Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhijñā System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta Author(s): David Lawrence

Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhijñā System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta Author(s): David Lawrence Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 165-204 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399403 . Accessed: 23/05/2013 06:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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TANTRIC ARGUMENT: THE TRANSFIGURATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE IN THE PRATYABHIJNA SYSTEM OF UTPALADEVA AND ABHINAVAGUPTA

David Lawrence

Introduction The Enlightenmentdichotomy between the detached, universally intelligibleand cogent discourse of science and philosophy on the one hand and the devout, reasonless, emotional or mystical discourse of religion on the other has greatly influencedWestern understandingsof Indian and other non-Western philosophies. Wilhelm Halbfass has observed that Indianphilosophy was excluded until recentlyfrom most Western historiesof philosophy because of its religious nature (i.e., its common purposeof facilitatingthe pursuitof salvation)as well as its situation outside the Europeanhistoricaldevelopment of Greek thought. The formerhas been viewed to contradicta "twofold concept of freedom" definitiveof philosophy: 1. a freedomfrompracticalinterests-fromsoteriological motivesandfrom interests;i.e., a "purelytheoretical"attitudein which ordinaryutilitarian knowledgeis soughtforitsown sake.

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2. a freedomfromthe gripof dogma,frommyth,and fromreligiousand other

and to thinkfor traditions; i.e., the freedomto criticize,to thinkrationally, oneself.1 Thiscriterionhas operatedequally in the exclusion fromserious considerationof other non-Westernphilosophies. Though for some time abjured by most scholars of non-Western philosophies,the religion-philosophydichotomy has continued to have an insidiousinfluence in a polarizationbetween religious-historicist and philosophical researchmethodologies.2The historicistapproachostensibly overcomes the dichotomy by interpretingin terms of holistic culturalcontexts, usually reducingphilosophyto the broadlyreligiouscategories of world view and ritual-ethicalpractice. This unification is achieved, however, at the expense of the rationalistprojectof philosophy-philosophy reducedto religionas mythor ritualis no longerseen as "philosophy."3On the other hand, a lot of the best philosophical work on non-Westernphilosophieshas tended to abstractdiscussionsof problemsof language, epistemology, and ontology from their functions within religioussystems in comparingthem to analogous discussions in the West.4 I believe that the modern philosophy-religiondichotomy may be better overcome by a historicallysensitive revision of the project of philosophicalrationalismthan by a relativistor postmoderndestruction of philosophy.Lookingback, beforethe prejudicesof the Enlightenment,

PhilosophyEast& West Volume46, Number2 April1996 165-204 ? 1996 by Universityof Hawai'iPress

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a more synergisticconception of the relationof philosophicalrationality to religionis found in ourown paradigmaticGreekphilosophies.As Pierre Hadot has shown, most of these were conceived as systemsof "spiritual exercises," in that they aimed at the conversion (epistropheand metanoia) of the studentto a redemptiveunderstandingof self and universe.5 Throughoutthe long historyof Christianphilosophy and naturaltheology, there have been attemptsto use reasonto determinereligioustruths independentlyof the assumptionsof the Christianrevelation,as an instrumentof religiousconversion,or underrubricssuch as "faithseeking understanding."6In the still-developingpluralismof the contemporary academy, there has been a steady increase of effortsto create dialogue between Westernand non-Western,between religiousand nonreligious philosophies-frankly attemptingthe mediationof religiousclaims.7 This essay will examine the strong synergism between a "hardheaded" concern with philosophical justificationand intelligibilityon the one hand and soteriologyon the other, in the Pratyabhijfiworksof the tenth-and eleventh-centuryKashmirithinkersUtpaladevaand Abhinavagupta.8Buildingon the initiativeof Utpala'steacher Somananda, these two thinkerscreateda new, philosophicalinstrumentof conversion for the Trikatraditionof monistic Saivism, to which I have given the name "tantricargument."Thoughthe methodof this essay is exegetical, I hope it can contributeto constructivephilosophicalas well as historical understandingsof the relationof philosophyand religion.9 I will firstpresentthe originatingprojectof the Pratyabhijnasystem as the thinkers'effortto lead all humanityto salvation.Then I will explain some key featuresof the Pratyabhijnamethodology.Concernedto achieve greater intelligibilityfor their traditionin order to accomplish their redemptive program, the Saivas appropriatesome of the most widely accepted justificatoryproceduresof the medieval Sanskritphilosophical academy. At the same time, however, they resituatetheir philosophical discoursewithin the traditionalSaivaworldviewand homologize it to tantric praxis. Finally, I will sample some of the actual philosophicalargumentsimplementingthis method, in which the Saivas refutetheir Buddhistopponents and demonstratetheir centraltheory of the Lord'sself-recognition. OriginatingProjectof the PratyabhijnaSystem The creation of the Pratyabhijinsystem is said to ensue from the experience of salvation in the Trikatraditionby Utpaladeva.Itsexplicit purpose is to lead all humanityto the same soteriological realization. Utpaladevaexplains in the firstverse of the corpus:

East&West Philosophy

Havingsomehowbeencausedto obtainservitude[dasya]to the GreatLord the recogof humanity,I am establishing and desiringthe benefit[upakara] of Him,whichis the causeof obtainingall prosperity.10 nition[pratyabhijna]f

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Servitude(dasya)is a widespreadSaiva term for a state of high spiritual realization.Abhinavaguptainterpretsthis word as indicatingUtpaladeva's realization of identity (tanmayata)with the Supreme Lord."1He explains this realization in a characteristicallytantricmanner as comprisingthe attainmentof the Lord'sSelf-enjoyment(svatmopabhoga),and to obtain whateveris desired.12The recognition the freedom (svatantrya) (pratyabhijfn)that Utpaladevawishes to convey is the very same realization of identitywith Siva, which might be expressed "Indeed I am that very Lord."13This again includes the Lord's omnipotence and bliss.14Itsdesignationas recognitionarticulatesthe Saivas'actual philosophical theory,which will be taken up later. The word "humanity"(jana)addressesthe sastraicquestion of eligibility for studying the system. Abhinavaguptainterpretsthe term as indicating "those who are afflicted by incessant birth and death" and who "as objects of compassion, should be helped."15He explains that Utpaladeva'sgeneral referencemeans that there is no restrictionregarding those who are eligible, not even of caste.16 It is unlikelythat Utpaladeva and Abhinavaguptareally believed that all humanitywould read these texts composed in the elite language of Sanskrit.Nevertheless, I believe that we should extend the hermeneuticcharityof taking the Saivas seriously as intendingtheir work to be of benefit to people outside their tradition.'7This intentionis crucial to the discursivemethodology thatthey develop. The PratyabhijhaMethodology Because the Pratyabhijiasastraattemptsto bringabout salvation, it in is numerous places described as a spiritualmeans or path (upaya, marga, patha). Abhinava describes the Pratyabhijhaas a specifically Trikamethod,as "a means for the goal of the Personwho is the Witness, who is none otherthan Anuttara."18 Anuttara,'not having a superior',is one of the importantTrikadesignationsfor UltimateReality.Utpaladeva refersto the means taught by Somanandaand himself as a "new, easy path." Abhinava'sexplanation of the path's novelty is interesting.He states that "[the word] "new" signifies that it is contained in all the sacredtexts but not well known because of concealment."19Abhinavais here giving the common hermeneuticdevice of groundinginnovationin the implicitor potentialsignificanceof a traditiona distinctivelytantric character of secrecy. In various places the Pratyabhijia is described specifically as a means working through knowledge (jnanopaya).20

The Pratyabhijfathinkers'understandingof the manner in which this means works is remarkablycomplex. They appropriateprocedures of philosophical justificationfrom outside their traditionwhile at the same time reinterpretingthem with their own symbolic and practical resources.21In this section I will first present theological and meta- David Lawrence 167

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physical considerationsadduced by them that in the highestperspective controvertthe possibility of any methodology regardingthe Supreme Lord.Then I will turnto the Saivas'appropriationof the classic justificatory methods of Nyaya. I will show how, at the same time they utilize these methods of detached rationaldiscourse, they homologize them with proceduresof tantricpraxis. Negations of Methodology. The Saiva formulationsof procedure are immediatelyinterruptedby reflectionsupon what I would describewith our own terminology-as a fundamentalreligious problematic.I would describethis problematicmost broadlyas the possibilityor utility of any finite human behavior,whether linguistic,aesthetic, theological, devotional, ritual, and so on, for expressing, affecting, or attaininga religious Ultimate Reality.22For the Pratyabhijnathis human-Ultimate "structural"issue has two aspects-coming from its nature as both a theistic and a fully monisticsystem. First,Siva is the omnipotent deity, responsiblefor everythingthat occurs.23How can a limitedhumanbeing bringabout identificationwith Him? Abhinavaguptadiscusses the familiar questions of divine will, grace, and finite humanaction in severalof his works.He acknowledges thatone may considerthe mostfavorableconditionsfor,or actionsof, an aspirantfor salvation.At the same time, he statesemphaticallythat in the ultimate perspective salvation is entirely accomplished by the divine will. The favorable conditions do not in any way cause the grace of Siva.24

Abhinava makes the same argumentat various places in the Pratyabhijnatexts, althoughnot at length.Thus he takes this issue up when explainingthe use of the causativein the gerund"havingbeen caused to attain"(asadya)in Utpaladeva'sintroductoryverse quoted above. Abhinava explains that the Lord does everything. His grace is therefore unattainableeven by means of hundredsof wishes. It is because of the obfuscationof its real naturethatactualcausationby the Lordappearsas ordinaryobserved causal relationships,such as the relation between means and goal (upayopeyabhava),accomplisher and accomplished and that which makes known and that (nispadyanispadakabhava), which is made known (jnapyajfnpakabhava). According to Abhinava, the unconditionednatureof the Lord'sgrace is indicatedby the adverb "somehow" (kathamcit)modifying"havingbeen caused to attain."25 It is to the second aspect of the human-Ultimatestructuraltension thatthe Pratyabhijna thinkersdevote most of theirreflection.At the same time thatthe UltimateRealityis understoodin "super-"personaltermsas the deity Siva, ratherthan as an impersonalprinciple,it is understoodto contain all realityin a pure unity. Ifthe UltimateRealityis nondual,the East&West structureand cognitive presumptivenessof its realizationmust be funPhilosophy 168

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damentallydifferentfromordinaryexperience, which comprisesdichotomies between subject and object, and between differentsubjects and objects, and takes place as a process in time. It would be impossible for Him to be a mere cognitive object (prameya)establishedby sastraic discourse. The Saivas develop the AdvaitaVedantinconcept of self-luminosity to explain how Siva always already has a nondual real(svaprakaSatva) of ization Himself.26Puttingtheirconvoluted discussionsof this concept in a more linearfashion,the thinkersdeny that(1) any cognizer (pramatr) could have (3) any cognition (prama,pra(2) by any means (pram.ana) miti) or proof (siddhi)-of which the object (prameya)is the Supreme Lord.LikeAdvaita,they explain the operationof the sastranegativelyas only removing the ignorance of this self-luminosity.27The following explanationby Abhinavaguptabringstogetherthis point with the other negation of methodology in termsof divine omnipotence; it is the Lord who both creates and removes His self-concealment: Nothingnew is accomplished.Nor is what is reallynot shining[aprakasathe supposition[abhimanana] that mana]illuminated[prakagyate]. [Rather] whatis shiningis notshiningis removed.Forliberation, whichis the attainmentof thestateof theSupremeLord,is nothingbutthe removalof that[false The cycle of sufferingin rebirth[samsara]is nothingbut the supposition]. of liberation arein nonremoval of that.Bothof these[conditions andrebirth] essence only supposition.And both are manifestedby the BlessedOne.28

The Pratyabhijnathinkers'denials of the efficacy of humanthought and action, like other such qualificationsin the world's religions,do not prevent them from engaging in elaborate positive discussions of methodology. These negative formulationsmay accordingly be taken as "dialectically complicating"their more positive descriptions.What is importantfor us is that in delimitingtheir new philosophicalprocedures fromthe point of view of UltimateReality,the thinkersare fromthe start carefully preserving their intratraditionalintegrity.Though the Saiva soteriologicalrealizationwill be entered into the game of methodologically detached interreligiousdebate, it is alreadythe winner. PositiveFormulationsof Methodology:(a) ThePursuitof UniversalIntelligibility:TheMethodologicalStandardsof Nyaya. It is the Pratyabhijina thinkers'goal of sharingthe Trikaspiritualvision with all humanitythat motivates their development of a philosophical method. For, in order that those outside theirtraditionmay accept it, its validitymust be intelligibleto them. The Saivaeffortin this respecthas its parallelin the more rationalisticstrainof Westernphilosophicaltheology and philosophyof religion. The Catholictheologian David Tracyhas analyzed the discourseof philosophicaltheology, which he calls fundamentaltheology, in a man- DavidLawrence 169

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ner addressing problems of cross-cultural/interreligious interpretation and rationality.Philosophicaltheology is primarilyaddressedto, follows the standards,and addressesthe substantiveconcerns of the academy. Thus,althoughit may argueon behalfof a particularreligioustradition,it is methodologicallydetached from the religious and ethical commitments and presumptionsregardingtruthof other formsof theology (systematic and practical): In termsof modesof argument,fundamental theologieswill be concerned to providearguments thatall reasonablepersons,whether"reliprincipally giouslyinvolved"or not,can recognizeas reasonable.Itassumes,therefore, the mostusualmeaningof publicdiscourse: thatdiscourseavailable(inprinciple)to all personsand explicatedby appealsto one's experience,intelliand responsibility, and formulatedin argumentswhere gence, rationality claimsare statedwith appropriate warrants,backingsand rebuttalprocedures.29 We may say that in the broadsastraic"academy,"there also developed a "philosophydivision,"analogousto those in the West and other cultures.Inthis sphere,the diverseschools of Hinduism,Buddhism,and Jainismhave attemptedto argue for their positions not simply by citing scripturalauthoritybut by using reasoning (yukti, tarka,etc.).30 Each school maintainedits own "intratraditional" point of view about what it was doing, whether it was apologetics to convert, means to allay the doubtsof theirown followers,or spiritualexercise. Though differences always remained, there emerged a number of convergences about methods and experientialand rationalcriteriafor philosophicaljustificationspanningthe variousIndianschools. The most widely accepted argumentativestandardsin Indiawere those developed by the Nyaya-Vaisesikatradition.Gautamasummarizedthese standards in sixteen categoriespertainingto philosophicaldiscussionat Nyaya Sutra 1.1, and these were elaborated with ever greatersophisticationin latercommentaries.31 Thoughin the truestperspectivethe Pratyabhijha systemdoes not do anything,when it comes to positive discussions of philosophical methodology, Abhinavaguptaassertsthat it adheresto the standardsof Nyaya: "Thereis the correctnessonly of the method of the Naiyayikasin the condition of Maya."32He explains the very power of the systemto convince otherson the basis of its addressingthe Nyaya categories: Theultimatepurposein that[9astra] is nothingbut [explanation in termsof] the sixteencategories,such as the meansof cognition[pramana], and so on.... Whenthe sixteencategoriesarearticulated another [niropyamanesu], is madeto understand completelythatwhichis to be understood.33 The sixteen Nyaya categoriesenumeratea varietyof concernswhich East&West must be addressed in philosophical discussions. They refer to items Philosophy 170

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of differentorders and are somewhat overlappingin their significance, and objects includingthe broadtopics of means of knowledge (pramarna) of knowledge (prameya),roughly correspondingto our fields of epistemology and ontology;a classificationof types of philosophicaldebates and of the criteriaoperativein this classification;and an enumerationof the formal requirementsof a well-rounded philosophical discussion.34 Within the Naiyayikas'own soteriological project, the categories are oriented toward the comprehensionof particularobjects of knowledge (prameya).Knowledge of and the elimination of error regardingrelevant objects of knowledge, particularlyas pertainingto what is and is not the true self, leads to detachment and liberationfrom sufferingin rebirth.35 The Nyaya categories are in various ways explicitly and implicitly addressed in the Pratyabhijnasystem. However, two categories receive the greatestemphasis in the constructionof the Pratyabhijnaphilosophical method. We will now examine how these categories are appropriated.I will devote the greatestattentionto the most importantof these, the schema for argument(avayava).Then I will more brieflyexplain the Saivas'treatmentof the Nyaya categoryof doubt (samsaya).In takingup each category,we will firstconsider how it is utilized in the Pratyabhijna effortto achieve more universalintelligibility.Thenwe will observe how the employment of each in the Pratyabhijnais given its deepest significance as spiritualexercise, by its homologization both with earlier patternsof tantricpraxis and with a particularclassification of praxis developed by Abhinava. In each case I will present only the minimum substanceof the Pratyabhijna argumentsnecessaryto get a programmatic understandingof theirmethod;I will give an idea of the actualarguments in the last section. PositiveFormulationsof Methodology:(b) PhilosophicalRationalization with the Nyaya Schema for Argument:Inferencefor the Sake of Others. The Nyaya category most emphasized by Abhinavaguptais the schema for argument (avayava).This schema presents the steps of the Nyaya In Indianphilosophy 'inferencefor the sake of others' (pararthanumana). there is a distinctionbetween two types of inference,that for the sake of oneself (svarthanumana)and that for the sake of others. The latter is given a rigorouslyexplicit formulationin orderto make logical justification from experientialand conceptual evidence assessable by any critical person.Abhinavaexplainsthat sastra"hasthe natureof an inference Its intelligibilityresults for the sake of others (parararthanumana)."36 directlyfrom its being constructedaccordingto the Nyaya category: Whatis the purposewith respectto the other?This [work]is for comprehensionby the other.Andthereis thatfromthe inferencefor the sake of others.... It has been explainedby the founderof Nyaya,Aksapada,that DavidLawrence 171

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every academic text [sastra] apartfrom scripturereally consists of the inference for the sake of others,and [thus]bringsabout complete comprehension by the other.37

I will firstoutline the Nyaya inferencefor the sake of others, using the common example of the inferenceof fire fromsmoke. This inference has five steps and five terms.38In the following, the numbereditems are the steps; the other expressions given are the terms.39(1) Thesis (pratijna):There is fire on the hill. The hill is the subject (paksa)of the inference.The fire is thatwhich is to be established(sadhya)pertainingto it. (2) Reason (hetu):Because there is smoke. The smoke itself, like the inferentialstep that invokes it, is also designatedwith the word 'reason' (hetu).It is a propertyfound in the subject, and known to be concomitantwith that which is to be established.As such it is the justificationfor the inference. (3) General principle with exemplification (udaharana): Where there is smoke there is fire, like in the kitchenand unlikeon the lake. This step explains the concomitance underlyingthe reason. The kitchen is the positive example illustratingthe concomitance (sapaksa). The lake is the negative example (vipaksa),showing that the property does not have concomitance with a class wider than that which is to be established.(Thisterm is usuallynot cited by the Saivas.)(4) Application (upanaya):The hill, because it has smoke on it, has fire on it. This step explicitlyassertsthatthe subjectfalls within concomitance shown by the previousstep. (5) Conclusion (nigamana):Thereforethere is fire on the hill. This repeatsthe thesis as established. We mustnow get a programmaticunderstandingof the Pratyabhijha version of this inferenceabstractedfromthe technical details of the theories which actuallyarticulateit. The propositionwhich the Pratyabhijia inference demonstratesis that of the soteriologicalrecognition,that is, that one is identicalwith the Lord.40The subject (paksa)of the thesis is the person, and what is to be established(sadhya)is that he or she is the Lord. The justificationfor the connection between the subject and what is to be establishedis made by the reasonstep in the inference.Thisstep is supposedto identifya quality(the reason term)in the subject,which is knownto be invariablyconcomitantwith thatwhich is to be established. The most distinctivefact known about Siva is expressed in the cosmogonic myth.That is, Siva emanatesthe universethroughHis power and consort Sakti,whose identitywith Himselfis describedas sexual union. The reason in the Pratyabhijiainferenceis preciselythatthe individualis the actor in the cosmogonic mythof emanation. The Saivas articulatethis reason, that the individualis emanatorof the universe, throughtheir actual technical philosophical discussions. East&West They also describe it with a variety of ad hoc figurativeexpressions, Philosophy 172

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some of which will be seen below. However, in programmaticdiscussions of Pratyabhijhamethodology, they give it two chief expressions, which we will take up presently.The firstexpression of the inferential reason is simplythatthe individualpossesses Sakti.As Utpaladevastates in the second verse of the sastra: Thisrecognition of Him,who thoughexperiencedis not noticeddue to the forceof delusion,is madeto be experiencedthroughthe revealingof [His] Sakti[Saktyaviskarana].41 In this formulation,SaktiHerselfis the reason as constituentterm of the reason step.42

In technical philosophical discussions, Sakti is often divided into special modalitiesthat designateSiva'semanatorypower as operativein the respectivespheresof explanation.The two most encompassingforms of Saktiare the Cognition(jfnana) Saktiand the Action (kriyj)Sakti,which are invoked in the fields roughly correspondingto epistemology and ontology.43These two are furtherdivided into a numberof Saktispertainingto subsidiarytopics.44 Speakingabstractly,the demonstrationthat the individualpossesses the emanatorySaktioperative in a particularsphere is made by an idealistic reductionof all its featuresto modalitiesof his or her subjectivity. This is broughtout in a concise formulationby Utpaladeva: Thereis the establishment of insentiententitiesas groundedin [pratistha] The life of livingbeingsis maintained to be the livingbeings[jTvadasraya]. [Saktisof] CognitionandAction.45 Abhinavaguptaexplains that by "living beings" Utpaladevameans subjects (pramatr).These include all apparently limited subjects, from a worm to the gods Brahmaand Sadasiva.The system demonstratesthat the very existence of objects is the subject's exercise of cognition and action over them.46 The conception that one is the emanator of the universe, which formsthe inferentialreason, is also describedas a special kindof insight PureWisdom is the awarenessthat called PureWisdom (Suddhavidya). one is the source emanatingall objective realityas identicalwith oneself. Thisawarenessis given the typical linguisticexpression"Iam this" (aham idam).47Accordingto Abhinava,the following statementby Utpaladeva explainswhy this wisdom (vidya)is pure: Thingswhichhavefallento the levelof objectsof cognitionandare understoodintheconditionof "this"areessentiallyconsciousness[bodha];andare [throughPureWisdom]seen as they reallyare.48

Such knowledge is pure because it is an awareness of the ostensible essential natureof objects as one's emanation.49 DavidLawrence

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The third step of the inference states the concomitance of Siva with His character as emanator, that is, Sakti, and so on, and gives examples demonstrating this concomitance. The fourth explicitly asserts that the individual falls within this concomitance. The conclusion reiterates the thesis that the individual is actually the Lord. The entire inference will be further clarified by the presentation and explication of some informal summaries of it by Abhinavagupta. In our first summary, the reason is formulated directly in terms of the Cognition and Action modalities of Sakti. Two supporting examples are mentioned: the LordSiva Himself, as known in sacred literature, and the king, who like the Lord Siva, knows and acts over all his subjects. Abhinava explains: The subject [pramatr],because he is endowed with the Cognitionand Action Saktis,is to be understood[vyavahartavyal as the Lord,like the Lordwho is well known in the Puranas,scriptures,and so on. Even if He is not well known [fromsuch texts], Lordshipis establishedto have the natureof the possessionof the Cognitionand Action Saktisover all objects. For [Lordship] is invariablyassociatedwith nothingbut these [two Saktis].Thusthe logical concomitance is understood in the case of one such as a king, who is regardedas Lord.Likethe king, one is the Lordover so much as one is the cognizer and doer. It is contradictoryto the natureof one who is not the Lord to be a cognizer and a doer. And the Self is cognizer and doer with regardto is established.50 everything.Thusrecognition[pratyabhijfna] This may be put formally as follows: (1) The subject is the Lord. (2) Because he/she has the Cognition and Action Saktis. (3) Whoever has Cognition and Action Saktis is Lord. Like the Lord known in the Puranas and scriptures, and like the king. (4) The subject, since he/she has them, is the Lord. (5) The subject is the Lord. The following example is similar to that just given but describes the relationship of individual and universe in terms of dependence: "He who is depended on somewhere is the Lord, like a king over his domain. So does the universe [depend on] you."51 Formally: (1) You are the Lord. (2) Because the universe depends on you. (3) He/she who is depended on somewhere is the Lord. Like the king over his domain. (4) You, on whom the universe depends, are the Lord. (5) Therefore, you are the Lord. Several expressions by Abhinavagupta do not even mention the Lord as the inferential predicate but establish that the individual has divine status in other ways. Thus the following demonstrates that one is the pervader of the universe because he/she contains it:

PhilosophyEast& West

That in which somethingmanifestsis the pervader[vyapakah]of so much, like a casket regardingjewels. The universe, beginning with the earth and ending with Sadasiva,as has been explainedby the sastra,[manifests]in you who have the natureof consciousness.52

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We analyze: (1) You are the pervaderof the universe.(2) Because in you there is the manifestationof the universe. (3) That in which something manifestsis the pervaderof so much. Likea casket regardingjewels. (4) You, in whom the universe manifests,are the pervaderof the universe. (5) Therefore,you are the pervaderof the universe, beginning with the earthand ending with Sadasiva. I hope these examples have given a sufficientgeneral view of the Pratyabhijfnmethodologicalprogramas structuredby the Nyaya inference for the sake of others.53By submittingtheir soteriologicalvision to this academic regimen, the Saivas are in a sense suspending their assumptionsof its validity in orderto demonstrateits cogency on extratraditionalgrounds.54 Positive Formulationsof Methodology: (c) The Encompassmentof the Inferencefor the Sake of OtherswithinTantricPraxis.At the same time, thinkers understandwhat they are doing with this the Pratyabhijina inference in intratraditionalterms. From this perspective, the Pratyabhijnaformulationof the Nyaya inferencegets its deepest significance as following the patternsof earlierand contemporaneoustantricpraxis. To proceed, the approachto Siva throughSaktior other representations of His emanatorypower is an ancient and pervasive tradition.55 Some of the most importantexpressions of this approach are found in Kramatantrism,where a numberof ritualsand contemplationsaim to give the aspirantthe realizationof himself as the Lordover circles of There was also a later developSaktis in the form of Kalis (gakticakra). ment of approachesto Siva throughHis emanation in the formof 'creative vibration'(spanda).56 I will cite two examples of an approach to Siva through his emanation prescribedin the scriptureVijnanaBhairava,which vividly present the traditionalbackgroundto the Pratyabhijnainference: There is always nondifferencebetween Saktiand the possessorof Sakti [i.e., Siva]. Since She is thus the possessor of His qualities, She is the Supreme [para]Sakti of the Supreme Self [paratman].[Similarly]the burningpower [sakti]of fire is not considered to be differentfrom fire. There is this [the analysisof powerand possessorof power]only as a beginningin enteringinto the state of knowledge. If one who has entered into the condition of Sakti would meditateon their nondifference,he would come to have the natureof Siva. Siva'sconsort [Saivi]is explained here to be the door. Dear,just as differentplaces, and so on, are cognized by meansof the lightof a lampand the raysof the sun, so is Siva [cognized]by means of Sakti.57 The second passage is even more interesting. This passage refers to Siva's character of emanating the world without using the word "Sakti." However, it mentions the two fundamental modalities of Sakti, Cognition and Action, which organize the Pratyabhijnatexts:

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One can become Siva from the firm conviction: "The SupremeLordis allcognizer [sarvajfia],all-doer [sarvakartr],and pervasive. I, who have the qualities [dharma]of Siva, am none but He. Justas the waves belong to the water,the flames belong to a fire, and lightbelongs to the sun, these waves58 of the universebelong to Bhairava,who is none but me."59 This contemplation is remarkably similar to the later Pratyabhijna inference. One understands oneself as Siva because of having his distinctive character of emanation.60 The use of the Nyaya category has only elucidated the "rationality" already contained in a traditional practice. The post-Abhinavagupta commentator Sivopadhyaya, looking backwards through the philosophical interpretation, explicitly identifies this passage as describing the contemplation of Pratyabhijna.61 The spiritual significance of the Pratyabhijna inference is not limited to its reenactment of earlier tantric practices. This inference fits within one of the classifications of spiritual means, systematized by Abhinavagupta in his Tantralokaand Tantrasara,called the sakta upaya.62 As I have just observed, the commentator Sivopadhyaya identifies the lastquoted passage of the Vijnana Bhairava as describing the contemplation of Pratyabhijna. In the same explanation, he also classifies this contemplation within the sakta upaya.63 The two programmatic formulations of the conception that is the reason step in the Pratyabhijna inference, the revealing of Sakti and Pure Wisdom, are in fact the most definitive methodological themes of the sakta upaya. Thus the special importance of the revealing of Sakti in this upaya is indicated by its very name.64 As Navjivan Rastogi has explained: The element of Sakti permeatesall these three in varying measuresand is characterizedvariouslyas gross,subtle,ultimate,etc., as the case may be. But it is the superabundanceof Sakti because of which this Upaya is called Sakta.65 It is in the chapters of the Tantralokaand Tantrasarapresenting the sakta upaya that Abhinavagupta develops a Trika appropriation of the Krama procedure of meditating on one's Lordship over circles of Saktis.66 Abhinava describes the revealing of Sakti in the sakta upaya in terms of the same modalities of Cognition and Action that are the foci of the Pratyabhijnaarguments: There is the condition of conceptual constructionsin the sakta [means]. In that [state], [the Saktis of] acting and cognizing are evident. However, accordingto the previous reasoning,there is a contractionof them. To the one occupied with destroyingall of this contraction,there is revealedblazing Sakti,which bringsabout the desired internalillumination.67 PhilosophyEast& West

Perhaps more distinctive than the revealing of Sakti per se is Abhinavagupta's consolidation in the sakta upaya of developing understand-

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ings of the religiousfunctionof intellectualactivity.68The sakta upayais the classificationof the means based upon knowledge (jfnanopaya).69We have already observed that the Pratyabhijnasystem is described as a means of knowledge by both Utpaladevaand Abhinavagupta. Abhinavaguptathus describes the modus operandi of the sakta upayagnoseologicallyas the 'purificationof conceptualization'(vikalpasamskara).The quintessential"tool"of the purificationof conceptualization, and thereby of the sakta upaya, is good or true reasoning (sattarka).70Reasoning was increasingly seen as a spiritual means in scripturesbeforeAbhinavagupta.Of the greatestimportancefor Abhinavagupta were the assessments of reasoning in his most revered Trika Tantra.This scriptureitself tantricizesIndian scripture,the MalinTvijaya academic traditionsin explainingthe soteriologicalrole of reasoningas the discriminationwhich encouragesthe movementfromthatwhich is to be abandoned (heya)to that which is to be pursued(upadeya).7 In his sakta upaya, Abhinavaguptaidentifiesthese two categories, respectively,with the impureand pure kindsof conceptualization.Now, the distinguishingcharacteristicwhich makes one pure ratherthan the other is whetheror not there is apprehendedthe absorptionof the objective universeinto the emanatorysubject: fromSivathese Theimpurity calledsupremeis the ideawhichdistinguishes of this [things]whichreallyhaveHimas theirnature.Purityis the destruction idea... 72

As the goal of this process, Abhinava posits a principle found in a number of Saiva cosmological schemes. This is none other than the conception with which we are alreadyfamiliar,PureWisdom,that is, the awarenessof emanationexpressed "I am this [universe]."73 Abhinava also identifies this goal of Pure Wisdom with the tool leading toward it, good reasoning:"Good reasoningis nothingbut Pure Wisdom...." 74PureWisdom may thus be understoodas the insightthat informs,and leads toward itself, the purificationof conceptualization. The following passage gives an idea of the overall process: The multitudeof things appear clearly in that jewel [the Self/Lord],who is pure,and has omnipotentfreedom[svatantra].That[conceptualconstruction] is said to be benighted [and is impure]which comprehendsdifferentiation

between[thosethings]andthe Self.However[thereis also conceptualconthe Selfas struction] havingthe natureof PureWisdom,whichcomprehends containingall objects [as is expressed]:"I am all this." This conceptual constructionhas the natureof PureWisdomand is clearlymanifest;it destroysthe mayic conceptual constructionwhich causes differentiation.75

Thus we see that both formulationsof the Pratyabhijnainferential rationaleare also the centralpracticalthemes of the saktaupaya.I do not wish to claim, however, that the upayais nothingbut the inference.The DavidLawrence 177

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two methodologicalthemes in the saktaupayainclude a varietyof other practices, including nonphilosophicalstudies of sacred scripturesand discussionsof them with gurus,and elaboratemeditationson mandalas. Abhinava formulatesthe upaya to encompass the Pratyabhijnaargumentationalong with these other practices.76 PositiveFormulationsof Methodology:(d) ThePhilosophicaland Tantric Encounterwith Doubt. We may now more briefly consider the Pratyabhijnathinkers'appropriationof one other Nyaya category, that of doubt (samsaya).Accordingto Nyaya, philosophyproceeds by firstconsideringdoubt or indecision regardinga view. It then utilizes the inference for the sake of others and other proceduresof debate to reach a justifieddecision (nirnaya).77 Most Indianphilosophical texts are structuredas a series of statements, questions, and answers expressingthe views of opponents (purvapaksa-the 'prima facie') in confrontationwith the position being established(siddhanta-the 'establishedconclusion'). In the IPKand its commentaries,the whole second chapter is devoted to an initial presentation of the views of opponents. The discussions are developed furtheras the proponentsargue their response in the remainderof the book. The Nyaya requirementfor the considerationof doubt may be taken as coming fromthe cognizance of the integralityof "otherness"to philosophical rationality.The effortto justifyone's views, or to make their ostensible validity more universallyintelligible, requiresan awareness of alternativepossibilities. Abhinavaguptaagain is explicit about the intelligibilityaccomplishedthroughthe effortof answeringdoubt: Thenatureof UltimateRealityhere[inthissystem]is explainedthroughthe of theviewsof opponentsas doubtsandthe refutation of them; consideration it is thusveryclearlymanifested.78 Given the Saivas' redemptive-apologeticproject, it should not be surprisingthat they do not understandalternativeviews as trulyviable options. They attempt to reencompass the otherness of philosophical oppositionwithin theirtraditionalcategories.This is illustratedby Abhinavagupta'sbenedictoryverse to the chapterpresentingthe views of the opponents: We pay obeisanceto Siva, who manifeststhe differentiated universeas the primafacie argument, andthen leadsit backto unityas the established conclusion.79

Here Abhinavais interpretingthe process of philosophicaldebate with the mythical understandingthat the Lordproduces both delusion and East&West revelationfor humanity.Shortlyafter this benediction, Abhinavagupta Philosophy 178

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quotes for supporta statementfrom a devotional work, the Stavacintamani of BhattaNarayana,which more generallydescribesthese acts: Homage to God [deva] who creatingthe delusion of the deluded who are within worldly existence, destroys it; and concealing the transoppositional bliss of cognition, uncoversit.80

We know that Siva ultimatelydoes everything.Nevertheless,correspondingto the mythicalidentification,the eliminationof philosophical opposition is also encompassed within tantricpractice.Thus in Abhinava's discussions of the sakta upaya, he polemically makes opponent doctrines an object of the purificationof conceptualization. He states thatthe pathto be abandoned [heya] is the means to liberationtaughtby other systems.81 Amongthose whom Abhinavamentionsare Buddhists, Blinded by maya, these Jains, Vaisnavas, Vaidikas, and Sanmkyas.82 schools lack good reasoningand do not understandthe purificationof However,throughpurifyingtheir conceptualization(vikalpasamskara).83 can be saved: those who follow other schools reasoning, Even one who [because of karma]has developed within those [wrongsystems] can come to be discriminatingabout his risingjudgments[paramarsa]. Due to the excellence of PureWisdom, he is purifiedby the descent of Sakti [saktipata,a way of describingmysticalgrace], and ascends the good path, fromwhich the obstacles have been removed.84

