The Battle of Coral Sea Strategical and Tactical Analysis - US Navy War College

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AD/A-003 053

THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA t MA Y 1 TO MAY 11 INCLUSIVE, 1942. STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL ANALYSIS Richard W. Bates Naval War College

Prepared for: Bureau of N-..val Personnel

1947

DISTRIBUTED BY:

Nlttollli TechnlClllnfo...uon Service U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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C'las!llfication

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ORIGINATING ACTIVITV (Corpora,. author)

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N.yal War Coll... Newport, Rhocla I.lalld

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2b, GROUP

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May 1 to May 11 Illcluely•• 1942.

Str.t••laal and

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Hchard W. Bat•• II, "'IE"'ORT OATil:

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ervisell the Action AiMir

109 •

Commander Combined FIllet. Steos In

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The Striking Force Seeka to Re-engage, and Finally Retires from Are. I~ 11th

109

of Other Japineee 9th, 10th Md 11th

Oper~tions

Ta~x

I

107

Forcea May 8th, l09-1U

The Effect of the Battle

Buttle lessons 114

It

Relatlo~s-Unified

2.

Command

va Divided Command

115

3.

Planning-Importunee of Adc.c,unte and Thorou6h Plana

115 115

5.

Planning

6.

~l£,.nnl:d

7.

Methoas-Int~ntions

va

C~p~bi:iti8S

Taetieul & StrlltegicEl.l Ulle c'f Weather

NeCCG8ti;y

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8.

116

for Ade4uate fiell-Coordlnatfld ::Jetrch

OpEll'ution

117

Un\;eslrability of Rigid ::Jet,reh Artla Border Linea

117

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.eee.aity for COllb1ned Trdnllle of Shol'tl Ba.ed Aircraft and rleet Un1h.

10. Reee •• ity for Faat, ~I R~lI. ReconnaUaance Land Plane. for Dn'eloping and Track1nl Contacta

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~all

118 119

11.

T.-ain1n, Value of Early

U.

A Strike

i. Esr.entia1 1n Air Strlkoe

119

IS.

Iaportance of superior Technology Deaonutrated

12~

106 •

Meoe.~lt1 fo~

lfO

16.

Tecbno1011cal Device. lU.t be Fully Exploited

120

16.

M.eelelt, for Tlaely and Effective Recogn! tiOD T~aifling

121

17.

Rap1ae..ent of Pilote and Planee

121

15.

LOiletiel

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19.

CryptographIc

20.

Anti-alrcratt Formations

Command~r

Action in War

117

Changing Areas During FUe11ng

~~pport

122

Rellabl1i~

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21. 'Clalal ot o..a,a Intl1ctQd b,y Aircraft

1£06

OaIbat Appra1.al, carrier Taak Pore. Caamuderc:

R..r AdIIIlr&l 'fadaichi Hara, I.J .1. Japan.,. Task

Or.g~tlatlon-Append1x

I F0110W8 Coahut Apprbisal

Organisatlon of !aak roree Seventaen - AppElndlx II &1mm817

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,Japanese D6IIIage)

SWaaar,y of Alliod Damage

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Plate I

Croll section • May 1~42.

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Plate III ?lute IV ?luta V

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Atllo.~h.r.,

Follows F.~S. Follows P.5~.

Cros. Seotion of the At.o~~h8r9. 1100(-11), 8 May 1~4~.

FolloW8 P.8~.

Schematio Diagram! of YOHKTOYIi~ Attack 8 May.

R80;)n~tructed Tl'~ck

Cha.rt from 11lS-1l:2.J,

Task Forct! 17 Tr(&ck Chart frOID li)~9-Ul5.

FOll.ow8 P.98.

Dlagrll/ll A

Action Area, May 4-0,

Diagr~

8-1

Allied Air Search Areae.

Dl~grMm

B-2 Baslc Air Search Plan.

Diugrlllll F Diagram G

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FOl\.ow3 P.~):::.

Pluta VII

Diagram E

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Foltows P.SS.

Follows P.:37.

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a Muy.

Dlagr.m C

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erolil seotl.)n of the AtAAoaphere, !.lOO( -11), 7 Nuy 1~4~.

Plot of YORJ(TO"'N'e RadRr ContBcte, 8 May 191:-':,

Plata VI

194~.

Battle of the CORAL ~~A, to 08~O, S MUY 1~4~.

SMck of book. &ck

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bocik.

SMcle of book. ~9

April 1942

B.. ck of book.

Batt.1o of the CORAL tiEA, 08~a, ~ lI_y \1942 to 2400, 4 May 1942.

Back bf book.

Battle or the CORAL SEA, to 2400, 6 lay 1942.

Back of book.

~400,

4 lay

Battlo of the CORAL SEA, 240l), 6 Illy to 2400, 7 May 194k.

Battle of the CORAL SEA to 2400 11 lay 194~.

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Back of book.

1942 Back of book •

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1. This analY.i. of the Batt~a of the Coral Sea ... prepar.d by the Naval "ar College. It 18 bued on information, trca both Allied and Japane .. "auree., which i. wider, mora complete mel more up to date than that avallabl~ to write~a of a1milar material puhllahed during the war.

2. All information from all .OurC8S wAS not avail.ble to the NAval Jar Collflge. For that rea Bon, oe,,' facts and oircwlltance& mo.)' come t.o l1r.ht, from time t.o tim. whlch !Day change &Jome of the analys •• produced herein. Th. Battl. of thIS Cord :;ea Wflt> th" fil'8t real war teet of the tlLcticd fOl"lllation. of the Fleet as w..l l 8.8 the tactted ability of tha principal Comrrumders. The pages of hhtory halve invllr,t,ably revealed defer.h and it would have beCin nothing ahort of mirllculou15 hnd such d.fecte not beon pr~aent in thie actIon. S.

