is perhaps what Zukertort had in mind. The idea is that the blow which would occur after, say, 2 8 . . . �xd3 2 9 . 'i¥xh7 + Wxh7 3 0 .:C:h3 + Wg8 3 l .l:rh8 mate will now be met by 3 0 . . . �h6 , but. . .
26. l:rc1 -g1
29. �h6xh7+! 26 . ...
�g8-h8
It turns out that the bishop is immune: 26 ...�xd3 2 7.�h6 and there is no averting disaster: 2 7 ...'iYxfS 2 7 . . . �f8 2 8 .fxg7 + �g8 2 9.�xh 7 + ! (this queen sacrifice is a major motif in White's at tack. Anderssen never missed such chances) 29 . . . Wxh7 3 0 J:th3 + (also possible was 3 0 . g 8'i¥+ .l:!.xg8 3 l . llh 3 #) 3 0 . . . �g8 3 l . .!:f.h8#. 28Jhg7+ rJolhs 29.tt::lg s .!::l.b 7 30.£7;
It was possible to try 26 .. Jlxf6 ! ? but here too 2 7Jhg7+ Wh8 2 8.�e3! c4 (28 . . . �xd3 2 9.'i¥xd3 .l:!.xd3 3 0 . .l:[g8#) 29.ite4! itxe3 (29 . . . 'i¥d6 3 0 .�g5) 30.itxd5 .l::!.g6 (30 . . . h6 3 l .fxe3 ; 30 ... h5
Even so! Only now did Zukertort see what was coming. After 29 . . . �xh7 there is the decisive 3 0 .f6+! �g8 3 1 . ith 7 + c;;t>xh 7 3 2 . l:i. h 3 + c;;t>g 8 3 3 . .l::!.h 8 mate. 1 -0 It is this final episode which has made the game famous, although by contem porary standards, such a queen sacrifice is a well-known idea. But the critical position, from which we started our examination, turns out to be surpris ingly richly saturated with possibilities. As we have already seen, the number of possible variations easily exceeds the quantity that any human could calcu23
T h e E n i gma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
late, even though I have quoted far from all the possible lines. As I have already said, all this work was carried out by me with the help of an analysis engine and a quite fast processor, and even the Silicon Monster had to sweat a fair bit over the job! Taking all this into account, I would not be surprised if somebody more patient and thorough than myself, and better equipped in terms of engine capacity, were to show that Black cannot save the position and is already lost in the first diagram. This is so because the power of the white forces, fully mobilised, and ready to spring into action in the im mediate future, is so very great. But I am not sorry about such a possible outcome, because a game of chess is not an exercise in proving a theorem, but is first and foremost a battle of two human personalities, and in such a bat tle, the most important thing is the abil ity to set the opponent the greatest pos sible problems, in all the circumstances arising on the board. Zukertort was forced to seek the most stubborn line of resistance, which he failed to find, and I have tried to do so, by placing myself in his shoes. But in terms of our subject, there is something else which is more impor tant. This is the following: everything depends on a huge number of different details, the full calculation of which would be beyond the capacity of any human. Nor could the most sophisti cated positional assessment point one to the correct path. Therefore, I would repeat: 24
In very rich and complicated positious, assessment by itself can tell us very little.
For example, if in the position of the first diagram one were to proceed solely on the basis of general positional consider ations, then as well as the text move, one would have to consider one of the princi pal candidate moves to be the transfer of the knight from aS to d6, by means of 24 . . .t2:Jb7. Incidentally, I did analyse this move, but I have not even presented it for your attention, because it turned out to be weaker than both the moves consid ered above. It is interesting that in order to establish this fact, the computer needed a lot of time, and at first it likes this continuation very much. That is how complicated the position is, and how much it depends on numerous little de tails, and to delve into the recesses of the complicated positions resulting is not easy even for the silicon monster itself So what can help us here? - this is the first question. And is there anything that can help, or does one just have to pick a move more or less at random in such cases, and trust to luck? The an swer is as follows: In such rich and complicated positions, a great role is played by intuition. It is essential that it
be supported by our judgement and calculation, but in such po
sitions, managing without intu
ition is extremely diffic ult. and
maybesimply impossible. Furthermore, on the basis of what we have already seen, it is possible, albeit
Chapter I - F i rs t Explorati ons
rather approximately, to construct some kind of scheme, concerning situations when it is difficult or impossible to rely on 'conventional methods' of reaching a decision. This is it: Whatever the situation, the ap
proach to it begins with a survey of the position.. Then. on the ba sis of that survey, we can draw a conclusion as to the properties of the position..
This conclusion is what we usually term the assessment of the position. Subse quently, one plays on the basis of the specific characteristics of the position, using them to indicate the direction of one's further play and possible future aims. Thus, in complicated positions, the assessment only provides an indica tion of the general direction of the goal we should be striving for. Beyond that, we must search for a concrete means of action. It should show us the best way forward towards the desired aim. Usu ally, this search is carried out by means of calculating variations, followed by the drawing of conclusions about the appropriateness or otherwise of specific lines of play. But in our last example, we saw a case where the calculation of variations is possible only to a definite limit, at which point the human player hits a wall; in or der to reach a position about which it is possible to draw a definite conclusion, we would have to perform calculations of such complexity as to be beyond any human player (as I have already pointed out, in our last example, even the com-
puter struggles) . This is where intuition must take over. Intuition does not consider
everything, it simply advises the player about what he cannot cal culate.
So, we have the following picture: in a complicated position, the assessment identifies the priorities of the position and suggests the direction of play. The initial calculation (which is certainly there, although what it consists of, we shall discuss further below) identifies certain important parameters, and if it becomes clear that calculation is insuffi cient, then this is when intuition is needed, the aim of which is to help us make the correct choice between the various possibilities. And this is the pri mary function of intuition in chess, the most important, but not the only function! There are also others - of which more later. But now we must speak of another im portant matter. I have seen a number of books on intuition in chess, some de voted entirely to the subject, others only partially so. I am probably not fa miliar with all those that exist, so I will speak only of those I have seen. The weak point of all of them (although the degree of weakness varies in size and extent) appears to me to be the fact that they treat as intuitive only decisions made where the player cannot calculate right to the end to some clear conclu sion or other. Or, in other words - that intuition replaces calculation and only that. I disagree with such an approach! I 25
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i on
am convinced, as I have said before and will do again, that a chess player is very used to choosing between different continuations not only on the basis of calculation, but very often on the basis of positional assessment, that is by comparing not so much variations as different details of the position and forming a judgement of their relative importance. In order to make my meaning clear, I will present a very graphic and typical example, taken from a very substantial piece of work the fourth volume, 'The Best of the West' , in Garry Kasparov's My Great Pre decessors. We will examine a fragment from the analysis of the game Taimanov,Mark Fischer,Robert Vancouver Candidates
m
-I , I 97 I
.i .t. .i
0
Without any doubt, the position before us is a very complicated one. Taimanov played: 25. tt:lb5-d4 and obtained excellent play, which he later spoiled. Among the variations examined in the book, naturally an important place is occupied by the win of the exchange by 26
Mark Taimanov
2 5 . tt:lc7. This is what is written about it: 'Over the board, it is very difficult to as sess the consequences of the win of the exchange; the probability of a mistake in calculation (my italics - VB) is very great (once again, I would emphasise to the reader - we are talking here about an assess ment via calculation! - VB) . Black, in en tering the position, followed his intu ition and . . . trusted to luck; White, see ing 2 S .tt:lc7, was led first of all by his feeling for danger. And as the com puter's analysis shows, the intuitive as sessment of both players was correct' . And then the author gives some varia tions, from amongst which I will pres ent only the main part: 2 S .tt:lc7 ? ! 'ilff7 2 6.tt:lxa8 tt:lxf4 2 7 . Ji.a6 .l::!.d 7 2 8 . 'i!fe3 tt:l 6h5 ! 29 . .!:i.c6 Jl.eS ! . In the book, this line is continued some way further, and ends with the words 'with excellent play (for Black - VB) ' . (Incidentally, the move 2 S .tt:lc7 ?! does not deserve a question mark. If we are not greedy, then we can continue 2 6 . Ji.a6 ! ? l:l.d8 2 7 . Ji.xb 7 ! tt:lxf4 2 8 .'il'e3 ! tt:ld3
Chapter 1 - F i rs t E xplora ti ons
2 9 . l:i.xd3 exd3 3 0 .'ffxd3 l:rd7 3 1 .'i¥c2 with equality, but this is not of great significance for our further discussion.) However, what I think must be said is that I am convinced that in this episode intuition, insofar as it played a role, did so only in a small way, and was not in fact necessary at all! Why do I think this? The point is that, although it is true that it would be extremely difficult to calculate everything to the end in such a complicated game, is it actually necessary to calculate to the end? Let us think about the position in the diagram. It is obvious that Black's extra pawn does not play even the smallest role, and White has more than enough compensation. What does it consist in? This is his well-placed rooks, his bishop pair, the light-squared of which, not having an opponent, could become ex tremely dangerous, whilst the dark squared bishop successfully blockades the enemy central pawn trio. The white knight is also a good piece, ready to jump into various dark squares in the enemy position, and, most of all - able to choose which! So, the plusses of the white position are obvious. And now let us compare the position after Black's 2 7 th move in the variation given above:
What are the results of this compari son? White has won the exchange and now himself has a small material advan tage, but look at what he has given up: A) The white knight is stuck in the far corner of the board and has at present very doubtful prospects; B) His important dark-squared bishop has disappeared from the board, so his bishop pair has gone, and even more importantly; C) Black's pieces have seized the dark squares in the centre. And finally, as a consequence of all this; D) The previously solidly blockaded pawn on dS has obtained real prospects of advancing in the very near future. And if this happens, White's prospects do not look great. The general conclusion is clear - these changes are obviously not in White's fa vour. And all this means that: firstly. calcu lating as far as move 2 7 is perfectly easy. and secondly, what is most important for us: in this position, an accurate assess ment is possible, based on perfectly clear, obvious positional factors. In other words, this is a case such as I described earlier: 'decisions taken on the basis of positional considerations should also be considered to be based on firm and tan gible foundations, because positional considerations are a real matter of sub stance. A positional judgement can be tested by reference to many well-known positional principles and typical posi tional assessments'. And if this is so, then Taimanov and Fischer did not need in this case to switch on their intuition. They managed perfectly well, I believe, with some simple calculation and a fully rou tine, precise positional assessment. 27
T h e Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i on
And now the time has come for a cou ple of further formulations. Number one: A player can manage without in tuition completely, if it is possi ble to make the choice between different continuations solely
have been played especially for the pur poses of this book. Even more than that - it excellently continues on from the previous example, opening up a new aspect of our subject. We will become acquainted with another function of in tuition, somewhat different from that revealed in the previous example.
on the basis of conventional means, such as calculation and/ or assessment.
Number two: Intuition is needed in those
cases where a decisio n has to be taken in conditions where there is too little formal (an ex tremely important word, which
will be explained later) infor mation. In such cases. it does the job ofreplacing not only the cal culation of variations. but also
positional assessment.
In the period when work on this book was in its infancy, the following game was played, which is interesting from a number of viewpoints. It is interesting historically, because in it, the 3 3-year-old ex-world champion meets with what is undoubtedly the most promising of the younger players, who at that moment was just 1 9 years old, and had already achieved the very high est results. And both I and the whole chess world wanted to see his enor mous natural talent realised to the full. The game is also interesting from the psychological point of view, although I will not dwell on this point especially. Most important of all is that it could 28
Carlsen.Magnus Kramnik. Vladimir London Chess Classic, 2009
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11.
tt:lg8-f6 e7-e5 tt:lb8-c6 d7-d5 tt:lf6xd5 tt:ld5-b6 1ilf8-e7 0-0 1llc8-e6 f7-f6 a7-a5
c2-c4 tt:lb1 -c3 tt:lg 1 -f3 g2-g3 c4xd5 1ilf1 -g2 0-0 a2-a3 b2-b4 .l::.a 1 -b1 d2-d3
This position is well known to theory. The immediate ll . . tt:ld4 is a popular alternative. .
1 2. b4-b5 1 3. tt:lf3-d2 14. e2-e3
tt:lc6-d4 �d8-c8 ttJd4-f5
Chapter 1
15. 1 6. 1 7. 1 8.
'ti'd1 -c2 �c1 -b2 �f1 -c1 li:Jd2-e4
l:rf8-d8 a5-a4 lt:Jf5-d6 li:Jd6-e8
1 9. 'iYc2-e2 A novelty at that moment. 1 9. 20. f2-f4 21 . g3xf4 22. d3-d4
�e7-f8 e5xf4 'li'c8-d7
We have before us a position which is difficult both to assess and to play. White's position is noticeably more ac tive, a dynamic advantage, and by way of compensation, Black has the more compact pawn formation, which is a static advantage. But it will be a long time before the latter can be exploited.
-
F i rs t Explorati ons
For now, Black must be on the alert, and not allow White's activity to grow un challenged. 22 . ...
c7-c6!?
Kramnik chooses active counterplay. He had two main lines to choose between. The second of these was 2 2 . . . �c4 (22 . . . lt:Jc4?? is impossible because of 2 3 .d5) which leads after 2 3 .'ti'f2 �d3 (23 . . . �xb5? fails because of 24.lt:Jxb5 ! 'ti'xb5 2 5 .lt:Jc5 and Black is in a bad way) 24.lt:Jc5 ! �xeS 2 5 .dxc5 �xb 1 2 6 . .l:!.xb 1 li:Jc8 (26 . . . li:Jc4 2 7 .�d5 +) 2 7 . .l::t d 1 WI e 7 (the vanatwn 2 7 . . . 'ti'xd 1 + 2 8 .li:Jxd 1 .l:!.xd l + 29.�fl lt:Je7 3 0 .'ti'c2 l:rad8 3 1 .�d4 is clearly better for White) 2 8 .�xd8 'ti'xd8 2 9.�xb7 l:lb8 3 0.�e4 to a position in which White has more than sufficient compensation for his material losses. So far, all is simple. For players of the level of those involved here, everything we have seen so far is quite simple to calculate and assess. 23. tt:Je4-c5!? 24. d4xc5
�f8xc5
24. ...
li:Jb6-c4!?
But here Black had a wider choice and it is not just a matter of different varia29
The Enigma o f Ch ess I n t u i t i on
tions, but of more than that - now he has to choose what character to give the game: a quieter or a sharper one. The quiet line arises after 24 .. .tud5 ! ?, which was perhaps a little better than the game continuation. Then after 2 5 .tt:lxd5 .txdS 26.e4 �e7 ! ? we obtain a position with roughly equal chances. But the further course of the game shows that on this day, Kramnik consciously chose to play for complications. 25 . .I:t.c1 -d1 26 . .tb2-c1
�d7-c7 tt:Jc4-a5!
This knight jump to the edge looks forced. For example, after 2 6 . . .'�'h8 2 7 . .l:Ixd8 Uxd8 2 8 .bxc6 bxc6 29 . .l:rb4 White has a significant advantage. 27. b5xc6
.i
i�
� i
l3:,
l3:, l3:,
.i. i
lLJ
l3:, 'iY
J!I !k J!I 27. ...
•
.i �
i i
l3:, jk t::, � b7xc6!?
Here too, Kramnik had a choice be tween two possibilities. White would probably meet the alternative 2 7 . . . tt:lxc6 with 2 8 .ld.xd8 .ll x d8 2 9. �bS ! . The resulting position can hardly appeal to Black, although the computer advises him not to panic, and to play 2 9 . . . tt:la5 3 0 . tt:ld5 �f7 3 l .e4 tt:lb3 3 2 .�xa4 tUxeS 3 3 .�a5 and now, by means of 3 3 .. Jhd5 ! 34.exd5 .txdS 30
Vladimir Kramnik
he can obtain a defensible position the point is that after 3 5 .�xc5 ? (stron ger is 3 5 . .l:f.b2 with advantage to White) 3 5 . . . �xg2 Black is OK, since White does not have 3 6 .\t>xg2? �g6+ . But the point is that such a development of events was not what Kramnik was striving for in this game. It is already quite clear that he wanted complica tions and was actively striving after them. In that context, his decision in the game can also be considered obliga tory. In addition, I would also like to draw to your attention that, after Black's choice at move 24 in the game, his sub sequent decisions were practically forced and the most likely choices, as they had been planned when he made his 24th move. Consequently, we must examine the resulting position more carefully and reflect on it. Thus, White's position has the follow ing plusses: two bishops, which have real prospects of being able to work well together, sooner or later. And if this
Chapter 1 - F i rs t Explora ti ons
happens, Black's prospects will not be very rosy. Furthermore, the black knight on e8 is far from an adornment to his position, and the attempt to bring it back into play by means of . . . f6-f5 weakens not only the square e 5 , but the whole long black diagonal (don't forget the white bishop pair!) . The pawn on a4 on the one hand cramps the white queenside, and gives Black a strong point on b 3 , which is already a serious plus. But on the other hand, the a4 pawn is quite weak and will quite prob ably be lost eventually. Now Black's plusses, which are, in turn, White's minuses. One we have just pointed out, and we should also men tion White's lag in development, and his weaker pawn structure around his king. In addition, there are the squares c4 and b3 , which are of great interest to Black. In this position, these squares are by no means an unimportant factor. And this is why: despite all his other problems, Black's main one is the seri ous issue with the coordination of his minor pieces. And for two of these in particular, the knight on aS and the bishop on e6, the route to coordination lies via the squares b3 and c4. So, as we have already said, when playing his 24th move, Kramnik had to foresee not only his 2 6th and 2 7 th moves, but also the resulting position. And that means he had to see all of its problems, and if he saw them all (about which I do not have the slightest doubt) , he also had to decide that they could be solved. But we will soon see that this conclusion is not, to say the least, to be taken for granted; and if the solution to these problems exists, it was scarcely within a player's
power to see this in a more or less concrete form at move 24. (Even if my discussion of this issue already seems rather exten sive, I have to continue it further. Please have patience!)
So, what is the greatest problem in as sessing this position? It is answering the question: how likely is it that the black minor pieces will succeed in occupying the squares b3 and c4, especially given that it is clear that the a4 pawn will fall? As we will soon see, the variations which help to answer this question are not as numerous as those in the game Anderssen-Zukertort. But calculating them is difficult (for the reasons given below) , and are sufficiently great in number for us to be able to say that as sessing the position purely on the basis of calculation is also virtually unrealistic. And if we accept the truth of these con siderations, then we have to conclude that amongst the resources used by Kramnik in deciding on his 24th move, was intuition. Only on that basis was it possible to feel (and believe!) that Black has enough resources to fulfil the task (seizing the squares c4 and b3) that we have identified as the most important. OK, enough; now let us return to the game.
31
The Enigma of Chess Intuition
28. tt::lc3xa4 Carlsen criticised this move in his anno tations and pointed out the stronger op tion 2 8 Jib4 ! ? suggesting as the only move for Black 2 8 . . . tt::lb 3 (28 . . . �b3 is noticeably weaker: 2 9 Jh d 8 .l:!.xd8 3 0 .�fl ! with a large advantage for White) . Even so, after 2 9 .tt::lxa4 tt::lxc l 3 0 .lhc I fS Black obtains definite com pensation for the pawn. Such short variations are very hard to calculate, especially to calculate from afar. The main problem is that they are not forcing and there is a wide choice of other possibilities, many of which are not at first glance so different from the best continuation. In calculating such lines from a distance, it is ex tremely hard to see the differences between such lines. 28. ...
.l:!.d8xd1 +
3 6 . 'iV xc4+ .l:!.xc4 3 7 .�h3 ! 'it>f8 3 8 . .l!{d7 ! is extremely unpleasant for Black. In addition, Carlsen now sug gests for Black 2 8 . . . tt::l b 3 ! ? 2 9 .tt::l b 6 .l:.aS ! with counterplay. 29. 'i¥e2xd1 30. �d1 -c2
�a8-d8
After 3 0.�f3 tt::l b 3 Black would have full compensation. You have probably already noticed that in every variation, Black's pieces get to c4 or b3, although admittedly, more often to the latter. The same will be true later. 30. 31 . tt::la4-c3
�c7-f7
Now it was Carlsen's turn to choose. I prefer his choice to the tempting 3 I .tLlb6 , since then there is 3 I . . .tt::lb 3 ! 3 2 .e4 tt::ld4 3 3 .�f2 ! �h5 34.�e3 tt::lb S ! 3 5 .a4 tt::l c 3 36 . .l:i.e l �h3 ! ? and Black is perfectly OK.
This is much stronger than 2 8 . . . �b3 29 .l:lxd8 �xd8 3 0 .tt::lb 6 J::!.d l + 3 I .'it>f2 �e7 and here White has a wonderful opportunity:
3 2 . lhb3 ! .l!{xc l 3 3 J id3 ! 'iYxcS 34.�a2 + ! tt::l c4 (the only move. 34 . . . 'it>h8 loses after 3 5 .'i¥f7) and the ending arising after 3 5 .tt::lxc4 'i¥xc4 32
Thus we reach a position in which even at first glance it is clear that Black has real compensation for the pawn, in the shape of all those factors considered be fore, but in a clearer form: better devel opment and hopes of exploiting the weakened white kingside. The problem, however, is that he needs to find a pre-
Chapter I
cise line of play, and Kramnik failed to do so, playing uncertainly at this point. However, in his annotations, Carlsen considered Black's decisive mistake to be his 3 2nd move, but even so, it seems that the main mistake occurred here. 31 .
'ti'f7-h5?
Instead of this , the continuation 3 1 . 11lb3! looks strong ('The bishop is in its place again! ') with the following likely continuation : 3 2.''i¥e4 If 3 2.'ti'f2 ? ! then 3 2 . . . 'ti'c4 and Black seizes the initiative; whilst if 3 2 .'ti'e2 'ti'e7 3 3 .tt:le4? does not work due to 3 3 . . Jid i +. 32 11lc4! 33. .l::I b 6 On 3 3 .lilh3 strong is 3 3 . . . tt:lc7 ; and after 3 3 .l:Ib4 11ld3 34.'iif3 'iie 7 Black is also fine. And here after 33 f5 ! 34.'1Wc2!? (if 34.'ti'e5 lile6 ! 3 5 .1ilfl (weaker is 3 5 Jlb4? tt:lc4) 3 5 . . . tt:lc4 3 6 .11lxc4 lilxc4 Black has full compensation for the pawn. For example, 3 7 Jhc6? (cor rect is 3 7 Jlb8 'i1Vg6+ 3 8 .Wf2 lixb8 3 9 . 'ti'xb8 h6 with roughly equal chances) 3 7 . . .'ifh5 and Black's activity decides: 3 8 . .!:le6 kld i + 3 9 . tt:lxd i 'ik'xd l + 40.Wf2 'ik'fl + 4 l .Wg3 'iYe l + ! mating) 34 ... 'ik'e7 3SJ:[b4!? tt:Jc7! In this complicated position, Black has full compensation for the pawn. •.
•.•
•..
32 . ...
-
F i rs t E xp l o ra t i ons
lile6-f5?!
Kramnik had either missed White's last move or underestimated its strength. Undoubtedly, better chances were of fered by 32 ... Wf8 ! ? , the idea of which is to avoid a check in various possible lines. For example, A) 33.tt:Jd4?! .!::f.xd4! 34.exd4 lilfs 3 5 .'ik'a2 'ik'd i + 3 6 .�f2 lilxb i 3 7 .'ik'xb i tLlb3 3 8 .i1H3 'ilfxc l 3 9.'ilfxb3 'i\Vxf4 with equal play; B) 33Jlb4?! allows the thematic 33 . . . 11lb3 ! 34.'ilfb2 tt:lc4 ! ? 3 5 .'ik'xb3 'i¥xe2 3 6.klxc4! (36 .1ilfl ? loses after 3 6 . . . 'ik'g4+ 3 7 .�f2 tLld2 3 8 .1txd2 'ik'h4+ ! etc.) 3 6 . . . l:Id i + 3 7 . 'ifxd i 'iYxd i + 3 8 .�f2 'ik'b3 3 9 . .!:f.d4 tLlc7 with a small advantage to Black; C) Carlsen, as we have already said, considered Black's last move the deci sive mistake, but it seems that it was al ready quite problematic for Black to survive, because it seems to me that there is the very strong reply 33.1ilfl ! ,
32. tt:Jc3-e2!
which closes the two important squares c4 and d I against entry by Black (the latter will not now be with check) . 33 'ik'g4+ After 3 3 . . .1ilf5 the com puter recommends 3 4.e4 lilh3 3 5 .1ilxh3 'ifxh3 3 6.tLlg3 'ik'd7 3 7 .tt:lf5 ! .••
33
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i on
and then shows a decisive advantage for White. 34.tt::lg3 "iYdl 34 . . . l:!.d l does not bring any benefit: 3 5 .�f2 .ids 3 6 . .ie2 "i¥h3 3 7 . .ixd l 'ifxh 2 + 3 8 . We l 'ifxg3+ 3 9.'ti'f2. 3S.'ti'e4! 3 5 .'iYxh7 turns out to be weaker because of the surprising 35 . . . .ia2 ! 3 6.'i¥h8+ .ig8 ! 3 7 . tt::l e 2 ! ? (bad i s 3 7 .'ifh5 'i¥xh5 3 8 .tt::lxh5 �dl 39.tt::l g 3 tt::lb 3) 3 7 . . . tt::l b 3 and Black has sufficient counterplay. 35 ....ia2 36 . .!lal .ids 3 6 ... tt::l b 3 loses after 3 7 .l::!.xa2 tt::lxc l 3 8 .�b2 . 37."i¥d3 Wixd3 38 ..ixd3 tt::lb3 39.l:!:bl g6 40.a4
with good winning chances. 33. e3-e4
.if5-g4
More tenacious was 33....ih3 but this could hardly change the result : 34. .ixh3 Also interesting is 3 4 . .ie3 ! ? .ixg2 3 5 .Wxg2 with a large advantage. 34.. .'i¥xh3 3S.tt::l g3 'i¥e6 35 . . . 'iVg4 loses after 3 6 . .id2 . 36.:c!.b4 The resulting po sition is extremely unpleasant for Black, for example: 3 6 . . . 'iYd7 3 7 . .l:!.a4 Wid l + 3 8 .'i¥xd l �xd l + 3 9 .�f2 etc. 34. tt:Je2-g3
Now it is all over. 35 . 36. 37. 38. 39.
... Wic2-c3 l::!. b 1 -b4 f4-f5 .ic1 -f4
.ig4-e6 .l:[d8-a8 'iYf7-d7 .ie6-f7 'iYd7-d1
Nor does Black save himself after 3 9 . . . tt::l b 7 40.Wf2 . 40. wg1 -f2
tt:Ja5-b3
Neither is 40 . . . �d8 4 l . .ie2 'i¥d7 42.:c!.b6 'iYd4+ 43 .'ifxd4 l:i:xd4 44 . .l:!.a6 any help. 41 . .if1 -e2 42 . .ie2-c4
'iYd1 -b1 �a8xa3
43. tt:Jg3-e2!
1 -0
iYh5-f7
Or 3 4 . . J:i:d l + 3 5 . .ifl ! (but not 3 5 .'i¥xd l ?? 'ifxc5 +) 3 5 . . . iYf7 ( 3 5 . . . 'iYh3 3 6 .Wixd l ) 3 6 .h3 .if3 3 7 .Wf2 .ihS 3 8 . .idb8 and Black is help less.
34
35 . .ig2-f1 !
Thus, Kramnik took an interesting and quite good intuitive decision, which was probably not the strongest, al though perfectly reasonable, but he lost all the same! However, even so, the game is useful for our investigations. The game was played between players of the highest level, is quite fresh, and is attractive for the fact that it well illus trates a certain important aspect of our subject, of which more below.
Chapter 1 - F i rs t E xplora t i ons
You will see that I try as far as possible to avoid formulating things too cate gorically, because the nature of the ma terial we are discussing is too elusive, but even so, we need to move forward, and the time has come for another for mulation: In its most general form, intu
ition allows us to correctly fore cast the turn of events, which in a practical game cannot realistically be worked out by other means. Magnus Carlsen
But for now I repeat, as I will not hesi tate to do again later, that intuition is a powerful weapon in the hands of those who know how to use it, but it is in no way the only weapon, and is not all powerful! So what role did intuition play in this example? Was it merely that of helping the player choose between a range of possibilities, or something else besides? In fact, the second - because in this in stance, the choice was made not only on the basis of the motto 'the best is the enemy of the good', but also partly on the basis of psychological consider ations (this is impossible to prove, but it seems highly likely) . That is, Kramnik wanted to complicate the game, and to do so, he had to forecast the likelihood of the bishop and knights reaching b3 and c4, even after the disappearance of the a4 pawn from the board. And this forecasting the chances of a certain turn of events is the second function of intuition!
As work on this book was proceeding, so time was marching on as well, and the traditional tournament at Wijk aan Zee came around. The two heroes of the previous game took part, and again they had to battle for first place. Once again, Carlsen played White and again, Kramnik was in an extremely un compromising mood, deliberately choosing a line which led to great com plications. In this way, the game became another part in an ongoing chess thriller. Intuition played less of a role in this game than in the previous one, but it is easier to understand the relation between the elements if we examine the play of the two giants. Carlsen,Magnus Kramnik, Vladimir Wijk aan Zee Corus A, 20 1 0
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
d2-d4 c2-c4 tt:lg1 -f3 g2 -g3 �f1 -g2 �c1 -d2
tt:Jg8-f6 e7 e6 d7 d5 d5xc4 �f8-b4+ a7-a5 -
-
35
The Enigma of Chess In t u i tion
7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 1 2. 13 .
t:Llb1 -c3 a2-a3 "iYd1 -a4 'ifa4xc4 "iYc4-b3 .itd2-g5 .itg5xf6
0-0 .itb4-e7 c7-c6 b7-b5 .itc8-a6 t:Llb8-d7
1 7. ...
13
.
...
g 7xf6
As in the previous game, this unex pected decision is based on a degree of psychology and courage. However, Vladimir Kramnik gave the move a question mark in his notes, giving in stead the natural 1 3 .itxf6 ( 1 3 t:Llxf6? 1 4.tLle5) 1 4.tLle4 .U.c8 1 5 .lic 1 lte7 1 6. 'f9e3 ! with a very small advantage to White and excellent chances for Black to equalise. Almost all other commenta tors assess 1 3 o o .gxf6 the same way, but I am refraining from giving the move any punctuation, not only seeing chances for Black later on, but also cer tain circumstances that are useful for our topic. 0 0 •
14. 1 5. 1 6. 1 7. 36
'fib3-c2 t:Llc3-a4 0-0 d4-d5!
0 0 .
e6xd5?!
It is very hard to punctuate this move. Having said 'a' , it is hard not to say 'b' , and especially if one takes into account the fact that Kramnik was aiming at complications, it is hard to criticise him for this move. But objectively a stronger continuation was 1 7 . . . tLleS ! ? . Then after 1 8 .tLlxe5 fxe5 1 9.dxe6 fxe6 20.axb4 cxb4 2 I .'fib3 .itc4 ! ? 2 2 .'iV'e3 ltgS ! 2 3 ."it'xe5 ( 2 3 ."it'e4 'ifd4 24."ifxd4 exd4 2 5 .tLlb6 .itxe2) 2 3 o o ..itf6 or even 2 3 o o ."iff6 ! ? Black has full compensation for the pawn. So it appears that it is this move, not the previous, which deserves censure, al though in this case too, all is not totally clear.
b5-b4 .l::ta8-c8 c6-c5 1 8. .itg2-h3?
Chapter 1
But here Carlsen commits a real error, missing an excellent, and indeed, the only, chance to pose the opponent seri ous problems. He should have played 1 SJ:t:fd 1 ! . In this case, there is the inter esting reply I. 1 S ... �b7 ; although it is hard to say if it is stronger than II. 1 S d4 1 9.'iif5 ! and Black faces a diffi cult choice. Thus, many commentators happily give variations after IIa. 19 .tieS?. Then there follows the the matic sacrifice 20.tt.'lxd4! cxd4 2 1 Jixd4 Uc7 (on 2 I . . .'i!Yc7 , 2 2 .lhd7 ! decides) 2 2.�e4 and White wins. Commenta tors always love variations with sacri fices. But other continuations must also be examined, maybe not all of them so easy Black is also doing badly after lib. •..
.•.
1 9 ... d3?! 20.tt.'le l ! tt.'les 2 1 .�e4 tt.'lg6 22.tt.'lxd3; but Kramnik suggested a re
ply which deserves very serious consid eration: IIc. 1 9 ...�d6 !?
-
F i rs t Explora ti ons
34.�h1 and White hardly has many winning chances. We should also look at: I. 1 S ... �b7 1 9.tt.'lh4 tt::le s 20.tt::lfs .!:Ies 2 1 .�xd5 �xdS 2 2.tt.'le3 �b3! Worse is 2 2 . . . 'iid 7
2 3 .tt.'lb6! 'iih 3 24.tt.'lbxdS and White has a long-lasting advantage. 23.'iixb3 'iic 7 24.tbds 'iic6 25 .axb4!? axb4;
White is better, but it is hard to say how serious his winning chances are. Now, by means of 1 8. ...
�a6-b5!
Kramnik seized the initiative. The battle proceeded in very sharp fashion and soon both players were short of time. 1 9. 20. 21 . 22.
a3xb4 .l:rf1 -d1 �h3-f5 �f5xh7+
a5xb4 d5-d4 tt.'ld7-e5!
Much weaker is 2 2 .�xc 8 ? 'i¥xc8 23 .tbh4 �e8 ! with a powerful initiative. 22. 23. tt.'lf3xe5 24. �h7-f5 25. 'ifc2-e4
g8-g7 f6xe5 .l:.c8-c6
25 . ...
l:rf8-h8!?
The main line is 2 0 .axb4 axb4! 2 1 .tt.'lxd4 cxd4 22.�e4 .ll eS 23.'iix h7+ �f8 24.�d5 ! tt.'les 25.f4 .!lc7 26.fx.e5 �xeS
2 7.tt.'lb6 ! ? �xe2 2 S . .!:I e 1
d3
29.UaS d2 Worse is 2 9 . . . �d4+ 3 0.�g2
�xb6 3 1 .�xd8 .l:rxd8 3 2 .�b3 and White has a lasting advantage. 30.'iih 6+
�e7
3 1 .'iix d2
'ii d6
32Jhe S + �xeS 33.'ii xe2 'iix b6 +
A very interesting decision, but maybe slightly more winning chances were 37
The Enigma o f C hess I n t u i tion
promised by 2 S . . . 'iYc 7 ! ? 2 6.'iYg4+ l:!.g6D 2 7 .�xg6 fxg6 and the two bish ops and powerful centre more than compensate for the material. By now, both players were short of time, al though Carlsen had about half as much as his opponent. As a result, play now proceeds largely on intuition. 26. 27. 28. 29.
'iYe4xe5+ 'iYe5-e4 'iYe4-g4+ �f5-e4
�e7-f6 l:lh8-e8 'itg7-f8
32 . ...
Wf8-e7
There was little time in which to make this choice, and it was hard to come to terms with all the subtleties of this non-standard position. Analysis shows that 32 ... 'itg8 was no less attractive. In this case, White would have to defend accurately. Here is a likely variation: 33.'i¥f4 .l:te6 34.'it'f5 �g7 35.'it'c5 'tWe8 36.'tWxc4 36.'iYxb4? is much weaker.
After 3 6 . . Jhe2 3 7 .tLlcS .lhf2 ! 3 8 .Wxf2 'iYe3 + 3 9 . Wfl 'iff3 + 40 . We l d3 4 1 .tLlxd3 (forced) 4 l . . .cxd3 42.lhd3 'tWxd3 White stands badly. 36 ...�xa4 3 7. .llxd4! �xd4 38.'i¥xd4 �c2 ! 39.e3 b3 It is hard to say how real Black's winning chances are here.
33. e2-e4
29. ...
c5-c4!
An important move. After 29 .. .l:k7 White equalises by 3 0 .b3. Now, how ever, Black will have excellent compen sation for the exchange. 30. �e4xc6 31 . 'Yig4-h5 32. 'iYh5-h6+
38
�b5xc6 l:re8-e5
Played in serious time-trouble. At first sight, the move looks very strong, but as analysis shows (analysis that is very dif ficult even with the help of the com puter) , stronger was 3 3 .'Yid2 ! . The variations have many branches, so I will show only the main line: 3 3 . . . 'iYdS 34.f3 ! c3 3 S .'ifd3 ! �bs 3 6.'it'xd4 'ifxd4+ 3 7 . .l::!.xd4 cxb2 3 8 .tLlxb2 .l:.xe2 3 9 .l::!.a 7 + We6 40.l:rxb4 with equality. 33. 34. 'it'h6-e3
d4-d3 �c6xe4
Chapter I
35. tt:la4-b6? But this is a terrible blunder, made in serious time-trouble. More stubborn, although still insufficient, was 3 S Jie l . Then Black has the following win: 3 5 . . . .iic 6! 3 6 .'i¥c5 + 'i¥d6 3 7 Jhe5+ lixeS 3 8 .'iVxc4 d2 3 9 .�b3 'iVd4! 40.'iVc2 .iif3 4 1 ..l:!.dl .iixd l 42 ."i¥xd l b 3 ! 43 .tt:lc3 �d3 44.ttlb l �c2 4S.'ifxd2 'iYxb l + 46.Wg2 "i¥xb2. This line would be harder to find that that in the game, but it would be child's play compared to what he would have had to find, had Carlsen guessed at the correct move. I say 'guessed' , but one could also say 'felt' , if you prefer. What mat ters is that the move can only be found intuitively; in serious time-trouble, no other resource is available to the player in such a position. The correct move is 35 .iVd2 .
F i rs t E xplora ti ons
to take my word for it, when I say that this line or that is the main line and that other variations, which I have not shown, do not change the essence of what I am saying. Thus, if 35.'1Wd2 then 35 '1Wd6 36.llacl lids 37.b3 If 3 7 . .tl.el Black must find the reply 3 7 . . . Wf8 ! and after 3 8 . .!:.xe5 lixeS 3 9 .b3 spot the crushing 3 9 . . . .iif4! ! . And now again, the best move is the hard, virtually impossible to find in time-trouble, move 37 ... �f8 ! ! 38.'ifh6+ 3 8.bxc4 is even worse : 3 8 . . . .iib 7 3 9 .'ifxd3 .l:te l + . 38 ... Wg8 39.ttlb2 and now a series of effective blows follows: 39 ... .iib 7 ! .•.
40.lhc4 iYds 4 1 ..tl.g4+ J::l.gS ! 42.f3 'lWcS + 43.Wg2 .iixf3+ ! 44.Wxf3 iYdS + ! 45.Wf2 'iYfS + 46 . .l:tf4 .iid4+ 47.Wg2 iYxf4 48Jhd3 'tWe4+ 49.Wh3 'i¥g4+ SO.Wg2 iYe2+ 5 1 .Wh3 .!::th S+
In the game, things ended simply: 35. 36. 'i¥e3-f4 37. 'iVf4xc4 38. .t!.d1 -f1
Now I will only give the main line. As you have seen, this is a method I often resort to. I do so to avoid unnecessary distractions for the reader, which might deflect him from the main theme. I just ask you to trust that I always deliber ately check my analysis very thoroughly and am confident that it is generally of high quality. For this reason, I ask you
-
lie4-b7 'iVd8xb6 l:l:e5-e2
And in view of 38 . . .1id4 White re signed. In this game, Kramnik again tried to take the game into non-standard lines, trying to obtain a position with atypical 39
The Enigma of Chess In t u i ti o n
characteristics (and this means, difficult to assess) , and hard to play by exact cal culation on account of its extreme com plexity. Positions of this type are usually de scribed as irrational. Playing such posi tions, as well as the ability to calculate well, and orientate oneself in positions with more or less standard features, also requires another quality. Now we can say that this is intuition. Evidently, Kramnik considered that it was this as pect that was one of Carlsen's weakest, and as we have seen, at the second at tempt, he managed to exploit it. Now is the time to discuss something I referred to earlier. I am not the first ob server to consider that Carlsen's play re minds one of Fischer's. The similarity is especially noticeable in one fundamen tal area, namely extreme accuracy of play in positions with a clear strategical line. But they also share a basic weakness. This is insufficiently certain play in po sitions of an irrational character. Of course, by 'insufficiently', we mean only when judged by the very highest standards in the world, at which both Fischer and Carlsen operate. At lower levels, many of us would love to play with their level of 'insufficiency' ! By way of comparison, and confirma tion of this, we will examine the fol lowing legendary game. Fischer,Robert Geller,Efim Monte Carlo, 1 967
Both players in this game were amongst the greatest theoretical experts of their 40
day. Therefore, they confidently went down a head-spinning variation. As a result, Fischer emerged from the opening with a position which, after this game, Black only once ever risked entering (see below) . But there was an other aspect of the game, about which we will speak. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 1 2. 1 3.
e2-e4 tt:lg 1 -f3 d2-d4 tt:lf3xd4 tt:lb1 -c3 �c1 -g5 f2-f4 'ifd1 -d2 r;ta1 -b1 f4-f5 f5xe6 tt:ld4xc6 e4-e5
c7-c5 d7-d6 c5xd4 tt:lg8-f6 a7-a6 e7-e6 'ifd8-b6 'ifb6xb2 'ifb2-a3 tLlb8-c6 f7xe6 b7xc6 tt:lf6-d5
At this time, the continuation 1 3 .. dxe5 was considered obligatory. It is highly likely that Geller took Fischer away from known lines, but it is also quite possible that the latter was prepared for such a turn of events. But here is some thing else interesting: this whole line was one of Fischer's own favourites for Black! On the other hand, Geller had .
Chapter 1 - F i rs t Exp l o r a t i o ns
only played the black side of the line once before, and against a not very seri ous opponent, and afterwards, he only played it three times more, also against opponents who were greatly below his class. Consequently, choosing it here against Fischer clearly owed a great deal to psychological considerations. We have before us a very interesting parallel to the preceding example. 14. tt::l c3xd5 1 5. �f1 -e2!
c6xd5
A strong reply, which for many years af ter this game was the only move played in this position. Nowadays, the bishop sometimes comes to d3 . 1 5. 1 6 . 0-0
d6xe5
Bobby Fischer
great tension remains in the position. Nowadays , the strongest move is considered to be 1 6 . . ..l::!.a 7 . 1 7. �g1 -h1 1 8. c2-c4 1 9. l:lb1 xf1
:i
l:lh8-f8 l:lf8xf1 + �c8-b7
.t
.l
• 1 6 . ...
�f8-c5+?
It is surprising, but this tempting move appears to be a serious mistake. In any event, all those later games in which it appeared ended in defeat for Black. Considering that the position is so sharp, it is not surprising that the first mistake turns out to be fatal. This turns out to be the case not only with the dia gram position, but also later in the game, because despite this mistake,
Several moves ago, Black committed a mistake, which has led to this position. It is very hard to assess at first (and even at second!) glance. This is because both sides have obvious trumps, and it is im possible to assess whose are the more important, without calculating varia tions. However, although a great deal of 41
The Eni gma of C hess I n t u i tion
calculation work is possible in analysis, during the game this is beyond even so great a master of calculating variations as Robert Fischer. So, calculation is im possible, and assessment alone is im possible. We have seen this picture before. We need intuition! And it is at precisely this moment, when normal methods do not suffice, that Fischer goes wrong! 20. .te2-g4? In essence, this move loses the game. Instead, White could obtain a large, possibly decisive advantage in all varia tions - we are reminded again of the value of a single move in very sharp positions. As far as I remember, although I cannot vouch for the truth of the story, I once heard that when Tal was shown the score of this game in the company of several other players, he immediately drew attention to this moment, and very quickly suggested the move
Two other interesting possibilities also need to be examined: A) 20 ... .te7 2 I ..thS+ g6 Also losing is 2 1 . . . �d7 2 2 . .txe7 �xe7 2 3 .lif7 + ; and 2 l . . .�d8 2 2 . .txe 7 + ! 'iVxe7 2 3 . 'iVxh7 dxc4 2 4.l:if7 . 22 . .ixg6 + hxg6 2 3 .'iVxg6+ �d7 2 3 . . . �d8 24 . .l:lf7 . 24..ixe7 �xe7 2 S.'iVg7+ �d6 26.'iVxb 7 ;
B) The most tenacious seems to be: 2 I ..ig4! .ics Weaker is 2 1 . . .dxc4 2 2 . .txe6 .ic6 2 3 .'iVxc4. 20 ... g6 !
22 ..ic l ! 'iVas 2 3.'iVb 3 ! �a7
24.'iVf3 !
hS 2S .ih3 'iVxa2 26.'iVf6 and it is very •
difficult to hold such a position. The game went on (I give only the min imum of commentary, but believe me, there is much to say!) : 2 I ..ig4! .ie7 If 2 1 . . . .tc8 Tal gives 2 2 .'iVd2 ! e3 2 3 .'iVc2 g6 2 4.cxd5 exdS 2 5 .'iVd l ! .ixg4 2 6 . 'iVxg4 .tel 2 7 .'iVe6 'iVd6 D 2 8 .'iVf7 + �d7 2 9 . .ixe7 winning; whilst after 2 l . . .dxc4 22 . .txe6 'iVd3 23 ..tf7 + �d7 there is the deadly 24.I;[d l . 22.'iVf2 ! 0-0-0
20.'iVc2 ! .
It so happened that later the same year, he had the chance to prove the correct ness of his suggestion (and very proba bly, his analysis) in practice. His oppo nent replied 20 ... e4. 42
23 ..if4! Tal conducts the attack in his own inimitable style, exploiting all the hidden resources of the position. Anal ysis shows that Black is defenceless. 2 3 ... �d6 24.�xe6 + �bs 2 S .'iVb6 �xf4 26.'iVxd8+ �a7 2 7.�b l 'iVd6
Chapter 1
2 8 .�xd5 ! �xdS 2 8 . . . 'i?Vxd8 2 9 .Ihb7+ �a8 30 . .l:Id7 + . 2 9 Ji'xd6 �xd6 30.cxdS 1-0 Tal-Bogdanovic, Budva YUG-URS 1 96 7 . Since this game, ac cording to my database, the move 1 6 . . . �cS + ? has only been played three times - and all games were lost by Black! For now, I will just draw your attention to one point - the only difference be tween this line and the main game is the inclusion of the moves 20 .'i?Vc2 ! e4. We will discuss this further below.
-
Fi rs t E xplora t i ons
3 0 .!:i.d1 .l::re 2 ! 3 1 .h4 d2 3 2 .Wh2 J;:l.e 1 3 3 .lixd2 �xd2 34.�xd2 l:le4 White can resign) 2 9 . . . .laxa2 3 0 .g4 l:ra3 3 1 .Wg2 e 6 3 2 .f3 d s and the ending is winning. But clearly, this did not interest Fischer.
In the Fischer-Geller game, play contin ued 22 . ...
d5xc4 20. 21 . �g4xe6 'i?Va3 d3! 22. 'i?Vd2-e1 -
There is not a lot of choice. It is either the text, or go into one of two lost endgames: A) 2 2..�f7 + d ? 2 3 .�xc4 'i?Vxd2 24.�xd2 .ld.f8 25 ..ld.xf8 �xf8 2 6.�e3 �b4; B) and 2 2 .'i?Vxd3 cxd3 2 3 .�f5 e4 24.�xh 7 ! �dS ! 2 5 .�xe4 �xe4 26 . .l:i.e 1 .l:i.b8 2 7 . .U.xe4+ Wf7 ! 2 8 . .1:i.e 1 (Black wins easily after 2 8 .h4 .l:rb2) 28 .. J:[b2 29 . .U.d1 (if 2 9 . a4 �b4
�b7-e4!
This is the crux of the matter. I cannot exclude the possibility that Fischer went in for this position expecting the 'obvious' reply 2 2 . . .e4?. Then every thing turns out in White's favour, al though he has to find several strong moves. A typical line is 23.'i?Val ! �d4 2 3 . . . 'i?Vd4 loses at once to 24.�f7 + d ? 2 5 . .U.d 1 ; whilst 2 3 . . . c3 does so more slowly: 24.�f7 + d ? 2 5 . .U.d 1 l:lf8 2 6 . .l:i.xd3+ exd3 2 7 .'i?Vxc3 .lhf7 2 8 .'i?Vxd3 +. 24.'i?Vc l ! c3 The same re sults from 24 . . . �c3 2 5 . .ld.f8+. The most tenacious is 24 . . . �f6 ! and then in the variation 2 5 .�xf6 gxf6 2 6 .'i?Vf4! �dS 2 7 .�xdS 'i?VxdS 2 8 .'iVxf6 White has a large advantage. 2 S . .ld.f8+ Wxf8 26.'i?Va3+ e s 2 7.'i?Ve7 mate. And after 2 2 . . . 'i?Ve4 there is 2 3 .'i¥g3 and Black has nothing better than 2 3 . . .'f!Vd3 and then again 24.'i?Ve 1 ; Geller's reply is in comparably stronger and now White is in trouble. 43
The Eni gma of C hess I n t u i t i on
2 5 .�a4+ Wd8 2 6 . 'ifa5 + ! �c8 27 .'ti'xa6+ with perpetual check.
