Statcon Review for Recits

Public Policy In construing the law of doubtful meaning the policy which induced its enactment, or which was designed to be promoted thereby is a proper subject for consideration. The policy of law, once ascertained should be given effect by the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy. A construction which would carry into effect the evident policy of the law should be adopted in favor of that interpretation which would defeat it. A decent respect for the policy of the law must save the court from imputing to a selfdefeating, if not disingenuous, purpose. Once that policy is legitimately ascertained, the proper source for the court is to adopt that sense of the words which promotes in the fullest manner the policy of the legislature in the enactment of the law and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy. But, the supposed policy of a statute cannot prevail over its plain language. (States v Eaves) Considerations of a policy are entitled to weight in the construction of statutes only in cases of doubtful construction, and where meaning and intention of the legislature appear to be opposed to the literal import of the language of the act. In construing the law, the legislative policy or intent behind the enactment must be ascertained. Where the legislative policy is so strong, as shown not only by the provisions of the law under examination but also by the amendatory acts thereto, a construction to carry out the evident policy of the law must be undertaken. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW IS AN EXCLUSIVE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY, THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS NEED TO CONSTRUE THE LAWS WHEN ENFORCING AND ENACTING THE LAWS, RESPECTIVELY.

Courts should respect contemporaneous construction placed by executive officers charged with the enforcement of the statute. Congress is deemed to have been aware of the contemporaneous and practical interpretation of the statute by the officers charged with its administration and enforcement and to have such interpretation as the legislative intent. It is also a rule of statutory construction that courts will and should respect contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it and unless the same is clearly erroneous, it ordinarily controls. Rules and regulations issued by administrative officials to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. Long and continuous construction given by the government officials are entitled to consideration. In view of the long and continuous construction by the government officials, the very fact that Congress has not seen fit to repeal or change it is a potent argument in favor of sustaining the construction. The appraisal by the Commissioner of Customs made in accordance with the authority granted him by Section 1377 of the Revised Administrative Code is presumed correct unless the contrary is proven. The final construction of statutes rest with the courts and not with the executive; however courts should not totally disregard executive construction except for the most cogent reasons. Executive construction is entitled to additional weight where it has been impliedly indorsed by the legislature, although it does not thereby become conclusive. Courts have also been generally reluctant to overthrow a long-followed executive construction where to do so would work injustice, unsettle titles or disturb rights which have been vested by virtue of such construction. Reasonable and practical interpretation must be placed on statutory provisions.

Construction by executive officers. In determining the proper construction of ambiguous statutes resort may be had to the contemporaneous construction placed upon them by the officers charged with their execution.

Executive Construction, kinds.

The duty of enforcing the law, which devolves upon the executive branch of the government, necessarily calls for the interpretation of its ambiguous provisions. Accordingly, executive and administrative officers are generally the very first officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its enforcement. These interpretations are in the form of rules and regulations, circulars, directives, opinions and rulings.

It may be expressed or implied. An interpretation embodied in a circular, directive or regulation is an expressed interpretation. A practice or mode of enforcement of not applying the statute to certain situations or of applying it in a particular manner is an implied interpretation; it is interpretation by usage or practice.

Not controlling and not binding on the courts, but the construction given by the executive department should be considered and given weigh, especially if such construction has been uniform and consistent and has been observed and acted on for a long period of time. Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws, command much respect and weight.

Construction by an Executive or Administrative officer directly called to implement the law.

Construction by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief legal adviser of the government. It is in the form of opinions issued upon request of administrative or executive officials who enforce the law. In the absence of judicial ruling on the matter and unless reprobated by the President, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice are generally controlling among administrative and executive officials of the government.

However, the President or the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the construction of a statute given by a department secretary.

enactment. However, the courts are the final arbiters as to the proper construction of statutes. They are at liberty to disregard legislative construction which in their judgment is clearly a wrong exposition of the original act.

Interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasijudicial power.

While legislative interpretation of a statute is not controlling, courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the language thereof. Such legislative interpretation is entitled to respect, especially if the executive department has similarly construed the statute. The “contemporaneous construction of the law by two departments of the Government – one, the legislative branch responsible for its enactment, and the executive branch responsible for its enforcement – while not controlling on the judiciary, is entitled to respectful consideration. For the orderly and harmonious interpretation and advancement of the law, the court should, when possible, keep step with the other departments.