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As a result of battle leaeons learned, and as quickly applied, the abUi ty of the Navy to conduct warf.re Shadily improved. h t1nle went on, the lesson 110 often forgotten, thut the teat of battle h UU~ only test "hich proves the combat ubility of Comm~der~ W8S relearned. The ability or the lack of ability of tha vlU'ious Communder~, in the art. of war became apparent.. V"lor alone was shown to be insufficiwt, for valor ia not an attribute of only one race but is an attribute end a heritage of many racas. The indi.penl&ble ~ualifieation for comm~d was ~hown to be the ability in combat to apply the scifnce of war to active !Dilittiry situations. 4.

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5. The pl'811f1nt Benior officers of the Nllvy are well aware of til .. reaeone tor changee in eetablished doctrines and in the development' of new onel5. But this CMlUlot nf'cesBurlly be aaid of the COIIlIIIunders of the futura, who very prob8.bl)' Wlll be inexporiencad in COIDII\&nd in war.

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all ca.menta and critici8IDs are designed to be constructive.

17 indicating what appear to he Bound and unsound dec1elontl, and the apparent rea.one for arriving at th.. , it i. hoped to provoke earnest thought ..ong prospective ca.manders and thus to improve profeSSional jud.ent in coaaand.

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....-.IIh. earl1 dq. ot th. War ..a due to the la." lUI. ot h.r aircratt both laDd and .hlp ba.ed 1a _ph1bloul operat1ODI aDd in Hoonn~lIalllae, air oOYer, and bc.bln, op.raUOIl.. It will be Ihom later that the A1l1ed layal forc.. in the Coral Sea rel1G4 pr1aarl17 on I.ra7 . md baaed airoraft tor th.... .... operation.. AI a r.lUlt, err 17 appear. to haY. bad 11ttle intoraatlon al to ttte nature ot the air operation. ba.1n, oonducted b1 tb. Artq.

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III yl•• or the aulpecwd prelenoe of an .nta)'" ,trikinl toroe, the tollbw1nC a •• lcaaent ot alroratt, ., ot 26 Apr11. WI• •adel

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Th••xact 41epoalt1on ot th... lud ba.ed aircratt on the d~. int.rTan1nC bet. . . the 25th, ot Apr1l and the 4.th ot ~ 18 Dot oerta1D, lNt it 11 mom tba\. OIl th• •0miD, ot th. 4.th of .~ the YOI[OSUU AIR GROUP ba.tJd with at leut 12 tl71na boat, at LAZ. Atter rec.1y1n, word ot the attaok on taLAQI th... t171n, boata ..re dlepatched on I.arohe. to the .alt. .rd upon th. ca.plet1OD, ot wb1oh. the)" return.d to SHOR'fW[) ISLAlD.* Thl., ... 1dent17, .eant a chanee or operating ba.. and WI. a .ouod chana' 10 yie. at the Deed tor ••arch in the area. .outh ot TULAGI. Th. ne.d tor a chan,. in relatl•• poa1tlOD to ~pport the reconna1.aance ObJ.ctiy. 18a.d1ate~ apparoot to the J.pan.... Th~ r, ••OD tor ,010& tir.t to SHORTLAID bland sad lator to both SHORTLAND Ialand and TULAGI •• becau•• TULAGI

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*War DiU"J ot 25th Ur Flot1lla, 1 April to 11

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... not on the 4th, ill new ot tb• .llUed attaok, and freedo. ot aotion ... ~~ter obtained at SHORTLAND liland. SOM. . .ldenc. teDd. to .how that all ot the.e ••aplane:J operated troa SHORTLAHD laland tor tb~ tollowiDI ...k, but th1. appear. to b. 1D error, a. 1. 1Dd1oated by th. tollowina aesian-.nt ot alrcratt a, 01 • ~~I

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T)'pe a8 Shipboard Shipboard rilhter tlehter

T1Pe 1 Attack Plane (IITTI1U

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The a ••1puaent ot 8 MAVIS to TULAQI ... 10110al 1 aa8lUcb a. th1a per.1tted ••arch.. or th. y1tal ar.a. to a rad1u. ot (0)-860 .11e. to the louthw.rd ot that Thll a ••~..t p.ralttec1 an ad."uat. dailJ 'e&rob ot two 15° ••ctor. and, probabl,y, !Dolud.d the ar.a b.t..en 11a1 t1Ac beariDI' leso and 185° fro. TUUOI. OD. bVIS r.port.dq operatlq out of' RtJSS!J..L I.land . .I abot down b7 a IORlTOII co.bat air patrol at 0810 OD 5 Iq 1a Lat. 14°-65 a, LoDe. UD°-01 1.** Another . . eneaeed and d....ec:t 10 Lat. 150 -52' a and LoDe. 181.0 -25' I. at 1045 OIl 10 Iq b7 11-P-2 011 pat~l troa Th••• two aotloD' took plac. b.t...D tb. tt.1tlDc be&r1DC' iIldlcated &boy. aod t_d furth.r to ••tabl1.h th. taot that tlT1111 boat. wer. op.rat1q fro. th. TOUGI area OD aDt'. aft.r 5 1Iq. OD the other bud, 1 t i. poal1ble that ca. ot tb•• e plaD•• ~ hay. been operatiDe out ot SRORl'LUD, a. th. aboYe aoUoo took pl.ce YW7 el0'. to th. s)() .11e radiu. rra. that b••••

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• Shortly afterward, 3nd prior to the 26th of April, an additional patrol area oalbd the KOO .ector ... e.tabli.h~d a. indioated belowr fa~£2l

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RABAUL

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The disposition of forces bet.een 1 April and 4 May ahow. nothing but fighter. ba.ed at tAl, and other evidenoe tends to indioate that no other planes were ba.ed at that field at that time. The SALAMAUA field waa too ~all tor heavy aircraft... It is theretore reaaonuble to assume that the aearchea from LA! wer. con~eted by MAVIS flyln€ boat.. Ina ..uch a. theae flying boMt. ..re not operating from LA! during the Coral Sea Operation .fter " May, it 13 considered that the aectors frOil this point ot origin .ere probably not .earoh.d Arter that d~t.. The 100 .ector, however, covered a con.ld.rable portion ot .ector. Y and Z L~d ~ay possibly have been provid~d to C~.~ thi~ .vantualtty.

