Stephen Bell, Andrew Hindmoor - Rethinking Governance - The Centrality of The State in Modern Society (2009)

 

This page intentionally left blank 

 

Rethinking Governance The Centrality of the State in Modern Society

Several problems plague contemporary thinking about governance, from the multiple definitions that are often vague and confusing, to the assumption that governance strategies such as networks and markets represent attempts by weakening  states to maintain control. Rethinking Governanc Governance  e  questions  questions these assumptions and seeks to clarify how we understand governance. Arguing that it is best understood as ‘the strategies used by governments to help govern’, the authors counter the view that governments have ha ve be been en de dece cent ntrred ed.. Th They ey sh shoow that that far far fr from om rece recedi ding ng,, stat states es are are in fact fact enhancing  their capacity to govern by exerting top-down controls and developing closer ties  with non-government sectors. Ident Id entify ifying ing sev severa erall ‘mod modes’ es’ of go gover vernan nance, ce, SStep tephen hen Bel Belll and And Andrew rew Hi Hindm ndmoor oor use a wide range of practical examples to explore the strengths and limitations of  each. In so doing, they demonstrate how modern states are using a mixture of  governance modes to address specific policy problems. This book demonstrates why the argument that states are being ‘hollowed out’ is overblown.  Rethinking Governance  refocuses   refocuses our attention on the central role played by governments in devising governance strategies. Stephen Bell  is Professor and former Head of the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland.  Andrew Hindmoor   is Senior Lecturer in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland.

 

Rethinking Governance T i nh eMCoedner etrrna lSiot yc ie io e tf yt h e S t a t e

Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor

 

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK  Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York  www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org www.cambridge.org/9780521 /9780521712835 712835 © Stephen Bell & Andrew Hindmoor 2009

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009   ISBN-13

978-0-521-71283-5

Paperback 

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Reproduction and communication for educational purposes The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10% of the pages of this work, whichever is the greater, to be reproduced and/or communicated by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or the body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. For details of the CAL licence for educational institutions contact: Copyright Agency Limited Level 15, 233 Castlereagh Street Sydney NSW 2000 Telephone: (02) 9394 7600 Facsimile: (02) 9394 7601 E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Information regarding prices, travel timetables and other factual information given in this work are correct at the time of first printing but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee the accuracy of such information thereafter.

 

For Jo and Hillary, and Jane, Jordan and Asha 

 

Contents

 

List of figures and tables Preface

page   xi xi

 

xiii

Chapterr 1: A state-centric Chapte state-centric relatio relational nal approach approach

 

Society-centred governance

1

 

3

 A fundamental transformation?

 

 A state-centric relational approach Modes of governance

6  

10 16

 

Conclusion

 

18

Chapterr 2: The resilie Chapte resilient nt state state

 

20

Public choice theory and state failure

 

21

Government overload and the fiscal crisis of the state The implementation gap?

 

23

 

 A crisis in legitimacy?

27

 

29

The decentring of government

 

Globalisation

32

 

Conclusion

39

 

44

Chapterr 3: Metagov Chapte Metagovern ernance ance and state capacity  capacity 

 

The functions of metagovernance

46

 

47

Metagovernance as a problem of public good provision

 

State capacity: a state-centric relational account

55

 

59

vii  

viii

 

CONTENTS

The challenges of metagovernance Conclusion

 

66

 

69

Chapterr 4: Hierarchy Chapte Hierarchy and top-down top-down govern governance ance

Rolling back the state?

 

 

72

Hierarchical governance: challenges and adaptations Self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy 

71

   

85 89

The growing volume of governance

 

Conclusion

92

 

95

Chapterr 5: Govern Chapte Governance ance through through persuasion persuasion

 

97

Legitimacy, persuasion and governance without government The metagovernance of persuasion

 

99

 

Persuading states

105

 

106

Combining modes of governance: persuasion and hierarchy 

 

Social capital and governance through persuasion Conclusion

108

 

109

 

113

Chapter 6: Governa Chapter Governance nce through through markets and contracts contracts The marketisation of governance  

 

115 116

State capacity and markets

 

120

The resilience of hierarchy 

 

121

The metagovernance of markets: markets through hierarchy  Policy learning and metagovernance

 

123

 

Relational capacity 

126

 

129

Governance through business?

 

Conclusion

131

 

135

Chapterr 7: Governa Chapte Governance nce through community community engagement  engagement 

Citizen and community engagement

 

137

 

139

The foundations of community engagement

 

 Willing and capable citizens and communities?

144  

 Accountability and legitimacy 

146

 

 A willing and able state?

149

 

151

 

CONTENTS

Power-sharing and the state

 

155

Do-it-yourself community engagement Conclusion

 

160

Chapterr 8: Governa Chapte Governance nce through through associations associations

 

Forms of associative governance

162

 

164

 

169

The role of the state within associative governance Governance without government?

158

 

Private-interest Privat e-interest government

 

   

174 181

ix

Conclusion

 

Chapterr 9: Conclusion Chapte Conclusion

Notes

 

 

Bibliography  Index 

184

192  

 

186

194 223

 

Figures and tables

FIGURES

 

2.1   Network and structures

page  35  35

4.1   Labour market deregulation in th three ree industries, 19 1975–2003 75–2003   74 4.2   Pages of Commonwealth Acts of P Parliament arliament passed p per er year year,, 1901–2006  

93

4.3   Agreements signed by the E European uropean Community/Un Community/Union, ion, 1969–2007  

94

4.4   Expansion of the number of rregulatory egulatory agencies agencies,, 1960–2002  

95

TABLES

2.1   Total social expenditure, selec selected ted OECD countries, 1980 and 2001   2.2   Total taxation, selected OE OECD CD countries, 1975–2007

25  

26

2.3   Public confidence in parliament, se selected lected OECD countries, 1981 and 1999/2000  

31

2.4   A typology of regulatory coordination   4.1   Total economic subsidies, selected OECD count countries, ries, 1980 and 2004   5.1   Social trust, select selected ed countr countries, ies, 1980–4 and 19 1998–2000 98–2000 7.1   Forms of public participation in go governance vernance

xi

 

44 73  

112 140

 

Preface

THE TERM GOVERNANCE  has become a part of day-to-day 

vocabulary. Politicians talk about the importance of ‘good governance’ in developing countries and the significance of corporate governance in

firms. Journalists write about the governance of charities, football clubs, museums, universities, schools and football clubs. In these cases it appears that governance is an alternative term for management or leadership. In political science, however, governance has a distinct meaning. Here writers talk about a transition from ‘government to governance’ and even of the exercise of ‘governance ‘governance without government’. At its simplest, the argument a rgument is thatwith governments been ‘hollowed out’ orto‘decentred’ andgoals. must now   work a range ofhave non-state actors a ctors in order achieve their t heir In our view these arguments arguments are overblow overblown. n. In fact, part of the motivation for writing this book was the lack of a sustained alternative account of  governance in which the state played a central role in governance arrangements and relationships, but also steered or metagoverned them. Although  we point to instances in which governments have been marginalised and collectively valued policy goals are being pursued by non-state actors, such cases are few and far between. In our view governments and the broader set of agencies and public bodies which together constitute the state are and shou sh ould ld re rema main in cent centra rall in gove govern rnan ance ce proc proces esse ses. s. But wh whil ilee reje reject ctin ingg what what we call arguments about accounts governance, we alsogovernments express reservations‘society-centred’ about alternative ‘state-centric’ in which are imagined to operate in splendid isolation from the societies they govern, descending from on high occasionally to impose their policy preferences. Instead, we develop a ‘state-centric relational’ account of governance, arguingg that in that state statess have have enha enhanc nced ed their their capac capacity ity to gove govern rn by stren strengt gthe heni ning ng their their own ow n insti institut tutio iona nall and and lega legall capac capaciti ities es but but also also by deve develo lopin pingg cl clos oser er relat relatio ions ns

xiii

 

xiv

 

PREFACE

 with non-state actors. Ultimately, Ultimately, the choice between society-centred and state-centric approaches to governance or between governance and government is a false one. Our state-centric relational approach emphasises the importance of the state and also the importance of state–society relations in governance. O U TL TL I NE O F T H E B O O K

The first three chapters survey existing debates and arguments about governance and develop our state-centric relational approach to governance. 1 sets  sets out our aims and emphasises that the state is still central Chapter 1 to governance processes. The next The  next chapter critically chapter  critically examines arguments that the state has been undermined by a range of forces, including neo3 looks  looks at the liberal ideology, ideology, regulatory failure and globalisation. Chapter globalisation. Chapter 3 concept of metagovernance, defined as the ‘government of governance’, and links empirical empirical arguments arguments about how governme governments nts govern to normative debates about the role and responsibilities of government within a  democratic society. society.

Chapters 4–8 apply these perspectives to ‘governance in action’ across the five modes of governance we have identified: via hierarchy, persuasion, markets, community engagement and associations. The wide-ranging survey mixes theoretical discussion with practical examples of governance arrangements, exploring the role that governments and state agencies play  in designing and managing various modes of governance. These five chapters develop develop our state-centric state-centric relational relational account account by including including perspectives perspectives from international relations, economics, development studies and comparative politics. Some studies of governance neglect major developments in political science, but discussions about networks, power, ideas and institutions can illuminate understanding of the forms and limitations of  governance. In challenging challenging societ society-cen y-centred tred accounts of governan governance, ce, we do not wish to create the impression that states are omnipotent. Instead, we show how  states have augmented augmented their policy capacity by developing developing closer relations relations  with non-state actors. Governments are not like a modern-day Gulliver tied down by non-state Lilliputians. When there is interdependence in the relations between states and non-state actors, it is often asymmetrical. Most of our examples are taken from major Western democracies, with a few from other countries. We examine governance beyond as well as  within countries. Arguments about the hollowing out of the state and new   ways of governing are related to arguments about globalisation and to what

 

PREFACE

 

some see as the gradual emergence of ‘global governance’. We discuss the governance role played by various international institutions, but we do not believe that global governance is a separate category.  All dollar sums are in US$. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 We are extremely grateful to Gerry Stoker and Grace Skogstad who pro We vided us with incisive comments on early drafts and whose endorsements thee comp th comple lete ted d boo book now now carr carrie ies. s. Than Thanks ks to Brian rian Head ead who who read and and comcommented on several draft chapters. Thanks to Mike Keating who read some early draft chapters and keenly supported this project. We have also benefited from the comments, suggestions and examples offered to us by the undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Queensland upon whom we have piloted various various versions versions of our arguments. Stephen Bell  Andrew Hindmoor

xv

 

1

 

A state-centric relational approach

HE WORD GOVERNANCE  derives from the Classical Greek  T kybernan, meaning to pilot, steer or direct. The term has a long heritage

and might be applied to any number of activities. In the Elizabethan Age in England people talked about the governance of the family. These days many use the term corporate governance to refer to the management and  Maillin,  2007), ), or more control of companies (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007 Nofsinger,  2007;;  Maillin, 2007 broadly the governance of particular organisations. This book focuses on the increasing use of the term governance to describe the attempts of  governments or other actors to steer communities, whole countries, or even groups groups of countries in the pursuit of collective collective goals.

 A large body of work presents what we call a ‘society-centred’ ‘society-centred’ focus upon governance. The argument is that the last few decades have resulted in a  ‘fundamental transformation not just in the scope and scale of government acti ac tion on,, but but in its its basi basicc form forms’ s’ (Sal (Salam amon on,, 2002 2002,, 1–2) 1–2).. Natio ationa nall gove govern rnme ment ntss are said to have been ‘hollowed out’ by neo-liberal governments intent upon ‘rolling back the frontiers of the ‘state’ (Thatcher, 1993 (Thatcher,  1993,,   744–5), by globalisation, and by the growth of international and occasionally  supra-national organisations. The alleged weakening of the state is said to be driven by growing fiscal or legitimacy deficits, by institutional fragmentation, or by pressures from below from social groups wanting more sa sayy in poli policy cy and and gov governan rnance ce.. As a resul esultt of the these pres pressu surres, it is argu argueed, govgovernments now lack the ability to gove govern rn unilaterally and must instead work   with interest-groups, private firms, charities, non-governmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), supra-national organisations, and a range of other bodies if  they are to achieve their objectives. This book rejects many of these claims. In particular, states have not been hollowed out and the exercise of state authority remains central to

1

 

2

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

most governance strategies. The main problem with many of the current appr ap proa oach ches es to gove govern rnan ance ce is that that the the role role of the the stat statee has has eith either er rece recede ded d from from vi view ew or re rema main inss ambi ambigu guou ous. s. In our our vi view ew,, gove govern rnme ment ntss and and the the broa broade derr se sett of  agen ag enci cies es and and publ public ic bodi bodies es that that toge togeth ther er cons consti titu tute te th thee stat statee are, are, and and shou should ld remain, central players in governance processes. We thus reject the notion that there has been any general loss of governing capacity and instead agree  with Tabatha Wallington, Geoffrey Lawrence and Barton Loechel (2008, 3)  who argue a rgue that governance is about a bout governments seeking to ‘govern ‘govern better rather than govern less’. We also argue that the scope and scale of governance is actually expanding, and that state-based, hierarchical or top-down forms of governance are doing likewise. States are attempting to expand their governing capacities not only by strengthening central state institutions but by forging new governance partnerships with a range of social actors.  Wee thus agree that governments have, in recent decades, adopted a   W broader range of governance strategies. But we disagree that this constitutes a ‘fundamental transformation’. This is partly because alternative governance strategies have a far longer pedigree than many of those writing about governance recognise, and also because states generally retain effective control over such arrangements. States are constantly choosing  new policy goals and learning to pursue them in different ways. But while much has changed, the state remains a central actor in governance arrangement me nts. s. We there therefo fore re defin definee gove govern rnan ance ce from from a state state-c -cen entri tricc pe persp rspec ectiv tivee and and argue that governance arrangements are largely created and orchestrated

by the state to help govern society. Governing can generally be defined as shaping, regulating or attempting to control human behaviour in order to achieve collective ends. Yet effective governance often requires states to build strategic relationships with a range of non-state actors. This is a  process of engagement that Donald Kettl (2002, 123) refers to as ‘governmentalising’ previously non-governmental sectors in attempts to draw in extra governing resources from society, allowing governments to increase their reach without necessarily necessarily growing in size. Hence, we argue for a definition of governance from a  state-centric   perspective and define  state-centric relational  perspective gove go vernan rnance ce as th thee to tool ols, s, st strrat ateg egie iess and and rel elat atio ions nshi hips ps us used ed by go gove vern rnme ment ntss to help help  govern. This approach suggests that governance can be seen as an extension of more traditional notions notions of public policy, except that the rubric of governa ernanc ncee impli implies es expe experim rimen entat tatio ion n with with a wide wide vari variet etyy of gove govern rnin ingg strate strategi gies es and the involvement of a wider range of non-governmental actors. Our approach is  state-centred  because   because we argue that governments rely  upon hierarchical authority to implement their policies, and because, even

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

 when governments choose to gove govern rn in al alte tern rnat ativ ivee ways, ways, the state state remai remains ns the pivotal player in establishing and operating governance strategies and partnerships. We thus We see s ee governance in governance arrangements as substantially driven by changesand in changes state preferences and strategy. Our approach to governance is also relational  because  because we emphasise the extent to which which gove govern rnme ment nts, s, in es estab tabli lishi shing ng and and oper operat atin ingg gove govern rnan ance ce strate strategi gies es,, develop strategic relationships or partnerships with a range of non-state actors. For this reason, ultimately, the choice between society-centred and state-centric approaches to governance, or between governance and government, is a false one. Our state-centric relational approach emphasises the importance of the state and also the importance of state–society relations in governance. Our state-centric relational approach thus absorbs the  aspects of the society-centred society-centred approach, approach, but from a state-centri state-centricc relational  aspects perspective. The rest of this chapter elaborates on these claims. We examine the society-centered perspective on governance and ask to what extent changes in governance amount to a fundamental transformation. We then define our state-centred relational approach and outline the range of ways in  which governments have deployed different ‘modes of governance’ in order to govern. S O C I E T YY- C E N T R E D G O V E R N A N C E

Much of the existing literature on governance is society-centred: it emphasises theance proliferation ofatcomplex ofed societal relations and gove go vern rnan ce netw networ orks ks that th aree said ar saidhorizontal to have have marg maforms rgin inal alis ised gove govern rnme ment nt or renre n-

3

dered its role ambiguous. As Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing (2008a, 3) put it: ‘the ‘the sove soverei reign gn state state . . . is losing losing its its grip and is is being being replac replaced ed by new  new  ideas about pluricentric government based on interdependence, negotiation and trust’. We begin by critically reviewing this writing as well as the notion that governance represents a ‘fundamental transformation’ (Salamon, 2002, 1–2) or a ‘substantial break from the past’ (Stoker, 1998 (Stoker, 1998,,  26) in the scope, scale and basic forms of governme government nt action. In our view, the society-centred approach consists of two parts. The first is that the alleged shift from government to governance has resulted in the involvement of aare wider of actors governing processes, and that these actors heldrange together not bywithin rules, regulations and hierarchy  but by informal and relatively egalitarian networks. Hence a major theme  within the society-centred approach consists of a focus upon partnerships and networks and the blurring of the boundaries between the public and

 

4

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

private sectors. According to Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes (2003, 55–6), ‘netwo network rkss ar aree the defin definin ingg charac characte teri risti stics cs of gove govern rnan ance ce’’ and and offe offerr a ‘coor coordi di-nating mechanism notably different from markets and hierarchies’. Policy  network is the name given to the formal and informal links and exchanges that develop between governments and civil society associations, NGOs and interest-groups in specific policy arenas (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992a, b).  A major proposition of the society-centred approach is that an increasing  number of policy decisions are being taken in and through self-organising  policy networks. Thus Lester Salamon (2002, 2) associates governance with ‘an elaborate system of third-party government in which crucial elements of public autho aut hori rity ty ar aree share shared d with with a host host of nong nongov over ernm nmen ental tal or othe otherr-go gove vern rnme ment ntal al actors, frequently in complex collaborative systems’. Rod Rhodes (1997, 15) defin defines es gove govern rnan ance ce in term termss of ‘se self lf-o -org rgan anis isin ingg inte inter-o r-orga rgani nisa satio tiona nall netnet works characterised by interdependence, interdependence, resource exchange’ and a shared acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’. In a recent edited work, Sorensen and Torfing (2008a, 3) acknowledge that ‘forms of top-down government remain in place’, but nevertheles neverthelesss suggest suggest that a major shift in gov governanc ernancee has occurred and that ‘public management increasingly proceeds in and through pluricentric negotiations among relevant and affected actors on the basis of interdependency, trust and jointly developed rules, norms and disc di scou ours rses es.. The ‘surge surge in gove govern rnan ance ce netwo network rks’, s’, they they cont contin inue ue,, ‘is prom prompte pted d by the persistent critique of traditional forms of governance in terms of  hier hi erar arch chie iess and and mark market ets. s.’’ Simil imilar arly ly,, Mar arkk Bevi Bevirr (200 (2007, 7, 2) us uses es the the term term govgovernance to describe a ‘shift from a hierarchic bureaucracy to a greater use of markets and networks’; while Adrienne Heritier (2002a, 185) concludes thatt gove tha govern rnan ance ce enta entail ilss ‘ty type pess of poli politic tical al steer steerin ingg in whic which h nonnon-hi hier erar arch chic ical al

modess of mode of guid guidan ance ce . . . ar aree emp emplo loye yed d. The second part of the argument is that the challenges to the state noted above, as well as the involvement of a larger range of actors in the process of governing, have resulted in government being superseded or at least marginalised. marginalised. As Eerik-Hans Eerik-Hans Klijn and Joop Joop Koppenjan Koppenjan (2000, 136) argue, a ‘broad consensus consensus has developed developed around the idea that government government is not not actu actual ally ly the the cock cockpi pitt from from whic which h soci societ etyy is gove govern rned ed’. ’. Andr Andrew ew Jorda ordan, n, R udig u¨ diger er Wurze urzel, l, and and Anth Anthon onyy Zito ito (200 (2005, 5, 480) 480) su sugg gges estt that that ‘mo most st sc scho hola lars rs assoc ass ocia iate te gove govern rnan ance ce with with the the decl declin inee in cent central ral gove govern rnme ment nt’’s abili ability ty to steer steer society’. Similarly, for Gerry Stoker (1998, 17), ‘the essence of governance is its focus on governing governing mechanisms mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government’. Maarten Hajer (2003) contends that governance has led to a dispersal of power and the emergence of an

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

‘i ‘ins nsti titu tuti tion onal al void void’’ in whic which h ther theree ar aree endl endles esss nego negoti tiat atio ions ns but but no cl clea earr rule ruless about how policy should be decided. Finally, Rhodes (1997, 52) describes governance networks as operating with ‘significant autonomy from the state’. To be sure, there are some countries in the world where central government has collapsed and non-state actors have stepped in to perform at least some of the functions previously performed by the state. In Somalia  the civil war that raged between 1988 and 1992 resulted in the deaths of  around a quarter of a million people. In its aftermath, informal coalitions of business leaders, clan elders and Muslim clerics assumed responsibility for constructing a system of local courts and other dispute-resolution mechanisms in the absence of any functioning state (Menkhaus, 2007 (Menkhaus,  2007)).  As Chapter  As  Chapter 7 on 7 on community engagement explains, Elinor Ostrom (1990; Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003 Ostrom,  2003))  has shown that non-state actors are sometimes capable of develo capable developin pingg elabora elaborate te but info informal rmal rule rules, s, norms norms and conv convent ention ionss governing the allocation of natural resources. There are, furthermore, a  number of instances in which NGOs have pressed firms to collectively  develop and voluntarily agree to abide by codes of conduct in the apparent absence of any state involvement. David Vogel (2008, 262) reports that there are now more than 300 such codes, primarily addressing either labour or environmental practices, on such high-profile political issues as child labour, sweatshops, diamond mining and fair-trade coffee and cocoa  production. ‘Non-state market-driven’ arrangements of this sort (Cashore, 2002) 2002) come closest to a model of ‘governance without government’. Nevertheless, a later chapter shows that such governance arrangements are limited in scope, are often poorly enforced, and are pursued by NGOs as a second-best alternative to state action.  Wee acknowledge that not every writer who points to the involvement of   W a larg larger er ra rang ngee of acto actors rs in the the proc proces esss of stee steeri ring ng soci societ etyy is will willin ingg to disc discou ount nt

5

the state. Janet Newman (2005, 1) suggests that ‘governmental power is both retreating – with state institutions being slimmed down, hollowed out, decentred and marketised – and expanding, reaching into more and more mo re ci citi tize zens ns’’ perso persona nall li live ves: s: for for exam example ple their their de deci cisio sions ns about about wo work rk,, heal health th and parenting’. We We concur with this latter view. view. In several of their texts Jon Pier Pi erre re and and Guy Guy Pet eter erss (2000; (2000; 2005) 2005) have have offe offere red d an avow avowed edly ly ‘state state-c -cen entri tric’ c’ perspective on governance, proclaiming that, ‘despite persistent rumours to the contrary, [the state] remains the key political actor in society and the predominant expression of collective interests’ (2000, 25). Yet, even here, changes in, and the limits of, the state’s authority are emphasised.  Although Pierre and Peters dismiss claims that the state is disappearing, they 

 

6

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

nevertheless maintain that its role and capacities have been fundamentally  chan ch ange ged. d. The The st stat atee is no lo long nger er the the prepre-em emin inen entt acto actorr whos whosee ‘cent centra rali lity ty ca can n be taken for granted’ and which can ‘be employed to enforce the political  will of the dominant political constituency’ (p. 82). The society-centred approach to governance also downplays concepts such as political power and authority (Koppenjan, 2008 (Koppenjan,  2008,,  133). For Newman (2005, 4), ‘governance theory offers an account of the dispersal of  power within and beyond the state, undermining the privileged place of  representative democracy’ (see also Hajer, 2003 Hajer, 2003,,  177). Vasudha Chhotray  and Gerry Stoker (2009, 12) see governance governance as a system that is ‘not necessarily hierarchical in nature’. Similarly, Sorensen and Torfing (2008a, 10) argue that within governance networks, ‘nobody can use their power to exert hierarchical control over anybody else without risking ruin to the network’. In this view, hierarchy, power struggles and conflict seem to get marginalised or replaced by negotiation,  working, mutual dependence, orcontracts, reciprocitybargaining, and trust relations. Thisnetis a  horizontal horizo ntal view of politics politics in which the state is recedin recedingg or playing playing a more marginal role in a system of ‘self-organising networks’ built on bargaining and negotiation, rather than authority structures. Hence, when writers such as Sorensen and Torfing (2008a) emphasise the centrality of ‘nonhierarchical forms of governance’, the ‘absence of top-down authority’ or the ‘role of horizontal networks of organised interests in the production of public policy and governance’ (pp. 3, 44, 3; see also Borzel & Panke, 2008) 2008), this implies that public actors do not have any distinctive role or authority vis-` vis-a-vis a` -vis private actors. Indeed, Tanja Borzel and Diana Panke (2008, 155) argue that ‘public androle private actors enjoy equal status’ or in such networks. In other words, the of government is marginalised rendered seemingly equivalent to that of private actors amidst processes of  horizontal bargaining and negotiation.

A FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION?

The society-centred account argues that states are being weakened by an arra arrayy of forc forces es and and that that,, as a re resu sult lt,, gove govern rnme ment ntss now now gove govern rn less less freq freque uent ntly  ly  throu thr ough gh the unil unilate ateral ral appl applica icati tion on of top-d top-dow own, n, hier hierar arch chic ical, al, autho authori rity ty an and d more frequently in partnership with non-state actors through markets, network associations andclaims? other ‘new’ forms governance. What are of wethe to make of these empirical We focus inof detail on the ‘resilience’ state in the next chapter, but here it is worth exploring the idea that other modes of governance have increasingly marginalised the state.

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

 We do not doubt that governments across the world are more likely   We than they once were to make use of, in particular, market mechanisms. In some cases – most notably the cap-and-trade provisions found in emissions trading systems – market mechanisms have acquired a high political profile. We accept that faith in market mechanisms is more than a passing  policy fad. Neo-liberal governments and international organisations like the World Bank were the first to eulogise the use of markets, but their acceptance has spread beyond this relatively narrow political base. We also recognise that governments have increasingly experimented with strategies to engage the community and governance through partnering with civil society associations. In this sense, the state is certainly experimenting with a wider palette of modes of governance, as we outline below. Nevertheless, the extent to which there has been a ‘fundamental transform fo rmat atio ion’ n’ in the the ‘bas ‘basic ic form forms’ s’ of gove govern rnan ance ce can can be exag exagge gera rate ted d (Sal (Salam amon on,, 2002, 1–2). In most policy areas in most countries, top-down governance throu thr ough gh hierar hierarch chyy re rema main inss the most most fr freq eque uent ntly ly empl employ oyed ed gove govern rnan ance ce strat strat-egy. Consider, in this regard, the illuminating study of European environmental policy by Jordan, Wurzel and Zito (2005). They document the exte ex tent nt to which which vario various us ‘new’ new’ envi enviro ronm nmen enta tall poli policy cy inst instrum rumen ents ts – ecoeco-tax taxes es,, tradable permits, voluntary agreements, eco-labels – have been adopted in seven European countries. They found that, while every country had adopted at least one new policy instrument, ‘there has been no wholesale and spatially uniform shift from government to governance’ (p. 490). Hie iera rarc rchy hy is not not simp simply ly hold holdin ingg its its own own agai agains nstt othe otherr gove govern rnan ance ce mech mech-anisms. In many cases it is resurgent, as described in Chapter in  Chapter 4. 4.  Government me ntss have have incr increa easi sing ngly ly come come to re rely ly upon upon hier hierar arch chic ical al solu soluti tion onss to addr addres esss new policy problems such as: speeding:   heavy heavy fines, fines, surveill surveillanc ancee cameras, cameras, compul compulsory sory educati educationa onall programs illegal immigration: fines for lorry drivers or airlines caught intentionally  or unintentionally carrying immigrants obesity: bans on the advertising of junk food during children’s television    

   

   

7

   

   

   

programs, on the sale of junk food within school premises, on the use of certain trans fats in the preparation of food compu mpuls lsory ory drug drug test testin ingg for for priso prisone ners rs and, and, in some some coun countr trie ies, s, drugg abuse: dru abuse: co public servants and, in almost every country, longer prison sentences for those caught dealing  anti-social behaviour:  court orders in Britain banning people from frequenting quenti ng a certain area or socialising socialising with certain people smoking: bans on smoking in public places

 

8

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE    

terrorism:  new legislation making it a criminal offence not simply to plan a terrorist attack but to acquire acquire information information likely to be of use to a  terrorist. In some cases the forms of hierarchy employed by governments have

changed. Governments are now more likely to employ ‘smart’ regulatory  systems in which the threat of fines and other punishments is accompanied by the promise of self-regulation and extensive consultation. Governments have also devolved more authority to quasi-independent bodies such as 2007)). Yet such central banks, regulatory agencies and courts (Vibert,   2007 developments do not spell the end of governance through hierarchy. hierarchy. Smart regulatory regu latory systems still rely upon the threat of hierarchical hierarchical intervention intervention to encourage firms and associations to regulate their own activities. Indeed, criti cr itics cs have have sugg sugges este ted d that that smart smart re regu gula lato tory ry sy syst stem emss incr increa ease se over overall all gove governrnment control over society by giving officials the opportunity to intervene in the absence of any clear legislative mandate (Berg, 2008 (Berg,  2008,,  45–55). As for the shift toward quasi-autonomous bodies such as independent central banks and regulatory authorities, it should be remembered that they  remain a formal part of the state with their authority being parcelled out by government. Hence, even where governments have embraced alternative governance arrangements, hierarchy remains of central importance. Pierre and Peters (2006, 218) suggest that governments, ‘rather than relying on command and control instruments’, are a re now ‘utilizing ‘utilizing “softer” instruments to achieve their policy goals’. We question this depiction because, although governments are experimenting with different modes of governance, this does not necessarily imply a shift away from hierarchical command and control strategies or from the use of governmental or state authority in structuring  a range of governance modes. Instead, the new instruments are running  in parallel with command and control strategies because the operation of a wide range of governance mechanisms usually entails hierarchical state oversight; Chapter oversight; Chapter 3 explor 3 explores es this process process further under the rubric of  ‘metagovernance’. There are two other reasons why we are sceptical about the notion of a  fundamental transformation in the state’s role. First, we believe that those

 writing about governance risk exaggerating not only the extent to which governments now govern through markets, associations and community  engagement but also governments’ past dependence upon hierarchy. Consider the way in which governments can contract with private firms or voluntary organisations to provide particular services: an important componentt of governanc ponen governancee through through the market. There has, undoubtedl undoubtedlyy, been

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

a dramatic growth in the use of such contract arrangements. The basic principle of contracting-out services is, however, a venerable one. Services provided by private firms under contract to governments in the 17th and 18th centuries included prison management, road maintenance, collection of tax revenue and refuse collection. In that period the British government granted the East India Company monopoly control on overseas trade with the East Indies, India and China and the authority to use armed force to protect its position (Bernstein, 2008 (Bernstein,  2008,,  214–40). Meanwhile, the convict ships that carried prisoners from Britain to Australia were operated by  private profit-making profit-making firms (Industry (Industry Commission, Commission, 1996, 74). Neither can the involvement of organised interests in the policy process be considered novel. In the 1950s President Eisenhower warned of  the influence exercised by the military-industrial complex over the United States’ defence and procurement policy. In the 1960s social policy innovations such as the Model Cities program saw governments engaging with neighbourhood and religious organisations. And academic work on American democracy in the 1960s pointed to the influence exercised by interestgrou gr oups ps in shap shapin ingg publ public ic poli policy cy (Lo (Lowi, wi, 1969). 1969). In many many Europ uropea ean n coun countr trie iess ‘corporatist’ power-sharing arrangements between governments and peak  associations representing the interests of unions and/or business have been an established feature of the governance landscape for decades. We thus reject the claim by Rod Rhodes (1996, 652) that governance implies ‘a  change in the meaning of government’ or ‘a new process of governing’ (see also Stoker, 1998, 26). Our second reason for scepticism is that, even where governments have chosen to cede some of their authority to non-state actors, they always retain the authority to change governance arrangements. The authority  the state gives to non-state actors is only ever on loan, and such arrangements are always potentially reversible. Consider, for example, the fate of the United Kingdom’s privatised rail network. In 1994 a new profitmaking firm, Railtrack, acquired ownership of all track, signalling and stations. Following a fatal rail crash that revealed systemic weaknesses in Railtrack’s engineering culture, the rail network ground to a halt in 2000 and, largely as a result of the losses it incurred during this period, Railtrack   was bankrupted the following year. year. A new company, company, Network Rail, was

9

subsequently established that, in the place of a responsibility to maximise the value of shareholdings, had a board of directors with a responsibility  to pursue the in public interest. More specifically, Network Rail required to set policies a manner consistent with guidelines devised byisthe Office of Rail Regulation. Nominally, Network Rail is still classified as a private

 

10

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

company. In reality, and as ministers have frequently boasted, Network  Rail is controlled by the Department of Transport, which sets the overall poli po licy cy fram framew ewor orkk with within in whic which h the the Offic Officee of Rail Rail Regul egulat atio ion n and and Netwo etwork  rk  Rail operate.

A STATE-CENTRIC RELATIONAL APPROACH

One of our key arguments then is that governance through hierarchical control imposed by the state is alive and well. In some arenas – defence, securi sec urity, ty, monetary monetary policy policy – polici policies es contin continue ue to be made and implem implement ented ed hierarchically by the state and consultation is non-existent or extremely  limited. And when governments have chosen to govern in alternative ways,  we argue that the state usually retains a pre-eminent position. On this basis  we argue that tha t states and governments remain critical players in governance   that governance  that is alsoinabout and  governance arrangements place.state–society relationships, whatever the Governments and state agencies are attempting to further boost their capacities by employing an expanding array of governance strategies. Governments can choose how they wish to govern and can exercise this choice without necessarily limiting their own powers. As Hans Andersen (2004, 7) writes: Many rese Many resear arch cher erss ha have ve clai claime med d that that the the restr estruc uctu turi ring ng of gove govern rnan ance ce is a ge gennerall retr era retreat eat of go gover vernme nment nt and th thee stat statee . . . yet th there ere is no rreas eason on to ass assume ume that that the the ri rise se of go gove vern rnan ance ce ne nece cess ssar aril ilyy lead leadss to a de decl clin inee of go gove vern rnme ment nt . . . th thee main reason reason for th thee rise in sta state te cap capacity acity thro through ugh rrestruc estructuring turing is . . . the fa fact ct that the state is now able to influence hitherto non-governmental spheres of  social life through partnerships, i.e. an enlargement of state competencies [see also Keating, 2004 Keating,  2004;; Pierre & Peters, Peters, 2000  2000,, 49].

Thus, by building close relationships with non-state actors through alternative governance arrangements, state leaders are attempting to enhance their capacity. capacity. How can this happen? One way of thinking about the relationship between state and non-state actors is in terms of a mutually beneficial

exchange. By working with other actors the state can sometimes achieve more than it could by working on its own. The exact nature of these exch ex chan ange gess will will vary vary depe depend ndin ingg on the the ty type pe of gove govern rnan ance ce mech mechan anis ism m bein being  g 

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

employed and the goals being sought. In general terms, however, governments can often acquire greater legitimacy and assistance in implementing  their policies by developing relations with interest-groups and community  bodies. By working with private firms, governments can purchase expertise and, in the case of controversial decisions, a certain amount of political credibility. have beenbyendorsed by and key public. stakeholders are more likely to be Policies regardedthat as legitimate the media In return, governments must concede to these actors at least some measure of influence in the policy process. Essentially, governing capacity is enhanced or potentially enhanced in such cases because governing relies not only on the state but on a broader array of actors who collectively bring more capabilities to the table than the state alone can. The existence of exchange relationships between state and non-state acto ac tors rs does does not, not, howe howeve verr, mean mean that that thes thesee re rela lati tion onss are are equa equal. l. As we desc descri ribe be more fully in the next chapter, and as Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker (2009, 22) observe, states are often able to ‘dominate the exchange’ (also see Pierre & Peters, 2000 Peters,  2000,,  100; Flinders, Flinders, 2006  2006,,  245). Michael Lister and David Davi d Mars Marsh h (200 (2006, 6, 255) 255) sa sayy that that ‘mode modern rn gove govern rnan ance ce invo involv lves es the the stat statee in more complex relationships with other governmental and societal actors, but it doesn’t inevitably reduce its role or power’. Similarly, Martin Smith (2006, 32) suggests in a discussion of pluralist theory: The problem with [society-centred] governance accounts of state reform and development is that they fall back on the simplistic assumptions of  plural plu ralism ism.. The Theyy . . . ign ignore ore the asymm asymmetr etries ies of po power wer that poten potentia tially lly exist even in network relations. Perhaps the main problem is the way in which governance assumes that the central state has lost power when there is a  raft of empirical evidence to demonstrate the high level of resources and authority that remains within the central state.

There is a second reason to be wary of assuming that governments have been superseded or marginalised. Even where governments choose to govern through markets, associations and community engagement, they  usually retain a responsibility for metagovernance, or the ‘government of  governance’. As Chapter As  Chapter 3 explains, 3 explains, whatever the governance mechanism employed, the state typically plays (and should play) a key role in overseeing, steering and coordinating governance arrangements; in selecting  and supporting the key participants; in mobilising resources; in ensur-

11

ing that wider systems of governance are operating fairly and efficiently; and an d in takin takingg re respo spons nsibi ibili lity ty for for demo democr cracy acy and and acco accoun untab tabil ility ity issue issues. s.

 

12

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Governments and state agencies thus typically play roles at two levels in governance arrangements. First, they are, with others, players in specific governance arrangements. Second, they also have a metagovernance function, an overall management and oversight role, that transcends specific governance arrangements. Existing discussions about the role of the state in governance arrangements sometimes encourage us to think about a spectrum of possible positions running from, on the one hand, society-centred governance with minimal governmental presence to, on the other, a state-centric view of  governance. Such a typology underpins the work of Jon Pierre and Guy  Peters (2005) in Governing Complex Societies  (see   (see also Chhotray & Stoker, 2009,  ch. 1; Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2005). Pierre and Peters identify five 2009, models of the state and society interactions in governance that are now said to be operating among contemporary democratic systems. These models are distinguished in terms of the actors involved, the nature of the processes and political dynamics at work, and the outcomes of the governing  processes; together they constitute a ‘continuum ranging from the most dominated by the state to those in which the state plays the least role’ (p. 11). The etatiste model:  government is the principal actor for all aspects of  governance and can control the manner in which societal actors are involved, if at all, in governance. The libera liberal-dem l-democr ocratic atic mode model:l:   gover governme nment nt is influen influenced ced by intere intereststgrooups gr ups but but can can neve evert rthe hele less ss ‘hav ‘havee the the oppor pportu tuni nity ty to pick pick and and choose cho ose . . . [who] [who] it will will permit permit to to have have influ influenc encee’ (ibid (ibid). ). The sta statete-cent centric ric mod model: el: th thee stat statee ‘rem ‘remai ain ns at the the centr entree of the the pro process cess’’ but but has institutionalised its relationships with social actors in corporatisttype arrangements. The so-called Dutch governance school model:   the state is ‘merely one among many actors involved in the process’ and ‘society may be the most powerful actor’ (ibid). The governance without government model:  the state has lost its capacity  to govern and is, at best, an arena within which private actors play  out their own interests to create more or less self-steering governance arrangements (p. 12). This typology in which the authority of the state waxes and wanes loses sight of the integral role that governments play in   all  governance   governance arrangements; a role that is the foundation of our state-centric relational approach to governance. Government and governance are not mutually  exclusive alternatives between which societies must choose. They are not    

   

   

   

   

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

even the end-points along a spectrum of institutional arrangements. As  we argue throughout this book, it is typically the case that government is routinely and authoritatively implicated in the exercise of all forms of  governance. States are central actors because they can bring to bear enormous financial resources resources to develop develop and support governance governance arrangements. arrangements. In recent decades it has become commonplace to observe that states operate under continuous fiscal stress. Yet as we argue in the following chapter, the financial position of most states remains reasonably robust. In metagoverning  its relationships with other actors, a state can deploy not only vast financial resources but large and often highly trained workforces. The US federal government government employs employs around 55 000 physical and biological biological scientists, scientists, 68 000 computer computer speciali specialists sts and 33 000 accountan accountants ts and auditors auditors.. More More generally, and at a local as well as national level, governments employ large numb nu mber erss of poli policy cy offic officer erss tr trai aine ned d to iden identi tify fy poli policy cy prob proble lems ms,, find find poss possib ible le solutions, and negotiate agreements.  Another source of authority states have at their disposal typically sustains their dominance of exchange relationships. Governments do not simply operate within exogenously given sets of governance rules. They  also have an authority, not possessed by any other actor, to choose the governance rules. Governments select the mechanisms to address policy  problems: they can choose governance partners and can choose whether to govern through through hierarchy hierarchy,, markets, persuasion, community community engageme engagement nt or associations. Having chosen which governance mechanism to employ, governments can also choose how to structure governance arrangements. In the case of governance through markets, governments can choose which services to contract-out and the criteria by which contracts are awarded. In the case of governanc governancee through through community community engagement engagement,, governme governments nts can choose the circumstances circumstances in which to engage engage with community community groups and, invariably, how to interpret and respond to the results. Furthermore, governments can always choose to revise the existing governance mechanisms. This is a significant power because, even if governments do not choose to change governance arrangements, the knowledge that they can do so is, in itself, an important resource. Non-state actors will sometimes be deterred from pressing strident demands upon the government if they  know that the government can simply change the underlying governance mechanism. The choices governments make incur opportunity costs. Governing in partnership with other actors often requires governments to make policy  concessions. Indeed, governing unilaterally through hierarchy can result

13

 

14

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

in a loss of legitimacy. This is hardly surprising. Every action incurs opportunity costs. In some cases the distribution of resources between state and non-state actors means that states will incur significant costs if  they operate operate unilaterally unilaterally.. Chapt Chapter er 8 su sugg gges ests ts that that,, if th they ey are are to gove govern rn ef effe fecctively, governments must often learn to work constructively with business associations. Yet, even here, governments, in our view, retain a meaningful choice how howtheir to govern. gogovernance vern. In thearrangements. first place, place, governm governments caofngovernance still choose how toabout structure In theents casecan through association, governments can set agendas and attribute ‘public status’ to favoured groups (Offe, 1981 (Offe, 1981)). Second, governments can, if they   wish, choose to incur considerable short-term costs by governing unilaterally in order to strengthen their long-term position. Upon being elected to office, neo-liberal governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, and  Australia chose to dissolve existing corporatist arrangements. In doing so these governments risked considerable political damage. By changing the rules of governance, however, governments can hope to secure a long-term advantage by undermining their opponents. Gove Go vern rnme ment ntss do no t alwa always find find them themse selv lves es in a posi po siti tion onPrime to endu endure re thes thesee short-term costs. Innot 2006 theysFrench government, led by Minister Dominique de Villepin, tried to change the prevailing governance rules by  excluding the trade union movement from discussions about the introduction of a new employment contract that would have allowed employers to fire employees under the age of 26 during the first two years of their employment. In this case the government underestimated its ability to  withstand the resulting political protests. Following Following a general strike that attracted the support of about two million people, the proposed legislation  was eventually abandoned. Governments are not, however, however, always so constrain str ained ed.. Equi Equippe pped d with with an expr expres esss mand mandate ate for for refo reform, rm, Presid residen entt Nicho ichola lass Sarkozky managed to oversee a number of similar reforms to French more labourrecently markets. States alone have the capacity to change the rules of the governance game ga me becau because se when when oper operat atin ing  g within na natio tionn-sta state tess they they cont contin inue ue to poss posses esss legal sovereignty in the sense that they remain the ‘final and absolute authority in the political community’ (Hinsley, 1986 (Hinsley,  1986,,  26). Governments are constrained by constitutions, parliaments, elections and the media, but they remain authoritative actors who can change the rules of the political game. Governments can, if they wish, impose legal restrictions upon trade unions, side-step pressure groups whose views they oppose, forbid private firms from operating in certain locations or selling certain products, and renege rene ge upon the contrac contracts ts they have signed with private firms.

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

On what basis does the state’s legal sovereignty rest? There are two very  different answers to this question, but both of them emphasise the centrality of the state. One theory is that the state’s sovereignty rests upon its legitimacy: that is, upon a popular acceptance that the state is entitled to be the final and absolute authority in the political community and has the right to make authoritative decisions, largely because its leaders hold a democratic mandate from the people. In this sense legitimacy is linked directly to notions of democratic authority. Over the last few decades, trust in politicians and willingness to participate in the political process have fallen, in some cases dramatically (Stoker, 2006 (Stoker,  2006). ). A second notion underpinning legitimacy is that the state retains political legitimacy in the sense that people still routinely expect governments to solve policy problems and steer society. In a classic statement of neo-liberal philosophy, Ronald Reagan used his inaugural presidential address in 1980 to argue that, ‘in the present present crisis, government government is not the solution to our problem; problem; governme gov ernment nt is the problem’. problem’. Yet in a secular secular age it is still government government and not God to which people are most likely to turn. When a flood strikes, unemployme unempl oyment nt increases or an inquiry reveals reveals falling standards of care for the elderly or the mentally ill, it is elected politicians or, occasionally, the executive of a government agency who appear on our television screens to promise swift action. When the American sub-prime mortgage market started to fail in September 2007, placing individual banks and the  wider capital market under enormous financial pressure, it was the federal government and the US Federal Reserve which was called upon to inject liqu liquid idit ityy into into marke markets ts and and suppo support rt and and even even nati nation onali alise se parts parts of the bankin banking  g  system.  A second and more brutal argument is that the state’s state’s sovereignty sovereignty rests upon its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This might seem dramatic, but the capacity of the state to unilaterally alter governance rules might, ultimately, be thought to depend upon its capacity to force other actors to behave in certain ways. Just as states continue to possess significant financial and bureaucratic resources, so they continue to possess not only an effective monopoly on the  legitimate  use   use of violence in society  but a near-monopoly on the use of all violence. In some countries, wellorganised criminal gangs pose a threat not only to public order but to the financial stability of the state. Yet Yet in recent years years the Italian judiciary (Della  Porta, 2001 Porta,  2001)) and (with a great deal of American assistance) the Colombian army (Bowden, 2001 (Bowden,  2001))  have shown that they are capable of frustrating the activities of, respectively, the Mafia and the Medellin and Cali drug cartels. Conc Co ncer erns ns have have al also so been been expr expres esse sed d abou aboutt the the legi legiti tima macy cy of, of, and and the the dang danger erss

 

15

16

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

posed by, the large and legally protected private security forces employed by Russian energy companies and by large American security firms such as Blackwater (recently renamed Xe for reasons that are discussed in Chapter 6) 6). These concerns need to be placed in context. Blackwater executives have spoken about creating a brigade-sized unit of around 2000 troops capable of being deployed to world trouble-spots at short notice (Scahill,   2007, 2007,   348–9). The US Army by contrast consists of around 400 000 enlisted enlisted soldiers soldiers and 80 000 officers. officers. MODES OF GOVERNANCE

Far from withering away, states have adapted to new environments and remain the public faces of governance. We therefore remain profoundly  sceptical of transformationalist arguments and agree with Graham Wilson (2000, 235) when he says that: ‘the popularity of anti-state rhetoric in the 1980s and 1990s [has] led many to confuse changes in the modes of  statee activit stat activityy . . . with a decli decline ne in the the signifi significan cance ce of the the state’. state’. Our Our statestatecent ce ntric ric re rela lati tion onal al appro approach ach to gove govern rnan ance ce reco recogn gnise isess that that go gove vern rnme ment ntss have have develo deve lope ped d new new tool tools, s, strate strategi gies es and and re rela lati tion onsh ships ips in orde orderr to gove govern rn and and that that governments can therefore choose between different modes of governance. This book distinguishes five modes of governance: hierarchy, persuasion, markets, community engagement, and associative governance. VIA HIERARCHY

Governance via hierarchy, or top-down governance, occurs when government me ntss or agen agenci cies es of the the st stat atee act act auth author orit itat ativ ivel elyy to brin bringg abou aboutt an outc outcom ome. e. Governments and state agencies directly allocate resources through taxing  and an d spen spendi ding ng,, or they they atte attemp mptt to impo impose se orde orderr, rule rule and and outc outcom omes es vi viaa dire direct ct regulatory, legal and enforcement measures. In this mode of governance state authority is used to foster order, rule and collective capacity. When governments ban smoking in public places (thus directly bringing about an outcome) or raise the taxes on a packet of cigarettes (thus changing  the incentives for smokers in order to bring about an outcome), this is an example of governance via hierarchy. VIA PERSUASION

 While an enormous amount has been written about hierarchy and markets as instruments instruments of governanc governance, e, far less has been said about governan governance ce

 

A S TA T A T E C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

through persuasion – a mode of governance achieved through inculcating  modes of ‘self-discipline’ or ‘compliance’ in target subjects. Yet attempts by governments to persuade  people  people to change their behaviour have become a familiar feature of everyday life. As well as inducing citizens to change their behaviour through laws, taxes or regulations, governments also try to change their attitudes and behaviour by persuading them to smoke less, eat more healthily, drink less alcohol, save water, recycle their rubbish, report suspected terrorists, engageregular in voluntary work, use publicgamble transport, take regular exercise, undertake medical examinations, responsibly, eschew drugs, and save for their retirement. VIA MARKETS

One obvious change in the way in which governments govern is the growing commercialisation of government and the use of markets and contracts in governance processes. Governments across the world have contractedout services to private firms and encouraged the development of public– private partnerships. Governments have privatised state-owned industries and deregulated other markets. havechange. also established markets to tackle policy problems such asThey climate Yet we arenew sceptical of  the claim that markets, any markets, operate independently of government. Rather than ‘free markets’, we talk about ‘managed markets’ and suggest that ‘the shift to marketisation largely represents an attempt by  government to enhance or restore their power to achieve their economic and social objectives, while minimising any loss of efficiency’ (Keating, 2004, 6). 2004, VIA COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

In thehad 1970s members of the Left and argued bureaucraticinstructures become too large andNew unwieldy thatthat the bureaucrats them had become divorced from the public they were meant to be helping. Far from transforming people’s lives, welfare expenditure had simply led to Smart,  1991)). But whereas a  the ‘regulation of the poor’ (Squires, 1990 (Squires,  1990;; Smart, 1991 similar neo-liberal critique of hierarchy led to a preference for governing  through markets, the New Left argued for a radical democratisation of  politics through the devolution of decision-making powers to local citizens and communities. In the 1990s community engagement became a  favoured strategy of local and, eventually, central governments seeking  to enhance their democratic credentials and legitimacy. Governments are

 

18

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

17

now awash with citizens juries, consensus-building conferences, deliberative polling surveys, public hearings and focus groups. As a working  example of such an approach consider the system of Participatory Budgeting developed in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in the late 1980s and now practised in around 300 cities across the world. Following a series of preliminary  open meetings to discuss past budget performance and future budget priorities, oritie s, citizens citizens elect a Budget Budget Council, which negotiates negotiates final investment investment priorities and a budget for the city (Fung & Wright, 2003 Wright,  2003;;  Stoker, 2006  Stoker,  2006,, 187–9). VIA ASSOCIATIONS

In associative or network governance arrangements, the state works with firms, private associations and interest-groups to develop and implement policy.. Through both corporatist and private-interest government arrangepolicy ments (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985 Schmitter,  1985)), states offer business associations and other groups influence over the contents of public policy in exchange for public support, access to information, and direct assistance in implementing policy. The involvement of non-state actors in the policy process is, in itself, nothing new. What is said to have changed is the scale of interestgroup involvement and the legitimacy accorded to it (Sorensen & Torfing, 2008a ,  4). Within a number of European countries, for example, peak  organisations representing the interests of labour or industry have on occasion assumed the role of formal co-legislators who are able to negotiate the contents of European Union directives (Treib, Bahr & Falkner, 2007, 10). Indeed, Rod Rhodes, whose work on governance we have already  mentioned, argues that the shift from what he describes as government to governance is synonymous with the proliferation of networks in which public and private sector actors exchange resources. CONCLUSION

This chapt This chapter er has has outl outlin ined ed our our cr crit itiqu iquee of exist existin ingg ‘soci societ etyy-ce cent ntre red’ d’ acco accoun unts ts of governance and introduced our ‘state-centric relational’ alternative to them. Our basic aim here has been to emphasise two points: the continuing centrality of governments to the process of governance; and the degree to which governments’ capacity to govern requires the development of  effective working relationships with a range of non-state actors. In the following two chapters we develop these themes: first by critically examining 

 

A S TA T A T E - C E N T R I C R E L AT AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

 

arguments that the state has been undermined by neo-liberal ideology, regulatory regu latory failure and globalisation globalisation;; and then by looking in more detail at

19

the notion of metagovernance. The remaining chapters then explore the role that governments continue to play in designing and managing governance through hierarchy, persuasion, markets, community engagement and association.

 

2

 

The resilient state

RGUMENTS ABOUT GOVE GOVERNANCE RNANCE are closely connected to  A RGUMENTS

those about the fate of the nation-state. In many commentaries, the state is depicted as ineffective, fiscally constrained, weakened by globalisation and increasingly unable to respond to the demands placed upon it. In response, so the argument goes, states have off-loaded substantial responsibility onto alternative modes of governance. This chapter restores some balance to the governance debate by highlighting the ongoing importance the state. Far from being hollowed out, governments and state agenciesofremain the central architects of governance strategies. Rather than receding, states are changing and adapting in the face of new challenges and experimenting   with more elaborate elaborat e forms for ms of both hierarchical and relational governance. It was during the 1970s that social scientists seriously began to question the existing capacity and future future relevance relevance of nation-states. nation-states. At a time when the world economy was faltering and terrorist groups like the Baader– Meinhof Gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy were threatening  the stability of mature liberal democracies, it became common to talk of  government ‘overload’ and an impending ‘legitimacy crisis’. In the 1980s and 1990simproved. the economic and political environment in globmost countries, Yet many Yet academics, buoyed bychanged concernsand, about alisation and regulatory failure, proclaimed the retreat (Strange,  (Strange,   1996) 1996), decline (Mann, 1990 (Mann,  1990))  or even death (Hobsbawm, 1990 (Hobsbawm,  1990)) of the nationstate.  Arguments about the state underlie discussions of governance and, in particular, the society-centred account of governance reviewed in the previous chapter. The so-called hollowing out of the state features as both a  cause and an effect of the alleged shift from government to governance. It is a cause in the sense that it is thought to have required governments

20

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

to reach out to non-state actors in the private sector, in policy networks and in communities, to help with – or even assume responsibility for – the process of governing. At the same time, it is an effect in the sense that the decision of governments to govern in different ways has undermined state policy capacity. Having had to learn to work with others, the state is now 

21

unable to work alone. alone.  Yet  Yet academic arguments about the decline of the state, although viewed uncritically in many works on governance, remain controversial. In some cases, specific variants of the hollowing-out argument have been overtaken by events. The concern of many UK political scientists in the 1970s about government overload soon gave way to equally strident critiques of the ‘authoritarian populism’ (Hall, 1985 (Hall,  1985)) and ‘executive dictatorship’ (King, 1988) 1988) of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative governments in the 1980s.  At other times, eye-catching academic theories about the infirmity of the state have encouraged government reform, as with arguments about policy  implementation or policy coordination; or they have given way to more nuanced academic debates that recognise the strengths and weaknesses of  the state, as with arguments about globalisation. globalisation. This chapter evaluates arguments about the weakening of the state as they relate to the public choice theory of ‘state failure’, the ‘fiscal crisis’ of  the state, the implementation ‘gap’, the ‘decentring’ of national governments, the loss of state legitimacy, and globalisation. Chapter globalisation.  Chapter 1 argued 1  argued that the extent of the shift from governance through hierarchy to governance through markets, associations associations and community engagement engagement is often exaggerated and  that  that the choice between between society-cen society-centred tred and state-centric state-centric approaches to governance is a false one because governments, in establishing and operating governance strategies, must develop and maintain close relationships with a range of non-state actors. Building on this, we argue that the pressures that are supposed to have led to a weakening of the state have been exaggerated and  that  that governments are changing and adapting in the face of new challenges and experimenting with more elaborate forms of relations with society. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND STATE FAILURE

Public choice (or, as it is often called, rational choice) theory involves the application of the methods of economics – principally the assumptions of methodological individualism, rationality and egoism – to the study  Hindmoor,  2006a ,  b). Public choice theory, of politics (Mueller, 2003 (Mueller,  2003,,  1; Hindmoor, 2006a 

 

22

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 which was initially developed within American universities in the 1960s and early 1970s, had by the 1980s acquired a measure of both academic hegemony (Green & Shapiro,   1994, 1994, 3; Lalman et al.,   1993, 1993,   79) and practical policy influence (Self, 1993 (Self, 1993;; Sretton & Orchard, Orchard, 1994  1994). ). Perhaps the easiest way to understand public choice theory is to see it as a reaction to the theory of market failure. One of the achievements of  postpo st-war war econ econom omic ic theory theory was the demo demons nstra trati tion on that, that, in cond condit itio ions ns of perper-

fect information and perfect perfect competition competition,, markets will clear, clear, allowing allowing for the achievement of a welfare-maximising equilibrium (Arrow & Debreu, 1954). Yet, as many economists soon recognised, one obvious implication 1954) of this fundamental theorem of welfare economics is that imperfect markets characterised by, for example, monopolies, externalities, public goods and uncertainty will generate generate imperfect results, so providing providing a  prima  prima facie   justification for state intervention. In concluding that the existence of market failure justified state intervention, public choice theorists argued that economists had simply assumed that politicians and state officials would be able and willing to act in the public interest. In their view, economists had made an entirely misleading comparison between imperfect markets and a perfect state and so had, unsurprisingly, found in favour of the latter. In fact, public choice theorists argued, the state would often fail, either because self-interested bureaucrats would inflate their budgets (Niskanen, 1971))  or because self-interested politicians bent on securing re-election 1971  1975;;  would manipulate the economy for political purposes (Nordhaus, (Nordhaus, 1975 Hibbs, 1977) 1977), use use thei theirr mono monopo poly ly cont contro roll of econ econom omic ic poli policy cy to ef effe fect ctiv ivel ely  y  ‘sell’ policy favours to firms and pressure groups (Rowley et al., 1988), or use the taxation system to redistribute income to marginal constituencies or key groups of swing voters (Tullock, 2005 (Tullock,  2005)). In denouncing a ‘romantic’ view of politics in which politicians and publ pu blic ic offic officia ials ls can can si simp mply ly be tr trus uste ted d to act act in the the publ public ic inte intere rest st (B (Buc ucha hana nan, n, 1999) 1999), public choice theorists have come to view any and every instance of state intervention as both harmful and motivated by considerations of  electoral or bureaucratic electoral bureaucratic self-interest self-interest.. For For this reason they have argued for a balanced budget amendment (Buchanan, 1997 (Buchanan, 1997)); more local referendums to approve proposed expenditure increases (Tullock, 1993 (Tullock,  1993,,  78–85); and more restrictive budget rules to prevent the kind of porkbarrel politics that led, most famously, to the proposal to build a $400 million ‘bridge to nowhere’ in Alaska as a part of the 2005 Transportation Equity Act (New  York Times , 21 October 2005). Durin uringg the the 1970 1970ss and and 1980 1980s, s, publ public ic choi choice ce argu argume ment ntss were were popu popula lari rise sed d by think-tanks like the Cato Institute in the United States and the Institute for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom. They provided intellectual

 

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

ammunition and a burgeoning policy agenda for neo-liberal politicians determined to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’ and make more use of  markets as a governance mechanism. Yet in political science departments there has been a growing backlash against the assumptions made and conc co nclu lusi sion onss re reach ached ed by publi publicc choi choice ce theor theorist istss (see (see Gree Green n & Shapi Shapiro ro,, 1994; 1994; Friedman, 1996; Bell, 2002 Bell,  2002;;  Marglin, 2008  Marglin,  2008)). One recurring argument is that they have exaggerated the propensity for the state to fail. In economic markets competition generates efficiency. Donald Wittman (1995) argues

23

that competition from opposition parties and between interest-groups and the pres presssthe to draw dr aw the the publ pu ic’’s atten attenti tion on to gove goGlobalised vern rnme ment nt mal malfe feas asan ance ce si simil milarl arly  ensures efficiency ofblic political markets. financial markets arey  alsoo li als like kely ly to puni punish sh poli politic ticia ians ns se seek ekin ingg short short-t -ter erm m el elec ecto toral ral adva advant ntag age. e. The The former governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bernie Fraser, invokes markets as one reason for the disappearance of opportunities for loose or politically manipulated monetary policy. These days . . . su such ch manipula manipulation tion will be caugh caughtt out . . . th thee financial markets in particular will see through the ruse and punish the perpetrators. Today’ oday’ss politicians appreciate that extended front page reportage of a plunging exchange rate, for example, could easily outweigh any positive effects of  a politically inspired cut in interest rates [quoted Bell, 2004a  Bell,  2004a ,  120].

The irony is that refor reforms ms inspired by public choice theory in the 1980s and 1990s have enhanced state capacity. The encouragement to devolve resp respon onsi sibil bilit ityy for for mone monetar taryy poli policy cy to inde indepe pend nden entt cent central ral banks banks (Buc (Bucha hana nan n & Wagner, 1977 Wagner,  1977))  has helped states control inflationary pressures during  the last few decades (Alesina & Summers,  1993)  1993). The support offered by public choice theorists like William Niskanen (1971) to introducing  competition within th thee publ public ic se servi rvice ce has has argu arguab ably ly enha enhanc nced ed the the capa capaci city ty of  the state bureaucracies to deliver services efficiently. Finally, public choice arguments about the dangers of regulatory ‘capture’ (Stigler, 1971 (Stigler, 1971)) have led governments to rethink the ways in which they interact with private firms and associations. Far from reining in the state, public choice assaults have in some ways helped to strengthen it. GOVERNMENT OVERLOAD AND THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE

 At the same time as those on the political right were using public choice theory to expose the alleged failings of the post-war state, left-wing academics influenced by various strands of Marxist thought were predicting 

 

24

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

an inevitable ‘fiscal crisis’ for the capitalist state (O’Connor, 1973 (O’Connor,  1973;;  Offe, 1984). The basic argument was that governments were caught between the increasing need to invest additional money in support of private capital, and their inability to finance that expenditure through taxation. These arguments found an echo during the 1970s in other and more general writings about government ‘overload’ (Brittan,  (Brittan,   1975; 1975; King,   1975 1975;; Crozier et al., 1975). The post-war years, it was argued, had seen a  rapid and unsustainable growth in public expectations about what governments could manage, which, once challenged, had led to a growing  loss of confidence not only in particular political parties but in the demo-

cratic process (Birch,   1984) 1984). Summarising this development, Anthony  King (1975, 166) suggested that ‘once upon a time man looked to God to order the world. Then he looked to the market. Now he looks to government. And when things go wrong people blame not “Him” or “it” but “them”’. Conc Co ncer erns ns about about gove govern rnme ment nt over overlo load ad and and the appar apparen ently tly in inex exor orabl ablee rise rise in post post-wa -warr publi publicc expe expend nditu iture re prov provid ided ed part part of the inte intell llec ectua tuall justi justific ficati ation on for neo-liberal efforts to cut public expenditure in the 1980s and 1990s. Even today, fears about excessive government spending continue to drive political debates in the United States and Europe about the cost of public health care and pensions. As Gerry Stoker (1998, 18) wryly observed, the demand to reduce public expenditure means that ‘governance’ is often regarded within government as a code for spending cuts. Equally, Jon Pierre and Guy Peters (2000, 52) suggest that the ‘emergence of the new  governance’, has been propelled by an ‘astounding’ decline in the financial resources of the state. Yet when we look at the data we find that, measured as a share of gross domestic product, overall state expenditure in nearly  all the countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developme Deve lopment nt (OECD) has either either remained remained constant or slightly slightly increased increased over the last 20 years (OECD, 2005a, 212–15). Between 1980 and 2001 overall public expenditure across the OECD increased by almost four per cent of GDP (Castles, 2007 (Castles,  2007,,  22–3). The limited impact of neo-liberalism neo-liberalism upon the state is even more apparent when figures on state expenditure are placed in historical perspective. In 1870 state expenditure accounted for around 10 per cent of US gross domestic product; product; by 1980 this figure had ri rise sen n to 31 per per cent cent.. In Germ German anyy over ver the the sa same me peri period od stat statee expe expend ndit itur uree rose rose from around 12 per cent to 48 per cent of gross domestic product (Tanzi ). Judged against this baseline, little has changed in & Schuknecht, 2000 Schuknecht,  2000). recent years. There is no evidence that state expenditure is likely to fall to the levels experienced in the 1960s, let alone the 1870s. Moreover,

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

Table 2.1. Total social expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product, selected  OECD countries, 1980 and 2001 Total social expenditure Country

1980

2001

 Australia France Germany Italy  Japan Netherlands

11.3 22.6 23 18.4 10.6 26.9

18.0 28.5 27.4 25.8 16.9 21.8

% change, 1980–2001            

6.7 + 5.9 + 4.4 + 7.4 + 6.7 − 5.1 +

25

United Kingdom United States

17.9 13.3

21.8 14.8

   

3.9 + 1.5 +

Source: Castles, 2007, 22.

 welfare expenditure, one of the key targets of neo-liberal governments, grew sometimes dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s (Table (Table 2.1 2.1). ).  Why has social welfare expenditure increased over the last few decades? In most countries it has done so in response to labour market insecurity, ageingg populations agein populations and rising health care costs. Neo Neo-libera -liberals ls may see such expenditures as evidence of government overload, but governments regard soci so ciet etal al acce accept ptan ance ce of the the mark market et syst system em and and econ econom omic ic open openne ness ss as cont contin in-gent upon the continued continued existence existence of social protection protection and redistribution redistribution (Rodrik, 1997 (Rodrik,  1997,,  1998; Alesina & Perotti, 1996 Perotti,  1996)). The once conventional  wisdom about globalisation was that it would generate irresistible pressures to reduce social expenditure as states competed to reduce taxes in order to attract and retain investment capital. Yet empirical studies show  that indicators of globalisation, such as relative openness to trade or capital movements, are in many cases  positively  related   related to various levels of  government expenditure (Rieger & Leibfried, 2003 Leibfried,  2003;;  Brady, Beckfield & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005; Castles, 2007 Castles, 2007)). As Dani Rodrik (1997, 53) argues: this puzzle is solved by considering the importance of social insurance and an d th thee ro role le of go gove vern rnme ment nt in pr prov ovid idin ingg co cove verr ag agai ains nstt exte extern rnal al ri risk sk.. So Soci ciet etie iess that expose themselves to greater amounts of external risk, demand (and receive) a larger government role as a shelter from the vicissitudes of global markets. In the context of the advanced industrial economies specifically, this translates into more generous social programs. Hence the conclusion that the social welfare state is the flip side of the open economy.

 

26

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Table 2.2. Total taxation as a percentage of gross domestic product, selected OECD  countries, 1975–2007  Total taxation Country

1975

1995

2007

 Australia Belgium Canada Denmark France

25.8 39.5 32.0 38.4 35.5

28.8 43.6 35.6 48.8 4 41 1.9

30.6 (2006) 44.4   33.3   48.9   4 43 3.4  

Germany Italy  Japan

34.3 25.4 20.9

37.2 40.1 26.8

  36.2 43.3   27.9 ((2006) 2006)

% change, 1975–2007  

4.8 + 4.9 + 1.3 + 10.5 + 7.9 +

+ 2.5 + 17.9  

+

7.9

Netherlands United Kingdom United States OECD average

40.7 35.2 25.6 29.4

41.5 34.5 27.9 34.8

38.0   36.6   28.3   35.9 (2006)

2.7 + 1.4 + 2.7 + 6.5

−

 

Source: OECD Tax Revenue T Trends, rends, 1965–2006 (2008 edition).

Have st Have stat ates es mana manage ged d to ra rais isee the the ta taxa xati tion on need needed ed to pay pay for for this this incr increa ease sed d expenditure, so averting a fiscal crisis of the state? Broadly, the answer is 2.2 shows,  shows, between 1975 and 2007 overall levels of taxation yes. As Table As Table 2.2 measured as a proportion of gross domestic product  increased  in  in a range of  Europ uropea ean n coun countr trie iess and and re rema main ined ed cons consta tant nt in the the Unite nited d King Kingdo dom m and and the the United Un ited States. States. Across Across the the OECD as a whole (including (including a range of of countries countries not included in the table shown here) average taxation increased from 30.3 to 36.3 per cent of GDP. GDP. Because most OECD economies have doubled in size over this period, period, absolute absolute tax income has grown grown dramatically; dramatically; indeed, indeed, as economies have grown, the ‘tax state’ has grown even faster. In Australia, for example, for more than a decade to 2007, corporate tax receipts grew  at over three times the rate of GDP growth growth (Braithwaite, (Braithwaite, 2008  2008,, 7).  Although tax revenues within OECD countries have remained buoyant, there is a general trend to finance public expenditure through long-term public debt. As long as the world economy continued to grow these public debt levels were manageable. Between 1980 and 2001 net debt interest payments as a proportion of GDP only rose from 1.8 to 2.3 per cent in the United States and from 1.5 to 2.0 per cent across a broader sample of  18 OECD countries (Wagschal, 2007 (Wagschal, 2007,,  26). Whether the combination of 

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

a global recession and additional public borrowing to rescue private banks brin br ings gs into into ques questi tion on gove govern rnme ment nts’ s’ abil abilit ityy to se servi rvice ce thei theirr de debt bt is, is, at the the time time of writing, an open question. In January 2009 the European Commission predicted that the UK budget deficit would rise to nearly 10 per cent of  GDP and that, overall, public debt would be equivalent of 72 per cent of  GDP. At this time, financial markets were awash with speculation that the credit rating of the UK government was to be downgraded and that this  would limit its borrowing capacity. capa city. THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP?

In 1964 US President Lyndon Johnson pledged to build a great society  through the elimination of poverty and racial injustice. Over the next few years a series of new government programs were introduced, including 

27

Medic edicar aree and and Medic edicaid aid,, fund fundss to assist assist child childre ren n from from lo loww-in inco come me fa famil milie ies, s, and an d a new new hous housin ingg act act to pro provi vide de re rent nt supp supple leme ment ntss for for the the poor poor.. Desp Despit itee the the huge sums of money involved, the results of these programs were generally  cons co nsid ider ered ed to be disa disapp ppoi oint ntin ing. g. In tryin tryingg to acco accoun untt fo forr thei theirr fa fail ilur ure, e, poli policy  cy  analysts stumbled upon the idea that programs had failed not because the programs themselves were inherently flawed but because they had been poorly implemented (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). According to one public official:  we became increasingly bothered in the late 1960s by those aspects of the exercise of government authority bound up with implementation. Results achieved by the programs of that decade were widely recognised as inadequat qu ate. e. On Onee cl clea earr sour source ce of fail failur uree em emer erge ged: d: po poli liti tica call an and d bu bure reau aucr crat atic ic aspe aspect ctss of the implementation process were, in great measure, left outside both the considerations of participants in government and the calculations of formal policy analysts who assisted them [quoted Brewer & DeLeon, 1983 DeLeon, 1983,, 249].

Over the next few years academics came to recognise the difficulties – sometimes impossibilities – of successful policy implementation in policy environments characterised by multiple centres of decision-making, ambiguous policy objectives, high levels of uncertainty and uncooperative ‘street-level’ ‘street-level’ bureaucrats (Lipsky, (Lipsky, 1980;  1980; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003 2003). ). A tidal wave of case-studies showed how frequently great policy  expectations are dashed during implementation (for reviews see Sabatier, 1986;  DeLeon,  1999)). Consider, as one example, the fate of the Kyoto 1986;  DeLeon, 1999 Protocol. Attention focused on the refusal of the United States and, to

 

28

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

aDe lesser extent, Australia to sign the treaty (Australia eventually signed ina  Dece cemb mber er 2007, 2007, foll follow owin ing g the el elec ecti tion on of a Labor La bor gove govern rnme ment nt). ). Le Less ss medi media  attention has been devoted to the implementation of the protocol itself. As of Janua anuary ry 2008 2008,, Swede weden n and and the the Unite nited d King Kingdo dom m were were the the only only coun countr trie iess likely to meet their Kyoto Kyoto emissions commitments, commitments, calling into doubt the value of the further promise made by leaders of the G8 countries in June 2007 to at least halve carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. In the 1990s research on the difficulties faced by governments in successfully implementing public policy was tied to the discussion of policy networks. In most policy arenas in most countries, public policy is formulated and implemented through networks of government officials and actorsprofessional who represent functional interests suchand as peaknon-government business associations, associations, farmers groups  welfare associations. Dave Marsh and Rod Rhodes (1992c) argued that these policy networks had become so entrenched in the United Kingdom that government efforts to bypass networks and unilaterally impose pol-

icy nearly always ended in failure. It is certainly true that governments can enhance their governing capacity by developing closer relations with non-state actors. Non-state actors provide legitimacy, expertise, and sometimes direct assistance in implementing policies. But the extent to which governments are constrained by the existence of policy networks can be exaggerated. Governments are not only leading players within networks, they retain the hierarchical authority to change governance rules if they  can bear the short-term political costs of doing so. The discussion below  on the alleged decentring of the state, for example, shows how the French government simply bypassed the two main farming unions when it came under pressure to reduce agricultural subsidies as part of trade talks in the early 1990s. Three further points are worth making about the literature on implementation. The first is that the academic study of implementation failures has prompted governments at both national and local level to more closely  invest in, monitor and control the implementation process. For example, in a study of implementing work requirements as part of social welfare policy in Wisconsin, Lawrence Mead (2001 (2001)) ‘confirms [the] success of a  top-down model of implementation’ by showing how the authorities effectively ‘built up an employment bureaucracy’ in efforts to further improve policy implementation. In similar centrist moves, the UK government created a ‘delivery unit’ in 2001 (Richards & Smith, 2004 Smith, 2004)) and the Australian government a Cabinet Implementation Unit in 2003 (Wanna, (Wanna, 2006  2006)). The second is that the academic search for further cases of implementation

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

failure and ‘policy disasters’ (Bovens & Hart,  Hart,   1996) 1996)  in the 1970s and 1980s risks creating a highly distorted picture of government performance  which ignores instances of successful policy implementation. im plementation. This is not to sugg su gges estt that that poli policy cy impl implem emen enta tati tion on is alwa always ys perf perfec ectl tlyy mana manage ged: d: cl clea earl rlyy it is not. But the third point to make here is that the perfect implementation of  policy may itself be a sub-optimal result: the marginal benefits of investing  additional money and staff in the implementation of a policy ought to be balanced against the marginal costs involved. Overall, implementation is a  challenging task, but we argue that governments now have a better grasp of implementation issues and are addressing them more effectively than in the past.