In one of his final comments in the IPV,Abhinavaassertsthat the Pratyabhijnasastramakes the views of variousother systems help bring about the recognitionof the Self, as the sun unitesthe essences (rasa)of earthand waterforthe nourishmentof grains.85Fromthe Saivas'point of view, they are purifyingconceptualizationsto reflecttheir tantricmetaalso has a rhetoricalconsequence. As will physics.Thisself-understanding be illustratedin the next section, the Saivas' argumentsattemptthoroughly to subvertthe views of theiropponents in establishingtheirown. The Implementationof TantricArgument The explanationof the Pratyabhijinmethodologythat has just been given has been confined to formulationsof a programmaticnature.To understandit more deeply, we mustturnto theirtechnical philosophical discussions. It is not possible to presenta detailed analysis of such discussions here. Iwill only give an overviewof the chief implementationof the Saiva method in the arenaof epistemology,that is, the philosophyof the recognitionof the Lord.86 The Challenge of the BuddhistLogicians.Followingprotocol, we must first turn to the challenge of the Saivas' opponents. Though they deal with variousrivals,the Saivas'chief opponentsare the school now often called "Buddhist logic," which was founded by Dignaga and most DavidLawrence 179

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Buddhistlogic develops two influentiallyinterpretedby Dharmakirti.87 of Buddhism-on the transitorinessof all soteriologicalemphases early things and on the dangers inherentin speculation-into a critical philosophythat has often been comparedwith the phenomenalismof David Hume. Buddhistlogic formulatesa radicaldistinctionand disaccordbetween (1) a series of evanescent flashes of direct perception lacking all conceptualization (nirvikalpakajnana)-of evanescent svalaksanas, 'selfcharacterized','unique particulars',or 'point instants'and (2) cognition, which includes vikalpa(i.e., savikalpakajnanna), that is, all imaginative, conceptual, and linguistic interpretation,which synthesizes the unique particularsinto ostensible objects characterizedby universals (samanyalaksana).Now, while the Buddhistsacknowledge that this interpretationhas a kind of provisionalvalidityfor ordinarybehavior in the world, they contend that it is ultimatelyunfoundedin immediateexperience and is invalid.88 In polemics spanningseveral centuriesbefore the Pratyabhijfisasthe tra, Buddhistlogiciansattemptedto refuteor "deconstruct"as invalid generalizationsof evanescent experiences many of the commonsensical and religiously significant conceptions held by the Hindu schoolsexternalobjects, ordinaryas well as ritualaction, an enduringSelf, God, the sacred languageof revelation,and so forth.A particulardevelopment in the debates was crucial in defining the immediateintellectualproblematics which the Pratyabhijfinthinkersattemptedto resolve in their philosophical theology. The entire process of interpretingexperience came to be viewed by both Buddhistsand Hindusto be epitomized in the experience of recognition(pratyabhijfin). Recognitionin ordinarylife is understoodas the realizationthat an object of a presentexperience is the same as an object of a past experience, as retainedin the memory. It has the typical expression "This is that." The same process actually occurs in all applications of interpretationto experience. In our memory are stored the semantic conWe ventions (samketa)regardingthe words thatwe use in interpretation. mnemonic imrelevant the to when apply interpretations experience of all are activated. Thus, applications interpretapressions (samskara) tion, which in contemporaryWestern philosophy are described as "seeing as," came to be understoodas comprisingthe "This is that" structureof a very generalsortof recognition.89 The Buddhistsclaimed that this process of recognition is invalid. They arguedthat memory has no epistemic relevance to presentdirect experience. Their most energetic Hindu opponents, the realistschools of Nyaya-Vaisesikaand Purva MTmamsa,argued that our recognitive seeing-as is grounded in, and elucidates, a world of genuinely indeWest East & Philosophy pendentobjects possessing intrinsicqualities.90 180

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Now it is possible to appreciatewhy the Saivasformulatethe soteriological realizationthat they wish to convey as a kind of recognition. They deliberatelyset it up as having the recognitivestructureof interpretationthat has been problematizedby the Buddhists.In this regard, I must also point out that in Indian philosophy inference itself, as an interpretation,was understoodto operate througha kind of recognitive pratisamdhana).Inferenceis the application judgment (lihgaparamarsa, of the knowledge-or memory-of a concomitance to a case presently at hand.91Forthe Pratyabhijna,we have a memoryfrom scripturesand other sources of the LordSiva as causing the emanationof the universe, possessing Sakti, and so on. One applies this memory to the direct experience of one's own self, as is expressed in the statement"IndeedI am that very Lord."92 The Saivas' interpretationof the challenge of the Buddhiststo their soteriological recognition is oriented toward the structureof the Pratyabhijna inference for the sake of others.93The Buddhistsattack the overarchingrecognitionby attackingthe recognitionsof the inference's key terms along with their entailments:Self; Cognition as a faculty, which it mustbe to be a Sakti;Action as enduringprocess,again which it must be to be a Sakti;and the very possibilityof relation,which Cognition and Action would have to have with the Self in orderto be Saktis. The Buddhistcontention is that, as there are no groundsfor recognizing these categoriesin the flux of unique particulars,there are no groundsfor the Saiva soteriologicalrecognition.94 The Saiva Response to the Buddhists.How do the Saivas answer this sweeping doubt, metaphysicallysubvert Buddhistlogic, and establish the inference leading to the soteriological recognition?Their response may be understoodas a highly creative development of the thought of the fourth-to-sixth-century Bartrhari linguistic philosopher Bhartrhari.95 had interpretedthe Vedic revelationmetaphysicallyas the Word Absolute (sabdabrahman) or SupremeSpeech (paravak).96 This principle is a and superlinguisticplenum containing language reality in a unity and into the universe of and words emanating separated objects. Bhartrhari's postulation of this principle as the source makes the entire universe of experience inherently linguistic, and thus provides the ground for the re-connection of words and objects in conventional linguistic reference.97 His basic position is diametricallyopposed to that of the Buddhists.98

Utpaladevaand AbhinavaguptainterpretSupremeSpeech as Siva's very self-recognition(ahampratyavamarsa).99 apExtendingBhartrhari's to the new proach problematics,they explain theircosmogonic myth of Siva emanating the universe throughSakti as this process of His selfDavid Lawrence recognition.As Abhinavaguptaputs it:

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The SupremeLord,who has the natureof awareness,makesHis own Self into an object of cognition,even though it is not an object of cognition, because the Cognizer is unitary.... As He recognitivelyapprehends[paramrsati]His Self, so, because everythingis containedwithin Him, He appearsas blue, and so on.100

The emanationof the recognitionsof discrete objects such as "blue" is understoodas a kind of fragmentationof the Lord'sself-recognition.In this process, there is firstthe pure monistic self-recognition"I." Then there is a recognition involving a partial differentiationof objectivity fromsubjectivity,havingthe structurewe know as PureWisdom,that is, "I am this." Finally,there is the loss of the awarenessof the "I" in the recognition of apparentlyseparate objects as "This," or, more fully, "Thisis that,""Thisis blue," and so on.101 Siva's self-recognitionis, of course, the very realizationthat the Saithinkers'ascriptionof a vas aim to convey to humanity.The Pratyabhijna primordial,cosmogonic statusto it is of great importin their arguments with the Buddhists.Theyare therebyable to arguethattheirsystem'sgoal constitutesthe veryfactsthatthe Buddhistssay preclude it. As the Saivas' speculation alleges the necessity of the Lord'sself-recognitionas the underlyingrealityof the basic epistemologicaland ontological facts, it may be classifiedas a highlyambitiousformof transcendentalinquiry.'02 Accordingto the Saivas,just as the Lord'sself-recognitionemanates into the recognitionsof apparentlydiscreteobjects, it emanates into different types of experiences of such objects. The chief among these are perceptualcognition, memory,and conceptual exclusion (apohana).In theirtreatmentof epistemology,Utpaladevaand Abhinavaguptaattempt to reducethese processesas well as theirostensibleobjects to modalities of Siva'sself-recognition.103 Here it will be possible to give a briefsummaryof the Saivas'treatment of only one topic of epistemology,which, I believe, is most representative: perceptual cognition. The Saivas' argumentson perceptual cognition may be roughlydivided into those centered on the term prakasa and those centered on the term vimarsaand its cognates such as pratyavamarsa, paramarsa,and so on. Thoughcontemporaryscholarship has given much attentionto these terms,I do not believe there has been a basic appreciationof the way the discussionsemployingthem function to articulatethe Saivas'argumentativeand redemptiveagendas of leading studentsto the soteriologicalrecognition.104 Prakaga,'light, illumination'or 'awareness', has the philosophical significance, preliminaryto the Saivas' argumentsabout it, of a kind of subjective awareness that validates each cognition, so that one knows that one knows.'05The thrustof the argumentsabout prakasais idealistic.106The Saivascontend that, as no object is known withoutthis valEast & West Philosophy idatingsubjectiveawareness,this awarenessconstitutesall objects: 182

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If the object did not have the nature of awareness [prakasa],it would be without illumination[aprakasa], as it was before [its appearance].Awareness [prakasa] cannot be different[thanthe object]. Awareness[prakasata]is the essential natureof the object.107 Nor can objects external to awareness be inferred as the causes of the diversity of awareness. For inference can only be made regarding things which have already been experienced, and not objects which by definition can never have been experienced.'08 Furthermore, the Saivas contend that one could never experience another subject outside one's own awareness. However, their conclusion is not solipsism as usually understood in the West, but a conception of a universal awareness: Even the cognition of others is nothing but one's own Self. Otherness is entirely due to accidental attributes[upadhi]such as the body, and so on. And that [an accidental attributesuch as the body] has been determinednot to be other [thanawareness].Thus everythingfalls underthe categoryof the subject. The subject is really unitary.And He alone exists.... Therefore, beginningwith "BhagavanSadasivacognizes" and ending with "Theworm cognizes"-there is only one subject. Consequently,all cognitions [by apparentlydifferentsubjectsreally]belong to that [one] subject.109 The term vimarsa and its cognates have the significance of a judgment with a recognitive structure.110The arguments centering on these terms develop earlier considerations of Bhartrharion the linguisticality of experience. They refute the Buddhist contention that recognition is just a contingent reaction to direct experience, by claiming that it is integral or transcendental to it. As Utpala explains: They attest that recognitive judgment [vimarsa]is the essential nature of awareness [avabhasa]. Otherwise,awareness [prakasa], even though colored [upararakta] by the object, would be like that which is insentient,such as a and on.111 so crystal, Among the considerations the Saivas adduce for this thesis are: that children must build upon a subtle form of linguistic judgment in their learning of conventional language; that there must be a recognitive ordering of our most basic experiences of situations and movements in order to account for our ability to perform rapid behaviors; and that some kind of subtle application of language in all experiences is necessary in order to account for our ability to remember them.'12 The Saivas further elaborate their position on the transcendental nature of recognition against the Buddhists by inverting the latters' point of view on the epistemic statuses of universals and particulars. The Saivas make the recognition of universals primary, and hold that particulars are constructed at a secondary level through the synthesis of these syn-

David Lawrence

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theses. As Abhinava puts it briefly in the course of discussing another issue: It has been explained here [in the Pratyabhijia]that objects are nothingbut manifestations.They are sometimesmixed, throughthe unificationof recognitivejudgment[paramarsa],when they have the formof the particular.And sometimes they are recognitivelyjudged [paramnrsyante] as unmixed,when they have the formof the universal.113 In this explanation, the Saivas attempt to achieve a double victory. The perceptions of both sorts of entities are claimed to depend intimately on conceptualization, especially that alleged by the Buddhists to be of the most basic and discrete sense data. Now, neither the arguments about prakda nor those about vimarsa and its cognates are meant to stand alone. The idealistic prakiaa arguments make the recognition shown by the vimarsa arguments to be integral to all epistemic processes, constitutive of them and their objects. The following statement places vimarsa in the idealistic algebra: Here, as the multiplicityof thingsare recognitivelyapprehended[vimrsyate], so they exist [asti].This is so because Being [astitva]depends upon awareness [prakasa].That is, there is the manifestationof Being as depending on the recognitivejudgment[vimarsa]regardingwhat is broughtabout throughthis awareness[prakasa].... Therefore,somethingexists as much and in whatever and unsublated.114 way it is recognitivelyapprehended[vimrrsyate] Several points must now be spelled out. Since according to the prakasa arguments all experience belongs to one subject, this recognition must be His self-recognition. And, inasmuch as this self-recognition is the means by which Siva causes the emanation of the universe, it is none other than His Sakti. This identity of self-recognition and Sakti is stated very frequently: which has the natureof Lordship, The Saktiwhich is Creatorhood[kartrtva], contains all the Saktis.That [Sakti]has the natureof recognitivejudgment [vimarsa].Thereforeit is properthat only it is predominant.... As He recogHis Self, so, because everythingis contained nitivelyapprehends[paramrsatf] within Him, He appearsas [objectssuch as] blue, and so on.115 Sakti is, of course, also the reason term in the Saiva inference. In the following passage, Utpala thus places the two chief Saktis of Cognition and Action, interpreted in terms of recognition, in the position of inferential reason:

PhilosophyEast& West

He [the subject] is the Great Lordsince it is necessarilythe case that he is recognitivelyjudging [vimarsattvenaniyatena], and since that very recognitive judgment [vimarsa]is the pure Cognition and Action of God [deva]. 6

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We are led to the startlingrealizationthatself-recognition,the thesis-goal of the Saiva's inferential-ritual methodology,is identicalwith the reason thatjustifiesit. Thatis, one is inferentiallyled to the recognitionthat one is the Lord,because everythingis one's self-recognition. This may be put another way. The Pratyabhijnatreatmentsof perceptual cognitionalong with othertopics of epistemologymay be understood as a recoveryor reintegrationof the Lord'sself-recognition,which has been fragmentedinto the recognitionsconstitutingordinaryexperience. The followingtersestatementby Abhinavaguptaelucidatesas such both key formulationsof the inferentialrationaleand the sakta upaya modus operandi,that is, the revealingof Saktiand the operationof Pure Wisdom/Good Reasoningin purifyingconceptualization: 17wordand object,charThe ascertainment[adhyavasa]judges [paramrSantT acterizedby name and form,as one, in the form"Thisis that."[Thatascertainment]is the Saktiof the SupremeLord,who has the natureof recognitivejudgment [vimarsa].Itappearsonly "as the Self,"that is, nonseparatelyfrom"I." However,it never appearsas "this,"that is, as separate[fromthe Self].118

The recognitionof an objective "This"/"Thisis that" is reallythe emanatoryself-recognition"I." This fact may be expressed either as "'This' is Sakti"or with the expressionof PureWisdom "I am this."'19The primordialstatusaccorded to self-recognitionin the interpretationof Saiva emanationismhas defined the radical conclusion of it's transcendental inquiry.It is the fact that the Pratyabhijnatheory of recognitionso fully encodes the Saiva myth that makes the inquiriesthat disclose it into tantricritualthat bestows salvation. Our discovery of the identityof the reason and conclusion of the Pratyabhijnainference brings us back to the overarchingtheological negationswe considered at the beginning of the discussion of methodology. I there explained the Saivas' understandingof the Lord'sultimate nonobjectifiabilityin terms of their conceptions of grace and self-luminosity. Abhinavagives these ideas another importantarticulationin his workson practicaltheology. Above his threefoldscheme of increasingly subtle and internalmeans, he postulateswhat he calls the "nonmeans" (anupaya).This is a final stage of immediate realization involving no effortor very slighteffort. Some of Abhinava'sremarksin his discussion of this nonmeansare directly pertinentto our present considerationof the steps of the Pratyabhijin inference. More fundamentalthan but homologous to the identityof inferentialreason and conclusion is Abhinavagupta'sdenial here of the ultimatevalidityof any relationbetween a distinctspiritual means (upaya)and goal (upeya): Therelationof means [upaya]andgoal [upeya]is an illusionof grossnessof cognition.Itis the ActionSaktiwhich is the cause of bothbondageand liberation.120 David Lawrence

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What use is there with reasoningsregardingthe self-luminousprincipleof consciousness [samvittattva]?...All means [upaya], external and internal, depend upon it. How could they be means [upaya]regardingit?... [Objects of differentkindsof experience, such as] blue, yellow, and pleasureare only awareness [prakaa], that is, Siva. Since there is [reallyonly] this supreme nondualitywhich has the nature of awareness [prakasa],what relation of means [upaya]and goal [upeya]could therebe which is otherthan it?Forthat [relationof means and goal] is only awareness[prakasa].121 It is the Lord's omnipotence and self-luminous unity that preclude all relationships of distinct means and the goal. This general conception of practical theology is exemplified in the identity of reason and conclusion in the Pratyabhijna inference. From a philosophical point of view, the identity of reason and conclusion in the Pratyabhijna inference may seem to admit a vitiating circularity. Though this essay is not strictly philosophical, even its exegetic project requires that I say that I do not believe this is so. For, in the Pratyabhijna, the soteriology is not presumed but is supposed to be discovered in inquiries into common problems and following common rules of Sanskrit philosophical discourse. The Saivas' development of these inquiries required an enormous amount of creative interpretation and hard "methodologically detached" thinking. In effect, all these inquiries that they have developed constitute "reasons for the reason" that is emanation/self-recognition. From our extratraditional perspective, the circularity of the inference is thus transformed into a cognitively advancing hermeneutic circularity. It is only within the intratraditional perspective that the elaborate argumentation of Pratyabhijna sastra does not do anything. We must recur to the monistic mythical dynamics of emanation and return. Utpaladeva describes the soteriological reintegration of self-recognition through the Pratyabhijnasystem as a sort of "telos" of the phenomena of ordinary experience: of the separatedrecognitive The accomplishmentof the purpose [krtarthata] the "this"-is recognitive judgment [vimarsa]of rest judgment [vimarsa] in its own nature essential [visranti] [expressed]"I am He."122 The progress of phenomena toward self-recognition is nothing but a clarification of their nature as self-recognition. Cosmogony and teleology are the same. Thus Abhinavagupta compares the recognition constituting ordinary experience to a point of rest in a paradoxical journey between the identical origin and goal of Siva's self-recognition.

PhilosophyEast& West

Thatwhich is called recognitivejudgment[paramarsa]is the absolutelyfinal and true [paryantikameva paramarthikam] place of rest [visrantisthanam]; and it only has the form"I."Intravelingto a village, the intermediatepointof rest[madhyavisrantipadam], at the rootof a tree, is explainedto be createdas

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expectantof that [finalpoint of rest].... Thusalso blue, and so on, existingin the intermediaterecognitive judgment [paramarsa]as "This is blue," are established to consist of the Self. For they rest upon the root recognitive judgment [paramarsa] "1."123

The new Saiva philosophy, with all of its technical procedureof justification, is a path of return in a circular journey that never really departs.124 NOTES

This essay develops one of the themes in my "Argumentand the Recognition of Siva: The PhilosophicalTheology of Utpaladevaand Abhinavagupta"(Ph.D.diss., Universityof Chicago, 1992). An earlierversion of this essay was presentedin the session "Encodingand Overcodingin the Tantras"at the 22d Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison, 1993. The following abbreviationsare used in the text or the notes: BIPV IPK IPKV IPV

Bhaskar,by Bhaskarakantha, commentaryon IPV. Isvarapratyabhijnakarika, by Utpaladeva. by Utpaladeva,commentaryon IPK. Igvarapratyabhijfinkarikavrtti, by Abhinavagupta,commentaryon 1svarapratyabhijfnavimarsinT, IPK. IPW IgvarapratyabhijnafvivrtivimarsinT, by Abhinavagupta,commentary on Utpaladeva'sIsvarapratyabhijnavivrtti. SD Sivadrstiby Somananda. TA Tantraloka, by Abhinavagupta. TAV Tantralokaviveka, by Jayaratha,commentaryon TA. TS Tantrasara, by Abhinavagupta. 1 - Wilhelm Halbfass,India and Europe:An Essayin Understanding (Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress,1988), p. 157. 2 - There was an effortto create a bridge between these approaches at the Universityof Chicago Conferences on Religions in Culture and History, 1986-1989, and the resulting SUNY series, Toward a ComparativePhilosophyof Religion. For examples of several approaches,see FrancisaCho Bantly,ed., Deconstructing/ Reconstructingthe Philosophyof Religion:SummaryReportsfrom the Conferenceson Religionsin Cultureand History 1986-1989 (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Divinity School, 1990); and see FrankE. Reynolds and David Tracy, eds., Myth and Philosophy (Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress,1990), Discourseand David Lawrence

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Practice(AlbanyState Universityof New YorkPress, 1992), and Religion and PracticalReason: New Essays in the Comparative Philosophy of Religion (Albany State University of New York Press,1994). 3 - The relativistHoward EilbergSchwartzthus attemptsto destroy the universalityand normativityof philosophical rationalityprecisely by reducingit to myth. See "Myth,Inferenceand the Relativism of Reason:An Argumentfrom the Historyof Judaism,"in Reynoldsand Tracy,Mythand Philosophy,pp. 247-285.

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4 - One of the greatest pioneers of comparativephilosophy, Bimal KrishnaMatilal,did do some interpretation of religion,particularly in his later years. However, most of his work has the form described. Thus, see his most importantstudy, Perception:An Essay on Classical Indian Theoriesof Knowledge (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1986). One of the most outspoken advocates of the seriousness of Indian philosophies, Daya Krishna,has claimed that their expressed religious objectives are an excuse to legitimate intellectualspeculations. 5 - See PierreHadot,Exercicesspirituelset philosophie antique(Paris: EtudesAugustiniennes,1981). 6 - David Tracy is an heir to the traditionof Christianphilosophical theology who has made greateffortsto develop it to addressconand rationality.See his analtemporaryproblemsof interpretation ysis of the differenttypes of philosophicaland nonphilosophical theological discourse in The Analogical Imagination:Christian Theologyand the Cultureof Pluralism(New York:CrossroadPublishingCo., 1975), pp. 47-98. I will referto this analysis in interpretingthe Pratyabhijhaphilosophybelow. Also see David Tracy, "The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method,Modernity,and Post-Modernity,"TheologicalStudies50 (1989): 548-570. 7 - Scholars making such efforts are as diverse as Bimal Krishna Matilal, Michael Hayes, Paul Griffiths,Robert Neville, and Tu Wei-ming. 8 - The main textual focus of this essay will be Utpaladeva's igvarapratyabhijiakarika(IPK)and Abhinavagupta'sIgvarapratyabhijnavimarsinT(IPV).For these texts I will use the edition [gvarof Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine apratyabhijfnavimarsinT Sanskrit Text with Bhaskar, 2 vols., ed. K. A. SuRecognition: bramanialyerand K.C. Pandey(reprint,Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass, 1986). I will sometimes refer to the eighteenth-centurycommentaryon the IPV,Bhdskari,by Bhaskara(BIPV).Also withinthe

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and the Isvarapratyaessay's scope are: Utpaladeva, SiddhitrayT ed. Madhusudan Kaul KashmirSeries Shastri, bhijnakarikavrtti, of Texts and Studies, no. 34 (Srinagar:KashmirPratap Steam Press, 1921), and Abhinavagupta,lsvarapratyabhijiavivrtivimarsinm,3 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, KashmirSeries of Texts and Studies (reprint,Delhi: Akay Book Corporation,1987). The gSvarapratyabhfinakarikavrtti and ISvarapratyabhijfnavivrtivimarsinTwill henceforth be referred to as IPKV and IPVV, respectively. Thisessay will for the most parttreatthe Pratyabhijiia theories of Utpaladeva and Abhinavaguptaas an integralwhole. As is usual in foundationalverse and aphorismtexts, Utpaladeva'sIPK is densely writtenand is intendedto be expounded in subordinate commentaries. However, there is presently available only the shorterof Utpaladeva'scommentaries,centered on the IPK-the IPKV-which is mostly concerned with clarifying the basic meaning of the verses. Abhinavagupta'scommentarieshave the quality of deep and originalthought, but it is most often impossible to distinguish arguments which had direct precedent in Utpaladeva from those which either furtheror depart from his discussions. It is also in accordance with the intentions of the Indiangenre of text and commentaryto treatthem as presenting one system. 9 - I am workingon a constructivephilosophicalinterpretationof the Pratyabhijnasystem in transformingmy "Argumentand the Recognition of Siva" into a book, and in an article. 10 - IPK1.1, benedictoryverse, 1 :18. 11 - IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :17. 12 - IPV 1.1, on IPK,benedictory verse, 1 :28-29.

