Supreme Court: The Solicitor General For Plaintiff-Appellee. Ricardo M.Sampang For Accused-Appellant

 

Republic of the Philippine Philippines s SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No G.R. No.. 9 930 3028 28 Ju July ly 29 29,, 199 1994 4 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant. REGALADO, J.: Here He rein in ac accu cuse sedd-ap appe pell llan antt  Ma Mart rtin in Si Simo mon n y Su Sung nga a wa was s ch char arge ged d on No Nove vemb mber er 10 10,, 19 1988 88 wi with th a viol violat atio ion n of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,  as amended, otherwise kn kno own as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that  on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four four tea tea  ba bags gs of mari rijjua uana na to a Na Narc rco oti tics cs Com omm man and d (N (NA ARC RCOM OM)) po pose seur ur-b -buy uyer er in con consi sid derat eratio ion n of the sum of  P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for  marijuana.1  Eve ven ntua tually lly arr rra aigne gned  wi with th the the as assi sist stan ance ce of co coun unse sell on March arch 2, 19 198 89, af afte terr his re rear arre rest st fo foll llow owiing hi his s escape from  Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained,2  he

 

pleaded not  guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded. I The Th e ev evid iden ence ce  on re reco cord rd sh show ows s that that a co conf nfid iden enti tial al info inform rman ant, t, la late terr id iden enti tifi fied ed as a NA NARC RCOM OM op oper erat ativ ive, e, informed the  police unit at Camp Oliva vas s, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug acti ctivities of a cert ce rtai ain n "A "Aly lyas as  Pu Pusa sa"" at Sto. Sto. Cr Cris isto to,, Gu Guag agua ua,, Pa Pamp mpan anga ga.. Ca Capt pt.. Fr Fran anci cisc sco o Bu Bust stam aman ante te,, Co Comm mman andi ding ng Officer of  the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of  Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt gt.. Dom omin ingo go  Pejor ejoro o, all memb embers ers of the the sa sam me unit. nit. Afte Afterr se secu curi ring ng marke arked d mon oney ey fr fro om Bus usta tama mant nte, e, the the tea team,  to toge geth the er wi with th th thei eirr in info form rma ant, nt, pro proce cee ede ded d to Sto. to. Cri rist sto o af afte terr they hey ha had d coor coordi dina nate ted d wit ith h the pol olic ice e au auth tho ori rittie ies s  an and d   barangay  officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential inf nfo orm rmer er poi oint nte ed  ou outt app ppe ell llan antt to Lop opez ez who co con nse sequ quen entl tly y ap appr proa oach che ed app ppel ella lant nt and and asked sked hi him m if he had marijuana.  Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags.  Appellant then  left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez  gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratche ched his head as a pre-arranged signal  to his companions who were sta stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team  closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested app ppel ella lant nt.. Th The e  lat attter was the hen n brou rough ghtt by the the team team to the the 3r 3rd d Na Narc rco oti tics cs Re Regi gion ona al Un Unit it at Ca Cam mp Ol Oliiva vas s on board  a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the 4

investigator. 

 

Pfc. Villaruz  corrobora ratted Lopez' testi stimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and  the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant.5 Sgt. Domingo  Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest  from the rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his co comp mpan anio ions ns..  He di did d no nott ac acttua uallly se see e the the sa sale le that that tran transp spir ire ed be bettwe ween en Lo Lope pez z an and d appel ppella lant nt but but he saw his  teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the  custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel.6  Pejo Pe joro ro also also  clai claime med d ha havi ving ng prep prepar ared ed Ex Exhi hibi bitt "G "G", ", the the "R "Rec ecei eipt pt of Pr Prop oper erty ty Se Seiz ized ed/C /Con onfi fisc scat ated ed"" whic which h app ppel ella lant nt sign signed ed,,  adm dmiitti tting ther therei ein n the the co con nfi fisc sca ati tion on of fou four tea tea bag ags s of mar ariiju juan ana a dri rie ed leaves aves in hi his s pos osse sess ssiion on.. Pej ejor oro o  like likew wise ise info nform rme ed the the co cou urt below elow tha that, ori origi gina nall lly, y, wha hatt he pla lace ced d on th the e re rece ceip iptt was that  only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected  his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to  the correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7  Dr. Pedro  S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day afte fter the the  lat attter's er's ap appr preh ehen ensi sio on, an and d the resu resullts were ere pr pra actic ctica all lly y no norm rmal al ex exce cep pt for his re rela lati tive velly hi high gh blood pressure.  The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of gastro-in -intestinal pain.  In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara disco cov vered that appellant has a history of  peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit

 

blood. In  the afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal.8   As expected,  appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question,  at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his family in their  house when  three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that  they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant boarde rded a  jeep with them. He was told that they were going to Camp Oliva vas s, but he later notice ced d that they were  taking a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight  from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to  sig sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt.  Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to  him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that that the the  twe wen nty-p ty-pe eso bil illl ca cam me from from the po pock cke et of Pejo joro ro.. Mo More reo over, ver, the re rea ason son wh why y he vo vom mite ted d bl bloo ood d was because  of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office  but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he  was being subjected. After esca cap ping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienven venido Sun unga ga,, at  San Mat atia ias, s, Gu Guag agua ua,, rea reach chiing the the pla lace ce at aro rou und 6: 6:3 30 or 7:3 :30 0 p.m. .m. Th Ther ere e, he co cons nsul ulte ted da qua uack ck do doct cto or  and nd,, lat ate er, he was acc ccom ompa pani nied ed by his si sist ste er to the the Rom oman ana a Pa Pang ngan an Di Dist stri rict ct Ho Hosp spiita tall at Floridablanca, Pampanga Pampanga where he was confined for three days.9   Appellant's brother,  Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga  after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He l10 ikewise confirm con firmed ed th tha at  app ppel ella lant nt ha had d bee een n su suff ffe erin ring fro from pe pept ptiic ulc lce er ev even en bef efo ore the la latt tte er' r's s arr rres est. t.  Also,

 

Dr. Evelyn  Gomez-Aguas, a resident phys ysiician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated  appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for  this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.11   On December  4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment con co nvict victiing app ppel ella lant nt  fo forr a vi viol olat atiion of Sec ecttio ion n 4, Arti rticl cle e II of Re Repu publ blic ic Act No. 6425 6425,, as am amen ende ded, d, an and d sentencing him  to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay  the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.12  Appellant now  prays the Court to reverse the aforementione aforementioned d judgment of the lower court, contending in  his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of   "fra "frame me-u -up p", (2 (2))  no nott de decl cla arin ring Exh xhiibit bit "G "G"" (R (Rec ece eip iptt of Pro rop per erty ty Seiz ized ed/C /Con onfi fisc sca ate ted d) in inad adm mis issi sib ble in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.13    At the  outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually  sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely  confiscated subsequently from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way con co nne nect cted ed wit ith h  th the e sa sale le,, the in info form rma ati tion on alle allege ges s that that he so solld and de deli live vere red d fou ourr te tea a bag ags s of marij ariju uan ana a drie dried d leav leaves es..15  In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the   act of  selling the  two tea bags   allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and dis isti tinc nctt issu issue e  of   illegal possession of the other two tea bags   wh whiich se sep par ara ate of offfen ense se is no nott ch cha arg rge ed 16

herein. 