23. �e6-g4 Geller points out the variation: 2 3 .�f5 �xfS 24.'ti'xe5+ �d7 2 5 .'ifxg7 + (af ter 2 5 . 'iYxfS + 'iYxfS 2 6 ..l:!.xfs �f8 Black wins the ending) 2 5 . . . �c6 2 6.'ti'f6+ �d6 2 7 .'ifxfS 'ifxfS and assesses the position as winning. The correctness of this assessment becomes clear after 2 8 Jhf5 .l:rb8 ! ? (also good is 28 . . . .C:f8 ! ?) 2 9 .g3 .!:lbs . 23. 24. �g4-d1
.Ua8-b8
24. ...
�e8-d7!!
A brilliant climax to Black's short but active defence. The king defends itself, whilst the other black pieces stand ready to invade White's position. A great mistake would be 24 . . . �e7 ?
44
25. l:if1 -f7+
�d7-e6!
After 2 6 .l:rfl �b2 2 7 .�g4+ WdS 2 8 .�f3 �xf3 29 .l:hf3 'ife2 everything is clear. 0-1 And now let us sum up what we have seen and draw conclusions. I would say that the most interesting as pect of the topic we are examining is this: the difference between Fischer's losing line and Tal's winning one was, as I have already pointed out, the inclu sion of the moves 20.'ifc2 ! e4. When we look at the text of the Tal game, it becomes clear how important this is. In fact, it is decisive. The difference was in two little details: the white queen leaves the d-file, which removes Black's re source . . . 'ti'd3 ! , and it also takes the two white diagonals from his pieces. The result is striking! That is all we need to say for now. Let us remember for the future that the differ ence lay in tiny details ('the Devil is in the detail' , as they say!) , and later we will need to discuss such details more thoroughly.
Chapter 2 - Successful U se of Intuition
So far, we have seen more examples which show the effects of insufficiently good use of intuition (Zukertort, Carlsen in one case, and Fischer) than of its successful use (Anand, Kramnik in one case) . It is time to become acquainted with some ex amples of effective, successful use of intuition in the games of great masters. Let us see.
How Serious People Do It
This is important partly because 1t IS significantly harder to describe the op eration of intuition than other weapons within the player's armoury. I am not thinking about stories, such as how in the year 1 9-whatever, Capablanca looked at such-and-such a position, and within a few seconds said that White was winning. I am concerned with con crete games and concrete decisions, and very much wish to show how these de cisions were the result of the exercise of intuition, even though proving such things is very difficult. But let us agree such exercise of intuition needs to be shown and explained as far as possible, preferably in the games of the greatest players. We will start looking at examples in chronological order, although some times, in order to enhance the effective ness of our material, we may depart from this principle. The first name on our list in Paul Morphy. To my mind, it is clear that the greatest part of his huge talent was intu ition. I say this as the author of a book
on Morphy, and one who has devoted a great deal of time to the study of his games. Anderssen,Adolf Morphy,Paul Paris m-4, 1 8 5 8
As I have already said, the fact that a cer tain decision was made on the basis of intuition is much more difficult to demonstrate than the fact that it was based on calculation or positional judgement (these two factors almost al ways occur together, but they vary in proportion from case to case) . Even so, I will try to do this in as convincing a manner as possible. 45
The Enigma of C hess In t u i t i on
1 9. ...
'iYd8-d6
In the game, Morphy played this, but in his commentaries (very brief, but they are commentaries nonetheless) , he claimed that he could have taken the pawn without being punished, and he gave several variations. But alas, his analysis was wrong! Here is his varia tion : 1 9 . . . tt:Jxe5 2 0 .dxe5 .!:!.xeS 2 1..�. xb6 cxb6 2 2. .�a2 'iYe8 2 3 . lt:Jxd5 lt:JxdS Paul Morphy
2 L�xd5 .!:i.d8 2 S .�xf7 + 'it>xf7 2 6. 'iVxd8 .l:f.e 1 + etc. , with equality. This contains two completely elemen tary mistakes, not worthy of Morphy's level of play. Firstly, instead of 24.�xd5 one can play simply 24.f4 and thereby win a piece. And secondly, the real mis take is the 'obvious' capture of the rook: 2 6 .'iYxd8 . Instead of this, by playing 2 6 .'iVf4+, White can force 2 6 . . . 'it>e6 and then both 2 7 . 'iYf3 and 2 7 . .!::!. ac 1 give him an easily winning position, thanks to the appalling position of the black king. Thus, we have terrible mis takes, and not just one of them, in anal ysis, committed by a player whose ge nius nobody doubts. In actual play, on the other hand, he very rarely commit ted such mistakes (he only did so 46
twice! ) , and only because he relaxed in completely winning positions. How can this be explained? It is quite possible that Morphy simply did not concentrate properly, when ana lysing a game he had already played, because the result was no longer at stake. Yes, this is perfectly possible. But then the question arises - surely he must have considered the capture of the pawn during the game? Yet he did not take it. So what was going on? Maybe he overlooked the move 2 6 . . . .!:!.e 1 + in the above variation? Maybe, but there are also other continuations which offer a decisive advantage, such as the move 24.f4, already pointed out, and the vari ation 2 3 .�xdS .l:f.d8 24 . .l:re 1 lt:JxdS 2 5 Jhe5 'iVxeS 2 6J�d 1 which is also winning for White. What can one say about a player who overlooks so much during a game? There are two possible answers - either he is a mediocre player, which is cer tainly not true of Paul Morphy, or the
C hapter 2 - S u c cessful Use of I n t u i tion
player simply did not examine these variations seriously. It is obvious that the second explanation is the more probable. But why would a great player, playing one of the most important games of his life, not even consider the possibility of winning a pawn? I do not see any other explanation than the fact that he simply felt that this direction of play did not promise him anything at tractive. Here, there are two important words 'felt' , which means intuition, and 'di rection' , which is one of the most im portant factors connected with the functioning of intuition. From this, I would risk drawing this conclusion: in tuition was involved in Morphy's play. I would go further: to me it is obvious that intuition was one of the most im portant components of the American's chess strength. In fact, I think it played a far greater role in his play than it did in that of the other great American cham pion, Bobby Fischer. We will say more about the percentage of different com ponents later. For now, let us make an important ob servation: similar mistakes in analysis, combined with clock-like precision in play, can be seen in the games of other great players of the past, such as Capablanca, Smyslov and Tal. It is a characteristic of all the great exponents of chess intuition. We will encounter such mistakes in commentaries later in this book.
committed an oversight. Instead, he should have played 2 0 . ltJxdS and then events could have developed as follows: 2 0 . . . tt:Jxd5 (the only move)
.i
.i
i £ .. i.Y �,
A
• i i
i
.. ttJ
8
•iV �
ji,
88 �
8
2 I .'iVc2 (if 2 I .'iVd3 lt:Jf6 2 2 .lt:Jg4 l:rad8 Black's chances are superior) 2 l . . . tt:Jxe5 (this too is practically forced) 2 2 .dxe5 'iVxeS 2 3 .'iYh 7 + �f8 and now 24.�xd5 ! ? 'iVxdS 2 5 .�a2 'iVe4 2 6 .'iVh8+ �e7 2 7 .'iVxg 7 'iVg6 2 8 .'iYe5+ �f8 2 9 .'iYh8+ with perpet ual check. As we see, this variation is not simple, especially playing Black, since his king is permanently under fire. In addition, White has other possi bilities as well. It is extremely difficult to calculate all this at the board, and there is no doubt that in this case, Morphy would have had to be guided by his intuition, which, as we have seen, is unlikely to have let him down.
But now let us return to the game. In this position Anderssen, by playing 20. 'iYd2-c2? 47
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
But now there is scope for direct calcu lation. 20. ... 21 . �e3xd4
25. 26. �g1 -h 1
l:!.a8-d8
26 . ...
.itd4xb2
tt:Jc6xd4!
Black is clearly better in the variation 2 1 .Ii.xd4 .itxd4 2 2..�.xd4 .itb7 ! (it is also possible to take the knight at once) 2 3 .ih2 .l:IxeS. 21 . ... 22. tt:Jc3xd5
�b6xd4
Black also has a clear advantage after 2 2 . .l::!.xd4 l::rx e5 2 3 . .ita2 �cS . 22. �d6xe5 23. tt:Jd5xf6+ �e5xf6 24. �c2-h7+ g8-f8
A very simple, but also very strong con tinuation. Morphy takes a pawn and then exchanges queens. Anyone would do the same. But first, he had to bring about the conditions for such a simple decision! 27. l::ra 1 -b1 28. l:!.b1 xd1 29. �h7-h8+
l:!.d8xd1 + �f6xf2
Even weaker is 2 9 .l:!.d7? 'liVe 1 + 3 0 .�h2 .iteS + .
When Morphy played his 20th move, he had, among other variations, not only to see this position, but also to fore see that his king would be safe, both now and in the further play. At the same time, this was with one of the greatest mas ters of attack that have ever lived, sitting opposite him! 25 . .itb1 -e4 The attempt to manage with checks loses at once: 2 5 .�h8+ e7 2 6.l:!.e l + �d7. 48
29. 30. 31 . 32.
... 'iYh8-h7 .ite4-f3 �h1 -g1
�f8-e7 .itb2-e5 �f2-g3
Chapter 2
32 . ...
�g3-g6
Just so! I am convinced that Morphy did not even consider other possibilities. Fritz immediately points out a forced win by 3 2 . . . �d4+ ! 3 3 .�h l (33 . .r!xd4 'ii' e l + 3 4.�h2 �e5+) 3 3 . . . g6 3 4.'ti'xh6 (34.�d5 �d6 3 5 .'ii'xf7 .!:.e l +) 34 . . . l::th 8 3 5 .'ii'd 2 and now Black can finish the job a la Morphy with 3 5 . . Jhh3+ etc. If Morphy had paused for a moment, he could easily have found this variation. But he simply did not bother looking, since the game was won. It is interesting that one can find similar occurrences in several of Lasker's games, and he was also a great tactician. Psychologically, this is very noteworthy! However, Black had no more difficulties in the game. 33. 34. 35. 36.
"i¥h7xg6 �f3-b7 �b7xa6 �g1 -f2
36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41 .
J:!.d1 -d3 �f2-e2 �a6-b7 l:rd3-d1 �b7-c8
f7xg6 J:!.e8-b8 c7-c6
�e5-d6! �e7-d7 .!:i.b8-a8 l::ta8xa3 �d7-c7 .l:.a3-a2+
42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51 .
-
S u cc essful Use of I n t u i t i on
�e2-f3 �c8-e6 �f3-g3 .t:rd1 -d7+ �e6-g4 �g3-h4 �g4-f3 .!:i.d7xg7 �f3-g4 g2- g3
�d6-c5 .l::ra 2-f2+ .!:i.f2-f6 �c7-b6 �c5-d6+ c6-c5 c5-c4 .l:.f6-f4+ c4-c3
Or 5 1 Jhg6 l:td4 5 2 .l:l'.f6 c2 5 3 . .Ufl �f4. 51 .
l::tf4xg4+ 0-1
A simple and at the same time powerful game. Subsequently, Capablanca was also able to play in such a style. Here, we have found several answers to the question of what made Morphy su perior to the great attacking master Anderssen. The latter only learned much later not to be afraid of having to defend, when the position demanded it. And he would only take a purely technical decision if there was dire ne cessity. Morphy, on the other hand, could do all this from birth! But if his opponent had been outplayed, but no simple decision was lying on front of his eyes, Morphy preferred to attack energetically, and could do so wonderfully. We will look now at a clas sic example, but without in any way di verting our attention from our main subject, which is intuition! In this section, I will also seek to kill two birds with one stone, by correcting some errors in my book Paul Morphy, A Modern Perspective, Russell Enterprises, 49
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i on
Inc. Milford, USA, 2 0 0 5 , as well as con firming what to me is obviously the case, namely that one of the most im portant components of the phenomenal natural talent of the tragic American champion was the strength of his intu ition. In my book, I analysed the following fa mous game Bird-Morphy, London, ca sual match, 1 85 8 , but I did not manage to shake off the impression created by a century and a half of commentators, supported by the authority of modern computer analysis taken from Kasparov's multi-volume work. As a re sult, I gave a long version of what re duces to the following: 'the match with Bird did not have great sporting signifi cance in Morphy's eyes. As a result, hav ing obtained an overwhelming position from the opening, in the following po sition,
correct anything, after experiencing a long feeling that something was wrong (is this intuition?) , I discovered that the truth was quite different, and that Morphy turned out to have pene trated the position more deeply than several (four of five?) generations of analysts. And if I am right, and this is really the case, then we must start our analysis one move earlier than the point at which most commentators usually start taking an interest. Bird, Henry Morphy,Paul London match, 1 8 5 8
•
"' � ',;s 0 ' '
1 6 . ...
... when he spotted a striking idea, he did not resist its charms in favour of a guaranteed technical method of play. But everything has its price, and in this case, it should have cost him half a point, if his opponent had not commit ted an obvious mistake on move 2 2 . .' But later, when the book had already appeared in print and it was too late to .
50
,
i''El'i¥ 8 �
•
J::!. a 8-b8
Analysis starts here, because the main alternative is 1 6 . . . �g4! with a simple positional idea: to exchange light squared bishops (White has many holes on the light squares) , then double rooks on the f-file, then exchange the other bishops (the pawn on f2 !) and the rest is quite easy. If this plan is to be played, it should be played now, since then the a8 rook can go to f8 in one move. 1 7. 0-0-0
Cha p t e r 2 - Su c cessful Use of I n t u i t i on
deed been considered incorrect, as I said above.
1 7. ...
l::f8xf2(!!)
This is what Morphy had seen and the reason he moved the rook on the previ ous move! Incidentally, I have deliber ately left that move without punctua tion, because the assessment of its strength depends entirely on the strength of the sacrifice just played. 1 8. �e3xf2
'ifh3-a3!
But now let us turn to the analysis. In doing so, I will make use of the past analyses. Fortunately, the most impor tant of these are summarised in Kasparov's first volume, to which he has added his own analysis and that of the computer. Effectively, it is with him that we will be debating. The main question is this: was the sacri fice simply the whim of a genius, since there can be no doubt that it would have been a simple matter for Morphy to see the technical route beginning with 1 6 . . . �g4. So why did he choose an incalculable line with a sacrifice? Or did he in fact feel with his intuition (we will soon realise that the number of possible variations makes it beyond hu man capacity to have calculated it out) , that he had great chances of conducting the attack to a successful conclusion? I am inclined towards the latter answer, but only analysis can show the effec tiveness of the American genius' intuition. 1 9. c2-c3
I have only given Black's last move one exclamation mark, because he simply does not have any other move. Moving the bishop to this square is incompara bly weaker. All the astonishment, inso far as it is justified, should be devoted to Black's previous move or to the whole concept, which one has to say is grandi ose, even if not fully correct at the end of the day For 1 5 0 years or so, it has in-
This move is forced. For example, 1 9 . 'if g S loses thus: 1 9 . . . lhb 2 ! 2 0 .'ii'd 8+ �f8 2 l .�d2 e3 + ! 2 2 .�xe3 'ifb4+ 2 3. We 1 l::b 1 mate. 1 9. 20. b2-b4
"ii!Ya3xa2
This too is forced After 2 0.'iYc2 �f4+ 2 1 .�d2 e3 Black wins. 20. 21 . �c1 -c2
"ii!Ya 2-a 1 + "ii!Ya 1 -a4+ 51
The Enigma of Chess In t u i t i on
22. �c2-b2? Without any doubt, a terrible move, which loses quickly. 2 2.�c l was oblig atory, and in the opinion of several gen erations of commentators, as men tioned earlier, should have saved the draw. Through the efforts of all these commentators, White's defensive lines have been worked out, which Kasparov (or whoever helped him with his book, which I think is very likely) corrected and refined. I, however, believe that White's defences can be breached even in this case. This is the main line of what I have found: 2 2 .. ..ifs 2 3..ie l ! Kasparov awards this move an exclama tion mark, considering that it saves White. It is indeed the most tenacious, as shown by the variations: A) 2 3 .�e3 �a2 ! 2 4Jlhg 1 aS ! 2 S Jld2 (2S .�h6 is no better: 2 S . . . g6 2 6 .�gS axb4 ! 2 7 .'i¥xfS .if4+ ! 2 8 .'iVxf4 bxc3 winning) 2 S . . . 'iVa l + 2 6.�c2 �a4+ 2 7 .�c 1 axb4 with a de cisive attack; B) 23 . .ie3 .ixb4! 24.cxb4 .l:i.xb4 2 S .�c2 'i¥a3 + 2 6.�d2 l::r b 2 winning. 23 'iVal + 24.�c2 The greatest in trigue starts with this move. First, let us look at the main variation, which is given in Kasparov's book: •••
52
2 4. . . e3 + 2 S .�b3 exd2 2 6 . .l::!.xa 1 .l::!.e 8 ! 2 7 . .ia6 (I would mention in passing that this move is bad. White loses two important tempi, whereas after 2 7 . .if3 ! dxe 1 � 2 8 . .r.f.axe 1 l:txe 1 2 9Jhe 1 .ixh2 3 0 . bS the advantage is already on his side, although it seems that Black should hold) 2 7 . . . dxe 1 'iV 2 8 .tlaxe 1 l::rxe 1 2 9 Jhe 1 .ixh2 3 0 . .ib7 .ie4 3 l ..ixc6 �f7 ' . . . gave Black a minimal advantage' . However, if we refrain from the natural check and play instead 24 .'iVa3! then White's prospects look much less rosy. 2 S .'iVcl 2 S ."iVe3 ? loses at once to 2 S . . . l::rxb4. 2S ... e3+ 26.l:ld3 Worse is 2 6 . .id3 'i¥a4+ 2 7 .�b2 e2 ! 2 8 . .ixe2 (after 2 8 Jld2 .ixb4! Black wins) 2 8 . . . aS ! with a winning attack. 26 .. .'iYa2+ 2 7.'i!iid l If 2 7 .�b2 'ifc4 2 8 .'i¥b3 aS ! 29 . .t!.fl .ie4 30 . .U.f3 axb4! 3 I . .U.xe3 .ig6 Black has a serious, prob ably even decisive advantage. I cannot prove this by variations, because there are too many non-forcing lines here, but I ask you to believe me - White is in a bad way. 2 7 ... aS ! 2 8.'iVc2 'iYa3 29 ..llfl .ie4! As a result, we have reached a po sition in which, despite his extra rook (for which, by the way, Black has three pawns already and will soon have an other!) White has serious trouble sur••
Chapter 2 - S u c cessful Use o f I n t u i t i on
viving. Once again, showing any further lines makes no sense, and I simply ask you to believe me when I say that White will not be able to escape from the pin without major material losses, and Black will then have every grounds for winning. In the game, Morphy won with a direct attack, practically by force: 22. 23. c3xb4 24. �d2xb4 25. Wb2-c2
�d6xb4 l:.b8xb4+ 'iYa4xb4+
'On 2 S . tit>a2 decisive is 2 S . . . c5 ! 2 6.dxc5 d4! ' - Kasparov. I will add a couple of lines, just for clarity: 2 7 .�xd4 �e6+ 2 8 .�al 'iYb3 (also good is 2 8 . . . 'iVa3 + 2 9 .Wbl 'iYa2+ 3 0 .tit>c l 'li'xe2) 2 9 J:£d2 e3 3 0.�xe3 'ii a 3+ 3 l .�b l AfS + .
very nice that his intuition did not de ceive him! But one cannot help noticing that the game, like others of his, was powerful. I am convinced that the most important part of the gigantic superiority that Morphy had over his contemporaries, and the reason why he remained ahead of his time by several decades, was his enormous natural intuition. Chronologically, the next player we come to is one who is universally ac knowledged as a chess genius, and par ticularly unrivalled for the strength of his chess intuition. This, of course, is Jose Raul Capablanca.
Jose Raul Capablanca
25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
�f2xe3 l:rd1 -d3 �c2-d2 tit>d2-d1
e4-e3! �c8-f5+ 'tWb4-c4+ 'tWc4-a2+ 'tWa2-b1 + 0-1
This game was not very important in a sporting sense. Morphy, we have to say, played for pleasure. But even so, it is
Legends abound of his intuition, and chess literature is rife with stories such as the following : 'During the Second Moscow Interna tional tournament in 1 9 3 5 , Ragozin and I were showing him our analysis of the adjourned game Ragozin-Lasker. Watching the complicated variations 53
T h e E n i g m a o f C hess I n t u i t i on
played out, Capa just nodded his head each time, as a mark of agreement. But no sooner had we reached one varia tion, finishing in an endgame, than he instantly (italics mine - VB) rejected my superficial summary, and expressed the view that the ending was lost for White; and as the result of joint analysis, Ragozin and I were unable to prove him wrong' (Mikhail Botvinnik, 2004) . I would point out that here we are deal ing with a case of analysis by Botvinnik, a great master in this sphere. But that is just words, whereas concrete demonstrations (and this is a very tough requirement!) showing the working of the intuition of one or other player are more important and easy to understand than any number of stories. So let us look. We start with a fragment from a very well-known game. Bernstein,Ossip Capablanca,Jose Moscow, 1 9 1 4
•
This was not a tournament game, but an exhibition game, and so it may be that the players did not achieve a full level of concentration during the en counter. So firstly, we should not criti54
cise Capablanca's opponent too severely for his mistakes, and secondly, one can not but be amazed at the grace and depth of Capablanca's play. In this posi tion, he played 1 5 . ...
c5-c411
This decision could be considered one of genius, had not the idea been seen before. I have in mind Lasker's move f4-f5 , which he had played some five years before, in an Exchange Spanish against Janowski. In this position, how ever, Capablanca had to consider much more serious counter-measures from the opponent, than was the case in the aforementioned predecessor game. But what is really remarkable is that later in this same year of 1 9 1 4, Lasker beat Capablanca in one of the most famous games in chess history, again employ ing the advance f4-fS in the Spanish Ex change variation! Fate loves to smile ironically on us! But why does a quiet advance of a pawn one square, without any sacrifice or at tack, excite such a response as to be considered virtually a move of genius? The fact is that it runs wholly counter to the accepted canons of positional play, as they were understood at that time. Now the pawn on dS becomes back ward, and one can forget about any hope of advancing it. At the same time, it becomes even weaker than it was. In addition, the white knight is presented with a splendid outpost on d4. All against the accepted rules! Even so, the decision is fully appropriate, and even more than that. 'The idea, which has been passed down from game to game over the course of sixty years, is that by
Cha pt e r 2 - S uc cessful Use of I n t u i t i o n
attacking the pawn on b2, Black relieves himself of the need to defend dS . In the event of b2-b3 , Black obtains an active passed pawn.' (Botvinnik, writing in Uchebnik Shakhmatnoy Igri Kapablanki), FIS Publishers, Moscow 1 9 7 5 ) . What is important here for our topic? It is that whilst all the factors listed by Botvinnik are perfectly correct, that was not how things were viewed at the time this game was played! Capablanca easily managed to see beyond the stereotypes of his time. The reason was his genius, of course, but the important thing for us was that the main component of his genius was intuition. In this case, it def initely showed itself In what are its ef fects seen? Mainly in the fact that it was necessary to feel (there is virtually no other word for the taking of such a de cision) , that play ' against all the rules' , that is, without relying o n standard posi tional principles for that time, is here fully justified. Such a decision is also very difficult to take without belief in one's correctness, which can be based either on intuition or concrete calculation. Which, as we will see, was not simple here. 16. l:lf1 -d1 1 7. ti:Jf3-d4
l:rf8-d8
1 7.
.te7-b41
Another surprise. The bishop, which seems so active and is not obstructed by anything, comes over to exchange itself for the enemy knight. Once again, this was a strange operation for those days. It is justified by one thing - securing the pawn on dS . Here, we must say something obvious, but essential - the fact that Capablanca correctly makes an excellent positional decision, does not mean that his position is superior as a result. No, the position was, and re mains, equal. The result of the game is caused by Bernstein's subsequent mis takes. The strength and importance of what Capablanca has done lies in the fact that, firstly, by solving the problem of the dS pawn, he has equalised com pletely, and has even created some small pressure on White's position. Secondly, he has done so by means that were rev olutionary for their time, thereby ope ning up for his contemporaries and fu ture generations further weapons in the arsenal of positional play and assess ment (and all with a modest pawn move and the exchange of a bishop for a knight! ) . Such long-lasting ideas are usually either worked out in home anal ysis (such an approach was typical in those days of Akiba Rubinstein) , which was certainly not the case here, or born at the board, in which case the proba bility of intuition having played a part in it is very high. This is even more the case here, where forcing play, though possible, as we shall soon see, is not mandatory. And for this reason, there was nothing much to calculate here. The game continued: 55
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i tion
22 . .l:!.c3-c2 Taking the pawn is bad: 2 2 . .l:i.xc4? tt:lc3 . 22. 23. .l:ld1 -c1 24. tt:ld4-b3
c4-c3 .!:i.c8-c5
24. ...
l:.c5-c6
1 8. b2-b3 This decision was widely criticised, but I think wrongly. Now Black will obtain a passed pawn, but with accurate play by White it will not be dangerous. As so often happens, the commentators' view has been influenced by the striking out come of the game. However, more pas sive methods of play are also perfectly reasonable, for instance: 1 8 .'ifc2 ! ? �xc3 (if 1 8 . . . .l:i.ab8, then 1 9 .tt:lce2 with equal play. This is why the white queen moved on the previous move) 1 9. bxc3 .l:i.ab8 2 0 . .l:i.b 1 'ifd6. Here Black has only a small initiative, which can subse quently be neutralised. 1 8. 1 9. b3xc4 20. .l:!.c1 -c2 21 . .l:!.c2xc3
l:.a8-c8 d5xc4 �b4xc3 tt:lf6-d5
At first sight insignificant, but an inter esting detail. Capablanca no doubt saw that Black has no real advantage, as his opponent's position is pretty solid. Therefore, Capablanca sets him a trap. I suspect that all these moves were played quite quickly, giving White an extra chance to fall into the snare! It was pos sible to retreat the rook to c7, but then the opponent would have fewer chances to go wrong! 25. tt:lb3-d4 26. tt:ld4-b5?!
.Uc6-c7
Bernstein takes the first step in the wrong direction. As often happens in chess, taken in isolation, this move does not spoil anything, but it was played with mistaken intentions. Had White seen his opponent's idea, he could have found one of several ways gradually to equalise, with the simplest perhaps be ing 2 6.a3 'ifas 2 7 .'iff3 .l:!.c4 2 8 .tt:le2 56
C h a p t e r 2 - S u c cessful Use o f I n t u i t i on
�xa3 2 9 .e4 tLlf6 3 I .tLlg3 ! . 26. ...
3 0 ..lhc3
�a4
�c7-c5
27. tt:Jb5xc3? Even now, after several inaccuracies by White, his position would only be a lit de worse after 2 7 . tLld4 �e8 2 8 .a3 . Does this mean that the effect of Capablanca's intuitive idea was minimal and it should not be taken too seriously? I be lieve it would be wrong to think this way. I would remind you of what I said earlier: 'Intuition should not be deified, nor demonised! It is not a magic wand, waving which solves all problems. Intuition is not more than a means to assist a player in mak ing a successful choice in difficult situa tions'. And this means that if there is ob jectively no advantage in the position, then even the grandest intuition cannot change this fact. However, having made a successful choice thanks to intuition, the player sets his opponent a more difficult task than would be the case in other possible vari ations, and in doing so, he increases the chances of a mistake by the opponent. We see that here too, and the same thing happens in thousands of games, although not all have such a wonderful finish as this one.
27. 28. �c2xc3 29. l:tc1 xc3
tt:Jd5xc3 �c5xc3
Capablanca ended this small pearl in the most spectacular fashion: 29. ...
�b6-b2!
And it turns out that White must lose a rook: 3 0.�e l ( 3 0.�xb2 l:r.d l mate; 3 0 . .l:!.c2 �b l +; 3 0.�c8 �b l + ; 3 0 . .l:!.d3 'iYb l + ; 3 0 .'1Wd3 �a l + !) 30 . . . 'ihc3 . I often use the position of the above di agram as a training exercise on the sub ject of candidate moves. I am sure that when he played his cunning 24th move, Capablanca had already seen 2 9 . . . �b2 ! . But you know, I am not sure that he bothered checking all the oppo nent's possible moves, apart from a couple of the main ones - he just knew that everything would 'come together' ! And one more thing - even the beauti ful final blow is not just a triumph of Capablanca's superiority in calculating variations. It is obvious that when, con trary to all the positional rules of his time, he advanced his pawn from cS to c4, he did not even try to calculate to the end of the game. But at the same time, he knew (was sure, intuitively) 57
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
that the resulting position with an iso lated pawn would not contain any seri ous danger, and that the resources of his position would at least be sufficient to maintain counterchances. This is intuition in the purest sense! 0-1 The following even more famous game has some things in common with what we have just seen.
other hand, i t makes possible the fol lowing small miracle. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0.
'iYb3xb6 c4xd5 tt:Jc3xd5 e2-e3 .tc1 -d2
'iYd8-b6 a7xb6 tt:Jf6xd5 c6xd5 ti:Jb8-c6
Janowski,David Capablanca,Jose New York Rice, 1 9 1 6
1. 2. 3. 4.
d2-d4 ti:Jg1 -f3 c2-c4 ti:Jb1 -c3
ti:Jg8-f6 d7-d5 c7-c6 .tc8-f5?!
This move is not good, as was known even before this game. 5. 'iYd1 -b3?! This is also a well-known inaccuracy. Black's last, over-optimistic move should be met by the preliminary ex change 5 .cxdS , and only after 5 . . . cxdS should the queen come out. This slightly spoils the game, but on the 58
David Janowski was a great master of at tack, and in general, of playing with the initiative. But here, he has emerged from the opening with an equal positi on, without queens. He did not like such 'boring' positions! His opponent, on the other hand, was a great master of such positions, as we will see. There fore, one should not be so surprised at the result of the game, but we should pay careful attention to how Capablanca won it! And the most important moment of the entire game occurred now. 1 0. ...
.tf5-d7!!
'Capablanca was the first player (my italics - VB) to be able to play such moves. Although the bishop stands "ac tively" on fS , Black transfers it to a more modest position, from where it defends the knight on c6 and assists in
Cha p t e r 2 - S u c cessful Use o f I n t u i t i on
the activation of the pawn on b6. Capablanca's pieces always cooperated to gether (again, my italics - VB) ' - Bot vinnik.
to do so, and this was an area where Janowski lagged behind his opponent in ability.
Botvinnik has already said the most im portant things about this move, and I have highlighted them in italics. But let us talk about this in more detail. Once again, as in the previous example, Capablanca plays a move which the great majority of players would not even consider. He has also gone against all common sense, as it was then under stood, and against all established posi tional principles. The move has a whole range of objections - it loses a tempo, voluntarily retreats the Slav bishop from the diagonal it usually dreams of occu pying, and next move, he will shut it in with . . . e7 -e6. And just as in the previ ous example, it is a remarkably deep and strong idea. And like the earlier ex ample, it cannot possibly have resulted from calculation, since this is not the kind of position where it is possible to calculate concrete lines, to a definite fu ture position. So once again, we have a decision by Black for which there is no supporting base of positional reasons (by the stan dards of that time) , nor of calculation. And yet the move is brilliant. Once again, the move can only be felt, which means it was the product of intuition. And there is another similarity with the previous example - here too, despite this wonderful idea, which was several decades ahead of its time, the position remains only equal. The only difference is that Black has already worked out his plan of campaign, whilst White still has
This move is imprecise, but not yet an outright mistake. It shows that Janowski has not yet foreseen very clearly the fu ture course of events. By continuing in such a fashion, he commits his king to castling. But here, we have a very obvi ous case where the king should stay in the centre, on the square e2. Therefore, correct was l l ..itd3 . Today, this is ele mentary, and obvious to all, but in those days . . . And Janowski was not only one of the strongest players of the day, he had even played a world championship match against Emanuel Lasker! !
1 1 . .itf1 -e2?!
11. 1 2. 1 3. 1 4. 1 5. 16. 1 7.
0-0 .I:!.f1 -c1 .itd2-c3 a2-a3 tt::lf 3-d2 g2-g3
e7-e6 .itf8-d6 �e8-e7 .l:i.h8-c8 tt::lc 6-a5 f7-f5 b6-b5
1 8. f2-f3?! But this mistake is more serious than l l ..ite2 , although it is still not a blun der. It is bad in principle, because it 59
The Enigma o f C hess I n t u i tion
does not prevent the opponent's plan. It was necessary to take the knight, which is striving for a splendid square on c4: 1 8 . .ilxa5 and Black would have only a small, although lasting advantage. 1 8. ...
tt.Ja5-c4
Now he will have permanent pressure. 1 9. .ile2xc4 A sensible decision. In such positions, the knight has more prospects than the bishop. 1 9. 20. e3-e4
b5xc4 �e7-f7
there is a good chance that Capablanca would have won, but this is how White should have played! Now, however, the game enters a new stage. White's pieces remain passive for a long time to come, whilst Black will become very active when he opens the position, which White cannot prevent. Now Capablanca gives a classic example of play on both flanks. First, he creates the threat of a breakthrough on the queenside, by transferring his rook there. 21 . 22. 23. 24. 25.
f3-f4 cJ;>g1 -f2 Wf2-e3 �a1 -b1
.ild6-e7 b7-b5 .l:!.a8-a4 .l:rc8-a8
21 . e4-e5? Surprising! With his own hands, Janowski smothers his own minor pieces! It was still not too late to put up lasting and strong resistance by means of the obvious decision 2 l .exf5 exfS 2 2 .f4 followed by the transfer of the knight to eS . Many commentators have even claimed that White would then stand perfectly satisfactorily, but I can not agree with this. After 2 2 . . .h6 23 .ti.Jf3 �f6 24 ..ilb4 .ilc7 ! Black retains the better chances, with the prospect of gradually increasing the pressure. If this had happened in the game, I still think 60
Now he turns to opening the game on the kingside. With his pieces tied down on the other wing, White cannot pre vent this. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31 . 32.
ti.Jd2-f3 ti.Jf3-e1 cJ;>e3-f3 g3xf4 tt.Je1 -g2 .l:!.c1 -g1 .ilc3-e1
h7-h6! g 7-g5 .l:!.a8-g8 g5xf4 J:Ia4-a8 l::rg 8-g4 .l:.a8-g8
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n t u i t i o n
With great difficulty, White manages to hold back the enemy rooks. Now the bishops must enter the game! 32 . ...
b5-b4!
Of course! So far, the light-squared bishop has been Black's most passive piece. Yet it is the bishop which has no opposite number, and if it succeeds in coming into play, it will be impossible for White to resist the pressure. It was these considerations which gave birth to the idea of the pawn break. But here, we must again look at the resulting variations. And the fact that they are not simple is shown by the experience of numerous commentators on this game. 33. a3xb4?! Now everything turns out to be quite simple, whereas the alternative 3 3 .1[xb4! ? has not found a proper refu tation from the various commentators, as far as I can see. I have tried to do this myself, and I believe that I now have quite a clear picture of what is happen ing in the game and at this point. First of all, I believe Black should start with the move 33 ... 1[a4! All the commenta tors I have seen consider only the more natural 3 3 . . . 1[xb4? ! , but this is worse. The reason, as we will soon see, is that it
opens the a-file too early and so gives White good counterchances. Here are the variations: 34.axb4 1[a4 (if 34 . . . hS , then 3 S .\tlf2 ! h4 36.h3) 3 S . .l:.a l 1[c2 3 6.l:ra7+ \tlf8 3 7 . .l:tga l 1[e4+ 3 8 .\tle3 and it is already very clear that White is surviving, because the knight cannot be taken: 3 8 .. Jhg 2 ?? 3 9 . .l::i. c 7 (b 7 ) . 34J:tbcl 34.1[xe7 loses to 3 4... 1[c2 ! 3 S . .i:tbe l 1[e4+ 3 6.Wf2 cJ;xe7 3 7 .tt:le3 .l:txf4+ 3 8 .cJ;e2 1[f3 + 3 9 . e8 ! 3 7 .b5 �d8 ! 3 8 .�g3 h 5 Black has all he needs for victory. 35. 36. 'it;f3-f2
�c2-e4+ h6-h5
•
34. 35. �e1 -g3
�a4-c2
White's posltlon is extremely un pleasant in all lines, but the best chance of confusing matters was 62
37. .l:!.a1 -a7 If 3 7 .tt::le 3 h4 3 8 .tt::lxg4 the capture 3 8 . . . fxg4! is very strong, and after 3 9.l:ta7 hxg3 + 40Jhg3 l::rb 8 4 1 ..!:l.ga3 llxb4 42 .l:Ic7 l:lxb2+ 43 .t>g l .llb 8 (another very strong continuation is 43 . . . �f3 ! 44 . .!:l.aa7 'it>g6 45 .l::!.x e7 'it>f5 with an easy and safe win) 44 . .!:l.aa7 lle8 4 5 . 'it>f2 'it>f8 Black will soon begin to realise his material advantage. 37. 38. .llg 1 xg2 39. �g3xh4
�e4xg2 h5-h4
Nor does the following try help : 3 9 . lhe 7 + ! ? Wxe7 40.�xh4+ 'it>f7 4 l . .ll x g4 fxg4! winning (but not 4 I . . Jhg4?? 42 .�g5) . 39. 40. 'it>f2-f3 41 . �h4xe7
�g4xg2+ J:!.g2xh2
If 4 1 .lhe7+ t>f8 42.�f6 (42 . .llh 7 .!:!.gg 2 ! ) then 42 . . . J:!.gh8 ! .
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use o f I n t u i t i on
41 . 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.
wf3-f2 �e7-g5+ .l:!.a7-e7 wf2-f3 l:re7xe6+
.l:!.h2-h3+ l::l: h 3-b3 wf7-g6 l:l.b3xb2+ llg8-a8 'it>g6-h7 0-1
Another widely-known game is the fol lowing, in which Capablanca once again shone with a deep and non-stan dard decision, all the consequences of which were practically impossible to foresee. Capablanca,Jose Bogoljubow,Efim London BCF Congress, 1 92 2
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
e2-e4 tt:lg1 -f3 �f1 -b5 �b5-a4 0-0 l:tf1 -e1 �a4-b3 c2-c3
e7-e5 tt:lb8-c6 a7-a6 tt:lg8-f6 �f8-e7 b7-b5 d7-d6 0-0
9. ...
e5xd4
Nowadays it is known that the immedi ate 9 . . . �g4! is stronger. 1 0. 11. 12. 1 3. 14. 1 5.
c3xd4 �c1 -e3 �b3-c2 �e3-c1 b2-b3 �c1 -b2?!
�c8-g4 tt:lc6-a5 tt:la5-c4 c7-c5 tt:lc4-a5
Forty years later, Fischer showed how one should play in this position: 1 5 .dS ! tt:ld7 1 6.tt:lbd2 �f6 1 7 . .l:rb l with a small advantage, Fischer-Kortchnoi, Saltsjobaden Interzonal l 9 62. Now Black equalises - but no more than that! 1 5. 1 6. d4-d5 1 7. tt:lb1 -d2 1 8. "ifd1 xc2
tt:la5-c6! tt:lc6-b4 tt:lb4xc2 .l![f8-e8
.!
1 9. �c2-d3 With this move, Capablanca begins a re grouping of his pieces. 9. d2-d4 Probably for the sake of variety, Capablanca forsakes the usual 9 .h3 in favour of a rarer continuation.
1 9. ...
h7-h6
Bogoljubow prepares a retreat for his bishop, remembering the rule of the two bishops. But in this position, the 63
The Enigma of Chess In t u i tion
bishop pair is not so valuable. After the normal 1 9 . . . tt:ld7 the game is equal. 20. tt:ld2-f1 21 . h2-h3
tt:lf6-d7 itg4-h5
As intended, he preserves the bishop. After 2 l . . .itxf3 2 2 .'iYxf3 itf6 the posi tion would be roughly equal. 22. tt:lf3-d2! 23. itb2xf6
ite7-f6 'iYd8xf6
25. b3xc4 26. 'iYd3-e3
tt:ld7-c5 b5xa4
2 6 . . . bxc4 was insufficient for equality, of course. After 2 7 Jh3 ! itg6 2 8 .f3 ti:ld3 2 9 . l:rd l ! White has the advantage, although Black has reasonable counter chances. 27. f2-f4
�f6-e7
Kasparov also offers a suggestion here: 2 7 . . . itg6 ! ? 2 8 .tt:lg3 .l:i.ab8, considering Black's chances in the resulting position to be perfectly good. However, after 29.I!a3 ! ? l:rb7 3 0.e5 'iYd8 3 1 .ti:lde4 White has a stable advantage . 28. g2-g4 29. f4-f5 30. tt:lf1 -g3
.ith5-g6 itg6-h7 'iYe7-e5
24. a2-a4!? This moment of the game is the most interesting for our researches. Capablanca invites his opponent to un dertake a tempting operation. 24. ...
c5-c4!?
Bogoljubow agrees. Kasparov points out the alternative 24 . . . tt:le5 ! ? 2 5 .'iYe3 g 5, considering the chances roughly equal. But the equality here would have a different character, as play would be sharper. Bogoljubow's deci sion looks tempting and positionally well-founded - he obtains an excel lent square for his knight, and later for his queen too. In addition, he gets a passed pawn with prospects of ad vancing it. 64
This position has arisen, if not by force, then as a very likely consequence of Capablanca's decision at move 24. It is obvious that it is far from one-dimen sional and is impossible to assess accu rately at the moment. Therefore, let us delve into it more deeply and try to un derstand Capablanca's idea. As we have already said, as a result of Capablanca's decision, the black knight and queen both occupy magnificent
Chapter 2 - Su c cessful Use of I n t u i t i o n
positions in the centre of the board, and he has obtained a quite promising passed pawn. Black will have the better prospects on the only open file, the b-file, because he has a potential pene tration square on b2, whilst it is much harder for White to find a similar entry point. White's advanced kingside pawns could potentially become weak, as could the white king, which stands be hind them, although he does stand better than his opposite number for the ending. So, Black has many plusses here. And what are the trumps of White's po sition? Firstly, they are not very many if he manages to exchange the black knight, the pawn on c4 can perhaps ad vance, followed by the dS pawn. Sec ondly, we have already mentioned his king's better prospects in the ending. But all this is not much. The main ad vantage White has is the blocked-in en emy bishop on h 7 . The big question here is: whose trumps are the more im portant? This is a very difficult question to answer, principally because it is hard to identify the means to compare such diverse factors. The point is that in chess, the only general means, which can measure any factor, is calculation. But here, the position is of such a type that there is not much to calculate, al though White had to see a few varia tions. These are the ones involving a breakthrough by Black on the b-file, to gether with the march of his a-pawn. In an ideal world, Capablanca would have clearly pictured the situation in that part of the board when choosing his 24th move. As we will soon see, White is in deed able to hold the situation there, al though not without a few problems.
Beyond that, as in the two previous ex amples, there is very little information one can bring to the assessment of the position, certainly using the known po sitional patterns of those years. But one cannot manage without coming to some judgement of a position, where both players have such differing trumps. One must either calculate ev erything, or else feel which side's ad vantages are the more important, that is, rely on intuition. In this component of play, there was a big difference in class between Capablanca and Bogoljubow, and as the analysis shows, Capablanca's intuition did not deceive him, although it did not save him from some inaccuracies in what follows. 31 . Wg1 -g2 32. ri.a1 -b1 33. tt:ld2-f3
.l:ra8-b8 f7-f6 .l:tb8-b2+
34. l:ib1 xb2? This is the aforementioned mistake, based on an oversight. It is interesting that this moment is not discussed in a single one of the commentaries on this game that I am aware of But it appears that the move 34.l:ie2 ! is much stron ger. In this case, after the very plausible sequence: 65
T h e Enigma of C h ess I n t u i t i on
A) 34 . . Jhe 2+ 3 S . 'ifxe2 'ii' c 3 3 6.�d2 'ifxc4 3 7 .�b4 �d3 3 8 .�xd3 tt:lxd3 3 9 .l:ha4 tt:lcS 40.lla2 'lt>f8 4 1 .ttld4 White has a significant advan tage; B) Maybe Capablanca did not wish to undertake the at first sight more com plicated task of realising his advantage after 34 . . Jhb 1 , but White is fine here too. After 3 5 . ttlxe5 .l:!.xeS 3 6 .�c3 .l:!.e8 he begins the assault with 3 7 .h4 with the idea of opening lines for his queen, and after 3 7 . . . .l:!.eb8 3 8 .g5 fxgS (38 ... .l:!. l b3 3 9 .'ifc l .l:!.b l 40.'iff4) 39.hxg5 hxgS 40.'iYe3 he should be doing extremely well. Now, however, after: 34. 35 . .lle 1 -e2 36. tt:lf3-d4
'iYe5xb2+ 'iYb2-b3
queen retreats, there comes 3 8. tt:le6. In this case, White would certainly have a significant advantage, but the trouble is, he has overlooked the elementary 3 7 . . .'iYxd5 . Here, we certainly have a classic example of a crude blunder in annotations, much more typical of players of an intuitive type, as I have al ready said. Because of this, White seems to have nothing better than 3 7 .tt:le6 , but this brings him no more than equality, and worse still, with the prospect of a quick draw. I will not show the varia tions, but it is clear anyway; again, I ask you to take my word for it. Probably Bogoljubow thought that in the end game, his passed pawn would be more dangerous than in the middlegame, and he was mistaken in his judgement. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41 . 42.
.lle2xe3 .l:Ie3-c3 'lt>g2-f3 tt:lg3-e2 tt:ld4-e6 c4-c5
l:re8-b8 Wg8-f7 .l:rb8-b2 .ith7-g8 tt:lc5-b3
Now the time has come for this pawn to advance. Now all the advantages of the white position, of which we spoke earlier, come to fruition.
It was Bogoljubow's turn to err. He ex changed queens by 36 . ...
'ifb3xe3?
He should bravely have taken the pawn with 3 6 . . . 'ifxc4. Now we again have cause to speak about a theme we have already discussed. In his notes, Capablanca shows that then there would follow 3 7 . .llc 2 and after the 66
42. 43. tt:le6xc5
d6xc5 tt:lb3-d2+
C h a p t e r 2 - S u c c essful U s e of I n t u i t i o n
44. �f3-f2?! This is Capablanca's second inaccuracy in this game. Admittedly, it does not throw away the win (thankfully! ) , but it could have seriously complicated it. The strongest was 44. �f4! and after 44 . . . tLlb l 4S . .l:!.c l a3 46.d6! a2 White wins by force: 47 .tLle6! �e8 48 . .l:!.c8 + ! �d7 49 . .l:!.d8+ �c6 S O .tLl2d4+ �b7 S l .tLlcS + �a7 S 2 Jld7+ �b6 S 3 .tLla4+ �aS S4.tLlxb2. But now, after 44. . . tLlb I ! ? White would have to work hard to overcome all the obstacles. By the combined efforts of various generations of commentators, it has been established that the best line then is the following (I give only the main line) : 4S .I:l:c4! a3 46.tLle6 �e7 47 . .l:!.c7 + �d6 48 . .l:[c6+ �eS ! 49.tLlf4 tLld2 S O . tLld3+ xe4
And now it is possible to win, as shown by Kasparov: S l .d6 �b8 S 2 .d7 .l:id8 S3 . .l:!.d6 �dS S4.tLlb4 aS S S . .l:ie6 + ! ! �xe6 S6.fxe6; and also by S I .tLlxb2 axb2 (S I . . .�xdS S 2 . .l:ic3 ! ; S l . ..�xdS S 2.�c2 tLle4+ S 3 .�e3 a2 S4 . .l:!.c l ) S 2.d6 �dS S 3 . �b6 tLle4+ (S3 . . . b l 'if S4 . .l:ixb l tLlxb l S S .d7) S4.�e3 tLlxd6 S S .tLlc3 + ! WeS ( S S . . . �c4 S6.tLla4) S 6.�xa6.
From this oversight, and partly from the previous one, we can make the follow ing very important observation: intu ition works well when a player is calm and collected - not tense, and not relaxed, but col lected, and not under too much internal ten sion. But Capablanca, understanding that his position is winning, relaxed and took the most obvious decision, which turned out not to be best. Such a thing is also to be seen in some of the games of Morphy, another player of the intu itive type. Bogoljubow missed his chance and played the weaker 44. 45. �f2-e1 46 . .l:[c3-d3
�f7-e7 tt:Jd2-b1
46 . ...
a4-a3?
Much more tenacious was 46 . . . �d6 47 .tLlxa4 .!:[b4 and White still has a good deal of work to do to win. It ap pears that the best line begins with the move 48 . .l:id4!. But his opponent de cided not to tire him out, and the game ended quickly: 47. d5-d6+ 48. tt:Je2-d4
�e7-d8 l:Ib2-b6 67
The Enigma o f Chess Intu i ti on
49. 50. 51 . 52.
tt:Jd4-e6+ f5xe6 e6-e7+ tt:Jc5xa6
�g8xe6 .l::r b 6-b8 Wd8-e8 1 -0
In this game, Capablanca showed the great power of his intuition in solving a complex problem, in a very non-stan dard situation. The following game of his gave the chess world a more general strategical idea of great depth. It still works in our day, although reached via a different opening system. And once again, there is no doubt that this remarkable discov ery was found to a significant extent by the use of intuition.
