J Indian Philos (2012) 40:593–614 DOI 10.1007/s10781-012-9168-x
Svabhā vav vav ā āda d a and
yata: A Historical the Cārvāka/Lok āyata: A
Overview Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
Published online: 15 November 2012 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
chhā (chance, accident) are named as Abstract svabhāva (own being) and yad ṛ ṛ chh vUp. two different claimants among others as the first cause ( jagatk ( jagatk āraṇa) in the Ś vUp. But But in late laterr work works, s, such such as As´vaghosa’s poems, poems, svabhāva is synonym synonymous ous with with ˙ yad ṛ chhā and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabhāva is said to be ṛ chh inhering in the Loka¯ yata materialist system, s ystem, although in which sense—cosmic order or accide accident—i nt—iss not always always clearl clearly y mentio mentioned ned.. Svabhāva is is also a par part of the Sa¯ mkhya doctrine and is mentioned in the medical compilations. It is proposed that ˙ svabhāva as va as cosmic order became the idea of svabh became a part of Loka¯yata ¯yata between between the sixth and the eighth century CE and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so that in the fourteenth century Sa¯yan ¯yan a-Ma a- Ma¯ dhava dh ava aka ak a Vidya Vid ya¯ ran ra nya could categorical categorically ly ˙ ˙ declare declare that the Ca¯rva ¯rva¯ka/Loka ¯ka/Loka¯yata ¯yata upheld causality, causality, not chance. chance. But the other meaning of of svabhāva, va, identical with yad ṛ chhā, continued to circulate along with ṛ chh k āla, la, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and similarly similarly had acquired acquired several significations significations in course of time. Both significations significations of svabhāva continued va continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another domain, that of daiva (fate) -vis puru ṣak āra (manliness daiva (fate) vis-a` -vis puru ra (manliness or human endeavour). ka/ Lokaa¯ yata yat a · first firs t cause cau se · k āla · la · Medical compilations · Keywords Ca¯ rva¯ ka/Lok Sa¯ mkhya · svabh · svabhāva · yad ṛ chhā ṛ chh ˙ Introductory Remarks
We first read of svabh svabhāva (lit. va (lit. own being) as one of the several rival claimants for the title of being the first cause ( jagatk ( jagatk āraṇa) in the Ś vUp (c. vUp (c. sixth century BCE),
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1.2. Thereafter more and more of such claimants are made to appear on the scene. Sau, 16.17 writes: As´vaghosa (first century CE) in his Sau, ˙ And the cause of this suffering from active being in the world is to be found in the category of the vices such as desire (t ( t ṛṣṇ ṛṣṇā) and the rest, not in Creator vara) or Prin ti), or Time ṛ ti), (īśvara) Princi cipa pall Matt Matter er ( prak ṛ Time or the Natur aturee of Thin Things gs va) or Fate (vidhi) vidhi) or Chance ( yad ṛ c chā) [Sau, Sau, 90 (text), 114 ṛcch ( svabhāva) (translation)]. No fewe fewerr than than 28 such such clai claima mant ntss appe appeare ared d in cour course se of time time (Bha (Bhatt ttach achar arya ya,, Dece Decemb mber er 2001 2001,, 19–2 19–23. 3. See See also also the the Appe Append ndix ix belo below) w).. Appa Appare rent ntly ly the the six six Sau were some (if not all) of the first causes that were current in mentioned in the Sau were the first century CE. It is interesting to observe that although the lists found in different sources are far from being identical, two of the claimants, svabhāva and k āla, la, are often present in such lists. Yet neither Dasgupta ( 1922 1922)) nor Frauwallner (1956 1956)) in thei theirr respe respect ctiv ivee hist histor orie iess of Indi Indian an phil philos osoph ophy y deals deals with with svabhāva. va. Dasgupta (1922 (1922)) merely mentions it once (I: 78), quoting Ś vUp, vUp, 1.2, and, although Frauwallner writes about the doctrine of time, k āla, la, at some length ( English trans. II: 75–78), he does not mention the other claimants for the title of jagatk of jagatk āraṇa at all. va for a particular reason. Quite It is necessary to study the significance of svabh of svabhāva for a number of writers on Indian philosophy have accepted this doctrine as a part of the va stands for in the context Ca¯ rva¯ ka/Loka ka/L oka¯ yata, yata , not n ot always alwa ys making mak ing clear clea r what w hat svabhāva stands of this philosophical system: causality or accident. Both the meanings of svabh of svabhāva are encountered in ancient as well as modern philosophical works.
Different Views on Svabha¯ vava vis-à-vis the Cārvāka/Lok āyata da vis-à ¯ vava ¯ da
Let us take a few instances. Louis de La Valle´ e Poussin believes that the materialists in India (“philosophers without philosophy” he calls them), by denying induction were “forced to deny causality” (8:494). He then relates svabhāva-as-accident va-as-accident to materialism: The name Sva¯bha ¯bha¯vikas is given to the scholars scholars who believe believe that things, things, the colour of the lotus and the sharpness of thorn, are born from the svabhāvo, vo, ‘own nature’. Much could be said on the exact value of the word: it probably means; means; ‘Things ‘Things are not produced produced by causes; they are because they are.’ (8:494) Louis de La Valle´ e Poussin, it is evident from the sources he refers to, relies heavily on Buddhist works in his exposition of the meaning of svabh of svabhāva. va. On the other hand, speaking of the Ca¯rva ¯r va¯ka/Loka ¯k a/Loka¯ yata ontology, Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz write: The world in all its diversity is only the result of various combinations of the material elements. There is no determinative principle, such as God or karma, which is responsible for the properties of things. They are due to their own nature; no agent makes fire hot or water cool. Loka¯yata causality operates with material causes only, and efficient causes are not recognized (179).
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The Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata then admits causality in the svav āvav ādin way, rejecting other rival jagatk āraṇas. Apparently in this respect Franco and Preisendanz have S-M’s SDS , chap. 1 and other sources in mind. Similarly, speaking of the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata ethics, Franco and Preisendanz revert, though not explicitly, to the doctrine of svabhāva: That we could have an unequal share of pleasure and pain is not due to any unseen force like karma, but to the different capacities of things caused by different combinations of the elements, just as bubbles on the ocean display a diversity of size, hue and duration (180). 1 Thus we have two diametrically opposite views on svabhāva vis-a`-vis the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. But this is not all. At least one modern scholar, Kavel Werner, has identi �ed the Ca¯ rva¯ka and svabhāvav āda: “While there are other materialistic and realistic schools in Indian philosophy, the Ca¯rva¯ka is the only naturalist (svabha¯va va¯din)” (Werner 1997, p. 274).2 Werner in all probability was following Vidya¯ranya’s VPS , 210 (or some secondary source) in identifying svabhāvav āda ˙ with the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. Let it be noted that the authors of these three views have one or the other ancient authority in their support.