 

To sustain  a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established.17   To se sell ll mea eans ns to giv ive e, whe hetthe herr for for mon one ey or an any y ot oth her mate teri rial al cons consid ider era ati tion on..18   It mu must st,, therefore, be  established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of  marijuana dried  leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.  After an  assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally cert ce rtai ain n tha hatt  app ppe ell lla ant was ca caug ught ht in fla flagra grante nte del delict icto o   eng ngag agin ing g in the the ill lleg egal al sa salle of pro prohi hibi bite ted d dr dru ugs. gs. The prosecution  was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did se selll  tw two o te tea a ba bag gs of mar ariiju juan ana a drie ried le leav aves es to Sg Sgt. t. Lo Lop pez. ez. Th The e lat attter himse imsellf cr cre edi dita tab bly test testiifi fied ed as to how  the the sa salle to took ok pla lace ce and his his test testim imo ony was amp mply ly co corr rrob obor orat ated ed by his te tea amma mate tes. s. As be betw twe een th the e st stra raig ight htfo forw rwar ard, d,  po posi siti tive ve an and d co corr rrob obor orat ated ed test testim imon ony y of Lo Lope pez z an and d th the e ba bare re de deni nial als s an and d ne nega gati tive ve testimony of  appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more entitled to credence. When the  drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Con onst stab abul ular aryy-In Intteg egra rate ted d Nati ation onal al  Poli olice (P (PCC-IN INP P) at Ca Camp mp Ol Oliv iva as fo forr ex exam amiina nati tion on,, P/Cp /Cpl. Marl arlyn Sal alan anga gad, d, a  foren orensi sic c ch chem emiist ther therei ein, n,23confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of  the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of  3.8 grams  of marijuana.24   Th Thu us, the the   co corp rpus us de deli lict cti  i o of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25    Appellant would  want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabili improbabilities ties in the testimonies of  the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the  marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had

 

nothing to  do with the confisc sca ation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Propert rty y Seized/Confiscated," Seized/Confiscat ed," he signed it as the one who seized the same.26   Suffice it  to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since  such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear  is that the marijuana was confisc sca ated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming   arguendo  that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seize zed d the marijuana from appellant,  such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither  impairs the  essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty.27   Bes esiide des, s,  th ther ere e wa was s cl cle ear arlly a me mere re impre preci cisi sion on of la lang ngua uage ge si sin nce Pej ejor oro o obv bvio ious uslly mea eant nt that he  did not take part in the  physical   taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit. Next Ne xt,, ap appe pell llan antt  ad addu duce ces s the the argu argume ment nt that that the the tw twen enty ty-p -pes eso o bi bill lls s al alle lege gedl dly y co conf nfis isca cate ted d from from hi him m we were re nott  po no powd wder ered ed fo forr fing finger er-p -pri rint ntin ing g pu purp rpos oses es co cont ntra rary ry to th the e no norm rmal al pr proc oced edur ure e in buybuy-bu bust st op oper erat atio ions ns..28   This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows: Q: Is it  the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such operation you do not anymore provide  a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?  A: We were  not able to put powder on these denomination denominations s because we are lacking that kind of  material in  our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir. xxx

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Q: Is it  not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of  NICA?  A: Our office  is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that powder  because they, themselves, are using that in their own work, sir.29   The foregoing  explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for   entrapment purposes  can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the  Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administe ster, delive verr,  give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or  shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."30   The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder  is only an evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by other species of evidence.  Again, appellant  contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any   barangay  barangay of offi fici cial al or ci civi vili lian an to witness  the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he  was not reported to or booked in the custody of any   barangay  offici cia al or police authorities.31   These  are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or  seizure, to  be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a   barangay  official or any other civilian, or be acc cco ompa pan nied by  th the e ta taki king ng of pict pictu ures. res. On the the co cont ntra rary ry,, the the po pollice enf nfo orc rcer ers s havin aving g ca caug ught ht ap appe pell llan antt in fl flag agra rant nte e  de deli lict cto, o, they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure. Likewise, contrary  to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in 32

connection with  his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report  states,   inter ter ali lia a, that "suspect was  arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the

 

confis conf isca cati tion on of  an anot othe herr tw two o tea tea ba bags gs of su susp spec ecte ted d ma mari riju juan ana a dr drie ied d le leav aves es." ." Be Belo low w th thes ese e re rema mark rks s wa was s affi ffixe xed d ap appe pell llan ant' t's s  sign signat atur ure. e. In the the sa same me man anne ner, r, the the re rece ceiipt for for the the se seiize zed d pro prope pert rty, y, her erei einb nbef efor ore e mentioned, was  signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the co con nfiscation of the marked bills from him.33   However, we  find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence.  Appellant's conformance  to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the  crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for  the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was ass ssiisted  by counsel.34    Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived  his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel,35 hen ence ce wha hattev ever er  in incr criimin inat ator ory y admis dmissi sion on or co conf nfe ess ssio ion n may be ex extr tra acted cted fr fro om hi him m, eit ith her ve verb rba all lly y or  in writing,  is not allowable in evidence.36 Be Besi sid des es,, the the ar arre rest st re rep port ort is se self lf-s -se erv rvin ing g and he hear arsa say y an and d can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect. Notw No twit iths hsta tand ndin ing g th the e  ob obje ject ctio iona nabi bili lity ty of the the afor afores esai aid d ex exhi hibi bits ts,, ap appe pell llan antt ca cann nnot ot th ther ereb eby y be ex extr tric icat ated ed from his  predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been suffici suf ficien entl tly y pro prove ven. n.  Th The e co comm mmiiss ssiion of the the off offen ense se of ill lleg egal al sa salle of pr proh ohib ibit ited ed dru drugs re requ quir ire es me mere relly   which happens the moment the buyer receives the the co con nsummation  of the selling transaction37 dru rug g from from the se sellle ler. r.38 In the the prese resent nt ca case se,, an and d in li ligh ghtt of the the pr prec ece edi ding ng di disc scus ussi sion on,, th this is sa sale le ha has s be been en ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt. Finally, appellant  contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting 43

officers  which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody. 

 

This he  asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier   discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion. The doctrin rine  is now too well embedded in our jurisp sprrudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not only  proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience  and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.44   The  evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of   malt ma ltre reat atme ment nt.. Tw Two o  do doct ctor ors, s, on one e for for the the pros prosec ecut utio ion n45   and the other for the defense,46   te test stif ifie ied d on th the e absence of  any tell-tale sign or indica cattion of bodily injury ry,, abrasions or contusi sio ons on the person of  appellant. What  is evid vident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he   Hi had be been en  su suff ffer eriing ev eve en befo efore his arre arrest st..47 His s own own br brot othe herr ev even en co corr rro obo bora rate ted d tha hatt fa fact ct,, sa sayi yin ng tha hatt appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48   Furt Fu rthe herm rmor ore, e, if  it is tru true tha hatt ap appe pell llan antt was maltre ltreat ated ed at Ca Camp mp Ol Oliv iva as, he had no re rea ason son wh what atso soev eve er  for not  divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his det ete ent ntio ion n  the here re..49   Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file app ppro ropr priiat ate e ch char arge ges s  ag agai ains nstt the the all lleg eged ed malef alefa actor ctors s des esp pit ite e the the opp ppor ortu tuni nity ty to do so50 and with the legal services  of counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the concl clu usion that appellant's story is a pure fabrication. Thes Th ese e, and  th the e eve vent nts s ea earl rliier dis iscu cuss sse ed, so soun undl dly y ref refute ute hi his s all lleg egat atiion ons s th that at hi his s ar arre rest st was was ba base selles ess s and pre preme medi dita tate ted d  fo forr th the e NARC RCO OM ag agen entts we were re dete eterm rmin ined ed to ar arre rest st hi him m at all co cost sts. s.51 Premeditated or not,  appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and it  was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of   prohibited drugs.  Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the

 

 judgment of  the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act  No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 wh whic ich h su supe perv rven enie ienc nce e ne nece cessa ssari rily ly af affe fect cts s th the e original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall now resolve. II The provisions  of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect: Sec. 13. Sections 3,  4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows: xxx xxx xxx Sec. 4. Sa Sale le,, Ad Admi mini nist stra rati tion on,,  De Deli live very ry,, Di Dist stri ribu buti tion on an and d Tran Transp spor orta tati tion on of Proh Prohib ibit ited ed Dr Drug ugs s . — The pen enal alty ty of    rec reclus lusion ion per perpet petua ua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten mill mi llio ion n pe peso sos s sh shal alll be im impo pose sed d up upon on an any y pe pers rson on wh who, o, un unle less ss au auth thor oriz ized ed by la law, w, sh shal alll se sell ll,, ad admi mini nist ster er,, del eliv ive er, give give  aw away ay to ano notthe her, r, dist distri ribu bute te,, disp dispa atch tch in tran transi sitt or tra rans nsp por ortt any any pr proh ohib ibit ited ed dru drug, or sh shal alll act as a broker in any of such transactions. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 17. Section 20,  Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 20. Application 20.  Application of  Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime . —  The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15  and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of  the following quantities:

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5.