Nimzowitsch,Aaron Capablanca,Jose St Petersburg preliminary, 1 9 1 4
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
e2-e4 tt:Jg1 -f3 tt:Jb1 -c3 �f1 -b5 d2-d4 �b5xc6 �d1 -d3 tt:Jf3xd4
e7-e5 tLlb8-c6 tt:Jg8-f6 d7-d6 �c8-d7 �d7xc6 e5xd4
8. ...
The 'normal' continuation at the time, and still considered to be so, is 8 . . . �d7 . However, it is still not great for Black. ChessBase gives only two games, played before the present one. Both saw Black played by none other than Steinitz, and he lost both. The subsequent statistics of the variation are also depressing for Black, with a huge percentage of losses. So it is not without good reason that Capablanca decided to seek new paths, and so his decision should not be criti cised. Probably, the whole variation is not very good, and instead at move S , Black should exchange on d4, going into the normal variation. Nowadays, this is fairly obvious. Another circumstance is more interest ing : when did Capablanca think up his idea, at home (this would be untypical for him, but why not?) or at the board itself? I do not know the answer to this question, and unless someone else knows, we will never be able to find out. But it is not actually so important. What is important is that the move played can lead, and in this game does indeed lead, to a new class of position. Not just to a new position, but to a new type of position that was unknown be fore the present game! Again we see Capablanca coping successfully in a po sition unknown to him and not in ac cordance with the standard positional means typical of his time! This is what is meant by genius. And in this instance, the main instrument used was definitely intuition. 9. tLld4xc6?!
68
g7-g6
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n tu i t i on
Nimzowitsch, whose intuition was not the strongest aspect of his talent, goes after the pawn. He undoubtedly be lieved that his queen would not get stuck in the enemy camp and would be able to return home safely. And he un doubtedly failed to realise that the queen returning home would only be the start of things! From the positional knowledge of his time, it is hard to criticise him. But looking ahead only a short time, Alekhine significantly strengthened White's play in 1 92 7 , playing 9 . .i[gS ! .i[g7 1 0 .0-0-0 ! , and he successfully showed that White retains a strong ini tiative. There is no doubt about the fact that this novelty was the result of home preparation, a subject we will discuss in more detail later. 9. 1 0. 11. 1 2. 1 3. 14. 1 5.
b7xc6 YWd3-a6 YWd8-d7 YWa6-b7 .U.a8-c8 'iVb7xa7 .i[f8-g7 0-0 0-0 'ifa7-a6 l:tf8-e8 YWa6-d3
Secondly, we can say that it was Capablanca who was right! 1 5. 1 6. f2-f3 1 7. .i[c1 -d2?1
'iVd7-e61 ti:Jf6-d7
Stronger was 1 7 . .i[f4 tbcS ! ? 1 8 . 'iV d2 Then after 1 8 . . . 'iVc4 Black 'only' has good compensation. 1 7. 1 8. 'ifd3-e2
ti:Jd7-e5 tt:Je5-c4
'Having g1vmg up the pawn . . . Capablanca plays as if nothing was amiss, strengthening his position to the maximum. His "simple" manoeuvres 'ifd7 -e6 and ti:Jd7 -e5-c4 followed by putting his rooks on the a- and b-files are, in my view, astonishing for the time' (Garry Kasparov, My Great Prede cessors, Volume 1 ) . I would add to this that what is even more amazing, is that the effectiveness of these manoeuvres had to be foreseen (felt) in advance, in choosing his eighth move! And even if the move itself was not strongest, what an idea was concealed behind it! 1 9. l:la1 -b1
Firstly, we can say that this position was probably foreseen by both players, but they had different opinions about it.
1 9. 20. a2-a4?1
lic8-a8!
69
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
Nimzowitsch plays the game in far from the best way. In general, he always found it very difficult to play against Capablanca. In their first seven meet ings, i.e. those played before Capablanca lost his world title to Alekhine, Nimzowitsch managed only two draws. In such circumstances, a degree of un certainty in his play is understandable. White's last move is not good and only helps Black realise his plan. Kasparov, in the aforementioned book, points out the best defence 2 0 . .ile 1 ! ? and then himself suggests the following for Black: 2 0 . . . ds ! 2 1 . b3 tLld6 2 2 .a4 fS with comfortable and active play. 'And no more than that?' , you may ask. Yes, that is all. Certainly, Capablanca found an extremely deep, positively genius idea, but for all that, if the starting posi tion of this idea was objectively per fectly good for his opponent, and if he had continued to play well, then Black should not be able to obtain more than the comfortable play already demon strated. 20. 21 . �e2xd2 22. l'.tf1 -d1
Another bad decision by Nimzowitsch. As a rule, the seriousness of mistakes has a tendency to grow, from small in accuracies to outright mistakes. ' 2 3 .�d3 �cS + 24.Wh l .l:l.b4! 2 5 . tLle2 retains chances of holding ' , writes Kasparov. However, even in this case, White would still have plenty of prob lems. After the probable continuation 2 5 . . Jhb2 2 6 .l::f.x b2 .ilxb2 2 7 .�b3 .ilf6 2 8 .c3 �e3 2 9 .�c2 �f2 his position would not be nice. 23. 24. �e3-g5
l'.tb8-b4!
Again, I agree with Kasparov, that after 24.'ifd3 �cS + 2 5 .h1 -g 1 'it>g1 -h2
40. ...
'i:fh5xh4+ 'ii' h 4-h5 l:!.b8-a8 'ii' h 5-c5+ 'ii'c5-c4 �c4-c5 'ii'c5xe5 'ii' e 5-h5+ 'ii' h 5-c5+
d6-d5!
Even simpler than 40 .. Jha7 4 1 .llxa7 �xa7 42 .tt:le4. 41 . l:!.a4-h4 42. tt:lc3-d1
I:!.a8xa7
42.tt:ld l �xc2. 0-1 'We can hardly reprove Nimzowitsch for underestimating his opponent's deep positional idea, so surprising for the start of the 2Oth century. A typical intuitive product of genius! ' (Kasparov, op. cit.) Capablanca will forever have a place in chess history as the archetypal general genius of the game, and also for the strength of his intuition. But chess also knows other greats who, even by the standards of the elite, are distinguished for the power of their intuition. We will now examine in more detail this aspect of the play of some of this group. But first a few words about this: one of the leitmotifs of this book is the postu late that intuition is one of the tools of a chess player, similar, but not identical, to other 'means of production' , such as judgement and calculation. And if this is the case, then we can and must talk about differences in the level of use of this tool in the play of different players. In other words, amongst different play ers of the same class, there can be dif ferences in intuitive ability, just as they may differ in their ability to calculate and make positional judgements, and we should not be surprised by such dif ferences. 71
T h e Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
Let us compare two world champions. I have already given one example and said that with Robert Fischer, for all his colossal chess talent and enormous strength, intuition somewhat lagged behind other components of his mas tery. We can recall the previously-seen example against Geller and the mistake committed by Fischer, at exactly the moment when intuition was required more than other qualities. And here is another confirmation of this, from a source of such authority that a greater one can hardly be imagined. Mikhail Botvinnik, amongst other things he mentioned as characterising Fischer, said 'When Fischer was faced with a surprise in the opening, he almost al ways reacted badly ! ' (Garry Kasparov, My Great Predecessors, Vol. 4) . But this is what Botvinnik wrote about another champion, Vasily Vasilievich Smyslov, who has long been considered one of the greatest intuitive players of all time: ' . . . his greatest strength in chess was his astuteness... Smyslov's strength showed itself especially when he fell into a prepared variation; he would then sit at the board for an hour, his cheeks resting on his fists and his ears red with the strain - and would find the refutation! ' I suggest that the ability to react well to an opponent's prepared novelty is to a large extent a function of intuition. Why? Because to reply well to a strong prepared novelty often requires a great deal, if not an impossible amount, of calculation work. And in addition, it re quires correct assessments of very com-
72
Vasily Smyslov
plicated positions, arising at the end of the lines calculated, if the player man ages to get that far. In other words, it is a task which is often extremely difficult and virtually impossible to achieve by the 'normal' means of calculation and assessment. And then, as we know, the heroine of our book steps forward - in tuition. And if intuition was far from being the strong side of the undoubtedly great player Robert Fischer (and I repeat this is only when judged by the very highest standards, to which he be longed; most players can only dream of having his level of intuition) , then for another giant of the game, Vasily Smyslov, intuition was one of the most powerful components of his natural chess talents. And now it is time to speak about this in more detail. To begin with, a couple of examples to illustrate Botvinnik's words.
Chapter 2 - S u c cessfu l Use o f I n t u i t i o n Szabo,Laszlo Smyslov,Vasily Moscow Alekhine mem, 1 95 6
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
c2-c4 d2-d4 tt:lb1 -c3 e2-e3 �f1 -d3 a2-a3 b2xc3 e3-e4
tt:lg8-f6 e7-e6 �f8-b4 0-0 c7-c5 �b4xc3+ tt:lb8-c6
So there was plenty to think about, in fact, and a very important decision to be taken. And this is what ensued. 9. c3xd4 1 0. e4-e5 1 1 . �e1 -f1
tt:lc6xd4 ifd8-a5+ tt:lf6-e8
The pawn cannot be taken, because of the loss of the knight: l l ...'iVxeS ? 1 2 .�b2 ifcs 1 3 .�xd4 ifxd4? 1 4.�xh7+.
Szabo's novelty. The usual continuation was 8 .tt:le2 .
Thus far, starting at move eight, play has been forced. 1 2 . �c1 -d2 8. ...
c5xd4
Thus, Smyslov is faced with a novelty and has to think. Actually, one could ar gue that there was not a great deal to think about at this point, since taking the pawn appears to be forced, other wise White will get everything he has ever dreamed of in this variation, at no cost. But things are not so simple, mainly be cause there is also the move 8 . . . d5 , with a complicated and unclear position. At the same time, taking the pawn leads to many complications, which will un doubtedly have been studied at home by the opponent.
Even in our day, this variation is still oc casionally the subject of debate. Black almost always follows in Smyslov's foot steps, the exceptions being rare, and al most always unsuccessful. White usu ally prefers 1 2 .�b2 here. All this con vincingly confirms the correctness of Smyslov's decision at move eight. As we will soon see, it is extremely difficult to work out all the ramifications and it is hardly possible to get by without rely ing on intuition. 1 2 . ...
ifa5-d8!
1 2 . . . 'i¥c7 is weaker because of 1 3 .�b4 'iVxeS ? 1 4.�c3 . 73
The Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
1 3. �d2-b4 14. �d3xh7+ 1 5. 'Yid1 xd4
d7-d6 'it>g8xh7 a7-a5
This move is a key part of the plan initi ated by Smyslov on his 8th move. In making his choice it was extremely im portant to evaluate correctly various endgames, in all of which Black would have a material deficit. As we will soon see, this was far from easy, especially when one takes into account that it all had to be foreseen in advance, in amongst many other possible continua tions for the opponent.
1 6. �b4-c3? Szabo flinches! Maybe events had taken a turn that he had not anticipated, or else he saw that his prepared judgement was not correct and this came as an un pleasant surprise to him. The correct and most principled line was to take the pawn: 1 6.�xd6 After 1 6 .. .tL:lxd6 there are two variations: A) 1 7.exd6 �f6 1 8.l2Jf3 If 1 8 .'Yixf6 gxf6 1 9.c5 .l:Ia6 20J:lcl .l:Ic6 2 I .l2Jf3 b6 Black easily equalises. 18 .. Ji'xd4 1 9.l2Jxd4 l:.d8 20.c5 This is the move given by Smyslov. The game is also equal after 20 .l2Jb5 lla6 2 l .We2 �d7 74
2 2. .l:i.hb l l:rc6. 20 ...b6 and here White has no real advantage; B) Slightly more interesting is 1 7.I:I.dl !? �d7 1 8.exd6 . If 1 8 .'Yixd6 then 1 8 . . . �a4 with compensation. 1 8 .. Ji'f6 1 9.l2Jf3 1!fxd4 20.llxd4 f6 2 1 .\t>e2 e5 2 2.I:I.d2 .l::!.ac8
Here Black also has fully adequate play and the chances of both sides must be assessed as roughly equal. Instead of going into the ending, Szabo takes a highly optimistic decision, which does not accord with the reality of the position on the board, and he is punished. But for us the interesting thing is how great a role did intuition play in Smyslov's decision, and could he have taken it without using intuition at all? We have already seen many of the tasks he had to solve, in deciding on how to react to the novelty. It is quite obvious that he had to calculate a great deal, but an even more difficult aspect of the work was the assessment of the different positions, which could arise in the various lines, the choice of which in most cases lay with White. The as sessment of the endgames was espe cially difficult. This is shown by the fact that, at first, the computer pronounces them all to be virtually winning for
C hapter 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n t u i t i o n
White, and only gradually does it see that Black's position is in fact satisfac tory. Thus, Smyslov had to perform a great deal of work in different direc tions, which made his task much more difficult. And since it was impossible to achieve complete certainty with either calculation or assessment, and yet he still took the right decision, we can say with a great deal of certainty that intu ition played a major role in the deci sion. Incidentally, had Szabo taken the right decision on his last move, then his position would not have been worse and a draw would have been the most likely outcome. It should not be sur prising that such is the objective truth, but it just means that Black could not have done any better and seized the ad vantage. But with his last move, White went against the requirements of the posi tion, and this is what followed:
1 6 . ...
Another mistake, worsening White's position further. His position is also dif ficult after 1 7 .exf6 ?! tt::lxf6 1 8 .tt::lf3 e5 . The best chance was the exchange 1 7 .exd6, although after 1 7 . . . 'ifxd6 1 8.'iVxd6 tt::lx d6 Black has a clearly better ending. Of course, having turned down an equal ending the move before, White probably did not consider enter ing an inferior one now! 1 7. 1 8. Iia1 -d1
IJ;?h7-g8
Black also has a significant advantage af ter 1 8 .exd6 'iYxd6 and also after 1 8 .exf6 tt::lxf6. 1 8. 1 9. J::rd 1 -d3
'iVd8-c7
Szabo continues the attack, ignoring ev erything else. But this attack is a chi mera, and will break up on the rocks of the defences around the black king. However, White is in a bad way anyway after 1 9.exf6 tt::lxf6 2 0 .tt::l f3 e5 or 1 9.exd6 tt::lxd6. 1 9. 20. .l::rd 3-h3
d6xe5
20. ...
b7-b6!
f7-f6!
Strictly according to principles - an un justified attack on the wing is met by a counter in the centre. 1 7. 'iVd4-h4+?!
75
T h e Enigma of C hess I n t u i tion
The black pieces come into play in the simplest way possible. White has no at tack, is down on material, and will soon lose even more.
33 . 34. 35 . 36 .
.l:!.g1 -g3 .l:lg3-d3 .l:ld3-d2 .l::!.d 2-c2
21 . ti:Jg1 -f3 There is no real attack. For example, 2 I .'ifh7+ �f7 2 2 .'ifhS + g6 2 3 .'ifh7+ tLlg7 24 . .l:!.h6 'ti'xc4+ and 2 S ... 'ifd3 . It was already possible to resign. Further commentary is not really needed, but even so, it is worth seeing how Smyslov finishes things off He always did this in the most artistic style. 21 . 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
... ti:Jf3-d2 'ti'h4-h7+ g2-g4 'it>f1 -e1 g4-g5
�c8-a6 .l:!.a8-c8 'it>g8-f7 �a6xc4+ 'fic7-d6 'fid6xa3
b6-b5 b5-b4 'ifa2-c4 'ifc4-e4+ 0-1
In the following game, too, the decision about how to meet a novelty has to be taken in extremely complicated circum stances. Geller,Efim Smyslov,Vasily Zurich Candidates Tournament, I 9 5 3
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11.
d2-d4 c2-c4 ti:Jb1 -c3 e2-e3 �f1 -d3 a2-a3 b2xc3 ti:Jg1 -e2 0-0 e3-e4 Wk'd1 -a4
ti:Jg8-f6 e7-e6 �f8-b4 c7-c5 0-0 �b4xc3+ ti:J b8-c6 b7-b6 �c8-a6 ti:Jf6-e8
This continuation had been seen once before this game, but it was not known to Smyslov, and he had to solve the problems at the board. 27. 'ti'h7-c2 Or 2 7 .'ti'h5 + 'it>e7 2 8 .gxf6+ gxf6 2 9 'ifh7 + J:.f7 0
0
27. 28. 29. 30. 31 . 32. 76
... .l:!.h1 -g1 ti:Jd2-b1 g5-g6+ 'ifc2-c1 .l:!.h3-h7
�c4-d5 'ifa3-a1 +! 'ifa1 -a2! 'it>f7-e7 tt:Je8-d6 ti:Jd6-f5
1 1 . ...
'fid8-c8!
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n t u i tion
'I thought for about an hour', wrote Smyslov. Now we too must pause for a moment, and ask ourselves: what was he thinking about for so long? It may seem that everything is clear enough: a) the bishop is attacked; b) retreating it would be against the spirit of the position, which requires Black to pressurise c4; c) that means playing either I I .. .lbc6-a5 , or the move in the game. Can the choice between them really take an hour? If we look at what hap pened in the game, and what might have happened, it will help us under stand why this choice was so difficult.
14. d4xc5?! This decision of Geller's is criticised by both Smyslov and Kasparov, who even gives it a question mark. I am not so categorical, but I also think that White should have played I 4. d5 . Then Smyslov gives the following likely vari ation: I 4 . . . ti:lf6 I S .�gS ti:lg4 1 6.�e7 'i¥e8 I 7 .'iVxe8 l:!.fxe8 I 8 .�xd6 �xc4. In this case, we would reach a roughly equal, but fully playable position.
1 2. �c1 -e3 The first variation is clear enough - in the event of the dubious I 2 .dxc S ? ! ti:leS (this is why the knight did not go to aS at once, its apparently natural post) I 3 .l:Id I bxcS Black would be doing very well. But this is all simple. So where did all the time go? 1 2. 1 3. l:ra1 -d1
d7-d6 Efim Geller
Smyslov's recommendation I 3 .ti:lg3 ! ? tt:Jas I 4.d5 . 1 3 . ...
tt:Jc6-a5
was So why did Geller, who was certainly not lacking a deep understanding of the game, choose such a positionally dubi ous undertaking? Maybe something had gone not quite as he had planned, when he prepared his new move. It is well-known that Efim Petrovich was a great master of home analysis and that he prepared his novelties very thor oughly, so it cannot be ruled out that what has occurred in the game was ex actly what he had been aiming for. If this is so, then Smyslov had penetrated 77
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i o n
to the heart of the position better than his opponent. Such a decision could easily take a lot of time, and would also depend to a large extent on intuition. 14. 1 5. e4-e5 1 6. �a4-c2
d6xc5 �c8-c6
verely restricts his pieces, but the pros pects in the variation 1 7 .exf6 tt:lxf6 1 8 . .itg5 .itxc4 1 9 . .itxf6 .itxd3 were even worse. But now it is clear that White has no real compensation for the catastrophically weak c4 pawn, together with his other problems on the queen side. 1 7. 1 8. tt:le2-f4 1 9. .itd3-c2
�c6-a4 tt:le8-c7
Exchanging queens was unfavourable, and not what White was planning. But what should Black do now, as the threats are very unpleasant? 1 6 . ...
f7-f5!
This is the principled and concrete re ply that Smyslov had to see in advance, along with its consequences. The move is practically forced, as all other moves are weaker. Of course, one could argue that Black's previous move, exposing his queen to the threat of .itd3-e4, was not forced. But from the positional point of view, it was important to drive the enemy queen from the square a4. So it is quite likely that this important re source in the position was foreseen by Smyslov, during his long think. 1 7. �c2-a2 Geller would hardly have wanted to leave the f5 pawn on the board, as it se78
Another notable moment in the game, for our purposes. Here Black also has a number of attractive continuations. In such situations, the choice is made ac cording to one of two possible criteria: either objectively, based on which line the player thinks offers the best chances, or subjectively, according to which continuation leads to the type of position the player likes best. But ide ally, one should combine the two crite ria. And this is what is interesting here: Smyslov, a great master of the endgame, turned down both chances to reach an ending with an extra pawn: A) After 1 9 . . . 1txc4 2 0 . .itxa4 .itxa2 , Smyslov was evidently not wishing to give White the chance of counterplay with 2 l .l:!.d6 ;
Cha p t e r 2 - Su c cessful Use of I n t u i tion
B) Black would have been offered more winning chances with the line pointed out by Smyslov: 1 9 . . . 'ti'xc4 ! ? 2 0. 'tW a 1 'ti'bs 2 I ..l:t.fe 1 'iVe8, but h e also declined this, preferring the more com plicated and sharper play in the middle game. 1 9.
ifa4-e8!?
would venture to suggest (offering strict proof of the operation of intuition is very difficult, as I have said before) that intuition was at work here, because it is unrealistic to work out all the con sequences exactly. This is especially so if one takes into account that after his pre vious expenditure of time, the prospect of later time-trouble is already a realistic one for Black. 20. �c2-b3 21 . tt::lf4-h3
g7-g5
After 2 1 .tt::ld 3 unpleasant is 2 l . . .f4 2 2 .�c l f3 . 21 . 22. f2-f3! 23. tt::l h3-f2 24. tt::lf 2-d3
h7-h6 �e8-e7 l::ra 8-d8
24. ...
�e7-g7!
Now we can clearly see what attracted Smyslov when he played his 1 9th move. The numerous pawn weak nesses in White's position tie his pieces down to lasting passivity. At the same time, these weaknesses are not going to go away. For this reason, the question becomes: how much longer can White hold his position? There is already no great question about the outcome of the game, assuming Black shows a proper quality of play in real ising his advantage, and with Smyslov playing Black, this is guaranteed. I re member he once said to me (alas , I have had all too few conversations with great masters! ) , 'In my day, if I obtained a winning advantage, I rarely let it slip ' . 25. 26. 27. 28.
f3-f4 tt::l d 3-c1 l:rd1 xd7 'i¥a2-e2
lld8-d7 �rf8-d8 l::rd8xd7 tt::l c 7-d5!
The last inactive Black piece comes into play. From here onwards, White's posi tion goes steadily downhill. 29. �e3-d2 30. �d2xf4 31 . l:rf1 xf4
tt::l d 5xf4 g5xf4 �g7-g5
79
The Enigma of C hess I n t u i tion
There is no doubt that both players were short of time. Consequently, Black's realisation of his advantage is dragged out a little, but he does not for one moment let it slip. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.
g 2-g 3 wg1 -f2 �e2-h5 'ifh5-e2 'ife2-h5 �h5-e8
wg8-h7 'ifg5-d8 .l::t d 7-g7 .l::t g 7-d7 'ifd8-g5 'ifg5-e7
nesses, for which there is no compensa tion. It is interesting that in the course of the next few moves, Fritz only as sesses it as slightly better for Black! I suspect the reason (although I am far from being a specialist in computer chess) is because it cannot calculate to a clear result. 39. �b3-a2 40. �f2-e2
l:re7-d7 �a6-b7
It is possible that the game was ad journed either here, or shortly after. The great analyst Geller finds a way to con tinue putting up a stubborn resistance, but in the end, he cannot hold the position. 41 . �a2-b1 �h7-g8 f5xg4 42. g3-g4 43. .ri.f4xg4+ .l:ld7-g7
Smyslov has managed to 'trap' his op ponent into exchanging queens, which favours Black, because it deprives White of his last hope of counterplay, whilst the latter has even more weaknesses than at move 24. 38. 'ife8xe7+ Smyslov points out the reason why White must exchange. In the variation 3 8 .'ifhs �g7 39.'ife8 (39.lih4 l:rd2+ 40.�e l l::t d 8 4 1 . �f2 ti:Jc6-+) 3 9 .. J:[e7 40.�d8 ti:Jc6 he loses mate rial. 38.
�d7xe7
The endgame is hopeless for White, on account of his numerous pawn weak80
44. l:rg4-h4 Exchanging rooks does not help White: 44.l::txg7 + �xg7 4S .�a2 �g6 46.ti:Jd3 �fS 4 7 . �e3 �a6 and the pawns fall one after another. 44. 45. �e2-d2 46. �b1 -d3
.l:tg7-g1 �g8-g7
Chapter 2 - Su c cessful Use of Intui t i on Smyslov,Vasily Tolush,Alexander Leningrad Chi gorin mem, 1 9 5 I
0
46 . ...
itb7-f3!
This magnificent bishop transfer de cides the game. The black pieces all co operate and the white weaknesses can not be held. 47. l:rh4-f4 48. tt:Jc1 -e2 49. �d2-e3
itf3-h5 .!::!.g 1 -g2
Here is another variation given by Smyslov: 49.h4 tLlc6 S O J:te4 itg6 5 1 . .l::!.e 3 .t!.g4, winning. 49. 50. h2-h4
.l:Ig2-g5
Nor does S O J:te4 tLlc6 5 1 .tLlf4 it£7 help. 50. 51 . 52. 53. 54.
�e3-d2 �d2-d1 �d1 -c2 .!::rf4-f2
l::!.g5xe5+ tt:Ja5-b3+ .!::!.e 5-e3 e6-e5 e5-e4
After 5 5 . tLlf4 exd3 + 5 6.�xb3 ite2 there is nothing more to be done. 0-1 In the following example, intuition shows itself in a complicated middle game.
To any experienced player, it is clear that we have a standard pawn structure from the Modern Benoni, although with a slightly atypical piece layout. In such situations, Black's plans involve the ad vance . . . b7-b5 , whilst White, as a rule, prevents this by means of a4-a5 . This could have been played here too. In this case, Smyslov gives the possible varia tion 1 6.a5 bS 1 7 .axb6 l:txb6 1 8 . .t!.a2 ltJcS 1 9.'ifxc4 'ii'b 7 ! with approxi mately equal chances and likely rapid simplification. Instead, he decided to follow a less standard, more compli cated and sharper path. He played: 1 6 . h2-h3!? which allows Black to unite his queenside pawns into a single unit, which will try to break into the oppo nent's ranks on the queenside. White is ready to play in the centre (the square d4 and then c6) and on the kingside. From this moment, until move 2 1 , play develops more or less by force. 1 6. 1 7. a4xb5
b7-b5 a6xb5 81
T h e E n i gma o f C h ess I n t u i tion
1 8. ti:Jf3-d4 1 9. 'i¥f4-h4
ti:Jf6-h5 b5-b4
Smyslov gives a variation which very well illustrates the sharpness and com plexity of the position: by playing 1 9 . . .ii.f6 2 0 .ii.gS ii.xd4 2 1 .'i¥xd4 ti:JcS 2 2 J�d 1 ti:Jb3 Black could win material, but after 2 3 . .l:i.a7 tbxd4 24Jhc7 tbxe2+ 2 S .tbxe2 l:Ixe2 2 6.ii.e7 White develops a dangerous initiative. And certainly, after 2 6 . . .l::!.xb 2 2 7 .ii.xd6 .l:!.a8 2 8 .g4 tbg7 29 .ii.eS l:!.e2 3 0.d6 l:tb8 3 1 .f4 Black is in trouble. We should note that to calculate such a variation fully is far from easy. 20. ti:Jc3-d1
to fathom out, even with the help of Fritz 1 0. 21 . ...
Another possibility is 2 1 . ..ii.f6 2 2 .ii.gS ii.xgS 2 3 .ifxg5 tbxc6 24.dxc6 .l:!.xe2 2 5 Jhc4 ii.e6 2 6 . .l:!.h4!, where White has a serious initiative. 22 . .l:!.c1 xc4! Exactly! The other capture is signifi cantly weaker, as Smyslov shows: 2 2 .�xc4 tbxg3 ! 2 3 . fxg3 �b6 + 24.h2 tbes .
ti:Jd7-e5
22 . ...
21 . ti:Jd4-c6! The most important moment of the game. As we have already said, this knight jump is an important part of White's plan, begun at move 1 6, and the fact that it can come about does a lot to justify Smyslov's strategic choice at that move. But he also had a good alternative in 2 1 .tLle3 ii.f6 2 2 .ii.gs ii.g7 2 3 . g4 f6 , af ter which there begins a prolonged pe riod of complications, which are hard 82
tt:Je5xc6
ii.h8-f6!
The strongest. After 22 .. Jhe2 2 3 Jhc6 �e7 24.�xe7 l:i.xe7 2 S . .l:!.xd6 White has an obvious advantage. 23. l:!.c4xc6! But not in any circumstances 2 3 .ii.gS ?? hgS 24.'i¥xg5 'i¥d8 and Black keeps an extra piece. 23. 24. d5xc6
'i¥c7xc6 ii.f6xh4
Thus far, starting with White's 2 1 st move, play has been largely forced. Now White has a choice, and it seems that Smyslov erred slightly.
C h a p t er 2 - S u c c essful Use o f I n t u i t i on
extremely large. Unlike the variation in the game, here White retains his re maining rook, which significantly en hances his activity. 25. 26. g3xh4
l:!b8-b6
26 . ...
J::[ b 6-a6!
25. c6-c7 Smyslov considers this move to be an important intermediate blow, and he awards it an exclamation mark. How ever, my joint analysis with Fritz 1 0 shows that here Vasily Vasilievich was not right, either in the game, or in his subsequent home analysis (this last point is only a little surprising - we can recall the similar occurrence with Capablanca, with whom Smyslov has much in common) . All things considered, he should have captured immediately: 2 5 .gxh4! ? and after 2 5 . . . �e6 (if 2 5 . . Jhe2? 2 6.c7 l::tb 6 27 . .l:.a8 l::te 8 2 8 . .l:.b8 l::ta 6 2 9 .tLle3 White should gradually win) 2 6.tLle3 l:Ia8 2 7 . .l:rd 1
White would have an undoubted advantage, although it cannot be called
Undoubtedly the strongest reply. In this way, Black utilises the tempo given to him by White's 2 5 th move, to exchange the last enemy rook, which should have saved the game. All other moves are no ticeably worse, although the choice of variations is considerable. Thus, Black had such possibilities as (this is just a part of the variations given by Smyslov) : 2 6 . . Jie7 ? 2 7 . tLle3 l:ra6 2 8 .l:rc l l:ra7 2 9 .tLld5 and White wins; Black is also in a bad way after 2 6 . . Jhe2? 2 7 .ti.Je3 l:ra6 2 8.llc 1 l:!.a7 2 9.ti.Jd5 (Smyslov's variation, but even stronger is 2 9 .�f3 ! i:Ixb2 3 0 .ti.Jd5 with a winning position) . White also wins after 2 6 . . . �b7 ? 2 7 .tLle3 �xg2 2 8 .�xg2 l:ic6 2 9.ti.Jd5 lieS 3 0.ti.Je 7 + ! �h8 3 1 . .l:. c 1 . A more stubborn try is 2 6 . . . ti.Jf6?! but even then, after 2 7 .tLle3 �e6 2 8.�g5 ! �g7 2 9.tLlg4! tLlxg4 3 0.hxg4 dS 3 1 .�f4 llc6 3 2.g5 White retains a large advantage. 83
T h e Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
I could have left out all these variations (although they are only a part of those possible) , but my aim is to show the reader the amount of calculation work involved here, so that the reader can un derstand how unrealistic it would have been to calculate out all these lines at move 2 1 . And if one realises that the latter move was a direct consequence of the decision taken by White at move 1 6, then it is obvious that calculation alone is not enough here. No less im portant is the fact that a preliminary as sessment of the consequences of those decisions is also extremely hard, be cause of the highly original nature of the resulting positions, which means it is practically impossible to assess them by analogy with standard patterns. From all this, it is clear intuition must have played a significant role in White's decision. 27. l:ra1 xa6 He could avoid the exchange of rooks by 2 7 J:k 1 , but after 2 7 . . J::ta2 2 8 . .ilf3 tbg7 2 9 ..ilf4 tLlfS the chances are roughly equal. 27. 28. tLld1 -e3
84
ilc8xa6
28. ...
tbh5-f6?
After this, Black's game goes rapidly downhill. Instead, after the obvious 2 8 .. J::k s ! 29.tLld5 �h8 his chances would not have been worse, because the white knight will soon be attacked and it will be difficult for the bishop to come to the aid of the c7 pawn.
Here are the variations: 30.ilg5 (bad is 3 0.tLlxb4? .ilxe2 and White is losing; also bad is 3 0.ild2? .ilb7 and Black has the advantage, whilst after 3 0 . .ile3 tLlg7 3 I ..ilb6 (if 3 I ..ild4 then 3 1 . . . .ilc4) 3 I . . .tLle6 3 2 .tLle7 .!::f.x c7 the position is equal) and here Black has the excellent resource 30 ... f6 ! 3 1 ..ile3 tLlg7 32 .itd4 .itc4 33 .itxf6 .ilxd5 34. .itxd5 :ctxc7, af ter which White has no advantage. The cause of Tolush's mistake is easy to un derstand. Before this, he has had to cal culate an awful lot, which can cause tiredness and time shortage. Psycholog ically, it is hard to believe in a move such as 2 9 . . . 'iit>h 8 and to force oneself to continue looking for a defence in such a variation. But it is only then that one can find 3 0 . . . f6 ! . Whatever the cause, Smyslov now finds himself in his ele ment, as he faces a technical task of realising an advantage. •
•
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use o f Intui t i on
29. �h6-g5
'Ot>g8-g7
If 29 . . . 4::l e 4 then 3 0.4Jds fS 3 1 .4::lxb4! �b7 3 2 .�d8 with an advantage suffi cient for victory. 30. �g5xf6+ 31 . 4Je3-d5+ 32. 4Jd5xb4
'>t>g7xf6 'Ot>f6-e6 �a6-b5
3 2 . . . �xe2 loses to 3 3 .�b 7 Wd7 34.�c6+; whilst in reply to 32 . . . �c8 there is the strong move 3 3 .�dS + ! Wf6 (White also wins after 3 3 . . . We7 34.�c6 .!:Ih8 3 S .tt::l d 5 + We6 3 6.b4) 34.e3 .l:le7 3 S .�g2 .l:!.eS 3 6.4::l d 5 + c;i.;>e6 3 7 .4::l b 6 .l:lcS 3 8 .4::lx c8 .l:hc7 3 9 .4::l b 6 and now the b-pawn decides the game. 33. �g2-b7
33 . ...
�b5-d7?!
Tolush misses his last chance to make his opponent's life difficult: 3 3 ... Wd7 . However, even then after 34.4::l d 5 ! l:rc8 ! (this is more stubborn than 34 . . . .1:!.h8 3 S .e3 h6 3 6.b4 .l:!.f8 3 7 .c8'if+ l:rxc8 3 8 .4::l b 6+ r:Jitc7 3 9 .4::lx c8) 3 S .tt::l f6+ Wxc7 3 6.�xc8 c;i.;>xc8 3 7 .e4 hS 3 8.f4 White's advantage should suffice for victory.
34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.
tt::lb 4-d5 �b7-c6 b2-b4 h4-h5 h3-h4 b4-b5
�d7-c8 .l:!.e8-g8 g6-g5 g5-g4 �c8-a6 �a6-c8
Or 39 . . .�xb5 40.�xb5 c;i.;>xdS 4 1 .�d7. 40. b5-b6 1 -0
g4-g3
It seems to me that the best conclusion, based on the examples we have seen from the games of Smyslov, is what was said by Kramnik, in his Foreword to the book Vasily Smyslov, The Art of Winning: The ex-world champion, not only a great player, but also a highly intelligent man (which one does not often find amongst chess players, even great ones!) , wrote: 'Smyslov is . . . truth in chess . . . you look at his games and there is an impression of such ease, as if his hand itself was making the moves, without the man behind the hand hav ing to exert himself at all! . . . There is no strain or effort . . . everything is so sim ple, but brilliant' . Kramnik's words about this impression of surprising ease are backed up by the observation of Smyslov's long-time opponent and col league Mark Taimanov: 'Vasya! . . . You have an infallible hand, which can be trusted implicitly. Wherever it places a piece, that is the right square for it! ' I had planned now to go on and look at some intuitive decisions in the games of Tigran Petrosian, but then I decided it would be better in this case to do a parallel portrait (almost in the style of Plutarch) of Tigran Vartanovich and his 85
The Enigma of C hess In t u i t i on
opponent in two world championship matches, Boris Vasilievich Spassky. This decision seemed the right one because I want to show two games from their matches, but even more so, because I think this point in the book is the right one at which to discuss in detail a very significant matter for our researches. But before that, I will allow myself to interrupt the chronological narrative of this chapter, and to show two games of Boris Spassky.
one example of this brings to mind a number of the features we have already noted, regarding decisions taken on the basis of intuition. Geller,Efim Spassky,Boris Moscow Zonal, 1 964
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11.
e2-e4 tt:lg1 -f3 �f1 -b5 �b5-a4 0-0 h2-h3 c2-c3 d2-d4 �a4-b3 �c1 -e3 tt:Jb1 -d2
e7-e5 tt:Jb8-c6 a7-a6 d7-d6 �c8-g4 �g4-h5 tt:Jg8-f6 b7-b5 �f8-e7 0-0
Boris Spassky
In his best period, Spassky was often spoken of as 'the best middlegame player' in the world, and it was gener ally acknowledged that he felt the ini tiative 'to the tips of his fingers' . One can add to this the fact that he played astonishingly well in positions with non-standard material, outclassing all his contemporaries in this respect, in cluding perhaps even Tal himself! But one can also find in his play quite fre quent errors in calculating the details of the position, and this sometimes made its presence felt. As we will see, even 86
11. .
..
d6-d5!?
This move was played in this position in the game Medina Garcia-Bisguier, Gothenburg Interzonal, 1 9 5 5 , and ap parently had not been seen since, ac cording to ChessBase. Its objective as sessment is not entirely good for Black, but chess is far from being purely about objective factors. Subjective ones also play their role, and quite a serious one,
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use o f I n t u i t i o n
even if not the main role. And from the subjective viewpoint, this decision could well have seemed attractive to Spassky. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the move leads to a quite complicated and sharp position, in which Black is fighting to take over the initiative, something which suits Spassky's style. Secondly, there was a good chance that Geller had not ana lysed the move at home, and even if he had, it would probably have been a fair time ago (it was nine years since it had been played! ) , and he may well have forgotten much of his analysis. Thirdly, there is no direct refutation, only a pos sibility by which to obtain slightly better play, and at the board, this is not easy to calculate out to full clarity. And, last but not least, it fits well against the style of the opponent, a great player, but one who was not always entirely stable and unruffled psychologically, and who could be very stubborn. But more on this later. 1 2. g2-g4!
decision can have a great effect in changing the character and assessment of the position. As a result, diagrams il lustrating the most important moments of the battle can follow one after an other, often after just one or two moves! Thus, here Geller has to make a decision which will have a key influence on the course of events, for a lasting period. He played: 1 3. d4xe5 Maybe it was better to take with the knight: 1 3.tt::lxe5 ! ? and then after 1 3 ... tt::l xeS
1 4.dxe5 tt::l xe4 1 5 .tt::l xe4
dxe4 1 6.f4!? exf3 1 7.'ifxf3
�h5-g6
It is clear that after the sharp turn of events Black gave the game with his 1 1 th move, play moves now into a very sharp phase. In such positions, any poor
White, at the cost of a somewhat tatty pawn structure, enjoys a lasting initia tive. But he would not have a clear and concrete object of attack, which may have seemed insufficient to Geller. The truth is that he was a chess maximalist, and considered that any 'sin' by the op ponent should always be convincingly punished. In this context, one must bear in mind that a chess player is only human, and his strength and capabili ties are limited, whilst chess itself is not a mathematical theorem, where truth can always be proved inexorably. In re fusing to accept this reality, Geller 87
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
would often consume huge quantities of time and strength, searching for a 'strict proof of the theorem', when the latter did not always really exist. As a re sult, he could suffer later in the game, through tiredness and time-trouble. In addition, he would sometimes place ex cessive demands on his position and try to extract more from it than was really there. It is highly likely that Spassky took this characteristic into account, in choosing how to play in this game. 1 3. 1 4. tt:Jd2-b1 1?
tt:Jf6xe4
I have seen this move criticised (alas, I can no longer remember where) , and it does indeed look dubious, but firstly, this was what Geller planned at move 1 3 , because now White wins the oppo nent's central pawn on dS , and sec ondly, in the position reached, White has nothing better. Thus, after the con tinuation 1 4 . .tc2 'i\Ve8 ! ? l S J:le l .!:f.d8 1 6.'i\Vb l fS 1 7 .exf6 .txf6 ! Black seizes the initiative, and at no material cost. Geller committed the decisive mistake further on. 1 4. ...
1 5. tt:Jf3-d4 (?) 88
'ifd8-c81
I don't like this move, neither from the pure chess viewpoint, nor from the subjective point of view. We have before us an example of the aforementioned psychological weakness of my great compatriot Efim Geller. After meeting with a surprise, or, more likely, after un derestimating his opponent's reaction, he becomes upset and goes over to an in-depth defence, which is going to be extremely unpleasant for White, on ac count of the irreparable weakness of his kingside pawns. Having said 'a' , he had to say 'b' , and grab the pawn with 1 5 ..txd5 ! ? and then after 1 5 .. JldS continue with 1 6 ..txc6 ! . Everything else is worse trust me! Then after 1 6 Jlxd 1 •.
1 7 Jhd1 l:f.bS 1 8.4Jbd2 tt:Jc5 1 9.4Jb3 tLld3 20.l:td2 we reach a very interest
ing, non-standard and rather confused position. Here is a characteristic and perfectly possible variation: 20 ...'i\Ve6 2 1 .4Jbd4 'i!Yc4 2 2.a3 In this position, Fritz 1 0 claims for a long time that Black has the advantage, but then sud denly drops its evaluation. Here is a striking and quite convincing variation: the tempting reply 22 ... l::!.b 6
can be met with the thunderclap 2 3.lhd3! ! and then Fritz gives the
C ha p t e r 2
1 7. f4xe5
2S.tLld2 'iVa4 26.b3 'tWaS 2 7.b4 'iVa4
White cannot be too materialistic. After 1 7 .tLle2 ? tt::l x g4 1 8 . hxg4 'iYxg4+ 1 9 .'�h2 �fS he loses. His position is also gloomy after 1 7 .�xdS tt::l g 3 1 8.fxe5 cxd4 1 9 .�xd4 tt::lxfl 20.�xa8 'iWxa8 2 1 .'iVxfl f6! .
2 8.�dS �c2 29.�f4 .l::[b 8 30.tt::l fl aS 3 1 .tLle3 axb4 32.tt::lexc2 and here, the
1 5. 1 6. f2-f4
tt::l c6xe51
S u c c essful Use o f I n t u i t i on
the developments of the game when he played l l . . .dS ! ??.
charming line 2 3 ... �xd3 (23 . . . 'ifxd3 ? 24.�d5 �e4 2 S .tLle l ) 24.e6 f6 (24 . . . �f6 ? 2 S .e 7 �xe7 2 6 .tLleS)
advantage is already with White. I have quoted these far from forced but very instructive variations with the aim of il lustrating the resources which are con cealed in the position. In addition, it is another illustration of a situation where it is impossible to calculate fully all the possibilities on the board, and one can not manage without intuition. I would also point out that I am convinced that Geller lacked the intuition to cope with such a position. I would go even fur ther, and suggest that this is all that stopped this tremendous player from becoming world champion!
-
1 7. 1 8. c3xd4 1 9. tt::l b 1 -d2 20. l:la1 -c1 ?I ·
White's position is unpleasant, but after 2 0 .tt::lf3 he could continue to resist stubbornly. But Geller, beginning from move 1 5 , has been 'punch-drunk', and could not put up any resistance (inci dentally, using the same metaphor, Spassky once described his opponent as akin to 'a boxer with a glass chin' - he knew his man's weaknesses very well!) . 20 . ...
1 6 . ...
c5xd4 Wi'c8-d7 f7-f61
�g8-h8
c7-c51
There is no doubt that, when he played his 1 4th move, Spassky saw this posi tion and assessed its prospects clearly and accurately. Even more interesting, however, is the answer to another ques tion: how clearly did Spassky envisage
21 . �e3-f4? This is already the decisive mistake. 2 1 . tt::l f3 ! was forced. 21 . ...
f6xe51 89
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
22. �f4xe5
24. ...
�g5-e3+!
Now the king comes under fire and perishes quickly. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
At first glance, White seems to be fine. He has completed his development, created the threat of 2 3 J:lc7 , and the weakness of his kingside does not ap pear vulnerable to the opponent at the moment. But it turns out that this is all an illusion, and the truth is very different! 22 . ...
�e7-g5 !
Spassky sacrifices his queen and wins beautifully. 23 . .l:tc1 -c7 Alas, 2 3 .tt:lxe4 �xc l 24.tt:lc5 does not work because of 24 . . . �e3+. 23. 24. �e5xc7
'i¥d7xc7
tt:le4xd2 .l:ta8xf8 .!:!.f8-f2+ tt:ld2-f1 + h7-h6 l:rf2-f8 0-1
The following game attracted huge at tention in the chess world at the time. That year, after a two-year absence, Fischer made a triumphant return to top-level chess, winning all the events he played in, in great style. It was highly likely that he would become the chal lenger for the world championship, al though the interzonal and candidates' events were still to come. Spassky, who had won the title the year before, was meeting Fischer for the first time as world champion. The psychological significance of the game, and the gen eral interest in it, in those remarkable days for chess, was colossal. Spassky,Boris Fischer,Robert Siegen ol, 1 9 7 0
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 90
g1 -g2 l:lf1 xf8+ �b3xd5 �g2-g3 �g3-h4 �c7-d8
d2-d4 c2-c4 tt:lb1 -c3 c4xd5 e2-e4 b2xc3 �f1 -c4 tt:lg1 -e2 �c1 -e3
tt:lg8-f6 g7-g6 d7-d5 tt:lf6xd5 tt:ld5xc3 �f8-g7 c7-c5 tt:lb8-c6 0-0
Cha pt e r 2 - S uc cessful Use o f I n t u i t i on
1 0. 11. 1 2. 1 3. 1 4. 1 5.
0-0 I:ra1 -c1 h2-h3 f2-f4 'iYd1 -e1 �c4-d3
'iVd8-c7 l:lf8-d8 b7-b6 e7-e6 tt::lc 6-a5 f7-f5
Igor Zakharevich Bondarevsky : 1 9 .�f2 ! ? �xe4 2 0 .tt::lxe4. 1 9. 'iVc7xb7 20. �e3-f2 'iVb7-c6 21 . 'iVe1 -e2 c5xd4 22. c3xd4 b6-b5
This strong move had been played sev eral times before the present game, and there is no doubt that Fischer knew about it. But I do not know if Spassky was prepared for it. Even so, he took the most resolute decision, both from a chess and a psychological viewpoint.
1 6 . g2-g4 Apart from anything else, this was a novelty at the time. Later, Spassky said that he considered the move virtually forced, although he did not say whether he found it in home preparation or at the board. Either way, from here on, the game assumes an open character and the crisis builds. 1 6. 1 7. �d3xe4 1 8. tt::l e 2-g3 1 9. �e4xb7
f5xe4 �c8-b7 tt::la 5-c4
It was more accurate to play the line in dicated by Spassky's long-time trainer,
The most dramatic moments of this game start from here, and this position needs to be examined in more detail. Black's position looks attractive, thanks to his pressure on d4 and the excellent knight on c4. White needs to play ener getically. Passive defence by 2 3 . llfd l leaves him with many problems after 2 3 . . . l:!.f8 . However, White also has his trumps, two of them and both related to the black king. The first is obvious the weak pawn on e6. The second will become more apparent if Black wins the d4 pawn, and the bishops are ex changed. Then the square f6 will be no ticeably weakened, and the square g 7 can also become a problem for Black. Since the best piece to exploit these weaknesses is the knight, Spassky brings it closer to the key squares. 23. tt::lg 3-e4! He was always happy to sacrifice pawns for such benefits, and usually followed 91
T h e Enigma of C hess I n t u i t i on
up such sacrifices by playing with great ingenuity and energy. 23. 24. tbe4-g5
�g7xd4 �d4xf2+
Bondarevsky suggested that Fischer would have done better to have retained his bishop (the positional basis for which we know) . However, the varia tions show that after 2 4 . . . �f6 2 5 .'ifxe6+ �xe6 26.tbxe6 .l:!.d3 there is an important improvement on the line given by Bondarevsky: 2 7 . .llfd 1 ! , which leads to complete equality: 2 7 . . Jhh3 2 8 .tbc7 .l:lb8 29 .tbxb5 tbe3 3 0 J:ld3 �xbS 3 l .l:.xe 3 . Fischer no doubt wanted more. 25 . .l:!.f1 xf2
sis is difficult, with many possible lines, and so I will not give it here. It can be found in Kasparov's volume, devoted to Petrosian and Spassky. The variations hidden in this game are huge in num ber, and there is no doubt that only a small part of them could realistically be calculated over the board. However, the resulting position is fairly clear from the strategical (if not the tactical!) view point. For this reason, up to here, the play has proceeded on the basis of fairly accurate assessments, as we saw, for ex ample, when discussing the position before White's 2 3 rd move. There, Spassky did not need to draw much on his intuition. In other words, in this game, intuition only shows itself in one definite interval, but this does not mean that the whole game is not still of inter est for our researches. 26. l:lc1 -e1
25 . ...
lld8-d6!?
