Statcon digests + fulltxt links Sept. 26
A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION 1. Verba Legis a. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 digest NATURE: These are petitions including: 1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively. (2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s) disqualification to run for and hold public office
FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo. HELD: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
FALLO: Petition is dismissed Fulltxt: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_206666_2015.html
b. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013 no digest full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/mar2013/gr_182249_2013.html 2. Dura lex sed lex a. OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009 digest FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when they went to his house to verify the report that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the corresponding license ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court HELD: When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the vicinity of petitioner’s house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber.
There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed. Fulltxt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/170589.htm
b. ARNEL SAGANA v. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009 digest On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City. He alleged that on November 20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent to kill, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. On January 31, 1995, process server Manuel Panlasigui attempted to personally serve the summons to respondent, Francisco, at his address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful because the occupant, who refused to give his identity, said that the respondent is unknown at the said address. Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office through registered mail on February 9, 1995. However, despite three notices, the respondent failed to pick up the summons. The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of “petitioner’s lack of interest to prosecute”, noting that the petitioner did not take any action since the filing of the Server’s Return on 8 February 1995. In response, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent and that respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on August 4, 1995, conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent within 10 days from receipt of the Order. Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at the respondent’s address but was told by Michael Francisco, the respondent’s 19-year old brother, that the respondent no longer lived at the said address. As such, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco. On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, since the respondent still failed to file an Answer despite the service of summons. The trial court granted the Motion, finding that the summons was validly served through his brother, Michael, and allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents were furnished to respondent at his address. On March 1, 1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons or that he was authorized to receive the summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at the defendant’s residence or left with any person who was authorized to
receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael Francisco also asserted in an Affidavit of Merit that his brother had left their residence in March 1993, and that respondent would only call by phone, or write his family without informing them of his address. Thereafter, Michael Francisco submitted his respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his Rejoinder, he attached a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent, dated December 23, 1992, where he declared himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the same lawyer who represented respondent’s brother before the trial court. The trial court denied Michael Francisco’s Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding that: “plaintiff had already sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known address. As also pointed out by [petitioner] in his Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except his affidavit of merit, to impugn the service of summons thru him. Movant herein also admits that defendant communicates with him through telephone. Movant, therefore, being a person of sufficient age and discretion, would be able, more likely than not, to inform defendant of the fact that summons was sent to him by the court.” On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. On November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on November 9, 1999, and that the same was contrary to the law, facts, and evidence, and prayed that his appeal be given due course. On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective briefs, a copy of which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate court rendered the Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court on the grounds that the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial court. The trial court’s decision was void since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that respondent did, in fact, reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the original copy of the envelope containing respondent’s Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondent’s return address to be No. 36 Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent. HELD: YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper substituted service of summons upon the respondent. Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provided: Section 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case. Moreover, respondent’s claim that he moved out of their residence on March 1993 without informing his family of his whereabouts despite the regular calls and letters is incredulous. It is even more implausible when the respondent admitted to receiving the trial court’s decision on September 20, 19999 which was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that his Notice of Appeal indicated the same address. He also admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate court’s order for a preliminary conference which was also sent to the same address. Finally, it is unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother was assisted by the same lawyer, none of them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of summons. Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his original home, if he actually did leave his home. The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under the circumstances of this case, the respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner. However, since he refused to disclose his true address because of his own pretenses, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 29 January 2004 Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Full txt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/161952.htm B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 1. Statutes must be capable of interpretation a. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 digest FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative. WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative. WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative? WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution. WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition. WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/mar1997/gr_127325_1997.html 2. Ratio legis est anima
a. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011 digest FACTS: Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition forcertiorari under Rule65 to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometres as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province. Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law anda plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued that exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid. RULING: No.The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including anyexemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRRwent beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. “ The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law asit already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision.Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules andregulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails. Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/apr2011/gr_180050_2011.html b. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013 digest
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC andBANAT vs COMELEC. Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists. HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The newguidelines are as follows: I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
or organizations, and
organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above). Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the partylist system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.) III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized
or for parties who
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house. As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented,
are ideologically marginalized. Full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_203766_2013.html in reference to this case! Banat vs Comelec digest In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules: 1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); 2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; 3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC. 4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES: I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house? II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling. III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid. IV. How are party-list seats allocated? V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid. HELD: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall benot more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives. How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula: (Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives Hence, (220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55 II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled. III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled toadditional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining
seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives. How is this done? Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed. Example: In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900). Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79 Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a twopercenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats. Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied. V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
3. Literal import must yield to intent a. AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE B. LINGAD, G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969 digest -Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/oct1969/gr_l-26406_1969.html b. UNITED STATES v. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85 (1910) digest police Power Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.” Full txt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html
c. SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009 digest --Fulltxt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/march2009/174168.htm
d. CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971 digest
FACTS: In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable. ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. Fulltxt http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1971marchdecisions.php?id=119 e. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v. SEC. ANGELO REYES, G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015 digest -Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/apr2015/pdf/gr_180771_2015.pdf
4. Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex a. B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991
digest -Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/aug1991/gr_93177_1991.html 5. Supplying legislative omission a. CARROLL H. LAMB v. W.H. PHIPPS, G.R. No. L-7806, July 12, 1912 digest -Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1912/jul1912/gr_l-7806_1912.html b. GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. BARBA, G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996 digest FACTS: Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States. To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government Code, disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position. On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba. ISSUE: Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure? HELD: The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs. The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him. Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/apr1996/gr_116763_1996.html 6. Construction as to avoid absurdity a. REYNALDO O. MALONZO v. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 137718, July 27, 1999 digest -Fulltxt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/137718.htm b. PARAS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996 digest FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/nov1996/gr_123169_1996.html 7. Construction in favor of right and justice a. KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997 digest FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? HELD: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes. Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.” ___________
NOTES: – On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant. Fulltxt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/94723.htm 8. Law does not require the impossible a. PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC, G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008 digest Facts: PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even sustained the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest and cost of suit. Hence, this petition. Issues: (1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of summons. (2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam. (3) Whether or not the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court and not respondent’s messenger. Held: (1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person. (2) The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies “in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the petitioner’s contention that the complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for recovery of sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore. (3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit “showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address”. The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication. Fulltxt
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/170943.htm 9. Number and gender of words a. SANTILLON v. MIRANDA, G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965 digest -Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/jun1965/gr_l-19281_1965.html b. SNYDER’S ESTATE V. DENIT, 72 A2D 757, 18 ALR2D 663 (1950) C. IMPLICATIONS 1. Necessary implication a. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) v. UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS , INC., G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015 digest -Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/feb2015/gr_212081_2015.html b. SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC. v. HON. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, G.R. No. 116194, February 2, 2000 digest FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-registered banking institution with principal office in Cebu City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union (APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).1âwphi1.nêt On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate of Registration No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter referred to as the union.
On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory employees of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor organization duly-registered with the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these employees supported the petition: (4) there was
no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and SRBI; and (5) no certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months prior to the petition.
On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The pre-certification election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union’s petition. It sought to prevent the holding of a certification election on two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEUTUCP were in fact managerial or confidential employees.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations and engaging in union activities.
(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon the filing of a petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the petitioner’s appeal pending before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the union’s registration.
RULING: (1) Petitioner’s explanation does not state who among the employees has access to information specifically relating to its labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves as the secretary of the bank’s Board of Directors may not be so classified.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the field of labor relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.
(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labororganization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the union’s registration. On this score, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed. Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/feb2000/gr_116194_2000.html 2. Grant of power includes incidental power a. CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. HRET, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988 digest -Fulltxt
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/dec1988/gr_84297_1988.html b. CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007 digest -Fulltxt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/august2007/171815.htm c. ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000 digest Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist. On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs. Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power. The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry. fulltxt http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/100152.html 3. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly a. TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011 digest FACTS: TMPC is a cooperative organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. On the other hand, LTWD is a local water utility created under PD 198 which authorized to LTWD supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the NWRB an application for a certificate of public convenience to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application claiming that under Section 47 of PD No. 198 its franchise is exclusive. In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be
exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. ISSUE: Whether the authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is exclusive. RULING: NO. The constitution provides in Section 11, Article XII that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. The Constitution is clear that franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character.T his constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On the other hand, PD No.198, as amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents thereto x x x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional. Fulltxt http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_166471_2011.html