13 - IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :37-38. 14 - There are numerousdiscussions of the soteriologicalsignificance of the recognitionwhich the Pratyabhijinsystem aims to convey. See IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :33-34, and on this BIPV, 33-34; IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :38-39; IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :41-42; IPKand IPV3.2.11-12, 2 :256259; IPKandIPV4.1.15, 2:308; IPK4.1.18,2:315-316; and also the discussionsof the practicalcausal efficacy (arthakriya) of rec1 at IPK and 2:312-315. IPV4.1.17, ognition IPV1.1.2, :58-59; 15 - IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :32. 16 - IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :29-30; BIPVon IPV1.1, on DavidLawrence IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 : 30; IPV4.1.18, 2 :316.

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17 - On hermeneuticcharity,see Paul Griffiths,An Apology for Apologetics (Maryknoll,New York:Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 20-21. 18 - IPV1.1, introductoryverse, 3, 1 :8. 19 - IPV4.1.16, 2:309. 20 - See IPVV,1.1, 1 :16. Cf. IPVand BIPV1.1.4, 1:78; and Utpaladeva in The Sivadrstiof Srisomanandanathawith the Vrittiby Utpaladeva, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, KashmirSeries of Texts and Studies,no. 54 (Pune:AryabhushanPress,1934), 3.16, 105. Somananda'stext will henceforthbe abbreviatedas SD. 21 - In this way, the Pratyabhijhaillustrateswhat Alexis Sandersonhas called the "overcoding"by which the variousKashmiriSaiva traditions have appropriatedthe symbolismand praxisof other traditions. BrianSmithhas interpretedthis patternof appropriationin the Vedic and largerSouth Asian contexts as "encompassment" on the basis of a presumed"hierarchicalresemblance."See Brian K. Smith, Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual and Religion (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1989), pp. 46-49, 186-189. I believe that the patternis actuallya reflectionof the hermeneutic circle, necessaryto all acts of interpretation. 22 - MirceaEliadeconceptualizedthis issue in termsof historyand the transcendenceof history,as the "dialecticof the Sacred." 23 - In Saivism generally, He is said to performfive cosmic acts: the creationof the universe,the preservationof it, the destructionof it, the creationof humandelusion (which is the cause of sufferingin rebirth),and the bestowal of salvificgrace. and 24 - See the discussionof sections fromthe Tantraloka,Tantrasara, The in Debabrata Sen Sharma, Philosophyof MalinTvijayavarttika, Sadhana: WithSpecial Referenceto TrikaPhilosophyof KgamTra (Karnal,Haryana:NatrajPublishingHouse, 1983), pp. 88 ff.

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25 - IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :24-28. Cf. Sivadrsti1.1, 2. 26 - The Advaita Vedantin theory itself interpretsdiscussions in the doctrine Upanisads,and was also influenced by the MTmamsaka of the means of of the 'self-established-ness'(svatahpramanya) cognition (pramanas),as well as the Buddhistlogicians' notion of the 'validatingself-awareness'(svasamvedana)inherent in all experiences. 27- The two chief sections where Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta focus on the issue of self-luminosityare IPKand IPV1.1.1, 1: 4756, and 2.3.15-16, 2:134-139. (Abhinavaguptapoints out the connection between these discussions,in IPV2.3.15-16, 134.) Cf.

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IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :38. On ignorance/illusionin the context of self-luminosity,also see IPKand IPV1.1.2, 1 :5759; IPKand IPV2.3.17, 2:141-143. 28 - IPV2.3.17, 2:143-144.

29 - Tracy,Analogical Imagination,p. 57. See the analysis of the differences between fundamental,systematic,and practicaltheologies in terms of five rubrics,ibid., pp. 54-58. Also see the discussion focusing on fundamentaltheology, in ibid., pp. 62-64. Tracy acknowledges that, because it is produced in particular historicalsituations,the effort of fundamentaltheology is intrinsically "problematic," "uncertain," and only "partly historytranscending."See his Blessed Rage for Order:TheNew Pluralism in Theology(Minneapolis:Winston-SeaburyPress,1975), pp. 6487, and his "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived,"pp. 557-559, 567568. Cf. Paul J. Griffiths'descriptionof philosophy in its idealtypical character of transcending the limitations of historical context, as "denaturalizeddiscourse," in "DenaturalizingDiscourse: Abhidharmikas,Propositionalists,and the Comparative Philosophy of Religion," in Tracy and Reynolds, Myth and Philosophy,p. 66. 30 - I emphasize that not all sastraicdiscourse is philosophical in the sense that I have given the term here. Accordingto this criterion, even the well-knownAdvaitaVedantinthinkerSahkara,for whom reason is subordinatedto the process of exegesis of scripture,is a philosopher only on exceptional occasions. He would more accuratelybe described as a systematicand practicaltheologian or "Brahmalogian." 31 -The list is given at Nyayadarsanam:With Vatsyayana'sBhasya, and VigvaUddyotakara'sVarttika,VacaspatiMigra'sTatparya.tka and Amarendramonatha's Vrtti,ed. TaranathaNyaya-Tarkatirtha with introd.by NarendraChandraVedantatirtha han Tarkatirtha, (Delhi: MunshiramManoharlal,1985), p. 28. The paradigmatic role of the Nyaya standardsis demonstratedin the studies of Matilal. See particularly"The Nature of PhilosophicalArgument," chap. in Matilal,Perception,pp. 69-93. 32 - IPV 1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :43. Abhinava states here that he is explainingthe view of Utpaladeva.I note that we must rely on explanationsof Abhinavaguptain consideringthe relation of the Pratyabhijfi method to the Nyaya standardsof philosophical argument.Utpaladevadoes not seem directlyto treatthis issue in his available writings.Certainlythe classic philosophicalstandards are in many ways implied in his speculation, and Abhina- DavidLawrence 191

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va's formulationsare profoundlyelucidative of Utpala'sthought. We may neverthelesssee in Abhinava'sdiscussionsof the Nyaya method some of his genuine innovations. The stress here on the Saivas' use of Nyaya concerns their constructionof their philosophicalmethodology in the pursuitof universalintelligibility.I am not claimingthat the Saivasare more substantively"influenced"by Nyaya than other schools of Indian philosophysuch as Vyakarana,Buddhistlogic, Samkhya,Advaita, etc. 33 - IPV 2.3.17, 2:140.

34 - Fora good explanationof the Nyaya categories,see Matilal,Perception, pp. 71-93. 35 - According to Nyaya, it is the knowledge of the following prameyas which leads to liberation: atma, siro, indriya, buddhi, manas, pravrtti,dosa, pretyabhava,phala, duhkha,and apavarga (Nyayadarsanam1.1.9, 180). 36 - IPV2.3.17, 2:140. 37 - IPV.Cf. IPVV2.3.1 7, 3: 181-182. 38 - Therewere debates between the Indianschools about the precise numberof steps and the structureof the inferencefor the sake of others.Abhinavadismissesthe Buddhistdisputationof the number of partsas mere obstinacy(IPV2.3.17, 2 :140). 39 - This account largelyfollows the interpretationsby KarlH. Potter, ed., Encyclopediaof Indian Philosophies, vol. 2, Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology:The Traditionof Nyaya-Vaisesikaup to Gangesa(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass,1977), pp. 180-181, and Presuppositionsof India'sPhilosophies(EnglewoodCliffs,New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,1963), pp. 60-61, and by Matilal,Perception,p. 78. 40 - IPV2.3.17, 2:142-143. 41 - IPK1.1.2, 1 :57. The same idea is expressedat IPK2.3.17,2:141. Utpaladevanever explicitlymentionsthe inferencefor the sake of others in his available writings. However, his statementsfit precisely into Abhinava'sexplanation of the inference. See above, note 32.

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42 - Abhinavaexplains elsewhere that by the word "Saktis"there are indicatedthe qualities (dharma)of the Lord(IPVV2.3.17, 3:182; IPV2.3.17, 2:146). At IPVV1.5.21, 2:269, Abhinavaexplains that in differentcontextsthe same fact may be variouslyreferredto by the termsquality(dharma),Sakti,attribute(guna)and operation (vyapara).

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43 - On the lattercorrespondence,see note 124. The Saktisof Cognition and Action are also central categories of prephilosophical tantras. 44 -Thus there are the Memory (smrti)Sakti, Semantic Exclusion (apohana)Sakti, Time (kala)Sakti, and Causal-Regularity(niyati) Sakti. 45 - IPK1.1.3, 61. 46 - See IPV1.1.3, 1 :62-67; IPV1.1.4, 1: 76-77; IPV1.6.11, 1:141143. 47 - PureWisdom is discussed at IPKandIPV3.1.3-7, 2:221-232. 48 - IPK3.1.4, 2:225. Thistranslationis influencedby that of Pandey, Doctrineof Divine Recognition,3: 193. 49 - On the operationof PureWisdom in bringingabout the soteriological recognition,see IPV3.1.7, 2:230-231; and IPKand IPV 3.2.2-3, 2:246-247. 50 - IPV1.1.3, 1 :67-68. 51 - IPV2.3.17, 2:144-145. 52- IPV2.3.17, 2:145-146.

53 - Otherexpressionsof the inferenceassertthat the individualis full (pQrna)of the universe, like a treasureis of jewels; and pervades the priorand latterpartsof the universe, like the earth in relation to sprouts.See the series of expressionsat IPV2.3.17, 2: 144-146, and IPVV,2.3.17, 3:181-182. 54 - I note that Abhinava goes so far in what might be called his enthusiasmfor philosophical rationalizationas to indicate correspondences of inferentialsteps with partsof the Pratyabhijnatext. He assertsthat Utpaladeva'sintroductoryverse states the thesis, and that one of his concluding verses, IPK4.1.16, 2 :309, states the conclusion. The middle of the book expresses the "reason (hetu),and so on," i.e., steps 2 through4 (IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictory verse, 1:42-43). The Pratyabhijnathesis may only be understood implicitly within the introductoryand concluding verses, which do not at all have the style of an inferentialthesis and conclusion. Thoughthe correspondenceswith particularsections must thus not be taken too strictly,the characterizationis illuminating.The middle of the text, which is supposed to contain the reason, general principle, and application, is largely constitutedby the technical discussionsof problemsof epistemology and ontology importantto the Indian philosophical academy. DavidLawrence 193

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These discussions logically substantiatethe soteriologicalpurpose of the system articulatedin the thesis. 55 -Alexis Sandersonsuggested in a personal conversation in 1991 that this practice reflects the assimilation of Saktism within Saivism. 56 - Abhinavagupta'spupil Ksemarajagives interestinginterpretations of the revealingof Saktiin his commentarieson the SivasCtras and Krama He the of circles of Saktis Spandakarikas. explains mastery as the backgroundto practices in these texts. See SivasCtras:The Yogaof SupremeIdentity:Textof the Sctrasand the Commentary Vimarsiniof Ksemaraja,ed. and trans.JaidevaSingh (Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass,1979), 3.30, 196-197, and TheSpandakarikasof Vasuguptawith the Nirnayaby Ksemaraja,ed. and trans.Madhusudan Kaul Shastri,KashmirSeries of Texts and Studies, no. 42 (Srinagar:KashmirPratapSteam Press, 1925), 1.1, 3-8; 3.19, 74; 1.5, 19. Sanderson accepts Ksemaraja'sview about the Krama backgroundas probable;see Alexis Sanderson,"Saivismand the TantricTraditions,"in The World'sReligions,ed. StewartSutherland et al. (London:Routledge, 1988), pp. 694-695. Cf. Bhaskara'sexplanationof the process of becoming the Lordof the circle in BIPV1.8, 1 :399-400. The last passage was pointed out by NavjivanRastogi,"The Philosophyof KramaMonismof Kashmir: An AnalyticalStudy" (Ph.D. thesis, Lucknow University,1967), pp. 417-418. Thiswork also contains informationon the relation of Kramato spanda. 57 - The Vijnana-Bhairava with Commentaryby Kshemarajaand Partly by Shivopadhyaya,ed. MukundaRamaShastri,KashmirSeries of Texts and Studies, no. 8 (Bombay:Tatva-vivechakaPress, 1918), 18-21, 13-15. This translationis influenced by that of Vijnafnabhairavaor Divine Consciousness:A Treasuryof 112 Types of Yoga,ed. and trans. Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 18-21, 16-17. The passage is cited by Jayarathain The of Abhinavaguptawith the Commentaryof Jayaratha,8 Tantraloka vols., ed. MadhusudanKaulShastriand MukundaRamaShastri, KashmirSeriesof Textsand Studies,ed. R. C. Dwivedi and Navjivan Rastogi (reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1987), 1.74, 2:115. Abhinavagupta'sworkwill henceforthbe referredto as TA, and Jayaratha'scommentary,Tantralokaviveka, will be referredto as TAV. 58 - Forthis word, bhargyah, I follow Singh, Vijfnanabhairava, p. 99. East&West Philosophy

59 - Shastri, The Vijfnana-Bhairava with CommentaryPartlyby Ksheand maraja Partlyby Shivopadhyaya,109-110, 95-96.