750 gra grams ms or mo more re of ind indian ian hem hemp po orr m mari arijua juana na xxx xxx xxx Othe Ot herw rwis ise e, if  the qu quan anti titty in invo vollve ved d is les ess s tha han n the fore forego goin ing g quant uantiities ties,, th the e pen ena alt lty y sh sha all ra ran nge fr fro om  prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. 1. Considering that  herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a  total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of   those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659  should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesse sser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.  Although Republic  Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of  the previo vious Articl cle es 190 to 194 of the Revise sed d Penal Code,53   it has long been settled that by  force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Art rtiicle 22 thereof applies to and sha sh all be  give given n re retr tro osp spec ecti tive ve eff effec ectt to cri crimes pun uniish she ed by sp spe eci cia al la laws ws..54 Th The e exec execu utio tion in sa saiid ar arti ticl cle e wou ould ld no nott  app pply ly to tho hose se co con nvi vict cte ed of drug rug offe offen nse ses s si sinc nce e hab habitua tual de dellinque nquen ncy re refe fers rs to co con nvi vict ctiion ons s for the  third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical   in inju juri ries es,, ro robo bo,, hu hurt rto, o, es esta tafa fa or falsification.55   Since, obviously,  the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor  invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can sua su a sp spon onte te   apply the provi vis sions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. vs.  Moran, et al . , ante.   ,  thus:

 

. .  . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in  so far as they are favora rab ble to perso rsons accused of a felony, would be use selless and nugatory if  the courts  of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has  applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty. If the  judgment which co cou uld be affected and modified by the reduced ced penalties provided in Republic  Act No.  7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence ther there eun unde der, r, th then en  pr pra actic ctice e, pro proce ced dure ure an and d pragm ragma ati tic c co cons nsiide dera rati tion ons s wo woul uld d wa warr rra ant an and d neces ecessi sita tatte the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus .56   2. Probably throu rough  oversight, an error on the matter of imposa sab ble penalties appears to have been committed in  the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.  As applied  to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the  penalty of    recl reclus usio ion n pe perp rpet etua ua   to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10, P1 0,00 000, 0,00 000. 0.00 00 up upon on  an any y pe pers rson on wh who o sh shal alll un unla lawf wful ully ly se sell ll,, ad admi mini nist ster er,, de deli live ver, r, gi give ve aw away ay,, di dist stri ribu bute te,, dispatch in  transit or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20  of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or  mari arijua uan na; ot othe herw rwis ise e,  if the qu quan anti titty in invo vollve ved d is le less ss,, the the pen enal alty ty sh sha all ra rang nge e fr fro om prision correccional  to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. In other  words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of    reclusion  perpetua by  re rea aso son n of its its du dual al imp mpos osiition tion,, that that is is,, as the the ma maxi xim mum of the the pe pena nalt lty y wh wher ere e th the e mari arijuan uana is less  than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750

 

grams or  more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regu regula late ted d drug drugs s  pr prov ovid ided ed in sa said id Se Sect ctio ion n 20 20.. To ha harm rmon oniz ize e su such ch co conf nfli lict ctin ing g pr prov ovis isio ions ns in or orde derr to gi give ve effect to  the whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved  is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from  prision correccional  to   re recl clus usio ion n temp tempor oral  al ,  and not   recl reclus usio ion n pe perp rpet etua ua.  This is also concordant with the fundamental rule  in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused. 3. Where, as  in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable  range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides  that the penalty shall be taken from said range "de depe pend ndin ing g upon pon the qu quan anti titty "   of the drug involved  in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of  three distinct penalties, that is,  prision correccional,prision mayor,   and   reclusion temporal  . In  such a sit situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of  them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.58   Ordinarily, and  pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty shall be  imposed on the accused. The pecu culliarity of the   se seco cond nd pa para ragr grap aph h of Se Sect ctio ion n 20 20,, ho howe weve ver, r, is its specific  mandate, above quoted, that the penalty sh sha all instead   de dep pend end upon pon the the qu quan anti tity  ty   of the dru rug g su subj bje ect  of th the e cr criimi mina nall tran transa sact ctiion on..59    Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to  subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid comp co mpon onen entt pe pena nalt ltie ies s  sh shal alll be co cons nsid ider ered ed as a prin princi cipa pall im impo posa sabl ble e pe pena nalt lty y de depe pend ndin ing g on th the e qu quan anti tity ty of the the  drug drug in invo volv lved ed.. Th Ther ereb eby, y, the the mo modi dify fyin ing g circ circum umst stan ance ces s will will no nott al alto toge geth ther er be di disr sreg egar arde ded. d. Si Sinc nce e

 

each component  penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as det ete erm rmiined by  the qu quan anttity ity of the the drug rug in invo vollve ved, d, then then the the mod odif ifyi ying ng ci circ rcu umstan stance ces s ca can n be use sed d to fi fix x the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained. It would,  therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition there reo on  that, unless there are co com mpelling re rea asons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated  in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or  treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately amo mong ng the the  three hree afo fore resa saiid peri eriod ods s ac acco cord rdin ing g to the se seve veri rity ty the here reof of.. Thus Thus,, if th the e mari ariju juan ana a inv nvo olv lve ed is below  250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be  prision   correccional  ; from 250 to 499 grams,  prision mayor  ; and 500 to 749 gra grams ms,,   rec reclus lusion ion tem tempor poral  al  . Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a co con njunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60   Now, considering  the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of   prision correccional    is co cons nseq eque uent ntly ly indi indica cate ted d bu but, t, ag agai ain, n, an anot othe herr pr prel elim imin inar ary y and and cogn cognat ate e is issu sue e has has first to be resolved. 4. Prisi Prision on correc correcciona cional  l    has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consist sts s  of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the  Code. The question is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be  taken from the penalty of    prision  prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account. We are  not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for   offe offens nses es un unde derr  sp spec ecia iall la laws ws,, the the rule rules s on mi miti tiga gati ting ng or ag aggr grav avat atin ing g ci circ rcum umst stan ance ces s un unde derr th the e Re Revi vise sed d

 

Penal Code  cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, how owev ever er,, re reve vea als  th tha at th the e reas reaso on the here refo forr wa was s be beca cau use the the sp spec eciial laws aws in invo vollve ved d prov proviide ded d their heir own spe sp ecif cific pen enal alti ties es  fo forr th the e offe ffens nse es pu puni nish shed ed ther there eun und der, er, an and d whi hich ch penal enalti ties es were ere no nott ta take ken n fr fro om or  with reference  to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned  did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be  impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is  to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code. This is  also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of  penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary applica cattion to special laws, since the  penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties pro rovi vid ded by  Ar Artticl icle 71 of the the form forme er. Th The e su supp pple leto tory ry eff effec ectt of the Re Revi vise sed d Pen enal al Cod ode e to spec specia iall la laws ws,, as provided  in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application. The Th e situ situat atiion on,,  how owev ever er,, is diff diffe erent rent wh wher ere e alth althou ough gh the the offe ffens nse e is def efiine ned d in and and os oste tens nsib iblly pu puni nish shed ed under a  special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature  and, necessarily, with its dura rattion, correlation and legal effects under the system of  penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of  prision    prision correccional, in  its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later. For the  nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended  by Republic Act No. 7659, is  prision    prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period

 

thereof pursuant  to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or  aggravating circumstance. 5. At this this  jun unct ctur ure e, a cla clari riffic ica atory tory dis iscu cuss ssiion of the the dev eve elo lopm pmen enta tall ch chan ange ges s in the the pen enal alti ties es impo pose sed d for offenses under special laws would be necessary. Originally, those  special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but dif ifffer ere ent ntlly fro from  th the e pe pena nalt ltie ies s pro provi vid ded in ou ourr Rev evis ise ed Pena nall Cod ode e and its Spa pani nish sh ori rig gin ins, s, pro rovi vid ded for one  specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for  one year  or for one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This  is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the    were passed during the American regime. Indeterminate Sentence Law61 Subsequently, a  different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall  be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided ther there ein. in. Inc ncep epti tive vely ly,,  fo forr in inst stan ance ce,, Com omm mon onwe weal alth th Ac Actt No No.. 30362   pe pena nali lizi zing ng no nonn-pa paym ymen entt of sa sala lari ries es and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided: Sec. 4. Failure of  the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this  Act, shall  prima facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or  laborer by  means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in articl cle e three hundred and fifteen, par arag agra rap ph fou our, r,  su sub b-p -pa ara ragr gra aph tw two o (a) (a) of the the Rev eviise sed d Pen ena al Co Code de an and d sh shal alll be be punished  punished in the same manner as therein provided  .63 Ther Th erea eaft fter er,, sp spec ecia iall  la laws ws we were re en enac acte ted d wh wher ere e the the offe offens nses es de defi fine ned d th ther erei ein n were were sp spec ecif ific ical ally ly pu puni nish shed ed by the  penalties as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are

 

exempl exem plif ifie ied d by  Re Repu publ blic ic Ac Actt No No.. 17 1700 00 (A (Ant ntii-Su Subv bver ersi sion on Ac Act) t) wh wher ere e th the e pe pena nalt ltie ies s ra rang nged ed from from   arresto mayor to death;64   Pre resi sid den enttia iall  De Decr cre ee No. 16 1612 12 (A (An nti ti-F -Fen enci cin ng Dec ecre ree) e) whe here re th the e pen enal alti ties es ru run n fro rom m   arresto mayor to  prision  prision mayor ; and Presidential Decree No. 18 No. 1866 66 (i (ill lleg egal al po poss sses essi sion on an and d othe otherr proh prohib ibit ited ed ac acts ts in invo volv lvin ing g fire firear arms ms), ), th the e pe pena nalt ltie ies s wh wher eref efor or ma may y involve prision involve  prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or perpetua or death.  Another variant worth worth mentioning mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act  of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and  not more than 17 ye yea ars and 4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons  or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed  with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. With Wi th re resp spec ectt to the firs firstt ex exa amp mplle, wh whe ere the the pe pena nalt ltie ies s un unde derr the the sp spe eci cia al la law w ar are e di diff ffe ere rent nt fr fro om an and d are without reference  or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of  the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based  on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of   special law, the legislative intendment is clear. The sa sam me  exclu clusio sionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months  to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of  reclusion temp reclusion temporal, oral,s call term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for    uch  technica carn ca rnap appi ping ng.. Bes esiide des, s,  th the e other ther pena enalti tie es for for ca carn rna app ppin ing g at atte tend nded ed by the qual qualif ifyi yin ng ci circ rcu umstan stance ces s

 

stated in  the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot  suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. On the  other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under  the the Re Revi vise sed d  Pen enal al Co Code de,, as we well ll as othe otherr stat statu utory tory en ena actm ctmen ents ts foun founde ded d upon pon and ap appl pliicabl cable e to su such ch provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. 1700  and those now provided under Presi sid dential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are spe sp ecia cial laws laws,,  th the e fa fact ct th that at the the pen ena alti tie es for for offe offen nse ses s ther there eun und der ar are e tho those pro rovi vide ded d for in th the e Re Revi vise sed d Pen enal al co cod de  lu luci cid dly re reve veal als s the the stat statu utory tory inten tent to giv ive e the the re rela late ted d pro provi visi sion ons s on pena penalt ltie ies s fo forr fe fellon onie ies s under the  Code the corresponding applica cattion to said sp spe ecial laws, in the abse sen nce of any expres ress or  implicit proscription  in these sp spe ecial laws. To hold otherwise would be to sancti ction an indefensible  judicial truncation  of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress. In   People  vs . Macatanda,65   a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known  as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that  Article 64,  paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that — We do  not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law   en enti tire rely ly di dist stin inct ct fr from om an and  d  unrelated to  the Revise sed d Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed   which is in terms of  the the cla class ssiifi fica cati tion on  an and d du dura rati tion on of pe pena nalt ltiies as presc rescri rib bed in the the Re Revi vise sed d Pen enal al Co Code de,, which is not for  penalties as  are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as  an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large

 

cattle catt le (A (Art rt..  31 310) 0)   or ot othe herw rwis ise e to be su sub bjec ectt to app ppli lica cab ble pr pro ovi visi sion ons s the there reo of su such ch   as Article 104 of the Revised Penal  Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.) More particularly  with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revise sed d Penal Code to  Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement: . .  . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to  special laws, this Court held that where the special law expressl ssly grants to the cou co urt discr iscre etio tion  in ap appl plyi yin ng the pe pena nalt lty y pres prescr criibe bed d for the the of offfen ense se,, the here re is no ro roo om fo forr th the e app ppli lica cati tion on of the provisions of the Code . . . . The Dangerous  Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of   discretion to  the Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law.   In such case, the court  must be  guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of   penalties   which  distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of experience in the administration of  criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66   Under the  aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Repu Re publ blic ic Ac Actt  No No.. 76 7659 59 by the the in inco corp rpor orat atio ion n an and d pres prescr crip ipti tion on th ther erei ein n of th the e te tech chni nica call pe pena nalt ltie ies s de defi fine ned d in and  constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more re reas ason on sh sho ould uld  th the e pr pro ovisi vision ons s of sa saiid Cod ode e on the ap appr pre eci ciat atio ion n an and d effec ffectts of al alll at attten end dant ant modi dify fyin ing g circ circu umstan stance ces s app pplly  in fixi ixing the the pen enal alty ty.. Lik ike ewi wise se,, the di diff ffe ere ren nt ki kind nds s or cl clas assi siffic ica ati tio ons of pen enal alti ties es and the rules for graduating

 

such penalties  by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if  they would result in absurdities as will now be explained. While not  squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of  modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circu cum mstance ces s should  be considered and applied only if they affect the  periods and the   degrees of  the penalties within rational limits. limits. Pre reffat ato ori rilly, wha hatt  ord rdiina nari rilly are are in invo vollve ved d in the the grad radua uati tio on an and d co con nse seq que uent ntlly de dete term rmiine th the e deg egre ree e of  the penalty,  in accorda rdance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scal cale of penalties in Article  71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the acc ccu used. However,  under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circ circu umstan stance ces s and  no ag aggr gra ava vati ting ng ci circ rcum umst sta anc nce e, the the pen enal alty ty sh sha all be re redu duce ced d by one   degree . Also, the presence  of privil vileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty  by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not  apply   in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of  section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature. Thus, para rag graph  5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in so som me manner not spe sp ecia cially lly pro rovi vid ded  fo forr in the the fou four pre prece ced din ing g para aragrap graphs hs the here reof of,, the the co cour urts ts sh shal alll pr pro oceed ceed by an ana alogy ogy therewith. Hence,  when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in  their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which  follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this

 

case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,  is,   prision correccional,  prision mayor   and   rec reclus lusion ion tem tempor poral, al, then one degree lower would be   arresto menor,   destierro   and   ar arre rest sto o ma mayo yor  r  . There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which  must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale. The Th e Co Cou urt  ru rule les, s, th ther ere efo fore re,, that that wh whil ile e mo modi dify fyiing ci circ rcum umst sta anc nce es ma may y be app ppre reci cia ated ted to det ete ermi rmine th the e  periods of  the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by   degrees, in no case should such su ch grad gradua uati tion on  of pe pena nalt ltie ies s redu reduce ce the the im impo posa sabl ble e pe pena nalt lty y be beyo yond nd or lo lowe werr th than an prision  prision correccional  . It is  for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be  consid sidered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any eve vent nt be be prision   prision correccional   in order rder no nott to dep epre reci cia ate the the se seri riou ousn sne ess of dru rug g of offe fen nses. ses.   Interpretatio fienda est  ut res magis valeat quam pereat . Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to  have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law,  which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. 6. The final  query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us.  Apparently it does, since drug offenses ses are not incl clu uded in nor has appellant committed any act  which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does nott in no invo volv lve e   rec reclus lusion ion per perpet petua ua   or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed  one year of imprisonment.68   The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.

 

It is  true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under  the Revised  Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the  accuse sed d to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum  fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term presc scrribed by the  same." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law  wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revise sed d Penal Code,  as discussed in the prece ced ding illustrations, such that it may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law. There can  be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indetermi rminate sentence for offenses under special  laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which  were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there  could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the the Co Code de  for for th the e of offe fen nse," se," as is the the rule rule for for felo feloni nies es ther there ein in.. In the il illlus ustr trat ativ ive e ex exa amp mple les s of pe pena nalt ltie ies s in special laws  hereinbefore provi vid ded, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the firs rstt and last exa xam mples. Furthermore,  considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.  69   We repeat,  Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the  penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their  te tech chni nica call si sign gnif ific icat atio ion n an and d effe effect cts. s. In fact fact,, for for pu purp rpos oses es of de dete term rmin inin ing g th the e   maximum   of said said se sent nten ence ce,, we have applied  the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at  prision correccional  and Article  64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although

 

provided for  in a special law, is now in effect  punished by and under the Revised Penal Code Code.. Corre orrellat ativ ive ely, ly, to  de detter erm min ine e the the min inim imu um, we mus ustt ap appl ply y the the fir irst st par artt of th the e afo fore resa saiid Sectio ction n 1 whi hich ch dir ire ect cts s that that  "in "in im impo posi sin ng a priso rison n se sent nte enc nce e for for an offe offen nse pun unis ishe hed d by th the e Re Revi vise sed d Pen enal al Co Code de,, or its ame mend ndm men entts, th the e  co cour urtt sh shal alll se sen nten tence the ac accu cuse sed d to an inde detter erm min inat ate e sent sente enc nce e th the e   maximum term of which hich  sh shal alll be th tha at which hich,, in vi vie ew of the the atte atten nding ding ci circ rcu umstan stance ces, s, co cou uld be pro rop perl erly im imp pos osed ed under  the rules  of said Code, and the   minimum which shall be within the range of the  penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code  for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)  A divergent  pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the horn ho rnbo book ok ma maxi xim m  th that at   qui hae aere rett in   li lite tera ra ha haer eret et in co cort rtic ice e . Fo Fort rtun una ately tely,, th thiis Co Cour urtt has has ne neve verr gon one e onl nly y skin-deep in  its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard  to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of  offenses punished  offenses  punished w   with death penalty or   lilife fe imp impris risonm onment ent,, " we have held that what is considered is the penalty  actually   imposed  and not the penalty imposable under the law,70   and that   reclusion  perpetua  is likewise embraced therein although what the law states s tates is "life imprisonment". What Wh at irre irresi sist stib ibly ly  emer emerge ges s from from the the prec preced edin ing g di disq squi uisi siti tion on,, th ther eref efor ore, e, is th that at unde underr th the e co conc ncur urre renc nce e of  the the pr priinc ncip iplles  of lite itera rall int nte erpre rpreta tattio ion, n, wh whic ich h ha have ve bee een n ra rati tio ona nali lize zed d by co com mpa para rati tive ve dec eciisi sion ons s of th this is Court; of  historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legisla slation;  and of structu ctural interpretation, considering the interr rre elation of the penalties in  the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it foll follo ows that that  th the e minimu nimum m of the the ind ndet ete erm rmin inat ate e se sen ntenc tence e in this this ca case se shal shalll be th the e penalty next lower  lower to to th that at pres prescr crib ibed ed  fo forr th the e of offe fens nse. e. Th Ther ereb eby y we sh shal alll ha have ve in inte terp rpre rete ted d th the e seem seemin ing g am ambi bigu guit ity y in Se Sect ctio ion n1

 

of Act  No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of   interpretation.71   The indeterminate  Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be lib iber era ally lly int nte erp rpre retted  in fa favo vorr of the ac accu cuse sed. d.72 The "m "miinimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not  before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the bal alan ance ce of  his se sent nte enc nce e ou outs tsid ide e of his co conf nfin inem emen ent. t.73   It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter  he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is  only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on  parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarce cerration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence. It is  thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of  a minimum sentence within the range of   arre arrest sto o ma mayo yor, r, the penalty next lower to  prision correccional w correccional  which  is the maximum ran range we have fixed through the application of Articl cle es 61 and 71 of the  Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of    ar arre rest sto o ma mayo yor, r, instead of 6 months and 1 day of   prision prision correccional  . The difference, which could  thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.  ACCORDINGLY, under  all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a qu quo o  ag aga ain inst st acc ccu use sed d-a -app ppel elllan antt Mar arti tin n Si Sim mon y Sun unga ga is AF AFFI FIRM RME ED, bu butt wit ith h the MOD ODIF IFIC ICA ATION TION that he  should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of  arresto mayor, as mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of  prision  prision correccional,  as the maximum thereof. SO ORDERED.

 

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting: I am  still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases ses where the penalty to be impose sed d   would be prision   correccional  correccional p pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by  Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applyi yin ng the Indeterminate Sentence Law  (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is within the range of the pena pe nalt lty y ne next xt  lo lowe wer, r,   i . e. , ar arre rest sto o mayo ayor  ; and (b) (b) the pr pre ese senc nce e of tw two o or more ore mit itig igat atiing ci circ rcu umstan stance ces s nott offs no offset et  by an any y mi miti tiga gati ting ng circ circum umst stan ance ces s or of a priv privil ileg eged ed mi miti tiga gati ting ng circ circum umst stan ance ce sh shal alll no nott re redu duce ce the penalty  by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into acco cou unt the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision be prision correccional .  I The first  view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under  the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their technical signification and  effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:

 

in imposing  a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its ame mend ndm men entts, th the e  co cour urtt sh shal alll se sen nten tence the ac accu cuse sed d to an inde detter erm min inat ate e sent sente enc nce e th the e max axiimum te term rm of which hich sh shal alll be th tha at whi hich ch,, in vi vie ew of the the atten ttendi ding ng ci circ rcu umstan stance ces, s, co coul uld d be pr prop oper erlly im imp pos osed ed und nder  er  the rules  of the sa saiid Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower  to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Elsewise stated,  by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offe ffens nses es pen enal aliz ize ed  und nder er the Da Dang nger erou ous s Dr Dru ugs Act (R (R.A .A.. No No.. 64 6425 25), ), as am amen ende ded, d, th the e lat attter offe ffenses nses would now  be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Section 1  of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. ct. No. 4103, as amended by Act. ct. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that: if the  offense is punished by any other law, the court shall se sen ntence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the  maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied). Ther Th ere e are, are,  th ther eref efor ore, e, tw two o ca cate tego gori ries es of offe offens nses es wh whic ich h sh shou ould ld be ta take ken n in into to ac acco coun untt in th the e ap appl plic icat atio ion n of the  Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws). The Th e offe ffens nse es  punished by the Revised Penal Code   are those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which  is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To si sim mplify furt rth her, a crime is deemed punished deemed  punished  under the Revised Penal Code   if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is punished  by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of  Book I thereof.

 

On the the  other ther hand, and, an of offfen ense se is co con nsi side dere red d pu puni nish she ed und nder  er   any other law ( w (or special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law. It is  thus clear that an offense is  punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor  are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and  the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the  Revise sed d Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished law  punished  by  by or  or  punishable  punishable under  under tthe Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the the sp spec eciial law th that at de deffin ines es the off offen ense se and im imp pos oses es a pen enal alty ty ther there efor, for, al alth tho oug ugh h it ad adop optts th the e Cod ode' e's s nomenclature of  penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code  can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code. Thus, I  cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescri rib bed by the  Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as  punished under  the Revised Penal Code . If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that  such offenses are   mala in se   and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the  stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16), accessory pena pe nalt ltie ies s (A (Art rtic icle les s  40 40-4 -45) 5),, ap appl plic icat atio ion n of pe pena nalt ltie ies s to prin princi cipa pals ls,, ac acco comp mpli lice ces, s, an and d ac acce cess ssor orie ies s (Art (Artic icle le  . ), co 46   et  seq.), com mplex plex cr criimes (A (Art rtiicl cle e 48 48), ), and gra gradu dua ati tion on of pe pena nalt ltiies (A (Art rtic iclle 61) 1),, amon among g ot oth her ers. s. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify. I respectfully  submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Rev eviise sed d Pe Pena nall  Co Cod de do does es not make an offe ffens nse e un unde derr the the Dan ange gero rous us Dru rug gs Act an offe ffens nse e punished  by   the  Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section

 

20 of  the Dangerous Drugs Act is  prisioncorreccional , the then, ap appl plyi ying ng th the e In Ind det ete erm rmin inat ate e Sen ente ten nce Law, the  indeterminate sentence to be meted on the acc ccu used should be that whose   minimum should not be  less than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act),   i  . e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of  prision  prision correccional  . II The majority  opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs  Act is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties,   viz  . , prision corr co rrec ecci cion onal al,, pr pris isio ion n  ma mayo yor, r, and   rec reclus lusion ion tem tempor poral, al,a and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code,  each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and  the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under the said second paragraph of  Section 20 the penalty   depends on the quantity o y  of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then  by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the pur urpo pose se of  Sect ctio ion n 20, 20, as amen ende ded d, eac ach h of the the afore foresa saiid comp compon onen entt pen enal alti tie es sh sha all be co cons nsiide dere red d as a  principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances  pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed. To illustrate,  if the quantity of the drugs involved ( e . g g . , marijuana below 250 grams) the proper  princip cipal penalty  should be  prision   correccional  , but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circu cum mstance ce,, then  the penalty to be imposed should be  prision   co corr rrec ecci cion onal al in its its mi mini nimu mum m pe peri riod  od  . Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:

 

The Co The Cou urt  ru rule les, s, th ther ere efo fore re,, that that wh whil ile e mo modi dify fyiing ci circ rcum umst sta anc nce es ma may y be app ppre reci cia ated ted to det ete ermi rmine th the e periods of  the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than than    prision correccional  .  It is for this reason that the three ree component penalties in the second paragraph of Section  20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should  in any event be  prision correccional   in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion temporal — temporal  —  if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two degrees,  or to  prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance  is present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating  circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under  circumstances covered  by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be impo im pose sed d is is prision   prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be  reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond  prision correccional . Finally,  if the proper penalty to be imposed is  prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed. I find  the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same seco se cond nd pa para rag gra raph ph  inv nvo olvi lving the the sa sam me ran range of pe pena nalt lty, y, we bot oth h   allow  allow and and   disallow  disallow th the e ap appl plic icat atio ion n of   Article 64(5),  Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz ., . , in  or orde derr not to dep epre reci ciat ate e the the se seri rio ous usne ness ss of dru drug offe ffens nses es,, is un unco conv nviinc nciing be beca caus use e Sec ecti tion on 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.

 

No. 7659,  has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the  determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable by   reclusion  perpetua to  death. It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous drugs —  say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclus rec lusion ion tem tempor poral  al —  may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of  prision  prision correccional  minimum because  of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of  possession of  only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is  prision   correccional  —  would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the same number of   privileged mitigating mitigating circumstances as the former has.  Also, if  the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to  the reducti ction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Art rtiicle 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:  Art. 68. Penalty to  be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age . — When the offender is a minor  under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisi sio ons of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a  person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of  the court having declared that he acted with disc sce ernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but  always lower by two degrees at least than that prescr criibed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a  person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

 

I do  not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by  Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another. Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur. # Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting: I am  still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases ses where the penalty to be impose sed d would be prision     correccional  correccional p pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by  Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applyi yin ng the Indeterminate Sentence Law  (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is within the range of the pena pe nalt lty y ne next xt  lo lowe wer, r,   i . e. , ar arre rest sto o mayo ayor  ; and (b) (b) the pr pre ese senc nce e of tw two o or more ore mit itig igat atiing ci circ rcu umstan stance ces s nott offs no offset et  by an any y mi miti tiga gati ting ng circ circum umst stan ance ces s or of a priv privil ileg eged ed mi miti tiga gati ting ng circ circum umst stan ance ce sh shal alll no nott re redu duce ce the penalty  by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into acco cou unt the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision be prision correccional .  I The first  view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under  the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their technical signification and  effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that: in imposing  a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its ame mend ndm men entts, th the e  co cour urtt sh shal alll se sen nten tence the ac accu cuse sed d to an inde detter erm min inat ate e sent sente enc nce e th the e max axiimum te term rm

 

of which hich sh shal alll be th tha at whi hich ch,, in vi vie ew of the the atten ttendi ding ng ci circ rcu umstan stance ces, s, co coul uld d be pr prop oper erlly im imp pos osed ed und nder  er  the rules  of the sa saiid Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower  to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Elsewise stated,  by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offe ffens nses es pen enal aliz ize ed  und nder er the Da Dang nger erou ous s Dr Dru ugs Act (R (R.A .A.. No No.. 64 6425 25), ), as am amen ende ded, d, th the e lat attter offe ffenses nses would now  be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Section 1  of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. ct. No. 4103, as amended by Act. ct. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that: if the  offense is punished by any other law, the court shall se sen ntence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the  maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied). Ther Th ere e are, are,  th ther eref efor ore, e, tw two o ca cate tego gori ries es of offe offens nses es wh whic ich h sh shou ould ld be ta take ken n in into to ac acco coun untt in th the e ap appl plic icat atio ion n of the  Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws). The offe The ffens nse es  punished by the Revised Penal Code   are those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which  is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To si sim mplify furt rth her, a crime is deemed punished deemed  punished  under the Revised Penal Code   if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is punished  by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of  Book I thereof. On the the  other ther hand, and, an of offfen ense se is co con nsi side dere red d pu puni nish she ed und nder  er   any other law ( w (or special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.

