Statutory Construction Case Digest

Case No. 9 Radiola Toshiba Philippines vs Intermediate Appellate Court GR No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Case No. 10 | Midterms Case No. 1 Manuel T. De Guia vs Commission on Elections GR No. 104712, May 6, 1992

Statutory rule: In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

Statutory Rule: A construction that gives to the language in a statute meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

Facts:

The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. However, an insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced four months after the issuance of the said attachment. Petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. Issue: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against the respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. Held: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction that will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.

Facts: Petitioner Manuel De Guia is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque. He contends that under par(d) of Sec. 3 of Ra 7166, members of the Sangguaniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in the May 1992 elections. Issue: W/N par(d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and SB shall be elected at large. Held:

No. Par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlungsod which are single district cities and Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner would make the act of the statute in singling out the single district provinces as useless or meaningless. The key to open the door to what the legislature intended in the language of a state is its purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. Statutes should then be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A construction should be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted.

Case No. 11 | Midterms Case No. 2 Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs CA GR No. 78687, January 31, 1989

Case No. 12 | Midterms Case No. 3 B/Gen Jose Commendador, et al. vs B/Gen Demetrio Camera, et al. GR No. 96948, August 2, 1991

Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and were charged with violations of Articles of War in relation with their alleged participation in a failed coup d’etat. Their case was referred to General Court Martial No. 14. At a hearing, petitioners manifested their desire to exercise their right to raise peremptory challenges against the President and the members of the general court martial invoking Art. 18 of CA No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under PD 39.

The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were grantees of free patent. The subject property was later sold to Elena Salenillas and her husband, petitioners in the instant case. On December 4, 1973, the property of petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a public auction by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. Issue: W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Held:

Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance." The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Facts:

Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 18 of CA No. 408 has been discontinued under PD 39. Held: No. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed under CA No. 408, PD 39 however was issued to implement General Order No. 8 issued during martial law to create military tribunals. With the lifting of Martial Law, General Order No. 8 was revoked and military tribunals were dissolved. As such, the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.

Case No. 13| Midterms Case No. 4 Lydia O. Chua vs The Civil Service Commission, NIA GR No. 88979, February 7, 1992

Case No. 14 | Midterms Case No. 5 City of Manila and City Treasurer vs Judge Amador E. Gomez, Et Al. GR No. L-37251, August 31, 1981

Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Facts:

Facts:

RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Sec. 2 provides for who are qualified to avail of the benefits of RA 6683 which includes, "all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees." Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program filed and application with the respondent NIA which was denied due to the fact that she is a coterminus employee. Her appeal with respondent Commission was likewise denied. Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law) Held: No. There is no substantial difference between a co-terminus employee and a contractual, casual or emergency employee for all are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career and temporary. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the SC were to sustain respondent's submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The doctrine of necessary implications should be applied in this case.

The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the other hand, the Special Education Fund Law imposed an “annual additional tax of 1% on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed 3%” Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%, the municipal board of Manila imposed an additional .5% to fix the total imposable tax on real property at 3% which is divided into the following: 1.5% as per charter of Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund law and .5% as per order of the municipal board. Private respondent Esso Philippines paid the additional one-half percent realty tax under protest and later filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent is void because it is not authorized by the city charter or any law. Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of Manila is valid or legal. Held:

Yes. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council, by ordinance, may impose a realty tax of “not less than one-half perfect but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property.” The additional one-half percent then is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of implications sustains the contention of the City of Manila that the additional one-half percent is sanctioned by the Special Education Fund Law when the same states that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.” The doctrine of necessary implications means that “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.”

Case No. 15 | Midterms Case No. 6 People of the Philippines vs Guillermo Manantan GR No. L-14129, July 31, 1962

Case No. 16 | Midterms Case No. 7 JM Tuason and Co., et al. vs Hon. Herminio Mariano, et al. GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978

Statutory rule: The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.

Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.

Facts:

Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of the Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that “No justice, judge, fiscal…. shall aid any candidate in any manner in any election, except to vote.” Defendant contends that this provision excludes justice of the peace and as such, he is excluded from this prohibition. Because of this, the lower court dismissed the case against him. The Solicitor General appealed. Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Held: Yes. Although petitioner argues that when Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words “justice of peace” from the Revised Administrative Code provision from which it was taken and thus making the intention of the legislature clear in the omission, the word judge in the former provision was qualified or modified by the phrase “of first instance.” The term “judge” in Section 54 is not modified or qualified, making it broader and more generic to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the Courts of First Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Courts of Industrial Relations and justices of the peace. The rule of casus omissus has no applicability to the case at bar for the maxim only applies and operate if and when the omission has been clearly established.