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60 - Thisexpressioncontainsexactly the fourth,application,step of the inference, i.e, "I, who have the qualities [dharma]of Siva, am none but He." 61 - Ibid.

62 -The features of the sakta upaya treated below are discussed of AbhinavathroughoutTA4, 1:617-923, and in The Tantrasara Kashmir Series of Texts and ed. Mukunda Ram Sastri, gupta, Studies, no. 17 (reprint,Delhi: Bani Prakashan,1982), 4, 21-34. I can make only a few comments here about Abhinava'sclassificationof means of realization.The firstthree means-typesare distinguishedby operationon the levels of the Trikacosmological triads. In ascending order, these are the individualmeans (anava upaya), the means of Sakti (sakta upaya), and the means of Sambhu, a.k.a. Siva (sambhavaupaya). Above them, Abhinava posits the 'non-means' (anupaya),which designates the direct absorptioninto UltimateRealityinvolvinglittleor no effort. Some contemporary scholars have assumed that the Pratyabhijnasystem teaches the 'nonmeans' (anupaya).See, e.g., R. K. Kaw, The Doctrine of Recognition (Pratyabhijfna Philosophy), VishveshvaranandIndological Series, no. 40 (Hoshiarpur:VishveshvaranandInstitute,1967), p. 264, and MarkDyczkowski, The Doctrine of Vibration:An Analysisof the Doctrinesand Practices of KashmirShaivism,ed. HarveyAlper,SUNYSeries in the Shaiva Traditionsof Kashmir(Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1987), p. 179. Dyczkowski apparentlybases his classificationon Abhinavagupta'scitations of the authorityof Somanandaon the nonmeans, and on the lack of need for practiceafterSiva is realized. However, none of the relevantstatementsby Somanandaor Abhinavaguptastate that the Pratyabhijfnsystem works through the nonmeans.See SD 75b-6, 209; TAand TAV2.48,2 :349-350; IPV1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :31-32; IPV4.1.16, 2:311. In my opinion, the significanceof the nonmeans is closely related to that of the doctrinesof self-luminosityand divine omnipotence. The highest realization is that Siva is already realized, and this highest realizationitself is known to be broughtabout by Siva. I furtherdevelop this point at the end of the essay. The sakta upayaclassificationwas firstsuggestedto me by Pt. HemendraNath Chakravarty. This well supportedmy own analysis of practicalthemes that seemed to contradictthe nommeans classification. Pt. Chakravartyand I then spent a considerable amount of time researchingthe sakta upaya classificationof the system together. Dr. Navjivan Rastogilater informedme that he also made the sakta upaya classification.He provided me with a DavidLawrence 195

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copy of the unpublishedsecond volume of his dissertation,"The Philosophyof KramaMonism of Kashmir:An AnalyticalStudy," which elucidatesmanyconnections between the Pratyabhijiaand the sakta upaya. My understandingof the Pratyabhijhasystem in terms of the sakta upaya is thereforeindebtedto Pt. Chakravarty and Dr. Rastogi-though I have also researchedit on my own. Alexis Sandersonalso latersupportedthe sakta upaya interpretation in our personal conversation. A summary of my understandingof this issue is found in my "Argumentand the Recognitionof Siva," pp. 85-98. The chief points on this topic made in this essay are my own: the way the revealingof Saktiand Pure Wisdom in the Pratyabhijfasystem as well as the sakta upaya articulatethe same knowledgeof emanation,theirfunctionwithin an inference in the Pratyabhijnasystem, and the connections between this inferenceand the sakta upaya. 63 - See his commentaryon Vijfinna-Bhairava, 109-110, 95-96. I may have learnedof this statementfrom Dr. Rastogi. 64 - In personalconversation,Sandersondid not wish to make a special connection of the saktaupaya with the practiceof the revealing of Saktibecause this practice is so general. Boththe revealing of Sakti and the operation of Pure Wisdom actually figure in Abhinava'sotherclassifications.However,they are given thematic prominencein the sakta upaya. 65 - Rastogi,"Philosophyof Krama,"p. 388. 66 - See TA4, 3:617-923 and TS4, 21-33. 67 - TA1.217-218,2:240. 68 -Alexis Sandersonexplained in personal conversationthat an increasing valuationof knowledge is evident even in the composition of the Saiva scriptures. 69 - TAand TAV1.148, 2:186-187. On this section of the text, see Rastogi,"Philosophyof Krama,"p. 416. The fact that the sakta upaya is the means of knowledge can be understoodon the basis of its operation on the middle level of the Trikacosmic triad, which is in one version the Cognition/Knowledge(jnafna)Sakti. See Alexis Sanderson,"Mandalaand Agamic Identityin the Trika of Kashmir,"in Mantras et diagrammes rituels dans L'Hindouisme,

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ed. Andre Padoux(Paris:CentreNationalde la RechercheScientifique, 1986), p. 173 n. 9. 70 - See TAand TAV4.13,3:628-629. 71 - Sri MalinTvijayottara Tantram,ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri (Delhi: Butalaand Company,1984), 17.18-19, 114. These verses

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are quoted at TA 4.15-16, 3:630-631. The role of reasoning along with scholarlyworks (sastras)in bringingabout the discrimination between heya and upadeya is discussed in Nyayadarsanam 1.1, 1. 72 - TA4.118-119, 3:737. Cf. TA4.218-220, 3:858-859. In his definitions of purityand impurity,Abhinava is subvertingorthodox Hindu understandingof the objective realityof these qualities.For his criticismof orthodox ideas, again citing the authorityof the Tantra,also see TS4.43, 31. MalinTvijaya I should also observe here that,aside fromthe operationof the inference, Abhinava frames an elaborate discussion in the PratyabhijfnaAgamadhikaraof the sortsof subjectsexistingon different cosmological levels in termsof the categoriesof that which is to be avoided and that which is to be pursued.He even explains the soteriological recognition itself in terms of making the discrimination between these two (IPV 3.2, Introduction,2:244). Utpaladevahimself refersto certain states of consciousness as to be abandoned (heya) at IPK 3.2.18, 2:269. The difference between the two classes is again that of the absorptionor nonabsorptionof the object into the emanatorysubject (IPV3.2.2-3, 2:246-247). 73 - PureWisdom is fifth from the top in the thirty-sixfoldscheme of tattvas,and intermediatein the Trikacosmic triads. In personal conversation, Alexis Sanderson suggested that Abhinavagupta may have utilized this principle in explaining the sakta upaya because of its importancein the Pratyabhijia. 74 - TA4.34, 3:655. Likewisesee TS 4, 23-26. Abhinavaguptafrequently utilizes the terms interchangeably;see TA 4.44b-45a, 3 :665; TA4.109-118, 3: 729-737. The identificationexemplifies Abhinavagupta'sgeneral view that spiritual means (upiya) are identical with their goal (upeya).This view will be discussed further at the end of this essay. 75 - TA4.111-114, 3:731-733. 76 - To emphasize furtherthe encompassment of the Pratyabhijna inference by the soteriology, I mention one other point: Pure Wisdom in the Pratyabhijnaitselfis also referredto as the Wisdom (vidya)Saktito highlight its characteras an activity of the Lord. Abhinava explains: "When there is born the condition of the bound creature ... then the Sakti of the Supreme Lord illuminates

His Lordship,as has been explained by means of the previously stated arguments.She due to whom some, having accepted these argumentsand having their heartsencouraged, become success- DavidLawrence

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ful-is the Wisdom Power"(IPV3.1.7, 2 :230-231). Also see IPK 3.2.2, 2 :246, and IPV3.2.2-3, 2 :246-247.

77 - See Matilal, Perception, pp. 53, 74, 80. Decision (nirnaya)is anotherNyaya category. 78 - IPVI.2, Introduction,1 :82. Cf. IPV4.1.16, 2 :309-310. I observe that many nonphilosophical sastras are also structuredaround debates with opponents. For example, there may be doubt or debate about interpretations of texts, doctrines,or practiceswhich are assumed to be correct.This sort of discussion is common to nonphilosophicalacademic (and, of course, nonacademic) discussion aroundthe world. Thereare certainlygray areas between what should and should not be considered philosophical. The distinctionperhapsdepends upon the systematicityand depth of reflexivity. 79 - IPV1.2, benedictoryverse, 1 :81. 80 - IPV1.2, Introduction,1 :82. The verse is in TheStava-Chintamani of Bhatta Narayana with Commentary by Kshemaraja, ed.

MukundaRamShastri,KashmirSeriesof Textsand Studies,no. 10 (Srinagar:KashmirPratapSteam Press,1918), 71, 80. 81 - TA4.17, 3:632. Abhinavaidentifiesdoubt with the propensityto seeing duality, particularlyof subject and object, which is eliminated by good reasoning(sattarka); see TA4.105, 3: 726. The significance of doubt in tantric practice is discussed in Rastogi, "Philosophyof Krama,"pp. 593-594. 82 - TA4.18-32, 3:636-653; TS4, 31-32. 83 - TS 4.4-5, 21-22. Cf. Jayaratha'sdiscussion of the difference between the good reasoningof the Saivas and the non-good reaof othersat TAV4.17,3 :636. soning (asattarka) 84 - TA4.39-40, 3: 659-660. 85 - IPV, Conclusion, 2, 2:317.

East&West Philosophy

86 - See note 124 for remarkson the Saivas' development of "tantric argument"in the realmof ontology. 87 - ThoughAbhinavaguptamentionsvariousother Buddhistthinkers, the Saivas' understandingcenters most on the thought of DharmakTrti.Buddhist logic is sometimes described as a hybrid of Yogacara and Sautrantika.I note that there are not presently known any texts expressingcriticismsof the Saivasby this school. Whether or not there were previous confrontations,what is importantis that the Buddhistlogicians were seen as a great intellectual threat by the large community of Hindu philosophers.