 

It is  thus clear that an offense is  punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor  are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and  the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the  Revise sed d Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law  punished  by  law punished by or  or  punishable  punishable under  under tthe Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the the sp spec eciial law th that at de deffin ines es the off offen ense se and im imp pos oses es a pen enal alty ty ther there efor, for, al alth tho oug ugh h it ad adop optts th the e Cod ode' e's s nomenclature of  penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code  can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code. Thus, I  cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescri rib bed by the  Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as  punished under  the Revised Penal Code . If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that  such offenses are   mala in se   and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the  stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16), accessory pena pe nalt ltie ies s (A (Art rtic icle les s  40 40-4 -45) 5),, ap appl plic icat atio ion n of pe pena nalt ltie ies s to prin princi cipa pals ls,, ac acco comp mpli lice ces, s, an and d ac acce cess ssor orie ies s (Art (Artic icle le 46   et  seq.), .) com mplex plex cr criimes (A (Art rtiicl cle e 48 48), ), and gra gradu dua ati tion on of pe pena nalt ltiies (A (Art rtic iclle 61) 1),, amon among g ot oth her ers. s. We   , co cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify. I respectfully  submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Rev eviise sed d Pe Pena nall  Co Cod de do does es not make an offe ffens nse e un unde derr the the Dan ange gero rous us Dru rug gs Act an offe ffens nse e punished  by   the  Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of  the Dangerous Drugs Act is  prisioncorreccional , the then, ap appl plyi ying ng th the e In Ind det ete erm rmin inat ate e Sen ente ten nce Law, the  indeterminate sentence to be meted on the acc ccu used should be that whose   minimum should

 

not be  less than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act),   i  . e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of  prision  prision correccional  . II The majority  opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs  Act is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties,   viz .   , prision corr co rrec ecci cion onal al,, pr pris isio ion n  ma mayo yor, r, and   rec reclus lusion ion tem tempor poral, al,a and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code,  each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and  the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under the said second paragraph of  Section 20 the penalty   depends on the quantity o y  of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then  by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the pur urpo pose se of  Sect ctio ion n 20, 20, as amen ende ded d, eac ach h of the the afore foresa saiid comp compon onen entt pen enal alti tie es sh sha all be co cons nsiide dere red d as a  principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances  pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed. To illustrate,  if the quantity of the drugs involved ( e . g g . , marijuana below 250 grams) the proper  princip cipal penalty  should be  prision   correccional ,  but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circu cum mstance ce,, then  the penalty to be imposed should be  prision   co corr rrec ecci cion onal al in its its mi mini nimu mum m pe peri riod  od  . Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares: The Th e Co Cou urt  ru rule les, s, th ther ere efo fore re,, that that wh whil ile e mo modi dify fyiing ci circ rcum umst sta anc nce es ma may y be app ppre reci cia ated ted to det ete ermi rmine th the e periods of  the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than than  

 

 prision correccional  .  It is for this reason that the three ree component penalties in the second paragraph of Section  20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should  in any event be  prision correccional   in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion temporal — temporal  —  if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two degrees,  or to  prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance  is present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating  circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under  circumstances covered  by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be impo im pose sed d is is prision   prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be  reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond  prision correccional . Finally,  if the proper penalty to be imposed is  prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed. I find  the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second seco nd pa para rag gra raph ph  inv nvo olvi lving the the sa sam me ran range of pe pena nalt lty, y, we bot oth h   allow  allow and and   disallow  disallow th the e ap appl plic icat atio ion n of   Article 64(5),  Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz ., . , in  or orde derr not to dep epre reci ciat ate e the the se seri rio ous usne ness ss of dru drug offe ffens nses es,, is un unco conv nviinc nciing be beca caus use e Sec ecti tion on 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,  has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the  determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable by   reclusion

 

 perpetua to  death. It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous drugs —  say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclus rec lusion ion tem tempor poral  al —  may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of  prision  prision correccional  minimum because  of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of  possession of  only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is  prision   correccional  —  would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the same number of   privileged mitigating mitigating circumstances as the former has.  Also, if  the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to  the reducti ction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Art rtiicle 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:  Art. 68. Penalty to  be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age . — When the offender is a minor  under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisi sio ons of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a  person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of  the court having declared that he acted with disc sce ernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but  always lower by two degrees at least than that prescr criibed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a  person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

 

I do  not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by  Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another. Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur. #Footnotes

* Thi This s cas case e wa was s ini initia tially lly rraff affled led to th the e Se Secon cond d Di Divis vision ion of th the e Co Court urt b but ut d due ue to the n nove ovelty lty a and nd importance of the issues raised on the effects of R.A. No. 7659 in amending R.A. No. 6425, the same was referred to and accepted by the Court en banc   pursuant to Circular No. 2-89 and Bar Matter No. 209, as amended. 1 Origi Original nal Recor Record, d, 2 2;; Cri Crimina minall C Case ase No. G-232 G-2320, 0, R Regio egional nal Tria Triall Co Court, urt, Bran Branch ch 5 51, 1, G Guagu uagua, a, Pampanga. 2 Ibid ., ., 11. 3 Ibid ., ., 23. 4 TSN, A Ap pril 6, 1 19 989, 5 5--32. 5 6 7 8 9

Ibid ., ., May 5, 1989, 2. Ibid ., ., May 24, 1989, 18; May 5, 1989, 11. Ibid ., ., May 24, 1989, 21-24. Ibid ., ., June 14, 1989, 3-22. Ibid ., ., July 10, 1989, 5-26.

10 Ibid ., ., July 17, 1989, 8-16. 11 Ibid ., ., August 18, 1989, 36, 41-43, 47-49.

 

12 13 14 15

Origi Original nal Recor Record, d, 1 174-17 74-175; 5; p per er Ju Judge dge Arsen Arsenio io P P.. Ro Roman. man. Br Brie ieff for Ac Accu cuse sedd-Ap Appe pell llan ant, t, 3; Rollo Rollo,, 54. Exhib Exhibits its F and G, fo folder lder of Ex Exhibi hibits; ts; T TSN, SN, July 10, 1 1989, 989, 53. Or Orig igin inal al Re Reco cord rd,, 2 2..

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

See People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295, August 20, 1993. See People Peop People le vs. Alil Alilin, in, G. G.R. R. No. 8436 84363, 3, Ma March rch 4, 1992 1992,, 206 SCRA 772. See People See  People vs. Querrer, G.R. No. 97147, July 15, 1992, 211 SCRA 502. Peop People le vs. Lati Lati,, G.R. No. 7 70393, 0393, Apri Aprill 17, 1990 1990,, 184 SCRA 336. TS TSN, N, Ma May y5 5,, 19 1989 89,, 5. 5. Sec Sec.. 3 3(m) (m),, R Rule ule 131 131,, R Rule ules s of Cou Court. rt. See People See  People vs. Labra, G.R. No. 98427, November 20, 1992, 215 SCRA 822. TS TSN, N, A Aug ugus ustt 1 18, 8, 1989 1989,, 3. 3. Ibid ., ., id ., ., 12; Exhibit M, Folder of Exhibits. Peop People le vs. C Celiz, eliz, et al. al.,, G.R. N No. o. 928 92849, 49, Oc October tober 2 20, 0, 198 1989, 9, 214 SCRA 7 755. 55. Bri Brief ef for Acc Accuse used-A d-Appe ppellllant ant,, 4 4-5; -5; Rollo , 55-56.

27 28 29 30 31

Peop People le vs. Ferna Fernandez, ndez, G.R. No. 86 86495, 495, May 13 13,, 199 1992, 2, 20 209 9 SCR SCRA A 1. Br Brie ieff for Ac Accu cuse sedd-Ap Appe pell llan ant, t, 6; Rollo Rollo,, 57. TS TSN, N, Ma May y5 5,, 19 1989 89,, 7. 7. Peop People le vs. Casti Castiller, ller, G.R. N No. o. 877 87783, 83, A August ugust,, 6, 1 1990, 990, 188 S SCRA CRA 376. 376. Bri Brief ef for Acc Accuse used-A d-Appe ppellllant ant,, 6 6-7; -7; Rollo , 57-58.

