Ten Years and Twenty Days - Karl Doenitz

Praise for Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days "Accurate and fair. . . . A work of permanent importance." -- Times Literary Supplement "A remarkable book. . . . Even people unfamiliar with naval tactics are likely to be impressed by Admiral Doenitz's achievements." --Christian Science Monitor "There is little doubt Doenitz was a tactical sailor of the utmost ability. His assertion that Germany would have won the war if he had been allowed to develop the U-boat arm from 1935 onwards is cogently argued. . . . [His] account will make a lot of people think." --Spectator "Neither overtechnical nor dull." -- New Yorker "A full and honest account. . . . The most interesting part of this well-organized book deals with Doenitz's role as temporary head of the [Third Reich]." --Library Journal "The most distinguished of recent reminiscences on either the Allied or the German side. The author displays a powerful capacity of sustained concentration. He writes with detachment and facility; he is fair both to his colleagues and his enemies, and he possesses an effortless mastery of detail. . . . He is, for a German officer, unusually honest in describing his relations with Hitler, and there is a refreshing lack of cant and fraud in his handling of the thorny problems of submarine warfare." -- The Guardian -i-

Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com Publication Information: Book Title: Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days. Contributors: Karl Doenitz - author, R. H. Stevens - transltr. Publisher: Da Capo Press. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: i.

CONTENTS

Foreword by John Toland Introduction by Jürgen Rohwer 1. Prologue U-boats in First World War--introduction of convoy sytem foils single U-boat attacks--prisoner of war of British--my interest in U-boats and decision to stay in German Navy--training as surface sailor between wars--appointment as chief of new U-boat arm 2. The New Task Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935--London Submarine Treaty 1936--Asdic--building up of Weddigen U-boat Flotilla--need to assert usefulness of U-boat as first class weapon of offence-problems and training. 3. Wolf-pack Tactics Need for joint U-boat action--evolution of U-boat wolf-pack tactics-problems of control of operations and communications--German Armed Forces Manoeuvres in Baltic 1937--exercises in Atlantic-1939 my book describes problems and tactics--nevertheless, British underestimation of U-boat arm. 4. U-boat Building Policy 1935-39 Exigencies of Anglo-German Naval Treaty--what type of U-boat to build--large boats not really advantageous--the golden mean, medium sized--I recommend Type VII to be developed--conflict with Naval High Command--my recommendations to meet growing war crisis-British preparations, convoy system to be used--my wolf-pack training vindicated. 5. The Decisive Months of 1939 1938 Planning Committee--Britist merchant navy main strategic target--Z-Plan for new fleet--I disagree with emphasis on surface vessels--I demand more U-boats--weak state of navy and rearmament requirements--outbreak of war--decision to build more U-boats--my requests to supervise expansion rejected. 6. The U-boat War Begins: September 1939March 1940 What is a war of aggression--Nuremberg, London Submarine Agreement 1936 and Prize Ordinance rulings--hostilities begin--attacking ships sailing independently--restrictions on U-boat activities against merchantmen, passenger ships, neutral ships, French ships--removal of restrictions by Naval High Command--attacks on convoy system-Gibraltar shipping--control of U-boats-mine-laying by U-boats-Scapa Flow--operational value of U-boats.

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-vQuestia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com Publication Information: Book Title: Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days. Contributors: Karl Doenitz - author, R. H. Stevens - transltr. Publisher: Da Capo Press. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: v.