It should be said that this game, which attracted so much attention, as I have said, was also widely discussed by vari ous commentators. The latter sought the reason for Fischer's defeat from the nice position he obtained from the opening. Spassky also said his piece. Here, he suggested for Black 25 . . . l:.e8 . However, subsequent analysis showed that in this case, after 2 6.tbe4 White has compensation for the pawn. The analy92
'i¥c6-b6
Now we reach the stage of the game where intuition reveals itself, because, as we will soon see, the number of vari ations is such that they are hard to ana lyse, even with the help of a computer. Here, Spassky played 27. tbg5-e4!?
Chapter 2
declining to take the pawn, and at the same time opening the path for his kingside pawns to advance. The result ing positions lend themselves to calcu lation of variations, but it must be re membered that the players' thinking time was limited, as was their physical strength. Therefore, it must be under stood that out of practical consider ations, not all variations should be cal culated at the board. How should one limit one's 'analytical horizon' (a term I have taken from Botvinnik, although he probably did not invent it) when the position is overflowing with possible variations? Which variations to calcu late and which to ignore is something dictated by a player's judgement of the position, his experience and, quite of ten, by his intuition. At this moment, I am convinced, Spassky did not get by without intuition! Thus, if 2 7.t.bxe6? l:re8 2 8.fS .!ld2 29.'iVf3 .l:!.xa2 ! 3 0JHI (the endgame after 3 0 .f6 'i¥xf2 + 3 l .'iVxf2 .l:!.xf2 3 2 .�xf2 t.bd6 3 3 .g5 aS is bad for White) 3 0 .!lxf2 3 1 . .l:!.xf2 Black has the strong blow 3 1 ...'iVe 3 ! (all other moves are simply bad!) .••
-
bring him any benefits: 3 2 ...'iVe l + 3 3.l:tfl In the variation 3 3 . 'it>g2 t.be3 + 34.�g3 'iYg l + 3 S .'it>f3 'iVh l + White loses his queen. 3 3 ... 'iVg3+ 34.�hl 'it'xh 3 + 3 5 .Wgl 'iVxg4+ 'iYh4+ 3 7.Wgl 'iYe7.
3 6 .�h l
However, White has at his disposal another, quite tempting possibility: 2 7.£5 ! ? .
But even so, after 2 7. .JH8 ! (probably also good is 2 7 . . . e5 2 8 .fxg6 l::t.f6 , but not 2 8 . . Jhg6?? because of 29 .'iVf3) 2 8.t.bxe6 .l::!.d2 29.'iVf3 'iYxfl+ 30.'iVxf2 .l::!. x£'2 3 1 .Wxf2 .!lf6 3 2 .t.bd4 gxfS 3 3.gxfS �fl 34.�g3 .l::!.a 6 it is a draw. We come to the conclusion that Spassky's decision was sufficient to re tain all the tension in the position. This opinion is supported by the fact that the assessment of Black's reply
27. ...
And it turns out that White's main chance, the attack 32.'iYb7, does not
S u c c essful Use of I n t u i t i o n
J:ld6-d4
turns out not to be so obvious. Thus, Spassky thought it was dubious, and this view was shared by Kasparov, who suggested instead 2 7 ....l::!. c6 !? (his punc tuation) and after the strongest reply 2 8.t.bf6 + ! (other moves are worse; I have confirmed this, but will not give the variations here) 28 Wh8! 29.t.bd7 .•.
'iVd4
93
The En igma of Chess I n t u i tion
have managed without intuition here. The variations are far from obvious, and the resulting positions are non-stan dard, such that positional assessments cannot easily be made with great confi dence. One must rely on feeling, i.e. in tuition. 28. tt:Je4-f6+ He only looks at 3 0 . tLleS (30 . .l:!.d l �e3 is just mentioned in passing) 30 . . . tt:JxeS 3 1 .�xeS+ �xeS 3 2 JheS a6 3 3 . .l::!. fe2 .l:!.e8 34.Wf2 suggesting that White has good chances of saving himself. But in fact, the line 3 0.l:!.d l ! 'ife3 is good for White here, because then after 3 1 .tLlf6 ! e 5 3 2.g5 ! h e has full compensation for the pawn and even hopes of the initia tive.
'i!itg8-h8
After the alternative 2 8 . . . 'i!itg7 Kasparov gives the following variation: 2 9 .�xe6 'ii'xe6 3 0 Jhe6 .l:rf8 ! 3 1 .gS aS 3 2. .l:.e7 + l'lf7 3 3 . .l:!. e 8 l'lf8 34. l:f.xf8 'i!itxf8 3 S .tt:Jxh7+ Wg7 3 6 .tLlf6 b4 with equal ity. 29. �e2xe6!
l:!.d4-d6!
One cannot rule out the possibility that, from afar, Fischer had intended 29 ... Il.dl ?.
Il.xg4
But here, there is the powerful counterblow 30.'ii'f7 ! and then (I only give the main line) : 3 0 ... Il.xe l + 3 1 . Wg2 tt:Je3 + He also loses after 3 1 . . .'ii'c 6+ 3 2 .Wg3 .l:!.e3 + 3 3 .Wh2 ! l:!.xh3+ 34.Wxh3 'ii'h l + 3 S J:!h2 �f3 + 3 6.'i!ith4 gS+ 3 7 .'i!ithS . 32.'lt>f3 ! Only this; 3 2 . 'lt>g 3 ? even loses after 3 2 . . . tt:Jfl + or 3 2 . . . tt:JfS + . 3 2 ... 'ii'c6+
44.l:!.xh7+ and only Black has prob
3 3 .Wg3 l:!.g l + 34.Wh4 .U.xg4+ 35 .hxg4
lems. As we see, Fischer could hardly
'ii'h l + 36.Wg5 tt:Jxg4! The only move.
Here is an example of the possibilities suggested by Fritz: 3 2 ... l:!.c7 This is not the best reply. Correct is 3 2 .. .'�W g 3 + and after 3 3 .l:!.g2 �xf4 34 . .U.d7 �c l + etc. it is a draw. 3 3 .'ii'xe3 tt:Jxe3 34.l::!.d3 exf4 3 5 .l:t.fd2 ! Il.c l + 36.'lt>f2 Il.fl + 3 7 .We2 l:t.hl 3 8.Ud7 Iih2+ 3 9.We l .!:lhl + 40.'lt>f2 ! Il.xh3 4 1 .llc7 Il.h4 42.Udd7
94
tt:Jg4+
43 .tLlxg4
Cha p t e r 2 - S u c c essful Use o f In t u i t i on 3 7.Wxg4 'tl:Vg l + 38.Wf3 �hl + 39.Wg3 l:td8 3 9 . . . l::!. c 8 loses after 40 .l2Jd5 'tW g I + 4 1 . Wf3 ; 3 9 . . . � g I + after 40.l:ig2 �e l + 4 I .Wg4 'ifd i + 42 .Wg5 'tWh i 43 .l::re 2 'tWg i + 44.l2Jg4 �c5+ 45 .l:ie5+-. 40.l2Jd7! 'tl:Vgl + 4 1 ..l:i.g2
3 3 .'tl:Vxe2 l2Je3 , and after 32 . .l::!.fl 'iYe3 ! 3 3 .'iVxe3 l2Jxe3 34.l:re i l:idi 3 5 . .l::!. e 2 .l::!.xe l + 36Jhe i l:f.d l . 31 . g4-g5 32 . .l:[e1 -f1
J:id6-d2
32. ...
'tl:Vb6-c7?
'tl:Ve l + 42.Wh3 'ifh l + 43J:Ih2 'tl:Vfl + 44.Wg4! 'tl:Vgl + 45.Wf3 �fl + 46.We4!
and Black must go into a lost endgame. These variations are the results of ana lytical work carried out in the pre-com puter era, then checked with the com puter. It is no wonder that Fischer fell into time-trouble when faced with a position of such complexity, and ended up making a fatal mistake. According to eye-witnesses, Spassky played signifi cantly quicker than his opponent, which is probably explained by the fact that he relied less on calculation and more on intuition. 'tl:Vb l + 47.We5
'tl:Va l + 48.We6
30. 'iYe6-e4
30. ...
l:la8-f8?!
This is the first decision by Black in this game which can really be called an in accuracy. After 3 0 . . Jhd8 3 I .g5 �d2 the game is equal, both after 3 2 . .l:l.e 2 l:ixe 2
This is considered the decisive mistake by everyone, but I am not certain that this is definitely the case. But regardless, it is a significant inaccuracy, because it makes Black's task much more difficult. The situation is very typical, as a first, small inaccuracy is followed by another, more serious one. Spassky suggested 3 2 . . . l2Jd6, but this loses quickly : 3 3 .'iVe5 lLlf7 ( 3 3 . . . 'i¥d4 34.�e 7 ) 34.'i¥c3 . Better would have been 3 2 ... W g 7 . The best reply to this is regarded as being Bondarevsky's 3 3 .h4. But then the line 3 3 ... l::rd4 looks fine, with the idea after 34.'iVe2 to reply 34 . . . J:id2 ! 3 5 .'iYe7 + .l:!.f7 3 6.'i¥e4 .l:!.d4 and nothing special is apparent for White. Now, however, Black is in a much worse way. 33. .l:If2xd2! 34. 'ife4-d4!
tt:Jc4xd2
95
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i ti on
how White wins. For example, 50 Jk8 (50.'lt>g4 tt:le3 + 5 l .'lt>h5 tt::ld 5 ! 5 2.'lt>g4 tt::le 3 + 5 3 .g3 tt:lc4) 50 ... .tlc5 5 l .l:i.e8 .l:l.a5 5 2 .�f4 .!:lxa2 5 3 .h5 b3 54.h6+ 'lt>h7 5 5 . l:i. e 7 + 'lt>xh8 5 6 .g6 .l:l.a8 5 7 . .l:!.h7 + 'lt>g8 58 . .l:l.g7+ �h8 !=. Alas, I do not see a confirmation of the cate gorical opinion of the two world cham pions. Therefore, I believe Black's 34th move was the decisive mistake. .l::[f8-d8?
34. ...
Now the game ends by force. It was es sential to play 34.. Ji'b6. After this Spassky gave the variation 3 5.Vi'xb6 axb6
3 6J:td l
3 8 . .tl e l ! .
.tld8
Kasparov
3 7.�g2 !
went
l:!.d4
35. tt:lf6-d5+ 36 . .l:!.f1-f2!
h8-g8 tt:ld2-c4
Or 3 6 .. .'il'c l + 3 7 .Wg2 Vi'c6 3 8 Jhd2 . 3 7. .l:!.f2-e2!
further:
38 ... �g7 3 9.l:.e7+ �f8 40.l:!.b 7 ! 1hf4 4 1 .tt::l xh 7 +
�g8
42.tt::l f6 +
�f8
43.tt::l d 7+
43 . . . e7 44.tt::l e 5+ 'lt>d6 45 .tt:lxg6 .l::r a4 46.tt:lf8 .l:l.xa2 47 .g6 winning. But how does one win if instead of 43 ... 'lt>e7 Black replies 43 ...'lt>e8 !? Then: 44.tt::l e5 44.tt:lxb6 tt:le4 45 .tLld5 .l:!.f2+ ! 46.'lt>g l .l:l.d2 4 7 . � e 7 + (4 7 . .l:l.xb5 .l::[ d l + 48.Wg2 .l::[ d 2+ 49 .'lt>f3 tt:lxg5+ draws) 47 ... 'lt>f8 48.l::i.xe4 llxd5 is inadequate for a win. 44 ... llf5 45Jlb8 + �e7 46.tt:lxg6+ Wfl 47.tt::lh 8+ �g7 48.h4 tt::lc4! 49.�g3 b4! and it is not clear 96
We have before us a typical picture of domination, with only a small amount of material on the board. Black is help less against the centralisation of the op ponent's army. 37. ...
.:ad8-d6
3 7 .. .'il'b6 loses to 3 8 . .l:!.e8 + ! 'lt>f7 3 9.'ifxb6. Similar is 3 7 . . . Vi'd6 3 8 J:i:e7 ! Vi'b6 3 9 . .l:!.e8+. 38. .l:l.e2-e8+ 39. .l:l.e8-f8+!
g8-f7 1 -0
After 3 9 . . . 'lt>xf8 40.Vi'h8+ White wins the queen.
Chapter 2 - S u c cessful Use of In t u i t i on
Now let us summarise the results of our look at these two games of Spassky's. It makes sense to discuss them together, because they have a lot in common. First of all, I should say that psychologi cal factors played a great role in both. As far as the Fischer game is concerned, play was balanced for a long time, with the players showing a very high stan dard of play, despite the complicated position. This also explains the difficul ties faced by commentators on the game, who in the main were players of the highest class. Fischer was the one who first failed to withstand the psy chological pressure. It is said that his situation was not helped by his sup porters, who put extra pressure on him by expecting him to win all the time. But in this game, he was not for one moment close to winning! It was easier for Spassky, who was under less pres sure - a draw was a perfectly satisfac tory result, but even so, he did not re frain from taking very principled deci sions. To put it briefly, Fischer backed himself into a corner, and in so doing, he lost his ability to assess the position realistically and to feel the danger, since this was a game in which it was impos sible to manage without intuition. The latter is a very fragile thing, and tension can prevent it operating properly. We will say more about this later. So, in the two games we have just seen, it was impossible to manage without intuition, the factor we are most inter ested in. It manifested itself first and foremost in the brilliant way in which Spassky developed his initiative, in po sitions where it was impossible to cal-
culate everything out to the end. As I have already said, such mastery in these situations was his calling-card. We have already seen and spoken a lot about this subject, for it to be clear without fur ther explanations that it would have been impossible to play in such a style without very good intuition. Everything we have said here is also true of the game against Geller. Now that we have seen at first hand how Spassky played in such situations, it is time to move on to our comparison of Spassky and Petrosian. However, this is the ideal moment to deal with an other very important matter, which fits ideally into this stage of our research. A short classification of types of chess intuition
We will start this discussion with an other reference to the Kasparov series, this time the Kortchnoi-Karpov volume. This contains a discussion of the topic of intuition, the text of which is repro duced in abbreviated form below. Thus: 'It seems that great masters can be di vided into three groups: I . Players with a weak intuition (of course, only by championship stan dards) : Steinitz, Botvinnik, Euwe, Fischer. . . 2 . Players with a strong, i f not phe nomenal intmtwn: strategic Capablanca, Smyslov, Petrosian, Spassky, Karpov. . . Amongst the candidates, probably only Rubinstein. They were all able to find the best squares for their pieces, with astonishing ease and accuracy. 97
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i tion
3. Players with a strong specific intu ition, which works in sharp positions and positions with unbalanced mate rial: Lasker, Alekhine, Tal, Kasparov. . . and also Chigorin, Bronstein, Stein and Kortchnoi. . . '
Later there follows the noteworthy phrase: 'incidentally, when analysing old games with the computer, I noticed that many of the classics' intuitive decisions were correct and more mistakes were made in the later analyses' . We have already spoken about the last observation, and I have nothing to add to it. But the issue of the classification is more difficult. In the first place, I have some doubts about the names, and was especially surprised to see Rubinstein's name included in the second group. I have always considered him as belong ing to the first group, and I still think so. I also wonder whether the phrase about unbalanced material needs to be added. Obviously, in sharp positions this is of ten the case, but even in the absence of such imbalance, these players were better able to play sharp positions than their opponents, who were less gifted with intuition, although I would not insist on this point. More importantly, whilst I am prepared to accept the classification types identi fled, it is very general and could do with further additions and amplifica tions. I do not intend to deal with the whole of the previous list, but want to do what I can to fit this small section within the overall subject of serious play ers' intuitions. 98
Finally, I can now do as promised, and present two games from the 1 969 match between Petrosian and Spassky, on the basis of which I hope to show the difference in the working of the in tuition of these two players, whom Kasparov allocates to the same group in his classification. Both are assigned to the second group, those with 'phenom enal strategic intuition' , who are able 'with astonishing ease and accuracy find the best squares for their pieces' .
Tigran Petrosian
Let us look in more detail at their simi larities and differences. We have already looked at Spassky and have, to some definite extent, seen that the most strik ing characteristic of his positional mas tery was his gift of feeling for the initia tive. This showed itself in the ability to pounce on the slightest chance to seize or take over the initiative, followed by great energy and precision in develop ing it. But such a colossal talent as that of the tenth world champion also has many
Cha pt e r 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n t u i t i o n
other sides, just like his great opponent, another player of enormous natural tal ent. But the main features of Petrosian's ability were to a large extent the oppo site of those of Spassky. And because both possessed a widely-acknowledged powerful intuition, it is quite reason able to assume that the different mani festations of this intuition will be quite noticeable between them. In other words, it makes perfect sense to speak of opposing intuitive tenden cies! Thus, in speaking of Petrosian, one can say that one of the most important components of his talent was what one can call an intuition for safety and defensive resources.
Spassky would not expect such an ap proach from his opponent, who was noted for his solid play, and so the chal lenger might not himself be in the mood for a full-fledged sharp struggle. As we will see, this approach by Petrosian fully justified itself 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
tt:lg1 -f3 d2-d4 tt:lf3xd4 .tf1 -d3 tt:ld4xc6
e7-e6 c5xd4 a7-a6 tt:lb8-c6
When two players with many stylistic differences meet in a long match for the highest title, then it is understandable that the result is a great deal of material for comparison and discussion. I have chosen two games for examination. Spassky,Boris Petrosian,Tigran Moscow Wch m- 1 , 1 969
1 . e2-e4
c7-c5
This move is already noteworthy. Before this game, Petrosian had played the Si cilian many times, but only on a few occasions in top-level events, and al ways in special circumstances. Knowing how events later developed here, I would venture to suggest that on this day, he felt like 'coming out of his shell' and heading for a sharp position. Prob ably this was dictated by psychological factors, and the belief that in the first game of a world championship match,
6.
b7xc6
Further confirmation of Petrosian's fighting mood. The alternative 6 . . . dxc6 is perfectly playable, and, for example, was often played in later years, with great success, by Tony Miles. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 1 2.
0-0 tt:lb1 -d2 �d1 -e2 b2-b3 .tc1 -b2 f2-f4
d7-d5 tt:lg8-f6 .tf8-e7 0-0 a6-a5
A novelty, and perfectly logical. Black is forced to take a decision, in a new situa tion, as to which direction he will take play along, for some time to come. 99
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
Petrosian chose a move which still sur prises even now: 1 2 . ...
g 7-g6!?
The most natural alternative is 1 2 . . . a4. Bondarevsky suggests that in this case, after 1 3 .e5 tt::ld 7 1 4.f5 il.cS + 1 S .'iit>h 1 a3 1 6.ii.c3 exfS 1 7 .ii.xfS il.a6 ! 1 8.ii.d3 il.xd3 1 9. "ti'xd3
White would have a small advantage, but it is hard to agree with this assess ment. Probably, Petrosian foresaw lon ger-term problems with the move f4-f5 and decided to prevent it. This moment is very interesting for our subject, be cause Petrosian's decision is very no ticeable, both from the purely chess, and from other points of view. A player whose cautious style of play had be come a byword in those times, here weakens the long diagonal in front of 1 00
his king, on which the opponent's bishop already stands, and he does so despite a total absence of any apparent threats, either now or in the foreseeable future! And let's not forget that he does this against an opponent who is a great master of attack. How can we explain this? There are no concrete variations, and from the positional viewpoint, the decision looks very unusual, and con trary to the accepted canons. Yet we are dealing here with a game between the two best players in the world, and, as we will see, no punishment ensued from this decision. So what prompted Tigran Petrosian to play this move? I do not see any other explanation than the now-familiar an swer: intuition, but a special type thereof, which we have not come across before. I have referred above to what it involves, namely the ability to accu rately perceive the strength of the op ponent's long-term threats and the po tential defensive resources of one's own position. In this case, Petrosian's intuition was dealing with the level of danger he faced in the two situations with the pawn on g7 or g6, without this decision being supported either by concrete calcula tion or standard positionalfactors. To a very great extent, this type of intuitive gift is shared by Anatoly Karpov. 1 3. l:Ia1 -d1 White has a wide range of options, but despite this game having been studied by many top-class players and first-rate analysts, no means have been found to punish Black for the weakening created
C h a p t er 2
by his last move. Thus, the attempt to storm the black fortress by 1 3 .fS ? ! dxe4 1 4.fxg6 does not bring anything real, according to Bondarevsky, after 1 4 . . . exd3 1 5 .gxh7+ tLlxh7 1 6.�g4+ 11t,gs 1 7 .1it,f6 e S ! 1 8 .�g3 �d4+ 1 9 .-;;t>h 1 "i'Yg4. Another attempt to clar ify the position, suggested by many commentators as the way to punish Black's last move, is slightly more promising: 1 3 .exd5 ! ? cxdS 1 4.�e5 ! 1it,a6 1 S J!f3 1it,xd3 1 6.cxd3 , but even here, Bondarevsky does not see any thing serious for White after 1 6 . . J:k8 . 1 3 . ...
-
S u c c essful Use o f Intui t i on
opening game of the match. We will soon see that it also fully justifies the risky strategical decision taken by Petrosian at move twelve. In this in stance, it makes sense to speak of an in tuitive strategical decision. We have al ready seen such decisions before, al though here, as in the game Capablanca-Bogoljubow, it is similar to the tactical example we saw in Kramnik-Anand. 14. 1 5. f4-f5 1 6. e4xf5
a5-a4 e6xf5 11t,e7-f6
ttJf6-d7
1 7. 1it,b2xf6! 14. c2-c4 But here, the trainers of both players, Igor Bondarevsky (Spassky) and Isaak Boleslavsky (Petrosian) are unanimous in their opinion that the most serious attention should have been given to the line 1 4 .fS ! ? eS (if 1 4 ...exfS 1 5 .exfS 1it,cS + 1 6.-;;t>h 1 �e7 1 7 .�f3 it is clear that the opening oflines favours White) 1 S .fxg6 hxg6 1 6.tLlf3 with the initia tive. Spassky conducts the whole game insufficiently confidently, clearly not at his best, which demonstrates the cor rectness of Petrosian and Boleslavsky's decision to provoke sharp play in this
The correct decision. The dashing at tack 1 7 .fxg6 1it,xb2 1 8 .gxf7+ .l:.xf7 1 9Jhf7 .;;t>xf7 2 0.cxd5 cxdS 2 1 .'iYhS + does not breach the black position; after 2 l . . .�f8 2 2 .�xd5 l:raS ! 2 3 .'ifd6+ (23 . .U.fl + 1it,f6) 2 3 .. .g 7 ! ? 24.tLlc4 11t,es 2 5 .tLlxeS .!:.xeS White faces a tough struggle to survive - yet another demonstration of the strength of Petrosian's strategical foresight. 1 7. 1 8. iVe2-f2 1 9. a2xb3 20. f5xg6
ttJd7xf6 a4xb3 .!:!.a8-a2
101
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
It was probably better to prod the active enemy rook by 20 .�b l ! ? keeping a small advantage after 2 0 . . . lla6. 20. 21 . h2-h3
f7xg6 'iYd8-e7
27. 'ife6-e2
22. 'iYf2-d4 White begins an unsuccessful opera tion, which only brings him problems. Here too, 2 2 .�b l was better. However, the game has still not de parted from the range of approximate equality. 22. 23. 'ifd4-f4 24. l::r d 1 -e1
c6-c5 �c8-b7
Equality could have been achieved more simply by 24.'i¥g5 ! ? c:J;;g 7 25 .cxd5 , as shown by Bondarevsky. 24. 25. 'iff4-e3 26. 'ife3-e6+
'ife7-g7 d5-d4 'iYg7-f7!
It is very probable that Spassky underes timated the strength of this reply, or just overlooked it altogether. Nothing too terrible has happened yet, but the psychological and the actual initiative has passed to Black. 1 02
This is the confirmation of what we said above. White misses his last chance to equalise reliably, which was hidden in the exchange of queens: 2 7 . .l:!.xf6 and after 2 7 . . . 'iYxe6 2 8 . .1:i.fxe6 .I:i.xd2 29.�fl .l:i.f7 30 . .l:.6e5 d3 (it is also equal after 3 0 . . . lldf2 3 l . .l:!.d l ! ) 3 l .ll5e3 l:!.d7 3 2 . l:!.e 7 ! the game is equal. Now, however, White has to fight, and, moreover, in conditions of time-short age. 27. 28. 'ife2-f2 29. 'il'f2xe1
llf8-e8 J::l.e8xe1
The ending is very unpleasant for White after 29 . .l:i.xe l ? tt::l g 4! 3 0 .'ifxf7 + Wxf7 3 l .�e4 tt::le 3 . iVf7-e8! 29. 30. 'il'e1 xeS+ tt::lf6xe8 31 . �d3-e4! Excellently played! The continuation 3 1 .tt::l e4 �xe4 3 2 .�xe4 tt::ld 6 3 3 .�d5 + Wg7 is significantly weaker, and here the break 34.b4 fails to 34 . . . cxb4 3 5 .c5 .l:i.aS ! 3 6.l:.c l tt::lb S 3 7 .c6 tt::lc 3 3 8 .c7 .l:!.cS . However, 3 1 ..l:!.f2 ! ? was interest ing.
Cha pt e r 2 - S u c c essful Use o f I n t u i t i on
31 . .l:.a2xd2 32. �e4xb7 tbe8-d6 33. �b7-d5+ Wg8-g7
36. c5-c6? This is what happens so often! Having taken a perfectly correct decision, based on intuition, the player, in time-trouble, fails to follow it up correctly by using calculation. White could obtain excel lent chances of saving the game by means of 3 6 . .l:!.b I ! .l:!.c2 3 7 .�e4 .l:!.c4 3 8 .�d3 .l:.xcS 3 9 Jhb4 .l:.dS . 36. 37. g2-g4
.l::l d 2-c2
Here too, it seems that 3 7 . .l:.b I ! ? was stronger. 34. b3-b4! Now this is necessary, since Black lacks the important resource from the varia tion given above! Spassky did not like passive defence, but he was magnificent at defending actively, counter-attacking at the first opportunity. Such is the case here, as he breaks the Gordian Knot. As we will soon realise, this decision too was taken without great calculation, but on the basis of a common-sense assessment of the position. 34. 35. c4-c5
c5xb4 tbd6-f5
37. ...
tbf5-d6
Petrosian was also in time-trouble, and missed the win 3 7 . . . tbe3 ! . The varia tions which follow are quite long, and I just show from amongst them the main line: 3 8.llf7+ Wh6 3 9.�e4 b3 40.lld7 WgS ! 4 I .l:rxd4 �h4 42 . .l:ld3 b2 43 .l:rb3 .l:.c l + 44.�£'2 tbd l + 45.Wf3 .l:f.c3 +! 46 . .l:.xc3 tbxc3 47 .�c2 tbbs 48.We3 Wxh3 49. �d3 Wxg4 5 0 .Wc4 tba7 5 l .c7 Wf4 5 2.Wc5 WeS 5 3 .Wb6 tbc8+ 54.Wb7 tbd6+ 5 5 .Wc6 hS, winning. 38 . .l:!.f1 -f4 39. llf4-d4
d4-d3 d3-d2 1 03
T h e E n i gma o f C hess I n t u i t ion
Fritz shows that a stronger line is 3 9 . . J:rc3 ! 4 0 . 1H3 ! ? (40.'\tlf2 tt:lbS 4 l .l:f.xb4 (4 1 ..l:lc4 d2 42 .'\tle2 .l:f.d3) 4 l . . .d2 42 .'\tle2 dl 'ii + 43 .�xd l .l:ld3 + costs White a piece) 40 . . . tt:lc4 4 1 . '\tlf2 l:!.c2 + 42 .'\tlg3 ! (42 . �e l b 3 -+) 42 . . . d2 43.c7 tt:les 44.l:!.xd2 l:rxc7 with excellent winning chances. 40. �d5-b3 41 . .!:!.d4xd2
43. l:[d7xh7 44. �g1 -g2
I:tc6-c1 + tt:le4-c5
l:i.c2xc6
45. �b3-f7! This unexpected reply (it is not immedi ately obvious why the bishop goes here) was found by Spassky's team in home analysis, but interestingly, was either overlooked or underestimated by his op ponent's. Witnesses testify that at this moment, Petrosian sunk into thought. A famous moment. Bondarevsky: 'The game was adjourned in this position and Black sealed his move. It turned out ... to be the strongest. It must be said that Petrosian has a remarkable quality, in that he always seals the strongest move (my italics - VB) ' . If we remember what this entails - after at least 40 moves of the hardest struggle, and five hours of play - then it becomes obvious that without great natural intuitive talent, one could scarcely exhibit such a remarkable abil ity. Thus: 41 .
tt:ld6-e4!
Analysis shows that after 4 l . . .Wf6, 4 2 . .l:ldS ! gives White excellent counterplay. 42 . .l:ld2-d7+ 1 04
�g7-f6
45. 46. g4-g5+!
b4-b3
This is White's idea. It is important for him to exchange the black g-pawn, whilst he intends to give his bishop for the other pawn. 46. 47. h3-h4+ 48. h4-h5
�f6xg5 '\tlg5-f6
Chapter 2
Given his opponent's intentions, Black's main focus here would normally be the move 48 . . . g 5 , and there is no doubt that Petrosian will have examined that move. But he played something else: 48. ...
.l::!.c 1 -c2+
Why? His trainer Boleslavsky gives as a j ustification the variation 48 . . . g 5 49.�g6 b2 S O . .l::.f7 + We6 5 1 ..l:tg7 and says that this is a draw, without explain ing how.
With the help of Fritz, I tried to look further, and found this: 5 1 . . . WeS 52 . .l:f.e7 + (if 5 2 .h6 lL:le4 5 3 . .l::!. e 7+ Wf6 54.h7 l::lg 1 + 5 5 .Wf3 l:tg3 + 5 6 .-;t>e2 tbc3 + 5 7 .-;t>d2 l:.h3 58 . .l:te3 .l:I.h2+ 5 9 .-;t>xc3 �xg6 Black wins) 5 2 . . . -;t>f4 5 3 .1::!.£7 + .;t>g4 5 4.�f5 + '>ith4 s s .h6 b 1 iV 5 6.�xb 1 .l:txb 1 5 7 .h7 .llb 8 and again Black wins! Perhaps this means that the adjourned position was objec tively lost and, further, I might venture to suggest that Petrosian's famed intu ition showed itself again in his choice of sealed move? ! 49. .;t>g2-f3 50. �f7-a2
b3-b2 g6xh5
Now there is no win anywhere, neither after S O . . .l:ic 1 S l .hxg6 .;t>xg6 (5 1 . . . .l:ra1
-
S u c c essful U s e o f Intu i t i o n
5 2 .g7) 52 . .l::!.h 2 lL:la4 5 3 .l::rh4 lL:lc3 (53 .. ..1:i.a 1 54.l:!'.xa4 l:rxa2 S S .l::i.b 4=) 54J:[b4 l:i.c2 5 5 .�c4, nor in the varia tion S O . . . l::r c 3 + ! ? 5 1 .-;t>g2 ! l:tc l 5 2 . .1::!.£7 + .;t>gs 5 3 .hxg6 .;t>xg6 5 4 . .l:lfl .;t>g s s s . �b 1 lL:la4 5 6. �d3 lL:lc3 5 7 . .l::l. f5 + ! .;t>g4 58 . .l::l.f7 l::r e 1 5 9.l:l.b7 lLld1 60.l::rb4+ .;t>gs 6 l .�h7 and there is no win. 51 . l:.h 7xh5
l::i.c 2-c1
52. l:Ih5-h6+? There is no objective win, but the op ponent comes to the rescue! This is the world championship, in the days when it was at its greatest, and the nervous tension is incomparable with any other event. Bondarevsky wrote that this posi tion had stood on their board during home analysis, and they had found the drawing line: 5 2 .We3 ! .l:tc4 ( 5 2 . . . lLla4 5 3 . .llh4 lLlc3 54.l::!. b4 .l::!.a 1 S S .�d3 = does not help) 5 3 . .;t>d2 and there is no win. 52. ...
�f6-e5
But now there is! 53. J::r h 6-b6 54. l::!. b 6-e6+
lL:lc5-a4
1 05
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i o n
He also loses after 5 4 J:[b4 �a I 5 5 ..l:ha4 .l::!.xa2 5 6 . .l::i.b 4 c;t>d5 5 7 .c;t>e3 c;t>c5 58 . .l::!.b 8 c;t>c4 and the white king does not get back! 54. ... 55. .a:e6-e4+
c;t>e5-d4 c;t>d4-c5!
The shortest way to win. Other moves are weaker. 56. J::te4xa4
6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 1 2.
... b2xc3 c3xd4 .tc1 -d2 '1Wd1 xd2 .tf1 -c4 0-0
tt:Jd5xc3 c5xd4 .tf8-b4+ .tb4xd2+ 0-0 tt::l b8-c6 b7-b6
.l::tc 1 -a1
An interesting position. White is help less. After 5 7 . �c4+ both 5 7 . . . c;t>d5 , and 5 7 . . . c;t>b5 win. 0-1
Spassky,Boris Petrosian, Tigran Moscow Wch m-5 , 1 9 69
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
c2-c4 tt::l b 1 -c3 tt::l g 1 -f3 d2-d4 c4xd5
tt::l g8-f6 e7-e6 d7-d5 c7-c5 tt::lf6xd5
1 3. �a1 -d1 ! A very important novelty, undoubtedly prepared for the match and which later became the main line of the variation. Previously, it had been considered cor rect to place the other rook on this square: 1 3 .l:Hd l . 1 3 . ... 14. .l:!.f1 -e1 1 5. d4-d5
.tc8-b7 J::!. a8-c8
1 5 . ...
e6xd5
6. e2-e4! The first time Spassky played this move in this position. Previously, he had al ways played 6.e3. 1 06
Cha p t e r 2 - Su c cessful Use o f I n t u i t i on
Kasparov analysed this game in the rele vant volume of his series. There he points out that Petrosian thought about this decision for 1 3 minutes. This seems to me quite a quick decision, because there was plenty to think about. The choice was between the text and 1 5 . . . tba5 , but it was a very difficult de cision. The most convincing demon stration of the problems facing Black af ter Spassky's novelty was the famous game Polugaevsky-Tal, played later the same year. There, the whole world saw the huge white attacking potential after 1 5 . . . tba5 1 6.ltd3 exd5 1 7 .e5 ! . Inciden tally, Polugaevsky himself later said that he had prepared the whole variation with Spassky and they had agreed that whoever was the first to be lucky enough to reach the position after 1 5 . . . tba5 would be free to use the anal ysis. Polugaevsky was the lucky one, and played one of his best games, crushing Tal spectacularly. This also gives the chance to confirm something we suggested earlier about the different types of intuition. Tal's intuition was brilliant when he had the initiative, as we will soon see, but a defensive radar system was not part of his weaponry! As a result, he walked into a blow that had been aimed at Tigran Petrosian, who himself side-stepped it with his last move, having felt (it would hardly have been possible to calculate it all) that some very hard blows awaited him in the line. There can be no doubt that he was fully aware of the downsides of the move he played - White is strength ened significantly in the centre - but he still managed to intuit his way to the lesser evil.
Much later, satisfactory lines were found for Black after 1 5 . . . tba5 , but this took a very long time. In the circum stances, Black's decision was perfectly valid. His serious mistake came on the next move. 1 6. ltc4xd5
tbc6-a5?
Alas, this is a real mistake, after which Black's position is very difficult. In Kasparov's opinion, both Boleslavsky's suggestion 1 6 . . Jlc7 ! ? and 1 6 . . .'ifc7 ! ? offered Black reasonable prospects of gradually equalising the game. 1 7. 'ifd2-f4! 1 8. 'iff4-f5 1 9. e4xd5
�d8-c7 ltb7xd5 'ti'c7-c2
The results of the try 1 9 . . . tbc4 are also unhappy for Black. Bondarevsky gives the variation 2 0 .tbg5 g6 2 1 .�h3 h5 2 2 . tL:l e 4 ! tb d 6 2 3 . tL:lf6 + � g 7 24.�g3 ! with a winning attack. Continuing the variation with 24 . . . tbf5 (things are no easier after 24 . . . �h6 2 5 . � e 3 + � g 7 2 6 . tbxh5 + ! etc.) 2 5 . 'ti'xc7 l:lxc7 2 6 . tb e 8 + , we can see he was right.
Now Spassky faced a moment of choice. According to Kasparov, he spent 2 0 minutes and played 1 07
T h e E n i g ma o f C hess I n t u i ti on
20. 'iff5-f4!? I would not exclude the possibility that this decision deserves a full exclamation mark. The difficulty of the choice con sists in the fact that White also gets a significant advantage in the endgame arising after 2 0 .'i¥xc2 ! ? �xc2 2 1 .�e7 J::!.x a2 2 2 . .l:Ixa7 llc2 2 3 .d6, although even so, Black has hopes of putting up a stiff resistance after 2 3 . . . h6 ! ? 24. tt:leS .r:i.fc8 ! . Spassky's task therefore consisted in estimating the winning chances in this ending and in the more compli cated middlegame battle. It is highly likely that this decision cannot be made without using intuition, because it is not possible to calculate everything out, and the positional assessment is not simple either. But Spassky 's remarkable feeling for the initiative did not deceive him here either. 20. ...
'ifc2xa2!?
Petrosian, in his turn, chooses the most tenacious line of defence. Geller's sug gestion (Efim Petrovich was another player, like Tal, who was much better in attack than defence) 2 0 . . . .l:!.fe8 2 I .d6 l:rxe I + 22 Jhe I 'ifd3 does not pass muster analytically.
I 08
After 2 3 .tt:ld4! 'i¥c3 (also hopeless is 2 3 . . . tt:lb7 24.d7 �f8 2 S .'iYb 8 ! g6 26.'iVxb7 'iYxd4 2 7 .h3 !) 24.'ti'e4! .i::rf8 2 S .d7 tt:lb7 2 6 .tt:lc6 �d2 2 7 .'iYe8 g6 2 8 .h4! Black can resign. Both Spassky and Petrosian had to take decisions here largely intuitively, be cause, I repeat, it was impossible to cal culate everything out or to assess the position normally, in view of the large number of different and not clearly de fined positional factors. One should also not forget that the decision was driven also by the need to assess the probability of White winning and of Black putting up the strongest possible resistance. 21 . d5-d6 22. d6-d7 23. 'i¥f4-f5!
l:!.c8-d8 'iYa2-c4 h7-h6
The continuation 23 . . . �cS is hardly any better. After 24.1::i.d S ! ? �c3 2 S . .l:Id3 'ifc6 2 6 .tt:leS 'i¥e6 2 7 .'ifxe6 fxe 6 2 8 .l:t.cl White has a significant advan tage. 24. .l:Id1 -c1 The most obvious and natural decision - the rook prepares to penetrate to the 7 th or 8th rank.
C h apter 2 - S u c c essful Use o f Intui t i o n
The strategic content of the play so far is clear - White has broken through in the centre and is looking at the enemy king, and Black is trying to contain his oppo nent's activity. But there is no lessening in the complexity and the importance of concrete actions, and thereby the value of each move; indeed, it is even growing. In such situations, the players have to spend a lot of time and effort in calculating variations. This leads to shortages of both time and energy, whilst the complexity and importance of the decisions taken remains high for some time. All this means that the chances of mistakes grow. And more than that, the difficulty of the calcula tion tasks before the players can become so great as to be beyond human scope, and we know that in such situations, the help of intuition becomes invaluable. As we now see, we have just such a mo ment before us. Here, Black must choose a retreat square for his queen. Petrosian played: 24. ...
fic4-a6
The alternative was 24 . . . 'iYa4 ! ?, which Kasparov considers more tenacious (which was not hard to conclude, given what happens in the near future) , add ing, however: 'although after 2 S J:[c7 ! the essence of things remains un changed.' I wanted to check this opin ion more seriously, and with the help of Fritz I 0 , we found a lot of interesting things. I will only show the most inter esting, but also a very characteristic part of the mass of possible variations: 25 ... tt::lc 6 !? 26.1lc8 g6 Fritz spends a long time wanting to play 2 6 . . . tt::lb 8, at-
tacking the dreaded white passed pawn, and for a time it thinks everything is OK for Black here, but then it realises that after 2 7 .tt::le s 'iYaS 2 8 .'iVxf7 + ! .l::txf7 2 9 .l:hd8+ �h7 3 0 . .l:i:h8 + 'iit> x h8 3 I .d8'i¥+ 'iit>h 7 3 2 .'iYd3 + 'iit> g 8
Here the most interesting part is reached: it turns out that the only win ning move is 3 3 .'iit>fl ! ! . After 3 3 . . J �f6 3 4 .'iVc4+ 'iit> h 7 3 S .'iYc2+ �g8 3 6 .'iYc8+ �f8 3 7 . 'iVc4+ ! 'iit> h 7 3 8 .'iYd3 + 'iit> g 8 3 9 .tt::l g 6 i t becomes clear that the king move was made to keep the rook on the e-file, and Black cannot avoid decisive material losses. 2 7.'iVh3 and now the toughest defence is 2 7 ... Wh7! . White's play is much eas ier after 2 7 . . . 'iit> g 7 2 8 . l:r.e8 'iYd l + 2 9 .tt::l e l llxd7 and the check 3 0.'iYc3 + wins.
1 09
The E n i gma o f Chess In t u i tion
And here Fritz shows that the only cor rect move is 28.g3 ! ! . Not 2 8 Jie8 ? when after 2 8 . . .'iYd l + 2 9.tt:le l l:rxd7 it is White who must find only moves to survive: 3 0 .'i¥e3 ! l:lxe8 3 1 .'i¥xe8 ttld8 3 2 . .l::!. x d8 l:i.xd8 3 3 .'i¥xf7 + 'it>h8 34.'iff6 + with perpetual check. 2 8 ...'it>g7 29Jles 'iYdl + 30.Wg2 'i¥d6
Now one more obligatory move : 3 1 .'i¥g4! and the rest is easier: 3 1 . ..b5 32.ttlh4 and Black cannot hold on much longer. And now let us sum up what we have seen in this unrealised episode from the game. I would draw your attention to the main thing: in order to win, White twice had to find obligatory and com pletely unexpected moves, with 2 8 .g3 ! ! being especially hard to find. Only these moves prove that the line chosen by White is strongest. The computer, unable to see these in advance, assesses the position as perfectly defensible for Black. A human player, at the board, could not hope to deal with such a task of calculation. He has to rely on feeling, but not intuition alone - intuition must be supported by calculation.
Here is the confirmation of what we said above. Spassky does not find a much easier line than those looked at above, and commits a serious mistake. He could have won without a problem by 2 6.lle8! tt:lb7 (much the same thing happens after 2 6 . . .'iYd6 2 7 Jk8! 'iYd l + 2 8 .tt:le l tt:lb7 29 .'i¥xb5 Wh7 3 0 . llcxd8 tt:lxd8 3 1..:i.xf8 'ifxe l + 3 2 . 'i¥fl ) 2 7 . .l:!.c8 ! 'iVa i + 2 8 .tt:l e l and White wins. However, here Petrosian also errs: 26.
'i¥a6-b6?
Had he chosen another square with 2 6 . . . 'i¥d6 ! and after 2 7 .tt:lxb5 'i¥d2 2 8.llfl tt:lb3 ! 2 9 Jha7 tt:ld4 3 0 .tt:lxd4 'i¥xd4 3 1. .l::i.c 7 g6 3 2 .'ifb5 Wg7 3 3 . .l:!.e l .l:!.b8 ! , his chances of saving the game would have been very high (this varia tion was pointed out by Kasparov) . This pattern of mutual mistakes is quite common and very interesting psycho logically. 27. llc7-c8
tt:la5-b7
Now there follows a striking finish: 25. .l:!.c1 -c7 b6-b5 26. tt:lf3-d4? 1 10
28. tt:ld4-c6! 29. tt:lc6xd8! 30. tt:ld8-c6
tt:lb7-d6 tt:ld6xf5 1 -0
Cha p te r 2 - S u c cessful Use o f I n t u i t i o n
Conclusions: both games undoubtedly underline the fact that within the greater category of 'strategically di rected intuition' , to which both Spassky and Petrosian belonged, there are gra dations. The fact that they both belong to this category is shown by their re markable strategic-intuitive decisions, and also by their mistakes at difficult moments, when it is impossible to choose solely by calculation. And now, in continuing our discussion of the different manifestations of intu ition, and also to resume our chrono logical order, we come to Mikhail Nekhemievich Tal.
Mikhail Tal
There have never been any other players in chess history whose intuition was so obvious and indisputable as Capablanca and Tal. They are without doubt the two pinnacles of chess intuition, and I can not imagine anyone ever excelling them in this area. At the same time, the re markable thing is their intuitions were
almost exactly opposite and contrasting in their directions. If Capablanca's intu ition showed itself first and foremost in strategical and technical elements, as we have already seen, Tal's intuition was based on fantastically striking and effec tive use in situations which were pri marily dynamic and involve the initia tive. However, I would also point out that Tal calculated variations brilliantly. In Botvinnik's opinion: 'From the point of view of cybernetics and computing capabilities, Mikhail Tal had a great memory and very fast reac tions when it came to processing infor mation, much more so than other grandmasters . . . The young Tal was less interested in the objective assessment of the position . . . he was not so bothered if he was objectively worse, providing his pieces were active. . . then the forest of variations was so great . . . that his oppo nent would find it impossible to cope, whilst Tal's speed of thought and mem ory would have its say'. Undoubtedly an excellent assessment, but it is . . . insufficient! As we will later have to acknowledge, although Tal did indeed calculate variations brilliantly, some of his opponents did so even better! So we have to address another factor, unmentioned by Botvinnik. To day, Tal's intuition is well-known and widely-acknowledged. But it seems that even so realistic and strictly-disciplined a thinker as Botvinnik was not lacking in the 'dark arts', as many consider in tuition to be! But Tal's genius came to the fore in complicated, sharp posi tions, that were practically impossible to exhaust by calculation alone. Tal was able to penetrate more deeply into the 111
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
secrets of such positions than almost anyone else. Here once again, I will quote Kasparov's remarkable words about Tal, from his multi-volume work: 'Tal is the only player I know who did not calculate long variations, but could simply see through them ! ' . So what was it that he had, which distinguished him from others? I once heard a story, which not only confirms what Kasparov said, but also illustrates it. It was told to me by friends at the chess club in the city of Dnepropetrovsk, and concerns the fol lowing famous and spectacular game:
6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 12. 1 3. 1 4. 1 5.
i.c1 -e3 f2-f3 �d1 -d2 �f1 -c4 h2-h4 �c4-b3 0-0-0 �b3xc4 h4-h5 g2-g4
�f8-g7 tt:Jb8-c6 0-0 �c8-d7 :a8-c8 tt:Jc6-e5 tt:Je5-c4 l:f.c8xc4 tt:Jf6xh5 tt:Jh5-f6
1 6. tt:Jd4-e21? 'iYd8-a5 1 6 . . . l:f.e8 ! . 1 7. 1 8. 1 9. 20.
�e3-h6 �d2xh6 .!:!.d1 -d31? g4-g51
Anatoly Karpov
Karpov,Anatoly Kortchnoi,Viktor Moscow Candidates final m-2, 1 9 74
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1 12
e2-e4 tt:Jg1 -f3 d2-d4 tt:Jf3xd4 tt:Jb1 -c3
c7-c5 d7-d6 c5xd4 tt:Jg8-f6 g 7-g 6
21 . l:f.d3-d51
�g7xh6 nt8-c8 l:.c4-c5 l:f.c5xg5
Cha p te r 2 - S uccessful Use o f I n t u i t i o n
But not in any circumstances 2 1 .tLldS ?? .l::!.xdS ! 2 2 .exd5 �xa2 and it is Black who wins! 21 . 22. tt:Jc3xd5 23. tt:Je2-f4!
.f:.g5xd5 .U.c8-e8 �d7-c6
Or 23 . . . �xa2 24.tt:Jxf6+ exf6 2 S .tt:Jds .
24. e4-e5!! Avoiding 24.tLlxf6 + ? exf6 2 S .tLlhS �gS + 24. ...
�c6xd5
24 . . . dxe5 2 S .tt:Jxf6+ exf6 2 6 .tLlhS , mating e7xf6 25. e5xf6 26. �h6xh7+ Wg8-f8 27. �h7-h8+ 1 -0 White's key 1 6th move in this game was suggested and analysed in detail by my friend, the Candidate Master from Dnepropetrovsk, Evgeny Chumak. Be fore Chumak published his analysis in 1 9 7 2 , Mikhail Tal visited the city, and Chumak seized the opportunity to show him his analysis. Naturally, in those far-off pre-computer days, many hours had been spent working out and correcting the numerous variations.
