Terrell DG, Early Egyptian Naval Warfare (scribd)

Early Egyptian Naval Warfare: Inshore Action off the Nile Delta (1179 BCE) David G. Terrell April 25, 2009

A land and sea battle occurred between Egypt and the ―Sea Peoples‖ (Inhabitants of the ‗Lands of the Very Green Sea‘) in 1174 BCE, early in the reign of Rameses III. Three years before, enemies, possibly from southern Asia Minor and the Aegean, had sent ships to aid the Libyans in war against Egypt.1 The battles of 1174 are described in texts and illustrations on the walls of Rameses' funerary temple at Medinet Habu. While intended to support political and religious ideology, the extensive sculptural reliefs and inscriptions do illuminate Egyptian warfare and may provide notionally accurate depictions of the battle. This paper will examine the sea battle and the naval tactics, weapons and organization exemplified there. The Identity of the Sea Peoples Breasted‘s translations of the inscriptions indicate that the peoples invading Egypt in 1147 were likely a loose confederation of probably Cretan Peleset, a settlement of whom later became the biblical Philistines; the Thekel, who may be the Sikeli, later of Sicily; and, several other groups of uncertain origin including the Shekelesh, the Shardana, the Denyen or Danaoi, and the Weshwesh. Romey suggests that the designs of the Sea Peoples‘ ships resembled those depicted in Central European iconography of the time, implying an Aegean or Mycenaean presence among the Sea peoples.2 Hall asserts a Greek origin.3 Most assert that, owing to pressure from uncertain external sources and bound in some form of alliance, large numbers of these peoples, accompanied by their wives, children, and belongings, in clumsy ox carts, left their homes, and moving eastward along the cost of Asia Minor, settled in Syria. 4

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James Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt: The twentieth to the twenty-sixth dynasties, Vol. IV. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906), 33. 2 Kristin Romey, The Vogelbarke of Medinet Habu, MA Thesis, (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2003), 3, 5. 3 Harry Reginald Hall, Keftiu and the Peoples of the Sea, (Athens: British School, 1902), 158. 4 Anthony J. Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 250. Andre Dollinger, The Incursions of the Sea Peoples. January 2003. http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/sea_peoples.htm (accessed February 22, 2009) Breasted, 33.

2 David G Terrell Regardless of origins, these ―Sea Peoples‖ sent a naval force from Syria-Palestine to Egypt with the likely intent to sack coastal cities and perhaps to create some long-term settlements in the Nile delta.5 The force likely represented the most serious threat to Egypt since the Hyksos invasion 500 years earlier.6 Ramses, made aware of the approaching force, gathered an army and sent it down the Nile to the coast—where he met the enemy and the actions took place, probably in close proximity to the shore—as the associated naval action occurred close enough to the coast that the ships received supporting fires from shore-based archers.7 The Inscriptions Describing the Battle Nelson, quoting Edgerton and Wilson‘s translation of the inscription incorporated in the depiction of the naval battle presents what little textual information is available: Now the northern countries, which were in there isles, were quivering in their bodies. They penetrated the channels of the Nile mouths … His majesty is gone forth like a whirlwind against them, fighting on the battlefield like a runner. The dread of him and the terror of him have entered into their bodies; (they are) capsized and overwhelmed in their places. Their hearts are taken away; their soul is flown away. Their weapons are scattered in the sea. His arrow pierces him whom he has wished among them, while the fugitive is become one fallen into the water.8 I (the Pharaoh) caused the Nile mouths to be prepared like a strong wall with warships, galleys and coasters, equipped, for they were manned completely from bow to stern with valiant warriors with their weapons. … As for those who came forward together on the sea, the full flame was in front of them at the Nile mouths, while a stockade of lances surrounded them on the shore, (so that they were) dragged (ashore), hemmed in, prostrated on the beach, slain, made into heaps from tail to head. Their ships and their goods were as if fallen into the water.9 From the inscriptions it appears Rameses was forewarned of the approaching enemy ships and had time to prepare and position a response as the implications are that the Egyptians were poised, ready to surround the

Michele MacLaren, Liam McManus, and Megaera Lorenz. The Inscriptions of Medinet Habu. April 7, 2002. https://www.courses.psu.edu/cams/cams400w_aek11/mhabu.html (accessed February 22, 2009) 5 Robert Drews, The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 53. 6 Drews, 21. 7 Breasted, 33-34. 8 Harold H Nelson, "The Naval Battle Pictured at Medinet Habu." Journal of Near Eastern Studies ((University of Chicago Press) 2, no. 1 (January 1943): 40-55), 43. 9 Nelson, 43.