7. The Norwegian Operation and the Torpedo Crisis April 1940--distribution of U-boats to prevent British landing--our failures--torpedo misfires--magnetic firing in northern waters--loss of faith in torpedo, but I raise morale--Court of Inquiry and Court Martial--not enough research by Torpedo Experimental Establishment between wars--solution found in 1942--the torpedo becomes a really efficient weapon. 8. The Battle of the Atlantic: July-October 1940 Inadequate protection of British convoys--first joint attacks on convoys --high number of sinkings by U-boats--conquest of northern France-advantages of Biscay ports--destruction of enemy shipping our most important offensive measure. 9. Organization of U-boat Arm and of U-boat Construction U-boat way in Atlantic--U-boat building at home--Operations Branch and training establishment merged under Friedeburg--my faith in U-boats, and the need for more--new building programme-Goering's opposition--Hitler's lack of co-operation. 10. The Battle of the Atlantic: November 1940December 1941 Year of deficiencies and dissipation of forces--operational planning in France--North Atlantic most fruitful area--need for Naval Air arm-opposition from Goering--I protest--Hitler places some aircraft under my command--importance of combined exercises--problem of locating convoys--co-operation of Admiral Parona and the Italian Navy-disappointing results from Italians in convey battles--wastage of U-boats--transfer of 15 U-boats to North African theatre--part played by surface ships in Atlantic--dock repairs to U-boats--the Bismarck sunk--some Atlantic convoy Battles--failures in South Atlantic. 11. America's War Against Us Before December 11, 1941 Neutrality Act of 1937--Churchill persuades Roosevelt to abandon neutrality--Naval conference in London--America assumes protection of Atlantic shipping--extension of US security zones--Hitler orders avoidance of incidents--first incident, the Greer--restrictions on U-boat activities--Japan enters war--Germany declares war on America.

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-viQuestia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com Publication Information: Book Title: Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days. Contributors: Karl Doenitz - author, R. H. Stevens - transltr. Publisher: Da Capo Press. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: vi.

12. Operation in American Waters: JanuaryJuly 1942 U-boat war on American coast--favourable peace-time conditions-number of U-boats available--great number of sinkings--attempts to save fuel--Hitler's 'intuituion'--some U-boats deflected to Norway-I protest--decisive effect on Atlantic battle--the Caribean shipping off Freetown--more operations in American waters--profitable period-less success in Atlantic against British shipping--British preeminence in Radar operating on short wave--'milch cow' submarine tankers--America adopts convoys tactics. 13. Convoy Battles and Distant Operations: JulySeptember 1942 U-boats' main task war on enemy shipping--still lack of U-boats-better maintenance necessary--superiority of British detection device and strengthening of British air patrols in Biscay--German defensive measures--Atlantic convoys still main target--successes on 'Great Circle'--subsidiary areas of operations--Brazil and Freetown--successes in American waters and Caribbean begin to diminish--Brazil declares war. 14. The Laconia British liner Laconia sunk in South Atlantic August 1942--Italian prisoners aboard--I order rescue of survivors--American bombers attack-jeopardy of U-boats--attack by seaplane--enemy do not attempt to help rescue--dangers of attack from air--I order cessation of all rescue work. 15. Improvements in U-boat Equipment and Armament Need for submarine of high under-water speed--advantages of Walter

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U-boat--need for counter device to Radar--need for insulation against surface location--better AA armament needed--the 'aircraft trap'-increasing menace from air--need for He177s with long radius-inadequate torpedoes. 16. More Convoy Battles and Operations in Distant Waters: October-December 1942 Allied landings in North Africa--complete surprise--failure of German Secret Intelligence Service--importance of dislocating enemy's supply lines with U-boats--shallowness of water--operations off Gibraltar difficult--I object to transfer of U-boats from Atlantic-usefulness of submarine tankers--resumption of operations in North Atlantic--great successes in November--first collision between Uboats --convoys in Trinidad area--Cape Town sinkings--our losses.

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-viiQuestia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com Publication Information: Book Title: Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days. Contributors: Karl Doenitz - author, R. H. Stevens - transltr. Publisher: Da Capo Press. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: vii.

17 Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Reader resigns--I assume command--my attitude towards National Socialism--good aspects of Nazism--disapproval of persecution of Jews --Hitler's misconception of British mentality--why I decide to fight for Germany--politics and duty should not be mixed--first personal contact with Hitler--I gain his confidence and support for Navy--clash with Goering. 18. Collapse of the U-boat War: January-May 1943 Admiral Horton's appointment--I still command U-boat war--convoy battle--losses on both sides--our lack of air reconnaissance--more convoy battles--March 1943 the peak of our success-stronger escorts for enemy shipping, 'support groups'--importance of radar--lack of submarines--bad weather--decline in our successes and increase in U-boat losses. 19. My Tasks as Commander-in-Chief 1943-45 Problems of naval rearmament--our defensive role--Navy's steel and labour requirements--'Fleet Building Programme 1943'--Walter U-boat and Type XXI--mass-production--U-boats in Mediterranean theatre--assistance to Italian Navy--sign of disintegration of Italian armed forces--transport of German troops from Sicily to mainland-senior commands of Navy and light forces--problem of the capital ships--sinking of Scharnhorst and Tirpitz--Black Sea theatre of operations--Normandy invasion--Navy's advisory capacity--enemy air superiority--Baltic theatre of war. 20. July 20, 1944 I learn about the conspiracy--tendency to shake morale at front--my disapproval as member of armed forces but I can condone moral motives-high treason. 21. The U-boat War form May 1943 to the End Necessity of continuing U-boat campaign--new weapons, AA armament, acoustic torpedo, bunkers for U-boats--menace of air attacks at see--'aircraft trap'--loss of U-boats--the 'Schnorchel'--U-boats and the Normandy invasion--offensive in enemy waters--new type of U-boat. 22. Head of the Government My reasons for resisting unconditional surrender--proposed Allied partition of Germany--U-boat campaign dwindling--transference of naval forces to Baltic--threat of Bolshevism--I am Hitler's successor-my policy--show-down with Himmler--death of Hitler--I appoint Schwerin-Krosigk political adviser--situation of armed forces-attempt to evacuate refugees to western Germany and hold eastern front --separate and partial capitualtion--Friedeburg negotiates with

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Montgomery--handing over of ships--Eisenhower rejects partial surrender--Jodl negotiates with him-surrender--my ignorance of concentration camps--my government until taken prisoner. 23. Epilogue German Navy's performance of its duty--Hitler's role in history-his suggestive influence--his misconception of British mentality--fatal principle of Fuehrerprinzip--democracy and patriotism. Appendix 1 U-boats of do German Navy Appendix 2 'Defence of Merchant Shipping Handbook 1938' Appendix 3 Causes of Torpedo Failures Appendix 4 'The Second World War' Appendix 5 U-boat Building Program Appendix 6 Figures concerning the German U-boat War 1939-45 Afterword by Jürgen Rohwer Index -ix-

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Appearing between pages 224 and 225

Grand Admiral Doenitz Doenitz in 1917 as Watchkeeping Officer in U-39 Hitler, Doenitz and Goering Doenitz and Admiral Parona Doenitz and Prien Speer and Doenitz Doenitz reviewing the Naval Hitler-Youth Organization Doenitz arriving at Wilhelmshaven to inspect the Navy Doenitz leaving Headquarters at Flensburg after surrrendering the German High Command Speer, Doenitz and Jodl after their arrest on May 23, 1945 Nuremberg Trials: Doenitz, Raeder, Shirach, Sauckel, Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner Doenitz in his cell at Nuremberg, November 1945 Doenitz since his release from prison Raeder, Doenitz and Hitler Raeder and Doenitz Mussolini, Doenitz and Hitler U-Boat Headquarters, Paris Korvetten Kapitan Hessler

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FOREWORD SINCE THE GRAND ADMIRAL'S memoirs were first published in Bonn, Germany in 1958, extensive historical research has uncovered revealing information about the history of the U-boat and its role in World War II. Germany's distinguished naval historian Jürgen Rohwer discusses these new insights in his afterword, which enhances our understanding and appreciation of Doenitz's original insider's account of U-boat activities through the Battle of the Atlantic, and even of his clashes with Reichsmarschall and Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring, who opposed his demand for a Naval Air Arm. Rohwer, who interviewed Doenitz many times over a long period, illuminates the admiral's frank revelations and character. "During those years," Rohwer writes, "I was impressed by his determination to find out how things had really transpired." As Rohwer gathered extensive information from Allied archives and participants, he passed along his findings to Doenitz, who was shocked to learn how he and his staff had overestimated the effectiveness of Allied radar and that the British had broken the German "Enigma" cipher in 1941, thus enabling the Allies to decipher many of the signals exchanged between his U-boats and to inflict crippling losses on the German Navy. But these discoveries did not persuade Doenitz to revise and update his account, nor have they substantially weakened its invaluable merits. For, unlike other German commanders who penned their memoirs, the admiral was able to make use of a copy of his own official war diary. That and the isolation imposed by his ten-year imprisonment at Spandau prison, which left his wartime perceptions untainted by ensuing postwar historical debates, contributed greatly to the Memoirs' lasting value as prime source material fueled by the intimate viewpoint of one of the most significant and disquieting figures of the entire war. -xiii-

Of special interest to those who lived through the war years are his descriptions of operations in west Atlantic waters, including the sinking of the British liner Laconia in 1942. Doenitz had ordered that the survivors be picked up, but American bombers forced him to cancel the rescue attempts. Equally fascinating are his descriptions of his new assignment as Supreme Naval Commander, succeeding Erich Raeder in 1943, as well as his chronicle of the crest and collapse of submarine warfare. By June 1943 he had to decide whether to withdraw the boats from all areas and end the U-boat war or "to let them continue operations in some suitably modified form, regardless of the enemy's superiority." Germany, in the grim days after El Alamein and Stalingrad, was on the defensive everywhere, leading the admiral "to the bitter conclusion that we had no option but to fight on. The U-boat Arm could not alone stand aside and watch the onslaught." In no other history have I read such a thorough account of the German Navy's new defensive role. On the afternoon of July 20, 1944 Doenitz learned of the attempt to kill Hitler. "I was greatly surprised both by the existence of such a conspiracy and by the attempted assassination. My first reaction was one of incredulity that officers could bring themselves, in war time, to do such a thing. . . . Germany, then, was like a besieged fortress, hard put to keep its foes at bay. Any strife within the fortress itself could not but adversely affect and weaken its efforts against the besiegers outside. The front itself would probably collapse, and complete defeat would swiftly follow." Doenitz was convinced that had the coup d'état succeeded, "civil war would inevitably have resulted" for "the masses of the German people were still solidly behind Hitler." Nor would the power of the National Socialist state have been removed by eliminating the Führer, for it was highly unlikely that Himmler, Goebbels, Göring, and the organizations they led would have bloodlessly surrendered their influence. By the summer of 1944, to self-deluded Nazis and to many generals whose political vision didn't go beyond a diehard militarism, it was still possible to view the situation with some degree of hope that the collapse of the Allied coalition and a separate surrender negotiated with the West would be forthcoming; it wasn't till the Ardennes Offensive, otherwise known as the Battle of the Bulge, in the winter of that year that those last fanciful vestiges were crushed. Although many historians have questioned the Volk's supposed willingness by 1944 to support Hitler's "total war" and the sufferings it entailed, at the time such views as Doenitz's were

widely shared by others, including General Heinz Guderian, who, although courageously outspoken and critical of Hitler by that late date, still denounced the conspiracy (see Panzer Leader, Dutton, 1952, Da Capo Press reprint, 1996). However often contemporaries or historians may judge the coup as reckless, poorly planned, and ineptly executed, these observations do not diminish the obvious and all-too-rare display of morality and courage implicit in the event itself. (The conspirators, many of whom were convinced they would fail and perish but that regardless of its success the act must be attempted, did not falter, though they often erred.) Such an understanding should not be perceived as irrevocably indicting one response while acquitting the other; it's worth noting that not only Doenitz and Guderian but Hitler's opponents found the situation to be confusing, treacherous, stressful, and dismaying. Many conspirators were deeply ambivalent about whether they were being patriots or becoming traitors, while others were torn by factional disputes and distrust instead of unifying to tackle the seemingly insurmountable task before them. Hitler himself was a master at ruling by the principle of "divide and conquer": he created a bewildering array of overlapping jurisdictions of responsibility and encouraged interdepartmental rivalries. For the conspirators, however, such a lack of unity and consensus, as well as the inexcusable dearth of any Allied encouragement, proved to be fatal for many (see Joachim Fest comprehensive, critical, and compassionate history Plotting Hitler's Death: The Story of the German Resistance, Metropolitan Books, 1996). The plot that culminated in the July 20th bombing failed in every practical sense, but has become indispensable as a symbol, desperately needed by Germany, of its inherent and enduring humanity. Although Doenitz and other contemporaries viewed the conspiracy in starker, less congratulatory terms ( Germany was, after all, deeply engaged in a precarious, life-anddeath, two-front war of attrition), their outlooks must be placed, alongside the conspirators' motivations and perceptions, into the larger historical context. One cannot exist--or be fully understood--without the other. As the Grand Admiral makes clear in his memoirs, "That was how I saw things at the time [italics mine], and as Commander-inChief of my service I acted accordingly. It was imperative to stamp as quickly as possible on anything which might shake the morale of the Navy and so undermine its will to continue to fight against our external enemies. As members of the armed forces, to fight on was their sole duty; mine was to do my utmost to maintain their determination and readiness to do so. . . . I

therefore . . . expressed my unequivocal disapproval of the attempted coup." When American Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who had helped me with my first book on the war in the Pacific, heard that I was preparing a history of the last hundred days of World War II in Europe, he urged me wholeheartedly to contact his German counterpart. He assured me that Doenitz was not, as many have claimed, an ardent Nazi or even a member of the National Socialist Party, but essentially a loyal naval officer, haunted by the Imperial Navy's rebellion in World War I and determined to prevent its reoccurrence. His unswerving (if, in retrospect, misguided) support of the military oath of fealty to the Führer earned him Hitler's unexpected attentions in the final days of the Third Reich and later an indictment as a war criminal at Nuremberg. Doenitz had previously declined to see me, but when I wrote again, mentioning Admiral Nimitz's recommendation, he invited me to Hamburg. Meeting with him confirmed for me Nimitz's estimate. I had been informed that Doenitz had recently lost his wife and might cut short the interview. My own wife Toshiko accompanied me that cold day in 1968. He greeted us at the door and was immediately impressed by her; I am convinced that he would not have spoken as freely if it were not for Toshiko's warm and gracious presence. He was soon talking so rapidly that I had difficulty scrawling down his words. He confessed how astounded he had been to hear that the Führer had named him as his successor. He then unlocked his desk, removed from a drawer his farewell address to his officers, written at the time of Germany's surrender, and began to read it aloud: "We have been set back for a thousand years in our history. . . ." As he continued, I noticed that his eyes were rather close together and extremely alert. His mouth was smallish and he had unusually large ears that seemed to be constantly collecting information. Near the end of the speech he stopped abruptly, folded the paper slowly, and returned it to his desk drawer. He paused to collect himself before telling us how shocked he had been when General Alfred Jodl, a codefendant at the Nuremberg Trial (later convicted and hanged), had shown him a copy of Stars and Stripes that featured gruesome photographs of the Buchenwald concentration camp. "At first I couldn't believe that such atrocities had taken place." But the evidence was more than conclusive; it was overwhelming. "I was faced with the truth. The horror of the concentration camps was not just Allied propaganda." His anguish was palpable. "My faith in National Socialism vanished. Hitler's achievements had been won at too frightful

a cost." Then he sadly added, "My two sons died in battle for the Führer." I realized that Doenitz had been only one of millions of Germans who were finally learning the perils of the Führerprinzip, the radically antidemocratic principle of political leadership by which only the highest leader (in Germany's case, Adolf Hitler) is confirmed by the people, who thereafter are expected to give their unconditional obedience and absolute loyalty to him. In 1971, while conducting research for my biography Adolf Hitler, I again visited Doenitz. This time I was alone. I noticed how much he had aged since our previous meeting. During the course of our conversation he again unlocked his desk drawer and drew out the farewell address he had failed to finish four years earlier. This time he read the entire speech: Comrades, we have been set back a thousand years in our history. Land that was German for a thousand years has now fallen into Russian hands. Therefore, the political line we must follow is very plain. It is clear that we have to go along with the Western Powers and work with them in the occupied territories in the west, for it is only through working with them that we can have hopes of later retrieving our land from the Russians. . . . The personal fate of each of us is uncertain. That, however, is unimportant. What is important is that we maintain at the highest level the comradeship amongst us that was created through the bombing attacks on our country. Only through this unity will it be possible for us to master the coming difficult times, and only in this manner can we be sure that the German people will not die. . . . His reading was vigorous, and as he continued talking, I could see that, for better or worse, he was no longer troubled about his own past. He no longer blamed himself or his gallant U-boaters for their defeat. He had reached an understanding with himself about his historical role and its impact on the German Navy's victories against superior foes, his country's grinding defeat, and perhaps even his own personal losses. There is little doubt that the Grand Admiral will remain a controversial figure--a potent mix of ambition and honor, of obstinance and pragmatism, of military vision and moral blindness. Despite the observations Reichsminister of Armaments Albert Speer recorded in his not-altogether-trustworthy (and in Doenitz's case, biased) Spandau: The Secret Diaries ( Macmillan, 1976) or the more formidable conclusions drawn by Charles S.