A CRISIS IN LEGITIMACY?

Governance arrangements can be described as legitimate to the extent that they are popularly accepted. Fritz Scharpf (1997; 1999) suggests that legi legiti tima macy cy is a twotwo-di dime mens nsio iona nall conc concep ept, t, re rela lati ting ng to the the inpu inputs ts and outputs

29

of the political system. On the input side, legitimacy requires that political choices are derived, directly or indirectly, from the preferences of citizens and that governments are accountable for the actions. On the output side, legitimacy requires a high degree of effectiveness in achieving goals. Governance arrangements that are democratic and accountable but re resu sult lt in inef ineffe fect ctiv ivee poli polici cies es will will not not be cons consid ider ered ed le legi giti tima mate te.. In the the Unite nited d Kingdom, the Child Support Agency, an executive agency of the Department of Work and Pensions, catastrophically lost public support when the Inde In depe pend nden entt Case Case Exam Examin iner er’’s Offic Officee re reve veal aled ed that that it to took ok an aver averag agee of 300 300 days to process a claim (BBC, 14 November 2004). Eventually, the agency   was abolished and replaced by the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission. By streamlining the process of determining and collecting  child support payments from absent parents, the commission eventually  acquired some measure of output legitimacy. Equally, governance arrangements that result in effective policies but are undemocratic and unaccountable are unlikely to be considered legitimate. After the World Trade Organisation had been the focus of many  anti-globalisation protests, its director, Michael Moore, sought to defend its record in liberalising trade arrangements and alleviating poverty in developing countries (Address to the European Parliament, 21 February  2000). This is unlikely to persuade critics who view the organisation as undemocratic and unaccountable. The political scientist Susan George

 

30

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

suggests that the World Trade Organisation gives ‘transnational corporati tion onss . . . the the idea ideall tool tool to comp comple lete te thei theirr glob global alis isat atio ion n and and impo impose se new  new  rules’, and complains that the way panels are appointed to settle trade disp di spute utess is ‘ob ‘obsc scur uree . . . the name namess of the “ex “expe perts rts”” who sit sit on them them and  who meet behind closed doors and hear no outside witnesses are not made public’ (Le Monde Diplomatique , November 1999). This argument is not about policy outputs but about democracy and accountability.  What evidence is there that states are losing their legitimacy? First,  we might point to declining levels of voting. In competitive elections in all countries between 1945 and 1990 turnout rose steadily to reach an average of 68 per cent. In the 1990s turnout began to fall back towards an average of 60 per cent (Stoker, 2006 (Stoker,  2006,,  32). Falling turnout might show  evidence of voter satisfaction with the status quo. But polls have also shown a rising cynicism about politicians and political political systems. European European Social Survey data shows that around 25 per cent of Europeans believe that ‘hardly any politicians care’ about what they think (Stoker,  (Stoker,   2006, 2006, 120). In the United States Joseph Nye and colleagues (1997) showed that whereas three-quarters of people expressed confidence in the federal government in 1964, only one-quarter were prepared to do so by the late

1990s. Second, we might point to the resurgence in some countries of  anti-system parties with non-democratic ideals whose members engage in unconventional, illegal or violent behaviour (Capoccia, 2002 (Capoccia,  2002;;  Keren, 2000 2000)). More prosaically, the decision of Dutch, French and Irish voters to reject the European Union’s constitution in referendums held in 2005 and an d 2008 2008 was also also inte interpr rpret eted ed as showin showingg a prof profou ound nd diss dissati atisfa sfact ctio ion n  with existing political processes. Finally, Finally, widespread political protests and marches – whether against the Iraq War, rising fuel prices, job losses or globalisation – might be taken as expressions of a loss of legitimacy in either national governments or international bodies.  Wee might account for declining legitimacy in terms of a growing belief   W that politicians are venal or incompetent; a lack of social cohesion; a rise in post-material values that has eroded any sense of deference to politicians; a  professional profes sionalisation isation of politics that has made it harder harder for ordinary citizens to part partic icip ipat ate; e; the the corr corros osiv ivee ef effe fect ctss of a cyni cynica call medi mediaa eage eagerr to as assu sume me poli polittical wrongdoing; or even the effects of public choice theory (see Stoker, 2006, 47–6 2006, 47–67 7 for for an overv vervie iew) w).. Yet we shou should ld not not se seee a cont contin inui uing ng decl declin inee in over ov eral alll le leve vels ls of legi legitim timac acyy as bein beingg some someho how w inev inevita itabl ble. e. Gove Govern rnme ment ntss have have adopted alternative governance arrangements precisely in order to enhance their legitimacy. This is most obviously true of community engagement strategies intended to give ordinary citizens the opportunity to directly 

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

Table 2.3. Public confidence in parliament, selected OECD countries, 1981 and 1999/2000  Question: I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could   you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of   confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?  Figures show proportion of respondents expressing ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of   confidence in their parliament. Country

1981

1999/2000

Belgium Canada Denmark  Japan United Kingdom United States

38.4 43.7 36.6 26.8 41 52.5

35.6 41.1 48.4 21.7 35.4 38.1

Source: World Values Survey  .

influence influen ce decisio decisions. ns. Accor Accordin dingg to A Manager’s Manager’s Guide to Citizen Engagement : ‘Public engagement strategies provide decision-makers with opportunities to improve the substance of public input, cultivate trust through the pro-

31

cess, raise the legitimacy of decisions in the public eye, and lay the ground work for lasting implementation’ implementation’ (Lukensmeyer & Torres, 2000 orres, 2000,,  16). The shift toward governance through persuasion and association, discussed in Chapters 5 and 8, can also be understood as an attempt by the state sta te to bols bolste terr its its le legi giti timac macyy. Gove Govern rnan ance ce thro throug ugh h persu persuasi asion on is attrac attracti tive ve to states because it provides an alternative to coercive policy instruments that may attract public opposition. Governance through community engagement me nt or asso associ ciat atio ion n is mean meantt to ensu ensure re that that poli polici cies es are are vi view ewed ed as legi legiti tima mate te by stakeholders. The loss of state legitimacy in recent years should not, however, be exaggerated. As we have said, voters continue to demand that states act to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, bank failures, environmental catastrophes, social disorder and threats to public health. Indeed, the pressures being placed upon governments often reflect growing and sometimes unrealistic expectations about what governments can achieve. The public is not turning its back on government; witness the historic voter turnout in the 2008 US presidential election. The World Values Survey allows us to track the amount of ‘confidence’ citizens have in various public insti Table 2.3 shows tutions. Table tutions. 2.3  shows the proportion of voters who had ‘a great deal’

 

32

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in their parliament in the early 1980s and in the late 1990s. With the notable exception of Denmark, confidence has generally fallen over this period. But it has not fallen dramatically. Only in the United States did overall confidence fall by more than 10 per cent. In the 1930s the legitimacy legitimacy of democratical democratically ly elected elected governments governments was brought into question by the Great Depression and then challenged by  both communism and fascism. In 1968 student-led protests in France, the United States, Belgium, Mexico and Brazil heralded a brief moment of acute political turmoil. In the 1970s stagflation and government overload precipitated the collapse of the Keynesian post-war consensus. As Gerry Ge rry Stoke tokerr (2006, (2006, 32) obse observe rves, s, howe howeve verr, the parad paradox ox of grow growin ing  g  public disillusionment with politics today is not so much that it has occurred but that it occurred during the long economic expansion of the 1990s 199 0s and and 2000s 2000s when when confi confide denc ncee in demo democr crati aticc decis decisio ionn-mak makin ingg remai remains ns high. THE DECENTRING OF GOVERNMENT

 A further argument about the alleged hollowing out of the state is that state sta tess and and gove govern rnme ment ntss have have beco become me incr increa easin singl glyy le less ss cent central ral to gove govern rnan ance ce or have been ‘decentred’ (Bevir, 2002 (Bevir,  2002)). The argument has two strands. The first is that governments have devolved much of their authority to

market contractors or policy networks. The second is that governments have lost power or authority and can no longer effectively coordinate or steer the activities of the multitude of actors now involved in governance processes. Hence, it is argued, the authority of central government has been compromised. Matthew Flinders (2006, 223), for example, points to the inherent difficulties of managing complex governance processes: ‘The state consists of a highly heterogeneous network of organisations and controlling, steering and scrutinising this increasingly diverse flotilla of  organisations and partnerships, many of which enjoy significant levels of  autonomy from elected politicians and legislatures, remains the primary  challenge of modern governance.’ The Dutch academic Walter Kickert (1993, 275) similarly argues that ‘dere deregu gula lati tion on,, gove govern rnme ment nt withd withdra rawal wal and and steer steerin ingg at a dist distan ance ce . . . are are all notions of less direct government regulation and control, which lead to more autonomy and self-governance for social institutions’. Donald Kettl (2002, 161) writes: ‘Hyperpluralism, policy networks, devolution, and globali globalisati sation on have have all greatl greatlyy diffuse diffused d power power.. Gove Governme rnment nt might might retain its legal position, but exercising political sovereignty amidst such

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

diffused power represents a major challenge.’ It is the existence of such self-organising networks that animates the society-centred account of governance described in the previous chapter. Indeed, Rhodes goes so far as to equate the alleged transition from government to governance with the proliferation of self-organising networks. In our view these arguments, which find an obvious extension in the claim that states have been decentred or hollowed out, have been overplayed. True, the relational aspects of governance might in certain circumstances stan ces see outsid outsidee groups groups achiev achievee consid considera erable ble influen influence ce within within gover governan nance ce arrangements. arrange ments. This is certainly certainly the case in associative associative governance governance arrangements such as corporatism, as we argue in Chapter in Chapter 8. 8. In another instance, the American Medical Association and the health insurance industry were  widely credited with derailing Hillary Clinton’ Clinton’s health reform proposals in the 1990s (Burns & Sorenson, 1999, 120–32). Kettl (2002, 143) adds that th at deal dealin ingg with with an ar arra rayy of part partne ners rs obli oblige gess gove govern rnme ment ntss to reco recogn gnis isee and and deal with the fact that the partners may have their own missions, operating  procedures and other projects that do not necessarily align with central governance purposes. But these dynamics do not mean that governments across the board have lost power or that networks are autonomous or selforganising. There is a significant difference between arguing that networks or devolution complicate governments’ efforts to steer policy, and arguing  that governance networks operate independently of the state. The problem is that self-organis self-organisation ation and self-respon self-responsibility sibility are demanding demanding criteria  criteria  against which to judge the existence existence of such networks. networks.

33

Nor do the standard discussions of policy networks support the idea  that non-state actors or interest groups dominate networks or operate auto au tono nomo mous usly ly.. Cent Centra rall is the the work work of Mars Marsh h and and Rhod Rhodes es (199 (1992a 2a), ), wh whoo iniinitially distinguished distinguished between two kinds of policy networks: networks: issue networks and policy communities. Where groups lack resources, where contacts between interest-groups and government fluctuate in frequency and intensi sity ty and and the the basi basicc relat elatio ions nshi hip p is one one of consultation consultation rath rather er than negoti negotiatio ation, n, an is issu suee netwo etwork rk is said said to exi xist st.. It seem seemss cle clear, ar, from from this this anal analyt ytic ical al acco accoun unt, t, thatt is tha issue sue netw networ orks ks cann cannot ot re reaso asona nabl blyy be desc descri ribe bed d as se self lf-o -org rgan anis isin ing  g   Parker,  2007)). Therefore networks (for case-studies see Damgaard, 2006 Damgaard, 2006;;  Parker, 2007  do not lead to governance without government. Policy Policy communities,  per se  do on the other hand, are characterised by a limited membership; frequent, high-quality interaction on all matters related to policy issues; stability  of membership and outcomes; shared basic values; the acceptance of the legitimacy of outcomes; and the possession, by each of the members, of some valuable resources. In the case of policy communities, however,

 

34

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

interest-groups are assumed to be in a stronger position; indeed, policy  communities are defined in these studies partly in terms of a balance of  power between government and non-state actors. Yet, even is vern clear thatt inte tha intere restst-gr grou oups ps ar aree not not vi view ewed ed as work workin ing g auton autonom omou ousl slyyhere, from fromitgove go rn-ment. Policy Policy communities are defined precisely in terms of the exchange of  resources and the development of a close relationship between government and interest-groups. interest-groups. Indeed, Indeed, in most cases actors join policy communities communities precisely because they wish to influence government.  A critical issue is that networks almost always contain authoritative actors from the state. There may be varying degrees of interdependency   within networks or within contractual arrangements, but such arrangements are typically established by the state for wider public purposes. In many cases governments can choose which firms and interest-groups to with. and firms, on the other hand, oftenpolicy  have no work choice but Interest-groups to work with government if they wish to acquire influence. Also, because non-state actors participate in networks mainly in order to influence the state, the notion that they end up operating with significant autonomy from the state is doubtful. Indeed, interest-groups have an incentive to lobby governments because the latter retain hierarchical authority. ExxonMobil was prepared to invest resources in the effort to persuade the US federal government to relax restrictions on oil exploration in Alaska precisely because the government retains the authority to determine where and when exploration can take place. Governments occupy a privileged position in networks and can change existing governancehave rules to bypasspolicy or even dissolve networks. In recent years governments abandoned communities centred on health

(Botterill, 2005  2005)), in Canada (Kay, 2006 (Kay, 2006,, 104–15), agriculture in Australia (Botterill, and an d indu industr strial ial re rela lati tion onss in the Unite nited d Kingd Kingdom om (Mars (Marsh, h,   1992) 1992). The relationship between governments and other network actors is usually  asymmetrical. The self-styled ‘structural’ approach to the study of policy networks developed by David Knoke (1990; 2001) can help us to understand how  governments can ‘dominate the exchange’ (Chhotray & Stoker,   2009, 2009, 22). Knoke makes two claims. First, that we can identify the participants in a network and formally measure the strength of the relationships between them inofterms of,committees. for example,The the frequency of their or membership shared second – and, for meetings our purposes, more interesting – claim is that we can explain actors’ success in achieving their goals in terms of their structural position within a network.

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E (i) A

 

(ii) B A B

C

D

 

C

D

Figure 2.1. Network and structures 

Figure 2.1 shows Figure 2.1  shows two possible network arrangements between four actors,  A–D. In the first network every ever y actor is connected to every other actor. actor. In the second, A, C and D are connected only to B. It seems obvious willpossibility be at a relative in the second network. But why is that this?BOne is thatadvantage network position determines the flow of information: information: a key bargaining reso resource urce within networks (Dowding, 1995 (Dowding,  1995,, 158). In the second network A, C and D have to depend upon B for any information about the behaviour of other actors, while B can withhold or distort information to its advantage. A second possibility  is that network position determines the opportunities actors have to form coalitions. In the second network A, C and D are at a disadvantage because they have no alternative but to work with B, who is therefore in a strong  bargaining position. In our view governments occupy a central location within associational networks to that by close actor working B in the relationships second network.  As we haveequivalent said, groups wantenjoyed to develop with gove go vern rnme ment nt offic officia ials ls beca becaus usee gove govern rnme ment nt poss posses esse sess hier hierar archi chica call autho authorit rityy –

35

the authority to make binding policy decisions. This is not to say that nonstate actors will operate in splendid isolation. Even when they are in direct competition for members and influence, groups want to exchange some info in forma rmatio tion n and, and, on occa occasi sion ons, s, deve develo lop p jo join intt nego negotia tiatin tingg po posi sitio tions ns.. But But the strongest network relationships are likely to be those between government and an d group roups. s. A gover ernm nmen ent’ t’ss cent centra rall posi positi tion on in a netwo etwork rk giv ivees it a numb numbeer of advantages in steering the groups: the opportunity to control flows of  information; to play interest-groups off against each other; and to demand that groups accept its preferenc prefe rences es as the starting-point starting-poin t for negotiation. negotiatio n. Of  course the government cannot simply require groups to accept its policies. But the structural position of government within associational networks frequently imposes an asymmetrical form on this exchange.

 

36

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

In their influential book  Reinventing  Reinventing Government , David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992, 30) called on governments to devolve responsibility for ‘rowing’ – the actual delivery of services to citizens – to nonstate actors while retaining responsibility for ‘steering’ – raising resources and setting priorities. Crucially, however, they argued that by doing less rowing governments would  enhance   their capacity to steer – by creating more opportunities for strategic management (or metagovernance; see 3). Chapter 3)  A critical issue is the government’ government’s capacity to exert control and to steer; it seems that in a wide range of instances governments continue to exercise considerable coercive power and regularly govern using hierarchical means. Indeed, Chapter Indeed,  Chapter 4 documents 4  documents ways in which governments have  extended  their   their hierarchical control to meet the challenges posed by  restructuring the state to boost governance capacities or those posed by  new technologies, market failures and security and environmental threats. Here are some examples in which governments across the world have relied upon the threat or the actual use of coercive force to achieve particular goals: In 2005 the United States passed a ‘Real ID Act’ requiring states to redesign their drivers’ licences in ways that would allow them to serve as a de facto compulsory identity card. In 2002 the United Kingdom introduced tough money-laundering legislation which requires banks and other financial institutions to report anyy susp an suspic icio ious us finan financi cial al acti activi vity ty to the Seri Seriou ouss Orga Organi nise sed d Crime Crime Agen Agency cy.. In the same year the Israeli government started to construct an 8-metre   

   

   

   

high security barrier physically dividing the West Bank from Israel. In 2001 the Australian government courted international unpopularity  in deny denyin ingg acces accesss to asylu asylum-s m-see eeke kers rs se seek ekin ingg to ente enterr Austra ustrali lian an terr territo itori rial al  waters, or by locking those that did in harsh h arsh detention centres.

In 1998 the European Union effectively suspended the production or importation importati on of genetically genetically modified modified organisms, organisms, a decision decision which led to a near trade war with the United States. It is also the case that government can restructure or overturn networks.  A case in point is French agricultural policy, which was traditionally t raditionally made  within a closed policy community composed of the two main farming  unions, the FNSEA and CNJA. These groups worked closely with the    

Ministry of Agriculture to defend the subsidy arrangements contained  within the Common Agricultural Policy (Keeler, (Keeler, 1987)  1987). In the early 1990s the French government came under intense pressure to reduce overall protection levels as a part of the Uruguay round of trade talks taking place as

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The French business community, represented through a different policy network centred on the Ministry Ministry of Finance Finance,, made it clear that a successful successful conclusion conclusion to the GATT talks making was vitalany to concessions. its interests. At The network  predictably resisted thisagricultural point the president and prime minister, together with the minister for finance, decided that limited agricultural reform was nevertheless in the national interest and authorised senior officials to essentially bypass the agricultural policy community and conclude a trade deal. As Paul Epstein (1997, 357) concludes:  when it became clear that a solution on agriculture was the key to progress in ot othe herr se sect ctor orss mo more re im impo porta rtant nt to th thee co coun untry try’’s econ econom omic ic we welf lfar aree . . . th thee in influ flu-ence en ce of th thee tr trad adit ition ional al po poli licy cy co comm mmun unit ityy wa wass un unde derm rmin ined ed,, as in inte tere rest st-g -gro roup up le lead ader erss an and d high high-r -ran anki king ng offic officia ials ls . . . fou found nd th them emse selv lves es pl play ayin ingg seco second nd fid fiddl dlee to those closer to the power centre of the Frenc French h Gov Governme ernment, nt, specifical specifically  ly  to the offices of the President and the Prime Minister.

The exercise of this kind of coercive power requires governments to possess legitimacy as well as a monopoly on the use of violence. This search for legitimacy has sometimes led governments to govern in conjunction  with a variety of non-state actors. Yet, even here, governments can continue to exercise coercive power in metagoverning these arrangements, by  choosing choosi ng and revising revising governan governance ce rules, selecting participants, mobilising  mobilising  resources, monitoring effectiveness, establishing chains of accountability, and ensuring legitimacy. In the case of Australia’s Job Network, for example, a complex contractual modewent of governance delivering employment services, the federal government to extraordinary lengths to control the market by setting service standards, imposing codes of conduct and determining prices (see Chapter (see  Chapter 3). 3).  As Flinders (2004, 895) observes, ‘contemporary ‘contemporary projects concerning 

37

joined up or holistic government represent an attempt to devise new  mechanisms or tools to steer dense organisational webs’. Referring to the United Kingdom, he cites new regulatory bodies created for such purposes – including the Food Standards Agency and the Office of the Communications Regulator – as examples of state adaptation. The claim by Flinders that a range of governance organisations possess significant of autonomy fromitgovernments also needs to regulatory  be treated cautiously. levels Within the state itself, is true that independent agen ag enci cies es may may be gran grante ted d parc parcel elss of auth author orit ityy, but but th thes esee mand mandat ates es are are alwa always ys on loan from governments. Indeed, governments have extended their

 

38

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

efforts to monitor and render such organisations accountable. The mechanisms of steering and accountability may not always work well (Flinders, 2006,  237), but this simply underlines 2006, underlines the metagovern metagovernance ance challenges, challenges, as  well as ongoing efforts by governments to improve performance. This is especially the case when metagovernance failures reach the political arena, quickly shattering any illusions that devolved governance arrangements are somehow at one remove from government or ‘depoliticised’. In the United Kingdom, where the most empirical research on the governance capacities of the state has been undertaken, the argument that governments have lost control of governing processes has been widely  challenged. For example Andrew Taylor (2000) finds that the use of taskforcess and other mechanisms force mechanisms to coordinate coordinate policy across government government has, far from hollowing out, helped ‘fill in’ government. Oliver James (2004) argues that the central coordination capacity of the ‘core executive’ has been strengthened strengthened using various various instruments, instruments, particularly particularly through through Public Public Servi Se rvice ce Agre Agreem emen ents ts (PSA (PSAs). s). Si Simi milar larly ly,, Ia Ian n Holl Hollid iday ay (2000, (2000, 173 173)) arg argue uess that that an increasing emphasis on central government capacity, coordination and ‘joined-up government’ has meant that the ‘enhancement of core execu). Francesca  tive capacity has been considerable’ (see also Flinders, 2002 Flinders,  2002). Gains (2003, 66) initially suggests that the creation of quasi-autonomous executive exe cutive agencies agencies within the public service has created created power-dep power-depende endent nt networks, but nevertheless concludes that ‘ political  political resources  legitimising    legitimising  the operation and the  authority to act  are   are still ultimately held by ministers’ (emphasis in the original). Josie Kelly (2006) argues that devolution of authority to local councils has been accompanied by more stringent central auditing controls which have strengthened central authority and steering. Two studies by Ian Bache (2000; 2003), one on regional policy  and one on education policy, also found that the devolution of parcels of  authority has been accompanied by increased central control and steering. In fact, study after study of central control over local governing strategies has reached similar conclusions (Benyon & Edwards, 1999 Edwards, 1999;; Morgan et al., 1999; 1999;  Davies, 2000  Davies,  2000)). Central government continues to set the goals and

rules of governance arrangements. In reviewing these and other studies, Mike Marinetto (2003a, 592) concludes that ‘central government is still highly resourced and has at its disposa dis posall a range of of powers powers . . . it is difficu difficult lt to see how how recent recent devel developm opment entss have transformed the capacities of the core executive’. Adam Crawford (2006) argues that heightened social surveillance and an ‘elaborate and complex mosaic of micro-management by government’ show that ‘ambitious interventionist government is alive and well’ (2006, 455). Michael

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

Moran (2003, 6) argues that new audit and regulatory rules have ‘widened the range of social and economic life subject to public power’ (see also Power, 1997 Power,  1997)). According to Michael Saward (1997), hollowing-out processes such as privatisation and decentralisation are best seen as efforts to rationalise the state in order to promote central coordinating authority. In the case of privatisation, he contends that there is no ‘strong evidence in favour of the hollowing out hypothesis. Indeed, we can see it as core actors flexing their political muscles’ (p. 22). Similarly, Giandomenico Majone (1994, 79) argues that privatisation tends to strengthen rather than weaken the regulatory regulator y capacity of the state (see also a lso Muller & Wright, Wright, 1994). 1994). Carolyn Hill and Laurence Lynn (2005) note that ‘the growing acceptance tan ce of gover governa nanc ncee as an organi organizi zing ng conc concep eptt . . . refle reflect ctss a wides widespr prea ead, d, though not universal belief that the focus of administrative practice is shifting from hierarchical government toward greater reliance on horizontal, hybridized, and associational forms of governance’. Yet in a review  of over 800 individual studies of governance arrangements they find that ‘hierarchical investigations of the nature and consequences of government action predominate in the literature’. They conclude that experiments in more horizontal horizontal forms of governan governance ce reflect ‘a gradual addition of new  admin ad minist istrat rativ ivee forms forms that that facil facilit itate ate gove govern rnan ance ce in a sy syste stem m of cons constit titut utio iona nall autho au thori rity ty that that is nece necessa ssaril rilyy hierar hierarch chic ical al’’ (p. (p. 173). 173). Suc uch h argum argumen ents ts and and conconclus clusio ions ns have have led led Rhod Rhodes es (200 (2007, 7, 1253 1253), ), the the orig origin inat ator or of the the holl holloowing wing-o -out ut thesis, to state that ‘the weight of criticism meant that I had to reconsider my discussion of the changing role of the state’.

GLOBALISATION

The argument that states are being hollowed out is frequently associated  with the claim that globalisation – the widening, deepening and speeding  up of worldwide interconnectedness (Held et al., 1999, 2) – has heralded ‘the the end end of geog geogra raph phy’ y’ (O’B (O’Bri rien en,, 1992 1992)) and and so ‘unde underc rcut ut th thee poli policy cy capa capaci city  ty  of the nation state’ (Cerny, 1995 (Cerny,  1995,, 612).

39

   

   

There are several parts to this argument: Globalisation has left states with little alternative but to engage in a race to the bottom by cutting taxes and regulatory standards in an effort to attract inward capital investment from transnational firms. Glob Gl obal al finan financi cial al mark market etss act act as a form form of ‘gold golden en st stra rait itja jack cket et’’ (Fri (Fried edma man, n, 1999), ), requiring states to adopt business-friendly policies. 1999

 

40

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Globalisation has empowered regional authorities and city states to bypass national governments and work with each other to secure their economic development. Globalisation has transferred policy-making authority to international and, occasionally, supra-national organisations (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), multinational banks, accountancy firms and ratings agencies,  which provide the infrastructure of global economic trade and to transnational NGOs. These academic arguments have been challenged by evidence that there are no clear relationships between: overall levels of globalisation and patterns of state expenditure (Keating, 2004, Castles, 2004,, 8 and references therein) 2004,  6; Castles, 2004 the leve levels ls of busin busines esss taxat taxatio ion n and and inwar inward d capit capital al inve investm stmen entt in coun countr trie iess (Wilensky, 2002 (Wilensky,  2002)) the degree of globalisation within a country and the level of business    

   

   

   

   

1997;; Vogel ogel & Kagan Kagan,, 2004; 2004; Basin Basinge gerr & Hall Haller er-regulation regul ation (Kenworthy,, 1997 berg, 2004)(Kenworthy thee degr th egree of gl glob obal alis isat atio ion n with within in a coun countr tryy an and d its its level evel of soci social al welf welfar aree expenditure (Swank, 2002 (Swank, 2002;;  for an overview see Hay, 2005 Hay, 2005,, 241–2). In discussing the relationship between government expenditure and globalisation, for example, Mike Keating (2004, 6), a former head of the  Australian public p ublic service, concludes that: tha t:    

even a cursory examination shows that government intervention, as measured by the ratio of expenditure and taxes relative to GDP, has not fallen, and that the amount of government regulatory activity continues to increas increasee . . . it is sim simply ply mis mislea leadin dingg to ass assert ert that gov govern ernmen ments ts have lost power and are withdrawing from their responsibilities.

 Why has globalisation failed to result in the expected ‘policy race to the neo-liberal bottom’ (Garrett, 1998 (Garrett, 1998,, 823)? One answer is that, with the exception of capital markets, the extent of globalisation has been exaggerated ated.. Most ost econ econom omic ic acti activi vity ty cont contin inue uess to take take plac placee with within in the the boun bounda dari ries es of the nation-state, and those parts of it that span borders are largely containe tai ned d withi within n Europ uropea ean, n, North orth Amer Americ ican an and and Asia– Asia–P Pacific acific regi region onal al tradi trading  ng 

blocs (Hirst & Thompson, 1996 Thompson,  1996)).  A second answer is that globalisation has actually increased the salience of  th the st stat ate’ e’ss role roleinward – not not only on ly in prot protec ecti ting ngsupporting its its citi citize zens ns vi via a soci social al expe ex(Evans, 1997 pend ndit itur ure e but but; in eattracting investment and businesses (Evans,  1997;  Weiss,  W eiss, 1998  1998)). Rather than taxes, it is the quality of a country’s education

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

and skills training and other publicly provided business infrastructure that can best account for levels of inward investment (Hay,  (Hay,   2005, 2005,  252–3). Those governments that have worked most closely with non-state actors such as business associations and invested the most in vocational training  and university education have benefited the most from globalisation.  A third answer is that the policy demands made by global markets, especially financial markets, are actually quite narrow. Layna Mosley (2000; 2003), for example, demonstrates that financial market decision-makers do not factor a wide range of government policy variables into their calculations but instead focus on two main issues: inflation levels and ratios between government deficits and GDP. These are regarded by traders as the key measures of a government’s willingness to protect monetary values and ensure debt repayment. As she argues: ‘Market actors forcefully  demand particular values on key variables, but the number of key variables is smal small, l, so that that many many nati natioonal nal econ conomic omic poli policy cy cho choices ices . . . reflect flect domes omesti ticc political and institutional constraints rather than external financial market pressures’ (2000, 745). Even in arenas such as monetary policy, which is  widely assumed to be highly constrained by market pressures, there is still evid ev iden ence ce that that nati nation onal al poli policy cy pref prefer eren ence cess and and insti institu tutio tiona nall dyna dynami mics cs matte matterr in shaping the details details of policy (Bell, 2005 (Bell, 2005)).  A final answer, answer, contrary to race-to-the-bottom arguments, is that globalisation has, in some instances, been associated with a ‘California effect’,  whereby manufacturers have standardised production values to align with those tho se deman demande ded d in the toug toughe hest st re regu gulat latory ory regi regime mes. s. Orig Origin inall allyy, this this refe referr rred ed to the practice of car manufacturers who set vehicle emissions standards to the high Californian levels rather than incur the costs of having different production processes for different states or of producing cars to a lower standard that could not then be sold in America’s largest domestic market  1995;;  Fredriksson & Millimet, 2002 Millimet,  2002). ). In principle, the California  (Vogel, 1995 (Vogel, effect could also ratchet up product standards in international trade in so far as countries with large domestic markets set higher regulatory standards (Vogel, 1995, 259). For example, Canadian businesses are prepared to support some form of emissions-trading because ‘big trading partners, including the United States, have either put a price on carbon or are about to do so [and] exporters worry that their products could be penalised if  Canada does not follow suit’ (Economist , 3 July 2008). In another area of debate, the argument that globalisation has resulted

41

in the transfer of policy-making authority to international organisations is, in some senses, irresistible. Organisations such as the European Union, the World orld Trade Organi Organizati zation, on, the Financi inancial al Stabil Stability ity Forum (which (which

 

42

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

promotes international cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance) and the Internet Governance Forum either have been created or have acquired considerable new powers over the last few decades. States choose to join such groupings or regimes voluntarily because they expect to further their own strategic interests. States remain beyond such regimes, and al and alth thou ough gh they they may may invo involv lvee some some cons constr trai aint ntss on poli policy cy auto autono nomy my,, thes thesee constraints are accepted by states in order to further their wider strategic interests. The European Union is the most extensive example of a supra-national body to which national states have surrendered significant elements of  decision-making authority. It is also represents the most obvious exception to our earlier argument that states remain the ‘final and absolute authority  in the political community’ (Hinsley,   1986, 1986,   26). In a range of policy  areas are as – trade, trade, compet competiti ition, on, agricu agricultu lture, re, energy energy,, fisherie fisheries, s, immigra immigratio tion, n, regional policy – the European Union has acquired formal regulatory  auth au thor orit ityy. Its 27 memb member er stat states es have have unde undert rtak aken en a proc proces esss of econ econom omic ic and and moneta mone tary ry unio union n re requ quir irin ingg the the adop adopti tion on of a si sing ngle le curr curren ency cy and and the the tran transf sfer er of monetary policy authority to the European Central Bank. Furthermore, an ongoing process of ‘Europeanisation’ means that there are now few, if  any, areas of policy-making unaffected by a European dimension (Borzel, 1999; 1999;  Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003). Following the near-collapse of the North orther ern n Rock ock bank bank in Septe eptemb mber er 2007 2007,, for for exam exampl ple, e, the the UK gove govern rnme ment nt arggued that ar hat it had bee been unable ble to lend public money to the the bank ank in order to secure its position because doing so would have breached European Union rules on the provision of state aid (Hindmoor, 2008 (Hindmoor,  2008)). European integration results in a process of ‘multi-level’ governance, comp co mpris risin ingg loca locall gove govern rnme ment nts, s, natio nationa nall gove govern rnme ment nts, s, bodi bodies es like like the the Euro Euro-pean Council composed of representatives of nation-states, and supranatio na tiona nall bodi bodies es li like ke the Euro Europe pean an Comm Commiss issio ion n (Mar (Marks ks et al al., ., 1996; 1996; KohlerKoch Ko ch & Rittbe Rittberge rgerr, 2006, 2006, 34–5). 34–5). In some some poli policy cy area areas, s, most most notab notably ly fore foreig ign n policy and justice and home affairs, the European European Council – composed composed of  the representatives of the governments of all the member states – remains the ‘pre-eminent political authority’ (Cini,   2003, 2003,  150). For this reason  Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 2005) argues that the European Union ought to be viewed as an ‘intergovernmental regime’ rather than a nascent supranational European state. It is clear, however, that a growing number of  policy debates within the European Council are subject to qualified majority voting, and that supra-national bodies like the European Commission,

European Parliament and European Court of Justice have acquired significant policy-making powers.

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

It is routinely argued that globalisation necessitates further European integration. The claim is that in order to tackle transnational problems like migra mi gratio tion n and and cl clim imate ate chan change ge nati nation on-s -stat tates es must must sacrifi sacrifice ce their their so sove vere reig ignt ntyy. In an add addre ress ss to the the Amer Americ ican an Cham Chambe berr of Comm Commeerce, rce, the the pres presid ideent of the the European Commission, Jose Barroso (2008), claims, for example, that ‘it is only through the European Union that the Member States can acquire sufficient collective weight to influence the worldwide debate on climate change, chan ge, energy energy securi security ty and sustain sustainable able develo developme pment’. nt’. Simil Similarly arly,, Tony Blair Blair (2006) says that ‘the nature of globalisation’ requires nations to ‘build strong alliances’ and that for this reason ‘an ever closer [European] union’ is ‘the only way of advancing our national interest effectively’.  Within ‘realist’ conceptions of international relations, sovereignty has traditionally been defined in terms of an internal supremacy over all other decision-making authorities and external independence over all outside authorities (Bull, 1977 (Bull, 1977,, 8). As Stanley Hoffmann (1987, 172) describes it, sovereignty is the doctrine that the state is ‘subject to no other state and has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction without prejudice to the limits set by applicable law’. Membership of the European Union requires countries to surrender their external sovereignty. In a landmark ruling in 1964 the European European Court of Justice confirme confirmed d that: by crea creati ting ng a Co Comm mmun unit ityy of un unli limi mite ted d du dura rati tion on,, ha havi ving ng it itss ow own n in inst stit itut ution ions, s, its own personality, personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation, on the international plane and more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights [quoted  Wallace,  W allace, 1999, 510].

By limiting their external sovereignty, states have enhanced their capacity  to deal with policy problems. On this reading, sovereignty has been pooled and enhanced rather than surrendered and diminished (Keohane, 2002 (Keohane,  2002,, 744). States have chosen to comply with European regulation in order to enhance their influence (G. Sorensen, 2006 Sorensen,  2006,,  200–1; Marsh, Richards &  2003,, 328–31). Smith, 2003 Smith, In terms of wider international regulatory issues, a major study by  Daniel Drezner (2007) finds that the ‘great power’ governments of the United States and the European Union are the major players in creating  and shaping transnational transnational governan governance ce arrangements. arrangements. Drezner Drezner (2007, 63– 88 88) ) dis isti ting ngui uish shees betw be tweeenthe situ situat atio ions nspowers in whic which h the thaerhigh e is aand high highlow and anddivergence low div iveergence of interest among great and

43

 

44

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Table 2.4. A typology of regulatory coordination Divergence of interests between great powers and other international actors

Divergence of interests among great powers

High conflict

Low conflict

High conflict Low conflict

Sham standards Club standards

Rival standards Harmonised standards

Source: Drezner, 2007, 72.

of interests between the great powers and other international actors (see 2.4). Table 2.4)  When the great powers agree on the need for regulatory action with other international actors, the result, Drezner argues, is harmonised standards formulated and monitored by international governmental and nongovernmental organisations like the International Organisation for Standards and the International Accounting Standards Committee. Within these organisations, the great powers steer ‘policy interventions behind the sc scen enes es’’ by makin makingg appoi appoint ntme ment ntss and and se setti tting ng agen agenda dass (2007 (2007,, 73). 73). Wher Wheree the great powers agree among themselves on the need for regulatory action but disagree with significant parts of the rest of the international community, ‘club’ standards result. Here, the great powers create new regulatory bodies and standards, standards, and invite other countries countries to adhere adhere to them. In the case of  international finance, for example, the great powers effectively sponsored the Basle Accord requiring banks in signature countries to keep an agreed amount of reserve capital available. They did so in the knowledge that, over time, other banks, usually in developing countries, would be forced to meet these standards in order to engage in international commerce. Where the great powers disagree with each other about regulatory standards, as has been the case with genetically modified foods, the result is either rival standards or, if the disagreement is broad, sham global standards such as the labour standards promulgated but not enforced by the International Labour Organization. The overall import of Drezner’s argument is that states remain the major players in intern international ational affairs. CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued against the theory that the state is being hollowed out. Our approach to governance rests on the continued centrality 

 

T H E R E S IL IE N T S T A T E

 

of governments and state agencies because it is these entities that are the architects and key players in governance arrangements. This view does not overlook the fact that such arrangements involve various types of relations  with society or major actors within society. society. Rather, Rather, governments and state agen ag enci cies es ar aree at atte tempt mptin ingg to incr increa ease se their their gove govern rnin ingg capac capacity ity by expe experim rimen entting with an array of governance arrangements involving strategic relations  with society. society.3 further 3  further explores the role of the state in governance arrangeChapter ments by looking in more detail at the role of governments and state agencies in establishing and managing governance arrangements. We refer to this government of governance role as metagovernance. As we shall see it involves important design and strategic considerations and important normative elements as well, because governments remain responsible for ensuring that governance arrangements are effective, accountable, legitimate and democratic.

45

 

3

 

Metagovernance Metagovernance and state capacity

GOVERNMENTS AND STATE agencies are participants in par-

ticular governance arrangements, but they also play a key role in metagovernance, or the ‘government of governance’. As Mark Whitehead (2003, 8) argue argues, s, ‘meta metago gove vern rnan ance ce . . . focu focuse sess expl explic icitl itlyy on pract practic ices es and and proc proceedures that secure governmental influence, command and control within governance regimes’. Yet, as Eva Sorensen (2006, 101) complains, ‘governancee theorists ernanc theorists do not define define the concept concept of metagoverna metagovernance nce precisely’. precisely’.  An example of this can be found in a paper by Josie Kelly (2006) 2006) on the devolution of regulatory authority over local government in England to an independent regulatory agency (the Audit Commission, AC). She argues that ‘the shift from direct to indirect regulation has resulted in the AC becoming a vehicle of metagovernance, acting on the government’s behalf’. In our view the devolution of authority to the AC is more accurately seen as a governance strategy itself; essentially a reallocation of parcels of authority from one part of the state to another. By cont contras rast, t, the cent central ral   metagovernance   role role in the the case case expl explor ored ed by  Kelly is how such governanc governancee relationship relationshipss (between (between the governme government nt and the AC and between the AC and local councils) are developed, managed, resourced, audited, assessed and ultimately controlled by the central government. The first part of this chapter defines metagovernance in terms of the performance of six functions. We show why metagovernance functions are the prime responsibility of the state, a view also adopted by scholars such as Renate Mayntz (1993 (1993)) and Fritz Scharpf (1994 (1994)). We then explore some of the challenges of metagovernance and examine the concept of ‘state capacity’ in relation to metagovernance.

46

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

THE FUNCTIONS OF METAGOVERNANCE

There are six core elements of metagovernance: steering, effectiveness, resourcing, democracy, accountability and legitimacy, conveniently summarised as SERDAL. These are the functions that governments typically  perform, or at least arguably should perform, in relation to any governance arrangement.

STEERING

Steering implies the need for overall strategic management, goal setting, coor co ordi dina nati tion on and and cont contro roll of speci specific fic gove govern rnan ance ce arran arrange geme ment nts. s. It also also cove covers rs the choice of mode or modes of governance to deploy in different settings and the roles to be played by non-state actors. Within any given set of governance arrangements, steering requires that governments provide (and, if  necessary, change) the ground rules for governance; ensure the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms; provide information and organise dialogue with which to shape the expectations and even the iden id enti titi ties es of acto actors rs with within in gove govern rnan ance ce ar arra rang ngem emen ents ts;; act act as a cour courtt of appe appeal al for disputes between the actors involved in governance arrangements; and rebal rebalan ance ce powe powerr diffe differe rent ntia ials ls by stre streng ngthe theni ning ng the the posi positio tion n of weak weaker er actor actorss (Jessop, 1997 (Jessop,  1997a, a, 575; 2002).  A good example of such a steering and regulatory role in relation to governance is Australia’s Job Network. In 1998 the federal government dissolved the Commonwealth Employment Service and in its place created the Job Network, in which profit-making firms and organisations such as the Salvation Army competed for contracts to provide job search, job training and ‘work for the dole’ programs (Considine & Lewis,  2003)  2003). The involvement of these non-state actors has not prevented the government from controlling the direction and performance of the Job Network.  As Michael Keating (2004, 91–5) demonstrates, governments have, over time, woven ever-tighter controls in order to minimise the discretion of  contractors. This has included: controlling the number of eligible referrals to specific service providers; setting tight service standards; establishing  codes of conduct; setting prices in what is, in effect, a managed market; establishing appeals processes; rating providers; and monitoring and policingg se in serv rvic icee qual qualit ityy. Thes Thesee mech mechan anis isms ms ‘h ‘hav avee le left ft the the gove govern rnme ment nt very very much much in control of the market’ (Keating, 2004 (Keating,  2004,, 95).

 

47

48

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

EFFECTIVENESS

Effectiveness is an obvious goal of metagovernance and closely related to the strategic management and steering of governance arrangements. Ulti Ul tima mate tely ly it is up to gove govern rnme ment ntss to es esta tabl blis ish, h, or at le leas astt appr approove, ve, the the goal goals, s, targets and evaluative criteria and methods used in overseeing governance arrangements. The government needs to monitor performance and take remedial remed ial action if the performance of specific governance governance arrangements arrangements is deemed inadequate.  As an example of the role governments can play in ensuring overall effectiveness, consider the complex governance arrangements for the provision of water in Guyana. Two publicly owned water utilities, the Georgetown Sewerage and Water Commission and the Guyana Water Authority, traditionally provided services. In 2001 the introduction of private sector management was made a condition of funding by the World Bank as a  part of its country assistance strategy strategy.. At this time, less than 50 per cent of  Guyanese houses had connections for water and less than 10 per cent had sanitation. In 2002 the Guyanese government created a new organisation, Guyana Water International, which subsequently awarded a contract to an English firm, Severn Trent Water International, to provide a range of  services. The entire funding for this contract was met through a grant by the UK Department of International Development. Under these complex arrangements, arrangements, responsibili responsibility ty for metagoverna metagovernance nce was retained retained by the Guyanese government. In February 2007 a consultancy report showed that Severn Water had met only two of the seven key performance targets it had been set with regard to the provision of potable water and the collection of revenue. In the case of a target to supply 52 per cent of residents in the Amerindian settlements with potable water by 2005, the audit showed a 45 per cent shortfall. On this basis the Guyanese government announced that it was terminating its contract with Severn Water and that it would develop alternative strategies for developing effective water supply. RESOURCING

Properly resourcing governance arrangements is an important aspect of  metagovernance. Of course not all the requisite resources need come from governme gov ernments nts or the state. Partnership Partnership arrangements arrangements with non-state non-state actors are often forged by the state precisely because it lacks critical resources. But the depth of the government’s financial resources, its access to a large

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

49

profes prof essi sion onal al burea bureauc ucrac racyy and and its its mono monopo poly ly on the the le legi gitim timate ate use use of vi viol olen ence ce mean that governments are, and in most cases probably should be, major supplies of governance resources. The resources in question might include leadership and authority, fiscal or administrative resources, in-depth policy  expertise, information, or the capacity to promulgate laws or shape rules or norms.  An example of metagovernance via resourcing is the provision of mental health care services in southern Arizona, a case extensively studied by H. Brinton Milward and Keith Provan (2000; 2003). In 1995 a new notfor-profit organisation, the Community Partnership of Southern Arizona,  was given overall responsibility for providing a range of mental health services in two counties. Four provider networks, each headed by a nonprofit mental health agency, were also created and randomly allocated around 1000 clients. The health agency in each network was required to set up its own network of collaborating agencies, with which they  could sign contracts for the delivery of services. Each health agency was paid the same monthly capitation rate for each patient and encouraged to use this money as it saw fit in the best interests of its patients. As a result, the direct involvement of the county’s Department of Health Services in the day-to-day delivery of services was effectively ended and significant competition injected into the system. In terms of the standard society-centred view of governance, this seems to be a prime example of a  transition from ‘government ‘government to governance’. Y Yet et under these arrangements government retains responsibility for funding and oversight. Furthermore, although only employing around 100 people, the Community Partnership of Southern Arizona received $180 million public funding in 2006, which it used to purchase contracts.

DEMOCRACY

Ensuri Ensu ring ng comp compli lian ance ce with with demo democr crat atic ic prac practi tice cess and and norm normss is an impo import rtan antt metagovernance function. In Western systems of representative democracy elected politicians are generally regarded as the font of democratic authority, and the involvement and ultimate control of these politicians over decision-making processes is regarded as the guarantor of democratic legitimacy. The inclusion of unelected non-state actors in the governance proc pr oces esss migh mightt ther theref efor oree be thou though ghtt to unde undermi rmine ne demo democr crati aticc cont contro rol. l. ConConsider, for example, the decentralisation of decision-making authority that has taken place within Denmark over the last 20 years (Greve & Jespersen,

 

50

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

1999; Greve, 2004 1999; Greve, 2004). ). User boards have been established in schools, kindergartens and care homes to give recipients of these services some measure of 

control over the delivery of services. Legislation allows groups of clients to organise organi se their own service delivery through self-owne self-owned d institutions institutions which can levy levy fe fees es.. Under nder these these arran arrange geme ment ntss it lo look okss as thoug though h deci decisi sion on-m -maki aking  ng  authority is being taken from elected politicians. In our view governments can enhance the democratic credentials of  governance arrangements involving non-state actors in two ways. First, insofar as they continue to assume responsibility for steering, effectiveness and resourcing, governments will, through these activities, continue to provide a measure of democratic legitimacy. In the case of the Danish reform refor m process, a report by the Ministry Ministry of the Interior Interior stated that the role of municipal politicians should no longer be to make all decisions but to ‘decide the overall priorities and define overall goals for the economy and for the service delivery’. Discussing this report, E. Sorensen (2006, 107) suggests that ‘this new role for politicians is problematic for democracy  because it gives politicians politicians a marginal marginal role’. Yet Yet so long as there is a way to ensure that the strategic decisions of elected politicians are translated into actio act ion, n, the oppo opportu rtuni nity ty to metag metagoovern vern by se setti tting ng over overal alll goal goalss and and prior priorit itie iess is a far far from from marg margin inal al acti activi vity ty and and an impo import rtan antt sour source ce of democ emocra rati ticc in inpu putt and legitimacy. The same argument might be applied to the governance of independent central banks and other ‘non-majoritarian’ public organisations which are deliberately shielded from the pressures of day-to-day politics (Coen & Thatcher, 2005 Thatcher,  2005;; Vibert, 2007 Vibert,  2007)). The creation of an independent central bank may seem to entail a loss of democratic control. Indeed, the credibility of central banks is usually thought to depend upon their freedom from political interference. Yet, even here, democratic controls remain in place. Elected governments determine the objectives that central banks must pursue. In most cases governments appoint the bank’s governing board. Governments Governme nts also usually retain retain the legislative legislative authority to suspend suspend indeindepen pe ndenc dencee in the the event ent of a natio ation nal emerg mergeency ncy or in the the case case of misc miscon ond duct uct Blinder, 1996  1996)). by the central bank (see Bell, 2004a  Bell, 2004a , 149–55; Blinder, Democratically elected politicians can enhance the democratic qualities of governance arrangements in a second way. We have suggested that the involvement of non-state actors poses a problem for representative democracy because it risks separating elected politicians from decisionmaking. Others argue that democracy ought to be understood as requiring  the engagement and empowerment of citizens. The central idea is that the devolution of authority to civil society groups or associations can enhance

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

democracy by encouraging participation, checking centralised power, and incre inc reasin asingg the opportu opportunit nities ies for delibe deliberati ration on and compro compromise mise (Elster (Elster,, 1998; 1998; Fung & Wright, 2003 Wright,  2003)).

51

It is easy easy to se seee how how the the dece decent ntra rali lisa sati tion on of deci decisi sion on-m -mak akin ingg auth author orit ityy to user us er boar boards ds in Denm Denmar arkk migh might, t, ther thereb ebyy, be argu argued ed to have have enhanced democracy. This appears to render redundant our argument that governments must provide democratic legitimacy through metagovernance. Yet even on this th is acco accoun unt, t, an impo import rtan antt role role for for gove govern rnme ment nt rema remain ins. s. One One obvi obviou ouss dandanger of decentralised of decision-making thatmanagement the community and stakeholder activistssystems who involve themselves inisthe of user boards, self-governing institutions and other bodies become an unrepresent sentati ative ve and and se self lf-pe -perpe rpetua tuatin tingg el elit ite. e. For this this reaso reason n Grace race Skog Skogst stad ad (2003 (2003)) concludes that mechanisms of participatory democracy are a useful supplement for, rather than an alternative to, government and representative democracy. A second lesson here might be that government should play an important metagovernance role in designing and monitoring mechanisms of participatory democracy in order to ensure that those who make decisions are representative of the broader community and, when they are not, that decisions can be appealed and reversed (see Fung & Wright, 2003).  Chapter 7.  Wee will pursue this argument further in  W in Chapter 7. ACCOUNTABILITY

The capacity to be called to account is an important criterion criterion of metagovernance because it implies the need for clear lines of responsibility and transparency. Accountability is essentially about responsibility, or where the buck stops. But accountability accountability also covers covers responsive responsiveness ness and control. control.  As Richard Mulgan Mulgan (2000, 563) puts it, ‘accountability and control are intimately linked because accountability is a vital mechanism of control’.  Accountability in all its forms is especially important not only when governments state agencies act, but also when non-state actors become involved inorgovernance arrangements as contractors or partners. The divi divisio sion n of deci decisio sionn-mak makin ingg autho authorit rityy be betw twee een n the the Euro Europe pean an Coun Coun-cil (the body within the European Union comprising the heads of state) and the supra-national European Parliament and Commission is often argued to have resulted in a loss of accountability within the European Union (see Arnull & Wincott, 2003 Wincott,  2003)). Similarly, the creation of networks composed of state and non-state actors is routinely argued to undermine accountability (Barrados, Mayne & Wileman, 2000). Rod Rhodes (2000 (2 000,, 77) sugge suggest stss that that netwo network rkss ‘subst substit itute ute priva private te gove govern rnme ment nt for for publi publicc

 

52

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

accountability’ which ‘disappears in the interstices of the webs of institutions which make up governance’. In these circumstances governments ought to retain (and, in our view, frequently do retain) a metagovernance responsibility for safeguarding accountability arrangements. One possibility is that governments accept responsibility for perfor-

mance even in those cases where a large number of actors are involved. Mulgan (2006 (2006))  suggests that the arm’s-length contracting arrangements underpinning the Australian Job Network raise potential accountability  issues. He nevertheless states that, ‘having flirted with the temptation of  off-loading blame on to contractors’, governments have ‘come to accept the public expect them to remain accountable’ (p. 49). This, he goes on to argue, has given governments a powerful incentive to exercise close control over contractors. Second, and even on those occasions when it has not assumed responsibility for steering, effectiveness and resourcing, the state can hold  other  actors to account for their behaviour. The most obvious manifestation of  this accountability is legal. Under laws relating to, for example, corporate manslaughter, private firms and individuals within them can be held to account for their actions through the courts. Following the deaths of 21 tourists in a canyoning disaster in Switzerland in 1999, six managers of  the adventure company responsible responsible for organising organising their trip were charged  with negligent manslaughter. manslaughter. In most countries politicians can also hold nonno n-sta state te acto actors rs to accou account nt throu through gh heari hearing ngss cond conduc ucte ted d by le legi gisl slati ative ve comcommittees. In February 2009 senior bankers were hauled before committees in the United States and United Kingdom, questioned about their bonuses and invited to apologise apologise for having caused the credit crisis.  Wee are not na ¨ııve:  W ve: there is no doubt that government sometimes seeks to evade accountability within partnership arrangements. Indeed, the possibility of off-loading blame onto other actors can be a key attraction of such governance arrangements. Yet even in these cases governments can still be held to account by legislatures, the media and the electorate. Governments can still seek to deny responsibility for the operational behaviour of nonstate actors within governance systems. But this is hardly a novel problem. Ministers are equally reluctant to accept responsibility for actions taken by  public servants of which they were unaware (Mulgan, (Mulgan, 2002  2002)). In the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal in Iraq, numerous critics called for the resignation of the US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Rumsfeld claimed that his office had received no warnings about the abuse and that in these circumstances his responsibility was only to ‘evaluate what happened, to

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

make sure those who have committed wrongdoing are brought to justice, and to make changes as needed to see that it doesn’t happen again’ ( New  York Times , 8 May 2004).  A good example of a metagovernance failure, at least in the initial phase, occurred in relation to accountability arrangements within Australian detention centres. Since the early 1990s Australia has had a system

53

of mandatory detention for those arriving in the country without a valid visa. In 1998, 3500 people – the majority of whom were claiming political asylum – were detained in various holding centres across Australia, mostly  in remote areas. By 2001 this number had risen to nearly 8000. In 1997 a contract was awarded to a private company, Australasian Correctional Management (ACM, a subsidiary of an American firm, Wackenhut), to run the detention centres. ACM was later widely criticised for conditions in the centres and held responsible by opposition parties and parts of the medi me diaa for for a se serie riess of ri riot otss and and brea breako kout uts, s, se self lf-m -muti utila lati tion onss and and hunge hungerr strik strikes es..  When questioned, ACM consistently argued that it was accountable for its behaviour under the terms of its contract with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA). Critics argued that the contracting-out of services had resulted in a loss of accountability as DIMA ministers routinely referred questions about conditions within the detention centres to ACM or declined to answer them on the grounds of  commercial confidentiality. In 2002 a report by the Regional Advisor of  the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Justice Bhagwati, concluded that ‘the situation in the detention centres seems to be bedevilled by a lack of transparency and accountability’ (Melbourne   Age , 31  July 2002). A subsequent report by the Australian National Audit Office (2003) warned that ‘the administrative administrative practices in place did not establish establish accountability’ and recommended that DIMA be made to report to Parliament on the results of its monitoring programs and details of its funding  outlays. This loss of accountability is unlikely to have happened by accident. At a time when the basic principle of mandatory detention was popular with the electorate but the details of the actual conditions in which detainees  were being held provoked considerable disquiet, ministers had a strong  incentive to minimise their accountability. The Inspector of Custodial Services in Western Australia, Richard Harding, suggested that accountability had been compromised compromised because ‘the governmen governmentt wanted this to be out of sight and out of mind’ (ABC, 20 June 2004). Similarly, a former  Attorney-General and Minister for Corrections in Victoria, Jim Kennan, argued that, ‘one of the driving political motives for [the contracting-out

 

54

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

of detention centre services] was to distance the government from problems lems . . . they they can say it is a matte matterr for the contra contract ctor or’’ (Melb (Melbou ourn rnee  Age , 9  January 2003). The government’s government’s initial refusal to accept a ccept responsibility for the management of the detention centres provides a good example of metagovernance failure. However, to argue that states can sometimes fail is not to argue that states must always fail. As we observed in Chapter in Chapter 2 2 when  when discussing  the limitations of public choice theory, the media, opposition parties and

inte in tere restst-gr grou oups ps have have an ince incent ntiv ivee to moni monito torr gove govern rnme ment nt perfo performa rmanc ncee and and draw public attention to anymetagovernance failings. Governments may sometimes an incentive to avoid their responsibilities but theyhave risk  paying a heavy political price for doing so. Precisely because the public expects states to retain overall responsibility for the delivery of services, governments remain politically vulnerable to claims that they have failed to effectively metagovern. In the case in hand, the failure to ensure the public publ ic accoun accountabi tability lity of gover governan nance ce arrange arrangemen ments ts within within detent detention ion centre centress became a popular cause with the media and Opposition, causing the government long-term political difficulties. When a new contract was signed  with Global Solutions to manage the detention centres in 2004, accountability procedures were, as a consequence, overhauled. In this sense, the expectation that the to government will metagovern itself creates an incentive for the government do so.

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy is an important criterion of effective metagovernance. Governance arrangements that are seen as fair in terms of processes and outcomes, have popular support, and are regarded as legitimate are likely to be more stable and effective than arrangements that are thought to be upheld through force or arbitrary power (Kjaer, 2004 (Kjaer, 2004,, 12). The legitimacy  of governance arrangements can ce best secured aterbyproduct of thevi perapte r 2 di disc scus usse sed d the view  ew  formanc form ancee of other othe r metago metagove vernan rnance functi funbe ctions ons.. Chap Chas of Fritz Scharpf (1997; 1999) that legitimacy is a two-dimensional concept relating to the inputs and to the outputs of the political system. On the input side, legitimacy requires that political choices are derived, directly or indirectly, from the preferences of citizens. On the output side, legitimacy  requires that organisations perform effectively. If governments effectively  steer governance arrangements, ensure effectiveness and provide necessary resources, the legitimacy of the outputs is enhanced. If governments

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

provide democratic oversight and ensure accountability, the legitimacy of  the inputs is enhanced.  Where, for whatever reason, governance arrangements lack legitimacy, legitimacy, governments come under pressure to take action. Following the internation tional al cr cred edit it cr cris isis is whic which h bega began n in la late te 2007 2007,, bank banks, s, inve invest stme ment nt firms firms,, cred credit it agen ag enci cies es and and accou account ntan ancy cy firms firms lo lost st a signi signific fican antt meas measur uree of publ public ic suppo support. rt. Immediately, governments in the United States and Europe were urged to revise light-touch regulatory systems in order to prevent banks from taking  excessive risks in the knowledge that taxpayers would ultimately have to cover any losses that threatened the integrity of the financial system. As

55

 argued: The Economist  argued: For three decades, public policy has been dominated by the power of  markets—flexible and resilient, harnessing self-interest for the public good, and better better than any pla planne nner-i r-in-c n-chie hieff . . . [but [but]] new rules beca became me inevi inevitab table le the moment the Federal Reserve rescued Bear Stearns and pledged to lend to other Wall Street banks. If taxpayers are required to bail out investment banks, the governments need to impose tighter limits on the risks those banks can take [3 April 2008].

METAGOVERNANCE AS A PROBLEM OF PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION

Metagovernance is exercised not only by state actors but also by various networks of public and private actors and a whole range of supranational, regional, and local levels in the formal political system. In fact, metagovernance can potentially be exercised by any resourceful actor – public or private. All it takes is resources and a desire to influence activities performed by self-governing actors [E. Sorensen, 2006 Sorensen,  2006,, 103].

So far we have been assuming that metagovernance functions must be discharg ch arged ed by the state state.. Eva Sore Sorens nsen en chall challen enge gess this this assum assumpti ption on by sugge suggesti sting  ng  that ‘any resourceful actor – public or private’ can metagovern. This raises twoo is tw issu sues es:: whet whethe herr priv privat atee (t (tha hatt is, is, nonnon-st stat ate) e) acto actors rs have have the the reso resour urce cess and and legitimacy needed to metagovern; and whether they have the incentives or desire to do so.  Wee will start with a discussion of resources. Chapter  W resources. Chapter 1 said 1  said that states retain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This is a key metagoverna ernanc ncee re reso sour urce ce.. States tates can can metag metagoovern vern beca becaus usee they they can can impos imposee deci decisi sion ons, s, change governance rules, extract resources through compulsory taxation,

 

56

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

and require actors to appear in court or before parliamentary committees to account for their action (also see Mayntz, 1998 Mayntz, 1998)). With regard to the first of these activities, imposing decisions, non-state actors could, in the event of a dispute, agree to accept decisions made by an independent arbitrator acting as a metagovernor. But it is difficult to see how non-state actors might force each other to abide by decisions that they do not accept. It is even harder to see how a non-state actor performing this metagovernance function might force the state to accept such decisions where it is involved as one of the participants in a governance arrangement. The same holds true of the second and third functions. Lacking any coercive power, non-state actors will only be able to change governance rules and extract

resources if all the groups affected agree. There The re is one one furth further er re reso sour urce ce state statess poss posses esss whic which h enhan enhance cess their their metagovernance capacities: legitimacy. Even if firms or sectional interestgroupss have the required group required organisational organisational and financial financial resources, resources, they may  lack lack the the legi legiti tima macy cy need needed ed to meta metago gove vern rn ef effe fect ctiv ivel elyy. It is not not hard hard to imag imag-ine how a non-state organisation like the American Automobile Manufacturers Association might position itself to metagovern a policy to reduce vehicle emissions. But such an arrangement would be unlikely to attract the support of environmental groups or concerned citizens. In some cases NGOs may acquire sufficient legitimacy to metagovern.   Chapter 8  8   on associative governance shows how the World Wide Fund for Nature has played a metagovernance role in encouraging private forestry firms to sign a charter committing committing them to sustainable forestry forestry practices. practices. In other cases criminal groups have come to perform some metagovernance functions. Diego Gambetta (1993 (1993)) argues that in the 19th century the Italian state  was so weak and corrupt that the Mafia was, within limits, regarded as a  trustworthy and legitimate legitimate body to enforce enforce commercial commercial exchanges. exchanges. These are, are, howe howeve verr, exce except ptio iona nall case cases. s. When When eith either er a new new poli policy cy prob proble lem m emer emerge gess or the failings of an existing policy become apparent, people continue to expect states to provide solutions; this expectation is itself a key metagovernance resource. Let us now turn to the more complex issue of incentives. Sorensen suggests that actors must have a ‘desire’ to metagovern but does not consider  whether this desire will be forthcoming. We argue that it is often absent. Economists classify goods in terms of their ‘excludability’, and their ‘rivalness’ (Hindmoor, 2006a  (Hindmoor, 2006a ,  103):  A good is excludable if its owner can prevent its consumption benefiting anyone else; it is non-excludable if the benefits deriving from its consumption are available to all.    

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

 A good is rivalrous when its consumption by one person reduces the amount available to others; it is non-rivalrous to the extent that consumption by one person does not reduce the amount available to others. Public goods   like defence, sanitation, clean air, street lighting and law  enforcement are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Street lighting on public lic road roadss pro provid vides a bene benefit fit to ever everyyone one who who walk walkss or driv drivees down the them and and this benefit is non-rivalrous in the sense that the light ‘consumed’ by one person does not reduce the amount of light available to others. Economists generally regard the existence of public goods as a key source of market    

failure. Because everyone benefits from the, everyone provisionhas of an a public good  whether or not they contributed contribut ed to its supply, supply incentive to free-ride and none of the good will be supplied. Economists then conclude

57

that the state must intervene to directly secure the supply of public goods using its coercive powers to, for example, extract taxation. In our our vi view ew the the supp supply ly of meta metago gove vern rnan ance ce rais raises es equi equiva vale lent nt issu issues es.. Effe Effecctive metagovernance provides benefits both for the participants in any  governance mechanism and for the broader public. Let us look first at the function of steering. Without a court of appeal to settle disputes, governance arrangements risk being paralysed by disagreements between partic par ticip ipan ants. ts. Witho Without ut the the timel timelyy pro provi visio sion n of info inform rmati ation on,, actor actorss risk risk bein being  g  co comm mmitt itted ed su b-opti ptimal mal arrangement plan pl ans. s. Or cons consid ider er resist ef effe fecti ctive vene ness. ss. Indi Indivi vidu dual al perparparticipants into a sub-o governance may the imposition of formancee targets formanc targets but nevertheless nevertheless recognise recognise that others will perform more effectively if they are in place. The same applies to accountability. When a  policy has failed, the public wants to see those responsible held to account. The benefit benefitss provid provided ed through through effect effective ive metago metagover vernan nance ce are, are, howhowever, non-rivalrous and non-excludable public goods. That the benefits of metagovernance are non-rivalrous is obvious. If one actor in the net work consumes information about the demand for services, this does not reduce the amount of information available to others in the network. Equally, the benefits a taxpayer derives from knowing that someone has taken responsibility in accounting actions of the participants in a  network do not reduce the ‘amount’for ofthe accountability available to others. Thee se Th sens nsee in whic which h the the bene benefit fitss of meta metago gove vern rnan ance ce are are nonnon-ex excl clud udab able le is initially less obvious. By way of an introduction, think about the provision of human rights and, more specifically, the right to free speech. There is no doubt that this right could be framed to exclude specified groups of  people: suspected terrorists, organised criminals, or employees of tabloid newsp ne wspape apers. rs. In this this practi practica call se sens nsee fr free ee speec speech h is excl exclud udabl able. e. But But an advo advoca cate te

 

58

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

of huma human n ri righ ghts ts will will ar argu guee that that a ri righ ghtt to fre free spe speech ech whic which h excl exclud udees cert certai ain n groups of people is no right at all: that the principle of free speech is intrinsically non-excludable. In an anal analog ogou ouss se sens nsee we sugge suggest st that that metag metagov over erna nanc ncee is nonnon-ex excl clud udabl able. e.  Assume that two of the three members of a network agree to share the cost of collecting and distributing general information about the demand for different kinds of services. It is not hard to see how they could refuse to prov pr ovid idee this this info inform rmati ation on to the third third membe memberr. In this this se sens nse, e, the info inform rmati ation on is a non-rivalrous but excludable toll good. But if, as a result of their decision, decisi on, this third organisation organisation sets incorrect incorrect plans, we could say that the right information had not been provided, that the function of steering  had not been discharged effectively and that there had been a failure of  metagovernance. For the functions of metagovernance to be discharged, they must be discharged inclusively. Steering requires the steering of   all 

the actors in the network; resourcing requires the provision of adequate resources for all  the  the actors in a network; accountability requires the calling  to acco accoun untt of all th thee acto actors rs in a netw networ ork, k, and and so on. Hence nce meta metago gove vern rnan ance ce is non-excludable. Because the benefits provided through effective metagovernance are public goods, interest-groups, private firms and other non-state actors operating in networks and other governance arrangements have an incentive to free-ride on their provision. Actors might recognise that there is a need to collect and distribute information, coordinate plans, provide a  neutral court of appeal, monitor the overall effectiveness of the network, and account for actions; but each recognises that any investment it makes in metagovernance will benefit not only the actors in the network but the taxpayers and others outside it and, conversely, that they will benefit from free-riding on any investment made by others. The ‘market’ for metagovernance is thus likely to fail because none of the actors in that market has an incentive to invest in metagovernance. Just as the state must correct for the existence of market failures by providing public goods like defence, law enforcement and sanitation, so, too, it needs to provide metagovernance if the other actors who benefit from its supply are driven by consideration of their own interest. Organisations may sometimes have an incentive to undertake metagovernance responsibilities if they have a  gene ge nera rall comm commit itme ment nt to the the welf welfar aree of all th thee acto actors rs in a gove govern rnan ance ce syst system em..  Chapter 8.  Wee point to such an example in  W in Chapter 8.  Yet it would be a mistake to assume that, simply because a range of actors benefit from the provision of metagovernance, any non-state actor will find it in its interest to supply  that metagovernance.

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

STATE CAPACITY: A STATE-CENTRIC RELATIONAL ACCOUNT

The chal challe leng nges es of metag metagov over erna nanc ncee raise raise import importan antt ques questi tion onss abou aboutt whe whethe therr state sta tess have have the the capac capacity ity to oper operate ate cohe cohere rent ntly ly and and forge forge ef effe fect ctiv ivee gove govern rnan ance ce relationshi relat ionships. ps. Here Here the widely discussed discussed concept concept of state capacity or ‘gov‘governing capacity’ is relevant. This approach provides a broad institutional and relational blueprint for understanding governing capacity by drawing  on a range of comparative studies. States’ capacity to formulate and implement policies varies both within and between countries (Weiss & Hobson, 1995,  28). As an example of varying capacity between countries, consider 1995,  Chapter 2 showed taxation. Chapter taxation. 2 showed that the amount of money raised through taxation has risen steadily within the largest OECD economies over the last 30-odd years. There are, however, striking differences between the capacities of states in this regard. In Sweden it is estimated that the state collects over 95 per cent of the revenue owing to it each year; in Russia the equiv-

59

alent figure is thought to be as low as 10 per cent (Rothstein, 2005 (Rothstein,  2005,,  1 2).  As an example of varying capacity within the state consider how, how, in the United Un ited States, a federa federall governme government nt that had successfully successfully mobilised more than a quarter of a million troops for the invasion invasion of Iraq was paralysed paralysed by  the flooding and subsequent breakdown of public order in New Orleans in 2005 following Hurricane Katrina. How do we account for such startling differences in governing capacity? Political scientists have tended to define both  institutional   and  relational  components of state capacity. Institutional arrangements can be vital in this respect. As Stephen Krasner (1984, 228) says: The ab The abil ilit ityy of a po poli liti tica call lead leader er to carr carryy ou outt a po poli licy cy is crit critic ical ally ly de dete term rmin ined ed by  the authoritative institutional resources and arrangements existing within a  gi give ven n po poli liti tica call sy syst stem em.. In Indu dust stri rial al po poli licy cy can can be or orch ches estr trat ated ed in Jap apan an th thro roug ugh h the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. There is no American institutional structure that would allow a political leader, regardless of the resources commanded, to implement a similar set of policies.