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Th. objective ot the •••earch.a was the protection of own foroes thru recoonaillance and thadowing to locate And trail any enaIIY foroes in the area.*** In vi •• ot th••bov. obJ.ctiv, ,18 not considered that the8e aearoh•• were the be.t that could h.ve been .Mde with the planea available .1 they could .carcely cover the area adequately, e.peciMlly in vie. of the weather at t1111 tlae. The J.pan..e had &IIple planes and pilot., and, i t thi •• reA had b.en given the atr.t.g10 laportanoe it merited, .dditional plan •• , i t :,.o••••ry, cogld bav, b.en aupplbd. It will b. not.d tbat ..archea oov.r.d tlv. SO .. ctorl with two plaue. assigned for .aoh .ector and on. 400 .eotor wi tb thr.. plan.. aseilDed. Th.r. 11 no tnfol'll.tlon available on th. Coral S••••arob•• , but Japanete diaaru. tor *War Diary ot 26th Air not1l1a, 1 April to 11 lay 1942, WOO 181725. **05885 (Paciflc Raval An.ly.i. 01y11ioo Interrog.tion ot J'panese Ottio1al., R.v. Ro. 97. ***War Dlarr ot 25th Air Plot11l., 1 April to 11 May 1942, woe 161725.

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oth.r &rl4, indioat. that tb. plan•• usually w~t out and, art.r aar!nl alon, the arc to cuv.r tb. radlu. ot vi.lbility, r.turn.d dlr.ot17 to the 10 radar 'q!l1P1.pt .a. 1A.t.Ul,d .LA ,zaRM'" pllAl' " iMp UI••

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In addition to tb. land-ba •• d .iroraft and patrol plan•• tb. J.pan ••• ulI.d ...plan•• oouth, unit., oc::.po ••d ot ihor't ran,. r.ooana18.~o ••incl. tlo.t bi-plano., .1tb.r tTP' Z.ro (PITtS) or typ. i6 (DAVIS) or both, whlch op.r.t.d trQl t.nd.r. or troa ahor. b.... .etabli.b~ b1 Under.. Tb••• unit. nre _pl01ed to .upent the DOl'IIal ••arob.. in u ••• tl' .. tabl1.h .dvano.d ba ••• tor provldln, .ir , ..rob ot an .r.a not otbarwl •• ,.arch.d, and to provide air cov.r to~ .urtao. toro... Th. Japan ••• r.alis.d, 10 th1. conn.ot.\on , that tb. air oov.r provid.d b7 the .all carri.r SHORO tor the P~rt Mor••b,7 Iova.lon 'oro. W8' not ad.~uat. and a ..lin.d two ....plan. tenduI, tbe BIJIRIlA'" Mana and the KAIIUA"A MaN .lth tb.lr att.obed aircratt to th.t dut, to auc-.nt tb. SHOHO', .iroraft. Both ot the., tend.rs Wire .t DEBOlME on lay 8tb.* Tbo weath.r condltion. in thi. ar•• w.r. ,.n.r.lly ,ood axc.ptlD, when a cold front paa ••d ov.r it. A. Japan ••• pr.ctlc. . . . , apparlQtly~ on blttine a bad n.th.r ar.a to r.tir. to ba •• , thl. n.turally l.,.ened the value ot the •••rche. and a.siat.d in aaking lt po •• ibl. tor Alli.d tore •• to strike without warninl.

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J'PID'" D.pl0Yment N.v.l Foro•• Th. str.t.gic d.plo,a.nt ot tb. J.pane •• fore •• at tb. tt.. of the Battle ot the CORAL S1" wal in fUrtherance ot the basic plan to sd •• b.se. farther louth tor prot.ctiv. purpos ••• It will b•• ppar.nt tb.t thi. d.ploya.nt consi.ted ot flv ••Ul,r.C. support.d by land ba ••d aircraft. t.nd.r b••• d aircraft and aubmMrlnea, and that ..ch irouP proc.~d.d toward8 its de8tination more or l.ss ind.p.ndently. Tber••ere evidently two ~peration. Icb.dul.d, on., a minor one and d.siined priaarlly to obtain • baae for air r.connaissance, the capture or TOLAGI--the other, a aaJor one, the capture and occupation of PORT MORESBY by .ea. group.~

Thos8 ,roupa were .ovinl southward '~d8r the oover ot land baa.d aircraft, as .ell •• ot patrol and tloat plan.s. Tbe Japanea. 8 ••~cb doctrine appeiU'a to have b.eu to accOlllpl1sb all a.rial r.con., ..1asance through medium bombera, flying boats (pGtrol plan•• ), rloat planes, and sbip-ba8ed aircraft not carrier ba •• d •. Th.y seldo. ua.d their carrier planea tOl' s.arch but instead used the above planes, tthus leaving th.ir *OperatiQn MO and the Battle or the CORAL SEA. Combat Report No.1, South Seas Force, ~O Occupation 'orce (Coabat Report Nc. 7, CruDiv 6) .. eriod 25 Apr. 1942 to 11 Ma;r 1942.