The court in a case pointed out the distinction between an interpretation by an executive officer charged with the enforcement of a law and that handed down by an executive official in an adversary proceeding: “There is indeed a basis for making such a distinction because the position of a public officer, charged with the enforcement of a law, is different from the one who must decide a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the case for the side which he represents, upon which lies the responsibility of decision. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it will, at least it may, be surrendered forever, and yet it may be right. Such rulings need not have the detachment of a judicial, or semi-judicial decision, and may properly carry bias. It may seem that they should not be authoritative.

Legislative Construction The fact that the interpretation of a statute is primarily a judicial function does not preclude the legislature from indicating its construction of a statute it enacts into law. It may thus provide in the statute itself an interpretative or declaratory clause prescribing rules of construction or indicating how its provisions should be construed. It may also define the terms used in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a previous law, or pass a resolution indicating its sense or intention as to a given statute. Legislative interpretation may likewise take the form of an implied acquiescence to, or approval of, an executive or judicial construction of a statute. The legislature, in indicating its construction of a law, cannot limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. For instance, it may not, by defining a term, make the definition conclusive not only as regards the statute which defines the term but also as regards to other statutes or as used elsewhere. Nor can it validate a law which violates a constitutional provision so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be construed as not to contravene the constitutional limitation. To do so would be to usurp judicial prerogative. The construction of a statute by the legislature, as indicated by the language of later enactments, is entitled to consideration as an aid in the construction of the statute, but is not generally regarded as controlling. In order, however, that a statute may be taken as a legislative construction of an earlier statute, it must be plain and unequivocal that such was the intent of the legislature. If it can be clearly gathered from a subsequent statute what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former one, this will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning and will govern its construction. Courts are not free to speculate on legislative intent where the legislature placed its own construction on its prior

Judicial Construction Judicial decision interpreting certain statutes should be taken into consideration in construing similar subsequent statutes. The presumption is that the legislature was acquainted with, and had in mind, the judicial construction placed on the prior enactment. Where a statute is taken directly from a judicial decision, the same should be construed in the light of the source from where it comes, unless its language imperatively demands a different interpretation. However, the judicial construction placed upon a specific provision of a statute prior to the enactment of a general law on a given subject is not controlling where the two acts are not essentially similar. As to particular words and phrases, where they have acquired a settled meaning thru judicial interpretation, and are used in a subsequent statute upon the same or analogous subject, they should be interpreted in the latter as in the former. Excepted from this rule are cases where the object to which the words are applied or the connection in which they stand, require a different meaning, or where a contrary legislative intention is made clear by other qualifying or explanatory terms. The construction made by foreign courts of a statute identical or similar to local laws may also be resorted to. Where a statute of a foreign state is before the local courts, the construction placed upon the statute by the highest courts of that state should be followed. The decision of the Supreme Court applying r interpreting a statute is controlling with respect to the interpretation of that statute and is of greater weight than that of an executive or administrative officer in the construction of other statutes of similar import. The reason is that the interpretation of a statute by the Supreme Court forms part of the statute itself and of the legal system and comes from that branch of government entrusted with the duty to construe or interpret the law. It is an invaluable aid in the construction or interpretation of statues of doubtful meaning.

Stare decisis

The legal maxim which requires that past decisions of the court be followed in the adjudication of cases is known as stare decisis et non quieta movere. It means one should follow past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled. The rule rests on the desirability of having stability in the law. Accordingly, a ruling of the Supreme Court as to the construction of a law should be followed in subsequent cases involving similar questions. In other words, once a case has been decided in one way, then another case, involving exactly the same point at issue, should be decided in the same manner. For the “Supreme Court has the constitutional duty of interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless upheavals in such interpretations and applications. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.” The interest of the State demands that there be an end to litigation. A ruling of the Supreme Court, in order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis, must be categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by the parties; it must be a direct ruling. Where the court resolved a question merely sub silencio, its decision does not come within the maxim of stare decisis, insofar as the question is concerned. Nor does an opinion expressed by the way, not upon the point in issue, fall within the maxim, for such is merely an obiter dictum. The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same. Where the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare decisis does not apply. The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. “The principle f stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of the court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of law in force. For more important than anything else is that the courts should be right. Only the Supreme Court can change or abandon a precedent enunciated by it; it cannot be done by an inferior court, nor even by the legislature except when the latter amend or repeals the law itself. Hence, until the high tribunal shall have overruled a principle or doctrine enunciated in the case, inferior courts are bound to follow it. There is only one Supreme Court whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. If inferior courts feel that the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court is against their way of reasoning, they may state their personal opinion on the matter but must decide the case in accordance with the doctrine and not with their personal view. For inferior courts to deviate from this rule will have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy.