3 David G Terrell enemy forces, able to cut off any attempt at retreat.10 The trap consisted of a naval force of various kinds of vessels supported by a force on shore to prevent the escape of fugitive enemies.11 The enemy, entering the ambush kill zone unawares, was surprised and completely defeated.12 The Graphic Depiction The description of the naval battle is an unprecedented first in Egyptian record. The inscriptions and images show no evidence that the attack took place in the vicinity of shore-based construction, possibly indicating the action took place away from any city, possibly on the shores of the Mediterranean.13 The ships used were not dedicated combatant vessels but rather transports pressed into combat service. There is some license in the depiction as only one type of Egyptian ship is shown, even though the accompanying inscriptions claim that Rameses ―caused the mouth of the river to be fitted out like a strong wall with river transports, cargo galleys and seagoing coastal sloops.‖14 15

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Nelson, 43. Nelson, 44. 12 Nelson, 44. 13 Spalinger, 253. 14 Bjorn Landstrom, Ships of the Pharaohs. (Stockholm: International Book Production, 1970), 108, 111. 15 Manual Robbins, Collapse of the Bronze Age: The Story of Greece, Troy, Israel, Egypt, and the Peoples of the Sea, (Lincoln, Nebraska: Authors Choice Press, 2001), 286. 11

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Fig 1 – Relief of the Naval Battle showing division per Nelson.

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The overall image of the naval battle (Fig. 1) occupies a rectangular, landscape-formatted area. Nelson recognized that the area was divided into four areas. Three of the areas represent activities occurring on land. The upper-right area is dedicated to the Pharaoh and his chariot; while the lower areas represent activities occurring on the shores adjacent to the battlespace.17 The actual battle at sea is depicted in the upper-left area of the scene. The Egyptian and enemy ships are distinguishable by the uniform hairstyle or headdresses of the various crews and the design and decoration of their respective ships. Egyptian ships are manned by personnel wearing the hairstyle typical of the Egyptian armed forces. The Denyen are shown with hair or headdress pulled upright while the Shardana are distinguished by their horned helmets. The Sea people‘s ships are decorated with a bird‘s head at either end and Egyptian ships have the head of a lioness on each prow.

16 17

Nelson, 44. Nelson, 44.

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Among the personnel deployed aboard the Egyptian vessels, native Egyptians predominated, as opposed to the mixed-ethnicity land forces depicted in the associated land-battle scenes. 18 19Inscriptions indicate that Rameses filled his ships with the ―picked men of Egypt‖20. While this appellation may indicate the picked men were chosen for their military prowess. It is also possible they were the best chariot archers, pressed into service as Marines. In order to declutter the image, Nelson considered the naval battle images after removing the floating bodies scattered amongst the vessels (See Fig. 2). From the cleaned up image, one can distinguish four Egyptian vessels (colored Red in figure 2) and five enemy ships (colored blue in the figure).

Fig. 2 – Naval battle with Floating Bodies Removed.

One is immediately struck by several obvious observations. First, all the Egyptian ships are equipped with oars allowing them freedom of action regardless of wind and tide while being noticeably absent in the enemy

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Drews, 158. Robbins, 284. 20 Drews, 161. 19

6 David G Terrell vessels. Second, the Egyptian ships each had a detachment of archers and naval infantry stationed aboard. 21 The Egyptian‘s use of archers stands in stark contrast to depictions of the enemy force, which displayed no evidence of long-range weapons—only of close-combat weapons and a few lances.22 As images of the land battle do show evidence of chariot support to infantry, this lack of naval archers may result from the long-term adverse effects of heavy humidity on bows and strings; or it could indicate that the enemy squadron was surprised by Egyptian forces. The Egyptian naval infantry were armed with shields and staves appropriate to repelling boarders and protecting the archers. 23

Fig. 3 – Naval Battle Segment involving Pharaoh.

In Figure 3, I changed the visualization color of two of the enemy ships from blue to yellow. Those ships, positioned at the upper right portion of the naval scene, are oriented relative to the large image of Pharaoh, rather than part of the ship-to-ship actions shown nearby. This is indicated by the presence of the large arrows piercing 21

Drews, 158. Robbins, 286. 23 Drews, 158. 22

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the enemy and pointing back towards the ruler. Note that from the stereotyped headgear, the two ships were representative of two different nationalities, perhaps demonstrating Pharaoh‘s overcoming of the multi-national force. The remainder of the maritime battle scene depicts three specific actions during the battle (from top to bottom). In the first, (Figure 4) an Egyptian ship is engaged in a boarding action with an enemy vessel. In the Egyptian vessel, one can see multiple archers and several infantrymen armed with lances dressed in garb similar to that of elite charioteers engaging the enemy. There is a man armed with a sling in a masthead ―fighting top‖ and amidships, there is a sailor throwing a four-pronged grapnel into the enemy‘s rigging. One Egyptian sailor appears to be retrieving an enemy sword from the water. 24

Fig. 4 – Close Engagement with a Grapnel.