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oarrier baaed plan.. ..aUaDle to aake up a liaziau. .tr.... i.~~ .t.r1k1ng torce, .1no. non. ot th. carri.r plan•• ne.d be u.ed tor .ooutiDI.* !bert ..re oooa.ioD., bo....r. wben th. Japane •• tound urlent D~.d tor ••arob by oarri.r plan•• and th1 . . . . the oa •• durln, th. Battle ut th. Coral S.a. Tbll practio. ot u.1n, land ba..d a.1rcratt to coyer tbe ar.. 1n whicb carri.r. ar. operat1o, 1. .ouod and 1a th. 10gioa1 a.thod to b. . .pl01. d, lon, a. it oon t1oue. to b. adequate and can be relied upon to turnhb th. lntor.ation required tor the .eouritr ot the toree. 1ovolved. In thls oa.e it ... not ad.quate t~r eith'r .id., tor the Japane •• Str1k1nc Poroe and T' 17 ..r. eaoh able to reach their launohin, polition wit~out ..min••

.0

The first operation wa. the oocupation of TULAGr. At th. tlme ot itl occupation on kar S--it bad been .vacuat.d b7 th. Au.tra11an. aD May 2-the deploya.nt ... a. indicated in Diacraa (C,. It will be noted thAt at tbe a~ent th. TULAGI Iova.lon Faroe had oocupild TULAGI, about 0820, MaJ 'S, other Japane.e foro •• movina aouLn were looated about al fo11owl fro. w.at to ea.t& (a) The PORr MORESSl Inva.loo Force waa at anchor 10 RABAUL, (b) The Caverins Force .... a over 150 aU.. to tbe we.tward ot TOLAO! and aouth of HEW CEORGIA Ialand, (c) The SUpport 'orce .aa in tbe aame area and wa. 60 al1ea we8t ot the Coverinl Force, (d) The TULAGI

lovaal~n

Force wal at TOLAGI,

(e) Tbe Strlk1nC 'orce ... about 6&0 al1es north•• at or TULAGI and on a aoutheaaterly courae, and

(t) The Subaarine Foroe location 1. Dot known exactl1. but all six 1U~1ne.

torpedoed. Greek ahip oft HOUKE! OD 7 May.**

The co.posltlon of tbeae force. 1. ahown in Appendix "I". It .hould be noted tbat whereaa the obJ.ctiTe of the TULAGI and PORT MORESBY Invaaion Force . . . . aol.1y ·capture and occupation". the objective at the other rorcea was ·protective". The Striking Force .aa a typioal bilbly mobUe car ..·ier forc ••i tb two t!r.t line carriera, *Tactic a ..played by Japane •• Air Forc •• in attacks on Navkl and •• rchant Sbippinll Op-S5 A.I.D. AS Par 1 or AUI. 1945 **War 01&17 USB TANGIER (AV-B) 7 May 1942

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.the SHOIAKU and ZUIKAKU, and with a screen of two heavy cruisers, the MYOKO and HAGURO and sb. destroyers, the SHIGURE, YUGURF., ARIAlCE, SHlRAURO, USHIO, AKEBONO; the Covering Force was a su~race force ot four heavy cruisers, the !OSk, KlNUGASA, ![AKO and PURUTAKA plus a SDall type carrier (CVL), the SHOHO, which is an ex-submarine tender and ex-oiler, and one de~troyer the SAZANAUI; the Support Farce was a light. force of two light cruisers the TENRYU' and the TATSUDA with gunboat8, minesweepers and auxiliarles; the Submarine l"crce DS pr1maril¥ a submlil'ine activity with six submarines, the RD-5:5, RO-54, I-22, 1-24, r-28, and I-29, with two tenders, the ISHIRO snd the HOYO-MARU. None of these shiae were equipped witb radar and one of the carriers were fitted with "homing" devi,!!!.. The tasks assigned these combatant forees by the Japanese were as their names impl.y~ (a> striking Force (1) To cover PORT MORESBY Invasion Force. (2) To destroy Allied Fleet (which might

~ppear

I

on the Icene)

(3) To destroy by air raiding operations on TOWNSVILLE, AUSTRALIA, and American planes and ships being 'delivered. there. (Actually, this task was left to the discretion of the Striking.Force CaamaIlder) (b) Covering Force (Referred to by Jap~lese as PORT MORESBY PrinCipal Unit of Main Bod¥) (1) To cover operations of both TULAGI ard PORT MORESBY InVasion Forcea. (e) SUpport Force (1) To support SOUTH SEAS Units. (This and PORT MORESBY Inva~ion F~rces)

~braces

both the TULAGI

(d) Submarine Force (l) To destroy enemy st:i.'1.king forces which come into the Co'!"&! Sea. (2) To destroy enemy shipping. (3) To reconnoiter* *Full Translation of the PORT MORESBY Operation, May 1942-V01. V, Doc. 18665 (WDI 56)

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The Striking rorce was designed to meet the threat of the Allied ligbt carrier task forces from tbe south as well as land based aircraft from Australia. It will be remembereu that Allied carrier tf!sk forces, which had beretotore operated in the CORAL SEA, had, with one exception, consisted of one carrier on~. In this one exception, two ot these carrier groups bad been employed in t.he attack on LAE and SALAllAUA. The Japanese appear to bave believed tbat this type ot a single carrier task torce would continue to be _ployed by the Wies and that they would meet one group with the SARATOGA only. They; therefore, tOl"lled a carrier task force or two carriers, whicb was designed on the premise tbat the otfensive power of the two silllHar carriers i8 mUCll greater than twic~ that of one carrier engaged in a silllilar operation. The Covering Force was evidently designed to cover the landings at both TULAGI and PORT MORESBY with priority to the latter operations and to provide ~erial security for the PORT MORESBY Invasion Force. Although the SHORO was a 25 knot CVL, nevertheless, so long as she remai~sd as part of the Covering Force, she restricted its freedom ot action, as the AOBA class were SS knot cNisers. However, sbe was very .vulnerable ano. was therefore.placed witb the Covering Force tor protection. She could provide anti-~ubmarine patrols, all' aearcbes for lilllited sectors, and ber planes could be ot conSiderable value, botb in defense ot the cruisers and t,ransports, and in support ot the operatio~ at PORT MORESBY. Tb6 lone destroyer, wbich is believed tO'be a plane guard tor the SROHO, is considered entirely inadequate for ~estroyer screen. The fact that only one destroyer was provided tor these cruisers suggests tbat already the Japanese were finding that they did net bave sufficient forces adequately to support their many tasks. Later in the war, vessels not adequately p~otected were usually destroyed by Allied submarines.

I , i

The f~rces assigned this group were inadequate against Allied forc .. believed to be in the area, unless used in concentration with carrier forces and land based air forces. Should this group not be employed with carrier forces or with adequa~e land based air, it could be destroyed piecemeal by strong enemy raiding torces. Also, without a destroyer screen it was subject to sub.arine atta~k even thougb air cover thru an inner air patrol was provided. A study along this line by the Japanese would probaD17 have indicated to them the necessity for mutual support and concBntration, and the timing, at least, ot the arrival ot the various units in the Soutb Sea area might have been changed. This is especially so regarding the earlier arrival of tho Striking Force. As it was, failure to do this adequately caused the 108s of the SROHO. The SUpport Force was designed to assist in escorting both the TULAGI and PORT MORESBY Invasion forces as well as to support landing operatioDs by guntire, aineaweeping and kindred activities for that type of operation, and appears to have b"en adequate tor the purpose, althouch the lack ot

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deltroyer8 lert the foree vulnerable to 8Ubmarinel. The SUbmarine Force was pr1Jlaril1 a lublar1ne actlvit1 with neo8saary tenaera. The taske asslgned this torce were doubtful ot aocoaplisbaent except in a m08t ainor way, because 1t 1s almost 1JIpossible tor six lubmarines adequatel1 to reconnolter a large area or to 80 cover an area al to insure the destruction or damage of en~ striking forces which come into the area. Why the Japaneee did not use more submarine. to laplsment the relatively sketcbT air reconnai8sance, is not known. AI will be shown later, a submarine contact by a plane of TF 17 caused CTF 17 to consider himself discovered by" the enemy- Actually, no Jar-3Dese submarine reported TF 17. This would indicate that more submarines were required i f the area was to be properly reconnoitered. The Striking Force was far distant trom TOLAGI on 5 II~. It was tran8porting 18 planes (Zero type) trom TRUK to RABAUL for the Tainan Air Group, knd has chosen the morning 01' that day to transter 9 01' th_. The reaaining 9 were transterred on the aorning of the 4th. The dotted lines show where these transters were made. The Striking Force a180 fueled on the morning 01' the 4th. Wh7 the Commander ot the Striking Force cho8e to transfer bis planes at this time is not apparent. Copies of his orders state that the Striking Force was directed to directly support the South Seal Units, one of which was the TULAGI InVasion Force. AS the TULAGI operatlou was scheduled tor early morning 01' lIay 5rd, it appears that his location violated the factors of securit1 and concentration. Be was certainly not in position to cover the TULAGI Invaslon rorce fro. any direction excepting from the north, which was the least probable direction, as enemy information showed that Allied 8urface and carrier force. were operating in the southern part of the CORAL SEA. It is possible that either Commander 4th Fleet or Commander Striking Force had decided that there would be no attack on TULAGI by ~he Allied forces, and therefore the Striking Force 1I8.S being held baCk in the area north of TULAGI and beyond the reach of Allied planes, until the Port lIu~­ esby Invasion Force had left RABAUL. Then the Striking Force would head south and west at high speed to catch any Allied carrier force which might attempt to interfere with the PORT MORESBY attack. The Japanese apparently did not weigh very heavily the Allied capability of attacking TULAGI. Instead, they appear to have decided that the Port Moresby Invasion Force would be to sole objective. Had they considered the Allied capability of attacking their torces at TULAGI and had they positioned their forces to counter this action, th., a1ght have caught CTF 17 with reduced forces. '~', '

The Covering Force evidently covered TULAGI from the west at a distance of about 150 miles,because of its dual covering function and because

.-101)5

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ot the iaportanoe ot the PORT MORESBY operaUClI1. the Japanese appartlDt17 did not think that TULAGI w. . .uttic1ent17 attractive to tbe Allied Coamaader to warrant attack in torce, and theretore the CoyerlDl roroe reaained at aucb a distance troa TULAGI aa would per.it it to .oye to the support ot TULAGI by air iulediately, and yet, at the a..e tae would pemit it to retum to PORT MORESBY at L"l econOilical apaed and, in till. to oover the Port Moresby Invasion rorce. Aa a matter ot teot, the COYering rorce actually covered the TULAGI landing b.y ..pl071nc three (8) carrier tighterl and attack planes in that operation.* Tbia OoverlDi rorce would bave been ot little value against a talt carrier task group ot the tn>e _ployed by the Allied toroel, unless _ployed in coorclinetion and concentration witb a Japanftse talt carrier talk torce or with land based air in strength. In this cODQection, it should be atrelsed that concentration at sea today ~oes not mean necessarily that ahipi ault be wIthin visual signal distanoe ot each other, although with radio ailence In ~rrect this tactor is wort~ot serious consideration. It doel mean, howc:" ..r, that they must be 80 disposed as to be able to coordinate their ettort with other friendly units in the most etrective .anDer. JAPANESE