 Wee can define institutions as formal or informal rules, norms or sanc W tions designed to shape human behaviour (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Thelen, 1999; Hall & Taylor, 1996). For pioneering researchers, such as Douglas North (1990, 4), an institution is ‘any form of constraint that th at huma human n bein beings gs devi devise se to shap shapee acti action on’. ’. The The core core cl clai aim m of inst instiitutional researchers is that institutions matter because they shape the behaviour of individuals and the possibilities for governance. All strands of 

 

60

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

institutionalism share a common focus on institutionally ‘situated’ actors or individuals, whose behaviour is shaped by their institutional location and role and by the authority relations and ideational orientations that institutions embody. Institutions also matter because governance typically  occurs in and through them, whether they are specific organisations or clusters of rules, norms, or other institutional arrangements. Existing institutional configurations also shape governance strategies and outcomes. Hence, we might expect that relatively centralised and unitary political systems such as those in New Zealand and the United Kingdom might be more inclined inclined to govern via hierarchy. hierarchy. By contrast, contrast, more decentralised decentralised institutional arrangements may lend themselves to more negotiated governance approaches, especially across the multiple levels of government in federal systems. In turn, governance strategies shape institutions. For example, market-oriented governance strategies have tended to strengthen those institutions engaged in various forms of market regulation, such as the organisations administering competition policy.  As a further f urther illustration of the importance impor tance of institutional arrangements

in shaping state capacity, consider the case of nuclear energy. In the 1950s and 1960s most Western governments decided to invest heavily in commercial nuclear energy programs in the mistaken belief that nuclear power  would prove to be an exceptionally cheap source of energy. energy. These nuclear programs met with varying fates. In France 67 nuclear reactors were built and an d nucl nuclea earr powe powerr now now gene genera rate tess more more than than 70 pe perr cent cent of Franc rance’ e’ss el elec ectr tric ic-ity.. In the United States and the United Kingdom nuclear power continues ity to provide around 15 per cent of electricity, but it fell out of favour in the 1980 19 80ss and and 1990 1990ss and and has has only only re rece cent ntly ly been been resu resurr rrec ecte ted d as a pote potent ntia iall solu solu-tion to the problems of climate change and energy security. In Germany  20 reactors were built, but a decision was taken in 1998 to phase them out. ou t. Austri ustriaa (1978) (1978),, Denm Denmar arkk (1985 (1985), ), Greec reecee (1975) (1975),, Ir Irel elan and d (1999) (1999),, Italy  taly  (1990), and Switzerland (1990) have gone so far as to ban the future use of nuclear power (OECD, 2001, 228). In each of these countries the capacity of government to hierarchically  impo im pose se its pref prefer erre red d nucl nuclea earr solu soluti tion onss depe depend nded ed upon upon exis existi ting ng insti institu tutio tiona nall rules. Inthe France, ‘although there was considerable nuclear energy’, political weakness of local government, resistance enshrined to within the constitution of the Fifth Republic, meant that ‘there were few paths’ for protestors (Kitschelt, 1986 (Kitschelt, 1986,, 79). In the United States, by contrast, a federal political structure that devolved considerable decision-making power to states severely constrained the capacity of central government to develop nuclear power (Joppke, 1993 (Joppke,  1993)). In New York, for example, the Shoreham

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

nuclear power plant, built in the late 1970s, was never switched on because the governor of the State of New York, Mario Cuomo, refused to sign the Emergency Evacuation Plan, so the plant could not receive a full power licence from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In Germany, mean while, the federal government’ government’s attempts to develop a nuclear program were eventually frustrated by a proportional voting system that resulted in the Green Party entering government in coalition with the Social Democratic Party in 1998 on the condition that Germany’s nuclear power program be abandoned (Feigenbaum, Samuels, & Weaver, 1993).  A range of scholars who have explored the major m ajor institutional attributes of ‘capable’ states have suggested the following key components: Centralised decision-making:   Strong states (or perhaps strong sectors  within states) have centralised political and administrative authority  and a minimum number of ‘veto points’ (Tsebelis, 2002 (Tsebelis,  2002)). Such centralisation implies the ability to act as a coherent, corporate actor. This capacity may stem from the structure of the state or from mechanisms that can effectively coordinate activity across a number of arenas. In weak states (or sectors), by contrast, decision-making authority is likely to be fragmented, perhaps because of federal structures or a lack     

61

   

of effective coordinating or steering mechanisms. For example, recent  Australian experience shows that the problems of dealing with salination and water management management have been exacerbate exacerbated d by the institutiona institutionall structures and state and regional divisions of the federal political system  2007)). Hence, capable states (or state sectors) typically have (Connell, 2007 (Connell, centralised, or at least clearly defined and coordinated, decision-making  hierarchies.  A strong administrative administrative appar apparatus: atus:  States must also have the requisite resources at their disposal to be able to act effectively. Bureaucratic and administrative resources, including high-quality information, forums of active policy debate, and expert, dedicated and experienced staff in key areas of policy formulation and implementation, are also a vital component of state capacity. Skocpol (1985, 16) writes that ‘loyal and skilled officials’ are the ‘universal sinews of state power’. As Max Weber, the original theorist of bureaucracy, pointed out long ago, the key  elements underpinning an effective bureaucracy include highly selective meritocratic recruitment and promotion procedures, combined with high hi gh st stat atus us and and re rewa ward rds, s, lo long ng-t -ter erm m care career er pros prospe pect ctss and and a se sens nsee of se servi rvice ce and professionalism. In the case of taxation, for example, the capacity  to tax citizens does not depend on simply imposing coercive power by  is issu suin ingg cr cred edib ible le thre threat atss to fine fine or impr impris ison on thos thosee who who refu refuse se to pay pay. It also also

 

62

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

requires a large bureaucracy capable of tracking people’s employment

   

   

and their ove overall wealth (for liability propertyonorincome capital gainssalary tax); (for theirincome place oftax); residence (forrall determining earned overseas); the movement of goods in and out of the country  (for tariffs); and the cumulative addition of monetary value through the production process (for sales taxes). Fiscal resources:  The taxation example relates directly to another element of state capacity: fiscal resources. resources. The capacity to extract financial resources through taxation remains a key source of state capacity. Historically, a state’s fiscal capacity has always been a major determinant of  its capacity to wage war, but increasingly projects of public infrastructure, industrial competitiveness and social compensation and welfare have made heavy claims on the‘extractive fiscal state. The capacity revenue via taxes reflects the state’s capacity’ (Weiss to & raise Hobson, 1995, 1995, 7). Policy instruments:  Policy instruments are the actual means or devices that governments have at their disposal for implementing policies (see Hood, 2007 Hood,  2007,,  for an overview). States must have the necessary tools, indu in duce ceme ment ntss and and sa sanc ncti tion onss to shap shapee the the beha behavi viou ourr of soci societ etal al or exte extern rnal al actors in appropriate ways. Policy instruments may include anything  from subsidies or tax incentives to moral suasion or regulation. John

Zysman (1983 (1983))  suggests, for example, that the capacity of the Japanese and French states to develop new industries crucially depends upon the

   

existence of ‘state-led’ systems of capital allocation within which the bureaucracy is able to control the flow of investment to private firms. In the United Kingdom and the United States, by contrast, the easy access of firms to capital markets and external sources of finance has limited the capacity of the state to direct economic development.  Wee have repeatedly pointed out that the successful exercise of  Legitimacy: W state power requires legitimacy (Seabrooke, 2006 (Seabrooke, 2006). ). Government leaders must ultimately be regarded regarded as having a mandate to rule and delivering  delivering  effective policies if legitimacy is to be established or maintained. Hence, governme gov ernments nts require require the consent of those being governe governed. d. In the United United King Ki ngdo dom m in the the la late te 1980 1980s, s, for for exam exampl ple, e, the the go gove vern rnme ment nt foun found d it almo almost st

impossible to implement a new tax, the community charge or poll tax,  which large parts of the population regarded as illegitimate (Butler et al., 2004 al., 2004)). Our account of state capacity also has important   relational   components involving the nature of the links between the state and society. It  was once orthodox to say that the strongest states were those that were

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

relatively insulated from the push and pull of political conflicts and possessed the authority to impose or push through their own policy agendas. Theda Skocpol (1985, 9), for example, defines state capacity in terms of  autonomy, and autonomy in terms of the ability of government to ‘implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of  powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances’. State capacity is thus simply defined in terms of a triumph over opposing groups. The problem with this account, however, is that it is too ‘state-centric’; states are assumed to gain policy capacity to the extent that they operate independently from the societies they govern. Yet, as Michael Mann (1988) points out, states have been able to enhance their policy capacity over the last few centuries by  strengthening    strengthening  their   their ties to society. In the 14th and 15th centuries rulers exercised almost unlimited despotic power over their subjects. Yet in many respects, these ‘absolute’ states (Gill, 2003 (Gill, 2003,, 98–102) were surprisingly weak. They lacked the capacity to promote economic development or control people’s lives, and their expenditure probably accounted for no more than two or three per cent of gross domestic product. States have a greater capacity to govern today  because they exercise ‘infrastructural’ as well as ‘despotic’ powers. Infrastructural power refers to the way in which states can ‘actually penetrate civil civ il society society, and . . . impleme implement nt logistical logistically ly political political decisio decisions ns throughou throughoutt the land’ (Mann, 1988, 5).

63

Developin Develo pingg Mann Mann s argume arguments nts about about infrast infrastruct ructural ural power power,, writers writers such such as Peter Evans (1997 (1997)), Linda Weiss (1998 (1998)) and John Hobson ( Hobson  (2000 2000)) have argued that state capacity requires states not only to ‘penetrate’ society but to work closely with non-state actors. This argument obviously bears upon our state-centric relational account of governance. The notion that the state’s capacity and authority may in part be derived from sophisticated links with key social actors is not new. Talcott Parsons (1963 (1963)) made a  distinction between active notions of state capacity and simpler but cruder forms of coercive state power several decades ago. But by documenting  the ways in which, in particular, Asian governments have been able to construct successful economic relationships with non-state actors, political economists have identified an economic alternative to the Washington Cons Co nsen ensu suss of fr free ee marke markets ts and and shrin shrinkin kingg gove govern rnme ment nt.. Hobso Hobson n (2000, (2000, 234 234)) suggests that states are more likely to be able to achieve their goals if the interests of the state and society are advanced ‘collaboratively rather than competitivel compet itively’. y’. Similarly Similarly,, Evans Evans (1992, 162) argues that the most capable states are now more likely to be those in which ‘concrete sets of social tiess . . . bi tie bind nd the the state state to soci societ ety’ y’,, al allo lowi wing ng for the the ‘cont contin inual ual negot negotiat iatio ion n

 

64

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

and renegotiation of goals and policies’ (see also Onis,   1991; 1991;   Martin, 1989) 1989). Governments can often extend their capacity to govern by developing  closer relations with non-state actors, and thus the relationship between government and interest-groups ought to be viewed as positive-sum rather than zero-sum. In order to successfully formulate and implement policy, governments often need to acquire the expertise, support or assistance of  inte in tere restst-gr grou oups ps and and NGOs NGOs.. In re retur turn, n, gove govern rnme ment ntss must must offe offerr these these grou groups ps a measu measure re of poli policy cy influ influen ence ce.. The The exis existe tenc ncee of these these exch exchan ange ge rela relatio tions nship hipss means that governments are often not in a position to unilaterally impose their policy preferences. Thus, our critique of the society-centric approach does not require us to regard regard the state as a behemoth capable of trampling  trampling  over any opposition. Instead, our state-centric relational approach leads us to emphasise the ways in which the relationships government builds can  its policy capacity. enhance  its  An interesting example of the significance of such relational capacity  is offered by Heather McKeen-Edwards and colleagues (2004) in a paper on financial integration within North America and the European Union. Despi De spite te grea greate terr rhet rhetor oric ical al commi commitm tmen entt to the the free free marke market, t, the Unite nited d States tates and Canadian financial markets are less integrated than those within the European Union, both in terms of regulatory control and cross-national ownership. This apparent paradox is explained in terms of the ‘relationship between private and public actors in the policy process’ (p. 336). The European Union has developed centralised corporatist structures of policy 

negotiation that mobilise negotiation mobilise major financial interests through peak organisations; this has made it easier for the state to negotiate market liberalisation. The United States and Canada have a ‘more pluralist pattern of policy  making’; thus government–business relations tend to be riven by conflict as firms lobby for narrow concessions rather than negotiate collectively on market structure (p. 342). In a book dealing with ‘policy networks’, or the interaction of state and non-state actors in specific policy arenas, Michael Atkinson and William Coleman (1989) look at industrial policy and offer an account that helps explain these relational dynamics. They are interested in the ways in which different kinds of policy networks are structured by institutional factors, including the authority and institutional capacities of the state and the associative capacities of key non-state actors or groups. In turn, such structure tu red d poli policy cy netwo network rkss can facil facilit itate ate or cons constra train in indu industr stria iall poli policy cy,, es espe peci ciall ally  y  in relation to what they call ‘reactive’ and ‘anticipatory’ policy styles. The former is a short-term, incremental policy style responding to events or

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

particul partic ular ar lobby lobbyin ingg deman demands ds;; antic anticip ipato atory ry poli policy cy is more more pl plan an-o -ori rien ente ted d and and implemented around long-term strategic goals. It might appear that governme ernments nts isarerelatively more likely to be  able developinterests anticipatory anticipat oryrelatively policies policies where the state ‘strong’   to business are weak  and  business and fragmented and so unable to challenge the government’s edict. Yet  Atkinson and Coleman argue that successful anticipatory policy requires the presence of  strong   business interests interests mobilised through powerful powerful peak    strong  business associations interacting with an authoritative and centralised state. In such ‘concentation’ networks ‘state officials seek an accommodation with business that not only meets the latter’s need for freedom of action and economic support, but is also in step with a set of broader political objectives’, most of which are ‘negotiated over a period of time with business’ (p. 59). Post-war Japanese industrial policy offers of s rela relatio tiona nall poli policy cy capac capacity ity. . In the after aft ermat math h of Waorld orparadigm ld War II Jof apane apathis nese sekind lead leader ers deci de cide ded d on a st stra rate tegy gy of acce accele lera rate ted d econ econom omic ic deve develo lopm pmen entt in orde orderr to rais raisee living standards, enhance national security (Weiss & Hobson, 1995 Hobson,  1995,, 187) and recover lost national prestige. How did Japan achieve its ‘economic miracle’? The conventional answer is that it was achieved in a hierarchical fashion through a ‘developmental state’ (Johnson, 1995 (Johnson,  1995)) which diverted resources to high-growth, high-technology industries. On this reading, the  Japanese state was successful because organisations like the Ministry of  International Trade and Industry (MITI) were able to create a ‘governed market’ (Wade, 1990 (Wade, 1990))  by issuing hierarchical ‘administrative guidance’ to private firms, imposing restrictions upon foreign ownership and imports,

65

licensing the use of particular technologies, and subsidising research and development.  Y  Yet et as Daniel Okimoto (1989) 1989)  observes, the Japanese state is far from being a leviathan. leviathan. Unlike Unlike the United United Kingdom, Kingdom, France, France, Italy Italy and a number of other European countries, Japan did not own the industries it set about promoting. Furthermore, when the economic miracle was unfolding in the 1960s, state expenditure remained relatively low. The state was able to guide development only because it was able to operate through a web of formal and informal contacts with individual firms, industrial clusters (Keiretsu) and industry associations with whom it was able to negotiate long-term policy.be‘Instead of labelling a “strong” therefore, perhaps it would more accurate to callJapan it a “societal” or state “relational”, or “network” state, one whose strength is derived from the convergence of  public and private interests and the extensive network ties binding the two together’ (Okimoto, 1989 (Okimoto, 1989,, 145).

 

66

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

In his analysis of Japanese industrial policy, Richard Samuels (1987 (1987)) talks of ‘reciprocal consent’. Linda Weiss (1998, 48), who uses the term ‘governed interdependence’ to describe similar relationships, suggests that the Japanese model was effective because policies were ‘the result of regular and extensive consultation, negotiation and coordination with the private se sect ctor or’. ’. The The Japan apanes esee st stat atee was was not not robb robbed ed of its its poli policy cy capa capaci city ty thro throug ugh h the the deve de velo lopme pment nt of poli policy cy netwo network rkss in which which there there were were freq freque uent nt,, high high-q -qual ualit ity  y  exch ex chan ange ge re relat latio ions nshi hips. ps. Inst Instea ead, d, as Atkin Atkinso son n and and Cole Coleman man sugg sugges est, t, the state state gained through the opportunity to work with a capable and well-organised business sector. The lesson is that state capacity is a function both of state structure and of associational capacities in society. Governments are more inclined to engage with groups not only when those groups possess valued resources but when they are effectively organised, a theme we return to in Chapter 8 on 8 on associative governance. THE CHALLENGES OF METAGOVERNANCE

The metagovernance of complex governance arrangements presents major challenges challe nges to governme governments. nts. For example, example, our argument that state capacity  can be enhanced through the development of closer state–society relations has one important qualification. On the one hand, a state that is too insulated from society will struggle to implement its goals. On the other hand ha nd,, ther theree is a dang dangeer that that gover ernm nmen ents ts end end up bein beingg capt captur ureed by the the nononstate actors with whom they are seeking to develop closer relations (Stigler, 1971; Laffont & Tirole, 1991 1971; Tirole, 1991)). In public choice theory, where the notion of capture unsurprisingly originates, the concern is that governments do

the bidding of interest-groups, firms and business associations. Such rentseeking activity is thought to explain, for example, the US government’s continued contin ued commitment commitment to farm subsidies subsidies that harm not only exporters exporters in developing countries but also American consumers (Tullock, 1989 (Tullock,  1989;;  1993; 2005). In another example, a critical aspect of economic governance in capitalist economies necessarily relies on the activities of private wealth holders, investors and entrepreneurs. A capable state needs to be able to achieve   its   goals by working with and encouraging such private actors  while retaining the necessary authority to avoid slipping into relations of clientism, capture, rent-seeking, corruption or other manifestations of  government failure. In this sense, close ties between the public and private sectors, or between the state and the community, need to be managed or metagoverned in order to achieve public  rather  rather than private goals.

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

In what circumstances are state actors most likely to retain their authority and independence within governance networks? We may already have answered this question. States are most likely to do so when either individual ministries or the state as a whole possess authority and a clear sense of their own legitimacy and mission, and when there is a well-trained,  well-equipped public service with a strong sense of its own identity. identity. To this extent, then, we might conclude that state capacity requires both a  relational state and a strong state. Furthermore, where state officials are captured, it is important that other state actors are in a position to intervene by challenging policy decisions made within the network and change its membership. Chapter membership.  Chapter 2, 2,  for example, showed how French authorities overturned an established agricultural network in order to achieve wider strategic goals. Another example is the Tariff Board, a statutory authority  charged with tariff administration in Australia in the late 1960s, which eventually destroyed the post-war protectionist policy network. The Tariff  Board worked to establish its authority, expertise and eventually enough key allies to challenge the dominant tariff policy network, led by the powerful Deputy Prime Minister John McEwen (Bell, 1989 (Bell,  1989)). Such an exercise can be thought of as a further form of metagovernance in the sense that it requires the state to steer governance arrangements in order to ensure effectiveness and accountability. In the final analysis, then, governments are instrumental in the creation of gove govern rnan ance ce netw networ orks ks and and they they can can choo choose se whet whethe herr to revi revise se such such arra arrang ngeements (Pierre & Peters, 2005 Peters, 2005,, 68). A further example of such state capacity  comes from Alan Greer (2002, 465) who examines the development of  organic agricultural policy in Ireland and shows how the government set up ‘an Organi Organicc Develo Developme pment nt Committ Committee ee compos composed ed of repres represent entati atives ves from from state bodies, the organic farming sector, the food processing and retail sector, and consumers to oversee the formulation of a development strategy’.

67

 When structuring networks, governments may have to choose between the interests of competing groups. Policy decisions taken in one network  can generate costly external effects for other actors. The adoption of lax  food safety standards in agricultural policy, for example, might generate high political and financial costs for a health ministry that must deal with the resulting public health crisis. In such situations metagovernance and coordination by higher state authorities may be necessary. Despit Desp itee ef effo fort rtss to buil build d cent centra rall stat statee capa capaci city ty,, th thee chal challe leng nges es of meta metago govvernance are not always met. The analysis by Stephen Bell and Alex Park  (2006) 2006)  of water management through community engagement across a  range of river catchments in New South Wales, Australia, provides an

 

68

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

illustration of the problems involved. In the early 2000s the state government established 36 Catchment Management Committees comprising  local and other stakeholders; they were tasked with formulating watersharing plansoftoparticipants allocatents water to users and environment. However, the selection participa in the governance governa ncethe arrangements, arrangemen ts, the resourcing and information flows provided to the committees, the specification of goals, and confusion over the rules relating to authority-sharing and decision-making arrangements, all caused consternation among participants. This was a classic case in which the authorities were relatively  unskilled, under-resourced and over-stretched in attempting to metagovern a governance system. Othe Ot herr prob proble lems ms assoc associa iate ted d with with metag metagov over erna nanc ncee are are illu illustr strate ated d by Mark  Mark   Whitehead (2003) 2003) in a study of decentralised urban regeneration schemes in the West Midlands in England. Contrary to the difficulties of control emphasised by government Flinders (2006), Whitehead emphasises the continued presence of central hierarchy in shaping such governance relationships and the powerful role played by government oversight bodies that insist on adherence to central strategies and perform ongoing monitoring and assessment procedures while employing a strategy of ‘fear and disc di scip ipli line ne’’ to inti intimi mida date te lo loca call unit unitss (p. (p. 12). 12). Th Thee inte intens nsit ityy of thes thesee meta metago govvernance arrangements has certainly increased steering and accountability. But it has done so, according to Whitehead, at the cost of ‘choking  and constraining the flexibilities’ ascribed to such decentralised networks. The ‘bureaucratic burden’ stemming from metagovernance is ‘deflecting  important time and resources from the actual projects’ the local units  were attempting are to pursue. that thenot ‘practices of  metagovernance currentlyWhitehead facilitatingconcludes hierarchical rule, local selfdetermination in policy decision making processes’ (p. 13). A similar conclus clusio ion n is re reac ache hed d by Tabat abatha ha Walli alling ngto ton n and and coll collea eagu gues es (200 (2005, 5, 13 13)) in thei theirr study of regional governance arrangements in Australia; they point to the

potentially contradictory tendencies of metagovernance in both fostering  and inhibiting local decision-making capacity: ‘The more that accountability is demanded by higher levels of government, the more likely that the regional bodies – created to be flexible, community-oriented vehicles for change – will become rigid bureaucratic structures, thereby nullifying  their the ir orig origin inal al purpo purpose se’’ (see (see al also so Flin Flinde ders, rs, 2002, 2002, 70) 70).. Simil Similarl arlyy Dona Donald ld Kettl Kettl (20 (2002, 02, 146) 146 poin points ts to the the of conc coancer erns ns of of acade academi mics cs in inand New Zea Zealan land d who wh have have studied the)development contract-based state concluded thato such governance arrangements have compromised social capital and reduced opportunities for wider engagement and debate. As he argues, government

 

ME T A G OVE R N A N C E A N D S T A T E C A P A C IT Y

 

strategies to increase control run the risk of ‘weakening government’s ability to manage the networks on which effective implementation of public programs depends’. Despite such problems, the challenges of governance and metagovernance may require a degree of restructuring of the state and perhaps further strengthening of central state authority. Kettl (2002 (2002)) argues that such challenges are being faced in American public administration without a theoretical compass and with ‘theory and practice sagging under the strain’. The traditions of American public administration, he argues, have been built on centralised institutions and hierarchy that are struggling to adapt to new governance arrangements and networks. On the other hand, he also points out that, ‘to a surprising degree, governmental institutions have shown remarkable resilience in adapting’ (2002, 123). These adaptations have required government leaders and administrators to develop better relational skills, especially in networking, negotiating and contracting. Nevertheless, he argues that there is a continuing need to join up government and develop new systems of budgeting, accountability and personnel management better adapted to relational modes of governance (p. 120). This requires negotiation and compromise, but it also requires st stro rong ng hier hierar arch chic ical al ar arra rang ngem emen ents ts and and a st stro rong ng cent centra rall stat statee to exer exertt cont contro rols ls and mobilise resources. As Glyn Davis and Rod Rhodes (2000, 94) argue, the experience of the outsourcing ‘contract state’ may help strengthen the ‘hierarchical state’; one featuring a ‘permanent, autonomous, career-based and policy-focused core public service, with a commitment to neutral professional advice’. CONCLUSION

The state-centric relational approach to governance places both the state and the nature of state–society relations at centre stage in analysing and understanding governance arrangements. The state may be a direct player in specific governance arrangements, but it also has a metagovernance role

69

that transcends such arrangements. The study of metagovernance is still embryonic. Relatively few scholars  Jessop, 1997a   1997a ; 2002; Bell & have explicitly explored it (see Scharpf, 1994 Scharpf, 1994;; Jessop, Park, 2006; 2006; Kelly, 2006 2006;; Whitehead, 2003; 2003; E. Sorens Sorensen, en, 2006 2006;; So Sore rense nsen n& Torfing, 2008b) 2008b), al alth thou ough gh some some have have impl implic icit itly ly do done ne so by emph emphas asis isin ingg an overall ‘state-centric’ management role in overseeing governance arrangeMayntz, tz, 1993; 1993; Fung ung & Wrigh right, t, 20 2003 03). ). We need need to ments men ts (Skogs (Skogstad tad,, 2003; 2003; Mayn know kn ow much much more more about about metag metagov over erna nanc ncee func functi tion ons. s. First, irst, go gove vern rnme ment ntss and and

 

70

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

state managers must move beyond beyond notions notions that governan governance ce arrangements arrangements can somehow be self-managing. For Gerry Stoker (1998, 17), ‘governance can be defined as a concern with governing and achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on recourse to the authority of the state’. From our perspective, this society-centric view of governance is problematic because it rules out the use of state authority and hence the possibility of metagovernance. In our view, the exercise of metagovernance results in a continuing role for hierarchical government in   any  governance   governance regime. Even when governments choose to govern through markets, networks and community engagement rather than through hierarchy, they retain a key role in the governance process. In a much-c much-cit ited ed artic article le Fri ritz tz Schar Scharpf pf (1994 (1994,, 41) su sugg gges ests ts that that go gove vern rnan ance ce always take place under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. In most most weste western rn demo democra cracie ciess . . . the uni unilat latera erall exerc exercise isess of sta state te auth authori ority  ty  has largely been replaced by formal or inform informal al negotiatio negotiations, ns, in polic policyy formulation as well as in policy implementation, between governmental actors and an d th thee af affe fect cted ed indi indivi vidu dual alss an and d orga organi nisa sati tion onss . . . bu butt th thes esee are are typi typica call lly  y  negotiations under the shadow of hierarchical authority.

Hence ence,, even even when when acto actors rs appe appear ar to be oper operat atin ingg unde underr gove govern rnan ance ce arra arrang ngeements apparently designed to secure a degree of autonomy from government, metagovernance casts the shadow of hierarchy over them. This is a  necessary function of the state in pursuit of the SERDAL functions outline lined d early early in this this chapt chapter er.. Met etago agove vern rnan ance ce,, howe howeve verr, is al alway wayss vuln vulner erabl ablee to underover-regulation. case ofthought the Newthrough South Wales catchments   2006), metagovernance (Bell &orPark, 2006), weakInorthepoorly  was the main problem. In the case of urban regeneration in the West Midlands (Whitehead, 2003 (Whitehead, 2003))  it appears that onerous levels of metagovernance inhibited local creativity and flexibility. The challenge, then, is to develop effective metagovernance without inhibiting local capacity. Given the hierarchical hierarchical nature of the state, this is indeed a challenge. challenge.

 

4

 

Hierarchy and top-down governance

GOVERNANCE REFERS TO THE TOOLS, strategies and rela-

tionships used by governments to help govern. Hierarchical governance

is distinguished the direct of or state authority target populations. It arisesbywhen statesapplication impose rules standards of to behaviour on othe ot herr acto actors rs,, back backed ed by sa sanc ncti tion onss and and re rewa warrds, ds, in orde orderr to achi achiev evee coll collec ecti tive ve goals. The claim that there has been a ‘fundamental transformation’ in the ‘basic forms’ of governance (Salamon, 2002, 1–2) can be understood as saying that governance through hierarchy is being gradually superseded by governance through markets, associations and community engagement.  Wee believe that this society-centric argument is misleading; that the state  W sta te is far from being pass´ passe´ and that we still need to recognise the ‘distinctiveness or uniqueness of state action within contemporary governance’ (Crawford, 2006,  458). The actors who control the modern state have at their dis2006, posal a ty setto ofvast powers andadministrativ resources – e, from formal constitutional andaccess legal authority authori fiscal, admini strative, informational inform ational resources resources and to expertise – that are qualitatively and quantitatively unlike those available to other actors in society. These resources are frequently employed to govern hierarchically. In later chapters we pursue our argument that states can enhance their capacity by developing close relations with a wide variety of non-state actors. This chapter argues that the extent to which governance through markets, associations or communities has replaced hierarchical governance

has been has been exag exagge gera rate ted. d. Hie iera rarc rchy hy is not not si simp mply ly hold holdin ingg its its own agai agains nstt othe otherr governance mechanisms: in some cases it is resurgent. We recognise that reliance on governance through hierarchyare varies across states among  policy sectors. Constitutional democracies characterised by and institutionalise alised d safeg safeguar uards ds again against st the the exer exerci cise se of certa certain in form formss of hier hierar arch chic ical al cont contro roll

71

 

72

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

not present within authoritarian regimes (Bellamy & Castiglione, 1997 Castiglione,  1997)).  As Kenneth Dyson (1980) (19 80) observes, there are also differing state traditions  within constitutional democracies. A French French statist political culture that invests substantial legitimacy in the exercise of centralised state authority can be contrasted with a more liberal American tradition. Comparing  policy sectors rather than countries, we might note that defence and monetary policy are almost always developed exclusively by senior politicians and public officials. By contrast, in areas where successful implementation requires the cooperation of semi-autonomous professionals – health and education policy being the sterling examples – extensive networks of  consultation often develop.  While recognising that such variations are relevant, we concur with those who point to the growth of the ‘regulatory state’ (Moran,  (Moran,   2002; 2002;  Jordana  Jord ana & Levi-Faur Levi-Faur,, 2004; Braithwaite, 2008) 2008).Thefirstpartofthechapter acknowledges a partial retreat in the use of hierarchical governance in some areas of economic management and in some areas of public policy. However, hierarchical governance has expanded significantly to address perceived risks posed by new technologies, market failures and threats to civi civill se secu curi rity ty.. We do not not cl clai aim m that that noth nothin ingg has has chan change ged d or that that go gove vern rnan ance ce today is little different from governance yesterday. Indeed, we go on to show how states have institutionally re-engineered themselves to exert more effective control, often as a direct response to weaknesses identified by academics and practitioners. ROLLING BACK THE STATE?

Chapter 2   demonstrated that state expenditure measured as a share of  gross domestic product, far from being rolled back, has increased in most countries over the last 20-odd years. However, this headline figure masks a significant retrenchment of hierarchical governance in relation to some areas of economic management. Governments have progressively withdrawn economic subsidies, exchange and credit controls and tariffs; loosened en ed re regu gula lato tory ry cont contro rols ls on capit capital al cr crea eati tion on;; priva privati tise sed d state state ente enterp rpris rises es;; and and deregulated a range of markets. Two important measures of this change are worth highlighting. Table highlighting.  Table 4.1 shows 4.1  shows that overall state expenditure on economic subsidies as a share of GDP fell on average by just over one per

cent of GDP in a sample of 20 OECD countries between between 1980 and 2004. Interestingly, this withdrawal of state support was not limited to countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, which first elected neo-liberal governments. The largest falls in state support were in those

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

Table 4.1. Total economic subsidies as a percentage of gross domestic   product, selected OECD countries, 1980 and 2004  Total economic subsidies Country  Australia Canada France Germany Italy  Japan Norway Portugal United Kingdom United States

1980 1.44 2.74 2.13 2.08 2.70 1.50 5.15 4.60 1.96 0.35

2004 1.32 1.17 1.29 1.27 1.07 0.86 2.25 1.64 0.53 0.34

Total OE(20-country  CD average)

2.37

1.24

% change,

 

1980–2004 −0.13 −1.57 −0.84 −0.81 −1.63 −0.64 −2.90 −2.96 −1.43 −0.01

 

−1.02

                 

Source: Obinger & Zohlnhofer, 2007, 184.

countries, Norway, Sweden and Portugal, with the strongest traditions of  state intervention. Second, Figure 4.1 Figure  4.1 shows  shows that the telecommunication, airline and electricity industries have experienced a marked decline in market regulation regulation in most OECD countries. Remarkably Remarkably,, in not one of these policy sectors did the level of market regulation increase in any country  between betwe en 1975 and 2002. These figures must be regarded with caution. In the first place, they  focus exclusively on developments in Western countries. Reaction to the explosion in world commodity prices in 2007 shows that hierarchical governance remains a reflex response within many developing economies. Faced with rising domestic food prices and the prospect of political unrest, the governments of Argentina, Cambodia, Indonesia, Russia, the Ukraine and Thailand responded to rising prices either by raising taxes on exports of basic foodstuffs or by simply banning the export of rice, beef or wheat (Economist , 2 April 2008 2008)). In Egypt, pt, the the army was redeployed to bak bake more bread. In the case of the so-called ‘developmental state’ economies of East

73

 Asia – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – it is sometimes argued that these states have, over the last decade or more, abandoned their efforts to

 

74

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE 1975

2003

(i) Telecommunications 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

   l    k   n  d   c  e   y   e   d   a    l  y   a  n    i  a    t  r   i  a   u  m   d  a   a  r   a    i  n   e  n   n  d   o  m    t  e  s    l   d  s   a  n  d   w  a  y   g    a   a    t   a  n   e  e  c    l  a  n    I    i   n   n   a   a   p   d    l  a   r   s    l    l   u   p   d   r    t   g    a   a    t    t  a   n   a   m    l    l   m   r    I  r  e   a   u   e   g    S   w  e   z  e  r   o   o  r   s    i  n    F  r   J   r   a   r   n   e   A     u    F   G   e    i  n   d  S   e    N   e   C    D    t    B    Z   S    P    i   A    h      K   G    t      t  e   w    i   S  w    i   e  d    U  n    N  e    N  e    t    U  n

(ii) Aviation 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

   l    k   n  d   c  e   n   n  d    l  y   a  n    i  a    t  r   i  a   u  m   d  a   a  r   a    i  n   m    t  e  s    l   n  y   e  c  e   a  n  d    t  a   d  s   a  n  d   w  a  y   g    a   a    i   n   n   a   a   p    I   r    l    l    l   u   p  a   e  d  e   r    l  a   g    s   d  o    t  a   r    t   g    a  n   a   e   a    t   a   m    l    l   n   m   e   a   u   r   r   r   S   o   s    i   J   r   n    F   S   e    N    P  o    F    I  r   A    B  e   C      i  n   e  r   G    t  z  e    K   S  w    i   A  u    h  e   w   Z      D  e   G    t     e  d   w    t   e    i   d   S    i    N    N  e    t  e    U  n    U  n

(iii) Electricity 6 5 4 3 2 1

   l    k   n  d   c  e   y   e   d   a    l  y   a  n    i  a    t  r   i  a   u  m   d  a   a  r   a    i  n   e  n   n  d   o  m    t  e  s    l   d  s   a  n  d   w  a  y   g    a    t   a   a  n   e  e  c    l  a  n    I    i   n   n   a   a   p   d    l  a   r    l    l   u   p   s   d   r    t   g    a   a    t    t  a   n   a   m    l    l   m   r    I  r  e   a   u   e   S   w  e   z  e  r   o   o  r   s    i  n    F  r   J   r   a   n   r   e   A     u    F   G    i  n  g    d  S   e   e   e    N   C    D    t    B    Z   S    P    i   A    h      K   G    t      t  e   w    i   S  w    i   e  d    U  n    N  e    N  e    t    U  n 0

Figure 4.1. Labour market deregulation in three industries, selected OECD  countries, 1975–2003. Note: Regulation is measured in each case on a 0–6 scale with 0 being the least  regulated and 6 the most. Source: Conway & Nicoletti, 2006  Nicoletti, 2006 , 52.

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

intervene strategically in their economics and have become more neoliberal in orientation (Jayasuriya, 2001). It is certainly true that market instruments have been used more fully in such countries, but it is less true that they have abandoned state activism in the economy or their tradition of working closely with key firms (Weiss & Thurbon,   2006) 2006). In South Korea, for example, state elites led an aggressive campaign to restructure and reorient the activities of the giant conglomerates that dominate the economy – the  chaebol  –   – in the wake of the Asian financial crisis (Cherry, 2005). Similarly, using as his case-study the creation of a  new ne w bi bioo-te tech chno nolo logy gy indu indust stry ry,, Josep oseph h Wong ong (2006, (2006, 65 653) 3) de demo mons nstra trate tess that, that, although the Taiwanese state’s ability to direct ‘industrial transformation from the top-down has weakened’, it continues to provide important support for the development of key sectors. Thus, the Ministry of Economic  Affairs provides tax deductions for corporate investments in research and development in bio-technology, and offers ‘improvement loans’ for small and medium-sized industries contemplating work in this area. In addition, the ministry confers confers generous generous tax exemption exemptionss on profits acquired acquired through patented intellectual property and has overseen the allocation of nearly  $1 billion of private funding in bio-technology. The Taiwanese state does not own any bio-technology firms: it does not need to. The state has achieved its development goals by developing closer relations with private actors. Even within within Western estern liberal liberal democr democracie acies, s, hierarc hierarchic hical al econom economic ic contro control, l, although in partial retreat, frequently remains significant. The economic logic of privatisation may have been accepted in most countries in the  world, but the OECD (2005b, 29) estimates that the asset value of stateowned enterprises in France, Greece and South Korea still exceeds $1000 billion. Furthermore, where governments have privatised industries they  have ha ve ofte often n foun found d ways ways of re reta tain inin ingg a meas measur uree of cont contro rol. l. In the the Nethe etherl rlan ands ds and an d Norway orway gove govern rnme ment ntss have have re retai taine ned d majori majority ty sha share reho hold ldin ings gs in the the firms firms they have privatised. pr ivatised. In France governments have retained a ‘golden ‘golden share’,  which allows them to appoint two non-voting members to the board of  directors and block the sale of any privatised firm to a foreign company. In Italy governments have restricted the sale of state assets to a small group of  trusted shareholders – usually banks and industrial conglomerations – that they th ey have have work worked ed with with cl clos osel elyy in the the past past and and trus trustt to prot protec ectt thei theirr in inte tere rest sts. s. These companies are prohibited from selling their shares for a certain period and, after this, can only sell their shares to a firm approved by the governme gov ernment. nt. Furthermor Furthermore, e, privatisation, privatisation, where it has occurred, occurred, has led to significant extensions in regulatory powers as governments have sought to

75

 

76

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

protect consumers from monopoly abuses by privatised companies (Vogel, 1995) 1995). In the case of trade policy, it is certainly true that the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay rounds of trade talks under the GATT system prompted signific ni fican antt li libe bera rali lisat satio ion n in the er eraa foll follow owin ingg World orld War II II.. But, But, more more rece recent ntly ly,, the Doha round of talks ended in an impasse when the United States and the European Union Union refused to disman dismantle tle agricultural subsidies subsidies and trade protection in return for greater access to markets in developing countries.  A study by Kym Anderson and Alan Winters (2008) 2008)  estimates that statecreated trade barriers continue to cost the global economy up to $3 trillion each year. The bottom line is that states still subsidise production in order to pursue domestic policy agendas, such as protecting the livelihoods of  farmers and rural populations. populations. The United State Statess prohibits prohibits overseas overseas firms  with assets in the US from trading with Cuba and has blocked foreign take-overs take-o vers of oil companies and ports. Even where governments have come to rely on alternative governance strategies, states continue to exert strong oversight and metagovernance controls. An example comes from Giandomenico Majone’s discussion of  the use of devolved authority or government by proxy using third parties to regulate or help deliver services. As Majone (1996, 146) says, ‘indirect gove go vernme rnment nt involv involves es . . . new forms forms of contro controll and accoun accountabi tabilit lityy’ – in our language, more metagovernance. ‘If policy makers wish to control or influence agencies and other organisations operating at arm’s length, they must do so by contractual arrangements, and by means of rules and regulations.’ Furthe urtherr evid eviden ence ce of hier hierar arch chic ical al cont contro roll in the mids midstt of appar apparen entt devo devolu lutio tion n of governance control can be seen in what Michael Power (1994; 1997) has described as an audit ‘explosion’ as governments seek to monitor and sanction the behaviour of charities, businesses, sports associations, housing  associations, and other bodies that receive public funding. Several factors drive this change: change: intensified intensified competition competition in markets, markets, increased increased individualism, the decline of earlier norms of trust and social cohesion, a greater appreciation of principal-agent problems, and increased recognition of risk  factors in societal and governance processes (Beck, 1992 (Beck, 1992)). Hence, the perceiv ce ived ed es esca calat latio ion n of ri risk sk in mode modern rn soci societ etie iess has has occa occasi sion oned ed incr increa ease sed d ef effo forts rts in both the public and private sectors to impose more control and auditing  in attempts at the ‘remanagerialisation of risk’ (Power, 1997 (Power, 1997,,  138). There are other, non-economic, issues on which it is possible to point to the erosion of hierarchical governance over a longer period of time. Legislation criminalising homosexuality was repealed as long ago as 1893 in Belgium and 1933 in Denmark, in the 1960s in the United Kingdom,

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

Canada and Germany and as recently recently as 1994 in South Africa. Laws relating to the possession of certain types of drugs, prostitution, pornography  and blasphemy have also been loosened or repealed in many countries over the last few decades. Yet in these cases it may be a mistake to equate statesancti san ction oned ed tole toleran rance ce with with the the decl declin inee of hier hierar arch chic ical al gove govern rnan ance ce.. In the case case of gay rights, repeal of discriminatory legislation has recently given way  to legislation recognising same-sex marriages (Netherlands, 2001; Canada  and Belgium, 2003; South Africa, 2006) or same-sex civil unions and state-recognised partnerships (Denmark, 1989; Sweden, 1995; Germany, 2001 20 01;; Unite nited d King Kingdo dom, m, 2004 2004). ). In thes thesee the the st stat atee has has dire direct ctly ly inte interv rven ened ed to give same-sex relationships legal status. Limited decriminalisation of recreatio ationa nall drug drugss has has occu occurr rred ed at the the sa same me ti time me as far far stri strict cter er regu regula lato tory ry regi regime mess have been introduced to monitor and sanction performance-enhancing  drugs within sport. sp ort. Finally, Finally, the repeal of blasphemy bla sphemy laws has been balanced by the promulgation of hate laws in more than 40 countries since the early  1990s. NEW TECHNOLOGY

New technologies, new perceived sources of market failure and concerns about growing risk and social disorder have provided three specific stimulants to hierarchical governance. The rapid growth of the digital economy  and information flows has prompted states to build or underwrite the construction of new communication networks (Zysman & Newman, 2006 Newman,  2006)). It has also required states to legislate to define and protect intellectual property rights. States have played a major role in defining property rights in new global services markets such as aviation and telecommunications. In a study of such developments, Peter Cowhey and John Richards (2006, 301) conclude that the ‘hand of governments has gripped the markets firmly’. State responses to the development of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have confirmed the durability of long-standing regulatory differences. Working with other food exporters including Argentina, Canada, Chile and Uruguay in the so-called Miami Group, the United States has lobbied for a permissive regulatory regime for genetically modified crops  2007,, 161). Adopting the precautionary principle in responding  (Drezner, 2007 (Drezner, to widespread widespread public alarm about the use of so-called so-called Frankenstein Frankenstein foods, thee Europ th uropea ean n Union nion has, has, by cont contra rast st,, sust sustai aine ned d an ef effe fect ctiv ivee mora morato tori rium um on GMOs. This is despite an adverse ruling by the World Trade Organisation that it had acted illegally in banning imports of genetically modified crops

 

77

78

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

between 1999 and 2004 (BBC News, 29 September 2006). This pattern of hierarchical control has been largely reversed in the case of stem cell research. In 2001 President Bush announced that federal funds would not be used used to supp suppor ortt re rese sear arch ch on huma human n embry embryon onic ic stem stem cell cells. s. The The foll folloowing  wing  year the European Union identified stem cell research as a funding priority. priority. In the case of the internet, it was once regularly claimed that because ‘cyberspace slips seamlessly and nearly unavoidably across national boundaries’, governments have been ‘pushed effectively to the sidelines’ (Spar, 1999, 1999,  82). Such a claim now seems less sustainable. Nation-states have played a leading role in funding initial research into the internet, in subsidising the creation of broadband and wireless access, in setting internet technical protocols and in fixing rules on e-commerce and data privacy. Through firewalls, proxy servers, routers and software filters, as well as simple prohibitions on the possession of personal computers, states have been able to block the content of websites considered to be morally or politically undesirable. The extent and varying methods of internet control have been documented by the Open Net Initiative (http://opennet.net/). Three examples  will suffice, the first two taken from authoritarian governments. Saudi  Arabia requires all web access to be routed through a proxy server, server, which blocks access to politically or religiously sensitive material. In China, the state employs employs an estimated estimated 30 000 public servants to monitor the content content of websites (Guardian, 14 June 2005), and companies like Yahoo, Google and Microsoft have been required to censor their own material in order to gain access to the Chinese market. This provoked a political storm in 2006 when Yahoo was widely criticised for releasing information to the Chinese authorities about the use of the internet by a political dissident.  Y  Yahoo ahoo executives argued a rgued that they had no choice but to abide by the ‘laws, ‘laws , regulations and customs’ of the countries in which they operate (Time , 3 October 2005). Finally, in South Korea, a law was passed in 2008 requiring the users of all major internet portal sites to verify their identity  following the earlier removal of some sites that had expressed personal criticism of politicians. M A R K E T F A IL IL U R E S

Market failures occur when the individual pursuit of self-interest in a  market setting leads to collectively sub-optimal outcomes. Externalities or non-priced non-p riced impacts (such as damage from pollutio pollution) n) on third parties who are not part of direct market transactions are a case in point. We have

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

already seen in Chapter in Chapter 2 that 2  that public choice theory offers a riposte to the orthodox theory of market failure, arguing that state intervention can be a source of inefficiencies. Recognition of the costs of state intervention has certainly encouraged privatisation and deregulation. Yet over the same period, new forms of market failure have been identified and dealt with through hierarchical intervention. In the environmental arena, scarce resources such as water have increasingly beenfor managed hierarchical forms of statea intervention. In  Australia, f or example,through the t he federal government imposed quantitative cap on water extractions in the largest river system in the country, and uses mark ma rket etss and and othe otherr mean meanss to pric pricee wate waterr to re refle flect ct its its sc scar arci city ty va valu luee (Con (Conne nell ll,, 2007). Ther 2007). Theree ar aree prop propos osal alss in Austr ustral alia ia to tran transf sfer er diffi difficu cult lt and and cont conten enti tiou ouss  water allocation decisions to an independent authority, authority, along the lines of  the policy authority held by independent central banks. More broadly, the use of hierarchy in environmental management is widespread. As we note no ted d in Ch Chap apte terr 1, a wide wide-ra -rang ngin ingg study study by Andr Andrew ew Jorda ordan n and and coll collea eagu gues es (2005, 490) found that, despite the development of a range of new environmental policy instruments, the state remains a central player and that there has been’.‘no wholesale and spatially uniform shift from government to governance’. governance In the case of climate change, much has been made of market-based emissions trading schemes. We examine the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme in Chapter in Chapter 6. 6. The fourth report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) says clearly that states must continue to play the lead role in steering investment decisions, promoting the use of  alternative energy sources, encouraging the development and transfer of  technologies, and investing in public transport in order to reduce carbon emissions. States have also relied on hierarchical governance mechanisms to tackle other environmental market failures, such as traffic congestion. London, Milan, Stockholm and Singapore have exploited new technology  to introduce congestion charges. In London charging has resulted in a 20 per cent fall in inner-city congestion since 2003. In Germany trucks are now charged for their use of roads according to the distance they travel and their emission levels. Finally, in the case of pollution caused by plastic bags, some states have moved beyond moral suasion of the sort examined in the following chapter to impose taxes, levied at the point of sale, upon consumers. The introduction of such a tax in Ireland resulted in a 90 per cent reduction reduction in the production production of bags (DELG, 2002). Governme Gov ernments nts have also identified identified obesity (especially (especially in children), children), pension provision and population decline as policy problems that competitive

 

80

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

79

markets are unable to resolve. Hierarchical governmental action to address obesity includes requirements that manufacturers list ingredients clearly  and bans on the sale of junk food in schools. In 2006 the New York  City Board of Health attracted publicity when it prohibited the use of  artificial trans fats in public restaurants. In the case of pension provision, deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the misselling of  pensions and a long-term shortfall in provision. To address this market failure, states are increasingly  requiring   individuals to contribute a certain  requiring  individuals proportion of their income to state-regulated pension schemes. Finally,  worries about declining population levels in Italy, Italy, Sweden, Sweden, Japan, France and South Korea have encouraged governments to try to boost birth rates through ‘baby bonuses’, tax incentives, and improved maternity and paternity payments (OECD, 2007). In France, all-day nurseries, income tax  reductions and subsidised rail transport have all been employed. Such measures supplement the Medal of the French Family which, since the 1920s, has been awarded to any woman who gives birth to more than eight children. Perhaps the most dramatic recent example of hierarchy being used to deal with market failure is the role of governments in dealing with the global credit market crisis since late 2007. In September 2008, for example, central banks, led by the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, injected over $620 billion of liquidity into the banking system by, effectively, lending taxpayers’ money to banks that  were refusing to lend money to each other. other. In order to reassure savers, the Irish government subsequently took the extraordinary step of guaranteeing  all deposits held in high-street banks for a two-year period. This created a competitive competitive pressure pressure similar to the California effect documented documented in 2.  Once Ireland had guaranteed savings in its banks, the governChapter 2. ments of Greece, Germany, Austria, Denmark and Sweden succumbed to intense pressure to guarantee savings in their banks in order to prevent capital flight. When it became clear that these measures had not restored confidence and that stock markets were continuing to crumble, a number of governments then proscribed the short-selling of shares while the governments of Austria, Iceland, Russia, Romania and the Ukraine simply  suspended share trading altogether.  When even these measures failed and the global financial system came close to meltdown, governments directly intervened to effectively partnationalise the world’s banking system. In the United States, the giant insurance company American International Group was the beneficiary of  a $85 billion loan, which its former chief executive officer characterised

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

as nationalisation. Before the political dust had settled, America’s two

81

giant mortgage corporations, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, were taken into the ‘conservatorship’ of their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance  Agency, at an immediate cost to the US taxpayer of at least $200 billion.  After protracted negotiations and much political grandstanding during  an election year, Congress agreed to spend more than $700 billion to buy ‘toxic’ debts from failing banks. In the United Kingdom two banks, Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, the latter specialising in ‘selfcertifying’ mortgage applications, were taken into public ownership  before  a furt furthe herr £500 £500 bill billio ion n of ta taxp xpay ayer ers’ s’ mone moneyy was was foun found d to take take equi equity ty stak stakes es in a numb number er of bank banks. s. In re retu turn rn,, the the UK gove govern rnme ment nt extr extrac acte ted d guar guaran ante tees es that that these banks would limit executive pay and resume lending to businesses, mortgage applicants, and other banks. Following its lead, the French, German, Austrian and Spanish governments pledged upwards of   €800 billion of taxpayers’ money to rescue crippled banks and inject further liquidity into European capital markets. Beyond the immediate crisis, policy debate began to focus on the need for long-lasting reform in the management and organisation of the world’s finan fin anci cial al mark market ets. s. The The impo import rtan antt poin pointt to make make here here is that that all all the the prop propos osal alss for reform required the extension of hierarchical authority. At the time of   writing in November November 2008, 2 008, in no particular order of either significance s ignificance or feasibility, proposals included: restrict the use of derivatives and securitisation; one specific option was to require those who securitise debt to retain a part of the risk of the securities they create proscribe the creation of hedge funds that seek to minimise client risk  by engaging in short selling  selling  tighten capital adequacy requirements in order to prevent banks from exposing themselves to too much debt create new insurance schemes to guarantee savings, the schemes being     

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

funded out of bank profits during periods of economic boom, rather than by taxpayers at a moment of bust require financial institutions to reveal their debt liabilities to each other establish new rules requiring central banks to target not only underlying  inflation but the ‘asset bubbles’ that frequently precede financial crises restrict executive pay and tax, or simply prohibit incentive schemes that encourage risk-taking to meet short-term performance targets empow emp ower er intern internatio ational nal bodies bodies,, whethe whetherr the Inter Internat nation ional al Monet Monetary  ary  Fund, und, the the G7 or the the G20, G20, to st stan anda darrdise dise inte intern rnat atio iona nall finan financi cial al regulations.

 

82

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

It might be objected that the financial crisis was caused by financial deregulation and sustained by an apparently limitless neo-liberal faith in markets and that it is therefore ironic to cite the crisis as evidence of a 

resurgent state. The global credit crisis certainly exposed the limitations of  an ideology which maintained that the pursuit of individual self-interest in competitive markets would always and everywhere secure the collective good. Its inadequacy is now recognised even by neo-liberals such as the former chairman of the Federal Reserve and chief cheerleader for financial deregulation, Greenspan (in played testimony to Congress in October 2008). Although aAlan supporting role was by Congress – which, for its own political reasons, pressed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to underwrite the ‘sub-prime’ mortgages being offered to poor American families – it is diffi di fficu cult lt to avoi avoid d cast castin ingg finan financi cial al dere deregu gula lati tion on as the the vi vill llai ain n of the the finan financi cial al debacle. Yet the coordinated and extraordinary response to the credit crisis showed showe d that the state remains capable of intervening intervening decisively decisively in dereguderegulated and globalised financial markets. The failure of governments across the world to anticipate and prevent the crisis from occurring reflected a  failure of political will rather than of governing ability. Partly artly in re resp spon onse se to the the re regu gula lato tory ry chall challen enge gess of glob global alisa isati tion on and and partl partly  y  du due a dion esir esnire tolinte in grat ateecity mar ma rkets keats, , stat st esnge hav haevof e work wo rke edThis toge tois geth thell ercert tortai eainl nhan nh ance ce theeeirtonat th atio alepol po ic icyytegr capa ca paci ty in wide wi deate ra rang area areas. s. Th will wi ce nly y be a central issue in dealing with the global financial crisis. In another arena  the development of the European Union has seen the rise of a Europe wide ‘regulatory state’ dominated by Brussels and using a wide array of  relatively independent regulatory agencies, such as the European Central Bank (Majone, 1996 (Majone, 1996)). The continuing relevance of hierarchical regulatory  rule-making rule-mak ing within the European Union Union can be seen in the ‘almost ‘almost exponential growth, during the last three decades, of member directives and regulations produced by the Brussels authorities each year’ (Majone, 1997, 144). Moreover, Moreover, the ‘Europeanisation’ of regulation continues to empower national regulators linked to complex European regulatory On a similar transnational regulatory note, and as we sawregimes. in Chapter 2, in Chapter 2, a major study by Drezner (2007) argues that state authority, especially  that of the major states, is the driving force behind new extensions of  state regulation in fields from the internet to international finance and the international pharmaceutical industry. Because of the growth of regulation and legal standards as extensions of state authority to regulate or poli po lice ce the the inte intern rnat atio iona nall ar aren ena, a, sc scho hola lars rs have have also also obse observ rved ed the the gro growth wth in the the ‘juridification’ of international relations and regulatory policy (Jayasuriya, 2001). Even in international arenas once considered the domain of private

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

transnational corporations, such as the oil industry, it is now increasingly  the case that national oil corporations, in many cases backed by state authority, have been out-manoeuvring oil giants such as Shell and Exxon Mobil in securing oil reserves around the world. Moreover, critical studies of global governance find plenty of evidence that international organisa-

83

tions from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization possess only limited autonomy from their most powerful member states (Murphy, 2000 2000), ), and that the leading nations, such as the United States, still exert considerable hegemony in shaping the rules of the international policy and regulatory arena (Gowan, 1999; Wade, 2003 Wade, 2003;;  Beeson & Bell, 2009). POLICING SOCIETY

In developed countries the last few decades have witnessed a significant extension exten sion of policing policing and surveillance. surveillance. This has occurred occurred amidst a general general set of fears, articulated by both the right and the left, about a breakdown of social responsibility following the erosion of traditional forms of social conditioning and restraint such as religion, community and family. In the the welf welfar aree field field,, new new forms forms of ‘welfa welfare re cont contrac ractu tuali alism sm’’ now now exem exempl plif ify  y  new or additional layers in the state’s regulation of behaviour. Prompted by concerns about the growth of a dependency culture and fraud, welfare payments have been made conditional upon a recipient’s willingness to look for work or retrain or undertake voluntary work. Following the development of a number of state-based programs, in 1996 President Clinton signed into law a new federal welfare system, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. This requires welfare recipients to retrain and imposes a  lifetime limit of 60 months upon the payment of support (Lurie, 1997 (Lurie, 1997)). A  number of countries – including the United States, the United Kingdom,  Australia and France – have adopted conditional welfare payments for the unemployed, lone parents, and the disabled (Clegg & Clasen, 2007 Clasen,  2007). ). In  Australia, contracts are being used to codify, codify, monitor and regulate the behaviour of welfare recipients through arrangements developed under the Howard government’s government’s system of ‘mutual obligation’. obligation’. State tatess have have used used tax tax ince incent ntiv ives es,, subsi subsidi dise sed d nurse nursery ry pl plac aces es and and job-s job-shar harin ing  g  schemes to encourage mothers to return to work. In Mexico, Brazil and other South American countries, conditional cash transfers provide financial incentives for mothers to take nutritional supplements, keep their children in school, and ensure they attend regular health check-ups. Parents are paid only if they effectively police their own activities. This kind of disciplinary power has also been employed in New York, where private

 

84

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

charities, funded through the mayor’s office, have offered cash payments to students in poor neighbourhoods who excel in exams. In parallel with such developments, and possibly overshadowing them, there the re has has been been an incr increa ease se in poli polici cing ng and and the the micr microo-man manag agem emen entt of soci societ etyy. The case of speeding fines is a classic example of governments ratcheting  up legal sanctions and technologically sophisticated methods of surveil-

lance in order to extend (increasingly successful) controls over drivers’ behaviour. The spread of random breath testing to detect alcohol and othe ot herr drug drugss amon amongg driv driver erss is a re rela late ted d ex exam ampl plee of the the stat statee furt furthe herr encr encroa oach ch-ing on societal behaviour. Writing about trends in the United Kingdom,  Adam Crawford (2006, 455) argues that ‘ambitious, interventionist government is alive and well’. He documents the rise of a ‘complex mosaic of  micro-management’ in previously semi-autonomous schools, universities and other public bodies. More generally, he points to enhanced efforts to regulate a wide range of behaviour through such hierarchical instruments as anti-social behaviour and parenting orders (see also Burney,   2005) 2005). The 1000 new criminal offences encoded in law in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2005 included measures allowing the state to prosecute and jail the parents of persistent truants. There have also been increasing incursions designed to curb ‘anti-social’ behaviour in public places, including police crack-downs, curfews, dispersal orders and court orders to restrict freedom of movement. Over the same period, the development of a  netwo ne twork rk of li link nked ed cl clos osed ed-c -cir ircu cuit it tele televi visio sion n camer cameras as has allow allowed ed the the poli police ce to track the movements of individuals and cars in city centres. It is estimated that the average UK citizen is now caught on a surveillance camera more than 300 times a day (BBC News, 2 November 2006). The authorities are even deploying technologies such as miniature remote-controlled drone aircraft fitted with surveillance cameras, and ‘talking’ surveillance cameras that can shout public rebukes to offenders dropping litter or engaging in other anti-social behaviour (Economist , 27 September 2007). The former abode of George Orwell, the author of the authoritarian dystopia  1984    1984 , now has surveillance cameras outside it. Recently, in response to continuing concerns about binge drinking, the government proposed measures to ban pubs and restaurants from running promotions offering women free drinks. The rhetoric of ‘crisis’ is increasingly an excuse for sidestepping routine policy processes and strengthening the hand of centralised government.  A classic example occurred in Australia where the federal government (in the run-up to a tough election) declared a national emergency in 2007, following the publication of a report that alleged that child sexual

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

abuse was occurring in ‘almost every’ Aboriginal community in the remote Northern Territory (Toohey (Toohey,, 2008, 2008, 45).Thedecisiontointervenewasmade hastily by a small inner inner circle without without wide consultati consultation on with the Northern Northern Territory government (whose chief minister subsequently resigned). The relevant legislation was rushed through the federal parliament. With the assi assist stan ance ce of the the ar army my and and poli police ce and and the the nota notabl blee abse absenc ncee of any any comm commun unit ity  y  engagement or stakeholder consultation, the federal government forcibly  acquire acqu ired d five-ye five-year ar leases leases over over townsh township ip land, land, quarant quarantine ined d welfar welfaree payment payments, s,

85

introduced new restrictions on the sale of alcohol and pornography, and announced health checks forgue all Final inally ly,, fear fecompulsory arss of terr terror oris ist t atta attack cks s and and rogu ro e stat stchildren. ates es have have been been used used to just justif ify  y  a wide range of military interventions interventions,, security security and surveillance surveillance measures, measures, new powers of detention, curbs on civil liberties, extended detention without charge, ‘offshore’ detention centres such as Guantanamo Bay, Bay, as well as the use of torture and practices such as ‘extraordinary rendition’. The US govvernme go rnment nt has has inv investe sted an estim stimat ateed $3 tril trilllion ion and and the the liv lives of over ver 4000 4000 Thee form formeer of it itss sold soldie iers rs fight fightin ingg the the war war in Ira raq q (Sti (Stigl glit itzz & Bilme ilmes, s, 2008) 2008). Th US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, argued for a system of ‘preventative detention’, claiming that ‘you can’t allow somebody to commit the crime before you detain them’. A wide range of such security incursions has been deployed the United Kingdom, the United and Australia. In the UnitedinStates, legislation introduced shortly States after September 11 enabled the federal government to monitor and freeze bank accounts suspected of being used to support terrorism (Woodward, 2002 (Woodward, 2002,, 45). Subsequently, the Patriot Act has relaxed controls over phone-tapping and other forms of surveillance. In the United Kingdom the government opted outt of part ou partss of the the Europe ropean an Conv Conveentio ntion n on Human uman Right ightss in ord order to pass pass legi legisl slat atio ion n allo allowi wing ng it to hold hold inde indefin finit itel elyy and and with withou outt char charge ge any any fore foreig igne nerr  who is deemed a national security risk. Following Following legal challenges to this measure the government introduced indefinitely renewable control orders, including electronic tagging, a ban on phone and internet use, and strict cu curf rfew ewss on any any susp suspec ecte ted d terr terror oris ist, t, Bri riti tish sh or fore foreig ign n (Economist , 4 Octobe toberr 2007). HIERARCHICAL GOVERNANCE: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATIONS

Despite such continuing incursions, a body of work points to various problems of hierarchical control and the dangers of regulatory overreach (Sunstein, 1990 (Sunstein,  1990)). Echoing a widespread view in the governance literature,

 

86

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 Jon Pierre Pierre and Guy Peters Peters (2000, 3) argue that ‘states can no longer longer control society in a conventional command and control mode’. Arguments first developed in the 1970s about the difficulties of policy implementation (Jordan, 1999; Lampinen & Uusikyla, 1998; Goggin et al., 1990 al.,  1990)) and state failure (Winston,  (Winston,   2006; 2006;   Orcalli,  Orcalli,   2007 2007)) continue to be applied to new subject matter. Such arguments should be taken seriously. There are problems with implementation failure; vested interests can exert powerful pressures on regulation; and there can be complex disputes over legal interpretation and enactment.

On the other hand, the difficulties involved involved in hierarchical hierarchical governance governance ought not to be exaggerated. The claim that governments always fail has no more veracity than the claim that governments never fail. It is clear that, sometimes against all expectations, hierarchical governance remains an effective means of addressing some policy problems. For example, in a  review of clean air regulation in the United States, Daniel Cole and Peter Grossman (1999 (1999))  challenge accounts of regulatory failure and argue that top-down regulation has proved reasonably effective in many instances. They invite critics to be more sensitive to the historical, technological, institutional and political environment of regulation; and they review a  range of studies to demonstrate that these contextual factors shape the efficacy of command and control strategies compared to alternative strategies, such as market-based instruments. Despite the difficulties countries have experienced in meeting their obligations under the Kyoto Treaty, internationally coordinated hierarchical intervention to deal with environmental problems can be effective. In the 1980s and early 1990s countries negotiated a series of deep cuts to the production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used in refrigerators and many industrial processes at an estimated long-term cost of $20–40 billion (Sandler, 2004 (Sandler,  2004,,  215). These gases were implicated in the creation of a growing ozone hole above the Antarctic. As a result of these agreements, overall global consumption of CFCs has more than halved, while the atmospheric concentration of most ozone-depleting  gases started to drop in the late 1990s. Statess have also adapted and reconfigured State reconfigured themselves themselves in ways that have increased centralised control and hierarchical authority. First, government leaders in a number of countries have increasingly centralised executive power and authority, a trend commentators have referred to as the presidentialisation of politics (Poguntke & Webb, 2005), the strengthening  of a culture of command (Walter & Strangio,  Strangio,   2007; 2007;  Walter, 2008  Walter,  2008)), or the rise of post-democratic leadership (Hocking, 2005 (Hocking,  2005)). The powers exercised by Prime Ministers Tony Tony Blair and John Howard and President Bush

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

exemplify this dynamic, which emphasises ‘strong leadership’ in the face of real or constructed ‘crises’. The centralisation of executive power is reflected in the strengthening and growing insulation of inner circles of  policy formulation and advice, often featuring the rise of political advisers and spin doctors, the bypassing of party structures and parliamentary arenas of decision-making, and the sidelining of departmental advice or input and even, at times, of cabinet government itself. Wide consultation and community engagement are obvious casualties of this approach. Seco Se cond nd,, state statess cont contin inue ue to re rely ly upon upon – and and inde indeed ed stre streng ngthe then n – hier hierar arch chiical governance governance options partly because because their own reform reform efforts have made

87

such options more attractive. As Michael Moran (2002, 410) observes, some of the ‘biggest upheavals that have taken place are actually within state structures themselves’. Attacks on state intervention in the name of  public choice have actually encouraged politicians to undertake reforms that strengthen state capacity. States are combating principal-agent problems by tightening authority structures and escalating the use of audits and other internal disciplinary measures such as competition and the use of  tightly specified contracts. Gove Go vern rnme ment ntss have have al also so sough soughtt to insti institu tutio tiona nall llyy rede redesig sign n their their ow own n state state systems to make them more responsive and authoritative. Across most  Western  W estern governments, for example, there have been extensive reforms of the public sector in recent decades, often under the banner of ‘new  public management’. This has resulted in a shift in the focus of management systems from inputs and processes to outputs and outcomes; towards grea gr eate terr meas measur urem emen entt of re resu sult lts; s; and and a pref prefer eren ence ce for for le lean aner er,, flatt flatter er an and d more more autonomous organisations (Hood, 1991 (Hood, 1991)). In the United States, States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Sweden and, to a lesser extent, in France, Germany and the European Commission, the application of such ideas over the last 20 years has entailed greater use of targets and performance indicators, tighter budgetary controls, the creation of  semi-autonomous executive agencies, and performance contracts between finance and delivery agencies (see Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000 Bouckaert, 2000,, 192–298, for country-by-country reviews). Performance contracts have exerted greater ministerial control over the bureaucracy. Such management reforms have aimed to abolish the security of tenure of senior bureaucrats, placing them on short-term contracts where performance is judged against specified targets. As we said in Chapter in  Chapter 2, 2,  such reform measures, as well as the use of taskforces and other mechanisms to coordinate policy, rather than hollowing out government have helped to fill it in and strengthen central coordination and the authority of central state institutions.

 

88

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 As a part of this reform process, there has been an explosion not only  in the degree to which state agencies regulate non-state agencies but in the regulation of state agencies by other parts of the state (Hood et al., 1999). Over the last few decades watchdog bodies have acquired additional staff, budg bu dget etss and and re regu gula lato tory ry powe powers. rs. For examp example le,, in the the Unite nited d States tates the the Offic Officee of Management and Budget monitors the performance of federal agencies; in the United Kingdom the Office for Standards in Education monitors and reports upon the performance of state schools; the European Court of Auditors must declare whether the European Union’s budget has been implemented correctly; and in Australia assorted Crime and Misconduct Commissions investigate ofnts public In an impo import rtan antt surv survey eyallegations of gove govern rnme ment s that that sector ha have ve incr incorruption. crea ease sed d cent centra rall st stee eerr-

ing and control in the face of external risks and the imperatives of internal control, Moran (2002) documents the growth of the ‘regulatory state’. Similarly, writers such as Martin Loughlin and Colin Scott (1997), FranKanishka Ja Jayasuriy yasuriyaa (2001) cis McGowan and Helen Wallace (1996 (1996))  and Kanishka argue that the institutional architecture of the state is changing, with an increasing emphasis on institutional self-regulation, technocratic rule, and patterns of intervention designed to support and police markets and other arenas of social life. According to these authors, central state powers have been consolidated and insulated, and core policy-making has been distanced from disruptive politicsindependent and partisanand intervention. This has been associated with moves towards partly self-regulating policy institutions whose rules and behaviour take on an increasingly juridical character at one remove from the government (see also Majone, 1996 Majone, 1996)).  A range of factors have been adduced to explain the increasing delegation of powers to independent agencies within government. In particular, the establishment of quasi-autonomous agencies offers politicians the prospect of boosting the expertise and authority of regulators, enhancing the credibili bi lity ty of a poli policy cy in the the eyes eyes of thir third d part partie ies, s, and and perh perhap apss shie shield ldin ingg poli politi tici cian anss fr from om the the poli politic tical al heat heat of makin makingg toug tough h regu regulat latory ory deci decisi sion onss (Gil (Gilar ardi di,, 2002; 2002; Elgie, 2006 Elgie,  2006). ). The recourse to specialised regulatory remits and the honing  of developments thatents. have helped build or specialised rebuild theexpertise authority authorityare ofimportant states in complex environments. environm  Although his work concentrates on the United Kingdom, Moran (2003; 2006) offers us one way to summarise the general effect of such changes in the way states order their activities. He charts a shift away from an earlier form of closed and genteel control by cloistered elites, which he refers to as ‘club government’, in favour of the development of a new  form of ‘high modernism’ and a new and more hierarchical ‘regulatory 

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

state’. The latter is characterised by stronger central controls, and extensive auditing and quantitative measurement of performance (see also Porter, 1995; 2004)). In response to claims by Rhodes (1997) about 1995;  Baldwin,   2004  weakening central controls and the hollowing out of the state, Moran (2006, 35) suggests: ‘to maintain this paradigm in the face of the evidence of the state’s transformed role – notably its invasion precisely of those self-regulating networks that were once central to British regulation – involves serious intellectual contortion’. Similar observations regarding the strengthening of the UK state in the context of the drive for neo-liberal reforms, particularly under Prime Minister Thatcher, have been made by Andrew Gamble (1998), who talks about the combination of a ‘free market and the strong state’. More broadly, Stephen Vogel (1996) shows that the creation of ‘freer markets’ has resulted in the imposition of more rules. Echoing earlier classical themes in political economy, especially as

89

developed by Karl Polanyi (1957 (1957)), Moran (2006, 42) argues that the ‘road to a more more mark market et li libe bera rall soci socieety was was cle clear ared ed and and sust sustai aine ned d by a mass massiv ivee stat statee intervention and a sharp rise in state control of regulatory systems’. He trac traces es this this proc proces esss in vari variou ouss deve develo lopm pmen ents ts,, from from the the tigh tighte teni ning ng of cont contro rols ls over financial markets and the City of London to the imposition of new  top-down governance agendas in arenas as diverse as school performance and the administration of sports. This is a discussion to which we will return in Chapter in Chapter 6. 6. SELF-REGULATION IN THE SHADOW OF HIERARCHY

Criticisms were first made in the 1970s and 1980s about the difficulties of successfully regulating the activities of non-state actors through hierarchical control. In response there has been an important movement toward various systems of self-regulation, or light-touch, smart or responsive regulation,, particularly lation particularly in business business and the professions professions (Cunningham (Cunningham & Rees, Rees, 1997; Braithwaite,  1992)). We will consider this reform process 1997;  Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992 in detail because it offers a good example of state-centric relational policy  capacity. The growth of self-regulation in business sectors, financial markets and the professions reminds us that states must frequently forge governing  coalitions with societal interests in order to achieve their policy goals. In othe ot herr word words, s, state state capac capacity ity is achie achieve ved d through coa coalit lition ion with other other powerf powerful ul non-state interests to achieve joint aims. As this book argues, state capacity  ought to be understood not only as a product of the state institutional

 

90

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

capacities but also as a network or   relational  concept.   concept. The relationship between state and non-state actors in such systems of self-regulation is not, however, one of equality; it should not be interpreted simply as an abandonment of hierarchical governance. As Ian Bartle and Peter Vass (2007, 902) point out, under self-regulation we may have moved beyond ‘conven conventio tional nal hierarc hierarchy’ hy’,, but ‘the ‘the state still still retain retainss a special special place place . . . in a  self-regulatory world, that place, at the very least, is primus inter pares ’.’. If states are always central players in shaping patterns of self-regulation, it is also useful to point to the impact of state traditions and institutional struc str uctu ture ress in shapi shaping ng cr cros oss-n s-nati ation onal al varia variatio tions ns in regu regula lato tory ry pract practic ice. e. Davi David d Vogel (1986) looked at differing ‘national styles of regulation’ some time ago, suggesting that a formal and legalistic pattern of regulation in the United States could be contrasted with informal and cooperative modes in the United Kingdom. Abraham Newman and David Back (2004 (2004)) pointed to a similar distinction in patterns of self-regulation, arguing that in the United States there is stronger recourse to direct threats by the state to

impose punitive action if industry does not meet self-regulatory standards. These relations of cooperation and hierarchy in self-regulatory practice have been analysed by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite (1992) in their influential model of ‘responsive regulation’. They emphasise that effective self-regulation can be fostered by continuing persuasion and dialogue between regulators and those being regulated. In the place of a confrontational relationship they show how expectations, agreements, and codes and norms of compliance can over time be agreed cooperatively (see also Cunningham & Grabosky, Grabosky, 1998)  1998). As As Chapter  Chapter 5 emphasises, 5 emphasises, persuasion is increasingly recognised as an important aspect of governance. But responsive regulation requires more than persuasion. Ayres and Braithwaite are clear that the compliance of non-state actors with understandings and expectations expec tations agreed agreed through dialogue is best fostere fostered d in a pyramidal pyramidal set of  relations. The base of this pyramid represents the ongoing arena of persuasion, norm-building, codification and voluntary compliance within the regulated sector. Yet such activity occurs in the shadow of hierarchy, with recourse, if needed, to the top of the pyramid, through the imposition of  coercive power if there are failures or breaches in self-regulation or compliance. Self-regulation works if, as well as speaking softly, the state carries a  big stick. In surveying the role played by the Occupational Health and Safety   Administration in the United States, Charles Caldart and Nicholas Ashford (1999 (1999))  found that cooperation between state and non-state actors to ensure more responsive regulation required strong systems of deterrence

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

and autho and authorit rityy. Si Simi mila larly rly,, in a st stud udyy of comp compet etiti ition on poli policy cy and and corpo corporat ratee regregulation in Australia, Christine Parker (2002) describes a process whereby  the role of the state has changed from direct command and control to a system of state-guided ‘metaregulation’, entailing the constituting of  markets and overseeing systems of self-regulation. Parker compares the performance of two regulatory agencies, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. She argues that both agencies adopted a strategy broadly in line with Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramidal, responsive regulation model. In her view the former has been a more successful metaregulator because it has more effectively connected the use of moral suasion and cooperation to state coercion. To what extent have such responsive partnerships weakened the state and drained its power? Lester Salamon (2002, 15, 12) reflects a common view when he argues that collaborative collaborative forms of governance governance entail mutual dependencies between state and non-state actors, in which ‘no entity is in a position to enforce its will on others’ and ‘negotiation and persuasion

91

re repl plac acee comm comman and d and and cont contro roll (see (see al also so Pie ierr rree & Peter eters, s, 2000 2000,, 99 99). ). In thes thesee conditions states are forced to ‘surrender significant shares of authority’ in order to make such collaborations effective (Salamon, 2002, 12). We disagree. Governance through partnerships, whether by means of selfregulation in associative networks or through community engagement, has allowed states capacity by reducing much ofse the burd bu rden en of prev previo ious usly lytocumb custrengthen mber erso some metheir re regu gula lato tory ry co cont ntro rols ls. . Yet in sy syste stems ms of self lf-regulation the state, operating under the shadow of hierarchy, remains the  weighty actor a ctor.. Indeed Chris Berg (2008 ( 2008)) argues that responsive regulation has allowed governments to increase  their   their regulatory reach in the economy  because firms have been pressured into accepting ‘voluntary’ agreements that they must abide by.  Wee have concentrated here on responsive regulation, but in other cases  W the state’s commitment to power-sharing can be even more limited. States do sometimes grant parcels of decision-making authority to non-state actors, but such grants are likely to be limited, highly conditional and po pote ntia iall llyy re reve vers rsib ible le..toThis Thdo is is pa rtly ly beca beonly caus useespecial st stat ates es do not not like like to shar sh aree powe powerr andtent usually consent sopart under or restrictive conditions. It is also because, even in a brave new public management world, politicians know that voters expect government to be ultimately accountable for outcomes. Thus governments set the parameters of acceptable agreements, and they may even overturn negotiated outcomes or plans submitted by  devolved negotiating forums. In recent years, following a series of public

 

92

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

scandals over the misbehaviour of doctors, the UK government withdrew  from the British Medical Council the authority to determine a doctor’s fitness to practise. At the same time, in order to meet an ambitious target to build 3 million new homes between 2008 and 2020, the government created create d a new Homes and Community Agency with the legal authority authority to issue binding directives to housing associations which, although publicly  subsidised, have previously operated as independent not-for-profit NGOs.  A further example of states enhancing their capacity by developing  close relations with non-state actors is offered by Geert Teisman and ErikHans Klijn (2002 (2002)), who examine various partnership arrangements in the redevelopment of Rotterdam Harbour. Their main finding is that government actors wanted to ‘retain their primacy’ in the processes and  were largely unwilling to share power (p. 204). Similarly, Similarly, in a study of  ecol ec olog ogic ical al mode modern rnis isati ation on poli policy cy in Swede weden, n, Lenn Lennart art Lund Lundqv qvis istt (2001, (2001, 332 332)) sets out to test Rhodes’ arguments about ‘governance without government’ and finds that, ‘contrary to Rhodes’ assertions, central government has been found to hold the initiative in the process of implanting Sweden’s new strategy of ecological modernisation’. The central government went out of its way to build new processes and institutions that increased its

power in relation to interlocutors such as independent expert agencies and municipal governments.