Facts: Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. Held:

OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735. Considerng the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled), the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

Case No. 17 | Midterms Case No. 8 Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs Intermediate Appellate Court GR No. L-72005, May 29, 1987

Case No. 18 | Midterms Case No. 9 Juanito Pilar vs Commission on Elections GR No. 115245, July 11, 1995

Statutory rule: When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The rule, founded on logic, is corollary of the principle that general words and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.

Statutory rule: The rule is well recognized that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

Facts:

Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires Inc. filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, private respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial corporation upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner Philippine British Assurance so the attached properties were released. The trial court then rendered a decision favorable to the private respondent and Writ of execution was issued in favor of private respondent. The same was however returned unsatisfied as varian failed to deliver the attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin thus prayed that petitioner corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. Issue: W/N the counter bond issued through petitioner corporation covers execution of a judgment pending appeal. Held: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It applies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by plaintiff. It is a recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Since the law did not make any distinction nor intended any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which may be charged against a counter bond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment but also a judgment pending appeal.

Facts:

On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost. Issue: W/N petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a "non-candidate", having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. Held:

Yes. Sec. 14 of Ra 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to who who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy".

Case No. 19 | Midterms Case No. 10 People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon GR No. 110898, February 20, 1996

Case No. 20 | Midterms Case No. 11 Cecilio De Villa vs Court of Appeals GR No. 87416, April 8, 1991

Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.

Statutory rule: When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Facts: Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. He filed a petition for probation. However, the Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of private respondent's application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and granted private respondent's application on April 23, 1993. Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent's application for probation despite the appeal filed by the private respondent. Held: Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall deemed a waiver of the right to appeal." having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. Furthermore, the law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals so neither should the court.

Facts: Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was charged before the RTC of Makati for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner contends that the check in question was drawn against his dollar account with a foreign bank and as such, it is not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law.. Issue: W/N a foreign check drawn against a foreign account is covered by BP 22. Held: Yes. The law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case since what the law only specifies is that “checks drawn and issued in the Philippines, though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of the law.” It is a cardinal rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Case No. 21 | Midterms Case No. 12 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs Pedro Jimenez GR No. L-14787, January 28, 1961

Case No. 22 | Midterms Case No. 13 RP vs Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson GR No. 89483, August 30, 1990

Statutory rule: General terms may be restricted by specific word, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.

Statutory rule: Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those especially mentioned.

Facts:

Facts:

Petitioner corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. They import materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those petitioner imports. For every importation, petitioner pays 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. However the same law also provides that “foreign exchanged used for xxx importation to the Philippines of xxx stabilizers and flavors xxx shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.” Petitioner now seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax they paid in the total sum of P113,343.99.

Acting on information received which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required private respondent Lt. Col. Tecson to submit his explanation or comment, together with supporting evidence thereto. Private respondent was unable to provide supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who ha gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to "investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service." Private respondent mainly argues that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A are acts of his alone and not connected with being a crony, business associate or subordinate. Hence, the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

Issue: W/N the foreign exchange used by petitioner in the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to a refund. Held: Yes. The refusal to deny refund was based on the argument that all the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: food products, book supplies/materials and medical supplies and that for petitioners to be exempt, the “stabilizers and flavors” they use must fall under the category of food products. Respondent contends that since petitioners use these as toothpaste, the same is not a food product. Court ruled that although “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following which were also included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, industrial starch and more. Therefore, the law must be seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by a particular recital does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.

Issue: W/N private respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. Held:

No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term "subordinate" as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative and close associate in E) 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent or nominee in EO 2.

Note: Ejusdem Generis – General words followed by an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

Case No. 23 | Midterms Case No. 14 PP vs Vicente Echavez, Jr. et al. GR Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1990 Statutory rule: Rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain. Facts: 16 persons were charged with squatting which is penalized by Presidential Decre No. 772 which provides that “any person who with the use of force, xxx succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of another against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment xxx” The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of PD 772 on the basis of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture.

Case No. 24 | Midterms Case No. 15 Vera vs Cuevas, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the PH Rule: The familiar rule of Ejusdem Generis Facts: Defendant Commissioner on Internal Revenue required the private respondents Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers and Consolidated Milk Company and Milk Industries, Inc. to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code, which essentially imposes this requirement on all milk products “from which the fatty party has been removed totally or in part.” Private respondents protest by alleging that filled milk is not skimmed milkwhich is required under the law. The lower court favored the private respondents on the ground of ejusdem generis. Issue: W/N Section 169 of the Tax Code applies to filled milk.