fWIl

It rill bI.t noted trOID the chart or air searches that the Auatrall&!'1 land baled air searches covered the SolOilOD. Sea, the SolOllClll Islanda and limited portions ot the Coral Sea. Tbe searches acrocs the Solomon Islands reached their max1mua radius about 45 aile, beyond the eastern shores nt thoee islands. Tbe Japanese apparently knew that. So they sent the Striking Force south on courses which carried it Just clear or these searches and clear ot the coast watchera. ThUS, unless discovered by a subaarine, this rorce would be an unknown torce ot great strength which would b: available tor a ISUdden strike against any Allied torces which attempted to tnt.errere' with either the PORT MORESBY Operation or the TOLAGI Operation, although the latter operation ~!!2l ae_ important enousb. It la, ot course, a tact that 1t it i8 desired to bring an ena.y into a vulnerable pOSition, 1000ething be values, web as PORT 1I0RF..BBY, IIlUSt be threatened and he aust teel cOllpel1ed to e%pose himselt in order to protect it, or, lID opportunity must appear to be presented to the weaker adversary to inflict a relative1r greater 108s on the stronger than he expects to Burrer himselt. Such an opportunity would ap~ear to have been presented by TULAGI. The Japanese thought that the Allied Caamander would be aware ot the movement ot the PORT MORESBY Invasion Force and wo~ld send a torce into the Coral Sea to intercept it.** They planned that, ohould an Allied toree interfere , they would destroy it by a sin,'lle or double envelopa.nt or bOth. They estimated that this fore. would come into the Coral Se, oetween SAR *saOHO Action Report 17, of 16 dated lay 7, 1942, IDC #160465 KSuppl_ental Report-Truk-Baval &: Naval Air Field Te8111 IS, USSBS.

I

CRI!TOBA1 I.l.nd .nd ESPIRITU SANTO I.l.nd ln •• out~.t.rly dir.otioD and would th.n ...d w.. t to • po.ition .outh ot PORT V.ORESPY. They •••• to have overlooked the ll1portanoe ot TULACI to the Allied co_nd.r, •• • 11' ....roh•• 1'1'011 ther' would .treot the AiUed tr.edoll ot .otion in the CORAL sr~ by reoonnoit.rins muoh tarther to the .outh.

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In thi ••• timet. theyw.r. onoe ."in in .rror. In the tir.t pl.o. there w•• on. o.~rl.r torOl. TF 17, iD the .outh.rn part ot the CORAL SEA .t the time ot -hi •• sti..t., whioh o.rrier toroe had r.turn.d to the CORAL, SEA troll TONG1TABU on May 1 .ttu 7 d.Y"upke.p .nd provhlonlnl. It had proo.eded vi. • oour.e .outh ot the NEW HEBRIDES. In the .e~ond pl.o •• there WIl. .nother o.rrler toro.. TF 11. whioh had p•••• d b.t.e.n BFATI .nd EROMlNGa or .bout SOO .il.. .outh ot wh8re .xploted by the J.pan.... aDd whiGh had be.n dlreoted to join TF 11 OIl "y 1. Their •• ti_tie that Allied toro•• would know ot the PORT MORESBY toro• • nd would ,.nd •• yor to .top it. pro~d to b. oorr.ot. Th.ir •• tl ..t. ot r.l.ti~ pOIition .... however, in '1'1'01' .nd o.u.ed the failure of the J.pane •• pl.n.. Had the J.p.n~c. maint.in.~ the thoulht of' the Alli.d objeotive .Dd view.d it tra. the oono.~tion ot podtiOD.....,.. .~ll.bl. and oppo.ed .nd tr."dolJl ot lotion, th.y would ha~ probahly arri~d .t the enemy o.o.~ility ot .trikin~ trom the .outh where hi •• uoport .nd henoe hi',treedom ot .otion lay. r.ther th*n trom the e •• t where he .i~ht r.adily be di.oovered by J.pan•••• iror.tt .nd .ubmarine.. The)' lIIilht ha~ eXplot.d ,al.o that hi would be in Ire.t.1' .tr.nrtb than h.retofor. and UDd'1' tb. 00 . . 1' ot Alli.d l.nd-b••• d airor.ft. The oap.bility or .pproaoh tro. the ••• t .hould h.~ b•• n oon.ider.d but .hould ha~ be.n Ii ~n l .... r i"port.noe than th.t troa the .outh.

I

If,,"'98r. the J.pane •• "1" hopef\tl ot their tr.p. Th.y ... r. alwaY' thinkinS of' • C.nn.e -- or • holdin~ oper.tioD with ...ktoro" in th. venter and or • double enoirclement with Itron~ foro •• on the enelllY'. w••k tlank•• - They att.m~ted thi •• t LETT! r.uLF where thelr wavy wa. de.tro,.d pi.oeme.l, .nd th.y att.mpt.d it at the CORAL SEA. wh.re ••• wl11 be .ho-D later, the ..aker toroe r.tu •• d to be h.ld. Th.y ott.n thoulht in tel''' ot laDu:.:>lIS operation, or botb, b7 AprU 28t.bbe baJ beon 1Dtol'llod ot the pre.cee ot tbe Japane.e oarrier diYi.iOll, Card1... lS, at TRDIt or ell route .outb, &Dd be auat baYe reaUHd that i t • • an on-7 'OapabllIt1 ot DWlber OIle priorIt1 to COf'er hi. _phibiou. wait. tor the aboYe land1nc' .ith air &Dd aurtace power. B18 de.Ire to bo readT tor ~ediate .e~loo--bi. de.ire tor troed~ ot aetian .bould &D ..er,ooC7 ari.e--hi. anziet7 OYU' the d'tYelop1D, .ltuat.lOD-b18 dea1re to be .ore to the ...tward and northward, are all appreciated, but could not the.e de.Ire. haye beon obtained witb • ooabined toroe' Doe. it Dot appear, theretore, a. i t It would bave beeD wi.er to baYe oo.blDod the two ta.k torce. a. directed b.1 CIICPAC or, at the lea.t, baYe kept tb.. togetber that he would be eoabled 1D aina_ tlae to c~Wl1c.to YIeual17 aDd to CODcootrate the a&x111\&11 .trqtb a"ailable Ihould the Deted arl.e' Also tbere could baye beon aD interchaD,e ot oller. whIch a1ibt baYe expedited tbe ruelinl. Bad tbll boon done, the tact that Tl 11 had oo.pleted ruel1D, a dq earlier tbaD planned, would ba~e beon DOWD to bla aDd he would ba.,.e been able to .trike TOLAGI with two tull tau torce.. .A. it happened, the.e t.wo talk toree. ~re roUlblT 1D the . .e latif-ude and but fJ) aile. apart at 2000 OIl S ..." and, Tet, t.be taot that. fl 11 had ooapleted rueliDI, aDd ... a.,ailable tor tbe .trike, apparentlT \1DJm01!lD to C"'l 17. Thi... becau.e the torce. were not within .,Iaual .i£D&l dl.t&Dce, it ... Dot de.ired to break radio .ilence, aDd aeroplane drop •• Dot u.od.