Other Modern Views on Svabha¯ va
It is neither possible nor necessary to review all the interpretations that have been offered by modern scholars. We propose to discuss some of the more representative and well-known works that deal with svabhāva in relation to the Ca¯ rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. Speaking of the Ca¯rva¯kas, Seal (1915) writes: Among the Cha´rva´kas there were two classes, the cruder school of materialists who accepted perception ( pratyak ṣa) as a valid source of knowledge, as well as the reality of natural law ( svabhāva), and the finer school of sceptics, who impugned all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate, and all evidence, Perception as well as Inference…. (p. 252) Seal quotes Jayantabhatta ( NM , chap. 1) as the authority who speaks of the ˙˙ su śik ṣitacārv āk āḥ (the well educated Ca¯rva¯kas) and cārv ākadhūrtaḥ (cunning Ca¯rva¯ka). Such a division of the Ca¯rva¯kas, now we know, is baseless, for Cakradhara in his GrBh commentary on the NM has explained that by both the terms Jayanta was referring to Udbhat abhatta and his followers (GrBh I: 52, 100). Before ˙ ˙˙ 1
The reference to bubbles is obviously derived from a Ca¯rva¯ka aphorism: jalabudbudavajj ī vā ḥ, “Souls are like water bubbles” (Bhattacharya, I. 9. 2009, pp. 79, 87). Franco relates this aphorism to the doctrine of epiphenomenalism and cites S. Hodgson’s description of the mind-body relationship as “the foam thrown up and floating on a wave” (Franco 1997, p. 99). 2
Cf. also his comment: “Buddhism steers between the extreme asceticism of Upnisadic teaching and the ˙ extreme indulgence of the senses taught by the naturalists ( svabhāva v ādins) of whom Ca¯rva¯ka is an example” (p. 275).
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the discovery of this commentary (1972), scholars like Dasgupta ( 1922, 1, pp. 78– 179, 362) and Shastri (1959, pp. 104–105) too were deceived by Jayanta’s irony. This, however, is not the point. Seal, it should be noted, takes svabhāva to mean ‘natural law’, that is, causality. He further writes that while the Buddhists assumed the principle of causality to be the ground of induction, the Ca¯rva¯kas did not (pp. 252–253). Apparently, according to Seal, one group of Ca¯rva¯kas admitted natural law, and the other, like the Buddhists, took their stands on the principle of the Uniformity of Nature ( prativandha, svabhāvaprativandha, as the Ny ā yavindu says). The problem is that ahetu cannot be the basis of the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. No aphorism or verse has yet been found that could associate the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata with ahetuv āda. So if svabhāva ahetuv āda, Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata cannot be svabhāva, a view that Vidya¯ran ya in his refutation of the Ca¯rva¯ka holds: sarvaṃ k āryaṃ ˙ svabhāv ād ebotpadyate iti b ārhaspatyo manyate, the bārhaspatya (the follower of Brhaspati) thinks that all effects originate from svabhāva (VPS , p. 210. See also Sinha ˙ III, pp. 221–222). Similarly, Kaviraj (1923) divides svabhāvav āda into two varieties: extremist and moderate (pp. 46–47; reprinted in C/L 442–443), labels reminiscent of Indian National Congress leadership of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This division too is not in conformity with available evidence. Kaviraj assumes that “the earliest representatives of the extreme form of svabha¯vava¯da seem to have been a set of free thinkers in ancient India who were originally called lok ā yatikas, but subsequently came to be more widely known under the name of C ārv ākas” (pp. 47– 48; C/L 443). He refers to the evidence found in Pali literature, to the Ja¯ba¯li episode in the Rāmā yaṇa (Ayodhya¯ka¯nda, 100. 38–39 in vulgate ed. 94. 32–33 in crit. ˙˙ ed.) and the Jain Bhagavat ī s ūtra, 2. 248. In the whole of Pali literature, the word lok ā yata means vitaṇḍ asattham, the science of disputation, not materialism (see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 187–192; Franco 2011, p. 630). The same meaning holds true for the passage in the Rāmā yaṇa as also for the Bhagavat ī s ūtra. Ja¯ba¯li does speak like a materialist but he represents some pre-Ca¯rva¯ka school of dehātmav āda, not the Ca¯rva¯ka, which appears much later (the name to designate this school is seldom encountered before the eighth century CE. The name along with Loka¯yata as its namesake occurs in Haribhadra’s Ṣ DSam, verse 85d, and Kamalas´¯ıla’s TSP , gloss on TS , verse 1885. There is no mention of Loka¯yata along with svabhāva before the sixth century CE. It first occurs in the oldest k nown commentary on the SK (Suvar ṇasaptati śā stra, cited by Bedekar 1961a, p. 10).3 Speaking of the rival claimants for being the first cause (as found in SK verse 27), ‘Parama¯rtha’ quotes a verse: “What produces the white colour of the ham sas [swans], the green colour of the parrots and the ˙ variegated colour of the peacocks, it is from that I too am created.” ‘Parama¯rtha’ quotes the verse again in his commentary on SK verse 61 and adds: “Thus spontaneity ( svabhāva) is the cause of the entire world; Deliverance is effectuated then spontaneously and not by Nature ( prak ṛt i).” Earlier still, in Mbh, 12. 224. 50, =
=
=
3
This text not being available to me, I have used Sastri’s rendering (p. 36). Instead of writing “the earliest known commentator of the SK whose work was translated into Chinese by Paramartha” every time, I shall henceforth use the shorthand ‘Parama¯rtha’.
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svabhāva is associated with the bhūtacintak āḥ, those who think in terms of the elements. However, in another verse in the same book (12.230.4) bhūtacintak āḥ is replaced by apare janāḥ, ‘other people’, not identified with any school of thinkers. The reading then is doubtful and the implication of the term bhūtacintak āḥ is uncertain (see Bhattacharya 2002a, 2007b, pp. 275–277). Following Louis de La Valle´ e Poussin, Johnston (1928) declares that he “would identify the svabha¯vava¯da with the adhiccasamuppanna [adhī tyasamutpanna in Sanskrit] school of the Brahmaja¯lasutta” of the Dī ghanik ā ya (Sau 60n). In a later article (1931), Johnston explains adhiccasamuppanna as ak āraṇasamuppanna, originating without any cause, as opposed to the Buddhist doctrine of paṭ icca samuppanna [ prat ī tyasamutpanna in Sanskrit], interdependent origination, which is one of the basic tenets of Buddhist philosophy that provides the first inkling of “the modern formulation of the law of causation”, of “the law of universal causation”, as T. W. Rhys Davids puts it (pp. 42, 47).4 Johnston takes svabhāva to mean accidentalism but does not consider why it is mentioned as a separate item, not identical to yad ṛ cchā, chance, both in the Ś vUp and the Sau. As we shall see, many of the handbooks and sundry popular works on Indian philosophy follow his view. At the same time, however, there was a divergent view which explained svabhāva as causality, quite distinct from svabhāva as accident. Curiously enough, both the views have been attributed to the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata: some believe that the Ca¯rva¯kas were materialists and accidentalists at the same time; some others speak of them as materialists believing in causality, in the material cause (upād ānak āraṇa), not, however, in the efficient cause (nimittak āraṇa). The earliest list of jagatk āraṇas (S´vUp 1.2) mentions three such efficient causes, namely, time, destiny and puru ṣa (primeval man or the spirit or God) and one material cause, elements ( bhūt āni), while yad ṛ cchā denies causality altogether. It is also too much to claim, as Hiriyanna (1949) does, that the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata “is a lineal descendent of that doctrine” ( sc. svabhāvav āda) (1949/1974, p. 57). What is worse, in spite of making a clear distinction between svabhāva and yad ṛc chā, Hiriyanna tends to associate the Ca¯rva¯ka with both (1932, pp. 103–104; 1974, p. 181)! Hiriyanna (in an article written before 1952) again observed that there were two non-Vedic currents of thought in the ‘Early Post-Vedic period’: ‘One known as Svabha¯vava¯da or “naturalism” which repudiated belief in the spontaneous and the supernatural; and the other, dualistic or pluralistic in its character which gave rise to doctrines like Jainism in the course of this period’ ( 1952, p. 110). This, I am afraid, accords too much credit to svabhāvav āda as a parallel source of the Vedic currents of thought such as S´aivism and Vaisnavism. Similarly it is difficult to accept ˙˙ Hiriyanna’s view expressed elsewhere (1932) that the Ca¯rva¯ ka doctrine “ascribes the events of life to mere accident” and that is how svabhāvav āda is to be understood as “the main source of later sensualist doctrine of Ca¯rva¯ka” (1932, 4
Chattopadhyaya was very much impressed by Rhys Davids’s “Introduction” to the Mahā-nid āna suttanta, as is evident from his preference for using the phrase “laws of nature” (or “natural law”) in relation to svabhāva (see below). He reprinted this “Introduction” in Chattopadhyaya (ed.) 1982, pp. 64– 72, renaming it “Causality as Weltanschauung : Early Buddhism”. Chattopadhyaya also quotes extensively from this “Introduction” in 1990, pp. 128–131).
