STATCON.docx

G.R.

No.

203335:

February

11,

2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents. ABAD,

J.:

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. ISSUES: Whether

or

not

a.

Section

b.

Section

c.

on

Section

5

on

Section

6

Identity

on Unsolicited

Abetting

on

and

the

Theft;

Attempt

Penalty

in

Cybersex;

Child

Pornography;

Commercial

Communications;

on

Libel;

4(c)(4) or

Interference;

on

4(c)(2)

Aiding

Access;

Cyber-squatting;

on

Section

constitutional.

Data

4(c)(1)

on

and

on

4(b)(3)

4(c)(3)

h.

valid Illegal

4(a)(6)

Section

g.Section

are

on

4(a)(3)

Section

f.

provisions

4(a)(1)

Section

e.

j.

following

Section

d.

i.

the

the

of

Commission One

of

Cybercrimes;

Degree

Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175; l. m.

Section Section

12

on

n.

Section

13

o.

Section

14

p. q. r.

Section

15

Section Section

on 17

19

8

on

on

Real-Time on

Restricting

Data;

Computer

Data;

Disclosure

of

Computer

Data;

and Destruction

or

Traffic

of

Seizure on

of

Preservation

on Search,

Collection

Penalties;

Blocking

Examination

of

of Access

Computer Computer

to

Computer

Data; Data; Data;

s. t.

Section Section

u.

24

on

Section

20

on

Cybercrime

Investigation

26(a)

Obstruction

on

and

of

Coordinating

CICCs

Powers

Center

Justice; (CICC);

and

and

Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel. HELD: a.

Section

4(a)(1)

of

Section

the

Cybercrime

Law

4(a)(1)

provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: (a)

Offenses

against

the

confidentiality,

integrity

and

availability

of

computer

data

and

systems:

(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1). Hence, b.

valid Section

and

4(a)(3)

of

Section

the

constitutional. Cybercrime

4(a)(3)

Law provides:

(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private documents. Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden. Hence, Section Section

valid 4(a)(6)

and of

the 4(a)(6)

constitutional. Cybercrime

Law provides:

(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is: (i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration; (ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and (iii)

Acquired

without

right

or

with

intellectual

property

interests

in

it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. Hence, Section

valid 4(b)(3)

of

Section

constitutional.

the

Cybercrime

4(b)(3)

b) x

and

provides:

Computer-related x

Law

Offenses: x

x

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press. In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection. Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006). Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published. The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section. Hence, Section

valid 4(c)(1)

and of

Section

the

constitutional. Cybercrime

4(c)(1)

(c)

Law provides:

Content-related

Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration. Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women. Hence, Section

valid 4(c)(2)

and of

Section

the

constitutional. Cybercrime

4(c)(2)

Law provides:

(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the AntiChild Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775. The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable. Hence, Section Section

valid 4(c)(3)

and of

the 4(c)(3)

constitutional. Cybercrime

Law provides:

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i)

There

is

prior

affirmative

consent

from

the

recipient;

or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or (iii)

The

following

conditions

are

present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message. The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Hence, Articles Section

void 353, 4(c)(4)

for

354,

and of

being 355

of

the

Cyber

unconstitutional. the

Penal Crime

Code Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel. The

RPC

provisions

on

libel

read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads: Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: x

x

x

(c)

x

Content-related

x

Offenses:

x

x

x

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print. The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by oneclick reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and Section

5

of

Section Sec.

the

Cybercrime

Law

5 5.

Other

Offenses.

The

following

provides: acts

shall

also

constitute

an

offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable. (b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression. The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionallyprotected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law. Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c) (4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression. Section

6

of

Section

the

Cybercrime

6

Law provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be. Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes. Hence, Section Section

valid 7

and of

the 7

constitutional. Cybercrime

Law provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is

again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of: 1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as 2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional. Section

8

of

the

Section

Cybercrime

Law

8

provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both. Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both. If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both. The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department. The

courts

should

Hence, Section

not

encroach

on

this

prerogative

valid 12

of

the

and of

the

lawmaking

body.

constitutional. Cybercrime

Law

Section

12

provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system. Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities. All

other

data

to

be

collected

or

seized

or

disclosed

will

require

a

court

warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information. The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence. Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another. Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes. Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977) Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect. Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy. The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and

definiteness

as

to

ensure

Hence, Section

respect

for

void

the

rights

that

for

13

the

being

of

the

Section

Constitution

guarantees.

unconstitutional Cybercrime

Law

13

provides:

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation. Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case. The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance. Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them. No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation. At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same. Hence, Section

valid 14

and of

constitutional

the

Section

Cybercrime

Law

14

provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation. The

process

envisioned

in

Section

14

is

being

likened

to

the

issuance

of

a

subpoena.