l

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AlUtd Plu Tbe ba.lI ot the Allied plu ... a pure rud.iDC operation. crl 11 ... to keep hi. c~d readT ill all re.pect~ tor ~ediate actlon. Wbc be recebed a report ccmeeniDi Japan••e aOf'_ent. either troa CIJCPAC or tro. eo.tander, South.at Pacitic Forces or troa hi_ om eoaaand, whIch ind1cf.ted. tbat • truittul tar,et, action acainat whieh would contribute toward the b&.ie plan, bad appeared, err 17 .a. to take auch otfeneiY. action ..ain.t It .~. appeared advI ..ble. Thia plan . . . .cund, but it will appear later that crl 17, in carrying it out, •••ed in bie plannlnl, to undere.ti.lllate th. Japane •••tr.nlth, and, apparentl" tUled to disc.rn the Japan ••e plan ot eneireleaent trom the eaat which near17 relUlted 111 diluter. General Bu'aa Th. preceding di.cu.aion caaplete8 the background tor the action ot the In general, 'it indicatel on the Japane.e lid., tour surtace torce., ODe ot which a strong two-carrIer ,roup, aupported by ,oaewhat inadequate land and t.nder ba.ed aircraft and aubmariDe., proc ••din, to oecup~ PORT MORESBY aDd, on the Allied .ide, two .ingle-carrier toree.,.oon to b. aer,ed Into on. two-carrier torc., aupported by extr..ely .ketc~ land aDd tender ba.ed CORAL BEl.

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alrOraft aDd alaarSn•• witlDl 'loO tab ottc81••• OUOD acain.t th... .Jap..... torO", .... their 10oatlOll _d oo.po81t101l bad bee "porteeS. TtJUQI bad 3••t __ oOCNpled. All .Japu... toroe. OOIl.lIIteeS cU"l1 ot lavaal. tOl'o", with tb. IXOept10e ot th. South .... Detaobeel Poro., whlob ... Ara7, and all "1" unel.r coaaud ot th. DaYal o. .aacl.r. AlUecl rOI'O'" 00 tb. oth.r bud, OODa18ted ot both AftI7 aad I ••al tora... ft... _ " .cvall, undll' ••parat. ~_d.r., not 1Il vq WI' 1D the . . . obalD ot aa.aDd.

Aft.r 'l'ULAOI bad bMD oOCNpled the .Japan••• CcW.riDl Porc. at 1100 Ird, lett It. cOYeriDI poalt1on .auth ot lID QJX)RQI.l Illand and h.aded ba a DOrtb...tlrq d1reC\.lOll, at _ .cOIlOllleal Gpeld, toward. WD2I CAROLIB lWtBOR, BUI.l ISLAlD, it •• to tuel prior to Joining tb .. PORT IOUSBY n..aaloe Poro.. t'blt strlklDc 1orc., whlcb • • _ rout. on a lOUth. .ate.t"17 OO\&I'a. to ita pluned poa1tlon, _a 210 allla north.alt ot lEI IRELAID _d abCNt ao aill. nol'tb• •t ot TULAGI. It tranat.rring o.rtaln plan•• to IWW7L wh1ob~ plan•• bad b.- terrbd tro. TROI. Tb. Support rorc • • a "tU!"lllDl to join th. PORT 1IOR!S8! Illva810D Porc. wblch . a aUll at aDohor ill lWWJL" ~

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Allot th.a. aorl. _ " in aceorG_c. with th• .Japq••• plaD which call.d tor th. PORT IIORISBt Ia.aalon Porc. tc d.part troa JWWJL at 1800 OIl .ay 4.* ~.I')'tb1D1 bad .procHded accordinl t.o plan Uld to bav. been DO tboulbt In the alDd. ot th• .Japan••• ot po.alble acUOD b, A.Ul.d torcel aca1n.t !VLjQI DOW that lt bad been occupled by tb. ,Japan.a. W~ tbout oppa.ltloe rrc. Allled rorOl.. tbua .. tllld that, 1D ttl. TUL.lGI ope .. _tlon, th. J_pappanDt17 talled to aaaq.. th. wao...1on ot ... _tl lnt.ll1lent17. Bad thq etucl1e4 th.ir OPlratl~ t.borou~, trma the vlewpoillt ot the Alli.d CaMed.r, tbe7 lI1&bt haT' realised that th.re . s a atrool Allbd capabUlt1 ot atri.Jd.n1 'l'ULAQI in ord.r to daDl"' t.porarlq the us. ot that bas. tor "coanal. . .c. aca1Dat tbe AlUed rald.1Dl toroe.

