Statcon Digests New

Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar Digest FACTS: In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law. Issue: Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law. HELD: The Postal Law does not allow “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a “gift enterprise” but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of “consideration”, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term “gift enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products. By virtue of noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the

slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included. Link to full txt: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1966/sep1966/gr_l-19650_1966.html

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission Digest FACTS:  October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,

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executed adeed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous resolution of

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the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of their corp. were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar affidavit declaring the same. June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an affidavit but not in

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the same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had five incorporators while as a corporation sole it has only one and it was ownership through donation and this was purchased As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds has some doubts

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as to the registerability, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution (section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151) LRC: In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine

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Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of

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sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in true for the

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benefit of the Catholic population of a place

ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution

HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale  A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be

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one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from

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their several chapters corporation sole 1.

composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever 2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole 3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.  Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership 

should be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple) undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the

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territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion

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fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or

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gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the revitalization of religious landholdings. as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust

Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1957/dec1957/gr_l-8451_1957.html

City of Baguio v. Marcos Digest Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue. Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953 Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid. StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/feb1969/gr_l-26100_1969.html

MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation Digest Facts: On April 13, 2000, the petitioner MCC Industrial Steel Corp., a domestic corporation engaged in the importation and wholesale of stainless steel in the country, contracted with the herein private respondent, Ssangyon Corporation, a manufacturer of stainless steel with a head office in Seoul South Korea. MCC ordered 220 metric ton of stainless steel for $1,860 metric

ton. It was arranged that the respondent will issue the sales invoices through fax, and once the petitioner conforme to such then MCC through its general manager and president George Chan, the latter has to fax the same with his signature. On the time the petitioner had a hard time to open the latters of credit, Ssangyong decided to negotiate with its mother company in korea to grant MCC a discount and to extend for a while the opening of letters of credit. Such request was accede by respondent. The first $70,000 letter of credit was issued by MCC but the remaining $170,000 was not. On this note, the respondent was compelled to filed a complaint for breach of contract and prayer for damages. The lower court acceded with the prayer of the respondent, that indeed petitioner failed comply with their contract despite discounts given as well as extension for opening of letter of credit, under the strong protest of the petitioner that the fax copies presented as document cannot be relied upon as the best evidence. Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such? Held: Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis-à-vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own findings in order to support its conclusions. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_170633_2007.html

Garcia v. Social Security Commission Digest Facts: Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, et.al. were directors of ImpactCorporation. Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems.Impact Corporation filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) a Petition for Suspension of Payments. The company is directed to payall the entitled workers unpaid wages, unpaid 13 th month pay and to remit tothe Social Security System loan amortizations and SSS premiums previouslydeducted from the wages of the workers.

The Social Security System (SSS), through its Legal and Collection Division(LCD), filed a case before the SSC for the collection of unremitted SSSpremium contributions withheld by Impact Corporation from its employees.Petitioner avers that under the aforesaid provision , the liability does notinclude liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions. Issue: WON petitioner can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions andpenalties therefore. Held: Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable. It is a rulein statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpretedwith reference to the context, i.e. , that every part of the statute must beconsidered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to thegeneral intent of the whole enactment.[23] The liability imposed ascontemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social Security Lawdoes not preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant toSection 28(f) is Section 22 of the same law Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, as sole surviving director of Impact Corporation ishereby ORDERED to pay for the collected and unremitted SSS contributions of Impact Corporation. The case is REMANDED to the SSS for computation of theexact amount and collection thereof. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_170735_2007.html

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. Digest Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate civil case against Philex for damages. Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.

HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. But, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

Link to full txt http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/08/floresca-vs-philex/

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations Digest FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office space in the Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress being used by the occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective employees, clients and customers, so that the picket has caused a disruption of the business of Wellington as well as the other lessors in the building. ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful? HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of peaceful picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the context of this

issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/feb1969/gr_l-22228_1969.html Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Digest Facts: On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal. Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission. Held: There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential

approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1962/mar1962/gr_l-16704_1962.html

Article VIII, Section 1 and Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, 434-436 (1986) FACTS: Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered

that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional. RULING: No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1953/aug1953/gr_l-6355-6_1953.html Angara vs Electoral commission FACTS: Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province. On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition. Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy; Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua. Link to fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1936/jul1936/gr_l-45081_1936.html Marcos v. Manglapus Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino’s ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the returnof Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus andprohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements ofdue process been complied with in the making of the finding? HELD: Petition Dismissed. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were

represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country. Another reason of the Court...“We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.” Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/sep1989/gr_88211_1989.html

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council Digest Link to full txt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2010/178552.htm

Penafrancia Sugar Mills v. Sugar Regulatory Administration Digest Link to full txt http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2014marchdecisions.php?id=186 Mendoza vs familiara Digest FACTS:

This petition questions the constitutionality of Section 2[1] of Republic Act No. 9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991"). As other barangay officials had done in previous cases, petitioner Constancio F. Mendoza (Mendoza) likewise questions the retroactive application of the three-consecutive term limit imposed on barangay elective officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections. Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro in the 29 October 2007 Barangay Elections. As required by law, Mendoza filed a certificate of candidacy. Prior thereto, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three (3) consecutive terms. On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having served, in the same position for three (3) consecutive terms immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections. ISSUE: I. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 is constitutional II. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 may be applied retroactively HELD: In COMELEC v. Cruz settles, the Court ruled that the constitutionality of the three-consecutive term limit rule no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law. The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the LGC - followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue. Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range of subject matters, all relating to local elective

officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter II); c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III). These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay officials. An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and self-contained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, except barangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), by its express terms, relates to all local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification. All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with the challenged proviso.

With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the provisobased on retroactivity must fail. Link to full txt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/november2011/191017.htm

Kilosbayan v. Morato FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million.

Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/nov1995/gr_118910_1995.html

David v. Arroyo Digest FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General. ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional. RULING: The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus: First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion” Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;” Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.” PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora) President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless. To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) (2) (3) (4) Congress.

There must be a war or other emergency. The delegation must be for a limited period only. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional. Link to full txt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20171396.htm

BPI v. Shemberg Biotech Corp. Digest Link to full txt

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/162291.htm

Carbonilla v. Board of Airline Representatives Digest Link to full txt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/193247.html

General v. Urro Digest Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, andCertiorari and/or Prohibition (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Luis Mario General (petitioner).The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de Guzman and Eduardo U. Escueta(collectively, the respondents) as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), and to prohibit then Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the respondents’ oath of office. Particularly, the petitioner asksthat respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office. With urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Issue: The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004.[13] Since she failed to finish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired portion or until October(should be September) 2010. Held:In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents’ appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings,what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition – a quo warran to against respondent Urro. A staggered term of office is not inconsistent with an acting appointment Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second,as to the manner in which it is made.[34]Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved.[37] The President’s power to issue an acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation from the service does not import removal but merely the

expiration of his term— a mode of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision on security of tenure[38] since no removal from office is involved. Link to full txt http://jlp-law.com/library/?article=gr-no-191560-march-29-2011hon-luis-mario-m-generalcommissioner-national-police-commission-vs-hon-alejandro-s-urro-et-al

Article 7, New Civil Code Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)

Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, Digest FACTS Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by the said policy, questioned the said administrative interpretation. ISSUES Whether or not the Civil Service Commission’s interpretative construction is:  

(1) valid and constitutional. (2) binding upon the courts. RULING  (1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. The law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a

distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.  (2) NO. Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank: . . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official. To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government employees. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/aug1992/gr_95832_1992.html Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, Digest --

Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_187485_2013.html

Lopez vs Ca Digest -Link to full txt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/sep2002/144573.htm

Tatad v. Secretary of Energy Digest FACTS: The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372). Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. Issue: w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional. sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997. HELD/RULING: (a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.

Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President—he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established. (b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws. Link to full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/nov1997/gr_124360_1997.html

Cagayan Electric v. Cagayan de Oro Digest -Link to full txt http://source.gosupra.com/docs/decision/3591