Statcon Digests for August 15
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS ISSUE: FACTS:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
1. Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting.
RULING: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
FACTS: The petitioner Candido Lopez was arrested on the morning of September 19, 1930 by the virtue of warrant of arrest signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives in the implementation of a resolution of the said House. The warrant of arrest was issued by reason of an alleged act of contempt against the Legislature committed on October 23, 1929 upon the person of Representative Jose Dimayuga by the petitioner during the second session of the Philippine Legislature. The constabulary officer took the petitioner into custody. The petitioner is asking that the said warrant of arrest be declared null and void and that he be released from the said arrest. `ISSUES:
Whether or not the House of Representatives has the right of a legislative body to extend punishment for contempt beyond the adjournment of the session of the Philippine Legislature.
Yes. The Philippine Legislature has the essential and inherent power to punish contempt. The right of the legislative body to punish contempt only ceases when the existence of the legislature ceases to prevail. Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez
Lopez vs De los Reyes
Petitioner alleges that it owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim situated in Benguet, located in public lands, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission. That said claim was located on January 1, 1929 to which an original declaration of location was registered in the office of the mining recorder of Benguet, Mountain Province, on January 7, 1929; That petitioner and its predecessors in interest have been in continuous and exclusive possession of said claim from the time it was located. Petitioner had the claim surveyed and produced plat and field notes of the claim and a certificate stating that more than P1,600 worth of labor and improvements had been expended on said claim, which were approved by the Director of the Bureau of Science. Petitioner filed an application for patent with the mining recorder, and duly posted a notice of the said plat and application upon the claim. A notice of petitioner’s application for patent was forwarded by the mining recorder to the division of mines so that the latter could order for its publication, made once a week, for 60 days in a newspaper of general circulation, commencing February 13, 1936 That petitioner paid P 113 to the respondent as purchase price of the said claim, and so it has requested the respondents as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the Bureau of Mines to approve petitioner’s application for patent, prepare the necessary papers relative to its issuance to be signed by the President, however, the respondent have failed and refused to do so. Petitioner alleges that it is entitled to the patent applied for as it has complied with the requisites of law for the issuance of such patent. Respondent alleges as special defense that the Petitioners are not entitled to a patent of the Nob Fraction claim pursuant to the Constitutional provision that 'natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated', and consequently the respondents are under no obligation to approve Petitioner’s application and are bound by duty to prevent the issuance thereof.
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether the mining claim involved in the present proceeding formed part of the public domain on November 15, 1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof 2) If not, whether a mandamus is the proper remedy in the case
HELD: 1. No. The mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
2. However, the Court held that it was not justified to grant the relief sought by the petitioner following the precedent established in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, that "mandamus will lie to compel the secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so is based on his misinterpretation of a statute."
*NOTE: The Court held that mandamus was not proper in the case, because in cases where a public officer misinterprets a statute in the performance of his duties: “Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by a statute might refuse to perform it, and when his refusal is brought before the court he might successfully plead that the performance of the duty involved the construction of a statute by him, and therefore it as not ministerial, and the court could on that account be powerless to give relief.”
FRANCISCO JR. VS NAGMAMALAKASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MAGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC. FACTS:
Under the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) adopted by the House of Representatives (“House”), in cases where an impeachment filed by a Member of the House, or by a citizen and endorsed by a Member, the impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated on the day that the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or, if the Committee finds it to be insufficient in substance, the day the house affirms or overturns such finding. Under Section 17 of said Rules, no impeachment proceedings against the same official cannot be initiated within one (1) year from the date a previous impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated as provided in Section 16. June 2, 2003, Former president Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public Trust and other High Crimes. On july 22 HOR adopted a resolution directing the committee on justice to conduct investigation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by CJ of judiciary development Fund, October 13, 2003, first impeachment complaint – dismissed. For the reason that: “sufficient in form but insufficient in manner” Four months and three weeks after filling of first impeachment complaint against CJ Hilario Davide filed with Secretary General of the house by representative Gilbert teodoro and felix fuentebella. Founded on the alleged results of the abovementioned legislative inquiry. This impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all House Members. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House, et. al., most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional for violating Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, which states that “no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” ISSUE: W/N POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW EXTENDS TO THOSE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
HELD: SECTION 16 AND 17 OF RULE 5 of Rules of procedure in impeachment proceedings approved by HOR are UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 2nd impeachment complaint against CJ Davide is barred under par. 5 sec. 3 of Article X1 of the constitution. IMPORTANT TOPICS DISCUSSED. To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the wellsettled principles of constitutional construction. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this wise: A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court
in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose[ The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared: x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms,not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretarythis Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR.