In one of the possible variations, which was especially important for the assess ment of the whole idea, it was shown that the white king could successfully escape the black counterattack, by run ning from the square c 1 all the way to the h-file, provided he chose the right sequence of 'only squares' . The route march was supported by many compli cated variations. In all, a whole exercise book was filled with the analysis of the move 1 6.ttJde2 ! . But here what is most interesting: Tal sat quietly watching the analysis being demonstrated, occasionally nodding his head by way of agreement. But when the analysis reached the criti cal position for the white king's march, Zhenya Chumak drew Tal's attention to the particular importance of this mo ment. And at that point, Tal instantly (as the people who witnessed the story emphasised) drew with his finger on the board the exact line of the king march, from one 'only square' to an other, which Chumak had spent hours working out! The time has come to examine some games by the eighth world champion. We will start with a game that is well known and has been commented on many times, but which I have neverthe less chosen, as it opens up some very interesting aspects of the issue with which we are concerned. Tal,Mikhail Hecht,Hans Joachim Varna ol, 1 96 2
1 . d2-d4 2. c2-c4
tt:Jg8-f6 e7-e6 1 13
The Enigma o f Chess Intui tion
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 1 2.
b7-b6 �f8-b4 �c8-b7 h 7-h6 �b4xc3+ d7-d6 e6-e5 �d8-e7 tbb8-d7 tbd7-f8
tbg1 -f3 tbb1 -c3 �c1 -g5 e2-e3 �g5-h4 b2xc3 tbf3-d2 f2-f3 e3-e4 �f1 -d3
.I
� .t � �
8
.s:
� 4l �� �
.I
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8 8 8 8 �, 8
�" 'i! \it
8
.s:
Black has played the opening rather passively, striving most of all for a solid position. As a result, White has a space advantage and the bishop pair, but Black's position is very solid. But now Tal starts to 'turn the screws' . 1 3 . c4-c5?! This decision is typical of him, but is positionally dubious. All three possibil ities pointed out by Kasparov would leave White with slightly better pros pects : I L �.f2 ! ? ; 1 3 .tbfl ! ? and 1 3 .�a4+ ! ? �d7 1 4.�c2. But this day, the youngest world champion was after a real fight. For the moment, his opponent reciprocates, choosing to al low the complications. 1 3 . ... 114
d6xc5
It is immediately clear that 1 3 . . . bxcS ? ! is bad. After 1 4 ..l:!. b 1 White has the ini tiative. Even worse is 1 3 . . . tb g 6 ? 1 4.cxd6 cxd6 1 5 .�bS +. But the text gives Black a good game. 1 4. d4xe5 1 5. �d1 -a4+
�e7xe5
1 5 . ...
c7-c6
Tal described this as a mistake, recom mending instead 1 5 . . . tb6d7, but point ing out that even then, after 1 6 .�c2 White has the initiative. However, Kasparov continues this line with 1 6 . . . tbg6 1 7 .�g3 tbf4 and asserts that Black is fine. I believe that blocking the check with the other knight is in no way worse. In both cases, White does not have full compensation for the pawn. It must be said that, in his commentar ies, Tal often substitutes what he wishes were the case for what actually is, al though never with the aim of deceiving the reader. Rather, he himself would be mesmerised by striking variations. I also suspect that during the game, he would be aware that the correctness of his sacrifices was often in doubt, but he did not let such trifles bother him, pro viding the play took on the right sort of
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n t u i t i on
character. However, this is not the only interesting aspect. Probably from this point on, White is forced to burn his bridges, because otherwise he will lose the initiative, which to Tal was unac ceptable in principle. It follows from this that the consequences of the subse quent queen sacrifice were already obligatory for White, if, as happens, Black plays correctly. 1 6. 0-0 1 7. tLld2-c4 1 8. e4-e5!
tLlf8-g6 �e5-e6
2 l .�xc4 bxc4 2 2 .exf6 fxg6 23 .fxg7 �xg7 a position is reached with a small advantage to White, although a draw will almost inevitably result. I suspect that Tal did not spend more than a minute looking at this! 1 9. ...
b5xa4?!
Objectively, this capture is not a mis take, but subjectively, it makes Black's task much more difficult. Tal wrote that this reply came immediately, but seri ous attention should have been given to 1 9 ... 0-0.
Clearly, White is not prepared to re treat. 1 8.
b6-b5
This too, is correct. Rather weaker is 1 8 . . . tLlxh4; according to Tal, after 1 9 .tLld6 + ! �f8 2 0 . l:Iae 1 ! White has a large advantage.
1 9. e5xf6!! It is the eternal question: how many ex clamation marks should one award a very striking sacrifice that is, nonethe less, practically forced? 'Practically' , be cause it was not yet too late to slam on the brakes with 1 9 . �b3 . After 1 9 . . . 0-0 20 . .txg6 (20 .tLla5 ? c4) 20 . . . �xc4
The possibilities here are very interest ing. Tal considered the reply 20 . .!::l.ael very strong (Kasparov rightly disagrees and suggests instead 20 .�c2 ! ? tLlxh4 2 1 .fxg7 �xg7 nJ:rae 1 �f6 23 .tLle3 with compensation for the pawn) . Tal continues 20 . . . �d5 , but this is not the strongest. Much stronger is the line he ignores, 20 ...�xe l ! and after 2 1 .llxel bxa4 22 ..txg6 fxg6 2 3 . .!le7 Black should play not 23 . . . .l:l:f7 ? because of 24.tLld6, but 23 ...gS ! and a draw should result from best play. 20. f6xg7
.ld:h8-g8 1 15
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i tion Wd7
24 . . . Wf7 ? 2 S .tLld6+. 2 5 .tLle5 +
Wc7 26 .tLlxg6 .txa2 2 7 ..tf6 .U.ge8
21 . �d3-f5! Look what a magnificently rich picture now arises, and also how confused play now becomes! But this is not the only surprising thing. The fearless Fritz shows even more possibilities!
28.�e5 + 'it>d7 29.f4 .tb3 and this re markable position should probably end in a draw. It is a shame that Tal did not say whether he saw this line, and if so, in how much detail. I would not rule out the possibility that he looked at it, felt that it would lead to simplification, and also felt the game possibilities, in cluding the difficulties facing the opponent over the board, and made his choice ac cordingly.
2 1 .�xg6 !?
•
:i
8
.l 8 � t � ·1 �
Now the following replies lose at once: A) 2 I . . .'f:Vxc4? 2 2. . �fe l + Wd7 2 3 . .l:;Ie7 + ; B) and 2 I . . .'ti'xg6? 2 2 JHe l + Wd7 2 3 .lbe5+ Wc8 24.lbxg6 fxg6 2 5 .l:!e7 ; C) Also unattractive is 2 l . . . �a6 2 2 .tLld6+ 'f:Vxd6 (White also has a sig nificant advantage after 2 2 . . . Wd7 2 3 .�f5 �xfl 24 . .U.dl ! jt,e2 2S . .l:;Id2 'f:VxfS 26.tbxf5 + We6 2 7 .tbxh6 jt,c4 2 8 .tbxg8 .!::l.x g8 29 .jt,f2 ) ; D) Black must play 2 1 ..fxg6 and now: 2 2 . .U.fe l �c8! 23 .U.xe6+ jt,xe6 24. .U.el •
116
8 , f:::, n� Here, for example, Black's problems are much harder to solve than in the lines we have just looked at. He stands before a large choice. And it may be that it was here than he chose a continuation that was not the best, although it it perfectly reasonable. 21 . ...
tt:Jg6xh4
As we have said, Black had a choice, and we must look at his options. It is obvi ously bad to take the knight: A) 2 I . . .'ifxc4 ? 2 2 . .U.fe l + 'f:Ve6 2 3 . .U.xe6+ fxe6 24..�xg 6 + Wd7 2 5 . l:ld l + W c 7 2 6 . .tg3 + Wb6 2 7 . .!:!.b I + mating; B) But the second continuation looks good: 2 1 ... 'f:Vxf5 ! ?. In his commentary,
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n t u i t i on
Tal claims this leads to a lost ending and continues 2 2 .lt:Jd6 + Wd7 2 3 .lt:JxfS lt:J:xh4 24Jbdl + Probably stronger is 24.tt:Jxh4 �e6! 2 S .l:hd 1 with some ad vantage to White. 24.. .'�c7 2 5 .ttJ:xh4, but Fritz points out that there follows 2 5 �c8 ! 2 6 .f4 ( 2 6 JHe l �e6 ! ) 2 6. .Jhg7 2 7.fS .!::!.g4 28.g3 .2.d7 with equality; C) Andre Lilienthal suggested another good possibility for Black: 2 l . ..�a6 !? •.•
22.�xe6 f:xe6 2 3 .lt:Jd6+ �d7 24.tt:Je4! ..ixfl 2 S .tDf6+ �c7 2 6 .�g3 + eS 2 7.tDxg8 .Uxg8 28.�xfl .lhg7 with a
roughly equal game. Without exception, in all the lines we have examined, we reach endings which differ from one another in terms of material relations and piece placing, but which all share one factor. This is the same pawn structure, the most im portant aspect of which is the poor po sition of the four black queenside pawns. The two white pawns hold them up easily and securely for a long time to come, whilst at the same time the white pawns on the kingside can become a se rious strength in the right circum stances. Naturally, this longest-lasting of the various factors in the position was noticed by Tal, and played a big role in his choice of continuation at move 2 1 (and probably even earlier, at move 1 9) . But here, it was not enough just to see this combination of factors. White also had to foresee their likely influence on the future course of events, both indi vidually and combined. As we have al ready partly seen, this was not easy to do; one only has to look at the differing assessments of Tal and Kasparov and
other commentators, (and also mine, if you excuse my lack of modesty!) to see how difficult it is to assess conclusively this complicated and non-standard situ ation. The quantity and variety of varia tions is great, as is the number of mis takes in Tal's commentary, which shows the somewhat rough-and-ready nature of his calculation work during the game. And certainly, it was impossible to calculate all this at the board, because only a small percentage of the variations end with a situation that is fully clear. From this, we have a situation and a conclusion that is already familiar: here, it is impossible to manage without intuition . 22. �f5xe6
�b7-a6
Plausible is 2 2 . . .fxe6 2 3 .tDd6+ �e7 24.lbxb7 Ihg7 2 5 .g3 with a small ad vantage to White. 23. ttJc4-d6+ �e8-e7 24. �e6-c4 llg8xg7 25. g2-g3
.I
1
..t 1 b :g 25 . ...
1 t2J 1 � b
. 1 .1
b b .1:: \tl
1 � b
we7xd6?!
As a result of the choice Black has to make, a better endgame arises for White. The remaining play seems bor ing by comparison with the fireworks 1 17
The Enigma of Ch ess I n t u i tion
that have gone before. But in chess, everything works according to the re sult. Thus, viewed objectively, Black's position should be defensible. However, starting from this moment, the oppo nents exchange a series of inaccuracies, which were probably the result of tired ness from the preceding short but fierce battle. Hecht is the last to go wrong, and this decides the outcome. He made his first step to defeat in this ending here. It was better to exchange bishops: 2 S . . . �xc4 2 6 .tt::lxc4 �d8 2 7 .'it>f2 tt::l g 6 and White's advantage is not great. 26. �c4xa6
tt::l h4-f5
Now Hecht returns the favour. He should have centralised the knight: 2 7 . . . tt::l e 3 ! 2 8 . .l:f.fe 1 ti:JdS and Black holds. 28. �f1 -d1 + 29. �d1 -e1 + 30. 'it>g1 -f2
After Tal's recommendation of 3 0 . . . hS , Kasparov continues 3 1 J;Ied 1 + 'it>e7 3 2 .�b7 and White should win. 31 . g3-g4? Alas, Tal errs again. After the simple 3 l .�xc4 his advantage would have re mained significant. 31 . 32. 33. 34. 35.
8
8..
�
8 8
� d6-e7 'it>e7-d6 c5-c4
35 . ...
�g8-c8?
Hecht is the last to make a mistake. Evi dently, tiredness and time-trouble came together. The obvious and standard counter-operation 3 S . . . hS ! 3 6 .h3 fS ! 3 7 .'it>g3 hxg4 3 8 .fxg4 fxg4 3 9 .l:hg4 a3 (pointed out by Kasparov) should have led to a draw.
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use of I n t u i t i on 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41 . 42. 43 . 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.
.l:l:b4xa4 .laa4-a6+ .l::l.a 6xf6 h2-h3 h3xg4 g4-g5 .l:rt6-f5 f2-g3 .l::r e 1 -e5! g5-g6! .l::r e5-c5+ l:rc5xc2 g3-f4 .l:rf5-g5
.lac8xc3 d6-c5 h6-h5 h5xg4 l::tg 7-h7 l::t h 7-h5 .l:Ic3-c2+ c5-c4 d5-d4 .trh5-h1 c4-d3 Wd3xc2 .l:[ h 1 -g1
well-known efforts, but even so, it seems to be more outwardly striking than anything else, and not entirely an swering the questions arising in our re searches. By contrast, the following game is less well-known, but meets our needs more fully. It is typical Tal in all respects. Tal,Mikhail Miles,Anthony Porz, 1 98 2
D
After 49 . . . .l::!:x g5 5 0 . xg5 d3 5 1 .g7 d2 5 2 .g8� d1 � 5 3 .�b3 + no hope re mains. 1 -0 The queen sacrifice is extremely strik ing, but even so, it is not the main con tent of the game, which instead lies in the variety of positions which arose, or could have arisen, in the depths of the game. The essence of the game lies here, and in the fact that, at times, al most half the board was under attack. There, calculation was possible, but only in very few cases does it lead to a clear outcome. The real difficulty lay in assessing the positions arising. And here, what is especially important for us is that the majority of the potential po sitions give rise to anything but stan dard, and hence reliable, assessments. From this, it follows in turn that during play itself, the main thing was the tak ing of intuitive decisions amongst the various promising-looking choices. In this area, Tal was hard to compete with! The previous game is one of Tal's most
Miles has played the opening badly. White is fully mobilised and central ised, and Tal comes forward. 1 4. tt:lf3-e5!
�d8-b6?
Miles had probably planned this queen move earlier. We will soon see what he had counted on, but his calculations turn out to be faulty. Better was 1 4 . . . � c8 , although even then, after 1 5 .�xh 7 + xh7 1 6 . Ihd7 ! g8 1 7 .J:!.d3 White's advantage is indisput able. But now Tal puts everything in its place: 1 5. �d3xh7+! Exactly. Significantly weaker is 1 5 .tt:lxd7 tt:lxd7 1 6 .�xh7 + xh7 1 7 .:!.xd7 �c6 1 8 .�d3 + g8 1 9 .f3 :!.ad8 and thanks 1 19
The Enigma of C h ess I n t u i tion
to his bishop pair and good develop ment, Black obtains definite compensa tion for the pawn. This is what Miles had reckoned on, but after the text, things are bad for him. 1 5 . ...
ttJf6xh7
The whole point is that after 1 5 .. .'�xh 7 , White takes with the rook: 1 6 .l:txd 7 ! . Recapturing loses : 1 6 . . . ttJxd7 1 7 ."iYh5 + c;t>g8 1 8."ifxf7+ c;t>h8 1 9 .ltJg6+ c;t>h7 20.ltJxe7 and Black is defenceless. After 2 0 . . . ltJf6, 2 1. ltJhS ! decides.
1 6. l:td1 xd71 Here too, this is stronger than taking with the knight. 1 6 . ...
g7-g6
1 6 ...f6 is bad because of 1 7 .ltJg6. Then after 1 7 ... "iYc6? the move 1 8.l:txb7 de cides. On 1 6 . . . ltJf6 Tal pointed out the re markable winning blow 1 7 .ltJhS ! ! and in reply to 1 7 . . . ttJxd7 ( 1 7 . . . l:tad8 leads to mate: 1 8 .l:txe7 ! l:txe7 1 9 .ltJxf6+ gxf6 20."iYg4+) 1 8 .'ti'g4! g6 (it is no easier after 1 8 . . . iL.f6 1 9 .ltJxd7 or 1 8 . . . g5 1 9 .ltJxd7 'iVxb2 2 0 .�e5) White wins with 1 9.ltJxg6. 1 20
Thus far, White has proceeded entirely by calculation and assessment. But what happened now, without a doubt, was a brilliant example of Tal's intuition. The trumps ofWhite's position are obvious. Tal had at his disposal several good, standard continuations. Two of the most obvious and enticing are these: A) 1 7 .l:tfd 1 ! ? and then the best is 1 7 . . Jhd8 (the replies 1 7 . . . ltJf6 ? 1 8.l:txe7 l:txe7 1 9 .�gS 'it>g7 20.�xf6+ c;t>xf6 2 1 .ltJg4+ c;t>g7 22 ."iYeS+ win ning, and 1 7 . . . ltJf8 ? 1 8.l:he 7 ! l:txe7 1 9 .Ags l:tc7 20.Af6 ltJh7 2 I .Ad8 well illustrate the strength of White's posi tion) 1 8.b3 ttJf8 1 9.l:t7d3 with a solid advantage; B) Also good is 1 7. b3 ! ? - defending the b2 pawn for the future and freeing the b2-square for the queen to come to the long diagonal. After 1 7 . . .ltJf8 (bad is 1 7 . . . ltJf6? 1 8 .l:txe7 l:txe7 1 9.Ag5) 1 8 .l:td3 (l:tdd 1 ) . White has about the same size advantage as in the previous variation. But Tal understood, and sim ply felt, that the position should offer more, and the search for it brought him to the move 1 7. b2-b411 It is not hard to understand why Tal was drawn to look at this move - it opens a
Cha p te r 2 - S uc cessful Use of I n t u i t i o n
second front, includes the c-pawn in the battle, frees b2 for the queen, as well as being a direct blow at the enemy position, which he has to meet, thereby using a tempo! All this taken together amounts to what we mean by the initia tive. And in chess, Tal was the embodi ment of the initiative! But it is rather more difficult, as we will soon see, to justify why he took this decision, rather than one of the alternatives.
tively equal. So, does this mean that he should not have played 1 7 . b4, and that, although very striking, the move is not terribly effective, and it would have been better to play one of the alterna tives, such as 1 7 . .!:.fd 1 ? No! Analysing with Fritz 1 0 , I found (although not at once) that the Rigan's intuition had not deceived him. His 1 7th move was the strongest, and here is the proof:
I � ,g _t j. � i i
(fj
�
(fj
'iY 8 8 8 ,g � 1 7. ...
�b7-c8
The most convincing demonstration of the intuitive nature of Tal's decision comes from his notes in the book by Tal & Damsky, Attack with Mikhail Tal, where he writes that the most unpleasant reply seemed to him to be 1 7...cxb4, after which he wanted to meet with 1 8 .c5 'iYa6 1 9 .c6 �xe2 2 0 .cxb7 'iYbS 2 1 .bxa8'iY .l:f.xa8 2 2 Jhe7 gS 2 3 .lLJxf7 gxf4 24.lLJh6+ Wh8 2 S .lLJe4, but then saw that he did not have more than a draw here. Then he decided to go down this continuation, but at move 1 9 , would play 1 9 .'iYc2 , maintaining the initiative. Tal does not mention any other possibilities. But in fact, White only retains a very insignificant initia tive here, and the game would be objec-
Correct here is not 1 8 .c5, but 1 8.�e3 ! 'iVa6 1 9.'iVg4! lLJf6 Fritz itself at first
sticks stubbornly to 1 9 . . . lLJf8; and in deed, it is hard to see that after this:
I �� ,g _t j. i i i 8 8
•
(fj
'iV � (fj 888 ,g �
the only move to win is 2 0 .lLJhS ! ! , a move that is not seen by the silicon monster for quite some time, and hence it hesitates to regard 1 7 . b4! ! as the strongest. Then the variations run: 20 . . . l:!.ad8 (20 . . . lLJxd7 2 I .lLJxg6 we 121
The Enigma o f Ch ess I n t u i tion
have already seen) 2 l ..!he7 .l:!:xe7 2 2 .tLlf6+ �g7 23 .'i¥h4 and this soon ends in mate. Now 20.'i¥f4 is necessary. This move is the only one that does not lose for White. Instead, it is Black who is helpless. 20 ... �ad8 20 . . . �g7 2 1 .'iVh6+ �g8 22.tLlxg6 and mate is not far off 2 1 .llxe7 etc. I must remind you that Tal, distracted by these fascinating intricacies, saw noth ing of these lines at the board, and it ap pears that the move 1 8 .�e3 ! did not even enter the group of moves that he consid ered seriously. Once again, we see the correctness of what Kasparov said, that modern analysis engines often show up mistakes in the analysis (and calculation VB) of even the greatest masters, but very often confirm the correctness of their in tuitive decisions. Finally, if at move 1 7 , Black takes the pawn not with the c-pawn, but with the queen, 1 7 .. .'ihb4, then the demise fol lows in the way with which we are al ready familiar: 1 8/uxg6! �f6 1 8 . . . �gS 1 9 .'i¥hS ! �c6 2 0 Jhf7 . 1 9.'�g4 1 8. b4xc5 1 9. tt:Jg3-e4
20. 'i¥e2-f3! And all the variations come together easily. 20.
'i¥b6-b2
It all ends rapidly after 20 . . . �xd7 2 l .�e3 ; or 20 . . . fS 2 1 .il'g3, as it does now too. 21 . tt:Je5xf7!
'ifb2-g7
There is also a nice finish by 2 l . . . �xd7 2 2 .�eS 'ir'xa2 2 3 .tLlh6 mate. 22. tt:Jf7-h6+ 23. �d7-c7!
�g8-h8
Also possible is 23 .�e S . 23 . ...
�e8-f8
Black's position is wrecked, resulting in numerous striking variations appearing like lightning in the sky: 2 3 . . . gS 24.�e S ; 2 3 ... 4Jf6 24.tLlxf6 ifxf6 2 S .�e5 .
ifb6xc5 'i¥c5-b6
24. .l::tc 7xe7! Time to resign! 1 -0 Once glance at the diagram shows how much White has achieved. In such situ ations, Tal only ever went forward! 1 22
The reason is obvious: 2 4 . . . �xf4 (24 . . . ifxe7 2 S .�e5+ tLlf6 2 6 .tLlxf6) 2 S . .!:!.xg7 �xf3 2 6 . .l::t g 8 mate.
Cha p te r 2 - S u c cessful Use of I n t u i t i o n
The following game also belongs to the list of Tal's intuitive masterpieces. The game is complicated, and analysing it is not easy, and for this reason, there will be many diagrams!
Spassky,Boris Tal,Mikhail Tallinn, 1 9 7 3
d2-d4 c2-c4 lbb1 -c3 �c1 -g5 �g5-h4 d4-d5 d5xe6 c4xb5 e2-e3 tbg1 -f3
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0.
1 1 . ...
i ·�
i
1 2. 'iVd1 -d2?!
i
:s
Possibly not the strongest. More is promised by 1 0 .a3 ! ? or 1 0 .�d3 . 10
.
.
..
l1f8xf6
tbg8-f6 e7-e6 �f8-b4 h7-h6 c7-c5 b7-b5!? f7xe6 d7-d5 0-0
.i * 8 i i A t2J 8 8
1 1 . . . tb e4, but for the moment, it could have been dispensed with: 1 1 .'ifc2 and now 1 1 . . .tbe4 will be met by 1 Lid3 ! d6 e5 3 6 .'fff3 \t>g6. No, a draw is not obvious here, although the win is also not guaranteed. It is not hard to understand why Tal was not satisfied with this prospect, and why Kasparov stayed silent. The alternative is the continuation adopted in the game.
K
.t 'iV �
:g
29.'ffxd6 llxd6 3 0 . .!d.c6 .!d.d2 3 1 ..!d.al
•
.t •
,.
.t
White wants to exchange heavy pieces, and effectively, everything revolves around the possibility or otherwise of this exchange. As we see if we continue the variation given by Tal, the exchange of rooks is even more important for White than the exchange of queens: 28.'i:Vg3 ..ia3 ! �b2 !
.t
32 . .l:i.el
�b5 3 3 J�cxe6 �d4
34.'it>hl �xf2 35 . .l:Ib l �c4
'if ��� :g �
Now Spassky had to make a choice, and it was not simple. 25. �b3-g3 Tal looks at 25 .�b5 and gives this vari ation: 25 ... 'i:Vd6 26JUcl ..ia6 2 7.'ti'b3 2 7 .'ff a 5 ? �xf2 + ! 2 8 .'it>xf2 'ff f4+ . 2 7. . J:tb6, assessing the position as win ning for Black.
Kasparov agrees with this. The reason for this assessment is that Black has managed to avoid the exchange of his rook. In the position on the board,
And Black can gradually win this posi tion, by bringing his king to g2. But I have not been able to find a con vincing answer (at least not convincing to myself) to the question of what Black should do after 25 .'i:Vf3 . Neither Tal nor Kasparov believe Black is winning after 2 5 . . . 'ffxf3 2 6 .gxf3 e5 (other moves even lose) 2 7 .\t>h l ! ( 2 7 . .!d.fc l ? .!d.g6+ 2 8 .'it>h l �b7 -+) and this is definitely so: 2 7 . . . �b7 2 8 .h3 ! and there is no sign of how Black can win here. There fore, both Kasparov and Tal recommend avoiding the exchange with 25 ... 'i!fc7 , claiming that Black retains the advan tage. However, I have doubts whether it is sufficient for victory. This is easily ex plained - the further course of the game, together with the great number of variations, and even simply the out1 27
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i tion
ward appearance of the position shows that Black does not have such great prospects of attacking the enemy king. The queen is a very powerful piece here, and its retreat significantly re duces Black's activity. I have looked at some of the variations, which are not forced, and may very well be capable of being strengthened, but the character of the play is clear. 26J:!:fcl �b7 2 7.'iYg3 'iYd7
must have gone wrong somewhere since. And if so, where exactly? I see two possibilities - either at move 1 5 , when we have to question Tal's intu ition, or at move 2 4, in which case it is more of a question of an error of judge ment, which was strengthened by his desire to avoid a boring and insuffi ciently convincing endgame. But I repeat, all this is only true if one accepts my assessment and rejects the more authoritative view of the two world champions. The remainder of the game is already much clearer strategi cally. Its character is determined by the calculation of variations, and it turns out to be a stable advantage for Black. 25. 26. �f1 -c1
'iYf4-f5
2 8.h3 �d6 29.'ii' b 3 lhc2 3 0..lhc2 �dS 3 1 .'iYb6 and I do not see how
Black can strengthen his position here. And here, I find myself experiencing a case of cognitive dissonance, which is generally defined as ·a feeling of dis comfort, caused by the contradiction between the established view and fresh information and new facts coming to light' . It is what happens when two world champions state something, which I am not able to believe. And more than that - a third world cham pion, Spassky, also did not utilise this chance! And this is where the main problem arises: if White can obtain real chances of saving the game with this move, and if Spassky played the open ing stage of the game poorly, as he un doubtedly did, then this means that Tal 1 28
1'3:,
!:!: !:!:
26. 27. 'iYg3-f3
'lW 1'3:, 1'3:, 1'3:, � .ic8-b7!
The bishop cannot be taken: 2 7 .'iYb8+ �h7 2 8 .'iYxb7 and now the thematic blow 2 8 . . . .ixf2+ wins. 27. ...
iYfS-gS!
But not 27 . . . iYxf3 ? 2 8 .gxf3 eS 2 9 Jhc5 l:[g6+ 3 0.�fl . 28. iYf3-b3
Cha p te r 2 - S u c c essful Use of Intu i t i on
Pursuing the black queen further does not work. After 2 8 .'iWg3 , again Black has 2 8 . . . �xf2 + ! 2 9 .'iWxf2 (29.Wxf2 .l::!.xc2 + 3 0 J:I:xc2 'iWfS +) 29 . . .'iVxc l + ! etcetera.
29. ...
�c5xf2+!
It has finally happened! Now this works. 30. '>t>g1 xf2
'iWg5-f6+
It was simpler immediately to play 3 0 . . . 'iWf5 + ! 3 l .Wg l 'iWe4 going into a winning position, that we will see later. 31 . '>t>f2-e1 3 l .Wg l loses after 3 l . . .'iVd4+ 3 2 .Wfl .l:l:f7 + ; whilst after 3 l .We2 'iYeS + ! 3 2 .Wfl 'iWfS + 3 3 .Wg l 'iWe4 play again transposes into the game. 28. ...
�c6-c7!
31 . 32. we1 -f1
'i:Yf6-e5+
32 . ...
�b7-a6+?
Exactly! This time, the traditional deci sion 2 8 . . . �xf2 + ? does not work: 2 9 .Wxf2 l:l:xc2+ 3 0 . l:l:xc2 'iVxg2 + 3 l .We3 'iWf3 + 3 2 . Wd2 and Black has nothing more than perpetual check, whilst 28 . . . .l::l:b 6 is weak because of 2 9 .'iWg3 . 29. g2-g3 Again 2 9 .'iWg3 �xf2 + ! -+ , whilst 2 9.'iWxe6+ is met by 29 . . . l:l:f7 ! 3 0.g3 �xf2 + 3 l .Wfl 'iVbS + 3 2 .'iWc4 �b6+ etc.
Not surprisingly, both players were now in time-trouble, after the amount of cal culation work they have had to perform in this game. Tal's move greatly compli cates his task, but does not actually throw away the win. Simpler was 3 2 . . . 'i:Yf5 + 3 3 .Wg l 'iWe4. 33. '>t>f1 -g1 Correct, whereas 3 3 . '>t>g2 ? is bad: 3 3 .. .'�'e4+ 34.Wg l (3 4.Wh3 l:l:xc2 3 5 .'iVxc2 �fl +) 34 . . . �b7 . 1 29
The Enigma of Chess I n t u i t i on
33. 34. �g1 g2 -
�e5-d4+ �d4-e4+
•
.l
35. �g2-g1 ? Spassky was also short of time! As we know, 3 5 .�h3 ? �xc2 3 6 .�xc2 .tfl + was losing, but after 3S.� f2 ! Tal would have had to win the game all over again.
And here, only 42 .. Ji'f3 ! guarantees the win, although I have no doubt that Tal would have found this in home analysis, time-trouble now being over. 43 .'iVxe6+ �h7 44.1lgl and now again a difficult moment: 44 ... h5 ! ! 44 . . . l:!.e2 ? 45 .'iYb3 'iVfS + 4 6 . g4. 45 .a4 l:!.e2 46.'iVd7 'iYf2 47.'iVd3 + g6 48.�d7+ �h6
Sickening, isn't it? Two great players, two world champions, suffer, fall into time-trouble and make mistakes, whilst the wretched silicon machine shows the right line in a matter of seconds! It is humiliating for us all! 35 . ...
.ta6-b7
Now we have the position pointed out earlier. White is helpless.
Fritz quickly shows the correct winning line: 3 S .. JH7 + 3 6 .�g l �d3 ! 3 6 . . . .tb 7 ? fails : 3 7 .�c8+ �xc8 38 . .l:.xc8+ �h7 3 9 .�c2 . However, it is not only Black's task that is difficult. White now needs to find the only reply: 3 7.h4! The end comes at once after 3 7 Jk 8 + �h7 3 8 .�b6 �e2 . 3 7 ... Uf3 38.�h2 .txc2 39.�xc2 'iVe3 40.'iVc8+ llf8 41 .'iVc4 llf2+ 42.�h3
130
36. h2-h4 37. �g1 -f2 38. �f2-e2
�e4-h1 + �c7-f7+ 'iYh1 -e4+
Here Spassky resigned, because he loses by force, with a series of checks: 3 9 .�e3 .ta6+ 40.�d2 .l:ld7 + ; or 3 9 .�d l �d7 + 40.l:!.d2 �h l + 4 l .�c2 llc7 +. 0-1 So, even if Tal's intuition did let him down at move 1 5 , about which I am far
Chap ter 2 - Successful Use of I n t u i t i o n
from sure, it was nonetheless unques tionably an intuitive decision! In addi tion, we have looked at the game in quite some detail, and have several times seen that the position is not fully clear, either in terms of calculation or assessment. It was not possible to pun ish White for his opening transgres sions without including intuition in the process. Now let us look at some more games, in which the presence of intuition in the decision-making process can be as serted with greater certainty. The first of these was played in the period before Tal came along, and made a great im pression, thanks to White's amazingly brave play for those days, crowned with a striking piece sacrifice, with incalcu lable consequences. Bronstein,David Keres, Paul Go then burg Interzonal, 1 9 5 5
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
d2-d4 c2-c4 tt::l b 1 -c3 e2-e3 �f1 -d3 tt::lg 1 -e2 0-0 e3xd4
tt:Jg8-f6 e7-e6 �f8-b4 c7-c5 b7-b6 �c8-b7 c5xd4 0-0
Keres has not played the initial stage of the game in the best possible way, and Bronstein now seizes the chance to grab some space.
David Bronstein
9.
d4-d5!?
h7-h6
Black prevents the unpleasant bishop move to gS. It is obvious that taking twice on dS is bad: 9 . . exd 5 ? ! I O . tt::lxd S tt::l x d S l l . cx d S �x d S ? (better is l l . . . tt::l a6 or l l . . . Ue8) 1 2 .�xh 7 + 'lt>xh7 1 3 .'tWxdS . .
1 0. �d3-c2 In his book, Kasparov is sceptically in clined towards this decision and recom mends as stronger the continuation 1 O.a3 �e7 l l .tt::l f4. He is partly right, and his recommendation is stronger, but Bronstein's choice is also sensible. It seems to me that in this game, he aims from the start for an irrational position, and the earliest possible seizure of the initiative, even at some risk. Such an ap proach was to a large extent in accor131
T h e Enigma of C hess I n t u i t i on
dance with his style, but in this case, it also fitted in well with the psychologi cal background to the game against Keres, who was a virtuoso at playing with the initiative and very strong at fighting for it, but was less confident in situations where his opponent held a lasting initiative, even if the latter had paid a large positional or material cost for it. We will soon see that Bronstein's approach worked wonderfully in this game. 1 0.
11. 1 2 . a2-a3
e6xd5 .,tb4-e7
•
•
tt::l b8-a6
Kasparov also sharply criticised this move, suggesting instead 1 0 . . . 'if c7 ! 1 1 . 'iVd3 l:!.c8 . However, here too, after 1 2..�b 3 the position remains compli cated, with mutual chances.
1 3. tt:Je2-g3! Strong, striking, but to a large extent already necessary. White had little choice, since 1 3 .cxdS tt::l c 7 ! 1 4.tt::l x c7 �xc7 1 S .tt::l c 3 .l:!:fe8 is not very nice for him. 1 3 . ...
d5xc4
1 1 . tt:Jc3-b5!? Strictly speaking, Bronstein's main, real intuitive decision was taken around here. All the later striking moves were, to a considerable extent, forced, in the situation that had arisen. Here, on the other hand, a good alter native was 1 1 .a3 ! ?. In this case, the manoeuvre 1 l . . .�d6 ! ? 1 2 .tt::l b 5 .,tes looks interesting, with a complicated game. 132
Paul Keres
Kasparov criticised this decision of Keres and even gave it a question mark. Natu-
Chapter 2 - S u c c essful Use o f In t u i t i on
rally, this assessment was made on the basis of his analysis of the great compli cations that follow. Instead, he suggested 1 3 ... ti:Jc5 (with an exclamation mark) , continuing 1 4.cxd5 jlxdS 1 5 .l:i.e 1 with the assessment 'with lasting compensa tion for the pawn' . However, my analysis of the complications shows somewhat different results, and consequently, I re gard this decision of Keres as objectively perfectly good, although as we will soon see, subjectively Keres went wrong here. He did not feel (our topic!) that the approaching storm would be so se rious and that it would prove impossi ble to calculate its consequences.
1 5 . ...
ti:Jf6-h7?
We have before us the most important position of this game, the moment of truth! Keres had to find the right deci sion, and it turned out to be practically impossible to calculate everything out to more or less clarity. As well as the move in the game, there are two other candidate moves, and the number of variations in all the possible lines is very great. I will show the most important: A) 1 5 tt:Jg4 This reply does not ap pear to promise a reliable defence. 1 6.'iff4 fs If 1 6 . . . jlh4 1 7 .'ifxg4+ Wigs 1 8 .'iffs ! 'ifxfS 1 9 .tt:JxfS jlf6 20.ti:Jbd6 tt:Jcs 2 l .ti:Jxh6+ �g7 2 2 .ti:Jhf5 + Wh8 23 . Uab 1 jla 6 24 . .l:i.fe 1 Black has to suf fer to save the game. 1 7.ti:Jxf5 h5 (on 1 7 . . . Wh8 strong is 1 8 .h3 ! , Black loses the h6 pawn and then the game) and here very strong is 1 8 .l::!.ael ! . .••
14. jlc1 xh6! Striking, although this sacrifice is a quite routine idea, but here its correct ness is questionable at first, second and even third glance! However, as I said earlier, in a higher chess sense it is necessary. The alterna tives, such as 1 4.ti:Jf5 dS (also good is 1 4 . . . .l::!.e 8 1 5 .ti:Jfd6 jlxd6 1 6.ti:Jxd6 .l:f.e6 1 7 _jlfs jlds !) are all clearly good for Black. 1 4. 1 5. 'ifd1 -d2
.
g7xh6
1 33
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
After the best reply 1 8 ... Wh8 ! (weaker is 1 8 . . . .tcs 1 9 .g8 2 3 .h3 'iif6 24.VWd3) 2 3 .�d3 VWg7 24.tLlxb7 with a decisive advantage to White) 1 9 . .t!.xe7 �xe7 ( 1 9 . . Jhf5 ? 2 0 . �xf5 �xe7 2 l .�xh 5 + Wg7 2 2 .'i¥xg4++- ) 20.d8-d7+ 6. "ii h 8-a1 +
'ifa4-f4 'iVf4-b8 1 -0
What was the main role of the exami nation here? It was that it made White's job much easier, since it saved him hav ing to waste time looking at unneces sary variations. Good use of the exami nation function often helps to identify the main direction of play, thus en abling all our efforts to be concentrated on the search for a solution in precisely that area. As a result, we are able to pen etrate more deeply into the secrets of the position, and economise on time and energy, which can become impor tant later in the game. This is what happens in this example. 0
As promised, I will not give a detailed description of the examination process (but I strongly advise the reader himself to carry out this full process, so as to 1 68
develop the habit of examining posi tions automatically) , but will just sum marise things in brief and emphasise the key factors, which define the es sence of the position. So: I ) Material is equal. 2) The king positions are very unequal, however, because here the third point comes in: 3) the white queen and bishop are at tacking h7, with only the black knight holding them off The latter is already attacked by the white rook. It is clear that White must strike at once, else the exchange of light-squared bishops will remove the possibility forever. The con clusion is obvious: candidate move number one for White has to be the capture on f8. Even more than that, with the requirements of the position being so clear, White can temporarily forget about the strict rules of calculat ing variations (see my book How to Cal culate Chess Tactics! ) as there are obvi ously no other candidate moves here. But what if things do not work out? An experienced player sees at a glance that things cannot possible not work out here, since the readiness of the white pieces for the attack is so great, and the enemy pieces so far away from the de fence. Once again, the calculation phase itself is very simple. 1 . l:tf1 xf8+! 2. l:tb1 -f1 + 3. 'ifh4xh7 and here the simple 4. c2xd3!
'it>g8xf8 'it>f8-e8 �a6xd3
C hapter 3
after which Black can calmly resign, since he will lose at least queen for rook. I leave you to check the variations yourself. The next example, although it looks quite different, is in essence largely the same as the previous one. Stein,Leonid Hartoch,Robert Amsterdam IBM, 1 9 69
0
Here, we will also have a situation where the positional problems are solved by tactical/calculation means. Again, though, the investigation carried out by White is pretty much forced, for concrete tac tical reasons. This imperative is dictated by the es sence of the position, which quickly becomes clear, if the examination is
-
The E l ements o f C h ess I n t u i t i on
carried out properly. Admittedly, the ex planation of the results will be longer, because the position contains more fac tors and is much more confused by the presence of so many. 1 ) Material is equal. 2) In the assessment of the king posi tions, things are less one-sided than the previous example. We will defer our conclusions in this respect, until we have dealt with the third point, con cerning attacks and defences. 3) First, let us speak about the black pieces. They are obviously passively placed, the only exception being the queen + bishop battery, which only at tacks the easily -defended pawn on g 3 . Conclusion: Black faces a passive de fence. On the other hand, the activity of the white pieces is evident at a glance. The rook battery against the c6 pawn strikes one at once. The bishop on e6 seriously restricts the actions of the black pieces, and among them, his king, which requires special attention.
Leonid Stein
1 69
The Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
If one takes the next step, and asks whether the pieces are already able to go over to an outright assault on the black position, then the answer would appear to be in the negative. The reason is obvious: the white forces, despite their superior positions, do not yet have sufficient coordination. In seeking a solution to this problem, we notice that the white queen and dark-squared bishop are currently not doing anything much. Then the ques tion arises: in what direction should we look for a possibility of bringing them into the game? We cannot do anything via the c-file, so where should we look? And then our glance falls on the g5-square. If the white queen were able to give a check on this square, it would be extremely unpleasant for the black king. This is only stopped by the pawn on f6 . Is there any way of removing it? Nothing except the advance e4-e5, which is stopped by the bishop on e5. The latter, incidentally, also defends the d4 pawn, which in its turn blocks the white bishop on b2. Now everything is clear and the further course of the game becomes simpler. Without any doubt, candidate move number one is the capture of the �e5 , followed by a breakthrough on that square. 36 . .l:!.c5xe5!
'ifd6xe5
The game ends even sooner after 3 6 . . . fxe5 3 7 .'i¥g5 + 'it>f8 3 8 .'i¥f6+. 37. 1:rc1 -c5 38. e4-e5
'ife5-d6
Black cannot save the game and could already resign. 1 70
38. ...
'ifd6-d8
The same happens after either 38 . . . 'i!Wf8 or 3 8 . . . 'i!We7 . 39. e5xf6+
'it>g7-f8
On 3 9 . . . 'i¥xf6, 40.'i!Wf4 decides. 40. 'i¥d2-f4 41 . �b2xd4!
tt:lb8-a6
It is very useful to compare this posi tion with the previous one. Only six moves have been played, and the pas sive though seemingly solid black posi tion has been shattered. This happened because White found a way to achieve a full, practically ideal coordination of his forces. And what is important for our subject matter is that the main part of the work was done by considerations emerging from a well-carried out ex amination of the position. There were hardly any variations, except the break e4-e5 and the queen check on g5 , which can hardly be called variations anyway! As I have already explained earlier, such 'variations' should be re garded as part of the examination. The real calculation was only performed on the basis of the results of these consid erations, and although effective, was short and simple.
Chapter 3
41 . 42. �d4xc5+ 43. "iVf4-e5!
tt:Ja6xc5 r;t>f8-e8
This position perfectly illustrates what is called domination. 43. .l::r h8-h7 44. �e6-d7+! 1 -0 The following, nice example is from my database, having presumably got there some years ago, from a book or maga zine of some kind I do not remember which. The previous moves, and even the players' first names, have not been preserved, but we have the crucial and most interesting part of the game, which I now offer for your attention. -
Liberman Ioffe USSR, 1 9 62
0
.i
-
The E l ements of C h ess Intui tion
Before going on to an ordered exami nation of the position, I would invite you to imagine someone you know, who is not a professional player, ap proaching this position and looking at it for the first time. What candidate moves would they consider, after a more or less brief examination of the position? On my side, I think there are at least three or four, and I would not exclude the possibility that this number includes the move played in the game. It is very striking, but not actually so difficult to find. My aim in choosing this example, how ever, is to show how a really well-car ried out examination, as opposed to a superficial enumeration of a few obvi ous points about the position, can improve the process of selecting candidate moves. So now let us set about the aforemen tioned careful examination. Material is equal, but Black has two bishops against his opponent's bishop and knight. Both kings are still in the centre; the white king's pawn cover looks the more vul nerable, but no attacks on his king are currently on the horizon. This means that the question of king positions can only become clear after we have consid ered the matter of the interactions be tween the two sides' pieces. The white queen is taking aim at f7 , but is currently not supported in this. It is also on the same rank as the enemy queen, with only the white bishop sep arating them. And if it were not for the black bishop on d7, this white bishop could take on c6 with check, winning the black queen! 171
The Enigma of C hess I n t u i t i on
For the moment, I only mention this as one part of the piece interactions on the board, but it is already clear that for a start, White should think about tactical ideas to win the black queen. And from this in turn, it is clear that the idea of moves such as I .tLlb3 or l .b4 as 'obvi ous candidate moves' is very doubtful. But let us put this main idea aside for a moment, which will help us to explain some other, highly useful things. I will not point out all details, by the way, but will only draw the reader's attention to one thing - the white knight on a4, which neither now, nor in the foresee able future, seems to have any possibil ity of relocating, and which could at any moment become the object of at tack. In other words, for this reason, White runs the risk of falling into an unpleasant position, if play develops along quiet lines. What we have said means that it is very desirable for White, maybe even obligatory (even though hard to prove with variations, because we are talking about longer term prospects) , to sharpen the play. This is what is called in chess the re quirements of the position, whether it be a direct threat, or the relative need to act in a definite way, to prevent a deteriora tion of one's position, etc. Fortunately (or, more probably, thanks to the white player's foresight) such a possibility exists here. How can we find it with the help of an examination of the position? We have already noted a number of the relevant elements of the position: the uncastled black king, the white queen on h5 x-raying it via the f7 pawn, and the fact that this pawn is pinned. From the other direction, the 1 72
white bishop dreams of giving check, which the black bishop currently pre vents. Thus, we have picked out the most im portant factor: White's chances to create trouble only exist all the while the black king remains in the centre. But how can we keep it there? And there is one other detail. When I mentioned the moves which might come to mind at a super ficial first glance, I mentioned 1 . b4, and immediately dismissed it and did not look at it further. Black's only replies would be to retreat the queen to c7 or d8. Thinking about this, and the desire to keep the black king in the centre, leads us to the only candidate move which meets all conditions. This was indeed played: 1. tt.Jd4-e6!! Now this move has appeared on the board, let us look at the position - care fully!
The first thing we note is that we have managed to bring about the sharp change in the position that our exami nation indicated was desirable for White. As well as the bishop on g 7 hanging, there i s now a terrible threat of 2 .b4, winning the queen. Obviously,
C h apter 3 - The E l emen ts o f Chess I n t u i t i o n
the knight is invulnerable: 1 ... �xe6 2.�xc6+ bxc6 3 .�xa5 . So what can Black do? Maybe he should immediately start looking for candidate moves? Such an approach seems appro priate in this situation, with both sides' forces in close direct contact with one another and threats and counter-threats filling the board. It is entirely natural that in such a position, strategical con siderations go on one side and give way to calculation. But this by no means im plies that examination of the position should be abandoned. This is because in chess, the examina tion of the position is of absolute value! This should be understood thus: no matter what is happening on the board, the player's first action should be an ex amination of the position, even when one is faced with a forcing variation! In the latter case, the examination should be controlled and brief, no more than 20-30 seconds, but even then, it is nec essary. In this respect, one can recall Emanuel Lasker's precept, quoted by Bobby Fischer in My 60 Memorable Games (game 49) 'When you see a good move, sit on your hands - there may be a better one'. And one can only find this better move by looking. We will con tinue this discussion later, but now let us return to the game. So, the most serious threat is 2 .b4. For example, l . . .�f8 2 .b4; l . . .a6 2 .b4 �xb5 3 .tLlc7 +. As can easily be seen, Black's main problem is the opposition of the queens. How can he try to escape from it? The reply l . ..b6 is one idea. In this case, after 1 . . . b6 2 . tLlxg 7 + Wd8
3 . 0-0-0 White not only has an extra piece, but also good attacking chances. The best try, undoubtedly, is the move played in the game: 1 . ...
f6-f5!
It closes the fifth rank, and creates some counterplay. White now has to work a bit to find the best winning chance, whilst Black cannot be blamed for the fact that he has not found a satisfactory saving move - there simply isn't one. 2. b2-b4
�g7xc3+
After 2 . . . t2lxb4 3 .t2lxg 7 + Wd8 4.�xd7 White wins easily. 3. t2Ja4xc3
t2Jc6xb4
If 3 . . . �xb4, then 4.t2lc7+ Wd8 5 .tLld5 �c5 6 .'ifxf7 and the extra piece will soon decide the game. Now, however, White must make the correct choice.
4. t2Je6-g7+! And he does so! A rather weaker contin uation was 4.tLlg5 ? �xb5 5 .t2lxf7 Wf8 6.tLlxh8 Wg7 . 4.
.
..
we8-d8!?
In the event of 4 . . . Wf8 5 .�c4! tLldS 6 . l:rc l ! Wxg 7 7 .�xd5 e6 8 .�g5 + 1 73
The E n i g m a o f C hess I n t u i t i on
�f8 9 .'i¥h6+ e8 1 0 . 0 - 0 ! White re gains the piece and wins with a direct attack. 5 . .tb5xd7
'i¥a5-c5!
After 5 .. /iJdS 6.exd5 'tWxc3+ the white king escapes from the checks: 7 .�f2 'tWd2 + 8.�g 1 'tWd4+ 9.g2 'iYb2 + 1 O.'Ot>h3 . 6. tt:Jc3-e2 7. �e1 -f1
'i¥c5-c4
After making this move, Black re signed. As well as a small material ad vantage, White has a great positional superiority. After 9 . �f2 tt::lc 2 1 0 .l'lc 1 'ifcS + 1 1 .�g2 tt::l e 3 + 1 2 .h3 it is all clear. 1 -0 The finish of the game was convincing and clear. The following fragment is no less impressive. We need to see how White found the following magnificent combinative at tack. 1 74
0
.i ;;
tt::l b4-c2+ tt:Jc2xa1
After 7 . . . �xd7 8 . .t'!.b 1 ! tt::l e 3+ 9 .�f2! tt::l g4+ (9 . . . .l!:!.hg8 1 0.'i¥xf7) 1 0 .�g 2 ! White wins. 8. .td7xf5
Spassky,Boris Schmid,Lothar Varna ol, 1 962
The main features of this position strike one right in the eyes. It is obvious that White's extra pawn does not play the slightest serious role. But the pair of black bishops stand out (I would re mind you that the element of material includes the composition of both ar mies) , one of which, the dark-squared, has no opponent. However, answering the second point of our adopted scheme, concerning the king positions, is slightly more difficult. It may be that this unopposed bishop will be able, if not completely, then sub stantially to reduce the danger lurking over its monarch's head, since White is not able to fight effectively on the dark squares. On the other hand, White has good chances of a breakthrough on the light squares. This means first of all the square h7 , but by itself, this is not enough for success. However, the white knights are also pointing (element number three in our scheme! ) at the squares f7 and e6, and after them, will be able to attack g6 as well. It is easy to see that the white rooks can join the
Chapter 3
party, at least one of them. I would draw your attention to the fact that the most likely route for them to do this is the third rank. So, we have seen the white attacking potential. What defensive resources does Black have? These are the pawn on f7 , the knight on c7 and the bishop on f5 . We can quickly and easily see that the last is the key to Black's defences. It defends the square e6 and, in some lines, also d 7 , and prevents the white rook coming to d3 . This all means that the attack must start with some measures being taken against this bishop. There are two such means: either attack it with the pawn, or offer the exchange of bishops. The second seems the more promising, since it also brings into play the .l::!.e I . It only remains to add that the consider ations we have discussed are enough to make the move 22. ii.e2-d3!! worth looking at first, leaving aside for a moment the issue of the fate of the knight on c5. We only need to come back to the fate of this knight if the vari ations show that the immediate sacri flee of the knight fails. The reason for this approach can be summed up in one, very important term: the initiative. I will not speak more about this subject here, but would point those who wish to know more to my book How to Play Dynamic Chess. Schmid took the knight. 22 . ...
�d6xc5
But he did so, not so much because this continuation is better than the rest, but
-
The E l ements of C hess I n t u i t i on
just because the others are bad. Thus, after 2 2 . . . ii.xd3 White wins by 2 3 . tt::l c e6 ! fxe6 24.�h 7 + �f8 2 5 . .l::!.xd3 . The same blow decides after the reply 2 2 . . . ii.c8 : 2 3 . tt::l ce6 ! fxe6 24.�h7+ �f8 2 5 .�xg6 �f4 26 . .l::!.e 3 . 2 3 . ii.d3xf5
tt::lc 7xd5
If 23 . . . gxf5 ?? 24.�h 7 + �f8 2 5 .�h5 ; whilst Black also loses after 2 3 . . . .l::!. ed8 24.ii.xg6!.
The concluding blow is not difficult, but beautiful: 24. ii.f5-e6! 24.ii.xg6 ! is no worse. In both cases, Black suffers fatal material losses. 1 -0 Now let us draw some conclusions from the examples we have discussed. They all confirm our preliminary con clusion: an examination of the position should precede any operation carried out on the chessboard. Without this, it is only possible to take the correct deci sion in chance cases, much like picking red or black at roulette. The scheme by which the search for a move is carried out was described above. In the exam ples we have looked at, the final stage 1 75
The Enigma of C h ess I n t u i t i on
was often the calculation of variations, but in all cases, the examination was es sential, both in taking decisions of a strategical nature, and of any other sort. There is one subject about which I promised to speak in more detail. This is that it is always necessary to make an examination, but the length of that process varies. A serious, fundamental and thorough examination, such as I went through in the examples above, is impossible and unnecessary at every move. Such exami nations are only carried out in special circumstances. They are necessary at moments following a serious change in the character of the position. Such changes include important and lasting changes in the pawn structure, or such piece exchanges which bring signifi cant changes in the character of the play, or change the material relations. I will not go into what is meant by such words as 'serious' or 'important' or 'significant' . This is mainly because it would take up too much space and would take us too far away from our main subject. Playing experience and, especially, the analysis of games, helps us learn to identify such key moments. This includes the analysis of both our own games, and especially well-anno tated games by strong players. The key word here is 'well-annotated' - such high-quality commentaries will always identify critical moments.
Finally, I will end this section with a few observations on how to look better at positions, so as to see what needs to be seen. The ability to examine a position cor rectly and effectively depends most of all on being able first to look at the whole position, and only then to turn to those parts of it that attract particular attention. It is always essential to pro ceed in that way, without exception. However, in certain circumstances, such as time shortage, when the player is fa miliar with the position as the result of a thorough earlier examination, the general survey can be done much more quickly, but it must still be done. Here is an apt quote on this subject, from the author Rex Stout: 'My eye is professionally trained, and can quickly pick up everything, from a complex outdoor scene to a small stain on a man's collar' (and it is often the case that the latter detail is the more im portant! - VB) . The time has come to suggest a general formulation for the subject under dis cussion:
In other cases, it is always possible to manage with a short examination, aimed mainly at checking the main di rection of play, be it tactical or strategical.
An obvious recommendation flows from this: the ability to look and to see should be trained as regularly and thor oughly as the ability to see tactical blows and calculate variations. And
1 76
In
chess, the examination of the
position is the most important. irreplaceable part of the deci sion-making mechanism. It is
the essential first stage in under
taking anything, without excep
tion, on the chessboard.
C h a p t er 3
even more: no matter what the situa tion, whether looking at games by other players, annotated by them or not, or in the analysis of one's own games, or training of any type, in a word, always and everywhere, when you look at a chessboard, teach yourself always to start with an examination of the position. Furthermore, I have often seen the opinion expressed that too much en ergy and time can be spent on an exces sively deep examination of the position, and that this would be better devoted to calculating variations. But I always reply as follows: Time and energy spent on an ex amination
of
the
position
should never be considered wasted. It will always repay it self, and even with profit! The return will come in the way
that, later in the game, thanks to
-
The E l em e n ts o f Chess I n t u i t i o n
I would also like to add this useful con sideration. It is quite typical to see a fairly weak player cope well with a situ ation, when he has to find a whole se ries of only moves to save a game, yet when he has to make a choice in a situ ation with many reasonable possibili ties, the same player will go wrong. This is partly explained by the psychological factor that the threat of imminent loss concentrates the mind better. But there is also another reason. It is much easier to find only moves when, as is often the case, one only has to con centrate one's attention on one sector of the board. But it is much harder to take a correct decision when the number of factors to be considered is much greater and the player has to control a much wider sphere of action. A player who is not trained in such things finds it much harder to cope with such a situation, which causes the weaker player to make mistakes, whilst a stronger player will manage better.
the fact that he is already famil iar with the key features of the position, the player will be able
to
concentrate immediately on
the calculation and evaluation of those
continuations and plans, which are most appropriate to the situation on the board.
At the same time, he will avoid the many other possibilities which are not relevant to the choice of move, and by which a player who has not carried out a proper examination of the position is liable to be distracted. Experience shows that the second player will waste far more time than the first!
Anticipating various critical observa tions, I should point out that this, and the closely-connected following section of the book, does not pretend to have exhausted this subject. My intention is only to acquaint the reader with this ex tremely important aspect of chess play, in a fairly general way, without a de tailed exploration of all its different as pects. And although I am surprised that such extremely important matters have received so little attention in chess liter ature, I do not propose to go into it fur ther, because I believe that what we have said so far is sufficient for the main purpose of our book. 1 77
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
The contents of the next section are closely connected with those of the pre vious one. Short tactics
But first, in order to explain the essence of what I mean, we should look at one important aspect, which appears in the following game.
1 2. 1 3. 14. 1 5.
t2Jc4xe5 0-0 t2Jc3-e4 �d1 -c2
t2Jd7xe5 "WHc7-a5 l:ra8-d8 .1ilf8-e7?
This move is a significant inaccuracy; he should have played 1 5 .. .1ilb4 or 1 S . . . t2Jg6. .
Capablanca,Jose Euwe,Max Amsterdam m-9 , 1 9 3 1
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11.
d2-d4 t2Jg1 -f3 c2-c4 t2Jb1 -c3 a2-a4 t2Jf3-e5 t2Je5xc4 g2-g3 d4xe5 .1ilc1 -f4 .1ilf1 -g2
t2Jg8-f6 d7-d5 c7-c6 d5xc4 .1ilc8-f5 t2Jb8-d7 �d8-c7 e7-e5 t2Jd7xe5 t2Jf6-d7
Now there follows a blow which is typ ical for this line, and which brings White a significant advantage. 1 6. b2-b4! It is interesting that four years later, in the opening game of his first world championship match against Alekhine, Euwe overlooked the same idea, in the same opening, in an only slightly dif ferent position! 1 6. 1 7. "WHc2-b2
1 1 . ...
.1ilf5-e6
The players have played one of the best-known old variations of the Slav. This line has again become topical in our day, but now the main move is 1 1 . g5 . .
.
1 78
.1ile7xb4 f7-f6
Chapter 3
-
The E l em e n ts of Chess I n t u i tion
And now there followed the strange move
.i
1 8. .l:l:f1 -b1 ? 'A serious mistake, which Capablanca never made in his golden years, when he played like a machine in winning posi tions ' (Panov, Kapablanka , Moscow 1 9 70) . He should have played the other rook 1 8 Jlab 1 ! with a large advantage for White. 1 8.
0-0
It turns out that Capablanca has over looked the elementary trap which even children learn in the earliest years of playing chess: 1 9.'YWxb4?? .l:tdl +. 1 9. .tf4xe5 20. t2Je4-g5
20. ...
-
Euwe reprieves his opponent I After 2 0 . . . .tfs ! ? or 2 0 . . . .tf7 ! ? he would have had a serious and lasting advan tage.
-
g7-g6?
And this is already final capitulation. Black is also doing badly after 2 2 . . . .txe4 2 3 .'YWxe4 g6 24.'YWc4+ .i:tdS (24 . . . Wh8 2 5 .l:Ixb7) 2 5 Jh 2 ! h6 26.e4
f6xe5
.tb4 c3?
21 . 'YWb2-c2 22 . .tg2 e4
22 . ...
.te6-f5
hxgS 2 7 . .l:tc2 ! . But he could still have complicated his adversary's task by 2 2 . . . .txa 1 ! 2 3 . .txfS e4! , although even here, after 24 . .txh 7 + ! Wh8 2 5 .tLJe6 ! White retains winning chances. 23. 'YWc2-a2+! t>g8-g7 Things are no easier after 2 3 . . . Wh8 24 . .txfS ! .l:txfS 2 5 . tLJf7 + l:rxf7 26.'YWxf7 .txa 1 2 7 .'YWf6+. 1 79
The Enigma o f Chess In t u i t i o n
24. .l:lb1 xb7+ 25. .U.a1 -b1
l:ld8-d7 'iYa5-a6
35. �e4-f3! A simple trick, protecting the back rank against the enemy rook's incursion and freeing the e4-square for the knight. Black has no counterplay, and is two pawns down. 1 -0
26. 'ifa2-b3!? A good human decision, which is quite good enough to win. The computer shows its own, forcing method : 2 6 Jhd7 + ! �xd7 2 7 .l:!.b8 ! �c8 2 8 .�d3 'iYaS 29 . .l:i.xc8 .l::!.xc8 3 0 .'iYf7 + �h6 3 1 .'iYxh7 + �xgS 3 2 .'ifh4 mate. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31 . 32. 33. 34.
1 80
'ifb3xb7+ l:lb1 xb7+ �e4xc6 J:rb7xa7 �c6-e4 h2-h4 l:la7-a8+ e2-e3
l:ld7xb7 'iYa6xb7 �g7-g8 l:lf8-d8 l:ld8-d6 �f5-d7 �c3-d4 �g8-g7 �d4-c3
The most interesting thing here for us is Capablanca's crude mistake at move 1 8. There are several possible reasons for this. The most probable is that, after landing such a serious blow two moves earlier, he relaxed and lost concentra tion. However, I am prepared to suggest an alternative explanation, which I will give later, after looking at some more examples. But now I want to draw attention to the changes which have _taken place in the play of Anatoly Karpov (and please for give me for this, Anatoly Evgenievich! ) . We will look at his play these days, on those rare occasions he plays in compe titions, and especially at normal time controls. In Karpov's play in his best years one could see a powerful intuition. This was especially obvious in situations requir ing the correct assessment of non-stan dard positions. Karpov coped with such tasks quickly and, as a rule, faultlessly. 'In Puerto Rico [at the 1 9 7 1 Student Olympiad - VB] the ease and elegance of his play made a great impression. He was usually the first to finish, using less than an hour on his clock' (Anatoly Bykhovsky, for many years the trainer of the USSR's youth team) . Karpov's phe nomenal ability to assess and play non-
Chap ter 3
standard positions was well-known in his heyday. But nowadays, the play of the ex-cham pion, no longer young, but still by no means old, presents a sharp contrast: extreme time-trouble, and in many games, even losses on time. And even when it does not come to that, there are many occurrences such as the follow ing: Karpov,Anatoly Movsesian,Sergey Donostia, 2009
0
-
The E l ements of C h ess I n t u i t i on
tt::lb S 3 4.�b 1 c3 3 S .tt::lxc3 ! tt::lxc3 + 3 6.bxc3 "ifxc3 3 7 . .ikfs "ifb3 + 3 8.�a 1 ! 'if a3 + 3 9 .l:!.a2 'ifc 1 + 40 . .ikb 1 . This variation is not forced, but is perfectly possible; obviously, it comes from Fritz. The same is true after 3 1 .tt::l g 3 ! b4 3 2 .axb4 .ikxb4 3 3 .�b 1 c3 3 4.b3 and White has all he needs for victory. 31 . 32. a3xb4 33 . .l:.f1 xf6
b5-b4 .ika5xb4
White had prepared this sacrifice with his 3 1 st move. Even so, stronger was 3 3 .tt::l g 3 ! ? �bs 34.tt::lfs tt::l f7 3 S . .l:!.h3 ! ? ( 3 S . .l:ig6 ! ?) ; or 3 3 . .ikfS ! ? tt::l e4 34.tt::l g 3 tt::lx g3 3 S .'ti'xg 3 , in both cases with a clear advantage. 33. 34. l:lh6xf6
tt::ld 7xf6 :t.e8-h8
Probably stronger was 3 4 . . . "ifa6+ 3 S .�b 1 "ifb7 . 35. "ifg2-h2 It is obvious that the h7 pawn gives White excellent prospects. Black has his trumps on the queenside, but for the moment he has nothing concrete there. But there is also a very important sub jective factor to consider: White was al ready seriously short of time. It was this factor that proved decisive.
Now White could also have played more strongly: 3 S .l:tg6! ? c3 3 6.b3 ! , but it seems he was down to just seconds. 35 . ...
c4-c3
31 . .!::rd 1 -f1 Karpov wants to limit the activity of the black pieces. There was already no time to calculate variations. But if one does so, it becomes clear that White had a close to winning position. A good line was 3 1.. �d2 ! .ikxd2 (3 1 . . .b4 3 2 .axb4 .ikc7 3 3 .tt::lc 3+-) 3 2 . .l:rxd2 b4 3 3 .axb4
36. b2xc3?! 181
The E n i g m a o f C hess I n t u i ti on
This is still not a mistake, but it prepares a decisive oversight. After the correct 3 6.b3 ! ? White retains slightly the better chances. But he had no time left. 36 . ...
It is understandable that Karpov had missed this reply in advance, but maybe he now missed the next move as well.
.ili.b4xc3?
It is possible that Black was also in time-trouble, but this is not clear. It may be that Movsesian decided not to inter fere with his opponent's planned blun der. Obj ectively stronger was 3 6 ... �a6+ 3 7 . '>i.tb 1 .ili.aS !
38. .ili.a3xb4?? No comment. However, after 3 8 .11i.fS + '>i.tb7 3 9 . .ili.b2 (3 9 . .ili.xb4 �a4+ 40 . .ili.a3 l2Jc4 4 l. . l:f.f7 + '>i.ta8) 3 9 . . . 'i¥c4+ 40.'>i.ta1 lLJxfS 4 l .gxf5 '>i.ta8 White is lost anyway. But that is not the point!
" ' :
:t� �;c�
38. ... with roughly equal chances. 37. .ili.c1 -a3? Yes, this move is wrong, but note that Karpov plays logically and consistently. He follows the strategical line adopted at move 3 1 ! But now the opponent finds an elementary combinative blow, which completely destroys White's plans. In such cases, the tragic side of chess of ten shows itself, when an excellent idea is destroyed by details, missed due to time shortage. Objectively, White was fine after both 3 7 . .ili.fS + '>i.tc7 3 8 .lLJxc3 �xc3 3 9 . .ili.b2 , and 3 7 .l2Jxc3 ! ? 'ifxc3 3 8 . .ili.a3 ! . 37. ... 1 82
.ili.c3-b4!
�c6xc2+ 0-1
The same transformation occurred at a certain point in the play of Capablanca, another colossal natural genius with a phenomenal intuition - we saw an ex ample earlier. Having in his youth out stripped all of his rivals not only by the accuracy of his play, but also by its speed, he not only started to commit mistakes of a sort that he had never previously done, but also fell into time-trouble, sometimes very serious. Similar changes happened not only to these two, and are probably symptom atic of a tendency that could interest us. In support of this fact, it is useful to quote from Taimanov's memoirs: 'Vasily Vasilievich Smyslov recently complained to me that he was getting
Chapter 3
old and found it hard to calculate long variations. I replied "Vasya, that is not your thing! You have a trustworthy hand, which you can believe in. Wher ever it places a piece, that is the right square for it." And this was not just a joke', added Taimanov. I would add that Smyslov said in his time that he had to a considerable extent lost this most valu able quality of his. Mark Evgenievich described very clearly and simply how intuitive deci sions appear to the observer. Virtually the same words were used by Vladimir Kramnik (see earlier) . But to continue our discussion, one must ask the question: what causes the transformation described above? How does a player, having so great and pre cious a gift, lose it over the course of years? Is it just the well-known effect of the weakening of calculation ability, which we all suffer from as we get older? Or, if not, then what happens when this magical gift of the gods dis appears? First of all, we can say that, without doubt, we are witnessing the operation of a law:
-
The E l ements of C h ess I n t u i t i o n
take on board, in a short time, all (ide ally) of the details in a position, even the most minor. But it is no less impor tant to be able to see not only all those details which are in the position at the moment, but also those changes in the positions of both sides' pieces and pawns, which may arise in the very near future. What I mean is that in any of the positions which arise on the board, there are already contained, in a hidden form, various possible clashes between the pieces and pawns, and with them are contained, also hidden for the moment, the most likely results of those clashes. It is time to give some examples, with out which this discussion may remain nothing more than an abstract thought. We will start with a very simple case. I will show you, one after the other, three textbook positions. The first is elemen tary and well-known. D
With age. we see a weakening of
whatever abilities it is that are absolutely necessary for the ef
fective functioning of intuition
(or at least, chess intuition).
Let us try to get to grips with what this unknown function is. Earlier, we discussed the proposition that one of the most important ele ments in chess intuition is the ability to
Clearly, White's hopes are bound up with his only surviving pawn. At the same time, it is attacked from behind and cannot advance, and the only ap parent defence, by a rook check, drives the enemy king towards the pawn. 1 83
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i tion
Meanwhile, the white king is too far away and cannot have any influence on proceedings, whilst the black king has an open road to the pawn. So, is that it, does the examination con clude that the position is a draw? Al most, but not quite! We have still not noticed one small detail. It is not yet on the board directly, but is already inher ent in the relative positions of the two sides' forces. In this simple situation, this detail is easy to see. It is that the rook cannot currently take the pawn I .. Jha7 be cause of 2 . .l::i. h 7 +. Having observed this extremely important factor, we also soon notice that the black king can easily eliminate this issue by ap proaching the pawn with his king along the sixth rank - he just needs to move to d6. This means that White has no time to manoeuvre. Unless he can force Black to capture the pawn at once, the game will be drawn. Note that there is noth ing else that needs to be considered. In other words, we know where to look for candidate moves, and this job has been done, as we know, by the exami nation of the position. Summing up what we have found, it is easy to find the only move, which creates a threat to promote the pawn at once: 1 . l::r h 1 -h8! and it is all clear: Black must lose his rook. The second example is also simple, and is based on an idea taken from the end of a study by Grigoriev. 1 84
0
Grigoriev
This is quite a simple example, but in the interests of understanding our theme, we will again discuss the whole thing in some detail. In the later exam ples, the explanations will be more la conic. It is clear that the main factor here is the difference in the activity of the kings, from which it is obvious that the white king cannot defend its pawn, so he must seek salvation with king versus king and pawn. For an experienced player, the relevant principles are quite elementary, but we will look at the process step by step. Thus: I ) How can we see that the black king will be able to win the white pawn? Isn't this obvious at once? Yes, but we can agree that it is not possible without cal culation, albeit a very simple calculation. Circumstance 2) is already more diffi cult to explain. It is the question of whether the loss of the pawn is danger ous for White, or whether he can still save the game by the standard method of taking the opposition? Here too, it is impossible to manage without calcula tion, albeit a short and very simple one: I .'it>c2 'it>d4 2 .'it>d2 'it>xe4 3 .�e2 and only now is it clear that Black has the
Chap ter 3 - The E lements o f Chess I n t u i t i on
opposition, since he has the reserve tempo 3 . . . d5 ! and White loses. So: the variation shown is only an explanation of the essence of the position, that is, it fulfils the role ofthe examination. And only now, once this work has been carried out, does it become obvious where White must seek salvation. Hav ing seen the above variation, it is clear that the whole secret of the position lies in Black's reserve tempo, and so we can draw the conclusion that White can live with the loss of the pawn, but must fight for the tempo! How? The answer is obvious: 1 . e4-e5! Incidentally, it is worth noting that White has no need to calculate the con sequences of the last move. The examina tion of the position, including the variation given above, shows that there is no other hope of saving the position. And this means: we must do what we have to do, and what will be, will be! However, everything turns out fine. 1 . ...
d6xe5
Now again there is no choice, since Black has the opposition on the fourth rank after Vit'c2 Wc4 and wins (this too, is simple and short, but it is calcula tion! ) . That means the move 2. wb1 -c1 is forced, and after 2 . ...
wc5-d5
(2 . . . Wc4 3 .Wc2 ; 2 . . . Wd4 3 .Wd2) , the
obvious
3. wc1 -d1
leads to a draw. So, what we have learned is there are many positions, even a majority, a cor rect understanding of the essence of which requires more than merely an at tentive examination of all the character istics of the position at the present mo ment. They also require that the player look at the changes in the relative posi tions of the two sides' forces, in the very nearfuture. Let us consider in more detail what we mean by ' the relative positions of the two sides' forces' . We mean, putt ing it crudely, to see the possibilities for the sides' forces to attack one an other, and the possibilities of defend ing against those attacks. And we are talking about such prospects in the very near future, ' the here and now ' . It i s obvious that we can only see such possibilities and their prospects by calculation. I am always concerned, with good rea son, about what might happen in a po sition over the very near future, and how, in any position, rain may suddenly appear from a cloudless sky. I would 1 85
T h e Enigma of C hess I n t u i t i on
underline that the calculation which should anticipate such sudden changes of fortune, is not deep and is quite sim ple, compared with other cases of cal culation. With this simple form of calculation/ tactical investigations, the main diffi culty lies not in the calculation itself, but in identifying all the possible paths during the examination, and picking up that factor which is often referred to in chess literature as 'short-range tac tics'. Until now, I have never seen an explana tion of this term, so we need to do the job ourselves. It may take time, but I hope it will be intelligible! The reader should not be misled by the word 'tactics' . In this case, we should be thinking in terms of something wider, as a complex of calculation and tactics. From this, we can draw our first and most important conclusion: Short-range tactics and the ex amination of the position are
not just closely connected with one another, but in essence, short-range tactics are a part of the process of examination itself and belongs much more to the
stage of examination than to that ofcalculation.
Now let us move on and look at the last of the three examples promised earlier. It also belongs to the category of text book positions, and is aimed at players taking their first steps in developing vi sian in chess. 1 86
D
As always, without exception, we begin with the examination. Material is equal and both kings are ab solutely safe. But the question of inter relationships between the pieces is more interesting. The white rook is at tacked, and itself attacks a defended knight. The black queen attacks the un defended pawn on c4. One might think that with this, we have completed this stage of the examina tion, but there are a few more details we have not noticed, and to which we should pay attention. Both the white rook on b7 and the black queen are rather strangely placed, cut off in en emy territory. Maybe here there is a hid den secret to the position? Is this now the end of the examination? No, not yet! We have still not done the most important thing, although we have taken the first step towards it. We have not yet realised the degree of dan ger, hanging over the pieces cut off in enemy territory. A quick glance does not make this clear, and this is where short-range tactics come in. With its help, we can quickly see that the black queen is trapped after I ..l::!. a4 (and if I . . ."i¥b3 , then 2 .t2ld2) But here Black can play l .. .'i¥xa4! 2 . tt:lxa4 t2lxb7 and is holding
Chapter 3
satisfactorily. But this points us to the correct line: 1 . l:rb7xd7! The rook does not die in vain! 1. 2 . l:i.a1 -a4 3. tt:Jf3-d2
-
The El ements of Chess In t u i t i o n
Shirov,Alexei A.kopian,Vladimir Oakham YM (U2 6) , 1 99 2
D
.l:!.d8xd7 'li'b4-b3
gaining a material advantage. Everything here is simple and under standable. But it would be interesting to pose the following question: Where does 'short-range tac tics', as part of the examination, end, and where does ordinary tactics (calculation) start?
The answer to this is also quite clear. Short-range tactics was the part where White tried immediately to exploit the cut-off position of the black queen, but realised that it fails to a counter-blow. In doing so, White divines the pre-exist ing, real possibilities of the two sides, in the immediate future. And only once he has appreciated these possibilities is it possible to go on to calculation of the variations. The fact that it turns out to be very simple does not affect the dis tinction between tactics as part of the exami nation and the following, independent tac tics. Next, I want to show a fragment that I like very much. In it, a nice short-range tactic is only very short, but is a highly important part of the calculation of the variations. In addition, it is very in structive.
Here we face an interesting phenome non. At first glance, we have on the board a typical case of calculation in its pure form, and in general, that is what it is. But the consequences are rather inter esting. Summarising what has happened: Alexei Shirov obtained an ending with an extra knight, but the realisation of this proved extremely difficult.
Alexei Shirov
In search for winning chances, he in vited his opponent to enter a variation 1 87
T h e E n i g m a o f C hess I n t u i t i on
which led to the diagram position. It is perhaps more correct to say that Black was lured into this variation, because the diagram position looks very prom ising for him, and even if he had chosen the correct path, he would have needed to find some very accurate moves to draw. However, the trap into which Akopian fell is very nice, far from obvi ous and difficult to see in advance, especially when short of time. It is clear that White can only choose between a king move or a knight move. The former loses the knight and leaves his king hopelessly far from the queen side. However, calculation shows that both knight moves lead to the same re sult, and Black is not risking anything: 5 5 .tt:lf2 �d4 5 6.�g2 �xc4 5 7 .�xh2 'it>b4 5 8 .tt:le4 �xa4 5 9 . tt:ld6 (as we see, the knight could also reach here from g3) 59 . . . 'it>b4 60.'it>g3 'it>c5 6 1 .tt:lc8 with a draw. Shirov chose a different path, which he had undoubtedly seen earlier: 55. 'it>f3-g2! 56. c4-c5
'it>e5xe4
This breakthrough is White's only chance. It is also highly likely that Akopian had seen this possibility some moves ago, but did not fear it. But once it appeared on the board, rather against his expectations (this is all speculation on my part, as I have no definite infor mation) , one can well imagine that he realised the problem and found himself having to choose a different move: 56 . ...
�e4-d5
Which, alas, does not save the game. So, what is wrong with the obvious 1 88
5 7 .a5 �dS (after 5 7 . . . c4 5 8 .b6 we reach an ending with queen against several pawns. I will not side track us with the details, but believe me, White is winning here, although the fact that Black has a c-pawn means it is not simple. You can find a detailed anal ysis of the whole of this ending in my first book Chess Recipes from the Grand master's Kitchen, Gambit Publications Ltd, 2002) ? 5 6 ... bxc5
On a quick glance at the position, I sus pect that the majority of players would miss the tactical chance here. The breakthrough must start not with the advance of the b-pawn, which gives up the c6-square too early, but first with 5 8.a6! and the pawn cannot be stopped. This is firstly, elementary, and secondly, well-known to any player with a decent chess education, which is certainly the case with both of the players here. De spite this, one of them overlooked it, which gives rise to two obvious ques tions. Firstly, why did this happen, and sec ondly, OK, he missed it, as happens, but what is so interesting about this for us? The answers to both questions are con nected. I have already said that Akopian took the decision earlier to enter a vari-
Chapter 3
ation which led by force to the diagram position. Admittedly, it was only about four moves earlier, but at the same time, he also had to see a number of other, difficult variations, and overall, there was quite a bit of calculation to do. In such circumstances, we often get events similar to those in which we are inter ested, cases where nothing is too obvi ous to be missed, and even a very strong player misses an elementary idea!
-
The E l ements o f C hess I n t u i t i on
have just seen, ordinary calculation went as far as move 5 7 , and then the re sulting position had to be assessed by stopping and looking more closely. In other words, it required an examina tion. That is what inevitably has to hap pen in cases of complex calculation. Right now, I do not intend to discuss what factors indicate when that stage has been reached, or how one can teach oneself to recognise them, and so on. I will only say what concerns the ques tion we are currently interested in. Here, it is the point of the last diagram that requires examination, and in accordance with my larger theory, here we cannot manage without 'short range tactics' . Yes, here is the paradox: In the course of a complicated calculation, at least occasionally there comes a point where a par ticular sub-species of calcula tion is called for!
Vladimir Akopian
I have a suggestion, which might be an acceptable explanation for this paradox. The first part of my mini-theory is well-known and generally accepted: the further the end position of the calcula tion is from the start position, the greater the fog which surrounds the player's mind. Because of this, one can miss something essential. The second part is far from obvious and quite vulnerable to critical shots: my suggestion is that in the example we
I am convinced of this conclusion, al though I am far from certain that I will manage to convince everybody else that I am right. So, to return to our example: Shirov did all that he had to do, ending his main calculation at the right time, examining the resulting position and realising what would follow. Akopian, on the other hand, slipped up at this point. I am convinced that in this case we have identified the key point where exami nation was required, and that the out come of the game depended on a tactic 1 89
The Eni gma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
that was elementary for any profes sional player, if he was looking at the position on the board. In other words, if he examined the position! However, I repeat that I cannot rule out the possi bility that Black simply did not have enough time on the clock to deal with everything in the right way.
Marshall,Frank Capablanca,Jose New York, 1 9 1 8
•
The game ended quickly.
57. 58. 59. 60. 61 .
c5-c6 'it>g2xh2 'it>h2-g3 'it>g3-f4 'it>f4-e4
'it>d5-d6 'it>d6-c7 'it>c7-d6 'it>d6-e6 'it>e6-d6
Here Akopian resigned, not in the least prematurely. The position is well known to endgame theory and the win ning path is instructive: 6 2 . Wf5 a6 6 3 . 'it>f6 axbS 64.axb5 'it>c7 6 5 .We6! 'it>c8 66.c7 ! Wxc7 6 7 .'it>e7 etc. 1 -0 In the following classic example, Black had to take a decision in a situation in which it was impossible to get to grips with the problems of the position, without short-range calculation. 1 90
The first glance at the position brings to one's eyes the mutual attacks on the pawns, with White attacking the pawn on c6, as well as the queen, and Black attacking pawn a2. But am I correct to focus at once on this issue? A conscientious reader would be justified in criticising me for this, since I have no right to skip the stages that I advise everyone else to follow! This is even more the case, since both of the stages we have skipped have something worth saying about them. Firstly, although material is equal, we should note the existence of a knight versus a bishop. Secondly, at this mo ment, White seems to have the more re alistic prospects of playing against the enemy king, although his prospects too, do not look very serious at present. There is also one other factor, which should not escape notice - the only open file is controlled by Black's rook. I have acted in this 'anti-pedagogical' way, just for educational purposes, to remind the reader once again of the value of systematically training one's technique of examining positions.
Chapter 3
Here, I have adopted the methods of the typical club player, untrained in this technique. In my long experience as a trainer, I am sure that the average club player would home in at once on the mutual attacks on the pawns. And now he would start analysing variations. Firstly: 1 8 .. .'�xa2 ?? 1 9 .l:ra 1 will be re jected at once. Opinions could differ about the second move: 1 8 . . . "lWd7 . After all, the pawn is defended! It cannot be taken because of the pin, so the answer has been found. But don't take the last bit seriously, I am being ironic. In reality. a quick glance at only some of the features contained
in the position is mistaken, not surprisingly, because incom
plete information is often worse than no information at all.
In reality, after 1 8 . . . �d7 1 9 .tt:Jfs f6 20.�g3 (this continuation was pointed out by Capablanca, who assessed it as clearly better for his opponent) ,
-
The E l em e n ts of Chess In t u i t i o n
erate together very effectively, whereas rooks tend to cooperate better with bishops. Once one thinks more about the prospects offered to Black by these short but convincing variations, in other words short-range tactics, we start to understand what is going on. This understanding results in the con clusion that in this position, the pres ence of queens on the board favours White. That is the first thing. Their ex change would significantly improve the prospects for the black bishop, in con junction with the rook on d8. Reason ing in this way, one can see that Capablanca's decision 1 8.
.
..
"tWe6-e5!
is not only perfectly understandable, but even rather obvious, if not virtually obligatory! Let us agree, however, that it is hardly possible for most mortals to reach such a decision based on a quick examination of the position, although I have no doubt that Capablanca himself found it after only a few minutes. 1 9. tt:Jd4xc6 'lWe5xc3 20. �c1 xc3 l:rd8-d2
White develops serious pressure on his opponent's king. The most important part of this pressure comes from the queen and knight pairing. It is well-known that these two pieces coop-
This position is much clearer strategi cally. In our day, no player who had read 191
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i o n
more than a handful of chess books would have any doubts as to the full ad equacy of Black's compensation for the pawn. I have even seen the opinion ex pressed that Black now has a clear ad vantage, but that is not the case. The game has not yet departed from the bounds of approximate balance, as Capablanca himself showed. This is his suggested continuation: 2 1 .C[je7 + ! Wf8 2 2 . .l:r.c7 .ixe4 2 3 .f3 .
ample of endgame technique for his own and future generations. 21 . 22. e4-e5
l:ta8-e8
After 2 2 .f3 there follows 2 2 . . .f5 ! .
.i
22 . ...
g7-g5!
Killing two birds with one stone - mak ing luft for the king and preventing f2 f4. And White maintains the balance. I have taken the analysis further and con firmed this opinion (could it be other wise?) : 2 3 . . . �c2 24.C[jc6 .if5 2 5 .�ee7 .ie6 2 6 . lha7 l:tc8 2 7 ..!hc7 .l:lxc7 2 8 . .ld.xc7 .l:f.xb2 29 .l:tb7 . This is how the game could and should have developed, but Marshall instead took a decision which is incomprehensible by the stan dards of our time:
23. h2-h4?! The commentators have criticised Mar shall for this move, but White's position
21 . .l:!e1 -b1 ? Going over to total passivity, to defend a pawn, in conditions where the oppo nent is ready to activate all of his pieces, is dangerous, to say the least. I would say it is totally out of the question, in principle. Now Capablanca continues in a manner typical for him - simply and precisely, creating another textbook ex1 92
Frank Marshall
Chap t e r 3
is unpleasant in any case, and patient defence was not one of his chess capa bilities. Both after 2 3 .tLlxa7 llxe5 24.llb3 .l:f.f5 ! 2 5 .f3 (25 .l:ifl ita6-+) 2 5 . . . g4! ; and after the possibly more tenacious 2 3 .b4 ! ? itxc6 24 . .l:.xc6 .:!.xeS White still has plenty of difficult problems. 23. 24. .l:.b1 -e1 25. l:Ie1 -c1
g5xh4 1:!.e8-e6 �g8-g7 !
Getting out o f the fork: 2 5 . . . .1:f.g6?? 2 6.lLJe 7 + ; 26. b2-b4 27. a2-a3
b6-b5!
-
The Elements of C hess I n t u i t i o n
And now another, this time decisive. 31 . e5-e6 This sacrifice only prolongs the agony. The other continuation loses at once: 3 1 . �fl llxc6 3 2 Jhc6 itxc6 3 3 . .l:i.xc6 l:!.a1 + 34.�e2 h2. But even now, every thing is quite simple, and White could have stopped the clocks with a clear conscience. 31 . ... 32. g3-g4
1:!.g6xe6
3 2 .tLld8 h2+. 32. 33. f2-f3
.l:.e6-h6!
33 . 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.
J:ih6-d6! l:!.d6-d2 �g7-f6 �f6-e5 lld2-g2+ h3-h2 �e5xf4 0-1
White has a totally prospectless posi tion, thanks to his lack of mobility after 2 7 .tLlxa7 l:Ig6 2 8 .tLlc6 h3 ! 2 9.g3 .l:.xa2 3 0 . .l:i.c5 .l:i.a6 ! 3 1 .tLld8 h2+ 3 2 .�xh2 l:!.h6+ 3 3 . �g 1 .l:!.h 1 mate. It follows that White cannot let his pieces stand idle any longer, and the game will end in zugzwang, as it soon does. 27. 28. �g1 -f1
lle6-g6 l:rd2-a2
Here is the zugzwang, which forces White to allow a new blow. 29. �f1 -g1 30. g2-g3
h4-h3 a7-a6
... tt:Jc6-e7 tt:Je7-f5+ tt:Jf5-h4 tt:Jh4-f5 �g1 -f1 f3-f4+
'Short-range' tactics, I would repeat, is a term widely-acknowledged amongst professionals, but which conceals within it more than a quick look at the name would suggest. It encompasses 1 93
The E n i g m a o f C hess I n t u i t i on
not only tactics as such, but also calcu lation. Those who wish to know more about the distinction between these two can be referred to yet another of my books, How to Calculate Chess Tactics. Here, I will only say that tactics and cal culation are not one and the same thing, but these two important basic el ements in chess are almost always closely inter-twined, and it is virtually impossible for one to exist independ ently of the other. Furthermore, we have already seen that short-range tactics and the examination are connected with one another in the most inseparable way. Certainly, as we know only too well, the examination is a general function, present in all chess operations. At the same time, in any of the examples from both chapters so far, one can see how in the process of draw ing conclusions from what one has seen in the position, short-range tactics are inevitably involved. Sometimes they are very short-range indeed, but all the same, they are there! And if that is so (and it cannot be otherwise) , then we must talk about a complex of examina tion/ short-range tactics. I would remind you that I gave my pre liminary comment about its existence earlier, as follows: 'I believe that investigations, the main difficulty of which lies in carrying out a high-qual ity examination of the position, and where the later actions are simple from the viewpoint of calculation and flow almost automatically from the examina tion, are correctly regarded as a special kind of calculation work' . Now it is clear that this special type is the afore mentioned complex. However, one 1 94
slight correction is required. I think it is right, for the sake of brevity, to call it examination, but I intend that this term should denote for us a set of processes. But now that we have drawn all the con clusions I want to present, and have made the various formulations, it is time to answer a question, which al though not directly asked, has no doubt been hanging over the reader's head: why have so many pages, crammed with text, been devoted to a question which does not have an obvious con nection with the subject of this book? The answer to this question may well be the most important of all my guesses in this book! ! It consists in my opinion, or, more ac curately, my strong belief, that: 1 ) Intuition, despite the aura of secrecy that surrounds it, be longs not to the world of ideas, but to the habitual material world familiar to us all.
It follows from this that, under the al most imperceptible appearance, and al most intangible substance, there should lie a material base. Thinking about this led me to the conclusion that:
2)
I
claim that this real, per
ceptible base is the above-men tioned complex: examination/ short-range tactics.
It is not hard to see how I arrived at these conclusions, if you look back to the very start of the book, to the defini tions of intuition given there.
Chapter 3 - The El ements of C h ess I n t u i t i o n
With some differences, they have two particularly important points in com mon. The first seems clear and obvious, and says that in any situation we are in terested in, we have first of all to gather some information about it. The second deals with a particular means of han dling this information. Thus, even for taking a decision using the 'secret' process of intuition, we have to gather a certain amount of informa tion, to give the intuition the material it needs to work with. This job is done by the complex of examination. In both of these two things, there is nothing un natural, and they are well-known phe nomena to all players. In practice every player, even if he has not formulated the thought to himself, continually per forms this work, to a better or worse standard - it is just a question of his de gree of mastery. Here, everything is clear enough and everyone can understand what is going on. And yet there is a mystery here! It con sists in the fact that the examina tion/short-range tactics complex, or, more briefly, the examination, as we have agreed to term it, turns into an intuitive decision. Here, we enter the territory of the sec ond definition of intuition, when we include in the mechanism what I judge only by its manifestation on the chess board, and more or less know what it does, without being entirely clear as to how it does it. In reality, all chess players, of whatever level, when they look at a position, whether it is good or bad, and they see a greater or lesser amount of what is going on, they all to some extent see these necessary short-
range tactics. But in doing so, only some of them are capable of working out sufficiently well the results of what they see in this intuitive way. I would remind you that, as agreed by many authorities (I quoted at the be ginning of the book the words from Plato and others about the two types of decision, intuitive and logical) , The intuitive method of han
dling information is a way of taking it and deriving conclu sions from it, in a subconscious way.
To put it another way: without the in volvement of the conscious in this process. But this raises the question: how, with out the involvement of the conscious, and with the involvement of what in stead? But let us put these questions aside for now, and try to answer them only at the very end of the book. For now, I would like to make another important observation. Please, dear reader, do not let yourself be daunted by this seemingly lengthy and compli cated process of examination/short range tactics. I have written about it at length and in detail, only because it is important to show and explain every thing as thoroughly as possible. In real ity, a strong player copes with this task quite easily and quickly. With players who have a strong intuition, the process takes place with great speed, regardless of the complexity of the position. But because each of us, without excep tion, has within himself the makings of 1 95
The Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
intuitive decision-making, it should be possible to develop this quality in us all. And I do not see any other means of training and developing this human gift (and maybe it is not only a human gift, but is also given to other members of the animal kingdom?), apart from training one's ability to look and see. At the same time, I do not claim that no other methods exist, only that they are unknown to me. If somebody suddenly comes up with another method, I will be grateful. But now let us return to the start of this chapter on short-range tactics, and, armed with our freshly-acquired infor mation, try to answer the question we posed at the start. Now we can state with a considerable degree of certainty that the undoubted decline in intuitive strength of players, as they age, arises from the fact that with age, every player without excep tion suffers a decline in calculating power. For this reason, firstly, the pro cess of examining the position takes much longer - see the 'Karpov prob lem' - and secondly, the quality of the calculation itself declines. This all makes it harder to cope with the prob lem of short-range tactics and leads to more mistakes in this area. As a result, the intuition, which obtains insuffi cient quality information for its opera tion, gives out mistaken recommenda tions. It seems to me that there is a nice con firmation of the conclusions I have drawn here, in the summary of Smyslov's qualities as a player, from the Foreword to his book The Art of Win1 96
ning. This Foreword is written by Kramnik, and I like it very much. And although it does not amount to a dem onstration of the facts, it illustrates very well one of my most important theses regarding the operation of the intuition in chess. In particular, it says the following: 'He possess a filigree accuracy and his ideas come into being "millimetre by millimetre" . To some extent, Smyslov was the creator of that style, which was then developed brilliantly by Karpov: a gradual increase in the positional pres sure, based on the calculation of short variations, performed with the accuracy of an apothecary's weights' . I don't think it can be expressed any better! I would draw your attention to the fact that Kramnik speaks specifically not just of calculation, but of the calculation of short variations. Believe me, he knows what he is talking about!
I will risk saying again that the ability to calculate, even at such a level of mastery as we have discussed earlier, declines with age, which causes many changes, including a weakening of the player's intuitive capabilities. After all that we have said, it is impossi ble not to pose the question: is it the ability to quickly and, ideally, faultlessly see short-range tactics, along with all the other details of the position in a clear, undistorted form, that marks the sign of intuitive chess talent? I do not think it is right to state this categori cally. I would say this: having such an ability is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. The process of examin ing a position and seeing short-range
C h a p t er 3 - The El ements of Chess In t u i t i on
tactics does not conceal within it an in tuitive component. It can perfectly well be absent, even if the examination work is performed in an ideal fashion. The intuition comes in afterwards, at the stage of drawing together the results of the previous process. The player who is gifted with a suffi cient intuitive apparatus, uses it when the situation on the board demands it, to obtain a recommendation as to the general direction of the further course of the game. On the other hand, the player whose intuition is insufficiently strong, or who does not wish to use it for some reason or other (see below!) , has to process the information obtained from his examination by other means. In the history of chess, there have been players who were excellent at calculat ing short-range tactics, yet who one would not class as intuitive players. One of the clearest examples of this is Sam uel Reshevsky, although as with all great masters, things are not quite as straight forward as they seem! This is how Mikhail Botvinnik characterised him: 'His great strength is calculation. Calcu lating 2-3 moves ahead (short-range tactics! - VB) he sees a great deal. How ever, this calculation does not always help, because in Reshevsky's play there is a lack of cleanness and so he often falls into difficult positions . . . Reshevsky's greatest weaknesses are a relatively poor positional feeling and systematic time-trouble' . As we see, Reshevsky had an important element of intuitive functioning, namely a strong ability to calculate short-range tactics, but at the same time, he played slowly
Samuel Reshevsky
and had a ' . . . poor positional feeling' , and 'feeling' is certainly an element of, if not a synonym for intuition. Conse quently, we seem to have every reason to regard Reshevsky's fantastic chess tal ent as of the non-intuitive type. But things are not so simple, especially if we take account of Reshevsky's widely known story as a chess 'wunderkind' . This is what he himself wrote ofhis life: 'Playing chess was like breathing for me - a natural function of my organism, not requiring any conscious effort. The correct moves came of their own ac cord, just like breath' . But this is a perfect description of intu ition! Admittedly, here he is speaking of himself as a child, and children usually play as if chess is their natural thing. But young Sammy certainly did not just throw the pieces around the board, like most children - he played very well! It could not have been otherwise, else he would never have been able to travel around Europe, and then America, from 197
T h e Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
the age of six ( ! ) , giving simultaneous displays! But when he got older, his play changed. Once again, Reshevsky him self describes it: 'The public are often surprised by my habit of spending a large part of my thinking time on the first 1 5-2 0 moves. . . I am often asked why I spend so long on "natural" moves. For a mas ter, there are no "natural" moves. Every move must be weighed in the scales and analysed from the point of view of the chosen plan.' Here, as we see, intuition is stuck in the corner and does not get a mention at all! So, it appears that for some reason, Reshevsky 'suppressed' his intuitive ability, although it was not gone com pletely from his adult play, and was seen in his legendary play in time-trouble. But there is another great player, a study of whose career makes me think he de liberately ignored the intuitive approach to the game, in favour of a search for the ul timate 'truth' . This was Efim Geller. And perhaps one of the main reasons why neither of these two chess giants ever became world champion, or even contested a world championship match, was this battle with their own nature. It is virtually impossible to win such a battle. And Reshevsky and Geller were far from being the only players, who had great ability to calculate varia tions, yet who always played without using the intuitive processing of the re sults of their examination. Naturally, another question now arises before us: what is meant by intuitive pro1 98
cessing of the results of the examination (including short-range tactics) ? Here I have to admit, as I have already done earlier, that I do not have a sure answer to this question. But let us look at an example of a position where intu ition is required more than any other device (we have seen a number of such cases already in this book) , but where the player does not possess intuition in sufficient quantity. This example will enable us to add and correct some de tails to what we saw earlier. The following game was annotated by the winner in his best game collection. Polugaevsky,Lev Torre,Eugenio Manila Interzonal, I 9 7 6
0
In a very sharp battle, Black has com mitted a serious mistake and Polu gaevsky goes over to the offensive. 1 6. b2-b4!
a6xb5
If 1 6 . . . tt:le4 1 7 .tt:lxe4 �xe4 1 8 .tt:lg5 ; or 1 6 . . . tt:ld3 + 1 7 .�xd3 �xd3 1 8 .�xd3 lhf3 1 9.bxa6 White has a large advan tage. Realising this, Torre strives to maximise his activity and complicate the game, at the cost of material. In general terms, this was the right ap-
Chapter 3
-
The E l ements of Chess In t u i t i o n
proach, but Polugaevsky was exception ally strong in situations where he has to extinguish the opponent's initiative, and up to a certain point, he does the job superbly here. 1 7. 1 8. 1 9. 20.
b4xc5 t2Jc3-b5 jlf1 -c4! �d2xb4
b5-b4 .l:ra8-a5 �d8-a8 t2Je8-f6
Lev Polugaevsky
and saving precious time) and it will later be easier for the white king to move about the board. 21 . l:!g1 xg7! A good practical decision, but White also had a number of other possibilities. The computer prefers to avoid the un necessary sacrifice of material and sug gests lines such as 2 1 . �b3 ! ? .l:Ib8 2 2 .t2::l g 5; or 2 l .a3 ! ? l::!. a4 2 2 .�b3 tbe4 2 3 .tbd2 . But it is also quite happy with Polugaevsky's decision. Still, this is a computer decision, based solely on an objective search for the truth. The human player also takes ac count of subjective factors. Thus, Lev Polugaevsky was well-known for his time-trouble, which arose in this game and in the later examples, because of his desire to calculate as widely and deeply as possible. Taking this into account, the sacrifice of part of his material advan tage has the merit of simplifying the position (making it easier to calculate,
21 . 22. t2Jf3-h4 23. c5xd6
Wh8xg7 jlf5-e4 l::!:a 5xa2!?