Issue: W/N PD 772 applies to agricultural lands Held: No. PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakeable. It stated that the “rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.”

Held:

No. Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms “skimmed milk” in the headnote and “condensed skimmed milk” in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause “all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part.” In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term “skimmed milk” under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute. Furthermore, there is a difference between skimmed milk and filled milk in that skimmed milk is milk wherein all fatty part is removed while filled milk is milk wherein all fatty part is likewise removed but replaced by a fat substitute like coconut oil.

Case No. 25 | Midterms Case No. 16 San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue GR No. 147749, June 22, 2006

Case No. 26 | Midterms Case No. 17 Dra. Brigida Buenaseda vs Secretary Juan Flavier GR No. 106719, September 21, 1993

Statutory Rule: The express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all other. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

Statutory Rule: Noscitur a socciis. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Facts:

SPMC is a corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other similar products. It was assessed and ordered by the Commission of Internal Revenue to pay the total amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency in miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax. SPMC opposed on the ground that they are exempted under Section 168 of the Tax Code on the ground that the purchaser of their products, UNICHEM, exports their products. Issue: W/N SPMC is exempted from the payment of 3% miller’s tax. Held: No. The language of the exemption did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC for nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials was covered by the exemption. The proposes interpretation of SPMC unduly enlarged the scope of the exemption clause. Where the law enumerate the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentiond. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Facts:

The private respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the petitioner, who were employees of the national center for mental health. The respondents argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. Held: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to "recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees, it referred to "suspension" as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitur a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Case No. 28 | Midterms Case No. 18 Manolo P. Fule vs Court of Appeals GR No. L-79094, June 22, 1988

Case No. 29 | Midterms Case No. 19 Purita Bersabal vs Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador Gr No. L-35910, July 21, 1978

Statutory rule: Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are mere directory.

Statutory rule: Use of word “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible thing while the word “shall” is imperative.

Facts:

Facts:

Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the stipulation of facts which was not signed by both petitioner nor by his counsel. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the appellate court. Issue: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the stipulation of facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. Held:

Yes. The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 4, states that “No agreement or admission made or entered during pre-trial shall be used against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and counsel.” By its very language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the petitioner and counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Case is re-opened to receive evidence in favor of the accused.

Private respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that “… counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court.” After receipt, petitioner filed a Motion Ex Parte to Submit Memorandum within 30 days from receipt of Notice of Submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. Issue: W/N the mere failure of an appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. Held:

The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts … shall decide.. cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city courts: provided…parties may submit memorandum.. if so requested.” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memorandum is optional. Being optional, a party may choose to waive submission of the memoranda. As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

Case No. 30 Jenette Marie Crisologo vs Globe Telecom, Cesar Maureal GR No. 167631, December 16 2005

Case No. 31 | Midterms Case No. 20 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (South) vs Court of Appeals GR No. 117188, August 7, 1997

Statutory rule: Statutory rule: Use of word “may” in the statuted generally connotes a permissible thing while the word “shall” is imperative”

Statutory rule: The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. Facts:

The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (North Association) was registered with private respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate by-laws. Later, it was discovered that there were two organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of North Association that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of the South Association, herein petitioner. The North Association complained and got a favorable result from respondent HIGC declaring the registration of petitioner association (the South Assocciation) cancelled and respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence, petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. Held: No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The wor “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statuted should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”.

Case No. 32 | Midterms Case No. 21 PNB vs Court of Appeals 222 Scra 134, May 17, 1993

Case No. 33 | Midterms Case No. 22 ALU-TUCP vs NLRC, National Steel Corporation GR No. 109902, August 2, 1994

Statutory rule: A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins.

Statutory rule:

Facts: To secure payments of his loan, private respondent mortgages two lots to petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. The notices of sale of private respondent’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of a newspaper “Daily Record.” The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and a Saturday respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks.” Issue: W/N the petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. Held:

No. it must be conceded that Article 13 of the NCC is completely silent as to the definition of what is a week. In Concepcion vs Andueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins. The petitioner bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication. Auction sale of petitioner bank is void and of no legal effect.

Case No. 34 Acting Commissioner of Customs vs Manila Electric Company, CTA Gr No. L-23623, June 30, 1977 Statutory Rule: