The Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann

Agapito, Joselito

4

DOCTRINE: There is no rule of general customary international law, which prohibits the enactment of retroactive penal legislation. Furthermore, the argument that to punish an individual for conduct which was not yet criminal at the time of its commission would be unethical loses its force in face of the odious crimes committed by the Appellant. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ISRAEL v. EICHMANN Criminal Appeal 336/61, MAY 29, 1962 FACTS: The crimes perpetrated by the Nazis during Hitler’s reign against Jewish citizens were some of the worst recorded in history. The Appellant, Adolf Eichmann, occupied the position of Head of Section for Jewish Affairs charged with all matters related to the implementation of the Final Solution to the Jewish. He was captured by Israeli Security Forces in Argentina and handed over to the District Court of Jerusalem to stand trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people. He was convicted of all 15 counts and sentenced to death by the District Court of Jerusalem. He appealed on both legal and factual grounds against his conviction and sentence based on the contention that rely on the Act of State doctrine to excuse his criminal responsibility. ISSUE: Can the Appellant rely on the Act of State doctrine to excuse his criminal responsibility? RULING: The Appellant contends that his crimes were Acts of the State, the responsibility for which rests with the State alone and another State has no right to punish the person who committed the act, save with the consent of the state whose mission he carried out. This ground of appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court as there is no basis for applying the doctrine to acts prohibited by international law, particularly in cases of such heinous international crimes. There is no rule of general customary international law that the principle of territorial sovereignty prohibits the enactment of a criminal law applicable to extraterritorial crimes committed by a foreign national. These findings are reinforced by positive international law: the crimes for which the Appellant was convicted were international crimes under international law entailing individual criminal responsibility at the time that they were committed and their universal character is such that each State is vested with the power to try and punish anyone who assisted in their commission.

There is no rule of general customary international law, which prohibits the enactment of retroactive penal legislation. Furthermore, the argument that to punish an individual for conduct which was not yet criminal at the time of its commission would be unethical loses its force in face of the odious crimes committed by the Appellant.