VS. COMELEC G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975 MAKASIAR, J. FACTS: The petitioner of the case assails the nullity of some Proclamations, decrees and orders that was passed at the time of then President Ferdinand Marcos. They alleged that under the 1935 Constitution and 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority, making some of the Proclamations, decrees and orders void. Issue: Whether or not the issued Proclamations, decrees and orders are valid. Held: Since President Marcos was the only incumbent President at the time, because his term under the 1935 Constitution has yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the Constitutional Convention, in approving the new Constitution, had in mind only him when in Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new Constitution it provided “that all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly. The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law. The court ruled Presidential Proclamations nos. 1366 and 1366-A and Presidential Decrees nos. 629,630, 637 and 637-A to be valid and the petition was dismissed.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary FACTS This is a petition to seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by the Pres. Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987. The assailed provision is Section 1 of the above-mentioned article which allows the cabinet members, undersecretary or executive secretaries and other appointive officials of executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations. According to petitioners, the cited provision contravenes the provision of Article VII, Section 13 which states that “The President, Vice- President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. xxxxxxxx” The “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” meant that exceptions must be clearly and expressly provided in the Constitution. On the other hand, respondents claim is that the said phrase makes reference to Article VII, Section 7 par (2) which states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision……..” ISSUE: 1. WON the prohibition in Sec 13, Article VII are concerned admit of the broad exception made for appointive official in general under Section 7, Article I-XB. 2. WON EO 284 be declared unconstitutional HELD: 1. NO. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in terms of holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere
because they exercised more powers and therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their cases. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. Section 7 of Art IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public official and employees, while Section 13 of Art VII is meant to be an exception applicable only to President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Therefore, the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the Constitution” in Section 13, Art VII cannot refer to broad exceptions provided in the Sec 7 because it would obliterate the distinctions so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution. The said phrase must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself: a) V-P being appointed as member of the Cabinet; b) acting as president in instances provided under Sec 7, Art VII; c) ex-officio member of the JBC. 2. Yes. EO No. 284 is unconstitutional, thus declared null and void. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. Vera vs. Avelino Facts: COMELEC submitted to the President and to the Congress of the Philippines, its report on national elections. The report contains that the election held in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will due to the acts of terrorism and violence in the said provinces. When the Senate convened, there has been protests against the election of the petitioners. They are Jose O. VERA, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero. Petitioners are included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes. There was a resolution approved referring to the report by the COMELEC and ordering that petitioners shall not sworn, nor seated as members of the senate. The resolution is called PENDATUN, wherein it provides for the situation in the said provinces above and a resolution on what should the country must do in condemning all the acts that seek to defeat the popular will. It also contains that the pending hearing and decision on the protest lodged against the petitioners’ election, wherein the terrorism averred in the report of the COMELEC and in the report of the Provost Marshal, constitutes the ground of said protests and will therefore be the subject of investigation and determination. The Petitioners immediately took an action against their colleagues praying for an order to annul and compel the respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and exercise their senatorial prerogatives. Respondents traverse the jurisdiction of SC and assert the validity of the Pendatun Resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the petition to annul the Pendatun Resolution can be decided by the SC
Ruling: The court refused to intervene and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. The Senate did not exceed in their powers for before the organization of the Commonwealth and the promulgation of the Constitution, each House of the Congress exercises the power to defer oath-taking of any member against whom a protest had been lodged, whenever in its discretion such suspension was necessary, before the final decision of the contest. It was also held that the result of the elections in the said provinces were not the legitimate expression of the voters’ choice and that the Senate made no grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability that, upon proof of such widespread lawlessness, the Electoral Tribunal would annul the returns in that region and declare herein petitioners that they are not entitled to seats in the Senate.
TAÑADA VS. CUENCO FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Ta.ada and Diosdado Macapagal sought to oust respondent senators from the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that the that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal." Respondents assail the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the
petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion." ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar raises merely a political question. RULING: Willoughby lucidly states: "Elsewhere in this treatise the wellknown and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. "As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and
these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.). To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:. "It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. "It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, the court is called upon to
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
STATCON: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION: The spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is in the spirit of the statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter therof, while that which is within the letter, but is not within the spirit of the statute is not within the statute. Doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction: As a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine has any application. Where the provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation is entitled to no weight and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. MANDATORY VS. DIRECTORY: Prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent, which must be obtained from all the surrounding circumstances,
and determination of which does not depent on the form of the stature. Consideration must be given on its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from construing it. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT. On the other hand, the language of the statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction. ROMAN CATH. APOSTOLIC ADM. OF DAVAO INC., vs. LAND REG. COM., et al. -Mateo L. Rodis (Filipino & Davao Resident) executed a deed of sale for a parcel of land with TCT No. 2263 to Roman Catholic Adm. Of Davao Inc., with Msgr. Clovis Thibault as incumbent on October 4, 1954 -When presented to the Registry of Deeds of Davao, the latter stated its resolution in the case of Carmelite Nuns, requiring petitioners to file an affidavit declaring 60% of the members of their corporation as Filipino citizens -The 2 cases (this case and that of Carmelite Nuns) are NOT similar since the case of Carmelite Nuns have 5 incorporators and that the property was donated to it, While in the case at bar, Roman Cath. Apostolic Adm., is a Corporation Sole and the property sold to it would be owned by the totality of the Catholic Population in Davao not by the corporation itself.
3) Bureau of Census and Statistics show that more than 80% of the population of the area are Catholic which is more than enough to satisfy the 60% requirement. **Respondents contend that 1) Although Petitioner is not the owner of the property,it still has the power to exercise right of ownership over said land held in trust by it. 2) Conglomeration of persons CANNOT be pointed out as the recipient nor can the masses (people) be referred to as the beneficiary who can exercise a right of ownership over said land. -Sections 153, 155, 157 of Corporation Law states that there is no room for doubt that bishops in a Corporation Sole can act as ADMINISTRATORS for the church and that such properties acquired upon the death of the incumbent (bishop, archbishop, etc.) will pass to his SUCCESSOR not to his heirs. -Roman Catholic Church has NO nationality and framers of the constitution did not have in mind such religious corporations when they came up with the 60% requirement of Filipino citizens being members of corporations (Sec.159 and Sec. 13 of Public Act 1459) -The nationality of the head of a diocese has no bearing on his functions which are LIMITED to ADMINISTRATOR of temporalities (properties held in trust, temporarily for the people and the church in this case) and that the Corporation Sole is CANNOT considered as aliens since they have no nationality at all.
-The Land Registration Commissioner ordered the Registry of Deeds to DENY Registration of TCT No. 2263 because there was no proof regarding the 60% Membership of Filipino citizens that is being required.
-a Corporation Sole is only entitled to purchase, convey, sell, lease, etc.and deal with real properties and personal properties if it pursuant to the purpose why such corporation was formed.
** Petitioners contend that 1) Corporation Law and Canon Law states that corporation sole are merely ADMINISTRATORS of properties that they may acquire
-Sec.159 states that corporation sole may only purchase and hold real estate and personal properties for its church, charitable, benevolent and educational purposes. They hold properties in trust for their locality or diocese.
2) Catholic Church is Composed of a) Clergy and b) Lay Members (people)
RULING : LRC's decision (Land Reg. Com.) is REVERSED and Registry of Deeds is ordered to register deed of sale
public office in the Philippine Islands. WILLIAM CHIONGBAN, petitioner vs ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, JOSE GALLOFIN, in his capacity as Collector of Customs of the Port of Cebu, and VICENTE DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Shipping Administration, respondents PHILIPPINE intervenor
[No. L-2007. January 31, 1949] FACTS William Chiongban, petitioner, sought to permanently prohibit respondent Custom officials from cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner’s vessels and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner. The bases of the respondent’s acts are first, their belief that the petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry and second, that the petitioner violated the contract of sale between them, on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in the said contract that his father was a naturalised Filipino citizen. ISSUES 1. Whether of not the petitioner is a Filipino citizen 2. Whether or not the privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2, section 1, Article VI of the 1935 constitution is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee HELD 1. YES. The petitioner is a Filipino citizen pursuant to subsection 2, section 1, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which states that(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongban, a Chinese citizen and father of the petitioner, was elected to and held the office of municipal councillor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis, a fact that is established from the findings from NBI, Opinion of the Secretary of Justice and as admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, the petitioner’s father became a citizen by virtue of the above stated provision. The petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article VI) of the Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of the Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his father. 1.
NO. The members of the Constitutional Convention would have not dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, section 1, Article VI of the 1935 constitution, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but i conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. They adopted said provision fully cognisant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is hereby GRANTED and respondent Custom officials are hereby ENJOINED from cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner’s vessels and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration is hereby ENJOINED from rescinding the sale of the three vessels made to petitioner. No costs. It is so ordered. GALMAN v. PAMARAN 138 SCRA 294, August 30, 1985 PONENTE: Cuevas, J.
FACTS: On August 31, 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. who was returning to the country after a long sojourn abroad was gunned down to death. P.D. 1886 was promulgated an ad hoc Fact Finding Board, more popularly known as the Agrava Board, in order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy. Pursuant to the power vested in it by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence. Two Information for murder – one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino and on for the killing of Rolando Galman – were filed based on a preliminary investigation, in accordance with the two reports submitted by the Board In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice. The prosecution, represented by the Office of the petitioner, offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. Private respondents, through their counsel, objected the admission of the evidences contending that it will be in derogation of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and violate the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Petitioner opposed, contending that said immunity was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the Fact Finding Board. Respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, which was assailed in the two petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies by the private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board are admissibl in evidence. HELD: No. According to fair play and due process, private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements given by them may be used against them. It is for this reason that the court cannot subscribe to the view of the petitioners that the right against selfincrimination must be invoked before the Agrava Board to prevent use of any given statement against
the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution (now Article III, Sectiosn 12 and 17) renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. The rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a
witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. (FOR STATCON – TOPIC: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION) Any interpretation of a statue which will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. If two or more constructions or interpretations could be resorted to, the one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though the one that would be disregarded shows the more usual and apparent import of the language used. A statue must be given a reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental law. Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections 192 SCRA 100 December 4, 1990
Facts: Article 10, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution states that autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera shall be created. In line with this, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, and the city of Baguio voted in a plebiscite regarding the implementation of Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.” However, the results showed that only the Ifugao Province approved by a majority vote, while the mentioned provinces and city devastatingly rejected.
Subsequently, the respondent issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved by majority of the votes in the province of Ifugao. The Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum stating that only the provinces and city voting for the establishment of the CAR shall be included in the said region. Therefore, only the province of Ifugao legally and
validly constitutes the CAR. This resulted to the petitioner filing a petition for the declaration of nonratification of the Organic Act for the Region upholding that the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said region should be composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: Whether or not the Ifugao Province alone can legally and validly constitute the CAR.
Held: A well-established rule in statutory construction provides that the language of the Constitution should be understood in the sense it has in common use, and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. This rule is applied in this case.
Upon the application of this rule, it then follows that the words (provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas) mentioned in Article 10, Section 15 of the Constitution indicates that the region to be created should be composed of more than one constituent unit, as the word – in its ordinary sense – means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions in the Philippines are groupings of contiguous provinces made up of common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures.
Also, the entirety of Republic Act No., 6766 is instilled with provisions against a sole province constituting the region. Implementing Republic Act No. 6766 would not only violate the provisions of the Constitution, but also of the Act itself.
Therefore, the petition is granted. Resolution No. 2259 is declared null and void, and the Ifugao
Province alone cannot legally and validly constitute the CAR.
language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that any other exists.
III. Ordinary Sense vs Technical Sense In re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held: That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States
Marcos v. Chief of Staff, 89 Phil. 239 (1951) Facts: These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the respondents. It is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals on the ground prohibited by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution:
Court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. Court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever and it cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict.
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. . . . Issue: Whether the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners. Ruling: We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a courtmartial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution. It must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted.
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case, it would be a bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense (Right of the accused against double jeopardy) It is obvious that there exist the intention of the framers of our Constitution in enacting section 17, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex. Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in courtmartial, the respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions for mandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.
What is a Court-Martial? Ruffy et al vs Chief of Staff The court-martial is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. In the
1. Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial Commander of Phil. Constabulary in Mindoro at the outbreak of war. Other petitioners were corporals. 2. When Japanese landed in Mindoro, petitioners retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering and led a guerilla movement called Bolo Combat Team (BCT). 3. At the time, Mindoro was part of the 6 th Military District (6th MD) of the Philippine Army. The Commanding Officer (CO), Colonel Peralta, assigned Major Ramon Ruffy as the Acting Commander, while other petitioners were promoted or given ranks. 4. 6th MD sent Lt. Col. Enrique Jurado to be the CO of BCT relieving Mjr. Ruffy as Acting CO. Jurado gave petitioners funds for palay and salary. 5. Lt. Col. Jurado was allegedly killed by the petitioners. After the crime, it was alleged, they seceded from the 6th MD. 6. Ruffy was acquitted. Other personnel, Fransisco and Furtos, filed the petition at bar. Issue: 1. Were the petitioners subjected to military law at the time of the commission of the offense? Petitioners contended that political law was suspended during war. 2. Is the 93d Articles of War unconstitutional, which is the imposition of death penalty for crime of murder by military court? Art VII of Constitution states that Supreme Court has jurisdiction on all crim cases which impose death penalty. Held: 1. Yes, they are subject to military jurisdiction because they accepted appointments as officers of the BCT even though they were originally guerillas. The suspension for political law only applies to civilians. In times of enemy occupation, officers are not relieved of their duties. 2. No, the 93d Articles of War is constitutional. Court Martial is executive in nature not juridical. It is a constitutional function of the president, as the commander in chief, provided to him by Congress to aid him in enforcing discipline and order. Note: Dissenting opinion states that the court still has power to review Court Martial decision.
Krivenko v Registry of Deeds Facts: Alexander Krivenko bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. Issue: w/n an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land Held: NO Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows: Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources. SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
provision when they disqualified him as a candidate 4. This provision is only a privilege and has not ripen into an enforceable right 5. Same provision is not self-executing, as it is merely a guideline for legislative or executive action; hence, the State is not mandated to take positive acts in accordance with it.
Under this constitutional provision, lands are classified into three types: agricultural, mineral, timber. In several SC decisions, the court held that the phrase “public agricultural lands” are those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. (definition followed in many court decisions) The Court ruled that in determining whether a land is agricultural or not, the test is not only as to whether it is actually agricultural, but its susceptibility to cultivation for such purposes. At the time the Constitution was adopted, the term public agricultural land was construed as to include residential lands.
Gonzales Vs. COMELEC November 9, 1967
As a general rule, words that have, or have been used in, a technical sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been previously used, although the sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of the words.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
Case: Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections Parties: Pamatong (Plaintiff)- filed a Certificate of Candidacy for President COMELEC (Respondent)- denied the Certificate of Candidacy and subsequent motion for reconsideration Salient Facts: 1. Petitioner filed his certificate for candidacy; denied by respondent 2. COMELEC declared petitioner and others nuisance candidates because they cannot affors nationwide campaign and/not nominated by a political party 3. Petitioner invoked "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Art. 2 of the 1987 Const. In effect, respondent amended such
Facts: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). his was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Issue: A. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question. B. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
Held: A. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations. B. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the  Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
** Mandatory v Directory statutes: The only thing about the mandatory and directory statutes is that the R.A 4913 is a directory statute that provides instruction. Thus, not making it unconstitutional because it merely directs what to do on special elections. Mandatory statutes are statutes that prohibits or mandates a person to do something positively or negatively. On the other hand, Directory statutes are statutes that merely directs or discretionary in nature. Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.81490, Aug.3l, 1988 Facts: Dante Villanueva was employed as service foreman by Hagonoy Water District (HWD) from January 3, 1977 to May 16, 1985 when he was indefinitely suspended and thereafter dismissed on July 12, 1985 for abandonment of work and conflict of interest. Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and underpayment of wages and emergency cost of living allowance against HWD with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(former name ng Department of Labor and Employment). HWD immediately moved for outright dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Being a government entity, HWD claimed, its personnel are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law, not by the Labor Code, and protests concerning the lawfulness of dismissals from the service fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Labor Court's Ruling: The Labor Arbiter proceeded to hear and try the case and rendered a Decision in favor of Villanueva. “WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate petitioner immediately to his former position as SERVICE Foreman, without loss of seniority rights and privileges, with full backwages, including all benefits provided by law, from the date he was terminated up to his actual date of reinstatement. In addition, respondents are hereby ordered to pay the petitioner the amount of P4,927.50 representing the underpayments of wages from July 1983 to May 16, 1985.” On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. HWD's motion for reconsideration was denied. Issue: Whether local water districts are Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCC) whose employees are subject to the provisions of Civil Service Law? Supreme Court's Ruling: Water Districts are government-owned and -controlled corporations whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Laws.
PD 1479 wiped away PD 198's provision exempting the employees of water districts from the application of the Civil Service Law. While the 1987 Constitution provides that Civil Service embraces GOCCs with original charters, the applicable law at that time was that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to render the decision that he in fact rendered. The Court merely stated that for whatever that effect might be, and it will deal with that when an appropriate case comes before the Court- the Court believes that the 1987 Constitution did not operate retrospectively so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to render a decision which, under the law applicable at the time of the rendition of such decision, was clearly outside the scope of competence of the Labor Arbiter. NLRC had nothing before it which it could pass upon in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. A decision of the Labor Arbiter without jurisdiction over the case is a complete nullity, vesting no rights, imposing no liabilities.
Issues: Are the written statements, the extra judicial confessions executed by the accused without the presence of a counsel admissible as evidence against him?
Held: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim the 1983 ruling in morales v enrile that “the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel” which was later incorporated in the 1987 constitution. The reason for this is that the petitioner’s extra judicial confession which needs the presence of a counsel and also his waiver to the right to counsel was made in May 1982, a year before the ruling in the case of morales was made. The prospective application of laws according to Art 4 of the civil code shall likewise be applied to judge made laws in pursuant to art 8 of the civil code. Furthermore, only penal laws can be given retroactive effect if it benefits the accused, and not the Constitutional provisions layed down by the constitution.
Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan Explanation: Facts: Petitioner Joese D. Filoteo Jr., a police investigation of good standing and competence was charged as mastermind for hijacking a postal delivery van on May 1982 which contained pension checks for U.S. government pensionados. During the custodial investigation, petitioner executed a sworn statement waiving his right to counsel under Sec. 20 art 4 of the 1973 Constitution. In the defense of the petitioner, he alleged that he was abducted by force and was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be accompanied by counsel. He also contents that he was forced and tortured to admit in participation in the hijacing. On June 1987, petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged against him and his coaccused.
Nangyari lahat to during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. According to the latter:
“ No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation xxx shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. xxx Any confession obtained in volation of this section shall be inadmissible as evidence.”
Therefore, walang sinasabi sa 1973 constitution na bawal i-waive ung right to counsel and the presence of a counsel in case of such waiver.
UNLIKE in the 1987 constitution, wherein naincorporate na ung ruling sa case ni Morales v. Enrile which provides the right against self incrimination and right to counsel during custodial investigation pero this time sinabi na “these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel”
Yes. In 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought to Samar in 1915. He filed
Therefore, ung waiver ng petitioner ng right to counsel makes the extra judicial confessions admissible as evidence under the 1973 Constitution. Co vs. Electoral tribunal
with the Court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, Jose Ong Jr. married a filipina named Desiree Lim. For the
Facts: The House of Representatives
elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong Jr
Electoral Tribunal declared that the
registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
respondent Jose Ong Jr. is natural born
Samar and voted there during those
Filipino Citizen and a resident of Laoang,
elections. Under the 1973 Constitution,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The
those born of Filipino fathers and those born
Congressional election for the 2nd district of
of filipino mothers with an alien father were
Northern Samar was held. Among the
placed on equal foooting. They were both
candidates for the position of representative
considered as natural born citixend.
are the petitioners; Sixto Balinquit and
Besides, private respondent did more than
Antonio Co and the private respondent.
merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
Jose Ong Jr was proclaimed the duly lected
established his life here in the Philippines.
representative aof the 2nd district of Northern Samar. Herein petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong Jr, is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and no a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar. Issue: WON Jose Ong Jr is a citizen of the Philippines Ruling:
Further, the intent of the framers of Art VI, sec 1 is to make it both prospective and retroactive. A remedy is therefore provided, which is to treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine Citizenship either before or after the effectivity of the Constitution. The provision is curative in nature since it was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women smile emoticon