Succession [Legitime Cases]

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987 INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents. Jose B. Echaves for petitioner. Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.: In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law. It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate — Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4. This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975. These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales. Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition. In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow? Our answer to the first question is in the negative. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right 1 of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided 2 for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are: Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation. Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that: Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287; Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another. In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. 3

The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this 4 observation in Lachenal v. Salas, to Wit: We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied). By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code. The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz — Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.) Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom

his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales. On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,

G.R. No.

179859

Present: MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners,

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BERSAMIN, * DEL CASTILLO, ** ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.

FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors. Promulgated: August 9, 2010 x-------------------------------------------------- x DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages—the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago. Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.

[1]

After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan

[2]

a petition for the probate of Basilio’s will, docketed as SP No. 1549-M. The will was admitted

to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.

The will contained the following provisions, among others: 4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod: xxxx c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y); d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupa’t bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; nguni’t ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c); e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at

pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x. f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at kabutihan. g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Datapwa’t, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang [3] hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first wife, were, on their motion, allowed to intervene.

[4]

After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a ―Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will,‖

[5]

the

probate court approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan andManila to register the certificates of title indicated therein.

[6]

Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No.

8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.

The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention

[8]

[7]

with the probate court, alleging that Basilio’s second wife was not

Irene but a certain Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilio’s will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.

[9]

The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its previous approval of the ―Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance with the Will.‖

[10]

The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-90,

[11]

against the heirs of the second and third marriages.

In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilio’s will because their legitime was reduced.

[12]

They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be

conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the properties from the time of Basilio’s death up to the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.

[13]

RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime) in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.

On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by Decision of January 25, 2002,

[14]

annulled the decision

of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case No. 562-M-90. court disposed:

[15]

Thus the appellate

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let the Decree of Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED. [16]

SO ORDERED.

(emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate court’s decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 155606, which this Court denied.

[17]

The denial became final and executory on April 9, 2003.

[18]

In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed before the probate court (RTCBranch 10) a Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees.

[19]

Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilio’s will, they alleged that:

x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on September 16, 1993. Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have ceased as such administrator[s] way back on September 16, 1993 and they should have transferred the above said titles to the named legatees in the Last Will and Testament of the testator by then. Said named legatees in the Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the following: xxxx Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also rendered an accounting of their administration from such death of the testator up to the present or until transfer of said properties and its administration to the said legatees. [20]

xxxx

Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered: 1)

To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to [the] Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit: 1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na 2) Tomas 3) Zoilo 4) Ma. Pilar 5) Ricardo 6) Cipriano 7) Felicidad 8) Eugenia 9) Clemente at 10) Cleotilde (all surnamed SANTIAGO)

2)

To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties, including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees.

3)

To render an accounting of their administration of said properties and other properties of the testator under their administration, from death of testator Basilio Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the present and until possession and administration thereof is transferred to said [21] legatees.

Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated.

[22]

The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,

[23]

disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees dated October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago are hereby DIRECTED, as follows: a.)

b.) c.) d.)

e.)

To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to this Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak na 2.) Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all named SANTIAGO. To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and To render an accounting of their administration of subject properties, including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and To submit an accounting of their administration of the above-mentioned estate of the testator or all the above said lots including the rice mill, animal feeds factory, and all improvements thereon from August 14, 1978 up to the present. To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how the parties may actually partition or adjudicate all the above said properties including the properties already in the name of all the said legatees xxx. x x x x.

Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the names of Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago. Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan. The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma. Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and [24] Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco, dated December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Respecting petitioners’ argument that the case had long been closed and terminated, the trial court held: x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties cannot actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something more has to be done after the approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed after September 16, 1993. Movant’s cause of action accrues only from the said date and for which no prescription of action has set in. The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate proceeding which is continuing in character, and terminates only after and until the final distribution or settlement of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate of the deceased for the period covering from the date of the filing of the petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And in the said August 14, 1978order it does not terminate the appointment of petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix and administrator, respectively, of the estate of the deceased particularly of those properties which were prohibited by the testator to be partitioned within 20 years from his death. Since then up to the present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the executor and administrator of the estate of the deceased and as such, they are required by law to render an accounting thereof

from August 14, 1978 up to the present; there is also now a need to partition and distribute the aforesaid [25] properties as the prohibition period to do so has elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration,

[26]

which the probate court denied, drawing them to

appeal to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court,

[27]

hence, the petition

[28]

which raises the following grounds:

I. “CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF” A. B. C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES; THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA. II.

“GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S ORDER TO TRANSFER THE MANILAPROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND [29] CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO.” (emphasis in the original)

The petition lacks merit. Petitioners’ argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present petition for review) fails.

Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[30]

The first, known as ―bar by prior judgment,‖ proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand

or cause of action already settled in a prior action.

[31]

The second, known as ―conclusiveness of judgment,‖ ordains that issues actually

and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.

[32]

Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors’ complaint on the reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which solely tackles the propriety of

the

termination

of

administration,

accounting

and

transfer

of

titles

in

the

names

of

the

legatees-heirs

of

the second and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of claim, demand or cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.

While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, ―conclusiveness of judgment‖ cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors’ supposed preterition and reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the present petition.

What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro forma parties.

Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit the interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilio’s estate and does not pertain to respondents’ supervening right to demand the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their names.

Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting respondents’ Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary continuation of theAugust 14, 1978 Order that approved the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilio’s estate. As did the appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become final pending the whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this case, would culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.

Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testator’s intent that no one is to own the same.

The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilio’s will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners’ names for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in common, thus: e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang ito’y walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x [33] x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

But the condition set by the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate court, viz: For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]’s contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years x x x x xxxx x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly [34] mandated by the Civil Code x x x x WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,

Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, * PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ** MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.

- versus -

FRANCISCO PASCUAL,

G.R. No. 189776

PASCUAL

and

MIGUEL

Respondents.

Promulgated:

December 15, 2010 x-------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Pascual.

[1]

Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N.

[2]

In a petition for ―Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration,‖ docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, ―may be considered as an advance legitime‖ of petitioner.

Respondent’s nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati [3]

RTC.

Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it ―may be considered as an advance legitime‖ to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedent’s estate,

[4]

the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of

notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus it disposed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:

[5]

1.

2. 3.

4.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual; The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation; rd

1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the 3 floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual; The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual: a.

1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;

b.

1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;

c.

Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;

d.

Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;

e.

Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;

f.

¼ share in Eduardo Pascual’s shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;

g.

Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona Arellano;

i.

Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;

j.

Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.

5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows: a. b.

To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889; To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally between them up to the extent that each of their share have been equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value of which shall be determined by an independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then Francisco’s and Miguel’s shares may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that I . . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR. II . . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

III

. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES. xxxx and V . . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR [6] INTESTATE HEIRS. (underscoring supplied)

By Decision

[7]

of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner’s appeal ―partly meritorious.‖ It sustained the probate

court’s ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise: Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said property as forming part of [8] the estate of Angel N. Pascual. (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein petitioner ―was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator.‖ Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned. The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in accordance with the [9] disquisitions herein. (underscoring supplied)

Petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration

[10]

having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution

[11]

of October 7,

2009, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling I . . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH. II . . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. III . . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES. IV

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND [12] RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.

On the first issue:

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.

[13]

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.

[14]

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

[15]

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

[16]

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, [17] and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, as donation made to a ―stranger,‖ chargeable against the free portion of the estate.

[19]

[18]

is deemed

There being no compulsory heir, however, the

donated property is not subject to collation. On the second issue:

The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz: Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied) Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties. SO ORDERED.

CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the estate litigated in the case below, RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and the heirs of CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, JR., namely: Estrelita L. Madarang, Consuelo P. Madarang, Casimiro Madarang IV, and Jane Margaret Madarang-Crabtree, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 185226 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and VICENTE R. MADARANG, Respondents. Promulgated: February 11, 2010 x-------------------------------------------------x DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3, 1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of P200,000.00.

[1]

He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose,

Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.

In the intestate proceedings filed by the couple’s son Jose which was lodged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr.

[2]

Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedent’s estate. Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429.

A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of the estate of the decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002,

[3]

the RTC, noting the following:

x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses after [their marriage on] December 27, 1931 and during their marriage or coverture. Article 160 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (which is the governing law in this particular case) is very explicit in providing that all properties of the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. This presumption, to the mind of the Court, has not been sufficiently rebutted by the special administratrix. [Dolores] This presumption applies and holds even if the land is registered under the wife’s name as long as it was acquired during marriage (De Guinoo vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. L-5541, June 26, 1955) or even if the wife purchased the land alone (Flores, et.al. Vs. Escudero, et.al., G.R. No. L-5302, March 11, [4] 1953). (underscoring supplied),

instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.

Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be referred to as ―oppositors,‖

[5]

questioned the RTC order

of inclusion of the six lots via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the court appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her mother Dolores.

As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr.

[6]

It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4B.

The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003,

[7]

thus modified its April 5, 2002 Order as follows:

Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be excluded. The administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a revised inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here modified; and (2) to render an accounting of her administration of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring supplied),

Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his parents, it should not be excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in Vicente’s favor was not notarized nor registered with the Register of Deeds. Jose’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of February 5, 2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.

In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC erred in excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as ―what the lower court should have done was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in the inventory of the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action where its ownership can be threshed out.‖

Jose later filed before the appellate court a ―Motion to Withdraw Petition‖ which his co-heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground that, inter alia, a grant thereof would ―end‖ the administration proceedings. The appellate court, by Resolution of January 18, 2008,

[8]

granted the withdrawal on the ground that it would ―not prejudice the rights of the oppositors.‖

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s Motion to Withdraw Petition was, by Resolution of November 6, 2008,

[9]

denied in this wise:

xxxx In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case interposed no objection to the noninclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto. x x x xxxx Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively argued that . . . Vicente Madarang [to whom the questioned lot was donated] and his family have been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the donated lot for over twenty (20) years, even before the execution of the so called donation inter

vivos in 1992. . . . Vicente Madarang has his residential house thereon and that his ownership over the donated lot has been fully recognized by the entire Madarang Clan, including all his brothers and sisters, except the much [10] belated objection by the appellant (Jose), allegedly resorted to as an act of harassment. (emphasis and underscoring supplied),

thus affirming the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot.

Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein petitioners. Casimiro, Jr. having died during the pendency of the case, he was substituted by his wife petitioner Estrelita and co-petitioners children Consuelo, Casimiro IV, and Jane Margaret.

Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the appellate court was the merit of Jose’s ―Motion to Withdraw Petition,‖ it exceeded its jurisdiction when it passed upon the merits of Jose’s appeal from the RTC order excludingLot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory.

Petitioners’ contention does not lie.

In their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s ―Motion to Withdraw Petition,‖ petitioners, oddly denying the existence of a ―petition,‖ raised the issue of the propriety of the RTC Order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory. Their prayer in their Motion clearly states so:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Oppositors-Appellees [petitioners] respectfully PRAY for this Honorable Court to RECONSIDER its questioned Resolution and rendering [sic], forthwith, a decision resolving the merits of [11] the Partial Appeal of petitioner-appellant Jose Madarang. (capitalization in the original; emphasis supplied)

The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.

More specifically, petitioners question the appellate court’s finding that as the parties ―interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto.‖

[12]

A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was no accord among the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.

While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of ownership, without prejudice to a final determination through a separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.

The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress that the question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which the question of title and ownership can be passed upon by a probate court.

[13]

As earlier reflected, Vicente’s claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests upon a deed of donation by his father (decedent) and his mother.

Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides: Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition. (underscoring supplied)

in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Corazon M. Gregorio and her co-administratrix Dolores Madarang are DIRECTED to include Lot829-B-4-B in the

Inventory of the properties of the intestate estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr.

Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the disposition of the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970 MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositorsappellants. Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee. Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.: Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of 1 Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs. 2

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her. After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties. The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the 3 legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of 4 legitimate children and descendants). In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows: 1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80 2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06 3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17 4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39 5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41 6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47 7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00 9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00 Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01 The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:

(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime; (2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above; (4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched. On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis: (a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced. Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows: 1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56 2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42 3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04 4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38 5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04 6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13 7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50 9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80 T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78 while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositorsappellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes. The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix." From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: . 1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction; 2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and 3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below. 5

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent 6 intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8 The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee. 1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her 10 seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs: ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive. This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes. 2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits 11 any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by actinter vivos." This was intended to repeal the then 12 prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an actinter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities 13 provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him." 14

3. In Habana vs. Imbo, the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil

15

Code). Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..." 4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or 16 legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs 17 under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirsmay dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs. Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it 19 may have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed. 5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee. Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question — and none is presented — as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' 20 manifestation, "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the 21 testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal. ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

G.R. No. L-46903

July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents. CRUZ, J.: Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the 1 ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included. 2

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50. There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious. The two articles provide as follows: Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious. *

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted 3 daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate. **

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net 4 estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda. The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows: IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa; IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay 5 bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely 6 described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention. Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough. There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino 7 v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered. Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992 MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN,respondents. Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners. Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.: Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 — affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages — is sought. in these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case. First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record: The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows: (a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin; (b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin; (c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and 1 Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, which however was not blessed with children. Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his 2 father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his 3 properties. The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e.,brothers and sisters or nephews and 4 nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doña Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's 5 6 estate which she submitted to the probate court for approval, Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 7 to 42 are conjugal." Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared

the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house. Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces: EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES 23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481 favor of Mariano Locsin 1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000 Jose R. Locsin 1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian 1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509 favor Aurea Locsin, Matilde L. Cordero and Salvador Locsin 2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045 favor Aurea Locsin, Matilde L. Cordero and Salvador Locsin 3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059) favor Aurea Locsin, Matilde L. Cordero and Salvador Locsin 4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco 5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian 6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin 7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin 15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto Aurea Locsin 16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson Aurea Locsin M. Acabado 17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin 19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto favor of Mariano Locsin 1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible Rosario whose maternal grandfather was Getulio Locsin

2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical Rosario but the rentals from bigger portion of Lot 2155 leased to Filoil Refinery were assigned to Maria Jaucian Lorayes Cornelio Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others: EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE 2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000 Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020) (6,825 sqm. when resurveyed) 24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000 in favor of Francisco M. Maquiniana 26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300 favor of Francisco Maquiniana 27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000 favor of Ireneo Mamia 28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750 favor of Zenaida Buiza 29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500 favor of Felisa Morjella 30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000 favor of Inocentes Motocinos 31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500 favor of Casimiro Mondevil 32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200 favor of Juan Saballa 25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500 of Rogelio Marticio Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977. Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute. In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did not join the action. After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants: (1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina; (2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio; (3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs; (4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this case (5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and (6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel. Costs against the defendants.

9

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision. The petition has merit and should be granted. The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of 10 (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." The rights to a person's 11 succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the 12 donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke: Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a) The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture. For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and

13

namesake Mariano Locsin II. On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another 14 15 Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 16

17

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020. Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin 18 and Mariano Locsin in 1975. There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 19 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio 20 Marticio. None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents. In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin 21 22 II, but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. If she was competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II? The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually. This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest. Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doña Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doña Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19, 23 24 1974 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another 25 deed dated September 9, 1975 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doña 26 Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria Olbes. The sales which she made in 27 favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part. Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of 28 Property, whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them 29 and the whole world. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil

Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein. SO ORDERED.