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At th. tiM of th. :: ,lipatlO1l at '1'tJLAQI, " 11 and 'fp 11 weI" on , ••ralq . .at.rq and nol'tb...t.rq caur••s and COlltlnUln, tu.llDi. Both oaapi.ted tu.llnl on the Srcl, althou&b thl8 tact was appar_tq Dot mo_ to err 17.

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At 1100 S -." C'1'P 11 r.celyed _ report troa Ca.mander, Soutbweat Pacltlc 1oroes wblob lDdloat.d that the Japan••• bad b'l\ID to occupy 'l'ULAGI BarboI' in the S)L(IIOIS. Be atated in hl. acUon "POrt, "'l'bll 1. Just th. k1acl ot "POrt w. bad bleD wa1UDl two aooth. to rec.lve.-, and b. al.o stated *CaaLat Report 10. 1, ~. 11 .Juq 1942, P.4.

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Airoraft losses s1J,t.a1,.,ed by 1'P' 17 in "hh flt.bok inoluded 1. "line because of t!1e attack. Finally most of these men were recovered and brought on bOurd again.

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All hands fought the rires caused by the attack and succeeded in getting them under contr~l. However, the NEOSHO gra.dually f'lled with _ater. She remained &float for severa.l days drifting northweot. By 1112 May 9th, her position was determined to be Lat. 150 _35' E., Long. 1560 -55' E. At 1200 May 10th an Australian Hudson appeared and was notified of the NEOSHO's difficulties, but no help appeared as a result of t~1s cont,act. There is no information available as to whether this plune reported this incident or not. At about 1100 May 11th tfie NEOSHO showed signs of sinking, 80 a fin~l conference was held to decide on ab~doning ship. However, ttbout t.his time d. Navy PBY from NOUYEA appeared and soon guided a destroyer, the HENLEY, to the scene. By 1542 all personnel had been removed and the NEOSHO was then t'Jrpndoed by the HENLEY wit.h 2 torpedoes. ohe sank at 145::' in Lat. 150 -58' S., Long. 155°-56' E. It appeared afterwards that the long delay in finding the NEOSHO was ~ err.-or tn navigation by the Navigator of the NEOSHO, who had reported her posltlon incorrectly. d'.1c to

~RATIONS'

OF JAPANESE STRIKING FORCEj, lIay 7t,h

The Striking Force continued on a northerly course until 0115 May 7th, when it changed course to.the southeastward ~nd at O~OO to almost due south. This reversal of direction was apparently due to the fa.ct thnt Commander Striking Force, failing to receive any infcr.nat1:m concerning the Allied Carrier Force Since it had attacked TULAGI, had made an estimute and had decided that it was an enemy capability to be to the south and had decided to search in that area before he moved into n favorable covering position to the westward.* He knew where his own forces were and, in particular, he knew that the Port Moresby Invasion Force which he was directed to cover, was in the vicinity of and approaching JOMARD PASSAGE. This action of Commander Striking Force appears logical. The t'act thnt the All ~.ed Force had 'not been located by planes from RABAUL, LAE or TULAGI *SUpplemental Report-TRUK-Nb.val and NHvt\l Air Field Team No.5, USSBS, p.~8-B.

"ll;II,.-"

~

:>l..c. thalt force beyond the noraal search range of Japanese ..areb plaDea operat1ac fro. the above o~aes. Ca.mander ~tri~ing Force, i f be -'.tltel to .... w" u._t the southem areas were adequ!ltE,ly searched, ... ror~ \MNf",.. to . . . . .t tile. . .~"·rche8 by hil 01ln carrip.r based aircr.Ct. apoeared to

B,t' ~ ..,. 1tb \.be Strlk1", Force .. ~ at Lut. 130 -12.' S, Long. 1580 _ ~~. E. =w 1$5 .U.. at ~. (NIl th. westem tip of REllNE~L Island. tal this u.. a . . reb rUe'.· a-:aa l.unched fraa the carriers to search a "'1I~l.7 MCt.or Nt _ _ l~ to ,1fP (r) to • diet.ance of 2dO lIiles. C~aaMr St.rlkiGC r~rce ba.j pla.. .ed to ... rch the lOuthwest sector be,..., t.n. beart.uca 1eoO M4 ~1fP (T). Hut he _s not sathfied with this

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pt.a

1t cla ~l CO¥er tbe southem area .de~uately, and he feared &l41ed carriers al4ht ,et bebiDd bi. as be .oved to the westward. be, t.bItf'eC,,.., 1tt~ UW Mctor eearch 1.0 include 20 degroes to the o.~

~t ~

s.ou~-.rd ••

HA.c t.!lh HCt.:>1' Mare:. to the lIOuth not been increased in scope, the 8MrCbeo WQUld ban been found VII.CWlt. Commander Strlking

8OUt~.rn ~

roree hn'~ obtla1ned this .uch neg&UYe infonaution could then have disaiaa8d the aouthern area frca fUrth.r con8iderati~n for the present, and could haye eearebed for the en.., to the westward, where the enemy might alao be. However, tbe ln~rea.. 1n sector search to the south was made and r88Ulted in the discovery at 07~o of the NEOSHO and her escort SIMS, which were entirely ...lone. This discovery was reported promptly by the search planes. Howe\rer, the report was incorrect in that It siated that the Allied Carrier Task Force had been discovered. This failure of the Japhnese reconnaissance pilots ade~uately to develop the contact of the NEOSHO and SIMS was, from the Japanese viewpoint, regret.table. It was, however, not unusual in these early days for either the Japanese or Allies, and was particularly bad on both sides during the Coral Sea Operations. One important reaSon for this was that recognition training was still in its infancy. A'fu~ther reason, but only on the Japanese Side, appears to have been the fact that the Japanese knew that the Allies had radar and, therefore, i f the reconnaissance plane closed in to develop the contact~ it stood a great chance uf being intercepted and shot down by Allied E