Torre maintains the tension. 24. jlc4xa2
�a8xa2
25. t2Jb5-a3? A serious mistake, which sharply changes the course of the game. Polugaevsky shows 2 5 .�b2 �c4+ 2 6.Wd2 and White wins easily, and in1 99
T h e Enigma of Chess I n t u i tion
deed, Black would have been helpless in this case, for example: 2 6 . . . cxd6 ( 2 6 . . . ttJxdS 2 7 .ifxe S + ) 2 7 .tLlxd6 'tWxdS+ 2 8 . �e l . 25. 26 . .!:1:d1 -g 1 +
c7xd6 �g7-h8
27. 'i.Vb4xd6! An important moment in the game. White finds the only move not to lose. Having committed a serious mistake in a winning position, found himself fighting to survive and in serious time trouble, Lev Polugaevsky, I am sure, was still not psychologically depressed. It was well-known that in such situations, he would get a second wind and start playing particularly strongly. But this is what most interests us: short of time, and in a far from standard posi tion - what means did Polugaevsky use to take his decision, and did intuition play a part? In this case, I am sure the decision was based on calculation, as the variations are not that numerous or lengthy, and could realistically be calcu lated. Here are a couple of very typical ones: 2 7 . 'i.V c3 ? ttJxdS ; 2 7 . �d 1 ? ttJxdS 2 8.'ifxd6 (28.'iYxe4 tLlc3 +) 28 . . . ttJc3 + 2 9.�cl 'iVa i + 3 0 .�d2 'tWb2+ 3 1 .�e l 200
Wie2 mate. So I would venture to sug gest that at this moment, he proceeded without the help of intuition. But let us follow the further course of events and seek a definitive answer later. 27. 28. �c1 -d1 29. �d1 -e2 30. ili.e3-d2
.l:!.f8-c8+ ifa2-a1 + 'i.Va1 -b2+
A very interesting episode, which Polugaevsky ignores in his commentary. White's move looks the most natural, but the meticulous Fritz unearths a sav ing move, the main line of which is 3 0.�e l ttJxdS 3 1 .f3 'ifc3 + ! ? 3 2 .ili.d2 'iVa i + 3 3 . tLlb l ! ili.xb l ! 34 . .l:!.g2! l:i.e8 3 S .ili.h6! with equality, which even now is far from obvious. The variation is difficult, and filled with moves that are hard to find. Therefore, we should not criticise White for choosing an other line, when in serious time trouble.
This is the most interesting moment of the game, both for its own sake, and in terms of our subject. Here, Torre committed the decisive mistake with 30. ...
ttJf6xd5?
C h apter 3
The move 3 0 ...�d3 + ! was obligatory (now I will give another of my addi tional analysis diagrams, which are nec essary to show the most interesting mo ments) .
And now White faces a difficult choice. In his commentary, Polugaevsky writes that he was planning to reply 3 1 . 'it>f3 , having seen, while his opponent was thinking, this variation : 3 1 .'it>xd3 'ii'd4+ 3 2.We2 tt:le4
-
The E l ements o f Chess In t u i t i o n
Forced. 34 tt:lc5 + Bad is 34 .. .'ifxg 1 ? 3 5 .'it>xe4 'ii'd4+ 3 6.'it>f5 'ii'f 2+ 3 7 .�f4! and it is White who wins! 35.Wc2 Also forced. 3 5 ... tt:le4+ If 3 5 . . . "tlixg 1 ? 3 6.'i¥f6+ Wg8 3 7 .tt:lc4 then Black is in trouble: 3 7 . . . tt:ld7 3 8 .'ii'e 6+ 'it>h8 3 9."tlixd7 'ii' c 5 (White should also win after 3 9 . . Jhc4+ 4 0 . 'it>b 3 ; for instance 40 . . . .U.xh4 4 1 .'ii'd 8+) and now Fritz 1 0 gives 40 .'iV g4! 'ii'x c4+ 4 1 . 'i¥xc4 l:.xc4+ 42 .�c3 l:hh4 43 .d6 l:ra4 44.d7 .l::t a 8 45 .�xe5+ Wg8 46.�f6 and White has the right-coloured bishop! 3 6.Wd3 with a repetition of moves. In any event, this line saves the game. But Polugaevsky preferred 3 1 .Wf3 . He tells of how this moment of the game was analysed afterwards, with the par ticipation of many of the other players in the tournament. Between them, they came to the conclusion that the game should continue 3 1 ...tt:le4 3 2 .'�' e 7 34.Wd3
•..
tt:lxd2+ 3 3.Wg2
3 3 .�e3 'ii'b 2+ and Black wins. Later on, when annotating the game for the above-mentioned book, he did not change his opinion of this episode. But in fact, in this line, White saves himself by playing not 3 3 .�e3 ? but 3 3 .'ii'h6 ! . This gives rise to variations which could not possibly be calculated with one's flag hanging, such as 3 3 .. .'ihf2+
And here 3 3 . . . tt:le4, after which Ljubojevic instantly pointed out the re ply 34.tt:lc2 ! ! after which Black is in trouble. Polugaevsky enthusiastically shows many other variations, all good for White. I have only chosen the one which is most interesting for us. 201
T h e Enigma of Chess In t u i ti on
Polugaevsky concludes: 'I am pleased that my intuition did not let me down' . You may recall that this is very similar to what we read from Anand earlier in this book. Similar or not, the two cases are oppo site. Anand's intuition against Kramnik led him to the correct decision, al though, of course, his task was appre ciably easier because the position was much less confused. But in this case, Polugaevsky chose a move that loses! Neither at the board, nor in his later commentaries, did he find the correct path for Black, which is the fairly obvi ous 33 ... l:!g8 + ! and the rest goes along with checks: 34.'\t>hl 34.Wh2 loses at once : 3 4 . . . tt::l f3 + . 34 ... .te4+ 3 5 .f3 l:!xg l +
3 6 .'\t>xg l
�c l +
3 7.Wf2
3 7 . Wh2
tt::l xf3 +
3 8 . tt::l xf3
W!ff4 + .
3 7 . . Jfkfl + 3 8 .'it>g3 �g l + 3 9 .tt::l g 2 tt::lfl + 40.'it>h4 �f2+ 41 .'\t>hs tt::lg 3 + ! 42.'\t>gs h6+! 43.Wf6 'tfkxf3+ 44.'\t>xeS
only moves to avoid immediate defeat, and the main thing in such situations is not to lose concentration and just to let your hand make the right moves. From now on, it is interesting to see how the white pieces, especially his knights on the edge of the board, come together and coordinate. 31 . J:rg1 -g4! Once again, when the game becomes concrete, Polugaevsky is at his best, even in severe time-trouble. This was his forte. 31 . ...
tt::l d 5-f4+
After 3 1 . . . tt::l c 3 + 3 2 . Wfl ! 'tfk a 1 + there is the decisive 3 3 . .te 1 ; White's task is slightly more complicated after 3 1 . . .'tfkd4, but it is still soluble: 3 2 .tt::l fS ! .td3 + 3 3 .Wf3 'ttk a 1 34.l:i:g 1 ! e4+ ( 3 4 . . . 'ttk x g 1 3 S . �xe 5 + Wg8 3 6.'tfkxd5+) 3 S .Wg2 l:i:g8+ 3 6 .tt::l g 3.
WifS + 45 .Wd6 'tfkxdS + 46.Wc7 'tfkb7 + ,
going into a difficult, but nonetheless winning endgame. But in the game, it was White who was now winning, although he still had to make ten more moves in severe time trouble. He was helped by the fact that the whole time, he had to keep finding 202
32. 'it>e2-e3! Typical Lev Polugaevsky! Not 3 2 . Wfl ?? Uc 1 + , but the at first sight less risky path 3 2 . lhf4 exf4 3 3 . f3 ! .tb7 3 4 . tt::l c 4! 'iV'bS 3 S .�e5 + �xe S + 3 6 .tt::lx e5 Re8 3 7 . f2 was also per fectly possible.
Chapter 3
32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.
tt:lf4-d5+ f7 3 I .l:rxe I . 26. �c4xf71 27. r;t>c1 xd1
�e1 xd1 + .itc8-g4+
Black plays on out of inertia. He has no hope at all. 28. r;t>d 1 -d 2 29. �d2-c3
l:ra8-d8+ .itg4xh5
30. 31 . 'iVf7xe8+
.l:rd8xd4 1 -0
The game is interesting and the final at tack superb. The most likely moment, when one can suggest the involvement of intuition, was the position in the first diagram, about which we have already spoken at some length. Even so, we do not know for certain whether at that moment the young Chinese girl relied solely on her remarkable ability to cal culate variations, or whether she also drew on intuition. One can only with confidence say the following: A) The assessment of the position was simple and no intuition was needed to find the right general course of action; B) Calculation of variations played an extremely important role in the deci sion-making process, and although it was by no means simple, there is no reason to think that it was beyond the capability of a player at the board. For this reason, the most likely thing is that intuition was not involved, even at 209
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
that very difficult moment. Still, as I have stated before, with such a delicate subject it is impossible to be l 00% cer tain. However, there is one small 'but'. In order to find the decisive blow at move 2 5 , White would have had to continue the calculations, in a position where it appeared at first that Black was doing fine. And in order to continue calculating at that point, White would have needed additional effort and moti vation, which could have come from a number of possible sources. We will say more about this subject later. Even so, despite the impossibility of be ing completely sure, I would stick with my earlier summary. The following game is very well-known and has been annotated by many differ ent people. Only one moment in it has any relationship to our theme, but I would like to look at that moment in more detail. Rubinstein,Akiba Lasker,Emanuel St Petersburg, 1 909
1. 2. 3. 4.
d2-d4 ttJg1 -f3 c2-c4 .2.c1 -g5
7. ttJf3xd4
ttJb8-c6
Here even Lasker himself criticises his own play, suggesting instead 7 . . . �e7 8 .e3 0-0, and he is right. 8. e2-e3
�f8-e7
.i .i .t 'ib' � l i .t i l l ..
-.
ttJ �� :I
ttJ
..
l
�
�
Lasker's habit of experimenting in the opening is well-known. Often it led him to obtain inferior positions, even with the white pieces. But even so, he rarely lost such positions, because of his ability to defend so well and gradually outplay his opponents. On this particu lar day, he had caught a Tartar.
d7-d5 ttJg8-f6 e7-e6 c7-c5
Not the strongest, although this was not fully clear at the time. The 'normal' re plies are 4 . . . jLe7 and 4 . . . ttJbd7. 5. c4xd5 6. ttJb1 -c3
e6xd5 c5xd4
Lasker plays the opening inaccurately, as happened with him from time to time. More accurate is 6 . . . �e7 or 6 . . . �e6 . 210
Akiba Rubinstein
Chapter 3
Rubinstein not only won the game bril liantly, but also showed just what a strong player he was. 9. �f1 -b5! From this point on, Black never gets a chance! 9. ...
�c8-d7
-
The Elements of Ch ess I n t u i t i on
Now, however, play goes into the realm of calculation, in which at first glance Black seems to get excellent ac tive play for the pawn. 1 0. 1 1 . tt:Jc3xd5 1 2 . e3xd4 1 3 . �b5xc6!
�e7xf6 �f6xd4 'li'd8-g5
It is obviously bad to play 1 3 .tLlc7 +?! 'ltd8 1 4.�xc6 ( 1 4.tLlxa 8 ? 'li'xbS 1 S .'ti'd2 I;le8+) 1 4 . . . i.xc6 1 5 .d5 ( 1 5 . tLlxa8 ? ? .l:r e 8 + - + ) 1 5 . . . �xc 7 1 6.dxc6 .!:!.he8+ 1 7 .�fl bxc6 with ad vantage to Black. 1 3. 1 4. tt:Jd5-e3
�d7xc6
1 4. ...
0-0-0
1 0. �g5xf6!? This is the key moment in the game about which I spoke earlier, in which Rubinstein took a decision with seri ous, long-term consequences. As we will see, Black could have taken a side road at move 1 4 , but the moves he played were the most natural and sensible enough in themselves, and from here until White's 1 8th move in clusive must be considered the main line. And given that this line lasts 1 0 moves, and a number of White's moves were far from obvious, then we are entitled to ask the question : did Rubinstein see everything that oc curred, including his 1 8th move, when he chose the text move, or did he rely partly on intuition? The alter native was castling, followed by stan dard play for such a position as this.
This continuation looks the most natu ral and should undoubtedly be re garded as candidate move number one. But Rubinstein also had to calculate, as I am sure he did, the line subsequently pointed out by Osip Bernstein : 1 4 . . . �xg2 1 5 .l::!. g 1 'tWaS + 1 6 .'li'd2 'li'xd2 + 1 7 .�xd2 �e4 1 8 . .ld.g4! �g6 1 9 .f4 with a large advantage to White. Objectively, the best reply looks like be ing 1 4 . . . 0-0!? 1 5 . 0-0 �ad8 with some 21 1
T h e Enigma of C h ess I n t u i t i on
prospects (admittedly, far from clear) of gradually equalising. From this, two conclusions emerge: A) Lasker overlooked something in White's subsequent play, and B) the de cision taken by Rubinstein at move 1 0 is fully justified, both tactically and positionally. 1 5. 0-0
1 7. .l:Ic1 xc6+
b 7xc6
.l:.h8-e8
1 8. 'ii'd 1 -c1 !! This is it - the moment of truth in this part of the game. Now White has a very serious advantage, whereas after 1 8 .fxe3 'ii'xe3 + 1 9 .Wh l J::i.xd4 2 0 .'ii'c 2 'ii'e 6 the game would be equal. 1 8. ... 1 6. l:.a1 -c1 !
.I::re8xe3?
Rubinstein's subsequent play is so con vincing that nobody has ever ques tioned its correctness, nor the fact that Lasker showed his customary magnifi cent fighting qualities, and made his opponent's task as difficult as possible. In view of this, it makes sense to look for chances of saving Black at this last possible moment, avoiding the un pleasant forced consequences which follow. Kasparov suggested 1 6 . . . �b8 ! ? 1 7 . .l:.c5 'ii'x c5 ! ? 'with hopes of saving the end game'. One has to agree with this recommendation. There are definitely chances. It is clear that this was not one of Lasker's best days, and he played too su perficially. 212
.l:!.d8xd4
The black king has fairly grim prospects after 1 8 . . . l:te5 1 9 .'ii'x c6 + ! �b8 20.dxe5 'ii'xe5 2 1 ..l:!.c l . l:rd4-d7 1 9. f2xe3 20. 'ii'c 1 xc6+ �c8-d8
Here a new segment of the game be gins, in which Lasker defends inge niously and tenaciously, that being one of the strongest components of his play,
Chapter 3
but Rubinstein conducts the heavy piece ending to victory with an iron hand. He takes play into a rook ending and creates one of his masterpieces of endgame technique, from which gen erations of players have learned. 21 . .l:U1 -f4!!
f7-f5
White's last move is based on a simple, but important tactic: 2 1 . .l:!.d 1 + 2 2.'>i;>f2 .l:i.d2+ Black's situation is completely cheerless after 2 2 . . . 'i:Wa5 2 3 .'i:Wa8+ We7 24.'i:Wb7 + (this is more decisive and stronger than Kasparov's 24.llxf7 + 'it>xf7 2 5 .�f3+ We8 2 6 .'i:Wxd 1 'i:Wxa2) 24 . . . 'it>d6 2 S .'i:Wb3 ! . 2 3 .'1t>e l 'iVxg2 .•
24.lld4+
22. 'iVc6-c5!
'lWg5-e7
Rubinstein's last move practically forced Black to exchange queens, under the threat of a direct attack on his king. Here is a characteristic line, given by Kasparov: 2 2 . . . lld 1 + 2 3 . 'it>f2 .l:i.d2+ 24.'it>e 1 'lWxg2 2 5 . 'YWa 5 + e7-f8 lib7-c7
23. 'lWc5xe 7 + 'it>d8xe 7 l::rd 7-d1 + 24. l::i.f4xf5 Even so, it is impossible not to give a di agram of this moment. It is scarcely possible to win just on account of the extra passed pawn and slight pressure on the a-file. Therefore, Rubinstein opens a second front on the opposite flank. An immortal textbook example!
25. g1 -f2!
30. 31 . 32. 33.
h2-h4! g2-g4! f8-e7 h7-h6 213
The Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
If the black pawns remain in their place, then after 3 3 . . . �f7 3 4.h6 gxh6 35 . .llxh6 'iit g 7 3 6.g5 �f8 the win is achieved by 3 7 .a4- �e8 3 8 .a5 �f8 3 9.a6; the rook continually threatens to transfer to b 7 , and Black cannot solve all his problems - an important and widely-known technical device. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.
�f4-f5 e4-e5 �a6-d6 .l:l.d6-a6 .l:ra6-d6 l::rd 6-c6
'iit e7-f7 �c7-b7 �f7-e7 'iit e7-f7 'iitf7-f8 �f8-f7
40. a2-a3! An elegant final brush stroke, on a can vas created by a great master. Black is in zugzwang and cannot avoid decisive losses, for example: 4-0 . . J:l.e7 4- l .e6+ �g8 4-2 .�g6 .l:!.e8 4-3.e7 aS H.l::r d 6. 1 -0 I have tried as diligently as possible to determine of the nature of Rubinstein's decision-making in the key segment in which we are interested, from moves 9- 1 8 . Turning over in my mind the events of the game, I have come to the conclusion that his play was dictated by 2 14-
a clear understanding of the character of the position. Strategically, the position is quite clear. White had a choice between playing against the opponent's isolated pawn, or winning it at once. The first approach is standard, and its plusses and minuses were typical and well-known. In the second line, the material gain had to be paid for by allowing the opponent very obvious activity. In other words, only the second line required serious thought. Its conse quences were impossible to assess solely by positional judgement. It was essential to evaluate the clash of forces which would inevitably result, and this was impossible without calculating the variations. As we know, it sometimes happens that the calculation is so complicated that intuition has to be called on for sup port. Was that the case here? I believe that the calculation task here was per fectly manageable, and did not necessi tate the calling in of intuition. Consequently, I have come to the con elusion that here too, we have a case of outstanding play, in which the winner was able to manage perfectly well with out intuition. These examples of play without intu ition have been included for the sake of balance, a principle known since an cient times. We have already seen many examples of intuitive play in this book, so for now I will only add one more ex ample - but what an example! I would particularly draw your atten tion to the year in which the following phenomenal game was played. I would
Chapter 3
remind you that the computer influ ence on chess was much less than it is now. The effects of hours spent analys ing with computer programs, which nowadays can be seen in the play of any professional, and even many amateurs, were much less evident 1 5 years ago. From this, one can assume that Ivanchuk 's fantastic queen sacrifice in this game had only been tested to a mi nor extent with the computer. Even more than that, the level of computer involvement cannot have been very great, because Ivanchuk's idea survived some 1 5 years, and has lived on into our day, and is still topical - the final word on it has still not been spoken' In openings of this type, which are built on a complex of highly complicated variations, this has hardly ever hap pened. What can we deduce from these factors for our researches? Firstly, that exact calculation of the resulting complica tions was impossible. Secondly, that making a general assessment was also hardly realistic, as we will soon see. It is in precisely these circumstances that in tuition plays a role. In this game, we will see many moments when both cal culation and positional assessment are impossible, and it is therefore essential to use intuition. Now let us look at the game itself. Ivanchuk,Vasily Shirov,Alexei Wijk aan Zee Hoogovens, 1 9 96
1 . d2-d4 2. c2-c4 3. tLlb1 -c3
d7-d5 c7-c6 ttJg8-f6
-
The E l ements of C h ess Intu i t i on
Vasily lvanchuk
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 1 2. 1 3. 1 4. 1 5. 1 6. 1 7. 1 8. 1 9. 20.
tLlg1 -f3 �c1 -g5 e2-e4 e4-e5 �g5-h4 ttJf3xg5 �h4xg5 e5xf6 g2-g3 d4-d5 .tf1 -g2 0-0 ttJc3-a4 a2-a3 a3xb4 �g5-e3 �d1 -g4+
e7-e6 d5xc4 b7-b5 h7-h6 g7-g5 h6xg5 ttJb8-d7 �c8-b7 c6-c5 'lfVd8-b6 0-0-0 b5-b4 'lfVb6-b5 e6xd5 c5xb4 ttJd7-c5 .!:.d8-d7
The players have played the legendary Botvinnik Variation, which is typified by its mind-blowing complications, and unavoidable long analyses. The po sition reached here was almost un known at that time. According to the database, prior to this game, it had been seen only once, some 1 4 years before, 215
T h e E n i g m a o f C h ess I n t u i t i on
and then Black had replied 2 0 . . .'i't'b8 . Several possible conclusions could come from this information. It cannot be ruled out that more information was available about what had happened be fore, but I do not have it and can only admire the winner's intuition (or, at least, his probable intuition! ) . Analys ing at home, Ivanchuk had clearly real ised the benefits for Black of the rook move, which theory nowadays unani mously considers the best move here, and had prepared the following bomb shell.
' o'�
In addition, even the most reliable of positional judgements could hardly encompass the many lines that arise here. In other words, the results of the stunning sacrifice are totally original, and do not have parallels for their posi tional and tactical complexity, and do not lend themselves to accurate calcu lation, either of individual parts or as a whole. It is hard to imagine a situation more ideally suited to the use of the heavy artillery of chess intuition. 21 . 22. f6xg7 23. tt::la4xc5
.,tt8xg7 .l:[h8-g8
23 . ...
d5-d4
'�
lJr,
: a; � 21 . 'ti'g4-g711 The punctuation of this move is not just emotional. It is highly objective. The continuation 2 1 tt::lx cS has also been tested in practice and has turned out to be perfectly satisfactory for Black. But there is another thing that matters here, mainly the fact that we have a truly grand prospect for the discussion of our main subject. As we will soon see, in those days, not even the most painstaking preparation, using the computer programs of the day, which had a fraction of the power of our own, could enable one to analyse to the end all of the possible variations here. .
216
Eleven years later, by which time enor mously powerful computers had been developed, a more reliable line was demonstrated here: 2 3 . J::i.x g7 24 . .,td4 .l:i.c7 and later the game ended in a draw, Bacrot-Carlsen, Dortmund, 2009. Starting from this moment, the game remains extremely complicated, but takes on a noticeably forcing character. There are many variations, and in the majority of cases, the most difficult part is assessing the positions arising at the end of the calculation. Contrary to my .
Chapter 3
usual practice, I will try to be terse here, and let the complexity of the problems speak for itself. 24. �g2xb7+ 25. tt:lc5xb7
l:!.d7xb7 �b5-b6
If 2S . . . Wxb7 26.�xd4 aS 2 7 . .l:l.fe l ; or 2S . . . 'YWxb7 26.�xd4 a6 2 7 . l:Ife l and the kingside pawns decide the game.
26. �e3xd4! The dangerous pawn has to be elimi nated. After 26.�f4 Wxb7 2 7 . llfe l a S ! the game i s complicated and unclear, but the pawns should give Black excel lent counterchances. 26. 27. l:!.f1 -d1
�b6xd4
·.� ... . .
:
.·tj.·
27. ...
�d4xb2?!
-
The E l ements o f C hess I n t u i t i on
Black faces a very difficult choice. As we have said, the real difficulty lies in cor rectly assessing the non-standard posi tions arising. A) For example, here it was necessary to assess correctly the endgame arising after 2 7 . . . 'YWxd l + 2 8 . .l:f.xd l Wxb 7 2 9.�d4 �xg7 3 0 . .l:f.xc4 aS .
At first sight, it seems that Black's activ ity should balance his opponent's extra pawn, but in such situations, the out come of the game depends on tiny de tails, and it is difficult to assess all of these. Given that thinking time is lim ited, it is hard to manage without intu ition. Thus, play could develop as follows: 3 I. .!:f.f4! Wb6 3 2 .Wfl ! 'it>cs 3 3 .l:!.fS + and it becomes clear that Black's counterplay is insufficient: 3 3 . . . Wc4 34 . .l:!.xaS Wb3 3 S . .l:!.bS �g4 3 6.f4 l:[g6 3 7 .We2 ; B) The correct path is: 2 7 . . . �xg 7 ! 2 8 . �xa7 Wb8 ! 2 9 . .l:i:da l �d4! 3 0 .tt:laS ! �dS ! 3 I .l:[b 7 + ! Wc8 3 2 . .!:f.xb4 l:!.g4 3 3 .b3 ! ? �eS 3 4J�(ba4! and White has only a small advantage . I have generously dotted around the ex clamation marks here, but I am not completely certain I am correct. One must take into account that this game 217
T h e Enigma of C h ess In t u i t i on
was analysed many times by different people, often with the help of the stron gest computer programs. The interest is obvious: in its day, this opening varia tion was the centre of attention, and many wished to explore it more deeply. It is quite possible, even likely, that there are people out there who know a great deal more about this line than I do. I can only therefore apologise for any inaccu racies. My task, I would emphasise, is different - to acquaint the reader with a brilliant example of the use of intuition in conditions of contemporary com puter chess. 28. tt::l b 7-d6+
29. .l::!.d 1 -b1
29 . ...
30. ...
wb8-c7?
Alas, Black lacked the energy or the time, probably both together, to find the right move. He had to play 3 0 . . . Wa8 ! with the following likely, though extremely hard-to-find follow up: 3 1 . l::rba4 �d4! 3 2 .tt::lxc4 l:!.b8 ! 3 3 .h4! l:!. b 7 34.h5 �d3 3 5 .tt::l e 3 .l:!.b l + 3 6 .l::rxb l �xb l + 3 7 .Wh2 Wb7 3 8 .l::rf4 �h7 3 9 . l:!.f5 . White's advantage is not in doubt, but I am not entirely sure he is winning. In the game, however, he wraps things up.
, ..
ifb2xg7!
Shirov is equal to the task and finds the right path. Here is an example of the misfortunes that would await Black after lesser continuations: 2 9 . . . �d2 ? 3 0 .tt::lxc4 ifc3 3 I. .l:!.a4! b3 3 2 .tLla5 ! �a8 (nor can he save himself after 218
30. l::r b 1 xb4+
�c8-b8
After 2 8 . . . �c7 2 9 . l::!. xa 7 + �c6 3 0 .tt::l xc4 White develops an initiative, which would be hard to contain in con ditions oflimited thinking time.
,
3 2 . . .b 2 3 3 . l:!.b4+ �a8 3 4.l::i: 4 xb2) 3 3 .l::ra 3 ! ifxg7 3 4.tt::lc 6 �b7 3 5 .tt::l e 7 ! and the black king cannot survive the ensuing attack. A forced loss results from 2 9 . . . ifc 3 ? 3 0 . l::r x a 7 ! �xa 7 3 1 . tt::l b 5 + Wa6 3 2 .tt::lx c3 bxc3 3 3 .l:l.b4! l:!.c8 3 4.g8�.
31 . l::ra 1 -a6!
l:!.g8-b8
White has a winning position after 3 l . . .ife5 3 2 . .l:!.b7 + Wd8 3 3 . .l:!.axa7 ; and also after 3 1 . . .l::r a 8 3 2 . .l:!.b7 + Wd8 3 3 .tt::lxf7 + We8 3 4.tt::l d 6+. 32 . .l:!.a6xa7+
Chapter 3
Also good is 3 2 . l:!.xc4+ Wd7 3 3 .l:!.f4! . 32. 33. l:!.b4xb8
Wc7xd6 'li'g7 g4 -
There is no saving the game, for in stance: 3 3 . . . c3 34 . .!:1d8+ We6 3 5 . l:k7 . or 3 3 . . . 'li'c3 34.Wg 2 ! �c2 3 S .lld8+ We6 3 6.l:!.d4! c3 3 7 .l:i:c7 . 34. .ll b8-d8+ 35 . .!::ia 7-a1
Wd6-c6
3 S . .l:[a l '.bb6 3 6 . .l:!.b l + Wc7 3 7 . .l:[d2 is hopeless for Black. White is also win ning after 3 S .l:!.xf7 c3 3 6 . .l:!.f4. 1 -0 Given that the correctness of the idea played in this game has been proven by time, and by the efforts of numerous ana lysts, armed with powerful modern com puters, one has to acknowledge the enor mous strength of Ivanchuk's intuition. And it is important to note also that in this game, intuition performed the same role as in the game Carlsen-Kramnik, ex amined in the first part of the book. It performed assessment work, helping White to believe in the reality of the ef fective coordination of his scattered forces, and without which coordination White would have been in trouble. In looking at the various aspects of our main subject, one cannot help wonder ing about the question: what if the whole aura of mystery which sur rounds intuition is just a mirage, and in reality we are just dealing with a banal case of pattern recognition, and the memory of the consequences which flowed from such patterns in examples we have seen previously?
-
The E lemen ts o f C hess I n t u i t i on
Pattern Recognition
Once having posed this question, we will not be able to rest quietly until we have answered it. To find the answer, we must first of all deal with the termi nology. If it is about recognising pat terns, then what types of patterns ex actly, and how do they appear? Experi ence shows that we should start with such things as Known elements and blocks of elements
There are circumstances, such as time-shortage, when the player's exam ination of the position is significantly abbreviated. This also occurs when the player is familiar with the position on the board, although the extent and form of the familiarity varies. Any situation, whether in chess or life itself, is composed of many different el ements. A person comes across certain individual elements frequently, and of ten encounters elements in groups, re gardless of what sort of elements they are or the size of the groups. I prefer to call such groups blocks of elements, or just blocks. What do I mean by blocks of elements? Just as in life, in chess there exist many combinations of elements, recognis able by an experienced player at first glance. Such combinations can be re garded as blocks, like bricks used to build up a construction. Such blocks of elements are familiar in all walks of life. Languages are a very good example. Real, effective conversation in a lan guage is impossible without using spe219
T h e Enigma o f Chess I n t u i tion
cific combinations of words, needed for a specific situation. When living in an other country and learning its language, a person tends to hear and see written down not so much individual words, as groups of words. At the same time, such word combinations are of fixed form. That is, individual words can often be replaced within them by others, with out the meaning of the expression changing, but such revised expressions will sound odd to a practiced ear of the language. Thus, for effective acquisition of a new language, it is better to learn blocks of words, rather than individual words. But this block method of learning applies in many other areas of life, including chess. In our game, when one comes across a position containing familiar fixed blocks of elements, one can be confident that known laws and rules of thumb will apply in the position, and that a certain typical method of play is likely to be effective. Consequently, the better prepared a player is, the greater will be his knowledge of typical posi tions and methods of play in them, in cluding the typical consequences of those methods. These typical methods can be positional, tactical, and techni cal. Now we will see how this looks in practice. In doing so, I will avoid giving variations, other than those main lines which are the simplest and most essen tial to show the contents of what I term 'blocks' . To start with, a couple of examples, showing a typical combinative solution in a typical position: 220
Yates,Frederick Reti,Richard New York, l 924
D
.i .l
.l � .l
i. �
.l
ttJ � � ttJ :
if
'iY � � � w :
White won immediately, by using a standard tactical block in this posi tion : 23 . .l:l:d3-h3 24. tt:le4-g51
�h4-e7
All is clear: 24 . . . 'ifxgS (24 .. Jif8 2 S .tt:lgxf7 U.x£7 2 6.tt:lxg6) 2 S . l:f.h8+ 'it>xh8 2 6. tt:lx£7 +. 1 -0
Frederick Yates
Chapter 3
-
The Elements o f Chess I n t u i t i o n
The following legendary example of an other well-known tactical device is sim ple enough in itself, but was the source of an essential piece of knowledge for subsequent generations of players: Torre Repetto,Carlos Lasker,Emanuel Moscow, I 9 2 5
0
:i
:� .. . ''
iA 'iV !'::,
!'::,
t2J l:l:
25. 26 . 27. 28. 29. 30. 31 . 32 . 33. 34. 35.
'
� 'if l:l:
!'::, !'::, !'::, �
jLg5-f6! '1Wb5xh5 .!d.g3xg7+ �g8-h8 �g7xf7+ Wh8-g8 .!d.f7-g7+ �g8-h8 .!d.g7xb7+ �h8-g8 llb7-g7+ �g8-h8 .!d.g7-g5+ �h8-h7 .!d.g5xh5 �h7-g6 .l:lh5-h3 �g6xf6 l:th3xh6+ �f6-g5 �h6-h3
With the so-called 'see-saw' combina tion, which became standard after this game, White has netted himself three ex tra pawns, and he won eight moves later.
Carlos Torre Repetto
motifs, which fill various textbooks, are composed of blocks of elements. As well as tactical elements and blocks thereof, there are also elements in posi tional play which combine in the most enormous range of blocks. Here is a pair of standard positional decisions, typical of a definite range of situations. The first of these, like the previous tacti cal examples, has long since become a classic and a standard positional landmark. Fischer,Robert Bolbochan,Julio Stockholm Interzonal, 1 9 62
:i 'i¥
0
'
1 -0 I will not show further examples of combinative decisions, as everything should already be clear enough. I will only say that all well-known tactical
:� • Ai i i
' !'::,
tLl � !'::, !'::, !'::, !'::, 'if �
!'::,
!'::, l:l:
l:l:
22 1
T h e Eni gma of Ch ess I n t u i tion
The simple exchange 1 9. .i1Le3xb6!
'iYd8xb6
followed by 20. tt:Jc3-d5 putting the knight on an ideal, invul nerable outpost, which is also the main command point in the centre, brought Fischer a dream position - absolute domination, with a total absence of counterplay for the opponent. Fourteen moves later, the game was ended with a nice mating attack.
But as a rule, they also know that the outcome of this operation is not usually guaranteed to be successful. The posi tion is too complicated, with many pieces on the board, many plans avail able, and both sides have their trumps. In this game, Kasparov convincingly demonstrates the strength of Black's chances.
The motif in the following game is no ticeably more complex, but also has long since been a standard operation, although its outcome is often not so easy to predict. But here, we are mainly interested in the typicality of the opera tion, and of the follow-up. Movsesian,Sergei Kasparov,Garry Sarajevo, 2000
Garry Kasparov
.i 'ii' � .t .i j_ � i i i i � i i i
•
14. 1 5. 1 6. 1 7. 1 8. 1 9.
tbd4-e2 g4-g5 h2-h4 .i1Le3-c1 h4-h5
.i � .t i i i i i
.t 'ii'
The following exchange sacrifice is fa miliar to all Sicilian players: 1 3. 1 4. b2xc3 222
.!:.c8xc3
.
!'!:,
'iYd8-c7 .i1Lf8-e7 0-0 tbb6-a4 tt:Jd7-e5
8�
!'!:,
� .i .M
� !'!:,
!'!:,
tb �
Chapter 3
1 9. ...
�e7-d6
2 6 . dxe4 �e5 + 2 8 .l:.xd4 'ifxc l + . 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31 . 32.
21 . ...
tt:Je5xd3!
The position contains many pieces, many factors, and looks very difficult. But Kasparov quickly transforms it into one where there can be no doubt of the out come. Nearly every one of his subsequent moves deserves an exclamation mark. Such positions as this, with the initiative, he played phenomenally well, even al most faultlessly. This game is a wonderful example for training one's ability to de velop the initiative. Intuition played its role, in telling Black where to look and what to look for. Even so, we will give only the minimum necessary variations, without explanation, as nothing more is needed at this stage of the book. 22. c2xd3 23. c3xb4?!
b5-b4!
The most tenacious continuation was 2 3 .c4 dxc4 24.g6 c3 , but here too, the outcome is not in doubt.
The E l em e n ts o f Chess I n t u i t i o n
23. 24. Wb1 -a1 25. f3xe4 26. g5-g6
d6-d5
Like the exchange sacrifice on c3, this move, opening lines for Black's pieces, is an integral part of the block. 20. 'iff2-h2 21 . 'ifh2-h3
-
'ifh3xh1 g6xf7+ 'ifh1 -g2 �c1 -b2 tt:Je2-d4 tt:Jd4xe6+
J:.f8-c8 d5xe4! �b7xe4! 2 7 . dS ! 3 8 .dxe7 f5 + ! 3 9 .Wh3 tt'lf2+, mating. Now, however, Black has to sweat a little more. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41 .
.l:!.h1 xd1 ilLc6-f3 Wg4-g3 'it>g3-h3 Wh3-h4
'iYd6xd1 + h 7-h5+ 'i¥d1 -e1 + 'ii'e 1 -e6+
After 4 l .Wg3 Black can win in the end game: 4 1 . . .'i¥e5 + 42.'i¥xe5 + .l:!.xe5 43 .a6 lla5 44.�b7 l:i.a4. But it is clear that things could have been much eas ier, several times! Nonetheless, Black eventually seizes the chance of a beauti ful finish. 233
The Enigma of Ch ess I n t u i t i on
41 . ... g6-g5+! 42. 'it>h4xg5 'li'e6-g6+ 43. 'it>g5-f4 N igel Short
43.Wh4 �e4+ 44.i.xe4 'l!!Vg4 mate. 43. ...
f7-f6!
Now White loses his queen: 44.h4 .!:i.e8 'li'e4+) (45 .i.xh5 4 5 . 'li'xh5 45 . . . .l::!. e4+ ! . 0-1 Out of the vast choice of games of Kramnik's great rival, I have chosen the following, principally because of the considerable similarity with the subject of the previous example. In my work on this game, I have been helped significantly by the notes of lgor Stohl, from his excellent two-volume work Garry Kasparov's Greatest Chess Games, Gambit Publications Ltd. Kasparov,Garry Short,Nigel Amsterdam Euwe Memorial, 1 9 94
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 234
e2-e4 d2-d4 tt:Jb1 -c3 e4-e5 f2-f4
e7-e6 d7-d5 tt:Jg8-f6 tt:Jf6-d7 c7-c5
6. 7. 8. 9. 10 11. 1 2. 1 3. 14. 1 5. .
tt:Jg1 -f3 i.c1 -e3 tt:Jf3xd4 'li'd1 -d2 0-0-0 h2-h4 �e3xd4 .!:i.h1 -h3 tt:Jc3-a4 'i¥d2xd4
tt:Jb8-c6 c5xd4 �f8-c5 0-0 a7-a6 tt:Jc6xd4 b7-b5 b5-b4 �c5xd4
.t 'iV �
.� • i i i
.i
i i ts
;i¥
' lS
lS !S lS w .M 1 5 . ...
f7-f6?!N
As in the previous game, it is our hero's opponent who plays the novelty, the usual reply being 1 5 . . . a S . And just as in
Chapter 3
the previous game, he walks right into his opponent's home analysis! 1 6 . �d4xb4! As they say, every novelty deserves an other! In this case, Kasparov had pre pared it all beforehand. 16. 1 7. 'i¥b4-d6 1 8. f4-f5!
-
The E l ements o f C h ess I n t u i t i on
right. After 20 . . . �g6 2 1 ..l:!.f3 .l:!.xf3 2 2 .�xf3 e4 2 3 .h5 'iYfs 24.�e2 �eS 2 5 .�e7 h6 Black holds. 20. 21 . g2xf3 22. �f1 -h3
llf5xf3 �h6-f6 f1 -e2
�b2xa1 + ttJb8-a6?
Now the game ends at once. The dis cussion of this position has also contin ued for years. The tone was set by the demanding first world champion, who analysed the only rational move 20 ... jla6 and asserted that Black was OK. He was successfully opposed in this view by his long-time opponent and ri val in principle, Mikhail Chigorin. The latter demonstrated that in this case, White still wins in the endgame which arises after 2 1 .tlJc7 + c.t>dS 22.tlJxa6 "i:Yc3 2 3 .�c7+ "i:Yxc7 24.tlJxc 7 . But this would all be rather plain bread and but ter stuff; instead, to the delight of the chess world, the game ended with a feast: 21 . ttJf5xg 7 + c.t>e8-d8 22. �f3-f6+ t2Jg8xf6 23. �d6-e7 mate Hooray! 1 -0 In brief, what have we just seen? A clear vision of the goal, an energetic and even wasteful mobilisation of the forces, fol lowed by a targeting of the enemy king, stuck helplessly in the centre. And what was missing? There was no cleanness in the execution, and it could easily have been crossed by the right reaction from Black. And there was little time for thinking, as it was only a casual game. Nor was there a strong enough degree of intuition, needed at the critical mo ment to point White in the right direction. 239
The E n i g m a o f Chess I n t u i t i on
Short-range tactics, as we know, require to be handled with great accuracy. Such a high level of accuracy is required in any tactical or calculating investigation. Here is a very authoritative opinion: 'I think play can only be beautiful if it is accurate. Accuracy above everything else' - Robert Fischer. From this it follows that the accuracy of the play, standing on the basis of accu rate calculation, largely determines the success of intuition. But there is more! Overall, accuracy of play is the most important component of chess strength. Many other parame ters occupy an important place in the game, but the decisive role in the result of a game, most if not all of the time, is the ability of one of the players to act with the greater accuracy. And this au tomatically gives rise to another ques tion, very interesting and important for our subject: if the puncher clashes with the boxer, who wins? In other words: which triumphs more often, the stron ger intuition or the more accurate cal culator? This is not a simple question, and in searching for an answer, I came across the following comment: 'Having been Tal's second for a num ber of years, I regrettably had to admit that his famous intuition, of which even Petrosian was afraid, was totally helpless in the face of the phenomenal calculating technique of Lev Polugaevsky' (Albert Kapengut, Tal's second in his 1 9 8 0 Candidates' match against Polugaevsky, international master, student and assistant to the great player and trainer Isaak 240
Boleslavsky, for many years second of Petrosian) . Reading these words, I naturally went to check the statistics, and was aston ished - the overall score in games be tween them was 8-2 in favour of Polugaevsky, a most improbable score! Here, I thought, some role was played by the so-called phenomenon of the 'difficult opponent' - a strange thing, but well-known at all levels, but even so, the score between Polugaevsky and Tal is incredible! I therefore decided to look at Polugaevsky's record against the rest of his strongest contemporaries. The most interesting ones were the large plus against Geller ( 1 2-4 to Polugaevsky! ) , and the overwhelming minus against Kortchnoi (2 2-9 to Kortchnoi! !) . Now the picture became clearer: the rampant attacker Tal, even helped by his famous intuition, could not cope with the defensive master Polugaevsky, and something similar was the case with Geller (although here things are slightly different) . So what was Polugaevsky's secret? One of his victims, Geller, gave a good pic ture of Polugaevsky's strengths: 'An ex ceptional ability to work at the board and exceptionally accurate calculation! ' . To this one can add Polu's colossal work capacity away from the board, at home, and the superb level and depth of his opening erudition, and not only open ings, incidentally! But at the board, it was first and foremost calculation. Now it is easier to answer the question of why he had such a catastrophic score against Kortchnoi. Probably it is be cause in many factors, such as calcula-
Chapter 3
tion, working capacity and defensive play, Kortchnoi's play was similar to, and a match for, Polugaevsky's, whilst in other areas, principally psychologi cal, he outdid him. But now let us look at an example of what happens when great calculation meets an intuition of genius. I have de liberately chosen a game which ended in a draw. It is less well-known than some of Polugaevsky's victories, but is very characteristic and relates excel lently to our subject. Polugaevsk.y,Lev Tal,Mikhail Tbilisi, 1 9 5 6
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 0. 11. 12. 1 3.
d2-d4 c2-c4 ttJb1 -c3 e2-e3 tt:Jg1 -f3 a2-a3 e3xd4 �f1 -d3 �d3xc4 0-0 Vi'd1 -d3 l:If1 -d1 �c4-a2
d7-d5 e7-e6 c7-c5 tt:Jg8-f6 ttJb8-c6 c5xd4 �f8-e7 d5xc4 0-0 b7-b6 �c8-b7 .l:f.a8-c8 Vi'd8-c7
The square d6 is usually considered a better one for the queen in positions of this type, since from there it defends the square e6. The continuation 1 3 . . . .l:f.c7 is also good. Positions of the type which we have on the board here are compli cated, and often take on a sharp charac ter. Tal no doubt liked this aspect, and the fact that lightning could strike at any moment, anywhere on the board.
-
The Elements o f C h ess I n t u i t i on
14. �c1 -g5 1 5. 'ifd3-e2
l:U8-d8
1 5 . ...
ttJf6-g4!
There is no doubt that, several moves ago, Tal decided to go in for blow-for blow play. Such a style of play was his trademark, especially in his young days. To some extent, he was not so inter ested in objective factors. Nor was it all that important to him if subsequent analysis showed that his opponent had had the better chances. What mattered was that the position was sufficiently confused and multi-faceted. Then it was a question of who coped better with the problems, there and then, at the board! He won a great many games with this method. But this time, things went a little differently. This time, he was facing an opponent who not only loved to calculate, but could do so mag nificently, and who could not be baffled by the calculation of variations, of whatever level of complexity! 1 6 . tt:Jc3-b5! The only move! The complications after 1 6.�xe6 tLlxd4 turn out in Black's favour: 1 7 Jhd4 (the counterblow 1 7 .�xf7 + loses: 1 7 . . . Wh8 ! 1 8 . .l:txd4 241
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
itxf3 1 9 . l:i.xd8+ .l:!.xd8 2 0 . 1Wxf3 'i¥xh2+ 2 1 . Wfl 'iVh l + 2 2 .We 2 'ifxa 1 2 3 .'i¥xg4 1Wxb2+) 1 7 . . . .l:!.xd4 1 8 .itxg4 ( 1 8 . itxc8 itxf3 1 9 . 1Wxf3 'iVxh2 + 2 0 .Wfl 'iVh l + 2 1 . We 2 'i¥xa 1 2 2 .itxg4 itxg 5 2 3 . 'i¥a 8 + .l:!.d8) 1 8 . . . .!:1xg4 1 9 .itxe7 .l:!.e8 2 0 .lle 1 'i¥f4 2 1 . Wfl .
We have before us one of the most characteristic and important moments in the battle between our two heroes. It seems that one can stop calculating this long variation. White has obtained a material advantage, his pieces are com pact and everything seems in order. This would all be the case, were it not for. . . 2 I . . Jhg2 ! 2 2 . itd6 llxe2 2 3 . .l:!.xe2 J:hf2 + ! . A wonderful variation and a remarkable piece of calculation!
1 6 . ...
itb7-a6?
Perhaps Tal was disappointed that his opponent had not fallen into the trap, and so played too impulsively, or did he just miss an important resource for his opponent in this new battle of blows and counterblows? I suspect the latter. An equal game resulted from 1 6 . . . t2lxd4! 1 7 . .l:!.xd4! itxf3 1 8 . t2lxc7 itxe2 1 9 Jhd8+ itxd8 (weaker is 1 9 . . . .l:!.xd8 2 0 .t2lxe6 ! itxg5 2 I . t2lxg5 t2lh6 22 . .l:!.e 1 ) 2 0 . t2lxe6 ! . Lev Polugaevsky, in his commentary on the game, considers this move to be vir tually the decisive blow, settling the outcome of the game, but in fact, after the simple 2 0 . . . itf6 ! 2 1 .h3 h6 the game is equal. Now, however, things are different.
1 7. 'iVe2xe6! No, I don't think it was this blow that Tal overlooked. He simply underesti mated it, missing something in the fol low-up. There was also another possibility for White : 1 7 .t2lxc7 itxe2 I 8 .t2lxe6 fxe6 I 9 .itxe6+ Wf8 2 0 .itxe 7 + but after 2 0 . . . t2lxe 7 ! 2 I .itxg4 itxd i 2 2 . .l:!.xd i llc2 2 3 .t2lg5 .l:i.d6 only White can have problems.
1 7. ...
ita6xb5
The only reply. Bad is I 7 . . . fxe6 ? I 8 . t2lxc7 .l:!.xc 7 I 9 . itxe 6 + Wf8 2 0 .itxg4 ite2 2 I .ite3 ! itxd I 2 2 . .llxd I with a large advantage to White. Even worse is I 7 . . . itxg5 ? I 8 . t2lxc7 fxe6 I 9 .t2lxe6.
1 8. 'ife6xg4 242
itb5-e2
Chap ter 3
-
The E l ements o f C h ess In t u i t i o n
This resource is the whole point, with out which White's entire line of play would be bad. I think this, and its con sequences, is probably what Tal missed when playing his 1 6th move.
24. ...
tt:Jc2xe1
Hopeless is 24 . . . �c7 2 S . llc l tLlxa l 2 6 Jhc7 .l:!.xc7 2 7 .Viiixh7 + .
25. 'iYd3xh7+ Wg8-f8 1 9. �g5xe7 Viiic7xe7 After 1 9 . . . tt:Jxe7 2 0 J:t e l �xf3 2 l .Viiixf3 tLlc6 2 2 .d5 tLld4 2 3 .Viiig 4 tLlc2 2 4 . .l:!.ac l Black stands badly.
20. .l:!.d1 -e1 21 . Viiig4xf3
�e2xf3 Viii e 7-d7
The variation 2 l . . . �f6 2 2 .Viiixf6 gxf6 2 3 .d5 is clearly not good, nor is 2 l . . . �f8 2 2 .ds tt:Jd4 2 3 .'iYd3 tLlc2 24.�b l .
22. d4-d5 23. �f3-d3
tt:Jc6-d4 tt:Jd4-c2
Since move 1 6 , the play has been largely forced. Thus, after 2 3 . . . tt:Jfs 24Jhd l the game will g o on for some time, but the result is not in doubt.
26. �b1 -f5! White 's entire operation hangs on this blow. Only now is his intention re vealed, and it becomes clear how well everything has been calculated!
26 . ...
Viiid 7xd5
Weaker is 2 6 . . . 'iYe8 2 7 .�xc8 tLlc2 2 8 .lld l (the key move of the whole undertaking ! ) 2 8 . . . �e2 ( 2 8 . . . .l:!.xc8 2 9 . d6) 2 9 .�g4 'iYxg4 3 0 .'iYxc2.
27. .l:!.a1 xe1
f7-f6
In reply to 2 7 . . . � eS Polugaevsky gives the variation 2 8 . 'iYh8+ We7 2 9 . .l:!.xe5+ Wf6 3 0 .Viiih4+ Wxes 3 l .g4.
24. �a2-b1 !
28. �f5xc8 29. h2-h4! 30. h4-h5?!
.lld8xc8 l:lc8-d8
243
T h e E n i g m a o f C hess I n t u i t i on
Polugaevsky gives this move a question mark, and claims that in time-trouble, he missed the win here. Certainly, his suggestion 3 0 J:te3 leads to an easily winning position. Even so, it was not this move that finally lost him his ad vantage, although it was certainly a step in the wrong direction.
30. ...
�d5-d3!
36. 37. 38. 39. 40.
f2-f3 'it>g2-g3 l::rc2-c4 .:ctc4xa4 l:ra4-a8
a7-a5 a5-a4 .l::r b 3xb2 .l:[b2-b3
It is interesting, although not surpris ing, that Fritz still gives White an ad vantage in the order of 0 . 9 , but the po sition is objectively drawn. This is one more confirmation of the fact that one cannot blindly trust the computer in every position.
40. ...
Wh6-h7
31 . 'ifh 7xd3 But here, I understand neither what happened (OK, it was in time-trou ble . . . ) nor Polugaevsky's commentary He writes 'Retaining queens is, alas, impossible' , not giving any further ex planation. But I trust Fritz I 0 , and do not see what is wrong with 3 I . .lle 4. Then the queens are kept on after all, which is what White needs in this posi tion. His task would undoubtedly be more difficult than on the previous move, but he would retain winning chances , whereas the rook ending is drawn.
31 . 32. 33. 34. 35. 244
l:re1 -c1 l:!c1 -c2 g2-g4 g3-f4 White cannot avoid the exchange of pawns. Nothing helps, for example : 4 1 .a4 .ll a 3 42 . .l:!.a6 .I:rb3 43 . .l:!.a7 .l:.a3 44.'it>f2 b5 4 5 . a 5 b4 4 6 . We 2 b 3 47 .'it>d2 b2 48 .Wc2 l:.xf3 49.Wxb2 .llf4 5 0 .a6 .l:!.xg4 5 l .Wb3 .l:!.g l 5 2 . l:i.c7 .lla l 5 3 .a7 Wh6.
41 . 42. 43 . 44. 45. 46. 47.
Wf4-e4 .lla 8-a5 a3xb4 we4-f5 .l::ra 5-a7 f3-f4
b6-b5 .ll b3-c3 b5-b4 l:i.c3-c4+ l:lc4xb4 l::r b 4-b3
Chapter 3 - The E l ements o f Chess I n t u i t i o n
Here Fritz gives the assessment + 1 . 0 !
47. 48. �f5-e6
.l:tb3-b5+ .l:tb5-b4
1h-V2
Incidentally, Tal had just as many prob lems playing Kortchnoi. His attacking attempts broke up in the same way on the greater calculated accuracy of Kortchnoi's defensive barriers. Clearly, a pattern is emerging here, some sort of law is in operation. What lies behind it, what is at the roots of this tendency? It seems as though, in gen eral terms, the answer should be as fol lows : although both qualities are im portant, better calculation can compen sate, and often more than compensate, for an insufficiency of intuition! And, although it seems a sin to say it, Tal often played 'by ear' , as they say. He would often 'feel' his way through vari ations, which is very typical of intuitive players, who tend to have a remarkable ability to guess where the pieces should go, but do not always work out the de tails thoroughly. We have seen a number of examples already. In addition, when one plays the whole time at ' high voltage' , like Tal, it is im possible to avoid situations in which
merely knowing the right general di rection of play is insufficient. But now that we have seen convincing demonstrations of how intuition can be overcome by a very high level of accu racy in calculating, many readers may experience some disappointment at seeing intuition in this light. If so, I would ask you not to worry. The level of accuracy required for such an outcome is only achieved in very rare cases, and is based on hours of daily work on ac quiring knowledge and an exception ally high level of ability to calculate variations, which is achieved only by very few players. So don't worry - the likelihood of your intuition running into such a nightmarish refutation is extremely small! But there is also another aspect to the problem. Because the working of intu ition is a subconscious process, not de liberately or consciously operated, con trolling its operation and even getting it to start, is harder than with other, 'purer' forms of thought. Therefore it is harder for us to influence the mecha nism of switching on our intuition, than it is to influence the mechanisms of other means of thought. Here it is worth looking at the experience of life more generally. This shows that the re quired switching on of intuition is eas ier, and comes to us most often, in peri ods when we are visited by what we usually call: I nspiration Much has been written about inspira tion, since ancient times. Poets have been especially interested in this aspect
245
The Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
of human psychology, and not surpris ingly. If I were to quote all I have read on the subject, it would certainly en large this book, but it might not please the reader. So I will restrict myself to a short extract from the prose tale Egyp tian Nights, by my beloved Pushkin: 'Any talent is inexplicable. . . nobody, ex cept the improviser himself, can under stand the speed of impression, this close connection between one's own inspiration and another's outward will (from the chess viewpoint, this 'out ward will' is the objective requirements of the position on the board! - VB) - I wish I could explain it myself . Now it is very clear that the arrival of inspiration brings to life an instant ap preciation of the whole of a situation, which is the most important thing in the pro cess of intuitively grasping anything. And in the opposite case, in periods when a chess player is lacking inspira tion, lapses can occur. This is the sort of thing that happened to Tal in the fol lowing game, when his opponent was neither Polugaevsky nor Kortchnoi. Nikitin,Alexander Tal,Mikhail Tbilisi ch-URS, 1 9 5 9
•
As we see, we have a very Tal-like posi tion before us - plenty of pieces on the board, many plans, with a great storm hanging over the board. Black had at his disposal the sound positional ap proach 2 1 . . .lt:lxf3 2 2 .l:!.xf3 WVb8 or the immediate 2 1 . . .'i¥b8 , in both cases with the better endgame, but such a transition from a highly tactical posi tion to a technical phase only ever in terested Tal in exceptional cases, and in those young days when this game was played, he would never even think of it! It is interesting, though, that attempting to find a way for Black to maintain the tension, without simplifying unduly, led me to just one idea: the prophylactic 2 l . . . l:!.8g7 . But prophylaxis was also not a major component of Tal's approach. And he did what he habitually did in such cases - he broke the Gordian Knot at all costs with
21 . ...
lt:lf6xe4?
Alas, though, here his intuition be trayed him, and evidently on the day he was full of desire to win, but the inspi ration was not united with these de sires! And if his opponent had not let him off the hook (as so often happened with Tal! ) by replying
22. �e3-b6? things could have turned out badly for Black. This is what could have hap pened: 22.c8-d8 d6-d5 �e7-g5
The resulting endgame is lost for White, largely because of the highly un fortunate position of his bishop, of which only recently he had such high hopes. The rest is clear and requires no commentary.
32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.
b2-b4 �a4-b3 c2-c3 a2-a4 �g3-h3 a4xb5 'it>g1 -f2 wf2-e2 �b3xc4
b7-b5 f7-f5 'it>d8-e7 f5-f4 tt:Je5-c4 a6xb5 'it>e7-d6 e6-e5 b5xc4
Chapter 3
41 . 42. 43. 44.
.l:[h3-h5 h2-h4 we2-d1 llh5-f5
e5-e4 f4-f3+ �g5-f4
and White resigned, without giving his opponent the chance to demonstrate the nice finish 44. l::i.fS �eS 4S . �d2 We6 4 6 . l:lf8 �g7 4 7 . l:!. e 8 + Wd7 48 .lla8 �xc3 + ! 49.Wxc3 f2 SO . .l:rf8 e 3 .
0-1 As we see, this could easily have ended in another fiasco for Tal, based on a miscalculation. From this, one must conclude that he was insufficiently good in this respect. This personal weakness caused him to suffer setbacks against especially persistent and sophis ticated calculators. It is logical to suggest that: Intuition, as an especially deli
cate thing, requires extra condi tions, in order
fectiveness.
to work at full ef
We have already spoken briefly about inspiration, which is essential to cre ativity. A no less interesting and impor tant question is the connection be tween: I ntuition and nerves Here, we will talk about how the condi tion of the player's nervous system im pacts on the quality of his intuitive de cisions (or even on the ability to make them at all ! ) . We will seek the answer to this by looking at the situation with the greatest players of the intuitive tendency.
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The E l ements of C h ess I n t u i tion
So, let us take some of those names, of whom we have already spoken earlier: Morphy, Capablanca, Smyslov, Tal and Karpov, and see what we know about the nervous systems of these players. Paul Morphy
It is widely known that this poor Amer ican chess genius suffered for a large part of his fairly short life from serious psychiatric problems, and was in gen eral an impressionable person. It would appear (although I am not a specialist and so cannot speak with cat egorical certainty about this) that a per son with such characteristics ought to be vulnerable, but from the testimony of his contemporaries, Morphy was ex ceptionally correct at the board, confi dent in himself and always calm. But could it be part of the reason why one of the greatest chess geniuses of all time gave up practical play so early that he found it increasingly difficult to maintain this calm in the face of events at the board? Jose Raul Capablanca
Much more is known of him. He was a temperamental man ( ' His Spanish blood played its part' - Botvinnik) , but in his best years, he was calm at the board and nerves did not seem to affect his play in those days. And this is the as pect that so interests us. We know even more about Vasily Smyslov and Anatoly Karpov. Indeed, the present author has had the pleasure of encountering them both over the board and away from it. As far as their nervous systems were con249
The Enigma of C h ess I n t u i t i on
cerned, both in their best years and later, the case is best summed up by say ing ' Let God give all of us such nerves' ! I have most of all to say on this topic concerning Mikhail Tal, since I have a concrete impression of him, having known him well for many years. And based on Tal's example, it is possible to draw up some generalisations. In Tal's play, there always stood out an unshakeable belief in his own strength. Many people would like to know where this precious quality comes from. My experience of many years, observing people in different circumstances, sug gests that it is built on three pillars: nat ural talent for the thing the person does, the presence of a great capacity for work, and a strong, very strong ner vous system. Tal's chess talent was known and obvi ous to all for many years; he was one of the greatest geniuses in the history of chess. It is also well-known that when he was in good shape physically, Tal had a great capacity for work at the board, but this quality was not especially no ticeable when it came to regular inde pendent work at home. As regards the last, but by no means least quality, this is what Alexander Roshal, long-time editor of the leading Russian periodical 64, who knew Tal very well over the course of many years , wrote in an article dedicated to what would have been Tal's 7 O th birthday : 'The well-known axiom claims that all illness is the result of nerves. But Tal had iron nerves and it was they which helped him fight his illness. They were the tightrope, on which he balanced all 250
his life ' , Alexander Roshal, Tal's reverse
axiom, 64, no 1 1 , 2 0 0 6 . S o a s not t o mislead the reader, and not to be misunderstood, I will add several observations: First, my aim is to advance the proposi tion that: Only strong nerves allow a chess player's intuition to function productively, without serious failures.
At the same time, it can happen that even such a person can lose his head in an extremely complicated situation, and start worrying, whereupon even the most remarkable intuition can work badly. But this happens rarely to people with good nervous systems, and if such a person is endowed with a particularly powerful intuition, then in the maj ority of cases it will show itself to its best ad vantage, bringing definite benefits. Second: However, what we have said above does not in any circum stances mean that any player with a strong nervous syste m will have intuition in sufficient quantity to be effective.
From this it follows that: Third: Having a strong nervous system is a necessary condition for a player to be able to make effec tive use ofhis intuition, but it is not a sufficient condition.
Chapter 3
In other words, a strong nervous system can only help, if there is something to help! The player also needs the intuition itself, and it is only the combination of these two components that can be re garded as a sufficient condition. So far, so good. But why do I single out such an extremely useful quality of the human organism as a strong nervous system, as being especially connected with the working, and, I emphasise, the effective working of the intuition? The key thing here is the factor we have already looked at, namely the special importance of rapidly
and accurately picking up a mass of basic details. And if we think about this problem, we can easily imagine the ruinous effect caused by failing to withstand nervous tension, first and most importantly on the accuracy of the perception of all these details. After all, if such tension affects someone in ordinary life, he can easily lose sight of various circum stances, or completely misjudge their importance. It even happens that he looks at an ob j ect, and does not see it for what it really is, but sees it in a completely dis torted form. A similar thing happens to a chess player who is in a state of nervous ex citement, with the result that he forms an inadequate impression of the situa tion on the board, and consequently a total failure of the mechanism of intuition. It will also be useful to say a few words about:
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The Elements o f Chess Intu i t i o n
I ntuition and the speed of play The Russian psychologists N. and I. Makvorse discovered an interesting law: if we increase fivefold the number of decisions to be made in a fixed amount of time, then the number of mistakes made increases fifteen-fold! This is partly explained by the fact that, in such situations, decisions tend to be made on the basis not of actual data, but by rely ing on stereotypes (remember what we said about Pattern Recognition?) . When there is no time to
think
out a decision, the chain of rea soning is not built, but instead, we substitute stereotypes, which reflect not so much the objective reality, as a subjective represen tation of the actual situation.
And this is what happens to people who are under stress. Whilst we have already spoken about speed, we should also speak about the speed of operation of the in
tuition itself. It is logical to assume that both the speed with which the eye takes in infor mation, and the speed with which that information is processed, will vary from person to person, and the experi ence of life does indeed confirm this. Consequently, the speed with which the intuition works also varies from person to person, although not greatly, since once we pass beyond certain limits, it can no longer be called intuition at all. We are now at the stage in our re searches where we can provide a more extensive definition of intuition in chess.
25 1
T h e E n i g m a o f C hess Intui tion
Intuition in chess helps us make
These mechanisms allow us to foresee (at varying distances) what will be the influence on the subsequent develop ment of events, of this or that detail that already exists, or which may arise on the board in the near future, as a result of some fairly simple operation.
tion and tactics from short-term tactics, which appears to serve players in a way different from ordinary calculation technique. And players who are very good at one function are not always equally good at the other. And one more thing: in writing com mentaries, such a player, trying to be objective, will try to deal with all the possibilities in the position and will sometimes not cope very well with this task, and commit mistakes in analysis. These factors give rise to a paradox.
This moment is a propitious one for ex plaining yet another significant issue: how, as we have seen, the greatest mas ters can make childish mistakes in com mentary, whilst playing the best moves at the board. At first, I explained this strange contradiction by the fact that, at the board, they proceed to a large ex tent on the basis of intuition. However, later I claimed that at the basis of the in tuitive taking of decisions lies the abil ity to see short-term tactics. Here there is a contradiction. Even so, I would not withdraw either of the claims I made. Both of them can co exist. This happens as follows: ' short term tactics' and the subsequent work ing of the intuition shows the player the direction in which he should search. This allows him to concentrate his at tention on a small number of possible lines, and at the same time largely to ig nore many other possibilities. Of course, this approach succeeds mainly in one who is endowed by na ture with a powerful intuitive gift. But at the same time, I would remind you, one must distinguish ordinary calcula-
Where do you live: in the mountains or in the swa mp? This book is coming to an end, and the time has come to take the risk: we have to dive into some deep water, the bot tom ofwhich is not fully visible. I have repeatedly reminded the reader about the mysterious mechanism by which intuition operates, and have de ferred its explanation until a later point. But it can be put off no longer, and we must now speak about this subj ect. To many people, intuition appears rather a mystical substance. However, this is not so. Intuition exists objectively in the real world, and is accessible to our senses, although not as simply and obviously as calculation and assessment. Of course, we are talking here only of chess, although . . . As Lenin put it: 'Matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation' (Ah, how well we learnt our Marxism Leninism - I can remember this quote without even needing to check the sources!) . But OK, we have established that for in tuition to work well, two important
decisions in non-standard situa
tions, using methods not based on consciousness, but on other mechanisms.
252
Chap ter 3
abilities are necessary: the ability to ex amine the position, and to calculate without error so-called 'short-range tactics' . These conditions are necessary, but not sufficient for a totally reliable construction. Maybe something else is also needed? Yes, indeed! To make successful use of the re
sults of a high-quality examina tion of the position, together with the calculation of short range tactics, we also need to add a defmite natural talent.
This talent is the most obscure part of the intuitive taking of decisions. But what precisely it consists of, is not as yet quite clear. However, it would be wrong to think that this gift of intuition is something special, and the only way a human has to take decisions and act, based not on conscious thought, but on some other means. Daily life regularly proves otherwise. To take one very simple example: a man is walking along the street, and someone else is walking directly towards him. We have all been in such a situation in numerable times, and can recall how we solve the problem of avoiding a colli sion without any calculation of direc tions, either our own or the other per son's. All the necessary changes in movement of our legs and body are ac complished, in the overwhelming ma jority of cases, without the involvement of our consciousness. Even more than that: without its involvement, we confi dently and faultlessly (unless we are feeling ill or drunk! ) manage to evalu-
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The E l ements of Chess I n t u i t i o n
ate the speed and direction in which both we and the other person are mov ing, since only in that case will our ma noeuvres of legs and body be success ful. Yet, when one thinks about it, this is a complicated process, requiring that we divine accurately a host of details and perform with a high degree of execution. Thus, we can see that what we are de scribing here has much in common with the function of intuition. I would emphasise that the important thing here is that, in this and other similar day-to-day situations in life, the process
occurs under the direction not of conscious ness, but some other aspect ofour organism. Since intuition is actuated not con sciously, but on the basis of some other source, then it follows that the nature of this 'something else' should interest us. Here, I would like to take the reader back to the very start of the book, to the fragment from the game Kramnik Anand, Belgrade Investbanka, 1 9 9 7 and Anand's note: •
'I considered playing 3 6 . . . .l:Ib7 ?? but smelt a rat and decided to stick with
36 . ...
c4-c3 253
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i tion
In fact 3 6 . . . l:rb 7 ?? loses to 3 7 .ihe6 + ! .
37. ilh3xe61? thanked my intuition for choosing 3 6 . . c3 over 3 6 . . . l:[b 7 ? ?' Let us now boldly assert that the great est mystery of intuition is its nature, in other words : which organ it resides in (just as the working of the conscious is generally accepted to take place in the brain) . I think we can safely say the organ in question is not the nose, although for many years, people have been accus tomed to speak of the ability to foresee events as involving smell, as Anand does above. The Germans, when speaking of the ' sixth sense ' , use the term 'Bauchgefiihl' - literally, a feeling in the stomach. However, I think we can agree that all such expressions are more a question of tradition and idiom, than of a serious suggestion as to the physical source of intuition, and we must seek our true answer elsewhere. In the search for more reliable informa tion on this matter, I turned to the work of the American neurologist and Nobel Prize laureate, Roger Wolcott Sperry, who, as a result of his researches, came to the conclusion that a person's intu itive abilities reside in the right hemi sphere of the brain. That is the area which receives and processes informa tion without the involvement of the conscious! Not myself being qualified to debate the rights and wrongs of this conclu sion, I present it to my readers, amongst whom there may well be some who are 254
in a position to form their own opin ion. But since the geographical location of the intuitive ability is not very im portant to our topic, I am happy to ac cept the view of the great expert, and consider that we can end the discussion at this point. In considering various aspects of our chosen subject, it must be borne in mind that intuition, by itself, without the
involvement of other methods, is relatively ineffective. What I have in mind is that a person, having by nature a strong intu ition, but who calculates variations badly, understands positions poorly and is weak in the technical phase of the game, and such like, will not be able to play well. In chess, everything is inter connected, and one must understand this. However, there is another, rather unex pected side to the question. This is con nected in a definite way with the oft-mentioned atmosphere of mystery surrounding the whole question of in tuition. I have in mind those cases where someone endowed by nature with a strong intuition, deliberately ig nores its voice ! This happens when he, for instance, considers that he cannot trust this ' dark matter' , the nature of which does not lend itself to rational explanation. Such people often miss the critical moment, both in chess and in life generally. Here I cannot help recalling with regret my own experience, when, in a couple of situations that subsequently turned out to have considerable influence on the future, I lacked the courage to trust my intuition!
Chapter 3
One other consideration arises from my personal experience of life, something which is hard to prove, and more in the nature of a personal opinion. But first, please allow me to present an other quotation:
Where is thejustice, when the blessed gift Ofimmortal genius, comes not as a reward Forfervent love or self-denial,for Hard work, diligence or prayer, But shines its light instead On the head ofa madmen or idler? (Alexander Pushkin, Mozart and Salieri) Here, as always with Pushkin, every thing that needs saying is said, clearly and precisely. And the thought occurs to me - cannot we take these words as applying per fectly to the cases of Capablanca and Tal, the generally acknowledged chess ge niuses, and also the two archetypal in tuitive players? In connection with them, and as we approach the cur tain-call of this book, I will finally re veal the opinion which I have held for a long time. I do not have any exact proof of it, only a fairly solid conviction. It consists in the fact that the tiny distance which separates a real genius from a highly talented, diligent, extremely hardworking individual (in our case, chess player) , is the difference in the degree of the natural power of their in tuition. The last subject which we have still to speak about has already been referred to a number of times. It is:
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T h e E l ements of C h ess In t u i t i o n
When should one stop ca lculating variations? In my book How to Calculate Chess Tac tics, a whole chapter is devoted to this topic, but even so, I have reason to want to add a few additional considerations here. They concern the question: what is it that helps a player correctly identify the moment at which it is necessary either to stop or to continue calculating? In the above-mentioned book, I said that here, one is helped by experience and intuition. Here, I have nothing to say about expe rience, as this is clear enough. But I will speak further about the role of intuition in this process. Thus, in the calculation process, there frequently comes a point when one has to take a decision as to whether one should continue calculat ing, or whether the time has come to stop and concern oneself with an as sessment of the position. In compli cated situations, it can be extremely dif ficult to find the answer to this ques tion. It happens that one can do no more thanfeel the answer. But what is this feeling, where does it come from? Probably the same place as the intuition, since intuition itself is some
kind offeeling, allowing one to guess orfore see events, without knowing what will hap pen precisely. Obviously, the same thing can be said about the feeling for when to stop cal culating or not. From this, I draw the conclusion that the feeling in question is very much within our sphere of in terest. The following example is on this theme. It is one I very much like, and I
255
The Enigma o f Chess I n t u i t i on
cannot resist presenting it again here, even though I have already used it in my previous book, Lessons in Chess Strategy (the present book corrects some of the previous commentary) . The example is too good to leave out, both because of its close connection with our subject, and also because it is so lovely in itself. I cannot count the number of times I have seen it, but even now, I cannot look at it without a feel ing of wonder. Tal, Mikhail Trifunovic,Petar Palma de Mallorca, 1 96 6
Other continuations also fail t o improve Black's fate : 45 . . . h2 46 . .l:txh2 l:!.xh2 47 .'�xh2 �xe6 48 .�g2 and White wins easily; 45 . . . Wxe6 46 .�xh 3 + We7 47 .lle2+ 'i!i;td8 48.bd7 �xd7 49.'i!i;tg4 and then the king comes to fS , and the rook to e4, and then to e6, winning.
46. .!::!.a 2-a7+
�e6-d7
The pawn ending is also lost after 46 . . . Wd8 47 .lla8+ �c8 48 .�a6 l:lg8+ 49. e6 48.f5 + �e7 49.b5 .
48. b4-b5! But not 48 . .ie2 ? .l::rh 4 49.b5 .l:!'.xf4, drawing.
48. 49. .if1 xh3 50. b5xc6 51 . .ih3xf5
.l:i.h5xc5 f6-f5 .l:i.c5xc6 .l:!c6-d6
52. 'it>h2-g3! A magnificent concluding stroke. Find ing such a move with the position on the board in front of one is not difficult, but to foresee it earlier, at the end of a long and diverse calculation, is another matter entirely!
52. 53 . 54. 55. 56. 57.
.l:ra7xd7 .if5xd7+ 'it>g3-g4 'it>g4-g5 �g5-f5
we7-e8 l:i.d6xd7 'it>e8xd7 ..t>d7-e6 e6-f7 1 -0 257
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i t i on
A real masterpiece of accuracy and ele gance.
31 . 32. \t>h 1 -h2
l:i.f8-f1 +
Here is another example on this theme. This time it is a very modern one, and moreover, it features one of the bright est stars of the future, whom we have already met before in this book, Ilya Nyzhnyk.
Sivuk,Vitaly Nyzhnyk,Illya Herceg Novi jr 2008
But once we reach this position in our calculations, what next? Black is a piece down, he has not even a check, and there is nothing to attack. So, should we forget about thoughts of a quick win, and instead consider how best to pre pare the offensive? I do not know exactly what Nyzhnyk thought, but he clearly felt that this po sition should be examined further, and the result was that he played It is obvious at once to the experienced eye that we have before us a position from the Sicilian. The magnificent bishop on the long diagonal is also typical for the structure. The concen tration of Black's heavy pieces on the kingside simply demands that this bishop be included in the game. Con sequently, the sacrifice which follows is highly tempting, but it requires cal culation. At first, things are simple :
29. 30. d4xe5 31 . .l:!.e1 xe3 There is no alternative. 258
f5xe4! e4-e3
32 . ...
'iVg6-f5!
( 3 2 . . . 'iVgS ! was also winning) and it becomes clear that White is totally helpless. At the same time, though, this one move by itself is not the point. Black's whole subsequent play is based on a series of tactical blows.
33. 'iVd2-d3 Beautiful, but relatively simple finishes are 3 3 . .l:!.e2 'iVxh3 + ! ! and 3 3 .'iVd4 .l:!.h l + ! 3 4.\t>xh l 'iVfl + with mate on g 2 , whilst 3 3 . .l:!.g3 leads to the follow ing : 3 3 . . . .l:!.xg3 3 4 . \t>xg3 'fHxe S + 3 S . \t>h4 ( 3 5 .\t>g4 �xg2 ! ) 3 S . . . �xg2 ! 3 6 .'iVxg2 'fHf6 + 3 7 .'iVgs l:i.f4+
Chapter 3
3 8 . Wh 5 "iff7 + 3 9 . Wh 6 40.�xh4 � g 6 mate.
Ai : lS 'iV.;.:: ..
33 . ...
"iff5-f4+
Here, alas, Ilya misses the elementary (for a player of his level) win 3 3 . . . itxg2 ! possibly because he missed that after 34.:c!.g3 (there is nothing better) the simple 34 . . . "ifxh 3 + 3 5 . :c!.xh3 :c!.h 1 mate. However, he missed this because he had seen an other tactical possibility.
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The E l em en ts o f C hess I n t u i t i on
Black has won the queen, but he still faces some work, although it is not too difficult to wrap up the win. Although I have no wish to interfere in the work of Ilya and his coaches, this is already the second time that we have seen him miss a simpler and more obvious tactical fin ish.
37. 38. 39. 40. 41 . 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.
e5xd6 wh1 -g1 :c!.c2-f2 tt:Jc3-e2 tt:Je2-f4 tt:Jf4-h3 Wg1 -h2 :c!.f2-f4 :c!.f4-f2 .ti.f2-c2
"ifg3xh3+! �h3-d3 �d3xd6 wh8-g8 "ifd6-e5 "ife5-e3 "ife3xa3 "ifa3-e3 e6-e5
34. :c!.e3-g3 :c!.g8xg3 35. "ifd3xg3 :c!.f1 -h1 + 36. Wh2xh1 "iff4xg3
46. ... 47. .ti.c2-c8+
�e3-e4 Wg8-g7 0-1
Although not yet twelve years old at the time, Ilya won this European U- 1 6 championship, with eight points out of nine!
259
The Enigma o f C h ess I n t u i t i on
So, now virtually everything I wish to say has been said. There remains only one more, traditional section for any textbook: Trai ning It is evident that few have the gift of great intuition from birth, although I should say that my many years of expe rience as a trainer have taught me that everybody has this quality to some ex tent, but in differing amounts. And just like other qualities, I believe this one can be developed with training, but only up to that maximum ceiling, im posed on us by our talent at birth. However, training this ability is more complicated than training, for example, one's tactical vision or technique for realising advantages. I am not about to throw up my hands helplessly, however, just because I have not ever seen a clear blueprint for improving one's intuition. That is not my way. I will try to imagine how one can set about raising the level of one's unconscious operation. I also believe that if one tries, one can also achieve definite progress in this area.
Given that our researches in this book have established that the basis of intu ition is a complex of examining the po sition and short-range tactics, the only sensible recommendation, in which I am firmly convinced, is to look at how to train these two abilities. The first of these is the 'simple' exami nation of the position, followed by drawing conclusions from what one has seen. The inverted commas are not there by accident. They reflect the popular view 260
of the problem of the examination. But we have already spoken of this, and it makes no sense to repeat ourselves. So, to train one's abilities in this area, my advice is: Test your ability to look and see
everything that is important. The first steps in this direction should consist of taking a selection ofgames by the
strongest possible players, with sufficiently detailed notes, expressed in words, and by following the explanations, oneself ex amine the critical moments, in which important decisions were taken, trying to see all the details of the position, on the basis of which the decision was taken. In the process, do not simply note these features, but try to under stand what you have seen, that is, try to reach independent conclusions about what you have seen. I must warn you straightaway - at first, you will not find this at all easy. But gradually, you will learn to master the essence of this work, and learn to look and see. When this ability comes, even still at the first stage, I would advise you to train
yourself to make this examination a per manent feature of your approach to any posi tion. In other words, train yourself so that every time you encounter any chess position, in any circumstances, you automatically start by examining the position, that is, make the habit into an automatic reflex. As footballers (and also basketball play ers, boxers and masters of other sport ing disciplines) say: 'Do it 5 0 0 times, and your legs (hands , body) will do it of their own accord, and even if you
Chapter 3
consciously try to act differently, they will take over automatically and act in the normal way! ' . Of course, here we are talking about or dinary mortals. Messi's legs, for exam ple, were probably like that from the very start, as were Capablanca's eyes and head. But these people, of course, are geniuses. We, on the other hand, must 'cultivate our own gardens' , and gradu ally work up to such a state of affairs. The same thing we have said here also applies to the realm of short-range tac tics, where exactly the same method can also be employed. And, after having diligently and regu larly trained these basic abilities, until they become automatic, you will notice to your surprise that you suddenly be come significantly better at ' guessing' the future on the chessboard! That is, you will have developed important intuitive capabilities. It only remains for me to say a few part ing words, regarding an aspect of the construction of this book, which might otherwise give rise to questions from the reader. The issue is this: I cannot ex
clude the possibility that quite often, in posi tions where the correct decision can perfectly well be taken on the basis of calculation or normal positional assessment, it is neverthe less taken by means of intuition. I cannot, and do not wish to, deny this possibility. But in this book, as I have stressed many times, I have tried, as Jar as it is possible to do so, to demonstrate thefact ofintuition being used. Proof can usually be found in two situa tions. The first is already well-known to us, and it is these that I have most often examined - when it is not realistic to
-
The E l ements o f C hess I n t u i t i on
take a decision on the basis of ordinary calculation and/ or assessment in a highly complicated position, and so in tuition cannot be avoided. The second is when the decision could have been based on calculation or assessment (most often some combination of the two) , that is, where it was possible in principle to dispense with intuition, but the player nevertheless used this gift. In such situations, we can some times confidently detect its use in the fact that a player acts contrary to the ac cepted canons of his time. As a result, in stead of getting a cake baked in accor dance with the standard recipe and tast ing the same as usual, we get a game such as, for example, Nimzowitsch Capablanca, St. Petersburg 1 9 1 4 - a masterpiece for all time! The subject of intuition was always in teresting in its rather mysterious ori gins, and in especially sharp cases, such as dazzling geniuses like Capablanca and Tal, who are so striking and effec tive in the way they use intuition. But in our day, another aspect of the subject is clearly to be seen, one which could not be seen in the pre-computer era. Nowa days, when the silicon monster has made its presence felt in chess in a de finitive way, it has become clear that the intuitive method of taking decisions represents the direct opposite of the computer method. This is shown most clearly in the fact that the computer, for all its speed and depth of calculation, way beyond the capacity of any human, still copes very poorly when it comes to assessing the consequences of situations, which do not lend themselves to accurate calculation. 261
The E n i g m a of C hess I n t u i t i on
Intuition, on the other hand, lends itself to precisely such situations, and a strong intuition firstly, is able to pro duce surprisingly accurate forecasts of a wholly unclear future, and, secondly, in our day it is the main, if not the only weapon with which the human player can hope to fight against the computer over the chessboard. Today, when analysing the masterpieces of the past with the help of an analysis engine, one comes across many mis takes, both in the play and in the com mentaries. These mistakes almost al ways arise in calculation. But in those cases where the decision was taken in tuitively, the percentage of mistakes is incomparably smaller! We have reached the end of a very diffi cult piece of research. The material which we have studied in this book, as I have said many times, is multi-sided and difficult to prove. Therefore, I am prepared for any critical observations. As one of my friends said to me, 'No body forced you to climb on the cac tus ! ' . I n conclusion, as regards the source of intuition and its varied manifestations, which we cannot see or feel, I will show you a very interesting piece of an cient Eastern wisdom, which, it seems to me, deeply and very successfully de scribes the secret in which we are interested. A Sufi proverb
'Behind the mountains, there was a great city, in which all of the inhabitants were blind. One day, an invading king and his army set up camp in the desert, 262
not far from the city. Amongst his forces was a large, fighting elephant, which was famous for its many successful bat des. The mere sight of it was enough to terrify its enemies. All of the residents of the city were anxious to know: what is an elephant? So several representa tives of the blind population were sent to the enemy camp, to find out. Not having the slightest idea what an elephant was, they began to feel the an imal from all sides. Each one of them, having felt only one bit of the elephant, thought he now knew everything about this creature. When they returned to the city, they were surrounded by the inquisitive population. Being deeply ignorant themselves, the population wanted to know the truth from those who knew. Each of the experts was keen to explain what the elephant was. Here is what they said: The one who had felt its ear said: 'It is something big, broad and rough, like a carpet' . The one who had felt its trunk said: 'No it's not. It is a long straight tube, very powerful and destructive' . 'No, it is powerful and strong, like a pil lar' , said the one who had felt its leg and foot. Each one had felt only one bit of the el ephant, and each described it incor rectly. They could not imagine the whole, since none had the knowledge of his blind companions. They each imagined something about the ele phant, and each was far from the truth. The created being does not understand the Divine. In this discipline, you can not manage with ordinary intelligence' .
Index of Players Numbers refer to pages. E
A
10 Ackroyd 1 87 - 1 89 Akopian Alekhine 69-70, 9 8 , 1 7 8 Anand 1 6- 1 7 , 45, 1 0 1 , 2 0 2 , 2 3 2 , 25 3-2 54, 2 5 7 Anderssen 1 9 , 22-2 3 , 3 1 , 45 , 47, 49, 2 3 8 226-227 Appel 203 -204 Avrukh B
216 Bacrot 1 2 , 1 7- 1 8 Bednarski 54-5 5 , 2 1 1 Bernstein 50 Bird 86 Bisguier 10 Boethius 43 Bogdanovic Bogoljubow 6 3 - 6 7 , 1 0 1 , 228 Bolbochan 22 1 Boleslavsky 1 0 1 , 1 05 , 1 0 7 , 240 9 1 -9 2 , 9 5 , Bondarevsky 1 00 - 1 0 2 , 1 04- 1 05 , 1 0 7 Botvinnik 1 2- 1 8 , 54-5 5 , 5 9 , 72, 93, 97, 1 1 1 , 1 97 , 2 1 3, 2 2 5 , 2 2 9 , 249 Bronstein 98, 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , 1 3 5 Bykhovsky 1 80 c
45, 47, 49, Capablanca 5 3 -7 1 , 8 3 , 9 7 , 1 0 1 , I l l , 1 7 8 - 1 8 0 , 1 8 2 , 1 90- 1 9 2 , 228, 249 , 2 5 5 , 26 1 Carlsen 2 8 , 3 2 -3 3 , 3 5 , 3 7 -40, 45, 2 1 6 , 2 1 9 98, 239 Chigorin 10 Christie 1 13 Chumak D
Damocles Damsky Donner
1 25 121 12, 17
Epicurus Euwe
10 9 7 , 1 7 8- 1 7 9
F
26, 40-43 , 45 , 47, Fischer 63, 7 2 , 90-92, 94-9 5 , 9 7 , 1 60, 1 7 3 , 2 2 1 , 2 2 9 , 240 G
Geller 40, 43-44, 7 2 , 7 6- 7 8 , 80, 86-89 , 9 7 , 1 0 8 , 1 98 , 240 1 2 , 1 7- 1 8 Giorgadze 1 84 Grigoriev H
Hartoch Hecht Hort Hou Yifan
Kramnik 1 6, 2 8 , 30-3 1 , 3 3 - 3 7 , 3 9-40, 45, 8 5 , 1 0 1 , 1 49- 1 5 1 , 1 5 3 - 1 5 6 , 1 83 , 1 9 6 , 202, 2 1 9, 230-233 , 2 5 3 229 Kryavkin L
49, 5 3 -54, 5 9 , 9 8 , 1 73, 2 1 0, 2 1 2, 2 2 1 252 Lenin 171 Liberman 1 17 Lilienthal 20 1 Ljubojevic 203 Lopez Martinez Lasker
M
1 69 1 13. 1 18 1 3 6 , 1 3 8 , 1 40 206
I
Ioffe Itkis Ivanchuk
171 1 44 2 1 5 -2 1 6
J Janowski
54, 5 8-60
25 1 Makvorse,I. 25 1 Makvorse,N. 1 90 , 1 92 Marshall 86 Medina Garcia 226 Meier 26 1 Messi 99, 1 1 9- 1 2 0 Miles 45-5 1 , 5 3 , 6 7 , Morphy 2 3 8 , 249 1 8 1 - 1 8 2, 222 Movsesian 255 Mozart N
K
1 42 - 1 44 240 42, 9 7 , 1 00 , 1 1 2 , 1 8 0- 1 82, 1 9 6, 249 Kasparov 2 6 , 5 1 -5 3 , 64, 6 7 , 69- 7 2 , 7 7 , 92-94, 96-98, 1 0 7 , 1 09- 1 1 0 , 1 1 2, 1 1 4- 1 1 5 . 1 1 7- 1 1 8 . 12 2 . 1 2 6- 1 2 7 , 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , 1 3 4, 2 1 2-2 1 3 , 2 2 2-224, 229, 232, 234-235 Keres 1 3 1 - 1 3 3 , 1 3 5 - 1 4 1 , 2 1 3 229 Khalifman 23 8-239 Kieseritzky Kortchnoi 6 3 , 9 7-98, 1 1 2 , 1 60 , 240-24 1 , 245-247 Kamsky Kapengut Karpov
Najdorf Nikitin Nimzowitsch Nyzhnyk
213 246-247 68-7 1 , 228, 261 1 44- 1 46 , 2 5 8
p
1 5- 1 6, 1 8 1 79 8 5 , 9 2 , 9 7- 1 0 1 , 1 03 - 1 1 1 , 228, 240 10 Plato 85 Plutarch Polugaevsky 1 0 7 , 1 9 8-203, 240-244, 246-247 1 49- 1 5 0 , Ponomariov 1 54- 1 5 5 Pachman Panov Petrosian
263
T h e Enigma of C h es s In t u i ti on
Pushkin
246, 2 5 5
R
Ragozin Reshevsky Reti Roshal Rubinstein
5 3-54 1 9 7- 1 98 220 250 5 5 , 97-98, 2 1 0-2 1 4
s
Salieri 255 Sasikiran 1 42 Schmid 1 74 1 8 7 - 1 89, 2 1 5 , 2 3 0 , Shirov 232-233 Short 234 Sivuk 258
264
Smyslov 47, 72-85 , 9 7 , 1 8 2- 1 83 , 1 96, 2 1 3 , 249 Spassky 86-9 3 , 95-99, 1 0 1 - 1 04, 1 06- 1 08 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 , 1 3 0 , 1 74, 228 Sperry 254 Stein 9 8 , 1 69 Steinitz 6 8 , 9 7 , 239 Stohl 234-235 Stout 1 76 73-74 Szabo T
Taimanov 26, 8 5 , 1 82- 1 83 Tal 42-43 , 4 7 , 8 6 , 9 8 , 1 0 7- 1 08 , 1 1 1 - 1 3 1 , 1 60 , 240-242, 245 -247 , 249-2 5 0 , 2 5 5 -2 5 7 , 26 1
Tarrasch Tolush Torre Repetto,C Torre,E Trifunovic
224 8 1 , 84 221 1 98-200 256
v
Vallejo Pons
206, 208
w
Wasserman
10
y
Yates
220
z
Zukertort
1 9 , 2 2-24, 3 1 , 45
Bibliography
St. Kindermann, R. K. von Weizsacker, Der Konigsplan, Rowolt Velrlag, GmbH, 2 0 1 0 Amatzia Avni, The Grandmaster's Mind, Gambit Publications Ltd, 2004 Igor Stohl, Garry Kasparov's Greatest Chess Games, Gambit Publications Ltd, Vol. 1 , 2 Valeri Beim, Paul Morphy, A Modern Perspective, Russell Enterprises, Milford 2 0 0 5 Valeri Beim, How to Calculate Chess Tactics, 2 0 0 6 Valeri Beim, How to Play Dynamic Chess, Gambit Ltd, 2004 V. N. Panov, Capablanca, series VShM, F&S, Moscow 1 9 7 0 Mikhail Botvinnik, Analytical and Critical Works, F&S, Moscow 1 9 8 7 Paul Keres, 1 00 Games, F&S, Moscow 1 9 6 6 Vasily Smyslov, Nauka Pobezhdat, Eterna, Moscow 2 0 0 8 Vasily Smyslov, Chronicle of Chess Creativity, Moscow 'Mashinostroenniye' , 1 9 9 5 Mark Taimanov, Memoirs 'Retro', St Petersburg, 2 0 0 3 Grandmaster Polugaevsky, F&S, Moscow 1 9 8 2 Mikhail Tal, Yakov Damsky, Attack with Mikhail Tal, Ripol Classic, Moscow 2 0 0 6 Boleslavsky and Bondarevsky, Petrosian-Spassky 1 969, F&S, Moscow 1 9 7 0 Robert James Fischer, My 6 0 Memorable Games, series VShM, F&S, Moscow 1 9 7 2 Garry Kasparov, My Great Predecessors, Vol. 1 - 5 Viswanathan Anand, My Best Games, Russian Chess House, Moscow 2 0 0 9 Alexander Beliavsky, Adrian Mikhalchishin, Intuition, RIPOL Classic, Moscow 2 0 0 3
2 65
Game List
Bednarski - Giorgadze (fragment)
Tbilisi Goglidze mem, 1 9 7 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2
Botvinnik - Donner (fragment)
Amsterdam GAK, I 9 6 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2
Botvinnik - Pachman (fragment)
Oberhausen Ech-tt, 1 9 6 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5
Kramnik - Anand (fragment)
Belgrade Investbanka, 1 9 9 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6
Anderssen - Zukertort (fragment)
Barmen WSB-8 . Kongress, 1 8 6 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9
Taimanov - Fischer (fragment)
Vancouver Candidates m- I , I 9 7 I . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6
Kramnik
London Chess Classic, 2 0 0 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8
Carlsen - Kramnik
Carlsen
Wijk aan Zee Corus A , 2 0 1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
Fischer - Geller
Monte Carlo, 1 9 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Anderssen - Morphy (fragment)
Paris m-4, 1 8 5 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Bird - Morphy (fragment)
London match, I 8 58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0
Bernstein - Capablanca (fragment)
Moscow, 1 9 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4
Janowski - Capablanca
New York Rice, 1 9 1 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8
Capablanca - Bogoljubow
London BCF Congress, 1 9 2 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3
Nimzowitsch - Capablanca
S t Petersburg preliminary, I 9 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
Szabo - Smyslov
Moscow Alekhine mem, 1 9 5 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3
Geller - Smyslov
Zurich Candidates, 1 9 5 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
Smyslov - Tolush (fragment)
Leningrad Chigorin mem, 1 9 5 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1
Geller - Spassky
Moscow Zonal, 1 9 64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6
Spassky - Fischer
Siegen ol, 1 9 7 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Spassky - Petrosian
Moscow Wch m- 1 , 1 9 6 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Spassky - Petrosian
Moscow Wch m- 5 , 1 9 6 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 6
Karpov - Kortchnoi
Moscow Candidates final m-2, 1 9 74 . . . . . . . . 1 1 2
Tal - Hecht
Varna ol, 1 9 6 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3
Tal - Miles (fragment)
Porz, 1 9 8 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 9
Spassky - Tal
Tallinn, 1 9 7 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3
Bronstein - Keres
Gothenburg Interzonal, 1 9 5 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 I
Hort - Keres (fragment)
Oberhausen Ech-tt, 1 9 6 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 6
Sasikiran - Kamsky (fragment)
Dresden ol, 2 0 0 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 42
Nyzhnyk - Itkis (fragment)
Kiev V Nabokov mem, 2 0 0 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 44
Kramnik - Ponomariov
Dortmund, 20 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 49
Stein - Hartoch (fragment)
Amsterdam IBM, 1 9 6 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 9
Liberman - Ioffe (fragment)
USSR, 1 9 62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 1
Spassky - Schmid (fragment)
Varna ol, 1 9 62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 74
Capablanca - Euwe
Amsterdam m-9, 1 9 3 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 8
Karpov - Movsesian (fragment)
Donostia, 2 0 0 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 1
Shirov - Akopian (fragment)
Oakham YM (U26) , 1 9 92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 7
Marshall - Capablanca (fragment)
New York, 1 9 1 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 0
267
T h e Enigma o f C hess I n t u i tion Polugaevsky - Torre (fragment)
Manila Interzonal, 1 9 7 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 8
Avrukh - Lopez Martinez (fragment)
Novi Sad Ech-tt, 2 0 0 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 3
Hou Yifan - Vallejo Pons (fragment)
Wijk aan Zee Corus B, 2 0 0 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 6
Rubinstein - Lasker
S t Petersburg, 1 9 0 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 0
Ivanchuk - Shirov
Wijk aan Zee Hoogovens, 19 9 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 5
Yates - Reti (fragment)
New York , 1 9 2 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 0
Torre Repetto - Lasker (fragment)
Moscow, 1 9 2 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 1
Fischer - Bolbochan (fragment)
Stockholm Interzonal, 1 9 6 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 1
Movsesian - Kasparov (fragment)
Sarajevo, 2 0 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2
Appel - Meier (fragment)
Germany Bundesliga 2 0 1 0 / 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 6
Shirov - Kramnik
Wijk aan Zee Tata Steel A, 2 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0
Kasparov - Short
Amsterdam Euwe mem, 1 9 9 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4
Anderssen - Kieseritzky (fragment)
London, casual match, 1 8 5 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 8
Polugaevsky - Tal
Tbilisi, 1 9 5 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 1
Nikitin - Tal (fragment)
Tbilisi ch-URS, 1 9 5 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Tal - Trifunovic (fragment)
Palma de Mallorca, 1 9 6 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 6
Sivuk - Nyzhnyk (fragment)
Herceg Novi j r 2 0 0 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 8
268