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention. Hence, Section Section

valid 15

and of

the 15

constitutional. Cybercrime

Law provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties. Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and: (a)

To

secure

a

(b)

To

make

(c)

To

maintain

(d)

To

conduct

computer

and

retain the

forensic

system a

integrity

analysis

or

or

a

copy of

examination

computer

of the of

data

storage

medium; secured;

those

computer

data

relevant

stored

computer

the

computer

data

storage

data;

medium;

and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications network. Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination. Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court. Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them. Hence,

valid

Section

17

and of

constitutional.

the

Section

Cybercrime

Law

17

provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination. Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the users right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted. Hence,

valid

Section Section

19 19

empowers

and of

the

Department

constitutional.

the of

Justice

to

restrict

Cybercrime or

block

access

Law to

computer

data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data. Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above. The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures. Section

20

of

the

Section

Cybercrime

Law

20

provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities. Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid. But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for noncompliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court. Hence,

valid

Sections

24

and

and

Sections

26(a)

24

of

constitutional. the

and

Cybercrime 26(a)

Law provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan. Sec.

26.

Powers

and

Functions.

The

CICC

shall

have

the

following

powers

and

functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x. Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow. In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563 (2007). Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national

cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity. Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and users assets.This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan. Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard. Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid and constitutional.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.: JULY 8, 2014 / FACTS:

Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days. The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz. Corpuz argued as follows: a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy. b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy. c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved. d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction ISSUES and RULING Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)? Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence? No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information: 1. The designation of the offense by the statute; 2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; 3. The name of the offended party; and 4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence? Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand. May a sole witness be considered credible? Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. Visayas Community Case Digest: GR 196156 Jan 15, 2014

Medical

Center

vs

Yballe

Facts: The NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCH (now VCMC). NAMAMCCH-NFL is a local affiliate whose union leaders proceeded to strike despite the fact that it is not a legitimate labor organization. The respondents in this case are staff nurses and midwives of MCCH who actively joined and were believed to have took part in committing illegal acts during the strike. Consequently, MCCH terminated the union leaders of NAMA-MCCH-NFL as well as the respondents. The CA, however, found that respondents cannot be considered to have committed illegal acts since their participation was limited to the wearing of arm bands. Issue 1: W/N the dismissal of the respondents is valid Held: No. Article 263 (a)(par 3) provides that any union officer who knowingly participated in an illegal strike and any union officer or union member who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Here, the respondents merely participated in the illegal strike but did not commit any of the illegal acts. Hence, their termination is not valid. Issue 2: W/N the respondents are entitled to backwages No. The principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award of backwages. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. For this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal. Since the strike in this case was illegal, the respondents cannot be awarded with backwages.

Issue 3: W/N the respondents are entitled to reinstatement No. Considering that strained relations ensued, the grant of separation pay to respondents is the alternative in lieu of reinstatement. Jurisprudence states that the alternative relief for union members who were dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer’s interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers’ continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer and employee. ## Gonzales vs Comelec 21 SCRA 774 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Political Question vs Justiciable Question In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite. Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question. ISSUE: I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question. II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election. HELD: I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations. II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010

FACTS:

AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a week.

In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time and while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.

Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife, then appellant was able to penetrate her. Two days after, appellant again raped her. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the same time until October 15, 2002, when she was 14 yrs. old.

RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape.CA affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and consider the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court authority

Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable.

HELD:

To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender.

Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People vs. Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure.

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA 7659.Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659, since he does not fit into that category.

Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Information. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.

Carandang v. Santiago G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.

HELD: Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

CIR V AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC. (Phil. Branch) 20JUN GR 152609 | June 29, 2005 | J. Panganiban Facts: Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit of AMEXHongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card members situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines. It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.” In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx” Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the claimant as they partake of the nature of tax exemption. CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines” and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of BSP. Issue: W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund Held: Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. Section 102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate:

(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP; (2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels and other service establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are zero-rated. Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating. As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, while imports are taxed. In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization of consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign client the drafts and bulls it has gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore, services also consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle, such service is subject to 10% VAT. However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption, and thus should be zero-rated: (1)

Service be performed in the Philippines

(2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code (3)

It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.

Romualdez G.R. July

vs Nos. 28,

Marcelo 166510-33 2006

Facts: Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription. In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the

Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied. Issues: (a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity? (b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed? Held: Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

San Pablo Manufacturing vs CIR

Statutory Construction – Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius

FACTS

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) was assessed a 3% tax on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products – this is pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Said corn and edible oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) who in turn exports these products and sell them abroad. SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same Section of the 1987 Tax Code which provides in part: xxx Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products:

SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows: That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products;

But that said tax exempts manufacturers who export these edible oil products; That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil products to UNICHEM, its purchaser, who then exports the oil products.

ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct.

HELD: No. The legal maxim “Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius” applies. Nowhere in the law was “corn oil” included in the enumeration of tax exempt exported products. Nor did it mention to exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil products nevertheless sells said product to a purchaser who does export. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al vs. RUBEN TORRES, as Executive Secretary, et al G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005 Facts: On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general. The law contains provisions on tax exemptions for importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. After which the President issued several Executive Orders as mandated by the law for the implementation of RA 7227. Herein petitioners contend the validity of the tax exemption provided for in the law. Issue: Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by President for the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive legislation. Held: To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of the Legislature to create a free port where the “free flow of goods or capital within, into, and out of the zones” is insured. The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment” was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious from the wording of RA No. 7227, particularly the use of the phrase “such as,” that the enumeration only meant to illustrate incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its being a free port zone. The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial establishments which are the only ones duly authorized to sell consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policy enunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that “. . .the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments.” However, the Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, from the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being contrary to Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearly provides that “exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.”