Construction by the bar A construction of a statute given to it by the Bar of the state for many years is entitled to consideration and weight. There are cases where the meaning publicly given a statute by long professional usage is presumed to be the true one and regarded as one which should not lightly be changed. While the views of the legal profession are entitled to

much deference, they cannot control the judgment of the courts.

Dictionaries and textbooks In the construction of a statute, the courts may resort to legal, scientific or general dictionaries, or to legal textbooks for aid in determining the meaning to be assigned to words of common usage or to technical terms Where a statute does not define the words or phrases used therein, nor does its purpose or the context in which the words or phrases are employed indicate their meaning, the courts may consult dictionaries, legal, scientific, or general, as aid in determining the meaning to be assigned to such words or phrases. While definitions given by lexicographers are not binding, the courts have adopted, in proper cases, such definitions to support their conclusion as to the meaning of the particular words or terms used in a statute, especially where no strong reason exists why their dictionary meaning should not be adopted in the construction of the statute. However, a correct construction of legislative language may not always be reached by a too dogmatic adherence to the lexicographical definition. The purpose of a statute may require a broader interpretation than what is to be drawn from dictionary definitions. Dictionaries generally define words in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptance and significance. Where the law does not define the words used in a statute and the legislature has not intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words, the Courts may adopt the ordinary meaning of the words as defined in the dictionaries. For the intention of the lawmakers, who are ordinarily untrained philologists and lexicographers, to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Definitions given by lexicographers as to a particular term cannot always be adopted as an accurate meaning for statutory words. The intention of the Legislature and the object of the law must be taken into consideration.

Doctrine of Implications and Inferences There is a doctrine that which is implied in a statute as much a part of it as that which is expressed. This doctrine is necessary for very rarely, if at all, are statutes framed with minute particularity as to cover every conceivable situation. It enables the courts to draw inferences from the legislative purpose ad intention in such a way as to determine whether certain minor or specific things are covered by the general or broad terms used in a statute. This is not judicial legislation; it is rather a method of discovery of legislative intent thru the logical process of deduction. Thus, a statutory grant of power carries with it, by implication, everything necessary to carry out the power or right and make it effectual and complete.

Similarly, where a statute grants a right or imposes a duty, it also confers, by implication, every particular power and every reasonable means necessary for the exercise of that right or the performance of that duty.

Restrictions on the doctrine Generally, the court may not by implication read into a statute that which is not intended to be there. They may not make an implication which the language of the statute may not warrant. Words may not be implied in a statute where there is no plain necessity for such implication. Authority may not be implied in the face of an express mention and of ejusdem generis which are treated in the earlier parts of this work. PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION In general. Numerous presumptions have been availed of by the courts as aids in the construction of statues. Such presumptions have been availed of by the courts as aids in the construction of statutes. Such presumptions are applicable only when there is some doubt as to the intention of the legislature. Hence, if the legislative intent is plain or clear, it is not necessary to apply any presumption of law. They only aid in the interpretation of a statute if its meaning does not otherwise appear. Needless to say, presumptions yield to express legislative declarations. When two conflicting presumptions apply to the same situation as aids to determine legislative intent, one offsets the other and the courts should not apply either of them. Presumption that the legislature acted within the scope of its authority It is the duty of the courts to assume that the law-making power was acting within the scope of its authority. They shall not presume the limits of its power or to encroach upon the powers properly belonging to the executive and judicial departments. Hence, if a statute admits of more than one interpretation, one of which would place the statute outside of the legislative competence and the other would place it within the limits of legislative competence, the courts shall adopt the latter interpretation. Presumptions against violation of international law In construing a statute, it shall be presumed that it is in harmony and in agreement with the rules and principles of international law. Hence, a statute shall not be given construction which will do violence against rights and obligations secured by treaties.

Presumption against unconstitutionality Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and the burden of proof is on him who claims that a statute is unconstitutional. The court is considering the validity of a statute should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law. Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Act, the legislation should be sustained. Every act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown. Generally, the Supreme Court will not pass the constitutionality of an act of the legislature unless the question is raised in an appropriate manner and argued by the parties. A statute should not be interpreted in a manner that would render its application violative of a constitutional inhibition. Strict construction to prevent retroactive operation has often been applied in order that the statute would not violate contractual obligations or interfere with vested rights. Prospective operation will be presumed where a retroactive operation would produce invalidity. Presumption against inconsistency The legislative mind is presumed to be consistent, hence, its enactments are presumed to be consistent with each other. Presumptions are indulged against contradictory statutes or provisions of a statute. Presumption against injustice In case of doubt in the construction of a statute, it shall be presumed that the legislature intended right and justice to prevail. Presumptions are indulged against unjust or harsh consequences. The court shall not presume that the legislature intended a violation of a settled principle of natural justice or an undue interference with vested property rights. Neither should the court presume that the legislature intended a law to work hardship upon the people. Presumption as to the motive of the legislature It is presumed that the legislature acted from honorable motives in accordance with reason and common sense. Presumptions also exist that the legislature acted in good faith; that it acted from patriotic and just motives; that it acted with a desire to promote the common weal. The courts cannot impute to Congress an intention to disregard the civil and political liberties of the people. Presumption in favor of beneficial operation of statutes