32 Ex Exhi hibi bitt F, F Fol olde derr of Exh Exhib ibit its. s. 33 Exhibit G, ibid .

 

34 35 36 37

Peop People le vs. Mauy Mauyao, ao, G. G.R. R. No No.. 845 84525, 25, A April pril 6, 19 1992, 92, 2 207 07 SC SCRA RA 73 732. 2. TS TSN, N, Ma May y5 5,, 1 198 989, 9, 11. 11. Sec Sec.. 12 12(1) (1),, Art. Art. IIII, II, 1987 1987 Co Const nstitu itutio tion. n. Peop People le vs. Rume Rumeral, ral, G.R. N No. o. 863 86320, 20, A August ugust 5, 199 1991, 1, 20 200 0 SCR SCRA A 194 194..

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

Peop People le v vs. s. S Sibug ibug,, G. G.R. R. N No. o. 1 108520 08520,, Jan January uary 24, 1994 1994.. Bri Brief ef for Acc Accuse used-A d-Appe ppellllant ant,, 11; Rollo,  62. Peop People le vs. Tand Tandoy, oy, G. G.R. R. No No.. 8050 80505, 5, De Decembe cemberr 4, 19 1990, 90, 1 192 92 SC SCRA RA 28 28.. Cf. P People eople vs. Ci Cina, na, G G.R. .R. N No. o. 882 88220, 20, Oc Octobe toberr 1, 19 1990, 90, 1 190 90 SC SCRA RA 19 199. 9. Peop People le vs. Consu Consuelo, elo, G.R. N No. o. 777 77755, 55, A April pril 18, 1 1990, 990, 1 184 84 SC SCRA RA 40 402. 2. TS TSN, N, Ju July ly 10 10,, 198 1989, 9, 12-1 12-13. 3. Peop People le vs. E Eslaba slaban, n, G.R. Nos. 1 101211 01211-12, -12, Fe Februar bruary y 8, 199 1993, 3, 218 SCRA 534. TS TSN, N, Ju June ne 14 14,, 198 1989, 9, 22. 22. Ibid ., ., August 18, 1989, 48. Ibid ., ., July 17, 1989, 15-16. Ibid ., ., October 23, 1988, 15-16.

49 Ibid ., ., July 17, 1989, 22; October 23, 1988, 15. 50 Ibid ., ., July 10, 1989, 26-27. 51 Br Brie ieff for Ac Accu cuse sedd-Ap Appe pell llan ant, t, 4; Rollo Rollo,, 55. 52 Sec. 28 o off Repub Republic lic Act N No. o. 765 7659 9 provi provides des tha thatt it "shal "shalll take ef effect fect fi fifteen fteen ((15) 15) day days s after it its s publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation," and it was so published in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal.

 

53 Title Five, Crim Crimes es Re Relati lative ve to O Opium pium and Ot Other her Pr Prohib ohibited ited Drug Drugs. s. 54 U.S. vs. H Hocbo, ocbo, 1 12 2 Phil Phil.. 304 (19 (1908); 08); U. U.S. S. vs. Pa Parrone rrone,, 24 Phi Phil. l. 29 (19 (1913); 13); U. U.S. S. vs. Al Almenci mencion, on, 25 Phil. 648 (1913); Peoplevs. Moran, et al., 44 Phil. 387 (1923); People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225 (1935). 55 Art Articl icle e6 62(5 2(5), ), Rev Revise ised dP Pena enall C Code ode.. 56 See See Harden  Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948); Gumabon, et al. vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420. 57 Lopez a and nd Son Sons, s, Inc. v vs. s. Cou Court rt of Ta Tax x Appe Appeals, als, e ett al., 1 100 00 Ph Phil. il. 85 850 0 (195 (1957). 7). 58 Ar Arti ticl cle e 77 77,, Re Revi vise sed d Pe Pena nall Co Code de.. 59 This graduated   scheme of penalties is not stated with regard and does not apply to the quantities and their penalties provided in the first the first paragraph,  the penalties therein being the same regardless of whether the quantities exceed those specified therein. 60 Sec Sec.. 4, iin n rel relati ation on to Sec Sec.. 20, R.A R.A.. No No.. 765 7659. 9. 61 Act Act.. No No.. 410 4103, 3, ef effec fectiv tive e on D Dece ecembe mberr 5, 1 1993 993.. 62 Ef Effe fect ctiv ive eo on nJ Jun une e9 9,, 1 193 938. 8. 63 See See a  a similar format in P.D. No. 330 which penalizes the illegal taking of timber and forest products under Arts. 308, 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code by reference. 64 In fa fact, ct, tthe he pe penal nalty ty fo forr off office icers rs or ra ranki nking ng le leade aders rs wa was s  prision  prision mayor   to death, just like the penalty for treason by a resident alien under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. 65 G.R G.R.. No No.. 513 51368, 68, N Nove ovembe mberr 6, 19 1981, 81, 1 109 09 S SCRA CRA 3 35. 5. 66 Peop People le vs. Tsa Tsang ng Hin Wa Wai, i, et al. al.,, G.R. No No.. 66389 66389,, Septe September mber 8, 1 1986, 986, 14 144 4 SCRA 22 22.. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 891 as Chairman of the Special Committee on the Death

 

Penalty, Senator M. Tolentino made this enlightening explanation as reported in the records of the Senate and which is pertinent to our present discussion: ". . . Article 190, referring to prohibited drugs, actually was repealed by the enactment of a special law referring to drugs. But since we were only amending the Revised Penal Code in this proposed bill or draft, we reincorporated Article 190 in an amended form.  . . . It reincorporates and amends Article 190 on the importation, manufacture, sale, administration upon another, or distribution of prohibited drugs, planting or cultivation of any plant, which is a source of prohibited drugs, maintenance of a den, dive or similar place, as defined in the Dangerous Drugs Law" (9th CRP, 1st Regular Session, Vol., No. 71, 12). 67 See See Articles  Articles 25, 70 and 71, revised Penal Code. 68 Sec Sectio tion n2 2,, A Act ct No. 410 4103, 3, as ame amende nded. d. 69 Conte Contempora mporaneous neous expos exposition ition,, or con construct struction; ion; a const constructi ruction on dra drawn wn fro from m the time  when, and the circumstances under which, the subject-matter to be construed, such as a custom or statute,  originated (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 390). 70 Peop People le vs. Roqu Roque, e, et al., 90 Ph Phil. il. 142 (1951); (1951); Pe People ople vs. Di Dimala malanta, nta, 92 Ph Phil. il. 239 (1 (1952); 952); Pe People ople vs. Moises, et al., G.R. L-32495, August 13, 1975, 66, SCRA 151. 71 Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus  (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 953). 72 Peo People ple vs. N Nang ang Kay Kay,, 88 Phi Phil. l. 5 515 15 ((195 1951). 1). 73 24 C C.J.S. .J.S.,, In Indeter determina minate te S Sente entence, nce, Sec. 1993, 1217 1217-1218 -1218.. 39

 Appellant then  asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger.  We take this  opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a

 

small scale  as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any an y plac place. e.40  It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger,41 for  what matters  is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts ac ts co cons nsti titu tuti ting ng  th the e sa sale le an and d de deli live very ry of the the ma mari riju juan ana a le leav aves es..42   Wh Whil ile e th ther ere e ma may y be in inst stan ance ces s wh wher ere e such sa such salle  co coul uld d be im imp pro roba babl ble, e, taki takin ng into nto co cons nsid ider era ati tion on the the div iver erse se ci circ rcu ums msta tanc nce es of pe pers rso on, ti time me and place,  as well as the incredibility of how the accuse sed d supposedly acted on that occas casion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.