Statcon Case Digest

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 1 of 21 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WEDNESDAY – JUNE 19, 2013/5:30pm-7:30pm (1D) CASE DIGESTS TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE ARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 1994 Aug 25 G.R. No. 115455 235 SCRA 630 FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that the imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of “non-impairment of contracts.”

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contract clause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law. Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up, the Court holds:

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 2 of 21 (1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes - beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers; (3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and (4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. GARCIA vs MATA (G.R. No. L-33713) Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57). Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill? Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to theGAA. It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 3 of 21 in the subject ofthe act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

De Guzman v. Comelec G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000) FACTS: The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act. The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition. ISSUE: WON the law violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999 Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 4 of 21 conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conform to law and justice. The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan Facts: Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, while Alejandro A. Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer of the same municipality. In June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas, thru Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18, requiring the installation of the 2 units diesel power generator, battery starter and other related installations. In September 1992, Mejica, the Planning and Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On the basis of said report, the municipal treasurer effected payment to Philwood Construction. In August 1993, Rodrigo et. al. received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project was actually accomplished. The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46. Rodrigo et. al. requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance and to reinspect the project. They reiterated their plea in a letter to the Provincial Auditor attaching therewith a "Certificate of Acceptance and Completion" signed by Clemente Arquero, Jr., Barangay Captain of Caboloan, Eusebio Doton, President of the Cabaloan Electric Cooperative. The Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on their requests. On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against Rodrigo et. al., Larry Lu and Ramil Ang of Philwood Construction. In 1995, the Ombudsman approved the filing of an information against Rodrigo et. al. for violation of Anti-Graft Law before the Sandiganbayan. Rodrigo et. al. filed a motion for reinvestigation

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 5 of 21 before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted it. The Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending that the charges against Rodrigo et. al. be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said memorandum. Rodrigo et. al. then filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information alleging, as grounds therefor that (1) the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense, and (2) the same information charged more than one offense. Motion to quash denied. The prosecution moved to suspend Rodrigo et. al. pendente lite. Rodrigo et. al. opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over them and ordered their suspension pendente lite. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether there was violation of due process by the filing of the complaint by the Provincial Auditor Held: No. Rodrigo et. al. argues that it is the duty of the auditor, by virtue of its issuance of disallowance, to decide on their written explanation. And the auditor’s hasty filing of criminal complaint against them denied them due process. However, Sec. 82 of State Audit Code states that the suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for good cause shown. It must be noted that disallowance and suspension are two distinct concepts. A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law or regulations. Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper. A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain requirements. A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned. Rodrigo et. al. misinterpreted Section 44.6.4 of the Code. The auditor actually issued a disallowance and not a mere suspension and that the "written explanation" was "for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance. In fact, under COA Circular No. 85-156-B, the Provincial Auditor is duty-bound to file a complaint before the Ombudsman when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due process of Rodrigo et. al. to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution. They will still have the opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may still raise the same defenses contained in their motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondent's motions, or should the COA, or this Court, subsequently absolve them from liability during the pendency of the preliminary investigation, the respondents may ask the prosecuting officer to take cognizance of such decision. The prosecuting officer may then accord such decision its proper weight. Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Rodrigo et. al.

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Held: Yes. Although RA 7975 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those government officials having Salary Grade 27 or higher, municipal mayors were re-classified from Salary Grade 24 to Salary Grade 27 by virtue of RA 6758 which took effect on July 1, 1989. Rodrigo however, claim that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September 1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758. This argument is too simplistic. Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that the Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions of government officials and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 as including all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation. The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that that may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation." Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary Grades34 ["Salary Grade" is "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class. That Rodrigo received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758 which provides that a local government official's actual salary may be less than what the Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official's Grade. An official's salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his position - the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners' argument that Mayor Rodrigo's salary determines his Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law. Rodrigo’s position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners,

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 7 of 21 vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent. G.R. No. 151908 August 12, 2003 Facts: The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities. Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court. Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003. Issues:

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1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and 2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy. Held: Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasijudicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case. Constitutionality of the Circular In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. Ruling:

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 9 of 21 Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution. Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the Court of Appeals on the civil cases are reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.

Pimentel, et al. v. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal GR 141489, November 29, 2002 Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. PangaVega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 10 of 21 Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as copetitioners. Issue: [1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. [2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Held: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 11 of 21 time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time. [2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936 DECISION (En Banc) LAUREL, J.: I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. II. THE ISSUE Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition.] NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

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The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx. [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. DUMLAO vs. COMELEC Case Digest DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 95 SCRA 392 L-52245 January 22, 1980

Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation. Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid. Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work,

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 13 of 21 but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class. WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR. [224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993] Facts: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, nonstock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of thenatural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by thefundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 14 of 21 sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. (2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit. (3) Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled. (4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements ofdue process. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 15 of 21

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of theirobligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in thefundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment andNatural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resourcesas may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy: The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 16 of 21 It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB (effects of constitutionality)

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 17 of 21 **Justice Fernando ponente kaya wordy at magulo**

•

Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later.

•

15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.

• Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff. • PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. o

E0 32 was issued in 1945 – providing for debt moratorium

o

RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium

• The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified. • Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution). • PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?

SC: NO. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 18 of 21 The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997 Facts: The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.” Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy (2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law (3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution (4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power (5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition Held: As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether astatute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by thefundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Court’s forthright resolution.

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 19 of 21

It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differentialviolates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur with this contention. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitutionespouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 20 of 21 uneven field. The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant tothe Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that thelegislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA Case Digest TAÑADA VS. TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES:

STATCON CASE DIGESTS 21 of 21 Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity? RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.