T RN OA WNI N G VOLUME OF GH OEV G ER CE

This chapter argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, governance through hierarchy remains an essential part of the policy armory of  governments. However, we do not argue that governing and governments have remained unchanged. The following chapters illustrate the development of governance through persuasion, markets, community engagement and associative governance. Is there a contradiction in arguing that governance through hierarchy is resurgent   and  that   that there has been growth in the use of other governance mechanisms? We think not. The use of  governance mechanisms can be measured in relative and absolute terms. Relatively, there has been some shift towards governance through markets, community engagement and associations. Yet because the total volume of  governance has grown, the absolute level of governance through hierarchy  has also increased. The total volume of governance has increased within many countries because the range of the collective goals that governments pursue has

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000   s   e   g 5,000   a    P 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0

   2   –    1    0    9    1

   8    0    9    1

   4    1    9    1

   0    2    9    1

   6    2    9    1

   2    3    9    1

   8    3    9    1

   4    4    9    1

   0    5    9    1

   6    5    9    1

   2    6    9    1

   8    6    9    1

   4    7    9    1

   0    8    9    1

   6    8    9    1

   2    9    9    1

   8    9    9    1

   6    0    0    2

Year

Figure 4.2. Number of pages of Commonwealth Acts of Parliament passed per year, 1901–2006. Source: Berg, 2008  Berg, 2008 , 12.

increased. As the first part of this book argued, we live in an age in which, despite the apparent political appeal of neo-liberal promises to ‘roll back 

93

the frontiers of the state , people still expect governments to solve policy  problems and steer society. It is true that governments once pursued policy goals that are long abandoned: for instance, most Western countries abandoned food rationing in the late 1940s. By and large, governments no longer attempt to control the movement of currencies across national boundaries, and in many European Union countries internal border control trolss have have been been dism disman antl tled ed.. Yet as new new poli policy cy prob proble lems ms have have been been iden identi tifie fied d and new technologies developed, the range of activities that governments seek to encourage, discourage, regulate, monitor, prohibit or offer advice on has grown. Obesity, species extinction, water conservation, smoking, carbon emissions, anti-social behaviour, the use of mobile phones while driving, busking, hate speech, cloning, the numbers of senior female business ne ss exec executi utive ves, s, the trans transfe ferr of perso persona nall data data betw betwee een n organ organisa isatio tions ns,, dopi doping  ng  in sport, road pricing, the transmission of major sporting events on terrestrial rather than satellite television, stalking, binge drinking, the number of  gold medals won at an Olympics – all have become the subject of political debate and government action.  As a measure of the absolute growth in governance through hierarchy, hierarchy, consider the graphs shown here. Figure  Figure   4.2  shows the total number of  pages of legislation contained in new acts of the Australian Parliament

 

94

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE 300   s    t   n   e   m   e   e   r   g   a    f   o   r   e    b   m   u    N

250 200 150 100 50 0     9     6     9     1

    2     7     9     1

    5     7     9     1

    8     7     9     1

    1     8     9     1

   4     8     9     1

    7     8     9     1

    0     9     9     1

    3     9     9     1

    6     9     9     1

    9     9     9     1

    1     0     0     2

   4     0     0     2

    7     0     0     2

Year

Figure 4.3. Total number of agreements signed by the European Community/Union with third countries and international organisations, 1969–2007  Source: .

between 1901 and 2006. It shows a spectacular increase in the late 1960s  which, far f ar from reversing itself with the t he election of a succession of increasingly neo-liberal governments in the 1980s and 1990s, has accelerated. Figure   4.3  shows the total number of formal agreements signed by the Figure Europ Eu ropean ean Union nion with other other countr countries ies and intern internatio ational nal organi organisati sations ons over three-year periods between 1969 and 2005. The subject matter of 

these agreements is incredibly varied. In 2007 the European Union signed, among other things, things , a fisheries fisherie partnership partners hip agreement agree ment witha Mozambique Mo zambique; a partnership agreement withsthe Republic of Tajikistan; scientific and; technological cooperation agreement with India; a protocol with Thailand relating to manioc production, marketing and trade; a convention on  jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters with Switzerland; and an agreement with Serbia on the issuing of visas. The important point to note is a dramatic increase in the overall number of agreements. In the 1970s when the then European Economic Community was first formulating many of its policies dealing   with trade and agriculture, fewer than 20 agreements were being signed every three years. Between 2002 and 2005 alone, 260 such agreements  4.4 shows  shows total 49 number of regulatory  were signed. Finally, Finally , Figure 4.4 Figure cies contained within 16 policy sectorsthe across countries between agen1960 and 2002. It also shows that a dramatic expansion in regulation started at precisely the moment in the early 1980s when resurgent neo-liberal parties  were promising to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’.

 

HIERARCHY AND TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE

 

40    d    t   e   a   e   r 30   c   s    A    R    f   o 20   r   e    b   m   u    N10

0 1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure 4.4. Expansion of the number of regulatory agencies across 16 sectors and 49  nations, 1960–2002  Source: Brai Braithwaite, thwaite, 2008   2008 , viii. CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided evidence that hierarchical governance, far from retreating, continues to expand in response to new policy challenges. States are clearly building in new governance instruments and expanding their reach. We agree with Moran (2003, 6) and Crawford (2006,

95

471), who argue that there has been an extraordinary growth of the “regulatory state”’ and that ‘recourse to command and control continues to occupy a prominent place in the contemporary social regulatory  armoury’. States are the only policy actors that have the authority to kill, deport, tax, imprison, usurp property, or send people to war. As Christoph Knill and Derk Lehmkuhl (2002, 43) argue, states are often in a unique positio posi tion n to ‘accommo accommodate date conflic conflictin tingg intere interests sts and define define gover governan nance ce priorities’. In defe defere renc ncee to publi publicc se sens nsiti itivi viti ties es,, neoneo-li libe beral ral ideo ideolo logy gy or even even,, perha perhaps, ps, academic writing, governments have sometimes eschewed the rhetoric of hierarchical control and coercive power. Politicians and state officials have found the notion of an ‘enabling’ state particularly attractive. Yet as  we explain in our discussion of governance through community engagement in   Chapter 7, 7,   there is danger in confusing rhetoric with reality.  Wee have described governance in terms of an exchange of authority and  W reso resour urce cess betw betwee een n st state atess and and soci societ etie ies. s. This This is the es esse senc ncee of our our state state-c -cen entr tric ic

 

96

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

re rela lati tion onal al appro approac ach h to gove govern rnan ance ce.. This This chapt chapter er has has docu docume ment nted ed an extraordinary growth in a wide range of forms of top-down authority. Some extensions of authority been criticised as excessive and may  be amended or repealed, whilehave others have been accepted by society as legitimate exercises of power. Either way, the political exchange between state and society is ongoing. ongoing.

 

5

 

Governance through persuasion

UCH OF THE LITERATURE ON GOVERNANCE  focuses

on the means of hierarchy, markets and associational networks (Thompson  2008)). We have argued for a broader concepet al., 1991; Borzel Borzel & P Panke, anke, 2008 tion of governance that allows for the possibility of community engagement, which we discuss in the following chapter, as well as governance through throug h persuasion, persuasion, the focus of this chapter. chapter. This can be contrasted with governance through markets or hierarchies in terms of the motives of those gove go vern rned ed.. Mar arke kets ts and and hier hierar arch chie iess re rest st upon upon the the appl applic icat atio ion n of rewa reward rdss and and sanctions, whether in the form of profits and losses or prohibitions and subsidies. When governing through hierarchy and markets, governments achieve their goals by making it in the interests of other actors to behave in particular ways. Governance through persuasion takes a different form, in which governments or other actors seek to convince people that they  ought to behave in a particular way. Governance through persuasion leads

M

not simply to a change in behaviour but to a change in people’s ideas about how they ought to behave. The capacity to exercise power by changing someone’s someone’s beliefs and values constitutes an important source of power analysed in Michel Foucault’s  work on ‘governmentality’: ‘governmentality’: a term coined to refer to the styles of reasoning characteristic of governing practices (1991). One of Foucault’s most importantt books, Discipline and Punish  (1979), opens with a lengthy and importan horrifying account of the torture and public execution of a murderer in Paris in 1757. This is contrasted with the austere and soulless order of  a young offenders’ institute in France in 1838. For Foucault, the difference en ce betw betwee een n thes thesee two re regi gime mess sy symb mbol olis ises es a more more gene general ral trans transit itio ion n duri during  ng  thiss peri thi period od fr from om ‘rep ‘repre ressi ssive ve’’ to ‘disc discipl iplin inary ary’’ powe power; r; a trans transit itio ion n that that vi vivi vidl dly  y 

97

 

98

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

illustrates the differences between governance through hierarchy and governance through persuasion. Repressive power, as characterised by Foucault, is exercised in the name of the sovereign and is, in its nature, episodic, violent and destructive. The purpose of repressive power – exemplified through military occupations and the suppression of insurrections as well as executions – is not simply to punish those who break established laws but to destroy them. Repressive power is exercised   on  individuals. By contrast, disciplinary power is pervasive, bureaucratic and productive. Disciplinary power is exercised with the intention of changing people’s behaviour. Where repressive power is destructive, disciplinary power is productive, in the sense that it operates through  individuals not to break them down but to reconstitute them in  ways that render them fit to be governed.  Although disciplinary power was initially confined within what Goffman (1968) called ‘total’ institutions such as prisons, hospitals, psychiatric institutions and military barracks, Foucault suggests that it has become a  pervasive – indeed, defining – feature of modern society. Factories, schools and hospitals have come to resemble prisons (Foucault, 1979 (Foucault, 1979,, 225). Supervisors, teachers, administrators, probation officers, career advisers, doctors, social workers, psychiatrists and, yes, lecturers, have all come to share  with prison officers a responsibility for setting and monitoring standards of ‘acceptable behaviour’. Constant regulation within the disciplinary or ‘carcereal’ society has the cumulative effect of shaping not only people’s preferences but their very identities. Foucault challenges the notion that there is an autonomous individual whose preferences the government and other actors can shape. In Foucault Foucault’’s work there are no autonomous individuals who lie behind and remain unaffected by the exercise of power. Power ‘constitutes’ people.

There is an apparent paradox here. The rise of the disciplinary society  has coincided with the triumph of a liberal governmentality that prescribes strict limitations upon government intervention. The Foucaultian answer to this this para parad dox is that that,, if peop people le ar aree to be le left ft to thei theirr own econ econom omic ic devi device ces, s, theyy must the must first first posse possess ss the re requ quir ired ed li libe beral ral vi virtu rtues es of se self lf-d -disc iscip ipli line ne,, fruga frugali lity ty,, entr en trep epre rene neur urshi ship, p, moral moralit ityy and and se sexu xual al re restr strain aint. t. So the state state must must inte interve rvene ne in order to create the conditions for its subsequent non-intervention. Yet in Foucault’s view it is not only representatives of the state such as social  workers and probation officers who exercise this disciplinary power. power. Power Power also also ‘ci circ rcul ulat ates es’, ’, to use use one one of Fouca oucaul ult’ t’ss favou favourit ritee phras phrases es,, within within chur church ches es,, universities, workplaces, community groups and the media.

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

Foucault’s arguments about the exercise of disciplinary power raise an important issue about the relative significance of state and non-state actors as agents of persuasion. In Chapter In Chapter 1 we 1 we showed that states retain an effective monopoly over the exercise of coercive power and that this underpins the continuing relevance of governance through hierarchy. Governance through persuasion, however, requires the exercise of a different kind of  power, and it is not immediately obvious why the state must always play  the same leading role in its application. This chapter provides examples of  non-state actors engaging in governance through persuasion and demonstrates that, on occasions, non-state actors may have a greater capacity to change people’s behaviour. This is important because governance through persu pe rsuas asio ion n might might there therefo fore re cons constit titut utee an import importan antt exam exampl plee of ‘gove govern rnan ance ce  without government’. government’.  Yet  Yet as the chapter unfolds we point to a number of reasons why governance through persuasion depends crucially on the continued involvement of governments: The resources that states possess – their financial muscle, expertise and legitimacy – usually provide a significant capacity to shape people’s preferences. Even where non-state actors are engaged in efforts to change people’s behaviour, governments retain responsibility for the metagovernance of  governance arrangements. Because the state has a monopoly on the exercise of coercive power, it is often the target of others’ persuasi persuasive ve efforts. States have a key advantage over non-state actors in that they can com   

   

   

   

   

bine attempts to behaviour throughgovernance persuasioniswith the application of change rewards people’s and sanctions. Hierarchical not simply an alternative to governance through persuasion; in many cases it enhances the efficacy of governance through persuasion. States play a major role in the development of social capital: one of the

99

key institutional prerequisites for effective persuasion. LEGITIMACY, PERSUASION AND GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT

Non-state No n-state actors routinely routinely attempt to persuade each other to change their beh behavio aviour ur.. Adver Ad vertisi tising ngaand marketi mark eting ng conduc con ducted ted by In and forProcter privatel privately  owned firms constitute m assive massive exercise in persuasion. 2007 &y  Gamble spent $4.6 billion on advertising in the American market; General

 

100

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Motors spent $4.3 billion; Time Warner spent $3.4 billion; and AT&T, $2.4 billion. Although precise estimates are difficult to obtain, the US federal government spent around $5 billion on advertising in 2001 (W ( Weiss, 2002, 222). 2002, Many of these efforts at persuasion may be considered to have little dire di rect ct poli politi tica call cons conseq eque uenc nce. e. Yet ef effo forts rts to pers persuad uadee peop people le to buy buy parti particu cular lar brands of cigarettes, drive sports utility vehicles, or buy fast food obviously  have the potential to undermine government efforts to persuade people to smoke less, reduce their carbon emissions and eat more healthily. But non-state actors also contribute positively  to  to the achievement of collectively  valued goals through persuasion. Consider the following examples. Over the last 30 years governments have sought to reduce rates of  HIV/AIDS infection. The most effective work in promoting safe sex  has often been undertaken by not-for-profit charities. In the United Kingd Kin gdom om the the Ter erre renc ncee Higg Higgin inss Trust, rust, name named d af afte terr one one of the first first Brito Britons ns to die die of AIDS AIDS,, has has soug sought ht to prom promot otee se sexu xual al heal health th th thro roug ugh h info inform rmat atio ion n campaigns and HIV testing programs; it has acquired a reputation for being able to communicate effectively with gay men and change their Australia (Mameli, (Mameli, 2001  2001)) behaviour. In Brazil (Levi & Vetoria, 2002 Vetoria,  2002)), Australia and Hungary (Danziger, 1997 (Danziger,  1997), ), programs to reduce the incidence of  HIV/AIDS have also largely relied upon the involvement of NGOs. 4  pointed to efforts by governments, governing through hierChapter 4 pointed archy, to tackle obesity by, for example, banning the sale of junk food in schools. Non-state actors have also contributed to the achievement of  the same goal. McDonald’s, which was subject to a barrage of bad press following the 2004 release of the film  Super Size Me , has promoted a  range of healthier menu options and committed itself to providing clear and accessible information about the nutritional content of its food. At the same time, it has sought to promote children’s exercise through, for example, a national exercise program run in conjunction with primary  schools in Canada, sponsorship of a junior-league soccer competition    

   

   

in South Korea, and the construction of gym clubs in France. Non-s on-sta tate te acto actors rs ar aree al also so rout routin inel elyy invo involv lved ed in atte attemp mpts ts to pers persua uade de peopeople to contribute to the provision of collectively valued goods. A variety  of airlines and companies like Climate Care, the Carbon Neutral Company and Offset My Life have sought to persuade people to offset their carbon emissions by paying to have trees planted (Smith, 2007 (Smith,  2007,,  14). The fair trade movement, created in the early 1960s, has collaborated  with charities like Oxfam to persuade supermarkets to stock products from manufacturers in developing countries who pay fair wages and

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

employ environmentally sustainable methods of production. Today Today,, the fairr trade fai trade move moveme ment nt is re regu gula late ted d throu through gh the Fairtr airtrad adee Label Labelli ling ng Orga Organnisations International, which sets common labelling standards (Moore, 2004). 2004). These exam These exampl ples es of gove govern rnan ance ce throu through gh pers persuas uasio ion n raise raise an impo imporrtant issue about individual rationality, which we will pause to discuss. Economists and public choice theorists assume, and arguments for the use of markets tend to presuppose, that people can be trusted to further their own inte intere rest stss thro throug ugh h the the choi choice cess they they make make.. Yet the the fa fact ct that that we some someti time mess re regr gret et the the choi choice cess we make make sugg sugges ests ts that that peop people le do not not alwa always ys act act rati ration onal ally ly..  Jon Elster (1979; 1983; 1989) has shown how information asymmetries,  weakness of will and a nd wishful thinking frequently f requently lead people to act in ways that are inconsistent with their own interests. In the absence of rewards or sanctions, people can therefore be persuaded to change their behaviour in order to serve their  own  interests by, for example, practising safe sex or eating more healthily. Governance through persuasion can, however, take a second form. Economists also tend to assume that people are exclusively  self-interested and that acting rationally means acting egoistically. Yet the empiric emp irical al eviden evidence ce is that people people’’s normati normative ve commitm commitment entss freque frequentl ntlyy lead lead them to act in ways that are contrary to their narrowly defined self-interest Ostrom, 1990  1990;; Funk, 2000 Funk, 2000;; Caplan, 2007 Caplan, 2007,, (see Hindmoor, 2006a  Hindmoor, 2006a , 122–5; Ostrom, 148–9 and references therein). This does not come as a surprise. We know  that in certain situations people’s normative commitments can lead them to make dramatic personal sacrifices. We live in a world where politicians sometimes go to jail for their beliefs; thousands of people have chosen to take their own lives (and those of others) in suicide attacks; and millions of people have volunteered to defend their country in times of war, or given blood, or donated time and money to charity. charity. More prosaically, prosaically, there is a wide body of evidence that public sector managers and workers are motivated by a commitment to public service (Brewer, Selden & Facer, 2000; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2000 al., 2000)). People’s willingness to act upon their normative commitments creates an opportunity to seek to persuade people to contribute to the collective

101

good by, for example, offsetting the carbon footprint of a flight. Foucault’s arguments about ‘disciplinary power’ paint a bleak picture of a carcereal society in which, collectively, people can be manipulated to act in ways that are contrary to their own best interests. An equally bleak picture is painted by Steven Lukes (1974), who shows how powerful elites can shape people’s preferences in ways that undermine their real interests. Our accoun acc ountt of gover governan nance ce throu through gh persuasi persuasion on is is more more positiv positive. e. Any power power can

 

102

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

be abus abused ed,, but but the the powe powerr to shap shapee peop people le’’s pref prefer eren ence cess can can be used used to furt furthe herr people’s long-term interests and those of the communities in which they  live. Having discussed the relationship between rationality and persuasion,  we ton-st the oftsthis chapter: significance of  st stat ateereturn and and nonno stat atecentral e acto actors rs issue as agen agents of pers pe rsua uasi sion on.the . The Threlative e invo involv lvem emen entt of nonnonstate actors in governance through persuasion can be linked to arguments about the declining legitimacy of the state. One obvious way in which a  loss of legitimacy may manifest itself is in people’s growing reluctance to be persu pe rsuad aded ed to beha behave ve in certa certain in ways ways by poli politi tici cian anss and and gove govern rnme ment nt offic official ials. s. In the United Kingdom, efforts to persuade parents of the safety of a newly  introduced vaccine for measles, mumps and rubella were undermined by   what is now known to have been rogue research suggesting a possible link  between the vaccine and the onset of autism. The government declared that there was absolutely no additional risk in using the combined vaccine. B a wid wimoney despr esprea ead d beli belief ef that thwith at the thememories vacci accin ne was wa s only only bein beingg intr introd oduc uced ed in orde orthat derr toutsave combined about a previous government  was thought to have deliberately misled people about the dangers of mad cow disease, so that, at one time, up to 30 per cent of parents refused to have their children immunised (Magennis, 1999 (Magennis, 1999,, 136–8).  Where governments lack legitimacy and are not trusted, it is easy to see  why non-state actors may be influential in persuading people to change their behaviour. In the case of the vaccination saga, the UK government eventually turned to the British Medical Council for support. In the case of HIV prevention, the Terrence Higgins Trust acquired a significant role  when it became clear that a significant proportion of the gay community  did notrights trust(Street, 1988 a government  1988)). which, it believed, was ideologically opposed to gay (Street, Ch Chap apte terr 2 ex expl plai aine ned d that that the the exte extent nt to whic which h nati nation onal al gove govern rnme ment ntss have have lost legitimacy can be exaggerated. Voters still expect governments to solve policy problems and steer society. Indeed, the problems that governments face often reflect growing, and occasionally unreasonable, expectations about governments’ capacity to resolve policy problems. There are specific cases in which governments are not trusted and non-state actors have a  greater capacity to successfully engage in governance through persuasion:

the management of HIV/AIDS offers a striking example. Yet Table 2.3 showed that, with the notable exception of the United States, levels of  confidence in national parliaments have not fallen dramatically over the last few decades. Furthermore, in most countries the public’s confidence in gove go vern rnme ment nt exce exceed edss its confi confide denc ncee in priv privat atee firms firms whose whose ef effo forts rts to persu persuad adee

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

people to eat more healthily or take regular exercise are regarded as being  tainted tain ted by self-in self-inter terest est..1 On Onee inte intere resti sting ng,, al altho thoug ugh h date dated, d, stud studyy into into ef effo forts rts to promote energy conservation in New York found that the behaviour of  consumers was more likely to be affected by a message from the New York  State Public Service Commission than by an identical message from their local utility company (Craig & McCann, 1978 McCann, 1978)).  As described in   Chapter 4, 4,  one way in which states have enhanced their governing capacity is through the creation of arm’s-length and semiindependent agencies. In situations where the government lacks legitimacy, such agencies have a vital role. Take, for example, efforts to ensure an adequate supply of blood for medical purposes. Globally, it is estimated that about 18 per cent of all blood is donated on a voluntary basis; 15 per cent is donated specifically to help relatives; and about five per cent is don donate ated in retur eturn n for for cash cash paym paymen ents ts (WHO (WHO,, 2007 2007,, 12). 12). In South uth Afri Africa ca,, Canad Can adaa and and Si Sing ngap apor ore, e, volu volunt ntary ary dona donatio tions ns are are orga organi nise sed d thro throug ugh h notnot-fo forrprofit charities. In most countries, however, blood donation is organised through throug h quasi-autono quasi-autonomous mous governme governmental ntal organisation organisationss like the National National Blood Service in the United Kingdom, the Irish Blood Service or the New  Zealand Blood Service. Even where trust in government has declined, it appears that these organisations have retained a reputation for political impartiality and expertise. It is striking that in the United Kingdom, Ireland and New Zealand, the overall number of voluntary blood donations each year has remained stable at a time when confidence in government has declined slightly. In China, voluntary blood donation increased from 45 to 91 per cent of all donations between 2000 and 2004 following a  concerted government campaign (WHO, 2007, 29). In Bolivia, the establishment of a national blood program and concerted media campaign by  the government government resulted resulted in the rate of voluntary donations donations rising from 10 per cent in 2002 to 50 per cent in 2006. Governments can also seek to  enhance  their   their legitimacy by governing  through throug h persuasion. persuasion. Consider Consider instances instances in which states attempt to change thee beha th behavi viou ourr of a la larg rgee but but disp disper erse sed d and and unor unorga gani nise sed d grou group p whic which h broa broadl dly  y  agre ag rees es abou aboutt the the desi desira rabi bili lity ty of achi achiev evin ingg a goal goal.. Persu ersuas asio ion n will will be an attr attrac ac-tive governance mechanism in such instances because it is non-coercive (Vedung & Doeelen, 1998 Doeelen,  1998;;  Weiss, 2002  Weiss,  2002)). We have shown how the reach of the regulatory state has been extended. Yet except for a wartime emer-

103

gency, most states would quail at the thought of trying to institute a system of compulsory blood donation. donation. As well as the financial and logistical difficultiess of constructing and policing such a system, cultie system, the government government would suffer political costs from loss of legitimacy if people believed this to be an

 

104

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

inappropriate and excessive use of coercive force. Hence, governments can economise on their legitimacy by governing through persuasion. Similarly, governance through persuasion is attractive to governments  where it can create the appearance appeara nce of decisive action. In cases where policy  issues are regarded as important but intractable, states can seek to enhance their legitimacy – or at least avoid a loss of legitimacy – by being seen to tackle a problem. There is little evidence that large-scale government campaigns to persuade schoolchildren of the dangers of drugs, or citizens of the need to report suspicious activity in order to prevent terrorism, reduce levels of addiction or terrorist attack. They may, however, create a  politically useful sense of urgency.  As governments have sought to persuade citizens to behave in particular ways, they have enhanced their communication strategies. Governing  parties increasingly regard themselves as fighting a ‘permanent campaign’ for media and public attention. attention. James Stanyer Stanyer (2007, 42) writes:  An obsession with promotion increasingly shapes all government communication nicat ion effor efforts ts . . . many of the the tech technique niquess pionee pioneered red in th thee public rrelatio elations ns and public opinion industries, and practiced during election campaigns, have become the mainstay of government communication, the belief being  that such promotional techniques are essential for administrations to get their message across.

Reflect Refle ctin ingg upon upon such such deve develo lopm pmen ents, ts, Sydn Sydney ey Blum Blumen enth thal, al, forme formerly rly a se seni nior or adviser to President Clinton, suggests that campaigning has become the new ideolo ideology gy underp underpinn inning ing gover governme nment nt (qu (quote oted d in Lillek Lilleker er,, 2007 2007,, 144) 144).. In order to enhance their capacity to communicate with citizens, according  to David Deacon and Peter Golding (1994, 4–6), modern states have turned themselves into ‘public relations states’ in which the ‘marketing  of government activity has become a central activity of modern statecraft’. The empl employ oyme ment nt of medi mediaa advi advise sers, rs, cons consul ulta tant ntss and and spin spin doct doctor orss is nothi nothing  ng  new ne w, but Deaco Deacon n and and Gold Goldin ingg show show how how gove govern rnme ment ntss have have institutionalised  such activities (see also Ward, 2007 Ward, 2007)). Communication strategies have become professional, political and central. They have been professionalised through the appointment of marketing consultants in the place of public servants; the consultants have adopted – outside the usual campaign environments – focus groups, tracking polls, planning grids, rebuttal units and ‘information subsidies’

(the strategic deployment of information to trusted sources in order to maximise favourable coverage, Gandy, 1982 Gandy, 1982)). Innovative and increasingly 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

sophisticated techniques have been employed to sell government messages. Stanyer (2007, 64) describes how the Clinton administration paid television networks producing popular shows like ER  and  and Beverly Hills 90210  to  to incl in clud udee in their their sc scrip ripts ts re refe fere renc nces es to the gove govern rnme ment nt’’s anti anti-d -drug rugss campa campaig ign. n. In the United Kingdom the government paid Jeremy Kyle, the host of a  controversial crash’ television showthe in ways whichinmen takethe on-air paternity  tests, to host ‘car a chat show discussing which government can help people find work. At the same time, communication strategies have been politicised politicised as the boundaries boundaries between between informing the public and sellingg the governme sellin government nt have blurred. blurred. During the lead-up lead-up to the 2003 Iraq  War  W ar,, the US and a nd UK governments exploited their hierarchical control over the release of intelligence information to inflate the threat posed by Iraq (Kaufmann, 2004 (Kaufmann,  2004))  and marginalise critics of the war. Finally, communication strategies strategies have increasingly increasingly been centralised within and around the office of the president or prime minister as governments have sought to coordinate the activities of disparate departments and ministers (Stanyer, 2007, ,  48; Maltese, 2003 Maltese,  2003) ). In 1997tothe newly Blair decreed 2007 that ministers would be required agree the elected timing Tony and content of any  speeches, press releases, or media interviews with the Downing Street Press Office. THE METAGOVERNANCE OF PERSUASION

Even where non-state actors engage in governance through persuasion, states usually retain the responsibility for the metagovernance of such arrangements. In the case of HIV/AIDS prevention, the decision to forge closer linksPoliticians with the Terrence Higgins Trust was taken within theorganisaMinistry  of Health. and senior public servants decided which tions they were prepared to work with and eschewed campaigning groups like Stonewall Stonewall which, at the time, were thought to be promoting too radical an agenda. The Ministry of Health set the overall goals and targets for the HIV/AIDS campaign and provided most of the resources used to fund campaig camp aigns. ns. Today oday, the Terrenc errencee Higgi Higgins ns Trust (2007), (2007), althoug although h appare apparentl ntly  y  independent of government, continues to receive about three-quarters of  its budget via statutory governme government nt grants or contracts. contracts. In othe otherr cases cases,, gove govern rnme ment ntss assum assumee a metag metagov over erna nanc ncee role role in coor coordi dina natting and steering governance efforts. In 2002 the UK government launched a high-profile campaign to encourage people to eat five portions of fruit

105

and vegetables a day, amidst reports that up to 42 000 people were dying 

 

106

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

each year as a result of their failure to do so. Much of this campaign  was delivered in conjunction with 500 partner organisations, including  NGOs like the British Heart Foundation and profit-making companies likee Weight lik eight Watchers atchers,, superma supermarke rkett chains chains and food food manufact manufacture urers rs (Colli (Collins ns et al., 2003 al.,  2003)). Yet responsibility for the content and management of the campaign was retained by the Ministry of Health; it intervened when, for example, a food manufacturer, Heinz, started to promote its range of  tinned spaghetti with the slogan ‘five-a-day the Heinz way’. Our state-centric relational account of governance emphasises the ways in which governments have strengthened their governance capacity by  developing close relations with non-state actors. Governance through persuasi su asion on offe offers rs anot anothe herr examp example le of the pote potent ntia iall llyy posit positiv ivee-su sum m rela relatio tions nship hipss invo in volv lved ed.. Cons Consid ider er,, once once agai again, n, ef effo forts rts to prev preven entt the sprea spread d of HIV/ HIV/AI AIDS. DS. The UK government’s initial efforts to inform people of the dangers foundered when it became clear that large parts of the gay community  saw it as out out of touch touch and and poli politic ticall allyy hostile hostile.. The devo devolut lution ion of resp respons onsibil ibil-ity to organisations like the Terrence Higgins Trust Trust helped the government to achieve its goals. Yet, as we have argued, the relationship between government and NGOs is unequal. Governments continue to set objectives, provide resources and monitor effectiveness. PERSUADING STATES

 When states s tates are not the agents of persuasion, they are frequently its recipients. Because states retain a monopoly of coercive power and, with this, a  monopoly on the authority to construct and revise governance rules, nonstate actors routinely attempt to persuade states to change their behaviour. 6  shows how businesses routinely use the political process to try  Chapter 6 shows and achieve a competitive advantage. More generally, charities, interestgroups, trade unions, universities, local governments and community assoass ociationss all lobby government ciation government in pursuit of their goals. The notion that non-state actors attempt to change the behaviour of  state sta tess is hardl hardlyy nove novel. l. Chapt Chapter er 2 me ment ntio ione ned d many many stud studie iess of poli policy cy netwo network rkss that seek to explain how governments trade policy influence for support in formulating and implementing policy. policy. Yet Yet there is a conceptual problem in viewing these relationships as examples of governance through persuasion. The studies of policy networks view the relationship between governments and an d pres pressu sure re grou groups ps in enti entire rely ly inst instrum rumen ental tal terms terms.. Netwo etwork rkss are are anima animate ted d by,, and by and cons consti titu tute ted d thro throug ugh, h, the the ef effo fort rtss of acto actors rs to barg bargai ain n with with ea each ch othe otherr, exchange resources and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes (Rhodes,

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

1986,   16–23; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992a, 10–11; Rhodes,   1997, 1986, 1997,   36–7). There is no obvious room for persuasion here. Governments and pressuregroups know what they want and flex their muscles in order to achieve it. Preferences are, in the language used by economists, exogenously given and fixed.  Y  Yet et pressure-groups do not simply bargain with government. Just as it is open to governments to try to persuade individuals that they have misconstrued their interests and should change their behaviour, it is open to interest-groups and other actors to persuade the government that a particular policy promotes not only their own interest but the public interest. In 2001 during the crisis over foot-and-mouth disease, the UK government was widely criticised for its refusal to abandon its policy of selective slaughter of animals in favour of one of preventative vaccination.2 Several inquiries later concluded that the costs of closing the countryside to tourists, an inevitable consequence of the slaughter policy, far outweighed the benefits of protecting British meat exports. So why did the government get its policy so wrong? At the time, newspaper commentators routinely  argued that the government had wanted to vaccinate but that the National Farmers Union (NFU), which opposed vaccination, had been allowed to exercise a ‘veto’ over policy (Whittam Smith,  Independent , 30 April 2001). In its report on the handling of foot-and-mouth disease, the European Parliament (2002, para. 34) denounced the way in which a ‘relatively small special interest group’, the NFU, had been given an ‘undue influence over decisions affecting the wellbeing of whole regions’. There is a major problem with this argument: there is no evidence that the UK government ever favoured widespread emergency vaccination as an alternative to slaughter, let alone that the NFU prevented it from implementing this policy (the following draws on Hindmoor, 2009 Hindmoor,  2009)). Of  course, the NFU’s opposition to the vaccination was relevant, but the access the NFU was given to policy-makers throughout the crisis enabled them to repeat repeat to ministers ministers and senior officials officials the arguments arguments for selective selective slaughter and the potential costs and uncertainties of vaccination. The NFU was a large group which could, if it wanted to, make life politically  uncomfortable for the government during an expected general election campaign. The government granted high-level access to NFU officials because it believed that it was in its interest to do so. Groups like the Soil  Association, the National Consumer Council, the National Trust, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Friends of the Earth and the Wildlife Trust favour favoured ed vaccin vaccinatio ation, n, but they they were were consid considere ered d politi politicall callyy lightw lightweig eight ht and were largely ignored. The important point here is that the relationship

107

 

108

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

betwee betw een n the the NFU NFU and and the the gove govern rnme ment nt was was not not si simp mply ly one one of barg bargai aini ning ng.. In inte in tervi rviews ews,, speec speeche hes, s, pres presss re rele leas ases es,, artic article less and, and, no doub doubt, t, pri priva vate te meet meetin ings gs  with government officials, the NFU sought to persuade the government of the merits of its case. Rather than bargaining with the government, the NFU persuaded it; the government publicly endorsed many of the arguments the NFU had advanced against vaccination. COMBINING MODES OF GOVERNANCE: P E R S UA U A S I O N A N D H I E R AR AR C H Y

 We have so far examined governance through persuasion in isolation. Yet  We one source of the comparative advantage that states have over non-state actors in persuading people to change their behaviour is that they can combine persuasion with hierarchy. Public health campaigns to encourage people to eat more fruit and vegetables have been combined with bans on advertising junk food on children’s television programs and the provision of free fruit in schools. Campaigns to persuade people to quit smoking  have combinedCampaigns with bans on publicto places punitive taxes been on cigarettes. tosmoking persuadeinpeople driveand safely have been combined with increased increased penalties penalties for those caught drink-driving drink-driving or speeding. There are two reasons why the application of hierarchical sanctions and rewards is likely to make efforts at governance through persuasion more effective. In the first place prohibitions, taxes and subsidies send a  clear signal to people about the significance a government attaches to an issue and so are likely to attract their attention. Second, sanctions and rewards reassure people who are willing to contribute to the provision of  a collective good but fear that free-riders may take advantage of them. In these circumstances, circumstan prov isionited. of sanctions sanctions and rewards rewards may persuade people that they ces, will the not provision be exploited. explo  As we saw in in Chapter  Chapter 4 4 in  in relation to ‘responsive regulation’, governments can combine efforts at horizontal coordination and moral suasion  with (if needed) the application of hierarchical controls. It is worth reexamining this approach in a different context. Over the last decade a  combination of government and consumer pressure has led many firms to create or join voluntary compliance regimes in which members promise to meet certain standards of ethical or environmental behaviour. Voluntary  programs have proved a popular method of dealing with environmental Welch & problems in the United States (Potoski (Potoski & Prakash, 2004 Prakash, 2004)), Japan ((W Hibiki,   2002) 2002), the European Union (Borkley & Leveque,   1998) 1998), and

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

developing countries such as Costa Cost a Rica (Rivera, 2002). 20 02). To To take one example, the US Environmental Protection Agency’s WasteWise program has attracted the support of nearly 1500 companies and public sector bodies (Delmas & Keller, Keller, 2005).  2005). There is no fee to join the program; participants agree to set waste reduction targets and report on their progress in meeting  them. In return, the Environmental Agency provides information on how  to reduce waste and sponsors case-studies and award ceremonies. Sceptics might argue that voluntary agreements are of no more than symbolic value as they allow firms not only to set their own standards but also to break them routinely. In some cases firms only agree to join a  voluntary scheme in return for a guarantee that they will not be prosecuted for any failure to meet the standards set out in an agreement (Steinzor, 1998). 1998). In the case of the WasteWise program it is notable that only about 20 per cent of member firms even submitted reports to the Environmental Protection Agency indicating whether they had met their performance targets (Delmas & Keller, 2005 Keller, 2005,,  93; for other critical accounts see Darnall & Carmin, 2005 Carmin, 2005). ). The more more ef effe fect ctiv ivee sc sche heme mess combi combine ne volu volunt ntary ary ef effo forts rts at persu persuasi asion on with with the threat of hierarchical regulation (Mackendrick, 2005 (Mackendrick,  2005)). There appear to be two models on offer here. In the first, voluntary agreements are signed as a supplement to, rather than replacement for, existing regulatory  st stan anda darrds. ds. In thes thesee case casess firms firms may may not not meet meet the the new new stan standa dard rdss cont contai aine ned d in thee volu th volunt ntary ary agre agreem emen entt but but ther theree can can be no eros erosio ion n in overa verall ll stan standa dard rds. s. In the second model governments indicate that tougher hierarchical controls  will be introduced unless voluntary standards are met (Reitbergen et al., 1999). late te 1980s 1980s the the Net ethe herla rland ndss gove govern rnme ment nt intr introd oduc uced ed long long-te -term rm 1999). In the la agreements on energy efficiency in an effort to reduce carbon emissions Wallace,  1995)). by 3–5 per cent by 2000 (Welch & Hibiki, 2002 Hibiki,  2002,,  410; Wallace, 1995 Over 90 per cent of Dutch firms signed these agreements, which were negotiated with peak-level industry associations. The agreements required firms to report upon their performance against agreed targets, and they  allowed the Environment Ministry to revoke the operating licence of any  firm that consistently failed to meet minimum standards. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

Social capital can be defined as ‘all those features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and social trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, 1994, 67). A useful distinction

 

109

110

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

is between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital. Bonding capital refers to the range and depth of relations between similar groups of people in a society; bridging capital refers to the range and depth of the relations among different groups of people. Over the last decade or so social capital has attracted huge interest from academics and policy-makers. This is because empirical studies of, in particular, bridging social capital – measured through such indicators as interpersonal trust, membership of voluntary organisations, community volunteering and engagement in social and political affairs affairs – have shown that it seems to be closely closely linked to such 1997)), valued policy goals as high economic growth (Knack & Keefer,   1997 rising education standards (Dika & Singh, 2002 Singh,  2002)), good health, and low  levels of crime (OECD, 2001). Social capital has come to be viewed as a  panaceaa for all policy problems. panace problems. The existence of high levels of social capital may also underpin the efficiency of market mechanisms. Economic sociologists such as Mark  Granovetter (1985) argue that markets work more efficiently when actors are embedded in interpersonal social networks, with ‘dense’ networks facilitating information exchange and the development and enforcement of  norms.. Empir norms Empiric ical al rese resear arch ch by Wayne ayne Bake Bakerr (1984) (1984) fo foun und d that, that, as the numnumber of traders in particular markets increased (thus reducing the density  of social networks), so too did price volatility. The point is that, contrary  to mainstream economic analysis, market relationships are not impersonal transactions based on narrow, short-term calculations of utility; they are typically rooted in deeper sets of cultural and social understandings, expectations,, norms and even obligations. tations obligations. Ash Amin and Je Jerzy rzy Hausner (1997, 5) refer to this as the ‘soft institutional institutional paramete parameters rs’’ of the market. Corr Co rrel elat atio ion n does does not not mean mean caus causat atio ion: n: the the exis existe tenc ncee of a st stro rong ng empi empiri rica call relationship between social capital and valued policy outcomes is not conclusive. It may be that social capital is a consequence, and not the cause, of  wever, er, it is eas asy  y  econ ec onom omic ic gro growth, wth, lo low w cr crim imee and and so on (Sca (Scanl nlon on,, 2004) 2004). Howev to see how high levels of social capital may make it easier to persuade actors to contribute their share to the provision of a collectively valued good. Indeed, there is a tendency in the literature to  define  or   or at least measure social capital precisely in terms of a person’s willingness to contribute to collectively valued goods. Consider, for example, the World Bank’s (1998) definition of social capital in terms of a ‘common sense of civil responsibility’. High levels of social capital also facilitate efforts at governance through persuasion by encouraging people to believe that they ought to contribute their share to the provision of some goal and also that others are likely to do so as well. In this way high levels of social capital may provide

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

111

an institutional catalyst to resolve collective action problems. Finally, high levels of social capital are likely to result in higher levels of trust not only in people but in government (Keele, 2007 (Keele, 2007). ). Governments that are considered trustworthy are, of course, more likely to persuade people to change their behaviour. For all these reasons governance through persuasion, whether by state or non-state actors, benefits from the existence of high levels of  social capital. In his his influ influen enti tial al book  book Bow Robe bert rt Putna utnam m (2000) (2000) arg argue uess that that Bowling ling Alo Alone, ne, Ro soci so cial al capi capital tal in gene general ral and and bridg bridgin ingg capit capital al in partic particul ular ar are are in rapid rapid decl declin inee in the the Unit iteed Sta tate tess and and that that this this is comp comprromis omisin ingg the the qual qualit ityy of mill millio ions ns of  people’s lives. Putnam says that Americans are leading increasingly isolated lives: commuting alone, working at a desk in a competitive office and, on returning return ing home, collapsing in front of the television television in their own room in a house. Academic studies, however, seem to indicate that the rapid loss in social capital that has occurred in the United States since the 1960s has not occu oc curr rred ed el elsew sewhe here re.. In the the Unite nited d King Kingdo dom m (Hal (Hall, l, 1999), 1999), the Nethe etherla rland ndss (Inoguchi, 2000))  and France (Worms, (De Hart & Dekker, 1999 Dekker,  1999)), Japan (Inoguchi, 2000 2000), 2000), people are less likely to engage in traditional activities such as attending church or joining political parties, but they are often more  likely   likely  to socialise with friends and engage engage in voluntary voluntary community work.3 If there is a clear empirical lesson in the mass of data that has been collected on social capital, it is of the sheer variety in, rather than decline of,, soci of social al capit capital al.. Table 5.1 tr trac acks ks peop people le’’s trus trustt in othe otherr peop people le betw betwee een n the the first wave of the World World Values Values Survey in the early 1980s and the third wave of surveys in the late 1990s. The survey shows that levels of generalised trust increased in almost as many countries as it declined in, and that there are are huge huge dis ispa pari riti ties es in tr trus ustt betw betweeen Arge rgentin ntinaa and and Franc rancee on the the one one han hand and Australia, Australia, Canada and Denmark Denmark on the other. Despite this mixed empirical record, many countries have expressed a  dete de term rmin inat atio ion n to inve invest st in the the prod produc ucti tion on of soci social al capi capita tal. l. Joini oining ng the the part partss of our argument together, this will, all other things being equal, enhance the capacity of state   and  non-state   non-state actors to govern through persuasion.  Y  Yet et it is clear that most of the methods of building social capital require not simply state action but hierarchical governance. In the conclusion to Bowling Alone  Putnam  Putnam (pp. 402–14) offers a manifesto manifesto for the restoration restoration of social capital and American society. He calls for the development of  community programs in schools; family-friendly policies in workplaces; less urban sprawl; the provision of more arts and entertainment facilities in communities; the reform of election finance laws to encourage citizens to contribute time as well as money to their political causes; and the

 

112

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Table 5.1. Social trust, selected countries, 1980–4 and 1998–2000 

Question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that   you need to be very careful in dealing with people?  % saying that most people can be trusted Country

1980–4

1998–2000

 Argentina

24.5

15

 Australia Belgium Canada Denmark France Ireland  Japan Nigeria South Korea United States

46.3 2 5.1 42.1 45.9 22.3 40 37.4 21.7 36 39.2

39.5 2 9.4 38.4 64.1 21.4 46.8 39.6 25.3 27.3 35.5

Source: World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/).

decent dece ntral ralisa isati tion on of gove govern rnme ment nt autho authori rity ty.. Othe Others rs have have sugg sugges este ted d that that so soci cial al capital might be enhanced through the sponsorship of community groups; better traffic management schemes to encourage people to walk to school or work; and the provision of more public festivals (Productivity Commission, 2003, 60). According to Rothstein (2005, 71–92), the provision of  universal welfare services that benefit everyone regardless of their income is an important source of social capital and must be maintained in the face of  demands for greater welfare selectivity. Similarly, Gittell and Vidal (1998 (1998)) argue that the provision of high-quality public services is a key source of  social capital. Where education and health services have been allowed to decline, they argue, the private sector has flourished and this has resulted in the segregation of services and the loss of bridging capital.  Yet  Yet most of these reforms require hierarchical government intervention to change planning regulations, subsidise public transport, reform electoral laws and welfare systems, decentralise decision-making authority, and so on. It is possible to imagine how non-state actors might be given contracts contrac ts to develop community programs in schools, schools, organise organise public festivals or build arts and entertainment centres. It is also possible that some profit-making firms will perceive it as being in their own long-term interests to develop more family-friendly employment policies. Yet the policy 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH PERSUASION

 

agenda for investing in social capital is largely an agenda for hierarchical state action. As Simon Szreter Szreter (2002, 613) concludes, concludes,

113

far from being an alternative to the state and to government activity, [social capita cap ital] l] is sym symbio biotic ticall allyy rela related ted to it . . . soc social ial ca capit pital al is not a form of do do-it -it-yourself civil elastoplast, for patching together polities with poor systems of  centra cen trall and loca locall go gover vernme nment nt and dep deplet leted ed public servi services ces . . . the first task  in building social capital in poor communities is, paradoxically, to restore collective faith in the idea of the state as and in local government as a  practically effective servant of the community.

Even ven where where nonnon-sta state te acto actors rs ar aree enga engage ged d in gove govern rnan ance ce thro throug ugh h persu persuasi asion on,, their efforts will be parasitic upon state action. States provide the environment within which governance through persuasion can be effective. CONCLUSION

There are plenty of academic studies on governance as it relates to markets, hierarchies and networks, but little has been written about the possibilities of eiss, 2002 governance throughetpersuasion seethis Bemelamans-Vedic Bemelamans-V et al., 1998;  2002;;  Collins al., 2003 al.,  2003)).(but Does matter? If weedic were to follow   W  Weiss, the public choice approach – regarding individuals as not only exclusively  self-interested but possessing fixed views about how best to achieve that interest – there would indeed be little scope for governance through persuasion. But as political scientists have recently come to emphasise, ideas matter (Campbell, 2004 (Campbell, 2004,,  90–101; Blyth, 2002 Blyth,  2002;;  Fischer, 2003  Fischer, 2003;;  Menahem, 2008). They matter because people’s normative commitments, their val2008). ues, attitudes, and morals, can lead them to act in ways that are contrary  to their self-interest. They matter because it is people’s empirical notions about abo ut how how the world world work works, s, about about cause cause-a -and nd-e -eff ffec ectt rela relati tion onsh ships ips,, prog program ramss and para and paradi digm gms, s, whic which h le lead ad them them to beli believ evee that that ce cert rtai ain n co cour urse sess of acti action on are  in their interest. As Colin Hay (2002, 209) puts it: ‘if actors lack complete info in form rmat atio ion, n, they they have have to inte interp rpre rett the the worl world d in whic which h they they find find them themse selv lves es in order to orientate themselves strategically toward it. Ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their environment.’ It is because ideas matter in politics that persuasion is possible. People can be persuaded to act out of a commitment commitment to the collective good good or  to   to change their views about how best to pursue their own interests. interests. In Michel Foucault’s view, the kind of preference-shaping activity we have examined in this chapter destroys individual autonomy. He equates

 

114

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 what we have called governance through persuasion with the rise of the ‘disc discipl iplin inary ary soci societ etyy’. Our Our acco accoun untt is le less ss blea bleak. k. We agree agree with with Foucau oucault lt that that efforts to shape people’s preferences, or perhaps even identities, are becomingg mor in more comm common on.. We al also so agr agree that that the the st stat ate, e, in part partne ners rshi hip p with with a rang rangee

of othe otherr orga organi nisa sati tion ons, s, play playss a lead leadin ingg role role in such such acti activi viti ties es.. Yet go gove vern rnan ance ce through persuasion offers an effective and non-coercive means by which governments can achieve collectively valued outcomes. There are instances in which non-state actors are engaged in governance through persuasion, and even some cases of governance without government, but the state retains a crucial role. States have attempted to enhance their legitimacy by  governing through persuasion. They have also attempted to enhance their gove go vern rnan ance ce capac capacity ity by work workin ingg with with nonnon-sta state te acto actors. rs. Under nder such such arran arrange ge-ments, however, governments retain responsibility for the areas identified  Chapter 3: democracy, accountability  in in Chapter 3: steering, effectiveness, resourcing, democracy, and legitimacy.

 

6

 

Governance through markets

and contracts

 A MARKET CAN BE DEFINED AS A SOCIAL arrangement allow-

ing for the voluntary exchange of goods and services. Markets are characterised by the existence of private property rights, competition, and the use of the price mechanism to allocate resources. The use of markets is usually  defended on efficiency grounds. Private property rights, when combined  with competition, are believed to give firms and entrepreneurs incentives to develop new products and anticipate consumer demand. Prices provide participants in the market with a constant flow of information about 1945;; Kirzner, 1973) 1973). In these way ways, the inv invisdeman de mand d and and supp supply ly (Hay (Hayek ek,, 1945 ible hand of the market is, according to liberal ideology, said to harness individual self-interest for the collective good. As we have observed, the ideaa that compet ide competitiv itivee markets markets represe represent nt the most most efficient efficient way of allocati allocating  ng  resources has become a paradigm of (neo-liberal) governance. In recent decades in a range of countries an ongoing process of ‘marketisation’ has resulted in waves of privatisation and deregulation, contracting-out and the creation of new markets. Not only have the boundaries between the public and private sectors been redrawn, but the public sector itself has been partly recreated in the image of the market. Economists continue to debate the economic consequences of marketisation. Critics suggest that, in many cases, market failures and high transaction costs outweigh efficiency gains.1 Our focus in this chapter, however, is on the relationship between marketisation and state capacity. There are two strands to the argument. The first is that marketisation has resulted in significant powers being surrendered to private businesses operating independent of government control. If governance means steering, marketisation, it is argued, has led to a reduction in the total amount of  gove go vern rnan ance ce.. Inde Indeed ed Susan usan Strang trangee (1996, (1996, 14) su sugg gges ests ts that that ‘the diff diffus usio ion n of 

115

 

116

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

authority away aw ay from national governments’ has resulted in ‘ungovernance’. ungovernance’. The second strand is that states have also lost control in those situations  where markets have been used as an alternative means of pursuing policy  goals. The contracting-out of public services to private firms is argued to have led to a hollowing-out of the state. There are indeed cases where marketisation has led to a loss of state capacity and a failure of metagovernance. In one of the cases we examine,

the outsourcing of defence contracts in Iraq, marketisation led to an even tually catastrophic loss of accountability, legitimacy and life. Emblematic of that one contractor, KBR,paid threatened to this stopfailure feedingarethenewspaper US army reports in Iraq unless it was immediately in full for a disputed contract (New York Times , 17 June 2008). Yet, as might be expected, we are sceptical about arguments that present the relationship between the state and hierarchy on the one hand and markets on the other in zero-sum terms. The extent to which markets, or indeed major players in them such as business interests, have replaced hierarchy as a mode of  governance can easily be exaggerated. Furthermore, marketisation and the metagovernance of markets frequently require the exercise of massive hierarchical authority. In short, we concur with Michael Keating (2004, 6),  who suggests that ‘the shift to marketisation largely represents an attempt by gosocial vern rnme ment nt to enha enhanc ncee or re rest stor oree thei theirr powe powerr to achi achiev evee thei theirr ec econ onom omic ic andgove objectives’.

THE MARKETISATION OF GOVERNANCE

 What we describe as the ‘marketisation of governance’ covers some related but distinct reforms. We will look at them in turn.

PRIVATISATION

Governments across theinworld privatised state-owned either by selling shares those have companies on stock markets,enterprises by selling  firms to private companies or by giving shares to citizens (OECD, 2005b). Pioneered in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, privatisation has had the greatest impact in those countries which had the largest number of state-owned enterprises. In Portugal, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the cumulative proceeds of privatisation sales have amounted to more than 20 per cent of current annual GDP (OECD, 2005c, 24). Even  where privatisation has been rejected, the impact of the philosophy has

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

been such that governments have committed themselves to rules requiring them to run state-owned enterprises on a commercial basis through independently appointed boards of directors, a process often referred to as ‘commercialisation’. DEREGULATION

This is the process by which states seek to eliminate, reduce or at least simplify restrictions on the activities of individuals or firms with a view to cre-

117

ating freer and more competitive markets. Chapter markets. Chapter 4 noted 4 noted that in OECD countries the telecommunications, aviation and electricity industries were, to varying degrees, deregulated in the 1980s and 1990s. Deregulation, along with technological change, has been a key driver of globalisation. Reductions in trade barriers, the elimination of restrictions upon the operation of foreign banks in domestic markets, and the removal of restrictions on the overseas transfer of capital have resulted in a massive expansion in international trade, overseas foreign investment and currency speculation. EXTERNAL MARKETS

 When governments privatise firms, a market for the products of those firms alre alread adyy exis exists ts.. In the the case case of what what we call call exte extern rnal al mar markets kets,, the the stat statee actu actual ally  ly  creates markets by establishing new property rights and encouraging trade  with a view to resolving specific policy problems. In response to a continuing drought exacerbated by intensive farming, the Australian government created a new market in water by limiting the amount of water farmers can extract from rivers while simultaneously creating water entitlements and allowing farmers to buy or sell their water allocations (Bell & Quiggin, 2008). The poli policy cy pre prescri script ptio ion n is that that,, for for any any giv given limi limitt upon upon the the amou amount nt 2008). The of water to be extracted, market trading ought to ensure the lowest loss in production as more efficient farms buy additional water from less efficient ones. External markets are still a relatively relatively novel novel governanc governancee approach. approach. In recent years, however, markets have been created to allow the exchange of  a range of pollutants, including emissions of sulphur dioxide (associated  with acid rain) and carbon dioxide (one cause of climate change). CONTRACTING-OUT

In contracting-out (or competitive tendering), services once performed by  state agencies are exposed to competition. Contractors are selected on a 

 

118

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

1 pointed  pointed out, range of criteria including, most obviously, obviously, cost. As Chapter As Chapter 1 there is nothing new in the principle; but contracting-out has proliferated, spurred on by a neo-liberal ideology and the prevalence of outsourcing in the priva private te se secto ctorr. Defe Defenc ncee pro provi vide dess an inte intere resti sting ng exam example ple,, give given n our our earli earlier er disc di scus ussio sion n about about sove sovere reig ignt ntyy and and the state state’’s mono monopo poly ly on the the legi legiti timat matee use of violence. violence. Having abolished military service, a previously previously reliable source of labour, armies across the world have come to depend on private firms to provide support functions such as training, base maintenance, health services and supply transport (Avant, 2005 (Avant,  2005;; Singer, 2001 Singer,  2001)). In the United States more than 50 per cent of the navy’s military research, development,

testing and evaluation have been outsourced to private, profit-making  firms, along with large parts of the work of nuclear laboratories and test centres at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore (Markusen, 2003 (Markusen, 2003)). In other cases, government services, particularly for health, education and personal well-being, have been contracted to not-for-profit organisations with commitment commitment to the delivery delivery of high-quality high-quality services in a particular area. The most recent comprehensive survey estimates that, globally, not-for-profit ‘third sector’ organisations account for around five per cent of world gross domestic product and employ around 40 million people (Salamon, Sokolowski & List, 2003). In the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, the third sector employs an average eight per cent of the economically active population. Indeed, in the United Kingdom the crime-reduction charity NARCO, which has criticised the use of prison as a deterrence strategy and warned that Britain is in danger of becoming  the ‘prisons capital of Europe’, has worked with a private security firm, Group 4, to tender to run two new vast ‘superprisons’ in Liverpool and London. According to NARCO’s chief executive, ‘if we’re both [Group 4 and NARCO] involved in working together on the design, planning and regime of a new prison, it increases the chances that [the] regime will be one which helps to reduce reduce re-offend re-offending ing by resettling resettling prisoners effectively effectively’’ (quoted, Guardian, 7 September 2008). PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) extend the role of private firms in the provision of public services to include the design, construction, maintenance and operation of infrastructure assets traditionally provided by the public sector (OECD, 2005a, 140). The arrangements vary but usually  governments either pay rent for infrastructure designed, built and maintained by a private firm, or allow that firm to charge customers customers a fixed rate

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

to use the facilities. Such PPPs were pioneered in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s to fund massive programs to build hospitals and schools. Elsewhere, PPPs PPPs have financed road construction in Portugal, a high-speed rail network in the Netherlands, and a new airport in Athens (OECD, 2005a, 140–3). INTERNAL MARKETS

In the pursuit of public sector efficiency, governments across the world have ha ve purs pursue ued d a prog progra ram m of ‘new new publ public ic mana manage geme ment nt’. ’. This This has has enta entail iled ed the the hierarchical imposition of benchmarking exercises, targets, related pay and short-term contracts. Governments have performancealso pursued

119

reform through the creation of internal markets or quasi-markets in which public sector organisations are encouraged to compete against each other to provide cheaper or better services (Barlett & Le Grand, 1993 Grand, 1993;; Le Grand, 2003). 2003). The most significant example of such a market was established  within the National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom. Traditionally, the NHS has been hierarchically managed through top-down budgets. In the early 1990s general practitioners were given more control over their budgets and encouraged to purchase treatment for their patients from local hospitals. The expectation was that doctors would send their those hospitals shortest waiting times, the lowest costs patients and the to best standards ofwith care,the and that the resulting competitive pressures would force every hospital to improve its performance. This did not amount to a privatisation of the NHS: medical treatment remained entirely free at the point of delivery. The money circulating within the internal market was, ultimately, all taxpayers’ money. COMMON FACTORS IN MARKETISATION

 What do these market-based reforms have in common? Recall here our definition of markets in terms of competition, property rights and prices. First, contracting-out private firms and public sectorderegulation agencies to compete to provide therequires best and cheapest service. Similarly, is meant to make it easier for new firms to enter existing existing markets. Second, Second, these reforms have created new property rights. Australian farmers have always had the right to extract water from their land; the creation of a   water market has given them th em an additional a dditional right to exchange this resource. Privatisation has created new property rights for shareholders, while deregulation has extended the existing rights of property owners. Third, these

 

120

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

reforms have resulted in a greater reliance on prices as a mechanism to allocate resources. Privatisation is meant to ensure that investment, pricing  and employment decisions are sensitive to changes in price. By creating a  price for water and pollutants, external markets are meant to ensure that use of resources reflects their environmental impact. The marketisation of governance has not usually led to unfettered competi pe titio tion, n, unqu unqual alifi ified ed prop propert ertyy rights rights and and absol absolut utee depe depend nden ence ce upon upon pric prices es.. Governments have often chosen to privatise state-owned enterprises as monopolies in order to maximise revenue from their sale (Marsh, 1991 (Marsh,  1991)). In the case of the internal health market in the United Kingdom, property  rights are carefully controlled. Doctors are not given the option of selling  their surgery and, until recently, could not choose to send their patients to a privately privately owned owned hospital at the taxpayer’s taxpayer’s expense. expense. In otherwise dereguderegulated markets, residual controls on prices also remain. The amount airlines

must pay for landing slots at major international airports like Heathrow  and Los Angeles and the fares they are allowed to charge on many international routes are still heavily regulated (Cowhey & Richards, 2006). Yet if   we think of competition, property rights and price-based decision-making  as a matter of degree rather than as binary alternatives, it is clear why  the changes described here might be said to constitute a marketisation of  governance. STATE CAPACITY AND MARKETS

 Alberta Sbragia Sbr agia (2000, 243) observes obser ves that ‘market forces are widely viewed as threat threateni ening, ng, dilut diluting ing or or erodin erodingg the power powerss of the state state . . . the power power of  of  public authority to protect its citizens over the long-term is seen as diminis ishe hed d’. Susan usan Str tran ange ge (199 (1996, 6, 4) ar argu gues es that that ‘wh wher eree stat states es were were once once the the masmasters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many critical issues, are the masters over the governments of states’. Christopher Pierson (1996, 124) suggests that the globalisation of markets has ‘strengthened the bargaining  positio pos ition n of capital capital [and [and]] . . . underm undermine ined d the authori authority ty and capac capacity ity of the the interventionist state’. Similarly, Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann (1996, 10) argue that ‘the whole of politics’ has become ‘a spectacle of  impotence’ and that the ‘democratic state has lost its legitimacy’ as a consequence of the diffusion of market forces. Governments, in this view, have not simply disappeared but have been relegated to a ‘market-supporting’ rather than ‘market-steering’ role (Levy, 2006 (Levy,  2006,,  3–4). Governments have become the handmaidens of markets; they must enhance labour market

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

participation, remove trade barriers and set minimal standards of regulation. Using alternative terminology, terminology, Jon Pierre and Guy Peters Peters (2005, (2 005, 104) 10 4) suggest that the ‘enabling’ policy style adopted by many governments in the 1990s was one in which the state ‘defines its role in society as one of  removing obstacles to economic growth. More broadly, the enabling state is less intervening, less steering, and less proactive than a state pursuing a  more traditional policy style.’ How, precisely, has marketisation challenged and undermined the role and capacity of the state? There are various theories. One is that privatisation has denied to governments an important policy tool by which they once directly influenced wages, employment practices and investment decisions within countries. Another is that deregulation in general, and the globalisation of markets in particular, have acted as a ‘golden straitjacket’ requiring states to adopt business-friendly policies (Friedman, 1999 (Friedman, 1999)). The  Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the global credit crisis beginning in 2008

121

showed that financial markets may have slipped beyond the control of  regulators. Turni urning ng to cont contra ract ctin ingg-ou out, t, cr crit itic icss ar argu guee that that a lo loss ss of in-h in-hou ouse se expe expert rtis isee and experience has made it impossible for states to manage or oversee the tangle of relationships they have voluntarily entered into (Milward, Provan & Else, 1993). Contracting-out is also said to have led to a loss of  legitimacy and accountability. In Sydney there was a public outcry in 2006  when the state government refused to publish the full terms of a contract it had signed with a private sector consortium to build and operate a  road tunnel. This was controversial because one clause in the contract was reported to require the government to close alternative traffic routes if  business fell below projected levels (Sydney Morning Herald , 17 November 2006). Patricia Ranald (1997) argues that the lack of transparency entailed by ‘commercial confidentiality’ clauses in contracts constitutes a removal of citizens’ democratic rights, since it denies public debate. Finally,, by encouraging competition, Finally competit ion, internal markets have been argued to unde underm rmin inee the the publ public ic se servi rvice ce et etho hoss upon upon whic which h gove govern rnme ment nt,, in the the lo long ng-term, must depend (see Le Grand, 2003 Grand,  2003,,  41–4 and references therein).

THE RESILIENCE OF HIERARCHY

The use of markets to solve policy problems has attracted considerable academic attention. We have already argued in Chapter in  Chapter 4 that, 4  that, even in

 

122

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 W  Western estern liberal democracies, hierarchical hierarchica economic remains significant, although it is diminished in somelareas of thecontrol economy. In the case of deregulation, the elimination of rules in some industries has occurred at the same time as new regulations have been introduced relating to airport security, genetic research, data privacy, smoking, advertising and the use of mobile phones. In the United States, the spiritual home of  the deregulation movement, a number of states have recently introduced regulations requiring people to pass a written examination and acquire a formal licence before advertising their services as an interior designer (Economist , 27 Octo Octobe berr 2007) 2007).. Glob Globall allyy, import importan antt reso resour urce cess are are still still pl place aced d beyond the reach of price-based markets. Most countries prevent payments for surrogate-pregnancy arrangements. With of Iran –  which created a highly regulated market in the salethe ofexception kidneys for transplant purposes in 2006 – governments have sought to prevent decisions about organ donation being influenced by price.2 Finally, we pointed in Chapter 2 to 2  to studies that emphasise the limits of globalisation and the continuing significance of national economies.

In regard to the contracting-out of services, the OECD (2005b, 134) obse ob serve rvess that that al almo most st every every deve develo lope ped d econ econom omyy has now now outs outsou ourc rced ed rout routin inee support services such as cleaning, facilities management and security. At the same time, it notes that only a handful of countries have outsourced core state activities such as the provision of emergency services, policy  advice, and audit and inspection. Even of basic vices remains inconsistent. One study in the the contracting-out United States found that serthe majority of bus services and libraries continue to be provided directly by  local government (Lundsgaard, 2002 (Lundsgaard,  2002,,  112). PPPs are flourishing in the United Kingdom but still fund only about one-tenth of capital investment projects (for a general discussion of the limits of such partnerships see Bloomfield, 2006 Bloomfield,  2006)). Outside the United Kingdom, internal markets and PPPs have been used sparingly (OECD, 2005a, 140). Finally, while carbon markets have been established in the European Union and California  and are set to be introduced in Australia in 2010, a number of studies have confirmed that market-based solutions to environmental problems remain the exception rather than rule al.,  2003;;  Rittberger al., 2003  2005). ). (Wurzel Also, afteretexamining the case of  & Richardson, 2003; Jordan et al., 2005 al.,the  water markets in Australia, Bell and Quiggin (2008) 2008) found a range of limitations in the use of market instruments, particularly related to difficulties in establishing property rights, high market transaction costs, and severe defic de ficie ienc ncie iess in the capac capacity ity of marke markett instr instrume ument ntss to achie achieve ve envi enviro ronm nmen enta tall goals.

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

THE METAGOVERNANCE OF MARKETS: MARKETS THROUGH HIERARCHY

In both political and academic discourse it is conventional to draw a sharp dist di stin inct ctio ion n betwe between en publ public ic and and priva private te and and betw betwee een n marke markets ts and and hier hierarc archy hy.. This, however, takes for granted the elaborate institutional infrastructure that underpins the effective functioning of markets. Markets are based on systems of state-enforced property rights that define ownership rights and the appropriate use of resources. The exchange of goods and services requires the continuing presence of, for example, courts, police forces, competition and fair trading authorities and contract law, along with education, health and welfare policies to provide an adequate and trained  workforce (North,  1990; ; Fligstein,  Fligstein, 1996  2001; Evans Rauch,  1999). ). ral Inl othe ot herr wor words, ds(North, 1990 , as Karl Karl Pol olan anyi yi (195 (1957, 7, 1996; 139) 139) ;obse ob serv rved ed, , ther there& e isRauch, 1999 ‘noth nothin ing g natu natura about laissez-faire’. laissez-faire’. Graham Wilson Wilson (1990, 4) makes the same point: It is the state which, by laws, establishes ‘the market’ whose existence is sometimes treated as if it were an act of nature. Markets require a vast institution tut ional al und underp erpinn inning ing.. Wit Withou houtt cou courts rts to int interp erpre rett and enf enforc orcee agr agreem eement ents, s,

123

for exam for exampl ple, e, co comm mmer erci cial al li life fe wo woul uld d be beco come me ch chao aoti tic. c. Wi With thou outt laws laws to de defin fine, e, and police to enforce them, property rights would be non-existent. The modern corporation itself – the limited liability joint stock corporation – is, in historical terms, a comparatively modern creation of the state.

Market systems also rely on institutions to ensure fair and transparent market competition. The private sector and the wider society also play  impo im port rtan antt role roless in supp suppor orti ting ng mark market ets. s. As Adam Adam Smith mith and and othe otherr foun founde ders rs of market theory have pointed out, markets rely on a moral underlay of  trus trustt whic which h is cr cruc ucia iall in ensu ensuri ring ng the the fulfi fulfilm lmen entt of cont contra ract ctss (Hir (Hirsc sch, h, 1978) 1978).  Where these institutional conditions do not exist, attempts to introduce governan gov ernance ce through markets markets often fail. In Russia, for example, example, the transition to a market-based economy through privatisation and the withdrawal of state subsidies has been compromised by the absence of stable property rights and an independent judiciary. According to Andrei Sharonov, a former adviser in the Economics Ministry, the absence of any legally  enforced property rights shows that ‘we have turned our back on healthy  competition. The system rewards those who are closer to the centre of  power, not those who work better. It is easier to get a competitor into a jail than to compete with him’ (quoted in Economist , 28 February February 2008). The NGO Transparency International has recently ranked Russia as one of the 30 most corrupt countries in the world.

 

124

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

In order order to govern govern through markets, governments governments must first create those markets through the exercise of a hierarchical authority. The construction of global financial markets, for example, required governments to devise and enforce regulations relating to insider trading, standard accountancy  practices, banking standards, and the disclosure of business information in orde or derr to ensu ensure re share shareho hold lder er confi confide denc nce. e. Hence ence the cent central ral parad paradox ox that that ‘the deve de velo lopme pment nt of finan financi cial al mark market etss and and the the incr increa easin singg prev preval alen ence ce and and impo import rt of market relations, so often linked to the diminution of state power and authority, have been accompanied by a substantial and ongoing expansion of law and prescriptive regulation’ (Cioffi, 2006 (Cioffi, 2006,, 186). Governments thus retain responsibility for the metagovernance of the markets they create. This requires ongoing steering and resourcing, as well as the monitoring of effectiveness and the provision of accountability and legitimacy. Privatisation may have created freer markets, but it has also led to more regulations (Vogel, 1996 (Vogel, 1996)). Where privatisations have occurred, ‘hierarchical safeguarding’ has been introduced to protect public values such as universal universal services and affordability affordability (De Bruijn Bruijn & Dicke, Dicke, 2006  2006;; see also Heritier, 2002b Heritier,  2002b)). In Belgium, for example, the public value of social inclusion has been translated into an obligation on privatised electricity providers to maintain uniform price structures. Eiji Kawabata (2001 (2001))

shows how the privatisation of the Nippon Telegraph Company (NTT) in the 1980s actually enhanced the authority of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. In return for acquiescing in the sale of NTT, the ministry received exclusive jurisdiction and the coercive authority to require firms to make their infrastructure available to rivals, veto the entry  of firms it believed would be unable to effectively compete with NTT, and approve proposed price changes. Where services are contracted out, governme gov ernments, nts, as well as providing providing the funds, decide decide which services to outsource, the criteria by which bids are judged, and the final terms of any  contract. Governments also retain responsibility for monitoring performance and applying sanctions where performance is judged unsatisfactory. Trevor Brown and Matthew Potoski (2004 (2004))  show that in the case of a  simple contract to manage refuse collection in Ohio, public service manager ag erss cont contin inuo uousl uslyy inte interve rvene ned d to st stimu imula late te comp compet etit itio ion n and and sanct sanctio ion n erran errantt firms. In the case case of more more comp comple lexx cont contrac ractt arran arrange geme ment nts, s, the metag metagov over erna nanc ncee of governance arrangements is ongoing. Chapter ongoing.  Chapter 3 briefly 3  briefly examined the cont co ntrac racti ting ng of priva private te firms firms and and volu volunt ntary ary orga organi nisat satio ions ns to pro provi vide de train trainin ing  g  and employment services for Australia’s Job Network. The contractual authority of these organisations to assess a client’s willingness to work 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

and to withhold welfare payments seems to give significant discretion in decision-making to NGOs. Yet contractors, whether from the private or voluntary sectors, are expected to adhere to detailed regulations set by the Depar De partme tment nt of Empl Employ oyme ment nt and and Workp orkpla lace ce Rela Relati tion ons. s. As Mark Mark Cons Consid idin inee (2003, 75) affirms: the quasi-market is controlled by a government department that is the monopoly purchaser of services. This gives senior bureaucrats enormous power to steer this market from behind the safe walls built upon the commercial-in-confidence tender process, and the contracts then written leave the agencies with little room to manoeuvre.

Cons nsid idin ineeitraise rai sess an impo im porta rtant nt poin point. t. Studi tudies es of co ntrac ractin tingg ofte of ten n expr exoccur pres esss theCo fear that renders governments vulnerable tocont ‘hold-ups’. These  when a firm that has obtained a contract acquires, over time, knowledge and ‘trans transac actio tionn-spe speci cific fic inve investm stmen ents’ ts’ that that prev preven entt other other firms firms from from moun mounti ting ng a  cred credib ible le bid bid agai agains nstt it in the the futu future re.. Hol oldd-up upss obvi obviou ousl slyy make make gove govern rnme ment ntss vulnerable to predatory pricing and poor performance (Williamson, 1985 (Williamson, 1985;; Klein, 1996) 1996). Such uch fear fearss ar aree not not with withou outt foun founda dati tion on.. The The UK tax tax coll collec ecti tion on agen ag ency cy,, the Inla Inland nd Reve Revenu nue, e, spen spentt £9 milli million on paying su suppl pplie iers rs to bid agai agains nstt its incumbent IT supplier, the American-owned Electronic Data Systems (Lonsdale,   2005, (Lonsdale, 2005,  225). Yet if governments must sometimes confront a 

125

monopoly seller, it is worth emphasising that private firms must always sell their services to a they limited of local and centralinvestments governmentinorganisations and that alsonumber make transaction-specific these contracts. Martin Sellers (2003, 608) argues that this level of dependence has, over time, led to a process of ‘publicisation’: private companies become more like public agencies because competition for contracts is keen and they must be perceived by the contracting agent, government, as being agreeable with the government’s demands in order to be contra contracted cted w with ith aagain gain . . . gov governme ernment nt ma makes kes ssugges uggestions, tions, sets rrequir equireements, and provides recommendations which, over time, cause the private companies to look more and more like government agencies.