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p. 104). When S-M associates the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata with svabhāvav āda, he rejects the concept of chance, yad ṛ chhā at the same time (SDS Joshi (ed.), 11). Writing under the name of Vidya¯ranya, S-M again identifies svabhāvav āda with the ˙ Ca¯rva¯ka: svabhāvav āda eba pāramārthika iti manyom ānasya…, (The Lauka¯yatika) considers svabhāvav āda to be the supreme reality. (VPS , 211). Svabhāva thus is treated as causality. If we accept S-M’s view in this regard, Hiriyanna cannot be right. ¯ jı¯vikas (1951) writes, “Some heretics exalted Basham in his study of the A ¯ jı¯vika system” (p. 226). Following svabhāva to the status of Niyati in the regular A the Jain representation of svabhāva, he brands the svabhāvav ādins as akriyāv ādins, who “agreed with the niyativ ādins on the futility of human efforts” (p. 226). In which way then did the former differ from the latter? Basham says: “while the latter viewed the individual as determined by forces exterior to himself, for the former he was rigidly self-determined by his own somatic and psychic nature” (p. 226). So far, so good. Basham then goes on to observe that “[t]hese ideas have much in common,” and suggests that svabhāvav āda was “a small sub-sect of A¯ jı¯vikism” (p. 226). ¯ jı¯vikas led him to include every heretical Basham’s total involvement with the A ¯ jı¯vikism. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the view as a part of A doctrine of svabhāva was adopted by any community, religious or secular. If the evidence of the Ś vUp and the Sau is to be believed, svabhāva, along with but distinct from the doctrines of time, destiny, etc., was proposed by a set of philosophers whom the author/s of the Ś vUp did not approve of. Svabhāva is mentioned there only in connection with the origin of the universe, “the first cause”, so to say. In later works svabhāva is endowed with another dimension: whether or not free will and hence human endeavour have any role to play in shaping the course of human life. The basic point here is to deny the existence of any power or force beyond nature and man. Implicitly svabhāva involves the rejection of God or any supernatural agency such as time, destiny, accident, the four (or five) basic elements, and puru ṣa. Now all these words have some special technical sense. Puru ṣa, for example, means the primordial person in the Ṛ gveda (10.90.11), the spirit in the Upanis ads, and the human body in the medical texts. When we come to ˙ Sa¯mkhya it carries a sense far away from all this (for the various significations of ˙ puru ṣa, see Chattopadhyaya 1985, pp. 286–287). Svabhāva too is explained in no fewer than eight different and quite unrelated senses in Haricarana Van Ś abdako ṣa. Such a variety of dyopadhyaya’s Bangla-Bangla lexicon, Vaṇ g ī ya meanings are also found in case of the English word “nature” (see Oxford English Dictionary, s.v.). Lovejoy (1952, pp. 72–73) shows that Nature as the cosmic order as a whole could mean both regularity and irregularity. Randle once noted the possibility “that names which later applied to a specific school were used in an early period in a different or in a much more general sense” (p. 3). We learn of all these rival claimants from the works of those who are mostly intent on refuting the atheistic doctrine. Yet all of the opponents certainly did not understand svabhāva, k āla, etc. in the same sense. Occurrence of the same set of words should not deceive us.
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The crux lies in the fact that some of the opponents take svabhāva to mean not only ahetuv āda, accidentalism, but also its logical corollary, akriyāv āda, inactivism, while some other opponents understand svabhāva as rigid causality, svabhāva (instead of God or time or destiny or any other agency) being the cause of every change in the world as also in human life. The logical corollary should then be kriyāv āda, activism, or faith in human endeavour or resoluteness ( purua ṣak āra), although this is not always explicitly mentioned in relation to svabhāva-as-causality. Riepe (1961) seems to have accepted Basham’s views in toto and ventures on some speculations: The Ajivikas believed that all beings are developed by niyati, by destiny, according to chance ( saṇ gati), and nature (bhāva). The ripening of the world, unlike the evolution of prakriti (sic) in Samkhya philosophy, is completely predetermined. Evidently the niyativ ādins like the svabhāvav ādins (whose view is that all things happened according to nature) together made up a group called akriyav ādins (those who did not believe in the effectiveness of purua ṣak āra) who believed works cannot effect any change. Niyati is not one of a number of causes but is the only cause…. (44). Here we have a me´ lange, a strange amalgam of several contradictory doctrines, not in the least supported by any positive evidence in the literature of the A¯ jı¯vikas. Some Indian philosophers, more particularly the Jains, did have a penchant for reconciling the irreconcilables, but, to the best of my knowledge, nobody would care to associate svabhāva with both destiny and chance, except perhaps some Jain philosophers and may be a few others (Bhattacharya 2001b, pp. 46–52). Bedekar (1961a, b) has dealt with the doctrine of svabhāva at a considerable length. He notes several significant facts but what concerns us here is that he, too, associates the doctrines of svabhāva and k āla with what he calls “crass materialism” (1961a, p. 5), presumably because according to these doctrines “everything in the world including human life is the product of the Material Elements (Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Space) which come together and go off at the behest of Svabha¯va, Ka¯la etc.” (Bedekar 1961a, pp. 5–6). Materialism does begin and end with material elements, which is why it is also called bhūtav āda. But the elements do not come together and go off “at the behest of anything or anybody,” that is, any efficient cause, as has already been noted above. So, when Bedekar speaks of svabhāva “conceived as a mythopoeic personification invested with a will of its own, governing in its supreme sway, the whole course of the world and the human life” (1961a, p. 6), svabhāva tends to become a mystic force like time and destiny, a view quite alien to materialism. Materialism does not admit such mythopoeic personifications. Moreover, in the Mbh, 12.172.11 and elsewhere svabhāva invariably suggests accident or absence of any cause; no efficient cause is allowed (animittataḥ) (for further details see Bhattacharya 1999, pp. 99–101). In spite of its excellent documentation, especially of Jain sources, Kulkarni’s study of svabhāvav āda (1968) suffers from the same mix-up. He rejects the view that “Svabha¯vava¯ da was a small sub-sect of Ā jivikism” (Basham, p. 226). However, the alternative he proposes is equally unacceptable. In his opinion svabhāvav āda “was more intimately connected with Materialism or C ārv ākadar śana…in as much
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as both deny a transmigrating soul….” (p. 18). This is all the more astonishing because the few verses which represent the doctrine of svabhāva (for a collection see Bhattacharya 2002b, pp. 76–80) are absolutely silent about the soul. The epigrams neither affirm nor deny its existence. Kulkarni further suggests that “it would be more proper to regard Svabhāvav āda as part and parcel of Materialism as has been done by tradition” (p. 18). Herein lies the chief crux: tradition associates svabhāvav āda with materialism but no ground for doing so is ever stated clearly, except perhaps for the reason that both are atheistic. The Veda¯ntins consider causality as part and parcel of materialism. S-M has been the most influential in giving currency to this ‘tradition’ and modern scholars like Chattopadhyaya (1969, pp. 55–68, etc.), Malvania ( 1982, p. 125) and others have followed suit. We are thus left to account for the other implication of svabhāva as mere accident. Warder (1971) follows the Buddhist tradition and accepts the view of svabhāva (‘own nature,’ in his rendering) as a rejection of the concept of causality. He does not care to notice the implication of the separate mention of svabhāva and yad ṛ cchā in the Ś vUp I.2 and other sources (although in addition to the Ś vUp he refers to the BC , the Mbh, and some later works). He says: In the earliest Buddhist sources, such as the Dī gha Nik ā ya, the theory of phenomena originated without causes is generally known as adhiccasamuppanna, ‘originated spontaneously’, ‘originated independently’, and later this is explained as yadicch ā (Sanskrit yad ṛ cchā), ‘chance’, ‘spontaneity’, ‘at will’ (35). This is a mere rehash of Johnston’s view mentioned above. 5 Chattopadhyaya (1969, pp. 55–68; 1977, pp. 175–186, etc.) all along insists on the concept of svabhāva-as-causality. Svabhāva to him means not just “inherent nature” but the “Laws of Nature”. In one of his last works ( 1991) he writes: We have seen that it ( sc. svabhāva) formed an important feature of the new intellectual climate ushered in the Second Urbanization and further, notwith standing differences among the modern and medieval scholars of looking back at it, the concept itself at least foreshadowed what came to be known in later times as the Laws of Nature (II:69–70. Emphasis added). From the twenty three verses pertaining to svabhāvav āda (Bhattacharya 2002b, pp. 75–90) it is evident that since the composition of the Moks adharma section ˙ (S´a¯ntiparvan) of the Mbh (see Bhattacharya 1999) and the Sau (that is, the first century CE onwards) the concept of svabhāva had become quite indistinguishable from ahetu, denoting both akriyāv āda and atheism. This is also the view of all Buddhist philosophers. For instance, in course of commenting on PV , verses162cd– 163ab, Manorathanandin identifies the vague word kecit as svabhāvav ādinaḥ (p. 64). Although Dharmakı¯rti does not mention the word svabhāva, the doctrine itself 5
Warder does not specifically mention the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata in connection with svabhāva, although he ¯ jivaka and Ajn˜a¯na Philosophy”. The section on svabhāva discusses it in a chapter entitled “Loka¯yata, A ¯ jivaka. Hence it can be assumed that he too believes occurs in the first part of this chapter, before the A that Loka¯yata and the doctrine of svabhāva are one and the same.
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denying causality and providing the stock example of the sharpness of the thorn to boot (taik ṣṇā yd ī nām yathā nā sti k āraṇam kaṇṭ ak ādi ṣu tathā’ k āraṇametat syād ) cannot but be reminiscent of svabhāva-as-accident. On the other hand, in the Upanisadic tradition and some later Naiya¯ikas’ and Veda¯ntins’ works (for ˙ references see Bhattacharya 2006, pp. 37–40), it is equally evident that there was another view which claimed svabhāva to be the cause of all things. Both approaches are recorded in TS , 4.110: sarvahetunir āśaṃ saṃ bhāv ānāṃ janma var ṇ yate | svabhāvav ādibhiste hi n āhuḥ svamapi ka¯ran am ||6 ˙ The proponents of the doctrine of svabhāva describe the origination of things as being independent of all causes. They do not declare even the thing itself to be its own cause. (Emphasis added) Apparently there was a group of svabhāvav ādins who no longer accepted svabhāva itself to be the cause of everything (the earlier position) but reverted to the position of ahetuv āda. Kamalas´¯ı la in his comment on this verse clearly mentions the existence of two schools of svabhāvav ādins. The passage runs as follows: nanu ye ‘ svata eva bhāv ā bhavanti’ iti var ṇayanti, tebhya e ṣāṃ ko bhedaḥ? ityāha – te hī tyadi. te = svabh āvav ādinaḥ. svamiti svar ū pam. api śabd āt parar ū pamapi. pu¯rbaka¯stu svabha¯vam ka¯ranamicchanti, ete tamapi nec˙ ˙ chantı¯ti bhedah. ˙ Question: ‘What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe the origination of things to themselves?’ Answer: They do not , etc. ‘They’, i.e. the upholders of svabhāva; the thing itself , i.e. its own nature (prior to origination); ‘ even’—this implies that they do not accept the form of any other thing to be the ‘cause’; the difference thus is that while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its ‘ cause’ , these other people do not accept even that as the ‘ cause’ (Emphasis added). On the basis of this passage Bedekar rightly concluded: “Thus Kamalas´¯ı la seems to suggest that there were two schools of Svabha¯vava¯dins: One school maintain at least Svabha¯va—‘the nature of the things itself’—as the cause to denial of other things as causes, the other school denying even Svabha¯va as the cause” (1961a, 11n46). However, in the very next sentence he dismisses this highly significant point rather summarily by saying, “The distinction tends to be metaphysical and abstract.” We shall see later that instead of being “metaphysical and abstract” it is the key to the crux. That there were two groups of svabhāvav ādins can also be inferred from the variant readings of the classic, oft-quoted verse expounding the basis position of svabhāvav āda. As´vaghosa’s version of a couplet rules out any role of human ˙ endeavour and represents the later position:
6
The TS verse (along with the two following) is also quoted in Prajn˜a¯karamati’s commentary on the Bodhi, 9.117 and in Maladha¯ri Ratnaprabha Vijaya’s commentary on GV , 2.25 (1643). Kulkarni, using a different edition, gives the verse number in the GV as 1963 (13. n. 10). He thinks: “it is not unlikely that they (sc. TS, 4.110-112) are derived from a common source” (p. 20).
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kaṇṭ akasya prakaroti taik ṣṇ yaṃ vicitrabh āvaṃ mṛ ga-pak ṣiṇāṃ v ā svabhāvataḥ sarvamidaṃ prav ṛt taṃ na k āmak āra’ sti kuta ḥ prayatnaḥ Who fashions the sharpness of the thorn or the varied nature of beast and bird? All this takes place by natural development. There is no such thing in this respect as action of our own will, a fortiori no possibility of effort ( BC , 9.62, quoted in several other works. For details see Bhattacharya 2002b, 77, verse 6). kaḥ
Three other variants of the same couplet completely omit the conclusion urging akriyāv āda and stops at asserting the role of svabhāva, not of any other agency or creator as the cause of all varieties. The first one reads: kaḥ kaṇṭ ak ānāṃ prakaroti taik ṣṇ yaṃ vicitrabh āvaṃ mṛ ga-pak ṣiṇāṃ ca mādhuryaṃ ik ṣoḥ kaṭ ut āṃ ca nimbe svabh āvataḥ sarvamidaṃ prav ṛ ttam Who fashions the sharpness of the thorns and the varied nature of beasts and birds? Who fashions the sugarcane sweet and the margosa bitter? All this takes place by natural development (SVi on Bṛ S, 1.7. Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 77, verse 6a). Other variants (Bhattacharya 2002b, vv.7–14, 22) similarly propose svabhāva as the cause of everything, either in the form of a series of rhetorical questions or as denial of any creator god by implication. Here are a few examples: badaryāḥ kaṇṭ akast ī k ṣṇ a ṛ jureka śca kuṃcitaḥ phalaṃ ca vartula ṃ tasyā vada kena vinirmitam Of the many thorns of a jujube tree, one is sharp, another is straight, yet another is crooked. But its fruit is round. Say, who has made all this? (Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 78, verse 7). agniru ṣṇo jalaṃ śī taṃ samaspar śastathānilaḥ kenedaṃ citritaṃ tasmāt svabhāv āt tadvyavasthitiḥ The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing and cool the breeze of morn; By whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born (Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 78, verse 8). A variant of this verse is also found in the SSS (chap. 2, verse 2): agnair au ṣṇ yam apāṃ śaī tyaṃ kokile madhurasvaraḥ ityādyekaprak āraḥ syāt svabhāvo nā paraḥ kvacit The heat of fire, the cold of water, the sweet sound of the cuckoos, and such other things happen to be (due to) the invariable nature (of those things), and (they) are not anything else. (Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 78, verse 8, v.l.). Denial of causality and free will then is the mark of one group of svabhāvav ādins (see Bhattacharya 2002b, verses 17, 19) while acceptance of sv ābhāva as the cause of everything is the mark of the other (see Bhattacharya 2001a, b). That the word svabhāva stands also for causality or universal order is also borne out by some observations of Joseph Needham. Referring to one of Chattopadhyaya’s works (1977) Needham (1980) writes:
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A key word in the ancient Indian literature is svabhāva, which could be translated “inherent nature”, “innate thus-ness”, or “the essential nature of things”. It must have had close relations with ṛ ta and even dharma in some senses, meaning “the Order of Nature” or the way in which Nature works—all recalling Tao in Chinese. The physicians were seeking the pattern-principles in Nature, the ultimate reasons (ultimately of course inscrutable) why things are as they are and behave as they do ( 1980, 25). Needham in this context makes another significant point in relation to the rendering of svabhāva in Chinese: It is interesting to see how these Sanskrit words came out when the Buddhist philosophers needed to translate them into Chinese. Svabhāva was rendered as hsing , and defined as embodied cause, the unchanging, independent, self-dependent, fundamental “nature” behind the manifestation or expression of anything. Sometimes this was amplified as tzu hsing , “the primary germ [verb. sap.] out of which all material appearances are evolved, the first source of the material world of phenomena”. Other more curious locutions were ssu-pho-pho and tzu-thi-thi, “own state”, essential or inherent property, innate or peculiar disposition, natural state or constitution (1980, 25). That svabhāva in the Chinese tradition meant hetu alone, not ahetu is clear from this instance. Thus hetu and ahetu, kriyā and akriyā continued to be associated with svabhāvav āda for centuries together. Most probably the group of svabhāvav ādins who believed svabhāva to be the cause of everything and hence believed in activism merged with the Ca¯rva¯kas at some point of time, although we cannot say exactly when. It may be presumed that such a merger took place before ‘Parama¯rtha’, i.e., in or before the sixth century CE.
a and Lok āyata Came to Coalesce When Svabhā vav ād
Yet it is also evident from the works of both S´ a¯ntaraksita and Haribhadra that ˙ svabhāva and the Ca¯ rva¯ka/Loka¯yata were not considered identical even in the eighth century CE. These two most well-versed savants never associate the two doctrines. S´a¯ntaraksita criticizes them in two different and widely separated ˙ chapters (TS , chs. 4 and 22), presumably knowing well that the twain were unrelated, at least not identical; one was not a namesake for the other. It is also worthy of note that at the very outset of his work he dispenses with six of earlier doctrines (similar but not the same as enumerated in the Ś vUp) and then proceeds to examine other and later philosophical systems. In Haribhadra’s two compendious works, the LTN and the Ś VS , too, all the doctrines are treated as distinct ones. The only difference in the approaches of these two scholars is that while S´ a¯ntaraksita ˙ does not mention yad ṛ cchā at all (presumably because he calls the same doctrine
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svabhāva), Haribhadra in both the LTN (chs.1 and 2), and the Ś VS 2.169-72), tak e note of svabhāva and yad ṛc chā as two different concepts, opposed to each other. 7 It was then sometime after the eighth century CE that svabhāva became an integral part of the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. ‘Parama¯rtha’ had shown earlier that the Lauka¯yatikas quoted a verse presumably composed by a svabhāvav ādin (on SK , v.27), but the assimilation is first clearly noticed in Utpala’s SVi (tenth century CE) on Bṛ S, 1.5. Utpala does not explain what he understands by svabhāva. Nevertheless, we have at least one piece of evidence before the SDS that it was svabhāva-as-causality, not as chance or accident, which had got assimilated in the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. There are also at least two aphorisms attributed to the Ca¯rva¯kas which almost definitely have their origin in sv ābhāv āv āda. The sūtras are as follows: janmavaicitrya bhed ā jjagadapi vicitram and mayūracandrakovat , “The world is varied due to the variation of origin” and “As the eye in the peacock’s tail” (II.1 and II.2 in Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 79, 87). Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯bhadra (late eleventh century) mentions both aphorisms in his Ā LV ṛ , marking them as iti lok ā yatasūtre (qutd. in Namai 1976, p. 38 n11 on A2–A8). The second simile is found employed in several verses pertaining to svabhāvav āda: cf. “What has fashioned the variegated plumage of peacocks?” TS , 4. 111c; “It is due to svabhāva like the variety of the peacock (i.e., its plumage),” NVV , 2: 10.8 Perhaps this is why some Veda¯ntins could speak of the Ca¯rva¯ka and svabhāva-as-causality at the same breath. The other group of svabhāvav ādins, on the contrary, clung to the later, altered view of svabhāva-asaccident. It is this group that is mentioned and refuted in the Nya¯ya texts and commentaries as proponents of ākasmikat ā, without any reference to the C ārv āka/ Lok ā yata (see NS 4.1.22–1.24). Svabhāva and yad ṛ cchā had become synonymous to some, as is evident from Dalhana’s view. He goes to the extent of explaining ˙ ˙ yad ṛ cchā as causality (on SS , S´ a¯rı¯rastha¯na, 1.11, 340)! Perhaps he argued to himself: If svabhāva could mean yad ṛc chā, why could yad ṛ cchā not mean svabhāva as well? The words were semantically interchangeable to him. Such a conclusion may appear to be partly conjectural, based as it is on the words of S´a¯ntaraksita, Kamala¯s´¯ı la, and Haribhadra, and the absence of any reference to ˙ ahetuv āda and akriyāv āda in some verses expounding svabhāvav āda. But without such a conjecture we cannot account for the reason why Somadevasu¯ri could take the Ca¯rva¯kas to be proponents of activism (YTC , I: 382).
Two Significations of K āl a and Svabhā va
How could the same name, svabhāva, be attributed to so diverse and contradictory views in two different domains, cosmology and ethics? We have to understand that ´ aṅkara distinguishes between svabhāva and yad ṛ cchā as follows: “By svabhāva is meant the Pseudo-S power invariably belonging to the material objects, as for instance [the radiation of] heat by fire…By yad ṛc chā is meant purely fortuitous origin” (on Ś vUp 1.2). S´an˙kara¯nanda, Amala¯nanda and S-M too make the distinction between the two along the same line. See Bhattacharya 2006, 39–40. 7
8
Several verses attributed to the svabhāvav ādins contain this and similar examples. See Bhattacharya 2002b, pp. 77–79.
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such changes in and additions to original meanings always happen to certain words, not all at once but over the ages. Such radical changes in signification and implication did not happen in case of svabhāva alone. It happens in a number of other instances too. Think of the knotty question: What is meant by ā stika and nā stika? To the Vedists, three non-Vedic systems, namely, the Buddhist, the Jain and the Ca¯ rva¯ka, all are n ā stikas; to the Buddhists and the Jains, the Ca¯rva¯kas alone are so. More relevant to this study is another question: What is yoga? The word, even in the context of philosophy alone, signifies a wide spectrum of systems (see Randle 3n1). I propose that the same happened in case of svabhāva and k āla too. Let us look at the doctrine of k āla. Erich Frauwallner has made a distinction between the idea of time in the Iranian neighbourhood and India. Gopinath Kaviraj too has pointed out that the original k ālav āda was a fatalistic creed but in the work of S´rı¯pati the astronomer (as quoted by D allana or Dalhana) time became synonymous ˙ ˙ ˙ with the lord-īśvara (Kaviraj 60). Yet there are reasons to believe that some sort of k ālav āda was adopted by the astronomers as their own creed (Agnicit Purusottama on ˙ S Ś, 1.528). Here too we face a crux: did the concept of time in the works of astronomers originate from the philosophical concept of k āla as mentioned in the Ś vUp? It is equally probable that astronomers quite independently developed their concept of time themselves. In other words, the k ālav āda of the AV and Ś vUp and that of the astronomers are virtually unrelated; only the word k āla is common to both. K ālav āda has also been said to be the view of the paur āṇikas, mythographers, by Utpala (gloss on B ṛ S, 1.7). Was the commentator right in this? It is plausible but by no means certain. 9 Apart from the astronomers, Va¯tsya¯yana in his KS , 1.2.39 too portrays the k ālak āraṇikas as believing that time alone is the determinant of human happiness and misery. The arthacintakas alone uphold purusak āra (human effort/manliness) and, as the commentator says, denounce daivamātrav āda, fatalism ( Jayamaṅ gal ā on KS 1.2.39, 23). Frauwallner has discussed k ālav āda first by referring to some verses related to time in a hymn ( AV , 19.53) and then mentioned some Buddhist and Jain sources. He concludes by saying: But in general this doctrine remains in the background. Apart from an occasional mention, the leading philosophical systems take no knowledge of it. On the contrary, they discuss the question of Time in quite a different way. 9
Kern in his edition of the B ṛ S has questioned the statement of Vara¯hamihira that Kanabhuk (Kana¯da) ˙ ˙ claimed dravyāni, substance, etc. (that is, the six categories mentioned in the Vai śe ṣikasūtra, 1.4) to be the first cause: “Although…they are the foundation of Kan a¯da’s System…, they are nowhere said, at least to ˙ my knowledge, to be the cause of the Universe. It appears the statement of our author is not accurate” (172 n1). Commentators on poems and narratives sometimes have to explain the philosophical views occasionally found in the texts. Since they do not have any uninterrupted tradition to follow, they have to recourse to their own understanding and knowledge. Especially when the views are archaic and no longer current, commentators and scholiasts are of little or no help. Sometimes they are totally unreliable. Two commentators are not always unanimous on the actual signification of technical terms. Nı¯lakantha is ˙˙ the worst offender in his glosses on the philosophical passages in the Mbh (see n11 below). We cannot altogether dispense with the commentaries but blind faith in the glosses offered by them only leads to further confusion.
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First of all we can say that the idea of Time vanishes where the proper philosophical thought comes in; it emerges only comparatively later. …The nature-philosophy of the Vais´esika in their atomistic-mechanistic world˙ picture had sufficiently proved the origin of all things so that there was no room for Time as the World-cause (Frauwallner I: 76). If this interpretation of k āla is accepted, the same might apply to the origin of the several mutually exclusive meanings of svabhāva in medical and philosophical works. It is interesting to note that an astronomer like Bha¯skara¯ca¯rya (S Śi , Gola¯dhya¯ya 5) and S´rı¯pati (S Śe 15.21) and even a grammarian like Durga¯ca¯rya [1.4.3 (on Nirukta 1.19), pp. 110–111] resorted to the concept of svabhāva in order to explain how the planets continued to roam in the void and how words acquire some special significations. Hence it may be presumed that svabhāva, like k āla, was rather a concept available for use by all and sundry without their ever being or even becoming k ālav ādins or svabhāvav ādins. There was no fixed connotations attached to these words; anyone could take them in whatever sense one liked. K āla could mean an 11.32: k ālo’ asmi lokak ṣayak ṛ t abstraction or a namesake of lord- īśvara (as in G ī tā prv ṛd dho lok ān samāhartumiha prav ṛ ttaḥ, “Time I am, in fulness, the consumer of creatures, here at work for the destruction of creatures.” As the translator explains: Time here stands for “the divine power of causing change” (G ī tā 174). Similarly svabhāva could mean both causality and accident. Both k ālav āda and svabhāvav āda were “lost philosophies,” as Randle said (16n3). But the words, k āla and svabhāva, remained in currency in classical Sanskrit and could be invoked as and when necessary. Malvania (GV , 125) and Chattopadhyaya (2001, p. 56) apparently presumed that svabhāva had always stood for causality and had not, at a certain stage of development, between the sixth century BCE and the first century CE, become synonymous with yad ṛc chā. Like k āla, svabhāva too first appeared as a jagatk āraṇa (the first cause), a view of cosmology distinct from both the idea of a creator as well as of an uncaused entity. Then the word in the sense of chance or accident, ha ṭ ha, appeared in a different domain relating to the philosophy of life, as a member of a triad or tetrad: daiva, puru ṣak āra, haṭ ha / svabhāva, and k āla (for a detailed discussion see Bhattacharya 2007 b, 277–281). This other domain, human conduct, is not altogether unrelated to the first, for if the world is viewed as created and moved by chance or accident, any human effort to achieve some end in life is bound to be futile. Thus even cosmological speculations may and do influence people’s philosophy of life. If, on the other hand, the world is conceived as an ordered entity, every effect having a cause of its own, the philosophy of life that would follow would uphold human endeavour and resoluteness. In the Indian tradition, daiva, haṭ ha/yad ṛc chā, and niyati follow from the first world-view, namely, ahetuv āda, while the second world-view, upholding karman, would endorse an activist philosophy of life. Karman, it is to be noted, admits rebirth, for actions of previous lives will have concomitant effects on succeeding lives: reward and punishment will be commensurate with past actions, good and evil. Svabhāva-ascausality, on the contrary, dispenses with such unseen and unverifiable concepts as it admits nothing supernatural beyond this world. Here causality is not something
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imposed from above or existing outside natural phenomena, yet every action would have its natural effect. In short, svabhāva-as-causality as a doctrine has every right to be called proto-materialistic. Although it first appeared as an independent view, it was latterly assimilated in the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata materialist school.
Materialist Views in India: One or Many?
The relation of svabhāva-as-causality to the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata is well attested. Yet, it is also known that the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata was not the only materialist philosophy in India. Besides Sa¯m khya there was at least another materialist school which ˙ thought in terms of �ve elements as opposed to the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata which spoke of four (earth, air, fire, and water), thereby excluding āk āśa or vyoma, space or ether, presumably because it was not amenable to sense perception. Several Buddhist and Jain sources as well as some verses in the Mbh confirm the existence of the school which was not only bh ūtapañcakav ādin but also akriyāv ādin in its philosophy of life (for details see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 33–43). It is possible that the doctrine of yad ṛc chā was at some point of time renamed svabhāva and had got assimilated in the thoughts of this or some other pre-Ca¯rva¯ka philosophical school that is called bhūtav āda in Manimekalai, 27.265–27.275, the only extant Tamil Buddhist poem (written between the third century and the seventh century CE). Mbh 12.267.4 also speaks of time as the creator of all beings out of the pañcamahābhūt āni, five great elements. Another verse in the Mbh (13.50.11) says that all gods, human beings, Gandharvas, Pis´a¯cas, demons and monsters are created out of svabhāva, having neither any effect nor any cause. There was thus several approaches to the problem of jagatk āraṇa, combining k āla, bhūtas and svabhāva-as-accident. Thus svabhāva-as-accident is as much a part of one or probably more than one pre-Ca¯rva¯ka materialist view of svabhāva-as-causality. Those who speak of svabhāvav āda as related to the Ba¯rhaspatya or Ca¯rva¯ka are definitely not right in their identification but not altogether wrong either. The latter being the only living system of materialist philosophy known to them, they could not think of any older or lost pre-Ca¯rva¯ka materialist school to which akriyāv āda and ahetuv āda were actually related. Ba¯rhaspatya or Ca¯rva¯ka or Loka¯yata was a sort of “brand name” representing materialism in India after the eighth century CE. Hence the confusion around the issue: whether the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata upholds ahetu and akriyā or hetu and kriyā. The original doctrine of svabhāva, it appears, was lost or merged in another system of philosophy such as the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata, whether in its first incarnation as causality or in its second incarnation as accident, and thus persisted as a concept found both in Sa¯mkhya and the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. Johnston has noticed that that ˙ svabhāv a “was still held worth shot and shell in the eighth century” (Johnston 1928, 159n).10 We may add: and even long after, as found in VPS (fourteenth century CE), 10
Apparently he had in mind the lines from Alfred Tennyson’s poem, “The Charge of the Light Brigade”: “Storm’d at with shot and shell, / Boldly they rode and well, / Into the valley of Death, / Into the mouth of Hell” (Stanza 3), p. 167.
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if not for anything else but merely for form’s sake, or perhaps because it was customary to establish theism and/or human endeavour/resoluteness ( puru ṣak āra) by denouncing all atheistic and/or fatalistic views. The doctrines of svabhāva and k āla were two such targets, conventionally chosen by some later writers. It is also to be noted that all those who identify svabhāvav āda with the Loka¯yata such as Utpala are not at all explicit about what they mean by svabhāva: causality or its negation. Therefore, casual remarks concerning svabhāva and the Ca¯ rva¯ka/ Loka¯yata quoted out of context by any author are not to be taken at face value. It is obvious that commentators like Nı¯lakantha were at a loss to explain some of the ˙˙ technical terms of philosophy employed in the Mbh and were therefore forced to provide wild and often wrong glosses. 11 By the ninth century, the relation between svabhāvav āda as a doctrine involving causality and/or as a component part of the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata (if not a synonym for it) was widely accepted as an established fact, at least by most of the Veda¯ntins. 12 Thus we have a continuity of this view identifying svabhāvav āda with the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata, right from pseudo-S´ an˙kara ¯ nandagiri (fourteenth century) (ninth century), Amala¯nanda (thirteenth century), A in their respective commentaries on the Ś vUp 1.2, down to S-M (fourteenth century) ¯ s´rama (sixteenth century) and Agnicit Purusottama in SDS , chap. 1, Nr simha A ˙ ˙ ˙ (seventeenth century) in their respective commentaries on the S Ś , 1.528, in whatever sense they might have taken the word svabhāva. We have also seen that in the Chinese tradition svabhāva was taken in the sense of causality alone (Needham 1980, p. 25 qutd. above). And it is this firm belief in causality that marks the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. What is not to be overlooked is that the view of svabhāva-as-accident or haṭ ha, chance, too continued to exist side by side with the medical view of svabhāva as “embodied cause” or unchanging nature (see Chattopadhyaya 1977, pp. 178–184). Even though the Indian medical texts are characterized by such a faith, there is nothing to show that they had been influenced by the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata. On the other hand, as has been shown above, the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata was not the only school of materialism in India. The original Sa¯m khya was also materialistic in its approach ˙ and the relation of the CS to Sa¯mkhya is an established fact (Dasgupta II, pp. 273, ˙ 304, 312, 314, etc.). Yet it should not delude us into believing that the CS , in the form it has come down to us, is wholly or even primarily influenced by Sa¯m khya. It ˙ is true that the authors and successive “reconstructors” ( pratisaṃ skart ṛs ) and redactors of the Indian medical texts, unlike their Greek counterparts, were not hostile to philosophy (see Bhattacharya 2003). Yet the philosophical speculations in ¯ diparvan, Mbh (crit. ed.), 68, notes: “Nı¯lakantha has Sukthankar in his Prolegomena to the A ˙˙ misunderstood the text and gives doubtful, far-fetched or fanciful interpretations,” such as offering a Vedantic twist to 1.23.15 and suggesting an “esoteric meaning” of 1.232.1-7,19. Belvalkar in his Editorial ´ a¯ntiparvan (crit. ed.), VIII, too complains that “orthodox commentators like Nı¯lakantha Note on the S ˙˙ gloss over” the differences in the representation of ‘the very large number of philosophical passages, particularly “Sa¯mkhya” passages… and interpret them all in consonance with Advaita Veda¯nta. The commentators by no means agree in their interpretations.’ See also Bhattacharya (2001a, pp. 182–183), cataloguing Nı¯lakantha’s shifting positions regarding svabhāva. ˙˙ 12 The only exception known to me is Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯ on S Ś , 1.528. He does not identify the svabhāvav ādins with the Ca¯rva¯kas but thinks that the svabhāvav ādins are accidentalists, who think that the effect happens without any cause, k āraṇaṃ vinaiva k āryaṃ bhavati…. (p. 678). 11
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the CS and the SS are so hopelessly mixed up with Brahminical beliefs and so oddly interpreted by the commentators (see Bhattacharya 2006, pp. 41–42) that it is virtually impossible to separate the right reading from the spurious, unless some earlier and more authentic mss are discovered. 13 Apart from the materialist trait found in the medical texts, there were several proto-materialist views current in India from the Buddha’s time, of which Ajita Kesakambala (Kes´akambalin in Sanskrit) is a very well-known representative (see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 45–54). Some of such materialists may have been akriyāv ādins and ahetuv āadins as well, a fact attested by clear references to them in the Mbh and other sources (see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 33–43 and 2007b).
Summing Up
The upshot of the whole discussion is then as follows: svabhāva was one of the oldest concepts formulated somewhat vaguely before or during the sixth century BCE which finds mention in Ś vUp 1.2. It continued to be invoked, along with other concepts such as time, destiny, chance, karman, etc., as one of the many claimants for the role of the first cause. In course of time, definitely before the first century CE, svabhāva, instead of, or rather in addition to, signifying causality, became synonymous with chance or accident and was derided as an inactivist approach to life in the Moks adharma section of the Mbh. The Buddhists (and the Naiya¯yikas too) ˙ adopted this changed connotation of svabhāva as a namesake for yad ṛc chā, while some followers of Sa¯mkhya and almost all Veda¯ntins, right from the ninth century, ˙ continued to hold the original view that svabhāva stood for causality while yad ṛc chā, for accident. Till the eighth century svabhāvav āda (whether as a doctrine advocating causality or chance) and the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata were considered by some (S´ a¯ntaraksita and Haribhadra, for instance) to be unrelated to each other. At a certain point ˙ of time (we do not know exactly when, but definitely before Utpala and Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯bhadra, i.e., between the eighth century and the tenth century CE) svabhāva-as-causality had already got associated with the Loka¯yata, perhaps because of their common atheistic and anti-supernatural character. Svabhāvav āda thereafter ceased to be a separate view and somehow got assimilated in the Ca¯rva¯ka / Loka¯yata materialism. Other materialist views such as bhūtav āda in the mean time seem to have withered away.
13
Chattopadhyaya’s plea for a new critical edition of the CS (1979, p. 235; 1986, pp. 569–578) is perfectly justified. In fact, such an edition of the Vima˜nastha˜na of the CS is under preparation, supervised by Karin Preisendanz, Institut fu¨r Su¨dasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde, Universita¨t Wien (see the respective papers by Maas and by Pecchia). But if the proposed edition is prepared on the basis of available mss along the line envisaged by Chattopadhyaya, the amount of emendation, not supported by ms evidence, will be so large that text-critics would quite legitimately condemn the reconstituted text as motivated by purely subjective considerations to suit the philosophical bias of the new editor(s). The �rst critical edition of the CS and the SS can never give us what Chattopadhayaya wished for. Maybe after the second or even the third critical edition (as Sukthankar said about editing the Mbh in his “Prolegomena to ¯ diparvan”, crit. ed., 104), emendatio and higher criticism may achieve it. See also Bhattacharya the A (2002a).
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In spite of all this, svabhāva has its own place in the Sa¯m khya tradition. In the ˙ medical literature too svabhāva occupies an important place. In the medical texts as well as in the Brahminical and Jain philosophical literature, a syncretic doctrine, which has been named k āl ādisāmagr ī v āda, involving time, svabhāva, niyati and karman (Dixit, “Ṭ ippanī ” 45; Ś VS , 2.191–193. See also Bhattacharya 2007) is also proposed by some Jain writers, although by no means all. For all practical purposes svabhāva turned out to be, so to say, a lance free and readily available for use by anyone and everyone; it was no longer attached to any particular school of thought. In the fields of astronomy and grammar too svabhāva is sometimes invoked when no plausible explanation of an odd phenomenon is available to the authors (Bhattacharya 2006, p. 45). More importantly, both the meanings of svabhāva, namely, causality and accident, continued to circulate simultaneously and anyone could choose either of the two meanings. The same situation evolved in course of time in relation to k ālav āda as well. Another aspect of svabhāva to be noted is that in the dispute between two forces, daiva and puru ṣak āra, svabhāva-as-accident is akin to the former, while svabhāvaas-causality, to the latter. Sometimes, however, two more forces, namely, chance and time, are also added (see Bhattacharya 2007b). The confusion of significations around the word svabhāva in philosophical literature can be resolved if we remember that besides Sa¯mkhya and the Ca¯rva¯ ka/Loka¯yata, other materialist views ˙ were current in India long before the redaction of the first sūtra-work of the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata, which most probably took place before the eighth century CE; between the sixth and the eighth, to be more specific. Acknowledgment Thanks are due to Amitava Bhattacharya for reading the draft and offering valuable suggestions for improvement. The usual disclaimers apply.
Appendix
Besides the mention of one or the other of the first cause, (see Bhattacharya 2001c) several lists of the “competing causalities” [in Wilhelm Halbfass’s (p. 291) words] are available. In addition to the first of such lists provided in Ś vUp, 1.2, we have JM , 23.17–20 ( svabhāva, īśvara, pūrvak ṛ ta karma, ucchedav āda), Ś VS , chap. 2 (k āla, svabhāva, niyati, karman), Siddhasena Diva¯kara, qutd. by Kulkarni, 16 n22 (k āla, svabhāva, niyati, pūrvakarma, puru ṣak āra), TS , chs. 1–6 ( prak ṛt i,, īśvara, both the two, svabhāva, śabdabrahman, ātman), Ā SV ṛ on Ā S, 1.1.3 (k āla, niyati, svabhāva, īśvara, ā tman), Ma¯thara and Gaudapa¯da on SK , 61 (īśvara, puru ṣa, svabhāva, k āla), ˙ ˙ GS , verses 679–683 (k āla, īśvara, ātman, niyati, svabhāva), SS ,1.1.11 ( svabhāva, īśvara, k āla, yad ṛ cchā, niyati), SK ā , 548 (īśvara, niyati, karman, svabhāva, k āla), Kumbhaka, as quoted by al-Bı¯ru¯nı¯ , I:321 (mahābhūta, k āla, svabhāva, karman), Kriyākalpataru, as quoted in YTC , Book 5, 458 (vidhi, vidhāt ā, niyati, svabhāva, k āla, droha, daiva, karman), and TRD, 11–15 (k āla, īś vara, ā tman, niyati, svabhāva, yad ṛc hhā). Thus from the fourth century CE to the fifteenth century, we have some such lists that however, intentionally or not, confuse the two domains, cosmological and
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ethical, in which svabhāva and k āla are generally common (I have omitted such texts as the HV , Bhavisyaparvan, 20.22 (vulgate ed.), which too mentions k āla and ˙ svabhāva). We also have references to svabhāva in various parvans of the Mbh (Bhattacharya 2007b, pp. 275–277) and stray references to the bhūtacintakas, k ālak āraṇikas, haṭ hav ādakas, and syncretic views in various sources (see Bhattacharya 2001a, b, and 2007b passim). In order to understand what svabhāva means in a particular base text and commentary we have to determine at first which domain is being referred to, cosmological or ethical, and then decide what svabhāva there stands for, causality or accident. All the syncretic views may be safely ignored, for they are expressions of mere wishful thinking: excepting a few Jains none used to think in such syncretic terms. Even all the Jain philosophers did not hold the same view in relation to svabhāva in either domain, cosmological and ethical, and some viewed svabhāva as causality, others as accident (Bhattacharya 2005, 2006). As to the relation between svabhāvav āda and the Ca¯rva¯ka/Loka¯yata, too, the Jains were not unanimous in their opinion.
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