Statcon Quiz

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION Donna Zapa Gasgonia [1st Semester 2013-2014] VII. INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. General Considerations 1. The legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word. (AGPALO, p. 270, citing People v. Buenviaje, 47n Phil. 536, De Ponce v. Sagario, 55 Phil. 79 and Victorias Milling Co. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555.) 2. Words and phrases should be given its ordinary, restricted, technical, legal, commercial meaning.(AGPALO, p. 273, citing Mustang Lumber Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430; Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. CentraL Bank, 104 Phil. 598; Espino v. Cleofe , 52 SCRA 92 and Phil. Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank , 120 Phil. 829.) 3. The statute should be construed as a whole and its provisions must be given effect. (AGPALO, p. 283, citing Claudio V. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388.) 4. The meaning of a word or phrase may be qualified by the purpose of the statute. (AGPALO, p. 282, citing Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 and Gelano v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 90.)

B. Rules of Construction and Interpretation 1. The doctrine of VERBA LEGIS- plain-meaning rule. (DIAZ, PP. 36-40, citing Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications v. NLRC, G.R.No. 82511, Mar. 3, 1992 and Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, G.R.No. 109445, Nov. 7, 1994; AGPALO, pp. 206-208, citing National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, 327 SCRA 158.) 2. The doctrine of necessary implication. (DIAZ, pp. 58-62, citing Chua v. The Civil Service Commission, G.R.No. 88979, Feb. 7, 1992 and City of Manila v. Judge Gomez, G.R.No. L-37251, Aug. 31, 1981; AGPALO, pp. 254-268,citing Chua v. Civil Service Commission, 206 SCRA 65.) 3. The doctrine of CASUS OMISSUS – intentional omission of person, object or thing in an enumeration. (DIAZ, p. 63, citing People v. Manantan, G.R.No. L-14129, July 31, l962; AGPALO, p. 336, also citing the Manantan case.) 4. The doctrine of STARE DECISIS – follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. (DIAZ, 66-67, citing J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., v. Hon. Mariano, G.R.No. L-33140, Oct. 23, 1078.) 5. The doctrine of DURA LEX SED LEX - the law may be harsh but it is the law. (AGPALO, pp. 208-209, citing Go v. Anti-Chinese League of the Phils. 84 Phil. 468; Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Republic v. Go Bon Lee, 111 Phil. 805 and Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720.) 6. The doctrine of NOSCITUR A SOCIIS – associated words. (AGPALO, pp. 302-308, citing Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc. , 234 SCRA 367; Commissioner of Customs v. Phil. Acetylene Co. , 39 SCRA 70;DIAZ ,PP. 95-98, citing Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R.No. 106719, Sept. 21, 1993.) 7. Doctrine of EJUSDEM GENERIS – when general words follow an enumeration of phrases or things, the general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but only as applying to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. (AGPALO, 308-318, citing Go0 Tiaco y Hermanos v. Union Insurance of Canton, 40 Phil. 40; Chartered Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931; Mutuc v. Commision on Elections, 36 SCR 228; and Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379; DIAZ, pp. 83-89, citing Republic v. Migrinio, G.R.No. 89483, August 30, l990; People v. Chavez, G.R.Nos. L-47757-61m Jan. 28, l980; Vera v, Cuevas, supra. ) 8. The doc trine of EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS – express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. (AGPALO, pp. 318-323, citing Canlas v. Republic, 103 Phil. 712; Lao Oh Kim v. Reyes, 103 Phil. 1139; People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614; Escribano v. Avila, 85 SCRA 245; People v. Lantin 30 SCRA 81; Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 448; Lerum v. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 and Velasco v. Blas, 115 SCRA 540; DIAZ,pp. 90-95, citing San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.No. 147749, June 22, 2006 and Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, 471 SCRA 715.) 9. The doctrine of last antecedent – relative words refer to the nearest antecedent. (AGPALO, p. 337, citing Pangilinan v. Alvendia, 101 Phil. 794 and Florentino v. Phil. National Bank, 98 Phil. 959.) 10. The doctrine of REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS – antecedents and consequences should be taken distributively . (AGPALO, pp. 339-340, citing King v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730; People v. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153 and Amadora v. Court of Appeals, 60 SCRA 315.) 11. When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. (DIAZ, 70-79, citing Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.No.L-72005, May 20. 1987; Pilar v. Commission on Elections, G.R.No. 115245, July 11, l995; People v. Judge Evangelista, G.R.No. 110898, Feb. 20, 1996 and Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 874165, April 8, 1991; AGPALO, pp. 289-299, citing Colgate –Palmolive Phils. Inc. v. Gimenez, 1 SCRA 267; Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Dominador v.

Derayunan 49 Phil. 452; Guevarra v. Innocentes, 16 SCRA 379; Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R.No. 32522, Jan. 28, 1983; Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. COA, 218 SCRA 203.) 12, General and Special terms – General terms may be restricted by specific words. (DIAZ, p. 79, citing Colgagte-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Jimenez, G.R.No. L-14787, Jan. 28, 1986; AGPALO, p. 276, citing Malicsi v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 99 Phil. 596; People v. Chavez, 120 Phil. 1019 and Phil. Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, 120 Phil. 13. Use of negative word. – Negative words and phrases are regarded as mandatory. (DIAZ, pp. 98-99, citing Fule v. the Court of Appeals, G.R.No.L-79094, June 22, 1988; McGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 830) 14, Use of the words MAY, SHALL, MUST; MAY generally connotes a permissible thing while SHALL is imperative and the word SHALL is not always imperative. (DIXAZ , pp. 99-107, citing Bersabal v. Judge Salvador, G.R.No.L-35910, July 21, 1978; Crisologo v. Globe Telecom Inc,, G.R.No. 167631 Dec. 16, 2005 and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 117188, Aug. 7, 1997.) 15. Use of the words AND, OR, AND/OR; a. OR as a rule should be construed as a disjunctive word. (AGPALO, p. 299, citing People v. Martin, 39 SCRA 430 and Katindig v. People, 74 Phil. 45) b. As exception, OR may mean AND when the spirit of the law warrants. (AGPALO, p. 299, citing Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, 332 SCRA 126. c. AND implies conjunction, joinder or union. (AGPALO, p. 301, citing Licomcen Incorporated v. Foundation Specialist Inc. G.R.No. 169678, August 31, 2007) d. AND/OR means to give effect to both AND and OR. (AGPALO, p. 301, citing A.E.Davidson v. F.W. Wollworth Co. 118 ALR 1363)

C. Provisos, Exceptions and Saving clause 1. The role of a PROVISO is (a) to limit the application of the provision; (b) to except something therefrom; (c ) to qualify or restrain its generality; (d) to exclude some possible ground or misinterpretation; (AGPALO, p. 341, citing Chartered Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931; U.S. v. Santo Nino, 13 Phil. 141; and Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318) 2. The substance and not the form determines whether the clause is a proviso or not. (AGPALO, pp. 341-342, citing Manila Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Employees Assn. 79 Phil. 409) 3. As a rule, the PROVISO qualifies the provision immediately preceding it. (AGPALO, p. 343. Collector of Internal Revenue v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 1026) 4. An exception to the rule is when the legislative intent is to restrain also the earlier provisions. (AGPALO, p. 345, citing Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055) 5. In case of repugnancy between the PROVISO and the provision of law, the later portion of the statute prevails, unless there is legislative intent to the contrary. (AGPALO, pp. 345-346,citing Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322) 6. The EXCEPTION clause exempts something from the operation of the statute by express words.(AGPALO, p.346, citing Pendon v. Diasnes, 91 Phil. 848) 7. An EXCEPTION need not be introduced by the word éxcept’. (AGPALO, p. 347, citing Pendon v. Diasnes, supra. and Gorospe v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 1144) 8. The SAVING clause operates to except from the effect of the law what the law provides, or to save something which would otherwise be lost. (AGPALO, p. 350, citing Bautista v. Fule, 85 Phil. 391) 9. In repealing a statute, the legislature may preserve, in the form of a SAVING clause, the right of the state to prosecute offenses committed in violation of the repealed law, or preserve proceedings pending under the old law. (AGPALO, p. 350, citing Ong Chang Wing v. U.S., 40 Phil. 1046, Lagrimas v. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247; Ibanez de Aldecoa v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228).