Hierarchical metagovernance is also a salient feature of governmentcreated external markets. The world’s largest carbon market, the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), was launched in January 2005. Under the rules of the agreement, large emitters of carbon dioxide – currently around 12 000 installations accounting for about 40 per cent

 

126

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

of total emissions – must match their emissions to an annual allowance they are given each year. Firms that wish to emit more pollution must  2005;;  Soleille, purchase other firms’ allowances (Watanabe & Robinson, Robinson, 2005 2006). At first glance, emissions trading represents a significant loss of  2006) regulatory control because governments cannot fix the amount of carbon to be emitted by any one country, let alone firm. Yet governments, acting  collectively, play a crucial metagoverning role in steering this market by  setting overall limits on carbon emissions and by facilitating and policing  subsequent exchanges. The capacity of national governments to manage the ETS is clear when thee limi th limita tati tion onss of the the poli policy cy itse itself lf ar aree cons consid ider ered ed.. Expe Expect ctat atio ions ns that that it wo woul uld d lead lead to a si sign gnifi ifica cant nt re redu duct ctio ion n in carb carbon on emis emissi sion onss have have,, so fa farr, been been dash dashed ed.. This is because national governments have awarded carbon allowances to firms which, cumulatively, often exceed existing emissions levels. In  April 2006 pollution allowances were trading t rading at around  €30 per tonne of  carbon dioxide. In 2007, after it became clear that national governments had issued so many allowances, the price fell to   €0.05. Promising to play a leading role in combating global climate change, European leaders subse su bsequ quen entl tlyy prom promis ised ed to issue issue fe fewe werr al allo lowan wance cess in iterat iteratio ions ns of the mark market et..  Y  Yet et at a summit held in March 2008 national leaders agreed to offer special protection to energy-intensive industries exposed to international competition. On current evidence it is difficult to judge the ETS a success. This Th is is not beca becaus usee of a la lack ck of stat statee capa capaci city ty.. Th Thee mark market et ha hass fail faileed beca becaus usee

governments have, for current political reasons, chosen to structure the market in such a way that total emissions are unlikely to fall. POLICY LEARNING AND METAGOVERNANCE

 We do not wish to appear too sanguine about the  We th e possible consequences of  marketisation. Privatisation and contracting-out can, if managed ineffectively, lead to a haemorrhage of state capacity. Governments usually retain the resources and incentives necessary to metagovern markets effectively  but, as Chapter as Chapter 3 acknowledged, 3 acknowledged, failures of metagovernance do occur. We  will describe two examples of costly failures: the contracting-out of children’s residential home care in the United Kingdom and the contractingout of military support services to Blackwater USA in Iraq. These failures reflected, in the first case, poor strategic planning and, in the second, an absencee of political absenc political will. However However,, they do not show that contractingcontracting-out out leads to baleful consequences and a loss of state capacity. Indeed, inevitably   leads

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

the interesting point in these cases is the evidence that governments have learnt from their mistakes and reasserted control. In the late 1980s local authorities in the United Kingdom started to pay  privat priv atel elyy owned wned firms firms to hous housee vuln vulner erab able le chil childr dren en in thei theirr ca care re.. In a care carefu full revi review ew of this this poli policy cy Ia Ian n Kirkpa Kirkpatri trick ck,, Marti Martin n Kitch Kitchen ener er and and Richa Richard rd Whip Whipp p (2001) show that the creation of this market had some unfortunate results. Large numbers of children were moved into homes located outside the boundaries of their local authority, making it harder for social workers to monitor their progress and standards of care. Some children with specialist needs were ‘warehoused’ in unsuitable accommodation, and authorities awarded expensive contracts to private firms without soliciting alternative bids or linking payments to performance. One manager is quoted as saying  that their local authority authority was ‘getting getting stung, left, right and centre’ because ‘social workers who are not very good at negotiating on money’ were left to write contracts (p. 60). Another suggests that the failure to seek out alternative sources of supply meant that ‘most of the local authorities have behaved as if they are hostages to fortune and the providers have set their fee levels and said take it or leave it’ (p. 57).  Although generally critical of the performance of the market in children’ children’s care, the authors show how, over time, some of the authorities involved learnt to metagovern. One local authority established a Children’s Contract Unit to negotiate with and monitor the performance of private firms.  Another offered formal form al training to social workers on negotiating and writing contracts. Working through the Association of the Directors of Social

127

Services, others developed a register of approved suppliers. Others replaced short-term contracts with long-term ‘relational’ contracts with firms that had already established a reputation for providing a high-quality service.  Wee have already noted that nations – most prominently the United  W States – in recent years have contracted-out a range of military support functions (Avant, 2005 (Avant, 2005)). It has been estimated that during the occupation of Iraq private contractors working for the US military there outnumbered US Army personnel (Los Angeles Times , 16 October 2007). In 2004 one private firm, Aegis, was even awarded a contract to coordinate and oversee the activities of all the other private contractors working in Iraq (Scahill, 2007,  158–9). However, it was Blackwater USA (renamed Xe in Febru2007, rary 2009) that captured the public’s attention. In 1997 Blackwater was established by a former Special Forces soldier, Erik Prince, whose stated ambition was ‘to do for the national security apparatus what FedEx did to the postal service’ (Scahill, 2007 (Scahill,  2007,,  xix). In 2003 the State Department awarded awarde d a contract contract to Blackwater Blackwater to guard diplomats and the US embassy 

 

128

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

in Baghdad. Blackwater obtained several other lucrative contracts and by  2005 had more than 1000 employees working in Iraq. In 2006 a Black water vehicle crashed into a US Army Humvee in Baghdad. Enraged by  the incident, the Blackwater employees disarmed the soldiers and held them at gunpoint. In December 2006 an off-duty and apparently drunk  Blackwater employee shot and killed a member of the Iraqi vice-president’s vice-president’s security detail. In September 2007 Blackwater contractors escorting a supply convoy shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians in what a large number of   witnesses described as an entirely unprovoked attack. In total, data collected by the State Department shows that between 2005 and September 2007 Blackwater employees employees were involved involved in 163 incidents incidents in which they  shot at someone before they had been shot at. These incidents incidents raised important questions questions about the accountability accountability of  Blackwater’s employees and the legitimacy of its operations in a war zone. Soldiers serving in Iraq are individually responsible for their actions and can, in theory if not always in practice, be tried through military courts. Those working for private firms appeared to operate outside the law. Not one contractor was investigated by the military or the police or other civil authorities authori ties between 2003 and 2007. Indeed Indeed Blackwater and other private se secu curi rity ty firms firms le led d ‘a lo lobb bbyi ying ng ef effo fort rt . . . to try to bloc blockk cong congre ress ssio iona nall or Pentagon efforts to bring their companies and employees under the same  justice code as active-duty soldiers’ ( Minneapolis  Minneapolis Star Tribune , 23 May  2004). In cons consid ider erin ingg the re relat latio ions nshi hip p betw betwee een n mark market etisa isatio tion n and and state state capac capacit ity  y  it should be emphasised that Blackwater employees were not called to accountt for their actions accoun actions because the Pentag entagon on and the State Department Department

allo low w the them to remai emain n unac unacco coun unta tabl blee. Under nder an ord order sig signed ned by the the chose to al head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, two days before the establishment of the new sovereign Iraqi government, US contractors  working in Iraq were exempted from f rom Iraqi laws. la ws. In Congressional hearings the Demo Democr crati aticc chair chairman man of the the House ouse Over Oversig sight ht and and Gove Govern rnme ment nt Refo Reform rm Committee, Henry Waxman, suggested that US authorities went on to become Blackwater’s Blackwater’s ‘enabler’ in Iraq. The State Department had arranged an immediate flight home for the contractor contractor accused of shooting shooting the vicepresident’s bodyguard, thus preventing a thorough Iraqi investigation of  the incident ( , 3 October 2007). The failure to metagovern New Yorkprivate Times  security firms was not an oversight: it was a  Blackwater and other deliberate political strategy.  Yet  Yet the Blackwater debacle shows that governments can, if they wish, reassert control over private firms. When news broke of the shooting of 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

the 17 civilians, the Iraqi government announced that it would prosecute anyone who it believed had broken Iraqi law and threatened to revoke the oper op erat atin ingg li lice cenc ncee not not only only of Bla lack ckwa wate terr but but of all all the the othe otherr priv privat atee se secu curi rity  ty  firms in Iraq. In response, the US government described the September shootings as a potential crime and dispatched the FBI to investigate them.  A few days later the State Department official responsible for monitoring  the activities of private contractors in Iraq was sacked. New rules were introduced requiring a representative of the State Department to accompany convoys operated or protected by Blackwater, and Blackwater itself  to install video camera equipment in all its vehicles and keep a record of all communications. Finally, in October 2007, the Congress passed a  bill, with the overwhelming overwhelming support of both Democrats and Republicans, Republicans, making all private contractors working in Iraq subject to prosecution by  US courts. RELATIONAL CAPACITY

1 explained that governments, in establishing and operating govChapter 1 explained ernance strategies, develop strategic relationships or partnerships with a  range of non-state actors. Governments choose to work with private firms and other actors in market-based governance arrangements because they  believe that, by doing so, they can enhance their capacity to achieve certain policy goals. Up to now we have emphasised the extent to which states retain control over markets. Here we point out that, even in situations  where governments have largely forsworn such hierarchical controls, the use of markets can enhance state capacity.  A good example is the role played in the global economy by a handful of credit rating agencies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. These

129

firms issue judgments on the creditworthiness of borrowers. Such is the significance attached to these that it is almost impossible for a firm or sovereign government government entering the bond market to borrow b orrow money without first obtaining a credit rating. The rating agencies argue that they have acquired such a dominant position because they have established a record for reliable advice. Critics suggest that their dominance is due to government regulations requiring  firms  firms to possess a favourable credit rating from one of a list of credit agencies approved by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Several rules require firms to obtain a credit rating. First, regulations designed to protect the long-term interests of investors in pension funds prohibit pension fund managers from investing in a company unless it has

 

130

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

the highest possible credit rating. Second, regulatory provisions relating  to the disclosure of financial information have been tied to credit ratings: firms that have been judged as a low financial risk are not required to disclose as muchoperating information to the the market. ministers central bankers through G10 Third, group finance of countries have,and in part, par t, foun founde ded d gl globa oball re regu gula lato tory ry re requ quir irem emen ents ts for for banki banking ng on cred credit it rat ratin ings gs.. Banks that are not in a position to undertake internal credit assessments of  sufficient sophistication to comply with the Basle II Accords can instead calculate their capital reserve requirements using ratings issued by credit agencies. As Christopher Bruner and Rawi Abdelal (2005, 193) comment, the ‘private authority of the rating agencies is not so private after all. Governments have both valorised and codified their authority.’ The authority delegated to credit rating agencies has led to a concern that a small number of exclusively US firms have been left ‘wielding de fact fa cto orali gove go vern powe poewer r lf’ . ’. (Bru . arune mark ma et-b -bas ased ed au thor orit y 7). th that atDi iseter almo almost st asr ,ity 207). 20 Diet er Kerwe Kerwer cent ce ntra lise sed drnme asment the thentstat state itse itself (B nerrket r& Abdel bd elal al,auth , 2005, 2005 (2005, 464) suggests that credit rating agencies have been turned into ‘quasi-public regulators’ and that this raises important questions about their accountability and legitimacy. The argument about accountability is straightforward. Credit rating agencies can be hauled before Congressional committees to answer questions about how they operate. But under the terms terms of the first first amen amendm dmen entt to the the US Cons Consti titut tutio ion n prot protec ectin tingg free free speec speech, h, theey ar th aree not not le lega gallly acco accoun unta tabl blee for for the the jud judgmen gments ts they they issu issuee so lo long ng as the they  are made in good faith. What legitimacy do these firms have in the absence of such an accountability mechanism? The agencies claim that they have the output legitimacy which comes from a generally successful record, but this th is re reco cord rd is cont contro rove vers rsia ial. l. Poor oor judg judgme ment ntss made made by th thee agen agenci cies es have have been been implicated in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2000 dot-com crash, the failure of Enron and Worldcom in 2001, and the global financial crisis that began in 2008. In the latter case, agencies have been widely castigated for

issuing the highest possible credit ratings to banks trading in sub-prime debt which were subsequently shown to be insolvent. Sceptics point to a  confl co nflic ictt of inte intere rest st beca becaus usee the the ra rati ting ng agen agenci cies es have have an ince incent ntiv ivee to comp compet etee for business by giving the firms who pay their bills a higher rating. Critics also argue that the agencies lack legitimacy because their judgments about creditworthiness overemphasise fiscal orthodoxy and the presence of weak  labour unions (Kerwer, 2002).  Yet  Yet in assessing the relationship between the credit rating agencies and governments, it should be remembered that the US government has

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

chosen  to foster closer relations with the agencies. From the government’s perspective there are good reasons to tie business regulations to credit worthiness. Light-touch Light -touch regulation for firms demonstrating a strong credit position allows regulators to focus on more risky firms. Preventing pension funds from making high-risk investments may save the state from meeting  the costs of more people’s people’s retirements. Governments could, if they wanted, reach their own judgments about the creditworthiness of firms. For the US government there are advantages in using the judgments re reac ache hed d by priv privat atee firms firms.. In the the first first plac place, e, they they are are le less ss cost costly ly.. Cred Credit it rati rating ngss are available free of charge to market participants: the firm seeking a rating  must pay for that service. Governments would have to devote considerable resources to devising their own ratings. Second, it is less politically risky to rely upon private firms. A government which classified as creditworthy a  firm that subsequently went bankrupt would be accused of incompetence and held liable by voters and taxpayers for the losses incurred. By relying  on the judgments reached by private firms, the US government has a  ready-made ready -made scapegoat. scapegoat. As Bruner and Abdelal Abdelal (2005, 209) wryly wr yly observe:  When Enron collapsed with no warning from the rating agencies, capping  a series of perceived failures including several global financial crises in the 1990s, Congress and the SEC could call hearings, investigate, and berate the agencies, querying whether ratings-dependent regulation makes sense in the future, without digging too deeply into whether incorporating them in the past was simply a bad decision.

The US government has in some ways enhanced its capacity by developing close relations with credit rating agencies. But there are also losers in this market. Given the effective duopoly maintained by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, European and Asian governments have no alternative but deal with agencies whose political views they do not always share. The relationship between the US government and the rating agencies has thus

131

far far been been mutu mutual ally ly supp suppor orti tive ve,, al alth thou ough gh the the se seve veri rity ty of the the 2008 2008 cred credit it cris crisis is is likely to lead to further strains. GOVERNANCE THROUGH BUSINESS?

 At the beginning of this chapter distinguished twohave strands in the cussion about marketisation andwe state capacity. We looked at disthe argument that states have lost control of the markets they have created.

 

132

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Now we look at the argument that marketisation has resulted in the surrender of significant powers to private businesses operating independently  of government control. As we have said, we are generally sceptical about viewing the relationship between the state and hierarchy on the one hand and markets on the other in zero-sum terms. We also doubt that markets – or major players within them, such as business interests – have replaced hierarchy as a key mode of governance. This section argues that the relationship between governments and business can be usefully understood from a state-centric relational perspective. States shape the environment in  which business operates. States sometimes constrain and discipline business interests for wider purposes. But generally the state–business relationship should be understood as a productive, positive-sum relationship. Businesses – whether small local businesses or giant transnationals – make decisions that affect the lives of millions of people. These decisions fall fall with within in the the scop scopee of gove govern rnan ance ce beca becaus usee they they cont contri ribu bute te to the the pro provi visi sion on of such collectively valued goals as full employment, economic growth, sustainable development and rising wages. We cannot draw a line and say that governance has nothing to do with the activities of private firms. Neither can governments afford to ride roughshod over the interests of  business, especially if this threatens a widespread loss of confidence or a  substantial slowdown in private investment. In capitalist systems, in which investment decisions are primarily taken by private firms, governments are structurally dependent upon businesses for private investment and 1985;   Bell & Wanna, economic growth (Lindblom,   1977; 1977; Przeworski,   1985; 1992). 1992)  Whether acting collectively or individually, individually, businesses are often in a  strong bargaining position when lobbying government. Chapter government.  Chapter 2 noted 2  noted that the American health insurance industry was widely blamed for derailing Hillary Clinton’s proposals for health reform. This chapter has shown that private security firms sought to secure a favourable legal environment for their activities in Iraq. The examples of businesses using political processes for their own ends are legion. ExxonMobil was instrumental in persuading the US government to allow further oil exploration in Alaska.

The defence firm BAE Systems was heavily implicated in the UK government’s decision to terminate a police inquiry into the alleged payment of  bribes to Saudi officials. The scandal over food-for-oil sanctions in Iraq revealed that the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Wheat Export Authority had sought to maximise the export revenue of the privately owned Australian Wheat Board at the expense of fulfilling  their regulatory duties (Bartos, 2006 (Bartos, 2006)).

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

Examining governan Examining governance ce through through associations associations   Cha Chapt pter er 8   looks looks more more closely at the interactions between business associations and governments. Here we identify a number of reasons why the authority of business is limited. Chapter limited. 1  explained that states possess key resources including   Chapter 1 explained legitimacy andsubmission a monopoly the useItof so they simply  be rolled into by on business. is violence, clear, though, thatcannot business possesses some preference-shaping power. Firms can persuade governments of  the virtues of acting in certain ways and can seek to persuade consumers of  the legitimacy of their behaviour. They can also help set government and media agendas. David Coen (1997) argues that business groups pressed for the creation of a European Single Market. Yet business lacks coercive powe po wer: r: the the abili ability ty to impo impose se its deci decisi sion onss again against st oppo opposit sitio ion. n. Sove Sovere reig ign n govgovernm ernmen ents ts can can and and have have forc forced ed busi busine ness sses es to pay pay mini minimu mum m wage wages, s, reco recogn gnis isee trade unions, accept the welfare state, reduce pollution and pay taxes on  windfall profits. Businesses can and a nd do b bargain argain and negotiate with governments, but they cannot force them to behave in certain ways.Here, power Businesses may sometimes be more lucky than powerful. means being successful despite opposition, whereas luck means getting   what you want without trying (Barry, (Barry,  1989)  1989). Businesses sometimes get  what they want because government also  wants what they want: a classic positive-sum outcome. As we have seen, this is the case with credit rating  agencies, agenc ies, which have been gifted a dominant market position because it is in the interest of government to require firms to gain a credit rating from an approved agency. Another example is the issue of nuclear power, which  we touched on in Chap Chapte terr 3. In re rece cent nt year yearss the the gove govern rnme ment ntss of the the Unite nited d States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan and China have committed themselves to expand the use nuclear power. Someofenvironmental critics have sought to account forofthis decision in terms the power of  large nuclear firms like EDF Energy. Yet we might alternatively describe these firms as the lucky beneficiaries of government’s determination to be seen to be addressing problems of energy security and climate change  without creating state-owned nuclear companies. In capitalist systems governments rely on private firms to invest and spur the economy. Globalisation is argued to have given transnational

133

firms an additional lever on national governments by making the threat to exit a national economy more plausible. However, Chapter However, Chapter 2 2 showed  showed that the key determinants of investment decisions are market access, a skilled  workforce, publicly provided infrastructure. Globalisation has not resultedand in aother qualitative shift in the power of business. Furthermore, as we have emphasised, states retain responsibility for the metagovernance

 

134

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

of markets. Governments not only operate under established governance rules: they play a major role in choosing governance rules. Where a government believes that marketisation has resulted in a loss of effectiveness, accountability or legitimacy, it can assert hierarchical control. In 2001 several eral large large Amer Americ ican an comp compan anie ies, s, incl includ udin ing, g, most most fa famo mousl uslyy, Enro Enron, n, coll collaps apsed ed shortly after revealing massive and previously undisclosed debts. One year later, Congress passed and the President approved a new law prohibiting  audit firms from engaging in a variety of non-audit consultancy work, and requiring firms to protect whistleblowers and to establish genuinely  independent audit boards with a legal responsibility to disclose any ‘material weakness’ in a company’s internal control structures. These measures proved hugely controversial; many companies threatened to move overseas because of the increased cost of doing business in America. One study  published by the right-wing American Enterprise Institute describes the legislation legisl ation as a ‘colossal colossal failure, failure, poorly conceived conceived and hastily enacted during a regulatory panic’ (quoted, Economist , 20 April 2006). Yet the survival of the law in the face of sustained business opposition ought to encourage scepticism about the ability of business or any other organisations to operate independently of national governments. In Rupert’s Adventures in China , Bruce Dover (2008) provides an entertaining account of the limits of one transnational firm: Rupert Murdoch’ Murdoch’s News Corporation. Murdoch first tried to gain access to the Chinese market in 1993 with the purchase of Hong Kong’s STAR TV. Murdoch saw the potential for a positive-sum relationship between the Chinese government and his company. He stood to gain access to the world’s largest domestic market; in return the Chinese sought more ‘objective’ and ‘balanced’ coverage of China in the Western media. In 2001 a deal was struck: STAR TV programs were carried on a  cable network in the Guangdong region, and in return Murdoch agreed to show sho w the Chin Chines esee gove govern rnme ment nt’’s new new 24-ho 24-hour ur roll rollin ingg news news se servi rvice ce,, CCTV CCTV9, 9, on his Fox cable network in the United States at no cost. The bargain was an unequal one. STAR TV broadcast programs in Mandarin, but most people in Guangdong speak Cantonese. Despite spending hundreds of  millions of dollars on programming, STAR TV remained in a financially  precarious position. Murdoch had been forced into the deal because the Chinese government had the coercive power to ban satellite dishes, prohibi hi bitt join jointt vent ventur ures es betw betwee een n overs versea eass firms firms and and lo loca call medi mediaa comp compan anie ies, s, and and

censor programs. In the long term Murdoch hoped that he would secure access to more of the th e Chinese market. Following the appointment of a new  leadership cadre in Beijing, News International hit, in Murdoch’s words, a 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARKETS

 

‘brick wall’ in 2005. The T he government, fearing ‘cultural pollution’, pollution’, affirmed its ban on satellite dishes and prohibited the further involvement of any  foreign media company in China. Nor have governments in Western democracies hesitated to take the kid gloves off and exert forceful authority over powerful business interests. Aggressive industry restructuring in the United Kingdom under the Thatcher government, for example, roused a hostile response from industry, with the leader of the Confederation of British Industry at one point promising a ‘bare-knuckle fight with the government’. The government, however, prevailed in its plans for industry restructuring and marketisation. Similarly, in the United States in the 1930s, the Roosevelt administration successfully introduced new labour laws and welfare state policies thatt raise tha raised d host hostil ility ity fr from om import importan antt busi busine ness ss se sect ctor orss (Sko (Skocp cpol ol,, 1980; 1980; Bl Bloc ock, k, 1980; Helleiner, 1994 1980; 1994)). In Austr ustral alia ia as well well,, the the Keat Keatin ingg Labo Laborr gove govern rnme ment nt turned on big business during the 1990s, claiming (largely erroneously) that the peak business association, the Business Council of Australia, had been ‘partisan’ during the 1993 federal election. Keating publicly attacked CEOs, and ministers and senior bureaucrats were discouraged from active engagement with the Business Council. As a former director commented: the philosophy that informed government’s attitude was if business put its head above the parapet then it’d be kicked in. And that had the effect of  causing many in the business leadership to actually retreat. They ultimately  had an obligation to their own shareholders not to expose the company to retali ret aliati ation on at the poli politic tical al leve levell . . . and the theyy back backed ed off [Be [Bell ll 200 2008a, 8a, 564 564]. ].

CONCLUSION

In Reinventing Government , David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) argue thatt gove tha govern rnme ment ntss can devo devolv lvee re resp spon onsi sibil bility ity for for ‘row ‘rowin ing’ g’ – de deli live verin ringg actua actuall services to citizens – without compromising their ability to ‘steer’ – to raise resources and set priorities. Their book is written in the style of a  can-do business manual complete with inspiring examples; at times it is quite galling. It has also been read as constituting an unqualified defence of the application of neo-liberal economic principles to the government sector (see Bevir, 2007 Bevir,  2007,,  xxiii). Yet, while recognising that ‘privatisation is one arrow in the government’s quiver’, Osborne and Gaebler (1992, 47)

135

are clear that those who believe business is always superior to government are selling the American people snake oil’.

 

136

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Privatization is simply the wrong starting point for a discussion of the role of government. Services can be contracted out or turned over to the public sector. But governance cannot. We can privatize discrete steering functions, but not the overall process of  governance . If we did, we would have no mechanism by which to make collective decisions, no way to set the rules of the marketplace, no means to enforce rules of behaviour. [p. 47 emphasis in original]

The choi The choice ce is not not betw betwee een n mark market etss and and hier hierar arch chie ies. s. Mark Market etss are are suff suffus used ed  with hierarchy. hierarchy. States not only create markets: they manage them. Privatisation, tio n, deregu deregulati lation, on, contrac contractin ting-o g-out, ut, PPPs PPPs and intern internal al and extern external al markets markets all require ongoing hierarchical intervention. Markets are managed and, as Michael Keating (2004, 6) argues, can be used to ‘assist in the achievement of many of the state’s policy directions and goals’.

 

 

7

Governance through community engagement

DESPITE TRENDS TOWARDS fragmentation and greater indi-

vi vidu dual alis ism m in mode modern rn Wes este tern rn soci societ etie ies, s, ther theree has has been been a gro growing wing inte intere rest st in a wide range of governance engagements or partnerships between governments, citizens and communities. These arrangements vary from relatively  inconsequential forms of public consultation to ambitious provisions for  joint decision-making. There is nothing new in the principle of community engagement, but this chapter describes precedents for apparently novel governance arrangements. The scale and scope of engagement efforts have increased over the last decade or more for several reasons. The development of the internet and the explosion in the ownership of home computers has made it easier and cheaper for governments to solicit citizens’ opinions. (On the possibilities of e-governance, see 2006;   Budd & Harris,   2008. 2008.) Torres et al.,   2006; 2006;   Dunleavy et al.,   2006; In 2006, when the UK prime minister’s office launched a website (http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/) that allowed visitors to create or sign online petitions, one petition, calling on the government to abandon proposals to introduce a road-pricing scheme, attracted almost 2 million signatures.  At a normative level, democratic theorists have, in recent decades, championed pio ned the virtues virtues of delibe deliberati ration on and civic civic engage engagemen mentt over over establi establishe shed d forms fo rms of re repr pres esen entat tativ ivee demo democra cracy cy.. It is now now rout routin inel elyy argu argued ed that that pu publ blic ic deliberation in which citizens reflect carefully on and debate the merits of policies enhances the legitimacy of decisions (Barber, 1984 (Barber,  1984;; Elster, 1998 1998;;  Dryzek, 2000; Besson & Marti, 2006). Civi Ci vicc enga engage geme ment nt and and the the foste fosterin ringg of ‘activ activee citi citize zens ns’’ are are key key poli policy cy prinprinciples of the ‘communitarian’ (Etzioni, 1995 (Etzioni, 1995)) and ‘third way’ (Giddens,    

   

   

137

 

138

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

   

1998)) phil philos osop ophi hies es that that pro proved ved at attr trac acti tive ve to a numb number er of cent centre re-l -lef eftt go govv1998 ernments in the 1990s. They are argued to lead to healthier and more prosperous societies, where rights are balanced with responsibilities. Perhaps most significantly, governments have learnt that community  engagement can enhance their capacity to formulate and implement policies. Governments have sought to engage more thoroughly with ci citiz tizen enss in orde orderr to info inform rm them themse selv lves es of pote potent ntia iall disco discont nten ent; t; to enhan enhance ce the legitimacy of decisions and ease implementation; to broaden the base of responsibility for policy and thus help shield government from blame; and to incorporate wider inputs or participation in government decisio dec ision-m n-makin akingg (Irvin (Irvin & Stansb Stansbury ury,, 2004 2004)). Th Thee evid eviden ence ce is that that citi citize zens ns are more likely to conclude that policies are fair if they have been given the oppo opportu rtuni nity ty to partic particip ipate ate in their their formu formula latio tion n (Kea (Keati ting ng,, 2004, 2004, 159). In promoting community engagement, governments have recognised – or have at least said that they recognise – that there are occasions when hierarchical governance unleavened by community engagement can be counterproductive. Community engagement is regarded as an antidote

to a decl declin inin ingg st stat atee le legi giti tima macy cy whic which h mani manife fest stss itse itself lf in gro growing wing mist mistru rust st of politicians and falling falling rates of political political participation. Finally, governance through community engagement is sustained by  a growing conviction that centralised forms of expert knowledge can be inappropriate or unreliable and that forms of knowledge garnered through dialogue and engagement with citizens or communities should ). be valued (Bell, 2004b (Bell,  2004b). This chapter explores the role of citizens and communities as partners in governan governance ce in national national and local settings. settings. We We defer analysis of internainternational governance until the next chapter, mainly because such activism is gene ge neral rally ly cond conduc ucte ted d thro throug ugh h inte intern rnati ation onal ally ly based based activ activis istt ass assoc ocia iatio tions ns and and    

NGOs rather than directly through citizens or communities. We start by  dist di stin ingu guis ishi hing ng among among the many many diffe differe rent nt form formss of commu communi nity ty en enga gage geme ment nt and offer examples of particular governance arrangements. Advocates of  community engagement argue that the state should share its power and resources and devolve governance functions to citizens and communities. In accordance with our broader state-centred relational approach to governance, we stress that governance processes involve a range of state–society  links, but that the role of the state remains of central importance.  While recognising that there have been many useful experiments and initiatives, we emphasise the limitations of community engagement as a  mode of governance. Three critical issues shape and potentially impede governance via community engagement. There are questions about:

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES    

   

   

 

the willingness willingness and capacity of citizens citizens and communities communities to participate participate in such arrangements, arrangements, especially especially on a sustained sustained basis  who exactly is being engaged, and how representative and legitimate such engagements are government motives and capacities, especially in relation to power sharing. CITIZEN AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Community engagement can be defined as ‘the process of working collaboratively with and through groups of people affiliated by geographical proximity, special interest, or similar situations to address issues that affect them’ (Lowe & Hill, 2005 Hill, 2005,, 170). Community engagement can sometimes devolve responsibility for both the formulation and the implementation of  policy to communities and, on this basis, has been celebrated as constituting an alternative to markets, hierarchies and pressure-group politics. Yet it is clear arrangements. that the term community engagement can describe a variety of  different Table 7.1   draws on work by the International Association for Public Participation (2005; see also Arnstein, 1969 Arnstein,  1969;;  Bishop & Davis, 2002 Davis,  2002;; Head, 2007 Head,  2007). ). It depicts a range of engagement alternatives distinguished in terms of the amount of authority shared between government and citizens. Towards one end of the spectrum is ‘empowerment’, which formally  incorporates public input; at the extreme it places final decision-making  authority in the hands of the public via community committees, citizens’  juries, ballots and referendums. Here the claims of community engagement to constitute a distinct mode of governance are clearest. The other end of the is the sharingand of information. Towards middle are spectrum options such as simple ‘consultation collaboration’, where the the government solicits the views and input of citizens and communities in a  spirit of partnership but reserves the right to take final policy decisions. In formal consultation processes governments listen to and acknowledge the public’s concerns and aspirations and provide feedback on the extent to which their views influenced policy decisions. At its best, such consultation becomes an ongoing dialogue involving mutual learning and accommodation. At its worst, it is tokenistic and creates a sense of betrayal  when communities believe that their views have been ignored. ‘Standing’ involves involves innovations innovations such as formal participation participation in forums of review  and decision. Examples include formal public engagement in processes

139

 

  s    n   o     i    t   a     i    t    m     i     L

   r   o    t   e    n   u   e   q     i    m    n   u    r     h    t   c   s   e    n     T    i   c     i     l     b   u    p   e     h    t   o    t   e   s     i    m   o    r     P

   n   o     i    t   a    t   c   s   u     i   e    p    n    i    t    n   u    i     i    n    m   u   c     i     l    m    m     b   o   u   c    m    p   y   o   a   c     d   e   e     i    t   e   w   -     i   s   v    m   n     i   a     L    O    P

   n     d    r   s   e   o    t   y   o   e    t     d   s     f   e   e     l   u     d   g   u    r   g     h   o    t    n   a   c   e    n     f   a     d    t   g     b   x     i     i    n   a   e   e    t    n     i   y   s    n   e    m   e    i   g   s     d   e    t   u   e   s    n    n   e   y    r     l     d   s    t     i   y   o    n   o   o    r   o     i     i     i    m    n   v   a   a   u     h    t   s     i    t    n    n    r     k   o     i     i    r   w   u   o    t    t   a    m  s   c   c   e   e     i   e    r    p     o    m   e    t   u    t   o   e     b  ,    m    m     d    p     f    p   s   q     l   s    m   s     l   o   o    m  s   s   e   e    n   c    t   c   a    m   a    i   o     i     i     e   e   o    t   e     h    n    t     f   o   a   e    t     b   c   u   u   a   c   s   s    n   c   y     d    i   s    t     h   e   s   s    t     d     d   e    n   e    f   e    k   o    t    r     i     i    n    r   o   o     f   a   x    i     i    t    n   e     l     h   o    p   u    t   y     h   a   y    f   y   c   e   s   e    i     f    n    t  ,     i     l    t   w     i     i     f   v   a     l     i    m   m  c    d   s   o    f     l     i     l   s     i   s    p   u    n     b   a     i    m   a   e   o   s   a    i   c     b     i    t   a    r   e     h   e    i   o   e   o    m   o    p   s   e    n   e    p   e   a    t   c   c   c   s   w   u    b   g   o    d   s   a    m   x    m   e   o   o   s     P    L     P     E     C     I     R

  s   e   s   s    m    t   e   o   e    h   e    t     i     h   s   s    n   e    t   c    b   e    p   a     O     F    W

  g   s    n     i   s     l    t    m     l    n   s   s    n   u   o   e   o     i   e    r   g    p     i   s   s   o     d    n   s     f   o    i    m   e    p   e   s    r   v   s   s   u     b     i   a   o    m    p    t   u   y   e   e   o   o   s    r   a     h   c    r   u   s    r     h   g    n   e   e   s    b   y   g   o    i   e   c   s    i   c   s   s     k   o     i     l     l     l     i   u    r   v   a    n   v    b   c    b   o    l   e    r     i   o    d   u   o   u   u     D    S    D    C    A    P    F    P     W

  u   o   y  .    p     d   e   e   e     k    m     l    r     l     i     f   o   w   n   e    i     W

   n   o    )   o   o    r    t    n     d   e   c   e   g     d    k   c   a    t   e    d    n   u   o    t   e    n    n     b   o    i  .   s    l     d   a    d   w   t   e    n   y     l    n   w   u   u   o    p    fl    i   s   e   a    n   o  ,   o   s    p   e     h     f     d   e   s    n    n    n   o     i     i     i   e   e    k    n     i   e    r   c   o    t    r     k   c   c   e     d   e     (    m   a   e     i     i     l   a   c    i   c    d    r    r   v   w    l     l     i     i     f   o    d    n     b   v   e   o   o   u    d   w   n    n   o    p    r   s    t   e    i   a   c   a    p    h    p   a    h     W

   e    c    n    a    n  ,    r   o    t     i   c   s   s    e   y    t   e     l     h    v     l   u    n   s    t    t   e   g    i   v    o     b   s     i    p   o   c    g   v    n     i   e    t   u    r   e    n     i     i    t   w    t   c   a   o     i     i    p   a    r    t   s     d    n    n     i     i   o   c   c     /    r    r    t   s     i    r     d    r     i   e   s    n     l     d   o     j    a    n   a   e    n    r    p     h    p   a    t     b    t  .    o     b   s   e    i     k     l   s     i   e   c   y    t   a    n   u   a   o     d    t    r     l   c   a   o     h     l   e    p    d    t   e  ,   s   a    r   e    d    t    a    t    t   e     b    r    n    r    p     b     d   e     i     i    c    t   e   s     d   e     d   o    n   a    i   u   s    t  .    p   e    n    m   e    i    t   u    d   u    l    n   a    i    n   o    n   u     h    t   a    p    t    n   s   o   s    t   s    r   o    i     d    r   e     b   s   e   e     f   a   u    n    t     h    n    n    n   e   o    a   o    t   s   o     d    n     i    r    r   g   o    k    h   c    m     i   o    r    t    n    r    p     i   e   o     i    t   u   v    t    n    r   e   c   o   u    r    h   o   a    p    p   c   c    d    c    m   a   o     i   o    t   o     d     d    t     l   e    p    l    r    b    n    n     l   e    h     f    r   e     i     l    n   a    n    r   o     b   o     h     h    p   w    n   a   u   a   a   c   a   s   o   o    t    t    t     i     b   w    u   o   o   o    p     G     T     T     f     o    s    m    r   e    o    t    n   a     F   o    r    r     i  .    t   o   o     1   a    t     b  .     f     l    p    m   a   o    i     7   u    l     l   c   s    e    r     i     l   o    m    t    n   o    r     b    r     f   o   c   a    a   o    n     T     F   p     I     C

 

 ,    m   s    t   o   s     f    r     i   v   s     i    t    t   c   u   a    p     l    n   a     i   c   o     d     l    n   a    n   o   s   e   s   c    r     d   u    t    n    n   a   e   o   s    t   e    m    m   u    r   e   o    r     d    n    d    n   e   e   y    r    t   v   o   u    i    m  g   v   a   e    b     H     L

 ,    t   s    r    t    t   u   a   o   g   s   e     h    r    t   c     i    n   e    t    r   s   e   o    m    i    n   u   s   u   s   s     d   s   w    n     i   e   e     i     d   o   e   v   s   c    n     e   o    r   u   e     f     h      t     l    m    l   a     i     l   o    t   e    t    m   w     d    t    r   o    n   s    n     f   a     d   c   a    r     i   o   v   e    t    t   a   e   v   s     l     i     i   e   e     l   s   w    r   o   a    m  g    n    t   e   e    p   s   a   c    l     l    n   y   o   x    i     E    B     O

  s    t     f    n   s   e   o   e     d     l   s    t    n   s   s   a   a    m   s   s   s     d    t    n   e    p    d    p   e   s   e   o   c    n    n   s   u   c   u   e    t   e   a   o    r   o   s   o   o    m    r    r   s     l    r   o     h    r   s   s    p   a    m  a     f   e     l   e   g    r   g   u   g   o   a   y    i    n   c    t   u   a     k   c   e   c    r     h   c   o    n   o   s    r    r    n   o    r   c   a   u   a   u   a     b   s     i   o   a    t    t   o   c    h   a   w    t   v    p     b    r   e   s     i    t    m   u     d     i   g    n   e    n    i     W  v    r   o   e    i    m    n      t    t     f    r     i   a   e   o   e   a    t   o    C     L    N     R     S     J   u    t   o     l     i   y   a   s   s     d    n   s   s   a   a     i     h    t     l   c   o    d   e   w   e   c    n    r   v   a     l     k    r   o   s   u   o   o   s   s    m   e    p    l   w    l   e    r   s     l   e     l     i     h    b   a    t   e   o    h     i   w   o    r     i   e    t    p   w    d     W  ,    n    t   s    n   o   e     i   e    i    t    t     d     i    n    m  c   e    n    p    t   u   u   o   o   o     l    r    m   r   e    p   g   s   v    l    m   e   a   e   a   o    h     d    t   c    t     h   c   y    n    m   e    n    t   u   s     i   o    t     i     h    t    t   w   n   u    n    n   c   o     i     k    r   e    m    i    r     j    o   o    j     r   v   o    m   o    n   w    i    n    p   c   e   o     T

  e   v     l   o   v    n     I

 

  o    t   y    t     i   s    n    n  ,   o   u   s     i  ,   y   e   s    m  s   s  ,     i     i    r   c   c   e     d    m    m   a   u   e   e    r     j    o    n   u    t     d   c    i   a    d   c    t     ’   s   o     l   s     d    n   a    m   n    t   e   e    m   e   o    r   v    m   m    i   z   e     l     l   e     l    r     f     d    t   o   a   o     i     e   e   o   c   c    b    r   v   e    f     D

  e   s    t     h     l   u    t   w    r   e  ,    t   e   e   s    n   e    i     d   e    r   c   a    r    p    n    r   v   u    l     i   o   y   e    d    i   o    r   c    t    p   s    r   e   u    m   e    t   e   a  ,   o   y    f    n   g   o     l   e    d    n    r    r   s    t    n   g   a     d     i     l     i   u    l   e   s  .   s    p   u    h   e    t   e    i   s   e    r   s     l   a   e   g    n   o   e    n    m    t    n   s     i   g    m  o   e   o    i    n   s   o   w     h   e   e   o   y   s    t    n     i    n   u    t     i   o    r    t   e     l     l     d    m    t   s     d    t   o   o     l     l   u   s    n    d    p    i   a    h   e   a   a   e    i     i     h    n   c   v   c    r   o    k   s     h    t   a    r   g    t   w   w    i   e   a   u     f   o     l   c    n   e   e    r   s    p   a   a    r   e   w   a   g    p   o   q    d     W     W     l   a    m    r   o   s   y     f    t    r   e    n   s   a     i   s    p    t   c     d    n   e    r   o   e     i     h    r    p    t    m   e   v   w     l   w   e   o   o     i     l   v   v     l   e   a    i    n    r   o     T

   t     l   u   e   a    h   o    n    t  .     l     fi   e   c    n    i   o     f   c   e    i     l    r   o    t   c   a    l   g    b   g    p   a    n   s    n   u    t     i     i    p   c  ,    p   s     k   e    k    r   e   e   a    h   a    p     i   o   s   -     f    t    t   y  ,    m    m     i    n    t   a   e    n    n   o   u    i   v    i    r   o   o    m     l   s     i   o    i   o   s     d   s     h     i   v    t   c    n   c    m   e   a   e   e   c   u    d   o   a     d    d     h   o     T

  e    t   a    r   o     b   a     l     l   o     C

   r   e   w   o    p    m     E

 

142

  y   a   w    t   s    t   e   u     b   o     l   e   a     b   c     h   a    t   g   s    n    l   o   s    n   e     i   u     i   o    r   e    m    t   s    m   s   u    ?   s    p   e   u    i     d    n    n   v   s   o     i   y     o    n   o    n    n   s     i   s   c     i   e   o     i   o    t    t   o   e    i   a    i   c   s   v    r     i   a   c    t   e    p    t   e       f     f    m     i   a     d   e    i   e    i   o   u    n    t    t   c    r     i   y    n   q     i     /    m   u   y     l    t   e   g     i   s     l    t   y    m    i    t ,     l     i   e   s   e    r   a    t    t     l   e   a     i     i    r    t   y   e    p   s    p    b   o   c    m     l    n     i    t   s   o    i   e   s   c    t   o   s   a    r    p   a   o    r   v   e    t   e   o    C   o    A     C    R     P     P

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 .   g    r   o  .     2    p   a     i     /     /   :    p    t    t     h

    >

    <

   n   o     i    t   a    p     i   c     i    t    r   a     P   c     i     l     b   u     P     f   o   e    t   u    t     i    t   s    n     I     l   a    n   o     i    t   a    n    r   e    t    n     I    m   o    r     f     d   e    t    p   a     d     A   :   e   c    r   u   o     S

such as environmental impact reviews (Glasson et al., 2005 al.,  2005,,  5–7). Such forms of engagement engagement can be effective but also time-consuming, time-consuming, expensive expensive and legalistic, requiring funding and specialised resources to operate effectivel tiv elyy. Final inally ly,, in ‘joi ‘joint nt proj projec ects’ ts’ the gove govern rnme ment nt help helpss or prov provid ides es reso resour urce cess to community community groups groups to implement implement policies. Examples include conservation groups or Neighbourhood Watch schemes performing tasks which, in other instances, might have been undertaken by government.  Wee will look at some examples of these arrangements. A good example  W of empowerment is the provision in nearly half of all the states in the United States to hold a public referendum on policy propositions which, through a petition, have attracted the support of a minimum number of  citizens. Referendums have a long history. The Swiss federal constitution of 1891 permitted citizens to request a vote on constitutional provisions. In California ballot propositions have, for some time, been a staple part of the political process (Allswang, 2000 (Allswang,  2000)). In 2004, 18 ballots were held on topics as varied as stem cell research, the collection of DNA samples, gambling, and additional taxation on personal incomes above $1 million to fund mental health care. Provisions for citizens’ initiatives have recently been included the2004 French constitution andCanada, the constitution of the European Union.inIn British Columbia, created a  Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform to explore options and make recommendations about a new electoral system. The assembly comprised 160 randomly selected citizens who were charged with receiving submissions, consulting with interested parties and experts, and discussing available options. In assessing the impact of the Assembly’s efforts, Bob Goodin and John Dryzek (2006, 225) observe that British Columbia’s legislature gave a commitment to put any recommendations to a formal referendum: ‘the macro macro-p -pol olit itic ical al uptak uptakee of this this minimini-pu publi blic’ c’ss reco recomm mmen enda datio tion n was hard hard  wired’. Dani Da nish sh cons consen ensu suss conf confer eren ence cess ar areehave a good go od exam exampl pleebeen of employed coll collab abor oraation. Consensus conferences – which subsequently in Is Isra rael el,, the Unite nited d States tates,, Spain, pain, Japan apan,, Aust Austral ralia, ia, Switz witzer erla land nd and and New Zealand (http://www.loka.org/TrackingConsensus.html) – deal with techno-scientific topics of interest to the public whose character is uncertain, contested or controversial (Fixdal, 1997 (Fixdal,  1997,,  370). The Danish Board of Technology has organised consensus conferences on genetically modified food, gene therapy, electronic identity cards, food irradiation, fishing, road pricing and electronic electronic surveillance. surveillance. The conferenc conferencee consists consists of a  broadly representative Citizen Panel of about 15 lay people and a Planning  Committee of eight or so experts. Introductory material, often written

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

by a science journalist, is reviewed by the Planning Committee and then

143

distributed to the Citizen Panel. At the conference, experts answer questions in public sessions before the Citizen Panel submits a final report and recommendations to the government and parliament (Blok, 2007 (Blok,  2007,,  167; Bruun, 2005 Bruun,  2005). ). Consensus conferences are a significant form of engagement, yet the government retains considerable power: it sets the agenda by  deciding which issues to take to a conference, and it decides whether to accept the conference’s recommendations. The Pacific Northwest of the United States provides an example of  a joint management arrangement in which about 20 Native American tribes co-manage the salmon fisheries with state and federal agencies. This arrangement grew out of a history of debilitating conflict between the relevant parties, who were finally forced to cooperate under court orders. The co-m co-man anag agem emen entt arran arrange geme ment ntss have have enco encour urag aged ed partie partiess to coop cooper erate ate to analyse and assess biological data and pursue initiatives to improve habitat and construct fish hatcheries. hatcheries. In what Sara Singleton Singleton (2000, 13) describes describes as a ‘striking transformation’, disputes between the parties now rarely go to adjudication by third parties or the courts. Landcare Landca re projects in Aust Australia ralia provide an alternative alternative example of a joint arrangement: the federal government has devolved partial responsibility  for environmental restoration and conservation projects to more than 4000 community-based Landcare groups (Curtis & Lockwood,   2000) 2000).  Another system of natural resource governance in Australia is the array  of community-based regional bodies that co-manage regional projects and challenges challe nges with governme government, nt, from bio-diversity bio-diversity and habitat protection to  water quality and soil conservation (Head & Ryan, 2004 Ryan, 2004)).  Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2003) bring together a range of  fascinating examples in which communities have provided various inputs to policy-making, including joint decision-making, in areas as diverse as local public schooling policy in Chicago, worker training in Wisconsin, species protection and conservation policy in the United States, participatory local budgeting in Brazil, and local village empowerment in Kerala, India. In the case of species protection and conservation policy in the United States, a former state of conflict and gridlock between developers and conservationists over the protection of endangered species threatened by development projects has been ameliorated through the formation of  local stakeholder management committees. Typically composed of government officials, developers, conservationists and local groups, they are charged with formulating Habitat Conservation Plans to balance development interests with acceptable levels of species protection. After the local

 

144

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

committee has formulated a plan, it is submitted for approval (or not) by  higher authorities authorities within the state (see also Thomas, 2003 Thomas, 2003)).

These exampl These examples es demons demonstrat tratee succes successful sful experi experimen ments ts in gove governan rnance ce through community engagement. We will now look at the features they  share. On a cautionary note we then consider the governance capacities of  citizens and communities before discussing the democratic legitimacy of  such governance arrangements.

T H E F O U N DA D A T I O N S O F C O M MU MU N I T Y ENGAGEMENT

 What are the common features that underpin successful citizen or community engagement? In a study of watershed management in the United States, Thomas Koontz and Elizabeth Johnson (2004) found that successful community engagement required the broad participation of the full range of affected affected interests. interests. Others have highlighted highlighted the importance importance of citizen skills and knowledge (Kellogg, 1998 (Kellogg,  1998)); the need to engage the public 1998); ); careful early in the decision-making process (Duram & Brown,  Brown,   1998 selection of community representatives; transparent decision-making; and clear lines of authority (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004 Stansbury, 2004,, 61). Singleton (2000, 4) lists a number of ‘necessary conditions’ that must be in place to underpin effective community engagement. Gove Go vern rnme ment ntss must must exhi exhibi bitt a stron strongg prior prior pref prefer eren ence ce for for coll collec ectiv tivee actio action n and effective community engagement. Citizens must be given sufficient information and data in order to reach a decision. The community must have the social and material capacity to overcome collective-action problems. Singleton notes that small or close-knit communities in which people have    

   

   

existing social ties find themselves in a stronger position.  Along similar lines, Kenneth Kernaghan (1993, 62) has considered  collaboration between community organisations and government.  genuine  collaboration Ideally, he says, it involves shared decision-making between parties; the mutu mu tual al acce accept ptan ance ce of a cert certai ain n lo loss ss of auto autono nomy my;; and and a shar shared ed cont contri ribu buti tion on of resources. He goes on to argue that collaborative forms of governance are most likely to prove successful when all significant stakeholders are involved; there is a mutual dependence between the partners and the potential for positive-sum cooperation; and arrangements are sustained through resource commitments and effective institutions.

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

In their their re revi view ew of the the facto factors rs unde underp rpin inni ning ng succ succes essf sful ul commu communi nity  ty  engagement, Fung and Wright Wright (2003, (2003 , 15–24) outline three ‘primary background conditions’. conditions’. Engagements must cover specific areas of community concern, of suffi   

145

cient magnitude to help mobilise communities. There should be ‘involvement of ordinary people affected by these problems proble ms and officials officials close to them’. There The re shoul should d be genu genuin inee deli delibe berat ratio ion n betw betwee een n partic participa ipant ntss in the the se sens nsee that that solu soluti tion onss ar aree achi achiev eved ed thro throug ugh h ongo ongoin ingg dial dialog ogue ue and and negotiation. Ideally, the power asymmetries between those who actually engage in such processes proce sses should not be too large because ‘individuals ‘individuals [who] cannot dominate others to secure their first best preference are often more willing to deliberate’ (Fung & Wright, 2003 Wright,  2003,,  23). Beyond these background conditions, Fung and Wright isolate three ‘institutional design features’ – metagovernance functions – common to the cases they examined. examined. The necessary necessary features are: Clea Cl earr li line ness of re resp spon onsi sibil bility ity with with some some devo devolu lutio tion n of autho authorit rityy to empowered local units charged with specific functions and responsibilities. In other words, governments must devolve specific and clearly  articulated articulat ed parcels of authority authority to local participants. participants. Formal links between communities or local units and the state through shared resources and information flows and clear lines of responsibility  and accountability (see also Singleton, 2000 Singleton, 2000,, 16). New state institutions designed to support and guide decentralised local units. The conditions identified by Fung and Wright suggest that effective community engagement requires restructuring both of the state and of  the incentives of state officials. This is why they describe their examples of deliberative democracy as state-centric; ideally, such governance arrangements are developed in intimate association with the state. Local part pa rtic icip ipat ator oryy bodi bodies es need need to be care carefu full llyy li link nked ed to the the stat state, e, whic which h perf perfor orms ms critica crit icall metago metagover vernan nance ce functi functions ons:: coord coordina inatin tingg and distrib distributin utingg resou resource rces; s; solving problems that local units cannot deal with; rectifying incompetent decision-making in local units; diffusing learning and innovations across boundaries; and helping to build more equal access and power balances in local arenas to facilitate participation. Chapter participation.  Chapter 2 emphasised 2  emphasised that the state often finds itself in a strong position in networks because it occupies a structurally ‘central’ position. If community engagement is to prove effective, governments must empower others.    

   

   

   

   

 

146

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

These factors are a challenging list of ingredients and criteria. Community involvement makes potentially heavy demands on local citizens. It is also clear that the role of the state is central in successful institutional desig de signs ns.. We will will now now expl explor oree the the re requ quir irem emen ents ts for for succe successf ssful ul publ public ic enga engage ge-ment in governance, starting with detailed questions about the governance capacities of citizens and communities.

WILLING AND CAPABLE CITIZENS AND COMMUNITIES?

Those who proclaim the merits of community engagement as a mode of  governance sometimes assume an idealised vision of community, in which communities or citizens are eager activists, relatively homogenised, rich in social capital, well organised and led by capable leaders. But if we reverse or substantially qualify these assumptions, does the idea of community  engagement look as potentially attractive? One important issue relates to the willingness of citizens to engage in governance processes. Chapter processes.  Chapter 5 showed 5  showed that high levels of social capital – ‘those features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam,  1993,,  67) – are an important prerequisite of governance through persuasion. Governance through community engagement is also morre li mo like kely ly to pro prove effe ffect ctiv ivee when when the there are are hig high le leve vels ls of soci social al capi capita tall and and a community is able and willing to engage in governance. Yet in the case of the United States Robert Putnam (2000) has documented a precipitous decline in levels of social capital since the 1960s as communities have been buffeted buffete d by job mobility mobility, social fragmen fragmentation tation,, long workin workingg hours and and the dominance of home (rather than public) entertainment (see Chapter (see  Chapter 5) 5). Theda Skocpol (1996) offers an account of such developments based on changed change d processes of electoral electoral and advocacy advocacy politics, which involve involve a shift awayy fr awa from om lo loca call activ activis ism m and and grassr grassroo oots ts activ activiti ities es towar towards ds nati nation onal ally ly orga organnised, poll-driven, top-down forums. She also charts a shift in the focus of  civic elites and leaders, from local groups and participation to wider and more professionally organised processes and the marginalisation of civil elites and local leaders – upon whom processes of community engagement often depend – by professional lobbyists and party apparatchiks. As she argues: privileged Americans remain active in think tanks, advocacy groups, and trade and professional associations, jetting back and forth between manicured neighbourhoods and exotic retreats. Everyone else has been left to

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

 work at two or three poorly paid jobs per family, family, coming home exhausted to  watch TV and answer phone calls from pollsters and telemarketers [Skocpol, 1996,,  24]. 1996

Even in the United States many citizens still wish to be informed and consulted and engage in governance activities. As we have emphasised, individuals are not exclusively self-interested and sometimes work for the

147

public interest. Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry Brady (1995) estimate that up to 10 per cent of the American population is politically  active. This is a small proportion of the overall population but nevertheless amounts to more than 25 million people engaged in governance activities. On the other hand, one study of community responses to the local stockpili pi ling ng of chem chemic ical al weap weapon onss in the the Unite nited d State tatess foun found d that that,, alth althou ough gh many  many  expressed an interest in participation, only around one per cent of people followed through on this interest by phoning for information about how  to become engaged (Williams et al., 2001 al.,  2001)). Looking at particular examples, Skocpol Skocpol (1996) estimates estimates that, in major civic associations associations such as the  American Association of Retired Persons, no more than 5–10 per cent of  members participate even in the most minimal ways in local affiliates or clubs.  Wee have noted that the rapid loss in social capital that has occurred in  W the United States seems not to have occurred in other countries. Yet there is plenty of evidence of limited willingness to engage in political activities elsewhere. In the late 1990s the UK government introduced a system called Best Value to replace, or at least augment, the system of compulsory  comp co mpet etiti itive ve tend tender erin ingg in which which lo loca call coun counci cils ls were were requ requir ired ed to cont contrac ract-o t-out ut certain activities. Under Best Value, local councils are required to compare their service provision with that found in other areas and consult with business and the local community about the quality of service delivery   2000)). In reviewing the levels of community engagement councils (Boyne, 2000 (Boyne,  were able a ble to elicit, Paul Foley and Steve Martin (2000, 486) sound a note of caution: Only a fifth of residents living in Best Value pilot areas stated that they   would like to have more of a say in the ways local services were run. Moreover, most of those who wanted to be more involved favoured passive forms of consultation such as postal surveys as opposed to more interactive approaches such as public meetings and citizens’ juries.

Best Value consultations about service delivery are not, of course, the mostt glamor mos glamorous ous or ambitio ambitious us of gover governan nance ce activit activities ies.. Propone roponents nts of 

 

148

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

community engagement might argue that limited exercises in consultation will not generate the same interest as genuine efforts to empower local communities. Yet, although generally supportive of governance through community engagement, Fung and Wright (2003, 37–8) recognise that ignorance about local political issues, when combined with an underlying  sense of apathy and a predisposition to free-ride, can endanger effective governance. For these reasons Graham Pearce and John Mawson (2003, 63) conclude that ‘devolved [governance] processes should not be too ambitious’, while Renee Irvin and John Stansbury (2004, 58) indicate

that ‘where communities are complacent, there is a strong argument for top-down administration, simply on grounds of efficiency’.  A second problem is that civil society associations and communities may  nott have no have the organ organisa isati tion onal al re reso sour urce cess or capac capaciti ities es to enga engage ge ef effe fect ctiv ivel elyy with with gove go vern rnme ment nt.. In a st stud udyy of the the capa capaci city ty of comm commun unit ityy or orga gani nisa sati tion onss to work  work   with government to deliver local housing services in the United States, Patricia Fredericksen and Rosanne London (2000) found that only one of  the 18 organisations they studied could be described as well organised in terms of its service delivery functions. functions.  A third problem arises when engagement processes are dominated by  unre un repr pres esen enta tativ tivee local local el elit ites es who use use enga engage geme ment nt proc proced edur ures es to pursu pursuee thei theirr Stephan,  2000;; Smith & own interests (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004 Stansbury,  2004;;  Abel & Stephan, 2000 McDonough,   2001; 2001;  Keating,  2004,  2004,   162; Halpin,   2006). 2006). As Fung and  Wright  W right (2003, 33) comment, ‘perhaps the most serious potential weakness of [community engagement] experiments is that they pay insufficient attention to the fact the participants in these processes usually face each other from unequal positions of power’. Because of inequalities of income, gender, race or education, certain groups are able to mobilise and defend their interests at the expense of others. As Foley and Martin (2000, 486) reflect, community aspirations are nowhere near as homogeneous as government pronouncements frequently imply. Previous have repeatedly demonstrated that local peoplecommunity-based rarely speak with initiatives one voice and their influence is not unambiguously positive. Communities can be deeply fragmented and many local people support policies which would exacerbate rather than combat social exclusion. Moreover Moreover,, ‘community representatives’ are often atypical precisely because, unlike most local people, they are willing to become involved.

Encouraging local engagement while ensuring a basic level of equality in that engagement constitutes an important metagovernance function

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

for the state. Community activists do not simply spring  de novo  from a voluntarist soil, but must be cultivated through public assistance. As Brian Head (2007, 444) says, ‘The community sector (as with the business sector) comprises a shifting shifting range of unorganised unorganised,, partially organised organised and well organised stakeholders. Their capacity and interest in interaction and engagement will vary widely.’ Accordingly, governments must continuously develop the capacities of weaker groups through programs that provide training or resources to encourage people to recognise and defend their mutual interests (Head, 2007 (Head,  2007;;  Keating, 2004  Keating,  2004;;  Wiseman, 2006). As Mich Mi chae aell Mar arin inet etto to (200 (2003b 3b,, 110) 110) poin points ts out, out, ‘pu publ blic ic auth author orit itie iess as the the gate gate--

149

keeper keep erss to exec execut utiv ivee powe powerr and and as hold holder erss of si sign gnifi ifica cant nt reso resour urce cess are are cruc crucia iall to cr crea eatin tingg oppo opportu rtuni niti ties es for for activ activee ci citi tize zens nship hip’. ’. In one one study study,, Will William iam MalMaloney and colleagues (2000) showed that Birmingham City Council in the Unite nited d King Kingdo dom m achi achiev eved ed a ta tang ngib ible le incr increa ease se in the the numb number er and and capa capaci city ty of  community-based voluntary associations through targeted financial grants and community development schemes. In other instances governments have attempted to deal with another another problem of community community activism, the burnout of activists. This has been a problem in the Landcare movement in Australia and has prompted government agencies to offer assistance and trainingg to find and motivate new activists trainin activists and leaders. leaders. Citizens or groups may decline to be involved in formal governance arrangements for fear of being co-opted by the state. Many environmentalists, for example, worry about this; the danger is that ‘incorporation’ into consensus or deliberative forums might isolate group leaders from their communities or limit alternative forms of political mobilisation (Doyle, 2000). (2005))  document a case in Queensland, Aus2000). Whelan and Lyons (2005 tralia, where conservation groups decided to boycott engagement that was seen as potentially co-optive or unproductive. ‘By rejecting both hierarchical, centralised decision-making and the inadequate engagement practices proposed by the state, activist groups mobilised community opinion and action to bring about an historic historic win’ (Whelan & Lyons, Lyons, 2005  2005,, 596). ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY

Traditio raditional nal systems systems of repres represent entativ ativee democr democracy acy requi require re only only limite limited d enga en gage geme ment nt of ci citi tize zens ns thro throug ugh h occa occasi sion onal al el elec ecti tion ons. s. The The Austr ustria ian n econom eco nomist ist Joseph Joseph Schump Schumpete eterr (1942, (1942, 269) defines defines such such ‘compet competitiv itivee’ forms forms of democracy as constituting an ‘arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a  competitive struggle for the people’s people’s vote’. Schumpeter contrasts contra sts this modern, competitive notion of democracy with its ‘classical’ alternative, which

 

150

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

requires direct, community-based, decision-making. In Ancient Greece major decisions were made by the Assembly, or  Ecclesia , which met about 50 times a year, at which every (male) citizen was entitled to speak and votee (Hanse vot (Hansen, n, 1991) 1991).1 Sc Schu hump mpet eter er ar argu gues es that that in a worl world d wher wheree mill millio ions ns of  people living in cities must confront technically complex issues there is no alternative to the competitive model of democracy. John Mueller (1992) also defends limited concepts of democracy because they do ‘not require more from the human spirit than apathy, selfishness, common sense, and arithmetic’. The arguments for community engagement that have been developed over the last few drawsystems upon and seek to promote broad-based ‘participatory’ or decades ‘deliberative’ of democracy in which decisions

are taken directly by the people (see Goodin,  2003,  2003,  1–8). According to Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing (2008b, 32–3), governance arrangements involving such participatory schemes could potentially deal with several ‘proble problems ms’’ encoun encounter tered ed in repres represent entativ ativee democr democraci acies. es. They They could could enhanc enhancee a vertical balance of powers through the establishment of sub-elites and governance networks; establish a link between top-down representative democracy and bottom-up participatory democracy; serve as a medium for enhancing political empowerment and mutual trust; widen the institutional and discursive sphere of the political and thus enlarge the space for political discussion andin contestation; improve governance efficiency  and ‘output legitimacy’ processes of and public governance.  Wee encountered the distinction between input and output legitimacy in  W 2  (Scharpf, 1999 Chapter 2 (Scharpf,  1999). ). Input legitimacy may be strengthened where decisions are taken by politicians who are elected to office. But community  engagement may lead to more output legitimacy if it results in better decisions being taken. In a similar vein, Michael Keating (2004, 159) has argued: Currently, increased public participation is widely seen as the best way to draw dr aw di disa saff ffec ecte ted d citi citize zens ns ba back ck into into th thee po poli liti tica call ma main inst stre ream am an and d of ov over erco comming increasing perceptions of a ‘democratic deficit’. By involving citizens in some way in the decision-making process, governments then hope to bridge any ‘legitimation gap’. Indeed, a representative body that has sought and considered the advice of constituents is on much stronger ethical ground, even if they subsequently reject that advice, than representatives whose  judgment is formed without consultation.

Governance through community engagement requires a careful balancing of different modes of legitimacy. Where it is difficult to define the

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

boundaries of a community affected by a decision, and where engagement processes are dominated by unrepresentative local elites, the state needs to exercise its metagovernance responsibilities by continuously monitoring, and perhaps curtailing, the authority devolved to local communities. Gracee Skogstad (2003, 968) offers a solution Grac solution to this dilemma of achieving  achieving  a balance of the various forms of authority in society, from hierarchical state authority to popular authority: underline the centrality of representative democracy and the legitimate authority of the state. As she argues, popular authority, as manifested in community engagement strategies, can only ever be a potentially useful complement to formal systems of represent sentat ativ ivee demo democr crac acyy. ‘Mec ‘Mecha hani nism smss of part partic icip ipat ator oryy demo democr crac acyy . . . that that give give representatives of society formal or informal rights of participation cannot substitute for state-centred governing because of their representational inadequacies.’ Still, such participatory schemes can help to boost ‘input

151

legitimacy’. A WILLING AND ABLE STATE?

 A central claim made in this book is that the state remains the major player in shaping and managing public governance. We have emphasised the state’s role both as a direct participant in governance arrangements and as operating operating the crucial higher-leve higher-levell functions functions of metagoverni metagoverning ng such arrangements. Now we consider the state’s role in citizen and community  engagement, looking at the institutional disjunctures and coordination problems that may damage links between governments and communities, and consider how much power governments or state agencies are actually   willing or able to devolve to communities. Ourr st Ou star arti ting ng-p -poi oint nt is a wide widely ly held held vi view ew:: gove govern rnme ment ntss do not not like like shar sharin ing  g  power. In examining the Blair government’s devolution of governance autho aut hori rity ty in the Unite nited d King Kingdo dom, m, Mike Mike Marin Marinet etto to (2003 (2003b, b, 116 116)) co conc nclu lude dess thatt ‘for tha for al alll its its supp support ort for for comm commun unit ityy invo involv lvem emen ent, t, the Labou Labourr gove govern rnme ment nt [retains] a predilection for strong central control’. Jonathan Murdoch and Simone Abram (1998, 49) found that central government strategies and obje ob jecti ctive vess cons consist isten entl tlyy li limi mite ted d comm commun unit ityy inpu inputt into into hous housin ingg poli policy cy in the United Kingdom. Local groups were given some discretion in how best to meet objectives but were ‘tied’ into ‘a set of calculations and relations that extend exten d down a planning planning hierarchy from the central central state’. It might be objected that the UK state has always been reluctant to embrace ‘horizontal inclusivity’ (Wallington, Lawrence & Loechel, 2008 Loechel, 2008)).  Y  Yet et in writing about community engagement experiments in the Netherlands, Geert Teisman and Eric-Hans Klijn (2002, 198) similarly conclude

 

152

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

that, although ‘there is intensified interaction between public and private partners, there is little joint decision-making and continuity in cooperation’. In the case of a commitment to ensure public participation in the redevelopment of Rotterdam Harbour, they conclude that public officials ‘wanted to retain their primacy’ and consistently thwarted engagement efforts (p. 204). Examining the development of community-based governance mechanisms in the United States, Singleton (2000, 16) also points to ‘the depth of resistance among state managers to sharing regulatory  authority’. Wallington, Lawrence and Loechel (2008, 17) reach a similar conclusion in their study of local input into regional governance in Queensland, implicating ‘unequal power relationships’. The ‘official framing of policy’ remained the centrepiece of such governance arrangements, leading them to conclude: ‘The reluctance of farmers and others to participate in what amounts to a co-option of regional participants serving a  policy agenda in the interests of, and defined by, government is perhaps

unsurprising. Again in Australia, Brian Head (2007, 449), an academic  with practical experience in community engagement, points out that: non-gover non-go vernme nmenta ntall org organi anisat sation ionss and com commun munity ity gr group oupss oft often en re report port unhappy experiences of ‘participation’, owing to poor project management or even bad faith by governments; for example, in cases in which people enter an apparently participatory process, only to find there is an absence of genuine devolution or meaningful involvement because the government sector has been unwilling to forgo control over processes and the shaping of  results.

Previous chapters argued that governance arrangements ought to be viewed in terms of an exchange relationship between governments and nonno n-go gove vern rnme ment nt actor actors. s. Gove Govern rnme ment ntss may may not not like like to shar sharee powe powerr but they  they  may be required to do so where non-state actors possess valuable resources and there is a strong mutual dependency. The following The  following chapter on chapter  on associative governance describes the substantial power-sharing that occurs in corporatist arrangements where business, and perhaps trade unions, are in a position to negotiate access to the policy-making process. By contrast, community engagement is often a limited, sometimes symbolic, activity  because communities do not generally possess the resources governments need, or at least not enough to encourage governments to devolve power or authority to them (Head, 2007 (Head, 2007,,  450).  A case in point is the experience of what Jurian Edelenbos (2005) terms ‘inte ‘in terac racti tive ve gove govern rnan ance ce’’ in urban urban re rede deve velo lopme pment nt in the the Dutc Dutch h munic municipa ipali lity  ty 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

of Enschede in the 1990s. Edelenbos (2005, starts by hierarchical depicting a  shift ‘from government to governance’, that is,111) ‘a shift from and well institutionalised forms of government towards less formalised, bottom-up forms of governance in which state authority makes way for an appreciation of mutual interdependence with different stakeholders’. However, the details of this case reveal a different story. The activities of local participatory forums of deliberation and advice ran in parallel  with, but did little to affect, traditional decision-making structures. Local coun co unci cill llor orss re remai maine ned d the final final deci decisio sionn-mak maker erss and and were were large largely ly dise diseng ngag aged ed from the participatory process. Furthermore, public servants who became involved used the participatory processes as little more than a ‘sounding  board’ 122) their own Ultimately, the ‘politicians andofcivil servants(p.did notfor perceive the ideas. temporary organisational structure the interactive process as having any authority’. As Edelenbos concludes, ‘the case of Enschede has shown that institutional dissociation takes place between the interactive process and the existing administrative structures and procedures’ (p. 123).

153

The experience of water resource planning in New South Wales, Australia, offers another telling example of the limits of community engagement (Bell & Park, 2006 Park, 2006)). The challenge was to devise plans to share water between rival users while leaving enough water in the drought-affected river system to maintain ma intain a sustainable environment. The New South Wales Wales government 36 catchment management across the state in 2002established which included representatives of thecommittees stakeholders. These committees were given the responsibility, but not the power, to create  water-sharing plans. The legislation stated that the committees were advi and that the relevant minister had the discretion to alter or change the sory  and plans. We can conceive of such a governance arrangement as the ‘networks in the shadow of hierarchy’ described by Scharpf (1994, 27). It seems clear that the government wanted stakeholders to negotiate among themselves, to ‘sort things out’, and then advise the government about an appropriate plan to share water based on local input and compromise; in other  words to offer the product of what Scharpf (1994, 28) calls ‘negotiated self-coordination’. Formally, this is not a nfro power-sharing model. will see see belo below w, this this high highli ligh ghts ts the the dile di lemm mmas as conf co ront ntin ingg gove govern rnme ment ntssAs who whwe o wish wi sh to reap the benefits of stakeholder commitment and negotiation but do ). not wish to relinquish power or authority (Teisman & Klijn, 2002 Klijn,  2002). In choosing to establish community engagement, the government must  weigh up its potential benefits. These include the legitimacy derived fr from om commu communi nity ty invo involv lvem emen ent; t; info informa rmatio tion n bene benefits fits arisi arising ng from from the

 

154

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

coal-face knowledge of stakeholders; and the possibility of ‘negotiated self-coordination’. However, in this case these benefits were not seen as outweighing the results of decisions made by the government on the basis of arm’s-length stakeholder input. After a lengthy process of often painful negotiation, committees submitted their water-sharing plans to the state government in 2004. The minister then amended most of them. Clearly, thee gove th govern rnme ment nt ei eith ther er did did not not re reco cogn gnis isee or coul could d not not real realis isee st stro rong ng mutu mutual al-ity ity gain gainss from from st stak akeh ehol olde derr invo involv lvem emen ent, t, desp despit itee the the crea creati tion on of an exte extens nsiv ivee system of governance. By overruling the water-sharing plans developed by  the manag managem emen entt commi committe ttees es,, the gove govern rnme ment nt le left ft stake stakeho hold lder erss fe feel elin ingg frusfrustrated and ignored. As the Irrigation Association of Australia explained: It was quite contentious and it led to a number of sections of the industry  feeling that they had been disenfranchised to some extent. There was a  consultative process gone through, then the recommendations of that consultative sultat ive pro process cess di disappe sappeared ared in into to the bur bureaucr eaucracy acy . . . Th Thee only thin thingg worse than tha n not consu consultin ltingg is to cons consult ult and the then n to ign ignor oree the resul results ts . . . Whe Where re that happened it has given those water sharing plans a difficult start in life because significant number of the stakeholders are feeling ‘well, that wasn’t

agreed by us’ [Bell & Park, 2006 Park,  2006;; see also Craig & Vanclay, Vanclay, 2005  2005]].