CASE TITLE :   G.R.   141386   COA   OF   THE   PROVINCE   OF   CEBU   VS   ROY   URSAL   – PROVINCIAL AUDITOR DIGESTED CASE  ISSUE     :   Whether or not the salaries and personnel­related benefits of public school teachers appointed by the local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses   for   college   scholarship   grants,   chargeable   to   the   Special   Education   Fund   (SEF)   of   the   local government unit concerned?

FACTS:  The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the period January to June 1998, it appeared that the salaries and personnel­related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF. Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court. On December 13, 1999, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures of the SEF. Declaring further, the respondent's audit findings on pages 36 and 37 in the Annual Audit Report on the Province of Cebu for the year ending December 31, 1999 as null and void. Hence, the instant petition by the Commission on Audit on the expenses for college scholarship grants, since chargeable to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned expressly was not mentioned under R.A. NO.5447. With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447 was repealed, leaving Section 100 (c) of the Code to govern the disposition of the SEF, to wit: SEC. 100. Meeting and Quorum; Budget  (c) The annual school board budget shall give priority to the following: (1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public elementary and secondary schools; (2) Establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary; and (3) Sports activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay levels.

RULING: The  Decision of the  Regional Trial Court  of Cebu City,  Branch 20, in Civil Case  No. CEB­24422, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION applying the Doctrine of Casus Ommisus (Casus omissus pro omisso habendus es). A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted it. The salaries and personnel­related benefits of the teachers appointed by the provincial school board of Cebu in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes are declared chargeable against the Special Education Fund of the province.  However, the expenses incurred by the provincial government for the college scholarship grants should not be charged against the Special Education Fund, but against the General Funds of the province of Cebu. Since salaries, personnel­related benefits and scholarship grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF under the Local Government Code, they should be deemed excluded there from. It should be noted that Section 100 of the Local Government Code substantially reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike payment of salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of establishment and maintenance   of   extension   classes   and   operation   and   maintenance   of   public   schools,   the   granting   of government scholarship to poor but deserving students was omitted.  

EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent G. R. No. 189755 July 04, 2012 Sereno, J. FACTS In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over the parcel of land. The latter

refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space ISSUE Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as defined in P. D. 1216. RULING Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.” The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or to be restricted to – things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.

Case Digest: Gutierrez v. House Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459 : February 15, 2011 MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTA, EVELYN PESTA, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, COCHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,Respondent-Intervenor.

CARPIO MORALES,J.: FACTS: For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration. To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other"is to dismantle her own interpretation ofFranciscothat the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of the impeachment complaint. Petitioners Motion concedesthat theFranciscodoctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the Houses initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim thatper Franciscoan impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint. Having uprooted her reliance on theFranciscocase in propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion inFrancisco. In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged inFranciscoprovided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committees finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the Houses affirmance or overturning of the Committees finding,which was clearly referred to as the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters."Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" didnotrefer to the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist ofFranciscoin pronouncing what initiation means. The Court adhered to theFrancisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want tostretchand those who want toshrinkthe term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation that the Courts Decision presents a sharp deviation fromFranciscoas it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow. Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion. Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no initiation processof the impeachment proceedingshall be commencedagainst the same official more than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation. In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court closely appliedFranciscoon what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation offiling-and-referralinFrancisco. Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms ofFrancisco. Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of the House.

ISSUE: Whether the period of one year to file impeachment complaint is mandatory. HELD: The decision is sustained POLITICAL LAW impeachment The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the oneyear bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the Houses power or function to refer a complaint. Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint. To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression. She particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulos concerns on the amount of time spent if "multiple impeachment charges"are allowed. She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one complaint or charge. In sum, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing andreferral in the present case, with Franciscoas the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however. The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it. Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods" She insists that the Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period within which to finish its business. Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision. Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Courts control. Again, impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject only to the constitutionally imposed limits.And beyond these, the Court is dutybound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.

DENIED FOR BEING BEREFT OF MERIT.

City of Manila vs. Laguio G.R. No. 118127, Apr. 12, 2005 Facts: Petitioner City of Manila enacted an ordinance prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area wherein women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. Those who were engaged in the aforementioned businesses were given 3 months from date of approval of the ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses, and owner of the hotel Victoria Court, filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction with the RTC of Manila, against the City Mayor and City Council of Manila upon grounds therein stated. Petitioners pointed out that the Council had the power to prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community as provided in Sec. 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. They likewise asserted that the ordinance was enacted to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with the government’s police power under Art. III, Sec. 18 (kk) of R.A No. 409 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of Manila. After trial, the court rendered its decision declaring the ordinance null and void. Hence, the instant appeal. Issue: WON the said ordinance violates the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Constitution. Ruling: Yes. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as prostitution-one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.