Thomas in The German Navy in the Nazi Era ( Naval Institute Press 1990) that Doenitz supported the National Socialist regime more enthusiastically than he later cared to remember, my own extensive research has revealed a man far more complex than the image--rather comforting in its clarity and simplicity--of the fanatical Nazi. While Doenitz on occasion couched his speeches in an anti-Semitic rhetoric as inexcusable as it was commonplace in Europe in the first half of this century, he also provided a naval escort for a Jewish refugee vessel. Let the reader not forget how Doenitz, who had earlier applauded Hitler's efforts to rebuild the German military, chose as the last Führer to disregard his predecesor's aims and doctrines and instead arranged a swift, unconditional surrender. The course the Grand Admiral navigated, both professionally and personally, crossed perilous uncharted waters; the decisions made and direction taken are not immune to criticism, but such reproaches must also consider the gray area in which we all struggle. This paperback edition of his Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days will provide a new generation of readers with not only a fascinating account of his remarkable military achievements, but the vivid feeling of what it was like for men such as Doenitz to serve their country during Hitler's regime and the price they paid for doing so. JOHN TOLAND Danbury, Connecticut October 1996 John Tolandis the renowned author of many historical books, including The Dillinger Days (available from Da Capo Press), Ships in the Sky, Battle: The Story of the Bulge, But Not in Shame, Adolf Hitler, In Mortal Combat: Korea 1950-1953, The Last 100 Days, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath, No Man's Land, and The Rising Sun. His autobiography will be published in June 1997 on W occasion of his 85th birthday.

INTRODUCTION GRAND ADMIRAL KARL DOENITZ has been condemned by many as a fanatical Nazi leader; others have recognized him as one of the great military commanders - and one of the ablest - of World War Two. Neither of these controversial verdicts, however, can be

deemed complete, for they ignore certain essential factors in his make-up. His formative years were spent in the Imperial German Navy, where he became inbued with the virtues of honourable behaviour, selfless devotion to duty, patriotism and unswerving loyalty to the regime. He served as a U-boat commander during the First World War and developed into a leader of the utmost vigour and forcefulness whose success was based upon determination, incisiveness and an inimitable charisma that won the hearts of his men. Leading by personal example, it was he who built the formidable ésprit de corps of the U-boat service, and the devotion of his men was maintained to the very end of his life in December 1980, in spite of the fact that the U-boats had endured the highest loss rates of all the German armed forces in the war. Always he channelled his whole, untiring energy into the task at hand. As Commander, U-Boats, he saw himself as responsible for the efficient conduct of the submarine war, looking after the welfare of his men, pursuing strategic and tactical developments, and presenting the needs of his arm of service as forcefully as possible to his commander-in-chief, Grand Admiral Raeder, and the 'Seekriegsleitung'. In January 1943, Hitler (whom he had met on but few occasions) promoted him to the post that Raeder had occupied. His first action, which came as a great surprise to many, was to persuade Hitler to reverse his decision to scrap the big surface ships. Now Doenitz was responsible not only for the U-boat arm but for the whole navy, and to carry out his new role he needed Hitler's confidence. This he won by pleading the Navy case, while scrupulously avoiding meddling