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By answering the challenges posed by them, the Saivas understood themselves as giving their soteriology a strong intellectual foundation. 88 - See the Saivas' summaryof the basic views of Buddhistlogic at IPKand IPV1.2.1-2, 1 :85-91. 89 - See Abhinavagupta'sexplanationof the "Thisis that"structureof at IPVV1.2.1-2, 1 :115. He supportsthis by quoting interpretation of VakyapadTya Bhartrhari,kanda 2, ed. K. A. Subramanialyer (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1983), 2.128. I note that the Saiva theory of recognition is actually elaborated with three sets of terms, all of which have extensive backgroundsin the earlier linalong guistic and epistemological speculations:(1) Pratyabhijfin, with cognates such as abhijna,is usually unproblematicallytranslated just as 'recognition'. (2) Derivatives from the root mrs, such as vimarsa,paramarsa,pratyavamarsa,amarsa,etc., convey notions of linguistic interpretation,judgment,apprehension,etc., which have a recognitive structure.I accordingly often translate these terms as 'recognitive judgment'. (3) Terms derived from attachingvarious initialprefixesto the second prefixsam and the root dha-e.g., anusamdhana,pratisamdhana,and abhisamdhidevelop the significanceof recognitionthroughnotionsof synthesis or association. I often translatethem as 'recognitivesynthesis.' Previous scholars have not understood the way the latter two classes of terms articulatethe Saiva theory of recognition.In the Pratyabhijnatexts, these three classes of terms are variously defined by one another,used interchangeably,and placed in close functional relationships.They are also employed disjunctively. The presentationin this essay is made on the basis of the synonymies and homologiesbetween the classes of terms.Textualsupport for my interpretationis found in my "Argumentand the Recognitionof Siva," pp. 131-133. 90 - See Nyayadarsanam,especially the TatparyatTka, 1.1.4, 93-131. Useful discussionof the debates about interpretationvis-a-visrecognition may be found in DharmendraNath Shastri,The Philosophy of Nyaya-Vaisesikaand ItsConflictwith the BuddhistDignaga School (Critiqueof IndianRealism),with a forewordby Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan(Agra:Agra University,1964; reprint,Delhi: BharatiyaVidya Prakashan,1976), pp. 144, 201-209, 227-230, 456471. I note that in manydiscussionsrecognitionand memorywere invoked by Hindu thinkersas proofsof a persistingSelf functioning as substratumfor the impressionsof the past. Thoughthey are sometimes used to defend epistemological points, these are in David Lawrence themselves argumentsof philosophicalpsychology. 199

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91 - This is evident particularlyin the fourth,application,step of the inference for the sake of others. See the discussions of lingaparamarsaby Uddyotakara,Nyjya Varttikain Nyayadarsanam,1.1.5, 142-143, and by MahamahopadhyayaBhTmacaryaJhalakTkar, NyayakoSa,or Dictionaryof TechnicalTermsof IndianPhilosophy, revised and re-edited by MahamahopadhyayaVasudev Shastri OrientalResearchInstitute,1978), Abhyankar(Poona:Bhandarkar and see pp. 709-710, Abhinavaguptaand Daniel Ingalls'explanation in The "Dhvanyaloka" of Anandavardhanawith the "Locana"of Abhinavagupta,trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls,Jeffrey MoussaieffMasson, and M. V. Patwardhan(Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress, 1990), 3.33b, 546, 547-548 n. 7, and the remarksin Daniel Ingalls,Materialsfor the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic, ed. Walter Eugene Clark,HarvardOrientalSeries, no. 40 (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1951), 32-33. The converse view, that all conceptual constructionis inferential,is well known;see Matilal,"Perceptionas Inference,"in Perception,pp. 255-291. 92 - IPV 1.1, on IPK,benedictory verse, 1 :37-38.

93 - This fact stronglysuggests that Utpaladevahimself, like Abhinavagupta,framedthe operationof the sastraas the inferencefor the sake of others. 94 - The challenge of the Buddhistsis presented in IPKand IPV1.2, 1:82-119. 95 - The Navya-Nyayalater developed an approachto epistemology that in some ways parallelsthe Pratyabhijnause of the ideas of Bhartrhariagainst the Buddhists;see Matilal, "Conception-free Awareness:Gargesa," in Perception,pp. 342-354. The NavyaNyaya is, however,a realisticsystemwhereasthe Pratyabhijinis a kindof monistic idealism. 96 - The Saivas use the latterdesignation.Contemporaryscholars are not agreed on whetherthis term reflectsa properinterpretation of Bhartrhari. 97 - For Bhartrhari, the Word Absolutegrounds linguisticreferenceas accessed through semantic intuition (pratibha)or manifestation (sphota).

East&West Philosophy

98 - This is not to deny that Bhartrhari's analysisof the role of language in experience also had a great influenceon the Buddhists. 99 - Somananda had already identifiedSupreme Speech with Siva's creative Sakti. See SD 2, 36-93. For the identificationof selfrecognitionwith Supreme Speech, see IPV 1.5.13, 1 :252-255;

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IPK1.6.1, 1:302; and IPKV1.6.1, 22. Utpaladevalists Supreme and Lordshipas Speech along with recognition (pratyavamarsa) descriptionsof consciousness at IPK1.5.13, 1:250. Utpaladeva also identifies the Lord Himself as semantic intuition (pratibha) (IPK1.7.1, 1 :341). 100 - IPV1.5.15, 1 :267-268. 101 -In explaining this cosmogony of self-recognition,the Saivas correlate the Trika cosmological triad's levels of emanation with Bhartrhari'sstates of the emanation of speech. For a good discussion by Abhinavagupta,see IPV 1.5.13, 1:252-255. Cf. IPV 1.8.11, 1 :423-424; IPKand IPV4.1.13-14, 2:305-307. On the unfragmentedcharacter of the highest level of the Lord'sselfrecognition/speech,see IPKand IPV 1.6.1, 1 :301-305. On the lowest level of fragmentedself-recognition,see IPK1.6.6, 1 :324; IPKV1.6.6, 24; IPV1.6.6, 1 :324-327. The entiretyof IPKand IPV 1.6, 1 :299-344, is about differentiationinherentin ordinaryconceptual constructions.Abhinava describes the lowest instances of recognition as reflected recognition (chayamayT pratyabhijfna) (IPVV1.6.6, 2:314). He also describesthem as impure(asuddha) (IPV1.6.6, 1:324-327; IPVV1.6.6, 2:314). 102 - Cf. David Tracyon the natureof fundamentaltheology as a transcendental/metaphysicalinquiry,in Tracy,Blessed Rage, pp. 5556, 108, and his "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived,"p. 559. 103 -The Saivas believe that the LorddifferentiatesHis self-recognition into the differenttypes of experience such as cognition, memory, decision, and doubt throughHis Maya Sakti(IPKand IPV1.5.18, 1 :280-283; IPKand IPV1.5.21, 1:296-298). Also see Bhaskara on IPV1.6.10, 1 :340, on the subtle judgment(pratyavamarsa) in all formsof experience. 104 -This is true of the studies of these terms by Harvey Paul Alper, Conceptof CognitivePower:A Translationof the "Abhinavagupta's with ComJifnasaktyahnikaof the TsvarapratyabhijhavimarsinT of and Introduction" diss., (Ph.D. University Pennsylvamentary nia, 1976), "Siva and the Ubiquity of Consciousness:The Spaciousness of an ArtfulYogi,"Journalof IndianPhilosophy7 (1979): 345-407, and "'SvabhavamAvabhasasyaVimarsam':Judgment as a TranscendentalCategoryin Utpaladeva'sSaivaTheology:The Evidenceof the Pratyabhijnakarikavrtti" (unpublished). 105 -It will be noticed that prakja is the same word as svaprakasa, 'self-luminosity,'withoutthe reflexiveprefixsva. The significance of prakasaas a validating awareness is also understoodagainst DavidLawrence 201

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the backgroundof the Upanisadic, Advaita Vedantin, MTmamsaka, and Buddhistlogician conceptions mentioned in note 26 above. 106 -These argumentsdevelop in a monisticdirectionearlierarguments of VijinanavadaBuddhism. However, the Saivas conspicuously avoid the Vijnanavadaargumentstryingto raise doubts about the validityof ordinaryexperience on the basis of the occurrence of perceptualillusions. 107 - IPK1.5.2, 1 :198. Also see IPV 1.5.2, 1 :197-203; IPVV1.5.2, 2:68. 108 - See IPKand IPV1.5.4, 1 :210-212; IPKand IPV1.5.6, 1 :221225; IPKand IPV1.5.8-9, 1 :230-235. The Saivas here are refutof the Sautrantikas. ing the "representationalism" 109 - IPV1.1.4, 1: 76-77. Cf. IPV1.1.3, 1 :66-67; TS1, 5-6. 110 - See note 89 above. 111 -IPK1.5.11,

1:241.

112 -For these arguments,see IPKand IPV 1.5.11, 1 :241-243; IPK 1.5.13, 1:250; IPV1.5.14, 1:255-265; IPV1.5.15, 1:267-268; IPV1.5.19, 1:283-293. 113 - IPV4.1.7, 2:292-293. There is discussion pertainingto the syntheses of universalsand particularsthroughoutIPKand IPV2.3.114, 2:67-134. On this also see IPV1.5.19, 1:293; IPKand IPV 1.8.5-9, 1 :408-421; IPV3.1, Introduction,2:214. The Saiva treatmentof universals and particularsis again On Bhartrhari's much indebtedto Bhartrhari. views, see Radhika on Individuals and Universals," in Herzberger, "Bhartrhari Bhartrhari and the Buddhists:An Essayin the Developmentof Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought, ed. Bimal K. Matilal and J. MoussaieffMasson, Studies in Classical India (Dordrecht:D. Reidel, 1986), pp. 9-105. 114 - IPV1.1.3, 1 :61-62. For statementsof the identityof awareness and recognition (vimarsa)also see IPKand IPV 1.5.11, 1 :241244; and IPV1.5.17, 1:273. 115 - IPV1.5.15, 1 :267-268. In this passage I include an earlierstatement along with a sentence alreadyquoted. Anotherexample will be quoted shortly.I also mentionthat Abhinavaidentifiespratyavamarsawith synonyms for Sakti, creative freedom (svatantrya), and Lordship(aisvarya)at IPV1.5.13, 1 :254. RecognitivesyntheEast&West sis (anusamdhana)is identifiedwith Sakti(s)at IPKV1.3.7, 10, and Philosophy 202

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with the Supreme Lord'screatorhood at IPV 1.6, Introduction, 1:301. 116 - IPK1.8.11, 1 :1 :421. See also IPV1.8.11, 1 :423-424. 117 - Bhaskaraexplains this word: "'Judges' [paramrs'antT] [means] to the condition of of brings object judgment [paramarsavisayatam]by means of recognition [pratyabhijfi],which has the nature of the unification of word and object [Sabdarthaikrkaranarupa]"(BIPV1.5.20, 1 :294). 118 - IPV1.5.20, 1 :294-295. Also see IPK1.5.20, 1 :294. 119 -For furtherelucidation of how the argumentof the Pratyabhijna relates to the sakta upaya theme of the purificationof conceptualization, see Abhinavagupta'sdiscussion of the spiritual ascent through ordinary conceptual constructions through the flashing forth in them of the Wisdom Power (vidyasakti,a.k.a. suddhavidya,Pure Wisdom) at IPV 1.6.6, 1:325-327. Cf. IPV 2.3.13, 2:129; TS4, 27; and IPKand IPV4.1.13-14, 2:305307. 120 - TA1.145, 2:184. 121 - TA2.10-11, 16-17, 2 :319-323. The readerwill recallthat in his sakta upaya, Abhinavaguptaidentifiesthe tool, good reasoning, with the goal, PureWisdom. in SiddhitrayT and the Isvarapratyabhijfnaka122 - Ajadapramatrsiddhi, rikavrtti,15, 6. This is perhaps the most frequentlycited verse throughoutAbhinava'scommentaries.Examplesare found at IPV 1.1, on IPK,benedictoryverse, 1 :35; IPV 1.5.11, 1: 1:244; IPV 1.5.17, 1:279; IPVV1.1, 1:54. 123 - IPV1.5.17, 1:278-279. 124 -As I have mentioned,the Saivasdevelop an ontology corresponding to the epistemology of recognition. I can only make a few remarkson this subject here. The Saiva ontology relies upon the Vyakaranainterpretationof Being/Existence(satta) as mythicoritualaction (kriya),and makes extensive use of grammaticaldiscussions of verbal-actionsyntax (karakatheory).Utpaladevaand Abhinavaguptaparticularlyengage earlier linguistic considerations which either emphasize or de-emphasize the role of the agent in relationto verbalaction. The Saivasdevelop the formerto reduce action along with its accessories, such as objects, instruments, etc., to the omnipotentagency of Siva. Siva'sagency is the ontological counterpartto His self-recognition.As Utpaladeva says: "Being is the condition of one who becomes, that is, the ...) David Lawrence agency of the act of becoming" (sattabhavattabhavanakartrta

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(IPKV1.5.14, 19). With this theory,the Pratyabhijnareenactsas it interpretsthe very syntax of the Saiva mythico-ritualdrama.The Saiva treatmentof action is found throughoutthe Kriyadhikara of the Pratyabhijna texts (IPKand IPV2.1-4, 2 :1-209). This subis in discussed ject my "Argumentand the Recognitionof Siva," in and an article I am writing,"TheMythico-Ritual pp. 192-229, of Syntax Omnipotence."

PhilosophyEast& West

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