In the second depiction of ship-to-ship activity (Figure 5) a different nationality of vessel is being engaged, indicated by the different headdresses of the crew. Notable also is the presence of enemy prisoners in the bilges of the Egyptian ship. The attack included some action to cut the rigging in the enemy vessel as the starboard shrouds are not seen and the mast, without support on one side, is listing. The crew of the enemy ship is 24

Romey, 8.

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armed with spears of javelins, unlike the crew of the ship shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, examining the Egyptian combatants, there are four archers and twelve naval infantrymen. This may be happenstance but it could be indicative of the deployment of four chariot crews aboard the vessel, each consisting of an archer/commander, driver and two runners.

Fig. 5 – Close Engagement.

In the third scene, in Figure 6, we may be seeing a third ship-to-ship action or possibly seeing again the first action, shown in Figure 4, at a later moment in time. The Enemy vessel has capsided. Notice that the grapnel is once again figured, being lodgen in the sail, which is shown torn. The Egyptian ships are fairly packed with prisioners.

Fig – Grapnel Attack Capsizing Enemy Vessel.

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Overall, it appears from the Medinet Habu images that the Egyptian vessels, manned by archers who attacked the enemy with long-range fire. After reducing the enemy‘s strength, the Egyptian ships closed with and engaged the enemy vessels at very close range.25 Examining the Egyptian squadron, it appears that the tactics were likely adapted from those used by land forces. The ships, manned with archers and naval infantry were used as chariot-borne archers were used on land. The Egyptian ships were equipped with, tops (platforms for lookouts and sling-equipped marksmen)26, oars and sails. Under oar, these ―naval chariots‖ could outmaneuver the enemy vessels, attacking at standoff range and from upwind (the weather gage or wind‘s eye). With this superior mobility and tactical surprise, Egyptian ships could engage enemy ships which could neither return fire upon them nor close the distance to board.27 I doubt that Rameses was keeping an armed coast guard force in readiness at every port on the delta. Considering this and the low probability that the Sea People‘s squadron would happen upon the combined Egyptian land and sea forces, the battle may have resulted from a fortunate circumstance. I believe it likely that the enemy squadron came into sight while Rameses was on shore with a land-based force, perhaps in conjunction with the land battle and coincident with the presence of a naval logistics convoy. It is therefore possible that Rameses, seizing the initiative, deployed elite chariot troops onto the available ships and mounted an ad-hoc naval response to the arriving squadron. Carrying the battle to the enemy, he prevented their landward assault and routed the force completely. Ramses‘ victory over the Sea Peoples seems to have been complete, for we do not hear of any further trouble from the Sea Peoples during the remaining sixteen years of his reign.28 David G. Terrell Herndon, VA

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Breasted, 43-44. Robbins, 286. 27 William J. Hamblin, Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC: Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 455. Spalinger, 255. 28 Breasted, 33-34. 26

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Bibliography Breasted, James Henry. Ancient Records of Egypt : The twentieth to the twenty-sixth dynasties. Vol. IV. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906, http://books.google.com/books?id=43wUAAAAYAAJ. Dollinger, Andre. The Incursions of the Sea Peoples. January 2003. http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/sea_peoples.htm (accessed February 22, 2009). Drews, Robert. The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Hall, Harry Reginald. Keftiu and the Peoples of the Sea. Athens: British School, 1902, http://books.google.com/books?id=DJgTAAAAQAAJ. Hamblin, William J. Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC: Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History. New York: Routledge, 2006. Landstrom, Bjorn. Ships of the Pharaohs. Stockholm: International Book Production, 1970. MacLaren, Michele, Liam McManus, and Megaera Lorenz. The Inscriptions of Medinet Habu. April 7, 2002. https://www.courses.psu.edu/cams/cams400w_aek11/mhabu.html (accessed February 22, 2009). Nelson, Harold H. "The Naval Battle Pictured at Medinet Habu." Journal of Near Eastern Studies (University of Chicago Press) 2, no. 1 (January 1943): 40-55. Robbins, Manual. Collapse of the Bronze Age: The Story of Greece, Troy, Israel, Egypt, and the Peoples of the Sea. Lincoln, Nebraska: Authors Choice Press, 2001. Romey, Kristin. The Vogelbarke of Medinet Habu. MA Thesis, College Station: Texas A&M University, 2003, http://nautarch.tamu.edu/Theses/pdf-files/Romey-MA2004.pdf. Spalinger, Anthony J. War in Ancient Egypt. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

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