Theree is a gener Ther eneral al le less sson on to be le lear arnt nt her here abou aboutt go govverna ernanc ncee and and the the use use of  language. Rod Rhodes, whose notion of ‘governance without government’  Chapter 1,  we encountered in in Chapter 1,  suggests that, rather than simply defining  governance in terms of particular institutional arrangements, we ought to look at the ways in which ‘individuals construct governance’ (Rhodes & Bevir, 2003 Bevir,  2003,,  195) and how governance ‘arises from the bottom up’ (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006 Rhodes,  2006,,  99). Rhodes is right to emphasise that governance is not simply a piece of academic jargon ‘divorced from [the language] of  practitioners and commentators’ (Riddell, 2000 (Riddell, 2000,, quoted, Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, 9). Politicians and public servants discussing governance often pepper their speeches and policy documents with references to ‘community  engagement’, ‘partnership’ ‘partnership’ and ‘policy capacity’. Drawing upon such references, academics have documented what they describe as a transition from government to governance. In this self-reinforcing circle academics and practitioners feed off each other. Our suspicion is that many politicians and public servants have learnt to use the language of community engagement strategically; it becomes a presentation device to obscure, or at least make more palatable, the exercise of hierarchical control. Public servants, consciously or unconsciously, have adopted a new governance language

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

in order to achieve certain goals without revising the underlying ideas, or indeed, power structures. There is, however, an interesting question here. If people adopt language for essentially strategic reasons, will that language eventually come to constrain their actions? Does the language of networks and community  engagement eventually lead to more networks and community engagement? Discussing deliberation and constitution-making, Jon Elster (1998) suggests that language can have this effect. In a legislative setting there is usually a strong expectation that politicians justify the demands they  make in terms of an appeal to the public interest. But the existence of this norm gives politicians an incentive to alter their behaviour. A politician  who wishes to avoid the appearance of obvious self-interest might, for example, demand a public subsidy or other allocation not simply for their example, constituents but for all the residents of the area where their constituency is located. Once having used a particular argument to justify a policy, politicians come under pressure to accept other applications of that argument so as not to appear incoherent incoherent or hypocritical. hypocritical. It is easy to see how the language of networks, partnership and community engagement might similarly constrain politicians and public servants. Even if everyone in a room believes that everyone else is using language

155

strategically, the ideas embedded within that language may nevertheless affect people’s behaviour. A public servant who has learnt to assert the importance of community engagement will, for example, find it difficult to always and everywhere dismiss requests to consult about policies. There is one important difference between these settings. Elster focuses on the relatively short period of time in which proposals are debated and voted upon in a legislative assembly. Governments, however, have much more time to claw back any concessions their language leads them to make during the course of the policy process. At a stage when they are drafting  prop pr opos osal alss and and se seek ekin ingg stake stakeho hold lder er suppo support, rt, poli policy cy-m -make akers rs migh mightt litte litterr th thei eirr speeches and briefing documents with references to partnership, consultation and community engagement. And this may lead them to modify  their behaviour. But, over time, governments can be expected to reassert hierarchical control, so exposing the limits of their rhetorical commitment to community engagement. POWER-SHARING AND THE STATE

 We have argued that the development of community engagement as an  We alternative mode of governance is often limited by the reluctance of state

 

156

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

officials to share power. How might we account for this reluctance? The simplest public choice might most easily  subs su bscr crib ibe, e,explanation, is that that powe powerrtoiswhich a valu valuab able le re reso sour urce ce and antheorists d that that se self lf-i -int nter eres este ted d poli po liti ti-cians will no more forfeit power than a private sector entrepreneur would pass up a profit opportunity. opportunity. Yet Yet there may be more principled reasons why  state officials cling to their authority. First, politicians may, rightly or wrongly, feel that community engagement is too time-consuming to undertake in situations where there are economic or political pressures to make – and be seen to be making – immediate decisions. Amidst a growing water shortage crisis in 2006–7 in south-east Queensland, the state government initially promised, then shelved, a community referendum on recycling waste water for human consumption, such wascommunity the sense ofengagement urgency. Second, politicians or officials may believe that processes would upset or contradict broader strategies or standards. A well-honed argument against the ballot initiatives employed in California is that they result in contradictory decisions that preclude strategic policy development. Voters find it too easy to approve both lower taxes and higher public expenditure, or improved environmental standards and lower vehicle taxes, when left to determine these issues separately. separately. Third, as a s we have suggested, government officials may be reluctant to concede authority where they believe that

engagement processes are likely to be dominated by unrepresentative local elites. Fourth, be reluctant to concede they  believe thatgovernments communitymay engagement is unlikely to authority result to where in a deliberative consensus. As Skogstad (2003) suggests, there may be limits to  what can be deliberatively handled, thrashed out or agreed upon in community engagement settings. Where significant interests are at stake and competition between groups takes a zero-sum form, bargaining and deliberation may not be enough to resolve differences. As we have seen, there are often dangers of parochialism and an inability to develop coherent links to strategic plans or concerns of wider groupings of state agencies or  whole-of-government approaches (Keating, 2004 (Keating, 2004,,  168). Moreover, many  deci de cisio sions ns invo involv lvee votin voting, g, and and commu communi nity ty grou groups ps are are ofte often n not not struc structu ture red d to accord with 48), suchwho processes choice aggregation. Skogstad quotes Chambers (2001, arguesofthat ‘talking (understood as deliberation) and voting do not mix well’. In a contest for votes, deliberation can become ‘strategic, strategic, competitive competitive and adversarial’ adversarial’.. Even Even when there is  a   a shared commitment to partnership and the public interest, individuals and groups can fail to reach an agreement if they are committed, whether consciously or

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

not, to inconsistent policy ideas or competing policy paradigms. Skogstad (2001, 968) cites the case of an attempt to develop a provincial land use strategy in British Columbia, Canada, where various community engagement processes failed to produce a consensus. The deadlock was eventually  brok br oken en by the the st stra rate tegi gicc use use of st stat atee re reso sour urce cess and and auth author orit ity, y, in incl clud udin ingg more more traditional forms of ‘horse-trading’, overseen by the then premier, Mike Harcourt. Members of the Harcourt team recognised that the path to land use consensus would have to be greased with dollars; forest workers threatened by  change would have to be appeased. Most important, they recognised that, more often than not, the results generated by advisory processes would have to be massaged into final outcomes, through traditional behind the scenes bargaining [Skogstad, 2003 [Skogstad, 2003,, 908].

Finally, other scholars have suggested that fundamental institutional mismatches can inhibit community engagement. Eran Vigoda (2002) argues that in modern systems of public administration, serving citizens as clients clashes with collaborating with them in governance arrangements. The prob proble lem m is that that gove govern rnme ment nt bure bureau aucra craci cies es are are fashio fashione ned d al alon ongg cl clas assic sical al  Weberian  W eberian lines, with steep st eep hierarchies of authority, authority, concentration of power among senior officials, professional specialisation, clear accountabilities, impersonal rule-based behaviour, an increased fascination with business

157

models, and a fear of sanctions for poor performance and hence a riskaverse culture. Vigoda cites Dennis Thompson (1983, 235), who says: ‘democracy does not suffer bureaucracy bureaucracy gladly . . . many values we associate  with democracy – equality, equality, participation, and a nd individuality – stand sharply  opposed to the hierarchy, specialisation and impersonality we ascribe to modern mod ern bureau bureaucrac cracyy’. Other Other instit institutio utional nal proble problems ms arise arise when when gover governme nment nt structures attempt to mesh with local engagement. For example, in dealing   with problems that cut across agency jurisdictions or traditional lines of  responsibility, the separate ‘silos’ of government bureaucracies can create problems as agencies attempt to coordinate activities not just with each other but with a wide range of local groups and engagements (Head, 2007 (Head, 2007,, 449; Boxelaar et al., 2006). In institutional terms, the challenge for government is to understand how ho w to bett better er conn connec ectt the the st stat ate’ e’ss admi admini nist stra rati tive ve appa appara ratu tuss with with quit quitee di diff ffer er-ent local local organi organisati sationa onall enviro environme nments nts that featur featuree flatter flatter structu structures res,, delibe deliberration ati on and and compr comprom omis ise. e. As Chapt Chapter er 3 ar argu gued ed in relat relatio ion n to metag metagov over erna nanc nce, e, public administrators involved in community engagement need to develop

 

158

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

skills in networking, networking, negotiation, negotiation, mediation, mediation, conflict resol resolution, ution, and synthesising or reconciling diverse frames of knowledge while also focusing on broade broa derr strate strategi gicc and and acco accoun untab tabil ility ity conc concer erns ns (Hes (Hesss & Adams Adams,, 2002; 2002; Davis however, indi& Rhodes, 2000 Rhodes, 2000)). The case described by Edelenbos (2005), however, cates that effectively linking hierarchical state structures with participatory  forums can be difficult. Case research by Lucia Boxelaar, Mark Paine and Ruth Beilin (2006) suggests that reconciling diverse frames of knowledge is no easy task and that bureaucratic, positivist and expertise-based forms of knowledge tend to prevail in such participatory settings. Similarly, Gill Callaghan and Gerald Wistow (2006) demonstrate in a case study of participation ticipati on in primary health care in the United United Kingdom that hierarchical powe po werr re relat latio ions ns were were inscr inscrib ibed ed in diff differ eren entt know knowle ledg dgee forms forms and and this this se serve rved d to limit effective effective participation participation by the lay public. If governments do attempt to share power, they must be clear about their intentions intentions in order order to avoid confusion and disappointment. disappointment. As Irvin and Stansbury (2004, 59) conclude: ‘Lack of representation and authority  to make decisions appears to be the key reason for participatory processes backfiring and actually increasing public dissatisfaction.’ Furthermore, as Keatingg (2004, 160) argues: Keatin argues: disappointed expectations, leading to further alienation, are most common  where the participants believe that they will have more power over the decision than is intended. It is therefore critical that government is clear at the outset about its purpose in seeking greater citizen participation, the

means that will be employed to achieve that participation, and what that implies for the respective roles of the participating parties. [See also Kane & Bishop, 2002 Bishop,  2002..]

Honestly stating the limits of its own willingness to share authority  constitutes an important metagovernance responsibility of the state.

DO-IT-YOURSELF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Thus far Thus far this this chap chapte terr has has exam examin ined ed the the gove govern rnan ance ce pote potent ntia iall of comm commun unit ity  y  engagement from a state–community relational perspective. This perspective fits our broader approach to governance, but it does not exhaust the potential opportunities for meaningful community engagement in governance practices. Indeed, the case we now examine comes close to one of 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

‘governance without government’, albeit on a small, localised scale and still in the shadow shadow of hierarchy. Our focus is on how communities might deal with collective-action problems. These are the problems that arise when individually advantageous behaviour leads to a sub-optimal collective outcome (Barry & Hardin, 1982). For example, it may be individually advantageous to drive to work work,, but but when when every everyon onee does does this this in a la larg rgee city city,, traf traffic fic grid gridlo lock ck and and high high leve levels ls of ai airr poll pollut utio ion n may may be the the (sub (sub-o -opt ptim imal al)) coll collec ecti tive ve resu result lt.. Such uch prob prob-lems lems have have been been a focu focuss of publ public ic choi choice ce appr approa oach ches es to inst instit itut utio iona nall anal analys ysis is,,  which focuses on ‘institutional ‘instit utional design’ (Goodin, 1996) 1996 ) or on working out how institutions – conceived of as sets of incentives and disincentives that shape sha pe behav behavio iour ur – might might be devi devise sed d to deal deal with with co coll llec ecti tive ve-a -acti ction on prob proble lems. ms. One of the major puzzles in public choice theory, which always assumes selfish behaviour, is why individuals would rationally contribute to the solution of collective-action problems. The suspicion is that individuals  will simply free-ride on the actions of others, hoping to gain benefits but not shoulder any costs. For some time, scholars assumed that selfish behaviour would always  win and that only strict, even authoritarian, hierarchical controls could deal with such problems (Hardin,   1968; 1968; Ophuls,   1977) 1977). However, in examining collective-action problems arising from the consumption of  natural resources, using the principles of public choice analysis, Elinor Ostrom (1990; Dolsak & Ostrom,  Ostrom,   2003) 2003)  identified an alternative and seemingly seemin gly non-hierarchical non-hierarchical means of resolving resolving such problems. problems. Where the number of users is relatively relativel y small and it is possible to monitor monito r behaviour, behaviour, people can develop elaborate but informal rules, norms and conventions

159

governing the allocation of resources that prevent free-riding. Some scholarly scholarly arti articles cles . . . recom recommend mend tha thatt ‘t ‘the he state’ con control trol most nat natural ural resources to prevent their destruction; others recommend that privatizing  these resources will resolve the problem. What one can observe in the  world, however however,, is that neither state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems. Further, communities of individuals have relied on institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to govern some resource syst system emss wit with h reas reason onab able le de degr gree eess of su succ cces esss ov over er lo long ng pe peri riod odss of ti time me [O [Ost stro rom, m, 1990 1990,, 1].

In the the vi vill llag agee of Alan Alanya ya,, Turke urkey, y, abou aboutt 100 100 fishe fisherm rmen en trad tradit itio iona nall llyy comcompeted for access to the best fishing in local waters. As a result fishing stocks

 

160

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 were being depleted while fishermen spent s pent much of their time fighting for the best spots. In the 1970s the fishermen agreed to allocate fishing spots randomly and to rotate among them in an agreed sequence. As Ostrom (1990, 19) observes, this system has the effect of spacing each fishing boat far enough apart to maximise overall returns and gives each fisherman an equal chance of fishing at the best spots at the best times. This institutional solution is not entirely independent of the state, however. The calendar allocating fishermen to spots is deposited each year with the mayor and the local police. The implication is that hierarchy might be deployed if the collect lectiv ivee agre agreem emen ents ts fail fail,, and and this this kno knowled wledge ge may may spur spur ef effo fort rtss at co coop oper erat atio ion. n. Normally,, however, Normally however, the fishermen themselves monitor the agreement; they  have every reason to notice notice if someone someone is occupying occupying their allocated space. CONCLUSION

This chapter has outlined a range of possible options and design principles regarding citizen or community engagement in governance. In line  with our overall argument, it has highlighted the state-centred control and oversight of such arrangements. Apart from a few exceptional cases, such as the fishermen of Alanya, community engagement typically occurs in the shadow of hierarchy. As Head (2007, 449) suggests, ‘if community engagement is largely at the discretion of the state – and indeed, is largely organised, shaped and subsidised by the state – there must be questions raised about the robustness and independent strength of community  engagement’. Such views underline the importance of adopting a statecentred relational approach to the discussion of governance. Community  engagement promises benefits but needs to be carefully managed. The key  site of such management must be within the state itself, given its pre-

ponderance in such engagements. Governments choose when to engage communities and what to engage them about. Even when governing in partnership partners hip with communities, communities, governments governments retain the authorit authorityy to revise revise governance rules and abandon engagement processes. In light of the range of limitations and concerns described above, ambitions about community engagement should probably be limited. Active power-sharing is unusual in such settings; it occurs under tightly prescribed conditions where the government has the whip hand. Moreover, in practice, according to Patrick Bishop and Glyn Davis (2002, 22), ‘most citizen participation takes the form of consultation, which begins with the acknowledgment that governments decide’. They suggest, however, that such consultation assumes some degree of reciprocity, with those being 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMMUNITIES

 

consulted having at least some capacity to influence decisions. Whether such reciprocity or influence occurs, however, may be another matter and, as usual, is mainly at the discretion of authoritative decision-makers within the state. Governments tend to commit themselves rhetorically to community engagement. This may be, in part, because community engagement offers governments a means of enhancing their legitimacy. Community  engagement, like governance through persuasion, is attractive because it is non-coercive. Yet this rhetorical commitment to community engagement is not always realised realised in practice. practice.

161

 

8

 

Governance through associations

SSOCIATIVE GOVERNANCE OCCURS  when governments or  A SSOCIATIVE

state agencies form governing partnerships with societal organisations or NGOs NG Os.. In this this chap chapte terr we expl explor oree as asso soci ciat ativ ivee gove govern rnan ance ce in two two lo loos osel elyy catcategorised forms: corporatism, where governments jointly make and implement public policy in cooperation with major interest associations; and private-interest government, where governments or state agencies sanction or encourage the use of private authority in governance arrangements. A  good go od exam exampl plee of corp corpor orat atis ism m is when when gove govern rnme ment ntss form formal ally ly nego negoti tiat atee wi with th labour associations to establish and jointly implement wage moderation policies in a national economy. An example of private-interest government is when governments allow firms or business associations to set codes of  practice or self-regulate their activities in certain sectors. Political scientists have always debated how influential interest-groups are within the policy process and how defensible that influence is. Two contrasting positions are offered by pluralists and public choice theorists.  Although tracing its intellectual origins back to John Locke’s Locke’s theory of  consent and Montesquieu’s 18th-century celebration of the separation of  powers, pluralist theory was developed mostly by American political sci-

entists in the 1950s and 1960s. At the core of pluralist theory is a belief  that power ought to be dispersed throughout society; that public participation in political processes should be encouraged; and that government policy should command the consent of the public. Pluralists have argued that interest-groups enhance the democratic process because they limit the power of the state by checking and balancing any excessive concentrations of political power that may arise (Truman, 1951 (Truman, 1951;; Dahl, 1956 Dahl, 1956)). In contrast, publi pu blicc choi choice ce theor theoris ists ts chall challen enge ge the the invo involv lvem emen entt of orga organi nise sed d priva private te inte interrests in governance arrangements. Since the 1970s they have argued that

162

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

interest-groups pursue their own narrowly defined concerns, lobbying for special privileges or ‘rents’; and that, cumulatively, this undermines economic efficiency (Tullock, 1989 (Tullock, 1989;; 1993; 2005). On this basis public choice choice theorists argued that the post-war proliferation in interest-group politics had ‘overloaded’ the state and even led to the ‘decline of nations’ (Olson, 1982). 1982). Our own account of the dynamics of governance through association differs in two respects from such arguments. In the first place, rather than being inherently attractive or unattractive, the costs and benefits of  governance through association depend, in particular, on prevailing institutional arrangements, especially on the capacities of associations and on the strength and capacity of the state. Where the associations representing private interests have a high membership density or coverage, effective internal procedures for mediating member interests, and selective incentives to help mobilise members in collective action, interest-group politics need not lead to rent-seeking or economic catastrophe. Second, far from being a handmaiden for private interests, the state can enhance its policy  capacity by establishing associative governance arrangements with nonstate actors and by effectively metagoverning such relationships. Chapter relationships. Chapter 2 anticipated parts of this argument by challenging the notion that governance networks operate with substantial autonomy from the state. Here,  we provide more examples of the ways in which states can metagovern associative governance relationships. This chapter explores examples of associative governance in terms of  corpora cor poratism tism and private private-in -inter terest est gover governme nment. nt. We then then probe probe the role role of the state in associative governance. The final section shifts the focus of the argumen argument, t, examin examining ing so-cal so-called led ‘non-sta non-state te market market-dr -drive iven’ n’ gover governan nance ce arrangements, in which private firms and associations work collaboratively   with campaign groups or NGOs to develop codes of conduct regulating the behaviour of firms. Such codes of conduct are entirely voluntary. Firms have an incentive to embrace these codes if they calculate that by  doing so they can avoid adverse publicity or attract additional customers. From our state-centric relational approach to governance, the most signif-

163

icant feature of such governance arrangements is that they seem to operate independently of governments and perhaps even constitute an example of  ‘governance without government’. The chapter concludes by examining  the limits to the significance of such arrangements. Codes of conduct are not always followed; they cover only a small fraction of business activity; and for campaign groups generally they remain an inferior alternative to state regulation.

 

164

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

FORMS OF ASSOCIATIVE GOVERNANCE

 As we said at the beginning of the chapter, chapter, associative governance can be divided into two types, corporatism and private-interest government. We  will look at them in turn. CORPORATISM

Most introductory textbooks recognise that interest-groups are important political actors and that governments often adopt particular policies after lobbying lobbyi ng by such groups. Chapter groups. Chapter 2 pointed 2 pointed to academic work on ‘policy  networks’ composed of interest-groups and government actors. Chapter actors.  Chapter 5 showed how the National Farmers Farmers Union persuaded the UK government to adopt a particular policy in relation to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth diseas dis ease. e. Howev However er,, the presen presence ce of powerfu powerfull intere interest-g st-grou roups ps with with ready ready access access to government officials not necessarily ofely anconsistent alternativewith formthe of  governan gov ernance. ce. Governanc Gov ernanceise through throug h hierarchy hierarcevidence hy is entirely entir presence of powerful interest-groups and their lobbying activities.  What we have called associative governance (see Hirst, 1994 Hirst, 1994;; Hirst & Veit, 2001) requires interest-groups to play a formal partnership role in governance and even perhaps in the development and implementation of  public policy. The lead candidate for this form of governance is corporatism, an arrangement in which government works with major interest associations, usually peak bodies representing the collective interests of  a particular group, granting them a formal role in policy formulation and securing their cooperation in implementing policy (Schmitter, 1974 (Schmitter,  1974;; Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982; Cawson,  1986). Of course, the degree of power-sharing under such relationships  1986). varies, but in the more robust forms of corporatism, major interest associations acquire a quasi-public status, becoming virtually an arm of the state’s policy-making and implementation apparatus. Claus Offe (1981) explores the conditions for such an ‘attribution of public status’. Important associative capacities include representing or speaking for key functional interests, such as business or labour; and the ability to aggregate interests, to act as a source of support

for government policy, to act as a key bargaining interlocutor, or to help shape member or sector compliance. Probab robably ly the most most prom promin inen entt examp example less of corpo corporat ratis istt po poli licy cy-m -maki aking ng are are bipartite or tripartite arrangements in which business associations and/or peak union organisations bargain with government over wage moderation or industrial restructuring, either at a sectoral or national level. Peak 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

union organisations, for example, may accept wage moderation and work  to encourage wage restraint as part of an anti-inflationary policy in return for concessions from the state, such as tax relief or social policy or other benefits. In this respect, discussions about corporatism ought to be understood in the context of more general debates about how, at a sectoral or national level, differing mixes of governance modes and sets of institutional relations have produced different ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskic So skice, e, 2001). 2001). Instit Instituti utiona onall configu configurati rations ons and relatio relations ns betwee between n market markets, s, states and associations help govern and shape processes and preferences at the level of the firm, such as investment investment,, corporate corporate governance, governance, inter-firm cluste clu sterin ring, g, labour–m labour–manag anageme ement nt re relati lations ons,, trainin trainingg and skill skill formati formation, on, and research, development and innovation (Morgan et al., 1999). Because of  institutional differences and varying modes of economic governance, capitalist economies have markedly different capacities for growth, innovation and productivity, as well as methods of sharing the proceeds of economic growth grow th (Hall & Soskice, Soskice, 2000; Berger Berger & Dore, Dore, 1996). In ‘liberal market’ systems such as those of the United States and the United Kingdom, economic coordination and governance occurs mainly  through market processes, with clear boundaries between the public and private sectors. Such a system can be compared, at the other end of  this idealideal-typ typical ical spectru spectrum, m, to ‘coord coordina inated ted market market’’ system systemss in Japan, apan, Germany and much of Northern Europe, which feature much higher levels of deliberative and collaborative activity within the private sector and between the public and private sectors. In such systems the emphasis is on long long-t -ter erm m pl plan anni ning ng and and inve invest stme ment nt strate strategi gies es thro throug ugh h the deve develo lopm pmen entt of clos closee re rela latio tions nship hipss betw betwee een n st state ate and and nonnon-sta state te actor actors. s. Corpo Corporat ratis istt fo forms rms of governance are a defining feature of such coordinated market systems. Northern European countries in particular have for decades engaged in such corporatist forms of governance. For example, the Danish ‘negotiated econ ec onom omyy’ fe featu ature ress patte pattern rnss of wide wide soci social al dial dialog ogue ue and and barga bargain ined ed cons consen ensus sus between major associations in the economy and with government (Nielsen & Pedersen, 1993 Pedersen, 1993;; Amin & Thomas, 1996 Thomas, 1996)). There are similar corporatist arrangements in the Netherlands (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997 Hemerijck,  1997)). In recent years the Irish economy has also been managed through ongoing coordination and bargaining between key state, business and union organisations  who have worked together to secure wage moderation and other goals as

165

part of a strategy to manage inflation and economic development (House & McGrath, 2004 McGrath, 2004)). There have also been some counter corporatist trends. In the United Kingdom in the early 1980s corporatist decision-making procedures were

 

166

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

dismantled by a neo-liberal government intent on reducing trade union power (Crouch & Dore, 1990 Dore,  1990)). Even once avowedly corporatist Sweden has seen a conceptual shift among many businesses, which led in the 1990s to the repudiation of corporatist governance and the collapse of norms of  social partnership (Lindvall & Sebring, 2005). Yet as Jurgen Grote and Phillipe Schmitter (1999) observe, there has, for the most part, been a  ‘renaissance’ of corporatism in those European countries with collectivist political cultures and established traditions of social partnership characterised by power-sharing and the search for consensus (Lijphart, 1999 (Lijphart,  1999)). In these countries the economic pressures of globalisation and economic restructuring have been interpreted as affirming the need for greater cooperation with the state. In exploring the importance of ideas and ideology  in shaping governing practices, research by Peter Katzenstein (1985; 2003) on European corporatism shows that the social construction of perceived thre th reat atss and and a se sens nsee of exte extern rnal al econ econom omic ic vuln vulner erab abil ilit ityy ha have ve prom prompt pted ed coop coop-erati eration on betw betwee een n pote potent ntia iall llyy hosti hostile le grou groups. ps. As he conc conclu lude des, s, ‘perc percei eive ved d vulvulnerability generated an ideology of social partnership that acted like glue for corporatist politics’ (2003, 11). Hence, a favourable conceptual environment constitutes one important prerequisite for corporatist governance arrangements. Of equa equall impo import rtan ance ce ar aree the the inst instit itut utio iona nall capa capaci citi ties es of the the priv privat atee orga organnisations drawn into corporatist arrangements. Private-interest government roles, and especially corporatist governance arrangements, make substantial organisational demands on civil society associations. Under associative forms of governance, associations must be able to draw resources from members, such as funds or information, as well as loyalty and commitment. Organisational capacity also implies aggregating and analysing  information, acting as a forum for deliberation and negotiation, building  trust and reciprocity among members, and perhaps fostering new or wider definitions of interests and goals. In this way associations may help overcome collective action problems and other organisational challenges posed by participating in governance relationships with governments. Associations can also be seen as sources of private authority. This may inhere in a  past history of contributions to governing, the ability of the organisation to represent and speak for its membership or constituency, and the social or economic importance or reputation of its members. members. If corporatism is to work effectively, peak associations must be able

to coherently represent particular sectors and bargain authoritatively in closed forums with governments. In particular, associational elites must be able to deliver the cooperation and compliance of group members, since groups are required to play an active role in implementing centrally agreed

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

policies. In France, the fragmentation of the labour movement into competing associations has been partly responsible for non-corporatist labour arrangements; in the United Kingdom and the United States, the prevalenc lencee of li libe bera rall vi view ewss abou aboutt comp compet etit itio ion n and and the the desi desira rabi bili lity ty of main mainta tain inin ing  g  an arm’s-length arm’s-length relationship between business, bus iness, unions and government has  1998). ). of state authoralsoTolimited corporatist (Gordon, see how normativepolicy-making ideas about ab out the(Gordon, 1998 appropriate limits ity and institutional capacities interact to determine the efficacy and durability of corporatist arrangements, we will examine the rise and fall of  corporatist governance in Australia. Within a generally liberal and confrontational political culture, the kind of corporatist arrangements common in Western Europe had traditionall traditionallyy found little favour in Australia. Australia. However, a new Labor government elected in 1983 forged an initially  very successful corporatist wages policy via formal, ongoing negotiations  with the peak union organisation, the Australian Council of Trade Trade Unions (ACTU). The unions agreed to exercise wage moderation, while successive Accords they werebenefits called) committed the government to providing  tax cuts and (as other social such as improved health care in return. During a period in which the Labor government was, in other areas, deregulatingg markets, ulatin markets, the Accords helped to control control wage inflation inflation and achieve sustained economic growth (Kelly, 1992 (Kelly,  1992,,  54–75; Matthews, 1994; Bell, 1995). 1995). How can we account for the apparently sudden emergence of corporatism in Australia? The election of a social democratic government led by  an instinctive instinctive corporatist deal-maker deal-maker, Bob Hawke, was clearly clearly important, important, as was was Hawk Hawke’ e’ss unio union n back backgr grou ound nd as pres presid iden entt of the the ACTU CTU (Kel (Kelly ly,, 1984) 1984). More generally, generally, the Labor La bor government needed the cooperation of the trade union to help contain wage-push inflation, which at ythe time  was themovement major macroeconomic ma croeconomic policy challenge facing the country countr . Earlier confrontations with the unions under the conservative Fraser government had failed, so a fresh approach was desired. The Accords were popular with the electorate and helped promote industrial peace, which encouraged the corporatist corpora tist partners to support such deals. The introduction of corporatism into Australia required a favourable institutional environment. The established tradition of formal, centralised  wage negotiation provided a backdrop to Labor’s Labor’s new approach. approach . Throughout the 20th century industrial relations in Australia had been managed through a series of quasi-judicial tribunals, most importantly the Com-

167

monwe monwealth alth Court of Conciliation Conciliatio and conditions Arbitration, Arbitration,ofwith legal to set binding minimum pay levelsnand work andauthority to impose  1997,,  183–4). One solutions in the event of industrial disputes (Bell,  1997

 

168

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

reason Australian unions were prepared to accept the introduction of corporatism in the 1980s is because because of this centralised centralised institutional institutional tradition. Government involvement in the industrial system was an established normative frame and institutional reality. Of equal importance in preparing  thee grou th ground nd for for corp corpoora rati tism sm was was the the devel evelop opme ment nt of the the ACTU CTU into into a powpowerful peak body by the late 1970s with sufficient organisational capacity  and representational coverage to effectively lead the union movement. In the face of political pressure from a threatening conservative government in the 1970s, the ACTU, under Bob Hawke, became much more of an ‘encompassing association’; one able to negotiate and deliver on centrally  negotiated wage deals (Keating & Dixon, 1989 Dixon, 1989;; Matthews, 1994). Corporatist political arrangements can be difficult to maintain in liberal political systems that emphasise freedom of association and the voluntary  natu na ture re of grou group p memb member ershi ship. p. Peak eak assoc associa iatio tions ns are are al also so vuln vulner erabl ablee to defe defecctions from their member units. Over time, the Accords slowly weakened in the face of countervailing neo-liberal pressures and moves by strong  unions for collective bargaining to gain wage rises beyond the restrictions of the Acco Accord rdss (Hamp (Hampso son, n, 1996) 1996). The The unio union ns beca became me wary wary of the the Acco ccords’ ds’ promise to sustain economic growth, especially after the devastating recession induced by monetary policy in the early 1990s. Business interests began pushing for more liberal arrangements under the banner of so-called enterprise bargaining. By the late 1980s, both the government and unions  were offering qualified support to the new enterprise bargaining agenda. The government increasingly recognised that such a move was the natural corollary of its ‘competitiveness’ agenda and earlier financial and product market deregulation. The reluctance of peak business organisations – especially the body  representing big business, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) – to embr em brac acee the the Accor ccords ds also also weak weaken ened ed the the syst system em.. Hawk Hawkee had had soug sought ht a form formal al alliance with the BCA at the inception of the Accord system. The BCA, reflecting entrenched liberal sentiments, flatly rejected such overtures, preferring instead to maintain a cordial but arm’s-length relationship with the governme gov ernment nt (McLaughlin, (McLaughlin, 1991). As a former BCA insider put it: Hawke thought the creation of the Business Council in 1983 was a marvellous opportunity to shore up corporatism, but he was sadly disappointed because the Council position was: ‘this is our policy and we are not going  to negotiate with you on policy. We’ll advocate our position. You’ll have to take a decision in government’ [interview, 25 November 2003, Melbourne, quoted Bell, 2008b Bell, 2008b]].

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

The BCA’s steadfast refusal to embrace corporatism caused ongoing tensions with the government. Yet the BCA would have found itself in an extremely difficult position if it had behaved otherwise. The corporate sector was, on the whole, opposed to close ‘collaboration’ with government, and especially to back-room corporatist deal-making. Moreover, the BCA  lacked the institutional capacity to negotiate on behalf of all businesses in Australia, let alone to guarantee their compliance with any deals struck   1995)). (Bell, 1995 (Bell, PRIVATE-INTEREST GOVERNMENT

 As it is usually defined, corporatism represents a particular form of governance through association: one in which relations between the state and key interests are mediated through peak organisations. In their work  on private-interest government Phillipe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck  (198 (1 985) 5) demo demons nstr trat atee that that a broa broad d ra rang ngee of priv privat atee as asso soci ciat atio ions ns do not not si simp mply  ly  lobby governments for particular policies but come to exercise measures of delegated authority on behalf of the state. Private-interest government thus refers to the role played by private associations as either formal or informal interlocutors with governments in helping to govern (Schmitter & Streeck, 1985 Streeck, 1985)). The main governance relations typically include associations or organisations lending expert authority to governments, operating  under delegated authority, acting as regulatory partners with governments, or working to ‘organise’ non-state roles in wider governance processes. Operating Operati ng locally or at the national national or international international level, the associations associations in ques questi tion on act act as sour source cess of orga organi nisa sati tion onal al capa capaci city ty and and priv privat atee auth author orit ityy in such governance processes. Examples of such associations include business associations, trade unions, expert panels, and NGOs such as human rights, consumer or environmental organisations. 4   discussed a good example of private-interest government, Chapter 4   where industry associations work with government in systems of ‘responsive regulation’. Another example is the role of business associations in facilitating worker training t raining and skills formation. Training Training workers within a  firm confronts employers employers with a serious serious problem problem of collective action: action: why  devote resources to training workers who can be poached by other employers in a competitive market? Firms have strong incentives to free-ride on any training provided by other firms. Governments can attempt to overcome this source of market failure with incentive payments or subsidies or othe ot herr assi assist stan ance ce to firms firms:: that that is, is, thro throug ugh h a form form of hier hierar arch chic ical al gove govern rnan ance ce.. But in a study of training regimes in France and East Germany, Pepper

169

 

170

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Culpepper (2001) shows that business associations can potentially play  an important governance role by organising ‘decentralised cooperation’ among firms. States retain the significant capacity to sanction behaviour and offer incentives. But because they lack detailed knowledge of skills shortages  within particular industries, they cannot tailor their policies with precision. Culpepper arguesespecially that business associations can assist governments to implement policy, in targeting assistance to firms with the greatest ‘cooperative propensities’ (p. 284). Cooperation is possible and mutua mu tuall llyy bene benefic ficial ial beca because use the ‘state state is stron strongg where where priv privat atee assoc associaiations are weak, but it is also weak where they are strong’ (p. 281). In France and East Germany in some instances associations helped overcome cooperation dilemmas among firms by drawing on their views and information, acting as a deliberative and learning forum for them, and mobilising them in favour of agreed positions. In this way business associations helped develop develop and stabilise stabilise the expectations expectations of firms and provide provided d important inputs for policy-makers. After studying a range of regional cases eachthat country, Culpepper confirmed associations one of the key of his in study: ‘the presence of employers’ withhypotheses capacities of information, deliberation, and mobilisation is a necessary condition for reforms premised on securing decentralised cooperation to succeed’ (p. 286). Culpepper’s study shows the sorts of roles that associations can potentially play as sources of ‘private governance’ working in partnership with state agencies in a positive-sum relationship. Private associations representing individual firms can bargain over the details of policy and so save the government the need to strike separate deals. Just as importantly, private associations give firms the chance to talk to and learn from other firms in a non-competi non-cproblems ompetitive tiveofsetting. By action, building buildingprivate trust, associations reducing reducing uncertainty resolving collective are crucialand in many countries in overcoming micro-level ‘coordination ‘coordination problems’ in capitalist economies. economies. Peter Peter Hall and and David Soskice Soskice (2001, (2001, 11), whose work work on the varieties of capitalism we introduced in our discussion of corporatism, argue that in such settings: ‘deliberative proceedings in which participants engage in extensive sharing of information about their interest and beliefs can improve the confidence of each in the strategies likely to be taken by  others’.  Another example of business associations playing a role in associative governance was the development and implementation of the goods and services tax in Australia from the late 1990s. Peter Hendy, a former chief 

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

executive of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, recounts this role: The federal government worked closely with and leaned very heavily, much more so than most people would realise, on business associations to help educate companies on how to transition to the new tax system. Because it  was a new system the feedback to government was critical. As part of the new system, there was initially a huge fuss about issues such as Business  Activity Statements and their administrative complexity. complexity. It should be noted that the government threw large amounts of money at this problem. For example, I recall that there was about $250 million in grants direct to business associations to run the education campaign and another $250 million to fund vouchers to small businesses to buy software etc. This is therefore not just a market issue responding to an announced government policy, but a policy implementation issue requiring (in the public interest) further government involvement than normal. The government took this path because it simply didn’t have the administrative infrastructure to get to hundreds of thousands of small businesses. If they hadn’t utilised business associations, the government would have had to otherwise spend large amounts of  resources creating that infrastructure for a one off administrative event. The government simply doesn’t have the tentacles into the business sector that a  binocular binoc ular view of the modern welfare state sugge suggests. sts. They don’ don’tt even have a consolidated mailing list for small business to send out political messages [Peter Hendy, personal communication, 10 June 2008].

There are many other examples examples of private associations associations playing a formal governance role in ways which benefit government. For example, Gerald Berk and Marc Schneiberg (2005) examine the role of business associations in ‘organising markets’ in the early 20th century in the United States. A number of sectoral business associations used research into cost accounting, deliberation, learning, and benchmarking to manage markets and conclude a period of mutually destructive cut-throat competition.  Associations in industries such as printing, bridge-building, textiles, and iron and steel production, among others, also used associative collaboration to improve productivity and reduce excessive costs and prices. As Berk and Schneiberg Schneiberg (2005, 73) argue, ‘deve ‘developme lopmental ntal associations associations perturbed habits, invited firms to reflect upon background cost conditions, and used information, deliberation, and benchmarking to foster discovery, experimentation and productivity improvement’. Similarly, Kelly Kollman and Aseem Prakash (2002) look at the varying uptake in Europe of a voluntary compliance regime on environmental factors, of the sort

 

171

172

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

examined in Chapter in  Chapter 5. 5.  They find that German firms are far more likely  than British or American ones to join, and then to comply, with these arrangements. Why? Compliance with environmental codes is potentially  costly because it requires additional employee training, the collection of  data and preparations for certification. In Germany well-developed industry associations and local chambers of commerce have reduced these costs because they have ‘provided checklists to help firms carry out internal audits’ (p. 47) and assisted with certification procedures. In further examples of governance through associations, governments often allow private associations to establish national accounting standards for companies. In the United States the authority to set such standards has forr some fo some ti time me been been dele delega gate ted d to the the Feder ederal al Stand tandar ards ds Accou ccount ntan ancy cy Boar Board, d, a private association that is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission but operates independently of it on a day-to-day basis. For governments, the expertise provided by such private associations and the close link linkss they they maint maintai ain n with with indi indivi vidu dual al firms firms prov provid idee an impo importa rtant nt gove govern rnan ance ce resource (Mattli & Buthe, 2005). Similarly, the Australian federal government gave responsibility for the implementation of an export promotion program, Export Access, to a number of national industry associations in the 1990s. It did so in the belief that such bodies have strong networks and possess more detailed knowledge of the circumstances of individual firms and so would be able to implement the program effectively effectively (Bell, 1995 (Bell, 1995)). In the international arena, Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony  Porter (1999) and Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker (2002) provide a  range of examples of the exercise of private authority in international regulation. Walter Mattli and Tim Buthe (2003) show how the International Organisation for Standards (ISO) and similar organisations promulgate thousands of product standards covering areas such as health and safety  and environmen environmental tal protection. protection.1 The ISO is composed of representatives of more than 150 national standards bodies and has a secretariat based in Switzerland. Operating largely on a deliberative basis, delegations of  national organisations meet under the auspices of the ISO to debate and argue about appropriate appropriate standards. Among the standards standards promulgated promulgated by  the ISO in 2007 are those relating to greenhouse gas validation and verification; drinking water; the sustainable development of fisheries; biofuels; and food safety. The ISO typically works by consensus and has no legal coercive power to enforce the agreed standards. However, in the case of  st stan anda dard rdss re rela lati ting ng to, to, for for exam exampl ple, e, the the dime dimens nsio ions ns of frei freigh ghtt co cont ntai aine ners rs and and the format of bank cards, the use of ISO standards is enforced via national regulatory bodies.

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

173

Other examples of associations shaping governance practices can be foun fo und d in the the real alm m of ide ideas and and the their impa impact ct on defin definin ingg inte interres ests ts and and iden iden-tifying tify ing proble problems; ms; knowle knowledge dge-ba -based sed organi organisati sations ons,, groups groups of experts experts or ‘episepistemic communities’ can shape policy outlooks (Hass, 1992 (Hass,  1992;;  Finnemore, 1996). The Inte 1996). Interg rgov over ernm nmen ental tal Panel anel on Clima Climate te Chan Change ge (IPCC (IPCC,, for for exam exam-ple, pl e, whic which h oper operat ates es unde underr the the ausp auspic ices es of the the Unite nited d Natio ations ns Envi Enviro ronm nmen en-tal Program, is a scientific intergovernmental organisation whose main decisions taken inpower. plenaryNational sessionsgovernments by national representatives. The IPCC has are no coercive are under no obligation to accept or even directly respond to the recommendations in assessment reports published in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007. Yet the IPCC has used its reputation for scientific expertise and political impartiality  to set agendas and shape preferences. Similarly, in a mammoth analysis of  Global   Global Business Regulation  John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (2000 (2000)) show how private authority plays an important regulatory role in international arenas, from aviation to food standards to labour standards to finance.  An important potential institutional issue relating to associational governance the problem of elitism. This raisesinagain the issues of isaccountability andorganisational legitimacy that were canvassed relation to community engagement. If anything, such problems become potentially more serious under associative governance arrangements that involve the substantial devolution of power to private associations. Early studies by Robert Michels (1915) and others in the tradition of elite theory  found that professional administrators and organisational leaders, even in social democratic settings, often tended to dominate the rank-andfile membership, which results in attenuated democratic processes and outcomes.  A recent case in point is analysed by Knut Mikalsen and colleagues (2006). Norwegian Fisheries Association, as a resultshifted of a partnership  with theThe Norwegian government to manage fisheries, over time from a bottom-up organisation to one pursuing ‘the economic interests of its most powerful members’ (p. 201). While the organisation ‘pays lip service to the goals of social responsibility and the broader mission of the association as the voice of all fishers, there is – in practice – a growing  emphasis on protecting the privileges and investments of a much narrower group of “professionals”’ (p. 206). On a similar though broader scale, Paul Magnette (2003) argues that new participatory forms of governance in the European Union aimed at curbing the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ are highly problematic, largely because the systems in place tend to be

 

174

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

dominated by narrowly organised and ‘elitist’ interests in policy-making.

Other studies point to similar problems problems of limited democracy and limited internal accountability in a range of civil society associations (Warleigh, 2001; McLaverty, 2002;; Halpin, 2006 Halpin, 2006)). 2001; Lyons, 2001; McLaverty, 2002 THE ROLE OF THE STATE WITHIN A S S O C I AT AT I V E G O V E R N A N C E

Governance through associations often requires the state to share power to a greater degree than any of the other modes of governance we have examined. In the case of corporatist arrangements, the state commits itself  to a measure of joint decision-making with partner organisations. In the case of private-interest government the state agrees to delegate authority  forr the fo the cr crea eati tion on and and impl implem emen enta tati tion on of regu regula lato tory ry rule ruless to nonnon-st stat atee acto actors rs.. The previo previous us chap chapter ter ar argu gued ed that that st stat ates es are are usua usuall llyy relu reluct ctan antt to shar sharee powe power: r: there must be clearly perceived payoffs or relationships of dependency to push governments down this path. In relation to strong associative forms such su ch as corp corpor orat atis ism, m, it seem seemss cl clea earr that that such such arra arrang ngem emen ents ts are are most most like likely ly to emer em erge ge when when the the st stat atee is suffi suffici cien entl tlyy auto autono nomo mous us to avoi avoid d capt captur uree by ma majo jorr inte in tere rest st as asso soci ciat atio ions ns,, but but not not suffi suffici cien entl tlyy auth author orit itat ativ ivee to rule rule by decr decree ee and and henc he ncee re reje ject ct coop cooper erati ation on with with affec affecte ted d grou groups. ps. There Therefo fore re state statess migh mightt sha share re power with associations which possess valuable resources, such as expertise and legitimacy, and which can frustrate efforts by the state to implement policy unilaterally. As Trevor Matthews (1988) suggests, associations can be ‘vitally important allies’ in helping governments govern.  Yet  Yet the state remains a major actor within associative governance arrangements. First, we stress that the corporatist and private-interest government arrangements that we have discussed are created and maintained by the state. A case in point is the study by George Christou and Seamus Simpson (2006, 43) of the development of a ‘new European transnational private governance’ arrangement for the internet. In the late 1990s the European Commission recognised a need to create a top-level domain name of ‘eu’ as an alternative to national names like ‘dk’ (Denmark) or ‘hu’ (Hungary). In deference to the participatory culture of the internet and the expertise of commercial interests, the European Commission recognised that it could not manage the domain system unilaterally. Instead, it created a private, transnational, not-for-profit company, the European Registry for Internet Domains (Eurid), to administer the dot-eu registry. The resulting arrangements, while containing elements of self-regulation and private governance, gave the European Union Union ‘all ‘all rights’ relating to the

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

registry databases, including the ‘right to re-designate the registry itself’. The authors conclude that ‘the shadow of hierarchy looms large’ over

175

governance arrangements because Eurid is subject to a time-limited and renewable agreement’ (p. 53). Gove Go vernm rnmen ents ts can can re revi vise se gove govern rnan ance ce rules rules,, and and any any autho authorit rityy give given n to priprivate associations can potentially be withdrawn. For example, the activities of ra rati ting ng agen agenci cies es in cr cred edit it mark market etss and and devo devolv lved ed form formss of se self lf-r -reg egul ulat atio ion n in industry indust ry are artefacts of state strategic choices in alloca allocating ting and overseein overseeing  g  such roles. In the United Kingdom in the early 1980s and in Australia  in the mid-1990s, incoming neo-liberal governments changed the rules of  gove go vernan rnance ce and simply simply dissol dissolved ved corpora corporatist tist arrange arrangemen ments. ts. Furthe Furthermo rmore, re, it is through the imprimatur of the state that these governance arrangements acquire legitimacy. According to Ian Hurd (1999), to the extent that a  state accepts some rule or body as legitimate that rule or body becomes becomes an auth au thor orit ityy. In this this re resp spec ect, t, some some acco accoun unts ts of the the role role of priv privat atee as asso soci ciat atio ions ns or firms risk confusing largely private functions with collective arrangements. For example, the analysis by Cutler (2002) of ‘private coordination’ and ‘private international regimes’ blurs private organisational arrangements in markets – informal agreements, production alliances, cartels and joint research initiatives – with more publicly oriented arrangements such as standards-setting and regulation. Governance through association does not emerge spontaneously. States must provide private actors with sufficient incentives to involve themselves in governance activities. Governments and state agencies often place heavy  demands on associations to report data, comment on draft proposals, and sit on consultative committees. There are demands for information; for advice, often at short notice; for appearances before hearings; for participation on consultative bodies or corporatist forums; and the need to keep memb me mber erss info inform rmed ed of the the stea steady dy st stre ream am of new new ruli ruling ngss and and poli policy cy deci decisi sion onss emanating from the state. One associational respondent in a study conducted by Bell (1995 (1995)) likened his role to that of an ‘unpaid public servant’.  A key metagovernance requirement for governments is to ensure that private associations have sufficient incentives to undertake these governance activities. Typical was the largely unsuccessful attempt to implant corporatist practices at a sectoral level by the government of Ontario between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. The government’s objective was to encourage organised labour and business interests to work together to negotiate and help implement a set of policies on industry, training, and occupational health and safety across industry sectors. In his account of this experiment,

 

176

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Neil Bradford (1998) points out that in a neo-liberal institutional and conceptual setting this was always an ambitious strategy. One major problem was that business interests mostly resisted collectivist engagements. As Bradford Bradf ord points out, ‘the viability and durability durability of such reforms depends

on the willingness of organised business interests to share power responsibly with other social actors’. On the whole such cooperation was not forthcoming, forthcom ing, because business saw the incentives, incentives, largely provided provided by the state, as insufficient; and because, more broadly, business interests distrusted such ‘incorporationist’ governance strategies, preferring instead to maintain the ‘autonomy of the firm’. Only in the case of industrial policy were the ‘inducements to business large enough and the threats small enough to convince corporate managers that partnership did not mean making unwarranted concessions’ (p. 568). Once the rules of the game have been established, the state remains a pivotal actor within associative governance arrangements. Although the basic relationship in such arrangements is one of exchange, the roles of  government and associations are not equal. Chapter equal. Chapter 2 pointed 2 pointed out that the central position of governments in associational networks allows them to ‘dominate the exchange’ (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009 Stoker,  2009,,  22). As an example of the inlve which states that appea app earrways to invo involv e a subst substan antia tialcan l measu medominate asure re of powe pogovernance wer-s r-shar harin ing, g,arrangements co cons nsid ider er Mexic exico’ o’ss approach to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The decision to seek membership of NAFTA was made centrally by Mexico’s political leaders. Having made this decision, the Mexican government sought to win support for this agenda from the business community. It created a new body, body, the Business Coordinating Council for Foreign Trade, Trade,  whose selected members were invited to discuss the trade deal with the government. Before the first meeting of this corporatist body the Mexican government revealed its hand through a political marketing campaign  which framed a free trade agreement as one in which businesses and social groups wouldleaders all gain. To be limit anyd dissent, government that business would invited invite to discussions discusthe sions and allowedindicated to lobby  for temporary concessions only if they accepted the principle of NAFTA  membe me mbersh rship ip.. ‘The prov provis isio ion n of these these conc conces essi sion onss gave gave pote potent ntia iall oppo oppone nent ntss an incentive to work for the best possible terms rather than against the initiative in general. While the Mexican state allowed businesspeople to participate in shaping NAFTA’s terms, that opportunity came with strings attached’ (Fairbrother, (Fairbrother, 2007,  2007, 284). In this case the central position of the government allowed it to set the agenda, determining the key issues to be resolved through associational

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

governance. Yet governments can also exert control by setting agendas within  governance relationships. Consider the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) introduced in the European Union in 2000. The OMC seeks to encourage mutual learning between national governments, the supra-national institutions of the European Union, and interest-groups

177

across a range of policy issues. As described by Helen Wallace (2000, 33), the aim of the OMC is ‘not to establish a single common framework, but rather to share experience and encourage the spread of best practice’.  Whereas hierarchical governance results in coercive rules and regulations, the OMC results in recommendations and regulations which actors are to implement. These recommendations are negotiated between encouraged   to ‘public and private actors at different levels of decision-making’, meaning  that ‘no distinction is made between steering subjects and steering objects’  2006,, 36–7). The OMC has been lauded lauded as a  (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, Rittberger, 2006 ‘new mode of governance’ and a retreat from centralised decision-making  in the Euro Europe pean an Union nion (Her (Heriti itier er,, 2003). 2003). The Euro Europe pean an Commi Commissi ssion on,, howhowever, has shown that it can steer the OMC process from behind the scenes. It can decide whether to use the OMC to address a particular policy problem. It frames policy problems, sets the sequence of consultation, drafts recommendations, and monitors their implementation. As Burkard Eberlein and Dieter Kerwer (2004, 126) conclude: ‘Although the OMC should be a combination of bottom-up participation and top-down guidance, in reality it is often dominated by the centre.’ Governments can also dominate governance arrangements in situations  where actors possess very different empirical and normative ideas about the appropriate policies to pursue. Conceptual differences can sometimes be resolved through processes of deliberation or policy learning such as the OMC, but they are often embedded in organisational cultures that resist change (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2008 Sveningsson,  2008)). This is partly because organisations are, from the moment of their inception, given differing mandates, responsibilities and lines of accountability. Where organisations possess very different cultures, attempts to govern through associational partnerships are likely to generate misunderstandings, conflict and paralysis. Even  when organisations are genuinely committed to working together in partnership, ‘the shadow of hierarchy’ may be needed to ensure the smooth functioning of governance arrangements. In some cases the conceptual differences among organisations in a network may even prompt the government to reassert control and govern through hierarchy. The treatment of drug addicts in the United Kingdom offers a good example of this governance dynamic. In a 10-year strategy document,

 

178

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain, published in 1998, the government identified drug addiction as a ‘wicked problem problem’’ that required government and non-government organisations to deliver ‘joined-up’ solutions  within a ‘network governance’ governance’ approach (Acevedo & Common, 2006 Common,  2006)). The institutional institutional expression expression of the governme government’ nt’ss joined-up joined-up approach approach was to create about 150 local Drug Action Teams (DATs). These teams were charged with ‘bringing together representatives of local agencies involved

in delivery of the Drug Strategy, such as health services, social services, police pol ice,, probati probation on services services,, local local educati education on authori authoritie ties, s, youth youth services services,, social housing providers and voluntary sector providers’ (http://drugs. homeoffice.gov.uk/dat/). Initially, DATs were given the responsibility to commission services, monitor and report on performance, communicate  with stakeholders and oversee the development of coordinated ‘street-level’ ‘street-level’ services.  Yet  Yet conceptual differences between b etween the t he agencies involved in drug treatment undermined the value of the partnership approach and the smooth running of the DAT DATs (Parker (Parker,,  2004  2004,,  381). The criminal justice agencies, principally the police and probation services, tended to frame addiction in terms of criminal enforcement and the protection of the community. In contrast, many of the voluntary workers in drug treatment charities favoured harm minimisation. A second difference emerged within the health sector between mental health workers who believed that addiction  was a symptom of underlying mental health problems that had to be treated first and those working in health clinics who favoured immediate treatment for the addiction itself. Finally, a third difference emerged between youth justice workers, who tended to favour minimal intervention for fear of stigmatising and so alienating drug addicts, and drug workers in nonstatutory agencies, who advocated long-term care relationships. According  to one senior official working within a DAT: the cultur cultural al asp aspect ectss [of work working ing]] were the ke keyy, parti particul cularl arlyy as . . . the ma main in ethos of the youth justice system is to divert youngsters from the criminal  justice system and very much based on minimal interventions. Whereas the needs of a drugs worker in that system are much more intense and it’s not minimal intervention, it’s about developing a relationship and getting into a lot of the problems. So those two approaches didn’t work together, they   2003,, 616].  were contrary to how people worked [quoted Newburn, Newburn, 2003

Over time, as the full extent of the differences between agencies and the limits of a partnership approach became apparent, the government

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

started to metagovern the DATs more actively. In 2001 the Home Office  was given overall responsibility for the delivery of drug services in England, while regional Government Offices, composed of representatives of  the major central government departments, were charged with monitoring  the performance of the DATs. In 2002 much of the remaining discretion that DATs had been given to implement policy was eliminated when the newly created National Treatment Agency was charged with determining  local treatment plans. Within three or four years the rhetorical commitment to a network approach gave way to what was, in effect, hierarchical

179

control.  While acknowledging the extent to which governance through association requires states to share power, we once again emphasise the ways in which states can enhance their policy capacities by developing these relations. Recall the argument of Michael Atkinson and William Coleman (1989) in Chapter in Chapter 3 that 3 that different forms of structured interaction between the state and society are linked to different different styles of policy-makin policy-making. g. Longterm, strategic and ‘anticipatory’ policy styles in industrial policy typically require the existence of state-directed or corporatist policy networks. Governme Gov ernments nts concede policy-making policy-making authority to trade unions and business leaders when they commit their authority to corporatist governance arrangements. But in doing so, government can enhance their capacity in achieving, for example, higher economic growth at a lower inflationary  cost. In arguing that there is a positive-sum relationship between states and private associations, we must return to the critique of public choice in Chapter Chapt er 2. The The basi basicc cl clai aim m is that that in a comp compet etit itiv ivee econ econom omic ic mark market et se sett ttin ing  g  thee purs th pursui uitt of se self lf-i -int nter eres estt lead leadss (a (ass if by an ‘inv ‘invis isib ible le hand hand’) ’) to the the coll collec ecti tive ve good, but that in a competitive political market the pursuit of sectional interests may be economically and politically destructive. Friedrich Hayek  (1982) argues that sectional interest-groups undermine the legitimacy of  the state and, in the case of trade unions, the rule of law. Mancur Olson (1982) (19 82) argue arguess that that inte intere restst-gr grou oup p poli politi tics cs le lead adss to insti institu tutio tiona nall sc scle lero rosis sis and and economic decline. Economists have estimated the costs of ‘rent-seeking’ by interest-grou interest-groups ps to be as high as 50 per cent of American gross domestic product (Laband & Sophocleus, 1988 Sophocleus, 1988)); 20 to 40 per cent of Indian gross domestic product (Mohammad & Whalley, 1984 Whalley,  1984)); and 12 per cent of   American domestic consumption expenditure (Lopez & Pagoulatos, 1994 1994)). Forr a critical Fo critical assessment of such figures see Hindmoor Hindmoor (1999). 1999).  Whether or not private associations have an incentive to pursue a narrow, rent-seeking, agenda depends upon their institutional configuration.

 

180

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

 As Mancur Olson (1982, 74–110) actually recognises, interest-groups that form peak associations representing the interests of large numbers of members have less incentive to pursue economically destructive rent-seeking  policies. Using evidence from Latin America, Richard Doner and Ben Schneider (2000) seek to identify the factors that encourage business associations to play a constructive political role. In their view, ‘progressive’ associations have a high membership density or coverage, effective internal proc pr oced edur ures es for for medi mediat atin ingg membe memberr inte intere rests sts,, and and se sele lecti ctive ve ince incent ntiv ives es to help help mobilise members in collective action. In addition to these institutional attributes, associations are more likely to play a progressive rather than

rent-seeking role in the presence of ‘external drivers’. Doner and Schneider emphasise the role of perceived threats of economic vulnerability in mobilising business cooperation. Finally, and most crucially, they stress the role of the the st stat atee in pro provi vidi ding ng ince incent ntiv ives es for for appr approp opri riat atee form formss of beha behavi viou our, r, pa parrticularly ticular ly supportive supportive incentives incentives such as subsidies subsidies or institutional institutionalised ised access to policy deliberation deliberation within the state. This Th is final final poin pointt is wort worth h unde underl rlin inin ing. g. The The rela relati tion onsh ship ip betw betwee een n the the st stat atee and private associations is most likely to take a positive-sum form when the state intervenes hierarchically  to  to secure the authoritative position of the asso associ ciat atio ions ns.. This This is a form form of meta metago gove vern rnin ingg or ‘st stee eeri ring ng’. ’. Gove Govern rnme ment ntss or state agencies can bolster the strength of associations by offering financial or othe otherr suppo supporti rting ng re reso sour urce ces. s. Furthe urtherm rmor ore, e, state state le lead ader erss can can activ activel elyy shape shape patterns of interaction between groups and the state, and act as brokers among competing interests. Governments and their administrative agencies may block the access of certain groups to forums of policy-making   while giving others a monopoly on representation. In Austria, for example, memb me mber ersh ship ip in majo majorr busi busine ness ss and and unio union n as asso soci ciat atio ions ns is comp compul ulso sory ry unde underr law,, thus strongly enhancing the associative law associative capacity of key interests. And as Streeck (1983, 270) points out in relation relation to Germany: Germany: Ministeri Minist erial al dep depart artmen ments ts ten tend d to dis discou courag ragee ind indivi ividua duall firm firmss fro from m con contac tactin ting  g  them the m dire directl ctlyy on matte matters rs tha thatt can be deal dealtt with by the their ir ass associ ociati ations ons . . . by  urging firms to go through established associational channels, state officials incre inc rease ase the fun functi ctiona onall imp importa ortance nce and the pr prest estige ige of ass associ ociati ations ons in rel relati ation on to their members [and] they help interest groups speak with one voice.

Such corporatist proclivities resonate with the state capacity literature,  where the term ‘embeddedness’ embeddedness’ describes the ability of state leaders and policy-makers to forge positive, collaborative and change-oriented rela). This capacity for positive tions with key groups or sectors (Evans, 1995 (Evans,  1995).

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

state–society collaboration, or what Linda Weiss (1998) terms ‘governed interdependence’, in turn depends on the organisational and associative capacity and outlook of major social or economic groupings and interest associations. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT?

The gove The govern rnan ance ce ar arra rang ngem emen ents ts we have have been been exam examin inin ingg so far far in this this chap chapte terr consist of partnership arrangements between state and private associations.  Y  Yet et during the last decade academics have identified new forms of nonstate (NSMD) governance in which private firms,market-driven under pressure from consumers andarrangements, non-governmental campaign

181

groups, develop and voluntarily abide by codes of conduct in the apparent absence of any state involvement. David Vogel (2008, 262) reports that there are now more than 300 codes, primarily addressing either labour or environmental practices, with a particular focus on such high-profile political issues as child labour, sweatshops, diamond mining and fair-trade coffee and cocoa production. One of the most successful and intensely studied NSMD arrangements  Bartley, 2003;; Conroy, 2007 Conroy, 2007;; Tollefson, relates to forestry (Cashore, 2002 (Cashore, 2002;; Bartley, 2003 Gale & Haley, 2009 Haley, 2009)). The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was created in is managed through a general and board on1993 whichand environmental and social groupsassembly and forestry firms of aredirectors equally  represented. The FSC has developed 10 principles of responsible forestry  management, including reduction of the environmental impact of logging  activities activit ies and maintenance maintenance of the ecological functions functions and integrity integrity of the forest; maintenance of forests of high conservation value, having outstandingg si in sign gnifi ifica canc ncee or cr crit itic ical al impo import rtan ance ce;; equi equita tabl blee use use and and shar sharin ingg of bene benefit fitss derived from the forest; and recognition and respect of indigenous people’s people’s rights. Forest owners apply to the FSC for certification and, if successful, can then display the FSC logo in an effort to attract customers. Based in Bonn, Germany, the FSC now has national offices in more than 50 countries, including Burkina Faso, the Congo, Ghana, Brazil and Papua  New Guinea. NSMD arrangements resemble some of the governance arrangements  we have already discussed. Chapter discussed. Chapter 6 showed 6 showed how NGOs like the Terrence Higgins Trust and firms like McDonald’s have attempted to persuade peop pe ople le to chang changee their their beha behavi viou ourr in ways ways that that cont contrib ribute ute to the achie achieve veme ment nt of collectively valued goods. In these cases NSMD governance results in  Chapter 4 examined pressure upon firms to change their   own behaviour.  behaviour. Chapter 4  examined

 

182

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

the proliferation of systems of self-regulation, showing that it occurs in the shadow of hierarchy. In relation to NSMD arrangements, self-regulation is apparently undertaken undertaken voluntarily voluntarily in the absence of the state.  Wee finally seem to have encountered a credible example of ‘gover W ‘governance without government’. government’. Cutler and her colleague colleaguess (1999, 2) describe describe NSMD systems as amounting to the ‘privatisation’ of governance. Ben jamin Cashore (2002, 504) suggests that NSMD ‘governance ‘governance systems’ derive their ‘policy-making authority not from the state, but from the manipulation of global markets and attention to consumer preferences’. Virginia Haufler (2006, 92) suggests that ‘one of the most significant changes in recent years is that the “who” in “who governs” must now  be expanded to include the participation of nongovernmental and noncorporate actors’. Similarly, Steven Bernstein (2005, 60) argues that the

civil regulations contained within NSMD systems represent an innovative form fo rm of gove govern rnan ance ce’. ’. Ar Arch chon on Fung ung (2002 (2002,, 150), 150), whos whosee work work on commu communi nity  ty  engagement we examined in Chapter in Chapter 7, 7, describes the ‘social markets’ contained within NSMD systems as ‘creating distinctive areas of governance’. Reviewing the literature on what he calls ‘private transnational governance governance’’  within international relations, Phillip Pattberg (2005, 591) similarly points to the way in which ‘the locus of authoritative problem solving does not rest with governments and their international organisations alone’ and how ‘authority is indeed relocated in many different settings, involving  public-private as well as purely private actor constellations’.  Wee recognise that  W th at NSMD systems constitute a separate and innovative governance arrangement, and that the continued development of a global civil society centred on campaigning organisations – Greenpeace, Amnesty  International, Human Rights Watch, the World Wide Fund for Nature (instrumental in the creation of the FSC), World Vision, Oxfam, and the fair trade movement – is likely to result in more of them. It is no surprise that we doubt some of the claims made on behalf of NSMD arrangements, especially the notion that they operate in isolation from governments. First, it is clear that firms often work through associations to establish NSMD systems with the explicit intention of forestalling government regulation. Vogel (2008, 268), for example, points to the example of Responsible Care, a code of conduct governing the behaviour of chemical firms,  which was adopted by a number of national chemical associations in order to reduce demands for further government regulation following the explosion at a chemical plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984 which ultimately killed overr 13 000 people. As Mathias Koenig-Archib ove Koenig-Archibugi ugi (2005, 122) observes, observes, the distinction between voluntary and state-imposed codes of conduct ‘is

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

best thought of not as a dichotomy, but as the ends of a continuum’. NSMD systems may not operate directly under the shadow of hierarchy  in the same way as conventional systems of self-regulation, but they do operate under the threat of hierarchy. Second, the history of the FSC shows that, behind the scenes, national governments can play an effective metagovernance role in supporting the acti ac tivi viti ties es of camp campai aign gn grou groups ps.. Fre red d Gale Gale (200 (2008) 8) sh shoows how how the the UK gove govern rn-ment supported the Friends Friends of the Earth’s Earth’s early interest interest in forest forest certificacertification tion by fund fundin ingg a seri series es of cons consul ulta tanc ncyy proj projec ects ts to inve invest stig igat atee the the poss possib ibil ilit ity  y  of usin usingg marke markett ince incent ntiv ives es to ensu ensure re susta sustain inab able le fore forest st mana manage geme ment nt.. In AusAustralia, Gale (2008 (2008))  shows how forest certification was kick-started by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food: it hosted a conference in Queensland in 1996, which resolved that ‘certification and labelling are potentially useful tools among many others to promote sustainable forest management’.

183

Third, it is not always clear what impact NSMD systems actually have on firms’ behaviour and thus on the achievement of collectively valued goals. The FSC system rests on rigorous external auditing which requires firms to demonstrate to independently accredited auditors that they are adhering to each of the 10 principles of responsible forestry management on an ongoing basis (Cashore, 2002 (Cashore,  2002,,  513). Yet in this respect the FSC is something of an exception. ‘Relatively few’ industry and corporate codes are independently monitored, and some contain absolutely no monitoring  provisions at all (Vogel, 2008 (Vogel,  2008,,  269). Fervent hopes have been expressed that NSMD arrangements represent a ‘civilising influence’ that can give ‘globalisation a human face’ (Cutler,  (Cutler,   2006, 2006,   200). Yet these governance arrangements are unlikely to do so in the absence of metagovernance to ensure their effectiveness or accountability. Fourth, while more than 300 business codes have been promulgated, these cover only a tiny fraction of all business activity. The firms that are most likely to adopt stringent codes of conduct are those with global brand names who can afford the costs of certification processes processes and whose reputation reput ation is most likely likely to be tarnished by allegations allegations that they are acting  unethically. Codes of conduct have now been developed to regulate the activ act ivit itie iess of indu indust strie riess that that have have prev previo ious usly ly attrac attracte ted d unwe unwelc lcom omee newsp newspape aperr headlines. Firms in other industries have less incentive to develop codes of  conduct. The growth in NSMD governance arrangements may therefore be subje subject ct to rapid rapidly ly dimin diminish ishin ingg re retu turn rns. s. Even ven withi within n the fore forest stry ry indu industry stry,,  which has the most successful NSMD arrangement, the FSC has certified only about three per cent of the world’s forests.

 

184

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

Because of in the monitoring of their implementation and limitations in inadequacies their reach, NSMD systems remain a second-best alternative for campaign groups. The World Wide Fund for Nature did not press for the creation of the FSC until the manifest inadequacies of the International Tropical Timber Agreement became apparent and national governments had failed to develop an effective international international forestry treaty during  the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de  Janeiro.. It is worth noting that nearly all of the codes of conduct govern the  Janeiro behaviour of private firms, often transnational corporations, operating in developing countries with weak or non-existent systems of national regulation. If, over time, NGOs can persuade national governments to develop international regulatory regimes that incorporate higher environmental or labour standards and constrain the activities of multinational firms, the demand for NSMD governance will probably fall.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has offered examples of associations playing a key role in governance arrangements, showing that state and non-state actors can benefit from these partnerships. A central argument is that associative governance reveals the state making substantial use of private associative resources. In cases, states to depend on these Such ucsome h depe depend nden ence ce impl immay plie iess come re reci cipr proc ocit ity y and and heavily a will willin ingn gnes ess s onresources. the the part part of the state to provide incentives for cooperation, even to the point of  explicitly sharing authority with non-state actors. These state-sponsored selective incentives are an important condition for successfully soliciting  associational cooperation. Successful associative governance also depends on the willingness of  associations to cooperate or be incorporated in governance partnerships. This willingness might be linked to incentives offered by the state, but it is also associated with a favourable conceptual environment in which actors trust each other and are prepared to cooperate for mutual gain. Associations must overcome or institutional challenges in order to be effectivedifficult partners,organisational including issues related to membership coverage and loyalty, resources and authority. Such arrangements may be unstable: changes in government and changes in the state’s state’s governing strategy can easily weaken or undermine them. As we have seen, in the United Kingdom, Kingd om, Canada and Aust Australia ralia corporatist experiments experiments were brought to an abrupt end by the election of new governments. We have also argued

 

GOVERNANCE THROUGH ASSOCIA AT TIONS

 

that the ingredients for successful associative governance vary across different countries and policy arenas. In the final analysis, major associative governance arrangements are chosen by states. Such choices are shaped by ideological dispositions and by assessments of the institutional capacity  and resources of non-state associations and their ability to deliver.

185

 

9

 

Conclusion

To be governed is to be watched, inspected, spied upon, directed, lawdriven, numbered, regulated, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, troll ed, check checked, ed, estima estimated, ted, value valued, d, censur censured, ed, comma commanded. nded. . . . It is, unde underr pretext of public utility, utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under und er con contri tribut bution ion,, dri drille lled, d, flee fleeced ced,, exp exploi loited ted,, mon monopo opoliz lized, ed, ext extort orted ed fro from, m, squeezed, hoaxed, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of  complaint, compl aint, to be repr repressed essed,, fined, vilified, harassed, hunted down, abuse abused, d,

clubbed, disarmed, bound, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, depo de port rted ed,, sa sacr crifi ifice ced, d, sold sold,, be betr tray ayed ed.. . . . Th That at is go gove vern rnme ment nt;; th that at is it itss just justic ice; e; that is its morality. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the  Nineteenth Century , 1851.

States form a part of the backdrop to everyday life. They register births, deaths and marriages. They control immigration, collect taxes, provide public goods and regulate what people can eat, watch and buy. It is true that in some countries communities of people have effectively opted out of the state for religious or political reasons – the Amish in the United States, for example. It is also true that states have sometimes collapsed. Yet for most people in most countries the state remains as central (although perhaps not as objectionable) an actor today as it was for Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in 19th-century France.  Yet  Yet those writers who advocate a society-centred perspective on governanc na ncee argue argue that that gove govern rnme ment ntss have have lo lost st powe powerr and and are are no lo long nger er the the ‘cock cockpi pitt from which society is governed’ (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000 Koppenjan,  2000,,  136). Lester Salamon (2002, 1–2), for example, argues that ‘problems have become too complex for government to handle on its own, because disagreements exist

186

 

CONCLUSION

 

about the proper ends of public action, and because government increasingly authority toseat enforce will on other crucial actors givinglacks themthe a meaningful at theits table’. Similarly, Donald Kettlwithout (2002, 161) says: to rule eff effect ective ively ly,, go gover vernme nment nt mus mustt firs firstt att attain ain and the then n exe exerc rcise ise sover sovereig eignty nty.. It must be able to chart its course and ensure that that course is followed. Hyperpluralism, policy networks, devolution, and globalization have all greatly diffused power. Government might retain its legal position, but exerc exe rcisi ising ng pol politi itical cal so sover vereig eignty nty ami amidst dst suc such h dif diffus fused ed po power wer rep repres resent entss a maj major or challenge.

One wayof of aanalysing these arguments aboutpolitical the power of governments is in terms long-standing debate within science about the ‘faces’, or dimensions, of power (see Hay, 2002 Hay,  2002,,  171–82). Power is most obviously manifested when one actor can force another actor to behave in a certain way. Writing about the distribution of power in the United States, Robert Dahl (1957; 1961) offered an ‘intuitive’ definition of power in which ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do’. In this case we can observe the exercise of power by looking at who triumphs when actors disagree

187

 with each other. other. This conception of power brings to mind the definition by Theda Skocpol (1985, 9) of state autonomy in Chapter in Chapter 3 3 as  as the ability  of government to ‘implement overofthe actual or potential opposition of powerfulofficial social goals, groupsespecially or in the face recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances’. There is, however, more to power than coercion. As Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962; 1963) pointed out in a critique of Dahl’s argument, a second face of power is manifested in the capacity of some actors to keep issues off policy agendas. A classic example was identified by Matthew  Crenson (1971). In the town of Gary, Indiana, the largest local employer, US Steel, succeeded in keeping clean-air laws off the local political agenda  despite the obvious health problems being caused by air pollution. There  was no obvious political conflict in Gary, Gary, no legislative tussles or interestgroup marches,far and so no behavioural sign of powerofbeing exercised. Yet this non-issue, from demonstrating the absence dominating power relations, was actually testimony to US Steel’s power and the dependence of the city upon the jobs it provided. Here, the exercise of power meant keeping an issue off the agenda. But agenda-setting can also, of course, mean putting issues on the agenda (Kingdon, 1984 (Kingdon,  1984))  and, less obviously,

 

188

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

determining the sequence in which options are discussed or voted on  1982,, 169–92). (Riker, 1982 (Riker, Final inally ly,, as Steve teven n Luke Lukess (197 (1974) 4) ar argu gues es,, a thir third d face face of powe powerr is mani manife fest sted ed in the capacity of some actors to shape the preferences of others:  A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?