This is especially true in our jurisdiction where the generally accepted principles of international law form part of the fundamental law of the land.

It shall be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits.

Presumption against extra-territorial operation of statutes

Presumption against inconvenience

The presumption is that a statute is confined in its operation within the territorial limits of the state enacting it. In no case shall the court, in case of doubt, impute to the legislature an intent of giving an extra-territorial effect to a statute.

Where a statute is ambiguous and admits of more than one construction, one of which leads to great inconvenience, the court may adopt some other construction in order to avoid such results. Presumption against absurdity

It is presumed that the legislature does not intend an absurdity or that its enactments produce absurd results.

Repeals by implication are not favored; hence the presumption against implied repeals.

Absurdity is meant anything which is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it could not have been intended by a sane person possessing ordinary intelligence and discretion.

Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Before there be such repeal, the statutes must cover the same subject matter and their provision irreconcilable. Moreover, a later statute, broad in scope as to encompass matters set forth in a special law cannot repeal the latter unless such purpose is clear and evident. Generalia specialibus non derogant.

Presumption against useless, impractical or meaningless legislation which is impossible or incapable of execution or performance have been applied. Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed to be a useless surplusage, and accordingly meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon.

A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repeal by a general law unless the intent to repeal is manifest. This is true even if the scope of the general act is broad enough to include that of the special law. Presumption of acquiescence to judicial construction

Presumption against ineffectiveness of statutes Presumptions are indulged against a construction which would render a statute ineffective or inefficient. Where the language of the law is susceptible of two or more constructions, one which will render the statute ineffective or inefficient and another which will tend to give effect to the evident intent of the legislature, the latter construction must be made there being a presumption against the ineffectiveness of statutes. Presumption as to public policy A statute will be presumed to be in accordance, not to be intended to conflict, with the public policy of the state. It will be presumed that the legislature intended to favor and foster, rather than to contravene, that public policy which is based on the principles of natural justice, good morals, and the settled principles of law. Presumptions against irrepealable laws The legislature is presumed not to intend its enactment to be irrepealable or to divest the state of any portion of its sovereignty. Presumption against repeal From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialabus non derogant. And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. At any rate in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. Presumption against unnecessary changes in the laws Although it may be presumed that by enacting a state the legislature intended some change in the existing law, it is also presumed that the legislature did not intend to make any alteration in the existing law beyond what is implicitly declared either expressly or by necessary implication. Presumption against implied repeals

Where a particular construction has been placed in a statute by the court, and the legislature at is subsequent session has left that statute materially unchanged, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation. When a statute is re-enacted or revised after it has received judicial construction, it is presumed that the legislature intended that construction to continue. Presumption as to existing laws It is presumed that the legislature had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statue and acted in accordance with respect thereto. Laws are presumed to have been passed with full knowledge of all existing laws on the subject. When there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, every effort must be utilized to make all acts stand and harmonize; and the later law cannot be presumed to have been passed to abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy is clear, convincing and irremediable. Presumption in favor of exceptions to general language It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its general language which would avoid injustice, oppression or absurdity, if a literal construction is adopted. Presumption as to jurisdiction of courrs It is presumed that the legislature by its enactments does not intend to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of superior courts, or to vest a new jurisdiction in them, unless there are express words or a necessary implication to that effect. Presumption as to foreign laws In the absence of proof to the contrary, the laws of other states will be presumed to be in accordance with those of the state of the forum. The foregoing presumptions are not exclusive. There are other presumptions that have been resorted to by the courts to aid them in the construction of statutes. Thus, it has been presumed that the legislature, in passing a statute, knew its own intention, and knew the rules of statutory construction. It has also been presumed that the legislature acted with deliberation, with knowledge of the effect of its act and with a purpose in view and that the provisions of the act

were formulated in harmony therewith. It has also been presumed that the legislature understood and intended the meaning of the words and phrases it used in a statute, and used them in their ordinary and common meaning and acceptation.

Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must undoubtedly prevail in this jurisdiction.