Stat Con People of the Philippines v Derilo

PEOPLE

OF

[G.R. No. 117818. April 18, 1997] THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-app  plaintiff-appellee ellee, vs. ROMAN

DERILO, ISIDORO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias “Sido”, LUCAS

DOÑOS, ALEJANDRO COFUENTES, and JOHN DOE, accused. ISIDORO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias “Sido”, accused-appellant . DECISION REGALADO, J .: .: Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Ale jandro jandro Cofuentes Cofuentes and one one John John Doe were charged with the so cal led crime of murder committed by a b and before the First Branch Branch of the former Court of First Instance of Borongan, Eastern [1] Samar. Sama r. The information information filed therefor all eges Tha t on Ja nuary nuary 1, 1, 1982 1982 at a bout 6:00 o’cl ock P.M. P.M. at s i tio Palaspas, Taft, Eastern Eastern Samar, Philippines Philippines and wi thin the jurisdiction jurisdiction of this Honorable Honorable Court, the a bove -named -named accused with treachery treachery and evident prem editation, with intent to kill, with the use of firearm firearm a nd bolos, confederating confederating and mutually helping helping one a noth er did then and there shot (sic) (sic) a nd s tabbed (sic) one Perpetua Adalim th us inflicting injuries which caused caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. LAW .

[2]

Of the fi ve a ccused, ccused, only accused-appellan accused-appellantt Isidoro Q. Q. Ba ldimo was apprehe nded and brought within the trial court’s  juri s diction. At his arrai gn me nt o n March 18, 1985, an d a fte r the i nfo rmation rmation was translated translated i n the Waray  dia  dia lect with with which he is [3] wel l versed, appellant pleaded pleaded not guilty.  Trial  Trial on the merits wa s conducted conducted thereafter. However, by the time the People had formally finished pres enting enting its evidenc evidence e on August 6, 1986, 1986, app el la nt, through hi s counsel de parte , man ifested ifested to the court a quo that he wanted to wi thdraw his earlier plea of not guilty a nd substitute substitute the s am e wi th one o f guilty. guilty. Consequent Consequently, ly, a re-arraign re-arraignment ment wa s ordered by the l owe r court court and, this time, a ppellant ppellant entered a plea of gui l ty to the [4]] [4 charge of murder. murde r. A series of questions was then propounded by the trial court to test appellant’s voluntariness and comprehension of the cons equenc equences es in making making his new plea of gui lty. Sati s fie d wi th the an swers of appellant, appellant, the the trial trial court court convicted hi m o f the crime of murde r de fined fined and p unished unished under Article Article 248 of th e Revised Penal [5] Code. Code . A de tailed account of the ki lling lling was furnished by prosecuti on [6] eyewitness eyewitness Cresencio Lupido. Lupido.  According to him, Perpetua C. Ada l im went to his house at Sitio Palaspas, Palaspas, Barangay Barangay Pol Pol angi angi i n Ta ft, Eas tern tern Samar Samar in the early even in g of Ja nua ry 1, 1982 1982 to l ook f or farml ands ands willing willing and desiring desiring to work work i n her ricefie ricefields. lds. Lupi do was a n a gricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived o n one of the p roperties roperties arrival, Perpetua instructed Lupido’s own ed b y the latter. latter. Upon h er arrival, wife to get food from her house in the poblacion a s she had decided decided to spend the night at Sitio Palas pas . While Perpetua Perpetua was waiting waiting and sta ndi ng i n the yard of the hous e, five armed men arrived arrived and confronte d Perpetua . Lupi do recognized two of the men as Roman Roman Deril Derilo and appe ll an t Is id oro Baldimo, Baldimo, as thes e two frequently frequently passe d by his house at Sitio Pal aspas. He d id not know the other three men but he claimed tha t he could identity them if brought before him. Roman Derilo talked momentarily with Perpetua. Then, without any warnin warning, g, Deril o s hot Perpetua three three times with the pi stol he was carr carrying. ying. After she fell fell to the ground, ground, appe ll an t, who was standing standing at at the right side side of Derilo, Derilo, approa ched Perpetua an d stab bed bed her severa severall times with a kni fe that lo oked l ike ei ther a Bata ngas knife or a b olo known locally as “depang.”  A thi rd member member of the the group, group, with a s hort hort and s tout phy physi si que, followed s uit i n sta bbing bbing Perpetu Perpetua. a. After After the repeated repeated stabb stabbings, ings, the gan g wa lk ed aroun d the the yard for some time and left, walking walking in the di rection of the mountai mountai ns. All of them carrie carrie d long firearms.

As so on as the group group had had left the scene scene of the crime, Lup id o hurri edly went to Perpetua’s Perpetua’s house i n th e  poblacion of Taft where [7] he i nformed nformed the family of the deceased a bout the the i nci d ent.