In challe challengi nging ng the societ society-c y-cent entre red d accoun accountt of gover governan nance, ce, we have have argued that governments continue to exercise considerable power. In terms of the first, first, coer coerci cive ve,, fa face ce of powe powerr, gove govern rnme ment ntss in nati nation on-st -state atess cont contin inue ue to possess legal sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and this underpins the exercise of hierarchical authority. Governments are not simply one actor within ‘pluricentric’ networks (Sorensen & Torfing, 2008a ,  3). Governme Governments nts do not simply operate within exogenous exogenously ly given given sets of governance rules. They also have authority, not possessed by any  other actor, to choose the governance rules and, as we explained in our discussion of metagovernance, act as a court of appeal for disputes between other actors. Chapter actors.  Chapter 4 makes 4  makes the case that, far from fading into obscurity, hierarchical, top-down governance is resurgent. Governments can

nationalise failing banks, suspend share trading, ban certain food products, introduce traffic congestion charges, detain suspected terrorists and ban the export of basic foodstuffs. Through their capacity to introduce taxes or subsidies, governments can raise or lower the costs of a wide range of activities. Governments also retain considerable powers to set agendas. By exploitingg their in their marke marketin tingg expe experti rtise se and and re reso sour urce ces, s, as well well as their their de demo mocr crati aticc le legi gittimacy,, governme imacy governments nts identify identify policy problems, frame debates debates and advance advance policy solutions. In recent years Western governments have identified  weapons of mass destruction, energy dependence and the costs of an ageing  population as items for the policy agenda, thus preparing the ground for the eventual invasion of Iraq, decisions on the future of nuclear power, and pens pe nsio ion n re refo form rm.. Of cour course se gove govern rnme ment ntss do not not have have a mono monopo poly ly on se sett ttin ing  g  agendas. agend as. The media, think-tanks, think-tanks, political political parties, international international organisaorganisations, private firms, community organisations and interest-groups can all bring forward topics for agendas in the policy process (Majone, 2006 (Majone, 2006)). In recent years the campaign group Landmine Action, having inspired public

 

CONCLUSION

 

debate about the use of landmines, has been instrumental in persuading  governments to sign a moratorium on the production, stockpiling, use or export of cluster bombs. Oxfam and War on Want have primed public opin op inio ion n about about debt debt re reli lief ef (Busb (Busbyy, 2007) 2007) and, and, more more rece recent ntly ly,, raise raised d conc concer erns ns about the link between the use of biofuels and world food prices. But governments can also exert control by setting agendas within governanc na ncee re relat latio ions nshi hips. ps. In the case case of gove govern rnan ance ce throu through gh commu communi nity ty en enga gage ge-ment me nt,, gove govern rnme ment ntss can can deci decide de whic which h issu issues es to cons consul ultt a comm commun unit ityy ab abou out, t, how ho w to st stru ruct ctur uree cons consul ulta tati tion on proc proces esse sess and and how how to se sett the the boun bounda dari ries es of the the community to be consulted. Governments can decide whether to promise a referendum on the results of any consultation or simply promise to take note of views expressed. In the case of associative governance relationships, governments can use their central location in networks to set the objectives of any partnership arrangement, the issues to be decided, the way in which those issues are framed, the sequence in which issues are to be addressed, and an d the the proc proceedure duress to be foll folloowed wed in the the case case of any any disag isagrreeme eemen nt. Chapter t. Chapter 8 sh showed owed the European European Union Union exploiting exploiting its agenda-sett agenda-setting ing powers powers to steer outcomes achieved through the Open Method of Coordination and the Mexican government securing support for the North American Free Trade  Agreement by requiring businesses to express in-principle support for a  treaty before being able to negotiate concessions within it. The lesson is that th at gove govern rnme ment ntss do not not alwa always ys need need to ‘enfo enforc rcee thei theirr wi will ll’’ (Sal (Salam amon on,, 2002 2002,, 1–2) in order to achieve their goals. Finally, as emphasised in Chapter in Chapter 5, 5,  governments retain a considerable

189

power to shape people’s preferences. Where it would be too economically  or poli politi tica call llyy cost costly ly to impo impose se poli polici cies es,, gove govern rnme ment ntss can can expl exploi oitt thei theirr legi legiti ti-macy and marketing budgets to persuade people to change their behaviour to protect either their own long-term interests or, in the case of collective goods, those of the society in which they live. Governments are not the only actors who can govern through persuasion, but their capacity to combinee persuasion combin persuasion with the exercise of hierarchical hierarchical authority gives them a great advantage over non-state actors. Of course, governance through persuasion is not always successful. After the failure of a campaign to persuad su adee shop shoppe pers rs to use use fewe fewerr plas plasti ticc bags bags,, the the Irish rish gove govern rnme ment nt was was forc forced ed to intr in trod oduc ucee a ta tax, x, le levi vied ed at the the poin pointt of sa sale le,, upon upon cons consum umer ers. s. Yet part partic icul ular arly  ly  in societies with high levels of social capital, persuasion can prove a surprisingly effective governance strategy. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008, 60–1) describe how a Texan television campaign in which local football players collected litter, smashed beer cans in their bare hands, and growled ‘don’t mess with Texas’ was credited with achieving a 72 per cent

 

190

 

RETHINKING GOVERNANCE

reduction over six years in roadside littering. In our own city of Brisbane,  Australia, which is suffering the effects of years of drought, a long-standing  campaign to persuade to use less water has been threats to fine or reducepeople water pressure to households usingcombined more thanwith 800 litress of water a day; there has been a 30 per cent fall in average household litre household  water consumption. Power is a useful concept with which to analyse the limitations of the soci so ciet etyy-ce cent ntre red d accou account nt of gove govern rnan ance ce.. As Mich Michae aell Liste Listerr and and Davi David d Marsh Marsh (2006, 255) argue: ‘modern governance involves the state in more complex  relationships with other governmental and societal actors, but it doesn’t inevitably reduce its role or power’. Yet in talking about the faces of power there is a danger of adopting a zero-sum conception in which the power of  gove go vern rnme ment ntss is equat equated ed with with the the (r (rel elati ative ve)) powe powerle rlessn ssnes esss of inte intere rest st-g -gro roups ups,, businesses and other non-stateanactors. In our viewofpower is ‘conditional and relational’, and therefore adequate theory the state can only be produced as part of a ‘wider theory of society’ (Jessop, 2001 (Jessop,  2001)). As governments have experimented with a range of governance arrangements, the boundaries between the state and society have blurred (McLennan, 1989 (McLennan,  1989;; Cammock, 1989 Cammock,  1989;; Mitchell,  Mitchell, 1991  1991). ). This blurring does not mean that governments have forfeited the ‘ability to steer society’ (Jordan, Wurzel &  2005,,  480). Indeed a new wave of statist theorists – whose work we Zito, 2005 Zito, review rev iewed ed in Chap Chapte terr 3 – have have emph emphas asis ised ed that that go gove vern rnin ingg capa capaci city ty is a prod prod-uct both of the state’s institutional and other resources, and of the relations  it constructs with non-state actors. ‘Embedded’ states (Evans, 1992 (Evans, 1992;; 1995) are undermined close links with powerful economic actors, rely not on them. On thisby revisionist account, the ‘strong state is one with but the

political support to be strong’ (Gourevitch, 1986 (Gourevitch, 1986,, 238). As Cathie Jo Martin (1989, 191) suggests, this revised and relational statist theory suggests the need for rethinking Theda Skocpol’s definition of autonomy, ‘since in this view state elites achieve their agendas by working with private-sector groups rather than by insulating themselves from them. The autonomy  question as traditionally posed allows for neither mutuality of interests nor reciprocity of influence.’ This theme of expanding governance capacities through partnerships is endorsed by John Braithwaite (2008, 26) when he  writes that the ‘state’s ‘state’s capacity to govern is actually extended by capacities to enlist negotiation the governance capacities other actors’. Thesethrough revisionist revisionist statist approaches resonate with theofstate-centric state-centri c relationall appro tiona approach ach to gove govern rnan ance ce deve develo lope ped d in this this book book.. Gove Govern rnan ance ce throu through gh markets, associations, community engagement and, potentially at least, persuasion, requires governments to enter into exchange relationships with

 

CONCLUSION

 

non-state actors. But governance has not replaced government. This is partly because, as we demonstrated in Chapter in  Chapter 5, 5,  the total amount of  governance has risen. Governance through markets, associations and community engagement has increased, but so too has governance through hierarchy. It is also because governments have  enhanced  their capacity  to achieve their goals by developing closer governance relationships with non-state actors. Finally, governance has not replaced government because governme gov ernments nts are not simply actors in governanc governancee relationshi relationships. ps. They also metagovern those arrangements by overseeing, steering and coordinating  them; selecting and supporting the key participants; mobilising resources; ensuring that wider systems of governance are operating fairly and efficiently; and taking prime carriage of democracy and accountability issues. This is why existing accounts which encourage us to think about a spectrum of possible governance arrangements running from society-centred to state-centred are flawed. By seeing government as one point on a governance ernan ce continuum, we lose sight of the integral role governments governments play in all  governance  governance relationships and the strength that governments potentially  derive from their relationships with non-state actors. Pre reci cise sely ly beca because use it has beco become me al alll-pe perva rvasiv sive, e, the term term gove govern rnan ance ce attracts suspicion. As Guy Peters (2000, 35) observes, ‘the real danger is that governance becomes meaningless and a tautology; something happened and therefore governance occurred’. It is true that governance has been defined in many different ways. But this is true of just about any  interesting concept in the social sciences – including, of course, terms like democracy, power and justice. In this book we have defined governance as the tools, strategies and relationships used by governments governments to help govern, and identified a number of different modes of governance. Our state-centric relational approach offers a useful way of understanding the

191

contemporary importance of the state, the adaptations of the state in the face of new policy challenges, and the ways in which states across the world are attempting to enhance their governing capacities.

 

Notes

5 GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE THROUGH THROUGH PERSU PERSUASION ASION 1 The World World V Values alues Survey – cited in Table Table 2.3 – asks respondents how much confidence they they have have in majo majorr comp compan anie iess as we well ll as in go gove vern rnme ment ntss an and d pu publ blic ic serva servant nts. s. Peo eopl plee in the the United States, States, Japan and South Africa have more confidence in major companies than in government. In the United States 53% of respondents had either ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in major companies and only 37% the same level of confidence in government in 1999. Yet people in most OECD countries trust government more than companies. The most striking result is for Iceland, where 70% have confidence in the government but only 39% have confidence in major companies. At the time of writing  it is unclear how the implosion of the Icelandic economy caused by the global credit crisis will affect trust. The Icelandic prime minister’s reported comments that ‘there will always be fish’ seem unlikely to inspire confidence. 2 On 19 February February 2001 a vet working at an abattoir abattoir in Essex reported reported a suspected suspected case of foot-and-mouth disease to the State Veterinary Service, which rolled out contingency  pl plan anss requ requir irin ingg th thee slau slaugh ghte terr of anim animal alss on infe infect cted ed farm farms, s, a ban ban on all all an anim imal al move moveme ment ntss ne near ar infe infect cted ed fa farm rms, s, an and d th thee trac tracin ingg of ‘da dang nger erou ouss co cont ntac acts ts’. ’. Over Over the the next next 221 da days ys mo more re than 2000 animals contracted the disease in the United Kingdom, and over four million  were slaughtered slaughtered to limit its spread. As the crisis developed, the central argumen argumentt became

 whether the policy of slaughter should be abandoned in favour of preventive vaccination. 3 In his his most most re rece cent nt work work Put utna nam m has has de dete tect cted ed si sign gnss of a dr dram amat atic ic turn turnar arou ound nd in Am Amer eric ican an social attitudes. Research indicates that the generation of Americans currently in their teens and twenties – whose attitudes, it is suggested, may have been most affected by  9/11 – will be the most engaged citizens for over 60 years. The evidence is that electoral pa parti rtici cipa pati tion on am amon ongg th this is grou group p is incr increa easi sing ng an and d that that co colle llege ge stud studen ents ts ar aree mo more re in inte tere rest sted ed in talking about and taking part in politics ( Economist , 10 July 2008).

6 GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE THROUGH THROUGH MARKETS AND C CONTRACTS ONTRACTS 1 In the case of priva privatis tisati ation on see Megg Meggins inson on & Ne Nette tterr,   2001; 2001;  Kikeri, Nells & Shirley, 1992; and OECD, 2005a. Assessments of the savings accrued through contracting-out Lerner, 1995  1995;;  and Lavery, 1999 Lavery,  1999.. can be found in Mueller, 2003 Mueller,  2003,,  373–80; Miranda & Lerner,

192

 

NOTES TO PAGES 122–72

 

Debates on the performance of public–private partnerships can be found in English, 2005;  Akintoye, Beck & Hardcastle, 2003; and Freeman, 2003 2005; Freeman,  2003..  For an introduction to  writing on the economic consequences of globalisation see Brady Brady,, Beckfield & Zhao, Wade, 2005  2005.. 2007; Stiglitz, 2002 Stiglitz, 2002;;  and, for developing countries, Wade, 2 St Stat ates es have have not not al alwa ways ys su succ ccee eede ded d in su supp ppre ress ssin ingg ille illega gall mark market ets. s. At a re rece cent nt Wor orld ld Healt ealth h Organization conference, conference, one participant reported that in some remote Pa Pakistani kistani villages up to half of the residents had sold one kidney at a going rate of around $2500 ( USA Today , 30 March 2007). 7 GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE THROUGH THROUGH COMM COMMUNITY UNITY ENGAGEM ENGAGEMENT ENT 1 Pa Participa rticipation tion in Athe Athenian nian democracy democracy was in other resp respects ects limited. limited. As well as women, slaves and those lacking in property were excluded from the democratic process. 8 GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE THROUGH THROUGH ASSOCIA ASSOCIATIONS TIONS 1 ISO is not an acronym. acronym. Becau Because se the acro acronym nym for ‘Interna ‘Internationa tionall Orga Organisat nisation ion for StanStandardisation’ would vary in different languages, its founders chose ISO, derived from the Greek  isos   isos , meaning ‘equal’.

193

 

Bibliography

 Abel, T. D. and Stephan, M. (2000), ‘The Limits of Civic Environmentalism’, American 614–28.. Behavioural Behaviour al Scientist , 44, 614–28  Acevedo, B. andSector’, Common, R. Management (2006), ‘Governa ‘Governance nce, 8, and the Managem Management ent of Networ Networks ks in the Public  Public Review  395–414 395–414. .  Akintoye, A., Beck, M., and Hardcastle, C. (2003), Public–Private Partnerships: Managing  Risks and Opportunities  (Oxford:  (Oxford: Blackwell).  Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996), ‘Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries – Composition and Macroeconomic Effects’,  IMF Working Papers , 96/70 (Washington, DC: IMF).  Alesina, A. and Summers, L. (1993), ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroecono Macroeconomic mic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , 25, 151–62.  Allswang, J. (2000),  The Initiative and Referendum in California, 1898–1998   (Stanford University Press).  Alvesson, M. and Sveningsson, S. (2008), Organizational Culture: Cultural Change Work in  (London:  Amin,Progress  A. and (London: Hausner, Routledge). J. (eds) (1997), Bey Beyond ond Mar Market ket and Hierarch Hierarchy: y: Inte Intera ractive ctive Governa Governance  nce   (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). and Social Complexity  (Cheltenham:  Amin, A. and Thomas, D. (1996), ‘The Negotiat Negotiated ed Economy: State and Civic Institutions in Denmark’, Economy and Society , 25, 255–81 255–81..  Andersen, H. (2004), ‘Governance and Regime Politics in Copenhagen’, Eurez Lecture 16 (University of Copenhagen, Department of Geography).  Anderson, K. and Winters, A. (2008),  The Challenge of Reducing International Trade and 

 Migration  Migra tion Barriers  (Copenhagen:  (Copenhagen: Consensus Project).  Arnstein, S. (1969), ‘A Ladder of Participat Participation’, ion’, Journal of the American Institute of Planners , 35, 216–24.  Arnull, A. and Wincott, D. (2003),  Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford University Press).  Arrow, K. and Debreu, G. (1954), ‘Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy’, Econometrica , 22, 265–90.

194

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 Atkinson, M. and Coleman, W. (1989), ‘Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy  Policy  Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies’,  British Journal of Political Science , 19, 47–67.  Australian National National Audit Office (2003),  Management of the Detention Centre Contracts  (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).  Avant,  Ava nt, D. (2005), The Market for Forc  (Washington: Force: e: Private Security and Political Change  (Washington: George Washington University).  Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992), Responsive Regulation  (Oxford University Press). Bache, I. (2000), ‘Government Within Governance: Steering Economic Regeneration Policy Networks in Yorkshire and Humberside’,  Public Administration, 78, 575–92. —— (2003), ‘Governing Through Governance: Education Policy Control under New  Labour’, Political Studies , 51, 300–14. —— and Flinders, M. (eds) (2005), Multi-Lev  (Oxford University University Press). Multi-Level el Gove Governance  rnance  (Oxford Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. (1962), ‘The Two Faces of Power’,  American Political Science  Review , 56, 941–52. —— (1963), ‘Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework’, American Political  Science Review , 57, 641–51. Baker, W. W. (1984), ‘The Social Structur Structuree of a National Securities Market’, American Journal 

of Sociology , 89, 775–811.

Baldwin, R. (2004), ‘The New Punitive Regulation’,  Modern Law Review , 67, 351–83. Barbe Ba rber, r, B. (1984) (1984),, Stron Strongg Dem Democr ocracy acy:: Partici articipat patory ory Poli olitic ticss for a New New Age (Berkeley: (Berkeley: Univ University  ersity  of California Press). Barl Ba rlet ett, t, W. and and Le Gra rand nd,, J. (1 (199 993) 3),,   Quasi-Ma Quasi-Market rketss and Social Social Policy   (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Barra Ba rrados dos,, M. M.,, Mayne Mayne,, J. and Wilem Wileman, an, T. (20 (2000) 00),, ‘Accou ‘Accounta ntabil bility ity for Collec Collectiv tivee Pr Progr ogramm ammee Delivery Arrangements in Canada’s Federal Government: Some Consequences of  Sharing the Business of Government’, International Review of Administrative Sciences , 66, 495–551. Barroso, M. (2008), ‘Globalization and Europe: Prospering in the New Whirled Order.  Address to the American Chamber of Commerce to the Europea European n Union’, Brussels, 28 February 2008. Barry, B. (1989), ‘Is it Better to be Powerful than Lucky?’, in B. Barry,  Democracy, Power   (Oxford: Clarendon Press). and Justice: Essays in Political Theory  (Oxford: —— and Hardin, R. (eds) (1982),  Rational Man and Irrational Society?  (London:  (London: Sage). Bartle, I. and Vass, P. (2007), ‘Self-Regulation within the Regulatory State: Towards a New  Regulatory Paradigm’, Paradigm’, Public Administration, 85, 885–905. Bartley, T. (2003), ‘Certifying Forests and Factories: State, Social Movements and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields’,  Politics and Society , 31, 453–64. Bartos, S. (2006),  Against the Grain: The AWB Scandal and Why it Happened   (Sydney:

195

UNSW Press). Basinger, S. and Hallerberg, M. (2004), ‘Re-modeling the Competition for Capital: How  Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom’,  American Political Science Review , 98, 261–76. Beck, U. (1992),  Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity  (London:  (London: Sage). Beeson, M. and Bell, S. (2009), ‘The G20 and International Economic Governance: Hegemony,, Collectivism or Both?’, Global Governance  Hegemony Governance , 15, 67–86.

 

196

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bell, S. (1989), ‘State Strength and Capitalist Weakness: Manufacturing Capital and the Tariff Board’s Board’s Attack on McEwenism’, McEwenism’,   Australian Journal of Political Science , 24, 23–38. —— (1995), ‘Between the Market and the State: The Role of Business Associations in Public Policy: Evidence from Australia’,  Comparative Politics , 28, 25–53. ——  Choice: (Oxford New University Press). Economy  (Oxford —— (1997), (2002), Ungoverning ‘The Limits the of Rational Institutionalism in the Test Bed of  Central Banking Politics in Australia’,  Political Studies , 50, 477–96. —— (2004a),  Australia’s Money Mandarins: The Reserve Bank and the Politics of Money  (Cambridge University Press). —— (2004b), ‘Appropriate Policy Knowledge and Institutional and Governance Implications’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 63, 22–30. —— (2005), ‘How Tight Are the Policy Constraints? The Policy Convergence Thesis, Institutionally Situated Actors and Expansionary Monetary Policy in Australia’,  New  Political Po litical Economy , 10, 67–92. —— (2008a), ‘A Victim of its Own Success: Internationalization, Neo-liberalism and Organisational Involution at the Business Council of Australia’,  Politics and Society , 34, 543–70. ——Council (2008b (2008b), ),of‘The ‘Th e Lim Limits its  Polity  of St Stati atism: Explai lainin ningg Busin Business ess Col Collec lectiv tivee Ac Actio tion n at the Bu Busin siness ess Australia’, , sm: 40, Exp 464–87. —— and Park, A. (2006), ‘The Problematic Metagovernance of Networks: Water Reform in New South Wales’, Journal of Public Policy , 26, 63–83. Bell, S. and Quiggin, J. (2008), ‘The Limits of Markets and the Politics of Water Management in Rural Australia’, Environmental Politics  (forthcoming).  (forthcoming). Bell, Be ll, S. and and Wan anna na,, J. (1 (199 992) 2),, Busi Businessness-Go Governm vernment ent Rela Relations tions in Austra Australia  lia (Sy (Sydney: dney: Har Harcourt court Brace Jovanovich Group). Bellamy, R. and Castiglione, D. (1997), ‘Constitutionalism and Democracy – Political Theory and the American Constitution’,  British Journal of Political Science , 27, 595– 618. Bemelmans-Videc, M., Rist, R. and Vedung, E. (eds) (1998),  Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments and their Evalua Evaluation tion (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers). Beny Be nyon on, and and Ed Edwa ward rds, s, A. New (1 (199 999) 9),, ‘C ‘Com ommu muni nity Go Gove vern rnan ance ceGovernance  of Cr Crim imee   (London: Cont Contro rol’ l’,, in ,G.J. Stoker (ed.),  The Management oftyBritish Local Macmillan). Berg, C. (2008),  The Growth of Australia’s Regulatory State: Ideology, Accountability and the   (Melbourne: Institute of Public Affairs).  Mega-Regulators   Mega-Re gulators  (Melbourne: Berger, S. and Dore, R. (eds) (1996),  National Diversity and Global Capitalism  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Berk, G. and Schneiberg, M. (2005), ‘Varieties   in  Capitalism, Varieties   of   Association: Collaborative Learning in American Industry, 1900–1925’,  Politics and Society , 33, 46–87. Bernstein, S. (2005), ‘Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance’,  Journal of Inter-

national Law and International Relations , 1, 39–66. Bernstein Bern stein,, W. (2008) (2008),, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World (N (New ew York: Atlantic Atlantic Monthly Bess Be sson on, , S. and anPress). d Mar arti ti,, J. (eds (eds)) (2 (200 006) 6),,   Delibe Delibera rativ tivee De Democ mocra racy cy and its Discon Disconten tents  ts  (Cheltenham: Ashgate).

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Bevir, M. (2002), ‘A Decentered Theory of Governance’, in H. Bang (ed.),  Governance, Governmentality Gove rnmentality,, and Community  (Manchester  (Manchester University Press). —— (ed.) (2007), Public Governance : Volume 1  (London: Sage). —— and Rhodes, R. (2003),  Interpreting British Governance  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Routledge). —— and —— (2006), ‘Interpretive Approaches to British Government and Politics’, British Politics , 1, 84–112. Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2008), ‘Decentred Theory, Change and Network Governanc na ncee’, in E. So Sore rens nsen en an and d J. Torfin orfing. g. (eds (eds), ), Theo Theories ries of Demo Democr cratic atic Networ Networkk Go Governa vernance  nce  (London: Palgr Palgrave). ave). Birch, A. (1984), ‘Overload, Ungovernability and Delegitimation: The Theories and the British Case’, British Journal of Political Science , 14, 136–56 136–56.. Bishop Bis hop,, P. and Davis, Davis, G. (20 (2002) 02),, ‘M ‘Mapp apping ing Pu Public blic Part artici icipat pation ion in Polic olicyy Cho Choice ices’, s’,  Australian  Austr alian Journal of Public Administration, 6, 14–29. Blair, T. (2006), ‘The Future of Europe’, speech, 2 February 2006, http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page9003.asp Blinder, A. (1996), ‘Central Banking in a Democracy: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’, Economic Quarterly , 82, 1–14. Block, F. (1980), ‘Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects’, in R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds),  The Socialist Register  (London:  (London: Merlin Press). Blok, A. (2007), ‘Experts on Public Trial: On Democratizing Expertise Through a Danish Consensus Conference Conference’,’, Public Understanding of Science , 16, 163–82 163–82.. Bloomfield, P. (2006), ‘The Challenging Business of Long-Term Public–Private Partnerships: Reflections on Local Experience’,  Public Administration Review , 66, 400–11 400–11.. Blyth, M. (2002),  Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the  Twentieth Century  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Borkley, P. and Leveque, F. (1998), Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Protection in the  European Union (Paris: OECD). Borzel, T. (1999), ‘Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain’,  Journal of Common Market Studies , 37, 573–96 573–96.. Borzel, T. A. and Panke, D. (2008), ‘Network Governance: Effective and Legitimate?’, in E. Sorensen and J.Torfing (eds), Theories of Democratic Network Governance  (London:  (London: Palgrave). Botter Bot terill, ill, L. (2005) (2005),, ‘Poli ‘Policy cy Change Change and Netwo Network rk Termina erminatio tion: n: The Role Role of Farm Groups in Agricultural Policy Making’,  Australian Journal of Political Science   40, 207–219. Bott Bo ttom omor ore, e, T. (1 (198 989) 9),, ‘M ‘Max ax Weber eber an and d th thee Capi Capita tali list st Stat State’ e’,, in G. Dunc Duncan an (ed. (ed.), ), Democracy  and the Capitalist State  (Cambridge  (Cambridge Unive University rsity Press). Bovens, M. and Hart, P. (1996), Understanding Policy Fiascos  (London:   (London: Transaction). Bowden, M. (2001),  Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw  (New   (New York: Simon & Schuster) Boxe Bo xela laar ar,, I. I.,, Paine aine,, M. an and d Beil Beilin in,, R. (2 (2006 006), ), ‘Com ‘Commu muni nity ty En Enga gage geme ment nt an and d Pub ubli licc Admi Adminnistration: Of Silos, Overlays and Technologies of Government’,  Australian Journal of   Public Administration, 65, 113–26 113–26.. Boyne Bo yne,, G. (20 (2000) 00),, ‘Ex ‘Exter ternal nal Regula Regulatio tion n and Best Best Valu aluee in Loc Local al Gover Governme nment’ nt’,, Pub Public lic Money  Money 

197

and Management , 20, 7–12. Bradf Br adfor ord, d, N. (19 (1998) 98),, ‘Pros ‘Prospec pects ts for Ass Associ ociati ative ve Go Gover verna nance nce:: Lesson Lessonss fro from m On Ontar tario, io, Canada’, Politics and Society , 26, 539–73 539–73..

 

198

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brady, D., Beckfield. J. and Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2005), ‘Economic Globalisation and the  Welfare  W elfare State State in Affluent Democracies: 1975–2001’, A  American merican Sociological Review , 70, 921–48. Brady, D., Beckfield, J. and Zhao, W. (2007), ‘The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies’, Annual Review of Sociology , 33, 313–34. Braithwaite, J. (2008), Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). —— and Drahos, P. (2000), Global Business Regulation (Cambridge Unive University rsity Press). Brewer, G. and DeLeon, P. (1983),   The Foundations of Policy Analysis   (Pacific Grove: Brooks). Brewer, G., Selden, S. and Facer, R. (2000), ‘Individual Conceptions of Public Service Motivation’,  Public Administration Review , 60, 254–64. Britta Bri ttan, n, S. (19 (1975) 75),, ‘Th ‘Thee Eco Econom nomic ic Con Contra tradic dictio tions ns of De Democ mocrac racy’, y’, Bri British tish Journal ournal of Politic olitical  al  Science , 5, 129–59. Brown, T. and Potoski, M. (2004), ‘Managing the Public Service Market’,  Public Administration Review , 64, 656–68. Bruner Bru ner,, C. and Abd Abdela elal, l, R. (20 (2005) 05),, ‘To ‘To Judg udgee Lev Leviat iathan han:: Sover Sovereig eign n Cr Credi editt Rat Rating ings, s, Natio National nal Law, and the World Economy’, Journal of Public Policy , 25, 191–217. Bruun, J. (2005), ‘Citizen Projects and Consensus Building at the Danish Board of Technology: On Experiments in Democracy’, Acta Sociologia , 48, 221–35. Bucha Bu chanan nan,, J. (1997) (1997),, ‘Th ‘Thee Ba Balan lanced ced Bu Budge dgett Ame Amendm ndment ent:: Cla Clarif rifyin yingg the Arg Argume uments nts’, ’, Public  Choice , 90, 117–38. —— (1999), ‘Politics without Romance’, in  The Collected Works of James Buchanan,  vol. 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty  (Indianapolis:  (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund). —— and Wagner, R. (1977),  The Consequences of Mr Keynes  (London:  (London: IEA). Budd Bu dd,, L. and and Harr Harris is,, L. (2 (200 008) 8),,   E-Gove E-Governance rnance:: Managing Managing or Governi Governing?  ng?   (London: Routledge). Bull, H. (1977),  The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Burney, E. (2005), Making People Behave: Anti-Social Behaviour, Politics and Policy  (Devon:  (Devon:  Willan Publishing) Burns, J. and Sorenson, G. (1999),  Dead Centre: Clinton–Gore Leadership and the Perils of  

 Moderation  Moder ation (New York: Scribner). Busby, J. (2007), ‘Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral  Action in Internation International al Politics’, International Studies Quarterly , 51, 247–75 247–75.. Business Council of Australia (1999),  Avoiding Boom/Bust: Macroeconomic Reform for a  Globalised Economy  (Melbourne:  (Melbourne: BCA). Butler, D., Adonis, A. and Travers, T. (2004),  Failure in British Government: The Politics of   the Poll Tax  (Oxford  (Oxford Unive University rsity Press). Caldart, C. C. and Ashford, N. A. (1999), ‘Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy’,  Harvard  Environmental Law Review , 23, 141–202. Callaghan, G. and Wistow, G. (2006), ‘Publics, Patients, Citizens, Consumers? Power and Decision Making in Primary Health Care’,   Public Administration, 84, 583– 601.

Cammock, P. (1989), Bringing the State Back In ,  British Journal of Political Science , 19, 261–90.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Campbell, J. (2004), Institutional Change and Globalization  (Princeton University Press). Caplan, B. (2007),  The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies  (Princeton University Press). Capoccia, G. (2002), ‘Anti-system Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment’,  Journal of Theoretical Politics , 14, 9–35. Cashore, B. (2002), ‘Legitimacy and the Privatisation of Environmental Governa Governance: nce: How  Non-State Non-S tate Market Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule Making Authority’, Governance , 15, 503–29. Castells, M. (1996),  The Rise of the Network Society  (Oxford:  (Oxford: Blackwell). Castles, F. (2004),  The Future of the Welfare State  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). —— (ed.) (2007), The Disappearing State? Retrenchment Realities in an Age of Globalisation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Cawson, A. (1986), Corporatism and Political Theory  (Oxford:  (Oxford: Blackwell). Cerny, P. (1995), ‘Globalisation and the Logic of Collective Action’,  International Organisation, 49, 595–625. Chambers, S. (2001), ‘Constitutional Referenda and Democratic Deliberation’, in M. Mendelsohn and A. Parkin (eds), Referendum Democracy  (London:  (London: Palgrave). Palgrave). Cherry, J. (2005), ‘Big Deal or Big Disappointment?: The Continuing Evolution of the South Korean Developmental State’, Pacific Review , 18, 327–54. Chhotray, V. and Stoker, G. (2009),  Governance Theory: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Christiano, T. T. (2004), ‘Is Normative Rational Choice Theory Self-Defeating?’, Ethics , 115, 122–41. Christou, G. and Simpson, S. (2006), ‘The Internet and Public–Private Governance in the European Union’, Journal of Public Policy , 26, 43–61. Cini, M. (2003), European Union Politics  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Cioffi, J. (2006), ‘Building Finance Capitalism: The Regulatory Politics of Corporate Governance Reform in the United States and Germany’, in J. Levy (ed.),  The State  after Statism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press). Clegg, D. and Clasen, J. (2007), ‘Levels and Levers of Conditionality: Measuring Change  within Welfare States’, in J. Clasen and N. Siegel (eds),  Investigating Welfare State   (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Change  (Cheltenham: Coen, D. (1997), ‘The Evolution of the Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union’,  Journal of European European Public Po Policy  licy , 4, 91–108. —— and Thatcher, M. (2005), ‘The New Governance of Markets and Non-Majoritarian Regulators’, Governance , 18, 329–346. Cole,, D. H. and Grossma Cole Grossman, n, P. Z. (1999) (1999),, ‘Whe ‘When n is Command Command and Cont Control rol Efficien Efficient? t? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative advantage of Alternative Regulatory  Regimes for Environmental Protection’,  Wisconsin Law Review , 887–938. Collins, J., Thomas, G., Willis, R. and Wilsdon, J. (2003),  Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Influencing Public Behaviour for Environmental Goals  (London:  (London: Demos). Connell, D. (2007), Water Politics in the Murray–Darling Basin (Sydney: Federation Press). Conroy, M. (2007),  Branded! How the ‘Certification Revolution’ is Transforming Global   (Galbriola Island: New Society). Corporations  (Galbriola Considine, M. (2003), ‘Governance and Competition: The Role of Non-profit Organisations in the Delivery of Public Services’,  Australian Journal of Political Science , 38, 63–77.

199

 

200

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—— and Lewis, J. (2003), ‘Bureaucracy, Network, or Enterprise? Comparing Models of  Governance in Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand’, Public Administration Review , 63, 131–40. Conw Co nway ay,, P. and and Ni Nico cole lett tti, i, G. (2 (200 006) 6),, ‘Pro ‘Produ duct ct Mark Market et Re Regu gula lati tion on in the the Non on-Manufacturing Sectors of OECD Countries: Measurement and Highlights’, Economics Department Working Papers No. 530 (Paris: OECD). Cowhey, P. and Richards, J. (2006), ‘Building Global Service Markets: Economic Structure and State Capacity’, in J. Levy (ed.), The State After Statism: New State Activities in the   Age of Liberalisation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Craig, A. and Vanclay, F. (2005), ‘Questioning the Potential of Deliberativeness to Achieve “Acceptable” Natural Resource Management Decisions’, in R. Eversole and J. Martin (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development  (London:  (London: Ashgate). Craig, C. and McCann, J. (1978), ‘Assessing Communication Effects on Energy Conservation’, Journal of Consumer Research, 5, 82–8. Crawford, A. (2006), ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State?’,  Theoretical  Criminology , 10, 449–79. Crenson, M. (1971),  The Un-politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision Making in  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). the Cities  (Baltimore: Crouch, C. and Dore, R. (1990),  Corporatism and Accountability: the Role of Organized  Interests in British Public Life  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Crozier, M., Huntington, S. P. and Watanuki, J. (eds) (1975),  The Crisis of Democracy  (New York University Press). Culpepper, P. D. (2001), ‘Employers, Public Policy and the Politics of Decentralised Cooperation in Germany and France’, in P. A. Hall and D. Soskice (eds),  Varieties of   Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Cunningham, N. and Grabosky, P. (1998),   Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental   (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Policy  (Oxford: Cunningham, N. and Rees, J. (1997), ‘Industry Self regulation: An Institutional Perspective’, Law and Policy , 19, 363–414. Curtis, A. and Lockwood, M. (2000), ‘Landcare and Catchment Management in Australia: Lessons for State-S State-Sponsored ponsored Community Participation’, Society and Natural Resources , 13, 61–73. Cutler, C. A. (2002), ‘Private International Regimes and Inter-firm Cooperation’, in R. B. Hall Ha ll and and T. J. Bi Bier erst stek eker er (eds (eds), ), The Emerg Emergenc encee of Pr Priva ivate te Au Autho thorit rityy in Globa Globall Go Gover vernan nance  ce  (Cambridge University Press). Cutle Cu tler, r, C. (20 (2006) 06),, ‘Tran ‘Transna snatio tional nal Bu Busin siness ess Civ Civiliz ilizati ation, on, Corpo Corporat ration ions, s, and the Pr Priva ivatiz tizati ation on of Global Governance’, in C. May. (ed.),  Global Corporate Power  (Boulder:   (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). —— Haufler, V. and Porter, T. (eds) (1999),   Private Authority in International Politics  (New York: SUNY Press). Dahl, R. (1956), A Preface to Democratic Theory  (University  (University of Chicago Press). —— (1957), ‘The Concept of Power’,  Behavioural Science , 2, 201–15. —— (1961),  Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City  (New Haven: Yale University Press). —— (1974), Polyarchy  Polyarchy:: Participation and Opposition  (New Haven: Yale University Press). Damgaard, Damgaar d, B. (2006), ‘Do Policy Networks Lead to Network Governance?’, Public Administration, 84, 673–91.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Danziger, R. (1997), ‘HIV Prevention in Hungary’,  Health Policy , 40, 231–6. Darnall, N. and Carmin, J. (2005), ‘Greener and Cleaner? The Signalling Accuracy of U.S. Voluntary Environmental Programs’, Policy Sciences , 38, 71–90. Davies, J. S. (2000), ‘The Hollowing-Out of Local Democracy and the “Fatal Conceit” of  Governi Go verning ng Without Without Governme Government’, nt’, Bri Britis tishh Jour ournal nal of Politic oliticss and In Inter ternat nation ional al Relat Relation ions s , 2, 414–28. Davis, G. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2000), ‘From Hierarchy to Contracts and Back Again: Refo Re form rmin ingg the th Aust Austra ralia lian n Public ublic Servi Se rvice ce’, in M. Keat Keatin ing, g, J. Wan anna na an and d P. Welle ellerr (eds (eds), ),  (Sydney:  (Sydney: Allen &’, Unwin). Institutions onethe Edge  Deacon, D. and Golding, P. (1994),   Taxation and Representation: The Media, Political   (London: John Libbey). Communication and the Poll Tax  (London: De Bruijn, H. and Dicke, W. (2006), ‘Strategies for Safeguarding Public Values in Liberalized Utility Sectors’, Sectors’, Public Administration, 84, 717–35 717–35.. De Hart, J. and Dekker, P. (1999), ‘Civic Engagement and Volunteering in the Netherlands’, in J. Van Deth, K. Mraffi, K. Newton and P. Whiteley (eds),  Social Capital and   (London: Routledge). European Democracy  (London: DeLeon, DeLe on, P. (1999) (1999),, ‘The Miss Missing ing Link Revis Revisited: ited: Cont Contempor emporary ary Implemen Implementati tation on Research Research’,’, Policy Po licy Studies Review , 16, 31–8. DELG DE LG (Dep (Depar artm tmen entt of th thee Envir Environ onme ment nt and and Loca Locall Gove Govern rnme ment nt)) (2002 (2002), ),   Plastic  Bag Environmental Levy  

DellaIreland4mar02.htm Porta, D. (2001), ‘A .Judges’ Revolution? Political Corruption and the Judiciary in Italy’,  European Journal of Political Political Resear Research ch, 39, 1–21. Delmas, M. and Keller, A. (2005), ‘Free Riding in Voluntary Environmental Programs: The Case of the U.S. EPA WasteWise Program’,  Policy Sciences , 38, 91–106. Dika, S. and Singh, L. (2002), ‘Applications of Social Capital in Educational Literature: A  Critical Synthesis’, Review of Educational Studies , 72, 31–60. Dolsak, N. and Ostrom, E. (eds) (2003),  The Commons in the New Millenium: Challenges  and Adaptation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). Doner, F. D. and Schneider, B. R. (2000), ‘Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More than Others’,  Business and Politics , 2, 261–88. Dover, B. (2008),  Rupert’s Adventures in China: How Murdoch Lost a Fortune and Found a    (New York: Random House). Wife  (New Dowding, K. (1995), ‘Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network   Approach’, Political Studies , 43, 136–58 136–58.. Doyle, T. (2000), Green Power: The Environmental Movement in Australia  (Sydney:  (Sydney: UNSW  Press). Drezner, D. (2007),   All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes  (Princeton University Press). Dryzek, J. (2000), Deliberative Democracy Democracy and Beyond  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). —— (2001), ‘Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy’,  Political Theory , 29, 651–99. Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., and Tinkler, J. (2006),  Digital Era Governance: IT   (Oxford University Press). Corporations, Corpora tions, the State and E-Government  (Oxford Duram, L. A. and Brown, K. G. (1998), ‘Assessing Public Participation in US Watershed Planning Initiatives’, 455–67.  Society and Natural Resources  Resource s ,  (Oxford Dyson, K. (1980),  12, (Oxford University Press).  The State Tradition in Western Europe 

201

 

202

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Eberlein, B. and Kerwer, D. (2004), ‘New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective’, Journal of Common Market Studies , 42, 121–42 121–42.. Edelenbos, J. (2005), ‘Institutional Implications of Interactive Governance: Insight from Dutch Practice’, Governance , 18, 111–34. Elgie, R. (2006), ‘Why Do Governments Delegate Authority to Quasi-Autonomous Quasi-Autonomous Agencies? The Case of Independent Administrative Agencies in France’,  Governance , 19, 207–27. Elster, J. (1979),  Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). —— (1983),  Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality  (Cambridge   (Cambridge University  Press). —— (19 (1989) 89),, Sol University  Solomo omonic nic Ju Judgm dgment ents: s: St Studi udies es in the Lim Limits its of Rat Ration ionali ality  ty (Cambridge University  Press). —— (19 (1998) 98),, ‘De ‘Delib libera eratio tion n and Consti Constitut tution ion Ma Makin king’ g’,, in J. Els Elster ter (ed (ed.), .), Delibera Deliberative tive Democ (Cambridge University Press). racy  (Cambridge English, L. (2005), ‘Using Public–Private Partnerships to Achieve Value for Money in the Delivery of Healthcare in Australia’, International Journal of Public Policy , 1, 91–121. Epste Ep stein, in, P. (19 (1997) 97),, ‘Be ‘Beyo yond nd Policy olicy Com Commu munit nity: y: French rench Agricu Agricultu lture re and the GA GATT’ TT’,, Journal  of European Public Policy , 4, 355–72. Etzioni, A. (1995), The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian  Agenda  (London:  (London: Fonta Fontana). na). European Parliament (2002),  Foot and Mouth Disease: 2001 Crisis  . Evans, P. (1992), ‘The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy  and Structural Change’, in S. Hoggard and R. Kaufman (eds), The Politics of Economic   Adjustment  (Princeton  (Princeton University Press). —— (1995), Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton University Press). —— (1997), ‘The Eclipse of the State? Reflections Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalisation’, World Politics , 50, 62–87. —— and Rauch, J. (1999), ‘Bureaucracy and Economic Growth’,  American Sociological  Review , 64, 748–65. Fairbrother, M. (2007), ‘Making Neo-liberalism Possible: The State’s Organization of  Business Support for NAFTA in Mexico’,  Politics and Society , 35, 265–300. Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. (eds) (2003),  The Politics of Europeanization  (Oxford University Press). Feigenbaum, H., Samuels, R. and Weaver, R. (1993), ‘Innovation, Coordination, and Imple Im plemen mentat tation ion in Energy Energy Policy’ olicy’,, in R. Weav eaver er and B. Rockma Rockman. n. (ed (eds), s), Do Ins Institutio titutions  ns   Matter?  (Washington,  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution). Finne Finnemor more, e, M. (1996) (1996),, Nati ationa onall Inter Interest estss in Inter Internat nation ional al Societ Society  y (It (Ithaca haca:: Cornell Cornell Un Universi iversity  ty  Press). Fischer, F. (2003),  Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices  (Oxford University Press). Fixdal, J. (1997), ‘Consensus Conferences as Extended Peer Groups’,  Science and Public  Policy , 24, 366–76. Fligstein, N. (1996), ‘Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions’, American Sociological Review , 61, 656–73.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

—— (2001), The Architecture  (Princeton University Press). Architecture of Markets  (Princeton Flinders, M. (2002), ‘Governance in Whitehall’,  Public Administration, 80, 51–75. —— (2004), ‘Distributed Public Governance in Britain’,  Public Administration, 82, 883– 909. —— (2006), ‘Public/Private: The Boundaries of the State’, in C. Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh (eds), The State: Theories and Issues  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Foley, P. and Martin, S. (2000), ‘A New Deal for the Community: Public Participation in Regeneration and Local Service Delivery’,  Policy and Politics , 28, 479–91 479–91.. Foucault, M. (1979),  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison  (Harmondsworth: Penguin). —— (1991), ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds),   The   (University of Chicago Press). Foucault Effect  (University Fredericksen, P. and London, R. (2000), ‘Disconnect in the Hollow State: The Pivotal Role of Organisational Capacity in Community-Based Development Organisation’, Public   Administration Review , 60, 230–39. Fredriksson, P. and Millimet, D. (2002), ‘Is There a California Effect in US Environmental Policymaking?’,  Regional Science and Urban Economics , 6, 737–64. Free Freeman man,, M. (20 (2003) 03),, Cr Critic itical al Choice Choices: s: The De Debat batee ov over er Publi Public–P c–Priv rivate ate Part artner nershi ships ps and Wha What t  it Means for America’s Future  (Washington,  (Washington, DC: National Council for Public–Private Partnerships). Friedman, J. (ed.) (1996),  The Rational Choice Controversy  (New   (New Haven: Yale University  Press). Friedman, T. L. (1999), The Lexus and the Olive T Tree  ree  (New   (New York: Straus & Giroux). Fung, A. (2002), ‘Making Social Markets: Dispersed Governance and Corporate Accountability’, in J. Donahue and J. Nye (eds),  Market-Based Governance   (Washington: Brookings Institution). —— and Wright, E. O. (2003),  Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Partici  (London: Verso).  patory Governance  (London: Funk, C. (2000), ‘The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and Societal Interest in Public Opinion’, Political Research Quarterly , 50, 317–42. Gains Ga ins,, F. (20 (2003) 03),, ‘Ex ‘Execu ecutiv tivee Age Agenci ncies es in Gover Governme nment: nt: The Impac Impactt of Burea Bureaucr ucrati aticc Netw Network orkss on Policy Outcomes’, Journal of Public Policy , 23, 55–79. Gale, F. (2008), ‘Global Democratic Corporatism: Earth Governance Beyond States’, Presentation to the Third Oceania Conference for International International Studies (OCIS), University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, 2–4 July. Gambetta, D. (1993),  The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer University sity Press). Gamble, A. (1998),  The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (London: Macmillan). Gandy Ga ndy,, O. (1982) (1982),, Be Beyo yond nd Age Agenda nda Se Settin tting: g: Infor Informat mation ion Subsi Subsidie diess and Publi Publicc Policy  olicy (Norwood:  Ablex). Garland, D. (1990),  Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory  (Oxford:   (Oxford: Clarendon). Garrett, G. (1998), ‘Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?’, International Organisation, 52, 787–824. Giddens, A. (1998),  The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy  (Cambridge:  (Cambridge: Polity  Press).

 

204

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

203

Gilardi, F. F. (2002), ‘Po ‘Policy licy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulato Regulatory ry Agencies:  A Comparative Empirical Analysis’, Journal of European European Public Policy  Policy , 9, 873–93. Gill, G. (2003), The Nature and Development of the Modern State  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Palgra Palgrave). ve). Gittell, R. and Vidal, A. (1998),  Community Organization: Building Social Capital as a  Development Developme nt Stra Strategy  tegy  (Thousand  (Thousand Oaks: Sage). Glasson, J., Therivel, R. and Chadwick, A. (2005),  Introduction to Environmental Impact   Assessment  (London:  (London: UCL Press). Goffman, E. (1968), Asylums  (Harmondsworth:  (Harmondsworth: Penguin). Goggin, M., Bowman, A., Lester, J., and O’Toole, L. (1990),  Implementation Theory and  Practice: Towards a Third Generation  (Glenview: Scott Foresman). Goodin, B. (ed.) (1996), The Theory of Institutional Design  (Cambridge University Press). Goodin, R. (2003), Reflective Democracy  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Goodin, R. E. and Dryzek, J. (2006), ‘Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics’, Politics and Society , 34, 219–44 219–44.. Gordon, C. (1998), ‘Why No Corporatism in the United States? Business Disorganisation and Its Consequences’, Business and Economic History , 27, 29–46. Gourevitch, P. (1986), Politics in Hard Times  (Ithaca:  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Gowan, P. (1999),  The Global Gamble  (London:  (London: Verso). —— (2 (2001 001), ), ‘Exp ‘Expla lain inin ingg th thee Amer Americ ican an Boom Boom:: Th Thee Ro Role less of “G “Glo loba balis lisat atio ion” n” an and d the the Uni nite ted d States Global Power’,  New Political Economy , 6, 359–74. Granovetter, M. (1985), ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’,  American Journal of Sociology , 91, 481–510. Green, D. and Shapiro, I. (1994),  Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory  (New   (New Haven: Yale University Press). Greer, A. (2002), ‘Policy Networks and Policy Change in Organic Agriculture: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and Ireland’,  Public Administration, 80, 453–73. Greve, C. (2004), ‘Public Sector Reform in Denmark: Organizational Transformation and Evaluation’,  Public Organization Review , 3, 1573–86. —— an and d Jes espe pers rsen en,, K. (1 (199 999) 9),, ‘New ‘New Pub ubli licc Ma Mana nage geme ment nt an and d it itss Cr Crit itic ics: s: Al Alte tern rnat ativ ivee Road Roadss to Flexible Service Delivery to Citizens?’, in L. Rouban (ed.),  Citizens and the New   (Amsterdam: IOS Press). Governance, Gove rnance, Beyond New Public Management  (Amsterdam: Grote, J. R. and Schmitter, P. C. (1999), ‘The Renaissance of National Corporatism: Unintended Side-Effect of European Economic and Monetary Union or Calculated Response to the Absence of European Social Policy?’,  Transfer , 1, 34–63. Hajer, M. (1995), The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the   (Oxford Unive University rsity Press). Policy Process  (Oxford —— (2003), ‘Policy without Polity: Policy Analysis and the Institutional Void’,  Policy  Sciences , 36, 175–95. Hall, P. (1999), ‘Social Capital in Britain’,  British Journal of Political Science , 29, 418–61. —— and Soskice, D. (eds) (2001),  Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of   Comparative Compara tive Advantage  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). —— and Tayl aylor or,, R. (19 (1996) 96),, ‘Poli ‘Politic tical al Sci Scienc encee and the Thr Three ee New New Insti Institu tutio tional nalism isms’, s’, Political  Studies , 44, 936–57. 936–57. Hall, R. and Biersteker, T. (eds) (2002),  The Emergence of Private Authority in Global   (Cambridge University Press). Governance  (Cambridge Hall, S. (1985), ‘Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al.’,  New Left Review , 151, 115–24.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

205

Halpi Ha lpin, n, D. R. (2006) (2006),, Th Thee Part artici icipat patory ory and Democr Democrat atic ic Potenti otential al and Pr Pract actice ice of  Interest Groups: Between Solidarity and Representation’,  Public Administration, 84: 919–40. Hamps Ha mpsher her-M -Monk onk,, I. and Hindm Hindmoor oor,, A. (20 (2009) 09),, ‘Ratio ‘Rational nal Ch Choic oicee and Inte Interpr rpreti etive ve Evide vidence nce:: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place?’  Political Studies  (forthcoming).  (forthcoming). Hampson, I. (1996), ‘The Accord: A Post-Mortem’,  Labour and Industry , 7, 55–77. Hansen, M. (1991), The Athenian Democr Democracy acy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Structure, Principles  and Ideology  (Oxford:  (Oxford: Blackwell). Hardin, G. (1968), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’,  Science , 162, 1243–8 1243–8.. Hass, P. (1992), ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’,  International Organisation, 46, 1–35. Haufler, V. (2006), ‘Global Governance and the Private Sector’, in C. May (ed.),  Global   (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Corporate Power  (Boulder: Hay, C. (2002),  Political Analysis  (London:  (London: Palgra Palgrave). ve). —— (2005), ‘Globalization’s Impact on States’, in J. Ravenhill (ed.),   Global Political   (Oxford University Press). Economy  (Oxford Hayek, F. (1945), Individualism and Economic Order  (London:  (London: Routledge). —— (19 (1982) 82),, La Law w, Legis Legisla latio tionn an andd Libe Libert rty: y: A New State tateme ment nt of th thee Libe Liberral Prin rinci cipl ples es of Jus usti tice  ce  and Political Economy  (London:  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Head, B. (2007), ‘Community Engagement: Participation on Whose Terms?’,  Australian  Journal of Political Science , 42, 441–54. —— and Ryan, N. (2004), ‘Can Co-Governance Work? Regional Natural Resource Management in Queensland, Australia’, Australia’, Society and Economy , 26, 361–82 361–82.. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999),   Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture  (Cambridge:  (Cambridge: Polity). Helleiner, E. (1994),  States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). the 1990s  (Ithaca: Heritier, A. (2002a), ‘New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making Without Legislating?’, in A. Heritier (ed.), Common Goods: Reinventing European and International   (Lanham: Littlefield & Roman). Governance  (Lanham: —— (2002b), ‘Public-Interest Services Revisited’,  Journal of European Public Policy , 9, 995–1019. —— (2003), ‘New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political Capacity and Policy Effectiveness’, in T. Borzel and R.Cichowski (eds),  The State of the European Union  (Oxford University Press). Hess, M. and Adams, D. (2002), ‘Knowing and Skilling in Contemporary Public Administration’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 61, 65–87. Hibbs, D. (1977), ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’,  American Political Science  Review , 71, 1467–87. Hill, C. J. and Lynn, L. E. (2005), ‘Is Hierarchical Governance in Decline? Evidence from Empirical Research’,  Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory , 15, 173–95. Hindm Hi ndmoor oor,, A. (1999) (1999),, ‘Re ‘Rent nt Seeki Seeking ng Ev Evalu aluate ated’, d’,   Journa Journall of Politic olitical al Philo Philosop sophy  hy , 7, 434–52. —— (2006a), Rational Choice  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). —— (2006b), ‘Public Choice Choice Theory’, in C. Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh (eds), The State:  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Theories and Issues  (Basingstoke:

 

206

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—— (2008), ‘Public Policy’, in P. Giddings and M. Rush (eds),  The Palgrave Review of   British Politics  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

—— (2009), Explaining Networks through Mechanisms: Vaccination, Priming and the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Crisis’,  Political Studies  (forthcoming).  (forthcoming). Hinsley, F. (1986), Sovereignty  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Hirsch, F. (1978), Social Limits to Growth (London: Routledge Kegan Paul). Hirst, P. (1994),  Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance  (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press). —— and Thompson, G. (1996),  Globalization in Question: The International Economy and   (Cambridge: Polit Polity). y). the Possibilities of Gove Governance  rnance  (Cambridge: Hirst, P. and Veit, B. (eds) (2001),  Associative Democracy: The Real Third Way  (London: Frank Cass). Hobsbawm, E. (1990),  Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Program, Myth and Reality  (Cambridge University Press). Hobson, J. (2000), The State and International Relations  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Hock Ho ckin ing, g, J. (2 (200 005) 5),, ‘Lib ‘Liber erty ty,, Secu Securit rityy an and d th thee Sta tate te’, ’, in P. Saun Saunde ders rs an and d J. Walte alterr (eds (eds), ), Ideas   (Sydney: UNSW Press). and Influence: Social Science and Public Policy in Australia  (Sydney: Hoffman, S. (1987),  Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International  Politics  (Boulder:   (Boulder: Westview Press). Holliday, I. (2000), ‘Is the British State Hollowing Out?’,  Political Quarterly , 71, 167–76 167–76.. Hood, ood, C. (1 (199 991) 1),, ‘A Pub ublic lic Ma Mana nage geme ment nt for for All All Seas Season ons? s?’, ’, Pub Public lic Administr Administration ation, 69, 69, 3– 3–19 19.. —— (2007), ‘Intellectual Obsolescence and Intellectual Makeovers: Reflections on the Tools of Government after Two Decades’, , 20, 127–44 127–44..  Governance  —— Scott, C., James, O., Jones, G. and Travers, T. (1999),  Regulation inside Government: Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police and Sleaze-Busters  (Oxford  (Oxford University University Press). House, J. D. and McGrath, K. (2004), ‘Innovative Governance and Development in the New Irela Ireland: nd: So Socia ciall Partner artnershi ship p and the In Integ tegrat rated ed Appro Approach ach’, ’, Governance , 17, 17, 29 29–5 –58. 8. Hurd, urd, I. (1999) (1999),, ‘Le ‘Legit gitima imacy cy and Autho Authorit rityy in In Inte terna rnatio tiona nall Poli olitic tics’, s’, Revi Review ew of Int Internati ernational  onal  Studies , 17, 67–85. Industry Commission (1996),  Competitive Tendering and Contracting by Public Service  (Melbourne: Australian Government Publishing Service).  Agencies   (Melbourne: Inoguchi, T. (2000), ‘Broadening the Basis of Social Capital in Japan’, in R. Putnam (ed.),   (Oxford Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society  (Oxford Universityy Press). Universit Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007),  Climate Change 2007: Mitigation.  (CamContribution of Working bridge University Press). Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC  (CamIrvin Irvin,, R. A. and and Stan Stansb sbury ury,, J. (2 (200 004) 4),, ‘Cit ‘Citiz izen en Par arti tici cipa pati tion on in Deci Decisi sion on Ma Maki king ng:: Is It wo wort rth h the Effort?’, Public Administration Review , 64, 55–65.  James, O. (2004), ‘The UK Core Executive’ Executive’ss Use of Public Service Serv ice Agreements as a Tool of  Governance’,  Public Administration, 82, 397–419 397–419..  Jayasuriya,, K. (2001), ‘Beyond Institutional Fetishism: From the Developmental to the  Jayasuriya Regulatory State’, New Political Economy , 10, 381–7.  Jessop, B. (1997), ‘The Governan Governance ce of Complexity and the Complexity of Governance Governance:: Preliminary Remarks on Some Problems and Limits of Economic Governance’, in A.  Amin and J. Hausner (eds), Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Inter Interactive active Governance and   (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Social Complexity  (Cheltenham:

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

—— (1997a), ‘Capitalism and its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance’,  Review of International Political Economy , 4, 561–81. —— (2001), ‘Bring the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections’, International Review of Sociology , 1, 149–73.

207

—— (2002), The Future of the Capitalist State  (Cambridge:  (Cambridge: Polity Press).  Johnson, C. (1995),  Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State  (New   (New York:  W.. W. Norton).  W  Joppke, C. (1993), Decentralisation of Control in Unite United d States Nuclear Energy Policy’, Political Po litical Science Quarterly , 107, 709–25.  Jordan, A. (1999), ‘The Implementat Implementation ion of EU Environmental Policy: A Policy Policy Problem  without a Political Solution?’,  Environment and Planning: Government and Policy , 17, 69–90. —— Wurzel, R. and Zito, A. (2005), ‘New Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPIs) in the European Union. From Government to Governance?’,  Political Studies , 53, 477–96.  Jordana,, J. and Levi-F  Jordana Levi-Faur, aur, D. (eds) (2004),  The Politics of Regulation  (London: Edward Elgar). Kane, J. and Bishop, P. (2002), ‘Consultation and Contest: The Danger of Mixing Modes’,  Australian  Austr alian Journal of Public Administration, 61, 87–94. Katzenstein, P. (1985),  Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). —— (2003), ‘Small States and Small States Revisited’,  New Political Economy , 8, 9–30. Kaufmann, C. (2004), ‘Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War’, International Security , 29, 5–48. Kaufmann, D. (2005), ‘10 Myths about Governance and Corruption’,  Finance and Development , 42, 41–63. Kawaba Kaw abata, ta, E. (2001) (2001),, ‘Sa ‘Sanct nction ion Pow ower er,, Juri urisdi sdicti ction, on, and Eco Econom nomic ic Policy olicy Ma Makin king: g: Explaining Expla ining Cont Contempo emporary rary Teleco elecommun mmunicat ications ions Policy in Jap Japan, an,   Governance , 14, 399–427. Kay, A. (2006),  The Dynamics of Public Policy: Theory and Evidence  (Cheltenham:  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Keating, M. (2004),  Who Rules? How Government Retains Control of a Privatised Economy  (Sydney: Federation Press). —— and Dixon, P. (1989), Making Economic Policy  (Melbourne: Longman). Policy in Australia  Australia  (Melbourne: Keele, L. (2007), ‘Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust’, American Journal of Political  Science , 51, 241–54. Keeler Kee ler,, J. (19 (1987) 87),, The TheP Politic oliticss of Neo-C Neo-Corp orpor orati atism sm in Fr Franc ance: e: Farmers armers,, theSt the State ateand and Agric Agricult ultur ural  al  Policy-Making in the Fifth Republic  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Kellogg, W. A. (1998), ‘Adopting an Ecosystem Approach: Local Variability in Remedial  Action Planning’,  Natural Resources and Environmental Issues , 11, 465–83 465–83.. Kelly, J. (2006), ‘Central Regulation of English Local Authorities: An Example of MetaGovernance?’, Public Administration, 84, 603–21. Kelly, P. (1984),  The Hawke Ascendancy: A Definitive Account of its Origins and Climax, 1975–1983  (London: Angus & Robertson). —— (1992), The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s  (Sydney:  (Sydney: Allen & Unwin). Kenworthy Kenw orthy,, L. (1997), (1997), ‘Glo ‘Globalisa balisation tion and Economic Economic Convergen Convergence’ ce’,,   Competitio Competitionn and  Change , 2, 1–64.

 

208

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Keohane, R. (2002), ‘Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States’,  Journal of Common Market Studies , 40, 743–65 743–65.. Keren, M. (2000), ‘Political Perfectionism and the “Anti-System” Party’,  Party Politics , 6, 107–16. Kernaghan, K. (1993), ‘Partnership and Public Administration Administration’,’, Canadian Public Administration, 36, 57–76.

Kerwer, D. (2002), ‘Rating Agencies: Setting a Standard for Global Financial Markets’, Economic Sociology , 3, 40–6. —— (2005), ‘Holding Global Regulators Accountable: The Case of Credit Rating Agencies’, Governance , 18, 453–75 453–75.. Kettl,Century D. (2002),  The (Baltimore: Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for Twenty-First   (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). America  Kickert, W. (1993), ‘Complexity, Governance and Dynamics: Conceptual Explorations of  Public Network Management’, in J. Kooiman (ed.),  Modern Governance  (London:   (London: Sage). Kike Ki keri ri,, S., S., Nel ells ls,, J. an and d Shir Shirle ley, y, M. (1 (199 992) 2),,   P Privat rivatisatio isation: n: The Lesso Lessons ns of Experienc Experience  e  (Washington, DC: World Bank). Kim, K. and Nofsinger, J. (2007),   Corporate Governance   (Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall). King, A. (1975), ‘Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s’,  Political Studies , 23, 162–174. —— (1988), ‘Margaret Thatcher as a Political Leader’, in R. Skidelsky (ed.),  Thatcherism (Oxford: Blackwell). Kingdon, J., (1984),  (Boston:  (Boston: Little, Brown).  Agendas, Public Ki Kirk rkpa patr trick ick, I. I.,, Kitc Kitche hene ner, r, M. Alternatives and and Whip Whipp, p,and R. (2 (200 001) 1),, Policy  ‘O ‘Out ut of Si Sigh ght, t, Ou Out t of Mi Mind nd:: Asse Assess ssin ing  g  the Impact of Markets for Children’s Residential Care’, Public Administration, 79, 49– 71. Kirzner, I. (1973),  Competition and Entrepr Entrepreneurship eneurship (University of Chicago Press). Kitschelt, H. (1986), ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Moveme Mo vements nts in Four Four Demo Democracie cracies’ s’,,   British British Journal ournal of Politic olitical al Scienc Science  e , 16, 57– 86. Kjaer, A. (2004), Governance  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Klein, B. (1996), ‘Why Hold-ups Occur: The Self-enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships’,  Economic Enquiry , 34, 444–63 444–63.. Klijn, Klij n, E. and Ko Koppe ppenja njan, n, J. (2000) (2000),, ‘Publ ‘Public ic Ma Manag nageme ement nt and Poli olicy cy Netwo Network rks: s: Foundat oundation ionss of a Network Approach to Governance’,  Public Management , 2, 135–58. Knac Kn ack, k, S. and andofKeef Ke efer er,, P. (1 (199 7),, 1251–88. ‘Doe ‘Doess So Soci cial al Ca Capi pita tall Ha Have ve an Ec Econ onom omic ic Pay-o ay-off ff?’ ?’ Quarterly   Journal Economics  , 997) 111, Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2002), ‘Private Actors and the State: Internationalization and Changing Patterns of Governa Governance’, nce’, Governance , 15, 41–63. Knoke, D. (1990),  Political Networks: The Structural Perspective  (Cambridge University  Press). —— (2001),   Changing Organizations: Business Networks in the New Political Economy  (Boulder: Westview Press). Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2005), ‘Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability’, in D. Held and M. Koenig-Arch Koenig-Archibugi ibugi (eds), Global Governance and Public Accountability  (Oxford: Blackwell).

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Kohler-Koch, Kohler-Koc h, B. and Rittberger, B. (2006), ‘The Governance T Turn urn in EU Studies’, Journal  of Common Market Studies , 44, 27–49. Kollman, K. and Prakash, A. (2002), ‘EMS-Based Environmental Regimes as Club Goods: Examining Variations in Firm-Level Adoption of ISO14001 and EMAS in UK, US and Germany’, Policy Sciences , 35, 43–67. Kooiman, Kooi man, J. (1993), (1993), ‘Soc ‘Socio-P io-Politi olitical cal Gov Governa ernance: nce: Introduct Introduction ion’’ in J. Kooi Kooiman man (ed.) (ed.),,  Modern Governance: Governance: New Government–Society Government–Society Interactions  (London:  (London: Sage). Koontz, T. M. and Johnson, E. M. (2004), ‘One Size Does fit All: Matching Breadth of 

209

Stakeholder Participation Stakeholder Participation to Watershed Group Accomplishments’, Policy Sciences , 37, 185–204. Kopp Ko ppen enja jan, n, J. F. M. (2 (200 008) 8),, ‘C ‘Con onse sens nsus us an and d Co Confl nflic ictt in Pol olic icyy Netwo etwork rkss’, in E. Sorensen and J. Torfing (eds),  Theories of Democratic Network Governance  (London:  (London: Palgrave). Krasner, S. (1984), ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’,  Comparative Politics , 16, 223–46. Kymlika, W. (2002), Contemporary Political Philosophy  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Laband, D. and Sophocleus, J. (1988), ‘The Social Cost of Rent Seeking: First Estimates’, Public Choice , 58, 269–75. Laffont, J. and Tirole, J. (1991), ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory  of Regulatory Capture’, Quarterly Journal of Economics , 106, 1089–127. Lalman, D., Oppenheimer, J. and Swistak, P. (1993), ‘Formal Rational Choice Theory: A  Cumulative Science of Politics’, in A. Finifter (ed.),  Political Science: The State of the  Discipline II  (Washington,   (Washington, DC: APSA). Lampinen, R. and Uusikyla, P. (1998), ‘Implementation Deficit – Why Member States Do Not Comply with EU Directives’,  Scandinavian Political Studies , 21, 231–51. Lavery, K. (1999), Smart Contracting for Local Government Services: Processes and Experience  (Westport: Praeger). Le Grand, J. (2003),  Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Lehmbr Leh mbruch uch,, G. and and Schmit Schmitter ter,, P. (ed (eds) s) (19 (1982) 82),, Patter atterns ns of Corpora Corporatist tist Policy olicymakin making  g (London: Sage). Levi, G. and Vetoria, M. (2002), ‘Fighting Against AIDS: the Brazilian Experience’, AIDS: Official Journal of the International AIDS Society ’,’, 16, 2373–83. Levy, J. (2006), ‘The State also Rises: The Roots of Contemporary State Activism’, in J. Levy (ed.), The State after Statism  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Lijpha Lij phart, rt, A. (1999) (1999),, Pattern atternss of Dem Democr ocracy acy:: Gove Governme rnment nt Forms orms and Perf erform ormanc ancee in Thirty Thirty-Si -Six  x    (New Haven: Yale University Press). Countries  (New Lilleker, D. (2007), Key Concepts in Political Communication  (London: Sage). Lindblom, C. (1977),  Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems  (New    (New   Y  York: ork: Basic Books). Lindvall, J. and Sebring, J. (2005), ‘Policy Reform and the Decline of Corporatism in Sweden’,  West European Politics , 28, 1057–74. Lipsky, M. (1980),  Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services  (New York: Russell Sage Foundation). Lister, M. and Marsh, D. (2006), ‘Conclusion’, in C. Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh (eds),  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). The State: Theories and Issues  (Basingstoke: Lonsdale, C. (2005), ‘Contractual Uncertainty, the Problem of Power and Public Contracting’, Journal of Public Policy , 25, 219–240.

 

210

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lopez, Lop ez, R. and Pagoula agoulatos tos,, E. (19 (1994) 94),, ‘Rent ‘Rent See Seekin kingg and the Welf elfare are Cost Cost of Trade rade Barri Barriers ers’, ’, Public Choice , 79, 149–60. Loughlin, M. and Scott, C. (1997), ‘The Regulatory State’, in P. Dunleavy. et al. (eds), Developments in British Politics 5  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Lowe, J. and Hill, E. (2005), ‘Closing the Gap Between Government and Community’, in A. Rainnie and M. Grobbelaar (eds),  New Regionalism in Australia  (Aldershot:   (Aldershot:  Ashgate). Lowi, Lo wi, T. (19 (1969) 69),, ‘Th ‘Thee Pu Public blic Phi Philos losoph ophy: y: In Inter terest est-G -Grou roup p Libera Liberalism lism’, ’, in W. Connol Connolly ly (ed (ed.), .), The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton). Lukensmeyer, C. and Torres, L. (2000),  Public Deliberation: A Manager’s Guide to Citizen

 (IBM Centre for the Business of Government). Engagement  (IBM Lukes, S. (1974),  Pow  (London: Macmillan).  Power: er: A Radical View  (London: Lundqvist, L. (2001), ‘Implementation from Above: The Ecology of Power in Sweden’s Environmental Governa Governance’, nce’, Governance , 14, 319–37. Lundsgaa Lund sgaard, rd, J. (2002), (2002),   Competi Competitio tionn and Ef Effici ficienc encyy in Publi Publicly cly Funde Fundedd Servic Services  es   (Paris: OECD). Lurie, I. (1997), ‘Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: A Green Light for the States’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 27, 73–87. Lyons, M. (2001), Third Sector: The Contribution of Non-profit and Co-operative Enterprise  in Australia  Australia  (Sydney,  (Sydney, Allen & Unwin). Mackendrick, N. (2005), ‘The Role of the State in Voluntary Environmental Reform: A  Case Study of Public Land’,  Policy Sciences , 38, 21–44. Magennis, S. (1999), ‘Immunisation and Prevention: An Up-to-Date Perspective’, in K. Booth and K. Luker (eds),  A Practical Handbook for Community Nurses  (Oxford: Blackwell). Magnette, P. (2003), ‘European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?’, Political Studies , 51, 144–60. Majone, G. (1994), ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’,  West European Politics , 17, 77–101. —— (1996), Regulating Europe  (London:  (London: Routledge). —— (1997), ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of  Changes in the Mode of Governance’,  Journal of Public Policy  17,   17, 139–67. —— (2006), ‘Agenda-Setting’, in M. Moran, M. Rein, and R. Goodin (eds),  The Oxford   (Oxford University Press). Handbook of Public Policy  (Oxford Mallin, C. (2007),  Corporate Governance  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Maloney, W., Smith, G. and Stoker, G. (2000), ‘Social Capital and Urban Governance:  Adding a More Contextualised Contextualised Top-Down Top-Down P Perspective’, erspective’, Political Studies , 48, 802–20. Maltese, J. (2003), ‘The Presidency and the News Media’, in M. Rozell (ed.),  Media Power,  Media Politics  Politics  (Lanham:  (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield). Mameli, P. (2001), ‘Splitting the Difference: Partnering with Non-Governmental Organizations to Manage HIV/AIDS Epidemics in Australia and Thailand’,  Human Rights  Review , 2, 1524–89. 1524–89. Mann, M. (1988), States, War War and Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). —— (ed.) (1990), The Rise and Decline of the Nation-State  (Oxford:  (Oxford: Blackwell). Marglin, S. (2008),   The Dismal Science: How Thinking Like an Economist Undermines   (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Community  (Cambridge,

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Mari Ma rine nett tto, o, M. (2 (200 003a 3a), ), ‘G ‘Gov over erni ning ng Be Beyo yond nd th thee Cent Centre re:: A Cr Crit itiq ique ue of the the An Angl glooGovernance Governa nce School’, Political Studies , 51, 592–608. —— (20 (2003b 03b), ), ‘Wh ‘Whoo Want antss to be an Active Active Cit Citize izen? n? The Poli olitic ticss and Pr Pract actice ice of Commu Communit nity  y  Involvement’, Sociology , 37, 103–20. Marks, G., Hooghe, L. and Blank, K. (1996), ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance’,  Journal of Common Market Studies , 34, 341–78. Markusen, A. (2003), ‘The Case Against Privatizing National Security’,  Governance , 16, 471–501. Marsh, D. (1991), ‘Privatization Under Mrs. Thatcher: A Review of the Literature’,  Public   Administration, 69, 459–80. —— (1992), The New Politics of British Trade Unionism  (London: Macmillan).

211

—— (ed.) (1998), Comparing Policy Netwo  (Buckingham: Open University Press). Networks  rks  (Buckingham: —— and Rhodes, R. (eds) (1992a),   Policy Networks in British Government   (Oxford: Clarendon). —— and —— (eds) (1992b), ‘New Directions in the Study of Policy Net Networks’, works’, European 181–205. 5.  Journal of Political Research’, 21, 181–20 —— and —— (eds) (1992c),  Implementing Thatcherite Policies: Audit of an Era  (Bucking (Buckingham: Open University Press). Marsh Ma rsh,, D., Richar Richards, ds, D. and Smith Smith,, M. J. (20 (2003) 03),, ‘U ‘Uneq nequa uall Plu Plural rality ity:: Towar owards ds an  Asymmetric Power Power Model of British Polit Politics’, ics’,   Governm Government ent and Opposition Opposition, 38, 306–32. Martin, C. (1989), ‘Business Influence and State Power: The Case of US Corporate Tax  Policy’,  Politics and Society , 17, 189–223. Martin, H. and Schumann, H. (1996),  The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy  Democracy  (London:  (London: Zed Books). Matth Ma tthews ews,, T. (19 (1988) 88),, ‘Vita ‘Vitally lly Im Impor portan tantt Allies Allies:: The Ro Role le of Inter Interest est Gr Group oupss in Gover Governme nment nt Decision Making’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 47, 147–63. —— (1 (1994 994), ), ‘Emp ‘Emplo loye yers rs As Asso socia ciati tion ons, s, Co Corp rpor orat atism ism and and the the Ac Acco cord rd’, ’, in S. Bell Bell an and d B. Head ead (eds),  State, Economy and Public Policy in Australia  (Melbourne:   (Melbourne: Oxford University  Press). Mattli, Mat tli, W. and Buthe, Buthe, T. (2003) (2003),, ‘Setting ‘Setting Interna Internationa tionall Standar Standards: ds: Technologic echnological al Rationalit Rationality  y  or Primacy of Power’, World Politics , 56, 1–42. —— and —— (20 (2005) 05),, ‘Ac ‘Accou counta ntabili bility ty in Accou Accounti nting? ng? The Poli olitic ticss of Pr Priva ivate te Ru Rulele-Ma Makin king  g  in the Public Interest’,  Governance , 18, 399–429. Maynard-Moody, S. and Musheno, M. (2003),  Cops, Teachers, Counsellors: Stories from the  Front Lines of Public Service  (University  (University of Michigan Press). Mayntz, R. (1993), ‘Governing Failure and the Problem of Governability’, in J. Kooiman., (ed.), Modern Governance  (London:  (London: Sage). —— (19 (1998) 98),, ‘N ‘New ew Challe Challenge ngess to Go Gover vernan nance ce Theory’ Theory’,, Europ European ean Univers niversity ity Insti Institut tute, e, Jean Jean Monet Chair Paper, 98/50. McGowan, F. and Wallace, H. (1996), ‘Towards a European Regulatory State’,  Journal of   European Public Policy , 4, 560–76. McKeen-Edwards, H., Porter, T. and Roberge, I. (2004), ‘Politics or Markets? The Determinants of Cross-Border Financial Integration in the NAFTA and the EU’,   New  325–340.. Political Po litical Economy , 9, 325–340

 

212

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

McLau Mc Laughl ghlin, in, P. A. (19 (1991) 91),, ‘How ‘How Bu Busin siness ess Relat Relates es to the Ha Hawke wke Go Gover vernme nment: nt: The Capta Captains ins of Industry’, in B. Galligan and G. Singleton (eds),  Business and Government Under  Labor  (Melbourne:  (Melbourne: Longman). McLaverty, P. (2002), ‘Civil Society and Democracy’, Contemporary Politics , 8, 303–18. McLennan, G. (1989),  Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond  (Cambridge:  (Cambridge: Polity). Polity). Mead, L. M. (2001), ‘Implementing Work Requirements in Wisconsin’,  Journal of Public  Policy , 21, 239–64. Meg eggi gins nson on,, W. and and Nette etter, r, J. (2 (200 001) 1),, ‘F ‘Fro rom m Stat Statee to Mark Market et:: A Surve Surveyy of Em Empi piri rica call Studi tudies es on Privatisa Privatisation’, tion’, Journal of Economic Literatur Literature  e , 39, 321–89. Menahem, Menahe m, G. (2008), ‘The Transformation of Higher Education in Israel Since the 1990s: The Role of Ideas and Policy Paradigms’, Governance , 21, 499–526. Menkhaus, Menkha us, K. (2007), ‘Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping’,  International Security  (31),   (31), 74–106.

Michel Mic hels, s, R. (1915) (1915) [1959] [1959],, Politic olitical al Part arties ies:: A Soc Sociol iologi ogical cal Study Study of the Oli Oligar garchi chical cal Tend endenc encies  ies    (New York: Dover Publications). of Modern Democracy  (New Mikalsen, Mika lsen, K. H., Herne Hernes, s, H. C. and Jen Jentoft, toft, S. (2006), ‘Leaning ‘Leaning on Use User-G r-Group roups: s: The Role of Civil Society in Fisheries Goverance’,  Marine Policy , 31, 201–9. Mille Mi ller, r, D. (1989) (1989),, Market, State and Community: Theoretical Founda Foundations tions of Market Socialism (Oxford University Press). Milward, H. and Provan, K. (2000), ‘Governing the Hollow State’,   Journal of Public   Administration Research Research and Theory , 10, 359–79. —— and —— (2003), ‘Managing the Hollow State: Collaboration and Contracting’, Public Management Review , 5, 1–18. Milward, H., Provan, K. and Else, B. (1993), ‘What Does the Hollow State Look Like?’, in B. Bozeman (ed.),  Public Management: The State of the Art  (San  (San Francisco: JosseyBass). Milw Mi lwar ard, d, H., H., Prova rovan, n, K. an and d Is Iset ett, t, K. (2 (200 002) 2),, ‘C ‘Col olla labo bora rati tion on an and d Inte Integr grat atio ion n of  Community-Based Health and Human Services in a Nonprofit Managed Care System’, Health Care Management Review , 27, 21–32. Miranda, R. and Lerner, A. (1995), ‘Bureaucracy, Organisational Redundancy, and the Privatisation of Public Services’, Public Administration Review , 55, 193–200. Mitchell, T. T. (1991), ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approa Approaches ches and Their Critics’,  American Political Political Science Review , 85, 77–96. Mohammad, Moham mad, S. and Whalley, J. (1984), ‘Rent Seeking in India: Its Costs and Significance’, Kyklos , 37, 387–413. Moore, G. (2004), ‘The Fair Trade Movement: Parameters, Issues and Future Research’,  Journal of Business Ethics , 53, 73–86. Moran, M. (2002), ‘Review Article: Underst Understanding anding the Regulatory State’, British Journal of  

Political Science , 32, 391–413. —— (2003), The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation  (Oxford University Press). University —— (2006), ‘The Transformation of the British State: From Club Government to State Administered High Modernism’, in J. Levy (ed.),  The State After Statism: New State   Activities in the Age of Liberalisation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Morav Mo ravcsi csik, k, A. (1993) (1993),, ‘Pref ‘Prefere erence ncess and Power ower in the Eu Europ ropean ean Com Commun munity ity:: A LibLiberal Intergo Intergovernm vernmenta entalist list Appr Approach oach’,’,   Jou Journ rnal al of Comm Common on Mark Market et Stud Studie ies s , 31, 473–524.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

—— (20 (2005) 05),, ‘The Eu Europ ropean ean Con Consti stitut tution ional al Com Compro promis misee and the Ne Neofu ofunct nction ionali alist st Legacy’, Journal of European European Public Po Policy  licy , 12, 349–86. Morgan, K., Rees, G. and Smith, M. J. (1999), ‘Networking for Local Economic development opm ent’, ’, in G. St Stoke okerr (ed (ed.), .),   The New Management of British Local Governance  (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Mosley, L. (2000), ‘Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National W Welfare elfare States’,  International Organisation, 54, 737–73 737–73.. —— (2003), Global Capital and National Governments  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Mueller, D. (2003), Public Choice III  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Muel ueller ler,, J. (1992) (1992),, ‘De ‘Democ mocrac racyy and Ralph’ Ralph’ss Pr Prett ettyy Goo Good d Groce Grocery ry Store Store:: Electi Elections ons,, Equali Equality  ty  and the Minimal Human Being’,   American Journal of Political Science , 36: 983– 1003. Mulgan, R. (2002), Ministerial, 61, Resignations 121–7. (and the Lack Thereof)’,   Australian  Journal of Public‘On Administration —— (2002a), ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’,  Public Administration, 78,

213

555–73. —— (2006), ‘Government Accountability for Outsourced Services’,  Australian Journal of   Public Administration, 65, 48–58. Muller, W. C. and Wright, V. (1994), ‘Re-Shaping the State in Europe: The Limits to Retreat’,  West European Politics , 17, 1–11. Murdoch, J. and Abram, S. (1998), ‘Defining the Limits of Community Engagement’,  Journal of Rural Studies , 14, 41–50. Murp urphy, hy, C. (2000) (2000),, ‘G ‘Good ood Go Gover vernan nance: ce: Poor oorly ly Don Donee and Poor oorly ly Underst nderstood ood’, ’, International   Affairs , 76, 789–803. Newburn, T. (2003), ‘Drug Prevention and Youth Justice’,  British Journal of Criminology , 39, Newm ewman, an,609–24. A. and Back, Back, D. (20 (2004) 04),, ‘Self ‘Self-R -Regu egulat latory ory Traject rajectori ories es in the Sha Shado dow w of Hiera Hierarch rchy: y: Resolving Digital Dilemmas in Europe and the United States’,  Governance , 17, 387– 413. Newman, J. (2005), ‘Introduction’, in J. Newman. (ed.),  Remaking Governance  (Bristol:   (Bristol: Policy Press). Nielsen, K. and Pedersen, O. (1993), ‘The Negotiated Economy: General Features and Theoretical Perspectives’, Perspectives’, in J. Hausner et al. (eds),  Institutional Frameworks of Market   (London: Avebury). Economies  (London: Niskanen Nisk anen,, W. (1971), (1971),   Bureauc (Chicago:: Aldine Aldine Bureaucrac racyy and Repr Represen esentativ tativee Go Governm vernment  ent   (Chicago  Atherton). Nordhaus, Nordha us, W. (1975), ‘The Political Business Cycle’, Review of Economic Studies , 42, 169– 90. North orth, , D. C. (199 (1 990) 0),,   Institu InsPress). titutio tions, ns, Instit Instituti utiona onall Cha Change nge and Ec Econo onomic mic Perform erformanc ance  e  (Cambridge University Nye, Ny e, J., Zelik Zelikow ow,, P. and King, King, D. (ed (eds) s) (19 (1997) 97),,   Why People Don’t Trust Government  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Obinger, H. and Zohlnhofer, R. (2007), ‘The Real Race to the Bottom: What Happened to Economic Affairs Expenditure after 1980?’, in F. Castles (ed.),  The Disappearing  State? Retrenchment Realities in an Age of Globalisation  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). O’Brien, R. (1992),  Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography  (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).

 

214

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

O’Connor, J. (1973),  The Fiscal Crisis of the State  (New  (New York: St Martin’s Press). OECD (2001),  The Well-Being of Nations: The Role of Human and Social Capital  (Paris: OECD). OECD (2005a), Modernising Government: The Way Forward  (Paris:  (Paris: OECD). OECD (2005b),  Privatising State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of Policies and Practices  in OECD Countries  (Paris:  (Paris: OECD). OECD (2005c),   Scale and Scope of State-owned Enterprises in OECD Countries   (Paris: OECD). OECD (2007), Can Policies Boost Birth Rates?  (Paris:  (Paris: OECD). OECD (2008), OECD Tax Revenue Trends, 1965–2006  (Paris:  (Paris: OECD). Offe, C. (1981), ‘The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups’, in S. Berger (ed.),  (Cambridge University Press). Organized Interests in Western Europe  (Cambridge —— (1984), Contradictions of the Welfa  (London: Hutchinson). Hutchinson). Welfare re State  (London: Okimoto, D. (1989),  Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High  (Stanford University University Press). Technology  (Stanford Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Gro Growth, wth, Stagflation and Social    (New Haven: Yale University Press). Rigidities  (New

Onis, Z. (1991), The Logic of the Developmental State , Comparative Politics , 24, 109–26. Ophuls, W. (1977),  Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity  (San  (San Francisco: Freema Freeman). n). Orcalli, G. (2007), ‘Constitutional Choice and European Immigration Policy’,  Constitutional Political Economy , 18, 1–20. Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992),  Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial  Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector  (Reading:   (Reading: Addison-Wesley). Ostrom, E. (1990),  Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective   Action (Cambridge University Press). Parker, C. (2002), ‘Regulating Self-Regulation: The ACCC, ASIC, Competition Policy  and Corporate Regulation’, in S. Bell (ed.),  Economic Governance and Institutional   (Melbourne: Oxford University Press). Dynamics  (Melbourne: Park arker, er, H. (2004) (2004),, ‘Th ‘Thee Ne New w Dru Drugs gs In Interv tervent ention ionss Indus Industry: try: Wh What at Ou Outco tcomes mes Can Drugs/Criminal Justice Treatment Programs Realistically Deliver?’,  Probation Jour379–86. nal , 51, 379–86. Parker, R. (2007), ‘Networked Governance or Just Networks? Local Governance of the Knowle Kno wledge dge Econom Economyy in Limeri Limerick ck (I (Irel reland and)) and Kar Karlsk lskorn ornaa (Swe (Sweden den)’, )’, Politic olitical al Studies  Studies , 55, 113–32. Parsons, T. (1963), ‘On the Concept of Power’,  Proceedings of the American Philosophical  Society , 107, 232–62. Pattberg, P. (2005), ‘The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and Non-profit Non-pro fit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules’,  Governance , 18, 589–61 589–610. 0. Pear earce, ce, G. and Mawso Mawson, n, J. (20 (2003) 03),, ‘Deliv ‘Deliveri ering ng Devolv Devolved ed Ap Appro proach aches es to Local Local Gover Governa nance nce’, ’, Policy Po licy and Politics , 31, 51–67. Pete eters, rs, G. (20 (2000) 00),, ‘Gl ‘Globa obaliz lizati ation, on, In Insti stitut tution ions, s, and Go Gover vernan nance’ ce’,, in. G. Peters eters and D. Savoie Savoie (eds), Governance in the Twenty-first Century: Revitalizing the Public Service  (Buffalo:  (Buffalo: McGill–Queen’s University Press). Pierre, Pier re, J. and Peter Peters, s, G. (20 (2000), 00), Governance, Politics and the State  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Macmillan). —— and —— (2005), Governing Complex Societies  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Pierre, J. and Peter, B. G. (2006), ‘Governance, Government and the State’, in C. Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh (eds),  The State: Theories and Issues  (Basingstoke:   (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Pierson, C.(ed.) (1996),  (London:  (London: Routledge).  The  The Modern Pierson, P. (2001), NewState  Politics of the Welfare State  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Pogu oguntk ntke, e, T. and Webb ebb,, P. (ed (eds) s) (20 (2005) 05),, The Pr Presi esiden dentis tisati ation on of Politic olitics: s: A Compar Comparati ative ve Study  Study  of Modern Politics  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Polanyi, K. (1957), The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press). Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2000),  Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis  (Oxford University Press). Porter, T. (1995),  Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life  (Princeton University Press). Potoski, M. and Prakash, Prakash, A. (2004), ‘The Regulation Dilemma: Co-operation and Conflict in Environmental Governance’, Public Administration Review , 64, 152–63 152–63.. Power, M. (1994), The Audit Explosion (London: Demos). —— (1997), The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press). Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A. (1973),  Implementation: How Great Expectations in Wash-

ington are Dashed in Oakland: Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympa (Berkeley: Univ University  ersity  thetic Observers who Seek to Build a Foundation on Ruined Hopes  (Berkeley:

of California Press). Pr Press essman man,, S. (20 (2006) 06),,   Alter Alterna nativ tivee Th Theo eori ries es of the the Stat State  e   (Basings (Basingstoke toke:: Pa Palgrav lgravee Mac Mac--

215

millan). Productivity Product ivity Commission (2003), Social Capital: Reviewing the Concept and its Policy Implications  (Canberra:  (Canberra: AusInfo AusInfo). ). Przeworski, A. (1985), Capitalism and Social Democracy  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Putnam, R. (1993),  Making Democracy Work  (Princeton  (Princeton University Press). —— (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community  (New   (New York: Touchstone). Ranald, P. (1997),  The Contracting Commonwealth: Service Citizens or Consumers? Public 

 Accountability, Service Quality and Equity Issues in the Contracting and Competitive   Accountability,   (Public Sector Research Centre, University of New  Tendering of Government Services  (Public

South Wales). Reitbergen, W., Breukels, M. and Blok, K. (1999),  Voluntary  Voluntary Agreements Agreements – Implementation and Efficiency: Case Studies in the Sectors of Paper and Glass Manufacturing  (Utrecht: Department of Science, Technology and Society). Rhodes, R. (1986), The National World  (London: Allen & Unwin). World of Local Government  (London: —— (1995), ‘The Institutional Approach’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds),  Theory and   (Basingstoke: Macmillan).  Methods in Political Science  (Basingstoke: —— (1996), ‘The New Governance: Governing Without Government’,  Political Studies , 44, 652–67. —— (1997) (1997),,   Understan Understanding ding Go Governa vernance: nce: Policy Networ Networks, ks, Governa Governance, nce, Reflexivit Reflexivityy and   (Buckingham: Open University Press).  Accountability  (Buckingham: —— (2000), ‘Governance and Public Administration’, in J. Pierre (ed.),  Debating Governance  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). —— (2007), ‘Understanding Governance: Ten Years On’, Organization Studies , 28, 1243– 64. —— and Bevir, M. (2003), Interpreting British Gove  (London: Routledge). Governance  rnance  (London: Richards, D. and Smith, M. (2004), ‘Central Control and Policy Implementation in the UK: A Case Study of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit’,  Journal of Comparative  Policy Po licy Analysis: Research and Practice  Practice , 8, 325–45.

 

216

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Riddell, P. (2000),  A Portrait of the Whitehall Program, Report to the Economic and Social   (London: Church House). Research Resear ch Council on ‘Future Whitehall’  (London: Rieg Rieger er,, E. and and Leib Leibfr frie ied, d, S. (2 (200 003) 3),,   The Lim Limits its of Globa Globalis lisati ation on   (Cambridge: (Cambridge: Polity  Press). Riker, W. (1982),   Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of    Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice  (San   (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman). Rittberger, B. and Richardson, J. (2003), ‘Old Wine in New Bottles? The Commission and the Use of Environmental Policy Instruments’,  Public Administration, 81, 575–606. Rivera, River a, J. (2002), (2002), ‘Assess Assessing ing a Volunt oluntary ary Envir Environme onmental ntal Init Initiativ iativee in the Deve Developing  loping   World:  W orld: The Costa Rican Certification for Sustainable Tourism’,  Policy Sciences , 35, 333–60. Rodrik, D. (1997),  Has Globalisation Gone too Far?  (Washington,  (Washington, DC: Institute for International Studies). —— (1998), ‘Globalisation, Social Conflict and Economic Growth’,  World Economy , 21, 143–58. Rosenau, J. (1992), ‘Governance, Order and Change in World Politics’, in J. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (eds),  Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World  Politics  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). —— and Czempiel, E. (eds) (1992),  Governance Without Government: Order and Change  in World Politics  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press).

Rothst Rot hstein ein,, B. (2005) (2005),,   Social Social Traps raps and the Pr Probl oblem em of Trus rust t   (Cambridge (Cambridge Universit University  y  Press). Rowl Ro wley ey,, C., C., Tollis ollison on,, R. an and d Tul ullo lock ck,, G. (eds (eds)) (1 (198 988) 8),, The Poli olitic tical al Ec Econo onomy my of Re Rentnt-Se Seeki eking  ng  (London: Kluwer). Sabatier, P. (1986), ‘Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research’,  Journal of Public Policy , 6, 21–48. Salamon, L. (ed.) (2002), The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance  (Oxford  (Oxford University Press). Salamon, L., Sokolowski, S., and List, R. (2003),  Global Civil Society: An Overview  (Johns   (Johns Hopkins University: Centre for Civil Society Studies). Samuels, R. (1987),  The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and   (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Historical Perspective  Perspective  (Ithaca: Sandler, T. (2004), Global Collective Action (Cambridge University Press). Saward, M. (1997), ‘In Search of the Hollow Crown’, in P. Weller, et al. (eds),  The Hollow   (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Crown: Crow n: Countervailing Trends Trends in Core Executives  (Basingstoke: Sbragia, A. (2000), ‘Governance, the State, and the Market: What is Going On?’,  Governance , 13, 243–50. 243–50. Scahill, J. (2007),   Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army  (New York: Nation Books). Scanlon, C. (2004),   What’s Wrong with Social Capital   (Melbourne: Australian Fabian Society). Scharpf, F. F. (1994), ‘Games Real Actors Could Play: Po Positive sitive and Negative Coordinat Coordination ion in Embedded Negotiations’, Negotiations’, Journal of Theoretical Po Politics  litics , 6, 27–53. —— (1997),  Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder: Westview Press). —— (1999), Governing in Europe: Effectiv  (Oxford University Press). Effectivee and Democr Democratic?  atic?  (Oxford

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Schmidt, V. A. (2000), ‘Values and Discourse in the Politics of Adjustment’, in F. Scharpf  and V. A. Schmidt (eds),  Welfare and Work in the Open Economy , vol. 1 (Oxford University Press). Schmitter, P. C. and Streeck, W. (1985), ‘Community, Market, State and Associations?’, in  W.. Streeck  W Streeck and P. C. Schmitter (eds),  Private Interest Government  (London:  (London: Sage). Schmitter, W. (1974), ‘Still the Century of Corporatism’,  Review of Politics , 36, 85–131 85–131.. Schumpeter, J. (1942),   Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy  (London: George Allen & Unwin). Seabrooke, L. (2006), ‘Why We Need Legitimacy in Political Economy and Institutional Theory’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies  Association, San Diego, California, USA, 22 March . Self, P. (1993),  Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice  (Basingstoke:   (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Sellers, M. (2003), ‘Privatization Morphs Into “Publicization”: Businesses Look a Lot Like Government’,  Public Administration, 81, 607–20. Singer, P. P. (2001), ‘Corporate Warriors: Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security’, International Security , 26, 186–22 186–220. 0. Singleton, S. (2000), ‘Co-operation or Capture? The Paradox of Co-management and Community Participation in Natural Resource Manageme Management nt and Environmental Policy Making Making’,’, Environmental Politics , 9, 1–21. Skocpol, T. (1980), ‘Political Responses to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the new Deal’,  Politics and Society , 10, 155–201.

217

—— (1985), ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds),  Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press). —— (1996), ‘Unravelling From Above’, American Prospect , 25, 20–6. Skogstad, G. (2003), ‘Who Governs, Who Should Govern? Political Authority and Legitimacy in Canada in the Twenty-First Century’,  Canadian Journal of Political Science , 36, 955–73. Smart, H. (1991),  Criticism and Public Rationality: Professional Rigidity and the Search for   (London: Routledge). Caring Government  Government  (London: Smith, G. and Wales, C. (2000), ‘Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy’,  Political  Studies , 48, 51–65. Smith, K. (2007),  The Carbon Neutral Myth: Offset Indulgences for Your Carbon Sins  (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute). Smith, M. (2006), ‘Pluralism’, in C. Hay, Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh (eds),  The State: Theories  and Issues  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Smith Sm ith,, P. D. and Mc McDo Donou nough, gh, H. (2001) (2001),, ‘Beyo ‘Beyond nd Publi Publicc Partici articipat pation ion:: Fairnes airnesss in Na Natu tural ral Resource Decision Making’, Society and Natural Resources  Resources , 14, 239–49. Soleille, S. (2006), ‘Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Schemes: A New Tool for the Environmental Regulator’s Regulator’s Kit’, Energy Policy , 34, 1473–7 1473–7.. Sorensen, E. (2006), ‘Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of  Democratic Governance’, Governance’, American Review of Public Administration, 36, 98–114. —— and Torfing, J. (2008a), ‘Governance Network Research: Towards a Second Generation’, in E. Sorensen and J. Torfing (eds),  Theories of Democratic Network Governance  (London: Palgra Palgrave). ve).

 

218

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—— and —— (2008b), ‘Theoretical Approaches to Metagovernance’, in E. Sorensen and  J. Torfing Torfing (eds),  Theories of Democratic Network Governance  (London:  (London: Palgra Palgrave). ve). Sore So rens nsen en,, G. (2 (200 006) 6),, ‘The ‘The Tra rans nsfo form rmat atio ion n of th thee State tate’, ’, in C. Hay, Hay, M. Li List ster er and and D. Mars Marsh. h. (eds), The State: Theories and Issues  (Basingstoke:  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Spar, D. (1999), ‘Lost in (Cyber) Space: The Private Rules of Online Commerce’, in C. Culter, T. Porter and V. Haufler. (eds),  Private Authority and International Affairs  (Albany: SUNY Press). Squires, P. (1990),  Anti-Social Policy: Welfare, Ideology and the Discipline State  (Brighton:  (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf). Wheatsheaf). Stanyer, J. (2007), Modern Political Communication  (Cambridge: Polity). Polity). St Stein einzor zor,, R. (1998) (1998),, ‘Re ‘Reinv invent enting ing En Envir vironm onment ental al Re Regul gulati ation: on: The Dange Dangerou rouss Journ Journey ey fro from m Command to Self-Control’,  Harvard Environmental Law Review , 22, 103–6. Stigler, G. (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’,  Bell Journal of Economics and   Management Science , 2, 3–21. Stiglitz, J. (2002), Globalization and its Discontents  (New  (New York: Norton). —— and Bilmes, L. (2008), The Three Trillion Dollar War  (Penguin  (Penguin Books). Stoker, G. (1998), ‘Governance as Theory: Five Propositions’,  International Social Science   Journal , 50, 17–28. —— (20 (2006) 06),,   Why Poli olitic ticss Ma Matte tters: rs: Mak Making ing De Democ mocrracy Work   (Basingstoke: (Basingstoke: Palgr Palgrave ave Macmillan). Strange, S. (1996),  The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy  (Cambridge University Press). Streeck, W. (1983), ‘Between Pluralism and Corporatism: German Business Associations and the State’,  Journal of Public Policy , 3, 265–84. —— and Schmitter, P. C. (1985),  Private Interest Government  (London:  (London: Sage).

Street,, J. (1988), ‘British Government Policy on AIDS: Learning Not to Die of Ignorance’, Street 490–507. 7. Parliamentary Affairs , 41, 490–50 St Stret retton ton,, H. and Or Orcha chard rd,, L. (19 (1994) 94),,   Public Public Goods, Goods, Public Public Enterprise Enterprise,, Public Public Choice  Choice  (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Sunst Su nstein ein,, C. R. (19 (1990) 90),,   After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Swank, D. (2002),  Global Capital, Political Institutions and Policy Change in the Developed   (Cambridge University Press). Welfare States  (Cambridge Szreter, S. (2002), ‘The State of Social Capital: Bringing Back in Power, Politics and History’, Theory and Society , 31, 573–621. Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L. (2000),  Public Spending in the 20th Century  (Cambridge University Press). Tay aylo lor, r, A. (2 (200 000) 0),, ‘H ‘Hol ollo lowi wing ng Ou Outt or Fillin illingg In In?? Tas askk For orce cess and and the the Ma Mana nage geme ment nt of Cr Cros osssCutting Issues in British Government’,  British Journal of Politics and International  Relations , 2, 46–71. Taylor-Gooby, P., Sylvester, S.,Values Calnan, M.Private and Graham, M. Journal (2000),of‘Knights, Knaves and Gnashers: Professional and Dentistry’, Social Policy  , 29, 375–95. Teisman, G. R. and Klijn, E. (2002), ‘Partnership Arrangements: Governmental Rhetoric or Governance Scheme?’, Public Administration Review , 62, 197–204. Terrence Higgins Trust (2007),   Trustees’ Report and Financial Statement ,   .

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C. (2008),  Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and  Happiness  (New   (New Haven: Yale University Press). Thatcher, M. (1993), The Downing Street Years  (London:  (London: Harper Collins). Thelen, K. (1999), ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,’ Annual Review of   Political Po litical Science , 2, 374–77. —— and Steinmo, S. (1992), ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective’, in K. Thelen and S. Steinmo (eds),  Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Compara tive Analysis  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press). Thomas, C. W. (2003), ‘Habitat Conservation Planning’, in A. Fung and E. O. Wright (eds),   Deepening Deepening Dem Democr ocracy: acy: Inno Innovatio vations ns in Emp Empow owere eredd Partici articipatory patory Governa Governance  nce  (London: Verso). Thompson, D. (1983), ‘Bureaucracy and Democracy’, in G. Duncan (ed.),  Democratic   (Cambridge Unive University rsity Press). Theory and Pr Practice  actice  (Cambridge Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R. and Mitchell, J. (1991),  Markets, Hierarchies and   (London: Sage). Networks: The Coordination of Social Life  (London: Toke, D. and Marsh, D. (2003), ‘Policy Networks and the GM Crops Issue: Assessing  the Utility of a Dialectical Model of Policy Networks’,  Public Administration, 81, 229–51. Tollefson, C., Gale, F. and Haley, D. (2009),  Setting the Standard: Certification, Governance  and the Forest Forest Stewardship Council  (Vancouver:   (Vancouver: UBC Press). Toohey, P. (2008), Las Lastt Dri Drinks nks?? The TheIm Impac pactt of the Nort orther hernn Terr errito itory ry In Interv tervent ention ion (Melbourne: Black Inc.). Torres, L., Pina, V., and Acerete, B. (2006), ‘E-Governance Developments in European Union Cities: Reshaping Government’s Relationship with Citizens’,  Governance , 19, 277–302. Treib, O., Bahr, H. and Falkner, G. (2007), ‘Modes of Governance: Toward a Conceptual Clarification’, Journal of Europea Europeann Public Po Policy  licy , 14, 1–20.

219

Truman, D. (1951), The Gove  (New York: Alfred & Knopf). Governmental rnmental Process  (New Tsebelis, G. (2002),   Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work   (Princeton University  Press). Tullock, G. (1976), The Vote Motive  (London:  (London: Institute of Economic Affairs). —— (19 (1989) 89),,   The (Boston: Kluwer Kluwer The Econo Economic micss of Sp Speci ecial al Pr Privi ivileg legee and Rent Rent Seeki Seeking  ng   (Boston:  Academic). —— (1 (199 993) 3),, ‘Ren ‘Rentt Seek Seekin ing’ g’,, in C. Rowl Rowley ey (ed. (ed.), ), Prope ropert rtyy Ri Righ ghts ts and and th thee Limi Limits ts of De Demo mocr crac acy  y  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). —— (2005), Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking  (Cheltenham:  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Vedung, E. and van der Doelen, C. (1998), ‘The Sermon: Information Programs in the Public Policy Process: Choice, Effects and Evaluation’, in M. Bemelmans-Videc, R. Rist and E. Vedung (eds),  Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments and their  Evaluation  (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers). Verba, S., Schlozman, K. and Brady, H. (1995),  Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).  American Politics  (Cambridge, Vibert, F. (2007),  The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers  (Cambridge University Press). Vigoda, E. (2002), ‘From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens, and the Next Ne xt Generat Generation ion of Public Public Administr Administration ation’,’, Pub 62, 52 527– 7–40 40.. Public lic Administr Administration ation Review  Review , 62, Visser, J. and Hemerijck, A. (1997),  A Dutch Miracle  (Amsterdam  (Amsterdam Univ University ersity Press).

 

220

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vogel, D. (1986),  National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and  the United States  (Ithaca:  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). ——(Cambridge, (1995),  Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy  Mass.: Harvard University Press). —— (2008), ‘Private Global Business Regulation’,  Annual Review of Political Science , 11, 261–82. —— and Kagan, R. (2004),  The Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalisation Affects  National Regulatory Po Policies  licies  (Berkeley:  (Berkeley: University of California Press). Vogel, S. (1996),  Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrialized   (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Countries  (Ithaca:  Wade,  W ade, R. (1990), Governing the Market  (Princeton  (Princeton University Press). —— (2 (200 003) 3),, ‘The ‘The In Invis visib ible le Ha Hand nd of th thee Amer Americ ican an Em Empi pire re’, ’, Et Ethic hicss and In Inter ternat nation ional al Affair Affairs s , 17, 77–88. —— (2005), ‘Globalisation, Poverty and Inequality’, in J. Ravenhill (ed.),  Global Political  Political   (Oxford University Press). Economy  (Oxford  Wagschal,  W agschal, U. (2007), ‘A Mortgage on the Future? Future? Public Expenditure and its Determinants’, in F. Castles (ed.),  The Disappearing State?Debt Retrenchment Realities in an Era 

of Globalisation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).  Wallace,  W allace, D. (1995), Environmental Policy and Industrial Innova Innovation: tion: Strategies in Europe, the  U.S.A. and Japan (London: Earthscan).  Wallace,  W allace, H. (2000), ‘Politics ‘Politics and Policy Policy in the EU: The Challenge of Governance in the EU’, in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds),  Policy-Making in the European Union  (Oxford University Press).  Wallington,  W allington, T T., ., Lawrence, G. and Loechel, B. (2005), ‘Regional Arrangements for Natural Resource Management in Queensland: Preliminary Findings from a Case Study of  the Fitzroy Basin Association’, Conference of the Australian Sociological Association, Hobart, 6–8 December. December. ——, —— and —— (2008), ‘Reflections on the Legitimacy of Regional Environmental

Governance: Governa Lessons fromPolicy Australia’ Australia’s s Experiment in Natura Naturall Resource Management’, , 10, 1–30.  Journal ofnce: Environmental and Planning   Walter,  W alter, J. (2008), ‘Can Kevin Kick the Command Cultur Culture?’, e?’, Australian Political Political Studies  Association, Presidential Address, Brisbane, 7 July July.. —— and Strangio, P. (2007), No Prime Minister: Reclaiming Politics from Leaders  (Sydney:   (Sydney: UNSW Press).  Wanna,  W anna, J. (2006), ‘From Afterthought Afterthought to Afterburner: Australia’ Australia’ss Cabinet Implementation Unit’, Journal of Comparative 347–369.. Comparative Policy Analysis: Research Research and Pr Practice  actice , 8, 347–369  Ward,  W ard, I. (2007), ‘Mapping the Australian PR State’, in S. Young (ed.), Government Communication in Australia  (Cambridge  (Cambridge University Press).  Warleigh,  W arleigh, A (2001), ‘“Europe ‘“Europeanisating” anisating” Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialisation’, Journal of Common Market Studies , 39, 619–39.  Watanabe,  W atanabe, R. and Robinson, G. (2005), ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’, , 5, 10–14.and Society  (New Climate Policy  Economy  Weber,  Weber, M. (1968),   (New York: Bedminster Press).  Weiss,  W eiss, J. (2002), ‘Public Information’, in L. Salamon (ed.),  The Tools of Government: A  (Oxford University Press). Guide to the New Governance  Governance  (Oxford  Weiss,  W eiss, L. (1998), The Myth of the Po  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Powerless werless State  (Ithaca:

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

—— and Hobson, J. (1995),  States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical   Analysis  (Cambridge:  (Cambridge: Po Polity). lity).  Weiss,  W eiss, L. and Thurbon, E. (2006), ‘Investing in Openness: The Evolution of FDI Strategy  in Korea and Taiwan’,  New Political Economy , 11, 1–24.  Welch,  W elch, E. and Hibiki, A. (2002), ‘Japane ‘Japanese se Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Bargaining Power and Reciprocity as Contributors to Effectiveness’,  Policy Sciences , 35, 401–24.  Whelan, J. and Lyons, K. (2005), ‘Community Engagement or Community Action: Choosing Not to Play the Game’,  Environmental Politics , 14, 596–610.  Whitehead, M. (2003), ‘ “In the Shadow of Hierarchy”: Metagovernance, Metagovernance, Policy Reform and Urban Regeneration in the West Midlands’, Area , 35, 6–14.  WHO (World (World Health Organisat Organisation) ion) (2007), Making the Most of World Blood Day  (Geneva:   (Geneva:  WHO).  Wilensky, H. (2002),  Rich Democracies: Political Economy, Public Policy and Performance  (Berkeley: University of California Press).  Williams, B. L. et al. (2001), ‘Hierarchical Linear Models of Factors Associated Associated with Public Participation Among Residents Living Near US Army Chemical Weapons Stockpiles sites’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management , 44, 41–65.  Williamson, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism  (New York: Free Press).  Wilson, G. (1990), Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction (London, Macmillan). —— (2000), ‘In a State?’, Governance , 13, 235–42 235–42..  Winston, C. (2006), Go Governm vernment ent Fa Failur iluree versus versus Market Market Fa Failur ilure  e (W (Washin ashington gton,, DC: American American Enterprise Institute).  Wiseman, J. (2006), ‘Local Heroes: Learning From Recent Community Streng Strengthening  thening  Initiatives in Victor’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 65, 95–107 95–107..  Wittman, D. (1995), The Myth of Democratic Failur Failure: e: Why Political Political Institutions are Efficient  (University of Chicago Press).  Wong,  W ong, J. (2006), ‘T ‘Technovation echnovation in Taiwan: Implications for Industrial Governa Governance’, nce’, Governance , 19, 651–72.  Woodward,  W oodward, B. (2002), Bush at War  (New  (New York: Simon & Schuster).

221

 World  W orld Bank (1998),  The Initiative on Defining, Monitoring and Measuring Social Capital: Overview and Program Program Description  (Washington, DC: World Bank).  Worms,  W orms, J. (2000), ‘Old and New Civic and Social Ties in France’, in R. Putnam Putnam (ed.),  (Oxford Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society  (Oxford University Press).  Wurzel,  W urzel, R., Bruckner, Bruckner, L., Jordan Jordan,, A. and Zito, A. (2003), ‘Struggling to Leave Behind a  Highly Regulatory Past? New Environmental Policy Instruments in Austria Austria’,’, Environmental Politics , 12, 51–72. Zysman, J. (1983), Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of   Industrial Change  (Ithaca:  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). —— and Newman, A. (2006), ‘The State in the Digital Economy’, in J. Levy (ed.),  The  State After Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Liberalisation Liberalisation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

 

Index

 A Manager’s Guide to Citizen Engagement ,  31  Abdelal, Rawi, 130 Rawi, 130,, 131  Abram, Simone, 151 Simone, 151  Abu Ghraib, 52 Ghraib, 52  Aegis, 127  Aegis,  127  American International Group, 80 Group, 80  Andersen, Hans, 10 Hans, 10 associations, 163 associations,  163,, 184 as sources of private authority, 166 authority, 166,, 169  169,, 170  170,, 172 associativee collaboration, associativ collaboration, 171  171 capacities, 163 capacities,  163,, 164 cooperation dilemmas, 170 dilemmas, 170 coordination coordinat ion problems, 170 problems, 170 decentralised cooperation, 170 cooperation, 170 governance relations, 169 relations, 169 incentives for associative associative governance, governance, 180  180 knowledge-b knowledge-based ased organisations, organisations , 173 organisational elitism, elitism, 173  173 and policy implementation, 170 implementation, 170,, 171 prestige, 180 prestige,  180 ‘progressive’, 180 ‘progressive’,  180 use of delegated authority, authority, 169

corporatist governance, 167 governance, 167– –9 corporatist institutional environment, 167 environment, 167 corporatist wages policy, policy, 167 Crime and Misconduct Misconduct Commissions, 88 Commissions, 88 Department of Employment Employment and Workplace Workplace Relations, 125 Relations,  125 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Mul ticultural Affairs, 53 Affairs, 53 Export Access, 172 Access,  172 forest certification, 183 certification, 183 goods and services tax (GST), 170 (GST),  170– –1 Hawke era, 167 era, 167,, 168 immigration detention centres, 53 centres,  53 industrial relations, 167 relations, 167  Job Network, Network, 37  37,, 47,  47, 52  52,, 124 landcare projects, 143 projects, 143 legislation, increase in, 93 in, 93 Northern Territory ‘intervention’, 85 ‘intervention’,  85 regional governance, 68 governance,  68 resource management, 79 management, 79,,  143 Tariff Board, 67 Board, 67  water consumption, Brisbane, 190 Brisbane, 190  water management and the creation of 

 worker training, 169 training, 169  Atkinson, Michael, 64 Michael, 64,, 179  Australia, 175  Australia,  175 ‘Accords’, 167 ‘Accords’,  167,, 168  Australian Council of Trade Trade Unions (ACTU), 167, 167, 168 Business Council of Australia, 135 Australia, 135,, 169 and corporatism, 168 corporatism, 168 centralised institutional tradition, 168 tradition, 168 centralised wage negotations, 167 negotations,  167,,  168 Commonwealth Court  Arbitration, 167  Arbitration,  167 of Conciliation and community engagement, Queensland, 152 Queensland, 152 corporate regulation, 91 regulation, 91 corporatism, 168 corporatism,  168

markets, 117,, 122 markets, 117  water management, New South W Wales, ales, 68  68,, 153– 153–4  water shortage, Queensland, 156 Queensland, 156  Australian Competition Competition and Consumer Commission as metaregulator, 91 metaregulator, 91  Austria  associativee governance, 180 associativ governance, 180 authoritarian populism, 21 populism, 21  Ayres, Ian, 90 Ian, 90 Baader–Meinhof Gang, 20 Gang,  20 Bache, Ian, 38 Ian, 38 Bachrach, Peter, 187 Peter, 187

223

 

224

 

INDEX

Baker, Wayne, 110 Wayne, 110 Bank of England, 80 England, 80 Baratz, Morton, 187 Morton, 187 Barroso, Jose, 43 Jose, 43 Bartle, Ian, 90 Ian, 90 Basle accord, 44 accord, 44 Beilin, Ruth, 158 Ruth, 158 Belgium, 124 Belgium,  124 Berk, Gerald, 171 Gerald, 171 Bernstein, Steven, 182 Steven, 182 Bevir, Mark, 4 Mark, 4 Biersteker, Thomas, 172 Thomas, 172 Bishop, Patrick, 160 Patrick, 160 Blackwater, 16 Blackwater,  16,, 126  126,,  127–  127–9 Blair, Tony, 43 Tony,  43,, 86,  86, 105 blood donation, voluntary, 103 voluntary,  103 Blumenthal, Sydney, 104 Sydney, 104 Boxelaar, Lucia, 158 Lucia, 158 Bradford, Neil, 176 Neil, 176 Bradford & Bingley, 81 Bingley,  81 Brady, Henry, 147 Henry, 147 Braithwaite, John, 90 John, 90,, 173 Bruner, Christopher, 130 Christopher, 130,, 131 Bush, George W., 86 W.,  86 business private firms See   private Buthe, Tim, 172 Tim, 172 California effect, 41 effect, 41,, 80 Callaghan, Gill, 158 Gill, 158 Canada  corporatist practices, Ontario, 175 Ontario,  175 electoral reform, British Columbia, 142 Columbia, 142 provincial land use, British Columbia, 157 capital flight, 80 flight, 80 capitalism capitalist economies, 165 economies, 165 ‘varieties ‘va rieties of capitalism’, 165 capitalism’, 165,, 170 carbon emission reduction through non-state persuasion, 100 persuasion, 100 carcereal society, 98 society, 98,,  101 Cashore, Benjamin, 182 Benjamin, 182 Cato Institute (US), 22 (US),  22

closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance, closed-circuit 84 ‘club government’, 88 government’, 88 Coen, David, 133 David, 133 Coleman, William, 64 William, 64,, 179 collective good See  goods,  goods, public goods Colombian army, 15 army, 15 communication communicatio n networks, 77 networks, 77 communities, idealised vision of, 146 of, 146 community engagement See  governance,  governance, modes of  community sector, 152 sector, 152 diversity within, 148 within, 148,, 149 government engagement, apprehension  149 towards, 149 towards, competitive tendering  See  governance,  governance, contracting-out of services congestion charges, 79 charges, 79 conservatorship, 81 conservatorship,  81 Considine, Mark, 125 Mark, 125 corporate governance, 1 governance, 1 corporatism, 9 corporatism,  9,, 14  14,, 33  33,, 162  162,, 163  163,, 164  164,, 165  165,, 166,  166, 174 corporatist governance, governance, 165  165,, 166  166,, 167  167,, 179 corporatist governance in liberal states, 168 states, 168 corporatist institutional environment, 167 environment, 167,, 184 corporatist policy-making, 164 policy-making, 164 counter-corporatism, 165 counter-corporatism,  165 in Europe, 166 Europe, 166 industrial relations, 164 relations, 164 and perceived vulnerability, vulnerability, 166,  166, 180 state-maintained, 174 state-maintained,  174 Crawford, Adam, 38 Adam, 38 credit rating agencies, 129 agencies, 129– –31, 31, 133  133,, 175 Crenson, Matthew, 187 Matthew, 187 Culpepper, Pepper, 170 Pepper, 170 Cutler, Claire, 172 Claire, 172,, 175,  175, 182 Dahl, Robert, 187 Robert, 187 Davis, Glyn, 69 Glyn, 69,, 160 Deacon, David, 104 David, 104 decriminalisation, 76 decriminalisation,  76– –7

central banks, 8 banks, 8,, 23  23,, 50,  50, 80 Chhotray, Vasudha, 6 Vasudha, 6,, 11 China  CCTV9, 134 CCTV9,  134 internet regulation, 78 regulation, 78 Christou, George, 174 George, 174 civil society  See  organisations organisations,, non-govern non-governmental mental (NGOs) climate change, 79,, 126 change, 79 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  79,, 173 (IPCC), 79 (IPCC), role of states, 79 states, 79 Clinton, Bill, 83 Bill, 83

democracy, 50 democracy, 50 and bureaucracy, 157 bureaucracy, 157 classical, 149 classical,  149 competitive, 149 competitive,  149,, 150 constitutional constitution al democracies, differences between, 72 between,  72 democratic authority, 15 authority, 15,, 49 democratic deficit, 150 deficit, 150 democratic legitimacy,  137,, 144 and interestlegitimacy, 137 groups,  162 groups, 162 loss of confidence in, 24 in,  24,, 120 mechanisms of, 51 of, 51,, 71 participatory, 150 participatory,  150,, 151

 

INDEX

participatory and representative, linked, 150 representative, 151 representative,  151 Denmark, 49 Denmark,  49,, 50  50,, 51 consensus conferences, 142 conferences, 142– –3

fair trade movement, 100 movement, 100– –1 Fannie Mae, 81 Mae, 81,, 82 financial integration, 64 integration, 64,,  82 firms See  private firms

‘negotiatedculture, 83 economy’, economy’, 165 dependency culture,  83  165 developmental state economies East Asia, 73 Asia, 73 Doner, Richard, 180 Richard, 180 Dover, Bruce, 134 Bruce, 134 Drahos, Peter, 173 Peter, 173 Drezner, Daniel, 43 Daniel, 43,, 82 drug cartels, Medellin and Cali, 15 Cali,  15 Dryzek, John, 142 John, 142 Dyson, Kenneth, 72 Kenneth, 72

Flinders, Matthew, Matthew, 32  32,, 37 Foley, Paul, 147 Paul,  147,, 148 Forestt Stewardship Fores Stewardship Council (FSC), 181 (FSC), 181,, 183  183,, 184 Foucault, Michel and the ‘autonomous individual’, 98 individual’, 98,, 113 ‘disciplinary power’, 98 power’, 98,, 101 ‘d ‘disciplinary isciplinary society’, rise of, 114 of, 114 Discipline and Punish, 97 ‘governmentality’, 97 ‘governmentality’,  97 France Medal of the French Family, 80 Family,  80 non-corporatistt labour policies, 167 non-corporatis policies, 167 Fraser, Bernie, 23 Bernie, 23 Freddie Mac, 81 Mac, 81,, 82 Fredericksen, Patricia, 148 Patricia, 148

Eberlein, Burkard, 177 Burkard, 177 Edelenbos, Jurian, 152 Jurian, 152,, 153  153,, 158 electoral politics and community engagement, 146 engagement,  146 elite theory, 173 elitestheory, 173 and persuasion, 101 persuasion, 101 civil elites, marginalisation marginalisation of, 146 of,  146 Elster, Jon, 101 Jon, 101,, 155 emissions trading schemes, market-based, 79 market-based, 79,, 117 117,, 122  122,, 125–  125–6 employment contracts, 14 contracts, 14 performance contracts, 87 contracts, 87 Enron, 131 Enron,  131,, 134 Europe voluntary compliance environmental regime, 171 European Central Bank, 42 Bank,  42,, 80,  80, 82 European Court of Auditors, 88 Auditors,  88 European Court of Justice, 43 Justice, 43

French government, government, 28 agricultural policy, 28 policy, 36  36– –7 de Villepin, Dominique, 14 Dominique, 14 investment in nuclear energy, 60 energy, 60 Sarkozy, Nicholas, 14 Nicholas, 14 Fung, Archon, 143 Archon, 143,, 145  145,, 148,  148, 182

European Registry for Internet Domains  174 (Eurid), 174 (Eurid), European Union/European Union/European integration, 42 integration, 42– –3, 51 51,, 64  64,, 82 .eu internet domain name, 174 name,  174– –5 Common Agricultural Policy, 36 Policy, 36 ‘democratic deficit’, 173 deficit’, 173 Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), 125 (ETS),  125– –6 formal agreements, number of, 94 of, 94

George, Susan, 29 Susan, 29 Germany  associativee governance, 180 associativ governance, 180 investment in nuclear energy, 61 energy, 61 voluntary compliance environmental regime, 172 Global Business Regulation, 173 global financial crisis, 27 crisis,  27,, 55,  55, 80  80,, 82,  82, 130 government loans to corporations, 80 corporations, 80– –1

Gaebler, Ted, 135 Ted, 135 Gains, Francesca, Francesca, 38  38 Gale, Fred, 183 Fred, 183 Gambetta, Diego, 56 Diego, 56 Gamble, Andrew, 89 Andrew, 89 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 76 (GATT),  76 See also World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay round, 37 round, 37

 

225

and globalisation, globalisation, 43  43 governance, participatory forms of, 173 of,  173 intergovernmentalism–supranationalism debate, 42 debate,  42 Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 177 (OMC), 177,, 189 Europeanisation, 42 Europeanisation,  42 of regulation, 82 regulation, 82 Evans, Peter, 63 Peter, 63 executive dictatorship, dictatorship, 21 ExxonMobil, 34 ExxonMobil,  34,, 132

globalisation,  1,, 21 globalisation, 1  21,, 25,  25, 30  30,, 39,  39, 40 and business regulation, 40 regulation, 40 and deregulation, 117 deregulation, 117 and government expenditure, 25 expenditure,  25,, 40 and its effect on the state, 40 state,  40,, 120  120,, 133 and social partnership, 166 partnership, 166 as source of power to business, 133 business,  133 protests, 29 protests,  29 regulatory challenges, 82 challenges, 82 Golding, Peter, 104 Peter, 104 Goodin, Bob, 142 Bob, 142

 

226

 

INDEX

goods  56 excludability, 56 excludability, public goods, 57 goods, 57,,  108,  108, 110  110,, 115 public goods and free-riding, 159 free-riding,  159 rivalness, 57 rivalness,  57 governance, 60 governance,  60 metagovernancee See also metagovernanc accountability accountabil ity issues, 11 issues, 11,, 38  38,, 52  52– –4, 68,  68, 128  128,, 173 alternative strategies, 76 strategies, 76,, 86  86,, 164 and appearance of decisive action, 104 action,  104 as a construct, 154 construct,  154 attribution of public status, 14 status, 14,, 164 audit ‘explosion’, 76 ‘explosion’, 76 broader conception of, 97 of,  97 business, relationship with, 132 with, 132 business associations, associations, 170  170,, 171 codes of conduct, 5 conduct,  5,, 163  163,, 181,  181, 183  183,, 184 collaborative, 91 collaborative,  91,, 106,  106, 144 communication communicati on strategies, 104 strategies, 104– –5 community sector assistance, 149 assistance,  149 contracting-out of defence services, 118 services, 118 contracting-out of services, 9 services,  9,, 13  13,, 36,  36, 53  53,, 68  68,, 116 116,, 117  117– –18, 18, 119  119,, 121,  121, 122  122,, 124,  124, 136  136,, 147 inconsistent, 122 inconsistent,  122 contracting-out of services and fear of  ‘hold-ups’, 125 ‘hold-ups’,  125 contracting-out of services to not-for-profit organisations, 118 organisations,  118 control mechanisms, 47 mechanisms, 47 coordination, 67 coordination,  67,, 69 core executive, 38 executive, 38 declining population levels, hierarchical management of, 80 of, 80 defined, 2 defined,  2,, 71 discourses, 4 discourses,  4 economic, 66 economic,  66,, 72 efficiency, 150 efficiency,  150 efficiency of community engagement, 148 engagement,  148 egalitarian networks, 3 networks, 3 elite networks, 88 networks, 88 ‘enabling’ ‘en abling’ policy style, 121 style, 121 executive power, power, centralisation of, 86 of, 86,, 87 expanding scale of, 2 of,  2 fundamental transformation of, 2 of,  2,, 3,  3, 7  7,, 8  8,, 71

hierarchies, 6,, 28 hierarchies, 6  28,, 68,  68, 92 horizontal networks, 3 networks, 3,, 6  6,, 39  39,, 108 implementation ‘gap’, 21 ‘gap’, 21,, 27,  27, 28  28– –9 in a risk-averse culture, 157 culture, 157 interdependency, 4 interdependency,  4 inter-organisational, 4 inter-organisational,  4 issue networks, 33 networks, 33 language of, 154 of,  154,, 155 legitimation gap, 150 gap, 150 marketisation of, 116 of, 116 and the media, 104 media,  104 multi-level, 42 multi-level,  42 Se e also European Union/European integration networks, 3 networks,  3,, 4,  4, 5  5,, 6  6,, 21  21,, 28,  28, 32  32,, 33,  33, 34  34,, 35,  35, 38,  51,,  64,  64, 67  67,, 106  106,, 150  150,, 153 38, 51 networks, ‘concentation’, 65 ‘concentation’, 65 new forms of, 6 of,  6,, 24  24,, 69  69,, 177 non-state market-driven (NSMD), 5 (NSMD),  5,, 163  163,, 181 181,, 182  182,, 183,  183, 184 norms, 4 norms,  4,, 76,  76, 155 of the internet, 78 internet, 78 partners, 13 partners,  13 pension provision, hierarchical management of, 80 of, 80 policing, 83 policing,  83,, 84 See also  state, micro-managemen micro-managementt power-sharing, 91 power-sharing,  91,, 92,  92, 174 ‘privatisation’ of, 182 of, 182 relational approach, 3 approach, 3,, 21  21,, 62  62,, 64  64,, 69,  69, 71  71,, 90,  90, 158, 158, 165 resources, 172 resources,  172 risk, 76 risk,  76,, 77 rules of, 13 of, 13,, 14  14,, 15  15,, 28  28,, 34,  34, 38  38,, 47,  47, 56  56,, 134  134,, 160, 160, 175  175,, 188 self-organising networks, 6 networks, 6,, 33  33,, 70 self-policing incentives, parents, 83 parents,  83– –4 ‘shadow of hierarchy’, 70 hierarchy’,  70,, 90  90,, 91,  91,  153  153,, 159,  159, 160 160,, 177  177,, 182  182,, 183 society-centred approach, 1 approach, 1,, 3  3,, 4  4,, 12  12,, 20,  20, 21  21,, 49 49,, 70  70,, 71,  71, 186  186,, 188,  188, 190 state centrality in, 151 in,  151,, 160  160,, 186 state-centric approach, 2 approach, 2,, 5  5,, 12,  12, 21  21,, 69 state-centric relational approach, 2 approach,  2– –3, 16  16,, 59  59,, 63, 63, 65  65,, 69,  69, 89  89,, 96,  96, 106  106,, 132,  132, 138  138,, 145,  145, 160,, 163, 160  163, 191 state-society coalitions, 89 coalitions, 89 third-party government, 4 government, 4

hierarchical authority, 35 authority, 35,, 70  70,, 76  76,,  86,  86, 90  90,, 116 116,, 124  124,, 188 extension of, 81 of, 81 hierarchical control, 75 control, 75,, 78  78,, 91  91– –2, 108  108,, 109,  109, 122,, 129 122  129,, 134,  134, 154  154,, 155,  155, 179

and threat/use of coercive power, 36 power, 36,, 37  37,, 90  90,, 104 through semi-autonomous agencies, 103 agencies, 103 and traditional notions of public policy, policy, 2 transnational, 43 transnational,  43– –4

exploitation of, 85 of, 105  105 problems with, 85 with, hierarchical sanctions and rewards, 71 rewards, 71,, 97  97,, 99,, 101 99  101,, 108  108,, 170

transparency, transparency, 121 trust, 4 trust,  4,, 6  6,, 76  76, 121 , 102,  102, 103  103,, 111  111,, 150  150,, 170 unrepresentativee elites, 51 unrepresentativ elites, 51,, 148  148,, 151  151,, 156 and use of language, 155 language,  155

 

INDEX

and use of market mechanisms, 7 mechanisms,  7,, 64,  64, 65  65,, 75  75,, 79 79,, 116  116,, 117 and the use of popular media, 104 media, 104– –5 volume of, 92 of, 92  without government/from government/from government to governance, 3 governance,  3,, 5,  5, 20  20,, 33  33,, 39,  39, 49  49,, 71,  71, 92  92,,

 

input, 150,, 151 input, 150 loss of, 14 of, 14,, 21,  21, 30  30– –1, 104 output, 150 output,  150 legitimacy/fiscal legitimacy/fis cal crisis, 1 crisis, 1,, 20  20,, 21,  21, 24  24,, 26 legitimate authority, 151 authority, 151

153,, 154  154, , 159,  159  163  163, , 182 153 governance, modes of,, 6, of, 6 , 16  16, , 47,  47, 165 associative, 11 associative,  11,, 18  18,, 21,  21, 31  31,, 33  33,, 91,  91, 162  162,, 164,  164, 166 166,, 172  172,, 174,  174, 184 costs and benefits, 163 benefits,  163 state centrality in, 174 in,  174,, 176,  176, 185 community engagement, 5 engagement, 5,, 8  8,, 11,  11, 17  17,, 21  21,, 30  30,, 67 67,, 91  91,, 137  137,, 139  139,, 144,  144, 146  146,, 150,  150, 152  152,, 160 160,, 189 benefits of, 153 of, 153 defined, 139 defined,  139 features of, 144 of, 144– –6 increase in, 137 in, 137– –8 limitations of, 138 of, 138,, 153 markets, 4 markets,  4,, 17  17,, 21  21,, 97 persuasion, 16 persuasion,  16,, 31,  31, 90  90,, 97,  97, 103  103,, 106,  106, 113  113,,

marginalisatio marginalisation n of, 4 of, 4 marketing of, 104 of, 104 ‘market-supporting’ role, role, 120  120 neo-liberal, 7 neo-liberal,  7,, 14  14,, 25  25,, 72  72,, 89,  89, 115  115,, 135,  135, 166  166,, 175 networks, 163 networks,  163,, 164 overload, 24 overload,  24,, 25  25,, 163 See also government, legitimacy/fis legitimacy/fiscal cal crisis pluricentric, 3 pluricentric,  3,,  4 and social capital, 113 capital, 113 Granovetter, Mark, 110 Mark, 110 Greenspan, Greenspa n, Alan, 82 Alan, 82 Greer, Alan, 67 Alan, 67 Grote, Jurgen, 166 Jurgen, 166 Guyana   water provision, 48 provision, 48

189  97 defined, defined, 97 persuasion and hierarchical, combined, 108 combined, 108,, 109 109,, 111 persuasion and hierarchical, difference, 98 persuasion through normative commitments, 101 top-down/hierarchical, 2 top-down/hierarchical,  2,, 4,  4, 6,  6, 16,  16, 21,  21, 36,  36, 39  39,, 60 60,, 65  65,, 70,  70, 71  71,, 72  72,,  76,  76, 79  79,, 86,  86, 87  87,, 97,  97, 112 112,, 132  132,, 164  164,, 169  169,, 177  177,, 188 increase in, 92 in, 92,, 93  93,, 95  95,, 96 stimulants, 77 stimulants,  77 government accountability, expectation of, 91 of, 91 as provider of democratic legitimacy, legitimacy, 50

Hajer, Maarten, 4 Maarten, 4 Hall, Rodney, 172 Rodney, 172 Harcourt, Michael, 157 Michael, 157 Haufler, Virginia, 172 Virginia, 172,, 182 Hawke, Bob, 167 Bob, 167  Australian Council of Trade Trade Unions (ACTU), 168 Hay, Colin, 113 Colin, 113 Hayek, Friedrich, Friedrich, 179  179 Head, Brian, 149 Brian, 149,, 152,  152, 160 Hendy, Peter, 170 Peter, 170 Heritier, Adrienne, 4 Adrienne, 4 ‘high modernism’, 88 modernism’, 88 Hill, Carolyn, 39 Carolyn, 39 HIV/AIDS

centralisation, 61,, 84 centralisation, 61  84,, 86 confidence in, 102 in, 102,,  103  103,, 113 debt, 26 debt,  26– –7 debt as proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), 26 (GDP),  26 decentring of, 4 of, 4,, 21  21,, 28,  28, 32  32,, 38 See also state, hollowing out of  decision-making, 138 decision-making,  138 expectations of, 93 of, 93,, 102 expenditure, 24 expenditure,  24– –5, 72 expenditure on social welfare, 25 welfare,  25 indirect, 76 indirect,  76 influence on non-state actors, example of,

infection rates, reduction of, 100 of,  100 Hobson, John, 63 John, 63 Hoffmann, Stanley, 43 Stanley, 43 Holliday, Ian, 38 Ian, 38 homosexuality  See  same-sex  same-sex relationships, legal status Howard, John, 86 John, 86 Hurd, Ian, 175 Ian, 175 ideas and governance through persuasion, 113 persuasion,  113 individual rationality, 101 rationality, 101 individual self-interest, 101 self-interest, 101,, 113  113,, 147

227

105 intentions, 158 intentions,  158 legitimacy, 11 legitimacy,  11,, 15,  15, 29  29,, 37  37,, 62,  62, 103  103,, 138,  138, 173  173,, 175 decline of, 102 of, 102,, 121,  121, 138 enhancement of, 104 of, 104,, 114,  114, 161

and markets, 115 markets, 115 and normative commitments, 101 commitments, 101,, 113 and sub-optimal collective collective outcomes, 159 Institute for Economic Affairs (UK), 22 (UK), 22

 

228

 

INDEX

institutions and collective-action problems, 159 problems, 159,, 166 institutional arrangements, 163 arrangements, 163 institutional capacities, 166 capacities, 166 institutional configuration, configuration, 159,  159, 165  165,, 179 institutional relations, 165 relations, 165 institutional solutions, 160 solutions, 160 instruments, policy  command and control, 8 control,  8,, 86 intellectual property rights, 77 rights,  77 interest groups, interest  groups, 33  33– –4, 164  164,, 179  179,, 180  public See a llso so  governance, networks and  public policy, communities effect on economic efficiency, efficiency, 163 influence of, 162 of,  162 partners in governance, 164 governance, 164 ‘rent-seeking’, 179 ‘rent-seeking’,  179 International Association for Public Public Participation, 139 Participation,  139 International Organisation for Standards (ISO), 172– 172 –3 international relations ‘juridification’ ‘juridificati on’ of, 82 of, 82 US hegemony, 83 hegemony, 83 international trade expansion in, 117 in, 117 International Tropical Timber Agreement, 184 internet and access to public opinion, 137 opinion,  137 investments decisions,, determinants of, 133 decisions of, 133 transaction-specific, 125 transaction-specific,  125 Ireland bank deposit guarantee, 80 guarantee, 80 governance, corporatist forms of, 165 of,  165 organic agriculture policy, policy, 67 Irvin, Renee, 148 Renee, 148,, 158 Italy  Italian judiciary, 15 judiciary, 15 Italian Mafia, 15 Mafia, 15  James, Oliver, Oliver, 38  Japan industrial policy, post-war, 66 post-war,  66 Nippon Telegraph Telegraph Company (NTT), privatisation of, 124 of, 124 social capital, 111 capital, 111  Johnson,  Johns on, Elizabeth, 144 Elizabeth, 144  Johnson,  Johns on, Lyndon, 27 Lyndon, 27 Katzenstein, Peter, 166 Peter, 166 Keating, Michael, 40 Michael, 40,, 47  47,, 116  116,, 150  150,, 158

King, Anthony, 24 Anthony, 24 Kirkpatrick, Ian, 127 Ian, 127 Kitchener, Martin, 127 Martin, 127 Klijn, Erik-Hans, 4 Erik-Hans, 4,, 151 Knoke, David, 34 David, 34 ‘structural’ approach to study of policy  networks, 34 networks,  34– –5 knowledge diverse forms of, 158 of,  158 through community engagement, 138 engagement, 138 Koenig-Archibugi, Koenig-Arc hibugi, Mathias, 182 Mathias, 182 Kollman, Kelly, 171 Kelly, 171 Koontz, Thomas, 144 Thomas, 144 Koppenjan, Joop, 4 Joop, 4 Kyoto Protocol, 27 Protocol, 27,, 86 Landmine Action, 188 Action, 188 Lawrence, Geoffrey, 2 Geoffrey, 2 legislation, 76 legislation,  76 blasphemy, 77 blasphemy,  77 drugs, 77 drugs,  77 hate crimes, 77 crimes, 77 homosexuality, 76 homosexuality,  76 Lister, Michael, 190 Michael, 190 London, Rosanne, 148 Rosanne, 148 Lukes, Steven, 101 Steven, 101,, 188 Lynn, Laurence, 39 Laurence, 39 Magnette, Paul, 173 Paul, 173 Majone, Giandomenico, 39 Giandomenico, 39,, 76 Maloney, William, 149 William, 149 Mann, Michael, 63 Michael, 63 Marinetto, Mike, 38 Mike, 38,, 151 market failure, 78 failure, 78,, 80  80,, 115 as justification for state intervention, 22 intervention,  22,, 80 80– –1 due to market structure, 126 structure,  126 externalities/non-priced externalities/non -priced impacts, 78 impacts, 78 hierarchical management of, 80 of,  80 sources of, 77 of, 77,, 169 theory of, 22 of, 22 markets as replacement of hierarchical governance, 116 ‘c ‘coordinated oordinated market’ systems, 165 systems, 165 defined, 115 defined,  115 external, 117 external,  117 and metagovernance, metagovernance, 125  125 imperfect, 22 imperfect,  22 institutional requirements, 123 requirements, 123 internal, 119 internal,  119,,  121  121,, 122 invisible hand of the market, 115 market,  115 ‘liberal market’ systems, 165 systems,  165

Kelly, Josie, 38 Josie, 38,,  46

limits on, 122 on, 122

Kerwer, Dieter, 2, Dieter, 130  130, Kettl, Donald, Donald, 2 , 32  32,,, 177  33,  33, 68  68,, 69,  69, 187 Kickert, Walter, 32 Walter, 32

market relationships, 110 relationships,  110, 119, ‘marketisation’, ‘marketisation’, 115  115,, 116  116,  119, 120  120,, 126 ‘marketisation’ and government control, 120 control, 120

 

INDEX

and need for hierarchical governance, 124 governance,  124,, 136 and property rights, 123 rights,  123 ‘publicisation’ of, 125 of, 125 ‘quasi-market’, 125 ‘quasi-market’,  125 reliance on states, 123 states,  123 and resource allocation, 115 allocation, 115 ‘soft ‘so ft institutional parameters’, 110 parameters’, 110 state creation of, 117 of,  117 transparent competition, 123 competition, 123 trust, 123 trust,  123 use of, defended, 115 defended, 115 Marsh, David, 11 David, 11,, 28  28,, 33,  33, 190 Martin, Cathie Jo, 190 Jo, 190 Martin, Hans-Peter, 120 Hans-Peter, 120 Martin, Steve, 147 Steve, 147,, 148 Matthews, Trevor, 174 Trevor, 174 Mattli, Walter, 172 Walter, 172 Mawson, John, 148 John,  148 McEwen, John, 67 John, 67 McKeen-Edwards, Heather, 64 Heather, 64 metagovernance, 11 metagovernance,  11,, 37  37,, 38,  38, 45  45,, 46,  46, 55  55,, 67  67,, 69  69,, 76 76,, 124  124,, 125,  125, 157  157,, 163,  163, 188  188,, 191 accountability, accountability, 51  51,, 124 burden’, 68 as cause of ‘bureaucratic burden’,  68 as learning process, 127 process,  127 as public goods provision, 57 provision,  57– –8 by non-state actors, 55 actors,  55 challenges, 66 challenges,  66,, 68 democracy, 49 democracy,  49,, 51 effectiveness, 48 effectiveness,  48,, 57 elements of, 47 of, 47,, 69 failure, 53 failure,  53,, 54  54,, 116,  116, 126  126– –9 functions, 145 functions,  145,, 148 incentives, 56 incentives,  56,, 58  58,, 126 legitimacy, 54 legitimacy,  54,, 56  56,, 124 of markets, 116 markets, 116,, 123  123,, 124  124,, 134 of non-state market-driven (NSMD) systems, 183 remanagerialisation of risk, 76 remanagerialisation risk, 76 resources, 55 resources,  55,,  126 resourcing, 48 resourcing,  48,, 124 SERDAL, 47 SERDAL,  47,, 70 state responsibility responsibility for, for, 105 steering, 47 steering,  47,, 57  57,, 105  105,, 115  115,, 124,  124, 126  126,, 135,  135, 177,, 180 177 Mexico North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (NAFT A), approach to, 176 to,  176,, 189 Michels, Robert, 173 Robert, 173 Mikalsen, Knut, 173 Knut, 173 military-industrial complex, 9 complex, 9 Milward, Milwar d, H. Brinton, 49 Brinton, 49 Model Cities program, 9 program,  9 Moody’s, 129 Moody’s,  129,, 131

Moravcsik, Andrew, 42 Andrew, 42 Mosley, Layna, 41 Layna, 41 Mueller, John, 150 John, 150 Mulgan, Richard, 51 Richard, 51,, 52 Murdoch, Jonathan, 151 Jonathan, 151 Murdoch, Rupert, 134 Rupert, 134 News Corporation and Chinese government, 134 –5  5 Muslim134– clerics, clerics, 5 natural resources and free-riding, 159 free-riding, 159 community responsibility for, for, 159 neo-liberal philosophy, 15 philosophy, 15 Netherlands community engagement, 151 engagement, 151 governance, governanc e, corporatist forms of, 165 of,  165 interactive governance, Enschede, 152 Enschede,  152– –3 social capital, 111 capital, 111 voluntary agreement on energy efficiency, 109 new public management, 87 management,  87,, 119 NGOs organisations, non-governmental non-gov ernmental (NGOs) See  organisations Niskanen, William,, 23 William, 23 non-state actors as agents of persuasion, 99 persuasion, 99,, 102  102,, 106,  106, 108 as investors in social capital, 112 capital,  112 and lobbying of governments, 106 governments, 106 and positive use of persuasion, 100 persuasion,  100– –1 and use of persuasion, 99 persuasion, 99,, 105  105,, 181 North, Douglas, 59 Douglas, 59 Northern Rock, 81 Rock,  81 Norway  Norwegian Norwegi an Fisheries Fisheries Association, Association, 173 nuclear power, 133 power, 133 investment in, 60 in, 60 Nye, Joseph, 30 Joseph, 30 obesity  and non-state persuasion, 100 persuasion, 100 hierarchical management of, 80 of,  80 Offe, Claus, 164 Claus, 164 oil industry, 83 industry, 83 Okimoto, Daniel, 65 Daniel, 65 Olson, Mancur, 179 Mancur, 179,, 180 Open Net Initiative, 78 Initiative, 78 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 24 (OECD),  24,, 26  26,, 59  59,, 72 countries and deregulation, 117 deregulation, 117 government outsourcing trends, 122 trends, 122 organisations conceptual differences and associate governance, 177 governance,  177,, 178

 

229

Moore, Michael, 29 Michael, 29 Moran, Michael, 39 Michael, 39,, 87  87,, 88  88,, 89

organisations, international, 43 organisations, international, 43– –4, 83 transfer of policy-making authority to, 41 to,  41

 

230

 

INDEX

organisations, non-governmental organisations, non-governmental (NGOs), 1 (NGOs), 1,, 4  4,, 5, 40,  40, 125  125,, 152,  152, 162  162,, 184,  184, 189 inequality amongst, 148 amongst, 148 not-for-profit, 17 not-for-profit,  17 and persuasion, 100 persuasion, 100 resources, 148 resources,  148 organisations,, supra-national, 1 organisations supra-national, 1,, 40  40,, 42 and accountability, 51 accountability, 51 Orwell, George, 84 George, 84 Osborne, David, 135 David, 135 Ostrom, Elinor, 159 Elinor, 159 Paine, Mark, 158 Mark, 158 Parker, Christine, 91 Christine, 91 Parsons, Talcott, 63 Talcott, 63 Pattberg, Phillip, 182 Phillip, 182 Pearce, Graham, 148 Graham, 148 Peters, Guy, Guy, 5  5,, 8,  8, 12  12,, 24  24,,  86,  86, 121  121,, 191 Pierre, Jon, 5 Jon,  5,, 8  8,, 12  12,, 24,  24, 86  86,, 121 Pierson, Christopher, 120 Christopher, 120 pluralist theory, 162 theory, 162 interest-groups, 162 interest-groups,  162 policy, environmental, 7 environmental, 7 hierarchical management, 79 management, 79 instruments, 7 instruments,  7,, 79 transnational, 86 transnational,  86 policy institutions  88,, 89 self-regulating, 88 self-regulating, policy instruments command and control, 95 control,  95 policy networks See   governance, governance, networks policy styles anticipatory, 65 anticipatory,  65 reactive, 64 reactive,  64 political participation, 15 participation, 15 political power, 6 power, 6 dispersal of, 6 of, 6 political processes confidence in, 30 in, 30,, 31,  31, 32 political protests, 14 protests, 14 politicians, 155 politicians,  155 criticism of, 78 of, 78 cynicism about, 30 about, 30 manipulation of economy/markets, economy/markets, 22  22,, 23 shielding of, 88 of, 88 trust in, 15 in, 15,, 22,  22, 102  102,, 138 pollution, 79 pollution,  79 popular authority, 151 authority, 151 Porter, Tony, 172 Tony, 172 power, 156 power,  156,, 158  158,, 187,  187, 190 agenda-setting, 187 agenda-setting,  187,, 188 checks and balances, 162 balances, 162 constitutivee effect, 98 constitutiv effect, 98 disciplinary, disciplinary, 98  98 to disciplinary, from repressive disciplinary, 97

of persuasion, 188 persuasion, 188,,  189 repressive and disciplinary, disciplinary, differences, 98 differences, 98 to persuade, abuse of, 101 of, 101 vertical balance of, 150 of,  150 Power, Michael, 76 Michael, 76 power struggles, 6 struggles, 6 Prakash, Aseem, 171 Aseem, 171 price mechanisms as resource allocators, 115 allocators, 115,, 120 Prince, Erik, 127 Erik, 127 principal-agent problems, 87 problems,  87 private firms, 11 firms, 11,, 14  14,, 21  21,, 125,  125, 132  132,, 163  163,, 181 accountability, 130 accountability,  130 advantages for government, 131 government, 131 advertising expenditure, 99 expenditure, 99– –100 and associations, associations, 170  170 as public service providers, 118 providers,  118 coercive power, lack of, 133 of,  133 conflicts of interest, 130 interest,  130 and defence, 118 defence, 118,, 132 government control over, 128 over,  128,, 129  129,, 132  132,, 133  133,, 134 134– –5 legitimacy, 130 legitimacy,  130 and loss of social capital, 112 capital, 112 and marketisation, 115 marketisation, 115 preference-shaping power, power, 133 public confidence in, 102 in, 102 and ‘responsive regulation’, 91 regulation’, 91 and use of political processes, 106 processes,  106,, 132 voluntary compliance programs, 108 programs, 108– –9, 172 private-interest government, government,  162  162,, 163,  163, 164  164,, 166 166,,  169  169,, 174 defined, 169 defined,  169 state-maintained, 174 state-maintained,  174 privatisation, 39 privatisation,  39,, 75  75– –6, 79  79,, 116,  116, 136 and decline in government influence, 121 influence,  121 and markets, 117 markets, 117 and price mechanisms, 120 mechanisms, 120 and property rights, 119 rights,  119 and regulations, 124 regulations, 124 ‘hierarchical safeguarding’, safeguarding’, 124  124 proceeds of, 116 of, 116 retention of government control, 75 control, 75 Russia, 123 Russia,  123 property rights, 115 rights, 115,, 119  119,, 123 absence of, 123 of, 123 Russia, 123 Russia,  123 Provan, Keith, 49 Keith, 49 public choice theory, theory, 21–  21–2, 66  66,, 79,  79, 101  101,, 156,  156, 159, 159, 162 ‘c ‘capture’ apture’ of governments, governments, 66  66 and collective-action problems, 159 problems, 159 critique of, 179 of, 179 interest groups, 162 groups, 162 and governance through persuasion,  113 of state failure,  21, failure, 21 , 22  22,, 23persuasion, 113