Statcon Case Digest for Tuesday

September 11, 2017 | Author: Rich De Mesa Ocampo | Category: Statutory Interpretation, Crime & Justice, Crimes, Intention (Criminal Law), Decree
Share Embed Donate

Short Description

Download Statcon Case Digest for Tuesday...


City of Baguio, ET AL. vs. PIO R. MARCOS, ET AL. G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969 Sanchez, J. FACTS: On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of cadastral proceedings (a land registration/ titling proceeding) Civil Case No.1. A decision on November 13, 1922 was rendered; the land involved (Baguio Townsite) was among those declared public lands. On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral court to reopen said civil case. He claims that the land (Baguio Townsite) be registered in his name upon the grounds that 1.) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times 2.) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus were not able to file their claim to the land in question. On the other hand, Francisco G. Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Teresita J. Buchholz, as tree farm lessees of the land in question, opposed the reopening. Their contentions are as follows: 1.) The reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by R.A. 931 2.) Petition to reopen the case was not published 3.) as lessees of the land, they have a standing to appear in the reopening proceedings. ISSUE/S: Statcon issue here is whether the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by R.A. 931 (enacted June 20, 1953). Joaquin’s group contests that the title of the said act is in conflict with section 1 of the same act, thus invalidating the petition of Lutes to reopen the civil case. Title of the act reads: AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. Section 1 of the act provides: SECTION 1. …in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted… HELD: The court allowed the reopening of the case since the case was filed within the 40-year period imposed by the act. Joaquin’s group believes that the difference between the title (BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED and in section 1 (by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted), is material. If the title is to be followed, the date November 13, 1922 should be the date used in reckoning the period (which is still within the 40-year period; counted from the date of the enactment of R.A. 931 which is June 20, 1953). But if the wordings of the title are to be followed, the date April 12, 1912, which is the date the Director of lands instituted the reopening of the case, would render the petition invalid since it is already outside the 40-year period. The rule on statutory construction provides that laws should be construed liberally (see page 12 of statcon book). The spirit or the intent of the law should be looked upon and should prevail over its letter. In this case, R.A. 931 clearly gives an opportunity to any person who has any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as public land to present his claim within the time prescribed. This act is a piece of remedial legislation; its intent provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the act had no legal means of perfecting titles. Therefore, the court cannot see an inconsistency between the title and its section. The title of the act is indisputably clear, as it expresses the very substance of the law itself. The constitutional jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title, breathes the spirit of command because the constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. Therefore, by the statute, the petition of Lutes to reopen the case, decision on which was rendered on Nov. 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.

Case: People vs. Purisima, G.R. No. L-42050-66 Facts: This case actually involves 17 petitions, in which informations in each petition were filed against the respective accused with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3. The accused in each petition filed a motion to quash, and the judge with the motions filed, filing an order to quash or dismiss the said informations on the ground that that the information in each petition did not assert facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9, paragraph 3 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. In one case, the information contended that the accused carried a carving knife 6 inches long, which the accused carried outside of his residence, not being used as a tool or something for him to earn his livelihood, nor being used in an activity that has connection therewith, which the information concluded as contrary to law. The judge who handled the case, Amante Purisima, ruled that the information should have shown that the possession of the bladed weapon was for the purpose of carrying out or worsening of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. in accordance to what is being mentioned in Proclamation 1081. The information filed didn’t have the requirement, since the accused didn’t have the motivation to carry out lawlessness as was in Proclamation 1081, since the bladed weapon is concealed. Hence, it doesn’t establish the facts to constitute an offense against P.D. 9(3). The petitioner argues that P.D. 9(3) punishes mala prohibita acts, hence for public policy. Furthermore, the presidential decree here doesn’t only condemn carrying a bladed weapon in connection with the commission of the crime, but in relation to criminality as a whole which characterized the pre-martial law era. The petitioner further said that the preamble of a statute, usually introduced by the word “whereas”, is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute, and that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it provides limits to the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself because the explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. Issue: Whether the informations filed by the prosecutors in each petition are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” punishable under P.D. No. 9(3). Ruling: The Court disagreed with the contention of the petitioner. First, the Court said that the preamble or the explanatory note of a statute contains the legislative intent and spirit of the decree if there will be problems as to how we should construe a statute. The Court then stated that the results of implementing P.D. No. 9 (3) should be within its legislative intent. The Court accorded with Judge Purisima’s ruling, saying that it is only the act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with an intention or motivation connected with or in relation with desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. No. 9(3), and nothing else. Furthermore, in construing this presidential degree, there should be an inquiry concerning the consequences of a word-for-word implementation of which, and it is a presumption that in any statute, maladaptive consequences where never intended by the legislator, and this is a characteristic of P.D. No. 9(3), and the way the petitioner claimed the presidential decree is to provide hardships for the citizens. The Court also found, as did Purisima, that the elements[1] to constitute the violation of P.D. 9(3) were not mentioned in the informations, the second element being absent, hence upheld the decision of Purisima. The petition therefore was denied. Statutory Construction Issue: 1) pursuit of legislative intent; 2) preamble and explanatory note as construction aids; 3) construing visà-vis the consequences of the statute [1] The first element is the carrying outside one’s residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

People of the Philippines v. Arnulfo Astorga 1J – 6, CN 6 G.R. No. 110097, December 22, 1997 Panganiban, J. Facts: On December 29, 1991, Astorga (accused) brought Yvonne (who was 8 years old at that time) to buy a candy. Some stores were closed and the others were open because of the brown out. However, they never went to any store to buy a candy, Astorga then dragged Yvonne until they were inside Maco Elementary School. They were strolling inside and when Astorga saw that there’s nobody else there, they went out for the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum. Yvonne asked where they were going and Astorga said that they were going home. She told Astorga that their home is in Sitio Binuangan, Maco which is opposite to where they were headed, to no avail, he even placed his hands on her shoulders and dragged her. She even cried but she was forced to walk some more. While the two were walking near the Luponlupon bridge, they came across a group of young men. These men noticed that Astorga kept on looking back at them which made them suspicious of him, hence, they followed Astorga and Yvonne. Upon seeing that the young men were behind them, Astorga walked fast and even carried Yvonne but they were overtaken of a distance of half a kilometer. One of young men asked where they were going and who the girl was, Astorga said that they headed towards Binuangan and she’s Traya. This made the young men doubt Astorga because they are towards Tagum. One of the young men also knew the Traya family, so they got Yvonne and returned her to their home. Astorga wanted to talk to Yvonne’s parents but her aunt prevented him from doing so, otherwise, he’ll be stabbed by Yvonne’s father. Issue: The trial court erred in convicting the Astorga despite the fact that he had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya. Ruling: Was there kidnapping or coercion? The prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping which is the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. Art 267 of the Revised Penal Code lays down the elements of kidnapping, to wit: 1. That the offender is a private individual. 2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty. 3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal. 4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: 5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or 6. That it committed simulating public authority; or 7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or 8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

The Spanish version of the cited article in the same Code used the term “lockup” (encerrar) rather than “kidnap” (secuestrar or raptrar). Lockup is included in the broader term “detention” which refers to the placing of a person in an enclosed place which he cannot leave but also to any other deprivation of liberty not necessarily involving locking up. Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code. Based from the testimonies of the witnesses of prosecution, they indeed failed to show that there was “locking up”. There were no signs of detainment neither the forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only Astorga knew cannot be said to be an actual detainment. Hence, Astorga cannot be convicted with kidnapping but only grave coercion under Art. 286 of the same code. The elements are as follows: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. Statcon relation: The Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code.

AGCAOILI vs. SUGUITAN G.R. No. L-24806, February 13, 1926 EN BANC JOHNSON, J.: Facts: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. JULIO AGCAOILI, plaintiffappellant, was ejected from being the justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Province of Ilocos Norte, he prayed to obtain the extraord...inary legal writ of quo warranto. The trial court denied the petition and the plaintiff appealed. The respondent Alberto Suguitan answered to the petition and set up the defense of prescription. Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Fermin Mariano, judge, sustained the defense of prescription and denied the petition for the extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto. From that judgment, Julio Agcaoili appealed, and now contends in a vigorous and logical argument that his remedy has not prescribed. The questions presented by the appeal are: (a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional, when applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve "during good behavior?" And, (b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations? Issue: Whether or not the court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte erred in its decision of denying the petition of Agcaoili for the extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto. Ruling: The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a judgment should be entered ordering the restoration of the appellant to the office from which he was illegally rejected. We should follow the effect of the doctrine announced solemnly by this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543). So ordered.

Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Johns, J., concurs in the result. RESOLUTION UPON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION February 26, 1926 The clerk having before it for consideration, (a) the motion of Alberto Suguitan for a reconsideration of the decision of the court promulgated on February 13, 1926, and (b) the motion of the Secretary of Justice, praying for leave to appear in the said decision in relation with said motions, it is hereby ordered and decreed that said decision heretofore announcement, be modified, to the end that the decision of all the questions involved ins aid decision be limited tot he following alone: (a) That said act No. 3107 can have no application to the petitioner herein, following the doctrine heretofore announced in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543); and, (b) That the defense of the limitation or prescription contended for by the respondent does not apply to the petitioner under the particular facts of this cause. Modifying the decision heretofore announced, as herein indicated, and basing the decision upon the two grounds above-mentioned only the eliminating all remarks made about the action and conduct of the Acting Secretary of Justice, said motions are hereby denied. AvanceᬠC. J., Street and Ostrand, JJ., adhering tot he dissenting opinion heretofore promulgated, concur nevertheless in this resolution.

Eugenio v. drillon Facts. On May 10, 1972, Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment basis from Florencio Eugenio and his co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. The Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc. complained to the National Housing Authority for non-development of their subdivision and the NHA rendere...d a resolution on January 17, 1979 ordering Florencio Eugenio to cease and desist from making furthur sales of lots in said village or any project owned by him. Prospero Palmiano filed a complaint case against against Eugenio because, Eugenio sold a lot to the spouses, Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo. Palmiano alleged that he suspended his payments because of the failure to develop the village. On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of Eugenio to cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed Palmiano's complaint. On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered Eugenio to complete the subdivision development and to reinstatem Palmiano's purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other. The Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. Eugenio filed a Petition for review before the Supreme Court. In his Petition before this Court, Eugenio avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the nondevelopment of the E & S Delta Village justified Palmiano’s non-payment of his amortizations. Eugenio avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the transaction. Issue. Whether or not the petition of the Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. Held. The Court ruled that the Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. Stat Con relation. The relation is that the statute was enacted to protect small lot owners from abuses of subdivision and developers. The principle of social justice was adhered by giving the law retroactivity effect.

People vs. Echaves G. R. No. L-47757-61 Aquino, J. Facts: On October 25, 1977, Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen (16) persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The said decree penalized squatting and similar acts in urban communities. In separate informations, each of the accused was claimed to have occupied and cultivated the agricultural land without the consent of applicant-possessor-occupant Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. Five (5) of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II. Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order which the five informations even before the arraignment of the accused, based on the following grounds: (1) the allegation that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy" is not the same as "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", which was the one specified in the decree; and (2) under the rule of ejusdem generis, the decree did not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. The fiscal amended the information by claiming that “stealth and strategy” was in accordance with “the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner." However, the lower court denied it. Hence, the fiscal appealed to the Supreme Court based on R. A. No. 5440. Issue: Whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalized squatting and similar acts in urban communities, applied to agricultural lands Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal. Based on the preamble of Presidential Decree No. 772, the decree was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. On the other hand, the squatting complained of involved agricultural lands in rural areas. Moreover, based on the clarity of the intent of the said decree, the rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) did not apply in this case. Stat Con relation: The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

View more...


Copyright ©2017 KUPDF Inc.