I Appe llant does not d eny his p articipatio articipation n in the commission commission of the crime. Rather, Rather, in in his brief pitifull pitifully y consisti ng o f two p age s , he merely asks for the the modificati modification on of the death pen al ty imp os ed by [8] the l ower court to l ife i mprisonment mprisonment.. Although appellant is aware that he has made his plea of guilty after the prosecution prosecution had pres ented its evidence, evidence, thus f oreclosing the ap plication plication o f paragraph paragraph [9] 7, Art Article icle 13 of the the Revis ed Penal Code, ode,  he  h e contends contends that his untimely acknow acknowledgment ledgment of culpab il ity may stil l be treated by ana logy logy as a mitigating mitigating circumstance circumstance under p aragraph 10 of the [10] oronel . sa me artic article, le, invoking therefor the afores ai d case of C oronel  Unfort Unfortunately, unately, that that de cision reli ed upon by appel lant is i na pplicable pplicable to his case. The death penalty i n People vs. Coronel , et [11] al . was modified modified to “life imprisonm imprisonment” ent” not i n con si dera tion of paragraph paragraph 10, 10, Art Article icle 13 of the code but becau se the numbe r of votes votes then requ requir ired ed to affi rm a s entence o f dea th i mpose d by a [12] lowe r cou court rt wa s not secured by this Court Court in its automatic revi revi ew of the ju dgment. Apparently, Apparently, the required number for concurren ce was not obtained obtained because because some membe members rs of the Court trea ted the bel ated confessi confession on of the accused accused therein therein as an in di catio n on hi s part to to reform, reform, and and they they felt tha thatt he shou ld only s uffer the sa me penal ty imposed on some of hi s co-conspirators. co-conspirators. The l ate plea plea of guilty entered entered by herein herein appellan t ca nnot be considered mitigating because the plea made is not “of a similar nature nature a nd ana logous” to the plea of guilty contemplated contemplated in pa ragraph ragraph 7 of Article Article 13. 13. A plea of guilty guilty is conside red miti gati ng on th e ra tionale tionale that an a ccused ccused spontaneously spontaneously and willingly admits hi s guilt at the first opportunity as an act of repentance. repentance. An accused should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome of the proceedings by pleading not guilty on arraignment, only to later su bstitute bstitute the the same with a plea of guilty guilty after di scoveri ng that the People has has a strong strong case aga ins t him. Withal , all i s not los t for appellant. The k i lling of the vi ctim, ctim, Perpetua C. Adalim, was found by the lower court to have been qualified to murder by trea trea chery. chery. Although not a ll eged in the i nformation, the the circums tances of s uperior uperior s trength trength and cuadrilla were taken note of by the court a quo base d on the evidence presented by the pros ecution, bu t the same we re correctly regarded by sai d co urt a s ab sorbed in alevosia. Ho wever, wever, it fo und that th e generic ag gravat gravating ing circum circumstance stance of evident premeditation premeditation l ikewis e a tt ttended ended the commi ssion of the crime. Hence, with n o mitigating mitigating circumstance circumstance to to offset this aggravating circumstance, circumstance, the tria tria l court se ntenced ap pellant pellant to suffer the supreme supreme penalty penalty of death and to in demn ify and pa y damages to the hei rs of the victim. victim. It will be observed from a reading of the lower court’s [13] decision decision that its judgment judgment was was obviousl obviously y bas ed not o nl y on the evidence presen presented ted by the the prose cution cution but al so on ap pel la nt’s belated admission of guilt, together with some inconclusive pron ouncements of this Court on conspiracy. conspiracy. The fo rmer apparent apparently ly proved the circumstances of treachery, superior strength and cuadrilla, while the latter latter supposedly supposedly suppl ie d the ground for the finding of evident premeditation. premeditation.

We agree with the finding finding of the court court below that ap pel la nt participated in the treacherous killing of Perpetua C. Adalim. Appe llant’s presence presence in the locus criminis and his i dentific dentification ation were positively supplied by the prosecution’s eyewitness.   The unw a vering vering and un equivocal equivocal testimony of Lupido, corrobora ted by that of Dr. Eduardo S. Evardone who conducted [14] the  postmortem examination on the corpse of the victim and [15] submitted his corresponding autopsy report,  i ndubitably show the de liberate liberate e mployment mployment by the a ccused of a reliable and unfai unfailing ling me ans to e nsure nsure th e killing without without giving the vi vi ctim an opportuni ty to defend hersel f. However, we cannot give the same stamp of a pproval to the fin ding on premeditacion conocida declared by the tria l cou rt. The di sturbing sturbing conclusi conclusions ons of said court court thereon thereon need to be cla rifi ed to obvi a te misconceptions misconceptions that may af fect the stability stability of o ur pre s en t 1

rul es on evidence and criminal procedure. Said the l owe r court on this aspe ct: The ag gravating circumstance of evident premeditation i s l ikewise present i n the commission of the offense of murde r as th e existence of the conspiracy am ong the a ccus ed Baldimo and his co-accused having been d uly proven a lso beyond peradventure of do ubt, presupposes evi dent p remeditation (People vs. Belen, L-13895, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39) whi ch the s aid accused himself s upplied the evidence on this score by virtue o f his p lea of g ui lty, which circumstance is not the l east disproven by the e vidence on record. Thus, its a ppreciation as an a ggra vating circumstance in this case. A p l ea of gu ilty constitute(s) an ad mission of all material fa cts alleged i n the information, including the a ggra vating circumstances al leged, although the o ffense cha rged be capital. (People vs. Boyl es, L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88; Peop l e vs. Mongado, L-24877, Ju ne 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642; People vs. Tilos , L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734). A p l ea of guilty is mitigating and at the same time it cons titutes an admission of all the m aterial facts alleged i n th e i nformation, in cluding the agg ravating circums tances, and it matters not that the offense is capital. Be cause of th e a foresaid l egal e ffect of Pineda’s pl ea o f guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to re cei ve his e vidence, much less require his presence in court. (People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450; Peo ple vs.Estebia, [16] 40 SCRA 90). The trial court should not have concluded that evident prem editation a ttended the commission of the crime o f mu rder on the ba ses of i ts fin dings reg arding the admission of guilt by appellant and the existence of cons piracy with hi s co-a ccuse d. As ea rlie r s tated , appellant entered his plea of guilty after the prosecution had pres ented its e vidence. Thereafter, no further evidence whatsoever was adduced by it to prove the supposed evident premeditation. The records and the transcripts of s tenographic notes a re barren of a ny proof tending to show a ny pri or refl ectio n on, followed a fter some time by persi stence in, the crimina l resolution of the five accused.

the pu rpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to b e im pos ed mus t be proved with equal certainty an d cle arne ss as that whi ch establishes the commiss ion of the a ct charged as the crimina l [21] offense.  It is not only the central fact of a kil l ing that must be sh own beyond reasonable doubt; every qual ifyin g or a ggravati ng circumstance alleged to have been pres ent an d to ha ve a ttende d [22] s uch k illing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof.

II The foregoing doctrines consequently point to the need of reconciling them with the old rule that a pl ea of gui lty ad mits not onl y the crime but also its attendant circumstances which is reli ed upon and invoked by the lower court in this case to justify its conclusion of evident premeditation to a ggravate the li abi li ty of appellant. Over the yea rs and through numerous cas es , this Court has a dop ted an exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there i s no ne ed to p rove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in a n information or complaint when the accus ed pl ea ds gui lty to the charge. Our rulings regardi ng this principl e we re express ed more or les s in this wis e: Ha ving pleaded guilty to the i nformation, these a ggra vating circumstances were d eemed fully es tablished, for the plea of g uilty to the i nformation covers both the crime as well as its attendant circums tances q ualifying and/or aggravating th e [23] crime. We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but more specifically with the consequences [24] the reo f. Th us, i n People vs. Rapirap,  i t was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has the following effects: A p l ea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the compl aint or information, but amounts to an admission of gu i lt a nd of th e material facts a lleged i n the complaint or i nfo rmation a nd i n this sense takes the place of the tria l itself. Such plea removes the necessity of pres enting further evidence and for all intents and purp oses the case is deemed tri ed on its merits and s ubm itted for decision. It l eaves the court with no a l ternative but to i mpose the penalty prescribed by law.

It i s e lementary law that to establish evident preme di tati on, thes e must be proof of (1) the time when the offender dete rmine d to commi t the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culpri t has clung to his determination, and (3) a s ufficie nt la pse of time betwe en the determination and execution to a ll ow h im to refl ect upon the consequences of his act and to a ll ow hi s conscien ce to overcome the resolution of h is will had he desired to hearken to its [17] warnings .

Then, i n People vs. Lambino, we prevented the a ccuse d in criminal actions from contradicting the outcome of hi s ad mi ss io n, wi th ou r holding that by the plea of guilty, the accused admits all the facts alleged in the information and, by that pl ea , h e is preclu ded from sho wing that he ha s not committed them.

The essence of premedi tation i s that the execution of the criminal a ct was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the res olution to carry out the criminal i ntent du ring a sp ace of tim e [18] s ufficient to arrive at a ca lm judgment. Whe n it is n ot shown as to how a nd when the p lan to kill was hatched o r what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be cons idered. Evid ent premeditation must be based on exte rna l a cts an d must be evident, not merely suspected, i ndi cati ng d el ib erate pla nning. Otherwise stated, there must be a de monstration by [19] outwa rd acts of a criminal intent that is notorious a nd man ifes t.

A p l ea of guilty is an admission of al l the material facts a l leged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty whe n fo rmally entered in arraignment is s ufficient to s us tain a conviction for any offense charged in the i nfo rmation, without the necessity of req uiring a dditional e vidence, since by so pleading, the defendant hi mself has supplied the necessary proof. It matters not eve n i f the offense is capital for the a dmission (plea of gui lty) covers both the crime as well as i ts attendant circumstances.

As there is no proof, direct or circumstanti al , offe red by the pros ecution to show when appellant and his co-accused med i tate d and reflected upon their decision to kill the victim and the in tervening time that elapsed before this plan was carried out, the circums tance of evident premeditatio n cannot be presumed agains t appellant. As early as 1905, we laid down the rule that the circumstances specifying an offens e o r aggravating the pe nal ty thereof must be proved a s conclusively as the act itself, mere su ppositions or presumptions being insufficie nt to es tabl is h thei r prese nce. No matter how truthful these supp osi tions o r presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the [20] effect of aggravating the liability of the accus ed.

Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr. cited by some of the cases reli ed upon by the lower court, declared that -

It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and a ggra vating circumstance before being taken into considerati on for

[25]

[26]

People vs. Yamson, et al . thereafter expande d the application of the doctrine to both capital and non-capi tal case s:

[27]

Whi le a n unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, i t at the s a me time constitutes an ad mission of all material facts a l leged in th e information, including the aggravating circums tance therein recited. x x x The p ros ecution does not n ee d to prove the three aggravating circumstances (a l l alleged in th e second amended information) since the a ccused, by his pl ea of guilty, has supplied the requisite p roof. With the foregoing prese ntation, the tria l court mus t ha ve bel ieved that it had acted correctly i n pres umi ng the exi ste nce of evid ent premeditation based on appellant’s pl ea of gui lty wi thout 2

any proof being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the developmental growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the advent of the revis ed Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, sp ecifically mandating the course that trial courts shou ld fol lo w in capi tal cases where the accused pleads guilty, was in troduced in to our remedia l l aw with this provis ion: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital off ense; reception of evidence - Wh en the accused pleads guilty to a capital offe nse, the co urt shall con duct a searching inquiry i nto the volu ntariness and full comprehension of the cons equences of h is plea and require the prosecution to prove hi s guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The [28] a ccus ed may a lso present evidence in his behalf. [29]

We expounded on this in People vs. Cama y explanation:

with this

Und er th e new formulation, three (3) thi ngs a re enjoined of the trial cou rt after a plea of guilty to a ca pital offense ha s b een entered by the accused: 1. The court must cond uct a searching i nquiry into the volu ntariness and ful l comp rehension of th e consequences of his plea; 2. The co urt must require the prosecution to present evi dence to prove the guilt of the accused and the preci se degree of his culpability; a nd 3. The co urt must a s k the accused if he d esires to present evidence in his beh alf and allow him to do so if he desires. The am ended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the o l d rule and pertinent jurisprudence. We had s eve ral occasions to i ssue the caveat that even if th e trial court i s s atisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with ful l kn owledge of its meaning a nd consequences, the Court mus t s till require the i ntroduction of e vidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of cul pability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be fol lowed not only to s atisfy the trial judge but also to a i d the Court in d etermining whether or not th e accused rea lly an d truly comprehended the meaning, full s i gnificance and consequences of his plea. The p resentation of e vidence is required in order to pre clu de a ny room for reasonable do ubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Sup reme Cou rt on review, as to the p ossibility that there mi ght have bee n some misunderstanding on the part of the accus ed as to the na ture of the charge to which h e pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attenda nt to the commiss ion of the crime whi ch  jus ti fy or req ui re the exerci s e of a gre a ter or l es s er de gre e of [30] severity in the i mposition of the prescribed penal ty. To emphasize its importance this Court held in [31] People vs. Dayot  tha t the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abus e of dis cretion. This Court has come a long way in adopting a manda tory rule with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cas es where the a ccused pleads guilty to the crimi nal charge. From granting trial [32] courts in the earlier Rules of Court  s ufficient discretion i n requi ring evidence whenever guilt is admitted by the ac cuse d, the Court ha s n ow made it ma ndatory on th e part of the lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the a ccus ed fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his p lea of gui lty.

III There is another reason why we have to reject the afo res ai d conclusion reached by the lower court in this cas e. Unde r se ttled  juri s prudence, th e con s equ en ces of a ggra vati ng ci rcums ta nce s al leged in the information must be explained to the accus ed when he ple ads guilty to a crime i mputed agai ns t him. A rea ding of the questions directed at a ppellant during his re arrai gnment reveals a shortcoming on the part of the trial court to [33] fully explai n to appell ant the consequences of hi s plea.

All right, please come forward, Mr. Baldimo. Your la wyer, Atty. Cami lo Libana n ma nife sted to the court that you in timated to him your desi re to wi thdraw your plea o f not guilty when arraigned in thi s case and to substitute the same with a plea o f not guilty after the prosecution has already pres ented evi dence and in fact cl osed i ts evidence this morning. What have you to sa y about the mani fes tation of your lawyer, Atty. Liba nan? ACCUSED: Yes, your honor. COURT: All right, re-arrai gn the a ccuse d. Did you und erstand the information charging you with th e crime of murder along with some other pers ons ? A Yes , your hono r. Q All right, what wil l your ple a be? ACCUSED: Guilty. COURT: When you withdraw your plea of not guil ty to the information when arraigne d the first time a nd substitute the s ame with a plea of guilty this morni ng, did you do so of your free and vol unta ry will? A Yes, si r. Q Were you not forced, threate ne d, coe rced or in timidated to change your plea of not gui lty a nd substitute the s ame with a ple a of guilty? A I was not. Q Were you not under infl uence by any person or persons who exercis es le gal authority over you whi ch may have been the considerati on why you are now pleading guilty to the offe ns e cha rged? A None. Q Do you rea lize the consequences of a pl ea , of your plea of guilty? A Yes , your hono r. Q You are therefore aware that by your plea of gu il ty you wil l be penalized by the court and ordered to in demnify your victim as well as other a ccess ory penal ties provided for by la w? A Yes , your hono r. Q And thi s notwithstanding your realization of wha t a pl ea o f guilty entail, will you still insist on your plea of gui lty to the information charging you with the crime of murder committed by a band ? A Yes , your hono r. Q Wa s it your realization that you actually commi tted the crime charged and the prodding of your cons cience that you n ow enter the plea of gui lty? A Yes , your hono r. Q Are you now repentant? A I am not repentant. Q You are not repentant for what you have done? A Yes, si r, I am repentant. Q In other words, you regret ha ving committed the acts, having committed the crime charged? A Yes , your hono r. COURT: All right, promulga tion i s s et on August 18. All right, September 1. A pl ea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was even made to expla in to the a ccuse d that a pl ea of guil ty to an information for a capital offense, attended by an aggravating circumstance, may result in the imposition of the death [34]  penalty . We can not declare with reasonable certainty that w he n a ppellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information he knew that he was at the s ame time a dmitting the pres ence a nd s eri ous e ffects of the a ggravating ci rcumstances al leged therein. We a re more inclined to believe, as a matter of judicial experience, tha t when he admitted his role in the kil li ng of the d eceas ed, he only i nte nded to limit such admission to the crime charged and not to the aggravating circumstances.

COURT: 3

The trial ju dge did not him self try to i nform or a dvise appellant rega rding the consequences of pleading guilty to ha ving ki ll ed the victim with both circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. More particularly, the trial judge di d n ot hi ms el f try to convey to a ppellant, in ordinary lan guage that appel la nt wo ul d be a s sumed to un derstand, the meaning of evident premeditation a nd trea chery as ci rcumstances that would qualify the k illing to mu rder an d to a ggravate the penalty as to call for the maximum pe na lty o f [35] death. We quo te from the old but instructive and stil l au thorita tive [36] case of U.S. vs. Jama d. If th e a ccused d oes not cl early and fully understand the na ture o f the off ense charged, if he is not advised as to the meanin g a nd ef fect of the technical language so ofte n used i n formal complaints a nd i nformations in qua lifying the acts constituting the offense, or i f he d oes not cl early understand the consequences by way of a he a vy a nd even a capital penalty flowing from his a dmissi on of hi s guilt o f the crime in the precise techn ical manner and form i n which it i s charged , his pl ea o f guilty s hould not be held to be sufficient to s us tain a convi ction. Our expe rience has taught us that it not infrequently ha pp ens that, up on arraignment, accused p ersons p lead “gui lty” to the commission of th e gravest offenses, qua lified by marked aggravating circumstances, when in truth a nd in fact they intend merely to admit that they commi tted the act or acts charged in the co mplaint, and ha ve no thought of a dmitting the technical charges of a ggra vating circumstances. It n ot infrequently happens tha t after a fo rmal plea of “guilty” it develops under the prob e o f the trial judge, or in the course of the s tatement of the a ccused made a t the time of the entry of h i s plea, or u pon the witness stand, that the accused, whi le a dmitting the commission of the acts charged in the i nformation, believes or pretends to b elieve that the s e acts were committed under such circumstances as to e xemp t him in whole or in part from criminal l i ability. Clearly, a formal plea of guilty entered under s uch ci rcumstances is not sufficient to s ustain a convi ction of the a ggravated crime charged in the information. [37]

In People vs. Alamada, this Court found the tria l cou rt to have failed in observing that quantum of care which it had pres cribed for the valid admission of a p lea of guilty by a n accus ed, es pecially i n capital ca ses, when i t did not e xplain to the accus ed the nature of the charges agai nst him, particularly the a ll egations rega rding conspiracy, treachery, evident pre meditation and abuse of su perior strength, which are terms s o techni cal that the la yman, es pecially an unschooled one li ke the a ccuse d in the sa id ca se , cannot possi bly understand without proper el ucidation. It i s neither just nor reasonable to assume that an uneducated person understands the allegation that “the aggravating circums tances of treachery a nd premeditation were pres en t i n th e commission of the crime,” inasmuch as “treachery” and “preme ditation” are highly technical terms the juridical mea ni ng of whi ch is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates al one but [38] even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers. If many members of the Bar are una ble to call to mind the technical requisites of “treachery” and “evident premedi tati on” as qualifying and aggravating circumstances, there is no reason for supposing that the accused, who is a farmer by occupation, understood such elements and requis ites after a few minutes of [39] whispered advice from a counsel de oficio in open cou rt. Another reason why we cannot agree wi th the lo wer cou rt’s pos ture on this issue is the consistent holding in several cases that a pl ea of guilty to an information alleging aggravating circumsta nces wil l not be considered an admissi on of s uch circumstances if the evidence presented by the prose cution fa il s to es tabl is h them. [40]

Even the ca se of People vs. Boyles  cited by the trial court dis allowed the apprecia tion of the a ggravating circumstance of ni ghttime when the Supreme Court found o ut tha t othe r than the

time of the commission of the crime, no thing el se sugge sted the circumstance of nocturnidad  as understood in crimin al la w, to wit: Not on e o f the prosecution evidence, oral or docu mentary, makes the s lightest indication that the prote ction of the n ight’s darkness was deliberately a vailed of by the appellants. In view of this deficiency i n the cas e for the Government, we are constrained to di s allow the sai d circumstance even as, technically, i t ma y have been accepted by the m when they pl eaded gui lty on arraignment. On the s ame ratiocination, although herein appellant pleade d guilty to the charge as alleged in the information, evident premeditation may not be taken a gai nst him si nce the evidence pres ented by the People does n ot adequately disclose the existence [41] of the same. Where the aggravating circumstances li s ted in the i nfo rmation were not supported by the evidence adduced, a plea of guilty to a capital offense canno t constitute an admi ss ion of the [42] aggravating circumstances se t forth in the in formation. [43]

The a bove rulings drew from People vs. Corachea which, in [44] turn, rei terated the dictum in Pe ople vs. Galapia  that even under the old rule on judicial confessi on of guil t, to be apprecia ted the aggravating circumstances must further be dul y proved. The rul e is that a judicial confession o f guilt admits a ll the ma terial facts alleged in the i nformation including the a ggravating circumstances listed therein. But, where s uch ci rcumstances are disproven by the evidence, i t s hould be disallowed in the judgment. Thus, in People vs. Gungab (64 Phil. 779), the Court ruled “that whe n a n accused, who lacks i nstruction, pleads gui lty to the crime of parricide described in the information as ha vin g been committed with the aggravating circums tances o f treachery a nd e vident premeditation a nd h is testimony gi ven under oath before the trial court, upo n his petition fails to show the existence of s uch a ggravating circumstances, his plea o f guilty shall be un derstood as b eing limited to th e admission of ha vin g committed the crime of parricide, not having don e so with treachery and evident premeditation.” In vi ew o f the present requirement of Section 3, Rul e 116 for the p resentation of evidence but with due explanation to appel l an t of the significance of the aggravating circumstances al le ged in an information, and considering the insufficiency of the People’s evidence showing evident premeditation in this case, we cannot cons ider appellant’s plea of guilty as an admission of the exis tence of that aggravating circumstance. As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of procedure, the pl ea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in pl ace of the evid ence that must be presented and is called fo r by sa id Sectio n 3 of R ul e 116. Tria l courts shoul d no longe r ass ume that a ple a of gui lty i ncl udes an admission of the attending ci rcumstances alleged i n the information as they are now required to demand that the prosecution should prove the exact li abi li ty of the a ccuse d. The requirements of Section 3 would become i dle and fruitles s i f we were to allow conclus ions of crimina l li abil ity and a ggravating circumstances on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule. Whi le i t may be argued that appellant entered an improvident ple a of guil ty when re-a rrai gned, we fi nd no n eed , however, to remand the case to the lower court for further reception of evid ence. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictio ns ba se d on pl eas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvid ence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory  jud gme nt. Ho we ver, wh ere the tri a l cou rt rece i ves evid ence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in ad mitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of gu il ty is mad e (i mprovidently or not) l oses l egal significance, for the simple reas on tha t the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission [45] by the accused of the offense charge d. Thus , even without considering the plea of guilty of appellan t, he m ay s till be convicted i f there is adequate evidence o n reco rd o n [46] which to predicate his conviction. As already observed, the prosecution had already rested when appellant de cide d to chang e hi s plea. The prosecution then had all the opportunity to verif y the 4

ma terial allegations i n the information. Despite such opportunity, i t only successfully established treachery but failed to present any evidence tending to prove evident premeditation.

Janu ary 1, 1932. Sai d provision provided that an y pers on gui lty of murder shall be punishe d by reclusion tem poral  in i ts maximum period to death.

We a l so doubt the applicability to the case at bar of People vs. [47] Belen, cited by the l ower court, to the e ffect that conspiracy presupposes evident premeditation. A reading of People vs. [48] Timbang, et al. upon which Belen is based, does not state, e ithe r cate gorically or impliedly, that evident premeditation exi s ts whe re conspi racy is proven.

The n on February 2, 1987, a ne w Constitution came into force after its ratification on that date by the people. The 1987 Cons titution, regarded by s ome as progressive since it contains ne w provi sions not covered by our earlier two Constitutions, pros cribe d i n Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights) thereof the impositi on of the death penal ty, as foll ows:

There is no doubt that conspiracy was s hown in the i ns tant cas e from the concerted actions of the accus ed. The e xis tence of this mode in the commission of a fel ony can b e i nferred from the s udd en shooting of the victim by De rilo and the successive stabbi ng of her person by appel la nt and his unidentifie d companion.

Se c. 19. (1) Excess ive fines shall not be i mposed, nor cruel , degrading or i nhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compell ing reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion  perpetua. (Italics supplied).

Howe ver, to claim that evident premeditation can be infe rred from con s piracy violates the fu ndamental principle that a ggravating circumstances should also be proved beyond reasona bl e doub t a s the crime alleged to have been committed. While the court be lo w di d not equate conspiracy with eviden t premed ita tion , the l atter cann ot be deduced from the former as the elements of cons pi racy and evident premeditation are completely different. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agre ement, the agreement concerned the commissio n of a fel ony, an d the execution of the felony is decided u pon. Howe ver, unli ke evident premeditation, where a sufficient period of time must el apse to afford full opportunity for meditation a nd refle ction an d for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences on his in tended deed, conspiracy arise s on the very in sta nt the pl otters agre e, expressly or impliedly, to commi t the fel ony a nd forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this a ss ent is e stabli shed, each and eve ryone of the conspirators is made criminally liable for th e crime [49] committed by an yone of them. To es tablish conspiracy, i t is no t essential that th ere be proo f as to the previous agreement and decision to commi t the crime, it bei ng sufficient that the male factors sha ll have acted i n concert [50] purs uant to the same objective. To en d any doubt on this matter, [51] we quote our ruli ng in People vs. Ri za l : The re is n o proof, aside from conspiracy, that the a ccus ed and his companions had sufficient time to plan the ki lling, reflect on i t and after reflection decided to commit the evil deed. Under ordinary circumstances where conspiracy is present wi th proof of attendant deliberation and sele ction of the method, times and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident  premeditation is taken for granted. But when conspiracy is merel y inferred from the acts of the accused and his companions in the perpetration of the crime and there is no showing that characterizes e vident premeditation, such aggravating circumstance cannot be taken for granted but must be proved like any other of its kind. (Emphasis supplied). It can thus be said that evide nt premedi tation ca n onl y be deduced from conspiracy if in the course of directly proving cons piracy, the elements of evident premeditati on were li kewi se presented and proven. But then, in such a case, evident premeditation would not merely be presumed but actually es tablished. Hence, it follows that there is real ly a n eed for the pres entation o f evidence indicating the exi ste nce of premeditacion conocida, which was not done in this cas e.

IV We co ul d stop at th is juncture, with the vital p oints against the de a th penalty having b een made, but there are certain facets of this case which necessitate elucidation. Indeed, the peculiar a nte cedents and chronological milieu o f the i nstant case con front us now wi th what appear to be the problematical ap pl ica tion of two penal la ws. At the tim e of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the conviction of the accused on October 12, 1986, the s ubs tantive law i n force dealing with the crim e of murder was Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which took effect way back on

x x x Res ponding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes bei ng committed in the country, Congress pas s ed a la w impos ing the de a th penalty on ce rtain h einous offenses a nd further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special pe nal la ws. Said law was officially enacted as Repu bl ic Act No. 7659 a nd took e ffect on December 31, 1993. Thi s is now the governing pen a l la w at the time of this review of the case at bar. Although the elements and circumstances which qua li fy a ki l ling to murder were maintained, Re public Act No. 7659 a me nde d Articl e 248 of the Code by i mposing a he avie r pena lty fo r murder tha n that originally prescribed, the new penalty provi ded i n Se ctio n 6 of sa id amendatory statute be ing reclusion perpetua to death. Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be a pplied to the crime o f murde r committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal la ws. Further, the presumption is that laws ope rate pros pecti vely, unles s the contrary clearly appears or is clea rly, plainl y and [52] une quivocally expressed o r necessarily implie d.  I n every case of dou bt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive o pe rati on [53] of laws. Nor can the prospective application of Rep ubl ic Act No. 7659 be dou bted just because of th e constitutional provision leaving to Congress the matter of the death pe nal ty in cas es of he inous crimes, since Congress did not otherwise provide. The i nterpellations in the Constitutional Commission tasked to draw up the present Constitution is enlightening in our determination of the non-retroactivity of said law, thus: MR. BENGZON. And then, s upposing Congress passes a la w imposi ng the death pena lty on those very same crimes committed by those that were convicted of the death penalty which pena lty h as bee n commuted to reclusion perpetua, wi ll they go back? MR. MONSOD.

No.

MR. BENGZON.

Not an ymore?

MR. MONSOD. Any new law passe d by the Nationa l [54] Assembly would be prospective i n character. One o f the universally accepted characteristics of a pena l l aw i s prospectivity. This general principle of criminal law is embodied in Articl e 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “no f el ony s ha ll be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to i ts commission,” and was applied by the Supreme Court in two e arl y cas es to mean that no act or omission shall be hel d to be a crime, nor i ts author punished, except by virtue of a law in force a t the time [55] the act was committed . Be s ides, to give retroactive effect to th e pertinent provision of Republ ic Act No. 7659 would be viol ative of the cons titutional [56] prohibition against ex post facto laws. Among others, an ex post  facto l aw has been defined as one which changes the puni sh men t a nd i nflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the cri me [57] when it was committed.

5

It i s s ettled that a penal law may have retroa ctive effe ct onl y [58] when i t is favorable to the accus ed.  Obviously, with a penalty more onerous than that provided by the Re vis ed Penal Code for murde r, the p ertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 can not fall within the exception to the general rule on prospecti vity of penal la ws. Las tly, observance of juridical uniformity i n the deci si ons of this Court requires that we refrain from app lyi ng Rep ubl ic Act No. 7659 to the cas e at bar. The present case is not the firs t an d on ly in stance where the Court has had to revie w a se ntence for dea th a fter thi s a mendatory law came into force. To give retroactive effect to sa id law in this case will disturb the nume rous deci si ons of the Court imposing reclusion perpetua on the accused who committed capital offenses prior  to the e ffectivity of the 1987 Constitution an d were convicted after  i ts effectivi ty but before that of Republ ic Act No. 7659, even though the penal ty impos abl e woul d ha ve been death. Ha vin g eliminated the p ossibility of a pplying the death penalty unde r Republic Act No. 7659 in the present case, we now exami ne the ap plicability of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its a fore said a mendment. On May 20, 1987, thi s Court issue d Ci rcul ar No. 9 rega rding the impos itio n of the dea th penal ty, under the circumstances therein defined. In the said circular, al l courts were enjoin ed to impose only the pena lty o f reclusion perpetua, even i n thos e cases wherein our penal laws provide for th e imposition of the dea th penalty, until Congress sha ll have provide d by l aw for the definition of the heinous crimes contemplated in the 1987 Constitution. Prio r thereto, in an en banc res oluti on da ted April 30, 1987 issued in Administrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0, the Court took cogni zance of the Cabinet Meeting he ld on April 8, 1987 wherei n, among others, the President agreed to issue a statement officially commuting to l ife i mpris onment the de ath sentence the retofore imposed on so me convicts, in accordance with the l etter a nd s pirit of the 1987 Cons titution. However, a verification with the Executive Department, through the Department of Ju sti ce, reveal s that the projected presidential commutati on n ever ma teria li zed. It wi l l further be noted that s aid circular referred only to those cases then “under automatic review by the Court,” and the aforestated resol ution quoted therein li kewise contemplated “pe ndi ng cases before the Court,” that i s, as of May 20, 1987.  Those is suances could not therefore apply to the p res ent ca se si nce, a s he reinafter explained, the case at bar was brought on ap peal to thi s Court only on July 20, 1994. Be that as it may, however, whether or not evident premeditation was present in this case a nd regardless of the inapplicability thereto of the aforementioned circular and res olution, the Court is reasonably convinced that it canno t va li dl y impose the capital punis hment on appe ll ant. The words of the Cons titution a re clear: Any death penalty already i mposed sha l l be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Appellant, it will be recalled, was se ntenced in 1986 to s uffer the de ath pe nal ty as then provide d under the Revised Penal Code. With the ratification of the Cons titution i n 1987, that se ntence shoul d have bee n reduced to reclusion perpetua under s uch constitutional fiat. The fact that this Court wil l ha ve the oppo rtunity to review ap pellant’s case only now does not detract from the force o f s uch di rective of the Constitution. Neither will the fact that Circular No. 9 wa s n ot yet i ssued when appellant was tried and convicted preve nt the a pplication to him of that Cons titutional provision. It i s not th e acti on of the courts whi ch, under the circumsta nces , convert hi s se ntence of death to reclusion perpetua. Such reduction is directed an d e ffected by the explicit words of the fundamental charter; the courts m erely apply this express and self-executing provision of the Constitution when they impose the penalty of reclusion  perpetua ra the r than the imposable penalty of death in appropria te cases. Again, the following proceedings in the Constitutional Commissi on yield l ight on the foregoing proposition: The prop onent’s amendment is a MR. DE CASTRO. comma (,) after “inflicted” on line 29 to be fol l owed by the clause “UNLESS FOR C OMPELLING

REASONS INVOLVING HEINOUS CRIMES THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROVIDES FOR THE DEATH PENALTY.” In this propose d amendme nt, there wil l still be a need for the Natio nal Asse mbly to pa ss a law providing for the death penalty. Is this correct? MR. MONSOD.

Yes .

MR. DE CASTRO. Wha t ha ppens to those awaiting execution, having al ready the dea th pen al ty on thei r heads, but there is no law yet passe d by the National Asse mbly? MR. MONSOD. Then the next se ntence wil l appl y: “Death penalty alrea dy imposed shall be [59] commuted to reclusion perpetua.” It can b e readily seen that the reduction of the pena lty i s not a nd w as not ma de dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period before the aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the courts. It cannot be infe rred, ei ther from the wordin gs of the subject provision or from the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence should be brought to the Sup reme Cou rt for review within a ce rtain time frame in order that it can be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The fu ndamental principle of constitutional construction i s to gi ve eff ect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the pe opl e adopting it. The intention to which force is to b e given is that whi ch is embodied and expressed in the constitution al provis io ns [60] themselves . Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam  pereat . A l a w should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than des troying it. The fact that no proclamation or grant o f commuta tion was officially issued by the President will not prevent the i mplementation a nd operation of Section 19 to a ppellant. To a rgue othe rwise would be subordinating the command of th e Constitution to the wi ll of the President. The framers of the Consti tution never intended that the non-imposition or non-execution of the death s en tence un der those constitutional provisions would b e dependent on the act or omis si on of the Chie f Executive. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission will justify this conclusion: MR. REGALADO. Ma y I a sk Commi ssioner Monsod about this second s entence. “Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion  perpetua.”  When we sa y commuted to reclusion perpetua, I think we refer to the power of the Pres ide nt to effe ct commutations because only the Pres id ent can commu te sentences a lready final a nd imposed by the courts. Is tha t correct? MR. MONSOD. Mada m Pres id ent, I am not the proponent of that sen tence. Perhaps the Committee should answer that. MR. REGALADO. That was the answer of the Gentlem a n in response to the inquiry of Commissioner Bengzon. MR. MONSOD. My an swe r is refl ective of wha t the Committee had answered before. And si nce that has not been changed, I suppose the answer woul d be the same. But if the Commi ttee wo ul d li ke to answer it in more detail, perhaps i t s houl d be the one to answer that. FR. BERNAS. The in tention of the provis io n he re is , upon ratification of this Constitution, the death pe nalty a lready i mposed is a utomatically - wi thout nee d for any action b y the President - commuted. MR. REGALADO. Yes, because the wording here is: “Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua.” The power of commutation i s a presi dential prerogative. Or we can say “ARE HEREBY FR. BERNAS. commuted,” if that is clearer.   But that is the intention. 6

MR. REGALADO. Does the Commission mean “are hereby reduced”? FR. BERNAS. Commuted to the dea th pena lty. MR. REGALADO. It “shall be REDUCED to reclusion  perpetua”? FR. BERNAS. To reclusion perpetua, yes . MR. REGALADO. Maybe the Commis si oner s houl d el iminate the word “commute” becaus e we are invading the presi dential prerogative. THE PRESIDENT. Is the Gentleman proposi ng an [61] amendment to the amendment? Although Commissioner Regalado was not able to formally propose an amendment because of an i nterveni ng ques tion by another commis si oner, his observation was correspondingly accepted by the Commis si on as s hown by the use of the word “reduced” in the present provision of the Cons tituti on, i ns tea d of “commute ” as originally proposed. The fact is that he did not ha ve to propose an a mendment as Commis si oner Bernas , who was representing the committee concerned, ha d a lrea dy taken note thereof and a cceded the reto. Thus, in his work on the 1987 Consti tution, Commis si oner Bernas had this to say on the matter: “x x x. But s i nce “commutation” is technically a n exe cutive p rerogative, the Commission, i n order to make the eff ect automatic without having to wait for pre s idential action, deliberately avoided the use of the word “comm uted” and, on the suggestion of Commi ssioner Regalado, used i nstead “reduced”.  Thus the provi sion reads: “Any death pen alty a lready i mposed sh all be reduced to reclusion perpetua.”  The phrase “sh al l be reduced” is not a d escription of s ome future act but a command that is immediately ef fective. (Nevertheless, Presi dent Aquino issued an Executi ve Order, perhaps ad cautelam, com muting death [62] s en tences already i mposed.)

From th e fore going, i t is ap parent that no p residential action is ne cessary i n order that any accused sentenced to the death pena l ty und er the same circumstances as herein a ppellant may ava i l of th e benefit of Section 19. The accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a reduction of his sentence. As the Consti tution i s not primaril y a l a wyer’s document, its language should be understood in the s en s e that it may have in common use. I ts words shoul d be given thei r ordinary meaning except where technical terms are [63] employed. While “to commute” necessitates presidential initiative, “to reduce” does not.

5. Trans mission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. - In a l l cases where the death penalty i s imposed by the tria l court, the records shall be forwarded to the Sup reme Cou rt for automatic review and judgment, wi thin twenty (20) da ys but not earlier than fifteen (15) da ys a fter promulgation o f the judgment or notice of de nial o f any motio n for new trial or recon sideration. The transcript shall also be fo rwarded wi thin ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the s ten ographic reporter. The Offi ce of the Court Administrator is a ccordingly dire cted to in vestigate this matter and submit the corres pond in g e valu ati on, report and recommendation to thi s Court within ni nety (90) days from notice hereof. All clerks of court are hereby ordered to scrupulous ly compl y wi th their duty and responsibility of seasonably tran smitting to thi s Court the complete records of cases where the de ath pen al ty was imposed, especial ly now that the trial courts ha ve impos ed the death penal ty in many cases involving hei nous crimes . With respect to the case at ba r, in jus tice to appe ll ant thi s appellate proceedi ng shal l be treated as an a utomatic review be cause there is no showing in the records that he was advised tha t the d eath penalty i mposed upon him has been reduce d to reclusion  perpetua pursua nt to the pe rtine nt provis ions of the 1987 Cons titution; and that his cas e is no longe r sub ject to automati c revie w, as provided and required in Circular No. 9 of this Court, hence a notice of appeal s hould have been filed.

WHEREFORE,  for failure of the prosecution to prove the a ggra vating circumstance of e vident premeditation and by virtue of the com mand of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment o f th e courta quo i s a ccordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo i s h ereby s entenced to suffer the penalty o f reclusion perpetua and to in demnify the heirs of the victim in the amo unt of P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Therefore, with or without an official executi ve i ss ua nce on commutation, the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Re vised Penal Code a nd i mposed on appellant by the lower court i n 1986 can not be carried out even th ough the case was brought to the Sup reme Court only i n 1994 a fter Re publi c Act No. 7659 had tak en effect. Nor can this l aw be deeme d to have revived the dea th penalty in the case of ap pel la nt, for reas ons s tated earli er. By February 2, 1987, that penal ty had a lrea dy been a utomatical ly reduced to reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the Pres id ent or of the courts, but by the mandate of the funda mental la w of the land. Before we end, we note the e xtremely protracted de la y i n bringing appellant’s conviction to the attention of this Court. Alth ough the judgment of the lower court was promul ga ted on October 12, 1986, the records of this case were ele vated to this [64] Court onl y on Ju ly 20, 1994.  Even by this da te, the records were not yet complete as some of the transcripts of s tenogra phi c no tes tak en during the trial were not in cluded in the records forwarded to this Court. We ca n on ly blame the court of origin for this improbable an d unexplained dela y of almost ei ght years. It is the express and s pe cific duty of the clerk th ereof to tra nsmit to th is Court, within the peri ods allowed therefor, the complete records of the cas e wh ere the death penalty is imposed for au tomati c review. Paragrap h 5, Section L (Appeal ), Chapter VI (Duties in Crimina l Cas es ) of the Manual for Cle rks of Court, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 10, Rule 122 of the Rul es of Court, provides : 7